Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

Advisory Board

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman
San Diego State University

Nick Cullather
Indiana University

Chester Pach
Ohio University

William O. Walker III
Florida International University

ENCYCLOPEDIA *of* AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Second Edition

VOLUME 1

Chronology
A – D

Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, and Fredrik Logevall, Editors in Chief

Louise B. Ketz, Executive Editor

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

GALE GROUP

THOMSON LEARNING

New York • Detroit • San Diego • San Francisco
Boston • New Haven, Conn. • Waterville, Maine
London • Munich

Copyright © 2002 by Charles Scribner's Sons

Charles Scribner's Sons
An imprint of the Gale Group
300 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Charles Scribner's Sons.

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy : studies of the principal movements and ideas / editors, Alexander DeConde ... [et al.]--2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-684-80657-6 (set : alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-684-80658-4 (v. 1) -- ISBN 0-684-80659-2 (v. 2) -- ISBN 0-684-80660-6 (v. 3)
1. United States--Foreign relations--Encyclopedias. 2. United States--Foreign relations--Philosophy--Encyclopedias. I. DeConde, Alexander.

E183.7 .E52 2002
327.73'003--dc21 2001049800

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z3948-1992 (Permanence of Paper)

Editorial and Production Staff

This Book Was Produced by the Louise B. Ketz Agency

Manuscript Editors
Nancy Belanger Michael Levine Linda Sanders
Elizabeth I. Wilson

Bibliographic Researcher
Alison C. Kero

Proofreaders
Janet Byrne Carol Holmes Evangeline Legones
Laura Patchkofsky

Composition Manager
Evi Seoud

Designer
Pamela A. E. Galbreath

Typesetter
LM Design

Senior Editor
John Fitzpatrick

Associate Publisher
Timothy J. DeWerff

Publisher
Frank Menchaca

CONTENTS

PREFACE xiii
CHRONOLOGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1607–2001 xvii
Richard Dean Burns and Louise B. Ketz

AFRICAN AMERICANS 1
Brenda Gayle Plummer

ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES 13
Warren F. Kimball

AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES . . . 29
Kenneth J. Grieb

ANTI-IMPERIALISM 49
Robert Buzzanco

ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION 61
Calvin D. Davis

ARMED NEUTRALITIES 73
Ian Mugridge

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 79
Richard Dean Burns

ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE 105
Michael T. Klare

ASYLUM 117
Michael Dunne

BALANCE OF POWER 131
A. E. Campbell and Richard Dean Burns

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 141
J. David Singer

BIPARTISANSHIP 155
Randall Woods

BLOCKADES 171
Frank J. Merli and Robert H. Ferrell

THE CHINA LOBBY 185
Warren I. Cohen

CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY 193
Kinley Brauer

COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS 207
Walter L. Hixson

COLD WAR ORIGINS 223
Anders Stephanson

COLD WARRIORS 241
Andrew J. Rotter

COLD WAR TERMINATION 257
Thomas R. Maddux

COLLECTIVE SECURITY 273
Roland N. Stromberg

COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM 285
Edward M. Bennett

CONGRESSIONAL POWER 293
Robert David Johnson

CONSORTIA 313
Warren I. Cohen

THE CONSTITUTION 323
David Gray Adler

CONTAINMENT 345
Barton J. Bernstein

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION 365
David M. Pletcher

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 377
Marvin R. Zahniser

COVERT OPERATIONS 387
John Prados

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 397
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES 409
Akira Iriye

DECISION MAKING 427
Valerie M. Hudson

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 439
Steven L. Rearden

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 451
Jerry Israel and David L. Anderson

DETERRENCE 463
David Coleman

DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY 477
Nick Cullather

DICTATORSHIPS 493
David F. Schmitz

DISSENT IN WARS 505
Russell F. Weigley and David S. Patterson

DOCTRINES 521
Marc Jay Selverstone

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 543
Eugene P. Trani

DOMINO THEORY 551
Edwin Moïse

VOLUME 2

ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY 1
David Shreve

ELITISM 17
Alan K. Henrikson

EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS 33
Jerald A. Combs

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 49
Kurk Dorsey

EXCEPTIONALISM 63
Trevor B. McCrisken

EXTRATERRITORIALITY 81
Jules Davids and Jonathan M. Nielson

FOREIGN AID 93
Katherine A. S. Sibley

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 111
Armin Rappaport and William Earl Weeks

GENDER. 123
Laura McEnaney

GLOBALIZATION 135
Thomas W. Zeiler

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF 151
Darlene Rivas

HUMAN RIGHTS 173
T. Christopher Jespersen

IDEOLOGY 187
Jennifer W. See

IMMIGRATION 203
Roger Daniels

IMPERIALISM 217
David Healy

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 225
John Prados

INTERNATIONALISM 241
Warren F. Kuehl and Gary B. Ostrower

INTERNATIONAL LAW 259
Christopher C. Joyner

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK 283
Francis J. Gavin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 299
Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Klaus Larres

INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION 315
Doris A. Graber

ISOLATIONISM 337
Manfred Jonas

JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE 353
Terrence R. Guay

LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION 365
Richard W. Van Alstyne and Joseph M. Siracusa

MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS 381
Edward M. Bennett

MILITARISM. 387
William Kamman

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 403
James A. Huston

MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE 417
Justus D. Doenecke and Michael R. Adamson

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 429
Burton I. Kaufman

THE MUNICH ANALOGY 443
Joseph M. Siracusa

NARCOTICS POLICY 455
William O. Walker III

THE NATIONAL INTEREST 473
H. W. Brands

NATIONALISM 485
Lawrence S. Kaplan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 499
Anna Kasten Nelson

NATIVISM 511
Geoffrey S. Smith

NAVAL DIPLOMACY 529
William R. Braisted

NEUTRALISM 543
T. Michael Ruddy

NEUTRALITY 559
Thom M. Armstrong

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. 573
Klaus Larres

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY 595
Kenneth J. Hagan and Elizabeth Skinner

VOLUME 3

OIL 1
David S. Painter

OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION 21
William Appleman Williams

OPEN DOOR POLICY 29
Mark Atwood Lawrence

ORGANIZED LABOR 45
Elizabeth McKillen

OUTER SPACE 61
Roger Launius

PACIFISM 73
Charles Chatfield

PAN-AMERICANISM 83
Thomas M. Leonard and Thomas L. Karnes

PARTY POLITICS 99
Fredrik Logevall

PEACEMAKING 113
Berenice A. Carroll

PEACE MOVEMENTS 129
Robert H. Ferrell

PHILANTHROPY 141
James A. Field, Jr., and Tim Matthewson

POST–COLD WAR POLICY 153
Richard A. Melanson

POWER POLITICS 169
Thomas H. Etzold and Robert L. Messer

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS 179
Albert Bowman and Robert A. Divine

PRESIDENTIAL POWER 195
Alexander DeConde

THE PRESS 221
Ralph B. Levering and Louis W. Liebovich

PROPAGANDA 239
Kenneth A. Osgood

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD 255
Burton F. Beers

PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 265
Raymond A. Esthus

PUBLIC OPINION 275
Melvin Small

RACE AND ETHNICITY 289
John Snetsinger

REALISM AND IDEALISM 311
Norman A. Graebner

RECIPROCITY 329
Robert Freeman Smith

RECOGNITION 345
Paolo E. Coletta

REFUGEE POLICIES 357
David M. Reimers

RELIGION 371
Leo P. Ribuffo

REPARATIONS 393
Carl P. Parrini and James I. Matray

REVISIONISM 407
Athan G. Theoharis

REVOLUTION 425
Jeremi Suri

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 443
Ronald E. Doel and Zuoyue Wang

SELF-DETERMINATION 461
Betty Miller Unterberger

SPECIAL-INTEREST LOBBIES 483
William Slany

SUMMIT CONFERENCES 501
Theodore A. Wilson

SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY 513
Vojtech Mastny

TARIFF POLICY 531
Thomas W. Zeiler

TELEVISION 547
Chester Pach

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 563
Brian Michael Jenkins

TREATIES 571
J. B. Duroselle and Ian J. Bickerton

THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT 597
Larry Berman and Jason Newman

WILSONIANISM 617
Tony Smith

WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 627
Roger R. Trask

EDITORS AND ADVISERS 637

CONTRIBUTORS 639

INDEX 643

PREFACE

As in the first edition of the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (1978), this second edition differs markedly from other works of reference dealing with the history of American foreign policy. Instead of bringing together small batches of information on many topics, it offers in-depth, original, interpretive essays commissioned from distinguished scholars who are experts in their field. Using both narrative and topical structure, the authors explain concepts, themes, large ideas, significant movements, and distinctive policies in the history of American foreign relations. Unlike textbook writers, they do not attempt to cover the full narrative history of those relations, or even to recount in detail major episodes. These essays may be used to supplement, and certainly to enrich, the traditional accounts available in history textbooks, special monographs, or other encyclopedias.

Taken as a group, the essays offer a unique approach to the study of America's international connections. Most entries are longer than articles in journals but shorter than monographs. Their length has allowed authors sufficient space to probe their topics deeply without including the usual scholarly paraphernalia. This methodology benefits students in universities, colleges, and high schools because they can quickly find and read authoritative accounts written in clear, straightforward prose in three easily available volumes rather than search through many books and academic journals, often scattered in distant libraries. Readers wishing to probe a topic in greater depth can use the carefully constructed bibliographies for more information and for leads to other sources.

In addition, the authors assess the pertinent scholarship on the topics they discuss and offer differing perspectives on viewing the past. Frequently they challenge previously established wisdom on a topic because perspectives in historical writing have always been subject to revision and change. We have encouraged this kind of investigation and debate because they make clear to the reader that research and writing in history and the social sciences are not monolithic. As with most all higher learning, these disciplines are vibrant and constantly growing. As new information becomes available and analyzed, the findings of scholars working within these disciplines are subject to assessment, modification, and even considerable alteration. This kind of probing and review by peers, like most other scholarly endeavors, enriches our understanding of the past while advancing the frontiers of knowledge.

In addition to scholarly practice, considerable changes in the conduct and theory of American foreign policy in the twenty-three years since publication of the first edition demanded revising and updating the encyclopedia's essays and supplementing them with new ones. Institutions such as the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency have expanded the government's decision-making structure and at times even eclipsed the Department of State as the main organization for making and carrying out foreign policy.

The mounting diversity of the nation's population as it has swelled over the past two decades, primarily as the consequence of new immigration laws, also has altered foreign policy considerations. While ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and other political pressures have long been part of the foreign policy-making process, special-interest lobbies have proliferated since the 1980s. Along with their added numbers and greater prominence, these lobbies have acquired more sophistication and clout than in the past in influencing American relations with other countries and peoples. The stepped-up internationalization of finance, the international mobility of industries lured by cheap labor, the proliferation of multinational corporations, and the mushrooming of electronic systems across national boundaries also have contributed to a transformation in Washington's timing and means of reacting to international crises, and hence to its shaping of both short- and long-term foreign policies.

These developments, plus the changing demographics of the nation's student population, the growth of new educational institutions, and the remodeling of old ones, have contributed to an expansion of topics that traditionally came under the heading of foreign policy. At the same time, we have seen a marked increase in the numbers of those who teach and study the history of American foreign relations in colleges and universities, both in the United States and abroad. Equally important, a new generation of historians who write the books and the articles in academic journals on the subject has risen to prominence.

These teachers, researchers, and writers have brought fresh perspectives to the discipline of diplomatic history. They frequently view its historiography differently than had their predecessors. For example, scholars of the previous generation wrote extensively on nineteenth-century foreign policy, devoting considerable attention to topics such as continental expansion, Anglophobia and Anglophilia, and isolationism, a topic about which they felt deeply and debated at length as to its impact on policymaking. When dealing with the twentieth century, they focused mostly on the diplomatic problems of the two world wars, communism, New Left historiography, and atomic diplomacy. Although the present generation does not ignore these topics—and it should not—its field of vision also includes the problems of international terrorism, "ethnic cleansing," the end of the Cold War, post–Cold War issues, the environment as an international concern, and the role of the United States as the world's sole superpower.

The extent of this new scholarship contrasts so strikingly with that of the entries of the first edition, as readers may readily discern, that this edition deserves consideration as a new project rather than strictly an updating and revision of the old. We have increased the entries by more than 25 percent and the new authors by a larger margin. Of the initial contributions, only one has remained untouched and only a few have survived with modest updating and revision. We are fortunate that a number of the senior scholars who wrote for the first edition more than a quarter of a century ago agreed to rework their essays and offer their wisdom for this new work.

The topics investigated and depth of analysis applied to them in this edition are also more extensive than in the first and compare favorably with similar writings on American diplomacy and related subjects in books and monographs. Of the present 121 essays, 44 are new topics to this edition. They reflect our expanded coverage and the breadth of the nation's view of topics that fall within the range of foreign policy concerns or activities that influence policymaking. For example, in the first edition we had one entry that covered the Cold War. Now, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War in 1991, we have five entries that deal with that topic: "Cold War Origins,"

"Cold War Evolution and Interpretations," "Cold War Termination," "Cold Warriors," and "Post–Cold War Policy," in addition to several other Cold War–centered essays such as "Containment." Other new essays include "African Americans," "Covert Operations," "Cultural Imperialism," "Development Doctrine and Modernization Theory," "Exceptionalism," "Gender," "Globalization," "Immigration," "Narcotics Policy," "Organized Labor," "Religion," and "Science and Technology."

More than in the past, we have sought to avoid snippets of information by combining some of the smaller essays of the first edition into longer pieces. We have, for instance, combined the essays on the Monroe and Eisenhower Doctrines in a longer piece that discusses and analyzes all doctrines connected with foreign policy. To give flavor, often from primary sources, and to provoke thought, we have included sidebars with most of the essays. To help readers when they have the need to place topics in a broad chronological context, we have added a chronology that highlights the significant events in America's foreign relations from the colonial era to the present. We have continued to offer with each essay an up-to-date selected bibliography with annotations, as well as extensive cross-references at the end of each essay.

We have not devoted separate essays, as has been conventional in studies of American foreign relations, to accounts of major subjects such as the diplomacy of the American Revolution, the Louisiana Purchase, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the Spanish-American War, World War II, the Marshall Plan, or the Korean War. We have omitted extended commentary on these topics because we chose not to focus at length on negotiations that produced specific treaties or that led to individual conflicts, other than the Civil War and the Vietnam War. We examine the Vietnam War in depth because it was the longest in the nation's history and because of its continuing prominence in twenty-first-century American foreign policy scholarship. We have not, however, ignored other wars or downplayed the importance of traditional topics. Various authors discuss or scrutinize these matters within the context of the subjects they survey and analyze. The cross-references and a detailed subject-and-concepts index provide easy access to the standard topics.

Again, as in the first edition, we believe the encyclopedia's topical framework, as well as the quality of the essays, will appeal to the growing segment of the public interested in history, as well as to students, academicians, journalists, and others who may wish to use this work for reference or for intellectual stimulation and insight on the significant international aspects of the American experience. Since the authors have written with free rein, readers may note conflicting views of the same topic or event. These differences reflect the flexibility, complexities, and nuances of historical interpretation. They show also that while historians and social scientists cannot escape agreement on hard facts such as dates or contents of treaties when known, even experts can, and often do, clash in their evaluations of the significance of the data they use and the theories they fashion. This diversity, as the essays illustrate, enriches our understanding of the history of U.S. foreign policy.

Diversity also influenced our choice of topics. From the start, we realized that even experts would differ on which topics merited selection. Our criteria for selecting some topics while excluding others of seemingly comparable worth evolved out of decisions to bring the subject matter up to date, to avoid the usual narratives of extended diplomatic negotiations, and to explain in depth new aspects of foreign relationships as well as the significance of the old. In doing this, we canvassed various scholars for their views. Ultimately, though, we had to choose from their recommendations and from our own experiences what topics we would cover that would be of most value to poten-

tial readers. We subjected each essay to careful review and editing to make sure each fitted our objective. In both selection and editing, we balanced our own judgments with the recommendations we received from other scholars. We believe we have been fortunate in attracting to this project some of the finest scholars on the subject of America's foreign policies, past and present.

—Alexander DeConde, for the Editors

Chronology of American Foreign Policy, 1607–2001

Richard Dean Burns and Louise B. Ketz

1607 On 24 May, 105 English settlers establish a village at Jamestown, Virginia, England's first permanent American settlement.

1689 King William's War (War of the League of Augsburg) begins 12 May and inaugurates a series of hostile engagements between England and France. The war ends on 20 September 1697.

1702 Queen Anne's War (War of the Spanish Succession) begins on 4 May and ends 11 April 1713.

1739 After twenty-six years of peace, British conflict begins again, with Spain in the War of Jenkins' Ear on 19 October, and enlarged when France joins Spain in King George's War, which ends on 11 October 1748.

1754 The French and Indian War (Seven Years' War) begins in the Ohio River Valley when British and colonial troops fight French forces and their Indian allies, beginning on 17 April. The war spreads to Europe on 15 May 1756. The Albany Congress meets 19 June to 10 July, at which Benjamin Franklin's Plan of Union is rejected.

1763 British hegemony in North America is confirmed in the Treaty of Paris (10 February), which ends the French and Indian War.

1764 The Sugar Act (5 April) passes Parliament, the first parliamentary law designed specifically to raise money in the colonies.

1765 The Stamp Act Congress convenes (7 October) in an effort to unite the American colonies in protesting the Stamp Act (passed by Parliament on 22 March), the first direct tax levied by Parliament on the American colonies.

1767 The Townshend Acts are passed by Parliament requiring import duties on tea, oil, glass, lead, and paper.

1773 The Boston Tea Party on 16 December protests the Tea Act, which Parliament had approved on 10 May.

1774 On 31 March, Parliament passes the first of the Coercive Acts (called Intolerable Acts by colonial radicals).The First Continental Congress convenes in Philadelphia on 5 September, providing a forum for all of the American colonies to protest jointly British policy.

1775 The American Revolution begins on 19 April, when shots are exchanged between British troops and colonial militia at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. The Second Continental Congress convenes on 10 May in Philadelphia and forwards the Olive Branch Petition to the king (5 July) to seek compromise. On 23 August, King George III proclaims the colonists are in rebellion. The Continental Congress on 19 September appoints a secret committee to buy foreign arms and ammunition. Congress creates (29 November) the Committee of Secret Correspondence to Conduct Foreign Relations, which sends agents to Europe to seek loans, alliances, and the purchase of military supplies. On 23 December a royal proclamation closes the American colonies to all foreign commerce.

1776 Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* is published on 10 January. Paine's proposal that America should pursue peaceful commerce with all nations while making political alliances with none becomes the essence of American political isolationism for over a century. On 3 March, Silas Deane is sent to France to seek aid for the American cause. Congress on 6 April opens American seaports to all nations but Britain. Louis XVI of France on 2 May provides for one million livres to secretly

supply the American army. On 4 July, Congress approves the Declaration of Independence. The Model Treaty of 1776 (Plan of 1776) is approved; on 26 September a diplomatic commission to France is appointed.

1777 On 17 April the Committee of Secret Correspondence is reconstituted as the Committee for Foreign Affairs. The Articles of Confederation are adopted by Congress on 15 November.

1778 The Franco-American Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce are signed on 6 February.

1779 Spain declares war on England but refuses to recognize American independence or to join the Franco-American alliance.

1780 Catherine II of Russia on 28 February proclaims the League of Armed Neutrality. Indirectly the league helps America by placing most of Europe against Great Britain. On 5 October, Congress approves the principles of the league.

1781 On 1 March the Articles of Confederation are ratified, granting Congress the power to make decisions about peace and war and to conduct foreign relations. The British defeat at the Battle of Yorktown on 20 August leads the British government to seek peace. On 20 October, Robert R. Livingston is appointed the first secretary for foreign affairs.

1782 English-American peace talks begin informally on 12 April in Paris between Benjamin Franklin and Richard Oswald. On 23 June, John Jay joins Franklin's discussions. John Adams signs a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the Netherlands on 8 October and on 26 October joins Jay and Franklin in Paris to finalize a peace treaty with the British. A preliminary peace agreement with Britain is signed on 30 November.

1783 On 20 January, Great Britain concludes peace terms with France, Spain, and the United States. The Definitive Treaty of Paris is formally signed on 3 September.

1784 The first U.S. merchant ship, the *Empress of China*, sails to China from New York on 22 February. Based on the Model Treaty of 1776, on 7 May Congress approves new guidelines for commercial treaties with other nations. On 26 June, Spain closes the Mississippi River to American navigation. On 21 September, John Jay becomes secretary for foreign affairs.

1785 On 24 February, John Adams is appointed minister to Great Britain. Thomas Jefferson replaces Franklin as minister to France on 10 March. On 20 July, Congress authorizes Jay's discussions with Don Diego de Gardoqui to resolve disputes with Spain regarding the southwest boundary and navigation of the Mississippi River. On 10 September, Prussia and the United States sign a commercial treaty.

1786 Samuel Shaw is informed on 30 January that he is to be the first U.S. consul at Canton. On 17 July, Congress approves a treaty with Morocco, under which vessels of each nation would be protected from seizure by passes of safe conduct and commerce would be based on most-favored-nation principles. On 29 August the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations end when Congress does not yield on the Mississippi navigation issue.

1787 On 25 May the Constitutional Convention convenes at Philadelphia, and on 17 September the Constitution is approved. On 27 October the first of the *Federalist Papers* to promote ratification of the Constitution is published.

1789 George Washington is inaugurated the first president of the United States on 30 April. The Department of Foreign Affairs is renamed the Department of State on 15 September. Thomas Jefferson is appointed secretary of state on 26 September and takes office on 22 March 1790.

1791 On 9 November, George Hammond, the first British minister to the United States, presents his credentials to Secretary of State Jefferson, just after Thomas Pinckney is nominated as U.S. minister to England.

1792 Gouverneur Morris is appointed minister to France and received at the French court on 3 June.

1793 Following the arrival on 8 April of Edmond Genet, the new French minister to the United States, the U.S. cabinet members agree unanimously that neutrality in France's disputes with other European nations should be maintained. On 19 April,

President Washington prepares the Proclamation of Neutrality, issued on 22 April, which asserts that the United States is at peace with all nations. On 31 December, Jefferson resigns as secretary of state.

1794 On 2 January, Edmund Randolph becomes secretary of state. Legislation passed on 26 March calls for a thirty-day embargo of British ships, extended on 25 April for another month. On 19 April the Senate confirms John Jay's appointment as a special envoy to London to negotiate disputes about trade and the Northwest posts. Congress approves the Neutrality Act on 5 June, prohibiting the recruitment of soldiers or sailors within the U.S. territory by a belligerent agent. James Monroe is appointed the new minister to France on 10 June. On 19 November, Jay's Treaty between the United States and Great Britain is signed. The treaty causes controversy in America because it does not gain U.S. principles of neutral rights.

1795 The U.S. Senate ratifies Jay's Treaty on 24 June. On 19 August, Edmund Randolph resigns as secretary of state, and Timothy Pickering is appointed to the office. On 27 October, Spain and the United States sign the Treaty of San Lorenzo (or Pinckney's Treaty). Spain acknowledges that both Spanish and American citizens should have the free navigation of the Mississippi River.

1796 On 2 March the Senate ratifies a treaty with Algeria to protect U.S. commerce. On 2 July a French decree announces France will no longer treat American ships as neutral, complaining that the United States renounced its neutral rights in the Jay Treaty. On 19 September, President Washington issues his Farewell Address, urging the nation to keep free of subservience to any foreign power. On 7 December the presidential election is won by John Adams; Thomas Jefferson becomes vice president.

1797 On 31 May President Adams appoints a special commission (Charles C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry) to France to seek a treaty of amity and commerce.

1798 On 3 April President Adams releases copies of dispatches from Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry to Congress, revealing that French agents suggested that an American loan and bribe would permit official talks to begin. Believing any war with France would involve naval engagements, Adams on 27 April signs a law creating the Department of the Navy; Congress authorizes the construction of twelve ships. On 7 July the treaties with France are abrogated and the undeclared Quasi-War begins.

1800 As first consul Napoleon on 7 March receives the American peace commissioners in a formal audience. On 30 September the final signing of the Convention of Mortfontaine (Convention of 1800) restores friendly relations between France and the United States.

1801 Because of an electoral tie the House of Representatives selects Thomas Jefferson on 17 February as president of the United States. On 5 March, James Madison becomes secretary of state, remaining in office throughout Jefferson's eight years as president. On 14 May the pasha of Tripoli declares war on the United States.

1802 Spain, on 16 October, announces suspension of America's right of deposit at New Orleans, contravening Pinckney's Treaty of 1795.

1803 On 30 April, France cedes the Louisiana Territory to the United States, which takes possession on 20 December.

1805 The *Essex* decision by the British Admiralty on 22 May destroys the principle of "broken voyage," causing a rapid increase of U.S. shipping losses and renewed friction between England and America. On 10 June peace is established with Tripoli, and on 30 August a new treaty is made with the bey of Tunis.

1806 Napoleon establishes his continental system with proclamation of the Berlin Decree on 21 November, a (paper) blockade of Great Britain that closes all continental trade with the British. On 31 December, James Monroe and William Pinckney sign a treaty with Great Britain on neutral rights. President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison immediately reject it.

1807 On 2 July, President Jefferson orders all ports closed to British ships, and on 22 December signs the Embargo Act of 1807, prohibiting U.S. ships from leaving for foreign ports.

1808 James Madison is elected president on 7 December.

1809 On 1 March Jefferson signs the Nonintercourse Act, which ends the embargo on 4 March but still forbids trade with England and France. After negotiations between Britain's minister and Secretary of State Robert Smith, on 19 April President Madison proclaims the renewal of trade with Great Britain. British foreign minister George Canning disavows the Erskine Agreement on 30 May, and on 9 August Madison revives the Nonintercourse Act.

1810 Congress on 1 May passes Macon's Bill No. 2, designed to coerce England and France into ending their restrictions on neutral trade. On 27 October, West Florida, territory disputed with Spain, is annexed to the United States.

1811 James Monroe becomes secretary of state on 6 April, serving until March 1817.

1812 On 1 June President Madison asks for a declaration of war on Great Britain, and Congress does so on 18 June. On 23 June, aware the United States has declared war, British prime minister Castelreagh announces repeal of British restrictions on the trade of neutral nations.

1813 On 7 December, Congress embargoes all trade with the enemy, and on 30 December, Castlereagh's offer for direct peace negotiations is accepted by President Madison.

1814 Peace talks began at Ghent, Belgium, on 8 August. On 24–25 August the British capture and burn Washington, D.C., then withdraw. The Hartford Convention meets in secret sessions on 15 December to protest dissent against the War of 1812. The Peace Treaty of Ghent is signed on 24 December; the treaty basically restores the status quo ante bellum.

1815 On 2 March Congress declares war on Algeria, which accepts peace terms on 30 June, ending the Barbary Wars.

1816 James Monroe is elected to the first of two terms as president.

1817 In March, John Quincy Adams is appointed secretary of state, serving throughout Monroe's presidency, until 3 March 1825. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 28–29 April provides for the demilitarization of the Great Lakes.

1818 The Neutrality Act of 1818 codifies existing neutrality laws and favors the independence movement in Latin America. The Convention of 1818 with Great Britain resolves issues on the Northeast fisheries, deported slaves, the Northwest boundaries, and transatlantic commerce.

1819 The Adams-Onis (Transcontinental) Treaty is signed on 22 February and resolves boundary disputes that had embroiled Spain and America in quarrels since 1803.

1822 Starting with Colombia on 19 June, President Monroe begins recognition of the Latin American republics and Congress appropriates $100,000 to establish diplomatic missions.

1823 On 2 December, President Monroe enunciates the Monroe Doctrine in his State of the Union message.

1825 In March, Henry Clay becomes secretary of state, serving until the end of John Quincy Adams's presidency in 1829.

1828 On 12 January a treaty is signed with Mexico recognizing the Sabine River as the U.S.–Mexico boundary. Congress approves the Tariff of Abominations on 19 May. On 3 December, Andrew Jackson is elected president.

1829 On 6 March, Martin Van Buren is appointed secretary of state.

1831 On 7 December, President Jackson and the Senate reject an arbitrated decision on the Northeast boundary.

1832 A commercial treaty is signed with Russia on 18 December.

1835 On 6 November, U.S.–French relations are severed, caused by internal politics in Washington and Paris and spoliation claims.

1836 France agrees on 5 February to pay the U.S. spoliation claims. The Alamo in Texas falls to Mexican forces on 6 March, but after victory at the Battle of San Jacinto on 21 April, Texans proclaim their independence.

1837 On 29 December the *Caroline* incident, providing military supplies to Canadian rebels,

causes antagonism between Americans and Canadians.

1839 Spain demands the release of the ship *Amistad* on 6 September and the return of its cargo of slave mutineers to Cuba; the case would not be resolved until 9 March 1841.

1842 The Webster-Ashburton Treaty is signed on 9 August, settling the Northeast Boundary Dispute. On 29 August federal courts are given jurisdiction over illegal acts committed under orders of a foreign government. In a message to Congress on 30 December, President Tyler implies a "Monroe Doctrine" for Hawaii.

1843 On 30 September the State Department learns that China will grant the United States most-favored-nation status.

1844 On 12 April Secretary of State Calhoun signs a treaty to annex Texas to the union, but on 8 June the Senate rejects the treaty. On 3 July the Treaty of Wanghia is signed with China, giving the United States trading rights equal to those of Britain. James K. Polk is elected president on 4 December.

1845 On 1 March, Texas is annexed to the United States by a joint resolution of Congress. James Buchanan is appointed secretary of state on 6 March, serving throughout Polk's presidency. On 2 July the British reject Polk's offer to settle the Oregon boundary dispute. John Slidell is sent on a mission to Mexico on 10 November to settle Mexican-American disputes and purchase territory to the Pacific Ocean. President Polk on 2 December asks Congress to annex the Oregon territory and keep Britain out of California. Newspaper editor John O'Sullivan coins the term "manifest destiny" in an editorial on 27 December.

1846 On 26 February, President Polk indicates a willingness to settle the Oregon boundary question with England at the forty-ninth parallel. The Mexican War begins on 25 April with a clash of U.S. and Mexican forces on disputed territory. President Polk asks Congress for and gets a declaration of war on 13 May. Great Britain and the United States sign a treaty to settle the Oregon boundary on 15 June. On 12 December the United States and New Granada (Colombia) sign the Treaty of New Granada, giving America the right of way across Panama.

1847 On 13 January the Treaty of Cahuenga ends fighting in California and Mexican forces surrender. The independent Republic of Liberia is established on 27 July.

1848 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is signed on 2 February ending the Mexican War.

1850 On 19 April the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty provides an Anglo-American agreement on a Central American canal.

1851 Americans greet Hungarian patriot and exiled leader Lajos Kossuth on 5 December.

1853 The Convention of 1853 with Britain, signed 8 February, settles all outstanding claims. William Learned Marcy is appointed secretary of state on 7 March. The Gadsden Treaty between Mexico and the United States is signed on 30 December, adjusting the southern boundary of the United States, which acquires nearly 30,000 square miles of new territory.

1854 On 31 March, Commodore Matthew Perry and Japanese officials sign the Treaty of Kanagawa, opening Japanese ports and granting most-favored-nation status. The Marcy-Elgin Treaty with Britain is signed on 5 June, resolving Anglo-American reciprocity and fishing rights. The Ostend Manifesto of 18 October, drawn up by U.S. ministers to Spain, France, and Great Britain, favors U.S. purchase or annexation of Cuba from Spain.

1855 On 1 March an act of Congress for the first time provides for diplomatic ranks and prescribes duties of American consular offices. William Walker, an American adventurer, conquers Grenada on 15 October and takes control of Nicaraguan government.

1856 A U.S. court ruling is accepted on 13 February giving a consular treaty precedence over the U.S. Constitution.

1857 On 1 May, William Walker's regime in Nicaragua is overthrown at the hands of a coalition Central American army assisted by Great Britain. Walker is executed on 12 September 1860, ending his filibustering adventures.

1858 The Treaty of Tientsin is signed on 18 June with China, one of the "open door" treaties. A commercial treaty is signed with Japan on 29 July, a model treaty that will

regulate relations with Japan for more than forty years.

1859 On 7 April the United States recognizes the liberal, constitutional Mexican government of Benito Juarez.

1860 On 6 November, Abraham Lincoln is elected president.

1861 The Morrill Act approved on 2 March levies high tariffs to protect American manufacturing. On 5 March, William Henry Seward becomes Lincoln's secretary of state, and on 1 April he proposes a "foreign war panacea" to stimulate national unity and avoid civil war. Fort Sumter in South Carolina falls to Confederate forces on 13 April and the American Civil War begins. On 19 April, President Lincoln proclaims a blockade of the South, forbidding trade with the seceded states. The United States on 21 May insists that Great Britain's neutrality requires it to stop all intercourse with "domestic enemies" of the United States. On 17 December, Veracruz, Mexico, is occupied by French, British, and Spanish forces.

1862 The Confederate warship *Alabama* leaves England on 31 July, the ship built despite Great Britain's claimed neutrality in the American Civil War. President Lincoln on 23 September issues the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation as a means of preventing foreign recognition of the Confederate government.

1863 President Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January, formally liberating all slaves in areas still in rebellion, winning wide public support in England and France. On 7 June, French troops occupy Mexico City to establish a monarchical government. On 24 September two Russian warships arrive in New York, but Americans incorrectly believe the Russian ships are there to support the United States against British and French intervention in the Civil War.

1864 Confederate agents violate the neutrality of the U.S.–Canadian border on 19 October by an attack on St. Albans, Vermont. Lincoln is reelected president on 8 November.

1865 The Confederate Army surrenders on 9 April. On 14 April, President Lincoln is assassinated.

1866 On 17 March the United States terminates the reciprocity Marcy-Elgin Treaty of 1854 with Canada. Americans learn on 5 April from Paris newspapers that Napoleon II will withdraw French troops from Mexico. The Irish Fenian Brotherhood unsuccessfully attacks Canada from the United States, a campaign for Irish independence from Great Britain. The transatlantic cable goes into operation on 27 July.

1867 On 12 March the last French troops withdraw from Mexico. Russia sells Alaska to the United States on 30 March.

1868 The Burlingame Treaty with China is signed on 28 July, recognizing the right of unrestricted immigration of Chinese.

1869 On 13 April the Senate rejects the Clarendon-Johnson Treaty to settle indemnity claims with Great Britain.

1871 On 8 May the Treaty of Washington creates an arbitration tribunal to settle the *Alabama* claims with Britain; the tribunal's report is issued on 14 September 1872 and accepted.

1873 On 29 November, Spain agrees to indemnify the United States for the *Virginius* incident in Cuba, when on 7 and 8 November fifty-three crew members and passengers were executed by Cuban officials.

1875 A reciprocity treaty is signed on 30 January with Hawaii, giving the United States a virtual protectorship over the islands.

1878 A U.S.–Samoan treaty is signed on 17 January, providing for an American naval and coaling station at Pago Pago. On 23 March the Diaz regime in Mexico is recognized.

1880 The Treaty of 1880 with China, signed 17 November, permits restriction of Chinese immigration.

1881 President James Garfield is assassinated on 2 July.

1882 A congressional act of 6 May suspends Chinese laborers from immigration for ten years. On 22 May a commercial treaty is signed with Korea.

1883 Passage on 3 March of the Tariff of 1883 retains U.S. protectionist principles; the same day Congress authorizes the building of a modern "steel" navy.

1884 On 6 December the United States secures a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

1885 The United States participates in the Berlin Conference on the Congo, which adjourns on 26 February and gains U.S. commercial privileges in the region.

1887 The fur seal controversy begins on 9 January when the British protest seizure of Canadian pelagic sealing ships. Congress on 3 March empowers the president to bar Canadian ships, fish, and other products from U.S. ports.

1888 On 15 February the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty on fishing rights with Great Britain is signed. A treaty with China on 12 March excludes Chinese laborers from immigration for twenty years. On 10 May a Pan-American conference is authorized by Congress.

1889 On 14 June the General Act of Berlin is signed, forming a German-British-U.S. protectorate over Samoa. The first Pan-American Conference is held in Washington on 2 October.

1891 On 15 June, Britain signs a modus vivendi on the Bering fur sealing dispute. Seamen from the USS *Baltimore* are attacked by a mob in Chile on 16 October; Chile makes reparations on 25 January 1892 and talk of war ends.

1893 On 30 March, Thomas F. Bayard becomes the first American to hold the rank of ambassador with his appointment as ambassador to Great Britain. An arbitration commission on 15 August rules against the United States in the sealing dispute with Britain and Canada.

1894 On 28 August the Wilson-Gorman Tariff is approved, providing for duty-free raw materials for U.S. industry.

1895 American neutrality laws are applied on 12 June in the Cuban rebellion against Spain. On 20 July the United States intervenes in the British-Venezuelan boundary dispute as a "duty" under the Monroe Doctrine.

1896 On 4 April assistance is offered to Spain to mediate with the Cuban rebels. On 12 November an arbitration treaty between Venezuela and England is established.

1897 A treaty of annexation is signed on 16 June with Hawaii. The Dingley Tariff on 7 July raises rates to a new high in U.S. history.

1898 On 12 January the USS *Maine* is sent to Havana, Cuba, and destroyed in the harbor on 15 February. Congress approves a joint resolution authorizing force to assure Cuban independence from Spain on 19–20 April. On 1 May the navy defeats the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the Philippines. Guam is captured from the Spanish on 20 June. The Spanish fleet in Cuba is destroyed on 3 July. Congress annexes Hawaii on 6 July. John Hay is appointed secretary of state on 20 September. On 19 November an anti-imperialist league is founded in Boston. On 10 December the Treaty of Paris is signed by Spain, formally ending the Spanish-American War.

1899 On 4 February fighting breaks out in Manila between U.S. and Filipino troops. The First Hague Conference adjourns on 29 July and the United States agrees to join the Permanent Court of International Arbitration. On 6 September, Secretary of State Hay asks six other powers to join America in the Open Door policy. An Anglo-German-American Treaty of 2 December partitions the Samoan Islands.

1900 On 3 July Secretary Hay issues the second Open Door Note. An international force lifts the Boxer rebels' siege of the Peking diplomatic legation on 14 August. On 20 December the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for a Central American canal is ratified.

1901 Congress on 2 March approves the Platt Amendment to regulate future relations with Cuba. On 4 July, William Howard Taft becomes first civil governor in the Philippines. President William McKinley is shot on 6 September and dies on the 14th. On 22 October the second Pan-American Conference opens in Mexico City. Senate approves on 16 December the revised Hay-Pauncefote Treaty to build and control a Central American canal.

1902 Congress approves construction of a Panama canal on 26 June. The Philippine Government Act (Organic Act) is proclaimed by President Roosevelt on 4 July, ending the Philippine Insurrection. The

Drago Doctrine on 29 December proposes that European nations cannot intervene in the Latin American countries to collect debt payments.

1903 On 20 October the Alaskan boundary dispute is resolved. American rights to construct and control a Panama canal are granted by the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty on 18 November.

1904 The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is declared in President Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to Congress on 6 December.

1905 Elihu Root is named secretary of state on 7 July. On 29 July the Taft-Katsura Agreement is signed, recognizing Japan's rights in Korea and maintaining the Open Door policy in Korea and Manchuria. The Russo-Japanese Peace Conference convenes at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 9 August with President Roosevelt serving as an intermediary.

1906 The Royal Navy launches the *Dreadnought*, first all-big-gun battleship, on 10 February. On 7 April the Algeciras Conference ends, settling French and German disputes over Morocco. The Third Inter-American (Pan-American) Conference is held at Rio de Janeiro beginning on 31 July.

1907 In a note known as the "Gentleman's Agreement" on 24 February, Secretary of State Root resolves disputes with Japan about immigration. On 18 October the Second Hague Peace Conference adjourns. The U.S. Navy by 12 December is the second largest in the world and begins an around-the-world cruise to demonstrate its power.

1908 The Root-Takahira Agreement of 30 November with Japan acknowledges the new balance of power in East Asia. On 4 December ten major naval powers meet at the London Naval Conference to clarify rules of naval warfare.

1909 On 27 January, Great Britain agrees to take the Northeast fisheries dispute to arbitration. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 9 April continues protectionism. Dollar diplomacy is extended to China when America seeks admission on 24 May to the banking consortium constructing a Chinese railway. On 16 December the United States assists a rebellion in Nicaragua.

1911 On 11 February the commercial treaty of 1894 with Japan is renewed, including the Gentleman's Agreement to regulate emigration of laborers. The Knox-Castrillo Convention of 6 June with Nicaragua establishes control of that nation's finances. On July 7 the pelagic sealing issue is settled with Britain, Russia, and Japan.

1912 The United States joins a six-power consortium on 20 June to offer loans to China. On 2 August the Lodge Corollary extends the Monroe Doctrine to Japan and to foreign companies. U.S. marines land in Nicaragua on 14 August to protect American property and interests. Woodrow Wilson is elected president on 5 November.

1913 General Victoriano Huerta overthrows the Mexican government on 9 February, beginning a new series of revolutions. On 5 March, William Jennings Bryan is named secretary of state. President Wilson withdraws U.S. participation in the Chinese loan consortium on 18 March. On 27 August, Wilson informs Congress of a "watchful waiting" policy toward Mexico. The Underwood Tariff is passed on 3 October lowering tariffs.

1914 U.S. forces occupy and blockade Veracruz, Mexico, on 21 April, and on 24 April, Wilson accepts mediation of the Mexican dispute. On 28 July, Austria declares war on Serbia and World War I begins. Wilson issues on 4 August the first of ten U.S. proclamations of neutrality. On 6 August, Secretary of State Bryan asks European belligerents to accept the naval rules of the Declaration of London of 1908. American loans to any European belligerent are forbidden on 15 August, the same day the Panama Canal officially opens. In the Declaration of London of 5 September, England, France, and Russia agree not to make a separate peace. On 15 October, Wilson approves "credits" to foreign belligerents by private U.S. bankers. The following day Herbert Hoover's Food Relief Program is launched.

1915 Japan submits the Twenty-one Demands on 18 January to gain predominance in China.

On 4 February, Germany declares a war zone around Great Britain, which the United States protests on 10 February. The *Lusitania,* a British passenger ship, is sunk by a German submarine on 7 May. On 11 May, President Wilson refuses to accept any Sino-Japanese agreement that impairs the Open Door policy. Secretary of State Bryan resigns on 8 June, believing Wilson's protests against German policy could lead to war. U.S. marines occupy Haiti on 29 July.

1916 The House-Grey Peace Plan is signed on 22 February to obtain a negotiated peace with Germany. Mexican bandit Pancho Villa raids Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March, and on 15 March, General John Pershing leads an expeditionary force against Villa. On 4 May the *Sussex* Pledge is issued in which Germany agrees not to permit submarines to attack any ships without warning. On 27 May, President Wilson proposes "a new world order" at a session of the League to Enforce Peace. Denmark cedes the Virgin Islands to the United States on 4 August for $25 million. Full military occupation of Santo Domingo begins on 29 November. On 12 December the German chancellor asks President Wilson to transmit Germany's peace offer to the belligerent powers. On 18 December, Wilson asks all belligerents to state their peace objectives.

1917 On 22 January, President Wilson delivers his "peace without victory" speech. Germany announces renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare to begin on 1 February; two days later Wilson breaks diplomatic relations with Germany. The Zimmerman Telegram is revealed on 24 February, in which Germany proposed an alliance with Mexico against the United States. Wilson calls for a declaration of war against Germany on 2 April; it is granted four days later. The Trading with the Enemy Act becomes law on 6 October, prohibiting commerce with enemy nations and permitting takeover of alien property in the United States. On 2 November the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is signed, recognizing Japan's special interests in China, and Japan declares respect for the Open Door policy. The Bolshevik Revolution on 7 November overthrows the provisional government in Russia.

1918 In a speech to Congress on 8 January, President Wilson outlines his peace objectives, the Fourteen Points. On 3 March, Russia and Germany sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to end their war. Germany seeks peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points on 6 October. On 11 November, Germany signs an armistice to end World War I.

1919 The Paris Peace Conference opens on 18 January; on 14 February, President Wilson develops the Covenant of the League of Nations at the conference. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presents on 4 March to President Wilson a petition signed by thirty-nine U.S. senators opposing the League of Nations. Germany signs the Treaty of Versailles on 23 June. On 25 September, President Wilson suffers a physical breakdown during a nationwide tour seeking public support for the League of Nations. The Palmer Raids, ordered by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, begin on 7 November against American socialists and communists. On 19 November the Senate rejects the Treaty of Versailles.

1920 The Red Scare raids continue on 2 January with 4,000 suspected radicals rounded up in twenty-three states. On 19 March a final vote in the Senate again defeats the Treaty of Versailles. Trade restrictions on Russia are removed on 7 July but the communist regime is not recognized. The Washington Naval Conference opens on 12 November and ends on 6 February 1922 with limits on capital shipbuilding

1921 Congress approves the Emergency Quota Act on 19 May restricting immigration. A joint resolution is passed on 2 July declaring that hostilities with the Central Powers have ceased.

1923 The Fifth Pan-American Conference adjourns in Santiago, Chile, on 3 May. Great Britain on 19 June accepts a plan to repay its U.S. war debts, a model for agreements with other Allies.

1924 On 24 May the Rogers Act unites the U.S. Consular Service and Diplomatic Service into one branch of the State Department, creating the Foreign Service. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on 1 July reaffirms America's refusal to recognize the USSR. The Dawes Plan of 1 September seeks to solve the German reparations problem.

1925 The Geneva Protocol is signed on 27 June, prohibiting the use of poisonous gas and bacteriological weapons of war; only Japan and the United States do not ratify the pact. U.S. marines leave Nicaragua on 4 August.

1926 The Senate approves membership, with amendments, in the World Court on 26 January, but the Court does not accept the amendments and the United States drops its membership application.

1927 The Geneva Naval Limitations Conference convenes on 20 June but Anglo-American disputes lead to no achievements.

1928 Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government of China is recognized on 25 July. On 27 August fourteen nations sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war.

1929 The Hague Economic Conference completes agreements on 31 August ratifying the Young Plan on German reparations.

1930 On 22 April the London Naval Conference delegates agree on a three-power (United States, Britain, Japan) treaty to limit cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

1931 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff, continuing protectionist policy, is approved on 17 June. On 20 June, President Herbert Hoover offers a moratorium on all debt payments owed America if Europeans postpone payments on debts due them.

1932 The Hoover-Stimson Nonrecognition Doctrine is announced on 7 January, protesting Japan's aggression in Manchuria.

1933 Cordell Hull becomes secretary of state on 4 March and serves until November 1944. President Franklin Roosevelt on 3 July disrupts the London Economic Conference by repudiating all temporary currency stabilization proposals. Fulgencio Batista comes to power in Cuba on 5 September but Roosevelt refuses to recognize the regime. On 17 November, Roosevelt signs an agreement to normalize relations with the USSR. A nonintervention pact is signed on 26 December at the Seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay.

1934 President Roosevelt establishes the Export-Import Bank on 2 February to encourage overseas commerce. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 24 March grants the Philippines independence, to begin in 1936. The Nye Committee is established to investigate the arms and munitions industry as a cause of war on 12 April. The Platt Amendment is abrogated on 29 May, ending limits on Cuban sovereignty but retaining a naval base on the island. Japan gives necessary two-year notice on 29 December that it will terminate the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922.

1935 On 16 March, Adolf Hitler denounces the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and plans to increase the German army by thirty-six divisions. The Neutrality Act of 31 August authorizes the president to embargo arms to belligerents and to forbid citizens to travel on belligerent ships except at their own risk.

1936 On 15 January, Japan withdraws from the London Naval Conference. A treaty is signed with Panama on 2 March abolishing the American protectorate over Panama. On 7 March Germany moves soldiers into the Rhineland. The Spanish Civil War begins on 17 July with insurgents led by General Francisco Franco. Secretary of State Cordell Hull announces a "moral embargo" against both belligerents in the Spanish Civil War. Germany and Japan sign an anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November.

1937 On 8 January, President Roosevelt signs legislation applying an impartial neutrality embargo to the Spanish Civil War. Another Neutrality Act is passed on 1 May, with cash-and-carry provisions on exports. On 7 July an incident near Peking leads to the undeclared Sino-Japanese War; on the 16th, Secretary of State Hull issues a peace circular to all nations urging them to adopt the "American principles of international good conduct." President Roosevelt delivers his "quarantine speech" on 5 October, urging against isolationism. On 12 December the U.S. gunboat *Panay* is sunk by Japanese airplanes; Japan's apology is accepted on 24 December.

1938 Germany invades and annexes Austria on 13 March. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee blocks a resolution for cash-and-carry provisions for arms to Spain's Loyalist government on 13 May. On 29 September at the Munich Conference, France, Italy, and Britain "appease" Hitler by trans-

ferring the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia to Germany. President Roosevelt on 14 December announces a $25 million loan to China. The Lima Declaration of 24 December asserts that the twenty-one nations at the Inter-Americas Conference will defend against all foreign intervention.

1939 On 14 March, Hitler conquers all of Czechoslovakia, and two days later Secretary Hull announces the United States will not recognize the conquest. The Spanish Civil War ends on 28 March when Madrid surrenders to Franco's forces. The British and French pledge on 31 March to aid Poland in the event of aggression, ending their appeasement policy. Franco's government in Spain is recognized on 3 April. President Roosevelt on 15 April appeals to Hitler and Mussolini to guarantee peace by not attacking thirty-one listed nations for ten years. On 23 August a Nazi-Soviet pact is signed in which they agree not to attack each other. German armies launch an invasion of Poland on 1 September. Britain and France declare war on Germany on 3 September; Roosevelt announces U.S. neutrality on 5 September. Scientists on 11 October inform Roosevelt that an atomic bomb can be developed. Roosevelt signs a revised neutrality act on 4 November ending the arms embargo and permitting cash-and-carry sale of arms.

1940 On 26 January the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan is ended. Winston Churchill becomes Britain's prime minister on 10 May. Congress approves legislation on 28 May permitting the president to release military supplies to Latin American countries for Western Hemisphere defense. On 3 June aid is extended to Britain and France via "surplus" U.S. arms and ammunition. France surrenders to Germany on 17 June; on 19 June, Henry Stimson becomes secretary of war and Frank Knox secretary of the navy. A naval construction bill is signed by President Roosevelt on 20 July to create a two-ocean navy. On 18 August the Ogdensburg Agreement is signed with Canada for a permanent joint board of defense. The destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain is announced on 3 September. On 27 September, Japan signs a tripartite pact with Italy and Germany. The "Germany first" war strategy is recommended on 12 November by Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark. President Roosevelt's radio "fireside chat" of 29 December urges a buildup of a "great arsenal of democracy."

1941 In his State of the Union Address on 6 February, President Roosevelt announces his proposal for a lend-lease program and enunciates his Four Freedoms; Congress approves the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March. On 9 April, Denmark agrees to provide rights for U.S. defense bases in Greenland. Roosevelt on 11 April informs Churchill that the U.S. Navy will patrol areas in what would become the Battle of the Atlantic. Japan and Russia sign a mutual nonaggression pact on 13 April. President Roosevelt orders all German and Italian consulates closed on 16 June. On 22 June Germany launches an invasion of the Soviet Union. On 7 July U.S. marines land on and occupy Iceland. Japanese assets are frozen on 26 July. Roosevelt and Churchill meet secretly off Newfoundland on 12 August and prepare the Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration of principles. On 9 November a settlement is reached with Mexico for an oil and agrarian expropriation compensation agreement. On 6 December, President Roosevelt appeals to Japan to maintain peace by withdrawing Japanese troops from Southeast Asia; the following day Japanese planes attack Pearl Harbor. On 8 December, Congress declares war on Japan; on December 11, Germany and Italy declare war on the United States.

1942 On 1 January the United Nations Declaration is signed by twenty-six nations, affirming the Atlantic Charter, to fight the Axis powers. Twenty-one American republics recommend breaking relations with the Axis powers on 28 January. Japanese Americans living on the West Coast are ordered relocated on 19 February. President Roosevelt on 1 June promises Russia a second front in Europe by the end of 1942. On 13 August, General Leslie R. Groves is appointed to command of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb.

1943 The Casablanca Conference results on 24 January with plans to invade Sicily and Italy and the requirement that the Axis powers must surrender unconditionally. Roosevelt,

Churchill, and military advisers finalize military decisions at the Trident Conference in Washington on 25 May and the Quebec Conference on 24 August. On 30 October the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (Hull, Anthony Eden, and V. M. Molotov) ends. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is established by forty-four nations on 9 November. The first Cairo Conference on 26 November results in British and U.S. agreements on China and the Far East. On 1 December the Big Three Conference ends at Tehran, Iran; on 6 December the second Cairo Conference concludes.

1944 On 6 June, D-Day, an Allied invasion begins along the Normandy coast of France. Diplomatic relations are severed with Argentina on 22 June because of pro-fascist sympathies. The Bretton Woods Conference ends on 22 July, establishing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. At the Quebec Conference of 16 September, Roosevelt and Churchill make final plans for victory over Germany and Japan. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference on 7 October prepares a draft for the United Nations organization. The Moscow Conference of 18 October ends, during which Churchill and Stalin decide on East European "spheres of influence"; Roosevelt later concurs.

1945 The Yalta Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin concludes on 11 February and defines the shape of postwar Europe. Roosevelt dies on 12 April and Harry S. Truman becomes president. On 21 April the Soviet Union and Poland sign a twenty-year mutual assistance pact. The San Francisco Conference on the United Nations convenes on 25 April. Germany's unconditional surrender is signed on 7 May, and the end of the war in Europe is declared on 8 May. On 5 June the European Advisory Commission decides on the division of Germany and Berlin. The United Nations Charter is signed by delegates of fifty nations on 26 June. Truman, Churchill, and Stalin begin discussions at Potsdam on 16 July. On 26 July an ultimatum is issued to Japan for an unconditional surrender. Atomic bombs are dropped on Japan at Hiroshima, 6 August, and Nagasaki, 9 August. On 15 August Japan surrenders "unconditionally." Lend-lease aid is terminated on 21 August. Ho Chi Minh on 2 September proclaims the independence of Vietnam. Canada, Britain, and the United States agree on 15 November to provide for international control of atomic energy; on 20 December legislation is backed by the Truman administration for civilian control of America's atomic energy.

1946 George Kennan sends his "Long Telegram" on 22 February, outlining the policy of "containment." Winston Churchill on 5 March delivers his "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. On 3 June, Japanese war crime trials begin under U.S. jurisdiction. Bernard Baruch presents the American plan (Baruch Plan) for the international control of atomic energy on 14 June; the UN Security Council accepts the plan on 31 December. The Fulbright Act is passed on 1 August to finance foreign study. On 15 August, President Truman approves a memo stating Soviet aggression against Turkey would be resisted. The Nuremberg war crimes tribunal announces its decisions on 1 October.

1947 On 29 January mediation efforts between the Communists and Nationalists in China are abandoned. The Truman Doctrine is enunciated on 12 March in a request for aid to Greece and Turkey to combat communism. On 5 May the State Department Policy Planning Staff is established with George Kennan as director. Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposes a plan on 5 June for economic aid to European nations to rehabilitate their economies. The National Security Act of 26 July establishes the Department of Defense, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency. The Rio Pact is signed on 2 September, a mutual assistance treaty for Western Hemisphere nations. Twenty-three nations sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at Geneva on 30 October.

1948 On 14 May the State of Israel is proclaimed. The Vandenberg Resolution, affirming U.S. support for regional security pacts, is approved on 11 June. The Berlin blockade begins on 24 June, followed by a U.S. airlift for more than a year. On 9–10 December the United Nations adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.

1949 President Truman in his inaugural address on 20 January proposes the Point Four program; Dean Acheson becomes secretary of state on 21 January. On 4 April the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is chartered by twelve nations. The Berlin blockade ends on 11 May with a four-power accord on Berlin. On 5 August the State Department issues a "White Paper" relating to Chang Kai-shek's loss of China. A White House press release of 23 September announces that the Soviet Union has detonated an atomic bomb. Mao Zedong proclaims the creation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October. On 7 October the Soviet zone of Germany is established as the German Democratic Republic.

1950 On 12 January, Secretary of State Dean Acheson describes a "perimeter strategy" for East Asia to prevent the spread of communism. Senator Joseph McCarthy charges on 9 February that communist spies have infiltrated the State Department. NSC 68, drafted by Paul H. Nitze, a document depicting the Soviets as aggressors seeking to conquer the world, is presented to the National Security Council on 14 April. On 5 June, President Truman signs a foreign aid bill, granting nearly $3 billion for the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) and the Point Four Program. North Korean forces attack South Korea on 25 June. On 23 September, Congress adopts the McCarran Internal Security Bill over President Truman's veto. Chinese communist troops launch a counteroffensive on 26 November to Korea against UN troops, forcing their retreat to the thirty-eighth parallel. On 23 December a mutual defense agreement with France and the Associated States of Indochina is signed to combat communist forces in Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh.

1951 The UN General Assembly approves an arms embargo against Communist China on 18 May. Truce negotiations begin on 8 July in Korea. A mutual defense treaty is signed with the Philippines on 30 August. On 1 September the ANZUS Tripartite Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand is signed. A mutual security agreement is signed with Japan on 8 September. Marshall Plan aid ends on 31 December.

1952 Britain, France, and the United States agree to West Germany's internal independence on 26 May. The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act is passed on 26 June, setting a quota for Asian immigration.

1953 Joseph Stalin dies on 5 March. An armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective 26–27 July in Korea. A coup in Iran on 19 August restores Shah Reza Pahlavi with CIA help. On 26 September, Spain agrees to creation of U.S. air and naval stations in exchange for $250 million in aid. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "New Look" policy emphasizing massive retaliation is described on 30 October. The Atoms-for-Peace Plan is proposed by Eisenhower on 8 December.

1954 The Bricker Amendment to limit the president's executive agreement and treaty-making powers is narrowly defeated in the Senate on 25–26 February. Vietminh forces on 14 March attack French troops at Dien Bien Phu; on 4–5 April, President Eisenhower decides to send only limited assistance to the French. On 8 June the CIA assists in overthrowing the left-wing government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala. The Geneva Conference of 1954 on 20 July divides Vietnam into two parts. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is formed on 8 September. On 23 October, President Eisenhower offers aid to South Vietnam. A mutual defense pact is signed on 2 December with Nationalist China.

1955 Congress on 25 January authorizes use of armed forces to defend Nationalist China and the Pescadores. The U.S. Army on 12 February agrees to take charge of training the army of South Vietnam. West Germany joins NATO on 9 May. The Warsaw Pact defense alliance is formed on 14 May by European communist nations. The Big Four Summit Conference is held 18–23 July in Geneva, where Eisenhower gains favorable world reaction to his "Open Skies" proposal, permitting aerial reconnaissance. On 26 October, Ngo Dinh Diem gains control of South Vietnam; he proclaims a republic and himself as the first president.

1956 Secretary of State Dulles refuses on 9 May to supply arms to Israel to avoid a Middle East confrontation with the Soviet Union. On 19 July, Dulles cancels U.S. offer to aid Egypt in

construction of the Aswan Dam. Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal on 26 July. On 6 November the Suez Crisis is resolved, when President Eisenhower applies pressure on Britain, Israel, and France after their attack on Egypt beginning on 29 October.

1957 The Eisenhower Doctrine, to check communist aggression in the Middle East, is presented in an address to Congress on 5 January. The Senate approves the Atoms-for-Peace Treaty on 18 June. The Soviet Union launches *Sputnik,* the first artificial Earth satellite, on 5 October.

1958 A cultural exchange agreement is signed with the Soviet Union on 27 January. On 31 January the first U.S. Earth satellite, *Explorer I,* is placed in orbit. Vice President Richard Nixon experiences intense anti-American feeling on a tour of Latin America 28 April–14 May. U.S. marines land in Lebanon on 15 July to halt aggression of the United Arab Republic. On 23 August, Chinese communists bombard the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Formosa Strait.

1959 Cuban president Fulgencio Batista flees Cuba after Fidel Castro's forces march into Havana on 3 January. Bilateral defense pacts are signed with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey on 5 March. The United States supports but does not join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a defensive alliance formed on 19 August by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. Twelve nations approve a treaty to reserve the Antarctic for scientific and peaceful purposes on 1 December.

1960 On 19 January the Japanese mutual security treaty of 1952 is renewed. The Soviet Union announces on 5 May that an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory; President Eisenhower accepts responsibility for the incident. On 6 July, Congress approves and Eisenhower levies cuts in Cuba's sugar quota; Castro retaliates by nationalizing all U.S. property in Cuba. The San José Declaration of 28 August of the Organization of American States condemns intervention "by any extracontinental power," a warning against Russian interference in Cuba. On 19 September the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is formed in Baghdad. Twenty nations on 19 November form the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

1961 On 20 January, President John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address calls on the nation to renew its commitment to extend freedom throughout the world. Dean Rusk is appointed secretary of state the following day. On 13 March, President Kennedy announces the Alliance for Progress program to aid Latin America. Twelve hundred Cuban exiles, trained and supported by the United States, land at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in a failed attempt to overthrow Castro on 17 April. A "moon race" is announced on 25 May to beat the Soviet Union to the moon. On 13 August the Soviets begin construction of the Berlin Wall, dividing East and West Berlin to prevent the flow of exiles to West Germany. On 22 November, President Kennedy approves the "first phase of a Vietnam program," broadening U.S. commitment in Vietnam with U.S. troops.

1962 On 22 October, Kennedy informs the nation there are Russian-built missile sites in Cuba and imposes on 24 October a naval quarantine on all missile equipment being shipped to Cuba; after a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and to remove missiles from Turkey, on 28 October the Soviets agree to remove the missiles.

1963 On 20 June the Soviet Union agrees to a communications "hot line" to reduce the risk of accidental war. On 5 August, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union sign the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; by 10 October more than one hundred nations agree to it. On 1–2 November, Ngo Dinh Diem is assassinated in Vietnam. President Kennedy is assassinated on 22 November.

1964 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution is passed on 7 August, authorizing President Johnson to take "all necessary measures" to repel any armed attack in Southeast Asia.

1965 Claiming a threat of communism, U.S. marines land in the Dominican Republic on 28 April. The Immigration Act of 3 October 1965 replaces the quota system of 1921.

1966 The Fulbright Hearings on Vietnam open on 28 January. On 6 February, France withdraws from NATO. The Food for Peace Act is signed on 12 November.

1967 On 26 January, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announces the "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) nuclear strategy. Sixty nations on 27 January sign the Outer Space Treaty.

1968 On 23 January the spy ship USS *Pueblo* is seized in international waters by North Korea; the crew is released on 22 December. The Tet Offensive is launched by communist forces on 30 January in South Vietnam. On 31 March, President Lyndon Johnson announces a bombing halt in Vietnam and withdraws as a 1968 presidential candidate. On 1 July sixty-two nations sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Soviet armed forces on 20 August employ the Brezhnev Doctrine to overthrow the Czech government of Alexander Dubcek. On 31 October the United States and North Vietnam agree to conduct formal negotiations for peace.

1969 On 18 March the first secret bombing of Cambodia is ordered by President Richard Nixon. The U.S. Vietnamization program is announced on 8 June and the initial withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam begins. In a speech in Guam on 25 July the president announces the Nixon Doctrine, to let countries develop in their own fashion. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) begin on 17 November. On 25 November, Nixon announces the United States will ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing biological and chemical weapons.

1970 On 22 June the Senate terminates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964.

1971 On 11 February eighty nations sign the Seabed Arms Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons on the ocean floor. The *New York Times* publishes the Pentagon Papers, a compilation from 1967–1968 of how the United States became involved in Vietnam. The People's Republic of China is admitted to the United Nations on 25 October; the Nationalist government of Taiwan is expelled.

1972 President Nixon visits China on 17 February and issues the Shanghai Communique on U.S.–China relations. Nixon orders renewed B-52 bombing raids on North Vietnam on 4 April. On 22–30 May, Nixon becomes the first U.S. president to visit Moscow and signs the ABM (antiballistic missile) Treaty and the SALT I Agreement.

1973 A military coup in Chile on 11 September overthrows President Salvador Allende with CIA assistance. Henry Kissinger is confirmed as secretary of state on 21 September. The Arab states begin a political oil embargo on 16 October when Israel invades Egypt. On 7 November, Congress overrides Nixon's veto of the War Powers Act.

1974 On 3 July in Moscow, Nixon signs an amendment of the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the Threshold Ban Treaty. President Nixon resigns on 9 August. President Gerald R. Ford meets with Soviet leader Brezhnev in Vladivostok on 24 November and a ceiling is placed on offensive nuclear weapons. On 16 December the Senate ratifies the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological Convention. Congress on 20 December refuses to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status pending Jewish emigration policy.

1975 The United States finally ratifies the Geneval Protocol of 1925 on 22 January. On 29 April the last U.S. helicopter leaves Saigon and South Vietnam falls to the communists. Thirty-five nations sign the Helsinki Accords on 1 August, legitimizing the Soviet Union's territorial gains in Europe since 1940. On 29 August, Venezuela nationalizes its oil industry, largely controlled by American companies. The United Nations issues a resolution on 10 November condemning Zionism as a form of racism.

1976 The United States extends its exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles offshore on 13 April. On 30 June, Europe's communist parties declare that each national party is independent but equal to the other parties ("Eurocommunism"). Mao Zedong dies on 9 September.

1977 On 18 May thirty-two nations sign a UN agreement banning environmental warfare. On 7 September it is agreed that Panamanians will assume full jurisdiction over the Panama Canal in the year 2000.

1978 Carter persuades Egypt and Israel to sign the Camp David Accords on 17 September after twelve days of negotiations for peace in the Middle East. On 15 December agree-

ment is made for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, to take effect on 1 January 1979, and the termination of the U.S. Defense Treaty with Taiwan.

1979 On 16 January the shah of Iran leaves Tehran; the Ayatollah Khomeini arrives in Iran from exile on 1 February and forms his own provisional government. Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty on 26 March; a military-economic aid package is approved by Congress in May. On 18 June, President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev sign SALT II, a five-year treaty limiting maximum numbers of intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers. Congress passes legislation on 29 September asking for the State Department to compose a list of nations that support terrorism. On 4 November the U.S. embassy in Iran is stormed and sixty hostages are taken; President Carter then freezes Iranian assets in the United States. On 28 December, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter warns Brezhnev of "serious consequences if the Soviets do not withdraw.

1980 On 23 January, President Carter enunciates the Carter Doctrine, declaring that the Persian Gulf area is a "vital American interest." He also withdraws from SALT II and orders a boycott of the Olympic Games scheduled for Moscow.

1981 The American hostages in Iran are freed on 20 January, minutes after Ronald Reagan is sworn in as president. Reagan on 23 November issues National Security Decision Directive 17, giving the CIA authority to fund the contra movement against the government of Nicaragua.

1982 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) begin on 29 June in Geneva with the Soviet Union. On 8 July the UN Law of the Sea Treaty is rejected. On 16 August the People's Republic of China signs an agreement to use only peaceful means to regain Taiwan, while the United States agrees to reduce its level of arms aid to Taiwan. U.S. marines arrive in Beirut on 27 September for peacekeeping activities.

1983 On 8 March, at a convention of evangelical Christians, President Ronald Reagan calls the Soviet Union an "evil empire." On 10 March the United States claims exclusive economic zones out to 200 miles. President Reagan on 23 March announces the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), derisively called "Star Wars," a defense system against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. On 23 October a suicide truck-bomb explodes at a U.S. marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. U.S. forces invade Grenada on 25 October to prevent a communist coup with Soviet and Cuban support.

1984 President Reagan concludes a five-day visit to China on 1 May, signing accords on nuclear cooperation and cultural relations. On 26 November the World Court rules that it has jurisdiction over Nicaragua's suit against the United States.

1985 On 24 April the House of Representatives rejects President Reagan's request for aid for the Nicaraguan contras. On 8 July, Reagan claims that world terrorism is sponsored by Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

1986 Meetings on 13–14 January with Canada's Prime Minister Brian Mulroney renew the long-lived North American Aerospace Defense Command System (NORAD). On 14 April, U.S. aircraft bomb five Libyan targets in retaliation for support of terrorists. The World Court on 27 June rules that the United States violated international law and Nicaragua's sovereignty, a ruling the United States ignores. Congress approves military aid to the Nicaraguan contras on 13 August. Congress on 2 October overrides President Reagan's veto of sanctions against South Africa. Reagan and Gorbachev meet on 11–12 October in Reykjavik, Iceland, about arms control; Reagan walks out of the last session.

1987 On 5 May joint congressional hearings begin on the Iran-Contra affair. Reagan and Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty on 8 December, eliminating intermediate-range missiles.

1988 On 4 February a U.S. court indicts Panama's General Noriega for racketeering and drug trafficking. The United States, Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan sign agreements on 14 April for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. With the INF Treaty of 1987 in effect as of 1 June, the United States and Soviet Union begin destruction of

nuclear weaponry in September. The Montreal Protocol on depletion of the ozone layer becomes effective on 16 December after ratification by twenty nations.

1989 President George H. W. Bush and Canada's Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on 10 February agree to reduce acid rain pollution. A U.S. federal court on 4 May finds Oliver North guilty of obstructing Congress in the investigation into the Iran-Contra scandal. On May 11 U.S. troops are sent to Panama after a "fraudulent" election renews the power of Panama's military leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega. NATO on 29–30 May accepts U.S. proposals to reduce Europe's short-range missiles and U.S.–USSR conventional forces. Chinese troops kill hundreds of protestors on 3–4 June in the Tiananmen Square massacre; in response, on 5 June, President Bush suspends military sales and high-level contacts and asks the IMF and World Bank to postpone Chinese loan applications. On 14 July, President Bush attends the G-7 Summit. Aid is provided on 25 August to Colombia to combat drug trafficking. On 18 October, South Korea asks that U.S. troop strength not be reduced. The Berlin Wall falls on 9 November. An invasion of Panama by U.S. forces on 20 December overthrows Noriega.

1990 On 15 February, President Bush and the presidents of Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru sign agreements to work together in combating drug traffickers. On 29 June ninety-three nations offer aid to Third World countries in reducing ozone-depleting gases. On 2 August, Iraq invades Kuwait; on 6 August, President Bush orders U.S. forces to protect Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield. On 12 September talks lead to a final treaty for German reunification on the 20th. On 17 November the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is signed.

1991 On 16 January, under U.S. direction, multinational UN forces launch the Gulf War against Iraq; by 28 February, in a 100-hour ground war, Iraq's forces are evicted from Kuwait. The Warsaw Pact's military and economic organizations are disbanded on 25 February. On 6 March, President Bush heralds a "new world order." On 7 May, UN peacekeepers arrive in Kuwait to oversee peace between Kuwait and Iraq. On 25 June, Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from Yugoslavia. Economic sanctions against South Africa are lifted on 11 July. President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative takes its first step on 22 July to develop a hemispheric free market by signing a trade accord with thirteen English-speaking Caribbean countries. On 31 July, Bush and Gorbachev sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). On 20 August the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania affirm their national independence from the Soviet Union. On 2 September, the United States and the European Union recognize the Baltic nations' independence. After Haiti's democratically elected president is overthrown in a military coup, on 29 October economic sanctions are imposed on the Haitian dictators. Twenty-four nations on 4 October extend the 1959 Antarctic Treaty by levying a fifty-year moratorium to ban mining and military activity and set guidelines for scientific research. On 8 November U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from South Korea and the two Koreas move toward reconciliation. Three former Soviet republics, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, form the Commonwealth of Independent States on 8 December.

1992 On 24 February the Supreme Court upholds President Bush's decision to forcibly repatriate Haitian refugees. An American court on 9 April convicts Noriega of drug trafficking and sentences him to forty years in prison. On 23 May the United States and the four Commonwealth of Independent States countries with nuclear arms sign the Lisbon Protocol to comply with the 1991 START I treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union. The Pentagon issues a defense guidance program for the post–Cold War era on 24 May, emphasizing a commitment to collective military action. President Bush extends most-favored-nation status on 2 June to China. On 14 June delegates of 178 countries to the Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) agree to promote economic development that would protect the earth's nonrenewable resources and sign a treaty to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases. On 17 June Bush and

Russian president Boris Yeltsin agree to draft a second strategic arms reduction treaty. Mexico, Canada, and the United States on 17 December sign the final North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

1993 On 3 January, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin sign START II to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals. Radical Muslims bomb New York's World Trade Center on 27 February. On 4 April financial aid is provided for Russia. The Oslo Accords are signed on 13 September between Israel's Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization chairman Yassir Arafat, the first Israel–PLO peace agreement. On 20 November, Congress approves NAFTA. Sanctions on South Africa are repealed on 23 November. The Uruguay Round of GATT is completed on 14 December with tariffs reduced 50 percent by the United States and the European Economic Community.

1994 The embargo on trade with Vietnam ends on 3 February. North Korea on 15 February avoids U.S. economic sanctions by approving inspection of nuclear sites. On 28 February, NATO aircraft shoot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the UN no-fly zone, NATO's first combat attack in its forty-five-year history. President Clinton renews China's most-favored-nation status on 26 May. On 8 June, President Clinton agrees to help the UN humanitarian effort in Rwanda, where warfare has killed 200,000 people and caused thousands of refugees to flee. The UN Security Council on 31 July approves a resolution for U.S.–led forces to intervene in Haiti; Haiti's President Aristide returns to Haiti on 15 October. The Senate ratifies on 1 December the GATT world trade treaty, which also creates the World Trade Organization (WTO).

1995 On 17 April, President Clinton signs an order to declassify all twenty-five-year-old records declassified after 1999, unless a special panel exempts certain sensitive materials. For assisting terrorist groups, on 1 May a trade embargo is placed on Iran. President Clinton and Fidel Castro amend their 1994 agreement on refugees on 2 May for the United States to admit 21,000 Cuban refugees being held in Guantanamo Bay. On 11 May the United Nations makes the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty permanent. President Clinton on 11 July extends full diplomatic recognition to Vietnam. That same day Bosnian Serb atrocities at Srebrenica lead to U.S. involvement, and the CIA and National Security Agency release secret files on Soviet documents from the 1940s. NATO air raids on 28 August on Bosnian Serbs lead to a peace conference. A U.S. court on 1 October finds ten Islamic fundamentalists guilty of conspiracy in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. On 2 October, Congress opposes a law to fight terrorism in America. The Dayton Accords of 21 November provide for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; they are signed on 14 December. Israel and Syria on 28 December renew peace talks at the Wye Conference Center near Washington.

1996 On 1 March, Colombia is declared no longer a certified country committed to the war on drugs. On 12 March, President Clinton signs the Helms-Burton Act to restrict trade of other nations with Cuba. On 24 April, Clinton signs antiterrorism legislation, providing $1.1 billion. Economic sanctions are levied on countries doing business with Libya and Iran on 5 August. On 27 September, Afghan Taliban rebels capture Kabul, imposing strict Islamic law.

1997 On 3 January, President Clinton delays enforcement of the Helms-Burton Act on Cuban trade. American George Soros on 7 September closes his foundation in Belarus. On 11 December 150 nations, but not the United States, sign the treaty banning the use of land mines. On 11 December, 150 nations prepare a treaty to limit greenhouse gases (the Kyoto Protocol). President Clinton indicates on 18 December that U.S. troops will remain in Bosnia indefinitely.

1998 Serb attacks on Kosovo lead President Clinton on 5 March to impose sanctions on Yugoslavia. On 19 April thirty-four Western Hemisphere nations agree to negotiate a free trade zone. Sanctions are imposed on 28 May on Pakistan and India because of their nuclear weapons tests; sanctions are eased on 14 July. On 20 August, President Clinton retaliates against terrorists who bombed the U.S embassy at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August.

1999 On 10 June, after seventy-eight days of bombing, Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic accepts NATO's cease-fire and peace terms. On 17 September, President Clinton lifts sanctions on North Korea after it stops missile tests. The Senate on 13 October refuses to ratify the treaty calling for ending all nuclear testing. Terms are accepted on 15 November for China to join the World Trade Organization.

2000 On 1 January, Panama gains full control of the Panama Canal from the United States. Congress approves on 24 May permanent trade relations with China. The United Nations Millennium Summit ends on 8 September. On 12 October the U.S. destroyer *Cole* is hit by a bomb in Yemen harbor, the work of suicide terrorists. A summit meeting on 16 October in Egypt with leaders of the United States, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, along with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, seeks to end violence between Israel and Palestine. On 24 November the global warming treaty (Kyoto Protocol) reaches an impasse because of U.S. and European differences on best methods to reduce greenhouse gases. On 31 December, President Clinton signs a treaty for a permanent international war crimes tribunal.

2001 On 18 January secretary of state–designate Colin Powell during hearings indicates that he favors deployment of the national missile defense system (NMDS). On 11 September terrorists hijack commercial airliners and crash them into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C. The United States initiates military action against Taliban-supported terrorists in Afghanistan with bombing raids on 6 October.

Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

AFRICAN AMERICANS

Brenda Gayle Plummer

Race and foreign affairs have intersected at numerous points in U.S. history. Officials in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not always explicitly aware of the impact of race on foreign relations or on their own decision making, but its impact on historical events is demonstrable. Beginning with the American Revolution and continuing through the twentieth century, race influenced what the United States did and how it pursued its interests abroad.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Black volunteers, detesting slavery and wanting liberty, fought on both sides of the revolutionary war. The activities of African-American revolutionaries were matched by those of black loyalists, some of whom were deliberately recruited into military service by British commanders eager to destabilize the plantation economy, especially in tidewater Virginia. This British policy was bitterly resented by slaveholders. Many of these soldiers retreated to Canada with the British after 1783. Freedom proved elusive for black protagonists on both sides. The U.S. flirtation with freedom for blacks proved ephemeral. Slavery persisted as a national institution and free people of color increasingly faced racial discrimination during the course of the antebellum period. Some loyalists who evacuated with the British were sold into slavery in the West Indies. Others found barriers to civil equality in their new Canadian homes.

RACE, IMPRESSMENTS, AND MARITIME ISSUES

Race was a factor in the maritime trades and in navies during the age of sail. Black men from North America, the Caribbean, and Africa, slave and free, were among the thousands employed in a range of industries and at war. They served on slavers, whalers, packet boats, warships, and were represented as sailors in almost all sectors of maritime activity. Rules governing the movements of both enslaved sailors and free men of color affected relations among states. In the antebellum South during periods of slave unrest, authorities enforced regulations that restricted the portside activities of West Indian seamen. Violators were threatened with enslavement. Abuse of foreign black sailors in U.S. ports sometimes brought protests from consuls or influential persons to whom they turned for support. The seamen's papers given black American sailors in 1796 did not afford them substantial protection from infringements on their rights, and until 1823, when civil equality was extended to black sailors in the British navy, black seamen of all nationalities were readily exploited, and those who were free faced the risk of illegal enslavement.

Impressment was a danger for all U.S. seamen, regardless of race, before and during the War of 1812. Those recruited into the British navy could expect harsher treatment than that experienced aboard U.S. ships. The fate of black loyalists enslaved in the West Indies during the American Revolution contributed to anti-British feeling among some African Americans in the early nineteenth century and helped preserve their loyalty to the United States during those years. The United States, however, was reluctant to recruit blacks into any armed forces except the navy. As a result, there were few black combatants except for those enlisted as volunteers in state units. The United States and Britain ultimately employed the same tactic that had been used in the revolutionary war in promising manumission to those who fought or served as military laborers. Those who allied themselves with Britain were taken to Canada at the end of the war and settled on plots of land. While many of the manumission promises made by U.S. authorities were honored, African Americans had no guarantee of civil equality.

SLAVERY AND ABOLITION

In Western countries, efforts to limit slavery began with the prohibition of the African slave trade and attempts to enforce an international ban on this traffic. Britain outlawed the slave trade in its possessions in 1807, and the United States soon followed suit, effective as of 1 January 1808. While the U.S. law curtailed the international supply of slaves, American traders continued to retail slaves through a domestic market. The abolitionist movement then focused on eradicating slavery itself. Antislavery activists created cooperative networks where they proselytized against slavery and abetted the escape of fugitives. Some antislavery activities had an international character. One campaign, noted in the cities of the northeastern United States and in Great Britain, focused on encouraging consumers to buy products grown without slave labor. The effort met with indifferent success but provided small ephemeral markets for imports from Haiti—a country that had gained its independence through slave rebellion—and after 1833, the British West Indies. The promotion of free labor produce coincided with a growing conviction in the northern United States and Britain that wage labor was the most rational, just, and efficient method of work, and with the social and political evolution of industrial society in those areas.

The British Parliament in 1833 enacted a gradual abolition program that ended slavery in British dominions by 1838. Between 1830 and 1860 a small African-American community had gathered in Britain. As most American universities barred black students, some were attending universities of far higher caliber than those in the United States. Others were fugitives who had made their way to a country where slavery was prohibited. Such prominent U.S. abolitionists as Frederick Douglass and Charles Lenox Remond and his sister Sarah Remond visited Britain to enlist both the working classes and the bourgeoisie in the American antislavery cause. Black abolitionists gave public lectures and sold copies of slave narratives written by themselves and others. They succeeded in thwarting many of the fund-raising efforts of the American Colonization Society, established in 1816–1817 to resettle blacks on the west coast of Africa. In Ireland, the Irish nationalist Daniel O'Connell, an outspoken foe of slavery, embraced Frederick Douglass. Douglass spent nineteen months lecturing in the British Isles between 1845 and 1847. British Quakers raised the money to buy Douglass's freedom from his Maryland owner.

Antislavery activists hoped that pressure applied by Britain, then the world's most powerful nation, would persuade the United States to deal forthrightly with the slavery question. Abolitionists did not succeed in capturing all Britons. They faced the opposition of those manufacturers and workers most dependent on imports of U.S. cotton, but benefited from a widespread revulsion among all classes against slavery. The groundwork that Douglass, the Remonds, and others laid helped neutralize British sympathies for southern slaveholders. This was a critical issue during the 1850s, when sectional animosity reached a crisis point in the United States. If Britain, despite its own antislavery stand within its realms, allied with the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War, the United States would likely be defeated. While American abolitionists often avoided direct discussions of class conflict because of their frequent reliance on elite patronage in Britain and their desire to keep the focus on slavery, the zenith of their activity coincided with the Chartist movement, which sought to improve conditions for the industrial working class, and debates over the status of labor.

American slavery was also drawn into the international arena as a result of the activities of fugitive slaves. In the course of the nineteenth century some thirty thousand black persons from the United States entered Canada. Periods of domestic crisis, such as the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and the Dred Scott decision, accelerated this immigration. The Fugitive Slave Act made it easy for slaveholders and bounty hunters to threaten the liberty of free people of color. In an explicitly racist finding, the Supreme Court, in the 1857 case *Scott* v. *Sandford*, ruled that blacks could not be citizens and had no civil rights. The decision effectively ended the prospects of free people of color in the United States until after the Civil War. Many who were able left the country. In addition to the relatively familiar escapes to Canada by slaves and free people alike, blacks from Texas crossed the border into Mexico, where slavery was illegal. During the early years of the Republic, when Spain loosely administered Florida, fugitives in combination with the Seminole nation engaged the United States in wars in 1817–1818 and 1835–1842. In the aftermath of the first Seminole war, Spain, unable and unwilling to guarantee the security of U.S. real and chattel property along its Florida

borders, and wishing to avoid armed conflict with Americans, ceded the rebellious territory to the United States.

Fugitives also included those whose antislavery activities put them in jeopardy of the law. Frederick Douglass in 1859 was a suspect in John Brown's conspiracy to seize the federal armory in Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Douglass fled to England to avoid arrest. Once there, he contacted the U.S. minister to the Court of St. James's hoping to secure a passport to visit France. The passport was denied on grounds that Douglass, according to Supreme Court dicta, was not a U.S. citizen. Douglass was an early victim of passport denial, a practice that would be used in the twentieth century to restrict the movements of blacks who were known critics of racial discrimination.

COLONIZATION AND EMIGRATION

Opinion leaders on both sides of the slavery question during the antebellum period expressed fears about the consequences of emancipation. Some abolitionists believed that slavery was morally wrong but did not think that freed slaves could be assimilated into American society for racial reasons. Certain proslavery advocates used these doubts about assimilation to argue that slavery could not be eradicated. A third alternative to slavery or abolition was the removal of freed slaves from the United States. The option appealed to blacks who wished a homeland of their own, and to proslavery and antislavery advocates alike who thought blacks could not be assimilated into American life. Paul Cuffe, a black New England shipowner, was committed to civil rights for African Americans and an outspoken opponent of slavery. He nevertheless employed his own resources in a back-to-Africa project in the early 1810s. After correspondence with prominent British abolitionists, including the parliamentarian William Wilberforce, Cuffe sought to repatriate selected emigrants to the British African colony of Sierra Leone. His plans were interrupted by the War of 1812 and by his own death not long thereafter, but he did succeed in settling some thirty-eight persons in Africa.

In 1821 the American Colonization Society resumed Cuffe's work. Members of the organization included such figures as Henry Clay, Francis Scott Key, and other prominent white Americans for whom the United States had to remain a white man's country. The society purchased African land from local rulers, and in 1847 the settlement, called Liberia, became an independent republic. Many antislavery activists opposed the American Colonization Society, believing that it was simply a stratagem to solidify slavery by removing from the United States the only blacks in a position to contest it. Others endorsed colonization and emigration in principle, reserving their objections for the society per se. There were, accordingly, other colonization ventures. In the 1820s and 1850s, two emigration movements to Haiti were organized with the cooperation of the Haitian government. A project in the 1830s involved the removal of American blacks to the island of Trinidad. President Abraham Lincoln, who endorsed colonization as a strategy to prevent a civil war over the slavery question, researched the possibility of a black homeland on the isthmus of Central America. These schemes involved negotiations with heads of state for land grants and concessions. Foreign leaders had their own reasons for endorsing these programs. Haiti had traditionally offered itself as an asylum for blacks in the Western Hemisphere and in the 1820s wanted to create a buffer on its frontier with Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic) by settling African Americans there. Great Britain in the 1830s sought labor to work on the Trinidad plantations abandoned by the beneficiaries of its own emancipation laws, a need for which it later recruited workers from India.

CIVIL WAR AND RECOGNITION OF BLACK COUNTRIES

During the nineteenth century, slavery and its accompanying racist ideology prevented the United States from conducting full diplomatic relations with Haiti and Liberia, states modeled on modern republics that were populated and governed by blacks. Many U.S. diplomats did not believe it possible to consort with black counterparts on an equal basis and receive them into the polite society of the period. Proslavery southerners saw Haiti as anathema on social and political grounds and as a security problem. Some southern states passed laws that forbade the entry of sailors and other free people of color from Haiti. Before the Civil War, the U.S. government did not recognize Haiti and was represented there only by consuls. Southern secession removed the obstacles to recognition, which occurred on 12 July 1862 when the State Department appointed a

chief of mission, Benjamin Whidden. In 1869, U.S. representation was raised to the ministerial level with the appointment of the first African American in such a post, Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett. The defeat of the Confederacy and the abolition of slavery meant improvement in Haitian-American relations, ending the threat of slavery expansionism and filibustering raids on Haitian coasts. Beginning with Bassett's appointment, diplomatic and consular posts to Haiti and Liberia became patronage posts for loyal black Republicans, a pattern that persisted until well into the mid-twentieth century.

In the late nineteenth century, American activists sought to bring international attention to the lynching problem in the "Jim Crow" South. Hampered by lack of access to sources of state power, activists such as the anti-lynching advocate Ida B. Wells-Barnett searched for unconventional and less restrictive venues for international contact. Just as American activists had sought British support for abolition during the slavery era, Wells-Barnett toured the United Kingdom in 1893 and 1894 to publicize the lynching problem and bring the weight of British public opinion to bear on the issue. She devised another way to focus international attention on U.S. domestic affairs when, in 1893, Chicago hosted the Columbian Exposition, which brought visitors from all over the world. Through the mediation of Frederick Douglass, the government of Haiti selected Wells-Barnett to manage its exhibit and provided her with a table in the Haitian pavilion. There she sold copies of a book she had written to document lynching and the context in which it occurred. Wells-Barnett was thereby able to reach a wide audience in one of the first efforts to employ an international cultural festival to air concerns about U.S. race relations.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PAN-AFRICAN CONGRESS

World War I shattered the balance of power in Europe and destroyed the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires. These state systems lost control of the diverse ethnic groups previously under their control. Subject nations and national minorities began demanding language rights, sovereignty, and democratic governments. When the Allies met in the Paris suburb of Versailles in 1919 to rebuild the world order, their agenda included the construction of nations in eastern Europe and the revitalization of the empires that remained. European debates on political autonomy and territoriality were the model for Asians and Africans seeking to bring their own interests to world attention.

The Pan-African Congress was an important vehicle for formulating and disseminating such demands. The association emerged from a 1900 London conference. Organized by a Trinidadian attorney resident in London and an African-

JIM CROW AND THE COLD WAR

"A vast literature has explored the major American cold war initiatives of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The decision-making processes and ramifications of the Truman Doctrine, the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and National Security Council document 68 (NSC 68) have received painstaking analysis from a variety of political perspectives. But there has been only occasional attention paid either to the ways in which these policy initiatives emerged from a racially hierarchical domestic and international landscape or to their racial meanings and ramifications. Yet, people of color at the time were well aware of this other context. Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of February 1946 represented a declaration of cold war, but it also served as a call for Anglo-American racial and cultural unity. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 opposed potential 'armed minorities' of the left but not those of the right who actually ruled much of the world: European colonialists. The Marshall Plan (1948) and NATO (1949) bolstered anticommunist governments west of the Elbe River but also indirectly funded their efforts at preserving white rule in Asia and Africa. NSC 68 laid out an offensive strategy of diminishing Soviet influence abroad, but it also revealed American anxieties about a broader 'absence of order among nations' that was 'becoming less and less tolerable' when the largest change in the international system was coming not from communist revolutions but from the decolonization of nonwhite peoples."

— *From Thomas Borstelmann, "Jim Crow's Coming Out: Race Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years,"* Presidential Studies Quarterly *29, no. 3 (1999): 549–569* —

American bishop, the congress brought together blacks from Britain and its colonies, the United States, and South Africa. The purpose was to discuss colonialism and racism and suggest strategies for reform. The association made little headway in its first twenty years, the zenith of European colonial domination of Africa. World War I provided an opportunity to renew its goals, however, and it planned a Paris conference that would convene simultaneously with the Versailles peace conference.

African-American leaders sought representation as observers at the peace conference and began discussing it before the war ended. Those most interested included the intellectual activist W. E. B. Du Bois, entrepreneur C. J. Walker, National Equal Rights League founder William Monroe Trotter, and activist Wells-Barnett. The Universal Negro Improvement Association, an international organization founded by Marcus Garvey, named delegates to the congress, including the labor leader A. Philip Randolph. Other interested organizations included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Race Congress. The thinking was that if representatives of black organizations were denied admission to the proceedings or audiences with principals, they could use the Pan-African Congress and their proximity to the peace talks to bring their issues to public attention.

President Woodrow Wilson led the U.S. delegation at Versailles. Wilson believed in international organization and saw the peace conference as an opportunity to put the United States permanently at the center of power in the global community. Like other Allied leaders, Wilson wished to maintain control over national minorities. He was, additionally, a committed segregationist who as president of Princeton University had excluded African-American students from dormitories, and as president of the United States had separated federal civil servants by race, placing black employees behind partitions.

The Wilson administration did not want minority observers or protesters in Europe. The State Department accordingly refused passports to most of the black Americans wishing to go to France. Those who managed to cross the Atlantic attended a Pan-African Congress composed of fifty-seven delegates who discussed, under the careful scrutiny of the French government, such issues as the status of defeated Germany's colonies and colonial reform. The more militant civil rights activists and nationalists were less interested in the Pan African Congress than in addressing the peace conference, the forum where decisions affecting the world's national minorities and subject peoples would be made. President Wilson was determined to prevent such initiatives. He refused to see either Trotter or a young Vietnamese leader, Nguyen That Thanh, later known as Ho Chi Minh. Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George prohibited the presence of delegates of colonized peoples and racial minorities at Versailles, but Du Bois succeeded in representing the NAACP at the first conference of the League of Nations in 1921.

THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR

In October 1935, Benito Mussolini's fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia. The war there occurred at the height of isolationist sentiment in the U.S. Congress and the nation at large. While public sympathy for Ethiopia was considerable, so was the disinclination to intervene. The minority that pressed for a more forthright stand included African Americans and Irish Catholics who broke with the Catholic majority on the issue. The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt showed concern about Italian aggression, but domestic opposition to even rhetorical intervention discouraged firm action. When Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a note suggesting that the United States would not necessarily remain indifferent to what his government did in Africa, the message was so subdued that Mussolini readily dismissed it. A neutrality act banned the sale of finished war products to belligerents, but it did not deny them access to strategic materials, which could be purchased proportionately to the rate of prewar consumption. Italy, a growing industrial power, bought large quantities of American oil. Ethiopia, still feudal, bought none. The neutrality act thus helped ensure that Italy would be well equipped to defeat its decrepit adversary.

Administration officials shrank from the prospect of ventilating an issue that would bring down isolationist wrath. For actors at the policy center, domestic considerations and the ultimate collapse of Ethiopian resistance tabled the question for the duration of World War II. At the periphery, however, the Ethiopian issue enabled the development of linkages that remained timely. Ethiopia was a ready-made issue for black nationalists and permitted liberals and leftists to focus

their general opposition to fascism. The Ethiopian government-in-exile played a leading role itself in keeping public interest alive through publicity campaigns and appeals for funds. It also made explicit appeals to African Americans as a usable pressure group. Ethiopia's experience with fascist conquest facilitated a sharper critique of racism and imperialism and focused postwar attention on the disposition of colonies in northeast Africa and colonialism in general.

GERMAN RECONSTRUCTION AND RACIAL SEGREGATION

In 1945 the Allies claimed victory over a German state that had taken racism to its logical extreme in the pursuit of eugenic purity and the destruction of millions of lives. African-American troops were part of the force that occupied Germany from 1945 to 1955, when efforts were made on all fronts to reform its institutions and reconstruct it physically. From the beginning of the occupation, U.S. racial practices in the military contradicted the essence of its mission in Germany and led to confusion and resentment among the conquered.

In the American zone of occupation, commanding officers could approve soldiers' marriages as they saw fit. Many of those holding conventional American ideas about race often prohibited mixed marriages even when children were involved. When individual soldiers appealed these prohibitions, military judges relied on the laws of the various U.S. states to determine whether a proposed union could be approved and compiled the relevant statutes for their own use. If a soldier resided in a state where interracial marriages were illegal, his application to marry outside his race would be turned down. Racial record keeping on marriages began in 1947. German courts followed this example. The Allies, having struck down the racist Nuremberg laws, oddly found themselves reapplying them in the American zone of occupation, where the German courts followed suit.

Military opposition to mixed marriages gradually declined, but in the interim approximately three thousand biracial children were born in Germany between 1945 and 1951, almost all the offspring of African-American servicemen. As a result of the continuing ambivalence among all parties about the children's prospects for adoption in the United States, the West German state, autonomous in 1955, was charged with the responsibility for absorbing them into German society. Germans witnessed the contradictions between U.S. opposition to nazi racism and policies governing intermarriage. The first cohort of biracial children reached their teens as violence associated with segregation in the United States made international headlines. While some Germans continued to believe that homes in the United States should be sought for those who were not already adopted, the prevailing opinion was that the orphans should not be sent into a society characterized by racial violence. If the United States' goal had been to transform Germany into a democracy characterized by tolerance, the biracial orphans provided them a paradoxical opportunity to show the world they had shed Hitlerism.

THE UNITED NATIONS PETITION

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the autumn of 1944, delegates planned the foundations of a postwar international organization that would reprise the work of the League of Nations. Conferees rejected a racial and national equality clause that the Chinese government had put forward but failed to energetically defend. In the early years of the United Nations, efforts were made to insert ethnic and linguistic rights into the UN Charter and other central documents. Cold War tensions entered the deliberations of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the late 1940s, as many sovereign states proved reluctant to permit international oversight of their treatment of national minorities.

For African Americans in particular the era reflected a rising interest in social science and world affairs and the secularization of black protest that moved it away from philanthropic church control. Black opinion widely supported a pluralist United Nations that would counter the "Anglo-American" conception of a postwar peace elaborated by Winston Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri, "Iron Curtain" speech. While no blacks attended the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, Walter White, secretary of the NAACP; W. E. B. Du Bois, the NAACP's director of special research; and Mary McLeod Bethune, of the National Council of Negro Women, were present as observers. Their attendance resulted from extensive organizing activities by black non-

governmental organizations to formulate an agenda for international activism. The black Republican Perry Howard urged blacks to send telegrams to their congressional representatives to demand that the UN Charter protect minority rights. Despite setbacks, the UN continued to be seen as a potentially useful instrument in checking Western abuses of national minorities and colonial subjects. In 1948 the chair of the Baltimore chapter of the NAACP urged UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie to reject the University of Maryland's offer to house the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Segregation at the institution, including its college of agriculture, would inconvenience FAO personnel from non-European countries.

Attempts in 1945 to influence the United Nations to protect minority rights were among the first of several efforts. Backed by labor, professional, fraternal, and veterans' associations, the National Negro Congress drafted a petition to the United Nations in mid-1946. It was formulated at the same time that similar petitions were being presented by Indonesians and the Jewish diaspora, and shortly before the General Assembly voted to censure South Africa for its treatment of its East Indian resident population. Encouraged by parallel international events, the NAACP followed suit with its own petition in 1947. The NAACP asked the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate racial discrimination in the United States. Supported by hundreds of black organizations across the political spectrum, and by African and Caribbean nationalists and labor federations overseas, the appeal was also viewed favorably by India, Pakistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Belgium, Haiti, Norway, China (Formosa), and the USSR, which introduced the petition in October 1947. Despite its popularity with the black public in the United States and international endorsement, the petition died in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Pressure applied on the United Nations by the United States, the influence of Eleanor Roosevelt, then a UNESCO commissioner, and misgivings among certain NAACP officials about Soviet support of the appeal, led to its demise.

RACIAL REFORM AND COLD WAR IDEOLOGY

The U.S. rivalry with the Soviet Union and its Cold War partners involved political as well as military competition. President Harry S. Truman articulated the need to improve U.S. race relations not only because the Soviets were exploiting the race issue but also because U.S. credibility was at stake. Truman and his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, articulated a need for reform and coupled this with the same repression of black communists and other radical black critics of America that generally characterized the early Cold War period in U.S. society. Such activists as Du Bois and Paul Robeson were refused passports. U.S. representatives abroad interfered with American-born dancer Josephine Baker, a French citizen and an outspoken critic of U.S. racial mores. The Eisenhower administration, committed to the reduction of military spending but putting greater emphasis on promoting the economic and cultural superiority of American life, had come to associate winning the Cold War with improving the civil rights climate for black Americans. While Eisenhower was not enthusiastic about desegregation, he was committed enough to the principle of civil equality to support a modest civil rights bill in 1957.

The belief that America's ability to champion democracy depended on its success at practicing it at home continued during the Kennedy years. The Cold War rationale for racial reform was strengthened by evidence that hostile countries utilized negative news about race relations to discredit the United States. In an increasingly decolonized world, where Africans and Asians now headed sovereign states, racial discrimination could no longer be endorsed or accepted. Technological change meant that journalists could record instances of racial violence and broadcast them to the world. The Soviet Union and its allies were not the only critics. Disapproval emanated from nonaligned countries, especially India, and from such conventional Western states as Denmark. In contrast to the world press, pro-apartheid South African journalists played up racial incidents in the United States, especially the exploits of white supremacists. This also constituted part of the embarrassment that necessitated a significant propaganda effort to neutralize damaging racial news stories about segregation.

Members of the intelligentsia and business communities also employed arguments that linked foreign and domestic affairs. In September 1950, for example, the NAACP convened the Breakneck Hill Conference, where senators, UN officials, journalists and broadcast executives, State Department representatives, educators, and activists con-

sidered the impact of racial discrimination on the nation's foreign policy objectives. Civil rights proponents, including participants in sit-ins and other demonstrations in the 1960s, also used Cold War arguments to rationalize their challenge to discriminatory statutes. Segregation tainted the U.S. reputation abroad, they claimed, and the limited opportunities for minorities that resulted from it meant fewer human resources available to defend the nation and extend its interests.

U.S. government efforts to counter the bad publicity involved activities sponsored by the State Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA). These included providing news to international readers, stocking U.S. libraries abroad with what was perceived as balanced information about black life in the United States, and enlisting African-American lecturers and entertainers to travel abroad and entertain or provide information to interested foreigners. Some individuals who toured foreign countries for this purpose sometimes exaggerated the amount of progress made in race relations. The State Department and USIA, for their part, did not deny the existence of racism but rather emphasized what they portrayed as a national commitment to effect change through nonviolent means. The appointment in 1964 of the African-American journalist Carl Rowan as USIA director was intended to emphasize the latter. Rowan had previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs and as ambassador to Finland.

AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS

The civil rights movement presented the State Department and other government branches not only with the problem of trying to counter America's racist image abroad but also that of dealing with discrimination within their own ranks. Since Reconstruction, most African-American consuls, ministers, and ambassadors had been political appointees posted to black countries. The number of career black foreign service officers and consular officials remained minuscule until the second half of the twentieth century. The State Department, an executive department in a staunchly segregated capital, steadfastly resisted integration. In addition to racial segregation, its institutional culture traditionally relied on eastern elites. The democratization of the State Department through geographic and demographic diversification evolved only gradually. Its racial desegregation occurred chiefly at the initiative of presidential administrations and informal pressure from black leadership.

Civil rights organizations had expressed dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative character of the State Department since the 1940s, but changes were desultory until the early 1960s. The Kennedy White House, seeking to consolidate its gains with the African-American electorate while maintaining a moderate posture on civil rights, looked to Africa for the solution. Well-publicized visits from African heads of state and the appointment of African Americans to diplomatic posts provided the symbolic politics the situation required. The United States would also realize the additional benefit of encouraging ostensibly nonaligned African states to view the West more favorably and limit their contacts with Warsaw Pact states. The State Department remained slow to change, however, and only after criticism of the pace and scope of reform accelerated were significant numbers of African-American diplomatic representatives named to countries outside Africa and the Caribbean.

In line with the perceived need to court newly independent African states and encourage them to maintain close ties with the West, U.S. officials tried to insulate U.S. foreign relations from the repercussions of domestic racism by assisting diplomats from Africa, the Caribbean, and other regions who encountered discrimination while living and traveling in the United States. In the 1950s and early 1960s, negative experiences of foreign envoys chiefly involved the refusal of service to Africans (as well as South Asians and others) in states where segregation was official, the relegation of nonwhites to Jim Crow sections of public facilities, and housing discrimination in states ranging from New York to Virginia.

Initially, the State Department dealt with the problem by attempting to isolate foreign blacks from African Americans, a task facilitated by the nature of diplomatic relations. Nonwhite envoys could, for example, simply be exempted from segregation laws by virtue of their status. Federal officials could intervene in particular cases, but they were not always present when visitors experienced embarrassments. When the Ghanaian finance minister was denied service at a Delaware restaurant in 1957, Eisenhower invited him to breakfast at the White House, and Vice President Richard Nixon sent him a formal apology. The

State Department discussed the matter with the restaurant's franchisee. The most serious incident was the beating of a Guinean foreign service officer by New York City police officers following a traffic accident. The presence of nonwhite envoys also forced adjustments in the elite social life of Washington. State Department chief of protocol Angier Biddle Duke resigned in 1961 from the prestigious Metropolitan Club because of its refusal to continue extending what had previously been automatic membership to foreign diplomats and its absence of black members.

To be sure, another consideration that drove reform within the diplomatic corps was the awareness that segregation as a whole made a bad impression on foreigners regardless of race. As early as June 1951, the solicitor general of the United States, Philip Perlman, filed an amicus curiae brief in a U.S. Court of Appeals case that involved a Washington, D.C., restaurant's refusal of service to a U.S. citizen on racial grounds. Perlman argued that foreigners judge the United States by their experiences in its capital and that segregation marred the image of American democracy. The solicitor general thus linked the reform of racial policies in the United States to the nation's best interests abroad.

In August 1961 the Kennedy administration created a task force composed of representatives from the White House, State Department, and local state governments to address the problem of racial discrimination. Because of local entrepreneurs' inability to distinguish between Africans and African Americans and favor the former, public facilities along the Washington-Maryland corridor ultimately had to be desegregated for everyone.

THE VIETNAM WAR

African-American opposition to the war in Vietnam, the overriding U.S. foreign policy concern of the 1960s and early 1970s, reflected perceptions of self-interest. During the 1950s the major civil rights organizations had stopped taking action on foreign policy questions. As the war escalated, civil rights leaders feared both the loss of organizational revenues if prowar advocates withdrew their support and the prospect of internal friction among organizations over the peace issue. Anxiety about possible accusations of subversion, and concern lest the civil rights focus be dissipated, were other causes of apprehension. The immediacy of civil rights insurgency in the South provided a powerful pretext for channeling organizational energies to domestic questions only.

Moreover, by the mid-1960s the reluctance of black leaders to engage in issues apart from domestic civil rights was reinforced by an increasingly beleaguered presidential administration fighting to maintain a "one voice" approach for U.S. foreign policy around the globe. President Lyndon B. Johnson, for whom Africa was a low priority, particularly opposed the consolidation of an African-American foreign policy constituency. Johnson did not want to multiply the number of players in international affairs and perceived such a constituency as contradicting the goal of fully integrating blacks into American life. Johnson believed that racially and ethnically based interest groups generally fragmented what should be a unitary national position on foreign affairs as government experts defined them.

In 1965, however, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, at the center of some of the most sweeping changes in American society, publicly advocated draft resistance. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee became the first national body to oppose the war. While antiwar sentiment did not overtake the black majority until 1969, activist organizations mounted pressure on Martin Luther King, Jr., to take a stand. Vietnamese Buddhists who sent him an "open letter" joined with domestic war critics in urging action. In 1967, King formally reiterated his inability to square the war with his conscience, his belief that the war was sapping the economic and spiritual vigor of the country, and his conviction that the national mission needed redefinition. In an April speech at the Riverside Church in New York City, King delivered a radical critique of U.S. foreign policy.

Ultimately, Vietnam was a broad enough issue to absorb many of the questions that had long preoccupied African Americans. Critiques of the war called into question the integrity of the political process and opened the door to large-scale insurgency. On this issue black foreign policy audiences entered the controversy late, had dwindling access to increasingly less responsive policymakers, and were considerably alienated from "normal politics." Their efforts to influence the conduct of the war were also hampered by strategies that were based on addressing legislatures and courts rather than executive officials.

The spirit of insurgency in the late 1960s combined with new global media to afford

African-American activists new forums for international exposure to U.S. domestic problems. One of the most prominent examples was the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, from which South Africa had been excluded owing to worldwide opposition to that country's apartheid policy. Certain African-American athletes had contemplated a boycott of the games because of their dissatisfaction with racial conditions in the United States, but they ultimately decided to participate. African-American medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos, feeling the need to make at least a symbolic gesture, raised their fists in protest at U.S. racial injustice as the "Star-Spangled Banner" was being played. Both athletes were widely criticized and their careers were destroyed. In an ironic twist in 1980, the U.S. government asked African-American boxing champion Muhammad Ali to persuade various countries to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

SOUTH AFRICA

By the mid-1950s, only in South Africa could U.S. diplomats be committed and outspoken racists. The State Department sent envoys to South Africa whose own outlook aligned closely with that of their hosts. In light of U.S. reliance on South African raw materials, mutual anticommunism, and interest in free trade, policymakers acquiesced to South African segregation laws that paralleled those that were still current in the United States. As civil rights insurgency and changing views toward race worldwide eroded segregation at home, U.S. official acceptance of South African racial practices could no longer be direct. Washington attempted to distance itself rhetorically from apartheid while continuing harmonious relations with South Africa.

As noted, the State Department and USIA often sponsored goodwill tours of African-American entertainers to foreign countries, and these included South Africa. U.S. authorities may have believed that exposure to the diversity of U.S. society would give proponents of apartheid pause. Visits to South Africa by American performers were not limited to government-sponsored ventures. South African promoters signed U.S. artists to lucrative contracts, but they were often required to perform before segregated audiences.

The gap between U.S. democratic beliefs on one hand, and government and private sector ties to the South African regime on the other, led in the 1980s to an international protest movement against apartheid. Anti-apartheid activists set out to discourage artist exchanges in the belief that they had no effect on apartheid, degraded the artist involved, and lent credibility to the South African regime. Through adverse publicity and boycott, many U.S. entertainers were pressured into avoiding South Africa. Similar actions were mounted when the South African government sent African troupes to the United States if they apologized for conditions in their homeland.

Pressure from advocacy groups was a crucial factor in leading the United States to impose economic sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s. Thus, in February 1990, South African President F. W. de Klerk released the African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela from his twenty-seven-year imprisonment, and in March 1992 white South Africans passed a referendum that would end white minority rule.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahrari, Mohammed E., ed. *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1987.

Blackett, R. J. M. *Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830–1860.* Baton Rouge, La., 1983.

Borstelmann, Thomas. *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle.* New York, 1993.

Collum, Danny Duncan, ed. *African Americans in the Spanish Civil War: "This Ain't Ethiopia, but It'll Do."* New York, 1992.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992.

Du Bois, W. E. B. "Inter-Racial Implications of the Ethiopian Crisis: A Negro View." *Foreign Affairs* 14 (October 1935): 82–92.

Dudziak, Mary L. "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative." *Stanford Law Review* 41 (November 1988): 61–120.

———. *Cold War Civil Rights.* Princeton, N.J., 2000.

Fairclough, Adam. "Martin Luther King Jr. and the War in Vietnam." *Phylon* 45, no. 1 (1984): 19–39.

Füredi, Frank. *The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1998.

Gatewood, Willard B. *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898–1903.* Urbana, Ill., 1975.

Hannaford, Ivan. *Race: The History of an Idea in the West.* Washington, D.C., 1996.

Harris, Robert L., Jr. "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter." In Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan, eds. *New Directions in Civil Rights Studies.* Charlottesville, Va., 1991.

Horne, Gerald. *Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963.* Albany, N.Y., 1986.

Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987.

Isaacs, Harold Robert. *The New World of Negro Americans.* New York, 1964.

Krenn, Michael L. *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945–1969.* Armonk, N.Y., 1999.

Krenn, Michael L., ed. *The Impact of Race on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Reader.* New York, 1999.

Lauren, Paul Gordon. *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination.* 2d ed. Boulder, Colo., 1996.

Lockwood, Bert, Jr. "The UN Charter and U.S. Civil Rights Litigation: 1946–1955." *Iowa Law Review* 5 (1984): 901–956.

Noer, Thomas J. *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968.* Columbia, Mo., 1985.

Plummer, Brenda G. *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996.

Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 2000.

Weston, Rubin Francis. *Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893–1946.* Columbia, S.C., 1972.

See also CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY; PEACE MOVEMENTS; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES

Warren F. Kimball

During the end of the 1990s, globalism for most Americans meant an exhilarating combination of political security and economic prosperity. The Cold War had dissipated, while wages and profits seemed on an endless uptick. Intervention in a new outbreak of the Balkan wars came in association with some of the major western European states and partly under the aegis of NATO, but the reaction against the U.S. bombing of Belgrade illustrated just how tenuous alliance policy really was. For the administration of President Bill Clinton and most Americans, globalism did not mean becoming the world's police officer, or even joining a police force with worldwide responsibilities. The United Nations was not an alliance.

But on 11 September 2001, globalism took on a new meaning. The suicide attacks by nineteen Muslim terrorists on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in the District of Columbia demonstrated that America's comfort zone, that sense of political security originally fostered by time and distance across oceans, no longer existed—not even as wishful thinking. The long-held belief in American invulnerability, enhanced by modern technology and dreams of Star War–like defenses that could not be breached, collapsed along with the twin towers of the World Trade Center.

The initial response by the administration of George W. Bush was to seek revenge under the guise of "infinite justice." But that quickly gave way to the realities of identifying, locating, and either capturing or executing those who planned the hijacking of the commercial aircraft that flew into the towers and the Pentagon and their use as fuel-laden missiles. The implications of what could appear to be a "crusade" against Islam, particularly for U.S. oil policy in the Middle East, had a chastening influence, and American opinion seemed to move slowly but firmly against rash action. The administration acknowledged the difficulties and began the process of preparing the public for a long-term "war against terrorism."

Diplomats, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, fanned out around the globe in an attempt to persuade, cajole, and even bribe (with foreign aid) other states to join the war effort as allies. Two old Cold War alliances, NATO and ANZUS, each formally declared the terrorist actions an attack on the entire alliance—invoking for the first time the "an attack on one is an attack on all" clause in each treaty. Even France, seen so often as hypercritical of the United States, praised President Bush for acting in a measured, responsible fashion. The Russian Federation, with its own history of concern about Islamic political influence (Afghanistan, Chechnya), led the way for new partners in the alliance against terrorism. And the United Nations Security Council passed an emergency resolution mandating that all members assist in the international effort against such terrorist attacks. Even China agreed. Islamic nations likewise condemned the attacks but backed away from allowing the United States to launch military operations from their territory against terrorists, while in Indonesia and Pakistan there were organized public demonstrations against the United States. Clearly, nearly all states recognized that terrorism posed a deep and frightening threat to the nation-state. The immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks was history's most remarkable example of global cooperation. But for how long? During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt understood that the Soviet Union was indispensable to victory, but that alliance did not survive the end of the common crisis. How the United States came to the point of making its twenty-first-century decision on globalism is buried, but not hidden, in the past.

THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

American reluctance to participate in alliances, coalitions, and ententes was traditional until

World War II. According to the conventional wisdom, in 1778, out of sheer necessity, but remembering the colonial experience of being dragged into European wars, the revolutionary leaders unhappily agreed to sign a political alliance with France. Some twenty years later, when that treaty seemingly forced the young American nation to choose between the two great antagonists in the Anglo-French conflict in Europe, the United States repudiated that alliance, fought a brief and undeclared war to make that repudiation stick, and then, embittered by the brief experience with "European-style" alliances, swore off such political activity forever. In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned against "permanent alliances," and in an inaugural address Thomas Jefferson provided the slogan that Americans seem always to need for a policy—"entangling alliances with none."

For a hundred and fifteen years, until World War I, the American nation refused to indulge in the kind of international alliance politics that characterized European diplomacy. Even then, once propelled into the Great War, the United States took the moral high ground and refused to accept full membership as an ally in the coalition against the Central Powers, opting instead for the label "associated power." Disillusioned and angered by the selfishness that the European powers exhibited during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the United States attempted to withdraw from the international arena during the interwar period, only to be forced by Japanese and German aggression to come again to the rescue of the civilized world. The events of World War II forced the United States into what became a long-term alliance with Great Britain and a very short-term one with the Soviet Union. Then, as Cold War tensions mounted, the U.S. government negotiated a series of defensive mutual security alliances aimed at protecting the "free" world against Russian (communist) aggression.

Reluctant participation is clearly the tone of the entire story. Perhaps the thrust of generally accepted interpretations was best summarized by Thomas A. Bailey in his extraordinarily popular text *A Diplomatic History of the American People*: "The United States cannot afford to leave the world alone because the world will not leave it alone." In other words, historians have treated coalition and alliance diplomacy as part and parcel of the story of America's traditional isolationism.

TERMINOLOGY

Although the American public has never drawn sharp distinctions between alliances, coalitions, and ententes, its leaders have frequently acted in a way that indicated that they understood the differences. Alliances are properly formal agreements between nations that call for specific joint action and responses to given political situations. They can be outlined verbally, but they are normally committed to paper and are, therefore, recognized in international law. Although alliances relate to wartime situations, they are usually concluded in times of peace and last for significant periods of time.

Coalitions bring to mind the various European joint efforts against France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Those wars saw various nations unite in military action against France frequently only after the fighting had actually begun. Short term and often not defined by written agreements, coalitions aim simply at the military defeat of a common enemy and do not relate to postwar considerations. Although the term is rarely applied, Russo-American cooperation during World War II against Nazi Germany was a coalition rather than an alliance. The only common ground was military victory over the enemy, and attempts by both nations to expand that limited relationship met with failure.

Entente, properly used, describes a far deeper relationship between nations than either alliance or coalition. An entente becomes possible only when two or more nations share a set of political goals and perceptions. The most obvious entente in American history has been the one that began to develop between Great Britain and the United States after the War of 1812. Frequently subjected to great strains, that entente was formalized as an alliance during World War II and the Cold War era. Such an entente is more a friendship than an alliance or coalition stimulated by sheer power politics, although the realities of international relations are never completely ignored.

REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY: THE NECESSARY ALLIANCE

Historians have frequently argued that America's antipathy to political involvement with Europe originated with the colonial experiences, when

European wars spread to the Western Hemisphere. Yet even a cursory glance at colonial newspapers indicates that the English settlers in America viewed the wars with France and Spain as their own. Historians agree that the colonials considered themselves Englishmen right up until the American Revolution began, and there is no evidence to show that this feeling did not extend to England's wars as well. Reluctance to pay war taxes proves nothing; taxes are generally unpopular at any time. The peace settlements negotiated by the English may have angered the colonists, but only because the treaties seemed to give more benefits to the French or Spanish than the American colonists thought necessary. Even after the revolutionary war had begun in earnest, many American leaders could not bring themselves to negotiate any sort of alliance with their traditional enemy—France.

What American leaders sought was not isolation but rather situations that clearly benefited national interests. Born into a world of traditional alliances and coalitions, the new American nation chose to avoid such associations not out of any moral or philosophical judgments, although such rhetoric abounded, but because, at least temporarily, an independent policy seemed to promise greater rewards. Thomas Paine, often misinterpreted as recommending isolation, made his point clear in the pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776):

> Any submission to, or dependence on Great Britain, tends directly to involve this Continent in European wars and quarrels, and set us at variance with nations who would otherwise seek our friendship, and against whom we have neither anger nor complaint. As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connection with any part of it. It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions, which she can never do, while, by her dependence on Britain, she is made the make-weight in the scale of British politics.

Paine, who soon became impatient with the Revolution's conservatism, argued not for isolation but for a policy of impartiality designed to open all of Europe's markets to American trade. That policy, which soon stimulated America's strong support of neutral rights, hardly represented a new departure in foreign policy. The smaller nations of the world have always attempted to avoid choosing sides in struggles between the greater powers, although sheer geographic gravity made that rarely possible in Europe's history.

The debates among the revolutionary leaders over broad guidelines for American diplomats, discussions that culminated in the Model Treaty of 1776, illustrate the distinctions made by Paine. Despite the precarious military situation, some argued for only a commercial connection with France. Led by John Adams, these men obviously feared that the presence of French troops in America would mean merely swapping one imperial master for another. Although Adams's statements were couched in the broad, sweeping terms so popular with Enlightenment thinkers, his objections stemmed from two factors: his practical appraisal of America's political weakness and economic needs and his intense distrust of French motives—a distrust he held in common with his fellow New Englanders. Despite Americans' claims that they stood for a new approach to world politics—a *novus ordo seculorum*—they had adopted policies that were merely variations of the realistic power politics of the Europe they professed to scorn. When military necessity forced the Continental Congress to seek a military alliance with France in 1778, the terms of that treaty were not fundamentally different from alliances negotiated by European nations. The French intended the United States to become a permanent client-state of His Christian Majesty, a sentiment embodied in a clause stating that the alliance would last "from the present time and forever." A plea from the United States to Spain for a similar treaty of alliance was ignored.

Nor did the United States go about alliance diplomacy any differently than its European predecessors. The peace negotiations aimed at ending the revolutionary war found the Americans as deceptive as France. Interpreting the alliance with France as selectively binding, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay negotiated an effective and separate treaty of peace with the British—a violation of their agreement with France. Although they justified their actions by pointing out that France had intended to betray the United States, their argument contrasts sharply with the self-righteous claims that America would practice a new diplomacy in which, to quote Adams, "the dignity of North America . . . consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of mankind, and the interests of the nations of Europe." Ironically, Franklin—a man with long experience in the world of eighteenth-century diplomacy—opposed such a violation of treaty obligations, while Adams demanded that they open negotiations with the British.

Although the treaties of alliance and commerce with France represented no breakthrough into some sort of new diplomacy, American leaders, particularly the New Englanders, viewed the new nation's diplomacy as somehow flowing from values and purposes different from those of Europe. Distracted by the social implications that went with their repudiation of an aristocratic class, many Americans confused diplomatic forms with substance. Refusal to dress like European diplomats became equated with a refusal to indulge in European-style power politics.

That image proved to be longer lasting than the alliance with France. The rhetoric of America's uniqueness and exceptionalism, something common among young, intensely nationalistic nations, meshed neatly with the notion that the United States practiced a new form of diplomacy. In reality, the only thing new about America's diplomacy was that geography permitted it to remain aloof from the constantly shifting balance of power in Europe. Hence, the decision not to join the League of Armed Neutrality was made because it was thought that the league offered no benefits to America, not because of any ideological opposition to taking sides.

By the mid-1790s, the French Alliance had become a detriment to the young republic. With the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution, soon to merge into the Napoleonic wars, Presidents George Washington and John Adams feared that the United States would be drawn into a conflict in which it had no interest. Again myth overtook reality. French restrictions on American naval freedom appeared to be a direct retaliation for the refusal of the United States to live up to its treaty obligations, whereas the reality was that the French Directory believed that the recently negotiated commercial treaty between Britain and America (Jay's Treaty) contained secret clauses that amounted to a political alliance. The treaty contained no such political commitments, but the French argument struck home. When great powers go to war, neutrals can maintain their trade only at the risk of losing any claim to impartial economic policies. Although the United States did not sign Jay's Treaty as part of an anti-French policy, the French quite logically believed the opposite. Historians have argued that Washington's famous Farewell Address sprang primarily from domestic political considerations, but it was the awkward confrontation with France—including attempts by the French directly to influence American elections—that clearly stimulated his warning against alliances. Washington included a caveat that Americans soon forgot; he warned only against "artificial" connections with Europe, not ones that were natural and in the national interest. Since the Quasi-War with France followed soon after Washington's warning, Americans tended to view the address as an accurate prediction of the outcome of U.S. involvement in European alliances. The economic consequences that might have followed any American attempt to maintain real impartiality—something that would have required economic isolation—were forgotten.

JEFFERSONIAN REALISM

Thomas Jefferson obviously understood the difference between artificial and natural connections with Europe. His condemnation of "entangling" alliances referred to involvements in European politics, not to the defense of American interests. When, in 1802, France seemed about to occupy the Louisiana Territory, striking a wedge between the United States and land that many Americans assumed was destined to become part of the United States, Jefferson's thoughts turned to plans of alliance with Great Britain. The Louisiana Purchase made that unnecessary, and Jefferson then followed policies that subtly favored France in its conflict with the British. His reasoning was simple and logical: only the English had a fleet large enough to pose a military threat to the United States, and, hence, they were America's only potential enemy of substance. But none of his talk of alliance or his attempts to play at a timid and small form of alliance politics came to public attention. With "no entangling alliances" already a tradition, domestic political considerations made Jefferson keep such thoughts to himself and his closest advisers.

After a brief period of peace beginning with the Treaty of Amiens (1802), the Napoleonic wars started anew in 1803. Again the United States found itself caught between two great powers. As both England and France turned increasingly to economic warfare, American attempts to maintain business as usual were less and less successful. Frustrated in his attempts to negotiate arrangements that would permit American foreign trade to continue without harassment, Jefferson overestimated the value of that trade to the European powers and also turned to economic coercion. An embargo prevented all American ships from sail-

ing to foreign destinations but drove home the lesson of America's economic dependence upon trade with Europe—a lesson statesmen have never forgotten.

IN ENGLAND'S WAKE: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The United States eventually became involved in the Napoleonic wars. Logic demanded that the nation choose one side or the other, but tradition, past experience, and the intense national division over the foreign policies of Jefferson and his successor, James Madison, made the decision difficult. George Washington had already become the nation's father figure, and no leader could ignore such pronouncements as the Farewell Address with impunity. Moreover, the unhappy experience with the French alliance made both politicians and the public cautious. More important, however, was the domestic political tug-of-war regarding foreign policy. Although President Madison and his supporters had strong sympathies for France, to have suggested an alliance with Napoleon would have confirmed the accusations of the Federalists, who claimed that the president had called for war to aid France, not to defend American interests. Since French violations of neutral rights had been as flagrant as those committed by England, that argument seemed plausible. So the United States entered the war against Britain, but without any alliance with France—a technique that the nation followed again in World War I a hundred years later.

The combination of luck and domestic politics that kept the United States out of a formal alliance with France in 1812 also made it possible for war-weary England to extend remarkably generous peace terms to the Americans. Despite an almost unbroken string of military defeats, the American public viewed the war as a great victory, thus adding to the tradition and myth that the United States need not and should not enter into alliances.

In the years immediately after the Treaty of Ghent (1815), the United States followed a foreign policy that took advantage of the European political situation. Designed and implemented primarily by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the policy took shrewd advantage of Europe's economic and psychological exhaustion following the defeat of Napoleon, of the Latin American revolts against Spain, of geography, and of the British desire to keep European power politics restricted to Europe. When the Latin American colonies revolted against Spain, the threat of intervention by the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France) made Adams reconsider his earlier rejection of a British offer of an alliance. Nevertheless, Adams finally concluded, correctly, that England would act to keep other European countries out of the Western Hemisphere with or without an alliance with the United States, and he again spurned the offer. The British obtained a commitment from the French that they would not permit their fleet to be used for any transfer of Holy Alliance troops to Latin America. Once again American leaders had examined the possibility of entering into an alliance but had rejected that move; not because of tradition, but because a careful appraisal of the situation convinced them that such an alliance was simply unnecessary.

But it is out of such stuff that traditions are made. President James Monroe's Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere (1823) made British policy appear to be a function of American diplomacy. John Quincy Adams knew full well the emptiness of any threat from the Holy Alliance, but the American public treated the entire episode as proof of their nation's ability to solve its international problems without help. And so the United States proceeded through the nineteenth century armed with Washington's advice and a conviction that there was no need to play balance-of-power politics with the European nations.

British foreign policy continued to make such beliefs come true. Great Britain, busy in Europe and Asia, hoped to see the United States restricted in size and power, but never did the potential gains of such desires warrant the use of military force to ensure that they materialized. British leaders encouraged the Texans to remain independent after 1836, tried to hold onto the Oregon country, and hoped for a Confederate victory during the American Civil War, but whenever the U.S. government threatened to respond with force, the British backed away from the confrontation. Unwilling to fight the Americans, British statesmen repeatedly, if reluctantly, chose policies designed to make a friend of the United States.

At the same time two events served to fortify America's opposition to alliance diplomacy. The bloody and inconclusive Crimean War during the late 1850s seemed to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the European alliances, and the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico in 1867 indicated once

again that the United States could itself deal with the "untrustworthy" European powers. The alliance system developed after 1871 by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck only led American statesmen to condemn further such power politics.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND AMERICA'S DESTINY

By the end of the nineteenth century, American policymakers and political writers were convinced that alliances, coalitions, and ententes were all part of a dangerous concept of international relations. Convinced that alliances caused wars rather than prevented them, Americans looked upon the European political scene with contempt. Yet, at the same time, a small group of statesmen-politicians led by such ultranationalists as Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert Beveridge, and Theodore Roosevelt concluded that its size and economic power made it necessary for the United States to play an active role in international politics. As Theodore Roosevelt put it: "We have no choice, we the people of the United States, as to whether or not we shall play a great part in the world. That has been decided for us by fate, by the march of events. We have to play that part. All that we can decide is whether we shall play it well or ill."

With Roosevelt as president from 1901 through 1909, the United States had, for the first time as chief executive, a man who saw the nation's mission as much more than merely an example to others. Roosevelt—taking his cue from the social Darwinists, but adding an optimism based on the American experience—saw America's role in the world as unique and tinged with messianic destiny. He not only believed the United States was a nation with international responsibilities, he also unquestioningly embraced the idea that the fate of mankind depended upon America's willingness to accept those responsibilities. Roosevelt saw no need for anything less than American superiority in the Western Hemisphere, but he sought to avoid antagonizing Great Britain in the process. The community of Anglo-American interests had been growing since 1815, but not until Roosevelt's presidency did the government establish a strong, if unofficial, entente with Great Britain. Roosevelt's prejudice in favor of Anglo-Saxon "civilization" as well as his realistic appraisal of America's economic and military interests resulted in American influence invariably buttressing British goals in Europe. Roosevelt was not alone, as can be seen by such editorials as appeared in *Harper's Weekly* openly advocating American participation in the Anglo-French entente. Although Roosevelt, largely because of domestic politics, did not heed such advice, he supported various British attempts to dominate the European balance of power, the best example being his secret diplomacy during the Moroccan crisis of 1905–1906.

The political situation in Asia concerned Roosevelt deeply. Convinced that the United States had to act like a Pacific Ocean power, he even expressed a vague desire for America to join the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was designed to delineate British and Japanese interests in China and to halt Russian expansion in the area. Although such active participation in an alliance seemed politically impossible, Roosevelt attained that goal in part without any domestic struggle. His role as peacemaker during the Russo-Japanese War found him privately applying diplomatic pressure; yet the American public, still committed to nonentanglement, approved what appeared to be a role of disinterested and uninvolved organizer of a successful peace conference. From 1905 through 1908, American and Japanese representatives held almost continuous talks about other mutual problems. Although the discussions were frequently unpleasant, a special relationship developed between the two nations. Roosevelt firmly believed that Japanese-American cooperation—the beginnings of entente—would bring peace, order, and stability to East Asia; and, as part of that policy, he recognized Japanese spheres of influence in Korea and northern China.

Roosevelt committed the United States to an active role in international affairs—a commitment that had been growing out of American power as well as his actions—and put the nation on a path that could not be reversed regardless of the rhetoric of isolation and the natural desire to avoid the responsibilities that accompanied the thrill of world power. His successors, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, reversed his policies toward Japan (with dire consequences), but the commitment to an active international role remained.

THE TRAUMA OF WORLD WAR I

On 6 April 1917 the United States formally joined a wartime coalition for the first time in its history. In refusing actually to join the Anglo-French-Russian

alliance, President Woodrow Wilson hoped to avoid even an implied commitment to the many secret treaties that provided for the division of the spoils among the Allied Powers, although he also realized that American public opinion would support the idea of continuing some measure of aloofness from European political systems.

American entry into World War I supported Theodore Roosevelt's contention. Whether the cause was German submarine warfare, American national security, business investments in Europe, or a desire to control events, the United States obviously if unknowingly had accepted his argument that it had to "play a great part in the world." Inspired by Wilson's rhetoric about a world safe for democracy, Americans set out upon their own "Great Crusade." After the defeat of Germany and its allies, the United States hoped to reform Europe and establish a permanent peace. Frustrated by the slow pace of reform at home, many Progressive Era reformers looked to Europe and the world for new opportunities. Coalition diplomacy during the war reflected American distrust of Europe. It took the pressure of a German offensive to get U.S. generals to coordinate their actions with a newly created Allied commander in chief, and even then the United States refused to permit its troops to come under foreign command.

Woodrow Wilson's historic proposal for the League of Nations has rightfully dominated the history of the postwar period. Wilson's concept of collective security, however incompletely developed, clearly represents one of the few attempts by a major world statesman to find a workable substitute for the diplomacy of power politics—alliance, coalition, and entente. Wilson's proposal had a fatal flaw: it rested upon the creation of a homogeneous world economic-political system. The collective security approach required a remarkable degree of cooperation and trust among the major world powers, but such trust could develop only when they shared similar political and economic creeds, and that was not to be.

Instead, the peace settlements that followed World War I created a system of alliances and ententes by which the victors hoped to preserve the status quo. Although the United States refused a role in Europe when it rejected membership in the League of Nations, a proposed alliance with France against Germany might well have received Senate approval, but the Wilson administration lost interest in it following the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. It soon became "traditional" again for Americans to speak disdainfully of Europe's power politics, never realizing that their government continued to display a strong interest in European events. In fact, American "observers" at the league's meetings frequently attempted to influence the deliberations, and throughout the 1920s and 1930s American policy paralleled that of Britain and France.

The peacekeeping system in Europe operated without overt American support, but the system for Asia sprang primarily from the efforts of the United States. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922, called by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, resulted in a series of treaties, each of which involved the United States in Asian power politics. The Five-Power Naval Disarmament Treaty was aimed directly at ending the naval arms race between Japan, Britain, and the United States. The Four-Power Treaty between Britain, Japan, France, and the United States replaced the old Anglo-Japanese alliance with one that promised only consultations. Both agreements clearly implied American support for the status quo in the Pacific. The Nine-Power Treaty, which merely endorsed the Open Door in China, served to distract critics from the realities of the power relationships being established. American participation in this informal system had one limitation: there could be no prior commitments (entangling alliances?) requiring the use of either economic or military coercion.

The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 eliminated whatever slim chance there might have been of that system developing into a meaningful and long-term entente. Moreover, Germany, China, and the Soviet Union, all excluded from the power structure, soon mounted challenges that spelled the demise of the informal system that had spurned them. The 1930s saw most nations withdraw into themselves, but none more so than the United States. Embittered and cynical about their experience in Europe and the international community following the Great Crusade, Americans indulged in self-recrimination and vowed never again to try to "save" Europe from itself.

Despite the rising tension caused by Nazi Germany during the early and mid-1930s, Americans opposed any participation by their government in European politics. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, although concerned about the actions of Adolf Hitler, chose to follow the lead of Britain and France. Those nations, eager to avoid a military confrontation, repeatedly asked the United

States for firm commitments. The pattern held for all of Hitler's and Benito Mussolini's aggressive moves right up until war began. The remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1935, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, the intervention in the Spanish Civil War beginning in 1936, German *Anschluss* with Austria in 1938, and the takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1939, all saw the United States draw away from Anglo-French requests for some sort of alliance. Inaction resulted as each blamed the other for a lack of leadership. Whether an alliance would have prevented a conflict with Germany is questionable; so is the claim that American support would have made the British and the French more courageous in their diplomacy. What is not questionable was the American attitude toward an alliance. The general public, Congress, and most public leaders believed that alliances caused wars instead of preventing them, and they opposed any such arrangements for the United States.

THE RUDE AWAKENING: WORLD WAR II

Hitler's violation of the Munich Pact of 1938 opened the eyes of French and British leaders, and the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, following Germany's invasion of Poland, forced Americans to reconsider. Still, while they supported the Roosevelt administration's decision to permit the Allies to buy military supplies in the United States, few seriously considered an alliance and intervention. Memories of World War I were too strong. Despite later claims that public opinion had limited his freedom of action, Roosevelt apparently agreed with the majority of Americans. He understood that Britain and France were fighting America's war but saw no need for the United States to be anything except what he later labeled "the arsenal of democracy." The collapse of French resistance in June 1940 made the president willing to lend money, equipment, and technical aid to Britain (which culminated in the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941), but he remained convinced, even until early 1941, that a military alliance, and the shedding of American blood, might be avoided.

Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union made Roosevelt less optimistic, for it raised the specter of a level of German strength that would necessitate U.S. armed intervention, and by the fall of 1941 he had concluded that American intervention was necessary. But it took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to bring the United States into the war. Only then did Americans begin to understand the degree to which an Anglo-American alliance—based upon firm entente—already existed. During 1941 the United States and Great Britain developed a remarkably close relationship at the level of military and logistical planning, based on the probability of an alliance.

Even with such close cooperation, the Anglo-American entente, like almost all other ententes and alliances, was not an equal partnership. The British found themselves repeatedly in the position of the pleader, while the United States, with its vast economic strength, soon began to act like a senior partner. Only during the early stages of the war, when the overriding concern was the prevention of a defeat at the hands of Germany and Japan, did the two nations meet on equal ground. After it had become clear that victory was certain—roughly about the time of the Tehran Conference in December 1943—the United States more and more frequently forced the British to accept American decisions, particularly with regard to matters affecting the postwar situation.

Problems with what Winston Churchill called the Grand Alliance fell into three categories: military strategy, politics, and economics. Disputes over military strategy found the Americans stubborn and rarely willing to compromise. Exhibiting a strong distaste for consistent British attempts to make war serve politics, particularly the preservation of the empire, American military leaders refused to consider any alternatives that did not combine the quickest and least costly path to victory. Except for the invasion of North Africa, Roosevelt refused to overrule his military chiefs of staff, and that one exception came more from his desire to get American troops into action than because he accepted Churchill's grand strategy. The Normandy invasion, the daylight bombing of Germany, and the invasion of southern France are only the most striking examples of America's insistence upon implementing its own military strategy.

As ever, economics and politics interacted. Economic diplomacy between Britain and the United States, at least as it related to the critically important questions of the structure of the postwar world, found the Americans rigid in their views. That rigidity was modified by the American desire for a postwar political alliance with Britain. Thus, the United States could and did demand that Britain eliminate the imperial preference system, which gave special trading benefits to members of the British Empire. The British realized that the

system itself had outlived its usefulness; but when the Americans pressed Britain to give up its colonies, the Churchill government dug in its heels. Faced with that response, Roosevelt backed off, partly in order to preserve the wartime alliance, but more and more in the later stages of the war because of his commitment to an Anglo-American political alliance in the postwar world.

A good example of this interplay between economic and political desires is in the case of atomic energy. Early in the war, the United States and Great Britain had agreed to work together to develop an atomic bomb. Initially, that cooperation was stimulated by fears that the Germans would develop the bomb first. But midway through the war, once the British had no more to offer, Roosevelt, at the instigation of his advisers, cut off the flow of information on atomic energy to England. They argued that Britain wanted to be privy to the secret in order to use atomic energy for commercial purposes after the war and that sharing nuclear knowledge would tie the United States to England politically—a reference to Britain's colonial problems. When Churchill protested vigorously, Roosevelt changed his mind. Not only had the president begun to worry about Britain's economic problems following the war, but he had come to assume Anglo-American alliance—and their atomic monopoly after the war.

The Anglo-American entente was the deepest commitment made by the United States during World War II, but the coalition with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proved the most important—and the most difficult. Even during the early 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt's attitude toward the Soviet Union had been one of practicality and persuasion, and once Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union, the president's nonideological stance made it easy to welcome the Russians as a military partner. Although Roosevelt has frequently been criticized as a political "fixer" rather than a man with an organized grand strategy, he clearly recognized the cardinal fact of the Russo-American coalition: if it defeated Germany and Japan (a certainty after the battles of Kursk, Stalingrad, El Alamein, and Midway—all by mid-1943), the Soviet Union would pose the major barrier to Anglo-American predominance in the postwar world. That left Roosevelt three simple but critical alternatives. First, he could include the Russians in the postwar power structure, hoping they would moderate their political and economic demands. Second, he could begin to confront Soviet power during the war by shaping military planning to meet postwar political needs. Third, he could firmly confront Soviet power late in the war, but only after military victory over Germany and Japan had been assured.

Despite advice from many, including Churchill, Roosevelt based his policy on the principle that the United States was not fighting one war in order to lay the groundwork for the next. Roosevelt refused to follow the path of confrontation; but cooperation, during and after the war, did not mean simple compliance with every Russian political demand nor did it mean that Roosevelt expected postwar Soviet-American relations to be without serious tensions. He merely emphasized the positive approach in the hope that it would engender a similar response. Nor was the dire warning given Roosevelt about Soviet intentions timely, for most came late in the war and well after most of the basic military strategies had been carried out.

Roosevelt's strategy failed to take into account the magnitude of the Soviet Union's distrust of the capitalist nations as well as his own advisers' intense fear of communism. He was by inclination a believer in personal diplomacy, and the general lack of enthusiasm within the U.S. State Department for a cooperative policy toward the Soviet Union forced Roosevelt to rely even more heavily on his own power and ability to shape events. More significantly, his conciliatory policies were not faithfully reflected by the American bureaucracy. Major changes in foreign policy can occur only when they generate the kind of national support that ensures that subordinates in the executive branch are actually thinking like the leadership. American policy toward the Soviet Union prior to World War II and the anticommunism of the Cold War show that Franklin Roosevelt's cooperative approach—a policy that foreshadowed the idea of "peaceful coexistence"—deviated from the norm of American foreign policy.

How the Soviet leaders, given their own ideological commitments and revolutionary experiences, would have responded to a totally candid and open Anglo-American policy during the war is uncertain. What is clear is that whenever Roosevelt hedged his bets—on the opening of a Second Front, on the Russian role in the occupation of Italy, on aid to left-wing partisan groups in Europe—Soviet leaders invariably accused the Anglo-Americans of playing political games. Although American policy toward Great Britain was frequently characterized by the same level of distrust as with the Russians, for example on the

question of the imperial preference system, Soviet-American relations did not possess that community of interests that made it possible to transcend the differences. That, in essence, sums up the difference between an entente and a coalition.

The lesser partners in the Grand Alliance of World War II varied from such potential giants as China, to the small Central American states, to latecomers such as the newly constituted Provisional Government of the French Republic, which signed the Declaration of the United Nations in 1945. Intentionally vague, the declaration called only for mutual aid against the Axis nations and promised that no signatory would agree to a separate peace. Convinced that postwar questions were best left to personal diplomacy, Roosevelt refused to consider anything more substantial. American diplomacy during the war centered on the military defeat of the Axis, and relations with the less-important members of the United Nations were largely reserved to integrating their economic resources into the overall war production effort. Individual bureaucrats occasionally initiated and implemented policies that concerned America's postwar economic and political interests, particularly in Latin America, but such actions reflected traditional American attitudes, not any overall plan approved by the president.

Although Roosevelt's conception of a global balance of power—the Soviet Union, the Anglo-American alliance, an Anglo-French association in western Europe, and eventually China—seems reflected in the Cold War power structure that soon developed, the president's vague ideas possessed a crucial difference: they emphasized cooperation, not distrust.

By the end of World War II the United States seemed on the verge of a radical departure from past policies. With Harry S. Truman replacing Roosevelt in the White House, alliance diplomacy aimed increasingly at containing and defeating what appeared to be the new enemy, the Soviet Union. The nature of that Cold War determined part of the structure of America's alliance system, but other aspects of alliance diplomacy stemmed from traditional American attitudes.

THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE SYSTEM: AN UNAMERICAN TRADITION

Much has been made of the shift in 1945 and 1946 of some key Republicans, particularly Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, from apparent isolationism to internationalism. Their approach toward alliance diplomacy demonstrates why that shift was really a logical progression. Isolationism had never argued against alliances per se, only against "entangling" ones. The atomic bomb, when added to America's conventional military strength and to the nation's demonstrable economic might, seemed to guarantee that any participation in alliances would be on American terms. Only the other nations would be entangled. Even the British, rhetorically an equal partner because of the sharing of nuclear weapons, quickly found that economics put them in a secondary role. Participation in the United Nations organization posed no problems, since pro-American states could dominate all voting. Moreover, the United Nations made internationalism appear somehow different from and more moral than balance-of-power politics. Alliances, however, appeared unnecessary until 1947, when clumsy Soviet attempts to influence domestic developments in Greece and Turkey caused the president to announce the Truman Doctrine. A unilateral pronouncement rather than a negotiated alliance, the results were the same. The United States had committed itself to defend two distant nations—and by implication many more.

Those implications became fact in September 1947, when the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the first of many so-called mutual security agreements, came into being. The very label given such treaties—mutual security agreements—testifies to the long-lasting antipathy to the very word "alliance," although it was also a means of making such arrangements seem to fit the United Nations Charter. Although such a Western Hemisphere arrangement, dominated by the power of the United States, was part and parcel of the historic Monroe Doctrine, this particular treaty aimed primarily at preventing internal communist subversion—a concern that related directly to the Cold War.

At the same time that formal alliances became part of American foreign policy, the United States used its entente with Great Britain to retain and expand the invaluable security assets of the British Empire. Reading the British a lesson in "informal" empire, the Americans continued to argue for independence for British colonies but then quietly provided financial and military incentives that would allow Britain to hang on to its military bases in those same colonies. Those bases would allow the United States to project its power and influence throughout the world.

As Cold War tensions increased, the United States resorted more and more to traditional balance-of-power politics in an attempt to maintain complete control. President Dwight Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, have usually been pictured as the architects of the American alliance system, but the bulk of those alliances came into being during the administration of Harry Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson. Following the Berlin airlift and the establishment of Russian hegemony in Czechoslovakia, the keystone of what was to become a worldwide structure of alliances came in April 1949, when, at the instigation of the United States, eleven other nations in the North Atlantic area joined the United States in signing the North Atlantic Treaty. The role played by that treaty in the Cold War is told elsewhere in this volume; but much of America's conception of its own role within that treaty structure existed separately from Soviet-American tension. From the inception of the treaty, the United States used the North Atlantic alliance to pursue two frequently contradictory goals. The treaty was primarily aimed at the military and political containment of the Soviet Union, a function in which the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military power, dominated all strategic planning. Since the conventional and small nuclear forces of western Europe depended upon American nuclear weapons to act as the ultimate deterrent against any Russian aggression, the crucial decisions always lay with American leaders. Accordingly, the major NATO commands fell to Americans.

Yet that role as the military leader of the alliance became increasingly offset by American insistence upon western European unity. At the time that the United States initiated the North Atlantic Treaty it had already begun implementing the Marshall Plan. Although ostensibly designed to promote European economic recovery, the Marshall Plan also added an economic facet to NATO. The long-term program supported by the United States called for economic and political unity among the western European nations. In a transparent attempt to transfer their own federal system to Europe, Americans consistently demanded that western Europe work together; first at the economic level and then, it was hoped, at the political level. American leaders spoke jejunely of a "United States of Europe" and frequently seemed to assume that, once European unification had occurred, the United States could pull back into the Western Hemisphere. This new reform movement—reminiscent of the Grand Crusade of three decades earlier—frequently clashed with American images of an evil and fanatical Soviet Russia, so powerful that only American military strength could defend the "free world." Just as an economically stable western Europe would eventually be able to compete with American business interests on an even basis, so the political and military strengthening of those nations inevitably meant that the United States would lose the total control of the North Atlantic Alliance that characterized the late 1940s and 1950s.

Initially, the North Atlantic Alliance exhibited great unity and strength under America's leadership, but only when the crisis was in Europe. As long as the Europeans feared Soviet expansion, either by force or subversion, they found NATO useful. But the Korean War, and American attempts to involve all its allies, found the western Europeans reluctant to translate a regional defense agreement into a worldwide crusade against communism. Despite a UN resolution that sanctified America's "police action" in Korea, the contribution made by the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance was a token one.

Asia posed special problems for the United States. The victory of the communist forces in China in 1949 stimulated an immediate attempt by the Truman administration to contain communism in Asia. In 1951 the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan that provided bases and similar methods of integrating that nation into the American alliance system, even if the Japanese constitution—written by the U.S. government—prohibited the development of any large-scale military forces. Less hypocritical were the mutual defense treaties the United States signed with its ex-colony, the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand (the Pacific Security Treaty or, more usually, the ANZUS Pact). Yet those alliances too were a disappointment during the Korean War. Japan had no choice but to provide bases and similar logistical support, but the ANZUS Pact brought little in the way of concrete assistance to American forces.

By 1952 it should have been clear to American leaders that their conception of alliances against worldwide communism differed significantly from that of most of their allies. But the Eisenhower administration refused to reexamine the alliance system, choosing instead to expand it in two areas where the collapse of the European and Japanese colonial empires had left political

chaos behind—Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Although specific events frequently stimulated the negotiation of specific alliances, the overarching purpose of the system was geographically obvious. The North Atlantic Treaty, which included Canada, Greece, and Turkey in addition to the United States and western Europe, blocked any Soviet expansion to the west, southwest, or north. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, prompted by the collapse of French rule in Indochina and fear of the People's Republic of China, completed another portion of the cordon sanitaire, which also included Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan (the last two each signed bilateral alliances with the United States shortly after the Korean Armistice of 1953). The containment ring around Russia and its supposed satellite, China, was nearly completed with the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which brought Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Great Britain into alliance together. The United States never formally joined the alliance (renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, after Iraq dropped out in 1959 following a coup d'état against the pro-British Hashimite monarchy). But Congress and the president publicly committed America to aid the members in the event of aggression or externally supported subversion. There were large gaps in the geographic encirclement; India and Afghanistan, for example, refused all blandishments from the United States. Nevertheless, American schoolchildren during the 1950s and 1960s, their teachers, and their leaders all reveled in the illusory security of world maps, which imitated the ones that so delighted the English in the nineteenth century.

The enormous disparity in economic and military power between the United States and its Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern allies meant that their relationship was that of patron and client. Although Americans claimed to prefer liberal democracies as allies, they did not become involved in the domestic affairs of their clients unless there was communist subversion or aggression. The only criterion for an alliance with the United States became anticommunism. The liberal community in America justified actual or inferred alliances with dictatorships such as those in South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, and Spain because of the greater danger posed by militant, expansionist communism. Such nations had little choice but to accept American leadership, since American military and economic aid provided important props for their regimes.

THE SYSTEM CHANGES

Two events and two long-term developments in the late 1950s and in the 1960s forced major changes in America's alliance system. The events were the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Vietnam War; the developments were the steady relaxation of European fears of Russian aggression and the rise of mainland China as an effective world power.

The Suez crisis of 1956 found Great Britain and France, with Israel joining in for its own reasons, invading Egypt following that nation's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Ostensibly a fight to protect property, the Anglo-French action aimed at the restoration of their influence in the Middle East—influence that had begun to diminish rapidly in the face of rising Arab nationalism. Since the Middle East had not yet become a zone of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, American leaders and the public viewed the Anglo-French action through their traditional prism of anticolonialism. Secretary of State Dulles publicly condemned the two European countries, and, in an ironically cooperative move, joined the Russians in applying intense pressure to force Britain and France to withdraw. Faced with such superpower unity, the two western European nations had little choice; but the diplomatic defeat at the hands of their longtime ally rankled. British conservatives had nowhere else to go, but a few years later, under the leadership of newly elected president Charles de Gaulle, the French redefined their relationship to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Arguing that Korea and Suez had proven that the United States cared only about its own interests and could never be counted on to defend western Europe (or anyone else), De Gaulle eventually pulled France out of virtually all the political aspects of NATO and withdrew French forces from the NATO military pool. Although the French promised to consider reintegrating their military forces if the need arose, the North Atlantic Alliance had obviously begun to deteriorate.

Still, the NATO alliance would have survived Suez and similar crises intact had the western European nations continued to fear either massive subversion or outright military attack by the Soviet Union. But those fears, at their height between 1948 and the end of the Korean War, had steadily subsided. Russian-instigated subversion seemed less likely in the wake of the remarkable economic redevelopment of western Europe, and all the members of the alliance simply assumed that the United

States would retaliate with all necessary force in the unlikely event of open aggression. In short, the NATO alliance, like others, possessed a strength directly proportional to the size and immediacy of the jointly perceived threat to its members.

Another foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Anglo-American entente, also changed drastically in the twenty years following the end of World War II. The outward signs of that change came in such episodes as the Skybolt missile debacle. The United States forced the British to accept an American missile system over strong protests from the British military establishment and then failed to put the system into production. But the real problem was the increasing American contempt for the deterioration of the British economy. Although Americans and the English continued to view the world through the same spectacles, the United States no longer looked for Britain to carry its share of the burden. Indeed, Britain appeared to be on the verge of economic and political collapse. Although fears of Britain's complete collapse were exaggerated, the United States refused to treat Britain as even a major partner, equal partnership having disappeared during World War II. Even the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom was thus forced to rethink its relationship with Europe. The result—and the apparent end of the Anglo-American entente—was Britain's decision, reaffirmed in 1975, to join the European Common Market. But that decision, however clear-cut it seemed in the mid-1970s, did not eliminate the Anglo-American entente. Despite De Gaulle's insistence that Britain had to choose between Europe and the United States, as the twenty-first century dawned, British policymakers still assumed that they were best suited to act as the honest broker between the United States and Europe.

THE 1970S AND AFTER

The North Atlantic Alliance had, by the 1970s, changed significantly from what it had begun as in 1949, but it still remained an important part of international power politics. The curious combination of historical experience, liberal political institutions, and varying but compatible combinations of capitalism, socialism, and the welfare state that characterize western Europe, Canada, and the United States provided a vague sort of entente—even though many rejected the proposition that Russia and world communism posed a military threat.

In Asia the situation was far different. Although American leaders tended to believe, at least until the late 1960s, that the People's Republic of China took instructions from Moscow, U.S. policy still had to react to the reality of increasing Chinese power. Fears of another confrontation with China such as had occurred during the Korean War directed American efforts toward alliances that would guarantee that only Asians would confront Asians. Supporters and opponents both likened such policies to that of the Roman Empire, which relied upon mercenaries to guard its frontiers. American troops remained in South Korea, but a massive military aid program made the Republic of Korea forces the first line of defense. The Japanese had proven surprisingly reluctant to rearm themselves, and the United States retained military bases in Japan.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of 1954 (SEATO) represented an attempt by the United States to stabilize the political situation in that area by bringing Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United States together after the collapse of French rule in Indochina. With Malaysia, the Philippines, and the nations of Indochina all struggling against communist-led guerrillas, America's alliance diplomacy sought to bolster the existing governments with military and economic aid. Although such aid helped maintain the status quo in Malaysia and the Philippines, the situation in Vietnam seemed to leave the United States no choice between direct military intervention and a communist victory. Working on the assumption that the entire alliance structure in Southeast Asia would collapse one country at a time—like "dominoes"—if Indochina came under communist domination, the United States guaranteed that very result by intervening unsuccessfully. Although the Southeast Asia Treaty remained in force, by the mid-1970s it had lost its effectiveness. Moreover, American requests to the SEATO and NATO nations for military or diplomatic support in Vietnam had met with even less success than during the Korean War. Clearly western Europe saw no connection between their security and the spread of communism in Asia, particularly since they no longer had colonies to protect.

By 1976 the American system of alliances so painstakingly constructed after World War II lay in disarray. Arab nationalism, focused on the problems of the Palestinian refugees and the existence of the state of Israel, had effectively destroyed the Middle East treaty. Although the ANZUS Pact

remained, the defeat of American efforts in Vietnam and the rise of the People's Republic of China brought about American recognition of the communist Chinese government and a scramble by nations from Australia to Japan to establish friendly relations with the Chinese. Latin America, once so obediently pro–United States in international affairs outside the hemisphere, now shifted to an increasingly anti–United States position as both the political left and right vied for public support. Outside of NATO, America's most entangling alliances were with the kinds of governments that the United States had condemned during World War II. Totalitarian regimes in Nationalist China, South Korea, Spain, and Greece all offered bases and staunch anticommunism in return for American economic and military aid. The key alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, still functioned, but the integration of Britain into Europe, the development of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, the rise to prominence in many western European countries of seemingly moderate and democratic communist parties, and the reestablishment of the West German army as the most powerful in Europe outside the Soviet Union promised to force major alterations in the North Atlantic alliance as well.

On paper the Cold War alliance system appeared to be a radical departure from the early American proscription against entangling alliances. Actually those alliances had never "entangled" the United States. Rather, such agreements, whether explicit or implicit, had supposedly served American interests. George Washington might have disputed the argument that America's national interest demanded the worldwide containment of communism, but he would not have rejected on principle a system of alliances as the best way to achieve that goal. Like most American presidents, he was at home in the world of alliance diplomacy and power politics.

America's feeling of comfort with its post–World War II alliance system allowed that structure to survive the demise of its putative rationale—the Cold War. But the Cold War had only been the front man, so to speak, for a deeper, more fundamental motive. Because the Western alliance system was so dependent on U.S. economic and military strength, it served as a vehicle for a unilateral globalism that allowed America to extend its hegemony—its influence and power—throughout the world. But because that globalism was largely on American terms, it did not break the traditional rule against "entangling" alliances.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s and NATO lost its enemy, the United States led the movement to preserve and expand the NATO Alliance. The western Europeans, their historical memories sharply focused on recent history, sought to prevent another German problem by perpetuating Franco-German collaboration (entanglement?). But for U.S. policymakers NATO expansion offered an opportunity to extend their nation's influence by fostering "democracy," both political and economic. Expanding the free marketplace for commerce and ideas replaced the "containment" of communism and the Soviet Union as the justification for retaining and expanding the NATO alliance and its extensive infrastructure. This was no new idea—it had been a basic element in the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and his administration during the 1980s. But once the Soviet threat disappeared, a debate ensued over whether or not the United States should continue to play the same extensive leadership role it had assumed during the Cold War. Was NATO even needed?

The administration of William Jefferson Clinton, fearful of losing its leverage in Europe, effectively ended the debate when it supported NATO expansion and then sent American military forces to the former Yugoslavia in an attempt to help end the bloodletting that had broken out along ethnic and religious lines. Democratic Party rhetoric may have referred more to political democracy than to the free market, but that was a matter of emphasis, not design. The epithet "isolationist" came to be applied to those who advocated anything but global involvement on American terms—not a new use of the term, but one that demonstrated the persistence of the desire, and ability, of the United States to follow a unilateral, my-way-or-the-highway style in foreign policy. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Republican administration of George W. Bush had confirmed U.S. involvement in the southern Balkans and expanded the American commitment in Macedonia.

American policymakers managed to square the circle, making a holy pretense of noninvolvement in the world while trying to shape that world in their own interests. Convinced that their nation offered a *novus ordo seclorum*—a new and better world order—they used alliances, coalitions, and ententes to extend the nation's reach. In 1776 that reach was limited by the practicalities of distance, wealth, and population. Two hundred twenty-five years later, those practicalities had disappeared, but the reach had not.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnet, Richard J., and Marcus G. Raskin. *After 20 Years*. New York, 1965. Argues that the alliance has outlived its usefulness and was, by the mid-1960s, contributing to increased world tension.

Beale, Howard K. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. Baltimore, 1956.

Coolidge, Archibald C. *The United States as a World Power*. New York, 1912.

DeConde, Alexander. *Entangling Alliance*. Durham, N.C., 1958. Investigates the French Alliance and its role in both foreign and domestic American politics during the 1790s.

———. *The Quasi-War*. New York, 1966.

Esthus, Raymond A. *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan*. Seattle, 1966.

———. *Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries*. Waltham, Mass., 1970. Both Esthus works amply illustrate the president's search for closer relationships with the other world powers.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J., 1961. Stimulating group of essays that emphasize the intellectual and ideological attitudes of the Founders.

Goetzmann, William H. *When the Eagle Screamed: The Romantic Horizon in American Expansionism, 1800–1860*. New York, 2000. Short but stimulating essay dealing with nineteenth-century Anglo-American relations.

Goldgeier, James. *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*. Washington, D.C., 1999.

Graebner, Norman. "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality." In David Herbert Donald, ed. *Why the North Won the Civil War*. Baton Rouge, La., 1960.

Hinton, Harold C. *Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia*. Bloomington, Ind., 1975. Studies the Sino-Soviet rift as it relates to American foreign policy.

Iriye, Akira. *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*. Cambridge, Mass., 1965. Puts forth the concept of an informal system.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *Jefferson and France*. New Haven, Conn., 1967. Imaginative discussion of Thomas Jefferson's willingness to consider alliances as well as his overall efforts to work within a world dominated by European power politics.

Kimball, Warren F. *Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*. New York and London, 1997. Examines the wartime Anglo-American alliance.

Kissinger, Henry. *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*. New York, 1965. Defends the continued utility of a revamped NATO and is helpful for understanding the later policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Louis, William Roger, and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Decolonization." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (September 1994): 462–511. Discusses U.S. support for British military bases.

McNeill, William H. *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941–1946*. London, 1953; New York, 1970. A remarkably perceptive study of the anti-Hitler coalition, only slightly outdated by the vast amount of documentation that has become available since it first appeared.

Neustadt, Richard E. *Alliance Politics*. New York, 1970.

Osgood, Robert E. *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*. Chicago, 1962. The standard historical study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, although it must be supplemented by more recent studies.

Perkins, Bradford. *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812*. Berkeley, Calif., 1961. Explains how the United States managed to enter the Napoleonic wars without joining either side.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. New York, 1950. Perhaps the best study of Anglo-American relations during World War II.

Wolfers, Arnold, ed. *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*. Baltimore, 1959. Essays examining the broad sweep of alliance diplomacy.

See also ARMED NEUTRALITIES; BALANCE OF POWER; CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONSORTIA; CONTAINMENT; DOMINO THEORY; FOREIGN AID; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; ISOLATIONISM; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; TREATIES.

AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

Kenneth J. Grieb

International relations involve negotiations between the governments of nation-states, which are conducted by their executive branches under the auspices of their heads of government. Since each state is sovereign, agreement is reached only when the parties involved in an issue reach unanimous agreement among themselves. Those nations that do not agree with the consensus among the participants do not sign the resulting agreement and hence are not bound by its provisions. Diplomatic negotiations are difficult and time-consuming, since all those involved must agree on every aspect and word of the agreement. When the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 amid the tensions following the Second World War, over 1,400 separate votes were required before the full declaration was adopted.

Achieving unanimous consensus requires extensive, constant, and precise communications between the heads of government of the nations involved. Such communications are conducted through a variety of representatives. The number and types of such representatives have proliferated throughout history and in particular during the twentieth century, when rapid communications increased the need for speedy and ongoing contacts. The end of colonialism during the second half of the twentieth century meant that many more nations and peoples were involved in global and regional issues.

These trends increased the need for representatives abroad as the United States became a global power and then a superpower during the twentieth century, and then the sole global superpower in the last decade of that century. During this period the United States found itself involved in virtually every major issue in international affairs, regardless of the part of the world in which it occurred. Not surprisingly, the increasing complexity of American foreign relations necessitated increased numbers of envoys and new forms of representation.

Ambassadors, executive agents, and special representatives are different categories of envoys conducting the constant negotiations between the governments of the world's nations. The type of envoy that is appropriate varies with the circumstances of each issue and the parties involved. Use of each type has evolved through modifications since the founding of the United States. Technically, each of these types of envoys serves as the representative of the president to foreign governments.

AMBASSADORS

Ambassadors (the official title is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary) have been utilized since the beginning of international relations as the principal representative of one government to another. Ambassadors normally reside in the state to which they are accredited, and serve as the head of the resident mission, called an embassy if it is headed by an ambassador. Technically, an ambassador reports to the president, though in fact he or she does so through the secretary of state. Ambassadors are accredited as representatives from one head of government to another. Consequently, they are part of a system designed to deal with bilateral relations between the governments of two nations.

The widespread use of ambassadors is also a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century, with most nations employing that rank extensively only from the era of World War II. In the early days of the republic, the title of ambassador was rarely used. Even the European nations posted individuals with the exalted title of ambassador only to the capitals of the most important nations, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries meant the principal European powers.

Most of the diplomatic missions throughout the world were headed by ministers and were referred to as legations. (Minister is a standard rank that is one level below ambassador; a legation is one level below an embassy.) Indeed, it was not unusual for the chief representative in any given nation to hold a lesser title such as consul or to be designated as the temporary chief of mission, known as a chargé d'affaires, while holding a rank below that of minister. The United States frequently followed this pattern from its early existence well into the nineteenth century since throughout most of this period, it was involved in only a limited range of interchange with other nations.

It was nearly the end of the nineteenth century before the United States began to bestow the title of ambassador on envoys, and then only in European capitals. Only in 1893 was the status of U.S. representatives in such pivotal nations as England, France, Italy, and Germany raised to the level of ambassador. Gradually, additional European posts were raised to embassies during the years prior to World War I, but even by the start of that conflict, ambassadors were posted to fewer than ten European capitals. Prior to World War I, the only nations outside Europe in which the United States was represented by an ambassador were Japan and Mexico. This pattern followed the then-prevailing diplomatic practice. Indeed, the U.S. envoy to Mexico was the only representative of ambassadorial rank in that capital, making the U.S. ambassador automatically the dean of the diplomatic corps no matter how new he was, since he outranked all other envoys. The sending of an envoy with the rank of ambassador was regarded as a sign that the government regarded relations with the host nation as of particular importance.

While the president may select any individual as an ambassador, the United States has developed a formal system and a standing diplomatic corps from which most ambassadors are drawn. This system was not formalized until the twentieth century. In the early days of the nation, Congress adopted legislation establishing separate diplomatic and consular services, in 1790 and 1792 respectively. Yet there were few precise criteria for envoys, and presidents were free to appoint individuals of their choosing to either.

In the twentieth century it became evident that, since the United States was becoming increasingly involved in world affairs, the nation needed a corps of highly skilled negotiators to represent it abroad so it could effectively reach agreement with other governments. The Rogers Act of 1924, later amended in 1963, established set ranks and provided for selection based on merit through competitive exams. This legislation, and the Foreign Service Act of 1946, combined the diplomatic and consular services, although full integration of the personnel involved into a single corps of professionals that comprise the Department of State and the Diplomatic Corps was accomplished only in the mid-1950s. As a result, the formal establishment of a diplomatic corps is a relatively recent development.

Since the establishment of the U.S. Foreign Service, presidents have been able to draw on a body of specialists, selected on the basis of merit and apart from politics. The overwhelming majority of ambassadors are selected from the skilled professionals of the Foreign Service who serve all administrations. Usually, ambassadors are experienced envoys who have come through the diplomatic ranks, giving them considerable expertise and familiarity with several different nations and cultures. This is especially important in multilateral negotiations, which require skilled and detailed negotiations to achieve the necessary consensus among all the nations concerned with a particular question.

The president, however, may also select individuals from private life with sufficient expertise. These are called political appointees, since they normally serve only for a single presidency. While such appointments include political contributors, they also include distinguished former senators, representatives, governors, cabinet members, and military officers, as well as prominent industrialists and businessmen, cultural figures, and journalists. For example, the U.S. ambassadors to the UN have included a past presidential candidate, a chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a former secretary of state, a former senator, and distinguished individuals from private life, in addition to a number of career diplomats. The existence of a pool of career diplomats makes it possible for the president to utilize experts both within the administration and as special representatives. A significant number of ambassadors have served as presidential advisers and as assistant and under secretaries of state.

Political appointees are used regularly in certain posts by all administrations, especially at embassies in Europe. This is necessitated by the very limited funding provided for American diplomatic missions by Congress, which renders it virtually impossible to appoint regular foreign service officers to U.S. missions in European capitals

where the cost of living, including the cost of receptions that are mandatory for national holidays and diplomatic occasions, is extremely high. The entire annual entertainment allowance for most U.S. embassies would not pay the cost of the single reception or party. Therefore, presidents appoint independently wealthy individuals to European posts, since only individuals with the wherewithal and willingness to spend large amounts of their own funds can entertain in the style expected. For this reason, U.S. embassies in Europe are invariably staffed with wealthy presidential supporters and contributors to presidential campaigns, regardless of the administration in power.

The appointment of ambassadors requires confirmation by the Senate, and ambassadors serve at the pleasure of the president. The head of any mission normally holds the rank of ambassador for protocol purposes, regardless of whether or not he or she has been appointed as a permanent envoy and confirmed by the Senate.

Ambassadors head a regular diplomatic mission residing in the country to which they are accredited, and are expected to report regularly on all aspects of the governance and life of that country, to assist the president and his cabinet in understanding the concerns of that nation and the factors that influence its government. Daily and other periodic reports are expected to deal with all facets of activity in the host country, including its political and economic circumstances. Ambassadors are also expected to assist American citizens and protect their interests. The embassy staff, finally, is counted upon to provide routine information to American citizens, investors, and businessmen working in the country.

Accordingly, the ambassador and the staff he heads serve as the official observers and sources of information about the nation to which they are accredited, and maintain a wide range of contacts with the host government, opposition political figures, and private citizens of that nation. An embassy staff includes specialists in a number of areas in which the two governments are cooperating, including investigative, security, scientific, artistic, and cultural liaison. The embassy staff also invariably includes specialists in trade, agriculture, political affairs, law, administration, and finance, as well as military representatives and consular officers. The ambassador thus serves as the normal channel of communication and information between the two governments. Ambassadors are also expected to conduct negotiations regarding pending matters with the host government. In addition, the ambassador and the embassy staff are responsible for helping the government and citizens of the host nation understand the United States and its concerns. To do this they provide information regarding the United States and promote cultural events and official visits by American citizens from many walks of life.

In addition to reporting, ambassadors are expected to recommend policy actions, and their recommendations are often very influential in the determination of American foreign policy. This reflects the fact that resident ambassadors are often in the best position to understand the outlook of the government and nation to which they are accredited. Often, helping policymakers in Washington understand the domestic situation in the host nation is one of the ambassador's most important duties. Because ambassadors provide Washington with their host nation's perspective, they are often accused of identifying with that nation and adopting its viewpoint. Yet in fact they are simply performing their duty to be sure that the views and concerns of the country in which they are stationed be taken into consideration prior to action. Career ambassadors acquire a broad viewpoint through service in many nations. For example, from 1974 to 1996 Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as United States ambassador in Jordan, Nigeria, El Salvador, Israel, India, and Russia and to the UN.

During the second half of the twentieth century, when the United States emerged as a global superpower, the United States maintained embassies in virtually every nation of the world. This reflected the involvement of the United States in a wide range of issues, particularly economic and security issues, in every region of the world. This engagement widened even further after the end of the Cold War, when the United States emerged as the sole global superpower. Less than 10 percent of the nations of the world maintain as extensive a representation in all nations as the United States. The governments that do so are primarily the industrialized nations. Most countries can afford to maintain only a limited number of diplomatic posts abroad, and conduct most of their relations with a small number of neighbors and trading partners or through global organizations where all nations are represented.

The twentieth century has also witnessed an increase in the number of independent nations, especially with the virtual end of colonialism during the 1960s. The increasing number of nations

resulted in a corresponding increase of multilateral issues—that is, issues involving or of concern to a number of nations, and sometimes even of interest to all nations. Throughout the twentieth century multilateral negotiations have become increasingly frequent. This, in turn, has resulted in the need for new types of representation to supplement the permanent system of embassies, which was designed to facilitate bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations.

Throughout its history the United States has been served by a dedicated corps of diplomatic representatives. Many exercised considerable influence in policymaking, though a large number served prior to the extensive use of the title of ambassador. Since the appointment of ambassadors initially served to enhance the importance of missions to those nations with which diplomatic interaction was most frequent, the list of influential envoys includes many ambassadors.

Mexico has provided several instances of influential ambassadors playing key roles in settling troublesome questions peacefully. For example, ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels was one of the ambassadors who were instrumental in resolving disputes that averted conflict and launched a new era of friendship at a crucial moment. Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Daniels in 1933, a time when relations with Mexico were extremely sensitive as a result of the role of the United States during the turmoil of the civil war that had characterized the Mexican Revolution some twenty years earlier. The subsequent revolutionary policies that led to expropriations of large landholdings impacted foreign landowners. These included many prominent Americans, including some who were influential in politics. More important, the expropriations affected the operations of several large mineral extracting corporations, which demanded intervention by the United States government to protect their property.

Daniels proved to be just the right person to represent the United States in Mexico during the regime of General Lázaro Cárdenas, when tensions reached their highest. In 1937, after a prolonged dispute with the oil companies operating in Mexico, Cárdenas nationalized the oil fields in an immensely popular move in Mexico. This immediately created a new crisis with the United States and Britain, whose oil companies were involved, while the delicate negotiations regarding the land claims continued. The nationalization of the oil fields and the land redistribution, which constituted the defining moments of the Mexican Revolution, nearly brought Mexico and the United States to war.

Ambassador Daniels, who had worked diligently to dispel the ill feeling toward the United States remaining from the intervention in Mexico during its Revolution, redoubled his efforts to explain each nation's viewpoint to the other. He carried on an extensive personal correspondence with President Roosevelt throughout his tenure in Mexico. At one point, Washington sent a harshly worded note to Daniels for transmission to the Mexican government, a note that would surely have led to deadlock. Daniels, however, saved the situation by simply refusing to deliver the note. Only his close friendship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt enabled him to do this. His action made it possible for negotiations to continue, and despite domestic outcries in both countries, they contributed significantly to the eventual settlement. The importance of a settlement with Mexico became clear when, just a few months later, Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into World War II; then Mexico's support was essential to enable the United States to focus on the war effort. Daniels's actions played a major role in restoring friendly relations between the United States and Mexico, and dissipating the mutual mistrust. His efforts made him genuinely popular in Mexico by the time his tenure ended in 1941.

Another influential ambassador to Mexico who prevented a break in relations and helped settle pressing disputes in the aftermath of the revolutionary turmoil was Dwight W. Morrow, who served in the post from 1927 to 1930. A Wall Street banker, Morrow was an unlikely envoy in the midst of disputes regarding land seizures that raised compensation issues and angered the business community in the United States. Yet he proved the perfect individual for the job. Like Daniels, Morrow genuinely liked Mexico and understood Mexican sensitivities and nationalism. He began the process of overcoming the unfavorable image of the United States in Mexico by befriending its leaders, particularly Plutarco Elias Calles, the former president who headed the governing party. Morrow worked to find solutions that were acceptable to Mexican sensitivities. It was his efforts in working with Calles that produced the solution to the initial stage of the land and oil issues. Morrow suggested that the Mexican government's interpretation of the provisions of the Mexican Constitution regarding those issues be submitted to the Mexican Supreme Court. Since at that time Calles controlled the

court, this suggestion made it possible for Mexico to alter its stance without offending Mexican nationalism or appearing to bow to United States pressure, while retaining its position. Since the government would be responding to a decision of its own Supreme Court, nationalism was satisfied and the United States protest eliminated without any Mexican concession, because the court remained free to reconsider its decision, which it did several years later, enabling the government to revive the issues at a more propitious time when relations with the United States were more cordial. This was precisely the formula needed to alleviate a crisis.

Given the importance of relations with the Soviet Union and later Russia, it is scarcely surprising that several ambassadors serving there played pivotal roles in developing U.S. policy towards Moscow. Policymakers in Washington often found it necessary to rely heavily on the recommendations and judgments of envoys in Moscow, since they provided necessary insights into a closed society. Among the influential ambassadors in Moscow, Charles E. Bohlen during the 1950s and Jack F. Matlock during the late 1980s and early 1990s stand out. Both were specialists in Russia and Eastern Europe, having completed many tours of duty in Moscow as junior officers before heading the embassy. This meant that they had detailed knowledge of the obscure functioning of the Soviet and Russian governments and good Russian language skills. Other ambassadors are particularly influential because of their previous political service and their relationship with presidents. Notable among these was Ambassador Michael J. (Mike) Mansfield, a former Senate majority leader, who served as ambassador to Japan from 1977 to 1988.

Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, who served as ambassador to Japan from 1932 until the start of World War II in 1941, had the thankless and ultimately impossible task of attempting to prevent war between two mutually suspicious nations during the period of Japanese military expansion. Grew devoted considerable effort to building a basis of understanding between the United States and Japan, a difficult task at a time when few in Washington understood Japanese ambitions. United States communications to Japan were often written for domestic consumption, which exacerbated disagreements. Although Grew repeatedly managed to stave off conflict by insisting on rewording notes in a more diplomatic manner that would be acceptable to the Japanese, eventually his efforts proved futile despite the accuracy of his warnings and explanations of the Japanese outlook. His efforts delayed war at a time when the United States was not yet prepared for conflict, although the divergent ambitions of the two nations and the fact that all eyes in Washington were focused on Europe ultimately prevented further negotiations.

Ambassador Grew was disappointed when the United States abandoned neutrality in the Far East by adopting the Stimson Doctrine, named after Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, which announced that the United States would not recognize the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. While this stance seemed inevitable to most Americans in view of the Japanese actions, Grew recognized that it placed the United States on a collision course with Japan without having any real effect on the situation in Manchuria. In actuality, the Stimson Doctrine and its ultimate adoption by the League of Nations led to Japanese withdrawal from the League, removing an important channel of diplomatic negotiations with Japan. In addition, the fact that nonrecognition changed nothing on the ground, leaving the Japanese in control of Manchuria, caused the Japanese to view this as an indication that the powers of the world would not act meaningfully to contest military expansion in Asia. Throughout the years leading up to the war, Grew worked tirelessly to promote a negotiated settlement, and even proved willing to risk a summit conference in an effort to seek a solution. But the viewpoints of the two nations were simply incompatible, and eventually Japan made the decision to attack the United States. Given the circumstances, it is doubtful if any efforts at a negotiated settlement would have succeeded.

While ambassadors and the embassies they head have remained the principle instruments through which American foreign relations with other nations are conducted, other categories of representatives have also been employed throughout the history of the United States. The use of these alternative channels increased as the nation's role on the world stage grew larger. Delicate situations and the need to be constantly involved in multiple, simultaneous negotiations, particularly those regarding sensitive security matters, led increasingly to the practice of employing types of representatives outside the normal channels provided by embassies to address special matters and separate them from routine negotiations. This practice is utilized to indicate the importance of particular questions, to separate negotiations

regarding particular matters from other issues, and to enable the appointment of specialists or individuals particularly close to the president to handle specific questions. Such an approach provides additional flexibility to the president and to the conduct of American foreign relations. These alternate forms of representations include executive agents and special representatives.

EXECUTIVE AGENTS

Executive agents have been employed in the conduct of American foreign policy throughout the history of the nation. The term "executive agent" denotes an individual appointed by the president, acting without legislative consultation or sanction, for the purpose of carrying out some specific function, often of limited duration. In some instances, executive agents have received instructions from and were directly responsible to the chief executive—that is, they reported directly to the president rather than through the secretary of state. The use of executive agents derives indirectly from the constitutional stipulation that the appointment of heads of regular diplomatic missions requires Senate approval, a procedure that frequently proves cumbersome and time-consuming and is especially inconvenient when politically sensitive issues are involved. As a result, even delegations including members of the Senate are routinely appointed without Senate confirmation, particularly for missions of short duration. This approach can be particularly valuable when the Senate is controlled by the opposition party. Distinct procedures are required for special missions responding to temporary situations, such as conferences, that necessitate prompt action. Congress recognized this fact by providing the president with a contingent fund for special expenses, and salaries of agents are normally drawn from this fund.

In practice, such individuals are sometimes considered to be the personal representatives of the president, as distinct from regularly accredited diplomats who are responsible to the secretary of state (though theoretically to the president through the secretary) and are regarded as representatives of the government of the United States. This may be a fine distinction that appears somewhat technical to the layperson, but it is an important differentiation in terms of function and operation, and one to which diplomats and governments are closely attuned.

That executive agents are employed for a wide variety of purposes, sometimes to make contacts possible outside regular diplomatic channels, reflects the flexibility of the office. In the strictest sense, the use of an executive agent rather than a regular ambassador is a pragmatic device available to the chief executive whenever expediency requires some fresh or supplemental channels. Consequently, the functions of agents and the nature of their office vary with circumstances and with presidents.

Given the flexible nature of the instrument and its dependence on presidential initiative, it is scarcely surprising that executive agents tend to be employed most extensively by strong chiefs of state. Presidential dynamics is thus a key element in the use of agents and their powers, for chief executives who prefer to act independently and conduct their office in a vigorous manner utilize this device to assume some degree of personal control of foreign policy. Consequently, the greatest use of such envoys has occurred under Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, both rated as strong executives by historians. Whether the agents supplement or supersede regularly accredited diplomats depends upon the president, and is generally indicative of his vigor and the nature of his relations with the State Department.

It is no accident that the two presidents making the most extensive use of agents, Wilson and Roosevelt, sought to conduct personal diplomacy, attempted to circumvent relatively weak secretaries of state appointed because of domestic political considerations, and mistrusted the personnel of the regular Foreign Service. Both employed executive agents as a means of placing the conduct of key aspects of foreign policy directly in presidential hands, effectively circumventing the regular diplomatic corps and the State Department. Since there is obviously a limit to the number of situations to which a president can effectively devote personal attention, the appointment of this class of envoys can also provide an indication of the importance attached to a particular problem, nation, or region.

The type of individuals presidents appoint and the basis of their selection affect not only the operation of the institution, but also the degree of controversy surrounding its use. Since the very nature of the position renders it a dependency of the president, the chief executive is free to select the individuals according to any criteria he chooses. Full congressional debates regarding the

constitutional powers involved have been rare, although a notable exception occurred in the Senate in 1831. Even in this discussion, the question was not whether the president had the right to appoint such agents, but rather what functions they could perform and their relation to regular diplomatic representatives. If the president seeks simply to secure the temporary services of an individual with recognized expertise in a given realm, whose talents would not otherwise be at the disposal of the government and whose abilities are especially suited to a specific task, little dispute will ensue. Similarly, agents assigned to discrete or minor tasks seldom breed controversy.

It is a different matter, however, when the chief of state sends a personal representative to supersede a regularly accredited head of mission. In such instances, the agent clearly displaces an individual appointed with the consent of the legislature, allowing more direct control by the executive. If the agent is dispatched to an important theater of foreign policy on a highly visible or sensitive mission, the likelihood that such an action will arouse the ire of Congress is increased. A president also assumes a greater risk of controversy when relying upon agents because of suspicion about the objectives of the regular diplomatic personnel or as a means of placing the matter in the hands of an individual more ideologically compatible with his own views. This is particularly true if the individuals employed as agents are political figures associated with the chief executive or political contributors. These agents are likely to be controversial figures whose employment can be expected to antagonize the opposition party. Although the resultant disputes often focus on the agents, the basic issue involves the policies pursued by the president.

The controversy regarding the activities of Wilson's surrogates in Mexico provides an example of such a situation. The issue was not the use of agents per se, but rather the uses to which they were put. Wilson was clearly employing executive agents to circumvent the regular diplomatic officers, who disagreed with his policy. This was particularly evident in the type of individuals he dispatched on such missions, for they were invariably "deserving Democrats" who were politically associated with the president or Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Wilson felt that the most important qualifications for a prospective appointee were loyalty and similarity of outlook, which he considered more significant than knowledge of the area involved or the possession of any diplomatic skills. It is scarcely surprising that the appointment of partisans to carry out partisan policies provoked political controversy. Franklin D. Roosevelt, by contrast, although he also employed executive agents extensively and was himself scarcely less of a storm center than Wilson, managed to minimize such disputes through the selection of men of stature and experience who were clearly well qualified, and by employing them only on missions that obviously required special procedures.

Early Examples One of the most common uses of executive agents has been in dealing with nations or governments with which the United States did not at the time maintain normal diplomatic relations. In these circumstances, recourse to some special type of temporary representative is plainly necessary for the transaction of any business, including the inauguration of formal diplomatic contact. Inevitably, such agents were common during the early days of the Republic, when the United States had not yet been accorded recognition by many of the world's nations, and during the nineteenth century when the United States maintained regular diplomatic missions in only a small portion of the world's capitals. Indeed, the first representatives of the United States in the immediate aftermath of independence had the status of simple diplomatic agents. Technically, the initial representatives were congressional rather than executive agents, since they were dispatched during the days of the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation, prior to the existence of a separate executive branch. These individuals were appointed by the Committee of Secret Correspondence and later the Committee for Foreign Affairs, and only appointments to regular diplomatic missions were considered by the full Congress. Thus, the use of agents whose designation was not subject to confirmation by Congress actually predated the existence of the executive branch.

Four of the nation's first five chief executives—George Washington, John Adams, James Madison, and James Monroe—found it necessary to employ executive agents extensively. Among the earliest agents was Colonel David Humphrys, whom President Washington dispatched in 1790 to conduct negotiations leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal. A series of similar emissaries was employed during the 1820s to arrange the nation's first treaty with Turkey. Executive agents were also utilized exten-

sively in the intermittent negotiations with the Barbary states of North Africa from the 1790s to the 1820s, an instance where piracy in the Mediterranean required negotiations prior to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Similar appointees were also employed during the early nineteenth century in establishing initial contact with the newly independent former Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America, individuals such as Joel R. Poinsett—an appointee of President James Madison—conducted reconnaissance missions and represented U.S. interests during the period when the ability of the new republics to maintain themselves was still in doubt and when formal recognition was delayed by negotiations with Spain regarding the purchase of Florida. Temporary representatives proved convenient for this type of mission and have served as the instrument of this class of exchanges throughout the existence of the United States. In the 1970s Henry A. Kissinger played a pivotal role in establishing relations with the People's Republic of China while serving as President Richard M. Nixon's national security adviser.

Purposes and Functions Agents are often employed as a means of dealing with nations or governments with which formal diplomatic contacts have been severed or temporarily suspended. This is another situation in which agents are well suited to a particular need, for preliminary negotiations are often a necessary prelude to the renewal of formal ties. When used in this manner, agents can serve as a vehicle to conduct negotiations regarding the legitimacy of the new government and the conditions attached to formal recognition. Such exchanges are obviously of temporary character and must be handled through some vehicle other than a regularly accredited representative, for the appointment of an individual with the latter status would in itself constitute de facto recognition of the government in question. This also applies in instances when it proves necessary to negotiate with the leaders of rebel movements. Talks with rebel leaders must take place outside normal diplomatic channels, since diplomatic relations with a rebel movement would constitute an unfriendly act toward the government of the nation involved.

This last circumstance became common in the latter quarter of the twentieth century when the United States, and indeed all the principal powers of the world, increasingly found it necessary to deal with civil wars in order to prevent conflicts from spreading and becoming full-scale international wars. The distinction between internal affairs and the maintenance of international peace and security became blurred in the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the Cold War. That is because modern conflicts, which involve weapons that are far more destructive than those employed in earlier centuries, often start as internal rebellions and then spread across borders to affect neighboring nations.

Missions of this type have included efforts to protect American citizens and their rights in areas controlled by unrecognized governments or rebel factions, simple negotiations regarding the procedures for the renewal of regular relations with new governments resulting from internal uprisings, and attempts to impose preconditions as a price for full recognition. In cases involving new governments resulting from civil war or revolution, if the break in relations is of recent origin and short duration, the appointment of a special agent is often unnecessary, since members of the regular diplomatic service still on the scene can serve as the vehicle for such exchanges. In instances where the use of such individuals proves inconvenient or where they have been withdrawn as part of the break, the appointment of an executive agent is essential.

Agents of this nature also date from the initial days of the nation, when President George Washington dispatched Gouverneur Morris to England in 1790 in a futile effort to open negotiations seeking a commercial treaty and the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. Since at this time there was no foreign service, the designation of agent was a matter of title and indicated a less formal status and a temporary mission. In the twentieth century, executive agents were most often employed in dealing with the newly emerging nations of the so-called Third World, where governmental instability and internal turmoil is more frequent. This is particularly true in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States is more likely to attempt to exact concessions as a precondition for recognition. Such efforts have frequently included attempts to secure pledges of elections or the resignation of a government that has recently seized power. Wilson's dispatch of John Lind—a former Democratic governor of Minnesota and a political associate of Bryan—to Mexico in 1913 was one example of this type of mission. Lind, who had no prior diplomatic experience and no previous contact with Mexico, was appointed "adviser to the American Embassy in

Mexico City," but in reality served as the personal representative of the president of the United States. In this manner he superseded the regularly accredited diplomats in that country. Acting as Wilson's spokesman and "confidential agent," Lind conducted negotiations with the incumbent government of General Victoriano Huerta, which included the presentation of demands that stipulated Huerta's surrendering his office. This is an instance in which Wilson, who was suspicious of the regular foreign service personnel, chose to employ his own representative because he preferred an adherent of his policies as his instrument. While controversial at the time, such situations have become far more common in the post–Cold War era.

In some instances more formal negotiations are employed prior to recognition. One such cased was the so-called Bucareli Conference in 1923, when executive agents designated as commissioners representing the United States and Mexico held an extended "exchange of impressions" whose "sole object" was "to report afterwards to their respective high officials." The use of the title "commissioners" served to allow negotiations with a government that had seized power through a coup d'état and had not yet been recognized officially by the United States. Because the conferees were executive agents, the sessions did not technically constitute recognition of the Mexican government of General Álvaro Obregón, but they did prove to be the vehicle for eventual recognition through a resulting memorandum of understanding that enabled the satisfactory settlement of the questions regarding damage claims and oil land. Executive agents are frequently used in comparable situations, but it must be noted that although they are a useful vehicle for this type of negotiations, such envoys are but one mechanism for completing the necessary arrangements.

At times, executive agents have even been employed to conduct negotiations for an early peace with nations with which the United States was at war. Executive agents are the only appropriate vehicle for such delicate discussions. The outstanding example of this type of mission was that of Nicholas P. Trist, chief clerk of the State Department. He was dispatched by President James K. Polk to Veracruz in 1847 to accompany the military expedition of General Winfield Scott, which had landed at that port and was advancing toward the Mexican capital. Since the United States had entered the war for limited and clearly delineated objectives and had already established effective control of the territory it desired, Polk hoped that Trist's presence would enable negotiations to be conducted simultaneously with the military campaign and possibly render the completion of the latter unnecessary. The use of an executive agent was essential because Mexican reaction was uncertain and because it was necessary to maintain secrecy as a means of circumventing a mounting domestic sentiment to extend the original war aims. Trist's mission resulted in an incongruous combination of intermittent combat and negotiations that failed to produce results until after the military expedition had fought its way into Mexico City.

During the early twentieth century, executive agents were frequently employed as the instruments of intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin American nations, a practice extended to other regions of the world during and after the Cold War. In numerous instances this constituted a conscious attempt to avoid military intervention through mediation between internal factions or the imposition of a political settlement. Admittedly this entailed political intervention, but such action was far less controversial than the landing of troops to terminate an internal conflict or to protect American citizens. Such roles were particularly prominent in the Caribbean and Central American regions, with which the United States was especially concerned because of their significance for the security of the nation and because of the necessity of protecting the approaches to the Panama Canal.

The mission of Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua in 1927 illustrates the use of an agent to mediate between internal factions. Civil war broke out in that Central American republic within a few months of the withdrawal of a U.S. Marine detachment that had kept the peace while serving officially as a legation guard. The United States considered it necessary to act to preserve peace in Nicaragua, owing to the potential in that country for an alternative canal route. Stimson went to Nicaragua as the personal representative of President Calvin Coolidge to mediate between the Liberal and Conservative Party forces in an effort to secure an agreement providing for a cessation of hostilities and the transfer of the dispute from the battlefield to the ballot box. The special envoy negotiated with the leaders of both factions, notwithstanding the fact that this entailed dealing with both the rebels and the incumbent government, which had been installed with the support of the United States and was still recognized.

The mission of General Enoch H. Crowder to Cuba from 1921 to 1923 constituted a similar effort to substitute political intervention for military action. Crowder was dispatched to Cuba in 1921 by the Wilson administration in an effort to forestall hostilities over a disputed election when Liberal ex-president José Miguel Gómez challenged the reported victory of his former vice-president, Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso, who now had the support of the Conservative Party. Crowder was continued in his position as the president's personal representative by Warren G. Harding. Crowder's open intervention and the implied threat of force prevented a civil war but failed to satisfy the opposition. When a compromise agreement proved impossible, Crowder remained in Cuba as a virtual viceroy, in effect an American governor of Cuba, overseeing and dictating to that nation's government. Such methods prevented an insurrection but constituted forceful intervention. It is interesting to note that Crowder's position became far less imposing when in 1923 his title was changed from the "president's personal representative" to ambassador to Cuba.

In addition to mediation and political intervention, executive agents have been employed as a means of establishing and maintaining contact with rebel movements during times of turmoil, when it is apparent that such factions have established effective control of substantial territory. Although such agents often participate in mediation efforts, in some instances the primary purposes are to protect American lives and property within rebel-controlled territory, exert some influence upon the policies of the insurrectionist leaders, and gather and report to Washington information regarding the revolution and its leaders. The most notable example of this practice occurred in Mexico during the Wilson administration. While Mexico was torn by civil war, Wilson dispatched numerous personal representatives and confidential agents to that country, usually stationing such individuals at the headquarters of two or three of the factions simultaneously. This practice resulted in a confusing welter of overlapping jurisdictions, with agents at times reporting on each other's activities, yet it also served to promote contacts between the rebel factions for the purpose of ending the conflict. It was necessary to utilize executive appointments because only in this manner could Wilson maintain representatives in more than one of the camps and attempt to influence the factions without technically conferring recognition upon them.

Other agents have been employed on similar missions. For example, William M. Churchwell was dispatched late in 1858 to confer with Mexican leader Benito Juárez in the midst of civil war. He arrived early in 1859, at a point when several factions claimed control of the nation and Juárez had been driven from the capital. Churchwell's mission paved the way for formal U.S. recognition of the Juárez regime.

In conducting negotiations or investigations of special delicacy it may be inexpedient for the president to inform Congress and the public in advance by requesting confirmation of a formal appointment. In such cases, presidents have found executive agents a convenient device. The mission of Robert D. Murphy to French North Africa during World War II is an example. Although ostensibly an American consul, Murphy was in fact dispatched as Roosevelt's personal representative to determine whether French officials in North Africa were loyal to the German-dominated Vichy government, and to conduct negotiations to arrange for their cooperation with an Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. Clearly, the success of a mission of this character depended on secrecy, which could not be maintained through a congressional confirmation proceeding.

Executive agents are also useful to the president when a disagreement with Congress precludes a request for advance approval. President Grover Cleveland's dispatch of former Representative James H. Blount on an investigatory mission to Hawaii in 1893 was such an instance. A revolution had led to the installation of a new government, dominated by American landowners and settlers, that promptly negotiated a treaty of annexation with the United States. Despite considerable sentiment for approval of the treaty, Cleveland withdrew it from the Senate and dispatched Blount, whose report confirmed that U.S. naval forces had aided the rebellion. The knowledge that the United States had been implicated in the revolt led to rejection of the annexation accord.

President Ulysses S. Grant's use of his private secretary, General Orville E. Babcock, as his personal representative and special agent in Santo Domingo in 1869 constituted one of the first instances of the executive employing a member of his personal staff to conduct confidential negotiations in the face of congressional disapproval. Grant was convinced of the advisability of acquiring Samaná Bay as a naval base, and dispatched Babcock ostensibly on a mission of investigation. Babcock negotiated a series of protocols providing

for a lease on the bay and a virtual protectorate over the Dominican Republic, even though this action exceeded his instructions. The accords meticulously stipulated that they constituted merely the "basis" for a "definitive treaty" to be negotiated subsequently by a duly accredited envoy. Consequently, the accords had the character of an agreement between the two presidents acting personally, rather than between their respective governments. Grant later sent his secretary back to Santo Domingo to sit in on the formal treaty negotiations as an unofficial observer who was "fully possessed of the President's views." Despite the fact that the negotiating powers were technically vested in the regularly accredited American minister in Santo Domingo, Babcock conducted the negotiations while the minister merely signed the accord. The effort proved futile, as the resulting treaty was rejected by the Senate.

Executive agents also serve as channels of direct communication with other heads of state in instances when particular circumstances require the bypassing of normal diplomatic channels, either as a matter of expediency or as a means of emphasizing the special importance of the talks. Usually, this involves the dispatch of a prominent individual of considerable stature who is closely associated with the chief executive. Frequently, the envoy is one of the president's principal advisers. This indicates that the emissary is speaking for the president; consequently, his or her mere appearance as a negotiator demonstrates the importance attached to the matter at hand.

Woodrow Wilson resorted to this type of agent to bypass normal diplomatic channels when he sent Colonel Edward M. House to Europe in 1916. House's mission was to offer a plan designed to terminate World War I or, failing in that, to bring the United States into active participation in the war. The dispatch of House made possible direct negotiations with the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, Sir Edward Grey, while also ensuring that only the two executives and the emissary were aware of the precise contents of the proposal until the completion of the negotiations. This was vital, because had the Germans learned of the talks, the result would have been immediate United States involvement in the war at a time when it was not yet ready to enter the conflict. Since House was a close ally of Wilson, his dispatch on a mission automatically endowed it with considerable importance, for in this instance the president's personal representative was indeed an individual who could be presumed to speak fully for him.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt also employed a close personal associate as a special envoy when he sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to initiate discussions regarding Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union shortly after Nazi Germany invaded Russia in 1941. The president chose to use a separate channel both to ensure confidentiality and to demonstrate, through the selection of an individual so closely associated with him, his desire that the envoy's mere appearance on the mission be regarded as a symbolic commitment. This approach succeeded in assuaging the suspicions of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin.

Roosevelt used a similar method in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China, who proved highly resistant to pressures exerted through normal diplomatic channels. Roosevelt resorted to a number of special officials in addition to the regular ambassador, ranging from Owen Lattimore, a political adviser to Chiang, to General Patrick J. Hurley, a personal representative. Hurley later became ambassador to China, although his influence as special representative was greater. President Harry S. Truman resorted to similar tactics when he dispatched former chief of staff General George C. Marshall to China during 1945 in an unsuccessful effort to convince the nationalist and communist factions to negotiate an agreement to terminate their civil war. President Richard M. Nixon sent his personal foreign policy adviser and head of the National Security Council staff, Henry A. Kissinger, on several missions, in particular in 1969 for negotiations in Moscow regarding the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. President James Earl Carter employed a special envoy, Sol Linowitz, to deal with the negotiations regarding the future of the Panama Canal.

Executive agents have also been utilized in dealing with international organizations, where they function as unofficial observers rather than as full delegates. Harding employed such individuals to establish contact with some agencies of the League of Nations and several other European conferences as a means of circumventing the isolationist sentiment in the United States. This procedure was necessary since—as a consequence of isolationism—the United States was not officially a member of the League and therefore could not appoint an ambassador to it. Such unofficial observers are usually members of the regular diplomatic service who are stationed at nearby posts, and function in a dual role.

The principal variables in the institution of executive agents are the type of mission, the particular individual involved, and the method of reporting to the chief executive. Of necessity, the purpose of the mission is one of the primary determinants of the activities of the agent and the importance of the effort. The personality and prominence of the agent are other significant factors. Dispatch of a prominent individual who also functions within the government, particularly if he is closely associated with the chief executive, endows the mission with significance. It is scarcely surprising that such individuals are most frequently employed in missions to the heads of governments of important powers or allies. The use of members of the regular Foreign Service can also affect the institution. Although such individuals come to their missions with greater diplomatic expertise, their appointment has less dramatic force, and consequently less impact, than the dispatch of a prominent individual or political figure. Accordingly, regular diplomatic officers tend to be employed as executive agents principally on missions requiring some degree of secrecy, as their movements are less conspicuous.

The channels through which executive agents file their reports and receive their instructions are also significant determinants of their activities. Some agents are of such stature, or are so closely associated with the chief executive, that they report directly to him, bypassing the Department of State. Such individuals obviously have greater latitude, and acquire the stature of spokespersons for the chief executive. Yet the impact of their labors is somewhat limited by this very fact, since the Department of State and its diplomats in the field are often unaware of the details of the mission until after the fact. In some instances this lack of communication has caused serious difficulties. At the least, it prevents the regular diplomatic officers from providing assistance or advice, and it can also delay the implementation of the resulting agreements. On the other hand many agents, usually those from the regular diplomatic corps or those not closely associated with the president, file their reports through the Department of State. Indeed, some of these individuals, although executive agents, are not in fact the president's personal representatives, but rather officials on special mission under the control of the Department of State, just as regular diplomats are.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the employment of executive agents has become increasingly institutionalized, reflecting a trend throughout the government. The growth of the Washington bureaucracy, which has expanded rapidly as the government assumes more extensive functions, has necessitated a formal and complex structure that has affected even so flexible an institution as that of executive agents. The formalization of a White House staff with distinct foreign policy advisers has been a gradual development occurring primarily after World War II. Many presidents have employed their own advisers since Woodrow Wilson's use of Colonel Edward House, but these were ad hoc arrangements until World War II. Then, their use was formalized so that foreign policy advisers became an ongoing presence in the White House in all administrations.

PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY STAFF

The use of specific presidential foreign policy consultants and personal envoys expanded during World War II and the postwar years. Franklin Roosevelt's use of Harry Hopkins and a "brain trust" of advisers contributed to the development of a separate White House office distinct from the existing cabinet departments such as the Department of State, although in large measure its emergence merely reflected the growth of the government that came with the increasing complexity of its functions in the modern world. It was Roosevelt, regarded as a strong chief executive, who initiated the development of the Executive Office of the president. By the 1950s there was an entirely separate White House staff of considerable size. Although only a small portion of it dealt with foreign policy, this portion was expanded under later presidents, eventually evolving into a sizable National Security Council (NSC).

The NSC, originally established as a small office in 1947, grew to importance during the administration of Richard M. Nixon. It has continued throughout all subsequent administrations as part of the White House staff, becoming virtually an alternate State Department functioning wholly under the president's control. While officially functioning as a coordinating body to assemble the recommendations of different agencies involved in foreign relations, it has provided the chief executive with a separate foreign affairs staff and enabled him to act independently in foreign affairs. Its power derives from proximity to

the president and the ability to set agendas by providing the chief executive with daily morning security briefings that cover important international events. The NSC proved especially important during the height of the Cold War, when security and national defense matters assumed precedence over other aspects of foreign policy. The prominence of the NSC, however, has continued beyond the end of the Cold War.

The existence of White House foreign policy advisers, and the creation of the National Security Council within the Executive Office as a separate body, provides the president with a staff of specialists of his own, distinct from the State Department and the regular Foreign Service. This has strengthened the hand of the president in foreign affairs, enabling him to conduct his own policy through what virtually amounts to an alternate foreign office. That it is housed in the building formerly occupied by the State Department is symbolic both of the increased size of the two institutions (the State Department moved to larger quarters) and of the change in the relationship between the chief executive and the State Department.

The process of utilizing special representatives in the conduct of foreign affairs accelerated in the years after World War II, reflecting the increasing complexity of world affairs; the increasing interconnectedness of the world, known as globalization; and the larger involvement of the United States in international affairs. Security cooperation on global and regional scales expanded, and economic interchange between nations and across borders accelerated greatly. In the 1960s the demise of colonialism doubled the number of independent nations in the world and the number continued to increase afterward. In addition, more rapid communications and transportation links enabled rapid movement of goods, business, and citizens, which meant that governments needed to remain in much closer contact. It also meant that individual citizens and organizations interacted constantly with their counterparts in other nations, in addition to the interaction between their governments. Issues formerly regarded as exclusively domestic were now considered part of the international system, and many previously domestic concerns extended beyond borders and were regarded as global or regional problems to be addressed jointly and cooperatively by many nations. Many problems had to be addressed at the global level, since they affect peoples in many nations, regardless of borders.

MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

After World War II, a new range of multilateral international institutions developed, leading to increased interaction between nations and a consequent need for new types of representatives beyond those in traditional embassies. The emergence of the United Nations, a series of specialized agencies associated with it, and other international organizations—ranging from regional security groups to free trade areas to military alliances—resulted in an extensive series of regularly scheduled meetings at which the United States needed to be represented. The increasing multilateralism of world affairs and the increasing importance of global issues necessitated dealing with groups of nations rather than addressing issues bilaterally with individual governments, which is the function of embassies.

Reflecting the fact that the UN system required a different level of representation than do individual nations, the U.S. representative to the UN was usually given cabinet rank to make possible his or her participation in policymaking. Hence, although the UN representative received instructions from the Department of State, she or he also ranked well above other ambassadors. While representatives from all nations at the UN held the rank of ambassador, their responsibilities were far more extensive than those of traditional ambassadors, since they dealt with envoys from all other governments in the world. In recognition of this fact, each nation's head of mission at the United Nations was called a permanent representative.

Individuals with the rank of ambassador, often drawn from the regular Foreign Service ranks, were assigned to represent the United States at a number of other permanent regional multilateral organizations. These included intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Other individuals with ambassadorial rank were sent to observe the meetings of regional organizations.

An increasing number and range of issues were addressed as global questions during the last quarter of the twentieth century. This required U.S. representation at many organizations, conferences, and meetings dealing with topics on a worldwide, multilateral basis. These sessions cover a wide range of vital subjects. Specialized agencies, commissions, and programs of the United Nations dealt with human rights, the environment, trade, drug

trafficking, crime, corruption, food, agriculture, health, air and maritime trade, postal and telegraph linkages between nations, intellectual property rights and protections, refugees, population, and many additional issues. All were problems that spanned national boundaries, and hence required international cooperation, which necessitated negotiations and agreements by national governments. In addition, the UN convened a series of world conferences to deal with topical issues, particularly the various aspects of development. The annual meetings of organizations formed by treaties to enforce or monitor the enforcement of treaty provisions often dealt with vital issues of international peace and security, such as arms proliferation; weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and the rights of civilians in wartime.

These meetings and conferences required representatives with particular expertise regarding the particular issues under discussion. The representatives involved came from a range of governmental agencies, in addition to the diplomatic corps. Such meetings were often covered by special representatives. Even when the delegation was headed by the Foreign Service officer, the members of the delegation included specialists and even members of Congress. These representatives were appointed on a short-term basis by the president, without confirmation by the Senate.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

Many of these international issues achieved such importance that regular offices dealing globally with these matters have been established, usually within the Department of State. The United States now had—in addition to the regular regional geographic bureaus—special officers, or assistant secretaries of state, dealing with various topical themes. These included drug control, human rights, the environment, scientific affairs, and communications and information policy. The administration of President George H. W. Bush established such a special representative for religious freedom. Such offices proliferated in response to domestic lobbying, and many citizens have come to believe that an issue is not receiving high priority unless a special office is established to deal with it. These offices served to provide the necessary expertise and monitoring for negotiations and conferences, just as such separate organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency do in their fields.

Economics and trade grew in importance, resulting in the development of a series of international organizations to establish rules to regulate and facilitate the exchange of goods and services between nations, and to settle disputes regarding the internationally accepted rules. These organizations required not only special representatives, but the establishment of new governmental offices to deal with these economic and trade issues. The organizations, all of which have regular meetings, included the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; the Group of Seven (which became the Group of Eight in the 1990s), the nations with the largest economies in the world; and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The meetings of these groups usually involved representatives of the Treasury and Commerce Departments as well as the State Department. Some were held at the summit level.

Trade and international economic matters became so vital that it proved necessary to establish a separate office to deal with these matters. The Office of the United States Trade Representative within the Executive Office of the president was established in 1962 and given broader status by the Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act of 1988. The trade representative's office was responsible for the negotiation of agreements relating to international trade; it conducted all global, multilateral, and bilateral trade discussions, both for the establishment of global and bilateral accords and for the effective implementation of such agreements. Its responsibilities encompassed the World Trade Organization (WTO)—which evolved from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and all bilateral trade disputes and agreements. Globalization increased the importance of these economic matters, and the Office of the Trade Representative played an increasingly central role in U.S. foreign relations from the time it was established.

The use of executive agents and special representatives greatly increased in the late twentieth century as new issues emerged and as all of them became more global in their impact. The result was a proliferation of offices that often created confusion as to which had ultimate responsibility; this resulted in rivalry between agencies. So many issues came to involve multiple offices and departments that the making of foreign policy increasingly involved interagency task forces to

coordinate the efforts of the many agencies involved. These groups gained considerable importance under the administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter and the senior George Bush. This created new problems, but also assured that experts with the appropriate knowledge are consulted regarding all issues.

CONFLICT MEDIATION AND MIGRATION

The use of special representatives also expanded, during the 1980s and 1990s, in dealing with regional crises involving international peace and security. Increasingly, it became normal for all presidents to appoint so-called special envoys to deal with crises regarded as important to the preservation of peace.

For example, the United States had a special envoy on a continuing basis to deal with the disputes between Israelis and the Palestinians. In this way, a single individual was placed in charge, making it possible for shuttle diplomacy to replace separate negotiations with the parties. This approach was particularly important since the United States did not officially recognize Palestine as a state, and consequently had no ambassador to Palestine, despite the fact that reaching any settlement required the inclusion of the Palestinians in the negotiations. Recognizing Israel's sensitivity to an extension of American recognition prior to a final peace agreement, the United States withheld recognition of Palestine until implementation of such an agreement, using recognition as a means of pressuring the Palestinians.

Yet the volatile situation between Israel and Palestine constituted one of the situations in the world most likely to lead to full-scale war. Because of the lack of trust between the two parties, it was essential that the United States continue to pursue actively a settlement in order to avert conflict, and hence, the appointment of a special U.S. envoy. Only an envoy accredited to both sides could engage in the necessary shuttle diplomacy, negotiating separately with both parties to the conflict. The service of Dennis Ross in such a capacity during the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton played a key role in the Madrid peace process during the 1990s. The existence of a special envoy became so common that both sides protested if none was appointed, since they viewed the absence of such a representative as an indication that the United States was not devoting appropriate attention to the conflict. Usually, the official appointed was a regular Foreign Service officer, often also serving as assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern affairs or as ambassador to a state in the region. In other instances, the special representative came from another of the Washington bureaucracies. Indeed, on two occasions the director of the Central Intelligence Agency mediated arrangements for temporary cease-fire agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.

This approach was also used in the Balkans during the 1990s after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The United States needed the ability to talk to all parties involved in the conflict that followed the collapse, even before the new states were recognized, and to continue discussions with ethnic factions within these states. Even after ambassadors were designated, a "super envoy" able to engage in shuttle diplomacy was essential to convince the parties, and NATO allies as well, that the United States regarded the situation as particularly critical. The Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that ended the conflict between Serbia and Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at least temporarily stabilized the internal situation in the latter nation were negotiated in advance and then pressed upon the parties to the dispute by the special representative, Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke. African civil wars were also often addressed through such envoys. Under the Reagan administration, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker developed a reputation for facilitating the settlements that ended long-standing conflicts on the continent, particularly in Mozambique.

The appointment of a special envoy to deal with conflict situations made it possible to separate the negotiations to settle disputes from all other aspects of ongoing relations between the United States and the countries involved in the conflict. Consequently, such envoys proliferated. By the turn of the century, they were constantly appointed to deal with particular conflicts in Africa and with the situation in the Korean peninsula. Such appointments reflected worldwide trends, since crises throughout the world came to be often addressed by the principle powers working with global and regional organizations. United States special representatives invariably found themselves working in cooperation with a special representative of the UN secretary general, and often with similar envoys representing regional organizations such as the European Union or the

Organization of African Unity. These practices reflected what globally is referred to as conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy, through which disputes and conflicts anywhere are addressed in their early stages by the international community to prevent them from spreading into a regional war involving several nations. In previous eras of slower communications, less interdependent economies, and less destructive weapons, civil wars were regarded as the internal affairs of states, and were addressed by the international community only after other nations had become involved. In the late twentieth century, however, localized conflicts were addressed before they spread. Once other nations and organizations dispatched special envoys, the appointment of a U.S. special representative was both expected and necessary. In this sense, the expanded use of such envoys in conflict situations was merely part of a global trend reflecting the greater interdependence of the era.

Use of the power to appoint executive agents and special representatives without the approval of the Senate, in addition to regular ambassadorial appointments, increased greatly during the latter decades of the twentieth century, though such appointments were employed by many presidents since the beginning of the nation. The extent to which this power was utilized varied with each chief executive. While the appointment of agents and representatives outside the regular diplomatic corps inevitably led to rivalry and controversy with the State Department, when combined with the emergence of a White House staff, it provided the president with a body of specialists at his disposal to serve as personal envoys who could speak for him in the conduct of negotiations and the direct execution of policy. During the twentieth century executive agents dispatched abroad were frequently drawn from the presidential staff.

The late-twentieth-century trend toward summitry, or personal negotiations between heads of state, rendered the use of executive agents to conduct direct negotiations not only convenient but highly desirable in dealing with key allies or important questions. The dispatch of such an agent in itself constituted an indication that the matter had been brought to the personal attention of the president, and hence assumed a certain symbolism of its own. Inevitably, the use of executive agents tended to downgrade the importance of regularly accredited diplomats, who were considered representatives of the government—that is, the bureaucracy as represented by the State Department—rather than of the president himself.

This development was obviously fraught with difficulties, particularly since instant communications enabled regular envoys to be in constant touch with Washington. As the complexity and size of the Washington bureaucracy increased, the issue of whether communications to the Department of State reached the president became important in the perception of other governments. Many governments preferred to be dealing with envoys who reported directly to the White House staff rather than the State Department, since they believed that his views would be more likely to reach the president. This perception has endowed the special agent with a status as a demonstration of concern by the chief executive. In some respects, this pattern is an inevitable result of the burgeoning of bureaucracy caused by the complexities of the modern world. President Nixon's use of Kissinger to conduct important negotiations during his service as national security adviser constituted a clear example of other governments preferring to negotiate with what they considered a direct presidential envoy. Since heads of state felt neglected if approached by someone other than the person with the president's ear, the mere appearance of a special envoy tended to facilitate serious exchanges and promote accord. This is one of the reasons why the use of executive agents gradually expanded.

The institution was adapted to serve yet another purpose, that of signaling that a situation was regarded as particularly important and was receiving the direct attention of the president. Such appointments also made more rapid action possible by circumventing the necessarily complex channels of modern governmental bureaucracy.

The increasing use of executive agents and special representatives caused considerable controversy regarding their role in enlarging presidential control of foreign policy. Some commentators contended that reliance upon such agents led to the bypassing of the State Department and Congress, thereby contributing to the expansion of presidential power at the expense of the legislature. Although the Constitution clearly vests authority and responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs in the president, it also provides for congressional controls by placing the sole war-making power in the hands of the legislature and the requirement of Senate "advice and consent" to treaties. Also, Senate approval is needed to confirm the appointment

of the ambassadors and ministers who represent the nation abroad, as well as for the selection of the secretary of state. Hence, while the State Department is clearly part of the executive branch, the legislature has a greater say in its functioning than in the case of presidential advisers and agents.

The expanded use of agents other than regular ambassadors occurred at a time when Foreign Service officers felt that their role was being considerably diminished. During the early days of the nation, all relations with a given country were conducted through the ambassador, whose advice played a significant role in the determination of policy. Ambassadors were sent out with broad instructions that allowed for considerable discretion. They were expected to report only occasionally, and hence were able to focus on crises and issues of overriding importance. In the new age of instant communications, however, ambassadors were required to report constantly, sending many communications each day dealing with a wide range of items, and required as well to clear virtually all actions with Washington in advance. Many former ambassadors and Foreign Service officers felt that diplomats and ambassadors had consequently lost considerable authority and influence. Envoys of all types often felt that they were being micromanaged. They believed the requirement that all actions be authorized in advance reduced their role and authority, placing more power in the hands of the president's political aides and handlers. Retired Foreign Service officers complained about this situation for many years. They invariably commented that instant communications enabled domestic politics to interfere with foreign policy decisions.

Presidents have expressed concern regarding the diminishing role of professional diplomats in the making and conduct of foreign policy. President John F. Kennedy attempted to alleviate the difficulty by appointing the veteran diplomat Averell Harriman as a permanent executive agent, or roving troubleshooter, with the title ambassador-at-large. The selection of a diplomat closely attuned to the State Department as the president's personal envoy provided a link between the two foreign affairs staffs. Yet the mere institutionalization of the position made it part of the bureaucracy, and this arrangement proved functional only because of the stature of Ambassador Harriman.

The use of such ambassadors continued under subsequent presidents, and became so institutionalized that at any given moment the United States had several individuals designated as ambassadors-at-large whose appointments were designed to deal—separately from the regular interchanges involved in bilateral relations between governments—with particularly important topics or with global issues. Individuals holding this rank were invariably drawn from experienced career ambassadors. President Nixon's concern about the resulting dichotomy between the White House foreign affairs staff and the State Department was evident when he shifted Henry Kissinger from the White House to the State Department, though such a step was unusual.

The use of such special appointments originally reflected the proclivities of individual presidents to conduct their own foreign policy and assume personal management of certain questions. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the accelerating expansion of such appointments merely reflected the expanding role of the United States in world affairs, and also the need to deal with emerging issues resulting from increasing globalization and global interdependence. Also contributing to this trend were disputes with Congress and delays in Senate confirmations of ambassadorial nominees, which often resulted from opposition party control of the Senate. Congressional problems increased as a result of close elections and the razor-thin legislative majorities that resulted.

Clearly, the use of executive agents and special representatives greatly expanded and changed during the twentieth century, particularly during its latter half. Originally they were utilized as an ad hoc arrangement to enable strong presidents to bypass the regular State Department bureaucracy on a temporary basis. As the Executive Office evolved in the post–World War II era, the president effectively had his own foreign policy advisers to oversee the bureaucracy. As that bureaucracy grew more complex, presidents found it even more necessary to utilize such agents to deal with situations requiring special attention. Increasingly, such agents and representatives were drawn from the regular bureaucracy; with growing frequency, they already held positions in either the State Department or on the White House staff. Thus, executive agents and specialized agents became part of the normal spectrum of representatives employed by presidents to deal with the increasingly complex international scene.

If such agents were employed to supplement normal diplomatic interchange and execute a policy upon which a broad national consensus

existed, they aroused little concern. The institution became far more debatable, however, when a particular chief executive employed it on a large scale in an effort to concentrate control of foreign policy exclusively in his own hands or to bypass objections to a controversial policy. The result has been a decline in the morale of the State Department and its Foreign Service officers as their functions were partially usurped, leaving them with largely routine duties.

It is significant that as the use of special representatives and executive agents increased, at times becoming the seeming norm in multilateral situations, such representatives were increasingly drawn from the professional diplomatic corps. This reflects the fact that expert negotiating skills were especially important in multilateral meetings. The increasing use of assistant secretaries of state to deal with particular issues and the appointment of ambassadors-at-large within the State Department reflected this trend. It was particularly evident in the tendency during the 1990s to appoint as a special representative the ambassador to one of the countries involved in the conflict with which the representative was to deal. This was done both in the Middle East and in the Balkans. Hence, while professional diplomats often complained that ambassadors were now often limited to bilateral issues, and found themselves sharing responsibilities with others in multilateral matters, increasingly both were drawn from the same pool of expertise. It can be argued that despite the proliferation of special representatives, the centrality of ambassadors was gradually increasing because of the need to draw on the relatively limited pool of foreign relations specialists represented by the Foreign Service. In an era of multilateral diplomacy, it was necessary simply to supplement the position of ambassador with a new type of ambassador whose mandate extended beyond traditional bilateral relations.

Whatever the result of this continuing evolution, it is clear that executive agents have played and will continue to play an important role in American foreign relations. The institution has proven sufficiently flexible to adapt to a wide variety of uses and functions, and this has rendered it valuable. It remains primarily a supplement to normal diplomatic channels, to be employed in critical circumstances requiring special attention, or to make it possible to focus attention upon the multilateral issues that characterize diplomacy at the turn of the twenty-first century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Latin-American Policy of the United States.* New York, 1943. A general survey, useful since agents were frequently employed in Latin America.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, and Robert H. Ferrell, eds. *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.* New York, 1928– . An extensive, ongoing series containing a volume on each of the individuals who served as secretary of state throughout American history. Offers some comments on the relationship of special agents to the regular diplomatic establishment and brief descriptions of some of the missions.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser: 1977–1981.* New York, 1983.

Destler, I. M., Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake. *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1984. Devotes special attention to the role of the National Security Council, while also providing an overall analysis of the delicate balance of powers and the offices involved in the making and conduct of American foreign policy.

George, Alexander L. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.* Boulder, Colo., 1980.

Graebner, Norman A. *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of States in the Twentieth Century.* New York, 1961.

Grieb, Kenneth J. "Reginald Del Valle: A California Diplomat's Sojourn in Mexico." *California Historical Society Quarterly* 47 (1968). A full discussion of the mission to Mexico of an agent sent by Woodrow Wilson.

———. *The United States and Huerta.* Lincoln, Nebr., 1969. Includes a detailed examination of an era during which Woodrow Wilson employed numerous agents in Mexico, with full discussions of the various missions.

Halperin, Morton H. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.* Washington, D.C., 1974.

Harriman, W. Averell, and Ellie Abel. *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin: 1941–1946.* New York, 1975.

Hastedt, Glen P. *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future.* 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2000. Offers a concise discussion of the various branches and offices of the government involved in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Henkin, Louis. "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution." *Foreign Affairs* 66 (winter 1987–1988). Updates his earlier monograph.

———. *Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution.* 2d ed. New York, 1996. Provides a detailed examination of the constitutional provisions and the roles of the executive and the legislature.

Hill, Larry D. *Emissaries to a Revolution.* Baton Rouge, La., 1973. Examines Woodrow Wilson's use of agents in Mexico throughout his administration.

Inderfurth, Karl F., and Lock K. Johnson, eds. *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council.* Pacific Grove, Calif., 1988.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy.* New York, 1994.

Munro, Dana G. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921.* Princeton, N. J., 1964. Includes a brief consideration of some missions in this area.

———. *The United States and the Caribbean Republics: 1921–1933.* Princeton, N.J., 1974.

Ripley, Randall B., and James M. Lindsay, eds. *U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Processes, Structures, and Decisions.* Pittsburgh, Pa., 1997.

Rosati, Jerel A. "United States Leadership into the Next Millennium: A Question of Politics." *International Journal* (spring 1997).

———. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy.* 2d ed. Fort Worth, Tex., 1999. Provides an effective overview of the evolution of foreign policy instruments and offices.

Rubin, Barry. *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1985. Gives an overview of the functioning of the Department of State, the role of political appointees, and the tensions between the Department and the National Security Council.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency.* New York, 1989. Contains a detailed history of the evolution of the role of the president and Congress in foreign policy.

Scott, James M., ed. *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era.* Durham, N.C., 1998.

Seymour, Charles, ed. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.* 3 vols. Boston, New York, 1926. Provides the personal records of House's missions.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History.* 2d ed. New York, 1950. Details the relationship between the two title figures and contains chapters referring to Hopkins's service as an executive agent.

Smith, Jean E. *The Constitution and American Foreign Policy.* St. Paul, Minn., 1989.

Wriston, Henry M. *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations.* Baltimore, Md., 1929; Gloucester, Mass., 1967. The most extensive study available, deals mainly with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A rather cumbersome discussion because of a broad interpretation of the term, but useful for consideration of the reasons for agents, early precedents, and congressional debates.

See also ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; RECOGNITION.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Robert Buzzanco

"America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy," Secretary of State John Quincy Adams told his audience during a Fourth of July oration in 1821. "She is the well-wisher of the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Should the United States adventure into other lands, Adams warned, "she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit." It is a great irony that such words, which would constitute a foundation of anti-imperialist thought for future generations, were uttered by the man who acquired Florida, crafted the Monroe Doctrine, and was a principal architect and defender of America's continental empire.

But then, any examination of anti-imperialism in the United States is replete with irony, ambiguity, and complexity. Whereas in other lands anti-imperialism was often closely identified with the political left and followed socialist or even Leninist models, and criticized the occupation and control of less-developed countries, American critiques of empire necessarily evolved differently because the United States did not have as strong a radical tradition and did not possess a formal empire in the European sense. Thus, anti-imperial ideas and actions have to be seen in a broader construction in which individuals or groups challenged the expansion of state hegemony, but did so based on the objective conditions of a particular time rather than on a doctrinaire or sustained ideology. Even more, anti-imperialists in the United States developed a broad comprehension of America's imperial mission, and so might oppose not just the political or military control of other lands, but also an aggressive foreign policy, supporting dictatorships abroad, the establishment of international organizations and compacts, or the excessive accumulation of executive power at home, all of which were perceived as antithetical to national values.

America's imperialism certainly could be coercive and militarized, but it was conceptually a grand strategy of economic penetration, a substitution of dollars in trade and investment for the armies and bullets of wars and occupations. As part of the imperialist pursuit for areas in which to invest, manufacture cheaply, find consumers, or trade, American military forces did in fact frequently intervene abroad, but usually pulled out after those lands were made secure for American political and economic objectives, often leaving proxy armies and puppet governments in their stead. Without a tradition of conquest and occupation, and believing in an ideology of republicanism, Adams and others therefore could champion both unrestrained expansion and anti-imperialism with plausible claims that they were not contradictory. By developing the historical sense, or myth, that the United States was not an imperialist power, the national elite—political leaders, business interests, media—could attempt to counter and delegitimize its anti-imperial critics. Making matters more complex, groups often critical of the state in domestic matters, such as farmers or workers, could be advocates of imperial growth out of self-interest because they needed foreign markets for their crops and manufactures.

Nonetheless, since the earliest days of the Republic, there have been significant opponents of American aggrandizement into new lands. Because U.S. imperialism had many justifications—economics, security, a sense of national purpose, racial identification, and so forth—critics offered an analysis and condemnation of empire based on different factors at different times and to varying degrees. American anti-imperialists could oppose foreign interventions because of a moral repulsion at the consequences of such involvement, the betrayal of self-government in other areas, a sense of geographic insularity or security, the contradictions of empire with democracy, or a rejection of the capitalist eco-

nomic system. It was, then, a varied line of thought that had economic, political, and moral roots, and was real, effective, and significant, though at times elusive and not part of a sustained and comprehensive historical process. At the same time, however, the words of John Quincy Adams and others with similar views would be invoked a century and a half later as the United States waged war in Indochina and intervened in various Third World areas, so there is indeed a salience to American anti-imperialism that must be recognized.

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Expansion and empire building were concerns for American leaders as soon as national independence became a reality, and issues of growth and hegemony grew more important into the first half of the nineteenth century. The United States expanded rapidly and significantly across the continent. By purchase and conquest, national leaders gained lands in the Northwest Territory, the Louisiana Territory, Florida, the Pacific Northwest, and the Southwest, while attempting to bring Canada and Caribbean areas such as Cuba under American sway, too, though without success. While it would be difficult to observe a consistent anti-imperial ideology in this period, there was criticism of and actions directed against territorial acquisition, Indian removal, and manifest destiny. Often, such opposition served the interests of political expediency or power—as with northeasterners or Federalists voting against the Louisiana Purchase or the War of 1812. Critics, however, also objected on moral grounds or, presaging an argument that would become especially powerful in the Cold War era, the excessive, or imperial, use of executive power in foreign affairs.

The United States was born out of a war of national liberation against the world's greatest empire at the time, and thus tended to deny its imperial ambitions or to describe them benignly. Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine, for instance, popularized the idea that America could establish a "benevolent" empire while they condemned the British for policies of the "extermination of mankind," rather than just conquest, in their colonies. Indeed, the founding generation was conflicted despite the apparent consensus on expansion. While there was a compelling political will to develop an "empire of liberty"—to use President Thomas Jefferson's words—there was also a continuing republican ideal that was distrustful of empire and its needs for standing armies, heavy taxes, large bureaucracies, and centralized decision making.

At the same time, there were strong isolationist tendencies among the ruling class. Not anti-imperialist per se, these isolationists did warn against American "entanglements" in other lands. Indeed, in his farewell address President George Washington, like John Quincy Adams an ardent expansionist using anti-imperial rhetoric, suggested that "harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing." Rooted in the fresh memories of the war against British imperialism, ambivalent views on state power, and an attachment to republican values, this isolationism had real meaning to many Americans and was practiced in their political affairs.

Thus, when President Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory from France, effectively doubling the size of the United States, critics attacked his actions as unconstitutional and imperial. Federalists, ironically using arguments that had been advanced against them by their political foes during the debate over the Constitution, contended that the purchase of trans-Mississippi lands was unnecessary and dangerous, for emigration into the new areas would "be attended with all the injuries of a too widely dispersed population, but by adding to the great weight of the western part of our territory, must hasten the dismemberment of a large portion of our country, or a dissolution of the Government." Such disputes notwithstanding, the Senate approved the acquisition of Louisiana, although the Constitution did not explicitly grant executive power for territorial expansion; subsequently, it authorized commercial restrictions and military engagements against Britain and accelerated a national program of Indian removal.

While the growth of a continental empire in the early nineteenth century may have been inexorable, it did not always proceed smoothly, for diverse voices were raised in protest against American expansion during the major episodes of territorial aggrandizement in the period. Representative John Randolph of Virginia was wary of imperial designs. "What! Shall this great mammoth of the

American forest leave his native element," he asked, "and plunge into the water in a mad contest with the shark?" Federalists stung by a swing in political influence and sectional growth toward the south and west opposed the War of 1812, with some beginning to develop a critique of expansion and even to consider the secession of New England states at the Hartford Convention (1814–1815). The defeat of Indians in the Creek War and the Battle of Tippecanoe, followed by General Andrew Jackson's invasion and eventual seizure of Florida in 1818, however, made anti-imperial critiques more difficult. Still, many questioned what they saw as the contradiction of maintaining republican virtues within a growing empire with an expanding military and a willingness to use force in the pursuit of national interests. Although the enthusiasm for new lands might have seemed frenzied, many Americans were concerned about unrestrained growth and especially lamented the destruction of Indian society.

After the War of 1812, the federal and state governments intensified their efforts to oust Native Americans from their lands, with General (later President) Andrew Jackson the leading figure in the era, attacking the Seminole in Florida and the Cherokee and other tribes in the southeast with particular ferocity. By the 1820s and 1830s, there was significant division over Indian removal and continental expansion. In 1831, when Georgia, relying on a Supreme Court decision that Indians were neither U.S. citizens nor a foreign nation, and with the support of President Jackson, expelled the Cherokee from their indigenous lands despite their treaty rights to it, evangelical Christians organized mass protests and condemned removal, comparing it to a crime against humanity.

Questions of morality and constitutionality—not unlike those raised in the late twentieth-century debates over the Vietnam War or intervention in Central America—were common throughout the Cherokee crisis as critics scored the national and state governments for violating the Constitution by rejecting Indian treaties. Writing under the pseudonym William Penn, Jeremiah Evarts, the chief administrator of the American Board of Commissions for Foreign Missions, an interdenominational missionary organization, exposed and denounced the U.S. attack on Indian sovereignty on the bases of morality, history, and the Constitution. Throughout the colonial period and under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, Evarts pointed out, various authorities had, by treaty, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Indian lands; the Cherokee and other tribes, which had never surrendered such title, still held "a perfect right to the continued and undisturbed possession of these lands." The Indians, he added, did not hold lands *in* Georgia or any other state, but were sovereign, "separate communities, or nations." Removal was, in the minds of Evarts and many other critics of aggressive expansion, "an instance of gross and cruel oppression." While such views held great currency—the vote in Congress to approve Jackson's removal program was quite close in fact—they were not those of the majority, and Indians embarked on their infamous "Trail of Tears" while many millions of acres of Native American lands in the southeast were soon opened to agricultural exploitation.

The appropriation of Indian territory occurred in a period of great expansion, because Americans believed it was their "manifest destiny" to acquire new lands. Advocates of this ideology believed that the United States had a providential right and obligation to assume control over less-developed areas in the name of republicanism, Christianity, and white supremacy. Expansionists even had a quasi-legal justification for building a continental empire, the Monroe Doctrine. Crafted by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and announced by President James Monroe in 1823, the doctrine was a statement of Pan-American influence in which the United States warned European powers to keep their "hands off" newly independent states in Latin America. Unspoken but just as compelling was the idea that the United States had a natural hegemony over the region and would expand control over all the Americas in time.

Again, however, John Quincy Adams seemed to be of two minds, refusing diplomatic or material aid to revolutionaries in South America and Greece because it would jeopardize the national interest by entangling the United States in the affairs of other countries and delivering his "America goes not abroad" oration, but also penning the Monroe Doctrine as part of his vision of a continental empire. To some critics, Adams's ideas were in fact endangering the national interest, with one member of Congress describing the Monroe Doctrine as "assuming an unwarrantable power; violating the spirit of the Constitution; assuming grounds and an attitude toward European Powers, calculated to involve us in the strife which there existed, and in which we had no interest; and indirectly leading to war, which Congress alone had the right to declare."

In addition to such continuing constitutional questions and insular concerns, critiques of expansion and empire invariably became intertwined in the intensifying slavery controversy, and almost always included attacks on the southern political and planter aristocracy, which had designs not only on the continental west but also on areas in the Caribbean, such as Nicaragua and Cuba, in which to extend their slave system. By the mid-1840s, these conflicting forces of southern expansionism and antislavery sentiment would lead to a national antiwar-cum-anti-imperialist movement.

The effective cause of the acute division of the era was the American war against Mexico, begun in 1846 but the culmination of a generation of U.S. attempts to absorb Texas into the Union. While there were strong sentiments north and south for bringing Texas and other southwest lands into the United States, the inevitable expansion of slave states gave rise to often fierce condemnations of expansion. John Quincy Adams, now an independent representative in Congress and a leader of antislavery, anti-imperialist political forces, feared that the annexation of Texas would turn the United States into a "conquering and warlike nation." Ultimately, "aggrandizement will be its passion and its policy. A military government, a large army, a costly navy, distant colonies, and associate islands in every sea will follow in rapid succession." Senator Thomas Corwin of Ohio echoed Adams's views, describing President James Polk as a "monarch" and his cabinet as a "court," and considering justifications for the war as a "feculent mass of misrepresentation." The "desire to augment our territory," Corwin lamented, "has depraved our moral sense." Ralph Waldo Emerson, noted essayist and earlier advocate of taking Texas, now predicted that the United States would gobble up new lands "as the man swallows arsenic, which brings him down in turn," and his fellow Transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau refused to pay poll taxes, received a jail sentence, and wrote his famous essay "Civil Disobedience" in protest of the Mexican War.

Such critiques held great popular and political appeal in the 1840s as pacifists, abolitionists, religious leaders, and literary figures pressed an anti-imperial agenda while 90 percent of Whig Party members in Congress voted against the war. Following the acquisition of Texas, California, and other Mexican lands in the southwest, anti-imperialists may have been on the defensive, but they were not quiescent. When, in the 1840s and 1850s, southern planters began to create and subsidize filibusters, military adventurers who tried to invade and secure Latin American lands for new plantations and slavery, abolitionist anti-imperialists protested vigorously. Whig politicians and an emerging political movement of Free Soilers, opponents of the extension of slavery into new territories, especially attacked the deeds of soldiers of fortune such as Narcisco López, who sought to invade Cuba in 1849, 1850, and 1851, and William Walker, the "grey-eyed man of destiny," who briefly conquered and ruled Nicaragua in the late 1850s. Indeed, the firm opposition of the Whigs and Free Soilers, as well as abolitionists and some evangelical elements, effectively thwarted southern dreams of a Caribbean empire in the antebellum period. They could not, however, suppress the intensifying sectional crisis, and civil war had become unavoidable by 1860 when Abraham Lincoln, who as a Whig representative opposed the Mexican War, was elected president. Within a half-decade, the conflict between the Union and the breakaway states of the Confederacy was over, and the United States was about to embark on its greatest imperial efforts yet, but not without protest and opposition at all points along the way.

THE NEW EMPIRE AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The Civil War not only ended slavery and the southern plantation system but marked the conclusive triumph of industrial capitalism as well. Within a few decades the United States emerged as a global economic power, with the opportunities and problems attendant to such status, including the acquisition of an extracontinental empire. Indeed, as soon as the Civil War ended, Secretary of State William Henry Seward embarked on a campaign to augment American territory by acquiring Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic) and Haiti, Cuba, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, and Alaska. Seward's plans, however, met heavy opposition from anti-imperialists like the noted author and social critic Mark Twain (later president of the Anti-Imperialist League), Senator Justin Morrill, and editor of *The Nation* magazine E. L. Godkin, who collectively called on American leaders to settle domestic issues and create a showcase society that others could emulate instead of seizing or otherwise taking on new territories. Subsequently, Seward's ambitions, except for buying Alaska, were shelved, though expansion and empire building would remain a priority in U.S. foreign policy.

By the end of the nineteenth century the American economy, producing more goods and agricultural commodities than the home market was consuming, seemed in deep peril, and government, corporate, and intellectual leaders urged that new markets abroad for trade and investment be found and acquired. Such economic pressures—along with calls for new coaling stations and a larger navy, the popularity of social Darwinist ideas calling on America to "civilize" the less-developed and nonwhite world, Christian ideology seeking to convert adherents of "pagan" religions, and the sense that America needed to extend its frontiers as a form of national renewal—led to a rush for new lands to control in the 1890s and set the stage for new levels of imperialism in the twentieth century.

In the 1890s the United States colonized or at least forcibly established hegemony over Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, while Secretary of State John Hay was insisting that an "open door" for American products and capital be recognized by other nations. Because the European powers and Japan had colonial footholds—with administrators, collaborating elites, and occupying armies—in various areas, especially China, the United States would have to use its economic strength to develop a new world system based on a free and open door for trade and investment. The 1890s, then, marked the establishment of a "new empire" not only because the United States forcibly took territory outside the continent but also because it was announcing a different form of imperialism, one based on equal access to the markets and investment houses of other lands rather than on administrative control and military occupation.

American hegemony over Hawaii, Cuba, and the Philippines prompted significant and striking opposition. Politicians, commentators, Christians, and intellectuals spoke out against the new aggrandizement and presented a comprehensive analysis of the new empire that foreshadowed later anti-imperial arguments and movements. The war against Spain and intervention in the Philippines, critics charged, gave "militarists" too much power; the United States could acquire coaling stations or new trading opportunities without war or empire, they explained. Liberal Republicans known as "mugwumps," who had been drawn to the party by its stand against slavery, equated anti-imperialism with abolitionism. Many dissenters contended that the United States had no right or need to "civilize" other peoples, especially considering its own treatment of blacks at home. Conversely, some did not want America to assume control over and responsibility for nonwhite, and thus inferior, peoples. Labor leaders, such as the Socialist Eugene Debs and the conservative Samuel Gompers, agreed that conquest and empire were dangerous, in large measure because they feared the loss of American jobs to foreign workers who would accept lower wages, a charge echoed in the late twentieth century by antiglobalization activists.

Perhaps most pointedly, anti-imperialists argued that territorial annexation would pervert American principles. William Jennings Bryan, titular leader of the Democratic Party and agrarian spokesman, anticipated that the "just resistance" of the United States to Spanish rule in Cuba and the Philippines would "degenerate into a war of conquest," giving others the right to charge America with "having added hypocrisy to greed." Senator George Hoar lamented "the danger that we are to be transformed from a Republic, founded on the Declaration of Independence . . . into a vulgar, commonplace empire, founded upon physical force." The Anti-Imperialist League, tormented by the specter of Filipino blood on American hands, even "more deeply resent[ed] the betrayal of American institutions" such as representative government at home, international law, and self-government for others. Mark Twain used his biting wit to condemn the new imperialism, offering new lyrics to the "Battle Hymn of the Republic": "Mine eyes have seen the orgy of the launching of the sword / He is searching out the hoardings where the strangers' wealth is stored / He has loosed his fateful lightning, and with woe and death has scored / His lust is marching on." He was particularly outraged by the occupation of and ongoing war against the forces of liberation in the Philippines, reporting from Manila and comparing the nationalist leader Emiliano Aguinaldo to Joan of Arc and George Washington. Twain was also quite vitriolic about missionaries who justified imperialism as an extension of the religious duty. "I bring you the stately matron named Christendom," he wrote angrily, "returning bedraggled, besmirched, and dishonored from pirate raids in Kiao-chou [Tsingtao, China], Manchuria, South Africa, and the Philippines, with her soul full of meanness, her pocket full of boodle, and her mouth full of pious hypocrisies." Notwithstanding their impassioned opposition, the anti-imperialists were fighting rearguard actions against faits accompli in the Philippines and elsewhere, leading Theodore Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the navy, strong expansionist, and later president, to deride them

MARK TWAIN AND THE IMPERIAL APOLOGISTS

Not only was Mark Twain the author of some of the greatest works in American literature, such as *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* and *Tom Sawyer,* but he was also, less known, an acerbic critic of U.S. politics, challenging the idea that so-called captains of industry were creating a better society in the Gilded Age, and, more intensely, railing against American imperialism, the wars of 1898 in particular. In one of his more notable essays, "To the Person Sitting in Darkness," Twain both rages against the U.S. intervention in the Philippines and mocks apologists, such as the "person sitting in darkness," for supporting the actions of the "Blessings-of-Civilization Trust," the imperialists:

> Having now laid all the historical facts before the Person Sitting in Darkness, we should bring him to again, and explain them to him. We should say to him: They look doubtful, but in reality they are not. There have been lies; yes, but they were told in a good cause. We have been treacherous; but that was only in order that real good might come out of apparent evil. True, we have crushed a deceived and confiding people; we have turned against the weak and the friendless who trusted us. We have stamped out a just and intelligent and well-ordered republic; we have stabbed an ally in the back and slapped the face of a guest; we have bought a Shadow from an enemy that hadn't it to sell; we have robbed a trusting friend of his land and his liberty; we have invited our clean young men to shoulder a discredited musket and do bandit's work . . . but each detail was for the best. We know this. The Head of every State and Sovereignty in Christendom, including our Congress and our fifty State Legislatures, are members not only of the church, but also of the Blessings-of-Civilization Trust. This world-girdling accumulation of trained morals, high principles, and justice, cannot do an unright thing, an unfair thing, an ungenerous thing, an unclean thing. It knows what it is about. Give yourself no uneasiness; it is all right.
>
> — "*To the Person Sitting in Darkness,*" North American Review, *February 1901*—

as "men of a by-gone age having to deal with the facts of the present."

Roosevelt's observations probably represented the views of most Americans, who appreciated the extension of American power and influence in 1898 and subsequently. Still, critics of the new empire persisted into the twentieth century, and American anti-imperialism was part of a broader, global attack on colonialism, but one that developed quite differently than elsewhere. Liberals like the Briton J. A. Hobson were offering a pointed economic analysis of empire, tying the European reach into new lands to underconsumption in the home market. More powerfully, the Russian theorists and revolutionists Nikolai Bukharin and Vladimir Lenin, writing during World War I, put forth a new socialist critique of empire that would find great currency in the coming years, though not so much in the United States as in Europe or the less-developed world. The great industrial powers, Lenin explained, were matched in a global contest for markets, and would increasingly come into conflict in areas yet to be exploited—later termed the "third world"—where they would vie with each other to establish colonies for consumers, raw materials, and investment. Although there were, to be sure, left, labor, and progressive political forces in the United States using such a radical model, anti-imperialism also continued to be an American ideology, unique to the nation's history and perceived values.

Anti-imperialists of the Leninist, liberal, or American variety found proof for their theses in the years after the Spanish-American-Philippine War and especially with the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Struggles for materials and colonies in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and elsewhere had led to the widespread carnage, principally, many critics held, for the benefit of state elites and corporations who needed expanded economic opportunities. In Europe, Bolshevik, socialist, labor, and other left parties, after initially supporting the entry of their various states into the war, emerged with this critique of empire. In the United States, similar analyses were current, though usually without the Leninist twist. The war, many American critics believed, was a product of great power, sphere-of-influence rivalries, not necessarily the inevitable consequence of economic expansion.

Henry Adams, grandson of John Quincy Adams, often debated the issue of American imperialism with Theodore Roosevelt and other

expansionists after 1898. "I incline now to anti-imperialism, and very strongly to anti-militarism," Adams observed. "If we try to rule politically, we take the chances against us." Any U.S. attempt to establish hegemony comparable to the British empire, Adams and others maintained, was dangerous, futile, and un-American. Many socialists and other radicals unleashed their wrath on "dollar diplomacy"—the American policy of sending bankers, rather than armies, to foreign lands to gain influence and power—as another form of imperialism, just as nefarious and effective, albeit more subtle, as traditional colonialism. Walter Lippmann, a young but influential journalist, spoke for many progressives in 1914 when he observed that "the arena where the European powers really measure their strength against each other is in the Balkans, in Africa, in Asia. [T]he accumulated irritations of it have produced the great war." Between 1914 and the April 1917 U.S. entry into the war, Americans pressed their government to stay out of hostilities, effectively enough for President Woodrow Wilson's 1916 campaign slogan to be "He kept us out of war." Senator Robert La Follette, House of Representatives Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, William Jennings Bryan, and activists such as Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Oswald Garrison Villard of *The Nation,* and others invoked American antimilitarist traditions to oppose entry into the war, contending that intervention would dampen reform at home, provoke a curtailing of civil liberties, and increase political repression, lead to war profiteering by big business, and otherwise sully American values. One group, the American Union Against Militarism, even had a mascot, a dinosaur named "Jingo," with the motto "All armor plate—no brains."

Despite such public dissent, Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war shortly after his reelection was secured, thus alienating progressives, liberals, and anti-imperialists who had supported him in 1916 on the basis of his claims of neutrality, noninvolvement, and anti-imperialism. Wilson did in fact advocate self-determination, believing that empires would collapse if their colonies had the right to rule themselves, but his vision was limited, essentially covering the states of Europe that had been constituents of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, not the underdeveloped and nonwhite world. More to the point, Wilson's anti-imperialism was, like John Hay's earlier, a means to promote the Open Door; by breaking down existing empires, the United States could use its economic strength to gain a foothold in new markets.

After American entry into the war, many of Wilson's previous supporters began to comprehend his version of anti-imperialism and were part of a large and diverse antiwar movement, which, though not exclusively an anti-imperialist movement as well, did create a broader critique to challenge the decision to go to war as a dangerous departure from American traditions. Progressives and future isolationists like senators La Follette, Hiram Johnson, and William Borah and others, and radicals like Eugene V. Debs, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, John Reed, Kate Richards O'Hare, Emma Goldman, "Big Bill" Haywood, Scott Nearing, and various socialist and labor organizations condemned the war and the imperialist frenzy attending it. Randolph Bourne charged that war, with its opportunities for profits and new territories, was "the health of the state." Woodrow Wilson, anti-imperial critics charged, had never been neutral but was always pro-England because of American economic ties to the British empire. Businessmen and their media propagandists, they added, had pushed the government into the war for their own self-interest and were hoping to use intervention to expand the Open Door. The war, critics concluded, served the interests of corporations and imperialists, not the national interest.

CHALLENGING A NEW WORLD ORDER

Such ideas became even more prevalent in the aftermath of the war as Wilson sought to develop a new global system, based on the Open Door rather than traditional colonialism. The keystone of the president's new program was to be the League of Nations, a body of the world's governments that would ensure "collective security" by taking action against aggressor states, militarily if necessary. Immediately a large and diverse coalition of critics came forth to condemn this departure from America's isolationist ideology, as they saw it. Some politicians, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, an old-line Republican from Massachusetts who represented northeastern commercial interests, feared that the league would damage U.S. sovereignty, forcing America to participate in collective action at the behest of other members of the new organization. "Are you willing to put your soldiers and your sailors," he asked, "at the disposition of other nations?" Missouri Senator James Reed invoked a sense of racial superiority, charging that "black, brown, yellow

and red races," ranking low in "civilization" and high in "barbarism," would be on equal footing with the great, white United States.

Lodge and Reed, however, were not specifically opposed to the extension and use of American power, but many others were, and saw danger in the league. La Follette believed that it would become an "imperialist club" that would maintain the status quo and keep colonies such as Ireland and India in bondage because the new body was not likely to sanction action against the great powers that held sway over the less-developed world. Like La Follette, others such as senators Borah, Hiram Johnson, and George Norris were so-called irreconcilables, who were progressive on domestic matters and believed that the league not only would limit American autonomy but also would deny autonomy to poor nations, and was not consistent with traditional national virtues of self-determination and isolation from the intrigues and squabbles of Europe and elsewhere. Further, a broad consensus was emerging to question America's involvement in and future after World War I; it was feared that the United States was embarking on a path of global behavior, with entanglements and interests abroad, which would resemble that of the existing empires. Indeed, in the years during and just after the war, a number of anti-imperialist and antimilitarist groups—including the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the American Friends Service Committee, the War Resisters League, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom—emerged to lobby for a more insular and less aggressive foreign policy. In the face of such widespread criticism, Wilson held his ground and refused to negotiate or compromise with his detractors, and the Senate accordingly rejected the treaty to join the League of Nations. While the war had marked America's debut as a great world power, the United States would not don the trappings of empire.

That is not to say, however, that the United States retreated from world affairs. Although the period between World Wars I and II is usually referred to as one of isolationism, the 1920s, as the historian and anti-imperialist Charles Austin Beard remarked, saw a "return to the more aggressive ways . . . to protect and advance the claims of American business enterprise." Trade and investments, and intervention, abroad increased between the wars as a corporative alliance of government offices and business institutions sought to create order and stability at home as well as to establish such conditions outside of national boundaries. In addition to reestablishing and augmenting economic ties to a rebuilding Europe and pressing for a greater opening of Asian markets, U.S. officials and corporations continued to move into Latin America in pursuit of expanded business opportunities.

Such circumstances led to another wave of anti-imperialism in the 1920s and 1930s but, once more, in complicated and seemingly contradictory ways. American officials such as secretaries of state Charles Evans Hughes and Frank Kellogg, concerned about exorbitant military spending and the potential for another outbreak of hostilities, brokered international agreements on disarmament and to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. They and their successor Cordell Hull believed that free trade would promote peace, whereas empire led to conflict. Isolationists in public life and the media also believed that Europe was still trapped in the type of rivalries that had caused war in 1914, and warned that the United States should stay clear of foreign engagements until that continent stabilized. Such critics, however, were often internationalists who did not question America's right or need to expand abroad, but saw contemporary conditions as a deterrent to foreign involvements at that time.

Others offered a more pointed analysis. Critics of the war and the League of Nations treaty, such as La Follette and Borah, continued to warn against American imperialism and militarism, and spoke out against U.S. attempts to crush nationalist liberation movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Marine General Smedley Butler became something of a folk hero and offered a compelling critique of American imperialism when he called himself a "racketeer, a gangster for capitalism." During his thirty-three years in the Marine Corps, Butler boasted, he had

> helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers 1909–12. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras "right" for American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested. . . . Looking back on it, I feel that I could have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.

Butler's views gained widespread acceptance. Huey Long, governor of Louisiana and putative presidential candidate when assassinated in 1935, agreed with the general and promised to nominate him to be secretary of (anti)war if elected in 1936. In fact, throughout the 1930s, disillusioned with World War I and alarmed by revelations and charges from the senate's Nye Committee that corporations, particularly in the munitions industry, had lobbied, if not conspired, for entry into the Great War, a majority of Americans held isolationist positions. Decrying what Senator Gerald Nye had termed the "rotten commercialism" of American businesses during the war years, Congress, with public support, passed a series of neutrality acts and other measures to prohibit President Franklin Roosevelt from becoming involved in conflicts in China, Ethiopia, and Spain.

The continuing aggression of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, however, undercut the anti-intervention, anti-imperial consensus and set the United States onto a path of apparently irreversible global empire. By war's end in 1945 the United States stood as the world's only great power: as a condition for aiding Britain during the war, the United States had insisted on the opening up of the markets of the empire and the beginning of a process of decolonization; Germany and Japan were in ruin as a result of the fighting that laid waste to Europe and Asia; and the principal rival to American hegemony, the Soviet Union, had lost more than 20 million people and millions of farms and factories during the war. The United States controlled half the world's trade and had established an economic order, the Bretton Woods system, and a political institution, the United Nations, as means to wield its power and influence. The so-called American century was in full bloom but, U.S. leaders warned, without a permanent military establishment and arms buildup it would be in constant peril. Accordingly, the United States embarked on its greatest military expansion, began to establish a global network of bases, sought an international Open Door, and established a national security state at home.

FIGHTING FOR AMERICA'S SOUL

Such measures attracted opposition. Henry Wallace, Roosevelt's vice president from 1941 to 1945 and presidential candidate in 1948, challenged the emerging "cold war" against the Soviet Union, charging that the United States was using "a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind." Atomic scientists such as Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard eloquently warned of the perils of a nuclear arms race and established organizations and journals to challenge the political status quo. Journalists like Walter Lippmann and the radical I. F. Stone expressed their concern over the extensions of American power and responsibility into all parts of the world. Senators as diverse as the liberal Claude Pepper and "Mr. Conservative" Robert Taft feared the establishment of a military government. Vito Marcantonio, a Labor Party member of the House of Representatives, attacked business and military influences in Washington and the expansion of American capitalism into the developing world. Many liberals feared that the United States was abandoning its republican virtues, especially as the political repression associated with Senator Joseph McCarthy consumed the nation's political affairs in the 1950s.

African-American critics in particular challenged the intensified imperialism, as they saw it. Black leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Harry Haywood believed it was dangerous, not to mention hypocritical, for the United States to spread its values and institutions abroad while maintaining a system of apartheid in its southern states. In particular, black spokespersons began to point out the common struggles of Africans trying to gain their national independence from colonial powers and of blacks in the United States seeking civil rights. Americans could hardly lead the "free world" by example, they argued, while maintaining legal segregation at home and endorsing continued colonization in Africa and other parts of the Third World. Although many mainstream black leaders supported the Cold War, hoping to parlay their loyalty to foreign policies into a commitment to act against racism at home, Du Bois, Robeson and others offered a more critical analysis, even invoking a Leninist critique of capitalist expansion and looking to the Soviet Union as an anti-imperialist model and champion of the rights of nonwhite peoples. Paul Robeson condemned Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech as a scheme for "Anglo-Saxon domination" of the world, and called for "united action of all democratic forces to achieve freedom for all colonial and subject peoples."

Views such as Robeson's, however, were not conventional wisdom, even in the black community, and most Americans accepted the new global

role ushered in by the Cold War. Throughout the 1950s, then, the United States, without much dissent, intervened in a civil war in Korea, overthrew governments in Iran and Guatemala, offered economic and military support to military dictatorships throughout the globe, and continued to expand the Open Door. By the end of the decade, however, some Americans were uneasy with such hegemony, and various figures emerged to again challenge the U.S. empire. Cultural figures such as the beatniks condemned the conformity of Cold War life, the arms race, and the American denial of self-determination in other lands. More powerfully, and perhaps surprisingly, President Dwight Eisenhower, as he was leaving office in 1961, warned against "the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power still exists." Such thoughts may have remained a novelty in the 1960s, but U.S. intervention in Vietnam, still limited as Eisenhower left office, would mushroom in the coming years and give rise to a mass antiwar movement that would also question what critics saw as America's imperial behavior overseas and the military-industrial complex at home.

As in the 1840s and 1890s, many Americans in the 1960s opposed U.S. intervention in a foreign war and developed a larger anti-imperialist critique as a result of their challenge to the conflict at hand. Even before the major decisions to commit advisers, airpower, and combat forces, and essentially "Americanize" the Vietnam War, there was evident concern over the growing U.S. role in the world. Movements calling for an end to the arms race, peace with the Soviet Union, normal relations with Cuba, and recognition of the People's Republic of China, for instance, were in existence during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, and the Cold War consensus on an aggressive foreign policy, though still noticeable, was being questioned in some quarters. Vietnam accelerated that process, however, and brought about the greatest domestic challenge to American involvement abroad in the twentieth century.

By 1964, as the United States began to conduct air attacks against the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, peace activists, professors, and students were beginning to challenge the growing American role in Indochina and the larger foreign policy context of the cold war. Scholars such as the linguist Noam Chomsky, the historian William Appleman Williams, and the political scientist Hans Morgenthau participated in "teach-ins" on Vietnam, giving rise to a national movement on college campuses and serving as a foundation for the antiwar movement. The Students for a Democratic Society, the largest radical student group of the period, held the first antiwar rally in 1964, and its adherents not only scored intervention in Vietnam but also offered a comprehensive analysis of the leaders of the American "empire," which, they charged, denied self-determination to Third World nations, intervened on behalf of corporate interests, and betrayed American principles. African Americans, engaged in an epic struggle for civil rights, added, as had Du Bois and Robeson earlier, that the United States had assumed the position of a white imperial power suppressing the yearnings for freedom of nonwhite peoples, whether in Indochina or below the Mason-Dixon Line. Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Peace Prize winner and civil rights leader, went so far as to call the United States "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today," while the militant Black Panther Party called on African Americans to refuse to join the military or support U.S. intervention and openly sympathized with Third World revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements.

Politicians entered the debate as well, as they had during the League of Nations fight after World War I. Senators J. William Fulbright, George McGovern, Ernest Gruening, Wayne Morse, Mark Hatfield, Frank Church, and others were, like the progressives of the 1920s, anti-imperialist and internationalist. Fulbright, like Borah, chaired the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and opposed the policies of the president of his own party. The senator from Arkansas believed that America had "betrayed its own past and its own promise . . . of free men building an example for the world. Now . . . it sees a nation that seemed to represent something new and hopeful reverting to the vanity of past empires."

Similar opinions were held by a significant number of Americans, including religious leaders, businessmen, and even military officials. Following in the tradition of Smedley Butler, former Marine Commandant David Shoup blasted not only the war but also the foundations of U.S. foreign policy. "I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody, dollar-crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people," he said in 1966, "they will arrive at a solution of their own. That they design and want. That they fight and work for. [Not one] crammed down their throats by Americans." Shoup's views, bluntly expressed, were shared by a

significant number of Americans by the late 1960s and 1970s. Millions demonstrated publicly against the war and also called for a new, noninterventionist foreign policy. "Dove" senators tried to pass legislation to limit the war and, after U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, enacted the War Powers Act to restrict the power of the president to commit U.S. forces abroad, a measure that was principally a response to the "imperial" presidency of Richard Nixon, who had waged war without authorization in Cambodia and Laos and was responsible for the Watergate crisis at home. By the mid-1970s, the United States seemed less prone to intervene in world affairs, a condition derided as the "Vietnam syndrome" by conservative critics but hailed as an anti-imperialist triumph by progressive and internationalist forces.

Such restraint, however, was short-lived; the Carter and Reagan administrations began to ratchet up the Cold War, increasing military spending, taking a more bellicose approach to the Soviet Union after the détente of the 1970s, and asserting American imperium in Central America and elsewhere. Millions of citizens, often invoking the legacy of Vietnam, challenged such policies as violations of national and international laws and of American values. Amid the Iran-contra scandal, they pointed out the similarities between the imperial presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Still, the 1980s and early 1990s were not periods of great anti-imperial activity. That would change dramatically, however, by the later 1990s as Americans had a vital role in a global coalition that was challenging the world's economic structure. In some measure, conservatives such as Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot, maverick presidential candidates in 1992 and 1996, used anti-imperial and nativist themes to sound the alarms about the new global economy. Sounding like progressives in the 1890s or isolationists after World War I, they believed that transnational corporations were moving abroad to find cheaper labor, thus causing American workers to lose jobs, and that the government and business elite was more interested in extending its interests abroad than in taking care of its citizens at home. Ironically, they even called for an end to U.S. sanctions against enemy states such as Iraq and Cuba, governments for which they held little love, because such economic warfare was damaging the people of those lands and not helping to oust Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro. The United States was "a republic, not an empire," Buchanan often reminded Americans throughout the 1990s.

By the later part of that decade—with many major powers establishing regional and world economic groups such as the European Union, signatories of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the World Trade Organization—anti-imperialists went on the offensive. Although such institutions had usually existed with little fanfare or opposition, critics such as Chomsky, the longtime consumer advocate Ralph Nader, and the anti-globalization activist Kevin Danaher emerged to attack what they considered a new form of global empire, with the United States as hegemon. From 1999 to 2001, when environmentalists, union members, student activists, anarchists, and other forces disrupted meetings of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, of the World Bank in Washington, D.C., and of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec, the lines were drawn in this new round in the global contest between the great powers and the forces of anti-imperialism.

As critics of American power, expansion, or empire entered the twenty-first century, they were using many of the same arguments that George Washington, John Quincy Adams, Mark Twain, William Borah, and J. William Fulbright put forth in earlier periods. Broadly defined to mean the aggressive use of power, the denial of self-determination abroad, militarism, or actions inconsistent with a republican form of government, American imperialism has a long tradition, but so does its anti-imperial counterpoint. Clearly, anti-imperialists, isolationists, doves, and others opposed to the excessive use of power or the extension of U.S. influence have been on the defensive as American leaders have tallied up an impressive array of territorial holdings, military interventions, proxy governments, and economic opportunities. One can ponder, however, how much more expansive the reach of American power or the extent of American militarism would have been without critics at home challenging the establishment and augmentation of "empire" at all steps along the way.

"The price of empire," J. William Fulbright remarked during the Vietnam War, "is America's soul, and that price is too high." Those words could just as easily have been uttered by John Quincy Adams at the turn of the nineteenth century. As America goes abroad in the future, in search of markets, bases, or even monsters to slay, one can be reasonably certain that there will be significant forces at home questioning and protesting against such extension of U.S. power, as there have been for more than two centuries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beisner, Robert L. *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900.* Chicago, 1992.

Buchanan, Patrick J. *The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy.* Boston, 1998.

———. *A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny.* Washington, D.C., 1999.

Buhle, Paul M., and Edward Rice-Maximin. *William Appleman Williams and the Tragedy of Empire.* New York, 1995.

Bukharin, Nikolai. *Imperialism and World Economy.* New York, 1925.

Chilcote, Ronald H., ed. *Imperialism: Theoretical Directions.* Amherst, N.Y., 2000.

Cole, Wayne S. *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945.* Lincoln, Neb., 1983.

Danaher, Kevin, ed. *50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.* Boston, 1994.

Danaher, Kevin, and Roger Burbach, eds. *Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule.* Monroe, Me., 2000.

Feuer, Lewis. *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind.* Buffalo, N.Y., 1986.

Fulbright, J. William. *The Arrogance of Power.* New York, 1966.

———. *The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic Consequences.* New York, 1972.

Fulbright, J. William, and Seth Tillman. *The Price of Empire.* New York, 1989.

Healy, David. *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s.* Madison, Wis., 1970.

Hobson, J. A. *Imperialism: A Study.* New York, 1902.

Horne, Gerald. *Black & Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963.* Albany, N.Y., 1986.

Johnson, Robert David. *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations.* Cambridge, Mass., 1995.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Imperialism, 1860–1898.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1963.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.* Peking, 1975.

Louis, William Roger. *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945.* New York, 1978.

Magdoff, Harry. *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1969.

———. *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present.* New York, 1978.

Mander, Jerry, and Edward Goldsmith, eds. *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local.* San Francisco, 1996.

Miller, James. *Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago.* New York, 1987.

Mommsen, Wolfgang. *Theories of Imperialism.* New York, 1980.

Ninkovich, Frank. *The United States and Imperialism.* Malden, Mass., 2001.

Parenti, Michael. *Against Empire.* San Francisco, 1995.

Paterson, Thomas G., ed. *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years.* Chicago, 1971.

Salisbury, Richard V. *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America, 1920–1929.* Wilmington, Del., 1989.

Schirmer, Daniel. *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War.* Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

Schroeder, John H. *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848.* Madison, Wis., 1973.

Tompkins, E. Berkeley. *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920.* Philadelphia, 1970.

Twain, Mark. *Following the Equator and Anti-imperialist Essays.* New York, 1996.

Von Eschen, Penny M. *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1997.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Cleveland,Ohio, 1959.

———. *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative.* New York, 1980.

See also CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; ELITISM; IMPERIALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; PAN-AMERICANISM.

ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION

Calvin D. Davis

American statesmen learned early that the discussions of diplomats and the conclusion of treaties are not always sufficient to settle international disputes peacefully. Their search for other methods of peaceful settlement began during the administration of George Washington and has been a continuing concern in the conduct of the foreign relations of the Republic since that time. In fact, it was a major aspect of American foreign policy before World War I and was of profound influence upon American thinking about international organization before that war.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ARBITRATION CONCEPT

International arbitration may be defined as the settlement of a difference between states through the decision of one or more individuals or a tribunal or court chosen by the parties to the dispute. An arbitrator may be the chief of state of a nation not concerned with the dispute; an ambassador, minister, or other official; or even a private individual. When a monarch or a president is an arbitrator he usually does not act personally; indeed, he delegates most responsibilities to the appropriate legal authorities of his government. When the parties to an arbitration decide to establish a tribunal, they may choose judges from their own nationals and then agree upon another individual to act as umpire. Sometimes they ask the head of another government to choose an umpire or leave the choice of umpire to the arbitrators already appointed. In several nineteenth-century cases no individuals were designated as umpires. Arbitrations may be concerned with questions of international law or facts. When arbitrations are primarily concerned with facts, as in pecuniary claims or boundary cases, the group of arbitrators is generally called a commission, but no precise distinction can be drawn between commissions and tribunals. An arbitral decision is called an award, and it may be set aside if there are reasons to believe that it was not given in good faith or was not in accord with international law or the preliminary special agreement, usually called a *compromis,* concluded by the parties to the arbitration.

Historians and anthropologists have discovered arbitral customs and institutions in many cultures. The city-states of ancient Greece developed fairly elaborate arbitral procedure; on occasion they organized groups of arbitrators similar to modern international tribunals. During the Middle Ages, popes, princes, jurisconsults, and even city governments acted as arbitrators. Arbitration was less important during late medieval and early modern times, but it never disappeared altogether from international relations. Occasionally, European governments made use of it when trying to resolve American questions. In fact, some aspects of the first problem in the diplomatic history of the European conquest of the Western Hemisphere—the location of the dividing line between Spanish and Portuguese interests—suggest later arbitral practices. When Portugal challenged Spain's rights in the lands Columbus had discovered, King Ferdinand asked Pope Alexander VI to confirm the Spanish title. The pontiff obliged, issuing in 1493 a series of bulls in which he drew a line between the imperial claims of the two countries. The Portuguese protested the papal decision, and in 1494, Spain and Portugal, in the Treaty of Tordesillas, moved the line westward and agreed that a commission of surveyors and mariners should locate the line. While the two governments never set up the commission, the provisions of the treaty calling for such a body are evidence that commissions were of some importance in international relations at that time.

Commissions appeared occasionally in connection with England's colonial problems during

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Treaty of Westminster, which Oliver Cromwell concluded with the Dutch at the end of the First Anglo-Dutch War in 1654, referred claims concerning the East Indies and the Americas to a commission. Apparently this commission met but failed to arrive at a decision. England and France in 1686 referred disputes over American matters to a commission, but it disbanded after outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg. The Anglo-French treaties of Ryswick in 1697 and Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Seville concluded by Great Britain, France, and Spain in 1729 provided for commissions to deal with American problems. All failed. After the War of the Austrian Succession, Britain and France established a commission for American questions. Again, failure. Certainly, the performances of commissions during the colonial era should have encouraged no one to believe that arbitration would be of large importance in later American history, yet that series of failures kept the idea alive. After the United States won independence, there were many problems that American and British diplomats found difficult to settle through negotiation, and they turned to commissions almost as a matter of course.

JAY'S TREATY AND THE TREATY OF GHENT

The United States and Great Britain for the first time agreed to use arbitration in their relations with each other when they concluded their first commercial treaty, usually called Jay's Treaty, in 1794. That treaty provided for three joint commissions to deal with disputes over boundaries, compensation due British creditors for obligations incurred by Americans before the Revolution, and questions arising from Britain's treatment of American shipping in the war with revolutionary France then in progress. The commission for maritime matters decided several questions, and the boundary commission also attained some success. It identified the Schoodiac River as the St. Croix, the river which was supposed to be part of the boundary between Maine and British territory according to the treaty of independence. But the debt commission broke up in an angry exchange, and it was necessary for the two governments to resume negotiations. According to a treaty concluded in 1802, the United States paid Britain a lump sum and the controversy came to an end.

The Treaty of Ghent, signed 24 December 1814, like Jay's Treaty, provided for three joint commissions. Only one commission completed its assignment—determination of the ownership of islands in the Passamaquoddy Bay. One commission tried to determine boundaries between British territory and the United States from the St. Lawrence River to the Lake of the Woods; it agreed upon a boundary through the Great Lakes but failed to determine the line from Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods. The third commission was supposed to decide the boundary from the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence, but it failed to reach accord. The two governments thereupon referred the dispute to William I of the Netherlands. That monarch failed to find a clear basis for a decision but in 1831 made an award anyway, giving the United States and Britain what he believed to be equitable shares of a wilderness. The United States refused to accept this award, protesting that the king had not acted in accord with the agreement referring the controversy to him. While arbitration had failed in this instance, the case was of considerable importance, for it clearly established the principle that arbitrators should abide by the terms of a *compromis* or other preliminary agreements. (The U.S. government probably erred in refusing to accept the award, for the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842 gave the United States less territory than it would have received according to the king's decision.)

The United States and Britain meanwhile had one other arbitration in connection with the Treaty of Ghent. The two powers were supposed to restore all property, both public and private, that they had seized from each other during the War of 1812. The treaty specifically mentioned slaves, but the British failed to return all American slaves under their jurisdiction at the close of hostilities. After many protests from Washington, British leaders agreed that an arbitrator should deal with the matter, and the two governments referred their dispute to Alexander I of Russia. The czar decided that Britain had failed to meet its obligations and should pay an indemnity. Upon his recommendation the United States and Britain concluded a convention setting up a commission to decide the amount due the United States. After elaborate proceedings, the commissioners decided that the indemnity should be $1,204,960, and, in a convention concluded 13 November 1826, the British government accepted this decision.

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE GENEVA TRIBUNAL

During the last half of the nineteenth century, the United States and Britain both made increasing use of arbitration. The United States had arbitrations with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Denmark, France, Portugal, and Spain. Britain, too, entered into many arbitrations with Latin American and European states, but the two English-speaking countries continued to have more arbitrations with each other than with other powers. Several minor but difficult Anglo-American controversies were settled by arbitration during the 1850s and 1860s; after the Civil War, arbitration became a major feature of relations between Washington and London.

The nineteenth century's most important arbitral decisions concerned Anglo-American controversies arising from the Civil War. British shipbuilders had built warships for the Confederacy, a practice stopped by London only after vehement protests from Washington. But British authorities acted too late to prevent the sailing of several ships, among them the *Alabama,* the most notorious commerce raider of the war. When the *Alabama* and its sister ships began destroying Union merchant ships, many American shipowners transferred their ships to foreign registry, Britain receiving the largest number of registrations. The American merchant marine almost disappeared. As the war closed, influential Americans fulminated against British misdeeds. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts charged that Britain was really responsible for prolonging the war for two years and demanded a large indemnity. Britain, too, had grievances, for British shipping had sustained considerable damages at the hands of the Union. As charges and countercharges were exchanged by intemperate speakers on both sides of the Atlantic, diplomats found negotiation of a settlement extremely difficult. Finally, in a treaty signed at Washington on 8 May 1871, the two governments agreed to arbitration of their Civil War claims and two other difficult matters, the boundary through the San Juan waterway between Vancouver Island and the United States and the compensation due Britain for recent concessions to the United States in the fisheries off Newfoundland and Canada.

The two governments used all the best-known forms of arbitration to resolve their four disputes. They made their most elaborate preparations for claims concerning the *Alabama* and the other commerce raiders, establishing a tribunal of five members in Geneva, Switzerland. Each of the two parties appointed an arbitrator, as did Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland. Presenting its case, the United States demanded payment of indirect claims, that is, damages sustained as a result of the prolonging of the war through actions of the raiders. The tribunal denied this demand, but in a decision announced 14 September 1872, it awarded the United States $15.5 million for actual destruction of ships and cargoes. Other American maritime claims against Britain and British claims against the United States were referred to a commission of three members, appointed by the United States, Britain, and Spain. Meeting in Washington, the commission soon decided against American claims but, in a decision announced 25 September 1873, awarded the British $1,929,819. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain had referred the San Juan waterway boundary dispute to German Emperor William I, who announced his decision on 21 October 1872, an award essentially in accord with American contentions. A commission of three members—an American, a Briton, and a Belgian—handled the fisheries case in sessions at Halifax. The commission announced on 23 November 1877 that the United States should pay Britain $5.5 million.

Of the four arbitrations, that of the *Alabama* claims was by far the most important. No other arbitration has so stimulated imaginations. While it is no doubt true, as Woodrow Wilson wrote, that the award "ended, not a controversy but a judicial process at the end of a controversy," many individuals convinced themselves that in this instance arbitration may have been a substitute for war. Long before the Civil War, arbitration had attracted the attention of people anxious to find ways of ridding mankind of the curse of war, and to such people the decisions of the Geneva tribunal seemed proof of what arbitration could accomplish. The spokesmen and journals of the American Peace Society, the Universal Peace Union, and many other peace organizations found in the Geneva arbitration topics for countless lectures and articles. Even before the Geneva tribunal announced its award, there were earnest recommendations that Britain and America negotiate treaties between themselves and with other nations in which they would recognize an obligation to resort to arbitration rather than war. Charles Sumner, on 31 May 1872, introduced a resolution in the Senate declaring that "in the

determination of international differences Arbitration should become a substitute for war in reality as well as in name, and therefore coextensive with war in jurisdiction, so that any question or grievance which might be the occasion of war or of misunderstanding between nations should be considered by this tribunal."

A British peace leader, Henry Richard, on 8 July 1873 secured passage of a similar resolution in the House of Commons, and Sumner on 1 December of that year introduced another resolution urging arbitration in the Senate. While the two governments took no actions in response to these resolutions, the idea of treaties of obligatory arbitration continued to gain adherents. American and British peace advocates were probably unaware that Latin American governments almost as a matter of course included promises of arbitration in many of their treaties, and most Americans had probably forgotten that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), which ended the Mexican War, contained an article by which the United States and Mexico agreed to arbitration of differences in connection with the treaty. The peace movement in the United States and Britain gave little attention to developments in Latin America; it focused attention upon Anglo-American relations. If the United States and Britain were to conclude a permanent arbitration treaty, they would set an example for the rest of the world, peace leaders reasoned.

THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES

It was not until the 1890s that there came many new opportunities to advance the ideas of arbitration enthusiasts. During that decade, marked as it was by naval building, imperial rivalries, and war, arbitration nonetheless seemed to emerge as a major feature of international relations, and the U.S. government was at the forefront of this development. As the period began, President Benjamin Harrison's secretary of state, James G. Blaine, brought together in Washington during late 1889 and early 1890 the First International Conference of American States. This conference recommended a number of proposals to promote hemispheric unity, among them a plan by which the American republics would have referred to arbitration all disputes that diplomacy could not settle, excepting questions of independence. Blaine called this agreement "the first and great fruit" of the conference, but he rejoiced too soon. No government ratified the agreement.

Even before it was apparent that the Pan-American arbitral plan would fail, the United States was concluding an agreement with Britain for arbitration of an acrimonious dispute. Endeavoring to stop the indiscriminate killing of fur seals in the Bering Sea by both British subjects and American citizens, State Department officials grasped at mistaken translations and interpretations of Russian documents which seemed to prove that sovereignty over the sea had passed to the United States with the acquisition of Alaska. The Coast Guard seized Canadian ships and arrested their crews. Britain protested vigorously. Blaine's successor, John Watson Foster, negotiated an agreement by which the two powers established a tribunal in Paris to hear the case. In an award announced in 1895 the tribunal upheld Britain's contention that the Bering Sea was part of the high seas and thus not subject to the police actions of any government in time of peace. It became necessary for the State Department to resume negotiations to save the seals.

The Bering Sea tribunal had barely completed its labors when a serious Anglo-American quarrel arose over arbitration in another matter. The United States had long urged arbitration of the border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, but the British government, fearing that such an arbitration would encourage demands for changes in boundaries of other British colonies, repeatedly rejected American suggestions. Late in 1895, President Grover Cleveland's new secretary of state, Richard Olney, convinced himself and the president that Britain was very possibly claiming territory without real justification and was, therefore, about to violate the Monroe Doctrine. The secretary sent stern messages to London. Lord Salisbury, who was both prime minister and foreign minister, responded with a statement that sounded much like a schoolmaster explaining a few simple facts to a student with little intelligence. The Monroe Doctrine was not "public law," as Olney claimed, it was simply a statement made by a distinguished American statesman. Salisbury was accurate enough, but Americans insisted that the Monroe Doctrine had a larger meaning that other nations should recognize. Cleveland sent Congress a special message that resounded with appeals to honor and patriotic duty. In both the United States and Britain there were calls for war. After a few days calmer counsel prevailed. The British government decided

that arbitration, after all, was the best way out of the crisis and concluded a treaty with Venezuela by which the two countries established a tribunal in Paris to determine the boundary. To the irritation of many Americans, the tribunal, in an award announced in 1899, largely upheld the British position.

In addition to the proceedings at Paris, the boundary controversy had another important result for arbitration. Shocked by the emotional excesses of the recent crisis, British and American leaders at last yielded to the pleas of peace spokesmen for a treaty of arbitration. Secretary Olney and the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, negotiated a treaty according to which their governments were to agree that for a five-year period they would settle territorial and pecuniary claims through arbitration. The treaty made no exception for national honor, but it provided an elaborate procedure for setting up tribunals and handling appeals that should have been adequate safeguards for the interests of both parties. Optimists believed the treaty could be a first step toward a permanent world tribunal. Olney and Pauncefote signed the treaty on 11 January 1897, and Cleveland and his successor, William McKinley, both urged ratification. Unfortunately, partisan politics, dislike for Britain, and fear of a departure from the traditional policy of avoiding entangling alliances influenced many senators. After approving amendments that would have deprived the treaty of any real force, the Senate on 5 May 1897 declined consent for ratification. Great was the disappointment of arbitration enthusiasts, but there soon came another opportunity for their cause.

The Russian foreign ministry, on 24 August 1898, sent a circular note to all governments with diplomatic representation in St. Petersburg. Czar Nicholas II proposed a conference to consider limitation of armaments. The United States was quick to accept, although there was no interest in Washington in limiting or reducing armaments, and some influential people suspected a connection between the Russian proposal and the recent American victory in the war with Spain. When the Russians added improvements in the laws of war and arbitration to the agenda, American officials became more interested. Secretary of State John Hay instructed the American delegates to work for agreement on these subjects, and he told them to present a plan for a permanent international tribunal modeled on the Supreme Court of the United States.

Upon request of Nicholas II, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands provided the conference with a meeting place at The Hague. Representatives of twenty-six governments were present for the opening session on 18 May 1899 at one of the Dutch royal palaces, the House in the Wood. In addition to the delegates, peace workers gathered at The Hague, anxious to encourage the "Peace Conference," as they called it, to make large initiatives for peace. To many people, the term "Peace Conference" soon seemed a misnomer, for the conference spent much of its time discussing war. It failed to agree to any reduction in armies and navies or their budgets but did adopt declarations against poison gas, needlessly cruel bullets, and the throwing of projectiles or explosives from balloons or similar devices. It was more successful in its work with the laws of war. It framed two conventions about this subject, one of which was a codification of the laws of land warfare and the other a convention extending the Geneva Convention of 1864 (popularly known as the Red Cross Convention) to naval warfare. While humanitarians hailed these conventions, another document, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, was more interesting to peace workers. This convention summarized experience with arbitration, mediation, and commissions of inquiry and made several significant innovations in the application of these methods to the resolution of international differences.

No part of the conference's work required more diplomacy than Title IV of the Pacific Settlement Convention, "On International Arbitration." The American delegates soon discovered that there was little chance for adoption of their plan for a permanent tribunal, and they decided not to press for its acceptance. Instead, they supported a plan offered by Pauncefote, the chairman of the British delegation. The British proposed that each signatory power name two jurists to a list and that parties to an arbitration should choose judges from that list. The Russians also advanced a plan, proposing that five powers be given authority to name one judge each and that these judges should always be ready to act as arbitrators. Both plans called for an administrative bureau at The Hague. The chairman of the U.S. delegation, Andrew D. White, and the delegation secretary, Frederick W. Holls, worked closely with the British and Russians to secure an acceptable compromise. For a time German objections threatened to defeat their efforts; and it required much persuasion before the German government

agreed to support a plan believed somewhat weaker than the original British and Russian proposals. The conference then agreed that each signatory power should select "four persons at the most, of known competency in international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of Arbitrator." These people were to be members of a permanent international institution, the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A bureau at The Hague would maintain their names on a list and carry out all administrative responsibilities. Powers wishing to enter into arbitrations could choose arbitrators from the list, but there was no requirement that they do so.

Efforts at incorporating obligatory features into the convention largely failed. The Germans, in particular, opposed obligatory arbitration, and without their support little was possible. The completed convention included, however, a statement that the signatory powers recognized arbitration "as the most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle," and article 27 declared that the signatory powers would "consider it their duty, if a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is open to them." This provision, based on a French proposal that Holls had warmly supported, was the subject of serious disagreement within the American delegation. The naval delegate, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the famed historian of sea power, argued that the article could lead to conflict between the Hague Convention and the Monroe Doctrine. Debate within the delegation ceased only when White read a statement to the conference that in signing the convention the United States was in no way departing from its traditional policies toward Europe or the Americas.

Many of the framers of the Peaceful Settlement Convention were as concerned with good offices and mediation as with arbitration. When a government extends an offer of good offices to powers in controversy or at war, it makes its diplomatic services and facilities available to them. When a power acts as a mediator, it takes an active part in negotiations, acting much as a middleman. In actual practice, it is difficult to distinguish between good offices and mediation, and the First Hague Conference did not make such a distinction, but it did recognize the need to guarantee their benevolent character. Too often such offers had been viewed as unfriendly interventions, sometimes for good reasons. Americans remembered how the imperial French government during the Civil War had been unsympathetic to the Union cause and had, at an inconvenient moment, offered mediation. The Peace Conference sought to prevent such problems in the future by including in the convention a declaration that powers that were strangers to a dispute had the right to offer good offices and mediation even during hostilities and that the exercise of this right could "never be regarded by either of the parties at variance as an unfriendly act." The convention was as careful in its treatment of recipients of offers of good offices and mediation. Article 6 declared that offers of good offices and mediation "have exclusively the character of advice, and never have binding force," while article 7 stated that mediation could not interrupt, delay, or hinder mobilization or other preparations for war.

Article 8 of the mediation section was in a class by itself. The result of a proposal by Holls—other delegates referred to it as *La Proposition Holls*—it provided for what was called "special mediation." According to its terms, each party to a conflict could choose another power to act in its place. For thirty days the disputing powers would cease all communication about their controversy and let their seconds make an effort at settlement.

In addition to the articles on mediation and arbitration, the conference included provisions in the convention for commissions of inquiry. It was already an accepted practice to promote international conciliation by appointing commissions to ascertain facts. Such commissions were not expected to make recommendations for settlement, but they were expected to make reports that could aid quarreling governments to work out their differences. There was, however, no generally accepted procedure for establishing commissions. Cleveland had appointed a commission to gather evidence during the Venezuelan boundary controversy, and while the commission did much good work, the fact that it was constituted by only one party to the dispute was lost on no one. Obviously, such one-sided arrangements should be avoided in the future. The Hague Convention provided that commissions should be organized according to a procedure similar to that by which arbitral bodies could be constituted from the list of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and that the commissions should confine their activities to the determination of facts. They would present reports to the conflicting powers but those powers would retain full freedom to interpret the findings of the commissions.

During the fifteen years following the Peace Conference of 1899, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was of considerable importance in international relations, and no country displayed more interest in the convention and the Hague Court than the United States. American statesmen made promotion of the court an important part of foreign policy. Upon the suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt, the United States and Mexico gave the court its first case, a dispute over whether the cession of California to the United States had ended Mexico's obligation to give financial support to an ancient fund for the conversion of the California Indians—the Pious Fund of the Californias. The court carefully examined a large quantity of historical evidence and, on 14 October 1902, rendered an award stating that Mexico was still obligated to support the fund.

Roosevelt's initiative in the Pious Fund case won approval from American and European peace movement leaders, but soon he made clear the limits of his confidence in the Hague Court. He refused to submit the controversy over the Alaska Panhandle's boundary with Canada to the court. A joint commission had failed to settle the matter, a problem since the Klondike gold rush in 1896, but Roosevelt agreed to what was essentially another commission, although called a tribunal. The president and the British monarch were each to appoint three "impartial jurists of repute." Roosevelt appointed his secretary of war, Elihu Root; his close friend Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts; and former senator George Turner of Washington, who was well acquainted with commercial relations between his state and the Alaskan gold-rush ports. King Edward VII appointed the lieutenant-governor of Quebec, Sir Louise A. Jetté; a Toronto lawyer, A. B. Aylesworth; and the lord chief justice of England, Lord Alverstone, who had a prominent role in the Bering Sea arbitration. Alverstone voted with the Americans for a decision favorable to American contentions. Great was the anger of Canadians who charged that no one could have expected the American jurists to be impartial, despite reasons for believing that the impartiality of the British Empire jurists was also suspect. Roosevelt told people who believed he had risked a sound claim to arbitration that a tie was the worst that could have happened, and he insisted that the London proceedings had not been an arbitration. History does not support what the president was saying, but his interpretation has, nonetheless, been widely accepted.

With regard to a more serious controversy, the Venezuelan debt affair, Roosevelt was as pleased to make use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as he had been determined to avoid it in the Alaska boundary dispute. After Britain, Germany, and Italy blockaded Venezuelan ports in late 1902 and early 1903 to force Venezuela to honor financial obligations due their nationals in that country, other governments asked that the claims of their nationals in Venezuela also be paid. The question then arose as to whether the blockading powers should have preference when the payments began. Roosevelt saw an opportunity for the Hague Court. Upon his suggestion a court was again constituted from its list of arbitrators, and the interested powers began a long and complicated arbitration. The court finally announced, on 22 February 1904, an award stating that the blockading powers should have preference, a disappointing decision to many of the warmest friends of the court, for it seemed to reward violence.

Before World War I broke out, the Hague Court rendered awards in twelve other cases, two of them involving the United States. The Treaty of Washington of 1871 and the Halifax commission had failed to put to rest all difficulties over the North Atlantic fisheries, and the American and British governments referred their controversy to the Permanent Court in 1909. The court, on 10 September 1910, announced an award that upheld most British contentions but which was so carefully stated that the Americans as well as the British believed justice had been done. A few weeks after making this award, the court, on 25 October, made an award in another case involving the United States, the Orinoco Steamship Company case, a dispute between a company owned by U.S. citizens and the Venezuelan government. The award was substantially in accord with the position of the United States government.

The provisions of the Pacific Settlement Convention for commissions of inquiry and good offices and mediation were not used as often as the arbitration sections from 1899 to 1914, but they were of importance in connection with the most serious armed conflict of the era, the Russo-Japanese War. When Russia's Baltic fleet, en route to the Far East, fired into a British fishing fleet off Dogger Bank on the night of 21–22 October 1904, having mistaken the fishing boats for Japanese torpedo boats, there was a furor in Britain, and high officials in London talked of using force to stop the Russian fleet. Anger subsided when the

Russian government suggested establishment of a commission of inquiry under terms of the Hague Convention. Four admirals—one each from Russia, Britain, France, and the United States—were appointed to a commission that carefully investigated the matter. Upon receiving the commission's report, the Russian government paid damages and the matter was closed.

As the war passed its decisive stages, peace movement spokesmen hoped that powers signatory to the Hague Convention would remember its provisions for good offices and mediation, and they were elated when President Roosevelt mediated a settlement, the Peace of Portsmouth of 1905. The American president made no use of the language of the Hague Convention, but it is probable that that document influenced him, for at one time he suggested that the Russians and Japanese hold peace negotiations at The Hague.

Many peace spokesmen in the United States and Europe believed Roosevelt's efforts to improve the Hague system would prove as important in the long run as his mediation of the Russo-Japanese conflict. The president in 1904 promised the visiting Interparliamentary Union that he would call another Hague peace conference, and in October of that year Secretary of State Hay sent out a circular suggesting a new conference. Later, Roosevelt stepped aside in response to a Russian request that Nicholas II have the honor of calling the conference officially, but the United States took an active role in the conference.

The Second Hague Peace Conference, which met in 1907, was much larger than the 1899 conference, for it included delegates from most Latin American countries. The Latin Americans were present because the United States asked for their inclusion. Indeed, Latin American policy was one of the most important considerations of the United States at the conference, but Secretary of State Elihu Root and the president did not forget the old dream of a world court. The chairman of the U.S. delegation, Joseph Hodges Choate, and another American member, James Brown Scott, struggled valiantly to secure establishment of a new tribunal, the Court of Arbitral Justice, which would have stood alongside the Permanent Court of Arbitration but would have been a truly permanent court, always in existence and ready to hear cases. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to agree upon a system of appointing judges without offending smaller powers that could not have continuous representation. As the conference closed, the Court of Arbitral Justice was only a project attached to a *voeu* (formal wish) that the powers signatory to the Final Act bring the court into existence as soon as they agreed upon the selection of judges and several details of the court's constitution.

The negotiation of arbitration treaties and treaties of conciliation were other important aspects of the diplomacy of peace from 1899 to 1914. Britain and France in 1903 negotiated a treaty of arbitration, and peace movement leaders then urged the United States to follow this example. Roosevelt and Hay yielded to their pleas, and Hay, in 1904 and 1905, negotiated treaties with France, Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Mexico, and Sweden and Norway. To the anger of Roosevelt and Hay, the Senate in advising ratification insisted that the preliminary arbitration agreements be actual treaties and therefore subject to the ratifying process. Roosevelt thereupon refused to proceed further, but Hay's successor, Root, was convinced that treaties amended so as to meet the Senate's requirements would be better than none. He prevailed upon the president to consent to negotiation in 1908 of a new set of treaties. The Senate found these treaties more to its liking and approved ratification.

It would have been well if President William Howard Taft and his secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, had been as cautious as Root in dealing with the Senate, for they would have been spared a large disappointment. Knox negotiated arbitration treaties with Britain and France in 1911 that made no exceptions for such considerations as national honor. The treaties merely stated that any matter that was justiciable would be arbitrated. Since whether or not a dispute was justiciable was subject to varying interpretations, it seemed that the treaties contained adequate safeguards for the interests of the governments concerned, but the Senate saw the matter in a different light. Believing that the treaties could limit the nation's freedom of action, the Senate refused consent for ratification.

President Woodrow Wilson's first secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, was less interested in arbitration than his immediate predecessors, although he negotiated renewal of the Root treaties. He was more impressed with the conciliatory effects of commissions of inquiry and believed that their development could be carried much farther than the Pacific Settlement Convention had done. He hoped for treaties of conciliation incorporating new ideas about investigating commissions. Soon after the Wilson administra-

tion took office, he advanced what he called the president's peace plan. He urged nations to agree to refer their disputes to investigating commissions for six months or a year. While awaiting the reports of the commissions, they would refrain from going to war or increasing their armaments. The signatories of the treaties would be free to accept or reject conclusions of the commissions or to go to war, but Bryan was confident that the period of waiting could have a cooling-off effect and help avert war. He negotiated twenty-nine treaties according to this plan, and twenty of them were ratified. Sadly, this initiative for peace was interrupted by the outbreak of World War I.

The declarations of war in 1914 also interrupted American efforts to bring the Court of Arbitral Justice into existence and to ensure the meeting of a third Hague peace conference. Since the conference of 1907, American diplomats had been conducting quiet negotiations with the British, French, and Germans to establish the Court of Arbitral Justice without waiting for the consent of all powers that had participated in that conference. While these negotiations had reached no definite conclusion, in 1914 there were some reasons to hope for success. Negotiations for a third Hague peace conference were even more promising. The 1907 conference had recommended that another conference meet after an eight-year interval, the same as between the first two conferences. To many peace spokesmen and theorists, the conference seemed to be developing into a permanent institution. A periodic world conference and a world court with judges always ready to hold sessions—these were the institutions necessary for a viable world organization, they believed. In the United States the peace societies and the new Carnegie Endowment for International Peace brought pressure to bear upon Wilson and Bryan to use their influence to bring about the meeting of the conference, and this the president and the secretary of state agreed to do. Planning for the conference had made considerable progress when war began in 1914.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE WORLD COURT

The Hague period of modern internationalism ended abruptly with the declarations of war. The Pacific Settlement Convention and the treaties of arbitration and conciliation were brushed aside as the armies of the warring nations hastened to secure strategic positions. Four years later, as the war moved toward its close, European nations and the United States advocated a world organization. Occasionally there were recommendations that the new world system be founded on the work of the Hague conferences, but at Paris, in 1919, Wilson and other internationalists sought to break with the Hague traditions as they planned the League of Nations.

Fundamental in Wilson's thinking was the famous pledge in Article X of the League of Nations Covenant "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of the league's members. Wilson's small respect for the work of the Hague conferences notwithstanding, other members of the drafting committee incorporated into the covenant the prewar experience with arbitration and conciliation. Members of the league were to refer disputes that threatened rupture to arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry by the League Council. Parties to a dispute were not to go to war for three months after arbitral awards, judicial decisions, or reports from the council. The league convened a conference of experts at The Hague in 1920 to draft a statute for a new international court. The conference took the 1907 draft Hague convention for a Court of Arbitral Justice as the basis of its work and quickly produced the draft Statute for the Permanent International Court of Justice. The older Permanent Court of Arbitration was to have a special role in the new judicial system: its judges were to meet in national groups to make nominations for the new court. The Permanent Court of International Justice met for the first time in the Peace Palace at The Hague in 1922. The creation of the Permanent Court, usually called the World Court, was a special challenge to the United States. Elihu Root and James Brown Scott were among the experts who drafted the World Court Statute. Despite the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the attached Covenant of the League of Nations, adherence to the statute was possible. The isolationism resulting from the league struggle was, however, so strong that even the court aroused senatorial opposition. Presidents and secretaries of state during the 1920s and 1930s made several attempts to secure American entry into the World Court system. All failed. Secretaries of state, nevertheless, pursued arbitration policies like those of Elihu Root, renewing Root's treaties and negotiating entirely new arbi-

tration agreements. The United States was one of sixteen republics at a Pan-American conference in Santiago, Chile, in 1923 that signed a treaty providing for commissions of inquiry to investigate disputes neither diplomacy nor arbitration could settle. At the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration in Washington on 5 January 1929, the United States was one of twenty American republics signing a general arbitration treaty and conciliation convention.

The European experience with peaceful settlement between the world wars was no more promising than that of the United States. The World Court decided several cases, and governments continued to make use of arbitration. The Geneva Protocol was an important proposal to strengthen the covenant's arbitration provisions, but it failed in 1925 when a new Conservative government in London withdrew support. Later that year, at the Locarno conference, the German government concluded treaties with Belgium and France recognizing their boundaries with Germany and concluded arbitration treaties with those two countries and Poland and Czechoslovakia. All such initiatives for peace were swept aside when World War II began.

THE UNITED NATIONS

As World War II neared its conclusion, Allied statesmen reasoned that a new beginning for world organization was necessary, so at conferences at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., and at San Francisco, they wrote the Charter of the United Nations. The charter included even more peaceful settlement procedures than the League Covenant. Parties to disputes were first of all to seek solutions "by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." The charter provided for a new World Court and declared that all UN members would be ipso facto parties to its statute. The new World Court Statute was a revision of that of 1920. When the International Court of Justice held its first meeting at The Hague on 3 April 1946, the most noticeable change was the dropping of "Permanent" from its official name.

The United Nations has been a major factor in world affairs since its founding. Decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly tried to maintain order and peace. Intervention in Korea and many peacekeeping operations have often given the impression of a military alliance, but the quieter means of settling disputes peacefully have, nonetheless, been of importance. The International Court of Justice has made decisions in numerous disputes, and governments have continued to make use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Such tribunals make possible preservation of greater secrecy and, at the same time, allow each party to a dispute to name some of the jurists who will hear the case. The UN secretary-general, Kofi A. Annan, in 1998 noted that the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice were neighbors in the Peace Palace and were "complementary institutions offering the international community a comprehensive range of options for the peaceful resolution of disputes."

When one reflects upon American initiatives to promote arbitration and a world tribunal before World War I and the consistency with which U.S. presidents during the 1920s and 1930s recommended adherence to the World Court Statute, American support since 1945 for the World Court and other means for pacific settlement has often seemed tepid. The memoirs and biographies of presidents and secretaries of state since 1945 include many references to the United Nations, but it is rare that they mention the International Court of Justice, arbitration, or other means for pacific settlement. As a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has pointed out, American diplomacy has often appeared to be unaware of the resources offered by international law. Yet, a century after the Pious Fund case, arbitration again was of importance in some aspects of American foreign relations. Problems resulting from the Iranian Revolution led to establishment at The Hague of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in 1981. It was reported in April 2000 that the tribunal had settled 3,700 claims cases involving hundreds of billions of dollars. Certainly Iranian–United States relations continued to be unsatisfactory, but the tribunal demonstrated that through arbitration, progress toward a better relationship could be made.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blake, Nelson M. "The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897." *American Historical Review* 50

(1945). A study of the Senate's rejection of the treaty.

Brower, Charles M., and Jason D. Bruesche. *The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal.* The Hague, 1998. A comprehensive study.

Campbell, John P. "Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911." *Journal of American History* 53 (1966). The failure of the last important American effort to conclude obligatory arbitration treaties before World War I.

Cook, Adrian. *The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865–1872.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1975. Careful discussion of the Washington Treaty and the Geneva arbitration.

Corbett, Percy Ellwood. *Law in Diplomacy.* Princeton, N.J., 1959. Chapter 5. Fine survey of the history of arbitration.

Cory, Helen May. *Compulsory Arbitration of International Disputes.* New York, 1932. Describes development of its special topic from 1820 to 1931.

Crackanthorpe, Montague H. "Arbitration, International." *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1910. The basic concepts and terminology of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation as they were understood early in the twentieth century.

Curti, Merle. *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936.* New York, 1936. Discusses the promotion of arbitration by the peace movement.

Davis, Calvin DeArmond. *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1962. A detailed account of the negotiation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

———. *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914.* Durham, N.C., 1976. Describes the establishment and development of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the attempt of the Second Hague Peace Conference to establish a stronger world tribunal, and the efforts of American diplomacy to further development of the Hague Conferences and Court into a permanent world system.

Duberman, Martin B. *Charles Francis Adams, 1807–1886.* Boston, 1961. Excellent accounts of the Washington Treaty and the Geneva arbitration.

Ferrell, Robert H. *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.* New Haven, Conn., 1952. Arbitration in the period between the world wars.

Gray, Christine, and Benedict Kingsbury. "Developments in Dispute Settlement: Inter-state Settlement Since 1945." *British Year Book of International Law 1992.* Oxford, 1993. One of the most important studies of the subject since 1945.

Herman, Sondra R. *Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898–1921.* Stanford, Calif., 1969. Analyzes important peace ideas.

Kuehl, Warren F. *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920.* Nashville, Tenn., 1969. Discusses proposals for organization of the world and its regions.

Mashkour, Mashkan. "Building a Friendly Environment for International Arbitration in Iran." *Journal of International Arbitration* 17 (2000). The latest information about Iran–United States arbitration.

Moore, John Bassett. "International Arbitration: Historical Notes and Projects." *Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore.* New Haven, Conn., and London, 1944. One of the best general surveys.

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. *On the Law of Nations.* Cambridge, Mass., 1990. A searching commentary on international law since 1945.

Oppenheim, Lassa. *International Law: A Treatise.* Vol. 2. London, 1906. Explains arbitration, mediation, and conciliation as international lawyers understood them early in the twentieth century.

Patterson, David S. *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914.* Bloomington, Ind., 1976. An outstanding history.

Reisman, W. Michael. "The Multifaceted Phenomenon of International Arbitration." *Arbitration Journal* 24 (1969). Modern legal scholarship.

Sanders, Pieter, ed. *International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke.* The Hague, 1967. Essays by leading scholars.

Savelle, Max. *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica, 1492–1763.* New York, 1967. Important background for the later interest of the United States in arbitration, mediation, and conciliation.

Stuyt, A. M. *Survey of International Arbitrations, 1794–1989.* The Hague, 1990. A basic reference.

United Nations Secretary-General and International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. *Permanent Court of Arbitration.* The Hague, 1998. Contains primary sources for the arbitral court's history.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PEACEMAKING; TREATIES.

Armed Neutralities

Ian Mugridge

One of the more difficult problems attached to all wars is that of relations between belligerents and neutrals. In land wars the question is not of such magnitude, although Switzerland is probably the only nation to have arrived at a satisfactory solution. In naval wars, however, in situations where maritime commerce and other activities are involved, the question of the relationship between belligerents and neutrals, that is, of neutral rights, has long been debated, almost always with inconclusive results.

The question of neutral rights in wartime is almost always discussed, especially by neutrals, within the context of international law. It is usually claimed that such international law is supported by principles established either by earlier treaties or by practice or both, that it is an expression of some accepted view of maritime conduct in wartime, which should therefore govern relations between belligerents and neutrals.

The problem is that international law has no validity beyond that accorded it in particular situations by particular nations. It only exists either when nations agree that it does or when they can uphold their interpretation of it by whatever means are appropriate. In a narrower context, the problem with stating and attempting to uphold neutral rights at sea is that, in the end, neutrals have no rights except those that they can maintain by their own actions, in which case they often cease to be neutrals, as the Dutch discovered in the American Revolution. Again, the example of the Swiss is instructive. They have preserved their neutrality inviolate for hundreds of years by the simple but effective expedient of placing themselves in such a position that challenging their neutrality would not be worth the cost.

The introduction of principles to regulate relations between belligerents and neutrals has never been motivated by anything other than self-interest. Since at least the seventeenth century, declarations, opinions, judgments, and conventions on neutral rights in seaborne commerce have been common. But if one strips away the philosophical disguises, legal circumlocutions, and endless casuistry, what remains is really very simple: neutrals have constantly been trying to trade with some or all of the belligerents in a given war while some or all of the same belligerents have been trying to stop neutral trade with their enemies. For example, the cause of most of the problems concerning the West Indies, particularly the French islands, during the American Revolution was the clear and avowed intent of the French to assist the Americans and the equally firm intent of the British to stop this. What mattered in this situation was not declarations of neutral rights or expressions of principle but the possession of the force required to carry out national policy.

There has, nevertheless, developed during the last three hundred years a great body of pronouncements on neutral rights as both neutrals and belligerents have sought to regulate their relations and to justify their self-interested conduct by appeals to principle and to precedent. No nation has been absolutely consistent in the principles and doctrines to which it has appealed and on which it has acted, and this has been as true of the United States as of any other nation.

In *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (1935), still a valuable work on the topic, Samuel Flagg Bemis noted that, in espousing unequivocally the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 and in embodying some of these principles in the Treaty of Paris, the United States established what he called "the American doctrine of freedom of the seas." This doctrine, which he recognized as being rooted in practice, was by no means American nor has it been one to which the United States has consistently adhered. During the Civil War, the British in particular tried, unusually for them, to uphold the principle of free ships, free goods; but the government of

Abraham Lincoln refused to do anything but cling to maritime doctrines more usually espoused by the British. In the two major wars of the twentieth century, the neutral rights of American shipping were one of the causes of contention between the United States and Germany, but in neither case was the real neutrality of the nation clearly established. In the 1960s, it might be maintained that one of the ingredients of the Cuban missile crisis was the unwillingness of the United States to uphold the principle of freedom of the seas when such an action would seriously have threatened its security. This is not to criticize particularly the actions of the United States in successive crises, merely to point out that its governments, like those of other major and minor powers over the years, have been motivated by self-interest rather than by continuous adherence to principle.

An examination of the conduct of the maritime powers in time of war, however, indicates that the body of international maritime law, ephemeral and even illusory as it may be, has yet had considerable influence on their actions.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In his *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763* (1938), Richard Pares noted that the classic age in the struggle between land power and sea power occurred in the middle years of the eighteenth century and that one of the results of this was that the same period became the classic age in the development of international maritime law. During the two great colonial wars, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, important doctrines on contraband, blockade, and colonial trade, advanced by theorists like the Dane Martin Hupner, were defined by English and Continental jurists in a long series of opinions in prize cases and the like. These definitions were in turn embodied in government pronouncements and treaties to build up reference points for the future. As Pares noted at the close of his work, "for Admirals, for Foreign Ministers, and for judges, [these wars] were the dress rehearsals for greater struggles to come." By implication at least, this view was taken up much later by Max Savelle in his *The Origins of American Diplomacy* (1967), in which he examined the international history of the European and particularly the British colonies in America from 1492 to the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763.

At the beginning of this war, as both Pares and Savelle noted, the neutral powers assumed that free ships made free goods and that they would be able to continue their lucrative trade with the belligerents as if nothing had happened. This was not, however, the British view. In response to the neutral position, the British developed what came to be known as the Rule of the War of 1756, which drew a distinction between trading *with* the enemy and trading *for* the enemy. The former was to be regarded as permissible so that trade that would have been carried on in peacetime remained free and uninterrupted during war. The latter, however, was not permissible and the British reserved the right to interfere with any trade in war matériel that would not have been carried on in peacetime. During 1757 and 1758, however, it became obvious to the British that even this rather strict rule was being continuously evaded by transferring contraband from one ship to another. The response to this problem was to promulgate a supplementary order that became known as the doctrine of continuous voyage. This rule laid down the principle that for a confiscatable cargo to begin a voyage in one ship and then to continue "in the ship of a friend" made no difference, for the British government would regard such a voyage as a continuous one. In other words, it was the cargo and not the ship that mattered.

These principles governed the actions of the British government and their navy throughout the Seven Years' War. From their point of view, it was a simple problem: in Pares's words, "English trade had nothing to gain from the vindication of neutral rights." In addition, the British war effort might be placed in considerable jeopardy by adherence to the principles being espoused by the French foreign minister, Etienne François, duc de Choiseul, in his attempts to win over the neutral powers. These powers did not take the same view of the problem as the British. Although Choiseul and his agents discovered that the neutral position was by no means a united one, there was yet sufficient feeling of grievance against Great Britain among all the neutral powers in Europe to make the construction of a maritime league of neutrals a serious proposition. The British desired to establish overwhelming power at sea and were not altogether unsuccessful in their attempts to do so.

It was to the creation of such a league that the French government, posing as the champion of the neutrals, bent its energies in the early years of the war. It was a difficult and ultimately fruitless task, but in many ways it provided the model for the League of the Armed Neutrality of 1780.

There were precedents for a league of neutrals, especially in northern Europe where, as early as 1690, Denmark and Sweden had combined to try to enforce their concept of neutral rights in the Baltic, the area where a league of neutrals stood the greatest chance of success. It could easily be closed to the shipping of nations refusing to respect neutral rights, much to the disadvantage of, in particular, the British, who at this time were beginning to rely increasingly on Baltic naval stores. The Danes, however, also relied heavily on the income they gained from dues collected on the Sound, and the Baltic trading nations as a group were growing more dependent on their naval stores industries. Nevertheless, the French concentrated on this area, especially in view of the agreement on neutral rights signed by Denmark and Sweden shortly before hostilities began.

William Pitt the Elder, the British prime minister, was forced to make some concessions to neutral protests lest these powers respond favorably to French efforts to form a maritime league. But the French were to fail through the weakness of the neutral position, the unwillingness of the British to recognize claims not already granted by treaty, and the resultant reluctance of the neutrals to make a firm commitment to a maritime league. Not only was the Baltic project doomed almost from the beginning—the Danes, for example, would never actually say that free ships made free goods—but attempts to put together a wider league met with equal reluctance to participate. Whatever their long-term interests might have appeared to dictate, whatever blandishments the French used on them, the neutrals, and particularly the Danes and the Dutch, always lacked sufficient confidence in their own ability or that of the French to uphold the principles with which they were flirting. They were always too reliant on British friendship, or at least noninterference, in maintaining their overseas trade to give unequivocal assent and support to a league that might oblige them to sacrifice concrete gain for abstract principles. By the spring of 1759, Choiseul had essentially given up the attempt, despite a rather half-hearted effort a few months later.

In many ways, as Pares noted, the events of the Seven Years' War were a rehearsal for later wars. In the War of American Independence and later struggles, both neutrals and belligerents appealed to the body of maritime law developed in the years up to 1763. As in the past, efforts to set up a maritime league of neutrals, a concept that became a reality in only a limited sense, foundered, like later attempts, on the rock of national self-interest. In one important respect, however, the league of 1780 differed from attempts made by Choiseul and the French to bring together a group of neutral powers in the 1750s. It may be this difference that goes a long way toward explaining its success, if not in limiting the belligerents' interference with neutral shipping then at least in providing mediation aimed at bringing the American war to a close.

LEAGUE OF THE ARMED NEUTRALITY

Formed in the spring and summer of 1780, the League of the Armed Neutrality was the first genuine league of neutrals formed because of complaints of the neutral powers against the major belligerents—with the possible exception of the United States. Although, in this respect as in others, the United States was of rather limited importance to anyone except Great Britain, France, and Spain, there is some evidence that the activities of American privateers were partly responsible for the movement to form a league of neutrals.

From the beginning of the war, Great Britain, still supremely, though as it turned out misguidedly, confident in the ability of its navy to hold the world at bay, had reverted to the maritime doctrines it had espoused in the past; and its actions had provided a constant source of complaint for the Danes and the Swedes as well as the Dutch and, later, the Russians. After the entry of France and Spain into the war in 1778, France made attempts to conciliate the neutrals as it had done in the Seven Years' War. Spanish policy hovered somewhere between the two. Whatever the avowed policies of the belligerent powers, however, they all, in varying degrees, offended the neutrals and produced a growing sense among them that some kind of joint expression of disapproval and firm resolve to take action was necessary to protect their interests.

Ultimately, leadership in this project was provided by Catherine II of Russia, who, under pressure from Great Britain on the one hand to enter an alliance and from the northern powers on the other to help protect their neutrality, found her own shipping becoming more subject to interference from the belligerents. The result was the declaration of 1780, identifying the principles by which Catherine proposed to act and the means—commissioning a substantial portion of her fleet to go "wherever honour, interest, and

necessity compelled"—by which she proposed to enforce those principles. Broadly, these principles were that neutral shipping might navigate freely from port to port and on the coasts of nations at war; that the property of subjects of belligerent states on neutral ships should be free except when it was classed as contraband within the meaning of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1766; and that a port was assumed to be blockaded only when the attacking power had rendered its ships stationary and made entry a clear danger.

Through the summer of 1780, other neutral powers issued similar declarations, and the belligerents protested that they had always treated and always intended to treat Russian shipping according to these principles. By August, Denmark and Sweden, by almost identical agreements, had joined Russia in conventions establishing an armed neutrality, and, beginning with the Dutch United Provinces in January of the following year, most of the major neutrals of Europe acceded to the league before the end of the war. Of these powers, only the Dutch were obliged, at least partly because of their joining the league, to go to war with Great Britain. In this case, Catherine and her allies agreed to regard the Dutch as neutrals in their dealings with France and Spain to mitigate the effects on them of war with the British. Even so, the Dutch suffered severely from the war which, despite repeated attempts at mediation by Catherine and other members of the league, dragged on into the early summer of 1784 before Great Britain and the United Provinces finally signed a treaty of peace.

What, in the end, did the league achieve? Its existence made little, if any, difference in the attitude of the British navy in dealing with neutral shipping. Indeed, in the case of the United Provinces, adherence to the league was at least partly responsible for a far more serious situation than that nation might otherwise have faced. Any slackening in British depredations on the neutrals in general was perhaps due more to the declining effectiveness of the British navy, to the ineptitude of those running the war effort, and to the appearance of France and Spain on the rebel side than to the unity and effectiveness of the league. Nevertheless, resentment against the Rule of the War of 1756 was still strong among the Continental powers, and when, after 1778, the British escalated their actions against neutral commerce, they reacted in a way that, strengthened by Catherine's firm support, resulted increasingly in British isolation. As Paul Kennedy notes, in 1783 even Portugal and the Two Sicilies joined Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark in the league, leaving Britain completely isolated, a situation that led the scholar G. S. Graham to comment that it was the principal factor in the British defeat. It is at least clear that the mediation of Catherine and Joseph II of Austria was partly responsible for the treaties that ended the war in the fall of 1783.

This was probably the limit of the achievements of the first armed neutrality. It had little or no influence on American affairs and diplomacy in general, beyond the threat it imposed on the British. For the United States, as for other nations, it provided a set of principles of maritime law that were useful when they became convenient or necessary but that were to be discarded when neither of these conditions existed. At the end of the war, Charles James Fox, the British foreign secretary, proposed drawing up a treaty embodying the principles of armed neutrality, but his plan came to nothing. Ten years later, with Europe once again at war, Sweden and Denmark signed a convention renewing the provisions of the Armed Neutrality; but Catherine had already concluded an alliance with Great Britain, which, by virtue of the fact that one of its objects was to destroy French commerce, deliberately ignored the principles of the league.

THE SECOND LEAGUE

In the words of Isabel de Madariaga, the idea of a league of neutrals "flickered into brief life again in 1800" before it was finally abandoned. At that point, Napoleon Bonaparte, first consul of the French Republic, was anxious to construct a continental alliance against Great Britain, whose opposition to his designs was proving intransigent. He was attempting to use against the British a league of neutral powers, particularly those of northern Europe, who were angered by British refusal to recognize the rights of neutral commerce.

Paul I of Russia had withdrawn from the Second Coalition against Napoleon early in 1800, believing that his interests lay more in the Baltic than in Italy and Germany and vexed by British refusal to surrender Malta to him as the new Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. As a result of his diplomacy, the 1780 Declaration of Armed Neutrality was renewed. Beginning with the Prussians and Danes, Paul recreated the league, and by mid-December 1800, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia had also

signed separate conventions with France to further their "disinterested desire to maintain the inalienable rights of neutral nations." Napoleon had earlier declared that he would not make peace with the British while they refused to respect the neutral rights not only of these powers, but also of the United States. He hoped to attach the Americans to the league, particularly after Thomas Jefferson's accession to the presidency early in 1801.

Late in 1800, John Adams, on the advice of his son, John Quincy Adams, minister to Prussia, sent an embassy to Paris that signed a convention reaffirming the principles of the 1780 declaration. This was ratified by the Senate early in 1801, but both Jefferson and his secretary of state, James Madison, were cautious about entering into a firm attachment with a league in which, in the words of one of the American envoys in Europe, "the silly powers of the north" had responded to "this interested and politic cry of France against Great Britain." They recognized too that the situation could be turned to their advantage if the Baltic trade were denied to the British, and they were suspicious of Napoleon's designs in the Western Hemisphere and fearful of the seriousness with which the British government clearly took the league.

So they hung back, and while they did the league collapsed. In the spring of 1801, two events destroyed it. Late in March, Paul I, the main prop of the league, was assassinated. Up to and past this point, the league worked: no British ships passed through the Denmark Strait in the first four months of 1801. But now decisive and ruthless action in the form of Horatio Nelson's destruction of the Danish fleet in Copenhagen Harbor hit the league at its weakest point. The league was finished, because the new czar, Alexander I, refused to maintain the policies of his father. The League of the Armed Neutrality of 1780 had, because of the temporary concurrence of a number of factors, some effect on the course of the American Revolution and, more particularly, on the European policies that surrounded it. A weakened Great Britain, faced with rebellious colonies and declarations of war by the major European powers, was in no position to resist effectively a league that eventually contained all the other major European powers. For once, an unusual show of neutral strength and unity had an effect on European politics, although even this did not extend fully to all the members and particularly to the Dutch.

The effectiveness of the league, however, had nothing to do with the principles it had espoused, with their justice or their strength. It had to do with the strength of the league's members and the comparative weakness of the major object of its existence. In 1800, when such a situation did not exist, this fact was illustrated graphically by the collapse of the second League of the Armed Neutrality. On this occasion, helped by a fortunate accident of Russian politics, the British, strong and confident, led by a resolute and able prime minister and served by a brilliant and fearless admiral, struck hard at the league's weakest link and destroyed it. Unable to maintain the rights they claimed, the neutrals returned to conciliation of Great Britain. They had learned a severe lesson—and so, watching them, had the government of the United States.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, John T. *Catherine the Great: Life and Legend.* New York, 1989.

Bolkhovitinov, Nikolai N. *The Beginnings of Russian-American Relations, 1775–1815.* Translated by Elena Levin. Cambridge, Mass., 1975. Discusses American influence on the first Armed Neutrality.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Extracts from American and Foreign Works on International Law Concerning the Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800.* Washington, D.C., 1917.

———. *Official Documents Bearing on the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800.* Washington, D.C., 1917.

———. *The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800.* Washington, D.C., 1918.

DeConde, Alexander. *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801.* New York, 1966. Gives the U.S. perspective of the second League of Armed Neutrality.

De Madariaga, Isabel. *Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780: Sir James Harris' Mission to St. Petersburg During the American Revolution.* New Haven, Conn., 1962. The most comprehensive treatment of the establishment and working of the first League of Armed Neutrality.

———. *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great.* New Haven, Conn., 1981. Supplements her *Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780.*

Feldbaek, Ole. *Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, 1800–1801: Small Power Policy in a World War.* Copenhagen, 1980. The second League of Armed Neutrality from the viewpoint of a small power.

Griffiths, David M. "An American Contribution to the Armed Neutrality of 1780." *Russian Review* 30, no. 2 (April 1971).

Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery.* London, 1976. A good though brief account of the first League of Armed Neutrality.

LeDonne, John P. *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment.* New York, 1997.

Pares, Richard. *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763.* Oxford, 1938. Best treatment of neutral rights in the eighteenth century.

Piggott, Sir Francis, and G. W. T. Ormond, eds. *Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800.* London, 1919. Contains a useful introduction and chronological account of the events surrounding the Armed Neutralities.

Saul, Norman E. *Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763–1867.* Lawrence, Kans., 1991. Contains a brief discussion of the United States and the first Armed Neutrality as well as a short section on the second league.

Savelle, Max. *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Anglo-America, 1492–1763.* New York, 1967. Contains a good account of international issues affecting the colonies in the prerevolutionary period.

Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson.* New York, 1990. An interesting discussion of the United States and neutrality.

See also BLOCKADES; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; NAVAL DIPLOMACY; NEUTRALISM; NEUTRALITY.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Richard Dean Burns

Historians have been slow to grasp the significant, occasionally dominating, role that arms control negotiations played in Cold War diplomacy—a situation undoubtedly the result of the often mind-numbing technical aspects of these lengthy deliberations. In the prenuclear era, political disputes might spark threatening military buildups, but political dimensions remained the focus of subsequent negotiations. This changed after 1950 as weapons systems themselves took on a political character. "The arms race . . . was both a result of the Cold War and a cause," as the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized, "as it constantly provided new stimuli for continued rivalry." The arms control pacts that gradually emerged from various multilateral and bilateral negotiations helped neutralize the insecurities brought on by the constant arrival of new weapons systems. "The decision to reduce arms," Gorbachev concluded, "became an important step on the road to ending confrontation and creating healthier relations between East and West."

Arms control and disarmament agreements were traditionally designed to accomplish two essential purposes: to stabilize the military climate and to diminish the military violence in any subsequent hostilities. The various arrangements, which reduced, limited, and regulated armaments, provided a more stable international environment; but could not themselves resolve other threatening, contentious issues. Controlling armaments had to be coupled with diplomatic resolve so that in an atmosphere temporarily cleared of insecurities inspired by unregulated weaponry, statesmen might deal with critical political, social, and economic differences.

DEFINING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TECHNIQUES

Although the terms "disarmament" and "arms control" have been widely used, there often has been, and still is, considerable confusion over their meanings. "Disarmament" became the fashionable term during the nineteenth century, particularly during and after the Hague Conference of 1899, to describe all efforts to limit, reduce, or control the implements of war. While some individuals may employ disarmament in the literal sense—the total elimination of armaments—most diplomats and commentators do not. The United Nations and its subsidiary agencies use it as a generic term covering all measures, "from small steps to reduce tensions or build confidence, through regulation of armaments or arms control, up to general and complete disarmament."

In the early 1950s, academic specialists linking the technology of nuclear weaponry to the strategies of the Cold War began substituting the term "arms control." For them "disarmament" not only lacked semantic precision but carried utopian expectations, whereas "arms control" involved any cooperation between potential enemies designed to reduce the likelihood of conflict or, should it occur, its scope and violence. Most arms controllers sought to enhance the nuclear deterrence system, and only occasionally sought force reductions, while literal "disarmers" dismissed arms control as a chimera and supported proposals seeking general and complete disarmament.

From a historical perspective the basic techniques that comprise arms control and disarmament undertakings may be divided into six general categories:

1. Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. These pacts put specified limits on the mobilization, possession, or construction of military forces and equipment, and may result in reductions. The restrictions may be qualitative, regulating weapons design, as well as quantitative, limiting numbers of specific weapons.
2. Demilitarization, Denuclearization, and Neutralization. Demilitarization and denu-

clearization involve removing or placing restrictions on military forces, weapons, and fortifications within a prescribed area of land, water, or airspace. Neutralization is a special status that guarantees political independence and territorial integrity, subject to a pledge that the neutralized state will not engage in war except in defense. The essential feature of all three is the emphasis on geographical areas.

3. Regulating or Outlawing Specific Weapons. These agreements regulate the military use or the possession of specific weapons. Their rationale is that the unrestricted use, or any use, of a particular weapon exceeds recognized "just use of force."
4. Controlling Arms Manufacture and Traffic. This approach involves restrictions, including embargoes, on the sale or transfer of weapons and munitions. It may prohibit the manufacture of specific weapons.
5. Laws of War. These efforts seek to lessen the violence and damage of war. The principles underlying the rules of war (or laws of war) are (a) the prohibition of weapons that cause unnecessary or disproportionate suffering; (b) the distinction between combatants and noncombatants; and (c) the realization that the demands of humanity should prevail over the perceived necessities of combat.
6. Stabilizing the International Environment. This technique seeks to lower international tensions through lessening the possibility of an uncontrollable cause célèbre provoking an unwanted war. In addition, it seeks to protect the environment from lasting damage due to the testing or use of military weapons.

Obviously, the six categories are not exclusive. The outlawing of weapons has the same effect as limiting them. Thus, a treaty that prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space (1967) is also an example of geographic demilitarization. In addition, a treaty may incorporate several arms control techniques: the Treaty of Versailles (1919), for example, limited the number of German troops, demilitarized specific zones, and outlawed German manufacture of military aircraft, submarines, and tanks.

The methods of achieving arms control and disarmament objectives may be classified into three broad categories—retributive measures, unilateral measures, and reciprocal measures—which can be subdivided into six general methods:

1. Extermination. A retributive measure, extermination is an ancient and drastic means of ensuring no future warlike response from one's opponent, dramatized by Rome's destruction of Carthage or the elimination of some American Indian tribes.
2. Imposition. Also a retributive measure, imposition results when victors force arms limitation measures on the vanquished, such as the terms imposed upon Germany and other enemy states in 1919 and 1945.
3. Unilateral Neglect. Often confused with unilateral decisions, unilateral neglect refers to a nation's decision not spend for defense, as in the U.S. unilateral reduction of army and naval forces after the Civil War (1866) or the British and U.S. self-imposed arms reductions between the world wars.
4. Unilateral Decision. A consciously decided policy of self-imposed military restrictions or limitations, as in Japan's post–World War II constitution and the Austrian Peace Treaty (1955), both restricting armaments to defensive purposes.
5. Bilateral Negotiation. A reciprocal measure, bilateral negotiation is a traditional method by which two nations seek mutually acceptable solutions to tensions heightened by armaments, as with the Rush-Bagot Agreement (1817) and the SALT, START, and INF treaties.
6. Multilateral Negotiation. Another reciprocal measure, multilateral negotiation is a common twentieth-century approach to regional and global military-political problems that involve the interests of several nations. The Hague treaties (1899, 1907) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) are multilateral agreements. The Latin American denuclearization treaty of 1967 is a regionally negotiated pact.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TO WORLD WAR II

Most American leaders, at one time or another, have defined the United States as a "peace-loving nation" that deplores the existence of large military forces and believes that their reduction will lead to a more peaceful world. Yet while American diplomats have frequently supported arms control objectives, they also have opposed them. For example, they rejected the idea of naval reduc-

tions at the 1899 Hague Conference and refused to consider political-military "guarantees" that might have brought about arms reductions during the League of Nations negotiations. Thus, early U.S. involvement in the efforts to limit weapons and warfare has been mixed.

Apart from early efforts to halt the trading in arms with various Indian tribes, the United States pursued three major undertakings during this period: demilitarizing the Great Lakes; formulating "rules of war" to govern the actions of its armed forces; and participating in the two Hague peace conferences.

Rush-Bagot Agreement The War of 1812 demonstrated that the Great Lakes were of strategic importance to the United States and Britain's eastern Canadian provinces. At war's end, the British flagship on the lakes was a three-decker more powerful than Admiral Horatio Nelson's *Victory*, and two even larger vessels were being built at Kingston, Ontario. The Americans responded by beginning construction of two vessels that would be the world's largest warships.

These undertakings conflicted with the U.S. Congress's economy drive, so, on 27 February 1815, President James Madison was authorized "to cause all armed vessels of the United States on the lakes to be sold or laid up, except such as he may deem necessary to enforce proper execution of revenue laws." Economies also led Great Britain to curtail construction and dismantling of warships.

Despite these unilateral actions, many in Washington were concerned that minor border incidents between Canadians and Americans might lead to a renewed naval race. In November 1815, President Madison endorsed efforts to negotiate with the British to limit the number of armed ships on the lakes. If the building of warships began again, he feared, a "vast expence will be incurred" that might lead to "the danger of [a] collision" between the two countries. In London, Lord Castlereagh agreed that such a naval race was "ridiculous and absurd."

The 29 April 1817 bilateral agreement limited the naval forces of each party "on Lake Ontario, to one vessel, not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon. On the upper lakes, to two vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force," and "on the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force." However, the pact did not end competitive armaments in the Great Lakes region. Fortifications continued to be built, and there were violations of the naval terms, and during the Civil War, the U.S. Senate voted to terminate the agreement. Despite these obstacles, the Rush-Bagot Agreement remains one of the most successful U.S. arms control undertakings—and certainly its most enduring, for it enhanced the security of both parties and saved them a great deal of money. Also, it paved the way for the Treaty of Washington (1871), which resolved remaining political issues between the parties and led to the "unguarded frontier" between Canada and the United States.

Rules of War In 1863 a Columbia University professor, Francis Lieber, submitted his *Code for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field* to the War Department. The Lieber Code, as it became known, was drawn from medieval jurists and was incorporated into the Union army's General Order No. 100. Among other things, it recognized the status of noncombatants, regulated treatment of prisoners of war, prohibited the use of poison, forbade the seizure of private property without compensation, and ordered that cultural treasures not be willfully destroyed. Lieber's contribution later influenced the Declaration of Brussels (1874) on the rules and customs of war.

Hague Conferences Peace advocates everywhere welcomed Czar Nicholas II's 1899 invitation for a meeting of the great powers at The Hague to deal with the threatening international arms race. The Americans were optimistic about the conference's prospects for peace even though their own government had recently concluded a war against Spain and was committed to a naval buildup and army modernization.

President William McKinley took the position that "it behooves us as a nation to lend countenance and aid to the beneficent project." Yet the active military force of the United States "in time of peace [is] so conspicuously less than that of the armed powers of Europe," he said, "that the question of limitations had little practical importance for the United States." Thus, while the U.S. peace movement collected petitions registering popular support for reducing armaments, at The Hague, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the U.S. delegate, joined Admiral John A. Fisher, the British naval delegate, to prevent any limitation of naval forces. Other proposals sought to restrict military budgets, prohibit the use of new types of firearms and explo-

sives, restrict the use of certain munitions, prohibit the dropping of projectiles or explosives, prohibit the use of submarines or similar engines of destruction, and revise and codify the laws and rules of war, especially those from the Conference of Brussels that were still unratified.

Secretary of State John Hay stated that the first four restrictions "seem lacking in practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would probably prove provocative. . . . But it is doubtful if wars are to be diminished by rendering them less destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the periods of peace have been longer as the cost and destructiveness of war have increased." Despite Washington's lack of interest, declarations prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gas and expanding (dum-dum) bullets and the throwing of projectiles from balloons were approved. With the U.S. delegation's support, rules of war aimed at preventing armies from committing excesses—such as those at the expense of noncombatants and prisoners of war—also were endorsed by the conferees.

At the Second Hague Conference of 1907, some thirteen new declarations clarifying and codifying the law of war were agreed upon. These were revised in 1929 and 1949. The conventions relating to prisoners of war and noncombatants were the basis of considerable diplomatic activity during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Prior to the Second Hague conference, President Theodore Roosevelt indicated that the United States might support naval limitations; however, none of the major European powers would consider reducing or limiting their military forces. In June 1910 both houses of Congress unanimously endorsed naval limitations, a decision sparked by the British launching of the dreadnoughts, a new class of battleship, which promised another round of expensive ship construction. The proposal failed to gain support abroad, but it pointed to new efforts a decade later.

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS, 1919–1939

The enormity of death and destruction wrought by World War I focused the attention of the American public and its government on ways of preventing future war. America's role in these interwar undertakings included the introduction of disarmament in the League of Nations Covenant, sponsorship of the Washington naval limitation system, 1922–1935, endorsement of the Kellogg-Briand Pact aimed at "outlawing" war, and belated, ambivalent support of the League of Nation's disarmament efforts.

League Covenant and Disarmament In January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson emphasized disarmament in Point Four of his Fourteen Points (a statement of the Allies' war aims) and in his endorsement of it as Article Eight of the League of Nations Covenant. Point Four called for "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Wilson did not consider arms reduction a high priority, but he clearly saw it as in the U.S. interest. A commitment to general disarmament, no matter how ambiguous, would justify the imposition of arms restrictions on Germany and its allies.

At the Paris Peace Conference Wilson reduced his emphasis on arms reductions because of considerations of national sovereignty, the threat of Bolshevism, and demands of economic nationalism. He even threatened a new naval race by urging Congress to fund the construction of 156 warships, including ten super-dreadnoughts and six high-speed battle cruisers, called for in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, in order to obtain political concessions. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George was unwilling to accept U.S. naval parity, nor did he agree with Wilson's desire to append the Monroe Doctrine to the League Covenant. Unwilling to undertake a costly naval race, Lloyd George relented on the latter point and agreed to future negotiations on the former.

Wilson tried the same strategy during the Senate's ratification hearings (May 1919–March 1920), insisting there were only two alternatives: the League of Nations and disarmament, or increased naval construction and higher taxes. The Senate rejected league membership on the grounds it impinged upon the nation's sovereignty and left the naval problems for the Harding administration.

The Washington Naval System In the spring of 1921, President Warren G. Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes confronted a burgeoning naval race—before the year was out, more than 200 warships were under construction. Hughes invited the other major naval powers—Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy—to meet at Washington, D.C., on 12 November 1921. Over-

ruling his admirals, Hughes developed a detailed plan grounded on two themes: an immediate halt of all capital ship construction and the defining of national strategies in terms of "relative security." By presenting his proposal for capital ship reductions and limitations in his opening speech, Hughes seized the diplomatic initiative and gained widespread public support.

The Washington Conference produced seven treaties and twelve resolutions, two of which contained arms control provisions. The most significant was the Five Power Naval Treaty of 6 February 1922, which established a reduction in battleships, quantitative limits (or ratios—United States 5:Britain 5:Japan 3) on capital ships and aircraft carriers, qualitative restrictions on future naval construction, and restrictions on fortifications and naval bases in the central Pacific. The ratios established battleship parity between the United States and Britain and acknowledged Japan's de facto preeminence in the western Pacific. Naval limitation was realized because the United States, Britain, and Japan had temporarily resolved their political differences, especially regarding China, and desired to reduce naval expenditures.

Attempts to abolish or restrict submarines failed, and the agreement to prohibit the "use in war of asphyxiations, poisonous or other gases" was not ratified, but the two concepts did reappear—the former in the London Naval Treaty of 1930, and the latter in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Since a formula for limiting smaller warships was not found, a new naval race appeared as admirals rushed to build cruisers that would fall just below the 10,000-ton limit that defined capital ships. Facing an expensive naval building program, Congress urged President Calvin Coolidge to negotiate limits on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. At the Geneva Naval Conference (1927), the administration wanted to extend the Washington Treaty's Big Three capital ship ratios (5:5:3) to auxiliary categories. However, the U.S. delegation abandoned Hughes's earlier approach of considering naval armaments as one thread in existing political relationships, and instead focused on technical issues.

With Japanese negotiators on the sidelines, American and British naval experts agreed on the idea of parity, but could not define it because the British and U.S. fleets were structured quite differently. Whereas the British sought strategic equality that acknowledged commercial and imperial obligations, the Americans demanded mathematical parity. The U.S. insistence on fewer large cruisers with eight-inch guns and Britain's determination to have more, smaller cruisers with six-inch guns deadlocked negotiations.

The failed Geneva effort paved the way for the London Naval Conference of 1930. Herbert Hoover's election in 1928 coincided with that of British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, who, like Hoover, believed that the reduction of armaments could contribute to world peace. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson indicated that he and the president, employing naval experts as advisers, would seek a "yardstick" to bridge the difficulties that had plagued the 1927 Geneva Conference—but no yardstick was forthcoming. The yardstick episode emphasized a recurring dilemma that plagued U.S. arms control efforts well into the Cold War era: arms control requires a perspective beyond technical considerations, for by concentrating on mathematical or other engineering factors, U.S. policymakers often tended to obscure or avoid basic political problems.

The 1930 London Naval Treaty refined the Washington naval system by applying a 10:10:7 ratio to capital ships and aircraft carriers. All five powers agreed not to build their authorized capital ship replacements between 1931 and 1936, and to scrap a total of nine capital ships. By 1936 the United States would have eighteen battleships (462,400 tons), Britain eighteen battleships (474,750 tons), and Japan nine battleships (266,070 tons). Aircraft carrier tonnage remained unchanged, despite attempts to lower it.

While the United States and Britain ultimately reached an agreement on naval "equality," many senior Japanese naval officers believed that applying the "battleship ratio" to all classes of warships would be disastrous for their nation's security. Reluctantly, however, the Japanese government accepted negotiated ratios for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

Naval arms control pleased most American politicians and their constituents, and President Herbert Hoover estimated that the United States saved $1 billion. However, the limits outraged professional naval officers in all three countries. The Japanese lamented that they must stop cruiser construction; the British complained that fifty cruisers did not provide protection for long sea-lanes; and the Americans felt that Japan's higher cruiser ratio reduced the chance of a U.S. victory in a western Pacific war.

The years following the signing of the London Naval Treaty saw increased political tensions in the Mediterranean and undeclared wars in

Ethiopia and Asia. Japan demanded naval parity, but Britain and the United States refused. Subsequently, Japan withdrew from the Second London Naval Conference (1935) and abrogated the Washington naval system. On 31 December 1936, the quantitative and qualitative limitations on naval armaments ended.

Naval arms control had rested on the assumption that Japan was satisfied with its world position. However, Japanese expansionists, both military and civilian, who dominated policy by 1934 believed that the United States and Britain were hindering Japan's economic expansion, and thus keeping that nation's industries depressed. Consequently, Japan's admirals argued that, if freed from treaty restrictions, they could build a strong fleet, dominate China and Southeast Asia, and become the leading power in Asia.

Throughout the interwar negotiations over naval limitations, U.S. policies were clearly motivated by a desire to reduce military expenditures and, at the same time, gain whatever strategic advantages were possible. The desire for the former drove most civilian policymakers, while efforts to achieve the latter were foremost in the minds of senior naval officers. Only the most single-minded analyst would suggest that U.S. negotiating positions involved any significant measure of altruism.

Outlawing War The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War (1928), renounced offensive war as "an instrument" of national policy. It called on nations to settle their differences by pacific means. The idea originated with a Chicago lawyer, Salmon O. Levinson, who argued that international law should declare war a criminal act. While this idea appeared to be utopian, many opponents to the League of Nation's concept of collective security saw an alternative in the movement to outlaw war.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact emerged as an attempt by the Coolidge administration to induce Paris authorities to alter their position that France's security needed to be enhanced by British or U.S. political-military commitments before they agreed to arms limitations. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg's offer to French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand acknowledged the virtue of a world tribunal to enforce the outlawry of war, but he was realistic enough to know that the Senate and the American people (and those of most other nations) were not ready for such a commitment.

Most historians have criticized the pact for its failure to provide for enforcement. Only a few believe it influenced international law, even though after World War II major war criminals were found guilty of violating the treaty. Any reappraisal of the Kellogg-Briand Pact should take into consideration that it did not abolish "defensive" war and that the United States and other nations made various reservations upon signing.

The League of Nations and Disarmament After several early committees failed to come up with a disarmament proposal, the League of Nations created an "independent" preparatory commission in 1926 to prepare a draft treaty. President Calvin Coolidge accepted the league's invitation to send a representative. In a message to Congress on 26 January 1926, he declared that "the general policy of this Government in favor of disarmament and limitation of armaments cannot be emphasized too frequently or too strongly. In accordance with that policy, any measure having a reasonable tendency to bring about these results should receive our sympathy and support."

The American delegation, headed by Hugh Gibson, U.S. minister to Switzerland, maintained a fairly consistent policy between 1926 and 1930. He emphasized that the U.S. Army had been unilaterally reduced after World War I from some 4 million men to 118,000, which he acknowledged America's geographical situation made possible. Gibson also emphasized—pointing to the Washington naval system—that his government favored the limitation of naval forces by categories and approved qualitative restrictions only when accompanied by quantitative limitations. Still, the United States opposed budgetary limitations and any regulation that might restrict industrial potential.

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments—also known as the World Disarmament Conference—convened in Geneva on 2 February 1932 and began negotiations on the preparatory commission's draft convention. Secretary of State Stimson declared that President Hoover would not authorize discussions involving political arrangements to facilitate arms control measures. Nevertheless, on 9 February 1932, Gibson assured the gathered diplomats that the United States wished to cooperate with them to achieve arms limitations. As the disarmament conference bogged down, President Hoover and, later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to stimulate negotiations. Citing the Kellogg-

Briand Pact's outlawing of aggressive war, Hoover on 22 June 1932 proposed a one-third reduction in all armies and battle fleets. Additionally, he urged the abolition of tanks, large mobile guns, and chemical weapons and the prohibition of aerial bombardment.

When the French argued that his plan must be anchored to some kind of verification, Hoover reversed the earlier U.S. position. President Wilson initially rejected permanent supervision of German disarmament at Versailles because this precedent might run counter to America's future interests. "The United States," he declared, "will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in [disarmament], nor be subjected to inspection or supervision by foreign agencies or individuals." Secretary of State Frank Kellogg restated this policy in January 1926. "The United States will not be a party to any sanctions of any kind for the enforcement of a treaty for the limitation of armaments," he asserted, "nor will it agree that such treaties to which it may be a party shall come under the supervision of any international body—whether the League of Nations or otherwise." Arms limitation measures, he insisted, "so far as we are concerned, must depend upon the good faith of nations." On 30 June 1932, Stimson announced that the United States was prepared "to accept the right of inspection" if there was any likelihood of concluding "a treaty of real reduction." This belated change of policy was insufficient because the French now also demanded a guarantee of military assistance in case of attack.

On 16 May 1933, President Roosevelt proposed abolition of modern offensive weapons. He also announced America's willingness to consult with other states in the event of threatened conflict, but since the Senate showed little interest in abandoning neutrality for international cooperation, this initiative failed. Confronted by French intransigence and German aggressiveness, the World Disarmament Conference slowly dissolved without any accomplishments.

EVALUATING INTERWAR EXPERIENCES

At the beginning of the Cold War, some American leaders were wary of entrusting any element of national security to arms control and disarmament, even if the agreements were linked to functioning international organizations. Harking back to the U.S. lack of military preparedness on the eve of World War II, these individuals believed that interwar disarmament activities had compromised national security. Bernard M. Baruch, who presented the initial U.S. proposal for international control of atomic weaponry, recalled that in preparing the plan "the [interwar] record of meaningless disarmament agreements and renunciations of war" was "very much in my mind."

Other policymakers believed that Japan's decision to challenge the United States was the result of naval limitation treaties that had left the United States with an inferior navy. After World War II, James Byrnes, President Harry Truman's secretary of state, recalled that as a young congressman he had approved of the Washington Naval Treaty and that "what happened thereafter influences my thinking today." Byrnes felt that "while America scrapped battleships, Japan scrapped blueprints. America will not again make that mistake." Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who assisted in developing the Baruch Plan, reportedly saw in international efforts to control atomic energy "a parallel with the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–1922. The idea of heading off a naval race had been a good one, but the content of the treaties was wrong. Worse, the United States did not build all the ships allowed by the treaty limits and the Japanese fortified their island bases."

"Policymakers ordinarily use history badly," Ernest R. May points out in *"Lessons" of the Past* (1973), because there is more assumption than analysis in their retrospective views. Even a brief analysis would have shown that at the Washington conference it was the United States that scrapped the most blueprints and uncompleted hulls. Congressional and public opposition to the expenditure necessary to complete the building program had made the treaty a virtue out of necessity. Later, Coolidge and Hoover were more interested in balancing the budget than in building ships, and their actions went unchallenged by legislators with little enthusiasm for increasing naval expenditures. While the notion that Japan secretly violated its pledge not to fortify the league-mandated Pacific islands has long persisted, historical investigations have revealed very little evidence to support such a conclusion.

Even more significantly, these critics and others failed to consider the relationship between naval limitation and its political setting. President Harding and the Republican Party oversold the system as one that would, by itself, bring about a new era of peace and considerable savings. Few leaders were willing to face the fact that the naval

treaties were only first steps toward a more stable, mutually beneficial international system for the western Pacific region, and that additional political arrangements to resolve new issues were required to maintain that stability. Consequently, when extremists—isolationists in the United States and military expansionists in Japan—thwarted political accommodation, it was impossible for the naval limitation treaties, by themselves, to prevent the oncoming conflict.

THE COLD WAR

After World War II, as the new weapons technology threatened the very survival of American society and its people, its policymakers continued to pursue traditional objectives. They sought to enhance the nation's (and its allies') security through deterrence, to reduce military expenditures, to influence international public opinion, and to gain domestic partisan political advantage. Politics became more important when arms issues became embroiled in election campaigns.

American public opinion during the Cold War reflected an ambiguity regarding arms control and disarmament treaties, especially with the Soviet Union. Opinion polls invariably showed that a majority of Americans favored arms control agreements with the Soviets, but at the same time a majority also said that they expected the communists to cheat if given an opportunity. Many politicians sought to follow the polls: they claimed to favor arms limitations, yet they never hesitated to demonstrate to their constituents that they were "tougher on communists" than their opponents. Thus, as the Cold War lengthened, the politicians' desire to be seen as strong on national defense often resulted in misleading, even derogatory, appraisals of arms limitations.

The unstable political-military environment with increasingly accurate nuclear weapons systems capable of obliterating cities, equally worrisome to leaders and to the public, persuaded the United States to engage in talks with the Soviet Union. Each successive administration after 1945 found itself—despite certain individual misgivings—engaged in protracted arms control negotiations. Washington's desire to sustain its influence in the United Nations and to maintain relations with its allies, especially in western Europe, often spurred arms control efforts.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, nourished by Hubert Humphrey and sponsored by John F. Kennedy, was established on 26 September 1961 to facilitate these negotiations. Its director was to be the principal adviser to the president on arms control and to act under the direction of the president and the secretary of state—a unique and often strained administrative arrangement. Despite limited staff and resources, the agency was instrumental in negotiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the treaties banning chemical and biological weapons. Perhaps because of its global approach, the agency was sacrificed to the new unilateralists—led by Senator Jesse Helms—in 1997; its transfer to the State Department was completed in March 1999.

The United Nations, United States, and Disarmament Government leaders, peace reformers, and the general public hoped that the new United Nations, with active U.S. participation, might provide the venue for controlling tensions and reducing the prospects of a nuclear war. The Atlantic Charter, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 1941, declared that "all nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force." It further envisaged the creation of "a permanent system of general security" as well as practicable measures to "lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments." The United Nations Charter emphasized the maintenance of peace and security. The General Assembly was to consider the principles governing "disarmament and the regulation of armaments" (Article 11, paragraph 1), while the Security Council was responsible for developing plans for the establishment of a system for "the regulation of armaments" (Article 26).

Bernard Baruch presented the U.S. proposal dealing with atomic weapons at the initial meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Committee on 14 June 1946. Although he regarded his remarks as a basis for discussion, they came to be known as the Baruch Plan—the definitive statement of U.S. policy. The plan called for the creation of the International Atomic Development Authority (IADA), which would control or own all activities associated with atomic energy, from raw materials to military applications, and would control, license, and inspect all other uses. In addition, it would foster peaceful uses of atomic energy by conducting research and development.

When the IADA was established, the manufacturing of atomic bombs would cease and all existing weapons were to be destroyed. Baruch declared that sanctions must be imposed on nations possessing or building an atomic device without a license. Finally, he insisted that "there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreement not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes."

From the outset, American and Soviet diplomats were at odds. The United States viewed the atomic bomb as an important source of its military power and insisted on extensive safeguards before destroying its atomic weapons or releasing information on their manufacture. The Soviets and others argued that the Americans were insincere, because they would not relinquish their atomic arsenal while expecting others to forgo developing their own atomic energy programs. And they were not far off target. "America can get what she wants if she insists on it," Baruch asserted in December 1946. "After all, we've got it and they haven't, and won't for a long time to come."

While some writers blame Washington for the failure of the negotiations, the historian Barton J. Bernstein suggests a more realistic perspective: "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared in 1945 or 1946 to take the risks that the other power required for agreement. In this sense, the stalemate on atomic energy was a symbol of the mutual distrust in Soviet-American relations." Not until the ill-fated UN discussions focusing on general and complete disarmament in the 1960s were such broad-gauged approaches again examined.

In a September 1961 address to the General Assembly, President John F. Kennedy responded to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 proposal for "general and complete disarmament" by offering one of his own. Both plans primarily sought to influence international and domestic opinion, since neither leader had any reason to expect their plan would gain approval. Extended discussions of the plans by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) revealed that a major point of contention continued to be that of verification. The United States insisted that verification must not only ensure that agreed limitations and reductions had taken place, but also that retained forces and weapons never exceed established limits. The Soviet Union countered that continued verification of retained forces and weapons constituted espionage.

While a few arms control agreements have emerged from the General Assembly and its subordinate bodies, their debates have been more valuable for the discussion of practically every aspect of disarmament. Arthur H. Dean, who represented the United States at the ENDC, wrote: "The discussions—at Geneva, at the United Nations, and in confidential diplomatic conversations—were a necessary means whereby the nations of the world could become educated on disarmament questions and the ground could be broken for concrete agreements."

Nuclear Test Bans and Nonproliferation The nonnuclear states' search for a comprehensive test ban was closely linked to the major nuclear powers' desire to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons through a nonproliferation treaty. The inability to achieve a comprehensive test ban was a source of friction between the two groups for five decades, especially during the periodic nonproliferation treaty review conferences. Beginning with President Dwight Eisenhower, successive administrations declared that a comprehensive test ban was their goal although they varied greatly in efforts for its accomplishment.

Limited Test Ban The spread of radioactive fallout resulting from atmospheric nuclear tests aroused public protests in the 1950s—led by Albert Schweitzer, Linus Pauling, and a host of "peace" groups—and put pressure upon President Eisenhower to halt the testing. When a 1957 Gallup Poll revealed that 63 percent of the American people favored banning tests, compared with 20 percent three years earlier, the president initiated the tripartite (U.S.–British–Soviet) test ban negotiations. Eisenhower turned to technical experts to develop a verification system, a move that was to have unexpected long-term results. With the advent of the nuclear age, even greater use was made of experts—including military officers, scientists, and technical specialists. Unquestionably, these experts were vital to the proper shaping of negotiating positions; however, they often complicated issues to a point where they become technically, and therefore politically, insoluble. A case in point is that during early test ban negotiations, seismologists sought a verification system that could distinguish between earthquakes and small underground nuclear explosions. After techniques acceptable to most were developed, technical experts kept searching for more and more refinements to reduce the

already low error rate. As a result, it was impossible to negotiate a comprehensive test ban because critics would argue that one could not be absolutely certain that no cheating was going on.

While Eisenhower's efforts resulted only in obtaining an informal test moratorium, John F. Kennedy came to the presidency committed to obtaining a comprehensive ban on tests. His sobering encounter with Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961 and the subsequent Berlin crisis, however, derailed his plans. The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, paradoxically, brought Kennedy and Khrushchev closer and led to the signing on 5 August 1963 of the Limited (or Partial) Nuclear Test Ban (LNTB).

The 1963 Moscow experience again suggests that successful arms control negotiations cannot be structured as an engineering or technical exercise; they must be essentially a political undertaking. When ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman was sent to Moscow to finalize the test ban, he took scientific advisers with him but deliberately excluded them from the negotiating team. He later explained, "The expert is to point out all the difficulties and dangers . . . but it is for the political leaders to decide whether the political, psychological and other advantages offset such risks as there may be."

The Kennedy administration's inability to provide absolute guarantees of Soviet compliance resulted in the LNTB's banning all tests except those conducted underground. This provided the Department of Defense and its nuclear scientists with a "safeguard" or guarantee that the United States would continue underground testing, as they put it, to ensure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. From 1964 to 1998, the United States conducted 683 announced tests, compared with 494 for the Soviet Union. Washington's emphasis on the "safeguard" continued to be used to justify testing after the Cold War ended.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty The People's Republic of China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964, focused President Lyndon B. Johnson's attention on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In 1965 both the United States and Soviet Union responded to the UN call to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by submitting their own draft treaties to ENDC, and, after resolving a few differences, became identical by 1967. The committee's nonaligned members argued that a nonproliferation treaty must not simply divide the world into nuclear "haves" and "have nots," but must balance mutual obligations. Thus, to stop states from engaging in "horizontal" proliferation (the acquisition of nuclear weapons), the nuclear powers should agree to end their "vertical" proliferation (increasing the quantity and quality of their weapons). The nonaligned nations specified the necessary steps, in order of priority: (1) signing a comprehensive test ban; (2) halting the production of fissionable materials designed for weapons; (3) freezing, and gradually reducing, nuclear weapons and delivery systems; (4) banning the use of nuclear weapons; and (5) assuring the security of nonnuclear states.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968, after the United States and Soviet Union reluctantly agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith" to halt the nuclear arms race "at the earliest possible date" (the fig leaf they tried to hide behind), and to seek "a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The dubious adherence to this pledge has been a point of serious contention at each subsequent review conference.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of a carefully structured regime that emphasizes the banning of nuclear tests and several other elements. The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 1957—as the coordinating body for Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace project—to promote and safeguard peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has established a system of international safeguards aimed at preventing nuclear materials from being diverted to military uses. During 1974 and 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in London to further ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, and technology would not be used in weapons production. Finally, nuclear-weapons-free zones further extended the nonproliferation effort.

Comprehensive Test Ban The comprehensive test ban issue was dormant during the early years of Richard Nixon's presidency, largely so it would not interfere with U.S.–Soviet negotiations on strategic arms limitations. At a Moscow summit meeting with Premier Leonid Brezhnev in July 1974, the two leaders resurrected the bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty, under which they agreed to hold underground tests to less than 150 kilotons, restrict the number of tests to a minimum, not interfere with the other's efforts at verification, and exchange detailed data on all tests and test sites. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed by Brezhnev and President Gerald

Ford in May 1976, allowed nuclear explosives under 150 kilotons to be used in a peaceful manner—such as "digging" canals. The pact provided, for the first time, on-site inspections under certain circumstances.

President Jimmy Carter shifted his focus from the unratified threshold test ban back to a comprehensive test ban. In 1977 the Soviet Union indicated that it was willing to accept a verification system based on national technical means (each nation's intelligence-gathering system), supplemented by voluntary challenge inspections and automatic, tamperproof seismic monitoring stations known as "black boxes." When signs pointed to an agreement on a comprehensive ban, major opponents—including the weapons laboratories, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger—killed the effort by emphasizing America's need for periodic tests to assure the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

In July 1982, President Ronald Reagan ended U.S. participation in the comprehensive test ban talks, arguing that the Soviet Union might be testing over the 150-kiloton threshold. He insisted that verification aspects of both the threshold ban and peaceful explosions treaties must be renegotiated before a comprehensive accord could be considered. Critics pointed out that proving a test had taken place was much easier than verifying a specific magnitude; therefore, the administration had things backward. When Premier Mikhail Gorbachev informed Reagan in December 1985 that he would accept on-site inspections as part of a comprehensive ban, Reagan's refusal to consider the offer made it clear that the administration's concern about verification was a sham and that it had been used to avoid any agreement.

President George H. W. Bush issued a policy statement in January 1990 that his administration had "not identified any further limitations on nuclear testing . . . that would be in the United States' national security interest." Negotiations proceeded on verification protocols for the 1974 threshold treaty and the 1976 peaceful explosions pact; in June 1990, Bush and Gorbachev signed the new protocols clearing the way for their ratification.

The UN General Assembly, supported by the United States, overwhelmingly adopted a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty on 10 September 1996. President William Jefferson Clinton signed the agreement and announced that its entry into force would be of the highest priority. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Republican chairman, Jesse Helms, a longtime opponent of the test ban, blocked its consideration until late in 1999, when Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott unexpectedly scheduled a ratification vote. After a bitter partisan battle, the Senate by a vote of 51–48 on 13 October 1999 refused to ratify the treaty. Apart from political partisanship, opposition to the treaty centered on two old issues: whether the treaty's "zero-yield" test ban could be adequately verified; and the potential long-term impact of a permanent halt on America's nuclear arsenal.

Critics refused to place much confidence in the Clinton administration's plans for a U.S. nuclear weapon custodianship, which was to ensure the safety and reliability of aging nuclear weapons. The directors of the three national laboratories (Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos) testified—not at all surprisingly, since they are in the testing business—that there was no guarantee the custodianship program would work, and it would take five to ten years to prove its effectiveness.

LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Bargaining between the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) began in the late 1960s, and eventually these efforts resulted in a series of bilateral agreements: the two SALT I pacts of 1972 (the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons); the SALT II Treaty of 1979; the INF agreement of 1987; the START I Treaty of 1991; and the START II Treaty of 1993.

SALT I and II Negotiations In late 1966, President Lyndon Johnson notified Soviet leaders that he wanted to limit strategic nuclear arms. The explosion of China's first thermonuclear device on 17 June 1967 persuaded Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin to meet with Johnson a short time later at Glassboro, New Jersey. When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lectured Kosygin on the need to restrict antiballistic missiles (ABMs) because they lessened the deterrent effect of their strategic nuclear systems, the Soviet leader angrily pounded the table and exclaimed: "Defense is moral, offense is immoral!"

After failing to get his message across at Glassboro, McNamara bowed to demands for the

ARMS CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE

"Most public attention in the area of arms control and disarmament has focused on the process of agreement negotiation. The news media emphasize the meetings of official delegations, the proposals and counterproposals, the compromises each side makes, and the debates over ratification that occur once an agreement has been reached. The negotiating process draws so much attention because it is dramatic, and because the personalities of national leaders and their prominent representatives are involved. In a negotiation, a clear objective is identified, and dramatic tension surrounds the question of whether the objective will be reached and what the terms of the deal will be.

"But the negotiating phase of an arms control agreement is only a prelude. The purpose of arms control pacts is to change or constrain the behavior of the parties in the realm of military security. While the terms of an agreement are important, the real substance of arms control lies in whether or not the parties are successful in accomplishing the objectives set out by the agreement; that is, whether they uphold the agreement over time. Arms control compliance is the actual implementation of the agreements that are concluded with such public fascination and dramatic flair. Compliance does not attract as much public attention as the process of negotiation, but it is arguably the most substantial and significant aspect of the arms control process.

"Arms control compliance has been surrounded by a considerable amount of controversy. Questions about compliance have often stirred states' deepest fears and insecurities about the intentions and military behavior of their adversaries, especially when tensions have been high and when international conflict or war has been imminent. Leaders are extremely uncomfortable with adherence to an arms control agreement when it is suspected that an adversary is gaining unfair advantage by violating the agreement.

"Charges of 'cheating' on arms control agreements have frequently been made, sometime on the basis of dubious evidence or arguments. The issue of arms control compliance was particularly politically charged in the 1930s and again in the 1980s. In an atmosphere of high political tension, the distinction can be lost between legitimate obligations that are sanctioned by international agreements, and expectations, promises, or verbal statements."

— *From Gloria C. Duffy, "Arms Control Treaty Compliance,"* Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, *vol. 1, New York, 1993* —

construction of an ABM system in September 1967. Three months later he announced that the United States also had decided to develop a new multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicle (MIRV), which, after being carried aloft on a single missile, was capable of delivering two or more warheads to different targets. In late June 1968, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko asked that discussions on limiting both offensive and defensive weapons begin on 30 September; unfortunately, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces intervened in Czechoslovakia in August, causing Johnson to postpone the talks.

Shortly after his inauguration, President Richard Nixon announced that his administration would seek strategic nuclear "sufficiency." On 17 November 1969 delegates initiated the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). But the two nuclear arsenals differed significantly. The United States had developed technologically sophisticated, accurate missiles with relatively small warheads of one to two megatons, while the Soviets had deployed a number of different types of weapons. Some were similar to American weapons, but others were larger and had a greater throw weight—the maximum weight that a missile is capable of lifting into a trajectory—a difference that caused difficulties in negotiations for more than thirty years.

Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, often met secretly with the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, in late 1970 when the talks stalled. These "back-channel negotiations," carried on without informing the U.S. delegation, assisted in formulating a compromise—negotiations would focus on limitations of both defensive and offensive systems—which permitted the formal delegations to reach two distinct agreements.

At the Moscow summit, 18–22 May 1972, terms were agreed to on the Antiballistic Missile

(ABM) Treaty and an Interim Agreement. Each side would deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers at each of two sites, one at the capital and the other at least 1,300 kilometers from the capital. The treaty called for verification by national technical means (satellite reconnaissance, electronic monitoring) without interference, and established a U.S.–Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to considering questions about such issues as compliance and interference. The Interim Agreement established, among other restrictions, a quantitative limit on both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—1,054 for the United States, 1,618 for the Soviets—and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but no limits on warheads. Using a formula that exchanged dismantled ICBMs for SLBMs, the United States could have up to 710 SLBMs on 44 submarines, and the Soviets 950 SLBMs on 62 submarines. The Interim Agreement's limits on strategic systems for each side were actually higher than what was currently possessed; but it did set ceilings on future deployments. The pact was to last five years (1972–1977), during which time both sides would work for a permanent treaty.

Nixon and Kissinger viewed the pacts as significant accomplishments. However, the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff had insisted on pursuing new strategic weapons systems—including the Trident submarine, an ABM site, a submarine-launched cruise missile, and multiple, independently targeted warheads—before giving their approval. Senator Henry Jackson, along with a former delegate to the talks, Paul Nitze, was concerned about Soviet retention of 308 heavy ICBMs, which conceivably might be fitted to carry forty warheads each. Jackson introduced an amendment that any future treaty would "not limit the U.S. to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits for the Soviet Union"—thereby launching a search for a new "yardstick" that had a dampening effect on subsequent negotiations.

After ratification of SALT I, the second phase focused on "quantitative" limits, with delegates meeting at Geneva to seek "qualitative" restrictions on the capabilities of weapons systems, a very difficult assignment. After Nixon's resignation, President Gerald Ford and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev met at Vladivostok in November 1974, to sign an "agreement in principle" that listed agreed-to objectives—each side should be limited to 2,400 ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers, of which 1,320 could have multiple warheads. Both sides of the strategic weapons debate in America were unhappy with the terms: some Americans complained about the lack of reductions; others were critical because the Soviets could still protect their heavy ICBMs. Meanwhile, to improve the accuracy of its missiles, the United States developed a larger ICBM known as the MX and introduced a more sophisticated warhead, MARV (maneuverable reentry vehicle), which greatly multiplied the challenges facing any missile defense system.

Jimmy Carter entered the White House hoping to quickly conclude a SALT II treaty that included deeper cuts in nuclear weapons than previously endorsed by the Vladivostok Accord. The Soviets rejected his March 1977 proposal because it took them by surprise, and because Carter had publicly announced his plan before presenting it to them. Finally signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979, the SALT II Treaty initially limited each side to a total of 2,400 strategic nuclear launch vehicles within this ceiling no more than 1,320 ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers could carry MIRVs or air-to-surface cruise missiles; and within this sublimit no more than 1,200 ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-to-surface cruise missiles could be MIRVed; and within that sublimit no more than 820 ICBMs could be MIRVed. The seventy-eight-page treaty did require both parties to dismantle some systems to make room for new deployments, and it also included an extensive list of qualitative restrictions.

The SALT II agreement was a mix of an engineering document and a lawyer's brief—the text was extraordinarily complex, and extensive definitions and elaborate "counting rules" were appended. As a result, opponents could employ the "fine print" to justify their claims that Backfire bombers were not properly counted or that the allowed "heavy" missiles gave the Soviets an unacceptable advantage. Despite these problems, Carter might have obtained sufficient support for ratification but for two problems: the "discovery" of Soviet combat troops in Cuba and the Iranian seizure of U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran.

INF Proposals Early in his administration, President Ronald Reagan was primarily concerned with expanding and modernizing U.S. military forces and actively avoiding serious arms control negotiations. Under pressure in late 1981 from antinuclear protesters in NATO countries and the "nuclear freeze" movement at home, he opened the intermediate nuclear forces (INF)

negotiations. These discussions were triggered by a NATO decision, late in the Carter presidency, to deploy 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to West Germany, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy to offset the Soviet Union's superior intermediate nuclear force, especially the new SS-20 with its three warheads. Not wanting to bow to "pacifist" demonstrators, the Reagan administration offered its "zero option" concept—the United States would cancel its scheduled deployment in the unlikely event the Soviets withdrew their intermediate-range missiles with 1,100 warheads. Moscow rejected the proposal, and U.S.–Soviet relations deteriorated under the Reagan administration's abusive rhetoric.

After Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, the two sides examined a variety of INF proposals until in 1987 he stunned NATO and Washington leaders by accepting the U.S. zero option with its disproportionate reductions and, ultimately, the removal of Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Asia. Gorbachev also agreed to America's extensive 1986 verification demands, and on 8 December 1987 he and Reagan signed the INF Treaty in Washington, D.C. To carry out the on-site inspections that would verify compliance with treaty provisions, the United States created a new umbrella organization, the On-Site Inspection Agency. Despite a few minor controversies, the verification process functioned successfully, and on 1 June 2001 inspections ended as both sides announced that all intermediate missiles had been removed and destroyed.

START I and II Negotiations During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan denounced SALT II as "fatally flawed" and claimed it allowed a "window of vulnerability" during which the Soviet Union could easily overwhelm U.S. land-based nuclear forces. On 9 May 1982, Reagan outlined his plan for the "practical, phased reduction" of strategic nuclear weapons in two-stages. In phase I, warheads would be reduced by a third, with significant cuts in ballistic missiles; in phase II, a ceiling would be put on ballistic missile throw weights and other elements. While the public response was enthusiastic, analysts found the proposal, like the zero option, so one-sided that they considered it nonnegotiable. In phase I the Soviets would have to dismantle nearly all of their best strategic weapons, while the United States would be able to keep most of its Minutemen and proceed with its planned deployment of 100 heavier MX missiles. In addition, the United States would be allowed to go ahead with cruise missile deployments and the modernization of its submarine and bomber fleets. In phase II, the Soviets were to reduce the total aggregate throw weight of their strategic missiles by almost two-thirds, while the United States made no cuts at all.

Not until 1985, when Gorbachev got the START talks back on track, was there any progress in the on-and-off negotiations. In their first summit meeting in November, Reagan and Gorbachev shared a belief that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," but Reagan's insistence on pursuing a ballistic missile defense system became a major sticking point. In March 1983 he had announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposal, which was to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The Soviets, and many NATO allies, opposed SDI (also dubbed "Star Wars") because it threatened the existing mutual nuclear deterrent system. Although the Geneva summit made little progress, both men agreed to work for a 50 percent reduction in strategic forces.

The spring of 1986 found the Reagan administration embroiled in a fierce struggle over whether or not to ignore the SALT II limits. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency chief William Casey insisted that alleged Soviet noncompliance demanded a response; while State Department officials and Admiral William Crowe, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that there was no operational reason for going over SALT limits. On 27 May, Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II ceilings, a decision that caused a loud outcry in Congress, dismay among allied leaders, and a public uproar. Gorbachev was unperturbed because he was readying a new arms control package.

At the Reykjavik summit, on 10–11 October 1986, Reagan suggested the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. Gorbachev immediately countered with the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons within ten years and limits on SDI. Since Reagan refused to accept any limitations on his Star Wars system, these radical arms reduction proposals were dropped—much to the relief of U.S. military leaders and the NATO allies, and undoubtedly to senior Soviet generals. In mid-1987 START negotiations began anew on reductions in strategic nuclear launch vehicles and ceilings on intercontinental

ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-launched cruise missile warheads.

When George Bush entered the White House in January 1989, the basic framework of START existed except for several unresolved details. While Moscow favored on-site inspections to determine whether ships were carrying sea-launched cruise missiles, the U.S. Navy rebelled at the idea of the Soviets snooping about its newest nuclear submarines. The United States now proposed that each side declare the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles it planned to deploy. At every meeting with Soviet leaders, Reagan had repeated the Russian proverb "Trust, but verify"; now, however, the United States wanted only trust.

The Soviets pressed for complex verification arrangements. Even though the basic procedures had been established in the INF treaty, verification continued to pose special problems. Congressional Cold War hawks still demanded intrusive inspections, but the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies did not want the Soviets prowling American defense plants. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci admitted, "Verification has proven to be more complex than we thought it would be. The flip side of the coin is its application to us. The more we think about it, the more difficult it becomes."

After eight and a half frustrating years, President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev signed the complex 750-page START I treaty on 31 July 1991. Basically, it limited each side to the deployment of 1,600 ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, carrying 6,000 "accountable" warheads by 5 December 2001, and established further sublimits. This was the first agreement that called upon each side to make significant cuts in its strategic arsenal. Almost 50 percent of the nuclear warheads carried on ballistic missiles were eliminated. The Lisbon Protocol, signed on 23 May 1992, created a five-state START I regime joining Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. However, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to turn over the strategic nuclear weapons based on their territories to Russia. The verification regime under START I was complex and intrusive, with a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission that served as a forum to facilitate implementation and to resolve compliance questions and ambiguities.

As the realization settled in that the Cold War was over, the START II treaty was quickly put in place on 3 January 1993 (although ratification was delayed—the United States took three years and Russia nearly seven years). This agreement further reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads to be held by each party on 1 January 2003 to no more than 3,500. To persuade the Russian Duma to ratify SALT II, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met in Helsinki during March 1997 and drew up the so-called Helsinki Initiatives (Protocol to START II), which reassured Russia about the addition of former Warsaw Pact members to NATO and enhanced the prospects of further bilateral nuclear arms cooperation. These initiatives included a package of amendments to various SALT I terms designed to alleviate some the Duma's fears that since the Soviets could not afford to replace all their aging missiles, they would lose parity with U.S. forces. Most significant was that now the core of SALT II would be a ban on all land-based strategic ballistic missiles carrying MIRVs. The removal of the MIRVs eliminated what most experts considered to be the most destabilizing weapons in their mutual arsenals. They also reached agreement in principle on an outline for START III that would stipulate even deeper cuts. The United States and Russia were ahead of schedule in reducing their strategic nuclear arsenal in 1997, when the outline for a START III pact would reduce the aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 for each side by 31 December 2007.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the chaos that followed led to the sometimes controversial 1991 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (often called the Nunn-Lugar Program), which provided U.S. funds to aid in consolidating the former Soviet arsenal and ensuring its custodial safety. Belatedly, the program was expanded to provide financial and technical assistance in disposal of chemical weapons and of fissile material extracted from nuclear warheads. The cost of disarming proved to be considerably more than expected.

CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

In addition to the major agreements dealing with nuclear weapons, several other arms control activities were undertaken in the post-1945 era, including a multilateral treaty limiting the conventional forces in Europe, agreements on chemical and biological weapons, pacts creating

nuclear-weapons-free zones, and protocols aimed at preventing accidental war.

Limiting Conventional Forces Immediately after World War II, the victors dismantled Germany's military forces and divided the nation. With the onset of the Cold War, however, the Western allies authorized controlled rearmament of (West) Germany and integration into NATO. In Japan the U.S. authorities endorsed, perhaps initiated, Article 9 in the 1946 constitution, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy and prohibited offensive military forces. Later, during and after the Korean War, the United States urged the development of Japanese "self-defense forces."

Negotiations seeking to limit conventional military forces in Europe began in the early 1970s and went on for nearly twenty years. The imbalance between the much greater Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and U.S. and NATO forces meant that Moscow was reluctant to offer concessions. Under these circumstances, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) measure adopted in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975—which called for regulating major military exercises—was more easily achieved than arms limitations. Several critics belittled the CSCE or "Stockholm" conventional arms control accord; yet the reduced size of these exercises, force concentrations, and armaments involved—along with the advance notice—realistically reduced concerns that "maneuvers" might become a surprise attack.

Negotiations in 1989–1990 finally resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement. Several factors contributed to their success: France joined the talks; Gorbachev unilaterally withdrew troops and equipment from forward areas; the Warsaw Pact disintegrated; and a reunited Germany agreed to troop limitations. The 11 November 1990 agreement limited five categories of conventional armed forces stationed in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. These included three categories of ground equipment (tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles), aircraft, and helicopters. The process included a full of sharing conventional arms information among all parties and a joint consultative group to iron out differences. By 1998 more than 3,000 on-site inspections had been carried out, and the dismantling of 58,000 units of weapons and equipment had been verified.

Negotiations soon began to establish troop limits and to resolve or clarify other issues. A CFE 1A treaty signed on 10 July 1992 at Helsinki, Finland, spelled out national personnel limits, including restricting the United States to 250,000 personnel in Europe. Another parallel agreement was the "Open Skies" Accord, signed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ministerial meeting in Helsinki on 24 March 1992. In July 1955, President Eisenhower had proposed aerial reconnaissance to eliminate "the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tensions," and to "make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament." The Soviets rejected the idea as an espionage plot. After it had lain dormant for three decades, President George H. W. Bush gave the Open Skies concept new life in 1989 because he needed a new arms control proposal; because aircraft, cheap and more flexible, complemented reconnaissance satellites; and because NATO could directly observe Soviet-bloc nations without relying on U.S. satellites.

Banning Land Mines The "humanitarian" approach won out in the efforts to negotiate a ban on the use of land mines—which in 1997 were estimated to kill or maim 2,000 people each month, some 80 percent of whom were civilians. The ban's origins may be traced back to the little-known 1981 "inhumane weapons" convention that sought to prohibit the use of "mines, booby-traps and other devices." From the convention's 1995–1996 Review Conference emerged support from worldwide nongovernmental organizations.

The United States rejected the original Inhumane Weapons Pact because the Defense Department was reluctant to give up its stockpile of high-technology mines. According to Pentagon estimates, the use of these "smart mines" (with self-destruction or self-deactivation mechanisms) could reduce American casualties on the Korean Peninsula by one-third by limiting the mobility of enemy troops and provide an early warning of attack. Military officials argued that U.S. policy ought to focus on eliminating "dumb" mines and postpone negotiations on other antipersonnel mines.

In October 1996 the Canadian government launched an initiative (the Ottawa Process) aimed at banning antipersonnel mines. Washington announced on 17 January 1997 that it would permanently ban the export and transfer of land mines and would cap its own inventory at current levels. U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy led the Ameri-

can campaign to ban land mines, against opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and found a growing number of military officers, both retired generals and those holding commands, questioning the utility of battlefield antipersonnel mines. In June, fifty-six senators signed a resolution calling for a ban on the use of land mines by U.S. forces after 2000.

At the Oslo conference in the fall of 1997, the Clinton administration introduced "improvements" in the draft text in line with Pentagon wishes; however, this endeavor drew the unanimous response "no exceptions, no reservations and no loopholes." On 17 September 1997 the administration decided not to sign the final text; later, however, it decided to unilaterally cease using land mines outside of South Korea by 2003 and to sign the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention by 2006 if alternative mines and mixed antitank systems could be developed. Moreover, the Clinton administration promised to raise $1 billion to carry out a U.S.-led "Demining 2010 Initiative" to remove all land mines from more than sixty-four countries by the year 2010. Between 1993 and 1997, the United States spent $153 million and planned to spend $68 million in 1998 to assist in mine removal in seventeen countries.

Banning Chemical and Biological Weapons

Although the United States had signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases," the Army Chemical Warfare Service and the chemical industry prevented its ratification. Ignoring his Chemical Warfare Service's recommendations, President Franklin Roosevelt in June 1943 unilaterally announced a "no-first-use" policy: "I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies."

During the first two decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated large stocks of chemical weapons and integrated them into their military planning. When a resolution to augment the 1925 Geneva Protocol was introduced in the UN General Assembly in 1966, the United States immediately objected to the addition of herbicides and riot-control agents. The Senate ratified the Geneva Protocol in January 1975—fifty years after signing—with reservations: it did not apply to riot-control agents or herbicides (widely used by the United States in Vietnam), and the United States reserved the right to retaliate in kind should a foe violate the protocol.

On 25 November 1969, President Nixon reaffirmed the chemical warfare "no-first-use" policy. At the same time, he unilaterally renounced U.S. use of bacteriological or biological weapons, closed all facilities producing these offensive weapons, and ordered existing stockpiles of biological weapons and agents destroyed. At Geneva the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had been preparing a convention that would ban production, acquisition, or stockpiling of biological weapons and would require destruction of stocks. Because of the complexities involved, there were no formal verification procedures. On 10 April 1972 the Biological Convention was signed; however, U.S. ratification was delayed until the Geneva Protocol was approved in 1975.

In 1989 a Soviet defector revealed that Moscow had possessed an extensive biological weapons program in violation of its treaty obligations. The 1979 accidental release of anthrax spores at Sverdlovsk, apparently leading to many deaths, had prompted U.S. officials to ask privately for an explanation. The Soviets were less than candid until President Yeltsin acknowledged in April 1992 that an illicit program had existed but had been terminated. While Iraq's biological weapons efforts were known, their surprising size and scope became known only in 1995 with Saddam Hussein's son-in-law's defection.

The threat of Iraq's biological arsenal during the Gulf War prompted the 1991 Biological Weapons Review Convention to search for a means of verification. The United States took the position that the convention was not verifiable, but other nations were not satisfied. The conference created the Group of Verification Experts, which began a protracted scientific and technical examination of potential measures, and was reviewing the verification techniques employed by the chemical weapons convention at the end of the twentieth century.

Following inconclusive bilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980 for a chemical weapons convention, the United States and Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to let the UN Conference on Disarmament wrestle with the problems. As finally signed, on 13 January 1993, the Convention on Chemical Weapons eliminated an entire class of weapons and established the most elaborate verification regime in history. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would collect declarations as to nations' stockpiles and oversee their destruction. In April 1997 the Senate finally granted its approval.

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones There is no authoritative definition of nuclear-weapons-free zones, but there are certain accepted elements implicit in the term. These include no manufacture or production of nuclear weapons within the zone, no importation of nuclear weapons by nations within the zone, no stationing or storing of nuclear weapons within the borders of nations within the zone, and preferably a pledge by nuclear weapons states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations within the zone. Although early proposals were caught up in the Cold War rivalry, the United States agreed to three multilateral agreements that prohibited nuclear weapons in specific, nonpopulated areas—Antarctica, outer space, and the seabed.

The Antarctic agreement (1959) has been acknowledged as the forerunner of nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties because of its demilitarizing provisions. An innovative verification system was established whereby the treaty parties might conduct aerial inspections and, at all times, have complete access to all areas and installations. Ten years of UN-sponsored, multilateral disarmament sessions resulted in the Outer Space Treaty (1967), in which the parties agree "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" or establish "military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies." The nuclear test ban accords and the ABM treaty (1972) also have constraints on testing or deploying various weapons in outer space, and the SALT and START treaties prohibit interference with the monitoring of space vehicles. The objective of the Seabed Treaty (1971) is to prevent the placing of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor beyond national territorial waters.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) pledged its Latin American signatories to keep their territories free of nuclear weapons; not to test, develop, or import such weapons; to prevent the establishment of foreign-controlled nuclear weapon bases in the region; and to negotiate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The United States ratified the protocols asking nations having territorial interests in the region "to apply the status of denuclearization in respect to warlike purposes" to these territories, and "not to use or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against" treaty signatories. Signatories of the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), including Australia and New Zealand, along with other nearby island states, modeled their pact after the Tlatelolco Treaty. The motivation for creating this nuclear-weapons-free zone was the desire to pressure France to stop underground nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll in the Tuamoto Archipelago and to prevent disposal of radioactive waste in the region. Many in Washington feared that Rarotonga might encourage additional nuclear-weapons-free zones in the South Pacific that would restrict the navy's freedom of movement; consequently, the United States signed but, as of 2001, had not ratified the agreement. The Reagan administration's talk of winnable nuclear wars aroused intense opposition in New Zealand and Australia. In February 1985, New Zealand's government banned a U.S. destroyer from its ports, because the United States refused to say whether or not it carried nuclear weapons. The episode caused a serious rift between New Zealand and Washington for nearly two decades.

In the mid-1990s, two post–Cold War nuclear-weapons-free zones emerged—the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995) and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996). Protocol I to both treaties states that the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, are "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" within these zones or against any treaty parties. The United States has argued that, regarding the innocent passage of its warships and aircraft, the Bangkok Treaty is "too restrictive" and has insisted on modifications before signing. The Treaty of Pelindaba apparently met with Washington's criteria and, although the United States signed it, as of 2001 ratification was still pending.

PROTOCOLS AIMED AT PREVENTING ACCIDENTAL WAR

History may hold few examples of accidental wars, but the advent of nuclear weapons—and the premium placed on striking first—gave rise to concerns that miscalculation, misperception, and pressures for haste might bring about an "unintended" nuclear conflict. The desire to provide each side the opportunity to consider a situation fully before taking irreversible action led to diplomatic, usually bilateral, negotiations seeking to improve rapid, direct communication in times of high tension.

Hot-Line Systems The Washington-Moscow "hot line," established in 1963, consists of a group of machines—IBM terminals, encryption machines, and teleprinters. Informally known as Molink, it came into being because the Cuban missile crisis had pointed up the inadequate means of communication between Washington and Moscow. The initial hot-line system consisted of one cable routed across Europe and a backup circuit routed through North Africa. During the 1971 SALT talks it was agreed that two other links be added to the original cable by using an American commercial satellite (INTELSAT) and a Soviet government satellite (MOLNIYA). In 1984 the hot-line technology was further modernized when the system was upgraded for high-speed fax transmission. An urgent message from a Russian leader to the president's ear takes well under five minutes—including translation.

Although the actual number of times Molink has been used is not known, the Defense Department indicates that it is used sparingly "but has proved invaluable in major crises." These include the June 1967 Israeli preemptive strike against Arab forces during the Six-Day War; in 1971 during the India-Pakistan War; during the 1973–1974 Arab-Israeli war; during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus; in 1979–1980 during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and in 1982–1984 when the Soviets needed to discuss Lebanon and the United States used it regarding Poland. Not surprisingly, other nations adopted the idea of direct communication systems. The British and French have their own direct links with Moscow; and Israel and Egypt have direct lines, North and South Korea are linked, and India and Pakistan have been connected since the 1971 war.

Preventing Untoward Incidents The Americans and Soviets were particularly active during the 1970s in seeking measures designed to prevent an isolated clash from sparking a much wider conflict. The Accidents Measures Agreement (1971) hoped to reduce the likelihood of nuclear accidents and to minimize the chance of war should such an accident occur. It urged both sides to undertake measures to improve the safety and security of their nuclear activities, and to notify one another immediately of unauthorized or accidental nuclear weapons detonations. Among other provisions, the agreement provided for advance notice of missile test launches in the direction of the other party.

The significance that Soviet diplomats placed on broad statements of principle is reflected in the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), which found the United States refusing to give a nonuse of nuclear weapons pledge or to renounce the option of "first use" of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the two nations agreed to consult with one another in crisis situations that posed a risk of nuclear war.

In contrast, the American emphasis on technical details may be found in the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea (1972), which updated the existing international guidelines to prevent collisions at sea. During the 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet and American naval commanders engaged in various forms of harassment. These included an occasional game of "chicken" in which two rival warships threatened to ram one another, each waiting for the other to turn away; buzzing an enemy ship with aircraft; aiming one's large guns at an opponent's ship; and nudging or "shouldering" hostile ships. Both sides recognized the obvious need to expand the traditional "rules of the road" to reduce these incidents and prevent an actual military engagement. The 1989 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities consisted of measures to improve military-to-military communication in times of crisis. It also created areas of "special caution," where U.S. and Soviet forces were operating in close proximity; outlawed the dangerous use of lasers; prohibited interfering with command and control communication networks by jamming; and agreed to treat minor territorial incursions as accidental rather than automatically threatening greater consequences.

EVALUATING THE COLD WAR EXPERIENCES

The protracted Cold War arms control negotiations did result in a number of accords—for example, the nonproliferation treaty system, the strategic arms pacts, and the hot lines—that stabilized the military climate and provided an avenue for easing political tensions. Although these were significant accomplishments, the tendency in American political circles and in the public mind during the Cold War era was to emphasize—even dramatize—the military dimensions of national security while playing down the contributions of arms control agreements.

The headlines featured those individuals who frequently exaggerated the U.S. vulnerability to Soviet nuclear weaponry. "For more than four decades," Strobe Talbott concluded, "Western policy has been based on a grotesque exaggeration of what the USSR could do if it wanted, therefore what it might do, therefore what the West must be prepared to do in response. . . . Worst-case assumptions about Soviet intentions have fed, and fed upon, worst-case assumptions about Soviet capabilities." Some Cold War hawks defended their frightening scenarios as a patriotic duty. "Democracies will not sacrifice to protect their security in the absence of a sense of danger," Richard Perle, a Reagan Defense Department official, explained in a *Newsweek* article (18 February 1983), "and every time we create the impression that we and the Soviets are cooperating and moderating the competition, we diminish the sense of apprehension."

Despite public pronouncements that America's continually growing nuclear arsenal would provide diplomatic "bargaining chips" or allow "negotiating from strength," U.S. leaders who were so inclined found it extremely difficult to put forth mutually negotiable proposals that could diminish the unthinkable threat posed by nuclear weapons. The interminable bickering between government agencies—especially, the Defense Department, State Department, Arms Control Agency, and intelligence agencies—often stymied presidents and diplomats. Such squabbling prompted a senior member of the National Security Council staff to declare, "Even if the Soviets did not exist, we might not get a START treaty because of disagreements on our side." Another high-ranking U.S. official complained that if the Soviets "came to us and said, 'You write it, we'll sign it,' we still couldn't do it."

America's proclivity to seek security almost exclusively through an ever-expanding nuclear arsenal allowed Defense Department officials, along with the cold warriors in Congress, to dominate arms control policies. Their frequent shortsighted objections to halting or placing limits on emerging weapons systems—such as MIRVs, cruise missiles, and nuclear testing—when the United States held a temporary technological lead often prevented agreements that could have forestalled another surge in the arms race. Not surprisingly, the SALT treaties, while establishing limitations, actually provided for both sides to expand their strategic nuclear forces. It was only with the INF accord and the START agreements that actual reduction of nuclear-armed weapons systems occurred, and these came about largely as a result of Gorbachev's initiative as he was terminating the Cold War.

During the pre-Gorbachev decades, hardy cold warriors argued that the authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union would most likely lead it to secretly violate arms control agreements in order to gain political or military advantage. Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration spent an extraordinary amount of time and energy in a persistent search for Soviet arms control violations. Three White House reports implied an accelerated pattern of Soviet noncompliance—seven alleged violations in 1984, thirteen in 1985, and eighteen in 1986. All but one of the allegations were found to be "inaccurate, ambiguous, or no longer relevant" by a 1988 report titled *Compliance and the Future of Arms Control* (Gloria Duffy, project director). "The overall pattern on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union," the report declared, "has been one in which compliance with agreements has clearly far out-weighted noncompliance." But the report observed:

> Through this politicization of the compliance issue in the United States, the Reagan administration has at times behaved as if it desired to withdraw from all existing strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The United States has acted in a fashion that undercuts the essential process of resolving disagreements that arise with regard to treaty compliance, rather than seeking to make the process work. This, combined with Soviet stretching of the terms of agreements and stubbornness in dealing with many of the compliance issues, has caused the arms control process to lose its give-and-take.

Dynamic changes in arms control and disarmament activities came about unexpectedly when in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev began essentially unilateral steps to wind down the Cold War by accepting the political democratization of Soviet and Soviet bloc societies, and by seeking ways to end the nuclear arms race. There have been many claimants seeking credit for the demise of the Cold War. The "peace through strength" perspective of containment and confrontation has been cited as prompting Gorbachev's actions. However, this view, as Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry noted in *Foreign Affairs* (1992), obscures "the nature of these momentous changes. Engagement and interdependence, rather than containment, are the ruling trends of the age. Mutual vulnerability, not strength, drives security politics. Accommodation and integration, not confrontation, are

the motors of change." Recognition of mutual vulnerability, accommodation, and integration were, and are, the essence of the arms control process.

The old cold warriors were replaced in the 1990s by unilateralists who disdained accommodation, distrusted arms control and feared mutual vulnerability. Their doomsday scenarios featured North Korea, Iraq, and other "radical terrorists" as threatening adversaries against whom the United States must build a missileproof umbrella regardless of how detrimental it might be to its relations with China, Russia, or its friends. Those most ardently pushing in 2001 for a strategic defense system of doubtful reliability—a Pentagon searching for missions, "defense" contractors, former cold warriors unwilling to recognize the changed world, and a woefully inexperienced President George W. Bush—appeared to be little concerned with its impact on existing arms control agreements. Any treaty, including arms control pacts, must be kept in line with changing international realities; however, in this process mutuality of interests must be a significant consideration.

CONCLUSION

During the twentieth century arms control and disarmament issues, spurred by developments in weapons technology, emerged as fundamental political and policy considerations. Concerns with modern weaponry led to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which updated the laws of war and sought to focus attention on the dangers of poison gas and aerial bombardment. The decades between the two world wars saw the unilateral disarmament of Germany in 1919, the controversial naval limitation treaties, and the inability of the League of Nations to deal with a rearming world. And, with the emergence of the nuclear era after World War II, debates over arms control and disarmament occupied much of the United Nations' attention and stimulated bilateral superpower negotiations.

The process of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements became increasingly complex. As policymakers prepared for negotiations, they wrestled with the objectives they wished to achieve and the risks they were willing to accept. Utopian aspirations or broadly gauged disarmament proposals rarely figured prominently in arms control objectives even when peace groups aroused public sentiment in support of such negotiations—such as at the first Hague Conference and with the nuclear-freeze movement of the 1970s and 1980s.

While the bargaining was usually strenuous between teams of competing diplomats, it was often even more intense between competing bureaucracies at home. Indeed, chiefs of state frequently discovered that their latitude in negotiating specific issues had been sharply curtailed in the process of getting all major players at home to agree. In Washington, this was often referred to as the Battle of the Potomac, and a similar struggle usually took place in Moscow.

As weapon systems became more complicated, it was necessary to call upon experts for advice. At the unsuccessful Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, naval delegates completely bewildered the conferees with elaborate formulas comparing the relative merits of eight-inch versus six-inch guns and heavy versus light cruisers. The senior British diplomat returned home arguing that from then on, experts "should be on tap, but not on top." With the advent of the nuclear age, it was often the case that specialists could complicate issues to a point where they became technically, and hence politically, insoluble. During the early test ban negotiations, seismologists developed verification techniques that appeared to be acceptable to many scientists and diplomats; however, these experts kept refining the already low error rate so it would be even smaller. It took a long time to develop a comprehensive test ban because critics—who often had a vested interest in continuing underground testing—argued that one could not be absolutely certain that there was no cheating. From all of this, there is one obvious lesson. To be successful, the negotiation of an arms control and disarmament agreement cannot be an engineering or technical exercise; it must be essentially a political undertaking.

Initial risks involved in arms control and disarmament agreements are sometimes difficult to perceive. Treaties that are termed controversial (that is, they involve some obvious risk) inevitably stimulate contemporary observers to judge the agreements consistent with their personal beliefs and values. The optimistic, enthusiastic supporters of the agreement usually tend to minimize the risks, whereas the pessimistic, suspicious opponents generally overestimate the risks.

Not all contemporary critics have been military officers, as some opponents of the London Naval Limitation Treaty of 1930 illustrate. As Fredrick Hale stated before the U.S. Senate: "The British by the terms of this treaty have us ham-

strung and hog-tied and there will keep us as long as limitations of armaments are the order of the day." Winston Churchill stated before the House of Commons: "I am astonished that any Admiralty board of naval officers could have been found to accept responsibility for such a hamstringing stipulation." T Inukai, speaking before the Japanese Diet, stated that the government had "betrayed the country by entering into an agreement at the London Conference inadequate for Japan's defense needs."

These were three civilian statesmen from the three principal signatory nations each insisting that his country's security had been impaired by the treaty. Each was, of course, assessing the risks incurred in the naval treaty based on his own personal convictions and assumptions about the nature of a nation's security.

During the Cold War it was obvious that most American policymakers disregarded the admonishment of Truman's Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, that if you define a political problem in military terms, it will soon become a military problem. As the cold warriors emphasized the military dimension of national security and scorned arms control and disarmament policies, their mantra was the old Roman precept—if you desire peace (security), prepare for war. A little historical insight might have given them pause, for the more Romans prepared for war, the more war they waged, until, in the end, Rome was conquered.

Clearly, national security cannot be defined simply in amounts of weaponry. Few in Washington reflected on the fact that during the nineteenth century the United States felt quite secure with its policy of political isolationism and its meager armed forces while, conversely, never had the United States felt so insecure as it did during the Cold War years when it possessed a vast peacetime nuclear arsenal, substantial military forces, and allies around the world. A nation's security, then, may rest as much on a sense of national well-being—a psychological state—as it does on the size of its military forces. It would appear, as H. A. L. Fisher wrote during the interwar years, that "in reality, security is a state of mind; so is insecurity."

Whether or not an arms control agreement might be violated was a matter of special concern in the nuclear era. Consequently, the search for effective means of verifying or supervising the compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements has been far more intense since 1945 than in earlier years. The verification or supervision process employs several methods of monitoring compliance that may be classified as "national means" and "cooperative/intrusive means."

The traditional method used to verify treaty compliance has been national means, in which human observers—including military attachés assigned to foreign capitals; national intelligence agencies (for example, the CIA); international businessmen and tourists; and clandestine or undercover sources, including spies—have served as important sources of information. The naval limitation treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as agreements dealing with the outlawing of weapons and demilitarization, used these methods. Prior to World War II, the reports of military attachés were considered to be particularly valuable because of the expertise of the observers; indeed, most of the treaty evasions reported were initially noted by the attachés. Equally important has been the analysis of foreign publications, especially commercial and industrial reports. In such documents, sharp-eyed readers could detect significant changes taking place in the allocation of resources and the establishment or conversion of factories. In this undramatic fashion, the allies learned in the mid-1920s of Germany's evasion of the Versailles Treaty clause forbidding a "general staff" by examining the telephone book of the German military headquarters, which listed the various offices and their functions.

With the advent of modern electronics, photography, space vehicles, and other devices, a new dimension called "national technical means" was added. Such devices have been employed to verify both the quantitative and the qualitative features of strategic weaponry, particularly the numbers and characteristics of ballistic missiles, information that was vital to negotiation of the SALT and START accords. The restrictions on nuclear testing have been monitored—quite effectively, according to private scientific groups—by specially devised seismic devices.

An obvious example of cooperative/intrusive supervision is on-site inspection employed to verify compliance. Such inspection has been used in the efforts to ensure that terms of, for example, the Treaty of Versailles, the Antarctic Treaty, the INF agreement, and the Iraqi armistice were carried out. They also have been used regularly by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that matériel employed in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not illegally shifted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The Antarctic and INF treaties and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections have been carried out in cooperation with various treaty members because of the perceived mutual advantages. With the Treaty of Versailles and the Iraqi armistice, on the contrary, inspection teams attempting to verify that all imposed terms were carried out were unwelcome in countries whose governments viewed the terms as unfair and the inspection teams as intrusive.

The historical record of compliance is somewhat mixed, but on the whole, agreements in which a sense of mutuality was established have been honored. Often, evasions or violations that occurred were unintended and marginal—with the possible exception of the Soviet violation of the biological weapons pact. There is no evidence of any unknown treaty violation having had a significant impact on the outcome of a military engagement. Few, if any, governments have negotiated and signed an arms control agreement while deliberately planning to evade the terms of the agreement.

Finally, people in general, even quite sophisticated individuals, usually expect too much from arms control agreements. These techniques are designed to accomplish essentially two basic purposes: to reduce the feasibility of electing war as a means of resolving disputes by reducing the armaments available; and, if that should fail, to diminish the military violence in any subsequent hostilities. These agreements, which usually have been rather specific and technical, focused on armaments or the employment of weapons. The arms control process requires a minimum level of political cooperation and, even then, progress can be slow where suspicions and hatreds must be mitigated. Often the first steps to break down the wall of suspicion are measures that provide for exchanging verified information concerning each side's military forces—confidence- and security-building measures. Rarely have arms control and disarmament accords sought to address the basic political, economic, social, and moral issues that are at the heart of the international disputes that have prompted nations to go to war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Valerie. *Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament.* Bloomington, Ind., 1990.

Adelman, Kenneth L. *The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summitry—A Skeptic's Account.* New York, 1989. Written by a director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan administration.

Almond, Harry A. "Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 17, no. 2 (1985): 229–284.

Atwater, Elton. *American Regulation of Arms Exports.* Buffalo, N.Y., 2000.

Barnaby, Frank, ed. *A Handbook of Verification Procedures.* New York, 1990.

Barnhart, Michael, ed. *Congress and United States Foreign Policy: Controlling the Use of Force in the Nuclear Age.* Albany, N.Y., 1987.

Blechman, Barry, and Janine Nolan. *The U.S.–Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Negotiations.* Washington, D.C., 1987.

Borawski, John. *From the Atlantic to the Urals—Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference.* Washington, D.C., 1988. Confidence- and security-building process.

Borawski, John, ed. *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age.* Boulder, Colo., 1986. Useful essays dealing with measures to prevent accidental war.

Brown, Frederic J. *Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints.* Princeton, N.J., 1968.

Bunn, George. *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Soviets.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

Burns, Richard Dean, comp. *Arms Control and Disarmament: A Bibliography.* Santa Barbara, Calif., 1977.

Burns, Richard Dean, ed. *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament.* 3 vols. New York, 1993.

Burns, Richard Dean, and Donald Urquidi. *Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919–1939.* 4 vols. Washington, D.C., 1968. Surveys most treaties of the interwar years.

Caldwell, Dan. *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate.* Columbia, S.C., 1991.

Carnesale, Albert, and Richard N. Haass, eds. *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight.* Cambridge, Mass., 1987. Looks at compliance.

Chatfield, Charles, with Robert Kleidman. *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism.* New York, 1992.

Clarke, Duncan L. *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.* New York, 1979.

Daadler, Ivo H. *The CFE Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment.* Washington, D.C., 1991.

Dean, Arthur H. *Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation.* New York, 1966.

Debenedetti, Charles. *The Peace Reform in American History.* Bloomington, Ind., 1980.

Dingman, Roger. *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922.* Chicago, 1976. Explores the decision-making process.

Divine, Robert A. *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960.* New York, 1978.

Duffy, Gloria. *Compliance and the Future of Arms Control.* Cambridge, Mass., 1988. Report of a project directed by Duffy and sponsored by the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, and Global Outlook.

Dunn, Lewis A., and Amy E. Gordon, eds. *Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site Inspection: Challenges, Issues and Realities.* Lexington, Mass., 1990.

Dyson, Freeman. *Weapons and Hope.* New York, 1984. Insight into the science and politics of Cold War arms control.

Fischer, David, and Paul Szasz. *Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal.* Edited by Jozef Goldblat. Philadelphia, 1985. A study of the IAEA safeguards system.

Fitzgerald, Frances. *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War.* New York, 2000.

Flowerree, Charles C., and Ricki Aberle. *Multilaterial Negotiations for Chemical Weapons Ban.* Washington, D.C., 1993.

Friedman, Leon, ed. *The Law of War: A Documentary History.* 2 vols. New York, 1972. Contains relevant documents.

Fry, Michael P., Patrick Keatinge, and Joseph Rotblat, eds. *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.* New York, 1990.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty.* Washington, D.C., 1987.

———. *Détente and Confrontation: Soviet-American Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Rev. ed. Washington, D.C., 1994.

Graybeal, Sidney N., and Michael Krepon. "Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission." *International Security* 10 (fall 1985): 183–199. The commission deals with SALT and START problems.

Hall, Christopher G. L. *Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921–1937.* New York, 1987.

Hirschfeld, Thomas J., ed. *Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience.* Austin, Tex., 1987.

Katz, Milton S. *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957–1985.* Westport, Conn., 1986.

Kaufman, Robert G. *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitations Between the Two World Wars.* New York, 1990.

Kelleher, Catherine M., and Joseph E. Naftzinger, eds. *Intelligence in the Arms Control Process: Lessons from "INF."* College Park, Md., 1990.

Kelleher, Catherine M., Jane M. O. Sharp, and Lawrence Freeman. *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.* The Hague, 1996.

Krass, Allan S. *The Verification Revolution.* Cambridge, Mass., 1989.

Krepon, Michael, and Dan Caldwell, eds. *The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification.* New York, 1991. Reviews problems associated with achieving ratification of selected treaties negotiated from World War I to the end of the Cold War.

Krepon, Michael, and Mary Umberger, eds. *Verification and Compliance: A Problem-Solving Approach.* Cambridge, Mass., 1988.

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control.* New York, 1990.

May, Ernest R. *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1973.

Meyer, David S. *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics.* New York, 1990.

Newhouse, John. *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.* New York, 1973. Negotiating SALT I.

Noel-Baker, Philip J. *The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932–1933 and Why It Failed.* Oxford and New York, 1979.

O'Connor, Raymond G. *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930.* Lawrence, Kans., 1962.

Pelz, Steven E. *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II.* Cambridge, Mass., 1974. Examines the final phase of naval limitation efforts.

Ramberg, Bennett. *The Seabed Arms Control Negotiation: A Study of Multilateral Arms Control Conference Diplomacy.* Denver, Colo., 1978.

Roberts, Brad, ed. *Chemical Disarmament and U.S. Security. Boulder, Colo., 1992.*

Rose, William. *U.S. Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work?* New York, 1988.

Royse, Morton W. *Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare*. London, 1928.

Scheer, Robert. *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War*. New York, 1983. Insight into their attitudes toward arms control.

Seaborg, Glenn T., with Benjamin S. Loeb. *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*. Berkeley, Calif., 1981.

———. *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years*. Lexington, Mass., 1987.

Sims, Nicholas Roger Alan. *The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force*. London, 1988.

Smith, Gerard. *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*. Garden City, N.Y., 1980. Written by the delegation head for SALT I.

Stares, Paul B. *The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945–1984*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1985.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament*. Stockholm, 1968–1969. An excellent resource with worldwide coverage.

Talbott, Strobe. *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*. New York, 1979.

———. *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*. New York, 1984.

———. *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace*. New York, 1988. Survey of policymaking during the Reagan presidency.

Tate, Merze. *The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907*. New York, 1942. Covers the Hague Conferences.

Tower, John G., James Brown, and William K. Cheek, eds. *Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s*. Washington, D.C., 1997.

Tsipis, Kosta, David W. Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, eds. *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Made It Possible*. Washington, D.C., 1986.

United Nations. *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1976–*. New York, 1977–.

———. *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1985*. 2 vols. New York, 1985. These two volumes are surprisingly comprehensive accounts.

———. *The United Nations and Disarmament: A Short History*. New York, 1988.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*. Washington, D.C., 1990.

Westing, Arthur H., ed. *Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal*. London and Philadelphia, 1984.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. *Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925–1931*. London, 1932.

Wunsch, Charles R. "Environmental Modification Treaty." *A.S.I.L.S. International Law Journal* 4 (1980): 113–131. Also known as the Enmod Convention.

York, Herbert F. *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race*. New York, 1970. Interesting for its particular insights into science and politics.

See also ARMED NEUTRALITIES; ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; DETERRENCE; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; OUTER SPACE; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY; TREATIES.

Arms Transfers and Trade

Michael T. Klare

Arms transfers and trade—both imports and exports—have been a significant issue in American foreign policy since the revolutionary war. During the Revolution and in the decades immediately following, the United States was primarily concerned with the import of arms, in order to equip its nascent military forces. Following the Industrial Revolution, however, the United States became a major producer of arms, and since then the principal question facing American policymakers has been when and under what circumstances to permit the export of arms. The latter question has gained in significance over time as the United States emerged as the world's leading producer and exporter of conventional weapons (weapons that do not incorporate nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions).

Arms transfers are an important question for foreign policy because they bear on the military capability of the United States and on those states to which the United States chooses to provide (or to deny) instruments of war. When the United States was relatively weak and lacked the ability to manufacture weapons for itself, it needed to obtain arms from foreign sources in order to enhance the capacity of its military forces to overcome both foreign and internal enemies. Since the United States has emerged as a major military power, and acquired the ability to manufacture weapons of all types, its decisions on when and to whom to export arms have had a direct impact on the relative strength of other, less powerful nations.

This capacity to affect the military power of other states became a major factor in American foreign policy before and during World War II, when the United States chose to mobilize its immense arms-making capacity to help defeat the Axis powers, and again during the Cold War, when Washington sought to construct a global network of anti-Soviet states. In both cases, decisions on arms transfers were viewed by American policymakers as issues critical to U.S. national security, requiring assessment and approval at the very highest (usually presidential) level.

Although the end of the Cold War alleviated some of the urgency once associated with decisions regarding arms transfers, such transactions remained a significant factor in U.S. foreign policy. In the mid-1990s, for example, the United States arranged major new arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates in order to enhance their capacity to resist attack by Iran or Iraq. And as China proceeded with a substantial buildup of its forces, the United States supplied Taiwan with increasingly sophisticated weapons.

At various times the question of when and under what circumstances to export arms has also been seen as a moral issue facing the United States. This is so because weapons are, by definition, instruments of violence, and so their transfer to another party is thought by many to entail some degree of responsibility for any uses to which they are put by their recipients. After World War I, for example, many Americans opposed the export of arms on the grounds that their sale contributed to the likelihood of war and also provided obscene profits to the "merchants of death." Similarly, during the Cold War some people objected to the sale or transfer of arms to pro-American dictators such as Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) who had been accused of egregious human rights violations.

For both security-related and moral reasons, arms transfers have become an important subject for international arms control negotiations. During the Cold War, for example, the United States conducted intermittent talks with the Soviet Union over proposals to restrict the flow of conventional arms to areas of conflict, such as the Middle East. And after the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, the United States and the Soviet

Union held similar talks with the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the P-5 negotiations).

Finally, it is important to note that arms exports are viewed by U.S. weapons manufacturers—and their supporters in Congress, the military, and the business community—as a legitimate source of revenue. Although such considerations have always been viewed as being subordinate to matters of national security, several presidential administrations (most notably those of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton) have embraced arms export promotion as a valid concern of American foreign policy. The purely economic dimensions of arms export policy have been accorded particular attention since the end of the Cold War, when the United States found itself in a less threatening international environment.

For all of these reasons, arms transfers and trade have been an important—and sometimes contentious—issue in U.S. foreign policy. Every American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has had to direct considerable attention to this issue at one time or another, and it is likely that this will remain the case for all future presidents. As long as there are discrepancies in the military capabilities of states, and as long as nations continue to go to war with one another, arms transfer considerations will figure prominently in the security planning of the U.S. government.

FROM THE REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR I

The original European settlers in what became the United States brought firearms with them for hunting and self-defense. Weapons were also imported from Europe to equip the militias formed in the English colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to fight hostile Indian tribes and to resist incursions by the French and the Spanish. Later, many of these weapons were used by revolutionary forces to fight the British. There were never enough weapons to go around, however, and so the importation of arms from friendly European governments became a major priority for the Continental Congress and its overseas representatives, including Benjamin Franklin. Only when France agreed in 1778 to aid the American rebels with arms and troops was the success of the Revolution assured.

After the Revolution the infant Republic continued to rely on imported weapons for many of its military requirements. To reduce this reliance, Congress voted in 1794 to establish government-owned facilities for the manufacture of firearms. These installations, most notably the army arsenals in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia), gradually acquired expertise in the mass production of rifles and carbines.

Although these facilities were largely able to satisfy government requirements during periods of relative calm, they could not produce sufficient weapons in times of war—as during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846–1848. To supplement production at Springfield and Harpers Ferry, the War Department contracted with private gunmakers such as Robbins and Lawrence of Windsor, Vermont, and Remington Arms of Ilion, New York—thus giving a significant boost to the development of a commercial arms industry in the United States. Many of these firms failed or were absorbed by others when government contracts disappeared, but others survived by embracing new technologies and finding foreign customers for their innovative products.

When the Civil War broke out in 1861, the United States possessed a significant arms-making capacity. Together the various army arsenals and their civilian counterparts were capable of manufacturing hundreds of thousands of firearms per year. But even this impressive capacity was insufficient to satisfy the prodigious demands of war, and so both sides were forced to procure additional arms from abroad. Although both the Union and the Confederacy turned to foreign suppliers for a certain percentage of their military equipment, the need for imports was especially acute in the South. Because most of America's arms-making capacity was located in the North, the Union could satisfy a larger share of its military requirements from domestic factories than could the South. As a result, the Confederacy placed a greater emphasis on military imports than did the North, and both sides became engaged in an elaborate diplomatic struggle over arms transfers—with the South seeking to procure weapons from sympathetic powers in Europe and the North seeking to persuade these states to deny arms to the rebels. In the end the Northerners prevailed in this contest, as the major European powers—whatever their political sympathies—chose to eschew involvement in the conflict. This did not, however, deter the North from declaring a naval blockade of the South and deploying hundreds of ships in a determined

effort to prevent the smuggling of arms to Confederate forces.

The Civil War, like the wars that preceded it, proved to be an enormous boon to the private arms industry. Once the war ended, however, the U.S. government sharply reduced its procurement of commercially manufactured weapons. To survive in this new environment, private arms companies such as Remington, Winchester, and Colt looked to the civilian market and to foreign customers for the orders needed to survive. This in turn spurred the introduction of new gun designs and manufacturing processes. As a result, American gun firms became adept at the mass production of cheap, reliable, and highly effective firearms.

Although the U.S. government did not always take advantage of this burgeoning capability, other governments were less inhibited. Samuel Remington, the president of Remington Arms Company, opened a sales office in Paris and secured lucrative contracts for the sale of rifles and ammunition to several European countries. Other U.S. firms, including Winchester, also obtained significant contracts from European governments. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, for example, the French army ordered 100,000 rifles and 18 million rounds of ammunition from the Union Metallic Cartridge Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut (later a division of Remington Arms).

The capacity of American military firms to produce large quantities of weaponry in a relatively short amount of time was next tested in 1914, when World War I broke out in Europe. Although the U.S. government initially adopted a policy of neutrality in the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson allowed American firms to sell arms and ammunition to the Allied powers. Desperate to supplement their own manufacturing capabilities, Britain, France, and Russia then contracted with American companies to produce large numbers of guns and cartridges. The British, for example, ordered one million Enfield rifles from Remington. As one such order followed another, American military exports jumped from $40 million in 1914 to $1.3 billion in 1916 and $2.3 billion in the final nineteen months of war. This marked the first time that U.S. arms manufacturers played a truly significant role in the international weapons trade.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II

At first America's emergence as a major arms supplier was lauded as a significant contribution to the Allied war effort. Once the war ended, however, many Americans became fearful of U.S. participation in future European conflicts, and therefore opposed any activities—including arms transfers—that conceivably might increase the risk of such involvement. The most significant expression of this stance, known as isolationism, was the Senate's 1920 rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, which established the League of Nations. The United States also refused to participate in other arrangements associated with the league, including the St. Germain Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition (1919) and the Geneva Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War (1925).

Although leery of international arrangements like the League of Nations, the United States was prepared to support disarmament efforts aimed at the prevention of great-power conflict. Most notable in this regard was U.S. participation in the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922, which aimed at setting limits on the naval capabilities of the major powers. Under the resulting Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty, ceilings were set on the total allowable tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers in the fleets of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. A follow-on treaty, signed at London in 1930, extended the tonnage restrictions to the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Although not bearing directly on the issue of arms transfers, these measures represented a significant effort to reduce the risk of war by constraining the arms procurement policies of the major powers.

The American public's antipathy to involvement in overseas conflicts was also reflected in calls for prosecution of U.S. arms firms for their alleged role in fomenting World War I. Antiwar crusaders like Dorothy Detzer of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom traveled the country, demanding a congressional investigation of the domestic weapons industry. Critical books and articles—most notably *The Merchants of Death* (1934) by Helmuth Engelbrecht and Frank Hanighen—further aroused public opinion. "Arms makers engineer 'war

scares,'" Engelbrecht and Hanighen wrote in their widely popular exposé. "They excite governments and peoples to fear their neighbors and rivals, so that they may sell more armaments." In addition, "bribery is frequently associated with war scares" of this sort.

In response to these and other such charges, the U.S. Senate voted to establish the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry in 1934. This body, headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, was empowered to pursue allegations that American and European weapons producers had conspired to instigate World War I and other conflicts in order to stimulate the demand for weapons. The Nye Committee (as it was called) was also authorized to investigate other charges of wrongdoing by the international arms industry.

After conducting numerous hearings, the Nye Committee concluded that U.S. arms firms had, in fact, employed bribery to clinch overseas sales and had spread tales of imminent hostilities in order to play one prospective buyer off another; it did not, however, find that they had conspired to ignite World War I. In the end, the Senate investigation did not result in any legal action against American arms companies. It did, however, lead to the establishment of the U.S. Munitions Control Board, the first governmental agency charged with regulating the arms traffic. It also sustained the national mood of isolationism and helped ensure passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935, which compelled the president to impose an arms embargo on nations at war.

The Neutrality Act of 1935 was followed by the adoption of similar measures in 1936, 1937, and 1939. The 1936 statute banned U.S. loans to belligerents, and the 1937 measure extended the provisions of the two earlier statutes to civil wars—a step that effectively precluded the sale of arms to the Republican government in Spain, then under attack from right-wing forces led by General Francisco Franco (and backed by the fascist governments in Germany and Italy). The 1939 act, passed at a time of growing tension in Europe, banned U.S. ships from carrying goods or passengers to belligerent ports, but allowed the United States to sell arms to friendly powers on a cash-and-carry basis.

Although they enjoyed strong support from Congress and the American public, the Neutrality Acts and related expressions of isolationism appeared increasingly constrictive to President Franklin D. Roosevelt at a time when the Hitler regime in Germany was accelerating its rearmament effort and pursuing a strategy of regional domination. While Roosevelt argued against repeal of the ban on arms transfers to belligerents in March 1939, when Hitler's armies overran Czechoslovakia, he changed his stance in September of that year, when Germany invaded Poland. Two months later, after Congress finally repealed the Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt authorized a series of cash-and-carry sales of U.S. arms to the European democracies.

A year later, following the fall of France, Roosevelt proposed a much more ambitious program of arms transfers, under which the U.S. government would lend, lease, or donate military equipment to the nations fighting Adolf Hitler. The new U.S. goal, Roosevelt told the nation on 29 December 1940, was to convert the United States into the "great arsenal of democracy," and thereby provide America's allies with the arms needed to defeat Hitler's armies. To fulfill this pledge, Roosevelt asked Congress to approve the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the transfer of U.S. arms to friendly powers that lacked the funds to pay for them.

Although opposed by isolationists in Congress, the Lend-Lease Act was finally passed by a vote of 60 to 31 in the Senate and 317 to 71 in the House. Signed into law on 11 March 1941, it empowered the president to "sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of" military articles to "any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." Congress initially appropriated $7 billion for this purpose, and later authorized total expenditures (by war's end) of more than $50 billion—the largest amount ever committed for arms aid until that time. The lion's share of this bounty, totaling $31.6 billion, went to Great Britain; the second largest share, worth some $11 billion, to the Soviet Union.

Ultimately, it was the direct involvement of U.S. soldiers and sailors, rather than the delivery of American weapons, that turned the tide in Europe and the Pacific. But U.S. arms transfers under the lend-lease program enabled America's allies—especially Great Britain and the Soviet Union—to hold out through two years of unrelenting warfare until the full weight of American combat strength could be brought to bear. The lend-lease program also established the principle—adhered to by all American presidents since World War II—that arms transfers can play a significant role in enhancing U.S. national security.

THE COLD WAR

Following World War II many of the factories that had been devoted to military production during the fighting were converted back to their prewar, civilian uses. However, the cessation of fighting in Europe and Asia was not greeted—as the end of World War I had been—with a wave of revulsion against American arms makers. Instead, the nation's military industries were widely viewed as a major pillar of American military strength and an important source of technological innovation. Thus, when the Cold War began in earnest, most members of Congress were prepared to support a new round of arms transfers along the lines of the lend-lease program.

The resumption of U.S. arms aid to friendly powers abroad did not occur without prodding from the White House, however. With World War II barely concluded, many in Congress were at first reluctant to authorize significant military aid to the European powers—fearing, as had their counterparts in the 1920s and 1930s, that this would eventually lead to U.S. military involvement in overseas conflicts. To overcome this resistance, President Harry S. Truman and his close advisers, including Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall, sought to portray the expansion of Soviet power in eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as a vital threat to the Western democracies and, by extension, to U.S. national security.

The first significant test of U.S. attitudes on this issue came in early 1947, when Great Britain announced that it could no longer afford to support the royalist government in Greece—which at that time was under attack from a communist-backed insurgency. Fearing that the loss of Greece to the communists would invite Soviet aggression in neighboring countries, including Turkey, President Truman concluded that it was essential for the United States to provide arms and military training to the Greek military. On 12 March 1947, Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to request funding for this purpose. In what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the president articulated a new guiding principle for American foreign policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

As noted by many historians since then, this speech shaped U.S. security doctrine for the next several decades. Henceforth it would be the unquestionable obligation of the United States to provide economic, political, and especially military assistance to any nation threatened by Soviet (or Soviet-backed) forces. As the first expression of this principle, Congress voted $400 million in military assistance for Greece and Turkey on 15 May 1947; this was soon followed by the appropriation of even larger amounts for these two countries and for many others in Europe and Asia.

In time the transfer of arms to anticommunist governments abroad came to be seen in Washington as a critical component of "containment," the strategy that governed American foreign and military policy throughout the Cold War. As articulated by its original architects, containment held that the totalitarian Soviet system was forced by its very nature to seek domination over the rest of the world, and thus, in response, the United States had no choice but to join with other nations in resisting Soviet aggression. And because many of the nations on the periphery of the Soviet empire were too poor to provide for their own defense, it was up to Washington to supply the necessary arms and equipment.

This principle was given formal expression in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949. Signed into law by President Truman on 6 October of that year, the MDAA (later incorporated into the Mutual Security Act of 1950) gave the president broad authority to conclude mutual defense assistance agreements with friendly powers and to provide these countries with a wide range of military goods and services. In its initial authorization Congress awarded $1 billion to members of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); $211 million to Greece and Turkey; $28 million to Iran, the Philippines, and South Korea; and $75 million for the "general area" of China. These appropriations were increased in subsequent years, reaching a peak of $5.2 billion after the outbreak of the Korean War.

These arms aid endeavors were accompanied, of course, by U.S. efforts to strengthen its own military capabilities. If a full-scale war were to break out, it was believed, the United States would have to provide the bulk of the required forces. But the initial tests of strength were assumed to take place in the border zones between East and West. As a result, much of U.S. diplomacy during the Cold War was directed at the establishment of military alliances with friendly states in these areas and at bolstering the defensive capabilities of their armies. The linkage between

military aid programs and U.S. national security was formally articulated in National Security Council policy document number 68 (NSC 68) of April 1950. Described by Representative (later Senator) Henry Jackson as "the first comprehensive statement of national strategy," NSC 68 called on Washington to aid any nation that might conceivably fall under Soviet influence.

At first U.S. arms aid was given primarily to the NATO countries and to other friendly powers on the periphery of the Soviet Union and China, including Iran, South Korea, Turkey, and the Nationalist government on Taiwan. In later years such assistance was also supplied to friendly nations in Africa and Latin America. Between 1950 and 1967 the United States provided its allies with a total of $33.4 billion in arms and services under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), plus another $3.3 billion worth of surplus weaponry under the Excess Defense Articles program. The United States also sold weapons to those of its allies that were sufficiently recovered from World War II to finance their own arms acquisitions; between 1950 and 1967 Washington exported $11.3 billion worth of arms and equipment through its Foreign Military Sales program. (All of these figures are in uninflated "current" dollars, meaning that their value in contemporary dollars would be significantly greater.)

Although the basic premise of American arms transfers—to strengthen the defenses of U.S. allies facing a military threat from the Soviet Union—did not change over the years, many aspects of these programs underwent significant transformation. Thus, while the bulk of U.S. weaponry was originally funneled to the industrialized powers of Europe and Asia, by the late 1950s an increasing portion of these arms was being provided to friendly nations in what was then called the Third World. The primary impetus for this shift was Moscow's apparent success in using arms transfers to establish military links with Egypt (beginning in 1954), Syria (in 1955), Iraq (in 1958), and Cuba (in 1961). In order to combat the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Washington began supplying vast quantities of arms and ammunition to its own allies in these regions—thereby triggering fresh Soviet arms transfers to its Third World clients, in what was to become an ongoing pattern of U.S.–Soviet arms competition.

Although the primary objective of U.S. arms transfer policy during this period was to bolster the defensive capabilities of key allies, American leaders did on occasion emphasize other priorities. In the early 1950s, for example, the United States joined with Great Britain and France in restricting arms deliveries to the Middle East. As noted in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the aim of this effort was to prevent the outbreak of an uncontrolled and destabilizing arms race in the region. (This effort collapsed in 1954, when the Soviet bloc began selling arms to Egypt and the United States responded by increasing its arms deliveries to Israel and other friendly powers in the area.)

In another attempt at restraint, the Kennedy administration attempted in the early 1960s to dissuade Latin American countries from acquiring expensive, "big-ticket" weapons such as jet fighters and armored vehicles. Believing that persistent underdevelopment—rather than the distant threat of Soviet power—represented the greatest threat to these states' long-term stability, President John F. Kennedy suggested that any funds saved by reducing arms imports be devoted to economic and social development. When supplying U.S. arms to these countries under the MAP program, moreover, Kennedy favored the transfer of "counterinsurgency" gear—small arms, light vehicles, helicopters, and so on.

For the most part, however, U.S. policymakers favored a liberal approach to arms transfers, permitting the flow of increasingly costly and sophisticated arms to American allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This policy was strongly backed by U.S. military leaders, who saw arms transfers (and their accompanying training and advising operations) as a valuable instrument for establishing and nurturing ties with the military elites of friendly countries. It also enjoyed strong support from the domestic arms industry, which consistently opposed any restrictions on the sales of weapons to friendly powers abroad.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Although the principal recipients of U.S. arms aid in the 1950s were the NATO countries and other friendly powers on the periphery of the Soviet Union, in the early 1960s, Washington began to direct considerable attention to Southeast Asia, where communist insurgents had become increasingly active. In line with the Truman Doctrine and NSC 68—which viewed a gain by communist forces in any part of the world as a strategic defeat

for the West—the Kennedy administration established major military aid programs in Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Thailand. By 1975 U.S. military aid to these countries came to an estimated $18 billion.

As the fighting between insurgents and government forces in South Vietnam intensified, the United States sent ever-increasing quantities of military equipment to the South Vietnamese army, along with large numbers of U.S. military advisers. By doing so, Washington hoped to avert direct U.S. military involvement in the conflict. As the insurgents—backed by increasingly powerful forces sent from North Vietnam—gained in strength, however, U.S. leaders determined that it would be necessary to deploy American combat forces to prevent the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. At the peak of the conflict in the late 1960s, some 550,000 U.S. soldiers were serving in Vietnam. But when U.S. intervention failed to produce a quick and decisive victory, the American public turned against the war and U.S. forces were eventually withdrawn.

The American failure in Vietnam had a profound impact on U.S. foreign and military policy. Probably its longest-lasting consequence was to engender a deep-seated antipathy on the part of the American people to the long-term commitment of U.S. ground troops to ambiguous conflicts in the developing world—a reluctance that shaped U.S. strategy in the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the Kosovo conflict of 1999. Congress also grew leery of major arms-supply arrangements with unpopular Third World regimes. In 1968, for example, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended to require a reduction in U.S. military aid to any underdeveloped country that diverted excessive funds to the acquisition of sophisticated military hardware. Subsequent amendments also prohibited the provision of military assistance to governments cited for egregious human rights violations.

But while Congress was reluctant to approve any increase in U.S. military assistance to repressive Third World countries, it also sought to prevent the deployment of U.S. combat forces in these areas—and so could be persuaded in some cases to sacrifice one goal for the other. This was the genesis of the Nixon Doctrine, which called for the substitution of U.S. arms aid for American troops in unstable areas deemed essential to U.S. security.

As articulated by President Richard Nixon in 1970, this policy held that the United States "shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate" to friendly nations that come under attack in remote areas of the world. But, at the same time, the United States would "look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."

Initially, the Nixon Doctrine was said to apply to the nations of Southeast Asia and the surrounding region. Before long, however, the main focus of this policy was shifted to the Persian Gulf, where Great Britain had long served as the regional hegemon. When Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that London would withdraw its forces from the Gulf by the end of 1971, the Nixon administration undertook an immediate review of American strategy in the area. Believing that the U.S. public—still in the throes of the Vietnam debate—would not tolerate the deployment of American forces in the Persian Gulf, the White House concluded that U.S. strategy would have to rest on the supply of weapons to friendly powers.

The administration's new policy toward the Gulf was spelled out in National Security Council Decision Memorandum number 92 (NSDM-92). Although the text of this document was never made public, its basic thrust was later articulated in congressional testimony by Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco. "What we decided," Sisco told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1973, "is that we would try to stimulate and be helpful to the two key countries in this area—namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia—that, to the degree to which we could stimulate cooperation between these two countries, they could become the major elements of stability as the British were getting out."

As suggested by Sisco, this policy was aimed at both Iran and Saudi Arabia. In practice, however, the greater emphasis was placed on Iran. This was so because Iran's armed forces were considered far more capable than those of Saudi Arabia, and because its leader, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was more attuned to U.S. policy objectives. Eager to enhance his nation's status as a regional power and to attract the support of Washington, the shah ordered $20 billion worth of American arms between 1970 and 1978—at that time a record for weapons acquisitions by a developing country. Indeed, Representative Gerry E. Studds of Massachusetts went so far as to state that these transfers constituted "the most rapid buildup of military power under peacetime conditions of any nation in the history of the world."

Although U.S. sales to Iran were motivated primarily by national security considerations, as spelled out in NSDM-92, the Nixon administration was not unmindful of the economic dimensions of arms exports. Facing a significant balance-of-payments crisis as a result of Vietnam War expenditures and the OPEC oil price increase of 1973, the White House saw in military sales a practical means for recouping some of the massive dollar outflows. Accordingly, U.S. arms firms were given a green light by Nixon to provide the shah with some of America's most advanced and sophisticated weapons, including F-4, F-5, and F-14 aircraft.

So massive were U.S. arms transfers to Iran at this time that many members of Congress became alarmed at the scale of the sales program and its potential for abuse. These concerns were increased by reports that U.S. weapons firms had employed bribery to solicit major orders from Iran—recalling the sort of charges made by Engelbrecht and Hanighen in 1934—and that U.S. officials had failed to impose any limits on the sophistication of the arms that could be supplied to that country. After investigating these charges, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in 1976 that U.S. arms sales to Iran were "out of control."

This report, and others like it, led Congress—for the first time since the 1930s—to adopt significant legislative restraints on U.S. military sales abroad. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, Congress gave itself veto power over all individual arms transfers worth $14 million or more and over all munitions packages worth $50 million or more. The AECA also required the White House to provide Congress with advance notice of pending arms agreements, and placed restrictions on the "re-transfer" of U.S. arms from their intended recipient to another country.

CARTER AND REAGAN

The issue of profligate arms sales to Third World countries arose in the presidential campaign of 1976. "I am particularly concerned by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman," then-governor Jimmy Carter told the Foreign Policy Association in New York. Arguing that "the United States cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war," he promised that, if elected president, he would work to "increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in arms."

Once elected, Carter renewed his promise to reduce U.S. weapons sales. In his first interview as president, he told reporters that the National Security Council had reached agreement on the need to place "very tight restrictions on future commitments" of U.S. arms to overseas recipients. These restrictions were contained in Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), adopted on 13 May 1977. In announcing the provisions of PD-13 on 19 May 1977, President Carter affirmed that "the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy instrument, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests."

To implement this "policy of arms restraint," as he termed it, Carter imposed a ceiling on the total dollar value of U.S. arms transfers (set at the sales level for 1977) to all but a few traditional allies, and pledged that the United States would not be the first supplier to introduce into Third World areas "newly developed, advanced weapons systems which could create a new or significantly higher combat capability." Moreover, to dampen the overseas demand for U.S. weapons, Carter ordered American diplomats to refrain from assisting U.S. arms firms in their efforts to secure foreign buyers. (This instruction was incorporated in the "leprosy letter" of 31 August 1977, sent to all U.S. embassies and military missions abroad.)

For the next three years Carter struggled to preserve his self-imposed ceiling on the dollar value of U.S. arms exports to nonexempt countries and to fulfill the other aspects of his policy. In Latin America, for example, he reintroduced the ban on sales of high-technology weaponry first instituted by President John F. Kennedy. He also succeeded in reducing total U.S. sales to non-NATO countries from $9.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1977 to $8.6 billion in FY 1978 and $8.4 billion in FY 1979.

From the beginning, however, Carter came under intense pressure from both domestic and international forces to abandon his arms restraint policy. At home he was besieged by supporters of Israel, who sought to exempt that country from any of the restrictions on high-technology arms exports. The domestic arms industry also campaigned strenuously against the restrictive provisions of PD-13. Overseas the president's determination to adhere to these provisions was

undermined by growing Soviet assertiveness in the Third World, most notably in Afghanistan. Buffeted on both sides by antagonistic forces, Carter decided to abandon the arms ceiling in 1979.

Even before announcing this decision, Carter had made a virtual about-face on the arms export issue. In February 1978 he authorized the transfer of two hundred advanced combat aircraft to three countries in the Middle East—-supplying sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia, fifty F-5Es to Egypt, and a combination of ninety F-15s and F-16s to Israel. Six months later he gave preliminary approval to the sale of another $12 billion worth of high-tech weaponry to Iran. Other major sales of this sort were announced in the final months of his administration.

The changing international environment doomed another key aspect of the Carter policy: a determined U.S. effort to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to mutual restraint on arms exports to the developing areas. Between December 1977 and September 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union held four meetings to consider restrictions of this sort. Known as the Conventional Arms Trade Talks (CATT), these negotiations produced consensus on certain matters of principle and terminology, but never resulted in agreement on specific control measures. With superpower tensions rising in the Middle East and elsewhere, the two sides discontinued the talks at the end of 1978.

Ronald Reagan, who became president in 1981, repudiated what little survived of the Carter arms policy and promised to expand U.S. military aid to threatened allies abroad. His administration's revised, pro-sales stance was initially spelled out in a speech by Undersecretary of State James L. Buckley before the Aerospace Industries Association on 21 May 1981. Rejecting the notion that arms sales are "inherently evil or morally reprehensible," Buckley affirmed that "this administration believes that arms transfers, judiciously applied, can complement and supplement our own defense efforts." These views were incorporated into a new presidential directive on arms transfers, signed by Reagan on 8 July 1981.

In contrast to the Carter directive on arms transfers, the Reagan policy did not portray the global arms flow as a potential threat to international peace and stability. Rather, U.S. arms exports were described as a vital adjunct to America's efforts to counter (what was seen as) the growing power and assertiveness of the Soviet Union. As Undersecretary Buckley explained on 21 May, "We are faced not only with the need to rebuild and modernize our own military forces, but also to help other nations in the free world to rebuild theirs."

In line with this outlook, Reagan repudiated the arms-export ceiling set by President Carter and abolished the ban on sales of high-tech weapons to friendly Third World nations. The new administration also eased the repayment terms for any U.S. arms purchased by developing countries with credits supplied through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. And, in a move that was eagerly sought by American arms manufacturers, Reagan rescinded the "leprosy letter" of 31 August 1977, and instructed U.S. diplomatic personnel to assist American military firms in securing contracts abroad.

As a result of these and similar initiatives, U.S. arms exports soared during the Reagan era. According to the Department of Defense, military sales under the FMS program jumped from $8.2 billion in FY 1981 (the last year affected by the Carter policy) to $20.9 billion in FY 1982—a one-year increase of 155 percent. In addition to condoning a dollar increase in military exports, the Reagan administration approved the sale of some of America's most sophisticated aircraft, missiles, and tanks to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other favored clients in the developing areas. All told, the United States exported approximately $92 billion worth of arms and military equipment during the Reagan era.

For the most part, President Reagan enjoyed strong congressional support for his efforts to boost U.S. arms sales abroad. He did, however, encounter significant opposition to a number of specific transactions. Most notable in this regard was his 1981 plan to sell five Advanced Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, along with other sophisticated weapons, to Saudi Arabia for $8.5 billion—the largest single U.S. arms package until that date. Many members of Congress, including a substantial number of Republicans, announced their intention to block the AWACS sale in accordance with the veto provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, on the grounds that it would pose a potential threat to the security of Israel. Only after a major lobbying campaign by the president was the White House able to defeat the veto effort in the Senate by the narrow vote of 52–48.

Aside from the AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia, the arms transactions of the Reagan era that provoked the most controversy involved the

covert delivery of weapons to anticommunist insurgents in countries ruled by allies of Moscow. As part of his drive to combat Soviet influence in the developing areas, President Reagan authorized the transfer of arms and ammunition to the Islamic *mujahideen* in Afghanistan, the rebel forces of Jonas Savimbi in Angola, and the anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua. Although these efforts were supported by some in Congress, the covert arms program provoked a major national crisis when it was discovered in 1986 that the National Security Council staff had sold U.S. antitank missiles to archenemy Iran, then ruled by the Ayatollah Khomeini, in order to finance arms deliveries to the contras. In what became known as the Iran-Contra affair, the administration's covert arms program came under intense congressional scrutiny and was subjected to a number of severe constraints.

THE GULF WAR AND BEYOND

Until 1990 U.S. arms exports were largely governed by Cold War priorities and a desire to reap the economic benefits of military sales. During all the years in which the United States and the Soviet Union competed for political influence in Third World areas, arms transfers were viewed in Washington as an indispensable tool of foreign policy—thus making reductions of the sort envisioned by President Carter nearly impossible to implement. With the end of the Cold War, however, the national security justification for arms transfers lost some of its persuasiveness, and greater emphasis was placed on the economic justification for export sales. This, however, exposed U.S. arms sales to objections of a moral nature, like those articulated after World War I. And, indeed, international events were to lend fresh vigor to these sorts of concerns.

The Cold War was still winding down in August 1990 when Iraqi forces commenced their invasion of Kuwait. Observers were initially struck by the speed and brazenness of the invasion, which could only be viewed as a willful violation of international law. But another aspect of the invasion also sparked international attention: the fact that Iraqi forces were equipped with very large numbers of sophisticated weapons that had been obtained from foreign suppliers. During the previous eight years Iraq had spent an estimated $43 billion on imported weapons, giving it the most modern and powerful arsenal of any nation in the developing world. Many of these arms were supplied by the Soviet Union (long Iraq's major supplier), but others were acquired from France and other Western countries. This led to widespread charges that the major suppliers bore some degree of responsibility for Iraq's aggressive behavior, in that they had provided the means for mounting the 1990 invasion. Thus, when the Gulf War concluded in late February 1991, many international figures called for the adoption of new multilateral restraints on the transfer of arms to areas of conflict.

In response to these pressures, representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P-5 powers) met in Paris in July 1991 to address the problem of conventional arms transfers—the first multilateral discussions of this sort since the failed CATT negotiations of the 1970s. At the end of the meeting, the P-5 delegates issued a communiqué in which they pledged to develop new controls on the arms trade. For the first time these countries acknowledged that "indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability," and that, as the world's leading suppliers of such items, they bore "special responsibilities" to practice restraint. With this in mind they promised to develop a set of "agreed guidelines" for a regime of mutual restraint.

At a second meeting of the P-5 nations, held in London on 17–18 October 1991, the delegates adopted a formal set of guidelines for conventional arms restraint. While reserving the right to provide arms to established states for the purpose of legitimate self-defense, they agreed to avoid transfers that would be likely to "(a) prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict; (b) increase tension in a region or contribute to regional instability; (c) introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a region." But, although they were united on these basic points, the P-5 states still had to establish formal criteria and procedures for their effective implementation. This task was left to subsequent meetings, to be held in 1992.

Before the P-5 states could meet again, however, domestic politics in the United States intruded into the process. As the November 1992 presidential election approached, President George H. W. Bush (then trailing in the national polls) agreed to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, thus providing a significant economic boon to Texas (where the planes would be built). Although of dubious political benefit to Bush (who subsequently lost the election), the F-16 sale

to Taiwan greatly angered China, which immediately withdrew from the P-5 negotiations. With China out of the picture, the other participating states saw no reason to proceed on their own, and the talks were suspended—never to be revived.

In his final months in office, Bush approved a number of major military sales abroad, claiming they served to enhance U.S. security by bolstering the forces of friendly nations in strategic areas, especially the Middle East. Arguing that the United States would need to rely on the support of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in any future encounter with Iraq, he authorized the sale of billions of dollars' worth of advanced aircraft, missiles, and armored vehicles to these three countries. In justifying these sales, Bush was not inhibited about touting the economic advantages of such transactions; at the same time, however, he sought to breathe new life into the national security arguments of the Cold War period by emphasizing their application to the new realities of the post–Cold War era.

Many of these sales were announced during the 1992 presidential campaign, and so it is hardly surprising that Democratic candidate Bill Clinton expressed concern over the magnitude of U.S. arms exports. Moreover, after winning the election, Clinton indicated that he would take a fresh look at American arms transfer policies. This suggested to some that he would resurrect some of the restrictive policies of the Carter administration. Once in office, however, Clinton followed essentially the same path as his predecessor—approving major sales that benefited American arms manufacturers while supporting U.S. security objectives in vital areas, such as the Middle East and the Pacific Rim.

To provide greater coherence to U.S. policy in this area, Clinton appointed a special commission on conventional arms exports. On the basis of this review, he announced a new conventional arms transfer policy on 17 February 1995. Reiterating many of the arguments made by previous administrations, the Clinton policy embraced both the security and the economic justifications for military sales. With respect to the latter, the policy specifically mandated that "the impact on U.S. industry" of pending sales was to be taken into account when deciding on future transactions.

In line with this policy, Clinton approved a series of major arms sales to friendly nations in the Persian Gulf area. Arguing that the United States had vital security interests in this region—notably the free flow of oil—and that these countries would be called on to assist U.S. forces in the event of an attack by Iran or Iraq, Clinton authorized the transfer of $46.5 billion worth of military hardware to the Middle East in 1993–2000—an amount that represented about three-fourths of the total value of all U.S. military transfers to the developing world. Saudi Arabia was the principal beneficiary of this largess, obtaining 72 advanced F-15XP Eagle jet fighters, 150 M-1A2 Abrams tanks, 12 Patriot air-defense missile batteries, and thousands of missiles of various types; Kuwait obtained 6 Patriot missile units, 256 M-1A2 Abrams tanks, and 16 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters; and the UAE obtained 10 AH-64s and 80 F-16 fighters.

By the time Clinton left office in early 2001, arms transfers had come to be seen in Washington as a normal, legitimate aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The United States completely dominated the international market, providing about two-fifths of all weapons transferred to developing countries in the 1992–1999 period (measured in dollar terms). Although Clinton encountered opposition to a number of specific transactions in Congress—for example, the sale of advanced jet fighters to Latin American countries—most lawmakers endorsed the basic premises of U.S. arms export policy.

Little change in this picture was expected when George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001. Even more than Clinton, the younger Bush emphasized the centrality of national security considerations in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy—a stance that typically has entailed a predisposition to provide favored allies with large quantities of sophisticated weaponry. Indeed, Bush signaled his support for this approach in April 2001, when he approved the sale of four missile-armed warships and eight diesel-powered submarines to Taiwan.

But while most senior U.S. policymakers generally harbor a relaxed attitude toward arms transfers, the historic concern over the moral implications of such exports has not disappeared altogether. Many peace, human rights, and religious organizations continue to argue that foreign military sales undermine American values and interests by enhancing the repressive capabilities of authoritarian governments, by fueling local arms races in areas of tension, and by encouraging states to seek military rather than negotiated solutions to their disputes with others. These concerns have surfaced in a number of legislative proposals introduced by sympathetic members of Congress, and in occasional newspaper editorials.

Whether they will have any impact on future policy remains to be seen, but such efforts are likely to remain an important feature of the national debate over U.S. foreign policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Grimmett, Richard F. *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993–2000.* Congressional Research Service Report to Congress. Washington, D.C., 2001. See also earlier editions of this annual publication.

Hammond, Paul Y., David J. Louscher, Michael D. Salomon, and Norman A. Graham. *The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales.* Cambridge, Mass., 1983.

Harkavy, Robert E. *The Arms Trade and International Systems.* Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

Hartung, William D. *And Weapons for All.* New York, 1994.

Klare, Michael T. *American Arms Supermarket.* New York, 1984.

Krause, Keith. *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade.* Cambridge, U.K., 1992.

Laurance, Edward J. *The International Arms Trade.* New York, 1992.

Neuman, Stephanie G., and Robert E. Harkavy, eds. *Arms Transfers in the Modern World.* New York, 1979.

Pierre, Andrew J. *The Global Politics of Arms Sales.* Princeton, N.J., 1982.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.* London, 2000. See also earlier editions of this annual publication.

Thayer, George. *The War Business.* New York, 1969.

Zwoll, Wayne van. *America's Great Gunmakers.* South Hackensack, N.J., 1992.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BALANCE OF POWER; CONTAINMENT; COVERT OPERATIONS; FOREIGN AID; MILITARISM; TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM.

ASYLUM

Michael Dunne

John Bassett Moore, the greatest American international lawyer of his age, wrote in his monumental *Digest of International Law* (1906): "No legal term in common use is perhaps so lacking in uniformity and accuracy of definition as the 'right of asylum.'" A century later, the same can still be said. Asylum, originally conceived as a right claimed by an individual fugitive, is now more readily regarded as a privilege abused by hordes of foreigners, self-styled refugees seeking to avoid the immigration restrictions of beneficent countries. The twentieth century, which began at the high point of intercontinental and peaceful migration, ended as intracontinental migration became increasingly salient and more and more contentious politically. Western and northern Europeans worried about "economic migrants" from the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc. From the Horn of Africa through the Great Lakes to the mouth of the Congo millions of people have been displaced through war and famine; South and Southeast Asia have seen comparable human exoduses. In the Western Hemisphere the debate has concerned the movement of migrants, overwhelmingly Spanish-speaking people, into the United States from the Caribbean and Central America. Thus to understand "asylum" in an American context we need to look at the historical evolution of the term as it has become entangled with the twin issues of immigration and refugee policy, both of which are themselves part of the larger pattern of domestic and foreign policymaking in the United States.

THE EVOLUTION OF ASYLUM

The practice of asylum (like the word itself) can be traced to ancient Greece, where particular altars and similar holy places offered sanctuary to fugitives, especially ill-used slaves. In the early Roman Republic the comparable custom protected aliens fleeing from other states, and though the practice was weakened during the first centuries of the Roman Empire, losing what little legality it originally possessed, the tradition that fugitives might seek at least temporary protection against those with greater physical power or apparent right reemerged with the establishment of Christianity. Churches were now designated as places of sanctuary, and the rights and duties of both fugitive and pursuer became formulated in increasing detail through imperial promulgations (such as the fifth-century *Codex Theodosianus*, books 9 and 16) and customary law. So it was for a thousand years in Europe until the Reformation began eroding such religious privileges—a process of abatement that continued until the late eighteenth century and the advent of the American and French revolutions.

As the authority of Rome and the Catholic Church declined, so conversely grew the power of the secular though usually Protestant state. For many centuries asylum had been understood as the granting of a privileged and protected area within a wider jurisdiction (the precincts of a church within the territory of a feudal lord). Since the seventeenth century, however, asylum has been understood as the creation by one jurisdiction (a "sovereign" state) of a privileged status for an individual from the reach of an opposing claimant, invariably another sovereign state whose "subject" the fugitive was. Thus, the common theme that links present-day notions and practices of asylum to those of the classical and premodern world is the special or "privileged" status of the would-be asylum-seeker vis-à-vis the state of original jurisdiction and the sought-after haven or sanctuary within a state of refuge.

Against this element of continuity, which emphasizes the individual's pursuit of safety from the executive and judicial power of one authority, has to be set the distinctive feature of asylum as it developed in the twentieth century, especially in

the years since World War II. Now when the term "asylum" is used, attention focuses upon the mass movement of people. The involuntary migration of people, of minorities expelled or fleeing from a hostile majority, is nothing new: so it was for the Jews and Muslims after the Reconquista in Spain in the late fifteenth century and for the Huguenots in France following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. In the twentieth century similar enforced population movements met the barriers created by the immigration policies of host countries. Thus, in the discourse of the early twentieth-first century, asylum became a term connoting mass migration, the laws and practices of host states in dealing with would-be immigrants, and the formal responsibilities of such states in the face of the legal rights and humanitarian demands of such alien refugees. The putative rights of a single individual are now overshadowed by the vision of those self-same rights exercised by thousands, even millions, of prospective incomers.

Given that the United States was rhetorically created partly as a haven for the oppressed; given the historical fact that the United States is a country of immigration ("a nation of nations"); and given the range of responsibilities that positive and customary international law now places upon the United States and all other sovereign states toward refugees, the issue of asylum has unsurprisingly become intensely debated and highly controversial. Even so, one element may be briefly—and relatively uncontentiously—explicated. Paradoxically, it is the topic that was once regarded as synonymous with asylum *tout cour,* namely diplomatic asylum.

DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM

In the course of the rise of the modern state system, diplomats became invested with various privileges and immunities, part and parcel of the convenient but necessary fiction that ambassadors and their entourage occupied within their country of posting (the "territorial" sovereign) an enclave of their own sovereign power. Thus persons and property of the "sending state" enjoyed within the protected zone customary (so-called extraterritorial) rights and were exempt from the normal reach of the executive and judicial power of the host or "receiving state," to cite the language of the two Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963 governing diplomatic and consular practice, respectively. Accordingly, an embassy could by custom extend the protection of its premises to fugitives from the summary justice or even lynch law of the host country. (Warships and merchant vessels were treated similarly.)

This tradition of diplomatic asylum became particularly strong in Latin America during the nineteenth century—a reflection of the political violence that frequently accompanied regime changes within the continent. By custom such asylum was not extended to ordinary criminals ("persons accused of or condemned for common crimes") but rather to "political offenders," those refugees whose only offense, it was asserted, lay in their beliefs. To regulate this tradition, in the first half of the twentieth century the Latin American republics negotiated a series of conventions (Havana in 1928, Montevideo in 1933, Caracas in 1954), though not all the countries ratified the results. The Caracas convention followed a bitterly fought dispute between Peru and Colombia before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. In two connected decisions, the Asylum and Haya de la Torre cases, 1950–1951, the court held that the right of diplomatic asylum did not exist through customary international law but, if at all, only by virtue of explicit bilateral or multilateral treaties, or through the established and reciprocal action of both countries. (Ironically, in the absence of a legal solution, the court urged the parties to resolve their dispute by negotiations and compromise, in other words, through what in lay terms would be called diplomacy.) Surveying the history and jurisprudence of diplomatic asylum, *sub voce* the scholar and advocate Ian Brownlie writes that, despite the examples drawn from "Latin American regional custom, . . . it is very doubtful if a right of asylum for either political or other offenders is recognized by general international law."

The United States, like other major powers, has generally disapproved of the invocation of diplomatic immunity for fugitives. But not long after the eventual resolution of the Colombian-Peruvian case, the U.S. embassy in Budapest granted diplomatic asylum to the Roman Catholic primate of Hungary, Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, as the Americans registered their profound opposition to the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in October–November 1956. This episode—an exception to normal U.S. policy—was a deliberate Cold War tactic and has to be seen as part of a larger pattern of American diplomatic and legal responses to the political and ideological challenges of communism. At the end of

the Korean War (1950–1953), for example, the U.S.–led United Nations negotiators offered asylum en masse to North Korean and mainland Chinese prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated to their home countries.

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION

Diplomatic asylum, understood as a particular form of sheltering fugitives, may be seen as the correlative to extradition, the mainly executive but also partly judicial process whereby an escapee is denied asylum (whether territorial or extraterritorial) and surrendered by one sovereign power to another for trial and punishment of criminal offenses. The usual protections for political offenders have been part of the custom and treaty law governing such rendition since the 1830s, the pioneering work of French, Belgian, and Dutch jurisconsults and legislators who reversed the pre-French Revolution tradition of surrendering political opponents and harboring ordinary criminals. In the United States, the paradigmatic act of 1848, "for the apprehension and delivering up of certain offenders," limited U.S. extradition practice not by category of alleged offense but through reciprocal international treaty. (The United States in 2001 had extradition treaties with more than one hundred other states.) As for multilateral extradition treaties, once again the republics of the Western Hemisphere led the way, beginning with the somewhat abortive treaties of 1889 and 1902, the distant precursors of the 1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition, which explicitly protects "the right of asylum when its exercise is appropriate." There the burden of the proviso is to protect "political" fugitives specifically, though not exclusively. But, as the U.S. Departments of Justice and State both glossed apropos a typical extradition treaty with Jordan, "political offense" is a category frequently used but never defined in such treaties.

Until the post–World War II period the most controversial example of the political exemption for asylum-seekers was the refusal of the Dutch authorities to surrender Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern to the victorious Allies for trial as a war criminal under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (article 227), which had arraigned the former kaiser for his "supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." Since World War II and particularly the establishment of the ad hoc Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals for the trial of war criminals (1945–1948), various multilateral instruments have diminished such residual protections, allusively so in the exhortatory Universal Declaration of Human Rights and specifically in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, both adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948. Controversies that have remained have usually been not for substantive reasons but rather on procedural grounds, for example grants of domestic immunity, the forceful seizure (kidnapping) of the accused, and unfitness to plead, the latter being argued in the high-profile case in 1998–2000 of the former president of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, whose case was taken on appeal against extradition to the highest court in England, the House of Lords. (In this instance the executive rather than the judicial branch—an uncertain distinction in the British constitutional system—released Pinochet from extradition to Spain.)

Here again, American and European attitudes have been similar: "forcible abduction" is permissible, provided the terms of any extradition treaty are applicable; such was the decision in *United States* v. *Verdugo-Urquidez* (1992). Undoubtedly the most famous modern case in which kidnapping was ruled to be inconsequential to the prosecution of inter alia "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" was that of the German Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann, which was decided on appeal before the Israeli Supreme Court in 1962. In this case the judges, as they put it, "rel[ied] on a long array of local, British, American and Continental precedents" to deny the appellant "asylum" in his former refuge of Argentina.

In the federal system of the United States extradition between states rests upon article 4, section 2, of the Constitution, requiring that "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime . . . shall . . . be delivered up" on demand by the applicant state. Significantly, the following paragraph implicitly invalidates the competence of any state to offer asylum and hence possible freedom to a fugitive slave—an interpretation borne out by the provisions of the contemporaneous Northwest Ordinance. (Congress passed a combined fugitive slave and extradition act in 1793.) This conjunction of principles in the federal Constitution acts as a valuable reminder of the intimate relationship between law and politics in American history, the permeability of the so-

called domestic and foreign spheres, and that general and particularly universal statements of rights —what we would today call "human rights"— must always be seen in their historical and specific context. The defense of slavery by the signatories of the Declaration of Independence is the locus classicus of this discordant interplay, and the invocation of this same Declaration by the delegates to the Convention of Seneca Falls in 1848 likewise confirms the general rule, with this latter meeting on American women's rights itself deriving from the worldwide antislavery campaign.

Slavery and particularly the slave trade were a constant irritant in Anglo-American relations from Jay's Treaty of 1794 (which provided for limited extradition for certain felonies—hence conditional denial of "asylum"—between the two countries) through the War of 1812 and the abolition of slavery within the British empire in 1833 until the time of the Civil War. In the case of the slave mutiny upon the brig *Creole* in 1841, law officers in England ruled that the colonial authorities in the West Indies could not surrender the fugitives to the U.S. government without specific parliamentary approval. (There was also the separate though weighty matter of the slaves' gaining freedom by virtue of their arrival within the jurisdiction of the English courts—an issue that had pre-independence roots in the groundbreaking *Sommersett* case of 1772.) Extradition, in other words, though an executive function of government, required in this case statutory authority—a process of legitimation that came most notably through the first (British) Extradition Act of 1870, with its protections for political refugees.

The negotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 between Britain and the United States helped to resolve the legacy of the *Creole* dispute while agreeing on the terms of nonpolitical extradition. But the difficulties between American and British jurisdictions and jurisprudence over the definition of political as distinct from criminal ("terrorist") offenses reemerged with the resumption of the Irish Troubles in the late 1960s. Yet the two countries are not unique in their differences. As Guy Goodwin-Gill authoritatively observed: "International law provides no guidance on the substance of the concept [political offence exception], other than its outermost limits." Inside the United States, the early federal legislation on interstate rendition was interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Kentucky* v. *Dennison* (1861) as merely declaratory and thus discretionary. It remained until long after the abolition of slavery for the Supreme Court (*Puerto Rico* v. *Branstad*, 1987) to rule that state authorities had no discretion on rendition. Interstate asylum, in other words, did not exist.

PRE–WORLD WAR II BARRIERS TO ASYLUM AND REFUGE

Diplomatic and territorial asylum (the latter term employable even in an interstate context) are concepts with a largely nineteenth-century resonance, privileges understood as benefiting individuals. Since the early part of the twentieth century, however, asylum has become linked with the fate of groups. Thus, to understand U.S. asylum law as currently practiced and debated, three different chronologies or narratives must be brought together. The first is the pattern of formal U.S. immigration legislation and executive action since the 1870s, the second is the contemporaneous and related history of international migration, and the third is the development of an international regime governing refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly in the years since World War II.

Whatever the proper interpretation of the discretionary power or mandatory obligations of the individual states in interstate rendition, the exclusive power of Congress over the admission and deportation of aliens is beyond dispute. Such was the import of two groups of cases the Supreme Court adjudicated in line with article 1, section 8, of the Constitution: the so-called Passenger Cases of 1849 and 1876, followed by the notorious half dozen Chinese Exclusion Cases from 1884 to 1893. This was the jurisprudential context in which Congress drafted immigration policy along explicitly racial lines and thus set in place for eight decades one of the three basic categories of inclusion and exclusion of aliens (and ultimately their safe refuge and asylum). In the first phase, from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 until the Immigration Act of 1917, Asian immigration was severely restricted. Meanwhile, as increasing numbers of immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe, Congress reacted in the 1920s with two laws, the (Temporary) Quota Act of 1921 and the (Johnson-Reed) Immigration Act of 1924. Together these two laws placed for the first time a descending ceiling over the annual number of immigrants, so that the aggregate of permitted immigrants dropped from a pre–World War I average of just under one million down first to approximately 360,000 and then to 150,000.

Within this shrinking total the ratio of new to old immigrants was also drastically reduced, with the countries of the old immigration being eventually awarded more than four-fifths of the final quotas: Germany, for example, was allocated some 26,000 visas, versus Italy's 6,000. The unprecedented "national-origins" or "quota" system, which required entry visas to be issued in the country of application, came fully into operation in 1929. These basic formulas set American immigration policy until the 1960s, not least in excluding from the calculations those born in the Western Hemisphere, mainly Mexico and Canada, who would form a growing number relatively and absolutely of the "non-quota" immigrants.

As immigration into the United States from Europe was severely limited under the legislation of the 1920s, migration within Europe and Asia Minor took on a new importance during and immediately after World War I. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Russians, and Turks were displaced as so-called nation-states succeeded former multinational empires in eastern Europe and the Near East. Under the new League of Nations regime, negotiated population transfers (notably between Greece and Turkey), the protection of remaining minorities (in Poland and Romania), and the relief of indigent refugees (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) became international responsibilities, with League of Nations bodies such as the High Commission for Refugees and the International Labor Office (predecessors of today's Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Labor Organization, respectively), individual countries (France particularly), and nongovernmental agencies such as the Red Cross supplying various kinds of help. The legacy of these different responses would be most clearly seen during and shortly after World War II, when the United Nations, with the United States in the leading role, assumed a comparable role in meeting the needs of the latest generation of refugees.

If the 1920s was the decade of a new international responsibility for displaced persons, then the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s produced forced migrations and displacement on a scale not seen for centuries in Europe and Asia. (Events in China had no effect upon U.S. refugee policy; but experts calculate that the onset of all-out war by the Japanese in 1937 led to the flight of tens of millions of Chinese inland from the coastal regions toward the north and west.) Figures capture the horror rather than express precisely the enormity of the human suffering: an estimated minimum of 40 million Europeans were displaced in two main stages, first under the Nazis and their allies until the failure of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in 1942–1943. The war was followed by a decade of "ethnic Germans" (*Volksdeutsche*) removing to the defeated fatherland and Slavs migrating mainly eastward and within the enlarged Soviet Union and its satellites (especially the Ukraine and Poland). Despite calling an intergovernmental conference at Evian, France, in July 1938 on the refugee crisis, President Franklin D. Roosevelt provided no leadership at home to effect changes in immigration policy to permit extra-quota places for victims of Nazi persecution.

After the net emigration that characterized the first (Great Depression) half of the 1930s came a net immigration in the second half of the decade and early war years that saw a maximum of 250,000 refugees enter the United States within quota. The end result was the lowest absolute decennial total admission of immigrants into the country since the census period 1820–1830, when 143,000 persons had arrived on U.S. shores. (The period 1831–1840 saw 600,000 immigrants, while in 1931–1940 it was just 528,000.) Thus, despite the arrival of some famous asylum-seekers (Hannah Arendt, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann) into the United States from the Europe of the impending Holocaust, numerically the impact of such refugees was minimal. Indeed, Eichmann argued in his own defense that the "final solution to the Jewish question" was facilitated by the general resistance to Jewish immigration—a claim corroborated by contemporary American opinion polls.

THE POST–WORLD WAR II YEARS

The interwar years had shown no sign of the adaptation of the immigration laws to cope with asylum-seekers en masse: such is the message authoritatively recorded in the 1945 analysis by Charles Cheney Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*. The legacy of national quotas in U.S. immigration law lasted beyond the weakening of the anti-Asian nativism that had been at work since the 1880s, the latter hostility mitigated and overlapping in the short term with more overtly political criteria for exclusion.

The Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952 exemplified this more recent mixture in a tense Cold War context, as did the earlier Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, which also dealt, inter alia, with alien exclusion. Yet there was a wartime hint of the remaking of U.S. immigration policy by different criteria from the national-origins ideals of the 1920s, when in 1943 the total prohibition against Chinese immigration was minutely but significantly eased as part of the American conciliation of Nationalist China, one of the Big Five in the wartime anti-Axis alliance. Two years later President Truman by executive order gave priority to "displaced persons" in the allocation of European quotas—though within the existing national totals. Only with such measures as the Displaced Persons Acts of 1948 and 1951 and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 were the annual quotas actually increased, at first simply by amortizing initial excesses against correspondingly reduced later totals. (An exception was made for the entry of non-quota wives, husbands, and orphans.) From 1945 until 1960 some 700,000 people were admitted to the United States under various "refugee-escapee" exemptions and programs—the beneficiaries of a deliberate Cold War policy directed against the Soviet bloc and communism in general by encouraging disaffected emigrants.

It required the more liberal, 1960s civil rights atmosphere to eliminate (via the landmark 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act) the ethnically coded national-origins system as the basis for the selection of immigrants. Yet quotas remained under the 1965 act, as they had under McCarran-Walter. But now they were absolute, limited to 20,000 for any one country, while for the first time immigration from within the Western Hemisphere was restricted to 120,000, effective in mid-1968, within a global maximum set initially at 290,000. (The 20,000 per country limit was extended to the Americas in 1976, and in 1978 the hemispheric subtotals were aggregated to 290,000 worldwide.) Within this changing ideological and numerical framework exceptions would be made for refugees, who under the new seven-category "preference" system of the Hart-Celler Act would technically occupy the last and smallest category at a maximum of 6 percent of the total for extrahemispheric entrants: an estimated 10,200, who would also include victims of natural disasters. (The refugees were expected to come from the Soviet bloc and the Middle East.) Finally, an unspecified number of refugees could be "paroled" into the United States by the attorney general—in other words, given a conditional right to reside despite their irregular status. This latter provision gave statutory form to the situation after the Hungarian uprising, when the great majority of the 38,000 refugees were initially admitted through the attorney general's parole power.

Edward P. Hutchinson, concluding his classic account *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy* with an analysis of the Hart-Celler Act, emphasizes the interconnection of legislation since the formative post–Civil War Immigration Act of 1875 with both the older tradition of political and religious asylum and the development of a post–World War II refugee regime by the U.S. government. He then blends all these factors together under the rubric "refugee asylum" as an "element of immigration law and policy." Indeed, at least half a dozen legal instruments between 1875 and the consolidating Immigration Act of 1917 contained provisions protecting political and religious freedoms—what we would call offering "political asylum"—while simultaneously barring racial undesirables. Thus, like other authorities Hutchinson endorses the argument that "asylum" in its more technical sense has to be understood within the wider context of the roads and obstacles to would-be migrants to the United States. As Colin Harvey perceptively writes, "Law is Janus-faced, it both coerces and enables. Refugee law . . . both excludes and includes."

The mutation of the quota system from its 1920s ethnic bias and the introduction of an allotment for refugees were two innovations in the Hart-Celler Act. (For all its ideological importance, the law was technically an amendment to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.) Conversely, a more recent tradition was continued outside the provisions of Hart-Celler, with asylum privileges extended ad hoc sometimes by formal legislation and at other times by presidential action. This twin-track approach has characterized federal policy since the 1940s, despite at least six major general laws passed by Congress in the succeeding decades. Yet other factors have also been involved, the practical force of which is difficult to quantify but which have been important at a rhetorical, symbolic level.

One example is the role of the United States as the most powerful country within the United Nations and, therefore, inescapably identified with exhortatory UN pronouncements, even when the United States has either opposed or not signed the relevant multilateral treaties, later failed to ratify

such binding instruments, or qualified ratification with terms seriously limiting the resultant obligations—a three-way method of American conduct traced by scholars such as David Forsythe, Louis Henkin, and Natalie Kaufman. (The Genocide Convention, which provided for extradition and voided pleas of "political crimes," was signed by the U.S. government in 1948, submitted to the Senate in June 1949, and finally received conditional consent from the Senate almost four decades later, in 1986.) Thus, the years since World War II show a pattern of complicated adjustments to U.S. immigration policy (which ultimately determines the legal entry for refugees and asylum-seekers) alongside an international rhetoric and the growth of a legal regime governing refugees and asylum-seekers, both of which are significantly shaped by the United States but not necessarily put into practice within its own borders.

THE UN ASYLUM AND REFUGEE REGIME

The Hart-Celler Act became fully operational in 1968, by coincidence the Human Rights Year celebrated by the United Nations to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1948, the UDHR echoed those provisions of the 1945 UN Charter that explicitly "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," stating, in the precise formulation of the UDHR article 14: (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution; (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Given the crucial role of the United States in the establishment in 1945 of the United Nations Organization—the multifaceted structure that gave institutional and eponymous form to the U.S.–led wartime alliance initially created by twenty-six states in January 1942 "to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands"—there might seem no possible exception to an American obligation to provide asylum to asylum-seekers. Yet a number of factors show the weakness of this deduction. At the most general level the UN Charter (chapter 1, article 2) forbade any UN "interven[tion] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The government of the United States, both the Congress and the executive, had traditionally regarded immigration (under the broader heading of the admission of aliens) as a matter determinable solely by the United States itself—a claim of national prerogative amply demonstrated in the senatorial and wider public debate in 1945–1946 over the conditions for American adherence to the UN Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore and specifically, even the terms of the nonbinding UDHR simply expressed traditional legal practice: the right of an individual to seek asylum was not disputed, but it remained for the host state or sovereign to grant asylum so that it might then be enjoyed—a qualification repeated passim in the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1967. Moreover, even the granting and enjoyment of so-called diplomatic asylum was not unconditional. Such considerations must be borne in mind when we read the later resolution of the General Assembly (24 October 1970) that the UN Charter precepts "constitute basic principles of international law."

As for refugees and would-be asylees, here the UN formulated two documents detailing international obligations toward those in need of such "social and humanitarian" protection: the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although "asylum" is a term absent from the body of both texts, the respective preambles and the context of the documents make the identification clear. The United States became a party to both instruments by signing and ratifying the later protocol, the purpose of which was to remove the temporal and geographical limits of the convention. Aside from the shift of UN (and American) concern from postwar Europe to Cold War Africa and Asia, the accession of the United States to the Refugee Protocol was yet another sign, paralleling the Hart-Celler Act, of the erosion of overt racialism in foreign policymaking. In refugee law, the convention and later protocol established an important textual commitment. In the formula of the convention, article 33 (subsumed in the protocol, article 1): "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

This paragraph gave multilateral treaty form to the principle of nonrefoulement (from the French *refouler,* to turn back, expel)—the obligation of a state not to expose a refugee within its territorial limits or under its jurisdiction to expulsion into the hands of former or likely persecutors. To this particular commitment two rather different qualifications can be made here. First, the convention's governing condition was the "well-founded fear of being persecuted" in the mind of the refugee, phrasing that would allow judges and officials of the host state to consider a mixture of subjective and objective factors in determining entitlement to asylum for the supplicant. Second (as noted by Hannes Tretter in *International Human Rights*), the wording left unanswered the question "how human rights standards and principles of humanitarian law could be guaranteed to war-refugees or refugees fleeing on economic and social grounds, considering . . . that neither the Convention nor its Protocol offers protection for them." While the United States would become a (conditional) signatory to a number of other human rights treaties—though not, perhaps paradoxically, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights within an inter-American juridical regime—these parameters of nonrefoulement and the selective extension and denial of asylum to economic, social, and political mass-migrants would constitute part of the framework of U.S. immigration policy in the last third of the twentieth century. (The American Convention on Human Rights must be distinguished from the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, in which article 27 speaks of the right "to seek and receive asylum," adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá in 1948, where the Charter of the Organization of American States was approved.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY

Since the passage of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965, four major U.S. laws have been written regulating immigration, and each has contained provisions governing the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers. In chronological and substantive precedence was the Refugee Act of 1980, the first omnibus refugee law ever passed by Congress. Prompted by the acute refugee crisis following the Vietnam War and the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia as well as the long-term problems of Cuban emigration, the legislation enlarged the annual permitted total of refugees (defined along the lines of the 1967 UN protocol) from 17,400 to 50,000, within an overall raising of the immigration ceiling from 290,000 up to 320,000. This figure of 50,000 would be reviewed after three years. Meanwhile, increases for "grave humanitarian" reasons would be possible—if agreed to by the president and Congress, who would also determine the initial annual per-country allocation. (Refugee admissions during the 1980s averaged twice this rate.) Five thousand places within the refugee total were assigned specifically for asylum-seekers, but within a very short time the applications ran at ten times this number. (In later years acceptances for asylum status would move toward 10,000 per year.) Individual states would be reimbursed for the costs of both the future refugee and past asylum programs. Those arriving with refugee status, which is accorded outside the United States, would be permitted to convert to "permanent resident alien" status within one year and thus embark on the road to citizenship.

Three specific features of the act were politically significant: the twenty-year-old Cuban refugee program would be phased out, the previous requirement (a legacy of the 1950s) that refugees hail either from the Middle East or communist regimes was ended, and a proviso was added that, in following the UN definition of refugees, future policy would be guided by the victims' "special humanitarian concern to the United States"—a qualification for selective U.S. engagement. Thus the 1980s would show far more admissions from unfavored regimes in eastern Europe than from favored regimes in Latin America—prima facie evidence of the political definition of refugees and the political selectivity of asylum grants. As a result of the 1980 act, total immigration under the refugee and asylee categories rose to an exceptional peak of 140,000 in fiscal year 1991 (including 23,000 asylees). The figure dropped back to 54,000 in 1998 from 112,000 in 1997, the latter aggregate figure being more representative of the 1990s as a whole.

The next law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), was primarily designed to regularize undocumented Hispanic aliens ("illegals" who lacked or had abused appropriate entry visas) by a double tactic of penalizing employers and offering amnesty to those who had

evaded existing immigration regulations. While these aspects of the IRCA harked back to the labor-control elements of earlier immigration legislation (notably the *bracero* program for migrant Mexicans, 1942–1964), other sections of the law eased the plight of Cuban and Haitian "illegals" who were regarded as political rather than economic victims. Legislators and commentators agreed that the IRCA was designed as the first in a two-stage revision of existing procedures, and four years later Congress more systematically revised the Hart-Celler Act. Under the Immigration Act of 1990, visas for specified labor skills were increased almost threefold (to 140,000) at the relative cost of family-reunification within a larger aggregate of immigrants (up from 500,000 to 700,000, then dropping to 675,000). Asylum-seekers and refugees, if qualified, were to be admitted outside of quota limits: an estimated 131,000 in the first year with an allocation of 10,000 for asylees. Furthermore, the attorney general was given powers to widen the categories (and thus the potential numbers) of aliens in need of "temporary protected status," such as victims of natural disasters and civil wars.

The fourth law in this important quartet was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Beginning its legislative life in the Senate and House as bills to reduce legal immigration as well as to police illegal immigration, the final product in an all-purpose appropriations measure was eventually designed mainly to minimize the numbers, penalize the presence, and expedite the expulsion of "illegals" in general. The annual number of legal immigrants approached pre–World War I highs—against a host population almost three times larger. Fiscal year 1993 was the decade's peak for "new arrivals." Even so, the 1996 act treated asylum-seekers somewhat ambivalently. The grounds for claiming persecution were enlarged to include state-enforced family planning (most obviously in the People's Republic of China), yet the numbers so protected were arbitrarily limited to one thousand per annum.

An authorized speed-up in processing and a later actual increase in rejecting asylum claims, together with limitations on the judicial review of rejections, were part of a growing general hostility to such claimants. (There were comparable immigrant increases and legislative and bureaucratic responses in the European Union.) Asylum applications were running at an annual average of 140,000, with almost four times that number unresolved. This huge figure was mainly due to the acceptance by the INS of an out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit, *American Baptist Churches* v. *Thornburgh* (1991), in which the churches charged that INS asylum policy toward Central American appellants during the 1980s had been driven by political priorities (hostility to the left-wing Sandinistas in Nicaragua and opponents of the U.S.–supported Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments) rather than disinterested application of the refugee criteria. More generally, under the new law the discretion of the executive to parole fugitives en masse would be inhibited by the offset of these parolees against the permitted totals for legal, "documented" immigrants. This particular provision was less the legacy of the Reagan administration in Central America than the particular case of "boat-people" from Cuba and Haiti.

U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE PRACTICE: CUBA AND HAITI

From the early 1960s Cuba has played a peculiar role in the making and conduct of U.S. refugee policy. Since Havana and Washington have periodically agreed to limit Cuban emigration and immigration, both governments have conspired to deny asylum to actual and would-be refugees. Nowhere does the interplay between the domestic and foreign spheres, or the practical limitations of multilateral commitments, appear more starkly than in the control of exit and entry between the two countries. (Article 13, section 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, defines the right to leave and return to one's country as fundamental; but Cuba is not a party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol.) Given the level of official U.S. rhetoric about the denial of human rights in Cuba, the implementation of selective admission for Cuban refugees must be seen as politically inspired.

There have been three notable stages in the pattern of U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. For two decades following Fidel Castro's assumption of power in 1959, Cuban émigrés in the United States enjoyed a privileged position as refugees not subject to the prevailing immigration regulations. The legislative pinnacle was the Cuban Adjustment of Status Act of 1966 (CASA), which permitted some 130,000 Cubans living mainly in Florida and New Jersey to become "permanent resident aliens . . . lawfully admitted for immigration" and thus start on the road to citizen-

ELIÁN GONZÁLEZ

On Thanksgiving Day 1999 a five-year-old Cuban boy, Elián González, was found floating on a tire tube in the sea off Florida. His mother, stepfather, and ten others had drowned when their small boat had capsized during the hazardous voyage. The rescue was *un milagro* (a miracle) in the eyes of many Cuban Americans, especially the powerful Cuban American National Foundation. For the next seven months the fate of Elián filled the media and involved at least four different courts, all three branches of the federal government, and lobbyists nationwide, as family members in Greater Miami and in Cárdenas near Varadero in Cuba struggled over the well-being of the *Cubanito*. Human interest aside, Elián's story showed the workings of the immigration and asylum system in dramatic form.

Initially, as an undocumented alien and a minor, Elián was paroled formally by the attorney general into the care of Miami relatives, who unsuccessfully used the Florida courts to gain long-term legal custody. The state court determined that the matter was properly within the federal remit of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to which the local family applied for asylum status for Elián, and was not a matter of state family law. (In Cuba, Elián's father, Juan Miguel González, opposed these actions, later coming to the United States to plead for the return of his son.) The INS meanwhile refused an asylum application, filed both by Elián and on his behalf by a great-uncle, Lázaro González, adjudging that Elián did not qualify under any statutory provisions, specifically the likelihood of persecution and torture if returned to Cuba. This executive decision, supported by Attorney General Janet Reno, was upheld first at the local level by a U.S. district judge and then by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit sitting in Atlanta.

In the several judicial decisions it was reiterated that the discretionary though delegated powers of the executive over immigration are virtually plenary; and even a paroled alien does not enjoy the constitutional protections of a U.S. citizen. (Bills were introduced in Congress to confer citizenship upon Elián.) The Eleventh Circuit also emphasized that if there was an issue about Elián's age (born 6 December 1993), then this made the role and wishes of his father, Juan, that much more important—rather than the counterclaims of Lázaro and his cosuitors. (For jurisprudential guidance the INS had examined even the Cuban Family Code as well as the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, though the United States is not a party to the CRC.) Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the appropriateness of the INS's considering the foreign policy aspects of any decision. Thus, by late June 2000 state and federal courts had moved to retain the jurisdiction of Elián's status within the INS under the higher authority of the Department of Justice—a sequence confirmed on 28 June, when the U.S. Supreme Court announced it would not take cognizance of the controversies. Later that same day, Elián was flown back to Cuba in the company of his father, having been seized nine weeks earlier—by armed federal agents—from his Miami relatives, whose temporary guardianship had been revoked by the INS. The federal operation, technically authorized or not, shocked even supporters of Elián's reunion with his father.

ship (and, in some states, register their professional qualifications to obtain appropriate employment). Having come as refugees, these beneficiaries of CASA had originally entered under visa waivers or as parolees (at the ultimate discretion of the attorney general), and the Hart-Celler Act had just outlawed such change of status.

The second significant chapter in the Cuban refugee story began in 1980, when as many Cubans left the island in five months as had benefited under CASA. More dramatically—and with much greater political effect—these fugitives, many encouraged by Castro himself in the Mariel boat lift episode, were joined by some 35,000 fugitives from nearby Haiti in a common armada of fragile and tiny boats sailing toward Florida. The 1980 Refugee Act had just been passed; but neither group of *bolseros* had been formally classified as refugees, which meant that neither they nor the host communities (Dade County and Greater Miami) would be eligible for earmarked federal funds such as Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children for individuals and a support program for school districts.

As in 1966, Congress and the president agreed on a solution, in this case to accord refugee

status to the fugitives—thus repeating the process that had brought almost a million Indochinese refugees into the United States. Through the 1980s the numbers of fugitives from Cuba fell back to the hundreds, then in the early 1990s, as a consequence of the deep economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the numbers rose to thousands, with almost 40,000 intercepted by the Coast Guard and other agents in 1994 alone. Such numbers (all potential beneficiaries of CASA) led to the 1994–1995 U.S.–Cuban compromise, whereby Washington agreed to accept 20,000 refugees while Havana would seek to discourage emigration. Those Cubans denied entry (even after an appeal along the terms of the Refugee Act of 1980) were to be repatriated without reprisals. Complicated in its details (which included using the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay on Cuba as a transit camp, operating the parole provisions of CASA to increase the numbers of legal permanent residents, and instituting a "visa lottery" to bridge the gap between applicants and available places), Washington's Cuban immigration policy of the 1990s confirms the general point that asylum, despite the formidable bureaucratic and judicial framework in which it operates, has been employed in practice as a means of promoting broader foreign policy goals while responding to domestic lobbies.

A similar lesson may be drawn from U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees. During the 1980s more than 20,000 Haitian boat people were interdicted (arrested) by U.S. officials at sea—and only one in a thousand was permitted to make an application for asylum. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights demurred, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993 (*Sale* v. *Haitian Centers Council Inc., et al.*) upheld 8 to 1 the authority of the executive effectively to refoul such migrants despite the explicit commitments of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol and the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act. Supporters of the interdiction policy, begun in earnest by President Ronald Reagan and continued through Bill Clinton's presidency, argued that the Haitians were "economic migrants" instead of political refugees, while some critics, particularly from the Congressional Black Caucus, detected racism at work. (The 1980 post-Mariel settlement had been less favorable to the Haitian refugees.) But there was another echo of the Cuban saga: in 1998 the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, modeled on CASA, was passed by Congress to allow more than 40,000 Haitian asylum claimants or parolees to adjust to "legal permanent residence"—while the policy of interdiction continued.

CONCLUSION

Tracing the pattern of executive and congressional actions in the twentieth century bears out the general point made by Joyce Vialet, an authority on the law and history of U.S. immigration, that "the distinction between immigrants and refugees, unheard of during the mass migrations of the 19th century, . . . developed in the wake of World War II, primarily as a means of reconciling our traditional ideal of asylum with restrictions in the immigration law." With the designation of the "Asiatic barred zone" in the 1917 act, tightened by the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, the barriers to immigration from Asia and the Pacific were made virtually impregnable. In the 1920s the former "open door" was almost closed to Mediterranean Europe, the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Black Sea region, where the "push" of poverty, often associated with the minority status and religious and ethnic persecution of disadvantaged groups (notably pogroms against Jews in czarist Russia), drove increasing millions toward the attractive "pull" of the United States during the three decades preceding World War I. (The Catholic Irish immigration of the 1840s–1850s was an earlier microcosm of similar economic, religious, and ethnic factors driving exiles to the United States.) This was the "new immigration" so distasteful to the older, established immigrant groups who in the 1960s would be dubbed the WASPS: White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

After World War II, which had brought no real opening of the immigration door, those who once would have come to the United States as ordinary immigrants now could come in any numbers only as refugees. Likewise in the 1980s and 1990s, many poor, frightened, persecuted migrants—and the simply ambitious—came from Central America and the Caribbean to the United States seeking a better life, economically, politically, and socially. The great majority came legally as admitted immigrants, and others came as technical refugees; the "illegals" arrived surreptitiously without documentation, and the desperate appealed for formal asylum. Where once "Asian" race and then European "ethnicity" had been categories of exclusion, now family unification,

employment skills, and even levels of social and personal threats and violence became the criteria for admission. Such has been the recent history of asylum in the much longer history of American immigration—a history of inclusion and exclusion that was encapsulated in the exhortation of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* on the eve of American independence:

> O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the tyrant, stand forth! Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia, and Africa, have long expelled her—Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anker, Deborah E. *Law of Asylum in the United States*. 3d ed. Boston, 1999. The standard work written for lawyers; very detailed text and heavily footnoted.

Bessiouni, M. Cherif. *International Extradition: United States Law and Practice*. 3d ed. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1996. A substantial work that, like Vialet, makes the argument that asylum and refugee regimes must be seen in the context of reducing immigration.

Bolesta-Koziebrodzki, Léopold. *Le Droit d'Asile*. Leiden, 1962. An older work, useful for a non-U.S. perspective and valuable for Latin America.

Brownlie, Ian. *Principles of Public International Law*. 5th ed. Oxford, 1998. A manageable introduction by an authoritative scholar and practitioner before the bar of the International Court of Justice.

Columbey, Jean-Pierre, ed. *Collection of International Instruments and Other Legal Texts Concerning Refugees and Displaced Persons*. 2 vols. Geneva, 1995. A publication of Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International Protection; volume 1 contains "Universal Instruments"; volume 2 deals inter alia with Latin America.

Dunne, Michael. "American Judicial Internationalism in the Twentieth Century." *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* 90 (December 1996): 148–155. Discusses the work of David Forsythe, Louis Henkin, and Natalie Kaufman.

Ermacora, Felix, Manfred Nowak, and Hannes Tretter, eds. *International Human Rights: Documents and Introductory Notes*. Vienna, 1993. The comparative materials are intelligently contextualized with excellent references.

Frey, Linda S., and Marsha L Frey. *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*. Columbus, Ohio, 1999. Set to become the standard account.

Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. *The Refugee in International Law*. 2d ed. Oxford, 1996. The detailed and authoritative starting point for the subject, written by a former member of the UNHCR. The text is wide-ranging and fully referenced; indispensable for the world picture.

Grahl-Madsen, Atle. *Territorial Asylum*. London, Rome, and New York, 1980. Half this book, by a contemporary leader in the field, is documentation pleading for a convention on asylum comparable to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Hailbronner, Kay. *Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union*. The Hague, London, and Boston, 2000. An exhaustive work that deals with refugees and asylum-seekers.

Hall, William Edward. *A Treatise on International Law*. 8th ed. Edited by A. Pearce Higgins. London, 1924. A classic, relatively brief work.

Harvey, Colin. *Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects*. London and Dublin, 2000. Contextualizes somewhat dated "critical legal theory" and useful for European developments, political and legal.

Hathaway, James C. *The Law of Refugee Status*. Toronto, 1991. Monograph on the 1951 Refugee Convention by an authority.

Hutchinson, E. P. *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798–1965*. Philadelphia, 1981. The classic and indispensable account.

Hyde, Charles Cheney. *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*. 2d rev. ed. 3 vols. Boston, 1945. First published in 1922, this work by an eminent international lawyer reveals how little interwar crisis affected U.S. immigration policy and practice.

Jennings, Robert, and Arthur Watts, eds. *Oppenheim's International Law*. 9th ed. London and New York, 1996. In this classic work, volume 1 examines asylum and refugees from a very wide international perspective with voluminous references.

LeBlanc, Lawrence J. *The United States and the Genocide Convention.* Durham, N.C., and London, 1991. Deals in chapters 8 and 9 with the "reserving" of international treaties by the Senate.

Morgenstern, Felice. "'Extra-territorial' Asylum." *British Year Book of International Law* 25 (1948): 236–261. The first in a trio of essays discussing asylum from an international, comparative perspective. See also "The Right of Asylum," *British Year Book of International Law* 26 (1949): 327–357; and "Diplomatic Asylum," *Law Quarterly Review* 67 (July 1951): 362–382.

Nicholson, Frances, and Patrick Twomey, eds. *Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes.* Cambridge, 1999.

Ronning, C. Neale. *Diplomatic Asylum: Legal Norms and Political Reality in Latin American Relations.* The Hague, 1965. The appendices and bibliography are useful in a study that puts the Columbia-Peru Asylum Case in context and also covers U.S. practice.

Skran, Claudena M. *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime.* Oxford, 1995. Places the Evian conference of 1938 in the larger picture of U.S. interwar policy.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *The State of the World's Refugees, 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action.* Oxford, 2000. This important serial provides the annual monitoring of the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol; contains factual information and statistics together with essays by regions, periods, and topics.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. *World Refugee Survey.* This annual survey is the most outstanding of relevant unofficial publications and presents the global picture.

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. *Statistical Yearbook.* Annual review that contains informative and clear essays on the published data.

Vialet, Joyce. "A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Policy." 91-141 EPW (25 Jan. 1991): 2.

See also EXTRATERRITORIALITY; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; HUMAN RIGHTS; IMMIGRATION; NATIVISM; RECIPROCITY; REFUGEE POLICIES.

BALANCE OF POWER

A. E. Campbell and Richard Dean Burns

The balance of power appears at first sight a simple concept. It has been defined as "a phrase in international law for such a 'just equilibrium' between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the rest." Yet the phrase has always been of more use in political polemic than in political analysis. Like other phrases with a strong emotional appeal it is vague, and it would lose its appeal if it were more precise. Its obscurities are several, but the most important is that it blends the descriptive and the normative. The condition is one, the term "balance" implies, toward which international life is forever tending. That is the descriptive element. But the condition is also one that may be upset, and right-thinking statesmen should constantly be on the alert to preserve or restore it. That is the normative element. These two elements reinforce one another. Because such a balance will be established in any event, it is sensible and moral to work toward it. Because people work toward it, it will be more readily established. Difficulties arise if either element is weakened. At what point is it right to abandon an old balance and accept a new one? Can a balance exist if people are unconscious of the need to maintain it?

Behind all the interpretations of the balance of power lies the appeal to realism in the conduct of international affairs. Realism remains the best, perhaps the only persuasive, argument for restraint; and it is common ground that the doctrine of the balance of power is a device to promote restraint, whether it is argued that lack of restraint is wrong, or dangerous, or ultimately bound to fail. In that sense the balance of power in international affairs is clearly related to the idea of checks and balances within a government, which is equally a device to impose restraint on men who might otherwise, seduced by power, abandon it.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The international balance received its classical exposition during the eighteenth century, about the time at which, largely during the struggle for independence of the American colonies, the idea of checks and balances within a government was elaborated. Although linked, the doctrines had important differences. The international balance existed, if at all, among similar entities, the recognized powers, which placed in the scale weights of the same kind—military power, actual or potential. It was the lack of any precedent and effective authority among nations that made the balance of power necessary. The threat of war maintained the balance, and sometimes war was needed to restore it. By contrast the domestic balance refined by the Founders was not among powers of the same sort, but among powers of different sorts. All these were derived from the people, who might limit, redistribute, or withdraw what they had given. And few believed that domestic society rested on the perpetual threat of strife.

It is not an accident that the doctrine of the balance of power—alike in international and in domestic politics—received its classic and most rigorous statements at a time when foreign policy was largely a matter for rulers who could use the war potential of their states for their own aggrandizement. It was because a ruler had to be able to wage effective war that he had to be allowed the armed force that contributed to his domestic control. British reliance on a navy rather than on a standing army was, and was known to be, important to the growth of British liberties—and later to American liberty. In a sense, therefore, the international balance of power was needed to check the pretensions of rulers who lacked any effective domestic check.

Many of the early American leaders, however, held the belief that in their new world a more just—a more perfect—society than that of Europe

could be formed. Historians may differ about the degree to which that implied a regard for democracy. The tyrant people was hardly less to be feared than the tyrant king. But that sensible, rational men—men of property and standing—could cooperate for the common good, few doubted. To balance the servants of the public against each other was both a political safeguard and a political convenience, rendering excess less likely and vigilance less demanding. It was not a political necessity of the same order as the international balance of power. Americans quickly came to believe, and continued to believe through most of their history, that sound domestic institutions must bring sound foreign policies with them.

The balance of power, however, although it may act to restrain the actions of those who believe in the doctrine, is in the first instance a device to restrain others. Should not Americans, very conscious that other states were not founded on their own good principles, have been ready to consider contributing to the maintenance of an international balance when appropriate, more rather than less because their own domestic principles were sound? There is little evidence that they did consider doing so, and that fact may throw light on the limitations of the doctrine.

The revolutionary war itself provides an example of the balance of power in operation. A desire not to be involved in the European balance, not to be a weight in the British scale, had played an important part in the American demand for independence. It was the readiness of the allies in the coalition against Britain to abandon each other, and the readiness of Britain to calculate relative gains and losses, that made the outcome possible. Behind the behavior of all the parties in the American war lay a tacit agreement that American independence was acceptable—the Americans wanted to be removed from the British scale, the French and Spaniards wanted the colonies removed from the British scale, and on their side the British were finally convinced that that removal would not have disadvantages only. Such calculations may imply a large element of uncertainty as to how the independent United States would behave—Why should their independence weaken Britain more than their continued existence as disaffected colonies?—but in the event few of the negotiators had any doubt as to the only possible conclusion of the war.

For a short time after independence, Americans remembered that the European balance of power had played some part in their victory. George Washington's famous injunction against "excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another" would hardly have been necessary had there been no Americans who wanted to align themselves either with Britain or with France. It would not have been uttered had American interests clearly required an alignment with either side. Yet in the political debates at the end of the eighteenth century there was already a large ideological element. Washington was not merely arguing that a due regard for the balance of power requires powers to hold themselves aloof until it is clear that the balance is about to tip, and then to place in the scale only such weight as is needed to adjust it. He was urging his countrymen not to take sides in European quarrels whose outcome could not affect the United States.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

So well did Americans learn their lesson and follow Washington's injunction that during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) Americans seemed to have little or no interest in the issues. Neutral rights, and no doubt a free hand in the Americas, were what concerned them. Neither the possibility that Napoleon might come to dominate the world, which loomed so large to many Britons, nor the possibility that he might overthrow the archaic monarchies of Europe and bring in a new order, which seemed to others an exciting prospect, affected Americans to any great extent.

By that time the doctrine of the balance of power had ceased to interest Americans, and so it remained for a full century. Most students would contend that a balance of power existed in the nineteenth century and perhaps worked more effectively than ever before or since, and that whether they chose to recognize the balance or not, Americans were beneficiaries of it. Americans then gave little weight to that proposition, and they were right. They quickly discovered a doctrine, or a practice, that served their needs better than any contribution to a balance of power. This was the American withdrawal from the affairs of Europe—in certain matters only—enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Attacking the international system, the British radical Richard Cobden could use as one of his chief arguments the fact that "*America, with infinite wisdom, refuses to be a party to the 'balance of power'*" (Cobden's emphasis).

If Americans could so largely ignore the existence of the balance on which their security finally rested, it follows that the balance was more stable than it has often been. This is, clearly, a balance in one sense, and perhaps in the most obvious sense—forces resting in equilibrium without perpetual adjustment and still more without fundamental readjustment. When the balance of power is most noticed, it is because it must be maintained—that is, because it is in perpetual danger of tipping too far to one side or the other. What, then, is the condition of stability such that it can even be neglected? American experience suggests that it is the introduction of what might be called an element of friction into the balance, something that operates on neither side, but inhibits movement or makes it more difficult.

It was this friction that the geographical distance of the United States from the power center of Europe introduced, so that for Americans the balance of power was always less delicate. Until the era of modern communications, this distance clearly made it more difficult for the United States to intervene in a European quarrel. Both more resources and more time were needed to sustain effective intervention. On the other hand, the converse was equally true. While it might be arguable that the complete overthrow of the European balance, and the dominance of Europe by one power or group of powers, would endanger the security of the United States, it was also arguable that that dominance would have to be more complete than it was ever likely in practice to be. The balance in Europe would have to be tipped far past the point at which the security of some European states was endangered before there could be any threat to the security of the United States. As Abraham Lincoln put it, rhetorically enough, in an address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, on 27 January 1838: "All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years."

This meant that American reluctance to be drawn into the quarrels of Europe was for long a realistic one. Americans could benefit from the balance of power without being fully conscious of it. The European states made little effort to involve the United States in their concerns. The well-known claim made in 1826 by George Canning, then British foreign secretary, to have "called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old," was confined in practice to denying France "Spain with the Indies." With that accomplished, there was an agreement (so general that it could be ignored) that there was no effective and inexpensive way of using American support in a European quarrel; nor, per contra, of using European support in an American quarrel. For most of the nineteenth century Britain was the only major power that had serious differences with the United States. Difficulties arose over Canada, over Britain's remaining Caribbean possessions, and over trade, but the British always concluded that such differences should be settled—if need be, even by British surrender—without attempting to involve other powers. They were not prepared to call in the Old World to redress the balance of the New.

Perhaps this became most obvious at times when it looked as if the United States might not continue to dominate North America. In 1842 and 1843 it was widely supposed that Britain would guarantee the independence of Texas in return for the abolition of slavery there—as a preliminary to attacking slavery in the United States. "The present attempt upon Texas is the beginning of her operations upon us," wrote Secretary of State Abel P. Upshur. It came to nothing. Still more obviously, during the Civil War the Confederacy hoped for European recognition and even intervention. The hope rested on several grounds, but clearly implicit was the belief that a restored American union could not be in the interest of Europe. Nor was it. But none of the European powers—among which Britain was the key—had sufficient interest in creating an American balance to justify the European risks that the effort would entail. The relative remoteness of America meant that the effort would have had to be greater than the rewards justified, and great enough to entail unacceptable risks nearer home. It remained possible, and it was easier and safer, to exclude the United States from a European balance than to draw the Americas into an enlarged world balance.

Social change in the nineteenth century, however, was to reveal certain limitations in the doctrine of the balance of power. Some advocates of the balance have defended it on the ground that it maintains peace, or, at all events, sets limits to wars—a proposition supported to some extent by the American revolutionary war. Others have contended, with Edmund Burke, that the balance "has been the original [origin] of innumerable and fruitless wars" and "ever has been, and it is to

be feared always will continue a cause of infinite contention and bloodshed." To such critics the purpose, or at any rate the desirable result, of the balance was the maintenance not of peace but of liberty. As many have pointed out, there is something inconsistent about the notion of going to war to preserve peace. One must calculate that continuing peace will result in some undesirable consequence, before war is justified. Loss of freedom is the most persuasive such consequence.

The nineteenth century saw the growth of romantic nationalism and democracy, and with it the demand of peoples for some voice in policy. In some areas rulers could behave as before, but increasingly the aggrandizement of princes was felt to have natural limits and was overshadowed by other forms of state activity. Within Europe, transfers of territory were found to cause more trouble than they were worth unless they were accompanied by wholesale transfers of population, a resource more acceptable in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. The great revolution in nineteenth-century Europe, the unification of Germany—the unification of Italy had no equal consequences—was tolerated partly because its effect on the balance of power was not immediately foreseen, and partly because it was held to be an expression of nationalism that could not justly be opposed, rather than mere Prussian aggrandizement—so that it would increase stability rather than lessen it. In a war of the ordinary sort, by contrast, there were natural limits to what the victor could gain, and the destruction of a rival nation lay outside them. As that was accepted, it became possible to argue that defense itself, the most traditional and urgent duty of the nation-state, might have unacceptable consequences for the quality of life within the state. There seemed better ways than conquest to increase wealth and power. With the modern revolution in technology, and with the ever-increasing role of government in the lives of citizens, discussions of the balance of power took on a new dimension.

1914–1945

Thus, when World War I broke out, although all parties made some play with the need to maintain or protect the balance of power (which, of course, they interpreted variously), none of them could argue that governments, or princes, were behaving in the way that one would expect. German apologists had to contend that Germany was surrounded by malevolent foes and that the survival of Germany was at stake. The allies had to contend not merely that Germany was too powerful for comfort, but that German militarism threatened a European civilization that would otherwise be peaceable. The argument, in short, could not be cast in terms of the balance of power.

Americans were presented with a dilemma. It was not, in the first instance, a dilemma of policy. Clearly the United States was not immediately threatened. The great growth of American power during the nineteenth century, if it made the policy of fortress America less necessary, made it no less appealing. It was hard to argue that the victor in the European war, whatever the outcome, would turn on the United States. Americans were therefore forced toward moral judgments about the merits of the war. Some indeed argued that what was going on was an old-fashioned struggle for the balance of power, of a sort that revealed how politically backward even the most advanced European states were, and of a sort with which the United States had no concern. Others accepted the argument that German militarism was the root of the trouble. Historians will long continue to debate the causes that finally brought the United States into the war, and their merits, but it is clear that no balance of power argument would have sufficed. A balance of power argument would have kept the United States neutral. (With the advantage of hindsight it might be argued that since the United States was the beneficiary of a balance of power in Europe likely to be upset, the proper American course was to intervene delicately to tip the balance back to the point at which it had been—and no more. Yet because the balance was bound to shift, war or no war, as the whole history of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was to show, that kind of intervention could not have been temporary and would have required a degree of anxious vigilance over the long term, which could have been neither sustained nor justified.) Neutrality, defended on grounds of self-interest and its morality, or intervention, defended on moral grounds, were the only serious alternatives and the only alternatives debated.

The decision for war was President Woodrow Wilson's, and in taking it he was much moved by the realization that if the United States did not participate in the war, it would have no voice in the settlement that followed it. As part of the settlement Wilson was determined to establish

an international concert—the League of Nations—which would bring about a better world order. Wilson's hostility to the balance of power was intense, and it was widely shared by Americans of his day. In an address at the Guildhall, London, on 29 December 1918, Wilson stated that

> the center and characteristic of the old order was that unstable thing which we used to call the "balance of power"—a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in the one side or the other; a balance which was determined by the unstable equilibrium of competitive interests; a balance which was maintained by jealous watchfulness and an antagonism of interests which, though it was generally latent, was always deep-seated.

Wilson made an automatic connection between the balance of power and spheres of influence, to which he was equally opposed. That connection is characteristic of much American thinking on the subject; its consistency with adherence to the Monroe Doctrine is clearer to Americans than to others.

The approach of World War II presented Americans with a dilemma of a different sort. The Great Depression diverted attention from international affairs, but increasingly Americans could not avoid being drawn into efforts to mitigate both the depression itself and the political consequences that seemed to follow. The whole structure of reparations and war debts set up at Versailles would alone have required American involvement. The rise of aggressive regimes in Italy, Germany, and Japan, together with the long-cherished hope that they might be rendered more moderate by well-calculated economic concessions, or by democratic strength and solidarity, or a combination of these, ensured it. By contrast with the years before World War I, few Americans doubted on which side their sympathies lay. Whatever their fears of communism, the Soviet Union was quiescent, and the actions of the Nazis deprived their claim to be a bulwark against communism of all appeal. Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1933–1944) shared Wilson's dislike of the balance of power, and had learned it in the same school; but such views, although they became influential again later, were irrelevant in the 1930s, when it became ever clearer—certainly to President Franklin D. Roosevelt—that the important contest was not among rival states but between dictatorship and democracy.

Paradoxically, the desire of Europeans, especially the British, that the United States should become part of the balance of power—that the New World should be called in to redress the balance of the Old—and the fact that Americans had little doubt on which side their sympathies lay, did almost nothing to make policy decisions easier. The arguments, both within the American government and between Americans and British, are a fascinating and complex field, on which much work remains to be done. But in essence a dispute developed among the allies—even before the alliance was formed—over who should contribute how much to the common cause. The residue of American security, which was very great, together with well-founded doubts as to whether the interests of the United States might not be better served if some accommodation were reached in Europe without American intervention—doubts shared by some European statesmen, such as Neville Chamberlain—meant that American activity was diplomatically ineffective. A slow process of economic support for the Western democracies did begin, and might in time have drawn the United States into the war, but Hitler had the good sense to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors, and he was at great pains to avoid giving the United States an occasion for belligerency. That occasion was, of course, provided by Japan.

Some exponents of balance of power theory have argued that the theory requires that nations should match, if need be by war, any increase in a rival's power, actual or foreseen, even in the absence of any aggressive act. But all the evidence suggests that even when nations have adequate cause for war, they do not go to war unless they also have an occasion for war. The occasion, the indicator that the right moment for war has arrived, is vital. Of course, occasions for war can be manufactured when they are needed; but they are hard to manufacture, or even to identify, for a nation that disposes of such great reserves of security as the United States. One important argument is missing—the argument that if the nation does not fight now, it will be too late to fight tomorrow. It is that argument—with its corollary that opponents must be supposed to know how sensitive one's position is, and that therefore their threats are not accidental but evidence of real intention—which identifies most clearly the occasion for war. At Pearl Harbor, in 1941, the Japanese faced the United States with an affront such as no nation could possibly let pass. The Germans had been most careful to avoid an affront. (In World War I, on the other hand, when by reviving their unrestricted submarine campaign they

deliberately took the risk of American intervention, a good many Americans could still be found to argue that the affront was not great enough to justify war in the absence of a real threat. The cause of neutral rights and of democracy had to be invoked.)

Just as a nation needs a signal to begin a war, so it needs a signal to stop, and that signal is often even harder to give or to detect. Because statesmen in the modern world are seldom wholly cynical, they commonly feel that war has been forced on them. As a war continues, they begin to raise their demands to include compensation for losses incurred. It is therefore hard to identify the point at which agreement for a truce can be reached, short of the final defeat of one side. Every success by either side leads it to think that final victory may be possible; every defeat, that this is not the moment to negotiate. It is the intellectual difficulty of translating the theory of the balance of power into a workable policy in a specific situation that, more than anything else, ensures that this theory is seldom of use when the time comes for negotiation.

These generalizations are supported by American practice in two world wars, yet American practice was not different from that of any other nation. Neither Britain nor France paid any special heed to the balance of power during either war. No way could be found of ending either war without the complete defeat of one side. After each war the recourse was not to some restored balance, but to a congress system. The experience of the League of Nations suggested to the allies in 1945 that no security structure was worth anything unless the great powers agreed, and that the right of veto might as well be formally accepted. If the five powers were not in agreement, the hope was at best for stalemate, by the agreed inactivity of four if one stood out. As always at the end of a war, what was in people's minds was peace, rather than either liberty or justice.

BALANCE OF POWER SINCE 1945

In neither world war, then, did the United States enter for considerations of the balance of power. In both, the entry of the United States so quickly and completely tilted the balance of power in favor of the side it joined, that had the United States been regarded as an element in the balance, the wars in the form they took would never have broken out. After World War I, the United States withdrew in disillusionment. After World War II that recourse was not open, although many in the Truman administration feared it and worked to prevent it. It took time before it became apparent, either to Americans or to any others, that the balance had been shifted permanently during, and to some extent as a result of, the war. It took time before it was realized that Britain would not recover, that France was not a world power, and that noncommunist China would not become the guardian of the Far East. Yet, paradoxically, while the postwar hope of a concert gave way, just as it did after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), to an ideological confrontation, the balance of power was being restored.

It has often been argued that the balance of power is really an imbalance of power. If the balance is to work at all, there must be at least three parties, such that any two can overpower the third, should its activities become too threatening. More than three is better; but three is the minimum. The idea of balance as implying some sort of equality gives way readily to the idea of balance as superiority of force on the side of the existing order. The balance between two powers or groups—sometimes called the "simple" balance—is altogether too unstable. It requires a degree of vigilance, of preparedness, of national concentration on defense, which is ultimately intolerable. The Cold War implied just such a balance, of course, and it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of the Cold War, on both sides (although recent attention has been given to that of the West), did not speak of balance at all, but looked to victory. That is a characteristic of the simple balance.

It was well recognized that the United States and the Soviet Union were in direct and unique competition. The appalling consequences of nuclear war introduced a new kind of stability. The so-called balance of terror or balance of deterrence ensured that each nuclear power was anxious not to give the other power any sort of signal that would justify an attack, and was also anxious not to identify such a signal. This caution was compatible with, and even required, an arms race. It was not by accident that for a time the chief danger to stability was thought to arise in an area—western Europe—where nuclear power could not be used with any advantage, yet which was regarded as vital. Talk of tactical nuclear weapons showed more wishful ingenuity than realism, and much of the American emphasis on strategic nuclear superiority derived from the knowledge

that only such superiority could counter Soviet geographical advantages in Europe.

If it was compatible with an arms race, the American-Soviet balance was also compatible with an ideological struggle waged with vigor on both sides. It is false to claim, as some revisionist historians now do, that the Cold War was started and maintained only by the United States; and that the Soviet Union, much weakened by the world war, was merely pursuing the traditional aims of Russian policy. (Those aims had been opposed by Great Britain for a century, and it is odd to find the Left arguing that a policy of old-fashioned imperialism is acceptable and, in essence, advancing the doctrine, if not of the balance of power, at least of spheres of influence.) The ideological struggle reflected the knowledge of both great powers that they contended in a fast-changing world; and the Cold War began to lose intensity, not when the protagonists decided to abandon it but when world circumstances changed and new elements began to contribute to the balance—lacking nuclear capacity, it is true, but disposing of real force. It became almost conventional to speak in terms of a world of five poles—the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, China, and Japan—to which perhaps the oil-producing states should be added. These poles differ from the great powers of old in that they are not of the same sort. Only two are nuclear in any serious sense. Other differences readily suggest themselves. It is as a consequence of this development that serious discussion of the balance of power is again taking place.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a student of Clemens von Metternich and Otto von Bismarck, naturally introduced the concept of balance into his discussions of foreign policy; he would not have done so if the preconditions had not been there. Yet, while he spoke of Soviet policy as "heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces" and as "never determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance," he was more apt to speak of American policy as seeking a "balance of mutual interests" with the Soviet Union and as moving toward détente through a "balance of risks and incentives." Such language was chosen with an American audience, and with the preconceptions that Kissinger believed Americans have, in mind. Nevertheless it shows two elements almost wholly lacking in classic balance of power theory: the recognition that nations may now offer domestic rewards and suffer domestic penalties in the conduct of international relations, and the conviction that the domestic penalties will be too great without an agreement on restraint—deliberate if tacit—by the opponents. The balance of power is seen not as replacing cooperation, but rather as requiring it.

The Cold War ended with a whimper, not the civilization-ending "bang" some analysts predicted. The Soviet Union simply chose to withdraw from the superpower competition. With the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States became incontrovertibly the world's dominant economic-military power (a title it had actually had for much of the Cold War). Without an apparent foe to challenge its security, the major question confronting U.S. foreign policy was what would succeed the Cold War's bipolar balance of power. The issue among academics and political commentators was whether the United States should (1) emphasize its dominant position as a "unipolar" global power, or (2) seek a leading role in a tripolar or multipolar system.

The conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer advocated the former. Krauthammer defined "unipolar" as meaning the United States should act unilaterally in resolving international matters that threatened its national interests. Acknowledging that the United States had lost the dominant economic position it had held during the early Cold War years, he nevertheless asserted that America remained the principal center of the world's economic production. An aggressive, determined U.S. foreign policy, backed by the world's greatest military prowess, Krauthammer argued, could dominate world politics. Perhaps in the future the United States might become the largest partner in a multipolar world; until then, however, he wanted Washington leaders to continue acting unilaterally. He concluded that "Our best hope for safety is in American strength and will, the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." It would be a Pax Americana in which the world would acquiesce in a benign American hegemony.

Other analysts envisioned a multipolar post–Cold War world, probably comprised of three or four power centers, in which the United States would remain the most affluent and powerful but would not be hegemonic. Joseph Nye, for example, suggested that a U.S. long-term unilateral hegemony was "unlikely because of the diffusion of power through transnational interdependence."

Preferring the term "multilevels of power," Nye endorsed preserving a strong military but predicted that the United States would not be able to dominate or direct the economic and political centers in an interdependent world. Thus, Washington should cooperate with like-minded nations in meeting such international concerns as conflicts between world markets, the acquisition by small nations of unconventional but destructive weapons, the international drug trade, environmental dangers of technological society, and diseases that can spread across continents.

Lawrence Freedman, who shared Nye's basic conception, focused on America's successful strengthening of democracy in Asia and western Europe after 1945. This, he argued, had created valuable political-military allies who rebuilt the world's economic foundations, promoted political democracy, and played the crucial role in halting communist expansion. In due course, these nations began competing with American business for world trade and investments because the United States had encouraged European economic unity and a prosperous Asia-Pacific rimland. Freedman foresaw that these European and Asian allies would press for a greater post–Cold War role in international affairs and, if Washington accommodated their expectations, all parties would benefit. If, however, the United States chose to deal unilaterally with economic and trade issues, there could be greatly increased tensions or even military conflict.

Both Freedman and Nye anticipated that states outside the American-European-Japanese centers would likely pose the gravest threat to global stability. During the Cold War the superpowers had been able to dampen most conflicts in Third World regions; it proved more difficult thereafter. The demise of bipolar constraints made violent confrontations stemming from festering ethnic, tribal, nationalist, religious, and territorial disputes more likely. And indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis reminded us, the first post–Cold War year "saw, in addition to the occupation of Kuwait, the near-outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, an intensification of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors, a renewed Syrian drive to impose its control on Lebanon, and a violent civil war in Liberia." It seemed a harbinger of things to come.

In Nye's view, attempting to deal unilaterally with these and other looming upheavals would place a heavy burden on the American treasury and national will. Far better, he argued, to seek multilateral cooperation to control the peripheral troubles. Failure to contain regional conflicts could put global stability in jeopardy.

President George H. W. Bush's formation and direction of an international coalition to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991 had the trappings of both unilateral determination and multilateral cooperation. In his victory speech of 6 March 1991, Bush called for a "new world order" that would enable the United Nations to fulfill its obligation to provide for the collective security of the weaker nations, and for a U.S. program that would assist in stabilizing the Middle East.

Bush's visionary statement generated much discussion in the months thereafter, but skeptical voices were quickly heard. Henry Kissinger, now a political commentator, lauded President Bush's building of a coalition to defeat the Iraqi aggression, but he derided the notion of a new world order. "The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way," he wrote, "and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it. In fact, the new international order will see many centers of power, both within regions and among them. The power centers reflect different histories and perceptions." In Kissinger's view, the essential thrust of the new American approach should be the recognition of regional balances of power to establish order. "History so far has shown us only two roads to international stability: domination or equilibrium. We do not have the resources for domination, nor is such a course compatible with our values. So we are brought back to a concept maligned in much of America's intellectual history—the balance of power."

Kissinger was correct to point to Americans' complicated relationship with the balance of power, but it was also true that the nation's leaders had often—and especially after 1945—consciously sought the equilibrium he so valued. The 1990s witnessed numerous regional, ethnic, and nationalistic struggles; U.S. officials, finding few of these conflicts fundamentally threatening to the global equilibrium, stayed out of most of them. When they did intervene, humanitarian concerns were a key motivation—the American military and economic response to such episodes as upheavals in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo were aimed in large measure at reducing human suffering and restoring local political stability. Even then, intervention happened at least in part because Washington policymakers deter-

mined that these upheavals, if allowed to spread, could in fact upset the regional balance of power.

American decision makers understood that the military component of the global equilibrium increasingly shared center stage with other elements as the world became more interconnected. The impact of technology, most notably personal access to various forms of global communications—worldwide telephone systems and television networks, and later the Internet—was impossible to ignore, and the 1990s witnessed economic interdependence that found manufacturing, banking, and merchandising virtually ignoring national borders. In search of continued economic growth and prosperity, Americans increasingly embraced the idea of globalization. President Bill Clinton stressed the interconnectedness of global economic affairs and the necessity of U.S. leadership in this area.

Few in Washington disagreed, and the 2000 presidential campaign saw much more agreement than disagreement between the two major candidates about how the United States ought to exercise leadership in the world arena. Once in office, however, the administration of George W. Bush immediately moved to adopt a starkly unilateralist approach of the type espoused by Charles Krauthammer and others. The Bush team ignored or refused to endorse several international treaties and instruments, most notably the Kyoto agreement regarding environmental pollution standards, and insisted on pursuing a missile defense system that would involve the abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty and, perhaps, stimulate a new arms race. Even though these policy decisions provoked serious objections from America's allies, and more strenuous protests from other nations, there seemed little concern in Washington about searching for an international consensus.

Critics of George W. Bush and of unilateralism complained that the approach indicated a failure to see the fundamental limits of American power, even in a one-superpower world. The critics achieved a measure of vindication with the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001. The assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon exposed America's vulnerability to a new destabilizing force: global terrorism. The Bush administration, while not disavowing its unilateralist inclinations, appeared to recognize the desirability of a "global coalition" to meet a newly recognized challenge that largely ignored the traditional international power structure. There were differences of opinion inside and outside the administration on how best to wage the struggle against terrorism, but on one thing all could agree: the United States could not do it alone.

The history of modern international relations, and of the American part in them, then, suggests a certain pattern. Americans, though often professing a distrust of European-style balance of power politics, have nevertheless sought precisely such a balance of power, or equilibrium, in world affairs. That preference survived the important shift from a world of very slow social change to a world of awesomely fast social change. It survived the end of the Cold War. It had not prevented wars nor served effectively to restrain any state that sought advantage from an active policy; it meant only that at the eleventh hour, coalitions formed to oppose serious attempts at world dominion. In this process the United States played an appropriate part, allowance being made for the great security provided until the mid-twentieth century by its geographical position.

The practical preference for an international balance does not always give rise to anything that can be called a theory of the balance of power, nor even to the use of the term in political discussion. At times when the balance is a "simple" balance—as during the Cold War or the years immediately preceding World War I—there is little discussion of a concept to which appeal cannot usefully be made, and what discussion there is, is apt to be critical. Equally, a period of great international complexity and uncertainty does not seem to be one that a theory of the balance of power can helpfully elucidate. Somewhere between these extremes the greater flexibility provided by a "complex" balance allows the idea of a balance, as something desirable and as a positive interest of the contending parties themselves, to be advanced. Because the balance is at its most stable when people need not consider its maintenance or even its existence, the discussion of balance is at best an indicator of strain in international affairs; but it may indicate the least amount of strain that mankind is likely to achieve.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, Graham, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order.* New York, 1992. A stimulating collection of essays by leading thinkers.

Butterfield, Herbert. "The Balance of Power." In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds. *Diplomatic Investigations*. London, 1966.

Cronin, Patrick M., ed. *From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on U.S. Foreign and Defense Policies*. Washington, D.C., 1993.

Dehio, Ludwig. *The Precarious Balance*. Translated by Charles Fullman. New York, 1962.

Dosch, Jörn, and Manfred Mols. *International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation*. New York, 2000.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*. New York, 1992.

Gulick, Edward V. *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1955. Focuses on the struggle against Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna.

Haas, E. B. "The Balance of Power as a Guide of Policy-Making." *Journal of Politics* (1953).

Henrikson, Thomas H. *Balance-of-Power Considerations for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era*. Stanford, Calif., 1993.

Hinsley, F. H. *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. Cambridge, 1963. Dated but still useful.

Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory Raymond. *A Multipolar Peace: Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century*. New York, 1994.

Kegley, Charles W., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. 2d ed. New York, 1994.

Kissinger, Henry. "Balance of Power Sustained," In Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*. New York, 1992.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Movement." In Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*. New York, 1992.

Lang, Daniel G. *Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power*. Baton Rouge, La., 1985.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson the Diplomatist*. Baltimore, 1957. A small classic on the American statesman who gave most thought to this problem.

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. 5th rev. ed. New York, 1978.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "What New World Order?" In Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. 2d ed. New York, 1994.

Wight, Martin. "The Balance of Power." In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds. *Diplomatic Investigations*. London, 1966. An elegant and perceptive essay, historical in approach.

———. "The Balance of Power and International Order." In Alan James, ed. *The Bases of International Order*. London, 1973.

Wolfers, Arnold. *Discord and Collaboration*. Baltimore, 1962. Adopts the approach of political science.

Wright, Moorhead, ed. *Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power 1486–1914*. London, 1975. A convenient short selection of European writings.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

J. David Singer

When it comes to the ability to understand and predict events of importance, students and practitioners of American diplomacy manifest a fair degree of ambivalence. On the one hand, we find many bold efforts to explain why certain events unfolded as they did, and, on the other, we find frequent statements to the effect that these phenomena are so complex as to defy comprehension. According to Henry Kissinger, one of the more celebrated practitioner-scholars, such understanding is often "in the nature of things . . . a guess." Or, as Robert Bowie put it, "The policymaker works in an uneasy world of prediction and probability." And George F. Kennan put it still another way: "I can testify from personal experience that not only can one never know, when one takes a far-reaching decision in foreign policy, precisely what the consequences are going to be, but almost never do these consequences fully coincide with what one intended or expected."

While there is truth in these statements, such uncertainty may not necessarily inhere in the phenomena we study. It may well be, rather, in the ways in which that study is conducted. At the risk, then, of suggesting that students of diplomatic history—American and otherwise—have plied their trade with less than a full bag of tools, this essay addresses a number of ways in which the behavioral approach might usefully supplement the more traditional procedures.

By behavioral approach, it is not meant to say that we should pay more attention to the *behavior* of individuals, factions, and states than to their *attributes* and *relationships* or to the regional and global environment within which such behavior occurs. If anything, diplomatic history seems to be overly attentive to behavioral phenomena, and insufficiently attentive to the background conditions and ecological constraints within which these phenomena occur. Normally, the behavioral sciences include psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, and political science, but the range of disciplines embraced can be less interesting than the range of methods, concepts, and findings that might be borrowed from those who labor in those particular vineyards.

SOME PURPOSES OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH

One way to examine those possibilities would be in the context of the various purposes and goals that diplomatic historians might set for themselves. For some, the purpose of research is to locate and present the facts alone: What happened, in what sequence, under what conditions, and who was involved? Others go a step further and try to put those facts into graceful narrative. More typically, we seek not only to tell the story, but to do so in an interpretive fashion. This involves both a selection from among all the facts and an interpretation of them. In interpretive history, once we are persuaded as to the facts, we make certain inferences from them: causes, motives, and likely consequences, as well as missing facts.

Some historians (even some diplomatic historians) consider these missions too modest, and tend to be more ambitious. Among these, there are the "grand theorists," who offer up wide-ranging interpretations of several sets of events, telling us just what it all means, in terms reaching from the plausible to the outrageous. A growing number are, however, beginning to redefine their mission, albeit in a less pretentious direction. Instead of offering sweeping inferences from a limited and selected set of facts, these historians are moving toward the generation of knowledge that may be not only more complex, but more useful than that to which we have been accustomed.

TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE AND RELATED METHODS

The most distinctive characteristic of the behavioral approach is its emphasis on reproducible knowledge. This approach does not belittle or ignore knowledge and evidence of a more intuitive or subjective sort, but it does recognize the very real limits of such knowledge. Without insights and suspicions as to certain historical patterns, there would be no place to begin, no hypotheses to test, and no theoretical models to formulate. But in recognizing the impermanence and contestability of subjective knowledge, the behavioral approach seeks methods that might avoid some of those liabilities. These methods are of several types and are best understood in connection with the types of knowledge sought.

Historical knowledge may be distinguished by two very different sets of criteria. The first are essentially theoretical and substantive in nature: Are we indeed getting at the relevant combination of variables in our search for explanation? The second are epistemological: Assuming that we are on a promising substantive and theoretical path, what is the quality of knowledge that we think has been acquired or that we hope to acquire? Leaving the matter of the *relevance* of our knowledge aside for the moment, we can focus on the *qualitative* dimensions of our knowledge. One possible way of evaluating the quality of historical knowledge is to first reduce it to its component assertions or propositions, translate these (if need be) into clear and operational language, and then ascertain where each such proposition or cluster of propositions falls along each of three dimensions.

The first, or *accuracy,* dimension reflects the degree of confidence that the relevant scholarly community can have in the assertion at a given point in time; this confidence level is basically a function of the empirical or logical evidence in support of the proposition, but may vary appreciably both across time and among different scholars and schools of thought at any particular moment. The second qualitative dimension reflects the *generality* of the proposition, ranging from a single fact assertion (of any degree of accuracy) to an assertion embracing a great many phenomena of a given class. Third is the *existential-correlational-explanatory* dimension: Is the assertion essentially descriptive of some existential regularity, is it correlational, or is it largely explanatory? With these three dimensions, an epistemological profile of any proposition or set of propositions can be constructed and a given body of knowledge can be classified and compared with another, or with itself over time.

For many the objective is to move as rapidly as possible on all three dimensions. We seek propositions in which the most competent, skeptical, and rigorous scholars can have a high degree of confidence, although these propositions may have originally been put forth on the basis of almost no empirical evidence at all. They will be propositions that are highly "causal" in form, although they may have been built up from, and upon, a number of propositions that come close to being purely descriptive. And they will be general rather than particular, although the generalizations must ultimately be based on the observation of many particular cases. As to the accuracy dimension, a proposition that seems nearly incontrovertible for decades may be overturned in a day, one that is thought of as preposterous may be vindicated by a single study or a brilliant insight, and those that have stood at the "pinnacle of uncertainty" (that is, a subjective probability of 0.5) may slowly or quickly be confirmed or disconfirmed. Moreover, a statement may enjoy a good, bad, or mixed reputation not only because of its inherent truthfulness or accuracy, but merely because it is not in operational language and is therefore not testable.

Shifting from the degree-of-confidence dimension to that of generality, the assertion (of whose accuracy we are extremely confident) that World War I began on 29 July 1914 is less general than the assertion that more European wars of the past century began in the months of April and October than in others, and this in turn is less general than the assertion (which may or may not be true) that all wars since the Treaty of Utrecht have begun in the spring or autumn. Theory (defined here as a coherent and consistent body of interrelated propositions of fairly high confidence levels) must be fairly general, and no useful theory of any set of historical events can be built upon, or concerned only with, a single case. As Quincy Wright reminds us: "A case history, if composed without a theory indicating which of the factors surrounding a conflict are relevant and what is their relative importance, cannot be compared with other case histories, and cannot, therefore, contribute to valid and useful generalizations. On the other hand, a theory, if not applied to actual data, remains unconvincing." (In the same article, he also noted, "Comparison would be facilitated if quantifications, even though crude, are made whenever possible.")

Existential Knowledge and Data-Generating Methods When we leave the accuracy and the generality dimensions and turn to the third proposed dimension along which a piece or body of knowledge may be described, we run into greater conceptual difficulty. A useful set of distinctions are existential, correlational, and explanatory types of knowledge. Existential knowledge is essentially a data set, or string of highly comparable facts. If, for example, we are told that one army had 1,248 men killed or missing in a given battle and that the enemy had "also suffered heavily," we would have something less than data. Similarly, statements that the United States has had two separate alliances with France since 1815, running a total of forty-seven years, and that American alliances with England and Russia have been nearly the same in number and longevity as those with France, would also be something less than data. That is, data provide the basis for comparison and generalization across two or more cases, situations, nations, and so on, and permit the generation of existential knowledge.

Of course, existential knowledge would not be very useful to the diplomatic historian if restricted only to phenomena that are readily quantified. Most of the interesting phenomena of history are of the so-called qualitative, not quantitative, variety, and it is usually assumed that the world's events and conditions are naturally and ineluctably divided into those two categories. Many phenomena that are thought to be "qualitative in nature" at a given time turn out to be readily quantifiable at a later date. In the physical world, examples might range from the difference between yellow and orange to the amount of moisture in the air; these were originally believed to be qualitative concepts. In the biological world, one thinks of metabolic rate or genetic predispositions. Likewise, in the world of social phenomena a good many allegedly qualitative phenomena turn out to be quite quantitative. Some illustrations might be the "linguistic similarity" of two nations, the extent to which nations gain or lose diplomatic "importance" after war, the changing "cohesion" of work groups, or the national "product" of given economies.

It is one thing to think of a way to measure or quantify a phenomenon that has been considered nonquantifiable and quite another thing to demonstrate that the measurement is a valid one. That is, we may apply the same measuring procedure to the same phenomenon over and over, and always get the same score; that demonstrates that our measure is a reliable one. But there is no way to demonstrate that it is a valid one—that it really gets at the phenomenon we claim to be measuring. The closest we come to validation of a measure (also known as an index or indicator) is a consensus among specialists that it taps what it claims to be tapping, and that consensus will rest upon (a) the "face validity" or reasonableness of the claim; (b) the extent to which it correlates with a widely accepted alternative indicator of the same phenomenon; and (c) the extent to which it predicts some measurable outcome variable that it is—according to an accepted theoretical argument—supposed to predict.

Quantification, however, may take a second, and more familiar, form. That is, in addition to assigning a numerical value to each observation of a given phenomenon, one can quantify by merely (a) assigning each such case or observation to a given nominal or ordinal category, and then (b) counting the number of observations that fall into each such category. The nominal category pertains to a set of criteria that are used to classify events and conditions; an ordinal category refers to the criteria used to rank them. To illustrate, generalizing about the American propensity to form alliances might require distinguishing among defense, neutrality, and entente commitments. Once the coding rules have been formulated and written down in explicit language (with examples), a person with limited specific knowledge could go through the texts and contexts of all American alliances and assign each to one of those three categories.

The same could be done, for example, if one wanted to order a wide variety of foreign policy moves and countermoves, in the context of comparing the effects of different strategies upon the propensity of diplomatic conflicts to escalate toward war. The judgments of a panel of experts could be used to ascertain which types of action seem to be high, medium, or low on a conflict-exacerbating dimension. The earlier distinction between the reliability and validity of measures is quite appropriate here. There might be almost perfect agreement among experts that economic boycotts are higher on such a dimension than ultimata, since the latter are merely threats to act. But if one examined a set of diplomatic confrontations and found that those in which boycotts were used seldom ended in war, whereas those characterized by ultimata often did end in war, one might be inclined to challenge the validity of the ordinal measure.

So much, then, for existential knowledge. Whether merely acquired in ready-made form from governmental or commercial statistics, or generated by data-making procedures that are highly operational and reproducible, propositions of an existential nature are the bedrock upon which we can build correlational and explanatory knowledge.

Correlational Knowledge and Data Analysis Methods. Although many diplomatic historians will be quite content to go no further than the acquisition of existential knowledge, there will be others who will not only want to generalize, but also to formulate and test explanations. To do so, it is necessary to begin assembling two or more data sets and to see how strongly one correlates with the other(s). Correlation or covariation may take several forms and may be calculated in several ways, depending on whether the data sets are in nominal, ordinal, or interval (that is, cardinal number) form.

In general, a correlational proposition is one that shows the extent of coincidence or covariation between two (or more) sets of numbers. If these sets of numbers are viewed as the varying or fluctuating magnitudes of each variable, the correlation between them is a reflection of the extent to which the quantitative configuration of one variable can be ascertained when the configuration of the other is known. Or, in statistical parlance, the coefficient of correlation, which usually ranges from +1.00 to −1.00, indicates how accurately one can predict the magnitudes of all the observations in one data set once one knows the magnitudes in the other set of observations. Even though the measured events or conditions occurred in the past, we still speak of "prediction," since we know only that those phenomena occurred, but do not know the strength of association until the correlation coefficient has been computed.

Another way to put it is that the correlation between two sets of data is a measure of their similarity, whether they are based on pairs of simultaneous observations or ones in which variable Y was always measured at a fixed interval of time after each observation or measurement of variable X. If they rise and fall together over time or across a number of cases, they are similar, and the correlation between them will be close to +1.00; but if Y rises every time X drops, or vice versa, they are dissimilar, giving a negative correlation of close to −1.00. Finally, if there is neither a strong similarity nor dissimilarity, but randomness, the correlation coefficient will approach zero. There are many different measures or indices of correlation, usually named after the scholar who developed and applied them, but two of them can serve as good examples. Although any correlation coefficient can be calculated with pencil and paper or a calculator, the most efficient method is the computer, which can be programmed so that it can automatically receive two or more sets of data along with instructions as to which correlation formula to use, and almost instantaneously produce coefficient scores. Looking, then, at the very simple "rank order" correlation, we note that it is used to calculate the similarity or association between two sets of ranked data. It is particularly appropriate when we can ascertain only the orderings, from high to low or top to bottom, of two data sets and cannot ascertain with much confidence the distances or intervals between those rank positions. The rank order statistic is also especially appropriate for checking the validity of two separate measures or indicators and ascertaining whether they "get at" the same phenomena.

To illustrate, if we suspect that a fairly good index of a nation's power is simply the absolute amount of money it allocates to military preparedness—regardless of its population, wealth, or industrial capability—we might investigate how strongly that index correlates with an alternative measure. And, since power is itself a vague and elusive concept, we might decide to derive the second measure by having the nations ranked by a panel of diplomatic historians. When these two listings—one based on a single, simple index and the other based on the fallible human judgments of scholarly specialists—are brought together, we then compute the rank order correlation between them. The results of any such computation can in principle, as noted earlier, range from +1.00 to −1.00, with 0.00 representing the midpoint. If there is absolutely no pattern of association between the two rankings, we say there is no correlation, and the figure would indeed be zero. Further, if each nation has exactly the same rank position in both columns, the rank order correlation between the two variables is +1.00, and if the orders are completely reversed (with the nation at the top of one column found at the bottom of the other, and so on), it would be −1.00. None of these three extreme cases is likely to occur in the real world, of course, and on a pair of variables such as these, a rank order correlation of approximately +0.80 is pretty much what we would expect to find when the computation has been done.

The above example illustrates how a rank order correlation might be used to estimate the similarity between two different rankings. While a high positive correlation would increase confidence in the validity of military expenditure levels as a measure of power, we assumed no particular theoretical or causal connection between the two data sets. Now, however, suppose that we believed (that is, suspected, but did not know with very much confidence) that the war-proneness of a nation was somehow or other a consequence of its level of industrialization. If we only know how many wars a nation has been involved in during a given number of decades, we have a rather crude indicator of its war-proneness. Such a number does not discriminate between long and short wars; wars that led to a great many or very few fatalities; and wars that engaged all of its forces or only a small fraction. Thus, we would be quite reluctant to say that a nation that fought in eight wars is four times more war-prone than one that experienced only two military conflicts in a given period. We would even be reluctant to say that the difference between two nations that participated in six and four wars respectively is the same as that between those nations that fought in seven and five wars. In sum, we might be justified in treating such a measure of war-proneness as, at best, ordinal in nature.

Suppose, further, that our measure of industrialization is almost as crude, based, for example, on the single factor of iron and steel production. Even though we might have quite accurate figures on such production, we realize that it is a rather incomplete index, underestimating some moderately powerful nations that have little coal or ore and therefore tend to import much of their iron and steel. In such a case, we would again be wise to ignore the size of the differences between the nations and settle for only a rank order listing. Depending on the magnitude of the resulting coefficient of correlation between these two rank orderings, we could make a number of different inferences about the relationship between industrialization and war-proneness. Suppose now that we were working with much better indices than those used in the two illustrations above, and that we could measure our variables with considerably greater confidence. That is, we now have a basis for believing that our indicators or measures are not only valid (and that has no bearing on the statistical tests that can be applied to a variable) but reliable and quite precise. If one variable were the amount of money spent for the operation of IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) in the international system each half-decade, and the other were the number of nation-months of war that ended in each previous half-decade, and such interval scale data appeared to be very accurate, we could employ a more sensitive type of statistical test, such as Pearson's product moment correlation.

The reason that a product moment type of correlational analysis is more sensitive is that its computation does not—because it need not—ignore the magnitude of the differences between the rank positions on a given pair of listings. Whereas rank order data merely tell us that the nation (or year, or case, or observation) at one position is so many positions or notches above or below another, interval scale data tell us how much higher or lower it is on a particular yardstick. The magnitude of those interrank distances carries a lot of useful information, and when the data are of such a quality to give us that additional information, it is foolish to "throw it away." Thus, when the measures of the variables permit, we generally use a product moment rather than a rank order correlation. As we might expect, certain conditions regarding the normality of the distributions, independence of the observations, randomness of the sample, and so on, must be met before we can use this more sensitive measure of statistical association. Once we have computed the rank order or product moment correlation coefficient between any two sets of measures, several inferences about the relationship between the variables become possible, providing that one additional requirement is met. If the correlation score is close to zero, we can—for the moment, at least—assume that there is little or no association between the variables and tentatively conclude that (a) one measure is not a particularly good index of the other (when validation of a measure is our objective), or (b) that one variable exercises very little impact on the other (when a correlational proposition is our objective). If, however, the correlation coefficient is about 0.50 or higher, either positive (+) or negative (–), we would want to go on and ask whether the above-mentioned requirement has been met.

That requirement is that the correlation be high enough to have had a very low probability of occurring by chance alone. That is ascertained by computing (or looking up in a standard text) the statistical significance of the correlation. When we have very few pairs of observations (or cases) in our analysis, even a correlation as high as 0.90 can occur by sheer chance. And when we have a

great many cases, even a figure as low as 0.30 can be statistically significant. To illustrate with what is known as the Z-test, statisticians have computed that a product moment correlation would have to be as high as 0.65 if the association between 12 sets of observations were to be thought of as having only a 1 percent probability of being mere coincidence. Conversely, if there were as many as 120 cases, they calculate that a correlation as low as 0.22 would also have only a 1 percent probability of being mere coincidence. In statistical parlance, we say that for a given number of cases, a given correlation score is "significant at the 1 percent (or 2 percent or 5 percent) level."

Once we have ascertained that the strength of a given correlation, as well as its statistical significance, is sufficiently high (and the evaluation of "sufficiently" is a complex matter, still debated by statisticians and scientists), we can then go on to make a number of inferences about the predictive or the explanatory association between the variables being examined. The nature of those inferences and the justification for them is explored in the next section. Suffice it to say here that when two variables are strongly correlated, and one of them precedes the other in time, we have a typical form of correlational knowledge but are not yet able to say very much of an explanatory nature.

Explanatory Knowledge and Causal Inference

It should now be quite clear that operational classification and enumeration, combined with statistical analysis of the resulting data sets, can eventually produce a large body of correlational knowledge. Further, it should be evident that correlational knowledge can indeed provide a rather satisfactory basis for foreign policy prediction, despite the limitations noted above. But the major limitation lies in the difference between predictions based on correlations from the past, and predictions based on theories. Without a fairly good theory (which, it will be recalled, is more than either a hunch or a model), our predictions will often be vulnerable on two counts.

First, there is the problem that has often intrigued the philosopher of science and delighted the traditional humanist. If the decision makers of nation A have a fair idea what predictions are being made about them by the officials of nation B, they can often confound B by selecting a move or a strategy other than the one they think is expected. A good theory, however, has built into it just such contingencies, and can often cope with the "we think that they think that we think, etc." problem. Second, a good theory increases our ability to predict in cases that have no exact (or even approximate) parallel in history. That is, it permits us to first build up—via the inductive mode—a general set of propositions on the basis of the specific cases for which we do have historical evidence, and then to deduce—from the theory based on those general propositions—back down to specific cases for which we do not have historical evidence.

If theories are, then, quite important in the study of foreign policy, how do we go about building, verifying, improving, and consolidating them? To some extent, the answer depends on one's definition of a theory, and the word has, unfortunately, disparate meanings. To the layman, a theory is often nothing more than a hunch or an idea. Worse yet, some define theory as anything other than what is real or pragmatic or observable; hence the expression that such and such may be true "in theory, but not in practice." The problem here is that—and this is the second type of definition—a number of scientists also imply that same distinction by urging that a theory need not be true or accurate, as long as it is useful. To be sure, many theories do turn out to be useful (in the sense that they describe and predict reality) even though they are built upon assumptions that are not true. One example is in the field of economics, where some very useful theories rest on the assumption that most individuals act on the basis of purely materialistic, cost-versus-benefit calculations. We are fairly certain that a great many decisions are made on the basis of all sorts of noneconomic and nonrational considerations, but, somehow or other, the market or the firm nevertheless tends to behave as if individual shoppers, investors, and so on do make such calculations. The important point here is that the theory itself is not out of line with reality, but that the assumptions on which it rests may be untrue without weakening the predictive power of the theory.

This leads to the need for distinguishing between theories that are adequate for predictive purposes and those of a more comprehensive nature that seek to not only predict, but to explain. While the dividing line between them is by no means sharp and clear, we can nevertheless make a rough distinction between those theories that are supposed to tell us *what* happens, or will happen under certain conditions, and those that tell us *why* it happens. Even in economics, it is

recognized that the predictive power of its major theories can be improved, and their explanatory adequacy markedly enhanced, by looking into and rectifying the psychological or other assumptions on which they rest.

Thus, even though short-run needs may be served by theories that are merely predictive, the concern here is with theories that are capable of explaining why certain regularities (and deviations therefrom) are indeed found in human affairs. To repeat the definition suggested earlier, a theory is a logically consistent body of existential and correlational propositions, most of which are in operational and testable form, and many of which have been tested and confirmed. This definition requires that all of the propositional components in the theory be, in principle at least, true; further, if the theory is to explain why things occur as they do, the propositions underlying it must also be true. Given these stringent requirements, small wonder that that there is so little in the way of explanatory theory in the social sciences.

SOME BEHAVIORAL CONCEPTS

Shifting now from some of the methods associated with the behavioral approach, one of the more serious obstacles to a richer and more subtle understanding of diplomatic history may well be the rather restricted set of concepts used in seeking to put together predictive and explanatory models. To a considerable extent, concepts are limited to those used by the practitioners, their spokesmen, and the journalists who cover diplomatic events. Are there in the behavioral science literature some concepts that might provide new insights or suggest more powerful ways of thinking about diplomatic history?

First, there are several conceptual schemes that have developed to such a degree that they might qualify under the rubric of "theories"; indeed, they are so labeled by many of those from whose disciplines they emerge. Perhaps most promising is that set of notions that are called general systems theory. Proceeding from the assumption that there are structural similarities in different fields, and correspondences in the principles that govern the behavior of entities that are intrinsically widely different, this approach seeks to identify those similarities and correspondences (as well as dissimilarities) that might be found in the universes of all the scientific disciplines. In its search for an integrated theory of behavior, the general systems approach postulates the existence of a system, its environment, and its subsystems. Some of the key concepts employed are feedback, homeostasis, network, entropy, and information, reflecting a considerable intellectual debt to cybernetics. By thinking of the states as subsystems within the international system, which in turn has a particular environment of physical and social dimensions, we are provided with a rather fruitful taxonomy that suggests, in turn, a fascinating array of hypotheses. Within the same context, the idea of homeostasis is particularly suggestive to those concerned with balance, stability, and equilibrium in the international system.

Another set of concepts that seems to offer real promise is that employed in the theory of games. The clearest model postulates two or more players (individuals, groups, states, coalitions) pursuing a set of goals according to a variety of strategies. If the goals are perceived by the players as incompatible, that is, only one player may win, we have a so-called "zero-sum" or win-lose game, with the players tending to utilize a "minimax" strategy. If, however, they perceive a possible win-win outcome, their strategies tend to deviate sharply from the conservative minimax pattern, in which they place prime emphasis on minimizing their maximum losses. The appropriateness of such a model for an enduring rivalry seems rather evident.

We now turn from these very general conceptual schemes to some of the more limited concepts found in the specific behavioral disciplines. Looking first at psychology, from learning theory, stimulus-response theory, and the concepts associated with reinforcement, a wide range of models can be adapted and modified and could ultimately shed useful light on diplomatic influence, a central aspect of international relations. For example, is a major power more likely to shape the policies of a weaker neighbor by punishment, reward, denial, threat, promise, or calculated detachment? Or, in seeking to explain the way in which public opinion in a given state ultimately influenced a certain policy decision, we might find some valuable suggestions in reference-group theory, the concepts of access and role-conflict, or some of the models of communication nets. To take another problem area, if one were concerned with the emerging attitudinal characteristics of the international environment, such notions as acculturation, internalization, relative deprivation, self-image, or consensus might prove to be highly productive.

"THE NEXT ASSIGNMENT"

"[H]istorians, having dedicated their lives to the exploration and understanding of the past, are apt to be suspicious of novelty and ill-disposed toward crystal-gazing. In the words of my distinguished predecessor, they lack the 'speculative audacity' of the natural scientists, those artisans of brave hypotheses. This tendency on the part of historians to become buried in their own conservatism strikes me as truly regrettable. What basically may be a virtue tends to become a vice, locking our intellectual faculties in the molds of the past and preventing us from opening new horizons as our cousins in the natural sciences are constantly doing. If progress is to be made we must certainly have new ideas, new points of view, and new techniques."

— *From William L. Langer,* "*The Next Assignment,* American Historical Review *63, no. 2 (1958): 283–304* —

Or consider the discipline of sociology, from which many contemporary researchers in foreign affairs have borrowed heavily. If we seek to better understand the foreign policy of the United States or any other nation, we may want to think of the international system (regional or global) as similar to other social systems, but with national states—rather than individuals or groups—as the component units. Such systems manifest certain characteristics, and as these change, the behavior of the component units might also be expected to change. For example, certain social systems are highly stratified at certain times, in the sense that people who rank high on wealth are also high on education, prestige, and political power. Under such conditions, one might expect more conflict because the underdogs are deprived on every dimension. Might it also be that when the international system is highly stratified—with a few nations ranking at the top in wealth, resources, population, military capability, industrial output, and diplomatic status—the likelihood of sharp conflict goes up?

Remaining with sociological concepts, but shifting down from the systemic to the unit level of aggregation, certain individuals tend to be much more mobile than others, and as a result may acquire power more easily, or perhaps experience more conflict. That is, lateral mobility—by which is meant the rate at which individuals move in and out of certain cliques or associations—may also apply to nations, reflecting the rate at which they move in and out of blocs, alliances, or international organizations. Similarly, rapid vertical (upward or downward) mobility might be expected to get nations, as well as individuals, into more conflict than if they occupied a constant niche or moved up or down very gradually.

In the same vein, the concept of status inconsistency and its relationship to "deviant" behavior might merit closer examination. For example, if an individual ranks high on education or some other status-relevant dimension but low on political influence, he should—according to some sociologists—show a fair amount of deviant behavior. Do nations that rank high in certain prestige or status dimensions but low in power, manifest more odd and unpredictable behavior than those that are status-consistent?

As an example from the discipline of economics, consider the concepts of monopoly and oligopoly, reflecting the extent to which a given market is dominated by one firm or a handful of firms. The concentration of economic power may have its parallel at the international level, with a regional, functional, or global system manifesting a high degree of concentration as one or two nations enjoy most of the trade, industrial output, energy consumption, or military might in that system. The consequences of such high concentration, among firms or among nations, could be quite profound in its effects on such phenomena as conflict and cooperation, vertical mobility or stagnation, or the formation and dissolution of coalitions.

The range and variety of concepts that have been developed in the behavioral sciences is impressive indeed, as is the extent to which those concepts have often helped to differentiate, clarify, synthesize, or explain phenomena that had hitherto been quite baffling.

SOME BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS

Turning to the third possible sector in which the behavioral science approach might enhance our comprehension of diplomatic history, let us consider briefly some of the findings that emerge from these disciplines. By findings, we mean

either existential or correlational propositions that seem to enjoy some standing in their home disciplines, and on the basis of which explanatory theories might be articulated.

One can hardly exaggerate the importance of these findings for diplomatic historians, and, of course, for practitioners. That is, those interested in foreign policy rest many of their interpretations, analyses, and predictions on behavioral science propositions that may or may not be accurate. First, they often extrapolate from the individual to the group or national level of aggregation, assuming that what holds for the individual will also hold for the collectivity. This is for purposes of speculation and hypothesis only. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is probably economical to assume that if, for example, individuals tend to be more cooperative in the face of reward rather than in the face of punishment, so will corporations or nations.

On the other hand, there are some fundamental differences between individuals and collectivities. The primary difference, of course, is that individuals (or, more precisely, rational, intelligent, and informed ones) can be thought of as purposive, problem-solving entities, trying to maximize their particular values. Collectivities, on the other hand, exactly because they are made up of such individuals—each pursuing a mix of private and public goals—cannot be so conceived. The group or organization will, almost inevitably, pursue a range of goals reflecting a compromise and amalgam of the often incompatible goals of its more powerful individuals and subgroups. Thus, it is essential to be sufficiently familiar with the findings of such microsocial disciplines as psychology and the macrosocial ones of economics, sociology, and political science and to know something of the discontinuities between the individual and the collective levels of aggregation. The second way in which we rest analyses and predictions on behavioral science findings is more direct, with many models depending heavily upon the accuracy of assumptions about individual and collective behavior. This dependence is quite heavy, whether the focus is upon public opinion, elite recruitment, executive-legislative relationships, bureaucratic responsibility for policy execution, or the decision process itself. In each of these areas of activity, individuals and groups—with considerable propensities toward regular and consistent behavior—are playing key roles, and to the extent that there is an unawareness of the findings that reflect those regularities and consistencies, the accuracy and completeness of analyses is seriously limited.

Rather than select some limited number of existential and correlational propositions from the behavioral sciences and summarize the evidence in support or contravention, we can turn for a large number of these findings to the general source *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Sills, 1979, which replaced the 1930–1935 and 1967 editions). Each section of the encyclopedia is written by a leading authority, and virtually all topics in the field are covered. Embracing nearly a dozen disciplines, however, rather than only part of one, it runs to sixteen volumes plus an index.

In the *Encyclopedia*, one finds summaries of the existential and correlational knowledge on such concepts as acculturation, aggression, anxiety, avoidance, business cycles, charisma, coalition formation, cognitive dissonance, mass communication, cybernetics, conformity, conditioning, conflict, cultural diffusion, decision making, defense mechanisms, demography, deviant behavior, diplomacy, disarmament, dominance, dreams, ecology, economic equilibrium, elites, ethnology, ethology, evolution, family structure, fatigue, fertility, forgetting, frustration, geopolitics, gestalt, motivation, homeostasis, identity, ideology, imperialism, income distribution, influence, inflation, interest groups, interpersonal interaction, kinship, land tenure, language, leadership, learning, legitimacy, loyalty, migration, social mobility, monopoly, norms, national character, neurosis, oligopoly, pacifism, paranoid reactions, perception (ten separate articles), personality, persuasion, pluralism, prejudice, prestige, propaganda, psychoanalysis, public opinion, punishment, race relations, reciprocity, reference groups, response set, roles, sanctions, self-image, sex differences, social stratification, stereotypes, stress, sympathy and empathy, thinking, traits, utilitarianism, utility, voluntary associations, voting, wages, war, and worship. (One also finds in the encyclopedia articles on such methodological matters as content analysis, contingency table analysis, curve-fitting, experimental design, multivariate analysis, statistical distributions, factor analysis, field work, forecasting, game theory, historiography, hypothesis testing, index construction, statistical inference, Markov chains, observation, panel studies, probability, rank correlation, scaling, simulation, spectral analysis, statistical inference, survey analysis, time series, typologies, and validity.)

Another very general source, although seriously outdated, is *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (Berelson and Steiner, 1964). After discussing the six most frequently cited procedures for generating the findings they report, the compilers go on to summarize what they consider to be the more interesting propositions to have emerged from research in the behavioral sciences. The substantive topics covered are behavioral development (meaning biological, emotional, and cognitive change as individuals mature); perceiving; learning and thinking; motivation; the family; small face-to-face groups; organizations; institutions; social stratification; ethnic relations; mass communications; opinions, attitudes, and beliefs; the society; and culture.

There are also collections of articles, summarizing the correlational and explanatory knowledge in the specific disciplines or problem areas. Among the more relevant are: *Handbook of Developmental Psychology* (Wolman, 1982); *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Pervin, 1999); *Handbook of Psychiatry* (Solomon and Patch, 1974); *Small Group Research: A Handbook* (Hare, 1994); *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, 1998); *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Taylor and Jodice, 1983).

There are two other—if dated—anthologies that not only summarize a good many concepts and findings from these related disciplines, but select and organize the articles on the basis of their applicability to specific topics in international affairs—*Man and International Relations* (Zawodny, 1966) and *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Singer, 1965).

Two collections that bring together the findings of research in foreign policy and international politics are *Beyond Conjecture in International Politics: Abstracts of Data-Based Research* (Jones and Singer, 1972) and *Empirical Knowledge on World Politics* (Gibbs and Singer, 1993). In these, the compilers attend only to published articles in English that generate, or rest upon, reproducible evidence. No effort is made to interpret, integrate, or evaluate the 300 or so studies that are covered, but they are very systematically arranged. Further, each is abstracted in accordance with a checklist that includes the following: query, spatial-temporal domain, outcome variable, predictor variable(s), data sources, data-making operations, data preparation and manipulation, data analysis procedure, findings, and related research. In addition, there is a recent compilation that brings together the ideas and research findings of both the behavioral scientists and the diplomatic historians in the very useful three-volume collection *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict* (Kurtz, 1999).

When the first edition of the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* was published in 1978, the behavioral movement was just getting under way in the foreign policy and world politics fields. There were relatively few data-based findings to report. Since then, the number of scholars working in the behavioral science mode has risen from a mere dozen or so to about two hundred worldwide; these scholars have written perhaps four hundred articles and books, almost exclusively in English and largely designed to help account for war. Most of these have been summarized, and modestly integrated, in *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict* by Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer (1998).

World War I and the Iraq-Iran War of 1980–1988 are two examples to be used to ascertain and illustrate the extent to which such examples conform to the patterns that emerge from the many studies that have looked at the effects of only two or three variables at a time across many historical cases since 1916. In the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990), there are the following specific instances of the more general patterns found in the larger literature: geographical contiguity, the absence of joint democratic regimes, the absence of joint advanced economies, a rapid shift in the joint relative capabilities, and, finally, the existence of an enduring rivalry characterized by seventeen militarized disputes during the half century run-up to war. Similarly, the case of World War I is marked by quite a few of the more general statistical findings: major powers on both sides, contiguity, shifting capabilities and an unstable balance, highly autocratic regimes on both sides, and, again, the longstanding rivalries.

CONCLUSION

There are several ways in which one might react to the foregoing information and suggestions. One might, for example, paraphrase that observer who told us that "history is bunk" and assert that "social science is bunk." Less frivolously, one might see little value in trying to apply the behavioral sciences to the study of diplomatic history, concluding that the investment will far exceed the likely gain. For those who conclude otherwise, it may nevertheless appear to represent a radical

break with traditional style, and thus one that should not be taken lightly.

Not only can we benefit considerably by attending to the behavioral sciences, but to do so represents only a logical expansion of practices and procedures that for decades have been the stock-in-trade of historians. First, we note that the scientific method has been utilized for centuries in the solution of all sorts of physical and biological problems. But for a variety of reasons, ranging from religious taboos and superstition to the allegedly greater complexity of social phenomena, we have shied away from (if not vigorously resisted) its application to the study of social problems. That orientation has, however, been gradually eroded, partly through the work of courageous and creative scholars and partly because of the increasingly obvious need to replace folklore with knowledge.

In addition to the fact that social science is merely an extension of a given intellectual style already well established in the study of physical and biological phenomena, it is also quite nonrevolutionary in that it is little more than an extension of certain problem-solving processes that have always been used. While it is clearly an extension, the fact is that human beings have used a combination of logic and sensory observation for centuries in coping with social problems. In trying to understand what people did under certain conditions and why they did it, philosophers, kings, merchants, and soldiers have often employed a rudimentary form of scientific method. That is, they have tried (a) to identify and classify a variety of social events and conditions; (b) to ascertain the extent to which they occurred together or in sequence; and (c) to remember those observed co-occurrences.

But since they seldom have used explicit criteria in classification, they often placed highly dissimilar events and conditions in the same category; and since they seldom used constant criteria, they often forgot which criteria they had used for earlier classifications, with the same garbled results. Moreover, because one could not put social events on a scale, or measure the length and breadth of a social condition, their basic belief that social phenomena were not tangible, and therefore not measurable, was reinforced. This failure to measure and scale further reinforced the philosophic notion that whereas physical (and later, biological) phenomena were inherently quantitative, those of a social nature were inherently qualitative. Given this widespread belief, there was little effort to develop either the instruments of observation or the tools of measurement.

For centuries, then, social phenomena could be studied in a no more reliable or accurate fashion than if physical ones were studied without yardsticks, balance scales, or telescopes. To put it another way, the primitive essentials of scientific method were used but the critical refinements were ignored. Instead of aiding and enhancing their natural capacities to observe, remember, and reason, observers made a virtue of these very frailties and inadequacies by arguing that the incomprehensibility of social phenomena was inherent in the events and conditions themselves, rather than in the grossly inadequate methods used in that effort to comprehend. Modern social science, then, is nothing more than an application of methods already found useful in the other sciences and an extension and refinement of the basic methods always used. As in the familiar cliché, we have been "speaking prose" all along, but prose of a rather poor quality.

To be sure, the study of foreign relations remains as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. But this is not necessarily good news. First, there was the lively and early interest in the behavioral sciences approach among certain scholars and practitioners. In the early days of the peace research movement, for instance, one found copies of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Peace Research* on the desks and shelves in certain self-selected offices in the Departments of State and Defense. Further, such agencies as the Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Office of Naval Research were practically caught up in the early enthusiasm of the 1960s for computer simulation, game theory analyses, or even the wide-ranging survey research and field interview strategies, as in the U.S. Army's Project Camelot. And the years following the Cuban missile crisis also saw moderate levels of involvement between U.S. and Soviet groups around a variety of conflict resolution conferences and field studies in Washington, New York, London, Moscow, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. But worth noting is, first, the relatively limited reflection of these interests in the scholarly literature of diplomatic and military history, and, second, the impact of U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. By the early 1970s, the behavioral science enthusiasm had pretty much disappeared from both the policy and academic scene, with almost no residue in the scholarly literature.

Worse yet, with the demise of the Cold War, the early curiosity and experimentalism of the Cold War–Cuban missile crisis–Vietnam epoch was grad-

ually replaced with a nouveau vague interest in approaches that were not only nonscientific but explicitly and ideologically antiscientific. For reasons not yet clearly evident, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s culminated in the flowering of a scholarly literature of remarkable vitality and intellectual vacuity. Reference, of course, is to the postmodernist movement, embracing such variations as poststructural, postpositivist, and, perhaps, postbehaviorial. These orientations are found primarily in the humanities and those of the more humanistic social sciences, including, of course, history. In addition to the appearance of a new vocabulary in which words like "discourse," "contested," and "social construction" figure prominently, it is not surprising that the discipline of history is paying less attention to diplomatic and military phenomena and more to gender, race, and social class. While such variables were admittedly underrepresented in the study of foreign affairs and world politics during the twentieth century, this radical shift in both the theoretical and the methodological hardly bodes well for the future of the discipline.

Some might suggest that none of this matters a great deal, given how modest has been the contribution of the behavioral sciences. Scholars such as John L. Gaddis (1992) have gone out of their way to remind us that with all of the modern scientific paraphernalia in their toolbox, the behaviorists utterly failed to predict either the Soviet collapse or the end of the Cold War. Three responses seem appropriate. First, the behavioral science researchers in international politics were not alone in being asleep at the switch. Second, those who should have been alert to the Soviet demise were the specialists in the Cold War, Kremlinology, and contemporary diplomacy. Third, there were some who did indeed predict the end of the Cold War (as J. David Singer did in his 1986 article "The Missiles of October—1988: Resolve, Reprieve, and Reform").

In sum, it is very difficult to quarrel with Robin G. Collingwood's early recognition (1922) of the intellectual similarity between history and science:

> The analysis of science in epistemological terms is thus identical with the analysis of history, and the distinction between them as separate kinds of knowledge is an illusion. . . . When both are regarded as actual inquiries, the difference of method and of logic wholly disappears. . . . The nineteenth century positivists were right in thinking that history could and would become more scientific.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barbieri, Katherine. *Trade and Conflict.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000. A careful and systematic examination of the historical pattern between trade and conflict.

Berelson, Bernard, and Gary A. Steiner. *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings.* New York, 1964. Although dated, this inventory summarizes much of the flowering research of the post–World War II period.

Brams, Steven J. *Theory of Moves.* New York and Cambridge, 1994. One of the richest and most accessible works on the game theory approach for the nonmathematical scholar.

Brecher, Michael, and Jonathon Wilkenfield. *A Study of Crisis.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1997. An original and ambitious analysis of most diplomatic crises since 1919.

Bremer, Stuart A., and Thomas R. Cusack, eds. *The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War.* Amsterdam, 1995. Papers from a Correlates of War conference emphasizing the strengths of thinking of war as part of a process.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives.* New Haven, Conn., 1992. A strong presentation of the rational choice interpretation of the decisions for war.

Collingwood, Robin G. "Are History and Science Different Kinds of Knowledge?" *Mind* (1922). A prediction that historians would begin to embrace the procedures of scientific method.

Cusack, Thomas R., and Richard J. Stoll. *Exploring Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory with Computer Simulation.* Boulder, Colo., 1990. An exemplary examination of how computerized simulations of international interactions can shed light on underlying dynamics.

Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz. *War and Peace in International Rivalry.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000. The most comprehensive investigation into the dynamics of international rivalries and the propensity to go to war.

Gaddis, John L. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 16 (1992): 5–58. A widely cited article that sought to understand Western failures to predict the end of the Cold War.

Geller, Daniel S., and J. David Singer. *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Con-*

flict. Cambridge and New York, 1998. A thorough codification of data-based findings on the correlates of international war.

Gochman, Charles S., and Alan Ned Sabrosky, eds. *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era.* Lexington, Mass., 1990. An anthology of papers summarizing data-based findings on war as of the late 1980s.

Goldstein, Joshua S. *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age.* New Haven, Conn., 1988. Examines the concept of cycles of a half-century or longer and how war and economic cycles correlate.

Houweling, Henk, and Jan G. Siccama. *Studies of War.* Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1988. Exemplary papers testing certain correlates of war models.

Huth, Paul K. *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996. Models and findings on the role of territorial disputes in the onset of war.

Janis, Irving L. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.* Boston, 1972. Applies psychological findings to foreign policy decision making and its high error rate.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* Princeton, N.J., 1994. A broad examination of the quantitative-qualitative relationship in political science.

Lemke, Douglas, and Jacek Kugler, eds. *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996. Data-based studies of the impact of material capabilities of states, and rates of change therein, on the probabilities of war.

Leng, Russell J. *Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000. Examines which strategies make crises more or less escalation prone.

Maoz, Zeev. *Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment.* Boston, 1990. Fascinating discussion of the ways foreign policy decision makers generate outcomes quite different from those preferred.

Midlarsky, Manus I. *Handbook of War Studies II.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000. Excellent articles reviewing some of the central issues in the study of war and peace.

Morgan, T. Clifton. *Untying the Knot of War: A Bargaining Theory of International Crises.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1994. Use of bargaining and game theory to understand the ways in which conflicts can lead to war.

Ray, James Lee. *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition.* Columbia, S.C., 1995. Evaluation of the evidence for and against the role of democratic regimes and reducing the incidence of war.

Russett, Bruce M. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.* Princeton, N.J., 1993. Systematic evaluation of the democratic peace proposition.

Singer, J. David, ed. *The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models.* New York, 1980. Anthology of data-based studies of some correlates of international war.

———. "The Missiles of October—1988: Resolve, Reprieve, and Reform." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 5, no. 2 (1986): 5–13. A science fiction prediction that the Cold War would end in 1988.

Stam, Allan C., III. *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996. A suggestive, rare, valuable look into the role of domestic politics in decisions for war and peace.

Thompson, William R. *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics.* Columbia, S.C., 1988. A long cycle historical interpretation of economic and strategic factors in war and the evolving hierarchy in the global system.

Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle.* Cambridge and New York, 1993. An influential effort to assemble and interpret data-based findings on the explanation of war.

Wayman, Frank W., and Paul F. Diehl, eds. *Reconstructing Realpolitik.* Ann Arbor, 1994. Collection of studies that scrutinized some of the more widely believed realpolitik models.

Wright, Quincy. "Design for a Research Proposal on International Conflicts." *Western Political Quarterly* 10 (1957). Some early proposed research foci by one of the pioneers of scientific research on world politics.

See also DECISION MAKING; PUBLIC OPINION.

BIPARTISANSHIP

Randall Woods

In the United States, foreign and domestic affairs are inextricably intertwined. Because they are responsible to the electorate, presidents and secretaries of state must take into account public opinion when they shape foreign policy. Under the Constitution, the legislative branch is a partner, albeit a junior one, with the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. Treaties may not become law without the two-thirds approval of the Senate, the Senate must confirm the president's top foreign policymakers, only Congress can declare war, and only Congress can fund both the diplomatic and military establishments. Throughout their history, the American people have been represented in Congress and the White House primarily by two major parties. There have been a multitude of third parties, a few of them with the power to determine the outcome of national elections, but national and international policymaking has been dominated by the two-party system. Hence, the term "bipartisanship" to denote periods of inter-party cooperation on foreign and domestic affairs.

Not even advocates of a foreign policy based on inter-party and executive-congressional cooperation have been able to agree on a name for this phenomenon, however. Franklin D. Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, wanted to classify close executive-congressional cooperation as "nonpartisan," because he was determined not to share credit with the Republicans. Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg sought acceptance of the term "unpartisan," by which he meant policy developed above partisan purposes and for the national interest. Political scientist H. Bradford Westerfield prefers the term "extrapartisanship," which he defines as a presidential resolution "to associate in active collaboration with his Administration's conduct of foreign relations enough influential members of the opposition party to prevent its lines from solidifying against basic administrative foreign policies." Significantly, only Franklin D. Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles preferred the term "bipartisanship," which has become the most widely accepted and used term.

Bipartisanship is a process of foreign policy formulation that presupposes presidential leadership in the establishment of the overall parameters defining the national interest. The chief executive, his advisers, and the State Department develop policy, working together closely and providing complete information to leaders in the Senate and House, especially to the chairman and members of both parties who serve on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The president must be willing to consult with leaders of both parties, especially those senators who can assist the administration in gaining broad-based support. He must appoint members of both parties to serve on U.S. delegations to important international conferences. He must be amenable to modifications, amendments, revisions, and changes in treaties or legislation and administer those policies in such a way as to help win the widest support in Congress and in the body politic. Bipartisanship does not preclude differences and partisan advantage but should, as much as possible, secure general agreement on a course of action before it becomes the victim of partisan squabbling. Underlying bipartisanship is the hope that the United States can present a unified voice in international relations. Obviously, bipartisanship is especially critical to a president when he is confronted with domination of both houses of Congress by the opposite party. Close staff work among the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the State Department, and presidential advisers must accompany changes in policy. The cooperation between the administration and Congress must also withstand the strains of political campaigns, which recur every two years.

At its best, bipartisan foreign policy functions as part of the American democratic process. Through their representatives in Congress, both

parties freely debate, and in the process issues receive the fullest possible airing. In addition, that policy must be based on generally agreed-upon principles and assumptions that are shared by the president and congressional leaders, including those of the opposition party.

Bipartisanship is usually associated with an activist, interventionist foreign policy such as that seen during World War II and the period of the Cold War through Vietnam. But throughout much of its history the dominant theme in America's approach to the world was isolationism, and it was around this theme that the first bipartisan consensus emerged. America was created out of a desire by certain Europeans to escape political and religious persecution. The wave of immigrants that began flooding across the Atlantic in the seventeenth century were hoping to escape the evils of monarchism and religious intolerance. They were fleeing a hierarchical system that denied them the opportunity for economic advancement, political power, and free religious expression. Even those who continued to regard themselves as loyal subjects of the British crown deeply appreciated the three thousand miles that separated them from the motherland.

FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The American Revolution was itself a deliberate act of separation and self-isolation. In order to secure its independence from Great Britain, the newly created United States of America was forced in 1778 to ally itself with monarchical France. But that was indeed a marriage of convenience. The United States had no desire to trade its British masters for French ones. At its inception, the United States was a fifth-rate power of some economic but no military consequence. Its first president, George Washington, perceived that it was in his country's interest to avoid the power politics of Europe. The American Revolution served as a prelude to the French Revolution and a generation of war as first revolutionary and then Napoleonic France and its allies struggled with Britain and its allies for control of the Western world. Washington perceived that it behooved his infant republic to remain aloof from this great conflict. Not all agreed, and from this disagreement, in part, came America's first party system.

The Federalist Party emerged out of the bloc in Congress that supported Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's financial program and the commercial and business interests that benefited from it. Ideologically, most Federalists were suspicious of the judgment and wisdom of the mass of citizens who in their opinion were prone to unchecked passions and social disorder; witness the activities of the mobs in the French Revolution. Federalists in general believed in a strong central government capable of acting decisively to maintain order and to restrain the popular tendency toward anarchy. To achieve such a government, they embraced Hamilton's "broad construction" of the Constitution. They detested the French Republic and agreed with Hamilton that the British system was "the best in the world." The opposition to the Federalist program developed under the leadership of James Madison, then a U.S. representative from Virginia, and Thomas Jefferson, who from 1790 to 1793 served as secretary of state in the Washington cabinet. The Republicans articulated the widespread fear among the people of a powerful, overbearing central government wedded to the particular interests of an economic elite that was little concerned with either the rights of states or the welfare of yeomen farmers and ordinary citizens. To preserve local and states' rights, and to protect individual liberty, they advocated the "strict construction" of the Constitution. Republicans accused Federalists of wanting to shape the American government to resemble the British monarchy. Republicans initially expressed admiration for the French and sought to portray the French Revolution as the natural playing out of the American Revolution.

In February 1793, France declared war on England, Spain, and the Netherlands, and in so doing set off a debate in the United States over what its policy should be if the government in Paris invoked the treaties of 1778. Hamilton argued that treaty obligations followed governments and because Louis XVI had been beheaded and the monarchy replaced by a republic, the United States was released from the terms of the treaty and free to declare neutrality as its national interest dictated. Jefferson countered that Louis had only been the agent of the sovereign nation of France and that that sovereignty remained intact. Nonetheless, he concluded, the United States should not come to France's aid if asked because it should not become involved in Europe's wars. Thus did the president proclaim and enforce neutrality with the support of both Federalist and Republican leaders. George Washington's Farewell

Address, published in September 1796, was a paean to isolationism and nonpartisanship. Europe's interests, he declared, were different from those of the United States, and thus Americans should permit only "temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." The president also warned that party division "opens the door to foreign influence and corruption," because it meant that "the policy and the will of one country, are subjected to the policy and will of another."

John Adams defeated Thomas Jefferson for the presidency in 1796. Although himself a Federalist, Adams resisted the blandishments of Hamilton and other Anglophile members of his own party and refused to align the nation with Britain against France in the ongoing wars of the French Revolution. So angry were the extreme (High) Federalists that they conspired against Adams in the election of 1800 in an attempt to throw the contest to one of their own. As a result, Thomas Jefferson was elected, and the so-called Republican revolution was launched.

By the time Jefferson ascended to the presidency, the principal of neutrality had become the cornerstone of American foreign policy. As the Napoleonic wars unfolded, the Jefferson administration struggled to preserve its asserted right to trade with both sides. Anglophiles in the Federalist Party agitated for a tilt toward Britain, while Anglophobes in the Republican Party advocated a neutrality that, if not pro-French, was strict. Jefferson and his Republican colleagues looked forward to an America inhabited permanently by independent yeoman farmers. Land ownership, they asserted, was the primary guarantor of an independent electorate and thus of democracy. Consequently, when the opportunity to purchase from France the vast territory between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains arose in 1803, Jefferson leaped at it. Federalists mobilized to fight the resulting treaty with France, insisting that it authorized too much money for land that the country did not need. They pointed out that nowhere in the Constitution was the president authorized to purchase real estate or convert the inhabitants of territories into citizens. These were but masks, however, for their concerns were that the new western states would ally with the South to further damage New England and the Federalist Party's position in the Union. Only John Quincy Adams, son of the former president and then a senator from Massachusetts, voted with the Republicans. But that was enough. The Louisiana Purchase Treaty was approved 24 to 7.

Great Britain's efforts to cut off trade with Napoleonic France and its allies led it to seize hundreds of American ships, and its unquenchable thirst for able-bodied seamen prompted it to impress American sailors. Although it worked assiduously to avoid the conflict then raging in Europe and on the oceans of the world, the Republican administration of James Madison, who had taken office in 1809, led the nation into war against Great Britain in 1812. While High Federalists proclaimed the conflict to be a Republican plot to align the nation with Napoleonic France, the decision to declare hostilities was bipartisan. Republican nationalists, angered by Britain's refusal to abandon the Northwest posts and to stop inciting American Indians against white settlers, joined with New England merchants and shipowners to push a declaration of war through Congress. When a plot by High Federalists to lead New England out of the Union was uncovered in 1814 and peace ensued with Great Britain later that year, the Federalist Party was effectively undone.

What ensued from 1816 to 1824 was a period in American politics known as the Era of Good Feelings. It was, in effect, a time of one-party Republican rule. In 1816, James Monroe defeated the Federalist presidential candidate by winning 183 of 217 possible electoral votes. He was elected four years later with only one symbolic electoral vote cast against him. Firmly committed to the view of a nonpartisan chief executive first articulated by President Washington, Monroe regularly condemned the "party spirit" as destructive to republican institutions. In an effort to create and sustain a national consensus, Monroe and Republican leaders touted a program that called for high tariffs to protect infant American industries, federal appropriations to fund internal improvements such as roads and canals, and ongoing efforts to solidify and extend the nation's burgeoning western empire. The ultimate manifestation and statement of Republican nationalism was the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1823 it appeared that in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, with the help of France's newly restored Bourbon monarchy, was preparing to resubjugate the republics of Latin America, which had taken advantage of Spain's involvement in the great European conflict to rebel and declare their independence. The Monroe administration, led by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, was determined to prevent the restoration of Spanish power in the Americas. In the knowledge that

whatever it did, the British Navy would prevent the departure of a Spanish-French armada for the New World, Monroe enunciated a doctrine that was simultaneously expansionist and isolationist. Posing as a defender of republicanism against monarchism, the United States declared that henceforward the Western Hemisphere was off limits to further European colonization. It posited the existence of two spheres, each with a separate set of interests, warned Europe to stay out of the affairs of the Americas, and promised not to interfere in European politics. Unspoken but generally recognized was that the United States did not include itself in the restrictions; indeed, the nation's generally agreed objectives were territorial and commercial expansion, and, ultimately, domination of the Western Hemisphere.

JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY AND CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

By the 1840s the prevailing theme in American diplomatic history was continental expansion. In an 1845 editorial, New York newspaperman John L. O'Sullivan captured the mood of the country when he asserted that it was "the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us." Meanwhile, a new two-party system had emerged in America. In 1832 the war hero Andrew Jackson rode into the presidency claiming to be heir to the Jeffersonian Republican tradition. At the heart of Jackson's new National Republican Party was an ideology that assumed the inherent conflict between "producing" and "nonproducing" classes, an assumption that enabled it to turn to its advantage the fears and aspirations of those voters in the throes of adjusting to the market revolution and simultaneously to those largely untouched by the revolution. Jackson had special appeal to the hundreds of thousands of newly enfranchised voters of the expanding West. It proved impossible for Jackson, as it would have for anyone, to maintain a national consensus in the face of changes wrought by the market economy and westward expansion. Small farmers in the West clamored for greater access to public lands, while those in the South pressed for a greater share of political power. In the Northeast and the Northwest, urban labor mobilized first in local workingmen's parties and later in unions, and the evangelized middle class took up the cause of various moral and social reforms. At the same time, southern slaveholders enacted increasingly repressive slave codes in response to abolitionism and continually pushed the cotton kingdom and its slave labor system into the trans-Mississippi West. Inevitably, during the middle of Jackson's second administration anti-Jacksonians galvanized to form the Whig Party (the National Republicans had by now renamed themselves Democrats). The new organization was a conglomeration of National Republicans, southern proslavery states righters, anti-Masons, high-tariff advocates, and various evangelical reformers from the Northeast.

Andrew Jackson was in favor of continued westward expansion, but he equivocated for fear of alienating northern antislavery elements who saw manifest destiny as a massive conspiracy by slaveholding interests to spread their nefarious institution to the Pacific. James K. Polk, the Democratic presidential candidate in 1844 who had outpolled Henry Clay, shared no such qualms. Under his leadership, the United States established clear title to the Oregon territory and set in motion a series of events that led to the annexation of Texas in 1845. The latter development in turn led to the Mexican War of 1846–1848 and ended the period of increasingly troubled bipartisanship that had characterized American foreign policy since the Era of Good Feelings. Even though the commanding general of U.S. forces in the Mexican War was a Whig, members of that party, including Representative Abraham Lincoln, became increasingly vocal in their criticism of the conflict. Aside from the opportunity the war presented to charge the Democrats with being mindless, unfeeling imperialists, the Whigs were concerned that the conflict with Mexico would add more western territory to the union. The ability of the party to remain national depended in no small part on its ability to finesse the question of whether slavery should be extended into the territories. House Democrat David Wilmot of Pennsylvania introduced a proviso to the appropriations bill of August 1846 that would bar slavery from areas taken from Mexico during the war. Northern support was not sufficient to override the opposition of southern Whigs and Polk Democrats, but California and the New Mexico territory were added to the union as a result of the peace treaty with Mexico (the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848). The increasingly rancorous debate whether slav-

ery in the territories was or should be legitimate would come to dominate national politics.

With the coming of the Civil War, bipartisanship became largely a moot issue because the strength of the Democratic Party lay in the South. When the southern states seceded, Democratic senators and representatives were reduced to a handful. The Lincoln administration's efforts to prevent European intervention on the side of the Confederacy and to interdict trade between Great Britain and France on the one hand and the rebels on the other enjoyed overwhelming support among Republicans and loyalist Democrats.

THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

The foreign affairs issue that dominated the late nineteenth century was overseas expansion. With the acquisition of the New Mexico territory and California, the United States had rounded out its continental boundaries, but the notion that America had a mission to spread its institutions and mores to the less fortunate peoples of the world remained a powerful part of the American psyche. The Industrial Revolution initially diverted the nation's attention from foreign affairs, but by the 1890s it had become a powerful force for overseas expansion. As the United States advanced from fourth to first among the manufacturing nations of the world, industrialists became convinced that under truly competitive conditions they could outsell their foreign rivals anywhere in the world. As the century came to a close, industrialists and financiers began pressuring various administrations and their State Departments to help them secure markets abroad that would absorb surplus capital and products. Especially attractive were the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Latin America. And finally, Americans were extremely conscious of the fact that they had reached the status of a great power in terms of population, agricultural output, and industrial production. In the late nineteenth century, colonies were the badge of great power status.

There were many obstacles to American expansion. Anti-imperialist groups, led by Senator Carl Schurz, writer Mark Twain, and newspaper editor E. L. Godkin, argued that the nation ought to concentrate on improving its own institutions and social conditions rather than acquiring overseas territories. Some Americans simply opposed the addition of dark-skinned peoples to the United States. Others argued that the establishment of colonies necessarily ruled out self-government and led to competition that caused wars. Up until the 1890s, the Democratic Party generally remained the party of expansion with the Republicans exhibiting reservations or outright opposition. There were exceptions. Lincoln's secretary of state, William H. Seward, was an ardent expansionist who brought Alaska into the Union.

That began to change in the 1890s, as the Republican Party (founded in the 1850s when the Whigs disintegrated as the party of economic nationalism and free soil) became increasingly the party of big business. The social Darwinists and naval expansionists found a receptive audience in a group of young, ambitious Republican politicians who decided to use overseas expansion as a vehicle to carry them to national prominence. Theodore Roosevelt, soon to accede to the presidency, and Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert Beveridge worked energetically and successfully to sell the Republican Party and the American people on the idea of using naval power to build an empire. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party continued to draw its strength primarily from farmers, large and small; its supporters were concentrated in the South and rural Midwest. The economic calamities of the 1890s spawned the Populist Party, which railed against a conspiracy by Republicans, Wall Street, and the federal government to oppress and exploit farmers and workers. Racism was a strong component of both the Democratic and Populist parties, with the latter strongly supporting immigration restriction and the former racial segregation. Grover Cleveland, the only Democrat to sit in the White House between 1861 and 1914, was not an expansionist; indeed, he and the Democratic Party fought against the annexation of Samoa and Hawaii during the late 1880s and 1890s. The Populists saw overseas empire as just an extension of the exploitive polices of the GOP-business coalition, policies that held no advantage for farmers and working people. In 1896, with the nomination of William Jennings Bryan on both the Democratic and Populist tickets, the former effectively swallowed the latter. In the national debate over the treaty with Spain ending the Spanish-American War, in which the United States would annex the Philippines and Guam and supervise Cuba as a protectorate, Bryan led the anti-imperialist opposition. He did so in vain, however, as Roosevelt, Lodge, and influential manufacturers rallied behind the McKinley administration and ratifica-

tion. In matters of tariff and trade, however, the Republicans were the nationalists, favoring high protective tariffs, and the Democrats the internationalists. Farmers, who depended upon world as well as domestic markets, and business owners, who depended upon trade with developed nations, favored low tariffs. Imperialism, then, was hardly the same as internationalism.

THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND WORLD WAR I

Each of the Progressive Era presidents—Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft and Democrat Woodrow Wilson—was committed to protecting America's empire in the Pacific and to solidifying the nation's economic and strategic position in the Western Hemisphere. All were determined to guard the strategic approaches to the Panama Canal (acquired in 1903 and completed in 1914), expand U.S. trade with the Americas and China, and pursue balance-of-power policies in Europe and East Asia to ensure that no one power emerged to dominate those respective areas. Although they differed in techniques and rationales, the goals of the Progressive Era presidents were essentially the same, and they evoked little significant partisan opposition. Their approaches did: Democrats were particularly critical of Taft's dollar diplomacy and Republicans of Wilson's missionary diplomacy.

Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War I to "make the world safe for democracy" and to safeguard American interests on the high seas. He and most of his countrymen regarded German submarine warfare as a threat to the nation's seafarers and to its economic health. They regarded Germany and its allies as totalitarian, expansionist powers who posed a threat to democratic societies everywhere. The majority of Democrats and Republicans enthusiastically supported the Wilson administration's decision to go to war. Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt had blasted the president for not coming to the Allies' aid earlier. The principal figure opposing the administration's preparedness policies and aggressive diplomacy was William Jennings Bryan, Wilson's first secretary of state. In the aftermath of the war, however, bipartisanship crumbled as Wilson sought to push his controversial peace program through Congress.

Wilson was an internationalist who envisioned a League of Nations that would act collectively to prevent aggression and war. His creation called for member nations to surrender a degree of their selfish national interests for the good of the community. When he and the Democrats in the Senate organized to push the Treaty of Versailles, which contained the charter of the League of Nations, through Congress, they found themselves opposed by two groups, both predominantly Republican. First were the so-called Lodge Republicans, who were determined to modify the covenant of the league. Personally, Lodge hated Wilson, but, in addition, the president had made no attempt to involve the Republican Party in the peacemaking process. The American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 included neither a prominent Republican nor a member of the Senate. Finally, the Lodge Republicans were nationalists. They saw no reason why the United States should surrender its freedom of action and be committed by a majority of the league members to a course that was not necessarily in its interests. The other faction opposing the treaty was a group of isolationists, dubbed "irreconcilables" by the press, who were opposed to membership in an international organization under any conditions. Led by Senator William Borah of Idaho, the fourteen Republicans and one Democrat insisted that the United States ought to focus on domestic problems of poverty, ignorance, corporate wrongdoing, and political corruption. Many were midwestern Progressives who had more in common with Bryan and the Populists than they did with the eastern, business-dominated wing of the Republican Party. When Wilson refused to compromise with Lodge and his followers, the Senate rejected the treaty and with it membership in the League of Nations.

INTERWAR ISOLATIONISM

Isolationism was the byword of American foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s. During the buildup to U.S. entry into World War I, a major shift in the two major parties' posture toward foreign affairs had taken place. Before 1916 Democrats had generally followed Bryan's lead in opposing a more assertive, interventionist role in world affairs. Under Wilson's leadership, however, the party gradually embraced a more active role for the United States in world affairs in which it identified its economic and strategic well-being with that of other democracies and in which it would be willing to use force in behalf of world

peace. A similar change was taking place in the Republican Party. Its support of the Spanish-American War and acquisition of the Philippines, together with the activism of Roosevelt, Lodge, and other prominent Republicans, had earned the party a reputation for favoring a larger role for the United States in world affairs. But in 1916 the Republicans refused to seriously consider nominating Roosevelt for the presidency. In the debate over the Versailles treaty, the party identified itself with nationalism and isolationism against Wilsonian internationalism. In truth, the rank and file of the Republican Party, especially outside the East, identified more with Borah and his followers than with Lodge and his. In the 1930s, influenced by the Great Depression and the gathering war clouds in Europe, the Republican Party, as well as a majority of Americans, would invoke the concept of Fortress America and insist that the rise of the fascist powers in Europe and Asia posed no threat to the United States.

During the height of the Great Depression, the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt chose not to challenge the Republican consensus. But as the 1930s progressed with Hitler gobbling up Austria and Czechoslovakia and Japan's invasion of China, Roosevelt began inching the country toward nonbelligerent alliance with Great Britain, China, and the other nations standing against the Axis. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939 and the fall of France in 1940, the debate over America's proper role in world affairs escalated, with the Democrats generally opting for interventionist policies and the Republicans clinging to isolation. In 1940 isolationists formed the America First Committee. The organization was Midwest-centered and made up largely of business-oriented opponents of the New Deal, although it included former Progressives and elements of the extreme left who espoused the "merchants of death" thesis. Opposing them were the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Ideologically, interventionists tended to be liberal New Dealers and politically they were generally Democratic, although members of the eastern, liberal wing of the Republican Party supported all-out aid to the Allies. In the spring of 1941, the Roosevelt administration went head-to-head with the isolationists in Congress and secured passage of the Lend-Lease Act. With that measure the United States became a non-fighting ally of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. With the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States became a full-fledged belligerent, and partisan opposition to intervention effectively ended.

WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

What changed dramatically during World War II, a shift neither understood nor appreciated by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was the attitude of the American people. They were willing, as they had not been earlier, to assume their country's burden of responsibility in world affairs. Americans were guilty over their refusal to participate in the League of Nations. If only the most powerful nation in the world had thrown its weight behind a collective security system, the Holocaust and World War II might have been prevented. The war experience had been so painful and after 1945 the prospect of nuclear war so horrible that Americans were willing to make sacrifices in the form of economic aid for the rebuilding of Europe and to provide funds for defense against the looming threat of Soviet expansion. Reflecting these changed attitudes, Congress, on 21 September 1943, passed the Fulbright-Connally Resolution, which pledged U.S. participation in an international organization to keep the peace. Even before the passage of this measure, the leadership of the Republican Party had gathered on Mackinac Island, Michigan, to hammer out a position on the postwar order. Under the tutelage of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan and Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, the conferees devised a compromise resolution acceptable to most Republicans, which favored the formation of an international organization after the war.

The realization that positive measures would be needed to prevent a third world war convinced them that their leaders, regardless of party, must cooperate to best serve the national interests abroad. In order that the United States have a full and constructive impact on world events, Americans demanded that partisan politics be removed from foreign policy so that the United States could speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. Politicians, presidents, senators, and the members of the House of Representatives were to work to develop policies that would receive broad-based support.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was never fully committed to State Department planning for a postwar international organization, held a fuzzy conception of what the postwar world should

look like. Roosevelt, however, did believe in cooperation among the great powers and summit diplomacy to maintain the peace. He was convinced that such cooperation had won the war and that major-power agreement would prevent another conflict. He never thought that the American people would support the stationing of U.S. troops abroad and the rebuilding of Western Europe. Moreover, to the president, bipartisanship meant total congressional acquiescence in the executive branch's conduct of foreign policy. In brief, he wanted to run foreign policy himself without congressional interference.

Into the breach stepped Senator Arthur Vandenberg. In an address to the Senate on 10 January 1945, marking another step in the establishment of bipartisan foreign policy, he rejected isolationism and pledged cooperation if the administration would state its plans for the postwar world with candor. Vandenberg announced that he would support the evolving United Nations. To further guarantee the peace and allay Russian distrust of the West, he called for a four-power military alliance to prevent another war and to ensure that Germany would not rearm. More important, he suggested maximum consultation and cooperation between the administration and the Senate in charting the course of American diplomacy in the postwar world.

The succession of Harry S. Truman to the presidency portended well for bipartisanship. Truman knew the senators as friends and had respect for their abilities. As a former member of the Senate establishment, he well understood the benefits of working closely with Senate and House committees, and as a new president, he needed all the support and advice he could garner. In the summer of 1945, the U.S. Senate ratified the charter of the United Nations by a vote of 89 to 2.

THE COLD WAR

From 1946 to 1949, with bipartisan support, the Truman administration gradually took a more confrontational stance toward Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe. With bipartisan support, Congress in March 1947 approved the Truman Doctrine, which appropriated funds to aid the Greek and Turkish governments as they combated communist-led revolution and external Soviet pressure, respectively. More important, Congress and the executive, Republicans and Democrats, joined together to declare that it would be the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Later that year, the Marshall Plan, devised to fund the reconstruction of Western Europe, passed Congress with bipartisan support. Over the next four years, the United States poured more than $13 billion into areas ravaged by World War II, in part out of a belief that communism thrived in areas where economic deprivation and social instability prevailed. In 1949, by a wide bipartisan margin, Congress approved U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which committed its members to view an attack on one as an attack on all.

By 1950 anticommunism had become perhaps the most important theme in American politics, but it was no longer a rallying point for bipartisanship. The Republicans were deeply frustrated by their inability to win a presidential election. Truman's upset victory over Thomas E. Dewey in 1948 was particularly galling. The New Deal and the permanence of the emerging welfare state in America had left the Republicans without a compelling domestic issue. In the aftermath of Truman's victory, the party leadership decided that it could no longer afford a me-too position on American foreign policy. With Wisconsin Senator Joseph R. McCarthy charging that the administration had permitted infiltration of the federal government by Soviet espionage agents, and Senators Robert Taft and Everett Dirksen indicting Roosevelt and Truman for selling out Eastern Europe to the Kremlin, the Republicans launched a relentless campaign to portray the Democrats as soft on communism.

The effect of this campaign was to create an anticommunist consensus in the United States of monumental proportions. In late January 1950, President Truman directed the State and Defense departments "to make an overall review and reassessment of American foreign and defense policy" in light of the fall of China to the communists and the detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union (both in 1949). The result was National Security Council Document 68 (NSC 68), a policy paper committing the United States to combating the forces of international communism "on every front," to use the historian Thomas G. Paterson's phrase. This paper led to a fourfold increase in defense budgets and committed the United States to defending democracy against communism on the global stage. It paved

the way for the transformation of the United States into a national security state and institutionalized a Cold War between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other that would last until 1989. It led to U.S. intervention into the Korean War and provoked a series of brushfire conflicts throughout the developing world with the Soviets or Communist Chinese backing one side and the United States the other.

Meanwhile, the Republicans continued to hammer the Democrats with the soft-on-communism issue. In 1950, with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in command, United Nations forces drove invading North Korean troops out of South Korea and pushed toward the Yalu River, the boundary between communist North Korea and Communist China. In November, 180,000 Chinese communist troops crossed the river and smashed MacArthur's troops. They retreated below the Thirty-eighth Parallel separating the two Koreas, but MacArthur soon halted the advance and mounted a counteroffensive. When the general regained the Thirty-eighth Parallel in March 1951, he asked permission of the Truman administration to once again proceed north. This time the president and his advisers refused. Undaunted, MacArthur wrote a letter to the leading Republican in the House of Representatives, Joseph Martin, in which he asserted that "there is no substitute for victory." When Truman subsequently relieved MacArthur of his command, the Republican leadership decided that they had the perfect presidential candidate for 1952. In May and June, Republican senators ostentatiously held hearings on MacArthur's firing. His demise and the refusal of the Truman administration to reunify Korea under a noncommunist government was clear proof that Democrats were either appeasers or soft-headed. When it became clear subsequently that MacArthur was defying not only Truman but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who took the position that an all-out war with Communist China would make it impossible for the United States to defend Western Europe, MacArthur's popularity faded, and the Republicans had to look for another war hero to run for president.

During the 1950s, many Democrats suspected that Dwight D. Eisenhower's frequent appeals to bipartisanship were merely attempts to trick the Democratic Party into sharing the blame if policies already decided upon failed. Senate Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson continued to act as a partner with President Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, in pursuing a policy of combating communism through a policy of cooperation with allies and economic and military aid to noncommunist developing nations. The Eisenhower administration actually received more support in Congress from Democrats than from the conservative wing of his own party. Indeed, led by Senator Robert Taft and former President Herbert Hoover, conservative Republicans espoused a form of neo-isolationism. They insisted that America's resources were limited and that it ought to concentrate on perfecting its own institutions and guaranteeing its own prosperity. They were particularly adamant about the need to balance the budget. The neo-isolationists opposed the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe as part of a NATO armed force, and they somewhat paradoxically warned about the perils of being drawn into a land war in Asia. The Eisenhower-Johnson axis prevailed, however, and in December 1954 Congress approved a pact between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Formosa that committed the United States to stationing troops "in and about" the island. In 1957 bipartisan support led to congressional approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine, empowering the president to use military force if any government in the Middle East requested protection against "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."

It was with Democratic help that the Eisenhower administration fended off a proposed constitutional amendment authored by the conservative Republican senator John Bricker of Ohio, which would effectively have given Congress veto power over executive agreements with foreign powers.

During the presidential campaign of 1960, Democrat John F. Kennedy, running against Vice President Richard M. Nixon, criticized the Eisenhower administration for being passive and unimaginative in dealing with the forces of international communism. He promised a more active policy in which the United States would fund and participate in "counterinsurgencies" against communist guerrillas, augment America's nuclear stockpile, and continue to furnish military and economic aid to developing nations. Kennedy and his advisers also promised to open dialogue with noncommunist leftist elements fighting for social and economic justice. Kennedy won, but his pragmatic intentions were soon dashed on the

rocks of Fidel Castro and communist Cuba. When the new president failed to press home the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, which was intended to rally popular opposition to Castro and lead to his overthrow, Republicans once again raised the "soft on communism" cry. From that point on, the president tended to base his assessment of nearly every hot spot in the Cold War upon his bitter experience with Cuba.

VIETNAM: CONFLICT AT HOME AND ABROAD

By the 1960s the salient features of American foreign policy were the domino theory, the Munich analogy, and the notion of a monolithic communist threat. American strategists believed that, in a world characterized by a life-and-death struggle between the forces of totalitarian communism and democratic capitalism, the fall of one nation to communism would inevitably lead to the fall of its neighbors. Moreover, to acquiesce in appeasement would only lead to further appeasement. Thus did the administrations of Democrats John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and the Republican administration of Richard M. Nixon feel it necessary to involve America in the burgeoning conflict between communist North Vietnam and noncommunist South Vietnam. At first there was strong bipartisan support for making Vietnam a testing ground for America's will to combat communism. In August 1964, after reports that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked U.S. destroyers on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson administration secured Senate passage (with only two dissenting votes) of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. In it Congress empowered the president to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The State Department subsequently called the resolution "the functional equivalent of a declaration of war." President Johnson did not reveal at the time that the U.S. vessels had been engaged in secret espionage and raiding activities directed against North Vietnam.

As the war progressed, opposition to it mounted in Congress. The activist foreign policies of the post–World War II era that produced the war in Southeast Asia were a product of the melding of conservative anticommunists who defined national security in terms of bases and alliances and who were basically xenophobic (many of them former Republican neo-isolationists), and liberal reformers who were determined to safeguard the national interest by exporting democracy and facilitating overseas economic prosperity. By 1966 a coalition of moderate-to-liberal senators, led by the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, began to express doubts not only about the war in Vietnam but about the assumptions that underlay it. To them, nationalism was more important than the Cold War in precipitating Third World conflicts. The communist world, especially given the emerging Sino-Soviet split, seemed hardly monolithic. In addition, there was no convincing proof that if South Vietnam fell under the rule of communists, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines would follow. Finally, and most important, congressional dissidents pointed out that most of the regimes the United States was defending in the name of democracy, including the governments of South Vietnam, were either authoritarian or totalitarian.

Lyndon Johnson had doubts about the war in Southeast Asia, but in order to get his domestic Great Society programs through Congress he perceived that he would have to appease the so-called conservative coalition—Southern Democrats and Republicans who had allied to battle the growth of the welfare state and federally mandated civil rights since the late 1940s—who were ardent in their anticommunism and hence supported the war in Vietnam. Johnson was obsessed with consensus and not just because of his desire to achieve domestic reform. He truly believed in the efficacy of bipartisanship in foreign policymaking. The contradictions inherent in the Cold War proved too much for the Texan, however. In 1968, facing opposition from the liberal and moderate wings of his own party, Johnson opted not to run for reelection, paving the way for the presidency of Republican Richard Nixon.

Nixon and his national security adviser and secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, were determined to create a new international order that would simultaneously contain communism and restore America's freedom of action. The new president could use his strong anticommunist credentials as a cover to build bridges to the communist superpowers. Once disarmed, the Soviet Union and Communist China could be persuaded to take their places as responsible members of the international community. Then, the great powers could act to control revolutions that threatened international stability. Unfortunately, such a pol-

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

James William Fulbright, educator, senator, and Vietnam-era dissenter, was born in Sumner, Missouri, on 9 April 1905, and was raised in Fayetteville, Arkansas. In 1942 he ran successfully for Congress, where he made a name for himself by cosponsoring the Fulbright-Connally Resolution, which placed Congress on record as favoring membership in a postwar collective security organization. In 1944 he captured a Senate seat, and two years later introduced legislation creating the international exchange program that bears his name. In 1950 he became chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and served in that capacity until his departure from the Senate in 1975. In 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton, one of Fulbright's protégés, presented him with the Medal of Freedom. Fulbright died on 9 February 1995 following a massive stroke suffered two years earlier.

The themes that dominated the public life and work of Fulbright were cultural tolerance and international cooperation. During his thirty-two years in Congress, he appealed to the people of the world but particularly Americans to appreciate and tolerate other cultures and political systems without condoning armed aggression or human rights violations. His dedication to internationalism generally and the United Nations specifically and his passionate support of the Fulbright Exchange Program followed logically. He was convinced that the exchange of students and scholars would increase understanding and breed political elites capable of pursuing enlightened foreign policies.

Frightened by the resurgence of the radical right and greatly impressed by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's conciliatory visit to the United States in 1959, Fulbright moved beyond competitive coexistence to embrace the concept of détente. He was pleased with the Kennedy administration's flexible response to the communist threat and, following the Cuban missile crisis in 1963, with its willingness to make a fresh start with the Soviet Union. During the 1964 presidential election, Democrat Fulbright took the point in the foreign policy debate with Republican Senator Barry Goldwater and the "true believers." He was a devoted advocate of the liberal internationalism espoused by the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, that is, he believed that the United States ought to deter Sino-Soviet aggression through military preparedness and combat communist wars of liberation through foreign aid and counterinsurgency, but at the same time, he was committed to peaceful existence. The communist world, he argued, would eventually collapse of its own internal contradictions.

Fulbright parted company with Lyndon Johnson because he believed that his longtime political comrade-in-arms had sold out to the very forces that Johnson had defeated in 1964. The decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic and to escalate the war in Vietnam signaled to the senator the triumph of the nationalist, xenophobic, imperialist tendencies that had always lurked beneath the surface of American society. Fulbright came to the conclusion that the war was not a case of North Vietnam aggression against South Vietnam. Rather, the north's Ho Chi Minh represented the forces of authentic Vietnamese nationalism and the war in the south pitted an American-supported puppet government against indigenous revolutionaries who were seeking social justice and national self-determination.

In February 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held televised hearings on Vietnam. The misgivings expressed began the national debate on the wisdom of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. From then until Johnson's departure from the presidency, Fulbright labored to undermine the consensus that supported the war in Vietnam. In 1967 he published *The Arrogance of Power,* a best-selling and sweeping critique of American foreign policy.

Concerning the executive-legislative prerogatives, Fulbright's concern was not with a particular interpretation of the Constitution. In the aftermath of World War II, with the tide of isolationism still running strong, an assertive, active executive was needed to advance the cause of internationalism and keep the peace. But over the years, the stresses and strains of fighting the Cold War under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust had taken their toll. Its actions sometimes circumscribed and sometimes dictated by a fanatical anticommunism, the executive had embarked on an imperial foreign policy that had involved America in its longest war and created a maze of international commitments and overseas bases not seen since the British empire was in full bloom. The only way to check this trend, Fulbright believed, was to restore congressional prerogatives in foreign policymaking.

BLOCKADES

Frank J. Merli and Robert H. Ferrell

Blockade, historically speaking, has been a maritime measure, to restrict entrance to a harbor or its environs. The word has been stretched to include entire countries. Sometimes "blockade" has meant enforcement or threat of enforcement by land rather than by sea, along the borders of an opposing nation or nations. The blockade has always been an attractive concept to the American people and government, for it has been seen as a way of restricting war and even of preserving peace. In time of war, a narrowly drawn blockade might ward off a conflict and allow a neutral nation, perhaps the United States, to carry on its trade much as before. In time of peace, a blockade might prove sufficient to discourage a quarreling nation from employing military force. According to international law there can be pacific as well as belligerent blockades, but most, of course, have been instituted in wartime. Although other terms—"quarantine," "interdiction," "interception"—have gained currency over the years, the basic concept of blockade has remained an important component of American diplomatic and military policy.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

The law of blockade, that is, the rules governing proper legal practice, originated in the early struggles for supremacy among the maritime nations of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During that time, belligerents hacked and hewed, by sea as by land, and neutrals constantly found themselves involved in quarrels, whether they wished to be or not. Early in the seventeenth century a compromise of sorts emerged between neutrals and belligerents, in which the latter undertook to define carefully the list of items that were contraband and subject to capture. They also agreed that blockades could not merely be proclaimed: acceptable practice required that a port be cordoned off by the stationing of naval vessels at its entrance. As originally conceived, a blockade was a maritime equivalent of a land siege. When a port was properly blockaded, an investing belligerent could prohibit all trade with that port, including that of neutral nations. The idea apparently appeared first in a 1614 treaty between the Netherlands and Sweden. A refinement of the concept of effective blockade appeared in a Dutch announcement or *Placaart* of 1630, issued after consultation with private jurists and judges of the courts of admiralty. Its first article declared: "Neutral ships and goods passing in or out of the ports of the enemy in Flanders; or being so near them, that there can be no doubt but they will go into them, shall be confiscated: Because their High Mightinesses continually beset those ports with ships of war, in order to hinder any commerce with the enemy." Interestingly enough, the drafters of this rule justified it as "an ancient custom, warranted by the example of all princes"—a useful, if not entirely accurate, assessment of prior practice. The "law" of blockade, however, unlike other branches of international law, owed less to statutory enactments and more to the customs and precedents of naval officers and admiralty lawyers as they sought to bend the definitions of blockade to accommodate national interests, especially the need for victory in war.

In the early modern period of European history, with its frequent maritime wars, new rules of blockade rapidly evolved, and as they grew they acquired increasing importance as effective instruments of naval coercion. But those rules never remained static. They required frequent adjustment to new circumstances, technological innovation, and modified strategic concepts. More importantly, over the centuries, blockades had to be adapted to the exigencies created by new definitions of the nature of war.

From the mid-seventeenth century onward, new concepts of blockade were developed, and

soon the nations of Europe agreed on some basic rules governing their use. Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, set out a rule that foodstuffs, so-called provisions, should be treated as contraband only when an attempt was made to introduce them into a blockaded port in extremis, and this humane refinement received general approval from naval authorities. For their part, legal theorists such as Cornelis van Bynkershoek generally agreed that international law recognized no right of access to ports effectively closed by naval squadrons. When the United States drew up a model treaty of commerce in 1776 for submission to foreign nations, it overlooked an article defining blockades, but soon remedied that omission. American statesmen took inspiration from the attempted Armed Neutrality of 1780. Catherine the Great sought to bring together some of the European neutrals in the general war then raging, to unite them in a pact of armed neutrality that would enforce an expanded definition of neutral rights in wartime. Russia proposed that "the denomination of a blockaded port is to be given only to one which has the enemy vessels stationed sufficiently near to cause an evident danger to the attempt to enter." Although little came of Catherine's initiative, the government of the United States incorporated this proviso into its Treaty Plan of 1784, and it sought international recognition of this principle.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the practices of nations vis-à-vis blockade tended to follow their treaty obligations, and those treaties spelled out a wide variety of reciprocal rights and duties that would become operative in time of war. Naturally, a good many of the arrangements concerned the proper implementation of the rules of blockade, for nations that were neutral had no wish to become embroiled in the quarrels of their neighbors. It might be said that no branch of international relations received more attention than the search for a viable definition of blockade, one that would protect the rights of neutrals without too seriously impeding the war efforts of belligerents. Part of the reason for a certain tolerance on the subject stemmed from necessity: the naval powers of that day, Britain and Holland, depended upon Scandinavian sources of naval stores. Prudence dictated a circumspect policy toward the northern neutrals of Europe, while the conditions of warfare made such a policy easier to pursue.

In that time of limited war, full-scale blockades were rarely imposed, for men-of-war and privateers usually found it more profitable to waylay merchantmen that might be subject to seizure and condemnation in a prize court (with consequent enrichment of the captors). In prize law, problems of blockade violation remained largely a subdivision of the law of contraband until the era of the wars of the French Revolution. In the 1790s, British Admiralty officials began to pay closer attention to the problems posed by blockade. The altered circumstances of the time required new approaches, and all concessions toward neutrals had to be reevaluated.

The struggle that engulfed Europe from 1793 to 1815 ushered in a new era of international relations. Changed conditions of warfare required the belligerents to impose heavy restrictions on trade with the enemy. Almost at once, Great Britain and France narrowed their definitions of neutral rights; and as the struggle between them intensified, both nations demonstrated that they would take whatever measures seemed necessary to defeat the enemy. At one point the French proclaimed that there were no neutrals, and the British echoed that sentiment. According to one commentator, international law, if it existed at all, had been known only "through the declamations of publicists and its violation by governments." Whatever the cynicism of that mot, it accurately reflected the views of an age caught up in revolutionary upheaval.

When the wars of the French Revolution led Britain to an assault on America's presumed right of unfettered trade with all the nations of the world, belligerent as well as neutral, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson drew up a strong protest. The provision order of 1793 had instructed British naval commanders to bring in for preemptive purchase all neutral ships en route to French ports with cargoes of corn, flour, or meal. By this arbitrary redefinition of contraband, by an order that would keep American grain out of French markets in Europe and in the West Indies, by a decree that arrogantly restricted American produce to the ports of Britain or its allies, the infamous provision order threatened the new nation's honor and interests. The threat led Jefferson to a spirited defense of America's canons of commerce and international law. After denouncing the British order as contrary to the law of nations and asserting that food could never be classified as contraband, he acknowledged a "single restriction" on the right of neutrals to use the seas freely: "that of not furnishing to either party implements merely of war . . . nor anything whatever to a place blockaded by its

enemy." Jefferson thus put his finger on an important point, for if food could be classified as contraband, as an implement of war, British cruisers could legally seize it on American ships. If an order in council could declare entire islands of the West Indies or the entire coast of France blockaded, then Americans could carry nothing whatever to those places.

In the practice of the times, a legal blockade "entitled the blockading power to intercept all commerce with the blockaded port and to confiscate ships and cargoes of whatever description attempting to breach the blockade." As a nation that lived largely by export of foodstuffs, America had a vested interest in the outcome of arguments on the fine points of international law.

But Jefferson could not bring the British around to his view. Nor could John Jay when, in 1794, he went to London to draw up a commercial treaty and to resolve a number of simmering disputes, including claims for damages that had grown out of the British attacks on American commerce. In part, Jay sought to bring the British around to Jefferson's definition of neutral rights, to get them to agree that foodstuffs could never be classified as contraband (although they might be captured on ships attempting to enter a blockaded port). In these negotiations the Americans also desired British assent to the definition of effective blockade incorporated in the Armed Neutrality of 1780. Unable to obtain these arrangements, Jay had to be satisfied with a British promise to indemnify American citizens for captured articles "not generally regarded as contraband," and for assurances that vessels approaching a blockaded port would be turned away rather than captured, if the captain had no knowledge of such blockade. Beyond these innocuous concessions the British refused to go.

Meanwhile, on the French side during the 1790s, matters became so trying for the United States that a quasi-war broke out in 1798, largely because of French interference with American commerce. Lasting two years, the war ended with the Treaty of Mortefontaine (better known as the Convention of 1800), which contained a Napoleonic affirmation of neutral rights, including a narrow definition of blockade. No altruism dictated such a concession; in all probability Napoleon sought to embarrass the British for their provision order and for other executive acts of the British cabinet that both interfered with his supplies and irritated neutrals by their arbitrary nature. Or he may have sought to lure the United States into another league of armed neutrals that was then forming in Europe.

The Treaty of Amiens (1802) momentarily brought peace to Europe, but when war resumed barely a year later, the concept of neutral rights and the definition of blockade again came in for heavy pummeling by both belligerents. Horatio Nelson's victory at Trafalgar in October 1805 and Napoleon's at Austerlitz in December of that year made England supreme on the sea and France supreme on land. As Napoleon moved from triumph to triumph thereafter and consolidated his hegemony over the Continent, the British sought to bring him down with ever more restrictive maritime regulations. The military stalemate required full-scale economic war, which spelled trouble for the neutrals. The British had already tightened up on neutral trade with French colonial possessions by invoking the Rule of 1756—a diktat that forbade in wartime trade not allowed in peacetime—to cut neutrals out of the profitable French carrying trade.

During the wars of Napoleon, blockade proved the most potent weapon in the arsenals of both belligerents, although sometimes its bark was worse than its bite. Upon becoming prime minister in 1806, Charles James Fox sponsored an order in council that declared the coast of Europe, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade (although its prohibitions were absolute only between the Seine and Ostend). It amounted to a paper blockade, unsupported by ships stationed off the ports in blockade. Even the mistress of the seas did not have sufficient ships to cordon off so extensive a portion of seacoast.

The French responded with the Berlin (1806) and Milan (1807) decrees. These imperial enactments placed the British Isles in a state of blockade, and any ship submitting to search by British cruisers or complying with regulations requiring a stop at a British port the French considered denationalized and a lawful prize. Essentially a set of domestic French regulations, Napoleon's continental system remained legal in territories under French control, in the dominions of its allies, or in consenting neutral countries. The system amounted to "a fantastic blockade in reverse." Its main purpose was not blockade but the ruin of British commerce, as Napoleon himself admitted. "It is by dominating all the coasts of Europe that we shall succeed in bringing Pitt [the Younger, then prime minister] to an honorable peace," he had written in 1800, but "if the seas escape us, there is not a port, not

the mouth of a river, that is not within reach of our sword." By denying his adversary access to continental markets, the emperor hoped to destroy British power.

Faced with competing blockades (the British, for their part, desired only to push their own goods onto the Continent, contrary to Napoleon's desire), confronted with ever more restrictive practices on the part of the European belligerents, the neutral United States twisted and turned, without finding a satisfactory resolution of its dilemma. On one occasion President Jefferson told the French minister in Washington that "we have principles from which we shall never depart. Our people have commerce everywhere, and everywhere our neutrality should be respected. On the other hand we do not want war, and all this is very embarrassing." The situation called for action, but action risked war. Under such circumstances, and given the peaceful proclivities of the Jeffersonians, it was tempting to resort to ingenuity; the more so because Napoleon had cunningly remarked in the Milan Decree that its provisions would not be enforced against neutrals who compelled Britain to respect their flag. The president sponsored a series of legislative enactments, including the embargo of 1807–1809, which, through unfortunate timing, coincided with the apogee of Napoleonic power. The baleful effects of the embargo helped convince some Federalists in Boston and elsewhere that the president was in league with the emperor. Nothing could be further from the truth. The European situation remained beyond the influence of American stratagems, no matter how ingenious, as Jefferson and his successor James Madison learned.

The British openly violated their own blockade of Europe by a system of licenses encouraging neutrals to carry both British and colonial goods through the French self-blockade, albeit after those goods had passed through British hands at a profit. In 1807 some 1,600 such licenses were granted; and by 1810 the number had reached 18,000. By that time Russia had deserted the continental system, opening the Baltic to neutral and British trade.

The result of all these twists and turns, taken under the name of blockade, was an extension of the war that soon involved the United States. Unable to control the periphery of his system, in Spain, Portugal, and Russia, Napoleon took his Grande Armée to Moscow and disaster. The object of that campaign, of course, was to force the Russians back into the system and to reconstruct his continental blockade. Shortly before this great effort commenced, the United States, with its sixteen assorted ships of war, entered the conflict against England. Soon the British blockaded ports in the American South and West, although they carefully refrained from blockading New England, where there was much disaffection with Mr. Madison's war. Merchants who carried foodstuffs for British troops received passes through British squadrons. For two months after the declaration of war, the British consul in Boston licensed cargoes.

The wars of 1793–1815 clearly demonstrated the irreconcilable difference between belligerents and neutrals over use of the flexible doctrines of blockade. For the belligerents, especially the naval powers, blockade was a weapon that, if used imaginatively, could do much to bring the enemy to its knees; for the neutrals, blockade constituted a danger to trade and a means of involvement in the war. To the extent that a neutral acquiesced in "unlawful" definitions, that nation decreased its impartiality by actions that gave sustenance to one side while denying it to the other. Conversely, a too vigorous assertion of neutral rights might involve the nation in war. Still, the imprecisions inherent in formulations satisfactory to all, hence to none, provided loopholes that required no great legal legerdemain to stretch meanings to fit the exigencies of a particular war. By selecting from an assortment of precedents and practices, a belligerent could easily define the rules of blockade so as to make neutral commerce a victim of the drive for victory.

When the British sought to close the Continent to neutral trade or to control that trade in their own interest by whatever arbitrary or quasi-legal means they might devise, their higher objective, the destruction of Napoleon's warmaking capacity, took precedence over abstract, poorly defined, and largely unrecognized neutral rights and theoretical definitions of how the Royal Navy might or might not use one of its most powerful weapons. In like manner, when Napoleon's continental system came into conflict with American views of proper conduct, the emperor proved no less ingenious or heavy-handed in bending practice to fit his military or economic objectives. Between the infringements of the British and French, Americans had little to choose. Caught between implacable forces in the war that raged over Europe for nearly a generation, Americans struggled to define and defend principles for which the world, at that dangerous time, could

find no use. When war threatened the safety of the state, right gave way to might. In its life-or-death struggle for national existence, Britain could not countenance interpretations of blockade that interfered with the pursuit of victory. Failure to understand that fact of international life did much to embroil the United States in a war it did not really want.

A WARLESS ERA

With the close of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, attendant upon Waterloo and the emperor's banishment to St. Helena, there followed almost a century when, with the possible exception of the American Civil War, no major conflict involving neutral rights took place. The important wars of the nineteenth century, from 1815 to 1914, were either civil conflicts such as the Taiping rebellion in China (1850–1864) and the American Civil War, or land wars of relatively short duration such as the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). Commentators on the law of war therefore had ample opportunity to refine their concepts and to sharpen their definitions. Statesmen of the time, especially American leaders, stressed the need for a new, more reasonable international order. As secretary of state, Madison had set the lines of this litany when he denied the legality of a British blockade of the entire islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe. In 1805 he told the British chargé d'affaires in Washington that international law required the presence of sufficient force to render "access to the prohibited place manifestly difficult and dangerous." In defense of this doctrine—and for the sake of American exports of food and naval stores—he added: "It can never be admitted that the trade of a neutral nation in articles not contraband, can be legally obstructed to any place, not actually blockaded." In 1824, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams ventured a new definition of a legal blockade, one that required "ships stationary or sufficiently near" the place prohibited, so that there was "evident danger" in attempting an entry. Then, during the Mexican War (1846–1848), the United States again affirmed its opposition to nominal blockades by telling the neutral British that according to American rules, "no Mexican port was considered blockaded unless a force was stationed sufficiently near to make trade with that port dangerous."

The United States refused to adopt the 1856 Declaration of Paris by which the major European powers at the end of the Crimean War attempted to promulgate a new code of neutral rights. That set of rules included a revised definition of blockade: "Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." That article coincided with traditional American views. Other portions of the declaration did not measure up to Washington's expectations of what a proper code of conduct should be. During the war, with the fighting mainly on land and hardly touching neutral commerce, the maritime powers, France and Britain (then allied against Russia), realized that privateers, that is, legalized private ships of war, might prove attractive to the Russians in some future war. Having renounced use of such vessels during the war, the victorious allies sought in peace a formal international prohibition against their use. Part of the price for such an abolition was adoption of a more liberal view of neutral rights, and the powers of Europe, including Britain, subscribed to the rules set out at Paris. Hence, the ideal statement about blockade. But the American government, like the Russian, found fault with the new code. With its small navy, the United States might find future utility in use of private vessels of war and was therefore reluctant to surrender their use. Until belligerents were willing to afford a total immunity to all private property at sea, the Americans did not want to abolish privateering. They sought, rather, to trade off American acceptance of the article abolishing privateers for European recognition of the principle of immunity for private property at sea during wartime.

Failure to sign the Declaration of Paris did not enhance America's status as a champion of expanded neutral rights or as a proponent of the need for clear limits to blockades. Nor was the American position advanced by the circumstances of the Civil War, a conflict that became so heated—the need to contain the rebellious South being so pressing—that Washington officials proved willing to abridge the national record on the rights of neutrals, particularly in the use of blockade theory and practice, if only such abridgment would bring victory. Indeed, some observers and later historians have argued that the United States had been a champion of neutral rights when it had a small navy and little military power, but when it marshaled the most effective army and largest navy in the world, it jettisoned the principles of an earlier generation in favor of a more expedient approach.

In retrospect, the Civil War seems to have been so large an anomaly in American national life that no easy judgment can be made on whether President Abraham Lincoln and his aides forsook the principles of the Founders to save the Union. For the president and his secretary of state, William H. Seward, the fundamental international problem during the war was to preserve the neutrality and if possible the goodwill of Britain. Blockade measures against the South therefore had to be arranged so as to put maximum pressure on the Confederacy without provoking British reprisals. To be sure, other European neutrals occasionally encountered difficulties—Spain, for example, because of ownership of Cuba, from whence blockade-runners sometimes passed, and Denmark because of the proximity of the Virgin Islands to the Confederate coast—but their involvement never reached crisis proportions. The Mexican government frequently complained about actions by Union captains off Matamoros, contrary to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), which forbade any blockade of the Rio Grande. But the British response to problems generated by the war always concerned Union leaders most, for they realized that Britain's international position, its merchant fleet and naval strength, gave Her Majesty's government a vital interest in transatlantic affairs. For example, when the British almost from the outset of the war failed to push any blockade cases with the American government, that forbearance provided Lincoln's administration with a helpful leeway in manhandling aid for the South coming in by sea, or any effort by Southerners to ship cotton abroad in order to import the arms and supplies needed to prosecute the war. Britain's lack of militancy on issues concerning blockade became so marked by the second year of the war that the federal government in Washington enjoyed virtual carte blanche in its measures to seal off the South from supplies.

At the outbreak of war the Lincoln administration made a slip, when on 19 April 1861 it proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas and then eight days later of the ports of North Carolina and Virginia. The president should have declared the ports closed. Proclamation of a blockade was a presumption that the South enjoyed belligerent status and might merit international recognition as an independent nation. Officials in London felt that, in any event, they could not look upon 5 million people as pirates or as engaged in unlawful combination, and on 13 May they issued a neutrality proclamation, which included a warning to British subjects against the violation of any blockade established by either belligerent. Months later, in July, President Lincoln tried to amend the legal faux pas by saying that the blockade was "in pursuance of the law of nations" against a domestic insurrection: "A proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade." These changes in legal terminology did not result in European withdrawal of recognition of Confederate belligerent status.

Later, debate would focus on the effectiveness of the Union blockade or on the "proceedings in the nature of blockade." Writers have contended that Union efforts were effective, but one twentieth-century southern historian argued that the blockade was a sieve. He calculated that blockade-runners made 8,000 trips to the South. He further points out that, in the early stages, the Union did not have sufficient ships to give even a semblance of effectiveness to its declaration. The porous nature of the blockade invited attempts to run into Southern ports with profitable cargo. Many of the adventurers who tried their hand at the business were "retired" British naval officers and other subjects of Her Majesty, the Queen. So many Britons took part in blockade-running that Lord John Russell, the foreign secretary, offhandedly quipped that his countrymen would, "if money were to be made by it, send supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails." Throughout the war, profits remained high; a return of 1,000 percent upon investment was not uncommon. Even in 1864, a captain who ordinarily made $150 per month might earn $5,000. A popular toast celebrated the blockade-runners' thankfulness to everyone: "The Confederates that produce the cotton; the Yankees that maintain the blockade and keep up the price of cotton; the Britishers that buy the cotton and pay the high price for it. Here's to all three, and a long continuance of the war, and success to blockade-runners."Still, the blockade was effective enough for the British government, despite considerable pressure against the move, to recognize its existence. Lord Russell, who can hardly be described as pro-North in outlook, eventually concluded that the Union blockade had to be considered "generally effective against foreign trade." His minister in Washington, Lord Lyons, regarded it as more than a mere paper blockade, noting that if it were "as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis says . . . he would not be so very anxious to get rid of it." From reports of the

commander of their North American station, the British carefully monitored the performance of Union blockading squadrons, and not until early 1862 did they formally accept the blockade. In February of that year, Russell told Lyons that there were enough Union vessels on blockade duty to prevent access to Southern ports or "to create an evident danger" to ships seeking to enter them.

Another Southern wartime hope—that the need for cotton would force European powers to press Lincoln's government to relax its blockade—also proved illusory. As it turned out, King Cotton proved a weak champion and an inept diplomat. By chance, the crop of 1860, one of the largest on record, had been shipped to Europe before the war started, and by the time a shortage developed, in the winter of 1862–1863, the South's military position was too precarious to warrant European intervention in American affairs.

One additional facet of the Civil War blockade deserves mention. Four captures of ships made during the first months of the war raised questions about the right of the federal government under international law to establish a blockade of its own ports during an insurrection, and of the right of the president to do so in the absence of a congressional declaration of war. Attorney General Edward Bates was advised to delay the cases until the president could appoint more politically reliable justices to the Supreme Court. After three Lincoln appointees joined the court, the government's position on the utility of the blockade was barely upheld in 1863, by a vote of five to four. The five cooperative justices made up in ardor what they lacked in support from their less certain brethren; and the dissenters no doubt blanched to hear that they had taken the "wrong" side of an issue involving "the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race," and that their negative arguments had threatened to "cripple the arm of the government and paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms."

In one of the prize cases, that of the *Springbok,* the court ruled that any cargo ultimately intended for a blockaded port could be captured whenever it left the territorial waters of its port of origin. This rule applied, the court said, "even if the cargo was to be transshipped at an intermediate port, and the vessel in which it was found when captured was not the one which was to carry it to a blockaded port." In this case the court assigned a penalty for a breach of blockade "to a guilty cargo in an innocent ship." The court, in effect, ruled that the cargo was on a continuous voyage from its port of origin to a blockaded port. Acceptance of this definition increased the power of the Union navy in intercepting supplies en route to the South. Such rulings went far toward making a blockade of Confederate ports almost unnecessary by substituting what amounted to a paper blockade of neutral ports in the Caribbean and Mexico.The case of the *Peterhoff* raised a question of the shipment of contraband overland, from Matamoros, Mexico, across the Rio Grande to Brownsville, Texas. The Union navy found itself with a perplexing problem in Matamoros, which before the war had had scarcely half a dozen visiting vessels a year. This hardly vibrant entrepôt welcomed 200 ships by 1864. Union captains hesitated to move against a neutral port, but they took ships en route to it, the *Peterhoff* being one of their more famous captures. After the war the case of the *Peterhoff* came before the Supreme Court; Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase roundly affirmed America's traditional record of respecting neutral ports and internationalized rivers such as the Rio Grande; he also asserted that the nation did not favor paper blockades. Release of the ship seemed a reasonable price for so many reassuring affirmations.

In another ploy to increase the efficacy of the blockade, Union officials even refused clearances to suspicious cargoes from their own ports or required the posting of heavy bonds to assure that such cargoes were intended for peaceful purposes. (During the war, suspiciously large amounts of clean-burning anthracite coal, a key component of successful blockade-running, were being shipped to British ports in Canada and the Caribbean.) The British chargé d'affaires complained about these export restrictions, remarking that the congressional enactment that sanctioned them was "a cheap and easy substitute for an effectual blockade." These practices so irritated British merchants that in 1864 Lord Lyons threatened that Her Majesty's government might have to reconsider its recognition of the legality of the Union blockade. Secretary of State Seward knew that, so late in the war, such an action could not serve British interests, so he ignored the minister's protest. For the remainder of the war the Union continued to use all the legal and economic weapons that it possessed to defeat the South.

During the half-century from the close of the Civil War to the opening of World War I, there were only one or two refinements in the concept of blockade. As noted, the Franco-Pruss-

ian War provided no opportunities for the expansion of old definitions or the creation of new ones. The Boer War and the Spanish-American War were local conflicts—the one a civil war, the other a splendid little affair. In the course of operations before Manila, prior to the capture of that city in 1898, Admiral George Dewey came to dislike the pretensions of a German admiral who happened to be in the harbor, and there is some evidence that Dewey told his German opposite that he wanted to "damn the Dutch." But that was hardly a refinement of blockade; nor did anything of a novel nature accompany use of blockades in the Caribbean, although the closing off of Santiago de Cuba was one of the last pre-submarine, close-in blockades, while the one at Havana, which began on 22 April 1898, had a closer connection with strategic considerations than with economic ones. The Americans believed that they could not capture Havana Harbor without risking heavy losses.

More important developments took place in a contretemps before the ports of Venezuela in 1902, when Britain, Germany, and Italy instituted a blockade to collect the debts owed by Venezuela to European creditors. The United States served notice that there was no right to interfere with ships of third parties, that is, American ships; whereupon the blockading powers announced that their blockade "created ipso facto a state of war" and gave themselves belligerent rights. When the issue went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the tribunal carefully skirted questions about the legality of the blockade, but in adjudicating the claims of the creditors decided in favor of the blockading powers. Shortly thereafter the nations of the world made another illustrious, if inconsequential, pronouncement about blockade. The second Hague Peace Conference (1907) had sought to establish an International Prize Court, but the delegates could not agree on the rules of prize law. To fill this gap a conference met in December 1908 in London, and after two months the delegates signed the London Declaration. Its provisions on blockade demonstrated once again the great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory definition; indeed, these men of the twentieth century did little better than their nineteenth-century counterparts at Paris in 1856. Unable to agree upon a definition that would be acceptable to all, and recognizing the need for a "certain imprecision," the delegates reaffirmed the illegality of paper blockades and said that for a blockade to be binding it had to be maintained by an "adequate" naval force. No government ratified the London Declaration, even though during World War I the United States pressed the British to accept its principles. The resultant refusal highlighted a basic ambiguity of international life. Despite the best intentions, a power at war will retain loopholes in commitments to other nations so as to permit maximum use of offensive and defensive weapons.

WORLD WAR I AND AFTER

The theory and practice of blockade entered a third stage (following the formative period in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the somnolent period dating from 1815) when the major nations of Europe joined in the Great War in 1914 and the United States entered the conflict in 1917. In the opening campaign along the Marne, the French army and a small British force slowed the German army, and the war turned from movement to position. By this time, the narrow definitions of the Paris and London declarations were all but obsolete—inoperable except in the most unimportant situations. Those formulations could not serve the needs of twentieth-century war. Transportation networks had grown up across all modern countries—rivers and canals, railroads, macadamized roads and highways for motor travel. New navies of steel and steam plied the seas, epitomized by the launching of the British battleship *Dreadnought* in 1906, and the conversion of merchant shipping from sail to steam was virtually complete. The new network of transportation made enemy ports of less consequence as goods could be shipped in and out via nearby neutrals. The conversion to steam made it unnecessary for warships to catch the wind before they moved out against blockade-runners or illicit neutral traders. Merchant shipping could operate apart from trade routes and prevailing winds, quite literally turning up anywhere. Then, too, the industrialization of much of Western Europe, especially of Germany, the principal antagonist of the Allies, gave a new dimension to blockade—the right sort of blockade might destroy German industry, or at least severely cripple it. And, as if blockade in the sense of Grotius and Bynkershoek would have had much chance at all, practical submarines and highly reliable mines were invented just prior to the outbreak of the war. Small wonder that World War I virtually ended blockade as it had been known.

In several instances, the old, traditional blockade of close-in surveillance of enemy ports

was practiced during World War I, but these operations, carried out in reasonable conformity to the strictures of the London Declaration, occurred in secondary theaters of naval activity—the Mediterranean, Africa, and China. Where things really mattered—the blockade off the European coast and in the North Sea—the British government at least made a formal effort to maintain that the old rules still roughly applied. Its foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, indulged in frequent long explanations to the American ambassador in London and to the secretary of state in Washington. He assured them and reassured them that any changes in traditional rules of blockade stemmed not from a spirit of innovation but from the need to adjust old definitions to new circumstances. He implied that nothing really had changed.

In fact, the purposes of a blockade during the war were assisted by other measures not given that name, and the belligerents were usually careful in avoiding use of that term to describe their actions. The outstanding examples of such measures were the German declarations of war zones and the British designations of mine areas, military areas, and danger zones. It was a piquantly interesting fact that every one of the belligerent resorts to what might be described as measures of quasi-blockade was adopted via the principle of international law known as the law of retaliation.

It is hardly necessary to explain in detail how the British and German blockades operated during World War I. The Germans first used mines, giving notice of their intent to do so in August 1914; the British countered in November by closing the entire North Sea because of minefields. In a proclamation of 4 February 1915, the Germans announced unrestricted submarine and mine warfare, and the following month the British and French retaliated by declaring their intent to detain and take into port all ships "carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin." To the Americans, Grey described that move as a blockade, and the U.S. government took his note as a formal notice of the establishment of a blockade and sought to get the Allies to respect neutral ports and vessels according to traditional standards of international law. In responding to the strictures of Washington officials, Grey took the stand that the March order amounted to "no more than an adaptation of the old principles of blockade." A decade later in his memoirs he wrote more candidly: "The Navy acted and the Foreign Office had to find the argument to support the action; it was anxious work." And well done. The order in council of 11 March 1915 was one of the most powerful weapons in the British system of economic warfare against Germany. With the order the Allies gained all the advantages that would have come from a formal declaration of blockade of German ports—and without the inconvenience of stationing "adequate" naval forces off the ports. Also, when the Royal Navy acted under that mandate it succeeded in reducing the flow of supplies to the enemy via neutral ports, while at the same time cutting down on Germany's overseas trade. If the Allied pursuit of victory impinged too closely upon the interests of neutrals, if American shippers complained about innovations or illegalities, the lawyers at the Foreign Office had little trouble finding arguments.

Ironically, the British government found quite a few in the practices of the Union navy during the Civil War. One of the more interesting adjuncts to the British system of blockade closely paralleled a technique used by the North in its efforts to subdue the South, although there is no evidence that the British borrowed the idea from the Americans. From 1861 to 1865, Union officials sought to cut off supplies to the Confederacy by requiring exporters to obtain licenses, which, of course, could only be procured upon evidence that the cargoes in question had a bona fide neutral use. During World War I the British played a variation of this theme in order to make their restrictions more acceptable to neutrals. Their system, called navicerting, worked thusly: A neutral exporter, say an American interested in perfectly legal, noncontraband trade with a Scandinavian country, applied to British authorities (usually a consul) for permission to send his ship through naval cordons guarding approaches to European coasts. If he convinced the consul of the innocence of his venture, he received a navicert, a sort of commercial passport, which in most cases assured noninterference with his ship and cargo. The innovation conferred enormous advantage on the British, for in effect it transferred control of a large measure of neutral trade "from the deck to the dock."

The Allies introduced other refinements in their practice of blockade. They censored neutral mail to discover firms trading with the enemy and then blacklisted them and subjected them to harassment, such as depriving them of coal or denying them facilities for repairs. In the case of the *Kim* a British prize-court judge accepted statistical evidence to establish a pre-

sumption that American goods consigned to a Danish port were actually on a continuous voyage to Germany. Prize courts also made a slight but significant alteration in procedure when they transferred the burden of proving the innocence of a cargo to the claimant. With such pressures the British secured neutral cooperation with their system of economic control. The alternative, to be sure, was not to cooperate, but the Allied supremacy at sea meant that noncooperation had unpleasant consequences: detention of cargo, expensive and time-consuming legal proceedings, confiscation of goods, and the denial of facilities needed to conduct business. All the while the German blockade of Britain moved back and forth from observance of rules of cruiser warfare (meaning that submarines would not sink on sight but instead would visit and search and if necessary make provision for the safety of passengers and crew) to the waging of unrestricted submarine warfare, with its barbaric killing of noncombatants.

With a poor harvest in the United States in 1916 it appeared possible to prevent grain from other neutrals entering the British Isles, and in that hope the German government at the end of January 1917 announced unrestricted submarine warfare and knowingly brought the United States into the war, believing that their submarine blockade would bring victory before the Americans could raise and transport an army to Europe.

That the Allied long-range blockade of Germany was effective in helping the Allies win the war must admit of little doubt. Its effect upon the enemy, however, took far longer than expected. During the great German offensives in the spring and early summer of 1918, the troops were astonished at the quality of the equipment of the routed British Fifth Army, and also at the relative luxury in which French civilians were living. In the last weeks of the war the German home front virtually caved in. The military forces had been defeated first—there may be no doubt about that. But the civilians had been standing in line for years, and the word *Ersatz* had become a commonplace. When the prospect of peace emerged during the diplomatic exchanges of October 1918, the German civilians came to believe that they had suffered too long. The British blockade at last had placed an impossible burden. Continuation of the war into 1919, which otherwise might have been possible, was too harrowing to contemplate.

In examining the operation of the blockade during World War I, there remains the practice of the United States once it entered the war. Popular wisdom at the time and later had it that the Americans turned the principles of neutral rights around as soon as they became a belligerent. Such was not the case. There appear to have been only two clear-cut and rather minor violations of international law by the U.S. government. Use of embargoes, bunker control, and the blacklist were all unquestionably legal, involving only domestic jurisdiction and municipal law. The task of enforcing the blockade remained in British hands; the U.S. Navy took no prizes. It is true that it laid a great barrier of 70,000 mines from Scotland to Norway. During the period of neutrality, the United States had reserved its rights on British and German mining of the seas, and so, technically at least, did nothing startlingly novel by constructing a huge mine barrier in 1918. Fear of German use of Norwegian territorial waters disappeared when Norway closed the gap in the barrage by mining its own waters. In the pre-armistice negotiations with the British about their insistence upon reserving freedom of the seas from discussion at the peace conference (because they feared it might restrict the right of blockade) President Woodrow Wilson stated that blockade was "one of the many things which will require immediate redefinition in view of the many new circumstances of warfare developed by this war." But there was, he said, "no danger of its being abolished."

In the decades to come, "blockade" as a term would give way to terms such as "quarantine," "interdiction," and "interception." The belief was that the new world organizations, the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations—not to mention the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), by which almost all the nations of the world renounced and outlawed war—ensured that neutrality in the old sense was gone, perhaps replaced by collective security.

The record of the League of Nations in this regard was probably too short to be conclusive. Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for sanctions, and the first assembly of that organization created an International Blockade Committee, which issued a cautious report in 1921. The committee felt that "to pronounce an opinion in regard to the naval blockade and the right of search" was outside the scope of its work because more study was needed on those subjects. It noted that three great exporting countries (the Soviet Union, United States, and Germany) remained outside the league, and

in a curious bit of logic concluded that its name was a misnomer, since application of Article 16 did not involve imposition of blockades in the traditional sense.

In the 1930s there was talk, in and out of the league, about quarantining aggressors. Membership in the league did not seem to make much difference in the results of the talk, for there were virtually no results. League members hesitated to include an oil embargo among the measures invoked against Mussolini's adventure in Ethiopia in 1935–1936, for the Duce said that he would consider an oil embargo an act of war. In 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke in Chicago about quarantining aggressors, but he gingerly withdrew the idea when it aroused a storm of protest from his fellow citizens. In that troubled decade before the outbreak of World War II, there was plain evidence that neutral thoughts had not disappeared. In 1932 the United States ratified a Pan-American Convention that reaffirmed the belligerent right of visit and search. The neutrality acts (1935–1941), passed by Congress to keep the country out of war, went into great detail about neutral rights and duties, including those that involved blockades. The acts implied that for the United States the league's new order would not function. Nor did it.

During World War II the United States again was forced to confront the problems of blockade, both as a neutral and as a belligerent. While neutral, it took an indulgent stand in regard to British blockade measures and sought to avoid repetition of the arguments during World War I. The United States reserved its rights under international law but in practice reached a cozy accommodation with British restrictions, including a much expanded version of the navicert system. Then, as a belligerent, the United States found frequent occasion to expand the use of blockade as a weapon of victory. When the U.S. Navy achieved dominance in the Pacific, it instituted a tight cordon around the Japanese home islands to cut off imports and enforced that cordon with the chilling efficiency of its submarine fleet. Clearly, the demands of total war imposed a need for permutations of what international lawyers describe as the latent law of blockade—the belligerent that possesses command of the sea is entitled to deprive an opponent of use of it. Drafters of the Dutch *Placaart* of 1630 would have understood that need.

But what had been appropriate to the period of total war proved inappropriate to the era of limited wars that plagued the world after 1945. Once more the United States devised modifications in its use of blockade. These variations have been called "special function blockades" and had a wide use in the Korean and Vietnam wars, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and in conflicts with unfriendly regimes in Iraq, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Because of its predominant naval power during the Korean conflict, the United States imposed a close-in blockade of all Korean ports and coasts that was reminiscent of the practice of earlier eras. In Vietnam, other tactics were used to interdict the flow of supplies to enemy contingents operating in South Vietnam. To prevent introduction of war matériel by sea, the South Vietnamese, with the aid of U.S. naval craft, conducted what might be described as a self-blockade. During this time they practiced all the traditional techniques of visit and search off their own coasts and in their own territorial waters. Perhaps a more interesting case was the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the internal waterways and coastal waters of North Vietnam by American aircraft in the spring of 1972. By this process of air interdiction of seaborne supplies the United States hoped to carry out the purposes of a blockade, and took extreme care to minimize the danger to neutral commerce. The U.S. Navy even observed the ancient custom of allowing a grace period for neutral vessels to leave the coast and harbors before activating the mines.

The most important invocation of a special function blockade occurred in the Caribbean during the missile crisis in October 1962. Thus, the United States relied on one of the oldest weapons in its arsenal to avoid resorting to more deadly ones. In a speech to the nation, President John F. Kennedy announced "a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba" and a turning back of all ships found to be carrying offensive weapons "from whatever nation or port." The subsequent proclamation ordered U.S. forces to interdict delivery of such matériel, and the navy set up a quarantine line around the eastern and southern approaches to the island. The president carefully coordinated his naval maneuvers so as to leave room for compliance by the Russians with these restrictions on their freedom of the seas. Successful resolution of the missile crisis again demonstrated the protean possibilities of concepts of blockade or "proceedings in the nature of a blockade," that is, as flexible instruments of national policy.

KENNEDY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

"Good evening, my fellow citizens. The government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. . . .

"Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately: First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers."

—From a radio and television address by President John F. Kennedy, 22 October 1962—

"Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, president of the United States of America, acting under and in virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba.

"For the purposes of this Proclamation the following are declared to be offensive material: Surface-to-surface missiles, bomber aircraft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles, warheads for any of the above weapons, mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items, and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation."

—Proclamation signed by President Kennedy, 23 October 1962—

In the case of blockading—such in reality was the word behind the other words—of Iraq that began in August 1990, the action against Iraqi trade divided into phases I and II. Phase I came at the outset of Operation Desert Shield, the effort by the United States together with a large number of other members of the United Nations to persuade Iraq to give up its occupation of Kuwait, which it had just accomplished. The lead in this effort to make Iraq move its military forces back behind its own borders was necessarily taken by President George H. W. Bush, for it was mostly U.S. Navy forces that would have to handle restrictions on ocean-borne trade; 95 percent of Iraq's exports were oil. The president skirted mention to blockade, at first referring to interdiction, then to interception. His effort to avoid a possible act of war was due to the sensibilities of UN members, some of which—notably France and Russia—were not in favor of strong measures. The president also hesitated because of lack of full support by Congress. But diplomacy abroad and at home gradually resolved the fears of the president's critics. Only two pipelines exited Iraq, one to Turkey and the other to Saudi Arabia. The former nation was cooperative, as was the latter, with a border to Kuwait. The only local supporter of the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, was Jordan, the monarch of which, King Hussein, might have been expected to oppose Iraq, where Saddam's political party, the Baath, had murdered Hussein's cousin, King Faisal, years before. Jordan's trade with Iraq also was at stake. President Bush managed to persuade Hussein to support a naval interception. As the months passed, with U.S. forces and those of its allies gathering in preparation for Operation Desert Storm, Saddam managed to alienate even more UN members by defying, if only in words, the interception of tankers by the U.S. Navy. To no avail the Iraqi representative in the UN denounced what he described as a U.S.-dominated action, asserting it was naught but a blockade.

Phase II of interception of Iraqi trade commenced after the triumphant few weeks of Desert Storm, and, to the confusion of U.S. and UN officials, continued into the twenty-first century. The basic problem during Phase II was to get the Iraqi regime to change its ways, for they were intolerable—a total disregard for human rights, support of international terrorism, hegemonic ambitions in the area, and development of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, not to mention refusal of reparations for its invasion of Kuwait. But how to force a reformation? Claims by Iraq that children suffered from lack of food were difficult to resist, and the UN was tempted to allow oil for food if only to pay Kuwait and nations such as Jordan, which had to house and feed refugees during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as well as nations whose nationals had been trapped in Iraq during that time. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's interceptions were difficult to enforce. Ships bringing cargoes into the country, particularly container ships, had to make space for inspectors, and the loss of cargo thereby led to complaints. Ships destined for Jordan's port of Aqaba required inspection at sea or at the port prior to land transshipment. Sentiment arose, encouraged by Iraq, to hold inspections at a designated point on the Jordan-Iraq border, so that the Iraqis could boast about doing everything properly, while goods could come in at other border points illegally and without notice. (The borders in the area had no passes or notable roads; they were lines drawn in the sand after World War I.) In 1997 the commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet accused Iran of complicity for smuggling oil through Iranian territorial waters. As late as March 2001 a notable breach in the interception was occurring by land transit of oil into Turkey, with the oil duly taxed by the Turkish government. Both the United States and United Nations informally accepted the traffic, amounting annually to hundreds of millions of dollars, for it benefited the weak Turkish economy.

Meanwhile, between 1991 and 1994 actions leading to interdiction were taken in Haiti, to force out a military regime that had deposed an elected president, and against Serbia for attacking Slovenia and Croatia, which had declared independence from Serbia. At the beginning in Haiti the international opposition was marshaled by the Organization of American States and was voluntary. At last, in 1993, the United Nations took over from the OAS and imposed mandatory prohibition on entry of oil, arms, police equipment, and "spare parts for the aforementioned." There nonetheless was trouble over border smuggling from the Dominican Republic, the government of which reluctantly allowed policing by U.S. military helicopters. On 19 September 1994, without any clear evidence that a limited embargo had had any effect, a small invasion force landed and the military regime came to an end.

In regard to Serbia, a situation developed not unlike that of the American Civil War, in which the Yugoslav federal government, dominated by Serbia, sought to bring back its independence-minded provinces. Two international squadrons stationed in the Adriatic undertook to enforce an embargo. But the government in Belgrade needed no arms support, unlike its seceding provinces. And other supplies to Serbia were easily available via the Danube or neighboring states. As in Haiti, naval measures of interception ultimately failed, and led to employment of air power and land-based peacekeeping forces.

CONCLUSION

And so the meaning of "blockade" has shifted over the years—perhaps it is more correct to say that it has been "jostled." Everything has depended upon the nation with available power, whether that nation wished to employ it for its own benefit or that of the international community. At the time when international law was a novelty, the time of Grotius, there was no such thing as an international community. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, blockade was a point of argument governed by power and, for the United States, by hope—trust that trading nations could make their ways without interference. After World War I the word "blockade" tended to go out of style. The international organizations created after the world wars anticipated the prevention of conflicts through the cordoning off of "aggressor" nations by multilateral action and not by the traditional bilateral maneuvers involving blockade. Then, too, other words—"quarantine," "interdiction," "interception"—have seemed less provocative than "blockade" and also would not automatically involve inconvenient rules and practices of the not-too-distant past.

As to the future of blockade, it may not have one. New words from the late twentieth century give indication that it is a concept of the past.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Behrens, C. B. A. *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War.* London, 1955.

Bernath, Stuart. *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., 1970. Makes international law not only intelligible but interesting to the general reader.

Blair, Clay. *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan.* Philadelphia and New York, 1975.

Burt, A. L. *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America: From the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812.* New Haven, Conn., 1940.

Chayes, Abram. *The Cuban Missile Crisis.* New York, 1974.

Deak, Francis, ed. *Neutrality in History, Economics, and Law.* 4 vols. New York, 1935–1936. Treatment of the evolution of a key portion of international law.

Field, James. *America and the Mediterranean World: 1776–1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961.

Lurabaghi, Raimonndo. *A History of the Confederate Navy.* Annapolis, Md., 1996. Translated by Paolo Coletta.

Mallison, W. T. *Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines in General and Limited Wars.* Washington, D.C., 1968. Legal problems raised by submarine war.

Medlicott, W. N. *The Economic Blockade.* 2 vols. London, 1952.

Merli, Frank J. *Great Britain and the Confederate Navy.* Bloomington, Ind., 1970. A portion deals with keeping blockade-runners out of the South.

Moore, John B. *Digest of International Law.* 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1906. Old but useful.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Boston, 1947–1962.

Savage, Carlton. *Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War.* 2 vols. Washington, D.C., 1934. Handy compilation of documentary material.

Savelle, Max. *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Anglo-America, 1492–1763.* New York, 1967. Although there is no index entry for blockade, there is the important chapter "The Impact of the New World of the Colonies upon the Evolution of the Theory and Practice of International Law."

Siney, Marion C. *The Allied Blockade of Germany: 1914–1916.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1957.

Tracy, Nicholas. *Attack on Maritime Trade.* Toronto, 1991. The perspective is from naval strategy rather than economics or international law.

Trask, David. *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918.* Columbia, Mo., 1972.

Varg, Paul. *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers.* East Lansing, Mich., 1963.

Wise, Stephen. *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War.* Columbia, S.C., 1988.

See also ARMED NEUTRALITIES; ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE; CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; NAVAL DIPLOMACY; NEUTRALITY.

THE CHINA LOBBY

Warren I. Cohen

"China lobby" is a pejorative phrase first applied in the 1940s to a disparate collection of Chinese and Americans who tried to influence the people and government of the United States on behalf of the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jie-shī;) and in opposition to the Chinese communists. Opponents of aid to the Nationalists commonly used the term to imply that Chiang's American supporters were paid and that their activities were coordinated by Chiang and other officials of his government or members of his family. A second usage implied the existence of an organization of Chinese Nationalist officials and American rightists joined to stimulate anticommunism in the United States. Americans most commonly associated with the China lobby were the noted publisher Henry R. Luce; Alfred Kohlberg, a retired New York importer; Frederick C. McKee, a wealthy Pittsburgh manufacturer and philanthropist; Republican Representative Walter H. Judd of Minnesota; and the Republican senators William F. Knowland of California and Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. The lobby was presumed to have tremendous influence in American politics by contemporaries. It has been credited with forcing a reluctant Truman administration to continue aid to Chiang during the Chinese civil war, preventing recognition of the People's Republic of China and barring it from the United Nations, and blocking the distribution of a book exposing the operations of the China lobby.

Although the Chinese Nationalist regime employed American lobbyists and public relations operatives and had the support of the American right in the struggle against communism in China, support for Chiang's China cannot be written off as either hired or right wing. In the United States popular support for Chiang—or, more precisely, opposition to communist control of China—was broadly based, including liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, and southerners, northerners, easterners, and westerners. Popular antipathy toward the Chinese communists derived from a widespread and profound distaste for communism and from traditional sympathies for the heathen Chinese. But it was the Korean War—especially the intervention of the People's Republic of China in the war—that brought about the results for which Chiang's supporters worked in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Without the Korean War, the limited public interest in Asian affairs and the reality of the communist victory in China might well have led to an early accommodation between the United States and the regime of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), despite the efforts of the friends of Nationalist China.

LOBBYING EFFORTS FROM THE 1920S THROUGH WORLD WAR II

Pressure group activity on behalf of the Nationalist regime dates back to the Nationalist revolution (1925–1928), when Chiang Kai-shek was struggling to unite China with Soviet and Chinese communist assistance. Fearing intervention by the United States and other governments, a group of American missionaries and educators, led by individuals like A. L. Warnshuis, secretary of the International Missionary Council; J. Leighton Stuart, president of Yenching University (Beijing); and Roger S. Greene of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, worked to alert policymakers, members of Congress, and the public to the need for an accommodation with Chinese nationalism. Links between Chiang's government and American missionaries and reformers continued into the 1930s as Madame Chiang Kai-shek and other American-educated Chinese leaders sporadically attempted to gain American assistance in the modernization of China. Major lobbying activities did not begin, however, until after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

Of the various groups that were organized to influence U.S. policy on behalf of China between 1937 and 1941 the most important was the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, also known as the Price Committee. In 1938, appalled by the inaction of the U.S. government in the face of Japanese aggression in China, Frank and Harry Price, sons of the famous missionary P. Frank Price, called together a small group of men, including an American employed as a propagandist for the Chinese government. To campaign against the flow of American supplies to Japan, they created an organization that soon received financial support from the Chinese government. There is no evidence that the formation of the committee was inspired by Chinese authorities, but given the relations between the two, especially during the early stages, this possibility cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the Chinese government considered itself entitled to reports.

Despite the initial role of the Chinese, the Price Committee subsequently attempted to restrict contributors to Americans and to sever potentially embarrassing ties to Chinese officials. One member who was employed by the Chinese government and required to register as the agent of a foreign principal resigned from the committee. Roger Greene and Henry L. Stimson served respectively as chairman and honorary chairman; Harry Price, as executive secretary; and Walter Judd, a former medical missionary, proved to be its most effective speaker. Frederick McKee and Geraldine Fitch, wife of the well-known missionary George A. Fitch, were also important members of the organization.

The central program of the Price Committee called for an embargo on supplies of military value to Japan. Beginning in 1939, it worked closely with key figures in the U.S. government, especially with Stanley K. Hornbeck of the Department of State and with Stimson, who became secretary of war in 1940. Individual members, like Greene and McKee, were also active and influential in the most important of the pressure groups espousing collective security. The activities of these friends of China may have been responsible for President Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision in July 1939 to notify Japan of the intention of the United States to terminate the commercial treaty between the two nations, thus facilitating economic sanctions. With access to Roosevelt and other top administration officials, Greene and Price may have shaped a number of important government actions, such as credits to China for the purchase of trucks and the National Defense Act of 1940, which gave Roosevelt authority to control exports. Similarly, these lobbyists on behalf of China utilizing the most sophisticated public relations methods then available—mass mailings, press releases, speaker tours, petition drives—mobilized opinion leaders in the colleges, churches and civic organizations across the country behind administration efforts to help China. Indeed, they generated pressures designed to push Roosevelt faster than he wanted to move. In the autumn of 1941, their warning against a Far Eastern Munich made a modus vivendi with Japan extremely difficult.

After the United States entered World War II, many groups emerged to raise money for China, enlisting men and women who had participated in the Price Committee's efforts. Most of these groups were brought together under United China Relief, a kind of holding company that attempted to coordinate private aid to China. Typical of the new groups that were organized during the war was the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC), with which Greene was involved and in which Kohlberg played a major role. All of these organizations reminded the American people of the long suffering of their Chinese allies, filled the country with stories of Chinese resistance and heroism, and, to simplify their story, personified China in the figures of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. From the *Weekly Reader* to the newsreels and the public prints, these glamorous figures appeared as the spirit of Free China, with greatly exaggerated references to their dedication to democracy and to the Four Freedoms that Roosevelt had offered as symbols of the ideals for which Americans fought.

From 1937 on, as Americans who believed China to be worthy of American support exercised their right to attempt to influence the policies of their government, various Chinese officials worked toward the same end. The Chinese ambassador, Hu Shih, made strenuous efforts to obtain aid for his country; and he was supported by a host of other officials, most prominent among them Madame Chiang's brother, T. V. Soong. Madame Chiang was herself probably the most effective propagandist for her country: an attractive, American-educated Christian who made marvelous copy for the mass media. Lin Yutang, a well-known popularizer of Chinese culture, also spent the war years in the United States on a diplomatic passport, advertising the virtues of Chiang's regime to the American people. These

and similar Chinese activities were sometimes irritating to U.S. officials who resented pressures to do more for China, but the Chinese were not known to be violating any laws and were engaged in practices whose legitimacy was sanctioned by custom in the United States.

Chinese officials and American friends of China naturally came together frequently to discuss China's needs and strategy for various campaigns. Again, there was nothing improper about this sort of cooperation. Most of the American participants were not acting as agents for the Chinese government and those who were did so openly and legally. They shared a concern for China, and their countries were allies in war, sharing an interest in the effort to defeat Japan. Problems developed only as questions arose as to whether Chinese and American interests remained congruous, and whether Chiang's regime represented the best interests of the Chinese people.

In 1943 the cohesiveness that Japanese aggression had produced among Americans interested in China began to wear away. The initial friction between the Chinese and U.S. governments had come about because of the limited Chinese share of lend-lease material, and American friends of China generally shared Chinese dissatisfaction. But in 1943 the focus was shifting to the Chinese war effort and to tensions between Chiang's regime and the Chinese Communists—tensions that threatened to erupt into civil war and already prevented Chinese forces from devoting their full attention to the Japanese invader. More and more criticism of Chiang was heard in U.S. government circles and leaked to the press. A few knowledgeable Americans began to argue in favor of sending aid to the Chinese communists, who seemed more willing to fight against Japan and more committed to democratic principles than were Chiang's Nationalists. Among China's American friends a growing number despaired of Chiang's repressive tendencies, brooded over corruption in his regime and, although apprehensive of the Chinese communists, wondered if the U.S. government might find an alternative to its total support of Chiang.

On a trip to China in 1943, Kohlberg was troubled by criticisms he heard of Chiang's regime—criticisms that did not appear to him to be justified. Increasingly he brooded about the source of these charges. Increasingly the Chinese government became fearful of the effects on American support if a corrupt and repressive image prevailed. Lin Yu-tang and Hu Shih publicly and privately contended that communist agents were responsible for the attacks on Chiang. Hu Shih maintained that American scholars affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) depended on Chinese researchers who were in fact communists. Greene was troubled by the publication of articles that appeared to substantiate Hu Shih's argument. Kohlberg gradually became convinced of a communist conspiracy to deceive the American people, convinced that the IPR, the center of East Asian studies in the United States, was an instrument of this conspiracy.

As Chiang's regime and some of its staunchest American friends, such as Judd and Fitch, tried to preserve the idealized image of the early war years, Kohlberg attacked the IPR. A man of great energy and considerable wealth, Kohlberg conducted a one-man campaign to purge the IPR of alleged communist domination. His initial charges in 1944 were ignored, but he persisted tirelessly, gaining support from professional ex-communists and Red-baiters who helped him to formulate charges and to obtain broader publicity for his effort. In particular, George E. Sokolsky, a widely syndicated Hearst columnist with strong ties to the House Un-American Activities Committee, helped Kohlberg with contacts and provided a public platform for his accusations.

COLD WAR AND THE "TWO CHINAS"

At the end of World War II, China faced civil war, and U.S. efforts to mediate failed. The few Americans interested in East Asian affairs fell into two main categories. One group argued that American interests would be served best by a scrupulous neutrality, allowing Chiang and his communist enemies to work toward their own resolution of China's problems. Another group contended that the interests of the United States would be served best by providing whatever aid short of troops was necessary to maintain Chiang in power. Members of the former group generally warned that the communists enjoyed greater support among the Chinese people and would ultimately triumph. They contended that U.S. aid to Chiang left him unwilling to compromise while peace was possible and would prolong the war and the agony of the Chinese people once the conflict began. The latter group generally mistrusted the Chinese communists, fearing they would serve Soviet rather than Chinese interests and bring

misery to the Chinese people. They argued that a communist-controlled China would be a negation of the ends for which the United States had fought in the Pacific. As fear of the Soviet Union increased in the United States in the late 1940s, anticommunist sentiment grew apace, and more and more Americans became receptive to the arguments of Chiang's supporters—that is, to the China lobby.

In the late 1940s the two major organizations calling for American aid to Nationalist China were the American China Policy Association and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China. The American China Policy Association was founded by Kohlberg; John B. Powell, one of the best-known American journalists in China during the 1920s and 1930s; and Christopher Emmett, a writer with decidedly liberal pretensions. The members worked to reveal what they considered the insidious nature of the Chinese communist movement, and, within the matrix of intense anticommunist feeling, the association began on a moderate note. Soon, however, it was dominated by Kohlberg, who was himself becoming increasingly irresponsible in his charges against diplomats and scholars critical of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China was run by Frederick McKee, who had long contributed to liberal causes and to the collective security wing of the peace movement. Since the late 1930s, he had contributed both time and money in China's behalf, joining existing groups and organizing his own. Unlike Kohlberg, McKee did not become involved in extremist activities. Restrained and responsible, McKee was easily overshadowed. Membership in the Kohlberg and McKee organizations overlapped, but McKee was able to muster the support of several prominent men not identified with Chinese affairs, such as the former Democratic National Committee chairman James A. Farley and the labor leader David Dubinsky.

If the Kohlberg and McKee operations could claim some degree of respectability, there were other operations that could not. The Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., and a variety of more or less independent entrepreneurs like T. V. Soong and his brother-in-law, H. H. Kung, lobbied frenetically for aid. Although their operations appear to have remained within the law, there is evidence of some sleight of hand within the embassy, resulting in the disappearance of large sums of money, the disappearance of senior Chinese military officers attached to the mission who presumably had the money, and the appearance of Chinese documents revealing some of their operations and including extravagant claims of success with U.S. congressmen. These activities had no discernible effect on American policy, and only the Chinese government seems to have been swindled.

Another unsavory but legal Chinese activity was the employment of William J. Goodwin as a lobbyist. In the 1930s, Goodwin had distinguished himself by his affiliation with the Christian Front and with the American fascists Gerald L. K. Smith and the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin. Like the Chinese operatives in the embassy, Goodwin was probably most effective at obtaining money from the Chinese government while claiming to be influencing American politicians.

A majority of congressmen in both houses were sympathetic to the Chinese Nationalist cause and willing to vote for aid to Chiang in his fight against the communists. There is no evidence that any of these congressmen had been bought by the Chinese government or by Kohlberg or McKee. Virtually all of these people equated the Chinese communist movement with Soviet totalitarianism and looked with regret upon the likelihood of such oppression being levied upon their erstwhile Chinese allies. Most of these congressional supporters of the Chinese Nationalists were not committed to Chiang or his regime but rather to what they saw as a worldwide struggle against international communism. Furthermore, if the administration asked for funds to protect endangered Greeks and Turks against communist subversion, why not aid the Chinese as well? Having once conjured up fears of an international communist conspiracy for world domination, the Truman administration failed to convince Congress or the American people that China could be or had to be written off. When providing aid for a beleaguered Europe, Congress forced the administration to continue aid to Chiang Kai-shek and anticommunist China.

Despite congressional and public sympathy for Chiang, and the intimidating efforts of Kohlberg and his allies in the Hearst press, when the communists drove Chiang from mainland China, the Truman administration was prepared to recognize the People's Republic of China and to allow it to take the Chinese seat in the United Nations. Even in early 1950, when Kohlberg and Sokolsky found an ally in Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the Truman administration proceeded

with plans to thwart them and to come to terms with reality. The outbreak of war in Korea and the subsequent confrontation between troops from the United States and troops from the People's Republic of China accomplished what Kohlberg and his friends and the Chinese embassy could not have accomplished by themselves. It created a climate of opinion in the United States in which Kohlberg's charges of treason in high places could be taken seriously and in which an accommodation with the People's Republic of China proved impossible.

Ironically, it was the Democratic senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, an archconservative whose reelection McKee had earlier tried to prevent, who chaired the congressional committee that investigated the Kohlberg-McCarthy charges against the Institute of Pacific Relations. The 1952 hearings were used to discredit and intimidate American critics of Chiang Kai-shek. But from 1951 to 1953 it was McCarthy—advised by Kohlberg, Sokolsky, and Roy Cohn—who succeeded in driving some of the State Department's ablest men from Chinese affairs and from the foreign service. Whether from McCarran or McCarthy, Kohlberg or Sokolsky, the story was always the same: China had been lost to the communists because disloyal Americans had prevented Chiang from receiving the aid with which he could have won; and American boys died in Korea because they had been betrayed by disloyal and stupid liberals who had turned China over to the communists. It was not until the marked change in the climate of opinion that came with revulsion against the war in Vietnam that some of the men vilified during the McCarthy era were vindicated.

By 1952, the legitimate concern some Americans had for the future of China had been transformed into an instrument with which the extreme right tried to destroy liberalism in the United States. Sokolsky, whose earlier writings showed him to be unusually well informed about the history of the Chinese communist movement, consistently misled his readers, in keeping with his assumed role as a spokesperson for the extreme right. The success that he and his colleagues enjoyed in discrediting Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, John S. Service, and Owen Lattimore demonstrated the validity of George Washington's warning about the consequences of "excessive partiality" for a foreign nation. In the 1950s, when criticism of Chiang Kai-shek invited charges of disloyalty to the United States, foreign service officers and scholars were intimidated, with a consequent crippling of both national policy and scholarship.

There were reactions against the work of Chiang's friends even at the height of their power, but to no avail. The Truman administration tried to neutralize them in 1951, promising friendly senators that it would cooperate in an investigation of the China lobby. In Congress, however, there was little interest in the investigation and the administration's own effort could turn up nothing to stimulate interest on Capitol Hill or in the press. In April 1952, the *Reporter* published two long articles that named some of the participants (Kohlberg, McKee, and Goodwin), implied more shady dealings than could be proven, and provided less than a model example of investigative reporting. Nonetheless, the articles contributed to the notoriety of the China lobby, and there were reports that mysterious Chinese were buying enormous quantities of the issues of the *Reporter,* in which the articles appeared. In April 1952, the Republican senator Wayne L. Morse of Oregon introduced into the Senate Chinese documents outlining the plans of the Nationalist regime to influence American policy. Some of the documents referred to cooperation with Goodwin, Judd, and Knowland, who was sometimes referred to as the senator from Formosa. Although the authenticity of the documents was never proven, the Chinese embassy admitted that they were cables sent from its offices, but denied that the counselor of the embassy had sent them, as alleged by Morse. There was little to be learned from the documents, which contained merely evidence of the deceits the embassy was practicing on its principal—and its agents were practicing on it.

As a result of the Korean War, American determination to keep the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations intensified, and a powerful new pressure group was created to retain the seat for Chiang's rump regime. Beginning with a petition drive, a Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations emerged in 1953. After collecting the requisite million signatures, including those of prominent Democrats and Republicans, the organizers disbanded in 1954, only to reorganize as the Committee of One Million in 1955. Liberal Democratic and Republican senators lent their names to the new committee, including the Democrats Paul Douglas of Illinois, William Proxmire of Wisconsin, and Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, and Republican Thomas

H. Kuchel of California. As with earlier organizations, anticommunism rather than approval of Chiang's regime explains the widespread support for the Committee of One Million, run by Marvin Liebman, an ex-communist.

In 1960, Ross Y. Koen, a young professor in California, prepared to publish his dissertation, *The China Lobby in American Politics*, but the book was not distributed. The Chinese embassy reportedly threatened legal action against the publishers for defamatory statements in the book, and it was widely assumed that the power of the China lobby had succeeded in frightening them. That power continued to seem impressive as President John F. Kennedy shied away from a rapprochement with the People's Republic, secretly promising Chiang that the United States would veto any effort to seat the communist regime in the United Nations. Lyndon Johnson's presidency brought no hope of change, although McCarthy, Kohlberg, and Sokolsky were dead, Judd and Knowland had lost their national offices, and the reality of the Sino-Soviet split had finally penetrated the American consciousness.

RECOGNITION OF THE BEIJING GOVERNMENT AND DEMISE OF THE CHINA LOBBY

The election of Richard M. Nixon in 1968 provided no expectation of new directions in American policy toward China. Nixon, the personification of the cold warrior, had been close to many of Chiang's staunchest supporters and had repeated many of the same inflammatory and unsubstantiated accusations that Kohlberg had levied. But, slowly and cautiously, the Nixon administration moved to improve relations with the People's Republic, and in July 1971 presidential adviser Henry Kissinger suddenly turned up in Beijing. A few months later a stunned world watched Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong exchanging pleasantries in Mao's study. In 1972 the United States facilitated the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations and acquiesced in the expulsion of Chiang's government. There was hardly a whimper of opposition—and that from a few supporters of the president who felt they had been betrayed. The day of the China lobby had passed.

American recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1979 did not end lobbying activities aimed at influencing American policy toward China and Taiwan. The governments in Beijing and Taipei remained intensely active and found support across the political spectrum in the United States. The Republic of China, headquartered in Taipei, and led by Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was not abandoned.

The Carter administration had won agreement from Deng Xiaoping to allow the United States to maintain "unofficial" relations with Taiwan and to permit continued arms sales to Taipei. Taiwan's diplomats quickly rallied their friends in the U.S. Congress and won a much stronger Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) than the administration had intended. The TRA explicitly stated that the use of force against Taiwan would be a matter of "grave concern" to the United States and committed the United States to provide such arms as Taiwan required to defend itself.

In the 1980s and 1990s, as Taiwan evolved into a democratic society, and especially after the Tiananmen massacres in Beijing in 1989, support for Taiwan increased dramatically among the American people and their elected representatives. The island's economic success allowed it to spend vast sums to woo the American media as well as American officials. Taiwan's lobbying activities, considered by specialists in foreign policy second only to those of Israel in effectiveness, frequently forced administration officials to take actions they considered undesirable. Most notable among these was the decision to issue Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, a visa to visit the United States in 1995, precipitating a crisis in relations between Beijing and Washington and generating serious tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Less effectively, the People's Republic also lobbied for support in Washington. Hampered by its human rights record and American admiration for democratic Taiwan, Beijing was fortunate to win powerful friends within the American business community. The U.S.–China Business Council, the Emergency Committee for American Trade, and major corporations, most prominently Boeing, labored assiduously to persuade Congress of the congruity of Chinese and American interests. In the 1990s, they succeeded in protecting China's most-favored-nation trade relations with the United States against attacks from human rights and labor organizations, ultimately winning passage of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations Act. China was thus assured that increased tariffs on its goods would not be used as a weapon by its adversaries in the United States.

In the early twenty-first century, lobbying by both Beijing and Taipei continued, with most of

the public criticism directed against presumably pro-China groups who were accused by some conservatives of sacrificing U.S. security interests. Complaints against Taiwan's activities came primarily from within the executive branch of the U.S. government, where those responsible for policy toward China feared being pushed into an unnecessary and dangerous confrontation with Beijing. But the notorious China lobby of the Cold War era was gone.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bachrack, Stanley D. *The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953–1971.* New York, 1976.

Borg, Dorothy. *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928.* New York, 1947. Includes references to the activities of Americans sympathetic to the Chinese Nationalist cause during the 1920s.

Cohen, Warren I. "The Role of Private Groups in the United States." In Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941.* New York, 1973. Discusses the lobbying activities of a number of groups and individuals between 1931 and 1941.

Friedman, Donald J. *The Road from Isolation: The Campaign of the American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression, 1938–1941.* Cambridge, Mass., 1968. A useful study of the organization and its work.

Keeley, Joseph. *The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberg.* New Rochelle, N.Y., 1969. A biography that epitomizes Kohlberg's exploitation by the American right.

Koen, Ross Y. *The China Lobby in American Politics.* New York, 1974. A comprehensive account of Chinese Nationalist and pro-Nationalist activities in the United States during Truman's term as president. Koen is better at describing the impact of these activities than at explaining how the Chinese and their American friends functioned.

Liebman, Marvin. *Coming Out Conservative: An Autobiography.* San Francisco, 1992. A first-person account of the origin and activities of most of the right-wing fronts of the Cold War era, including the Committee of One Million.

Sutter, Robert G. *U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups.* Lanham, Md., 1998. Focuses on lobbying activities on behalf of China and Taiwan in the post–Cold War era.

Thomas, John N. *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics.* Seattle, Wash., 1974. An unsympathetic study of the organization with a useful chapter on Kohlberg.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; FOREIGN AID; PUBLIC OPINION; RECOGNITION.

Civil War Diplomacy

Kinley Brauer

The importance of diplomacy during the American Civil War has long been underestimated. Both Northerners, who were committed to the preservation of the Union, and Southerners, determined to create a new nation, understood that without support from Europe, the secession movement in the United States was doomed. Thus, the foreign policy of the Union, in the able hands of Secretary of State William Henry Seward, was directed toward preventing the Confederacy from securing diplomatic recognition, military supplies, and any kind of encouragement from abroad. Toward that end, Seward conducted a vigorous foreign policy composed of bluff, bluster, and ultimately cautious moderation. The Confederates, on the other hand, were confident that the reliance of Britain and other industrialized nations of Europe on Southern cotton for their economic health and well-being and their desire for free trade guaranteed full support. Confederate foreign policy, therefore, was largely passive and dependent on King Cotton. Britain and France were indeed dependent on Southern cotton, and their leaders were convinced that the United States was irrevocably divided. All that was needed, they thought, was for the Union to recognize that fact. That conviction, a broad hostility toward slavery, an ample supply of cotton already in British warehouses, and a highly profitable wartime trade with the Union led to a uniform European policy of neutrality. That policy, however, which helped the North but hurt the South, was never carved in stone. Union blunders, British impatience, the actual and feared depletion of cotton stocks, and European horror at the bloodshed and destruction in America all threatened to move Europe from neutrality to intervention and Confederate success. Diplomacy, as much as military leadership, strategy and tactics, and Northern economic dominance, provided an essential key to the ultimate triumph of the Union and preservation of the United States as a single nation.

Because of the phenomenal development of the American economy and the expansion of the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century, Europe and Latin America closely watched the American crisis unfold. The health of the economies of Britain and France depended greatly upon the import of American raw materials, primarily cotton, and access to the prosperous American market. Early on it was recognized that peace in North America best served European interests and therefore European leaders hoped that Americans would not engage in hostilities. They were convinced that restoration of the Union was impossible. When hostilities began, they decided that neutrality best served their interests.

The Confederate States of America also hoped for a peaceful separation. Shortly after his appointment as provisional president, Jefferson Davis and his secretary of state, Robert Toombs of Georgia, dispatched a mission to Washington to secure recognition and the transfer of all federal property to Confederate authorities. Davis and Toombs also dispatched three commissioners to Europe to explain the reasons for the creation of the Confederacy and to secure recognition and treaties of amity and commerce. Support from Europe, Southerners understood, was critical, for without a navy or industry of its own, the Confederacy had to have foreign backing. They placed primary reliance on European, and particularly British, dependence on their cotton, believing this ensured a favorable response.

Northern leaders, particularly Abraham Lincoln and Seward, were absolutely committed to the preservation of the Union and also understood that the European reaction to the American crisis was critical. Seward, especially, believed that secession lacked majority support in the South and that Southern Unionists would rise and end the secession movement by the spring of 1861. It was essential that the Southern extremists receive no encouragement from abroad, without which

expectation, Seward believed, the Confederacy would be short-lived.

SEWARD AND EARLY UNION POLICY

Seward was the driving force behind American Civil War diplomacy, and much of his diplomacy was shaped by his imperial vision. For more than thirty-five years, Seward had extolled the promise, potential, and perpetuity of the American empire, and much of his Civil War diplomacy aimed at preserving, expanding, and ensuring the successful completion of that empire. Well before "manifest destiny" became the slogan of expansionists, Seward envisioned the expansion of the United States to include all of North America and quite likely South America and the islands of the Caribbean as well. He also spoke eloquently about the certain growth of the American economy and American overseas commerce and predicted that U.S. merchants, commercial agents, and diplomats would spread the principles and ideology of the American System around the world.

Seward's program required the centralization of American political power and the containment and eventual abolition of slavery in the United States. He promoted legislation to attract, Americanize, and assimilate immigrants, liberalize land policies, centralize banking and monetary programs, and fund internal improvements and federal money. He also believed that the gradual end of slavery and its replacement by free labor were essential for peaceful American expansion and the full growth of the American economy. Without the stain of slavery, he thought, Canada and Mexico would eagerly seek admission to the American commonwealth.

Slavery also gave excessive power to reactionary agrarian interests in the South. Containment of slavery to the states where it presently existed, gradual emancipation, and the reduction of Southern power in Congress, Seward believed, were made possible by the Republican victory of 1860, as was the restructuring of the American political economy and the expansion of the American territorial, commercial, and ideological empire. During the war years these programs were subordinated to the preservation of the Union, an end that Seward never questioned and a goal from which he never wavered.

Throughout the secession winter of 1860–1861 that followed Lincoln's election, Seward worked tirelessly to find a compromise or modus vivendi with those Southern leaders whose states had not left the Union. While Lincoln remained in Springfield, Illinois, preparing for his inauguration, Seward made a number of public speeches emphasizing the dangers, impracticality, and fruitlessness of secession. He opposed all actions that would close the door to the return of the disaffected states and tried to ensure that the Confederates received no encouragement, prospect of support, or tangible aid from overseas.

Although Seward did not assume office until Lincoln's inauguration on 4 March, he engaged European diplomats in Washington in private conversations that aimed, first, at assuring them that the secession effort would shortly collapse, and, second, warning Europe that the United States would not tolerate any foreign intervention in American or hemispheric affairs. Seward had predicted that if the United States became divided, European nations would sweep down upon the Americas to reestablish or expand their authority and influence. During the last weeks of March, these concerns appeared justified. Rumors were rife that Britain, France, and Spain were planning to intervene in Mexico, that Spain was about to recolonize the Dominican Republic, and that France was about to move back into Haiti. The first two had a basis in fact. The three European powers were discussing an intervention limited to collecting debts for their nationals who had invested in Mexican bonds, and the Dominican Republic, engaged in civil war, had asked Spain to return. Spain had agreed and dispatched a force from Cuba to reestablish a colonial government in Santo Domingo. The information that France was contemplating recolonizing Haiti was groundless. Seward chose to use this information both to reassert his waning authority in the cabinet and perhaps to take effective control of the Lincoln administration and generate an issue calculated to reunite the fractured nation.

On 1 April 1861, Seward sent Lincoln an extraordinary memo entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." In the memo, Seward complained that the government lacked both a domestic and a foreign policy and was adrift. He recommended that Lincoln change the thrust of the American dispute from the question of slavery to that of union, and proposed that the United States seek "explanations" from France, Spain, Britain, and Russia for their plans and actions. (The Russian minister, Edouard de Stoeckl, had met with one of Davis's Confederate commissioners, and

Northern newspapers reported that Russia was about to recognize the Confederacy.) If, Seward continued, France and Spain could not satisfactorily explain their intentions and their recent actions, Lincoln should convene Congress and ask for a declaration of war. In addition, Seward recommended sending agents to Canada and Latin America to promote independence and opposition to European interference in the New World. Finally, he suggested that this policy required energetic and constant attention and implied that if Lincoln was unwilling to provide leadership, Seward was willing to assume it himself.

Lincoln responded to Seward immediately, pointing out that he had already made it clear that his administration would not interfere with slavery in the states where it already existed and that the fundamental issue in the crisis was indeed the question of union. He also noted that recent dispatches which Seward had sent to American agents abroad clearly stated his administration's foreign policy. Finally, Lincoln said that he would continue to determine policy with the help of his entire cabinet.

Seward's chief purpose, aside from taking control of the administration, had been to create a crisis that was calculated to restore unity. It is most unlikely that he either expected or wanted war with Europe—a foreign crisis only, not war, would have served his purpose. It was a dangerous strategy, however, and it is just as well that Lincoln rejected it. Although the memo remained confidential, Seward's foreign war panacea was well known among diplomats and merely confirmed their view that Seward would be a difficult person with whom to deal.

Seward's memo stemmed partly from his disagreement with his fellow cabinet members over the question of maintaining federal control of Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. The fort, well within the range of shore batteries, could not be defended, and when President James Buchanan had attempted to send provisions to the fort early in January, Confederate gunners opened fire on the supply ship *Star of the West*, forcing it to retreat. Buchanan left the question of reprovisioning the fort or evacuating it to his successor, and shortly after Seward took office, he recommended the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Initially, Seward had majority support in the cabinet. He argued that attempting to resupply the fort would be regarded as a hostile act against the Confederate States of America and would not only strengthen the separatists' hands but also cause critical border states, such as Virginia, to secede from the Union. Lincoln, however, did not agree. He had pledged that he would yield no federal property to the Confederate government and decided to let events help him decide on a course of action. Over the following few weeks, public sentiment for holding the fort

"SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION"

On 1 April 1861, less than two weeks before the outbreak of hostilities between the Union and the Confederacy, Secretary of State William Henry Seward sent a memo to President Abraham Lincoln criticizing the president for not developing either a domestic or foreign policy and urging him to "change the question before the Public from one upon Slavery for a question upon Union or Disunion." The most extraordinary part of the memo dealt with foreign policy. Spain was in the process of reestablishing colonial authority in the Dominican Republic at the invitation of the Dominicans, France was rumored to be considering the recolonization of Haiti, Britain had objected to the impending interference with its trade in Southern ports, and there were rumors that Russia was about to recognize the Confederacy. Seward thus wrote Lincoln:

> I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically at once. I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention, and if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress, and declare war against them.

Lincoln responded to Seward privately the same day, pointing out that his domestic policy was clear and explicit. His foreign policy, he reminded Seward, had been expressed in circulars and instructions to American ministers abroad that the two of them had framed, "all in perfect harmony." Finally, referring to Seward's proposals and offer to take over its administration, Lincoln informed Seward, "If this must be done, I must do it." So ended one of the most extraordinary proposals ever submitted by a cabinet member to a president.

strengthened, and by the end of March, a majority of the cabinet came to the same position. This isolated Seward, who still counseled delaying any confrontation and who now feared that attempting to reprovision the fort would lead to war. His memo was his last effort to dissuade Lincoln from sending fresh supplies to the fort.

On 6 April, Lincoln notified South Carolina authorities that he had dispatched a supply force to Fort Sumter. Four days later, South Carolina demanded that the commandant of the fort, Major Robert J. Anderson, immediately surrender. When Anderson offered to surrender only after a few days when his supplies ran out, the Confederates, aware that fresh supplies were in transit, rejected Anderson's offer. On 12 April, Confederate General Pierre G. T. Beauregard opened fire on Fort Sumter. As Seward had feared, the decision to hold on to the fort had provoked the Confederates. The Civil War had begun.

Following the outbreak of hostilities and Jefferson Davis's announcement on 17 April that the Confederacy would issue letters of marque and reprisal, creating privateers for action against Union shipping, Union policy changed. Lincoln responded to Davis on 19 April by announcing that the Union would treat privateers as pirates and proclaiming a blockade of Southern ports. Seward attempted to open negotiations with the British foreign minister, Lord John Russell, for American adherence to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, an international agreement that, among other things, outlawed privateering. The United States had declined to participate earlier because, as a small-navy nation, it wanted to hold on to the privateering option. Seward hoped that the negotiation would cause Britain to postpone recognition of the Confederate belligerency and that an Anglo-American convention committing the United States to the Declaration of Paris would require Britain and other nations to treat Confederate privateers as pirates. Negotiations, however, began on 18 May, four days after Britain had recognized Confederate belligerency and collapsed in July, when Russell announced that if negotiations with the Union were successful, Britain would neither hold the Confederacy to the agreement nor treat Confederate privateers as pirates.

Lincoln's blockade proclamation had an important effect on British policy. A blockade was universally regarded as an act of war and therefore an implicit recognition that a state of belligerency existed. Therefore, Lincoln's proclamation opened the door to a British proclamation of neutrality and recognition of Confederate belligerency, which (except when in violation of neutrality laws) gave the Confederate States the right to, among other things, solicit loans, buy arms, engage in recruiting, and put cruisers on the high seas with the rights of search and seizure. Because British commerce with the United States and reliance on Southern cotton was so heavy, Russell had to respond to Lincoln's proclamation. The British proclamation became public on 14 May 1861, and as Seward had feared, the other nations of Europe immediately followed with their own proclamations of neutrality. The way was now clear for Confederate agents to scour Europe for money and material to conduct their war.

The Union blockade was a double-edged sword. If effective, or even moderately effective, it would reduce the ability of the Confederates to import war material. But it would also interfere with foreign commerce and deprive Britain, France, and other industrialized nations of vital supplies of cotton. Reducing the export of cotton to Europe could increase pressure in Europe for involvement in American affairs in support of the Confederacy, which the Confederates hoped and expected would be the case.

CONFEDERATE AGENTS IN WASHINGTON AND EUROPE

While Seward was meeting regularly with diplomats in Washington and, after Lincoln's inauguration on 4 March 1861, sending elaborate instructions to American ministers abroad, Confederate leaders—confident that foreign support would be forthcoming with little or no effort on their part—had a casual attitude toward foreign affairs. Thus, Jefferson Davis chose Robert Toombs of Georgia as his first secretary of state, despite the fact that Toombs had no experience and little interest in foreign affairs. After six months Toombs resigned to become a general in the Confederate army. Davis then replaced Toombs with Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, who also lacked experience and had previously declined appointment as secretary of state when it was offered by Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. Hunter remained in office only seven months. Finally, on 17 March 1862, Davis appointed his close personal friend, former attorney general, and current secretary of war Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana to the post. Benjamin, who had had limited experience dealing with international legal disputes regarding slavery,

served ably until the end of the Confederacy. Neither Davis nor any of these secretaries of state, however, ever attempted to develop a cohesive or imaginative foreign policy program.

Confederate officials did not develop a foreign policy program chiefly because they were confident they did not need one. Committed to the notion that "cotton is king," they were certain that Britain, France, and the other industrial nations of Europe could not tolerate a destructive civil war in the United States that would weaken or destroy the cotton culture. Neither, Confederates believed, would Europeans tolerate interference in their North American commerce. Furthermore, for decades Southerners had demanded free trade and had resisted the high, protective tariffs favored by Northern manufacturing interests. Confederates reasoned that the prospect of free trade with the Confederacy would also win British approval and ensure support. And surrounding these economic considerations, Confederate leaders were certain that the European elite felt a special affinity to the planter class. All that was needed, therefore, was to explain why the Southern states had seceded, to convince European governments that the Confederacy had an effective government, and to assure European governments that the Confederates were determined to preserve their independence.

On 25 February 1861, Davis and Toombs dispatched A .B. Roman, Martin J. Crawford, and John Forsyth to Washington to negotiate a peaceful separation and the evacuation of all federal property in the Confederacy. Two days later, Toombs sent William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann to Europe to secure de jure recognition of the Confederate States of America and treaties of amity and commerce. No thought was given to establishing permanent missions in Washington or any European capital.

Not surprisingly, Roman, Forsyth, and Crawford—who arrived in Washington in early March—had no success there. Seward refused to meet with the commissioners or to arrange a meeting with Lincoln, which they had requested. Unwilling, however, to antagonize the agents, Seward maintained contact through a third party. He assured the Confederates that the Union would not attempt to coerce the seceded states into returning to the Union and still hoped that a peaceful reunion was possible. On 8 April, after a month of waiting impatiently and distrusting Seward's assurance of Lincoln's commitment to the maintenance of peace, Crawford informed Davis of rumors that Lincoln was committed to war. A few days later the three Confederates returned home.

The Confederate mission to Europe began with considerably more promise than the mission to Washington. Russell and French foreign minister Edouard Thouvenel both received Yancey, Rost, and Mann unofficially, as was common practice in dealing with nonaccredited agents. Toombs had instructed the Confederate agents to visit Britain first, and then continue on to France, Russia, and Belgium. They were to explain that the secession of Southern states was provided for by the U.S. Constitution, and was necessary to prevent Northern social, political, and economic domination of the Southern states. Toombs had instructed the commissioners to avoid mention of slavery and emphasize the economic benefits to Europe of an independent Confederacy.

Meeting with the British and French foreign ministers was all that the commissioners accomplished. Russell expressed sympathy for the Confederacy but refused either to discuss treaty negotiations or to grant de jure recognition without a treaty. The British neutrality proclamation was already forthcoming when he spoke with the Confederate commissioners on May 3 and May 9. Russell had also reached an agreement with France that the two nations would act jointly on American affairs and instructed his minister in Washington, Lord Lyons, to coordinate policy and work closely with his French counterpart, Henri Mercier. In France, Thouvenel also expressed sympathy for the Confederacy but would go no further than Britain.

Britain's proclamation of neutrality did not address the question of whether the Union blockade was effective and therefore legal. Confederate agents understood that access to Southern ports was essential for the import of war material legitimized by belligerent status, and that the ability of the small Union navy to blockade all Southern ports and the extensive Southern coast was implausible at the least. Britain was divided on the issue. Commercial interests, legal purists, Southern sympathizers, and Confederate propagandists insisted the blockade was ineffective and demanded that Britain, with its powerful navy, confront the United States; the Admiralty and several in the government, however, understood that a loose interpretation of effectiveness could be most useful to the British navy sometime in the future.

The consequence of this division was that Russell never challenged the legality of the Union blockade, which became more effective as the war

continued. Initially, the appearance of effectiveness was inadvertently enhanced by the decision of Southerners to impose a voluntary cotton embargo of their own. The Confederates reasoned that the sooner Britain and France felt the effects of the loss of fresh supplies of cotton, the more rapidly the former would demand the end of the Union blockade and come to the aid of the South. Southerners stated that no cotton would leave the Confederacy until the Northern blockade ended and Europe provided recognition and support. Their policy created the illusion that the blockade was more effective than it was, which Union agents and propagandists abroad used to their advantage; it also opened the Confederacy to charges of blackmail and hypocrisy.

Yancey, Rost, and Mann, having failed to secure de jure recognition from either Britain or France, saw no reason to continue their mission on to Russia and Belgium. They returned to Britain and began an intensive propaganda campaign in association with a number of other Southerners whose goal was to strengthen and expand support for the Confederacy among sympathetic members of Parliament and the upper classes, journalists, and conservatives generally. Yancey was confident that the upper classes and those in power in both Britain and France supported the Confederacy, but he understood that positive sentiment was not enough. Only a decisive Confederate military victory and a deprivation of fresh cotton would move both nations to act.

LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

After Lincoln squelched Seward's call for an aggressive program to meet European interference on 1 April, the secretary's policy changed. The secretary of state followed a surprisingly mild policy toward Spain, toward British, French, and Spanish intervention in Mexico, and toward the subsequent French occupation of Mexico City and establishment of Archduke Maximilian of Austria as emperor of Mexico. For example, he officially protested the Spanish occupation of Santo Domingo to the Spanish minister to the United States, Gabriel García y Tassara, and to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid through the American chargé in Madrid. Tassara dismissed Seward's note as being meant primarily for the American public and not to be taken seriously. When Spanish officials explained that Spain had returned to Santo Domingo by invitation and asked Seward to explain his note further, Seward retreated, noting to Tassara that Congress would consider sometime later on whether war was justified.

With regard to the impending tripartite intervention in Mexico, Britain had been firm in insisting that the three powers invite the United States to participate. Seward declined the offer, and since foreign intervention for the purpose of collecting debts was allowed under international law, he had no justification to oppose the three nations. Seward did propose lending Mexico funds to pay off its creditors with Baja California and other Mexican territory as collateral if the European nations would agree not to intervene. The plan failed when Britain, France, and Spain responded unenthusiastically and the U.S. Senate rejected the proposal. In October 1861 the three European nations signed the Tripartite Treaty of London and in December they jointly landed troops in Vera Cruz.

It soon became apparent that the French emperor, Louis Napoléon, had more ambitious schemes in mind, and Britain and Spain withdrew their forces. Seward warned France that the United States would not "view with indifference" the establishment of a European monarchy in the New World, especially so close to the United States, but Napoléon was undeterred. In June 1863, French troops seized Mexico City. Napoléon, with the support of Mexican conservatives in the capital, offered Maximilian an imperial throne. Maximilian accepted and set up his government in the following year. Benito Juárez fled to the countryside and initiated a guerrilla war against Maximilian and the French army that protected him. Seward was unhappy with this turn of events, but did nothing to oppose either Napoléon or Maximilian. War with France or even a threat of war, he decided, would not serve Union interests. Mexican affairs, like Caribbean matters, could wait until after peace had returned to the United States.

Confederate involvement in Mexico began in May 1861, when Toombs sent John T. Pickett to Mexico City to open a permanent embassy, secure recognition, and negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. Astonishingly, Toombs also instructed Pickett to point out to the reformist Juárez the similarity of the Confederate and Mexican economies and the resemblance between slavery and peonage. Pickett's career as a filibusterer in Cuba and his record as consul in Vera Cruz did not inspire confidence among Mexicans, and Juárez was not impressed.

Pickett's mission was a disaster. He was unable to overcome Mexican fears of Southern expansionism or hostility toward slavery, both emphasized by the Union minister, Thomas Corwin. When Pickett suggested that the Confederacy might return some of the territory taken in the Mexican War in exchange for recognition, Mexican officials were skeptical. By the fall of 1861 Pickett had alienated all of those with whom he had dealt, chiefly by exposing his contempt for Mexico and his racism. When he became involved in a public brawl with a Union sympathizer in November, the Mexican authorities arrested him as a common criminal. When Davis and his cabinet learned of Pickett's behavior and arrest, they did not defend him but, rather, recalled their diplomat in disgrace and repudiated his actions. The damage, however, had been done. Juárez had no interest in supporting the Confederacy and maintained a strict neutrality throughout the Civil War.

In Mexico, the Confederates had greater success in negotiations with Santiago Vidaurri, the governor of Nuevo León and Coahuilla, who had long had separatist inclinations and conducted his affairs autonomously. The Confederate agent, Juan A. Quintero, had solid relations with Vidaurri. Quintero secured an important commercial agreement and a promise from Vidaurri that he would block any requests for the transit of Union troops across territory under his authority. The Confederate government instructed Quintero to discourage Vidaurri from separating from Mexico and asking for annexation to the Confederacy. President Davis doubted the Confederate Congress would welcome the addition of a Mexican province to their nation and he wished to avoid the embarrassment of a rejection. For all their efforts, Mexico was a low priority for the Confederates. They understood that the key to a successful foreign policy remained in Europe.

PRESSURE AND COUNTERPRESSURE ON BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Seward understood that British policy would be decisive in Europe, and he was pleased that in the patronage battles, he had succeeded in having Charles Francis Adams, the son and grandson of former American ministers to the Court of St. James, appointed to Britain. Lincoln's choice, William Dayton of New Jersey—John C. Frémont's running mate on the Republican ticket in 1856—went to France instead. Adams had his first interview with Russell on 18 May. Seward had been outraged by the British neutrality proclamation and the granting of belligerent rights to the Confederacy, and Adams complained to Russell. Russell only assured Adams that Britain had no intention at that time to move to the next step of recognizing Confederate independence.

Seward also reacted harshly to the willingness of Russell to meet, even informally, with the Confederate agents. He sent Adams his notorious Dispatch No. 10, dated 21 May 1861, instructing Adams to break off all relations with the British government if Russell continued to meet with the Confederate commissioners. Seward had wanted Adams to read the message to Russell, but Lincoln wisely insisted that Seward change the instructions so that Adams had discretion in his discussion with Russell and was to use the document only for his own guidance. Adams had the good sense to soften the dispatch by presenting only noninflammatory parts to Russell. Russell, as it happened, had already decided to have no further discussions with the Confederate commissioners.

By late summer Yancey, Rost, Mann, and their colleagues had had enough success in arousing British and French support to alarm both Adams and Dayton. Hunter, who had replaced Toombs as Confederate secretary of state, saw great potential in the use of propaganda and decided to formalize the propaganda effort by appointing journalists Henry Hotze and Edwin De Leon to promote the Confederate cause in London and Paris, respectively. Hotze established a weekly journal, the *Index,* that was highly successful. After De Leon ran into difficulties, Hotze took over the French propaganda operation as well.

Whatever success these agents had in shaping opinion, however, Britain and France refused to move from their neutral policies. Yancey remained confident that a military victory and lack of cotton would bring about British support, and he was relieved when Lincoln emphasized that the Union had no intention to abolish slavery. All of the elements he believed necessary for tangible British support were in place by midsummer 1861. The Confederates scored a stunning military success on 21 July at Bull Run, Virginia, and distress was already apparent in the cotton manufacturing areas. When, however, the Confederate agents requested an unofficial meeting with Russell, he put them off and informed them that Britain would remain neutral. Both British public opinion and the cabinet remained divided,

and whatever Lincoln's position on slavery, British abolitionists and Union sympathizers emphasized that the Confederacy was based on slavery and its expansion. Neither Prime Minister Lord Palmerston nor Foreign Minister Russell were willing to appear as champions of a slave nation or to contribute to its perpetuation and expansion.

Shortly after Russell's response, Davis and Hunter decided to take a more aggressive approach and establish formal diplomatic missions in Britain, France, Spain, and Belgium. The previous passive policy was clearly not working; Yancey submitted his resignation to Davis and prepared to return to Alabama. Davis ordered Mann to open a diplomatic mission in Belgium, and he sent Rost to Spain. More significantly, Davis selected James Murray Mason of Virginia to establish a mission in London and John Slidell of Louisiana, a highly experienced and able diplomat, to go to Paris.

Following Adams's assumption of his duties in London, Anglo-American relations proceeded smoothly until the end of the year. Adams deftly handled Seward's Dispatch No. 10, and Russell's decision to have no further meetings with the Confederates resolved the matter raised by the dispatch. For the most part, Adams attempted to counter the increasingly effective Confederate propaganda campaign and to gather information on the activities of Confederate agents. The only major diplomatic issue was the unsuccessful negotiation on the Declaration of Paris.

THE *TRENT* AFFAIR AND ITS AFTERMATH

A much more serious dispute in Anglo-American relations arose over the Union capture of Mason and Slidell in November. The two Confederate diplomats ran the blockade on 12 October 1861, sailing from Charleston to Nassau and thence to Cuba. On 7 November they boarded the *Trent,* a British mail packet, for the remaining leg of their voyage to England. On the next day the USS *San Jacinto,* under the command of Captain Charles Wilkes, stopped the *Trent* on the high seas, boarded the vessel, and after a minor skirmish removed Mason and Slidell and their secretaries. Wilkes carried his prisoners to Boston where they were imprisoned in Fort Warren in Boston harbor. Wilkes had acted without instructions and the seizure raised a number of questions of international law that resembled the issue of impressment that had so aroused Americans before 1812.

While feigning outrage, the Confederates were delighted with Wilkes's action. They were certain that the Union would never give up the prisoners and that the resulting Anglo-American hostility could only help the Confederate cause overseas. Wilkes was widely applauded in the North, and the seizure of Confederate "traitors" from a British ship struck many as just and a proper response to Britain's assumed partiality toward the Confederacy. The crisis intensified during November and December as Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, the House of Representatives, and the Northern press extolled Wilkes's heroism. Meanwhile, the British developed an extensive case for the illegality of his action and made it clear that they regarded the seizure as an affront to Britain's national honor. Prime Minister Palmerston was furious. Britain prepared for war, and sent more than eleven thousand troops to Canada. Russell charged that Wilkes had violated international law and instructed Lyons to demand the immediate release of Mason and Slidell and an apology. At Queen Victoria's request, Prince Albert, although mortally ill, softened Russell's dispatch and provided an out for the Americans by allowing Seward to deny that Wilkes had acted under instruction.

Seward may have initially been pleased by Wilkes's action, but he very quickly adopted a moderate tone in a dispatch to Adams that the latter presented to Russell. Seward's note did much to defuse the crisis at the highest level. Lyons also presented Russell's demands in such a way to make a favorable American response more likely. Finally, on 25 December Seward responded by informing the British that Wilkes had indeed acted on his own and, while not violating international law, had made certain technical errors. The two diplomats would be "cheerfully liberated" and turned over to Lord Lyons. Seward had convinced Lincoln, others in the cabinet, and a number of prominent senators that retaining the Confederates was decidedly not in the Union's interest.

The furor generated by the *Trent* affair dissipated quickly. Support for Wilkes disappeared as American attention turned to the war at home and journals published calculations of the costs of a war with Britain. Seward had demonstrated genuine statesmanship that Russell and others recognized. For the first time, British officials began to reconsider their early estimation of the secretary of state. Seward perhaps understood better than before that threatening war was, indeed, a dangerous policy. Seward's reputation among influential

associates, however, did not improve. A number of prominent Radical Republicans, never supportive, renewed efforts to remove him from office. By this time Lincoln had come to regard Seward as an effective secretary and as a valuable ally in his opposition to the Radical Republicans and was determined to keep him in the cabinet.

Seward meanwhile sought to capitalize on the relief felt in Britain and the Union over the peaceful resolution of the issue. Although the details remain vague, there is evidence that he facilitated the deployment of British troops in Canada—they had arrived after the St. Lawrence River froze over. Whatever the case, Seward skillfully used the story that he had granted permission to Her Majesty's troops to cross American territory to emphasize that he held no animosity nor aggressive intent toward Britain. Seward also resisted suggestions that the United States abrogate or let expire the Marcy-Elgin Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The treaty, set to expire in 1864, eliminated duties in trade between the United States and Canada, opened the St. Lawrence to the United States, and regulated fishing off the Canadian coast. Seward saw Canadian-American free trade as a means of integrating the Canadian economy into America's as a prelude to annexation.

Seward also concluded negotiations with Lyons in April 1862 for the suppression of the African slave trade. The agreement extended the reciprocal right to search and detain merchant ships off the coasts of Africa and Cuba and established prize courts in Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, and New York. In February 1863, Seward and Lyons expanded the agreement to include the coasts of Madagascar, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. These treaties completed efforts to end the Atlantic slave trade that had begun a half century earlier. (In the absence of Southern senators, Seward also recognized Liberia and Haiti in 1862 and treaties of amity and commerce with Liberia on 21 October 1862 and Haiti on 3 November 1864.) These agreements with Britain after the *Trent* crisis contributed to the restoration of friendlier relations. This was especially important at a time when pressure for mediation was increasing in Britain and France because of a developing crisis in cotton textile manufacturing centers.

COTTON DIPLOMACY

Confederates were disheartened by the peaceful settlement of the *Trent* affair, and by 1862 had realized that their best hope for British and European support would come from a cotton famine in England. Distress in the cotton manufacturing districts increased greatly during the spring and summer of 1862. The jobs of an estimated 900,000 workers in the textile industry, centered in Lancashire, were in jeopardy. The British welfare system was severely strained, and Southern sympathizers increased their demands for intervention to relieve the cotton shortage. Although Seward made available cotton that came into Union hands, and imports of non-American cotton increased, the distress in Lancashire did not diminish, and Confederate reliance on cotton diplomacy seemed to be working.

In fact, although less American cotton was reaching Britain, British manufacturers, unlike their workers, were not in dire straits. In 1859 and 1860 the South had produced bumper crops that had glutted the market and driven down world prices. British warehouses were thus filled with huge stocks of cheap cotton fiber, and manufacturers were producing cloth at unprecedented levels, which also depressed textile prices. The Union blockade and Southern embargo were a blessing for these manufacturers as well as financiers dealing in cotton securities and futures. The prospect of a shortage of fiber and cloth immediately caused the value of both raw and finished cotton to rise dramatically. Merchants and manufacturers hoarded their goods, reduced their output, and made fortunes in the process. Those who had been promoting the development of alternate sources in Egypt and India appeared vindicated as planters in those regions also reaped huge profits. Only the workers suffered.

Outside of the cotton districts, other British industries prospered from the war. Both the Union and the Confederacy purchased war materials in increasing quantities, and producers of woolen cloth benefited from the reduced production of cotton cloth and inflated textile prices. Finally, Confederate raiders had enormous success in attacking Northern commercial vessels. American merchantmen were driven from the seas or forced to pay enormous premiums for maritime insurance. British merchants replaced American merchants in direct trade and strengthened their domination of other markets.

Despite the new wealth generated by the American war and continued national prosperity, by the fall of 1862 the distress in Lancashire was real and the news of bloodshed and destruction from America was shocking. It also seemed that the

Union would never be able to subdue the South and that continuing the war was pointless. With the approval of Palmerston and Chancellor of the Exchequer William E. Gladstone and the prior agreement of Napoléon, Russell therefore brought the question of mediation to the cabinet. The discussion was extensive, and the cabinet was divided. Russell and Gladstone urged their colleagues to support an offer of mediation to both sides. However, after an impassioned argument against offering mediation by Minister of War George Cornewall Lewis—who pointed out that neither Lincoln nor Seward would accept the offer and that Britain could be forced into supporting the slaveholding Confederacy—news arrived that the Battle of Antietam had ended without a clear victory by either side. Palmerston decided to continue waiting until the war took "a more decided turn." Napoléon then proposed offering the Americans a six-month armistice if both Britain and Russia agreed to act jointly with him. Russia declined first, and on 13 November the British also declined. Confederate confidence in King Cotton was shaken, and the Confederate government sought support from Europe along other avenues.

DECLINING CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS

In May 1861 Confederate secretary of the navy Stephen Mallory sent James Dunwoody Bulloch, a retired naval officer, to Britain to build or purchase six steamships to serve as commerce raiders and James H. North to purchase two ironclads for use against the Union blockade. By August, Bulloch had begun the construction of two ships, later christened the *Florida* and the *Alabama*, and in 1862 the North contracted for the construction of an ironclad ram.

Union agents learned of Bulloch's plans and Adams attempted to prevent the sailing of the *Alabama*. Russell refused to seize the ship for lack of evidence that its construction violated British neutrality laws. When Adams amassed evidence and a legal opinion to the contrary, Russell sought legal opinion himself and ultimately became convinced that the ship should be detained, but his order to that effect arrived too late to prevent the launching of the *Alabama* in early August 1862. Captained by Raphael Semmes, the ship wreaked havoc on Union shipping, which after the war became the basis of demands by the United States for massive compensation. After the departure of the *Alabama* from Britain, Adams and Russell engaged in a rancorous exchange of notes. Adams was determined to prevent future Confederate cruisers from leaving British ports.

Russell ultimately decided that it would better serve British interests if other ships being constructed for the Confederacy did not put to sea. In April 1863 he ordered seizure of the *Alexandria*, then under construction. Later in the year, following strong protests from Adams and the threat of privateering by the Union, Russell decided to detain rams that Bulloch was having constructed. By 1863 the Confederates had given up hope for recognition and substantial support from Britain. British consuls, whom the Confederate government had allowed to remain at their posts and who initially had written home about Confederate invincibility, had antagonized Confederate officials by their protests on behalf of British subjects being conscripted into the Confederate army. (Seward had gone out of his way to appease British consuls in the North over the same problem.) In October 1863, President Davis expelled all British consuls still at their posts. Two months earlier, on 4 August 1863, Judah Benjamin ordered Mason to close his London mission and to join Slidell in Paris.

Confederate officials had come to the conclusion that their best hope for support lay in Napoléon and France rather than in Palmerston and Britain. Napoléon had taken the initiative, following the failure of the Anglo-French mediation discussions in 1862, in proposing an armistice. In January 1863 he unilaterally proposed mediation, which Seward summarily rejected. During the previous September and October, Slidell successfully concluded a loan of $14.5 million with the French firm Emile Erlanger and Company that allowed Confederate agents used to purchase war materials.

Also, Mallory honored Bulloch's request that he shift operations to Paris, and in April and June 1863 the latter contracted for four commerce raiders and two ironclad rams. Unfortunately for the Confederates, France proved little more hospitable than Britain. Napoléon clearly sympathized with the Confederates, but pressure from Seward and Dayton forced him to prevent the ships from sailing. Napoléon, about to embark on his imperial program in Mexico, had no wish to become embroiled with the Union.

The construction of Confederate naval vessels in Britain and France was not the only issue that created difficulties on the high seas. As the demand for goods rose in both Britain and the Confederacy, success in running the Union block-

ade became ever more profitable. Similarly, the owners of Union vessels that captured blockade runners could take the ships to prize courts and receive a substantial proportion of the value of condemned prizes. The system led to a number of questionable seizures of not only British ships but also of vessels flying French and Spanish colors. Charles Wilkes continued to create problems after the *Trent* affair by using neutral ports as bases of operation against ships suspected of intentions to run the blockade. These possibly illegal seizures and violations of international law led to continual protests, legal battles, and ill will. Palmerston, however, saw value in the continual stretching of international law by Americans. They were setting precedents that could be useful to Britain in subsequent conflicts. None of these issues rose above the level of annoyances.

THE SLAVERY ISSUE AND THE END OF CONFEDERATE DIPLOMACY

Until 1863 the slavery issue lingered in the background of the American crisis. For domestic reasons, Lincoln and Seward had attempted to make it clear that the conflict in the United States had little to do with slavery and everything to do with preserving the Union. The North, they argued, had no intention of interfering with slavery in the states, and even after hostilities began they suggested that no assault would be made on the institution. Confederate agents abroad did their best to avoid discussion of slavery altogether, and when pressed argued that the war was not about slavery but rather over the right of states to preserve their social and economic institutions. British supporters of the Confederacy took Lincoln at his word, and Palmerston, firmly hostile to slavery, was relieved that it was not an issue, since otherwise Britain would have had less flexibility in developing policies toward the American war. Nevertheless, the Confederates could not disguise the fact that their nation was committed to the preservation of the slave system, and the British could never forget that to aid the Confederacy was to aid a slave nation. Furthermore, whatever the wishes of Lincoln and Seward, Radical Republicans at home and abroad, abolitionists on both sides of the Atlantic, and Union propagandists called for a change in Union policy toward slavery and kept the issue alive in public discourse. The question of the future of American slavery never disappeared from view.

Following the Battle of Antietam in September 1862, Lincoln decided to confront slavery directly. On 22 September he issued his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation freeing all slaves in areas that were still in rebellion in January 1863. Lincoln had presented the plan to his cabinet on 22 July, but Seward and others persuaded him to wait until the Union had a military success lest the policy be regarded as an act of desperation. Seward strenuously objected to the proclamation because he feared it would antagonize slaveholders who had remained loyal; strengthen Confederate morale and determination; and, worst of all, encourage blacks in the South to rise in "servile insurrection." He also doubted that emancipation was constitutional and feared that the sudden end of slavery would permanently weaken the American economy and either delay or destroy altogether the rise and completion of the American empire. Seward remained committed to the containment of slavery and its gradual abolition and replacement by free labor.

European diplomats in Washington were uniformly critical of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. They regarded it, indeed, as an act of desperation following the Union failure to score a major victory at Antietam; some saw it as signifying the triumph of the Radical Republicans and abolitionists in the North. All worried that its enunciation would trigger a slave insurrection, extend race war, and then lead to the thorough destruction of the cotton culture in the United States. The European home offices were also critical of this turn in Union policy, especially since Seward had continually warned Britain and France that it was their policies of neutrality and support for the Confederacy that had extended the war and increased the danger of a slave uprising.

Nevertheless, by 1 January1863, when the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Europeans had reconciled themselves to the impending end of slavery in the United States should the Union win the war. (It was expected that slavery could not long survive in areas not in rebellion.) This understanding made it appear that the outcome of the war would determine the future of slavery, which changed the character of European-American relations for the remainder of the conflict by making it even more difficult for Europe to adopt policies in support of the Confederacy. When the Union armies scored major victories in July at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, European ministries began to regard a full Union military victory as more likely, and the continued

successes of Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Sherman convinced them that victory was certain. As the British and French discarded their working assumption that the division of the United States was irreversible, their foreign policies changed accordingly. Confederate appeals for support were now largely ignored.

Jefferson Davis and Judah Benjamin understood that survival depended on European support and that this support would not be forthcoming without altering the Confederate position on slavery. In November 1864, Davis presented to the Confederate Congress a plan to employ forty thousand slaves in noncombatant military service to be followed by their emancipation. While this proposal was being considered, he dispatched Duncan F. Kenner of Louisiana to Europe on a secret mission with instructions to offer European governments a promise of emancipation of the slaves in exchange for recognition. Napoléon, then deeply involved in his Mexican policy, declined the offer and replied that France could not act without British concurrence. When Kenner made the same proposal to the British government, Palmerston rejected it out of hand, informing Kenner that Britain would never recognize the Confederate States of America. Confederate diplomacy in Europe had come to a dead end.

The final episode in the diplomacy of the American Civil War occurred in February 1865, when Lincoln and Seward agreed to meet with a delegation of Confederate leaders at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Francis P. Blair, Sr., had arranged the meeting at Davis's request, and Davis had selected Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, former Confederate secretary of state Robert M. T. Hunter, and former U.S. Supreme Court justice and Confederate assistant secretary of war John A. Campbell to conduct the negotiations. Both Lincoln and Davis hoped to arrange a return of peace, but their terms were incompatible. Lincoln demanded reunion, acceptance of emancipation, and the disbanding of all Confederate military forces. He was prepared to offer the South generous terms on a number of issues, including compensation to slaveholders. Davis had wanted an armistice, to be followed by discussion of all these and other issues. When Lincoln would not yield in his demands for reunion and the breakup of Confederate military force first, the meeting collapsed.

Military action resumed fully after the Hampton Roads conference, and within four months the last of the Confederate armies had surrendered to Union forces. Jefferson Davis, who refused to admit defeat and promoted guerrilla war to the end, was captured by Union troops in Irwinsville, Georgia, on 10 May. He was imprisoned and indicted for treason, but was paroled two years later.

CONCLUSION

It is doubtful that the Confederacy could ever have achieved the support that it expected during the Civil War. It never was in the interest of the nations of Europe to become entangled in the American conflict. Rather, they profited by a neutral policy. Confederates relied on sympathy and the pressure from cotton textile manufacturers to force Britain, and then other nations in Europe, to their support and defense. They believed that time was on their side. As a consequence, the Confederate government delayed in adopting a bold diplomatic strategy until it was far too late. At the same time, William Henry Seward, with the significant aid of Charles Francis Adams in London and a number of other superb diplomats, developed an aggressive and consistent program that did not always win friends but was effective. Seward began his term of office with a reputation for recklessness and hostility toward the British, and his initial maneuvers seemed to confirm, as Lyons wrote home, that he would be a "dangerous foreign minister." Seward's erratic behavior had the positive effect of making European foreign ministers more cautious. During the critical first year of the war, Palmerston and Russell worried that Seward had little understanding of the limits to which he could go in his threats and bluster against British policy, and so as not to arouse him and precipitate a crisis, the British leaders adopted a largely passive policy, ended official contacts with Confederate officials, and resisted attempts by pro-Confederate members of Parliament to support the Southern cause. After Seward's first year in office, his reputation improved, and by the end of the war, he and Adams were highly regarded overseas.

It is clear that international relations during the war years were largely determined by the interests of all the nations involved directly and indirectly in the struggle. It is difficult to see how the Confederacy could have acquired the support it needed or how the Union could have done better. It is also clear that the Confederacy's weak

policy did not help its cause and that the strong and clearsighted Union policy, conducted by able hands, made a profound difference and was essential to a Union victory in 1865.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Ephraim D. *Great Britain and the American Civil War.* 2 vols. New York, 1925. The classic study.

Bernath, Stuart L. *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy.* Berkeley, Calif., 1970. A superb analysis.

Blackburn, George M. *French Newspaper Opinion on the American Civil War.* Westport, Conn., 1997.

Blackett, R. J. M. *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War.* Baton Rouge, La., 2001. A thorough and sophisticated analysis.

Blumenthal, Henry. "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities." *Journal of Southern History* 32 (1966): 151–171. An important essay.

Brauer, Kinley. "Gabriel Garcia y Tassara and the American Civil War: A Spanish Perspective." *Civil War History* 21 (1975): 5–27.

———. "The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War." *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (1977): 439–469.

Carroll, Daniel B. *Henry Mercier and the American Civil War.* Princeton, N.J., 1971. An excellent examination of the diplomacy of the French minister to the United States.

Case, Lynn Marshall, and Warren F. Spencer. *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy.* Philadelphia, 1970. A thorough and judicious examination.

Clapp, Margaret. *Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow.* Boston, 1947. A biography of the American consul in Paris.

Cortada, James W. "Spain and the American Civil War Relations at Mid-Century, 1855–1868." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 70, no. 4 (1980).

Crook, D. P. *The North, The South, and the Powers, 1861–1865.* New York, 1974. An able synthesis that emphasizes British and Canadian relations with the Union and Confederacy.

Cullop, Charles P. *Confederate Propaganda in Europe, 1861–1865.* Coral Gables, Fla., 1969.

Duberman, Martin B. *Charles Francis Adams, 1807–1866.* New York, 1961. Excellent biography of the U.S. Minister to Great Britain.

Ellison, Mary. *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War.* Chicago, 1972. Excellent study of the effects of the cotton famine on British opinion in the Lancashire cotton district.

Evans, Eli N. *Judah P. Benjamin: The Jewish Confederate.* New York, 1988. Especially strong on Benjamin's relations with Jefferson Davis.

Ferris, Norman B. "Diplomacy." In Allan Nevins et al., eds. *Civil War Books: A Critical Bibliography.* Vol. 1. Baton Rouge, La., 1967. An excellent starting point for books published before 1967.

———. *Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward's Foreign Policy, 1861.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1976. A study of the difficult first year of the war.

———. *The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1977. Best detailed study of the crisis.

Hanna, Alfred J., and Kathryn Abbey Hanna. *Napoleon III and Mexico: American Triumph over Monarchy.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1971.

Hyman, Harold, ed. *Heard Round the World: The Impact Abroad of the Civil War.* New York, 1968. Looks at the influence of the Civil War primarily on Europe.

Jenkins, Brian A. *Britain and the War for the Union.* 2 vols. Montreal, 1974, 1980. More recent and useful treatment than the Adams work.

Jones, Howard. *Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992. Excellent study of the mediation crisis of 1862.

———. *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War.* Lincoln, Nebr., 1999.

Mahoney, Harry T., and Marjorie Locke Mahoney. *Mexico and the Confederacy, 1860–1867.* San Francisco, 1998. Good narrative survey.

May, Robert E., ed. *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim.* West Lafayette, Ind., 1995. Information on the impact of the Civil War on Europe, European colonies, and Latin America and examines the role of African Americans in influencing British opinion.

Meade, Robert D. *Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate Statesman.* New York, 1943. A good treatment of Benjamin's diplomacy.

Merli, Frank. *Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861–1965.* Bloomington, Ind., 1970. Best study of the subject.

Monaghan, Jay. *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers: Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs.* New York, 1945. A popular study that overemphasizes Lincoln's role and is oversimplified.

Owsley, Frank L. *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America.* 2d ed. Chicago, 1959. A full examination of Confederate diplomacy but somewhat dated.

Richardson, H. Edward. *Cassius Marcellus Clay: Firebrand of Freedom.* Lexington, Ky., 1976. Covers Union diplomacy with Russia.

Saul, Norman E. *Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763–1867.* Lawrence, Kans., 1991. Based on research in both Russian and American materials.

Schoonover, Thomas D. *Dollars over Dominion: The Triumph of Liberalism in Mexican–United States Relations, 1861–1867.* Baton Rouge, 1978.

Smiley, David L. *Lion of Whitehall: The Life of Cassius M. Clay.* Madison, Wis., 1962. On Union diplomacy with Russia.

Spencer, Warren F. *The Confederate Navy in Europe.* University, Ala., 1983. Deals with Bulloch and Confederate naval warfare.

Stern, Philip Van Doren. *When the Guns Roared: World Aspects of the American Civil War.* Garden City, N.Y., 1965. A popular study.

Taylor, John M. *William Henry Seward: Lincoln's Right Hand.* New York, 1991. A readable popular account.

Tyler, Ronnie C. *Santiago Vidaurri and the Southern Confederacy.* Austin, Tex., 1973. On Mexican-American relations.

Van Deusen, Glyndon G. *William Henry Seward.* New York, 1967. A scholarly biography.

Warren, Gordon H. *Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas.* Boston, 1981. A study of the first year of the war.

Willson, Beckles. *John Slidell and the Confederates in Paris, 1862–1865.* New York, 1932.

Winks, Robin. *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years.* Baltimore, 1960. An able treatment of Canadian-American relations.

Woldman, Albert A. *Lincoln and the Russians.* Cleveland, Ohio, 1952. A narrative based on diplomatic correspondence from the United States.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; BLOCKADES; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; REALISM AND IDEALISM.

Cold War Evolution and Interpretations

Walter L. Hixson

Interpreting the history of the Cold War has been a notoriously controversial pursuit. New evidence, unearthed in recent years from archives on both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, has not resolved old debates, but it has added immensely to our collective knowledge. Much remains to be learned and understood about the history of the global power struggle, the impact of which on the latter half of the twentieth century can scarcely be exaggerated. As it recedes into history, the passions of presentism (interpreting history on the basis of contemporary prejudices) have receded as well. These developments open up new possibilities for stimulating discussion of the evolution and interpretations of the Cold War.

Five key interpretive themes can be employed to explain the evolution of the Cold War and to interpret the history of the conflict: ideology, national expansionism, economic hegemony, militarization, and patriotic culture. These forces help explain the origins, evolution, and end of the Cold War. Despite the primary focus on Soviet-American relations, no one questions that the Cold War became a *global* phenomenon enveloping the fates of scores of nations, some modern and industrial, others premodern and developing. Nations such as Great Britain and China played key roles in the evolution of the Cold War, but so did smaller states as diverse as Angola, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, South Africa, Vietnam, and many more. As this list suggests, the Cold War encompasses a vast and complex history, overshadowing the latter half of the twentieth century.

IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE

Ideology is a central element in coming to grips with the Cold War. In this respect, the Cold War actually began in 1917, with the triumph of the Bolshevik communist revolutionaries in Russia. The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, a committed Marxist revolutionary, denounced capitalism as an exploitative and moribund social system. Lenin's contribution to Marxism was his theory that imperialism was the last gasp of capitalism. The Bolsheviks believed that the bloodletting then under way in World War I reflected the penultimate crisis of modern capitalism. Lenin and other communists sought to build socialism in Russia while doing what they could to facilitate expansion of Marxism-Leninism abroad.

The West greeted the Bolshevik Revolution with implacable hostility, including an ill-fated Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war, which the Marxists eventually won. The Western worldview was capably represented in the rhetoric of President Woodrow Wilson, who had called for U.S. intervention in World War I to make the world "safe for democracy." Wilson spoke not just for constitutional government but also for free-trade capitalism as well. Bolshevism, with its emphasis on state economic planning, was anathema to the deep-seated faith in free enterprise, a cornerstone of American ideology. Moreover, Wilson, like millions of Americans deeply religious, found Marxist atheism, which had condemned religion as the "opiate of the masses," profoundly offensive.

Hence, an ideological gulf between the Soviet Union and the United States, between communism and capitalism, emerged from World War I and divided East and West throughout the interwar period. Beginning in 1929 the Soviet Union came under the iron authority of Joseph Stalin, a pitiless autocrat responsible for the deaths of millions of his own countrymen in purges, forced agricultural collectivization, and breakneck industrialization. Washington declined to accord formal diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933. Among other consequences, East-West hostility ensured that efforts to forge an antifascist alliance against Nazi Germany during

the late 1930s would come to grief. When the Western powers rejected Soviet overtures for an alliance against the Nazis, Stalin negotiated his own pact with Adolf Hitler in 1939, paving the way for World War II. After sacking much of Europe, Hitler turned on the Soviets, long his primary target, in an invasion of Russia launched on 22 June 1941. The West quickly embraced the Soviet cause as its own in a mutual conflict against Nazi aggression.

Clearly the wartime Grand Alliance, forged by the Nazi bid to dominate Europe, was little more than a marriage of convenience. Indeed, nothing less than Hitler's bid to dominate Europe could have brought Stalin and the Soviet Union into alliance with Great Britain and the United States. Winston Churchill's memorable comment that he would ally with "the devil himself" against the Nazi regime was no mere quip; Churchill was explaining just how extraordinary the prime minister himself considered the unlikely alliance between East and West. Equally cosmopolitan, but markedly less anti-Soviet than Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the war as an opportunity not only to defeat Nazi aggression but to create a framework through Soviet-American cooperation for something like the world order Wilson had envisioned all too prematurely during the previous European war.

Roosevelt came to understand, however, in the weeks before his death on 12 April 1945, that his vision might not stand up to the hard realities embodied in a renascent Stalinist Russia. Once seemingly on the brink of destruction, the Soviet Union had turned the battle at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–1943 and never looked back. Despite the unparalleled destruction of the Soviet state, including some 27 million dead in the war, the Red Army found itself ensconced in the heart of Europe, all with the blessing of its wartime allies. The onetime pariah state now stood poised to exert unprecedented influence on the postwar world.

NATIONAL EXPANSION

World War II redrew the map of the world, creating vast power vacuums from the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe and imperial Japan in Asia. Given his own ruthlessness and the lens of Marxist historicism, Stalin could only interpret the Soviet victory as an opportunity both to ensure his nation's security and to promote the inevitable expansion of the communist system. None of the new archival evidence that began emerging in the 1990s has contradicted Stalin's explanation to a group of comrades in 1945 that to the victors would go the spoils; that is, whichever power occupied a liberated European country could be expected to impose his own social system on that state. Stalin heard his allies' pleas for him to pay lip service to a postwar democratic order, best embodied in the Declaration of Liberated Europe issued at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but at the end of the day this was "algebra," as far as the Soviet dictator was concerned, and he averred a preference for simple math.

Presiding over a vast global empire—though one verging on dissolution rather than expansion—Winston Churchill understood simple math as well. He and Stalin had engaged in just such an exercise in coming to the so-called percentages agreement during a tête-à-tête in Moscow in 1944. Running down the nations of East-Central Europe one by one, the two Allied leaders came to agreement as to which powers would call the shots in the states then being liberated from the Nazis. In effect, Churchill went a long way toward acquiescing in the very division of Europe that he later bitterly decried in his 5 March 1946 "Iron Curtain" address in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill hoped to temper Soviet ambitions, but when it came to the fates of neighboring states such as Poland and Romania, Stalin understood only one language—domination.

U.S.–Soviet relations, vastly improved during the war under Roosevelt, began to deteriorate. Within less than a year after the end of the European war, Cold War declarations emanated from both capitals. In a February 1946 address, Stalin offered up a plateful of Marxist verities, including the warning that conflict between communism and Western imperialism was inevitable and would continue. George F. Kennan, America's foremost Soviet expert, dispatched the "long telegram" from Moscow that same month warning of an unstable, xenophobic, and expansionist regime. The policy Kennan urged in response—"containment" of Russia's "expansive tendencies"—soon became the watchword of American foreign policy. Churchill's address in Fulton, delivered in Truman's presence in his home state, followed on the heels of Kennan's landmark 8,000-word telegram. Stalin responded to Churchill's speech by labeling Britain's wartime leader a "convinced reactionary" and accusing the Western powers of planning a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union.

Rising Cold War tensions focused next on the Near East. Only a showdown in the new United Nations prompted Stalin's grudging withdrawal from neighboring Iran, where the Red Army had remained past an agreed-upon March 1946 deadline. By the spring of 1947, the threat of a leftist triumph in Greece, fear of Soviet influence in Turkey, and the decline of British power in the Mediterranean region combined to give rise to the Truman Doctrine. In a speech that has long been interpreted as an American declaration of cold war, Truman averred in April 1947 that the world had become divided between "alternative ways of life" and that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Despite its own history of often bellicose national expansion (such as the Mexican War or annexation of the Philippines), the United States would not accommodate itself to postwar Soviet expansion. Washington dominated postwar Japan and western Europe, both of which were reoriented along Western lines, and established a system of military bases across the world. The United States built and controlled the Panama Canal and backed British and French control of the Suez Canal, yet it rejected Soviet efforts to extend influence over the Black Sea straits. In addition to resenting these double standards, Stalin and his comrades feared America's ability to wield its unprecedented economic clout.

AMERICAN FINANCIAL HEGEMONY

In addition to the ideological divide and issues of national expansion, U.S. economic hegemony fueled the Cold War. The Soviets—who had suffered far more devastation, both human and material, in World War II than the United States (or any other country)—sought loans, grants, and reparations to rebuild. Washington had contributed immeasurably to the Soviet war effort through lend-lease and other forms of aid. The United States also promised a postwar loan but delayed the matter and then linked economic assistance with political issues, notably the fates of postwar governments in East-Central Europe. No loan was ever made.

In striking contrast to the devastation of Russia's economy, World War II had been phenomenally good for American business. Government-fueled war production ended the Great Depression and brought full employment and rapid economic growth to the United States. Unscathed by war and prosperous at home, the United States emerged as the unquestioned economic powerhouse of the postwar world. The dollar dwarfed all other currencies and New York displaced London as the world's financial center. At the 1944 Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) Conference, the United States established the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, agencies that would issue loans and assistance to anchor postwar economic recovery. Such assistance came with strings attached. In order to be eligible, countries would have to meet certain criteria compatible with free-market capitalism. After attending the conference, the Soviet Union never joined the Washington-based and U.S.-dominated international financial agencies.

If there was any hope of heading off the Cold War, it ended with the Marshall Plan. The European Recovery Program, launched by the U.S. Army general turned secretary of state George C. Marshall, laid the foundation for decades of American and western European economic and political integration. The program of loans, assistance, and psychological recovery from the destitution of war succeeded brilliantly in effecting the economic and political recovery of western Europe, especially in France and Italy, where communist parties backed by Moscow had been poised to bid for power. The Marshall Plan exemplified "empire by invitation," an interpretive framework that emphasized that American economic assistance and political influence were welcomed by the western European governments and the majority of public opinion. U.S. propaganda and covert operations, especially in Italy, played a significant role in the process, however. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that western Europeans welcomed American power and influence far more than Eastern Europeans welcomed Soviet power. This single reality carries a great deal of explanatory power as to both the origins and the eventual end of the Cold War.

By the late 1940s, the Marshall Plan had begun to achieve its aims of fostering western European economic recovery and political confidence building. It gave rise to a postwar order in which the United States emerged as the unquestioned world leader. It advanced an American campaign of global financial hegemony. As successful as the Marshall Plan was in advancing Western political and economic integration, the economic recovery program also cemented the

division of Europe. Although the Soviets had attended the initial discussions in Paris, Stalin and his foreign minister, V. I. Molotov, understood all too clearly that they would be left, by design, on the outside looking in. With American economic clout dwarfing that of the devastated Soviet Union, Stalin and Molotov understood that the Marshall Plan posed a grave threat to the budding "people's democracies" of East-Central Europe. After Molotov strode out of the Paris discussions, Stalin ordered out the Czech delegation as well. Within months the Kremlin orchestrated a coup, brutally ousting Czech liberals in tactics that revived vivid memories of Hitler. "Moral God-fearing peoples," Truman declared, "must save the world from Atheism and totalitarianism."

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

There was, of course, no precise moment when the Cold War can be said to have begun, yet there is no question that it was in place by 1948, the same year in which the term itself was popularized. The breakdown of Allied cooperation in Germany brought the division of the postwar world into the capital of the vanquished former common enemy. American, British, and French forces colluded in floating a new German currency without notifying the Soviets. The Kremlin and its German comrades cut off road, rail, and canal links to Berlin in an effort to force the Western powers out of the former Reich capital, which reposed in the heart of Soviet-occupied eastern Germany. The subsequent American airlift broke the back of the Kremlin blockade, which Stalin abandoned after eleven months in May 1949. The emergence of two rival German states, and years of bitter propaganda and covert operations, followed in the wake of the Berlin blockade and airlift.

The United States and its west European allies accepted the division of Germany under a strategy of "dual containment." The larger, more productive western Germany—soon to become the Federal Republic of Germany—would anchor the postwar European economy under U.S. occupation and supervision. This approach would not only fuel recovery but would reassure France and other past victims of aggression that Germany was now contained within the Western alliance. The Soviets incorporated into their sphere the smaller eastern rump Germany—which became the German Democratic Republic—and which the West subjected to unremitting psychological warfare in the form of radio propaganda, covert operations, and various forms of subversion. In any case, the division of Germany cemented, in both real and symbolic terms, the division of Europe.

MILITARIZATION

One of the most significant outcomes of World War II was the enormous momentum of militarization. Four years of global conflict—indeed, two world wars in a single generation—had left a powerful imprint. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States ever fully demobilized. Troops from both nations remained encamped in the heart of Europe, while U.S. air and naval bases spread throughout the world. Although the Soviet Red Army was the world's largest ground force, the United States possessed a formidable two-ocean navy and the most powerful air force the world had ever seen. As the Soviet economy and society struggled to rebuild from the ruins of war, U.S. economic might laid the foundation for the emergence of an awesome military power.

Sole possession of the atomic bomb offered both real and symbolic evidence of U.S. military superiority. Some historians have argued that the United States dropped the two bombs on Japan as much to make an impression on the Soviets as to end the Pacific war. "Atomic diplomacy" did not work, however, as Stalin adopted a nonchalant stance toward the bomb and refused to adjust Soviet political aims in deference to the U.S. monopoly. While Washington had shared atomic information with Great Britain during the war, the Soviets were kept in the dark—or so Americans thought. In actuality, Soviet spies had penetrated the atomic research program and stolen the secrets of the atom. Talks on international control of atomic weapons quickly foundered and became another casualty of the Cold War.

Both sides cultivated their military prowess and vowed to defend their territory and spheres of influence. While the Soviets trumpeted the heroic defense of the motherland against the Nazis, the Americans reorganized their defense establishment, now housed in the sprawling new Pentagon building. Under the National Security Act (1947), Washington created a new Department of Defense and departments of Air Force and Marines to join the Army and the Navy, all four branches coordinated by a new phalanx of generals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The legislation also created the National Security Council to advise the president

on global foreign policy and the Central Intelligence Agency to gather information and carry out covert operations.

The West took the lead in dividing Europe into hostile military alliances. In 1949, acting under a UN provision for collective security arrangements, the West promulgated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance aimed squarely at the Soviet Union. The actual threat of a Soviet military attack on western Europe was remote, yet memories of Nazi blitzkrieg and Pearl Harbor remained vivid. More to the point, however, NATO furthered the course of Western economic and political integration and created a market for perpetuating the profitable wartime collusion between science, government, and the defense industry. The successful Soviet atomic test in 1949 fueled the nuclear arms race, as both powers pushed ahead with development of hydrogen, or thermonuclear, weapons. From this point forward, the two superpowers each cultivated the power to destroy one another in an all-out war.

THE COLD WAR IN ASIA

Tumultuous developments in Asia ensured that the Cold War would become global. U.S. policy appeared well in hand in the early postwar years, as the occupation of Japan provided an unprecedented opportunity to further Washington's economic and political agenda in Asia. Establishing Japan as the focal point of an economic program across the "great crescent" of Asia, Washington sought to ensure an anticommunist order friendly to the supremacy of the dollar and U.S. ideology. The Japanese proved largely compliant, but the triumph of the communists in the Chinese civil war promptly shattered the American quest for a noncommunist Asian postwar order.

The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1949 was a stunning blow to Americans, who had long waxed sentimental about the prospects of expanding Western influence in "the Orient." Roosevelt had given rise to false hopes during the war by floating the ill-fated concept that China would serve as one of the "four policemen" of the postwar world. In reality, the democratic China was a chimera. And while Stalin had repeatedly shown himself willing to sell out the Chinese communists during the war, now that they had come to power, he entered into an alliance with Mao Zedong's regime in 1950. Inexperienced in foreign affairs, and plagued by demagogues and opportunists in Congress, millions of Americans believed the leaders who told them that only domestic subversion could account for the dastardly turn of affairs in East Asia. Still adjusting to the burdens of world power, Americans became resentful when events did not unfold as they expected.

KOREA AND NSC 68

With capitalist and communist regimes ensconced in Japan and China, respectively, Korean communists led by Kim Il Sung sought to "liberate" their peninsula through armed aggression. Archival evidence found in the 1990s revealed that Kim practically pleaded with Stalin, on numerous occasions, before gaining the Kremlin autocrat's assent to an attack against southern forces backed by the American-educated Syngman Rhee. The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 stunned the Truman administration and an American public already reeling from a series of Cold War setbacks. Unaware and unwilling to consider that Kim, and not Stalin, had fomented the war in Korea, the Truman administration decided immediately to respond with force to what it was sure was a deliberate *Soviet* provocation. Within months, U.S. and UN forces reversed the battle, prompting a massive Chinese intervention that turned the Korean War into a bloody three-year stalemate. Korea would remain a divided nation for at least the rest of the century, yet another casualty of the Cold War.

The outbreak of war in Korea, punctuated by the approval of the historic U.S. foreign policy document National Security Council Document 68 (NSC 68) marked the end of the first phase of the Cold War. The apocalyptic policy paper envisioned a fight to the finish with Soviet-sponsored world communism. The document, approved by Truman, literally envisioned spending whatever was necessary in the name of national security. During the course of the Korean War, defense spending more than tripled, ensuring the predominance of military Keynesianism for the remainder of the century. Military Keynesianism encompassed stimulation of the economy through federal investment and expenditure on defense.

Among other significant repercussions of the Korean bloodletting was the establishment of U.S. military bases in Asia; lasting involvement in the dispute between Taiwan and mainland China; assignment of U.S. troops to Europe on a perma-

nent basis; and West German rearmament. Approval of NSC 68 culminated the first phase of the Cold War. The Korean War cemented militarization and the adoption of worst case scenarios of "enemy" behavior on both sides. Sometimes referred to as the "forgotten war," insofar as it was sandwiched between World War II and the Vietnam War, the Korean War was one of most significant conflicts in modern world history.

PATRIOTIC CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES

Cold War anxiety reached new heights, or depths, during the Korean War and had a profound effect on American society. Conservatism outpaced reform. The process began early in World War II, when Roosevelt himself announced that "Dr. New Deal" had been replaced by "Dr. Win the War." The reform era was over, replaced by the inevitable conservative reaction of war, mirroring the World War I experience. War and Cold War provided an opportunity that conservative elites, alarmed by the specter of creeping socialism in the New Deal, would not let pass. The profitable matrix revolving around science, business, government, and defense cemented military Keynesianism over government spending on domestic concerns. While federal dollars fueled Cold War militarization, spending on social programs, deemed socialistic by many conservatives, would be contained at home. An inveterate New Dealer, Henry Wallace, launched a last-gasp campaign against the new order but was thoroughly repudiated in the 1948 election. Truman's stunning upset victory over Thomas Dewey underscored that containment, anticommunism, and militarization would illuminate the path to electoral triumph.

Hysteria over domestic communism brought repression and exercised a lasting chilling effect on left-wing sentiment. Beginning with the "Hollywood Ten" in 1946, former communists and left-wing sympathizers were harassed, purged, and put on notice. In 1950 the Alger Hiss case, in which a former high-level State Department diplomat was convicted of perjury for lying about being a communist agent, put liberals and former New Dealers on the defensive while giving rise to a new breed of politician, best embodied by Richard Nixon, for whom the Cold War provided the core of their identity. Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover—accountable to no one and since World War I obsessed with destroying radicalism—launched a campaign against thousands of Americans who had harbored left-wing sentiments. Despite the extraordinarily crude and reckless tactics of Joseph McCarthy, the junior senator from Wisconsin conducted a four-year campaign against thousands of alleged subversives. The victims of the postwar hysteria were not only the tens of thousands of men and women harassed by McCarthy and the FBI, but the basic constitutional rights of freedom of thought and association as well.

THE FAILED QUEST FOR "LIBERATION"

While U.S. national security elites still hoped to force the Soviet Union to allow political independence throughout Eastern Europe, the State Department grasped the possibilities inherent in the independent communist course being pursued in Yugoslavia since the open breach in 1948 between Stalin and Josip Broz Tito. Both Truman and his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, sought to promote "Titoism" in Eastern Europe, but the confrontational quest for "liberation" of the "captive nations" undermined this effort. Right-wing critics insisted that containment was a fatalistic and unmanly (even "pantywaist," to some critics) policy, which supposedly acquiesced in Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. In reality, Kennan's conceptualization of containment, embraced as U.S. Cold War policy, had always encompassed liberation, or rollback, of communist power in Eastern Europe.

Eisenhower intensified a campaign of "psychological warfare" that had begun under Truman in an effort to destabilize Soviet hegemony. A variety of strategies, focused especially on radio propaganda, did indeed help shake the foundations of Communist Party authority in Eastern Europe. When necessary, however, as in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, the Soviet Union simply resorted to direct military intervention to maintain its hard sphere of influence over East-Central Europe. Nothing the United States and its NATO allies could have done, short of initiating World War III, would have altered this fundamental geopolitical reality flowing from the World War II settlement and the postwar ideological clash.

A more subtle Western approach might have enhanced the possibility of the post-Stalinist leadership loosening the bonds of authority over the East-Central European Communist Party regimes. However, by confronting the Soviet Union with

both NATO and aggressive psychological warfare, Washington gave the Kremlin no opportunity to allow for liberalization, or Titoism, in the region. It was all too clear to Soviet leaders that if the "satellites" were allowed to go their own way they would end up ultimately—as in fact occurred decades later after the end of the Cold War—being transferred directly into the hostile NATO orbit. The Kremlin had no choice, short of capitulation to the West, but to protect its sphere at all costs. With psychological warfare having failed to deliver the ultimate prize of liberation, the Eisenhower administration was compelled to adopt an evolutionary approach emphasizing toned-down radio propaganda, exchanges of film, trade fairs, exhibitions, and people-to-people contacts.

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Nikita S. Khrushchev eventually emerged as the new Kremlin leader. In 1956, Khrushchev stunned communists throughout the world by denouncing Stalin for his many "crimes" against the people. A dedicated Marxist-Leninist known for his thundering denunciations of the West, Khrushchev also took concrete steps, including meaningful cuts in Soviet defenses, toward achieving "peaceful coexistence" with the West. Khrushchev's brash style, however, combined with deeply ingrained American Cold War anxieties, continued to plague any progress toward a genuine détente. A hysterical American reaction to the Soviet launch of *Sputnik*, the first Earth satellite, in 1957 complicated Eisenhower's hopes for a breakthrough in the Cold War. The president's own decision to authorize a campaign of aerial spying over Soviet airspace doomed the Eisenhower-Khrushchev "thaw" in the Cold War. Hopes for achieving what would later be called détente came crashing down with Gary Powers's U-2 spy plane in May 1960. Eisenhower limped out of office decrying the "unwarranted influence" of the military-industrial complex, a phenomenon that, ironically, had gained substantial momentum on his own watch.

KENNEDY AND CRISES

The essential forces that fueled the Cold War—ideology, geopolitics, economics, militarization, and patriotic culture—persisted throughout the conflict. The Cold War manifested itself in waves, or cycles, of varying intensity. After the brief thaw of the mid-1950s, another intense wave of conflict emerged during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Bitter confrontation over the anomalous western enclave in Berlin, deep inside East Germany, ended with construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The wall brought a pernicious settlement to the German problem, but the concrete and barbed wire divide gave substance to Churchill's metaphor of an Iron Curtain. Despite scores of bold and often successful escapes by East Germans, the wall was an effective physical barrier, though ultimately a devastating propaganda liability and harbinger of the West's eventual triumph in the Cold War.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis marked the apogee of Cold War confrontation, including a palpable threat of nuclear annihilation. Already livid over the loss of Cuba to communism under Fidel Castro, Americans were angered even further by Khrushchev's decision to place medium-range nuclear warheads ninety miles off U.S. shores. From the Cuban and Soviet perspective—a perspective rarely considered under a monolithic U.S. patriotic culture—the action might have been seen as an understandable response to blatant American efforts to topple Castro, which had failed once in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 but would continue in no fewer than eight assassination plots against the Cuban leader. Moreover, as Khrushchev pointed out, nuclear missiles in Cuba would confront the United States with an analogous situation to that faced by the Soviet Union, which had nuclear weapons targeting its cities and defense sites from a variety of hostile NATO states.

Kennedy ultimately rejected the most hawkish advice he received—unilateral bombing of Cuba—but the president opted for a national television address rather than private diplomacy to demand that Khrushchev dismantle the missile sites. Kennedy then confronted the Soviets with a naval blockade, an act of war that the administration tried to soften by employing the euphemism of a "quarantine." Khrushchev backed down, but only after Kennedy renounced intervention in Cuba and pledged privately to dismantle U.S. missile sites in Turkey.

The last months of Kennedy's abortive presidency marked a turning point in the history of the Cold War. Following the crises in Berlin and Cuba, a sobered Kennedy and Khrushchev began to usher in a new thaw by establishing a "hotline" for instant communication and signing the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, terminating above-ground nuclear test blasts. Cultural exchange picked up throughout the 1960s as well. Cold

War rivalry continued on a global scale, but after 1963 the shadow of Armageddon began to recede, particularly as the Soviets achieved a rough parity in the nuclear arms race by the end of the decade.

THE THIRD WORLD

While both sides accepted the status quo in Europe and embraced mutual deterrence through MAD (mutually assured destruction), the Cold War continued to rage in the so-called Third World of developing nations. From 1946 to 1960, thirty-seven new nations emerged from under a history of colonial domination to gain independent status. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, backed by their respective allies, competed intensively for influence over the new nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Strategists in both camps believed that ultimate victory or defeat in the Cold War depended on the outcome of Third World conflicts. Moreover, many of these areas harbored vital natural resources, such as oil in the Middle East, upon which the developed world had become dependent. With American and allied automobiles, industry, and consumerism dependent on ready access to vast supplies of crude oil, maintaining access to foreign energy sources emerged as a key element of U.S. foreign policy.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union abhorred neutralism, that is, they demanded that their allies and Third World nations side with them against their Cold War rival. Both powers equated neutralism with appeasement and sought to punish not just states that sided against them but those that attempted to remain equivocal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union worked tirelessly in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to convince Third World leaders that their ideology was on the right side of history and held out the best hope for those nations to grapple with their pressing social problems, including poverty, disease, and rampant population growth. The Soviets had less money and a weaker economy than their Western rivals, but they did have the advantage of arguing that communist ideology offered liberation from the legacy of colonialism.

Adopting a much harsher line toward the West than Khrushchev, China's leader, Mao Zedong, called on Third World revolutionaries to launch "wars of national liberation" against the capitalist world. The message had resonance since the overwhelming majority of Third World states had been under the control of foreign powers, including Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, and the United States, for much of the previous century. Washington sought desperately to counteract the Soviet message and to contain revolutionary movements in the Third World. U.S. leaders went to great lengths to stave off defeat in even the most obscure and strategically insignificant corners of the globe out of fear of a bandwagon or domino effect. They insisted that a communist victory anywhere would encourage other revolutionaries and thus precipitate the much-feared red avalanche.

While the United States was most sensitive to revolutionary movements in neighboring Latin America, Cold War intervention was a global phenomenon. For years Washington coveted as a strategic partner South Africa, at the time a racist white minority regime that attempted to isolate and contain black radical movements in southern Africa. In North Africa and the Middle East, Washington backed Egypt and Israel against more radical regimes, some of which, such as Syria, became close Soviet allies. The United States and the Soviet Union supported different sides in the Middle East Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States backed the Zionist state, a policy supported by most American Jews—the largest population in the world in any one country—but also by a majority of overall public opinion. While Washington became Israel's chief diplomatic benefactor and weapons supplier, the Soviet Union embraced the cause of Arab nationalism and Palestinian statehood. When wars erupted in 1956, 1967, and 1973, however, Washington and Moscow ultimately found the common language to work together to prevent the conflicts from escalating into longer wars.

While the Soviets and Chinese appealed to the Third World on the basis of Lenin's theory of imperialism, Washington offered its democratic ideology as well as its advanced economy to woo Third World nations. Through its supervision of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States offered aid and loans on the condition that the recipients join the capitalist camp in the Cold War struggle. The United States confronted serious obstacles, however, in its efforts to win over the Third World. First of all, most of the Third World consisted of populations of people of color. The leaders and peoples of those nations condemned America's history of slavery, racism, and support for imperialism based

on a racial hierarchy. Many scholars believe, in fact, that the Cold War played a significant role in the slow emergence of federal government support for the civil rights movement, which culminated in the United States in the mid-1960s. U.S. leaders recognized that they could not hope to appeal successfully to the Third World while sanctioning segregation, denial of voting rights, and other forms of racial discrimination in the United States itself.

CIA COVERT OPERATIONS

When economic, ideological, and cultural appeals failed, the United States, like the Soviet Union, employed spies and covert operations in an effort to achieve its aims in the developing world. Both employed a variety of tactics, including bribes, intimidation, propaganda, and violence. As a Communist Party dictatorship, the Soviets were less accountable to their public than the Americans were to theirs. Anxious to avoid public scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Agency and other covert branches of the national security state conducted their operations in secret. U.S. covert operations included extralegal coups against revolutionary regimes in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. In 1953, for example, a CIA operation, approved directly by Eisenhower, led to the overthrow of the elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq. The Iranian leader had moved to assert national control over his nation's oil supplies, an action that menaced the interest of U.S. and British oil conglomerates and smacked of socialism. The coup succeeded, as the CIA paved the way for Shah Reza Pahlavi to assume power and keep Iran open to the West. The foreign policy of intervention proved shortsighted a quarter-century later, however, as Iranian fundamentalists overthrew the shah, condemned the United States as the "Great Satan" in world affairs, and held fifty-three American hostages for more than a year.

In 1954 another CIA coup overthrew Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the legitimate ruler of the Central American nation of Guatemala. Arbenz had engaged in land redistribution, threatening the interest of the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation. Moreover, Washington was determined to curb such socialist-style behavior out of fear that it would inspire similar actions by other nations of the region. The coup replaced Arbenz with a more compliant leader but ultimately led to more than a quarter-century of factionalism, poverty, and state terror in Guatemala. In part it was the success of the Guatemalan coup that led the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to confidently approve plans for a takeover in Cuba, an initiative that failed spectacularly at the Bay of Pigs. Castro's fully prepared forces destroyed the U.S.-backed Cuban exile guerillas shortly after their landing at Cochinos Bay. Lack of air support and widespread publicity on the eve of a putatively "covert" operation doomed the invasion and left a humiliated Kennedy administration even more determined to contain communism. An even more disastrous intervention subsequently unfolded in Asia.

THE VIETNAM WAR

While securing Japan as the centerpiece of the "great crescent" strategy, Washington successfully fended off a leftist insurgency in the Philippines after granting independence to the archipelago in 1946. U.S. economic and strategic influence (weapons sales, for example) helped contain radical movements in the new nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. Taiwan depended heavily on the United States to maintain its defensive posture and separation from mainland China.

In 1954, just a year after the Korean armistice, a new Cold War crisis arose in Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) as France suffered a humiliating defeat following an eight-year campaign to reassert imperial authority. The Viet Minh, a nationalist group led by a communist, Ho Chi Minh, won the battle of Dien Bien Phu, forcing France to capitulate. Determined to prevent Vietnam from falling to communism, the United States helped sabotage an international agreement that elections would be held in 1956 to unify the Southeast Asian nation. The problem with the elections, as the Eisenhower administration well understood, was that Ho Chi Minh would have won them. Washington threw its support behind Ngo Dinh Diem, who proclaimed the existence of a separate Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in opposition to Ho's regime in the northern half of the country. The United States thus began a commitment that would eventually cost billions of dollars and more than 58,000 American lives while bringing unparalleled death and destruction to Indochina.

Despite occupying the country with more than half a million ground troops and pummeling the region with the most intensive bombing cam-

paign in world history, Washington could neither subdue the Vietnamese opposition nor create a viable government in Saigon. By the time President Richard M. Nixon pulled out in January 1973, the United States itself had become deeply divided over the war. Saigon fell to the communists two years later. The much-feared domino effect never transpired in Southeast Asia. Laos and Cambodia did "go communist," but well before the end of the Indochina war, the Soviet Union and China had become enemies. In 1979, Communist Party governments of the region were at war with one another, as China briefly invaded Vietnam, a Soviet ally, for its attack on the bloodthirsty regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a Chinese ally.

The consensus interpretation is that the Vietnam War was a tragic foreign policy blunder. Some diehard elements of the patriotic culture insisted that Washington could have won the war with a divergent strategy, but this argument ignores the decisive political aspects of the struggle as well as the very real possibility that an unlimited assault on North Vietnam in the mid-1960s would have brought China into the war, much as events had transpired in Korea. The nation as a whole struggled for decades to recover from a foreign policy debacle that, however tragic, had flowed logically from U.S. Cold War ideology and perceptions.

DÉTENTE

Despite the aggressive U.S. militarism in Southeast Asia, and a brutal Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a new thaw in East-West relations emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Détente (relaxation of tensions) emerged as part of the cyclical pattern of Cold War history in which periods of relative calm followed periods of bitter great-power conflict. Kennedy and Khrushchev started the process in the wake of the missile crisis, but both were removed from the scene with Kennedy's assassination in Dallas and Khrushchev's ouster in a 1964 Kremlin power shift. The new, hard-line regime of Leonid Brezhnev aggressively pursued Soviet aims, including sending the Red Army into Czechoslovakia to repress the "Prague Spring." Although the Czechs had not rejected the Warsaw Pact alliance with the Soviet Union, the Brezhnev Doctrine proclaimed that none of the East European states would be allowed to vacate the communist camp.

Preoccupied with his foreign policy debacle in Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson made little progress toward détente, but his successor, Nixon, was keenly interested in improved East-West relations. Nixon's support for détente was ironic, since he had made his reputation in politics as a fervent anticommunist, yet he would achieve a breakthrough in the Cold War. The impetus for détente, however, actually came from European leaders Charles de Gaulle, president of France, and Willy Brandt, the West German chancellor. Bitterly opposed to the U.S. war in the former French colony of Indochina, De Gaulle excoriated U.S. foreign policy, withdrew France from NATO's integrated military command, and met with Brezhnev in Moscow in 1966. Brandt, a former mayor of West Berlin, pursued a diplomacy of *Ostpolitik* (Eastern policy), improving relations with neighboring East Germany.

Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, a refugee from Nazi Germany and a former Harvard professor turned national security adviser, pursued détente in part to prevent the Europeans from undermining Washington's leadership. Nixon and Kissinger also hoped to use improved relations to gain the assistance of Moscow and Beijing in bringing an end to the Vietnam War without the United States suffering a humiliating defeat. Nixon and Kissinger exploited the Sino-Soviet rift with a "triangular diplomacy" that sought to play off the great communist powers against one another to the betterment of U.S. national interests. After Kissinger traveled secretly to Beijing for talks in 1969, the momentum toward rapprochement (reconciliation) was irreversible. During a dramatic state visit in 1971, Nixon clinked cocktail glasses with Mao Zedong in Beijing and posed for photographers atop the Great Wall of China. The next year the two powers issued the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement that China and the United States would strive to improve their relations and to contain "hegemony," a euphemism for the Soviet Union.

The dramatic "Nixinger" summit diplomacy with the onetime archenemy "Red" China wowed the American public and created anxiety in Moscow. The Kremlin warned the Americans against playing the "China card" but also received Nixon in Moscow in 1972 despite the American mining of Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam, where Soviet supply ships regularly anchored. The high point of the U.S.–Soviet détente was the signing of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, known as SALT I. The treaty estab-

lished ceilings on offensive missiles and sharply limited destabilizing defensive weapons systems, but it was more important as a political vehicle for improved relations than for its actual achievements in limiting the weapons of mass destruction. Nixon and Kissinger failed completely in their quest to go through China and the Soviets to prevail upon North Vietnam to accept an independent South Vietnam, which instead fell in April 1975.

The momentum of détente began to wane in the mid-1970s. Nixon, its chief architect, met his political demise in the Watergate scandal. With the Soviet Union maintaining its hegemony over Eastern Europe, sponsoring revolutionary movements in the Third World, and denying human rights to many of its own citizens, American critics began to equate détente with appeasement. In the southwest African nation of Angola, the two superpowers backed competing forces in a raging civil war. Cuban troops, viewed as Soviet "proxies," fought in behalf of leftist rebels in Angola while the United States and China supported the opposition. A Cold War battle also emerged in Ethiopia and throughout the horn of Africa. Soviet and Cuban influence was confined mainly to those two countries, as U.S. trade and diplomacy proved advantageous in several other key African states.

Critics of détente advocated "linkage"—linking trade, arms control, and improved relations with Soviet behavior in world affairs and in the regime's human rights policies. The Soviets bitterly resented this approach and any effort to influence their internal affairs. They had left themselves vulnerable to such criticism, however, not only by denying freedom of intellectual and religious expression in Russia but by violating pledges to respect human rights embodied in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Under this agreement, the United States, Soviet Union, and governments throughout Europe recognized current borders as permanent, thus in effect renouncing the old U.S. Cold War depiction of Eastern Europe as a set of "captive nations."

Jimmy Carter, elected president in 1976, advocated arms control but made human rights the centerpiece of his diplomacy and criticized the Soviets for their violations. U.S. relations with China continued to improve, however, a process that culminated in 1979 with formal recognition of Beijing at the expense of the longtime U.S. ally on Taiwan. The Japanese, too, expressed dismay at not being consulted about the dramatic shift in U.S. East Asian policy. Détente deteriorated under Carter, who adopted conflicting policies that reflected the conflicting advice he received from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, an advocate of détente, and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Polish emigré who adopted a harder line toward the Soviets. Carter himself allowed the SALT process to break down. Although a SALT II treaty was negotiated, Carter never took it before the U.S. Senate, where it faced rejection.

Two climactic events in 1979 destroyed détente and ensured Carter's defeat in the 1980 presidential election. First, in November a militant fundamentalist regime in Iran took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding fifty-three Americans hostage. Carter began painstaking negotiations aimed at securing their release, which would not come for more than year. Meanwhile, the United States appeared helpless as Iranian radicals burned the U.S. flag and shouted "Death to Carter" in daily rituals outside the embassy. In December the Soviet Union launched an invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, where the pro-Soviet government in Kabul had come under siege. The Soviet assault seemed to confirm critics' charges that détente had been a form of appeasement. Carter declared that Brezhnev had lied to him and instituted a variety of sanctions, including a U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow.

REAGAN'S COLD WAR

Yet another cycle of Cold War confrontation followed in the wake of the collapse of détente and the foreign policy disasters in Iran and Afghanistan. Like the previous similar waves, this one featured hostile rhetoric, military escalation, little or no diplomacy, and fear of a superpower conflict. What distinguished the new cycle of conflict was the dynamic personality of President Ronald W. Reagan, an inveterate cold warrior who labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire." A former Hollywood actor and two-term California governor, Reagan declared that the country had grown weak but soon would once again "stand tall" in world affairs. The new president embarked on an enormous campaign of militarization reminiscent of similar spurts following NSC 68 (1950) and in the wake of the "missile gap" controversy in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

U.S.–Soviet relations deteriorated sharply in Reagan's first term. Diplomacy virtually ceased. In March 1983 Reagan stunned the Soviets, and

threatened to destabilize the nuclear arms race, by announcing his support for a space-based defensive shield. The president glibly declared that nuclear weapons could be rendered "impotent and obsolete" by developing a perfect defense against incoming ballistic missiles. The program, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was both costly and a violation of the 1972 treaty limiting defensive systems. The Kremlin feared, however, that the initiative would force the Soviets, already suffering from a badly flagging economy, into a costly new arena of superpower competition. The Kremlin bitterly criticized SDI, launched an offensive missile buildup of its own, and accused the United States of enhancing the threat of another world war.

On 1 September 1983, U.S.–Soviet relations reached their nadir when a Soviet pilot carried out an order to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 en route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, Korea. The passenger jumbo jet had deviated from its course and flown hundreds of miles into Soviet territory. The Soviet pilot could not distinguish the Boeing aircraft from U.S. reconnaissance jets, which routinely played "chicken" with Soviet forces along their vast border. The Reagan administration claimed that the Kremlin had deliberately destroyed the civilian airliner, which had gone off course as a result of a computer programming error. The Soviets, after remaining silent for days, insisted, apparently truthfully, that they had not recognized the plane as a civilian airliner. The Kremlin charged that the civilian jet clearly had been on a U.S.– and South Korean–backed intelligence mission.

While Reagan unnerved the Soviets, most of the American public supported his policies. Even foreign policy disasters did not undermine the president's appeal. In one such incident in 1983, Reagan dispatched U.S. forces to Lebanon on an uncertain mission to combat "terrorism" and contain Syrian "aggression." The action brought little more than the deaths of 241 U.S. marines from a radical suicide assault on their position. Reagan also overthrew a leftist government in Grenada by direct invasion and conducted a series of raids against the Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. The most intense arena of the revived Cold War, however, was Central America. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista rebels, named for a martyred reform leader from the 1930s, came to power in 1979 and launched a socialist government. In neighboring El Salvador, leftist rebels battled a murderous U.S.-backed military regime. Although Carter had initiated the move to contain the perceived threat, it was Reagan who embarked on an all-out campaign to destroy the left in America's "backyard." While employing every possible means to isolate and economically weaken Castro's Cuba, Reagan sharply increased aid to the Salvadoran military, which allied with "death squads" responsible for executing not only leftist leaders but liberal critics of the government, students, citizens, Catholic priests, and even American churchwomen. The CIA authorized funding for the contras, rebels whose aim was to overthrow the government in Managua. Funded, armed, and trained on U.S. bases in Florida as well as in Honduras, the contras began to fight their way through the Nicaraguan jungles.

Although the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the World Court condemned the United States for actions such as the illegal mining of Nicaragua's harbors in 1982, Reagan ignored the world community. Reagan's campaign against the left led to the Iran-Contra scandal, which tarnished his presidency. The president either authorized illegal actions or failed to exercise supervision over his subordinates—he was not sure himself which had been the case. What became clear was that the administration had secretly sold arms to Iran—officially a terrorist nation with which Washington had refused to conduct diplomacy—as part of a scheme to gain the release of hostages being held in Lebanon as well as to circumvent congressional restrictions on funding for the contra rebels in Nicaragua.

While Reagan remained a popular president, the damage done by the Iran-Contra scandal as well as changes in the Soviet Union prompted him to reconsider his hard-line Cold War policies. Throughout the 1980s, antinuclear protesters in the United States and Europe, as well as liberal and moderate critics, also brought pressure to bear on the White House to pursue an arms-control agreement and a renewal of East-West diplomacy. Some of the president's advisers, including his wife, Nancy, urged him to leave a legacy of peace rather than one simply of zealotry and confrontation.

THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON

A dynamic new Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, prompted Reagan's turn to moderation. Following the death of Brezhnev in 1982, two more

Soviet leaders assumed the helm but died within a short period. Born in 1931, well after the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev represented a new generation of Communist Party leadership in Moscow. Assuming power in 1985, Gorbachev sought to revitalize Soviet society through a series of dramatic reforms. He called the program *perestroika,* or restructuring, a concept that included sweeping economic and social reforms. The Soviet government authorized joint ventures with foreign companies, allowing some free enterprise to emerge in the socialist economy, and lifted restrictions on free speech and intellectual expression. Gorbachev called that reform *glasnost,* or openness.

Decrying the Cold War as dangerous and wasteful, Gorbachev unilaterally reduced Soviet investment in the great-power struggle. Declaring that intervention in Afghanistan had been a mistake, he pulled out Soviet troops in 1989. Gorbachev implemented sharp cuts in Soviet defense spending, including the withdrawal of tens of thousands of Red Army troops occupying Eastern Europe. Reagan and his advisers reacted with skepticism to Gorbachev's initiatives in world affairs, but the sweeping changes promoted by the charismatic new Russian leader soon became impossible to ignore. Gorbachev pressed Reagan to join him in bold new diplomatic ventures, and the U.S. president nearly responded at the Reykjavik summit in Iceland in 1986. There the two world leaders flirted with the "zero option"—an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This breathtaking proposal collapsed, however, over Reagan's refusal to sacrifice research and development of his Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite the summit breakdown, Reagan and Gorbachev had formed a bond, one that led the next year to a successful nuclear arms summit in Washington, D.C. Under the INF Treaty, both sides agreed to dismantle all intermediate range nuclear forces throughout the world. The Soviets agreed to on-site verification of their missile installations, a concession that would not have been possible in the pre-Gorbachev era.

By the time Reagan left office in 1989, the warlike atmosphere he had fostered in the early 1980s was but a distant memory. Both the U.S. and Soviet presidents were calling for an end to the Cold War, but no one envisioned just how sudden, dramatic, and complete that end would be. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* could not help but reverberate beyond Russia's borders. The sweeping economic reforms and loosening of restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and artistic and intellectual life unleashed powerful forces that proved impossible to contain. Before they had run their course, the Communist Party regimes would topple throughout Europe and the Soviet Union and the Cold War would come to an end.

Skeptics assumed Gorbachev would inevitably respond in the fashion of the Chinese Communist Party, which conducted a bloody crackdown on student demonstrators in June 1989 at Beijing's mammoth Tiananmen Square. The United States condemned the repression at Tiananmen but maintained trade, diplomatic, and cultural ties with the People's Republic of China. U.S. national security elites concluded that continuing dialogue with China was too important to make an issue of the regime's repressive action. Rejecting the Chinese model, Gorbachev concluded that the costs—militarily and politically, and in world opinion—were too high to forcefully maintain Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. The Soviet leader stunned Western national security experts by renouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that the Kremlin would use force to maintain communist regimes.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Once Soviet intervention had been renounced, the people of Eastern Europe took matters into their own hands. Poland had assumed the lead, well before Gorbachev's time, under Lech Walesa and the Solidarity trade-union movement. Similar pro-democracy reform movements emerged in Czechoslovakia and throughout Eastern Europe. The movement climaxed in 1989 with the sudden dissolution of the Soviet empire. A leader of Solidarity became prime minister of Poland, where a year later the first free elections in sixty-eight years were held to turn out the communists. Soviet troops departed from Hungary, where a new government unearthed the remains of the martyred reform leader Imre Nagy, executed by the Soviets after the 1956 rebellion, in order to give him a burial ceremony with full honors. The poet and playwright Vaclav Havel led the "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia. In November 1989 security forces bludgeoned hundreds of protesters in Wenceslas Square in Prague, but even more massive crowds returned on successive days, shouting for an end to communism. The regime came tumbling down.

The most dramatic change came in Berlin, the heart of the nation that had been divided by the

Cold War. After the East German authorities announced under pressure that citizens would no longer be prevented from traveling to the western sector of the city, the Berlin Wall, the ultimate symbol of the Cold War, literally crumbled in the hands of crowds of jubilant, hammer-wielding Germans. German reunification soon followed. Contending parties agreed on free elections in Albania and Bulgaria, but the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania grimly clung to power. In December, after his security police fired into crowds murdering hundreds of protesters, the Romanian army joined forces with the street protesters to topple the regime. Ceausescu and his wife were summarily executed by firing squad on Christmas Day 1989.

Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union itself, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, forcibly annexed by Stalin in the 1939 pact with Hitler, demanded independence. All across the vast Eurasian empire, ethnic republics such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan rejected the essence of Soviet political life: the central authority of the Kremlin. Gorbachev repeatedly ruled out military intervention against the breakaway republics, but violence erupted in regions throughout the Soviet Union. Finally, in August 1991, on the eve of Gorbachev's planned signing of a new union treaty that would have created a formal confederation, hard-liners effected a coup, placing Gorbachev under house arrest in the Crimea. Protests, led by renegade Russian Communist Party leader Boris Yeltsin, overwhelmed the plotters of the coup after three days of tense standoff.

The collapse of the coup left a changed world in its wake. Gorbachev attempted to return to power after the coup, but in fact—because he was the leader of the discredited Communist Party—he had no real authority left. The Soviet reformer had won the Nobel Peace Prize but had lost the real prize: state power. Yeltsin assumed the Russian presidency under a new democratic system. Russia, and most of the fifteen other republics, rejected the Soviet system, though individual communists could remain engaged in parliamentary politics. The infamous KGB security police assumed a new name and no longer hounded intellectual critics of communism but otherwise remained active. Western Europe and the United States embraced the newly independent East European regimes, even encouraging several to join NATO over the opposition of Yeltsin and many residents of the former Soviet Union.

The United States confronted a world in which the nation's preeminent adversary for almost a half century had suddenly ceased to exist. President George H. W. Bush, who had succeeded Reagan in 1989, reacted cautiously to the dramatic change before declaring the triumph of the United States in the Cold War. The Cold War had been costly and dangerous but had provided a pernicious kind of stability in world affairs. With regional conflicts raging in the former Yugoslavia, Africa, parts of Asia, and in ethnic enclaves of Russia, many wondered if the post–Cold War world might bring even greater instability and uncertainty to world affairs.

INTERPRETING THE COLD WAR

From the outset of the Cold War, the two adversaries blamed one another for the conflict. For a long time, historians, echoing the patriotic culture of their nations, followed in train. In the Soviet Union, historical interpretation adhered to the rigid Communist Party line, which held the "imperialist" United States responsible for the Cold War. The Americans had tried to strangle the Soviet Union during its infancy and had sought ever since, with the brief interlude of World War II (known there as the Great Patriotic War) to contain Russia by surrounding it with hostile states. The United States and its allies had menaced the Soviet Union with the atomic bomb and had tried to isolate and destroy the "motherland" with their economic power and trade restrictions. The Soviet Union depicted itself as a defensive outpost of progressive reform in a world dominated by ruthless but ultimately doomed capitalist imperialists.

Until a wave of revisionism emerged in the 1960s, historians in the United States interpreted the evolution of the Cold War in orthodox terms: that it was a struggle to contain an expansionist and "totalitarian" Soviet regime. The totalitarian model linked Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as two ruthless military powers that forced their will upon neighboring states and employed terror at home against their own people. Like the Soviets, Americans insisted that their actions in the Cold War had been primarily defensive, as the term "containment" suggested. The essential argument, reflected in the language of NSC 68, was that the United States represented the "free world" in a struggle against atheist totalitarianism.

Revisionists of various shades began to emerge in the United States in the late 1950s,

reaching their apogee in the wake of the disastrous U.S. intervention in Indochina. Revisionists challenged the patriotic culture with their willingness to consider the Soviet point of view. Some argued that economic necessity, specifically the need for foreign markets, determined the direction of U.S. Cold War diplomacy. Revisionists emphasized that the United States, not just the Soviet Union, had been an expansionist power throughout its history. They also underscored the willingness of U.S. national security elites to ally themselves with a host of dictators across the globe, as long as those rulers embraced anticommunism and left their nations open to U.S. economic penetration.

Orthodox interpretations returned with a vengeance with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The triumphalist argument held that the Cold War policies of the United States and its allies had been necessary to contain communism and that they had proven spectacularly successful. Despite the violence of the era, some viewed the Cold War as a "long peace," because, in fact, the superpowers had not gone to war. One scholar went so far as to assert that the end of the Cold War marked the "end of history" insofar as democratic politics and capitalism soon would be embraced by everyone.

Others rejected the triumphalist interpretation of the history of the Cold War as well as the notion that the long struggle had been worth the effort. They argued that the Cold War had been extremely expensive, diverting resources to the respective militaries and away from economic and social development. Moreover, the superpowers typically carried out military conflicts on Third World battlefields, leaving many of those nations divided and wracked by poverty and degradation. The East-West struggle might have come to an end, but the great divide in wealth and quality of life between North and South had never been greater. Moreover, market reforms failed to revive the Russian economy. Indeed, "shock therapy" brought a sharply lower standard of living for most of the population, which had lost the guaranteed employment and safety net once provided under the Soviet system. In 1999, Yeltsin stepped down for Vladimir Putin, a little known former KGB officer, who became the new Russian president.

Interpretations of the Cold War will continue to evolve as scholars gain access to more evidence and as world events continue to unfold and illuminate fresh perspectives on the past. New archival evidence, made available by the collapse of the former Communist Party regimes, has revealed fascinating insight into Cold War conflicts such as the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. Scholars now argue that Third World countries, rather than being mere pawns in the Cold War, often shaped the agenda for their superpower allies. Others argue that the real significance of the Cold War was its impact on science, technology, and culture, including popular culture and consumerism.

By century's end, the Cold War may have been over but many legacies remained. Russian-American and Sino-American relations continued to be strained. Ethnic and regional conflicts simmered across the globe. The threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons remained real, whether they might be wielded by terrorists or by so-called outlaw regimes. At the same time, information technology, rapid population growth, and environmental threats such as global warming began to establish an agenda for the new millennium. The efforts of the people of the world and their leaders to meet these challenges would determine the character of the post–Cold War world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brands, H. W. *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War.* New York, 1993. A pithy overview of Cold War history.

Carroll, John M., and Herring, George C., eds. *Modern American Diplomacy.* Rev. ed. Wilmington, Del., 1996. An excellent anthology.

Chomsky, Noam. *World Orders Old and New.* New York, 1994. A radical perspective on the end of the Cold War and its implications.

Engelhardt, Tom. *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation.* New York, 1995. An enlightening cultural perspective.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York, 1982. A worthwhile read on American grand strategy.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta.* Chicago, 1993.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Washington, D.C., 1985. A magisterial history.

———. *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War.* Washington, D.C., 1994. The best work on the end of the Cold War.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World.* New York, 1987. The deposed Soviet leader's revolutionary ideas on society and foreign policy.

Herring, George C. *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975.* New York, 1996. 3d ed. An excellent survey of the Indochina war.

Hixson, Walter L. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961.* New York, 1997. Assesses psychological warfare and cultural perspectives.

Hogan, Michael J. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954.* New York and Cambridge, 1998.

Hunter, Allen, ed. *Rethinking the Cold War.* Philadelphia, 1998. The best anthology on the end of the Cold War.

LaFeber, Walter. *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750.* 2d ed. 2 vols. New York, 1994. One of the best texts on postwar U.S. foreign policy.

Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. *We All Lost the Cold War.* Princeton, N.J., 1994. A critical perspective on the argument that the West "won" the Cold War.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

Lundestad, Geir. *East, West, North, South: Developments in International Politics Since 1945.* 4th ed. New York, 1999. The perspectives of a top Norwegian scholar.

May, Ernest R., ed. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68.* New York, 1993. Multiple perspectives on perhaps the most revealing document on the American side of the Cold War.

Pessen, Edward. *Losing Our Souls: The American Experience in the Cold War.* Chicago, 1993. A historian's biting assessment of U.S. Cold War diplomacy.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *American Diplomacy Since 1900.* 4th ed. New York, 1998. One of the better texts on modern U.S. foreign policy.

Sherry, Michael S. *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s.* New Haven, Conn., 1995. The best analysis of the role of militarism in American society.

Smith, Tony. "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (fall 2000): 567–591. Emphasizes the centrality of peripheral nations in the Cold War era.

Stueck, William W. *The Korean War: An International History.* Princeton, N.J., 1997. A solid international history of a pivotal Cold War conflict.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. An excellent analysis of the first generation of the Cold War.

Westad, Odd Arne. "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (fall 2000): 551–565. A stimulating reconceptualization based on new documentation.

White, Donald W. *The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power.* New Haven and London, 1996. A mammoth study of the American empire.

Williams, William A. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* 2d rev. ed. New York, 1972. A classic work on the economic imperatives underlying U.S. diplomacy.

Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996. The best assessment of Soviet Cold War diplomacy by two accomplished Russian scholars.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; COLD WARRIORS; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONTAINMENT; COVERT OPERATIONS; DETERRENCE; DOMINO THEORY; FOREIGN AID; GLOBALIZATION; INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; OUTER SPACE; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; SUMMIT CONFERENCES; SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY; THE VIETNAM WAR.

Cold War Origins

Anders Stephanson

Since the astonishing disintegration of its empire in eastern Europe in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself, "Cold War" has widely come to designate the entire postwar period in international relations from 1945 onward, during which the tense relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union formed the pivot of world politics. The end of one side, then, evidently ended the relationship as such and thus the period as well. This is not, however, precisely the way in which the term emerged or was always understood and used. The "end" of the Cold War was declared on a number of earlier occasions, perhaps no more emphatically so than during the height of so-called détente in the early 1970s, when the respective leaders Richard M. Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, on partly different grounds, announced that the relationship had entered a new kind of state. While the usage today assumes, more or less explicitly, that the designation and period are essentially to be derived from the nature of the two parties themselves and their supposedly inherent antagonism, Nixon and Brezhnev considered the term to signify, simply put, a particular phase of a continuing relationship.

For the sake of transparency, let it be known that the present writer is inclined to agree with Nixon and Brezhnev. If the Cold War is coeval with the entire relationship and simply rooted in systemic difference, then, for one thing, it would seem natural to locate the beginning in the Bolshevik Revolution. This is a coherent position but immediately puts into question how one is to characterize the alliance during the Second World War. Similarly, it becomes hard to account for the peculiar shift in the U.S. posture toward the far more radical People's Republic of China during the 1960s and 1970s, a shift from utter, relentless hostility to something close to a great-power alliance.

By contrast, here the Cold War will be grasped as a state of abnormally intense conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that resulted from the inability of the two powers to resolve the monumental political issues at the end of World War II. Beginning in 1947, the Cold War was "abnormal" in the sense that while the level of enmity resembled that of outright war, the conflict took place, according to the classical terms of international law, in conditions of peace. The Cold War was cold because it did not issue in outright war at its core. Whatever ending date (1963, 1972, or 1989–1991) one chooses, the fact remains that the United States and the Soviet Union, along with their military alliances NATO and the Warsaw Pact, never entered into military conflict. Actual war was displaced to the periphery and carried out by proxies or by independent actors whose interests, projects, and associations became entangled within the larger conflict. As a *condition* or state of affairs, the conflict can be characterized as a warlike antagonism, executed by means short of war, where the adversary's legitimacy as a regime was essentially denied, and diplomacy, understood as a process of resolving issues of mutual concerns in times of peace, withered away and was replaced by diplomacy as ideology and propaganda. The structure of international politics became, as a consequence of the projection of the conflict onto the rest of the world, increasingly bipolar in nature. The division was accompanied by an immense and escalating arms race. Finally, there was suppression of internal dissidence on both sides, vastly more brutally and extensively in the Soviet case.

Seen as a *phase* of the U.S.–Soviet relationship, the Cold War thus comes to an end when these characteristics expire or change into their opposites. The legitimacy of the other is recognized de facto and the irreconcilable ideological animosity is replaced by a general emphasis on the need for peaceful coexistence. The existing divisions and balance of power are implicitly acknowledged in the form of spheres of influence or

control. It is agreed, by fact rather than formal treaty, that nuclear weapons must never be used unless in conditions of ultimate resort. From this perspective, the end can thus be located in 1963 after a series of recent events: the apparently final division of Berlin and Germany, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the horrendous, mutual experience of the Cuban missile crisis, and the ensuing expression of cooperation in the nuclear limited test ban treaty. However the Cold War is understood, it is clear in any case that some qualitative change occurs around this moment.

A defining set of features or a typology can serve as a description of a condition and means of periodization but it says nothing much about the origins of the Cold War and its deeper meaning. The following account, indeed, takes as its starting point that the "Cold War" is more than a descriptive term or a simple metaphor: it assumes that it is a genuine concept of explanatory potential. For analytical reasons, we will thus keep distinct "origins" and causes from the problem of the Cold War as a dynamic project and projection. "Cold War," it should also be borne in mind, is not everything that happens in international politics or even in U.S.–Soviet relations during the Cold War. The significance of these differentiations will be evident once the term is situated against the background of the opposition and semantic field that originally produced it, namely, that of war and peace.

GENEALOGY OF THE TERM

It was in the United States, not accidentally, that the Cold War as a term entered popular discourse. It was there too that much of the early discussion about its nature and causes took place and where the preponderance of historiography on the subject would later appear. The Cold War was from the beginning an American concern. It has never quite been established who coined the phrase. Nor does it much matter. Bernard Baruch, the aging financier and sometime policymaker, used the term in the spring of 1947 but in passing and without any elaboration. By his own subsequent account, Baruch took it from his friend and speechwriter Herbert Bayard Swope, who claimed he had come up with it while considering the so-called Phoney War of 1939–1940, the odd and extended early phase of World War II in Europe when nothing substantial by way of military activity took place.

The person who turned it into an integrated part of the political language, however, was the powerful newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann. In the fall of 1947, he published a series of wide-ranging articles on foreign policy that took as their critical starting point an important analysis of the Soviet Union that had appeared in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the authoritative journal of the foreign policy establishment in the United States. The author, George F. Kennan, was a high official in the State Department, and because the piece was controversial it appeared anonymously under the signature "X"—thus rendering it known and famous subsequently as the "X Article." At the end of the year, Lippmann collected his columns in a short book he entitled *The Cold War*. Although he nowhere used the term in the actual writings, the idea was present throughout. In the next few years it gradually became a common reference but it only achieved general usage in the early 1950s. Against the Baruch-Swope claims to authorship, Lippmann maintained later that his choice of title had been inspired by a certain French vocabulary of politics in the 1930s, where terms such as *la guerre froide* (cold war) and *la guerre blanche* (white war) designated a state of war without open war. French lexographers have disputed Lippmann's retrospective account but the matter remains open.

There are, in any case, other and earlier appearances. Two are of considerable interest. In October 1945 the English writer George Orwell had referred to a "cold war" in the context of what he saw as a new historical stage where a few "monstrous super-States" would be able to divide the world between them because of their control of the awesome new weapon, the atomic bomb. Orwell surmised that these superpowers, now essentially unassailable, would agree not to use the bomb against each other but deploy it as a means of intimidating their respective neighbors in what would constitute "a permanent 'cold war.'"

Vast conflagrations such as World War II might then be replaced by a "'peace that is no peace,' an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity." Three such Cold War power configurations would emerge: the United States, the Soviet Union, and, potentially, China–East Asia. Highly suggestive, Orwell's grim scenario thus reserved "cold war" for the relationship between the powerful and the weak, probably an extrapolation from fascist examples of intimidation and expansion during the 1930s. His use of the term had little effect; but the notion of

three global hegemons would reappear three years later in his classic novel of dystopian drabness, *1984*, where Oceania, Eastasia, and Eurasia engage in seemingly useless wars on the periphery in the name of meaningless propagandistic slogans, language having been reduced to a political instrument of pure manipulation.

Orwell's geopolitical vision was a postwar version of an idiosyncratic work that appeared in the United States in 1941, James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution*. Here, another tripartite division of superstates, each impossible to conquer, is envisaged (Japan, Germany, and the United States). Enduring in its fundamentals, the system would nevertheless feature a myriad of diffuse conflicts, hard to get a grip on because they would be undeclared, their origins, beginnings, and endings forever mired in obscurity. Orwell's peace that is no peace, already discernible in this account, will become more explicit once Burnham had moved from renegade Trotskyist to relentless cold warrior. By 1947 he was arguing that a sort of World War III had broken out even before the second one was over, a conflict triggered in April 1944 by the outbreak of civil war in Greece. This new and all-encompassing contest required, above all, unflinching assertion of American power in the form of a world empire: the United States, not least because of its atomic monopoly, would be able to intervene to decide all global issues vital to its national security. Should the United States fail, the Soviet Union would take its place. Burnham thought the imperial project, necessarily entailing a great deal of coercion, could be combined with democracy at home. Moreover, he suggested that, rather than calling the whole endeavor an empire, one should give it the more palatable name of a "democratic world order."

The idea of a new historical condition outside the "normal" polarity of peace and war, initially distilled from the experience of fascist aggression in the 1930s, was thus in circulation by the time Lippmann put the term on the public map. There is, however, a much older use, though not as old as sometimes alleged. It appears to originate in the early fourteenth century with a Castilian aristocrat, Don Juan Manuel, who was part of the long and continuing Christian campaign to reconquer the Iberian peninsula from Islamic power. This struggle featured a wide range of irregular engagements and changing frontiers against the backdrop of a "total" political and cultural conflict between religious ideologies. Don Juan Manuel, reflecting deeply on the nature of the antagonism, is said to have called it a cold war. What his manuscript actually says is probably "tepid" or "lukewarm." The rendition "cold" is the accidental result of erroneous editorial transcription in the 1860s. Yet Don Juan Manuel's image of tepid war is not without relevance in the present context. Real war, he says, has real results in the form of either death or peace. Tepid war, by contrast, is not an honorable war between equal enemies and seems not to result in any real peace. The mistake of his subsequent editor in any case illustrates some of the problems with the metaphorical aspects of the term: the opposite of cold may be hot, in this case signifying open war, but a rising temperature can also indicate a "thaw," as in a warming relationship replacing a frosty, frigid, and unresponsive one. The term indicates, then, the absolute, polar enmity of real war without any real fighting: it is warlike in every sense except, paradoxically, the explicitly military.

In pondering his Muslim enemies, Don Juan Manuel was highly respectful of their qualities as warriors; but in the end his study had to do with a conflict that was doctrinally irreconcilable in nature, indeed civilizational: there was no frame in which European Christendom and Islam could understand one another as equal adversaries. "Peace" could only result from a total victory and liquidation of the enemy as an independent force. A century later, however, Europe itself was rent asunder by confessional struggles regarding the very orthodoxy of Christianity. In the long process during which these struggles were played out, the modern concept of the state emerged along with a sharply defined, dichotomous understanding of war and peace. Simply put, confessional conflicts (and war) were effectively banished from the sovereign inside of the new, inviolate state borders. To wage war from then on is, supposedly, the exclusive right of sovereigns. Understood as a legitimate political means, such warmaking can only take place externally against enemies who are essentially legitimate equals similarly engaged. These intramural, European wars, in principle, are only to be conducted for limited gains, not for the absolute end of total liquidation of the enemy as a political entity. A whole apparatus regulating these limited wars is constructed, based on the premise of an absolute distinction between inside and outside as well as between war and peace.

This is, in short, the birth of international law as we know it. It is a profoundly Eurocentric

order. Although challenged severely by the French Revolution, it survived essentially down to the 1930s, when the fascist powers launched a series of aggressions that broke decisively with the earlier, sharp distinction between the states of war and peace. Thus, Japan's war against China was officially classed as an "incident"; Italy called its intervention in the Spanish Civil War "not warmaking"; and Hitler expanded his territory through successive ultimatums and threats of violence that did not become open war. A range of state actions seemed to have emerged that constituted some form of state close to but below the level of actual war. The traditional system (declaration of war, rules of conduct, rights of noncombatants, neutrality), which had been codified in the Hague Convention in 1907 and achieved a strong resurgence in the legalistic 1920s, appeared to have been set brutally aside. It was this process, then, that eventually would draw two immense new powers onto center stage, both with universalizing, quasi-confessional claims: the United States and the Soviet Union. The "origins" of the Cold War lie in this event, more particularly in the diverging ways in which the two regimes understood and dealt with the antifascist war and its aftermath.

THE SOVIET WAY

The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 ushered in a regime that, in its initial stages, assumed that it could only be a transitory moment in a world-historical process of socialist revolution. Existing state arrangements constituted a mask, falsely legitimizing class rule. What mattered was the relations and struggle between the international working class and its counterpart, the bourgeoisie. Peace in this context was merely an appearance, a veil behind which an always present class struggle was taking place. Real peace could only arrive with the global victory of rational socialism. The premise of class relations as a systemic condition of antagonism across state borders was traditional Marxism. Lenin's Russian appropriation, however, added a strongly militarized concept of politics as a field of alliances, battles, and positions, necessarily ordered around the analysis of a complex of contradictions that served in turn to identify a "main enemy," either tactical or strategic. Everything must be arranged in relation to the all-important task of winning the struggle against that enemy. State sovereignty as a principle, consequently, had no fundamental sanctity within this frame. Indeed, by resurrecting the moral right to revolution on a global scale, the early Soviet regime formed as formidable a challenge to the traditional European world order as one could imagine.

What followed instead was the uneven integration of the Soviet Union into the existing system. By 1923 the insurrectionary wave in the wake of the First World War had expired. In this (by definition) temporary lull, and having finally established its rule, Moscow settled down to constructing socialism at home while establishing formal diplomatic relations with the capitalist outside. Eventually but not inevitably, the anomaly of a revolutionary state in such circumstances was resolved by Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin. In the first place, Stalin territorialized Lenin's militarized concept of politics by turning the defining "fundamental contradiction" from the vertical, deterritorialized antagonism between capital and labor to a "horizontal" one between the capitalist outside and the Soviet Union. From then on, what was in Moscow's immediate interest was by definition also in the interest of the international working class. Because this new and territorialized interest happened to be lodged on an immense Eurasian landmass, it was possible as well to freeze in part the dialectical interaction constitutive of the previously pivotal contradiction: whereas capital and labor presumably exist and act upon each other in the same space, the Soviet Union and its outside capitalist state enemies were physically separated in space. The concept of dialectical contradiction remained, but once territorialized on a horizontal plane, its two sides featured only one readily identifiable pole and actor, namely, the Soviet Union. Where "the main enemy" of the Soviet state was to be found on the capitalist outside was a matter of tactical and strategic assessment by the Kremlin. The terrain was thus open for realist statecraft of the most traditional and cynical kind.

The tendency to subjective maneuvering for Moscow's narrowly conceived objectives in foreign policy was reinforced by the manner in which Lenin's stage theory of capitalist development was applied to the novel phenomenon of fascism. Around 1900, according to Lenin's erstwhile concept, capitalism had reached its classical limits and mutated into monopoly capitalism, a qualitatively new form expressed in imperialism, presumably the final stage of the system as such. Overripe and on the verge of stagnation, the system had to find

new spaces of exploitation abroad and more intense levels of exploitation at home. The propensity to resolve the periodic and intensifying crises by aggression and violence thus typified the new epoch, a feature demonstrated with the greatest clarity in the advent of the First World War.

From this perspective it was subsequently possible for the Stalinist regime initially to see fascism in the 1920s and 1930s as a sign of capitalist weakness and to locate its objective class basis narrowly in, supposedly, the most rabidly reactionary parts of monopoly capital. Not only was this a remarkably slim social foundation but the analysis left actual identification of who was "the most" reactionary up to the judgment of the Kremlin, a judgment in turn not uninfluenced by which powers and forces happened to fit its geopolitical interests at the moment. Once it became apparent that fascism, especially its Nazi variant, was an immediate threat of appalling potential, the strategic and tactical outlook was thus suitably adjusted. As this was the Great Depression, there was little reason to revise the view that fascism expressed the final, structural crisis of monopoly capitalism; but it became absolutely imperative to prevent such regimes of violence from attacking and endangering the rapid achievements of putatively rational socialism in one country. Fascism consequently became the new main enemy and mobilization against it across the board the all-consuming task. Because the class basis of fascism had been conceived so narrowly, the potential targets for that mobilization were extraordinarily wide in scope, so that they came to include, in theory, capitalist elements and regimes. Antifascism in the name of the broadest possible coalition was not, however, merely a momentary tactic ultimately designed to defend the Soviet Union. It was a strategy for the eventual achievement, again in theory, of the final victory of socialism. For if monopoly capitalism was inherently stagnating, the planned rationality of the Soviet Union was obversely destined historically to win out, provided the danger of fascist aggression could be prevented.

Hence there was, in principle, nothing in the Soviet position after the shift in the mid-1930s that rendered long-term relations of coexistence possible with capitalist powers. Far from having to do directly with capitalism and socialism, the main contradiction—and main enemy—was now located socially in the division between monopoly capital (strictly speaking, a fraction of it) and the amorphous "people." Geopolitically, the contradiction was between any given anti-Soviet powers and the Soviet Union and its assorted affiliates. Since this latter form of the contradiction was decisive, it is not surprising that Stalin abruptly changed his foreign policy in 1939 when the former strategy of antifascist alliance seemed manifestly to have failed and an opening presented itself to strike a cold-blooded deal with Hitler. Yet the geopolitical shift did not cause any correspondingly radical alteration in the basic ideological outlook, thus facilitating the desperate return to antifascist alliance politics and patriotic defense after the Nazi assault in June 1941 with the largest single military force in history.

At no point on the Soviet trajectory from Leninist internationalism to geopolitical realism did Stalin or his regime cease to be "communist." Given the ideological transmutations since 1917, Soviet foreign policy made sense (of a certain kind) both as Realpolitik and communist strategy. The two postures were eminently compatible, for there could be no contradiction, in theory or practice, between the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union and the historical interests of communism as a movement. Defense of the regime in Moscow, securing what had been achieved in Stalin's fortress, was always paramount. It was the precondition for future victories, victories that could only be won elsewhere by a strategy of class and state alliances broadly conceived, not by any confrontational policy of socialist revolution. The merits or demerits of this posture are of no direct concern here. What should be borne in mind for future reference, however, is the fact that the doctrine featured no positive conceptual space for conducting a Cold War against capitalist powers after the defeat of fascism. Such a policy would have been theoretically nonsensical. It would also have been politically foolish in the extreme. The United States, after all, was a colossally superior power that produced half of all manufactures in the world at the time, a nation that had not only suffered no physical damage in the war but had actually seen its depressed economy brilliantly revived by the war effort, while the Soviet Union had incurred staggering losses in every domain. Short of another outright assault on the regime, such a Cold War was as nightmarish a scenario as could be imagined: a vast set of anti-Soviet alliances around the periphery led by a ferociously anti-Soviet power with unprecedented, seemingly unlimited resources.

The notion of a Cold War was indeed never contemplated before it became a fact and a sys-

tem. Given the autarkic inclinations, Stalin's policy may instead be said to have envisaged distant but stable postwar relations with the capitalist ("peace-loving") democracies, based on mutually demarcated spheres of material and strategic interests. When this did not happen and the advent of full-blown Cold War had taken place in the latter part of 1947, the Soviet policy was still recognizably based on the established concept of defensive antifascist alliances: mobilizing against the "reactionary circles" that had now apparently again taken over at the helm of Western capitalism was to be carried out in the interclass name of national independence, not socialism. The U.S. thrust to world leadership was interpreted as an aggressive reaction to the achievements and advances of the Soviet Union and the "democratic" movement everywhere. An authoritative analysis in September 1947 thus found U.S. expansionism "highly reminiscent" of the fascist drive to "world supremacy." The world was divided between the "imperialist and antidemocratic camp" and its "anti-imperialist and democratic" counterpoint. Logically enough, the struggle against the former was everywhere to be based on patriotic support for peace and "national sovereignty." At the same time, the principle of "coexistence for a long period" between capitalism and socialism was reaffirmed, as was the corresponding idea of "cooperation" between the Soviet Union and capitalist powers, provided the principle of "reciprocity" and existing "obligations" were honored. This was uttered right before the Cold War became a political term; when it did, Moscow consequently saw it as a violently anticommunist policy, an aggressive U.S. attempt to prevent peaceful coexistence and indeed prepare for war against the Soviet Union. Signs of a thaw in the late 1950s would be interpreted as a victory for the (Soviet) policy of peace over the Cold War policy of anticommunism.

None of this, to reiterate earlier distinctions, is to say anything about "causes" or actual "origination." One might well argue that Stalin "caused" the Cold War unwittingly by pursuing policies likely to bring about just such an unwanted situation. Stalinism provided few analytical resources for any genuine understanding of Western politics, or for that matter the dynamics of nazism. Extreme materialist determinism reduced such "surface" Western phenomena to transparently clear economic and geostrategic interests, while Soviet society, because the economy had supposedly been socialized and classes largely abolished, was conversely subject to the pure, rational will of the regime. Such an outlook was not conducive to sophisticated evaluation of long-term interests in a highly volatile situation with immense issues at stake.

THE AMERICAN WAY

The product of a war of emancipation from one of the most powerful European states, and a nation that identified itself as the embodiment of universal right, the United States always had a problematic relationship with the reigning world order, alien, different, and European as it was. The United States was, however, able largely to escape the ill effects of that system, indeed paradoxically to profit from it by being allowed, as it happened, the luxury to develop its rapidly expanding continental space in geopolitical seclusion. This experience, wholly unlike that of the Soviet Union (and its czarist predecessors), lacked sustained dialectical interaction with powerful enemies. The United States, then, could afford to conceive of itself as a privileged place singled out by history to demonstrate the proper principles of humankind as such. Affirmation of that truth was of course continuously to be found in the phenomenal material progress visible throughout. It was really only through Woodrow Wilson's intervention in World War I and his ambitious attempt to restructure the old European order afterward that the United States was momentarily forced to reflect on what a properly "American" alternative to the given international order might look like. As it turned out, Wilson's project of law, discussion, arbitration, and self-determination in the interest of humankind was rejected at home and fared little better abroad than Lenin's contemporary counterpart. What followed instead, eventually, was the fascist challenge. Thus, in 1941 both of the two continental powers that had tried to maintain distance from the lethal center of world politics for most of the 1930s suffered fascist attacks, surprise attacks, without previous declarations of war.

A vital precondition for the Cold War was the diverging conceptions of what the ensuing, common war against fascism was ultimately about, in particular what sort of peace the colossal effort was to achieve. When the Soviet Union went from being a wartime ally of the United States to a postwar adversary (1945–1947) and then to a mortal enemy (1947–1963)—or, to put

it differently, when a hot war against fascism became a Cold War against communism—the quite specific way in which Franklin D. Roosevelt (and to a lesser extent his auxiliaries) had grappled with the issue of war and peace in the world and the international role of the United States was transplanted, with important modifications, to his successor. This in turn allowed the previous understanding of fascist aggression to be superimposed on its allegedly similar communist counterpart. We will pursue this changing trajectory from Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman (and his administration) by also including a reflection on the person who provided much of the raw material for the new Cold War analysis of the Soviet Union and whose writings also inspired Lippmann to name the international condition a "Cold War," namely, George F. Kennan. What will be of particular interest is the "rejectionist" aspect common, on different grounds, to Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennan alike: the notion, in short, that the enemy had no legitimacy because it in turn not only failed to recognize the legitimacy of others (especially the United States and the West) but was itself by nature bent on world conquest. This was an enemy, therefore, that had to be eradicated by a struggle to the death or (in Kennan's case) cast out of the international community so that it would eventually wither away.

Geopolitical noninvolvement was popular in the United States during the 1930s. No one was more keenly aware of this than President Roosevelt. By 1935, however, it was becoming impossible not to worry about the deteriorating international climate. Roosevelt began to take special note here of the rapid proliferation of aggression carried out, technically speaking, below the level of outright, declared war. Using the naval war of 1798 against France as historical reference, the administration introduced the term "quasi-war," which Roosevelt deployed specifically to illustrate the difficulty in maintaining the old, sharp distinction between war and peace. In his famous "Quarantine" speech of October 1937, he spoke of "times of so-called peace," and by the outbreak of the world war in September 1939, he had come to view this condition of mounting aggression quite specifically as a problem of international "lawlessness." Accordingly, he saw the advent of generalized war as a result of already existing gangsterism, enormously magnified and intensified, to be sure, but long rampant. Dealing with such a phenomenon was not war as traditionally conceived but essentially a "policing operation," albeit a huge one. To conduct that endeavor on traditional principles of recognizing the legitimacy of the enemy was palpably absurd. From the beginning, it was now apparent, the fascist regimes had unleashed their illegal aggression with the utmost contempt for international law and order. The distinction between war and peace, it was clear to Roosevelt, meant nothing to them. As he declared at a moment in July 1941 when the United States was still officially at peace with Germany, "the only peace possible with Hitler is the peace that comes from complete surrender."

The polarity of gangsterism and law, then, made retrospective sense of the events of the 1930s. Less obviously, it also allowed conceptually for the inclusion of the defensive Stalinist dictatorship in the camp of good, good being understood negatively here as not bad. The Nazi surprise attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 probably confirmed for Roosevelt that the aspect of "dictatorship" did not in itself provide any precise gauge of what that regime would do in the international arena. Some dictatorships, though not perhaps proper admirers of "law," might indeed favor order, and without initial order in the sense of stability and international respect, there could be no ensuing institutionalization of civilizing law. Thus, on closer inspection Roosevelt's polarity turns out to harbor an important temporal dimension: while fascism/gangsterism could only disastrously lead to death and destruction, the powers of caution and order overall might, if nurtured in appropriate ways, evolve into something recognizably closer to home. There was, then, a civilizational potential here to be realized, given enough time and resources. The precondition was complete and utter destruction of gangsterism. It is in this light that one can understand Roosevelt's attempt to treat Stalin as a member in good standing in the association of orderly forces. This Rooseveltian posture must not be mistaken for any standard version of U.S. "legalism" or utopianism. Order, the essence of law, was always much more important to him (as it had been to his predecessor and relative Theodore) than the formal, procedural aspects. One recalls the court packing scheme of 1937, an ill-fated attempt to alter the political complexion of the Supreme Court and illustrative of Roosevelt's deeper attitude toward supposedly sacrosanct institutions of law. His explicit vision of a postwar world dominated by four great policing powers may be read in similar ways. It is not farfetched to detect in this concept of pacification

and order a suitably updated Progressivism of the early 1900s, Roosevelt's own formative era.

In the event, Roosevelt's formula for all this, "unconditional surrender," performed a range of services from his viewpoint: it was an absolute precondition for the future construction of a reasonable world order; it offered the simplest possible platform for the wartime alliance; and by subordinating everything to the military objective of defeating the enemy it allowed for the postponement of sticky geopolitical issues such as territorial demands and exclusive spheres of influence. By the same token it was unclear what would follow that surrender. The underlying notion of pacification and policing entailed no vision of the political future. With a discerning eye on domestic opinion, Roosevelt chose accordingly to combine the demand for unconditional surrender with a declaration that the war was ultimately about "freedom." Both positions were absolute and general in character, but unconditional surrender was as precise as the goal of freedom was diffuse. One referred to the enemy and the only possible way the war could end in that regard. The other referred to the deeper meaning of the struggle and what would happen to the forces of good once the enemy had been defeated. The choice of "freedom" in the latter case may now seem natural, given that the idea had always been a constituent part of politics in the United States and its presence later on in Cold War language would become ubiquitous. Yet it was not always the most central referent in the political vocabulary, and Roosevelt's deployment was in fact the product of recent domestic controversies over the New Deal, which had been attacked from the right precisely as subversive of revered American values of freedom. The administration returned the salvo by appropriating the term and connecting it to "security," the notion that people have a substantial right to, among other things, a certain social and economic security in life.

The argument enjoyed, not surprisingly, considerable resonance during the Depression decade when deep "insecurity" was indeed rife among the public at large. At the end of the decade, when the insecurity of the United States itself was becoming manifest, the coupled concept was thus readily available for Roosevelt to project onto the world, above all through the Atlantic Charter and the "Four Freedoms" speech. The position entailed nothing much, again, by way of commitment to any concrete political arrangements, but because it was proclaimed in a language of inherent rights, a certain awkwardness was potentially attached to the procedure. Respect for the universal rights of individuals and nation-states in their capacity as autonomous, self-determining entities was not immediately apparent in British imperial rule, the brutal domestic repression of the Soviet regime, white supremacism, internment of Japanese Americans, and semicolonialism of the United States. These problems were manageable, however, since the suppression of gangsterism was always a prior condition for freedom in full-blown form. Thus, for instance, Roosevelt's support for "trusteeship" as a reasonable intermediate stage for colonial peoples deemed unready for full independence.

There the matter might have rested, but Roosevelt went on to connect unconditional surrender, order, freedom, and security into a single, neo-Wilsonian frame such that there would be and could be no real, final security for the United States and humankind until everyone everywhere had come to encompass and recognize these freedoms. Partly launched as domestic polemic against "isolationism," Roosevelt's crucial move had several related effects. It was now incumbent on policymakers, in principle, to demonstrate in every international matter that, negatively, the issues involved were irrelevant to the overall struggle for freedom, on which hinged in turn the security of the United States. This was extremely difficult to do, as the Truman administration would find out when China was being "lost" in 1948–1949. Moreover, if the world was now to be divided into two exclusive zones of freedom and un-freedom, any conceivable gain for the latter was not only a defeat for the former but also automatically an infringement on the security of the United States. During World War II this made sense because the dividing line was easily defined in straightforwardly military terms and no one could deny that the position of that front was vital for the very future of the world. The free world was for all practical purposes all areas beyond fascist control, while "liberated" ones, specifically, were those freed from such domination. Gains, then, were graphically clear in the movement of the line. Drawing the same line in the postwar world, however, where the antifascist free world was now the anticommunist free world, was a very different matter: areas of contention might technically be at peace, the demarcation vis-à-vis the enemy could not always take the form of a clear front and the issue of "freedom" might well

be a good deal blurrier. The Rooseveltian matrix, then, expanded American security concerns in principle to the entire world and structured them in terms of a continuous, epic struggle for final, positive freedom everywhere.

The globalist implications were quietly reinforced by the addition, again for contingent domestic reasons, of a peculiarly American historical referent. To the image of gangsterism, never hard to grasp presumably with the Prohibition era in fresh memory, was added that of a global civil war, understood as a typological reenactment of the U.S. Civil War. Roosevelt himself liked to argue that he had taken the formula of unconditional surrender from Ulysses S. Grant, a nifty triple play on the Civil War, unconditional surrender, and the United States. Distinguished figures around him, moreover, began to talk of the struggle in the religiously flavored terms of abolitionism and slavery. Henry Stimson, the incoming (Republican) secretary of war, invoked Abraham Lincoln's biblical metaphor of a house divided which cannot stand but must turn either slave or free. Vice President Henry Wallace referred similarly to a "fight to death between the free world and the slave world" just as in the United States during the Civil War. Now a matter of the world as a whole, there could be "no compromise with Satan," as he put it. Wallace, interestingly, followed the historical analogy to its conclusion by insisting that the lethal struggle had to be followed by a phase of reconstruction, where the social and economic rights of the underprivileged, the enslaved as it were, would be secured. This aspect tended to disappear or at least be severely constricted when the trope came to provide core concepts for Cold War thought. Eradicating gangsterism, however, was for Roosevelt himself what the struggle was immediately and foremost about: the sequence began with the liquidation of the lawless and continued with policing and establishment of order, followed by the opening up of a long and winding road of progress toward freedom and final, true peace everywhere.

The end of World War II and consequent expiration of the alliance happened almost to coincide with the death of Roosevelt. His successor, Harry S. Truman, not a politician of equal world-historical ambition, inherited a deceptively simple scheme from a figure of deceptively open character who had actually kept much of his geopolitical project to himself, managing to combine in his policymaking extraordinary publicity with extraordinary privacy. Truman was far more literal-minded. The future focus of world politics was to be the war alliance of the United Nations as transformed into a universal operation of cooperation. Pronouncements, such as the Declaration on Liberated Europe at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, meant exactly what they said, as did the agreements on democratic elections in Poland. To the subtleties and nuances of traditional geopolitics he was largely deaf. Four months later, when Truman had the satisfaction of achieving the first of Roosevelt's absolute aims, unconditional surrender (or something close enough to it), he was thus left with the open-ended commitment to the accomplishment of U.S. security through the global victory of freedom. Whereas the first goal had been clearly strategic and measurable in character, directed as it was to the total defeat and liquidation of a well-defined enemy, it was not at all clear after the final victory in early August 1945 what would follow in regard to the second aim. Crushing the enemy had eliminated the immediate strategic terrain for Roosevelt's second, more positive idea, the concept of freedom. The next two years would thus be a period of reconnaissance and reinvention of that terrain through the gradual installment of the Soviet Union as the new mortal enemy of freedom and U.S. security.

For Truman, the postwar period of 1945–1947 seemed indeed to feature nothing but a whole string of such Soviet transgressions. Moscow was staking claims in two theaters of traditional Russian interests, eastern Europe and the Near East, in ways that appeared to him not only disquieting but in explicit violation of existing agreements. Thus, Stalin imposed his own kind of regime in Poland and never allowed the free elections promised in the Yalta accords. In fact, by the fall of 1945 it seemed clear that the future of Soviet-controlled eastern Europe would not entail anything resembling the sort of "freedom" envisaged by the wartime declarations. Strikingly hard-nosed in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the forum where the peace treaties were to be hammered out, the Soviet representatives appeared little interested in anything but their own very narrowly conceived concerns. Subsequently, in 1945–1946 civil war revived in Greece, apparently instigated by communists, while Moscow itself proceeded to make a series of exceedingly hostile demands on Turkey and refuse to leave northern Iran as previously agreed. At the same time there was little or no progress on the economic rejuvenation of Germany and western Europe because of

Soviet obstruction, and the situation was clearly (or so it seemed) deteriorating fast.

Truman's response was typically hard: support for the Iranian regime in 1946, strong assumption of previous British responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean through massive military assistance to Turkey and Greece in the spring of 1947, and, the crowning achievement, the launching of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 to restore the western European economies, followed by institutionalized military ties in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. The western and by far richest parts of Germany being under western control, the process was completed with the creation of the Bundesrepublik in 1949.

Whether or not this was an accurate understanding of Stalin's actual policies is an interesting historical question. Having faced the Nazis mostly alone for almost three epic years of monstrous war, the Stalinist regime was hardly about to jeopardize its new positions in eastern Europe for the sake of any general declarations on liberty. One wonders if the United States would have done so either had there been invasions of comparable scale and devastation through, say, Canada. Indeed, Stalin was doubtless aware that the United States had not been unwilling historically to order and arrange the domestic politics of states in its vicinity for reasons apparently of far lesser magnitude. The Soviet demands on Turkey were imprudent, as were the equivocations and obstructions in northern Iran; but in neither case were the actions beyond the traditional bounds of the czarist predecessors.

In western Europe, meanwhile, the communist parties continued a policy of class coalitions and reconstruction until the Marshall Plan divided the region from the East. The German matter, however, was the paramount one in the end. Here the Soviet Union considered itself entitled chiefly to two things: reparations and absolute guarantees that a reconstructed Germany would never again constitute a threat. In the end it got nothing close to what it had anticipated by way of reparations, and it also witnessed the emergence of the powerful anti-Soviet state in western Germany that was to join NATO. Seen as statecraft in pursuance of its interests, then, the Stalinist policies were not impressive. A more subtle and clever regime, for example, could have wrecked the Marshall Plan by appearing to accept it.

Sharp and pointed as these various actions and counteractions were, however, they do not in themselves add up to a Cold War. That would only come about when the Truman administration had cast a new, modified version of Roosevelt's wartime matrix and superimposed it on the novel condition of what seemed to be a peace that was no peace. What enabled this critical process to take place was the concept of "totalitarianism." By 1950 the "American" translation of the totalitarian theme was to be completed with the full-blown reintroduction of the wartime idea of a global civil war about freedom and slavery.

As a neologism of Italian fascism in the 1920s, totalitarianism had signified the goal of "total" confluence between state and society. At the end of World War II it had of course become an entirely pejorative word, indicating (simply put) a tyrannical regime in dictatorial control of its population by modern means of propaganda and secret police. Dormant if not irrelevant during the war because of the alliance with the Soviet Union, it reentered the Western frame after the war as a focus for the attempt to understand the emerging divergencies with the Kremlin. By the spring of 1947 the Truman administration was announcing in no uncertain terms that the Soviet camp was totalitarian and thus essentially the same as fascism. The reversal abstracted certain similarities in technologies of rule and turned the resultant concept into an explanation of what such regimes would be doing in foreign relations. Fusing two very different adversaries under the rubric of totalitarianism carried with it, then, the projection of fascist modes of aggression and ultimate objectives of world conquest onto the Soviet Union.

The idea of totalitarianism served to reactivate a certain dual lesson already painfully learned at Pearl Harbor, if not before, about the origins of the Second World War and the proper role of the United States in the world. The first part of the lesson had to do with what had actually been done. Legitimate governments in the 1930s, accordingly, had not only failed to stand up to the dictators but, when pressed, actually helped them along by obsequious negotiations and the most abject concessions, only to find the insatiable aggressors escalating their demands and finally throwing the world into generalized war. Tyrants recognized no language, it was clear, other than that of force. This historical lesson was encapsulated in the harsh references after the war to "Munich" and "appeasement," both of which became instantly recognizable signifiers of condemnation.

The second part of the lesson had to with what had not been done. For there was of course the more particular problem of the inactivity of the United States itself. The weaker democracies France and Britain had at least been in a position during the 1930s to choose whether to appease or not. The United States, though possessed of vastly greater potential power, had removed itself even from this choice. Deeply bogged down in self-imposed "isolationism," the country had eventually paid the devastating price at Pearl Harbor. Thus, the model analogy impressed on the public the indisputable imperative of global responsibility and action against threats of the totalitarian type. Given that frame and the experience of Pearl Harbor, it was only with the greatest difficulty from now on that one could find any morally and politically plausible way of opposing such a vast engagement. Perhaps the only truly "American" counterargument was that of the traditional Republican right to the effect that unlimited commitments conjured up the nightmare of an un-American Leviathan, a normalization and entrenchment of the expanded wartime state, in turn a continuation of the corruptions invented by the detested New Deal apparatus. In evoking Munich and Pearl Harbor, however, the "internationalist" response could easily insinuate that some blame for these events had to be put on the Republican stab in the Wilsonian back after the First World War.

The lesson learned, in short, was double. First, dictators could only be stopped with unequivocal force and never appeased with concessions. Second, the United States must never again retreat into "isolationism" or abdicate judgment over international events but must always play a leading role in the world. These two truths had been established unequivocally on 7 December 1941, the day of "infamy" at Pearl Harbor. The graphic clarity of the ensuing war effort, however, did not require much reiteration and elaboration of the lesson. Roosevelt's twin vision of unconditional surrender and future cooperation for order naturally dominated the proceedings. When postwar realities seemed to disappoint those expectations, when the American eye began to detect in Soviet behavior something beyond mere intransigence, when one began to see crude impositions and violations of agreements honestly and fairly concluded, when, in short, the Soviet Union became a systemic problem—it was then that "totalitarianism" became a powerful device for the Truman administration, through which it could explain Moscow's conduct in a way that reinforced and recast the twin lessons of World War II in novel circumstances. In a word, communism became identical to fascism. The development was momentous.

Once the identity had been established, some implicit differentiation could take place. For one thing, the older Rooseveltian theme of aggression as gangsterism no longer seemed pertinent. While the Kremlin was no doubt an illegitimate regime, expressive of the cruel, arbitrary will of a tyrant and willing, should the occasion arise, to engage without compunction in every illegal act, it was not on the international level a criminal regime in the sense of, say, an Al Capone. (Indeed, Stalin had been bitterly indignant at the sheer illegality of Hitler's surprise attack, and once the Cold War got going, the Soviet view began to denounce "recklessness" and gangsterism in the name of peaceful relations, now with the United States as target.) The notion, in short, of an adventuristic outfit launching massive assaults at will did not square with the Soviet Union and the communist movement. Early analytical accounts spoke instead of a fairly cautious government, proceeding by secrecy, subversion, conspiracy, proxies, and creeping takeovers, in fact avoiding hot war if possible. This was an adversary with a strong sense of power, equipped with a disciplined, patient machine of great ingenuity, "a far-flung apparatus" in George F. Kennan's phrase. It was the piecemeal, covert as opposed to overt, aspect of totalitarian aggression that appeared to mark the Kremlin.

Another difference, tacitly recognized now and then, was ideological: rather than attacking democracy along fascist lines as degenerate, communism appealed to a putatively better and fuller form of it; rather than declaring racial superiority, communism offered strong critiques of it, not least as it appeared in the United States; rather than celebrating geopolitical expansion, it mobilized against "American imperialism" in terms of national independence and colonial liberation; rather than glorifying war, it proposed a politics explicitly calling for adherence to international agreements and the promotion of peace. One could easily (and often quite rightly) disparage this as empty propaganda, but the fact remained that the ideology of totalitarian communism was not the same as the ideology of totalitarian fascism. "Cold War" was the name of that difference, the name eventually given to the new and lethal challenge of the Soviet incarnation of totalitarianism.

Much of the concrete view of the Soviet Union here stemmed from Kennan. His Soviet morphology, first conveyed in early 1946 in the so-called Long Telegram from his post at the Moscow embassy, proved extraordinarily persuasive to the Truman administration. The grand narrative of freedom and totalitarianism appeared to be amply confirmed by the particulars of the analysis: the image of a hostile, powerful state, predetermined by its very nature to expand and destroy, refusing all normal, decent relations with the West, looking for "security only in patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it." When combined with the totalitarian trope and the historical lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor, this account became irresistible ideology.

Curiously, however, Kennan himself was not especially interested in the concept of totalitarianism, nor for that matter in the universal issue of freedom and slavery. What was inimical about the Moscow regime for him was, simply put, what he took to be its despotic, fanatically anti-Western character and inherent need to expand that rule, not the fact that it was "unfree" as such. Kennan's conservative outlook combined two partly overlapping, partly contradictory orientations or sensibilities, neither of which had any extensive anchoring in American traditions. On the one hand, he was a realist, conceiving politics purely as a matter of power, interests, and security, not of ideology or norms: the primary question for the realist is what sort of "interested" policy any given power structure might give rise to or permit. On the other hand (and more fundamentally), Kennan espoused what one might call an ideology of the cultural West. He understood this entity as a wide civilization, the central and most mature areas of which lay in western Europe but which was made up of a whole range of specific political traditions and customs, some of which quite legitimately evinced few or no similarities with U.S. democracy. Real diplomacy (or at least extensive relations) could and should take place only within this realm, a realm of "intimacy" as he liked to think of it. Contrary to his realist impulse, then, Kennan felt that cultural proximity should be the decisive criterion in determining the manner of Western diplomacy. Toward the outside, where shared meaning was limited or nonexistent, one should maintain one's natural distance with dignified reserve. In particular, there could be no proper relationship with any fanatical regime that by its very nature was defying the West.

Ever since the late 1920s, when Kennan had begun his career as one of the first experts on the Soviet Union in the State Department, he had argued that the regime did not belong to the normative community of the West and should be isolated. Accordingly, he had opposed Roosevelt's diplomatic recognition of Moscow in 1933. A few years later he had also opposed the idea of any Western collaboration with the Soviet regime against fascism. The best policy, all things being equal, toward such disagreeable regimes was really a nonpolicy of no interaction, except where absolutely necessary. This was indeed to be his chief recipe for dealing with the nationalism of what would come to be known in the 1950s as the Third World. In Kennan's view, the Stalinist regime, because it was at once the most fanatical and powerful foe, could not just be ignored, especially not now that historical accident in the form of Hitler's immense betrayal of the West had served to place the Red Army in the middle of the civilizational heartland. It could, however, be isolated, or, in Kennan's own term, contained. Thus he argued that the United States should act rapidly and vigorously to restore to health the remaining parts of the central West, while preventing the enemy by all means necessary from making any advances into those areas and any others that might be deemed strategically vital for the West. Toward the Soviet regime itself, by contrast, one ought to maintain very low relations or none until such a time that its thwarted need to consume decaying Western body parts began to result in collapse, a change into something qualitatively different or at least some "mellowing" into manageable form.

Kennan imagined this whole scenario in the language of bodies, health, and disease because societies and civilizations were for him essentially organic substances. The body whose health mattered to him and which worried him a great deal was the West, always under threat of disease from within and without. The central threat after the war was the Soviet disease, a parasitical if not cancerous regime. The first step in diagnosing and coming to terms with this threat was to study it as though it were an object under a microscope in order to lay bare its inner nature. Intelligent countermeasures might then contain it—not ignore but isolate it. Deprived of feeding grounds, this inherently expanding entity would either wither and die or become innocuous. The parasite, while maliciously alive and energetic, could be treated throughout as an object, an object of knowledge and of action. To have dealt

with it as an equal other would have been unthinkable. Kennan's was a policy of rejection and isolation, of no real diplomacy.

This may be compared with Roosevelt and Truman. For Roosevelt there could be no proper relations with gangsters, whose clearly stated aim was to destroy the world of order by means of massive war. Thus they themselves had to be destroyed by similar means. For Truman there could be no proper relations with totalitarians, whose clearly stated aim was to destroy the world of freedom by means of Cold War. Thus, they, too, had to be destroyed by appropriate measures, the specifics of which were to be worked out. For Kennan there could be no proper relations with fanatical and despotic regimes antithetical to the West. Mostly one could afford to ignore them because their means of carrying out their aims were severely limited; but the Soviet foe had to be contained and neutralized by rebuilding damaged parts of the West and preventing any further advances on Moscow's part in any areas of supreme strategic value. All three outlooks begin, accordingly, by assuming a priori the existence of a mortal threat, the character of which is determined by its inner nature and which in turn generates a struggle to death, as the enemy denies others the right to exist.

Eliminating the threat was for Roosevelt and Truman a matter of acting and imposing one's will entirely upon the enemy, for Kennan (chiefly) to prevail by isolation and containment. It is readily apparent how Roosevelt could take this view, given the events of the 1930s and early 1940s: the phenomenon of fascism offered up no great analytical enigmas as far as foreign affairs were concerned, and the answer to it seemed equally obvious, all-out war to eradicate. For Truman and Kennan, the matter should have been a little more complicated. Soviet behavior, as Lippmann was to indicate, was not simply the product of some DNA structure to be delineated with iron certainty through laboratory procedures. Soviet policy was a product of what others did and what the regime expected others to do and claim. Indeed, the brutal cynicism of Stalin's foreign policy was eminently within the interactive, realist tradition of European geopolitics, and, far from never seeking any "compacts and compromises," as Kennan would have it, the Soviet regime had historically engaged in a whole string of such efforts. Given to seeing its interests and security in terms of autarky, Moscow was in fact always prepared to strike deals.

What Kennan's containment really amounted to, by contrast, was in fact precisely a refusal to strike deals. This was also the gist of Walter Lippmann's realist critique of the X Article. The columnist made two particularly incisive observations. Equating, not unnaturally, Kennan's views with Truman's, he argued first that the administration was now espousing "a disbelief in the possibility of a settlement of the issues raised by this war." Second, he found Kennan's concept of diplomacy deficient. Rather than being based on "intimacy," as Kennan seemed to think, diplomacy was in effect about the political resolution of concerns of mutual interest between states. The idea of containment was for Lippmann not only unnecessarily passive but also implied that the West should refuse to engage in the sort of dealmaking that states normally do in times of peace. Whereas the Truman-Kennan position assumed that the U.S.–Soviet relationship was incommensurable because of the very character of the Kremlin regime and consequently that no agreements of a lasting nature were possible, Lippmann maintained that the systemic differences between the two powers were less important than their respective state interests. He went on in that regard to suggest that concrete negotiations on such essential questions as troop withdrawals from central Europe would be eminently doable and certainly verifiable: armed forces were either present or not present. From the U.S. standpoint it seemed most imperative to get the Red Army to return to the Soviet Union, in which case it made sense to figure out what Moscow would demand in return. Lippmann's umbrella term, meanwhile, for the existing impasse was "Cold War."

Ironically, Kennan himself would soon come to embrace this approach internally in the Truman administration, while the latter became increasingly wedded to what Lippmann had singled out as Kennan's view. By the middle of 1948 the Soviet expert had thus begun to see the solution to his paramount "culturalist" concern with the future of the intimate West in realist terms: the only way to prevent the permanent, militarized division of Europe, the anchor of the West, down the middle would be some sort of agreement with the Soviet Union on Germany, an agreement that would presuppose the principle that Moscow had legitimate security interests. Kennan would spend a very long lifetime from then on elaborating an extraordinarily trenchant critique of Cold War thinking, while the administration on its part went in the other direction,

applying a simplified concept of Kennan's containment within the context of a grand narrative about totalitarianism and appeasement. One consequence was that, as of 1947–1948, there ceased to be any real need for fresh analyses of the Soviet problem: Moscow became an axiom, its essence written in stone. A crucial, contributing reason for this was that the established account solved the issue of legitimizing the permanent, peacetime presence of the United States throughout the world: it provided the essential premise of a ubiquitous, mortal threat, which could and should not be appeased by any diplomatic concessions. This is not to say there was no real threat. It is to say, however, that there was no urgency about revising the image once it had opened up for the United States to become "leader of the free world" and to initiate a formidably successful effort to restore order in the Western capitalist world. By 1949 Kennan had been marginalized, and by the end of the following year, he had effectively left the State Department. The professional background of Paul Nitze, his replacement as head of the Policy Planning Staff, was on Wall Street.

One of Nitze's early achievements is indeed indicative of another notable development. In the massive, foundational policy document known as NSC 68, written under Nitze's auspices in the spring of 1950, the totalitarian frame was thoroughly "Americanized." It is sometimes contended that NSC 68 was merely a rhetorically overcharged pitch for what was really a call for immense budgetary increases and military buildup. NSC 68 was certainly that, but its ideological content was actually remarkably telling. The document returns powerfully to the Rooseveltian subtheme of a civil war between freedom and slavery and a combat to death between entirely incompatible principles; a return to the image of a world divided, doomed to go completely one way or the other. Freedom is under constant, global threat from a monumental conspiracy, engendered by an enslaving, evil agent of epic proportions. At times, in fact, the language seems taken directly from the abolitionist movement of a century earlier. Soviet communism appears here in a guise not unlike that of the southern slave owners before the Civil War: inherently incapable of tolerating the very existence of freedom, Moscow must destroy its every last trace by any means necessary. Hence, there can be no recognition of one another as equal enemies. The opposition is not symmetrical. While freedom is conceived as the natural, independent condition of humankind, slavery is merely its perversion, a parasitical, degraded other. The former thrives on its own; the latter can exist solely as a subversive attempt to destroy freedom. This is the reason there is a relation at all. By definition, the relation begins with the attack on freedom. By definition, too, the agents of slavery can have no legitimate interests. Their whole modus operandi is in fact to invent a range of devious "designs" to liquidate the free world and its leader. The name of this enslaving attack, then, is the "Cold War." In the following "total" conflict, the free world must learn to use the Soviet techniques against the Kremlin itself, to subvert the subversive agent.

The political vocabulary of NSC 68, a sort of neo-abolitionism, gave a recognizably domestic coloration to the otherwise slightly alien notion of totalitarianism and to the narrative of Munich and World War II. That the struggle overall is irreconcilable, a struggle to death, is reinforced here by the historical evocation of the Civil War. Henry Wallace had moved on to become a Cold War critic, but his adage from the Second World War could stand for NSC 68: "no compromise with Satan." However, writing after the "loss" of China and the detonation of a Soviet atomic device in 1949, the authors of NSC 68 were not interested in maintaining the status quo, what the document in a crucial passage characterizes as the "diplomatic freeze." To settle down along existing lines would not only be to accept the morally and politically indefensible but to encourage continuing encroachments, in some sense to recognize slavery. Although containment is summoned as a legitimating principle, the argument against the "diplomatic freeze" is in fact, not surprisingly, a critique of Kennan's notion as altogether too inactive and conservative. Thus NSC 68 culminates in an exhortation to mobilize the vast, untapped resources of the United States for victorious combat against evil.

The Republican Party, in the same vein, would shortly come to declare containment as somehow un-American since it implied a stalemate as evidenced by the Korean War. Containment was just appeasement on the installment plan, as the slogan went in the campaign of 1952. The spatial metaphor of containment was thus to be replaced by another, more appropriate one: "rollback." The lines of communist power would have to be forced backward, not merely stabilized. Nothing much by way of substance, however, would happen on that front, and the irony is that

the actual posture of Democrats and Republicans alike remained remarkably similar to the isolating strategy of the early Kennan. For in the end, by far the most important aspect of the entire Cold War project was not what happened to the communist camp. It was the rebuilding and securing of the West and the maintenance of some kind of order in other parts of the noncommunist world. Roosevelt's policing, in another irony, came to be a matter of ordering the free world, so that the temporal idea of progress following order could be applied to various right-wing dictatorships, eradication of domestic radicalism in the name of anticommunism being the precondition for orderly development and civilization.

If the primary aim was not really "rollback" but leading the "free world," then serious negotiations about issues of mutual concern would be doubly wrong. They would be wrong because any real settlement would remove the axiomatic divisions that permitted the whole project to be set forth in the first place. They would also be wrong because they presupposed concessions and compromises, deeds already declared morally intolerable and strategically disastrous. At the same time, negotiations as such were supposed to be a good thing in the Western idiom, and public opinion, especially overseas, might well find them politically congenial. NSC 68 grappled pensively with the issue. The authors grasped that the only politically correct negotiations, given their frame, would have to concern "a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system." This was obviously fatuous, and so negotiations turn into something to be done for tactical purposes in order to make the Soviet regime look bad or, alternatively, a sort of registry for presumed future successes in "the policy of gradual and calculated coercion," the phrase used in NSC 68 to encapsulate the newly invigorated essence of containment.

The problem with the act of negotiating and making concessions had an interesting echo in Roosevelt's wartime scheme. That one would not strike deals with aggressors and gangsters was of course not a problem. The problem was that the framework really did not allow much by way of deals with one's allies either. This was especially the case with the Soviet Union, whose fierce struggles against the Nazis in the East presented prospects of an order there not easily accommodated within the U.S. image of what a liberated, free world would and should look like. The temporary escape from this quandary was Roosevelt's dual set of absolutes, unconditional surrender and freedom. One was minimalistic, an easily defined, immediate goal, the other a vast and almost entirely abstract desire. "Unconditional surrender" allowed for the postponement of the nasty issues that threatened to render the meaning of freedom too concrete. Neither, in any case, provided any clear room for deals short of the U.S. ideal. The intermediate notion, order and policing, might have done so, but it largely faded with Roosevelt himself. The victory may have been absolute, but it turned out not to be total, because it produced a peace that was no peace and certainly no peace of freedom. Thus was reinstated the idea of unconditional surrender as the object of the ensuing war that was no real war.

CONCLUSION

The argument here has delineated a certain U.S. horizon of expectations that permitted the Cold War to appear as a worthy, indeed vitally necessary, project to be undertaken on a massive, global scale. Roosevelt's particular framing of World War II made possible a political reorientation afterward such that Washington was able to interpret Soviet behavior as a totalitarian, fascist-like, lethal attack on the very being of the Western states and to label this attack a Cold War. The derivation, then, began with the revealed inner nature of the Soviet regime itself, which no immediate U.S. act and no negotiation or settlement could change. The Soviet Union and the communist movement were by definition a Cold War. Indeed, the central reason there was not an outright open war on the West was that the latter happened still to be stronger than the Soviet Union. The response to this mortal challenge was first to maintain and preferably increase one's massive preponderance of strength so as to keep Moscow from launching such an open attack and, second, to fight the already existing Cold War to the lethal end, an end that, logically, could only come about when the Soviet regime ceased to be or surrendered unconditionally.

This configuration or outlook was uniquely "American." The Cold War would not have happened had Britain been the overwhelmingly superior Western power. The infamous "percentage deal" between Stalin and Winston Churchill in October 1944 about their respective future influence in eastern Europe, unthinkable in any properly American context, is enough to illustrate the difference. The Soviet view, meanwhile, was conceptually and geopolitically defensive. Launching a

Cold War made no sense whatsoever for Moscow and was never projected before it became a reality. When it did, the Soviet interpretation could only place it within the old antifascist frame and the heroic narrative about the Great Patriotic War. Thus, Moscow saw the Cold War as fascist-like aggression to destroy the progressive achievements of the Soviet Union and the progressive camp. At first sight this seems to be a mirror image of the U.S. position. The crucial difference lies in the logic of the response: defensive coalition politics for relative gains, the strategic object always being prevention of exacerbated forms of aggression, to be achieved by making it politically impossible for the other side not to come to terms. Such a process of recognition would then secure the foundations for future Soviet successes, presumably in the interest of everyone. Negotiations and deals in the traditional sense of Lippmann's diplomacy were at the center of this strategy of recognition. Détente, not surprisingly, would be its apotheosis.

If the manner in which Roosevelt's matrix was transposed in the United States after the war was the pivotal condition of possibility for the Cold War, it was not necessarily the ultimate "cause." A war, even a virtual Cold War, is not supposed to be a good thing, and so gives rise to questions of who is to blame for starting it, the perennial question of "war guilt." As there is no agreement on what the Cold War is or was and no agreement on when it started or ended, there can be no agreement on who began it. The present account has assumed that the question of war guilt is less interesting than the question of emergence. The decisive element in that regard was the shifting view of the United States as to the nature of the Soviet regime, occasioned by the string of events in 1945–1947 that undermined existing ideas of cooperation and served to confirm the new understanding of relentless, totalitarian antagonism. One might think this a justified view or one might think that the actual result was good for the United States and the interests of history, even if the analysis happened to be wrong. The Cold War was in any case a deeply "American" project.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Les, and Thomas G. Paterson. "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s." *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970).

Alperovitz, Gar. *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth*. New York, 1995.

Backer, John H. *The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition*. Durham, N.C., 1978.

Claudin, Fernando. *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*. 2 vols. New York, 1975.

Cold War International History Project. *Bulletin*. Washington, D.C., 1992– .

Cumings, Bruce. *The Origins of the Korean War*. Vol. 1. *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947*. Princeton, N.J., 1981.

Eisenberg, Carolyn. *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949*. Cambridge and New York, 1996.

Etzold, Thomas H., and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*. New York, 1978.

Feis, Herbert. *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950*. New York, 1970.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York, 1972.

———. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York, 1982.

———. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford, 1997.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1996*. 8th ed. New York, 1997.

Fleming, Denna F. *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917–1960*. 2 vols. Garden City, N.J., 1961.

Halle, Louis. *The Cold War as History*. New ed. New York, 1991.

Hogan, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*. Cambridge and New York, 1987.

Kennan, George F. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947).

———. *Memoirs, 1925–1950*. Boston, 1967.

Kimball, Warren. *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as a Wartime Statesman*. Princeton, N.J., 1991.

Kolko, Gabriel. *The Politics of War*. Rev. ed. New York, 1990.

Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko. *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*. New York, 1972.

Kuniholm, Bruce. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton, N.J., 1980.

Leffler, Melvyn. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48." *American Historical Review* 89 (April 1984).

———. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

Lippmann, Walter. *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1947.

Lundestad, Geir. *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947.* Tromsø, Norway, and New York, 1978.

McCormick, Thomas J. *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War.* Baltimore, 1989.

Mastny, Vojtech. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years.* New York, 1996.

Messer, Robert L. *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982.

Naimark, Norman M. *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949.* Cambridge, Mass., 1995.

Milward, Alan. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951.* London and Berkeley, Calif., 1984.

Reynolds, David, ed. *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives.* New Haven, Conn., 1994.

Schaller, Michael. *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.* New York, 1985.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. "Origins of the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October 1967).

Steel, Ronald. *Walter Lippmann and the American Century.* New York, 1980.

Stephanson, Anders. "Fourteen Notes on the Very Idea of a Cold War." In Geróid O'Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds. *Rethinking Geopolitics.* New York, 1999.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999.

Ulam, Adam B. *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973.* New York, 1974.

Vogt, Timothy R. *Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945–1948.* Cambridge, Mass., 2000.

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* Boston, 1977.

Zubok, Vladimir, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WARRIORS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; THE MUNICH ANALOGY; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

Cold Warriors

Andrew J. Rotter

Architects of the conflict that gripped the world for nearly fifty years, cold warriors were the men, and few women, who gave shape to the ongoing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1989. They built the Cold War's institutions, forged its diplomacy, oversaw its military flare-ups and its diplomatic standdowns, and supplied its fierce rhetoric and its silent espionage. In the West, the so-called free world, cold warriors were usually well-born and well educated. In revolutionary societies and communist countries, high class standing was no asset for a leader, so cold warriors either came from humble stock or claimed that they did. The most prominent cold warriors were men of power—commanders of great armies, of the masses, of economic might, of words and ideas. Cold warriors were frequently messianic in their convictions, believing they represented the one best political, economic, and social system. They were serious men, disinclined to joke about their work and for the most part innocent even of a sense of irony about it; with the exception perhaps of their hubris, they masked their emotions, though they could never fully erase them. Cold warriors were often pragmatic men, able to calculate their nations' interests and if necessary to negotiate with their adversaries in order to protect those interests. Still, despite their pragmatism cold warriors contained within their bodies the cells of history and ideology that compelled them to the contest, in the belief that they were defending their nations' values or in the hope of spreading their values to others beyond their borders.

Cold warriors lived most obviously in the United States and the Soviet Union, but because the Cold War enveloped the world its warriors were everywhere. They included the presidents of the United States, from Harry S. Truman to George H. W. Bush, and their secretaries of state, among them John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, and Henry Kissinger. Many other U.S. government officials were cold warriors: appointees such as George F. Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Jeane Kirkpatrick, and elected representatives including senators William Knowland, Joseph McCarthy, and Hubert H. Humphrey. There were members of the intelligence community (J. Edgar Hoover, Edward G. Lansdale, William Colby), prominent journalists who interpreted the Cold War to the American people (Walter Lippmann, James Reston), and theologians, among them Reinhold Niebuhr and Billy Graham, who saw the Cold War as a moral challenge to Americans. In the Soviet Union a commitment to the Cold War was necessary for the leaders who followed Joseph Stalin after 1953, from Nikita Khrushchev to Konstantin Chernenko. The ideologue Andrei Zhdanov was a cold warrior of the first magnitude. Soviet diplomats carried out their superiors' orders but contributed as well their own mite to the conflict; among them were the longtime foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the ambassador to the United States Andrei Gromyko. Lavrenti Beria, head of Stalin's secret police, maintained a bloodstained vigil against all forms of Cold War heterodoxy.

Outside the United States and the Soviet Union, cold warriors fought their own battles in the shadows cast by their powerful allies. Their Cold Wars were similar to the principal superpower conflict in their ideological and geopolitical purposes, but different to the extent that they were influenced by histories that preceded the Cold War and in some ways transcended it, and also different because local concerns pressed down upon a broad Cold War foundation, reshaping it as wood construction forms mold wet concrete. There were British cold warriors, among them Winston Churchill, prime minister and influential statesman, foreign ministers Ernest Bevin and Anthony Eden, and in the last decade of the Cold War, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In Canada there was Lester Pearson

(prime minister, 1963–1968). France had Charles de Gaulle (whose Cold War had an overwhelmingly Gallic flavor), South Africa Hendrik Verwoerd (prime minister 1958–1966, who invoked the Soviet threat in order to defend white supremacy in his country), and the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos (president 1965–1986), who traded his support for U.S. military bases on his islands for U.S. help against his domestic enemies, communist or not. On the other side were Kim Il Sung of North Korea, Vietnam's revolutionary nationalist Ho Chi Minh, Walter Ulbricht of East Germany, and Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

There were thousands of cold warriors; the four profiled here were selected because they represented different sides of the conflict and because, taken together, their influence spanned nearly the length of the Cold War. Joseph Stalin was dictator of the Soviet Union from the late 1920s until his death in 1953. Dean Acheson was U.S. undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947, secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, and foreign policy adviser without portfolio thereafter. Mao Zedong led the communists to victory in China in 1949 and became the nation's supreme ruler for nearly thirty years. And Ronald Reagan, U.S. president from 1981 to 1989, stoked the flickering fire beneath the Cold War cauldron. All of these men made decisions that had enormous consequences for the world in which they lived and for the world inherited by the next generation of leaders. Strenuous as it was to fight the Cold War, it proved even harder to unmake it.

JOSEPH STALIN

That Stalin came to lead the Soviet Union following Vladimir Ilych Lenin's death in 1924 was a surprise to nearly everyone. Stalin was a man people underestimated. He was short (five feet, four inches tall) and stocky, with a face pitted by smallpox and a left arm bent permanently by a childhood accident. He mumbled or talked so quietly that he was hard to hear; possibly he was embarrassed at his poor grasp of Russian, which he spoke with an accent. On the eve of the October 1917 revolution, one of Stalin's colleagues on the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet wrote that he gave "the impression . . . of a grey blur which flickered obscurely and left no trace. There really is nothing more to be said about him." But some by then could see in his eyes a fixity of purpose that promised a good deal more. "He's not an intellectual," noted the American journalist John Reed in 1920. "He's not even particularly well informed, but he knows what he wants. He's got will-power, and he's going to be on top of the pile some day."

He was born in 1879, in the Russian state of Georgia. His family name was Dzhugashvili. (Joseph would take the name Stalin, meaning "man of steel," in the early 1900s.) Possibly he was illegitimate. His father, or the man who raised him, was a cobbler, while his mother was a domestic servant. Joseph attended local schools and was a good student, though inclined to challenge the authority of his teachers. His boyhood hero was Koba, a character in a novel called *The Patricide,* who battled against the forces of injustice and rewarded the downtrodden with the spoils of his victories. Joseph identified so fully with this Russian Robin Hood that he later took "Koba" as one of his code names.

Stalin had no philosophy in the usual sense of the word. Unlike Marx or Lenin he was not much good at theorizing. He understood Russian history as a narrative of triumph and tragedy and took from it the lesson that an unguarded Russia would be ripe for exploitation or worse. Russia had saved Europe from the Mongols in the thirteenth century, had stopped Napoleon in the nineteenth, and would destroy Adolf Hitler's Reich in the 1940s. Each of these hard-won triumphs had saved civilization. Yet it seemed to Stalin that Russia's reward for its sacrifice was to be attacked yet again; the nation was surrounded by enemies who wished for its demise. Superimposed on this view of Russia's haunted history was a particular version of revolutionary communism. Stalin believed that the revolution required a long period of incubation at home, that it would not be ready for export to other nations until it had totally transformed Russia. Agriculture must be collectivized. The state must control industry, goading factory workers to new heights of production. Art, literature, and even science ought to reflect the noble purposes of the communist state, valorizing the proletariat and refusing to indulge in bourgeois fripperies. Suspicious of Russia's neighbors, suspicious of ideological deviation, suspicious, really, of almost everyone, Stalin built by the 1930s an industrial power and a state ruled by intimidation and terror.

No one knows how many Soviet citizens died as a result of Stalin's agricultural policy or by his direct order. Judging the rich peasants, or kulaks, inherently selfish and therefore incompat-

ible with the goal of collectivization, Stalin eradicated them as a class. When grain production fell short of expectations in 1932, Stalin demanded more. The result was the starvation of perhaps five million Russians. Between 1936 and 1938 Stalin instituted the Terror, in which millions more of his political opponents real or imagined were deported to Siberia or executed following a show trial. On one December day in 1937 Stalin and Molotov signed 3,167 death warrants, then went to a movie. A cult of Stalin developed throughout the country. Poems and songs celebrated the dictator. One of his speeches was pressed onto seven sides of a gramophone record; the eighth side contained nothing but applause.

Once disclosed, the horrors of the Stalinist gulag convinced many observers that Stalin's foreign policy would proceed, by comparably brutal steps, to threaten the world with a bloodbath in the guise of revolution. There was a germ of logic to this fear. If Stalin did not hesitate to murder Russian citizens, why should he have scruples about killing foreigners? Revolutionary ideology would not respect national boundaries. The metaphors used to describe it by those who dreaded it—a conflagration, a disease, or even, in George Kennan's more measured analysis, "a fluid stream"—suggested that Stalinist communism was relentlessly expansionistic.

The reality was a good deal more complicated. Certainly Stalin was opportunistic, looking for trouble spots or turmoil to exploit. He had not abandoned hope of inspiring revolution in other countries, only shelved it temporarily in favor of consolidating control at home. Yet Stalin's first concern was always the preservation of the Soviet state from invasion or erosion from without. There was much to lose—including, of course, his own power. A shrewd foreign policy must, therefore, state the Soviet Union's claim to survival while nevertheless avoiding antagonizing neighboring countries that were capable of destroying the motherland. This meant, for example, that when Germany was restored to its military power under Hitler during the 1930s, Stalin would seek to offset German strength by finding friends among the bourgeois states that were ideologically anathema to him. When it became clear, after the Munich Pact of 1938, that the British and French had no stomach for opposing Hitler's absorption of other countries, Stalin decided to make his own arrangement with the Germans. The result was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, in which the two nations agreed not to fight each other, and (secretly) to divide Poland and the Baltic states between them. Stalin even promised that if Germany seemed in danger of losing a war, he would send a hundred divisions to the West to defend his new ally. It turned out badly for the Soviet Union, which in June was invaded by the Germans.

Stalin was at first shocked into near paralysis. "Lenin founded our state, and we've fucked it up!" he said. He fled Moscow and failed to communicate with his generals, who were desperate for instructions. But he recovered and began issuing orders. Russia would not surrender. There would be bloody battles, and many lives would be lost—indeed, well over twenty million by the war's end. Germany would be beaten, and the Soviet Union would have a peace that would at last guarantee the protection of the nation against all outside forces.

The Soviet victory over Germany was bought with help from the United States, which provided equipment through President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Lend-Lease program. Stalin was grudgingly appreciative of this aid. Still, he believed that the Americans, along with the British, could have done much more, and he suspected that his new allies wanted Russians and Germans to kill each other in droves, leaving Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill free to dictate the peace. Stalin was especially angry at the allies' failure to open a meaningful second front against Germans in Europe before mid-1944.

It seemed to Stalin that the Russians bore the brunt of the German attack. Over time, however, Stalin found the policy could work to his advantage. Once the Nazis had been defeated at Stalingrad, in February 1943, they fell into retreat, pursued by the Red Army. By the spring of 1944, as the Americans and British were preparing at last to invade Normandy, the Russians had begun arriving at the eastern frontiers of the European nations that had made common cause with the Nazis.

Ultimately, by dint of having the largest army in the region, the Soviets gained predominant influence after the war in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the eastern quarter of Germany. Yugoslavia was controlled by communists. To gain these prizes seemed to Stalin nothing more than a reasonable division of the postwar spoils. He did not picture the eastern European satellites as an entering wedge toward world domination but rather as recompense for

Russian suffering at Nazi hands and the logical result of occupation policies established by his allies. And he sought a buffer zone of politically compliant states along the western face of the Soviet Union.

It was not so much ideological conformity as simple cooperation that Stalin sought, in eastern Europe and elsewhere. He hoped that the Americans and British would allow him the buffer zone and a good deal of reconstruction aid as well. Churchill, after all, had in 1944 conceded major Soviet influence in several eastern European countries. Franklin Roosevelt endorsed a spheres of influence arrangement in the postwar world, to include a Soviet sphere roughly east of the Elbe River. Meeting with Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt had seemed to accept a face-saving formula on the composition of the emerging Polish government. Stalin felt sure that the others would permit him to do essentially what he wanted there. "The logic of his position was simple," as one of Stalin's biographers has written. "He had won the war in order to have good next-door neighbors." He thought his allies accepted this.

Elsewhere Stalin probed in places where his predecessors had long had interests. He pressured the Turks to revise the Montreux Convention, up for renewal, and grant him joint management of the strategically vital Dardanelles strait. He dragged his feet on the matter of withdrawing Soviet troops from northern Iran in 1946, though he had previously agreed to pull out. And he demanded a share of the occupation authority in Japan, having sent his armies against Japanese forces in China in the last days of the war. When the allies remonstrated or acted firmly against him, however, Stalin backed down. The Dardanelles remained Turkish, Soviet troops left Iran without having guaranteed Moscow's access to Iranian oil, and Stalin pretty much conceded his exclusion from Japanese affairs after 1945. He did not want a confrontation with the United States. He emphatically did not want war.

But between April 1945 and March 1946 Stalin came to believe that the British and Americans sought a confrontation with him. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 deprived Stalin of a rival who had nevertheless shown flexibility in negotiations and apparent sympathy for Soviet predicaments. Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, seemed less inclined to give Stalin the benefit of the doubt. The American use of atomic bombs against Japan in August was a shock. The Russians had known and had been receiving information that scientists in the United States were working on the bomb, but until he read reports of what had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki Stalin had not appreciated the power of the new weapon. He immediately authorized a major effort to build the bomb; unless the Soviets tested their own weapon, he believed, they remained subject to intimidation by the United States. The Soviet bomb was tested successfully in August 1949. Finally, as the disagreements mounted between Russia and the West—quarrels over the disposition of postwar Germany, reparations or loans or aid due the Soviet Union, and the future of atomic weapons—the United States and Great Britain seemed to conspire against the Russians. The rhetoric on both sides intensified; the Cold War had begun.

To statesmen in the West, Stalin's culpability seemed obvious. He had clamped down ruthlessly in eastern Europe, suppressing freedom throughout the region, most outrageously in Czechoslovakia in early 1948. He stripped Soviet occupation zones of their factories, refused to bargain reasonably over German reunification, and in 1948 blockaded Berlin. He reestablished the Cominform to coordinate the menacing activities of communist parties everywhere. It looked different to Stalin. He wished only for security, prosperity, and noninterference by other nations in Russia's affairs. Just five years after defeating Germany, the Soviet Union was threatened with encirclement once more.

The emergent Cold War was not confined to Europe. In China a long-simmering civil war between the Nationalist forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the communist peasant army of Mao Zedong came to a full boil following Japan's surrender. Stalin did not at first embrace Mao's revolutionary quest and doubted the efficacy of Mao's movement; however, Mao was able to establish the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. Stalin hoped to preserve Soviet influence in China, which the 1945 treaty provided, and could not afford to subsidize the People's Republic to the extent that Mao would have liked. Strains developed between the two men: Stalin was suspicious of Mao's plans, while Mao resented what he considered to be his second-class treatment in Moscow. While the two men agreed on a treaty of friendship in mid-February 1950, the differences between the communist leaders remained.

The most strenuous test of the new Sino-Soviet relationship, and the most dangerous flare-

up of the Cold War to that point, was the Korean War. The North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, visited Stalin at least twice, in April 1949 and March 1950, and corresponded with him at other times. Stalin at first splashed cold water on Kim's assertion that he could reunite Korea by military means. Stalin worried, as ever, that the United States would intervene, thus threatening Soviet security. By the early spring of 1950, though, Stalin had come around. Assured by Kim that his forces were far superior to those in the south, that the Americans were unlikely to act, and that there were 200,000 communists in South Korea who would rise up in support of the North Korean invaders, Stalin went along with Kim's plan to attack. Stalin offered increased military aid and some military advisers. At the same time, he urged Kim to ask Mao for help.

The Truman administration's decision to intervene in the Korean War, buttressed by the United Nations Security Council (from which the Soviet representative was conveniently absent), confirmed Stalin's worst fears. It was a measure of his reluctance to venture too deeply into conflicts with the United States, even those in places close to Russia's border, that he would not commit Soviet troops to the fray. He did nudge the Chinese forward, promising aid and support to Chinese brave enough to go to war, but the aid came stintingly, and Soviet air cover appeared over Korean airspace a full month after the first Chinese soldiers crossed the Yalu River into North Korea. Stalin, who had worried about a U.S.–China rapprochement, was not unhappy to see Americans and Chinese killing each other.

The Korean War became a bloody stalemate in 1951, and by then Stalin's health was failing. He continued to rule with an iron hand, arresting those of whom he contrived any reason to be suspicious, reducing more and more the size of the trusted circle around him. But his body had weakened, and his thinking was no longer clear. He had a brain hemorrhage on the night of 28 February–1 March 1953, though he managed to remain alive for another four days. Just as he died, according to his daughter, "he suddenly lifted his left hand as though he were pointing to something up above and bringing down a curse on us all. The gesture was incomprehensible and full of menace." It was a fitting end for a man who had brought so much suffering to Russian citizens, while nevertheless making the Soviet Union a nation to be respected, or feared, throughout the world.

DEAN ACHESON

When Dean Acheson became U.S. secretary of state in early 1949 he hung in his office two portraits: one of John Quincy Adams, the other of Henry Stimson. These were significant choices. Adams, perhaps the greatest secretary of state in U.S. history, had conceived the first American empire but had warned his overzealous compatriots against going "abroad in search of monsters to destroy." Stimson, who had served as secretary of state for Herbert Hoover and became secretary of war (for the second time) under Franklin Roosevelt in 1940, had preserved Adams's imperial vision. Both men were among the best and brightest of their generations: Adams the scion of the famous political family, Stimson a partner in Elihu Root's law firm. And both men were dedicated to the service of their country, had a keen sense of right and wrong, and believed that gentlemen should behave honorably—as Stimson said, they did not read one another's mail. Dean Acheson believed these things too.

Acheson was born and raised in Connecticut. His father, Edward, was an Episcopal rector; his mother, Eleanor (Gooderham), was a grande dame with a sense of humor. Both were British subjects. Eleanor spoke with a British accent, and the family celebrated the queen's birthday. Thus was Acheson's Anglophilia instilled at an early age. He went to Groton and Yale, finishing both (Groton barely) without academic distinction. His Yale classmate Archibald MacLeish recalled that Acheson was "socially snobby with qualities of arrogance and superciliousness." Seriousness arrived in his second year at Harvard Law School, when he took a class with Felix Frankfurter. The law captured him, especially for its possibilities as training for government service. Frankfurter arranged a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis.

Acheson's career in government began in 1933, when he was named Roosevelt's treasury undersecretary. The appointment was short-lived. Acheson opposed FDR's plan to buy gold to shore up prices, and he was asked to resign that fall. But he had made himself known to Roosevelt's men, and early in 1941 Secretary of State Cordell Hull brought Acheson to the State Department as assistant secretary for economic affairs. Acheson quickly made his presence felt. He helped negotiate the lend-lease agreement with the British, into which, and despite his Anglophilia, he inserted a clause demanding an

end to preferential economic arrangements within the British empire. Acheson also insisted on tightening an embargo on oil shipments to Japan. And after the United States had entered the war, he became one of the American architects of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both of which would do much to stabilize the economy of the capitalist nations following the war. When, in late 1944, Hull was replaced by Edward Stettinius, Acheson became assistant secretary of state for congressional relations and international conferences.

Acheson fortuitously had had a lengthy meeting with Truman two days before Roosevelt's death in April 1945. Truman made "a very good impression. He is straightforward, decisive, simple, entirely honest." He would "learn fast and inspire confidence." But Acheson was not at first moved to stay on in the government, and after seeing through to completion the drafting of the United Nations Charter, in midsummer he submitted to the president a letter of resignation. Truman and his new secretary of state, James Byrnes, refused to accept it. They wanted Acheson to stay in the administration and to promote him to undersecretary of state, second in command in the department. Acheson hesitated but finally agreed to return.

He was thrust immediately into the maelstrom. Byrnes was a clever politician but a poor administrator, and the volume of information flowing into the department, as well as the demands placed on its employees by the developing Cold War, threatened to overwhelm all of them. Acheson became the department's leading organizer and troubleshooter. Truman assigned him to the crucial task of finding a way to control atomic energy without sacrificing American security. His report, written with David Lilienthal and submitted in March 1946, was a sincere (if doomed) effort to accommodate Soviet concerns about the American nuclear monopoly by establishing an international agency to regulate the production of atomic energy. Yet Acheson found himself, along with his president, moving toward a tougher stance against the Soviet Union. If Stalin thought by early 1946 that his capitalist enemies were encircling him despite the reasonableness of his position, the view from Washington was different. U.S. policymakers came to believe that the Soviets would push and probe and stir up trouble anywhere they were not met with resistance, including potential military action. While the hallmark of American resolve was George Kennan's 1947 essay "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in which he called for the employment of "counterforce" against the Soviets "at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points," the Truman administration had in fact been pursuing an ad hoc version of this containment strategy since early 1946. Acheson was its lead author. It was he who wrote Stalin a stern note, delivered by Kennan, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from northern Iran. And it was Acheson who wrote the Truman administration's sharp response to the Soviet demand, in August 1946, that Turkey agree to a joint Russian-Turkish defense of the Dardanelles. Acheson's note, along with arrival in the area of a U.S. naval task force, caused the Soviets to back down.

Acheson also played a vital role in shaping the political and economic institutions of Truman's Cold War. In early 1947, with Byrnes out and George Marshall in as the secretary of state, the anticommunist governments of Turkey and Greece claimed to be under severe Soviet pressure and could not guarantee their own survival. Convinced that the United States must help the Turkish and Greek governments, the administration nevertheless faced the difficult task of persuading a fiscally careful Congress to provide the aid needed to shore up these governments. On 27 February, Truman called a meeting between administration officials and a handful of leading senators and members of congress in hopes of winning over the legislators. Acheson described this encounter as "Armageddon." Marshall spoke first, emphasizing the need for the United States to act because it was the right thing to do and because no one else would help. The legislators seemed unmoved. Was it America's fight? Was the bill likely to be enormous? Acheson asked to speak. Immediately he changed the terms of the debate. The crisis in southeastern Europe, he said, was no local dustup but one that involved the two Cold War powers. The Soviets were pressuring Turkey and Greece as they had pressured Iran. At stake was a vast portion of the free world, for if Greece went communist, "like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and Europe through Italy and France," which faced communist threats of their own. Only the United States stood in the way of a communist onslaught that would, if successful, snuff out freedom and destroy all hope of eco-

nomic recovery in parts of three continents. The congressional leaders were impressed, and the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine followed on 12 March, promising that the United States would fight communism everywhere.

The world's biggest problems remained economic, and the chief area of concern for Acheson, as always, was neither Iran nor Greece but western Europe. Policymakers in Washington believed that communism fed on economic distress; European nations were vulnerable to radicals promising the redistribution of wealth as a panacea for poverty. Economic aid from the United States—and in far greater magnitude than that proffered to Turkey and Greece—was essential to Europe's economic recovery, its revival as a market for U.S. exports, and its people's continued faith in democracy. Acheson said as much in a speech he gave in Cleveland, Mississippi, in early May 1947. His call for massive economic aid to Europe found its manifestation in the Marshall Plan, announced by the secretary of state at Harvard the following month. If the Truman Doctrine had made the strategic case for containment, the Marshall Plan was designed to give economic spine to American's closest friends and trading partners in western Europe. Once more, Acheson had played a crucial role in shaping the new policy.

Acheson had previously decided to leave the administration, and when he tendered his resignation effective 1 July 1947, Truman this time reluctantly let him go. He was, however, receptive when Truman, surprisingly victorious in the 1948 election, invited him to return to public life, this time as secretary of state.

The problems to which Acheson returned in January 1949 were even knottier than they had been when he had departed eighteen months earlier. Europeans and Soviets no longer doubted American resolve. But the Nationalist government of China was in the final stages of collapse; as Acheson remarked ruefully, he arrived back in service just in time to have it fall on him. There was not yet a peace treaty with Japan, and France's effort to return to power in its colony of Indochina had met with firm resistance from Vietnamese nationalists associated with communism. The Soviet Union would explode its first atomic bomb later that year. Above all, at least as far as Acheson was concerned, Europe remained dangerously unstable. The Italian and French governments turned over with distressing frequency, threatening Europe's stability and ultimately its solvency. Great Britain still depended on U.S. aid, and a slight U.S. recession in the spring of 1949 undermined the sterling pound and forced a new round of austerity on London. Germany remained divided, with Berlin under siege in the East and with the West, its capital at Bonn, a seeming outpost of Western interests thrust provocatively into the Soviet bloc, economically infirm and utterly defenseless. Here especially, thought Acheson, something had to be done.

Acheson addressed the problems systematically, blending a staunch anticommunism, a fervent faith in liberal capitalism, and a healthy measure of pragmatism. There was not much to be done about China: Chiang Kai-shek was plainly a loser and it would be necessary to "let the dust settle" following the communists' victory. Japan would have a peace treaty in 1952. Vexed by French behavior in Indochina but unwilling to weaken France further or cede more territory to what he construed as world communism, Acheson supplied some economic and military aid to the French-backed (read "puppet") government of Bao Dai in Vietnam. What Europe and especially West Germany needed was an infusion of confidence that the United States would come to the rescue in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union attacked. Working with the Europeans, Acheson helped fashion, in the spring of 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty, which created a group of like-minded nations committed to the proposition, as article 5 of the treaty put it, that "an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all." For Acheson the treaty was valuable as a morale boost for U.S. allies, as well as a means to permit, someday, the military restoration of (West) Germany under multilateral aegis.

Acheson had not spent much time thinking about Korea. His State Department predecessors, and the military, had already put into motion the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. In a speech in January 1950 Acheson described a U.S. "defense perimeter" in East Asia that incorporated various islands, among them the Philippines and Okinawa. It was possible to take from Acheson's words the implication that mainland Asian nations, including South Korea, fell outside the U.S. picket, though this was a strained interpretation; Acheson did say that the United States had "direct responsibility" for Korea. Certainly Acheson was naive to assume, as he told the Foreign Relations Committee, that South Korea "could take care of any trouble started by" the North. But no cold warrior of Acheson's type would have

KONRAD ADENAUER

The United States and Soviet Union were undisputed superpowers after 1945, but the bipolarity of the postwar system did not make all other nations onlookers in the Cold War. Konrad Adenauer, formerly mayor of Cologne, became chancellor of West Germany in 1949. He wished to restore the strength, pride, and importance of Germany (even if only the western part of it) by emphasizing the culture and commerce of the Rhine, and especially by establishing a closer relationship with France, which he thought a far healthier role model for Germany than were the nations of central or eastern Europe. He was instrumental in creating the European Coal and Steel Community, the joint French-German authority for the mining of coal and the production of steel. Adenauer also exploited the Korean War to good effect for Germany. He put it about that West Germans were worried about a Soviet attack on their territory or at least that East German police might now probe the border between the Germanys. Given these worrisome possibilities it would be best, Adenauer indicated, for the Allies to end their occupation of Germany and to permit the arming of some West German troops. In this Adenauer ultimately got his way.

Adenauer, who died in 1967 at the age of ninety-one, was a cold warrior as surely as Joseph Stalin and Dean Acheson were. Adenauer accepted the premises of the conflict and believed in its necessity, he was ideologically sympathetic to the West and staunchly opposed to communism, and he never shrank from the prospect of military action to deter, defeat, or at least delay a Soviet attack on western Europe—one that would begin, inevitably, in West Germany. At the same time, Adenauer looked back to a time before the Cold War began, grasping the older and deeper forces that had shaped German political culture and European politics since the early nineteenth century. Because of this, Adenauer's principal goals preceded and transcended the Cold War: he sought the creation of a stable and economically viable Germany (or part of Germany), the end of Germany's pariah status, the attachment of Germany to the largely democratic and capitalist West, and, following on all of these, the return of Germany to its prewar position as a regional power. In his efforts to achieve these goals Adenauer found the Cold War useful. He reminded the British, the French, and above all the Americans that a strong and friendly West Germany was vital to their security. Soviet behavior in eastern Europe and Korea seemed to confirm his fears. At the end of his life he could take satisfaction in what he had done for the Cold War, and what the Cold War had done for him.

invited an attack on an ally, even one as troublesome as Syngman Rhee's South Korea. The proof of Acheson's commitment came in the last days of June, once Kim Il Sung had launched his offensive. Truman, closely advised by Acheson and the military, committed U.S. forces to the conflict, seeking UN support for this step afterward.

The Korean War would ultimately serve the ends of the containment strategy. The North Koreans, who were presumed by Acheson to be proxy soldiers for Moscow, were stopped. Still, Acheson's reputation suffered as a result of the war. Conservatives attacked him because he had not seen it coming. He would have, they argued, had he understood the implications of his do-nothing policy on China; his abandonment of Chiang had encouraged communists throughout Asia to think they could launch attacks with impunity. Republicans led by Senator Joseph McCarthy accused Acheson of appeasement or worse. He was part of a "crimson crowd," said McCarthy. Senator Hugh Butler exclaimed: "I look at that fellow. I watch his smart-aleck manner and his British clothes, and that New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I want to shout, 'Get out, Get out. You stand for everything that has been wrong with the United States for years!'"

Truman and Acheson could not achieve a truce in Korea. An armistice was signed only in July 1953, six months after Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had succeeded them as the nation's chief cold warriors. Out of harness Acheson drifted. He wanted badly to have influence again on U.S. diplomacy. This was not possible in the Eisenhower administration: Acheson was tainted by his association with the humiliations of the United States in East Asia. In any case he disparaged the administration's reliance on nuclear

weapons, a strategy dubbed "massive retaliation," and thought Dulles sanctimonious. Nor would Democrats embrace him. Adlai Stevenson, the Democrats' presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956, thought Acheson irascible and controversial, and kept his distance. In Germany in 1957 Ambassador David Bruce, who was Acheson's friend, found the former secretary "devastating, clever, bitter and not constructive. . . . Dean is overfull of bile and it is sad."

John F. Kennedy, the Democrat who won the presidency in 1960, did consult with Acheson. Kennedy took Acheson's advice on cabinet appointments (Secretary of State Dean Rusk was Acheson's suggestion, though Acheson later regretted having made it) and the need to build NATO forces in Europe. Elsewhere Kennedy resisted Acheson's increasingly reflexive militancy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Acheson, a member of Kennedy's high-level ExCom, urged the president to bomb Soviet missile sites and was disgusted when JFK decided to interdict Russian ships instead, a tactic Acheson thought timid. As the war in Vietnam expanded, particularly under Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, Acheson found himself more and more in demand as an adviser. Johnson treated Acheson with deference. And Acheson's early position on Vietnam—that the United States had no choice but to fight until South Vietnam was preserved against a communist takeover—matched Johnson's.

Averell Harriman said in 1970: "Some people's minds freeze. Acheson's hasn't changed since 1952." That was unfair. While Acheson never lost his suspicion of the Soviet Union, and thus remained convinced of the necessity of containment, and while his contempt for his intellectual inferiors, especially those in Congress, remained undiminished, he came to see the Vietnam War as a waste of American power. Harriman himself, along with Undersecretary of State George Ball, made Acheson see by early 1968 that Vietnam was a peripheral Cold War theater. At a meeting of Johnson's Vietnam "wise men" on 25 March 1968, Acheson spoke bluntly and eloquently of the need for the administration to disengage from the conflict. Johnson, shaken, announced less than a week later that he would seek to negotiate with Hanoi. He added, almost as an afterthought, that he would not seek reelection in 1968 but would instead devote all his energy to finding a way out of the morass in Southeast Asia.

Acheson had come full circle. He had started his public career as a man of principle, demanding to see evidence that one policy choice was better than another, just as Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis had taught him. His Cold War—like Stalin's, ironically—sprang from ideology tempered by pragmatism. There was assertiveness but no adventurism in the man who helped shape the United Nations, the Bretton Woods economic system, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. But the harsh criticism of conservatives inclined Acheson toward greater militancy and left him unable to resist the temptations of victory in Korea. Thereafter he grew increasingly sharp with those with whom he disagreed. That never changed. But the Vietnam War restored Acheson to his former view that the United States could not solve every world problem, especially not by military means. When Acheson died on 12 October 1971 he left a legacy worthy, in ambition and execution, of the two secretaries of state he admired most.

MAO ZEDONG

The Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong and Dean Acheson were exact contemporaries, born in 1893. But while Acheson enjoyed a comfortable boyhood and moved rather casually through Groton and Yale, Mao left school at thirteen to help with the family farm, married at age fourteen (and was widowed at seventeen), and in 1911 joined the Republican army in its quest to unite and strengthen China. When he was twenty years old Mao, who came from the rural province of Hunan, returned to school and came under the influence of a teacher named Yang, who inspired in him a passion for reform, a strong ethical sense, and an enthusiasm for exercise, generally taken in the nude. When Yang got a job at Beijing University, Mao went north with him. It was the young farmer's first time out of Hunan.

He took a job as a clerk at the university library and came to know a corps of intellectuals who published an influential magazine called *New Youth,* which became the literary centerpiece of an inchoate but determined reformist movement that emerged following the formal end of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a republic in 1912. Sun Yat-sen, a Japanese-educated radical from Canton, was the movement's leading political light, but his faith in republicanism was not shared by some young Chinese who sought the end of class oppression. Li Dazhao proclaimed an interest in Marxism and endorsed the Bolshevik revolution. Hu Shih, who had a

degree from Cornell, was a literary critic who wrote on women's liberation. Mao was not in their intellectual circle, but the yeastiness of the Beijing scene plainly affected him.

Mao returned to Hunan and the city of Changsha in the early spring of 1919. He thus missed the great urban demonstrations of 4 May, out of which would flow reformist currents that would dominate China for the next thirty years. But Mao contributed a small tributary of his own. He taught history at local schools. And he edited a journal called the *Xiang River Review,* for which he wrote nearly all the articles. His writing heralded the forthcoming "liberation of mankind," which would arrive when people lost their fear of those who ruled them and the superstitions that held them in thrall. When the local warlord stopped publication of the *Review,* Mao shifted to another journal; when it, too, was suppressed, he wrote for Changsha's biggest newspaper.

On 23 July 1921 thirteen Chinese and two members of the Soviet-sponsored Comintern (one Dutch, one Russian), met in Shanghai for the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong was among them. After days of discussion the Congress decided that it should devote its efforts to organizing the working class, putting off plans to mobilize the peasants and the army. The capitalists would be overthrown and "social ownership" of land and machinery would ensue. Buoyed by these resolutions, and presumably in agreement with them, Mao returned to Hunan to begin building a mass movement.

He organized workers and orchestrated strikes. Mao did not attend the Second Party Congress meeting in July 1922, but he soon after learned that the party, nudged by the Comintern agents, had decided to enter into coalition with the Nationalist, or Kuomintang, Party, then headed by Sun Yat-sen. Communists were instructed to form "a bloc within" the party. In this way, they would work alongside the bourgeois elements in China to overthrow the feudal oppressors, all the while securing their bonds to the working class and awaiting the revolutionary situation that would someday emerge in the country. Mao dutifully joined the Kuomintang. Certainly the Communist decision to create a United Front with the Kuomintang seemed reasonable at the time and was consistent with Marxist doctrine. The Kuomintang under Sun was a militant organization, sympathetic to workers and willing to help them strike for their rights. Nor were there many Communist Party members in China, and the party was broke. The Communists could decide their ultimate course as events unfolded.

Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and leadership of the Kuomintang, and thus the United Front, was grasped by Chiang Kai-shek, a general who was commandant of the United Front's military academy. In the spring of 1926 Chiang led his forces north out of Canton, determined to destroy the power of local warlords and unite the nation under United Front rule. Communists marched alongside Kuomintang troops, but even more important were the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organizers, among them Mao, who were assigned to prepare the way for Chiang's soldiers. The men and women of the CCP served as agitators, turning peasants and workers against their local regimes in order to soften them up for the expedition forces. Alarmed at the success of CCP organizers in mobilizing workers, Chiang decided to purge the United Front of its Communists, thus purifying the Kuomintang ideologically and eliminating any awkwardness about power sharing in the future. Chiang's purge was bloody everywhere, but particularly so in Shanghai, where Kuomintang troops killed thousands of their recent allies in April 1927. As the ideological cleansing spread westward, Mao found himself the de facto leader of a demoralized peasant army whose ranks dwindled daily. Increasingly isolated, he moved his remaining supporters to a mountainous area on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces.

His force, as he noted at the time, consisted of "ten thousand messy people." The description was not altogether disparaging. In 1927 Mao had written a report on the peasants in two Hunan counties. Contrary to the Comintern view that peasants were benighted and thus unlikely revolutionary tinder, Mao discovered that the country people were doing a remarkable job of radicalizing and organizing themselves. The Communist Party was at a crossroads: it could continue to deny the revolutionary potential of the rural masses, or it could break with Moscow-inspired orthodoxy, take its place at the revolutionary vanguard, and guide the peasants to victory. For Mao the second road seemed best; however, this decision put Mao at odds with the Comintern and Stalin.

Under pressure from Kuomintang forces, in 1930 Mao and his peasants moved to a new border base and created a government in what they called the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao's grasp of power now slipped. He fell seriously ill several times. In 1932 the national CCP leadership removed to Jiangxi,

and the bosses pushed Mao to the side. It was they who decided that the Soviet had become indefensible, and that the Communists would have to leave, though exactly where they would end up was unsettled. Thus began the Long March, an event that would assume legendary status among the Communists, especially as the passage of time dimmed memories of its horrors. Some eighty-six thousand people left Jiangxi in the fall of 1934, Mao among them, though without a leading role. Harried by Kuomintang troops, exploited by the locals, frozen, hungry, and sick, the Communists lost marchers at an alarming rate. As the former Soviet leaders were blamed for the debacle, Mao's star rose. By the time the remnants of the column—only eight thousand people—reached far off Shaanxi province a full year after its departure from the Soviet, Mao was back in charge.

The Communists made their new headquarters in the town of Yan'an. Living in caves carved into the sere hillsides, they worked to create their version of a just society, to include some land redistribution and respect for the local peasantry. Mao was the acknowledged leader in these efforts. He insisted that intellectuals learn from rather than teach the masses. But he abandoned sociology in favor of political theory that he represented as unassailable.

In July 1937 the Japanese forced a clash with Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, then used the incident as a pretext to launch a full-scale assault against China. The Japanese attacked the major eastern cities, took Shanghai, then drove Chiang's Nationalist Kuomintang out of its capital at Nanjing, committing appalling atrocities as they did so. The spreading war forced Chiang to reinstitute the United Front with the CCP. Mao welcomed this step, though he understood that it was born purely of expediency; once the Japanese were defeated, he knew, war between the parties would resume.

Nationalist and Communist troops frequently fought hard against the Japanese, but they cooperated minimally and kept a wary eye on each other. When the war ended in August 1945 Japanese troops remained on Chinese soil. The Americans, who had sent representatives to Yan'an during the war and had encouraged the maintenance of the United Front, were nevertheless determined to help Chiang regain political and military superiority. They gave weapons to the Kuomintang, ferried its troops north to accept the Japanese surrender and thus their weapons as well, and kept Japanese soldiers armed in order to prevent Communist advances. The Russians, for their part, ushered Communist troops into Manchuria in the wake of their own departure. Thus did the Cold War come implicitly to China.

Hoping to prevent the resumption of civil war, President Truman sent George Marshall to China in late 1945. Marshall wanted a coalition between the Communists and the Nationalists, a desire that was as sincere as it was unrealistic. Mao, whose postwar position seemed weaker than Chiang's, proved cooperative, agreeing to remove Communist fighters from southern China and accepting in principle Marshall's proposal for a unified Chinese army. Chiang balked at nearly every American suggestion, preferring to pursue his war against the Communists. When a discouraged Marshall left China in January 1947 he labeled Chiang "the leading obstacle to peace and reform" on the scene. Yet the Americans would not abandon Chiang. He was, the Truman administration judged, the only hope for a united, noncommunist China.

Mao may have hoped for a more genuinely balanced U.S. policy but he could not have been shocked when the Americans sided with Chiang. Never, despite his pretensions, a sophisticated political theorist, Mao soon proved his abilities as a battlefield strategist. He maintained high morale and fought relentlessly and without quarter. Within each new area seized from the Kuomintang, Mao instituted land reform, with the understanding that the beneficiaries in their gratitude would become eager recruits for the Communist army. Beginning in the fall of 1947 CCP forces won battle after battle against the Kuomintang. On 1 October 1949 Mao declared in Beijing the founding of the People's Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, taking with him the remnants of the Kuomintang government and vowing to reconquer the mainland.

China desperately needed help. There had been a flicker of hope of establishing a diplomatic relationship with the United States. Even after the failure of Marshall's mission, Mao had signaled that he would welcome American assistance, and Mao's compatriot Zhou Enlai, who would become premier of the People's Republic, had seemed even more willing to make overtures to Washington. But in June 1949 Mao had given a speech in which he declared the need for China to "lean to one side" in the Cold War, specifically toward the Soviet Union. Mao's pronouncement did not ensure that the Soviets would embrace the Chinese Communists. Stalin had all along treated the

Chinese revolution as an odd and ominous strain of the species, and he remained ambivalent about its prospects even after the CCP had won. Mao came to resent the widely held perception that he was Stalin's junior partner in revolution, and he was not reassured by the treatment he received when he arrived in Moscow in December, seeking a new relationship with the Kremlin and a good deal of economic aid. He got far less than he had hoped for with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in February 1950.

Mao's most important goal was to consolidate the revolution at home, which required the establishment of Communist political legitimacy and economic policies that would eradicate poverty. He was also intent on liberating Taiwan from Chiang; without this step, the revolution would remain unfinished. Stalin promised no help, but when the Americans indicated their disinterest in defending the island, Mao began to concentrate his forces along China's southwest coast in preparation for an attack across the Formosa Strait. But Kim Il Sung moved faster. Having received Stalin's permission to go to war, Kim came to Beijing in May 1950, seeking Mao's blessing as well.

Mao was unenthusiastic about Kim's plans and asked him to reconsider. Kim refused. In the end Mao offered Kim a green light but promised nothing in the way of help, and Kim did not then pursue the matter, figuring he was likely to win quickly or that the Soviets would give him any assistance he needed. Mao was also surprised when the Americans intervened to halt the North Korean attack and placed their fleet in the Formosa Strait. The United States, Mao decided, was determined to destroy the People's Republic, and had taken its first step toward doing so in Korea. In response Mao began redeploying troops to northeast China near the Korean border. In September, following Douglas MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon and the subsequent rout of the North Korean army, Mao wrote to a Manchurian comrade: "Apparently, it won't do for us not to intervene in the war. You must accelerate preparations."

On 16 October Chinese units crossed the Yalu River in force. Mao professed confidence in their ultimate victory. Once the Chinese had bloodied U.S. forces in battle the American people would demand an end to the conflict. Privately Mao looked for additional help from the Soviet Union. Stalin was not at first forthcoming; he evidently wanted to test Chinese determination, and he remained wary of antagonizing the Americans. But as the Chinese routed UN forces and gave every indication that they intended to stay the course, Stalin relented, putting Soviet warplanes into action over Korea in mid-November.

Military stalemate came in Korea by the spring of 1951. The negotiations toward ending the war then dragged on for two frustrating years. During this time Mao used the war to rally people to the CCP. He mounted campaigns aimed at rooting out "counterrevolutionaries," crypto-capitalists, and Kuomintang sympathizers. His own power grew. By 1953 he was not only chairman of the Communist Party but also chairman of the People's Republic of China itself and in charge of its armed forces. Stalin's death in March left Mao unrivaled as a source of revolutionary wisdom and experience. He became the leading symbol of the communist Cold War, dispensing advice to would-be revolutionaries throughout the world, rattling sabers at the capitalist powers and their "running dog" allies, and threatening, as always, to absorb Taiwan.

The relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, tense during the best of times, deteriorated rapidly following Stalin's death. Nikita Khrushchev, who ultimately succeeded Stalin and who exposed some of Stalin's crimes to the world, found Mao cruel and megalomaniacal. At a time when Khrushchev was seeking to coexist with the United States, Mao seemed always to be courting war. In Moscow in 1957 Mao, according to Khrushchev, told Communist Party delegates that they should not fear "atomic bombs and missiles." If the imperialists started a war China might "lose more than three hundred million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we'll get to work producing more babies than ever before." The Russians present were appalled. The following year Mao confronted the United States (for a second time) over the status of Quemoy and Matsu, two Nationalist-held islands in the Formosa Strait. Having precipitated a crisis Mao then backed down, which suggested to Khrushchev that the Chinese leader was better at creating confrontations than he was at resolving them. (Mao would say the same thing about Khrushchev following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.)

By then the breach between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was total. The Russians found intolerable Chinese abuse of Soviet advisers sent to help China develop its oil and build an atomic bomb, and in 1960 the Soviets removed their people. Mao, meanwhile, was incredulous that the Soviets would sell advanced MIG jets to India in 1962, given the friction that existed on

the border between China and India. For his sixty-ninth birthday that year, Mao wrote a poem that contained the defiant lines "Only the hero dares pursue the tiger,/ Still less does any brave fellow fear the bear." It may be presumed that Mao himself was the "hero," even more contemptuous of the Russian bear than of the paper tiger of imperialism.

As ever Mao's Cold War abroad directly affected his domestic policies. In 1958 Mao inaugurated a program of economic acceleration called the Great Leap Forward, in which all farm cooperatives would be joined into twenty thousand enormous communes and in which the nation's steel production would be increased through the efforts of workers who would erect blast furnaces in their backyards. Mao also announced a campaign to "let a hundred flowers bloom, and a hundred schools of thoughts contend." This seemed encouragement to Chinese to write or say anything, even if it was critical of their government. Both policies proved catastrophic. The Great Leap Forward resulted in a famine that killed twenty million in 1960–1961. Intellectuals and journalists who took seriously Mao's invitation to let flowers bloom quickly found themselves branded as "poisonous weeds" by an orchestrated "anti-rightist" campaign. Mao grew increasingly dictatorial and unpredictable.

He also seemed to withdraw from the battlements of the Cold War. He continued to support revolution around the world, and he was helpful in particular to the North Vietnamese in their war with the United States after 1965. China, not the contemptibly revisionist Soviet Union, would summon what Mao called "the mighty revolutionary storm" in the Third World. But Mao had never been greatly interested in affairs beyond China's borders, or he was circumspect about China's ability to control them. He did not leave China for the last twenty years of his life. It is too much to say that he mellowed, but he nevertheless came to understand that the world was changing. Seeking to offset the emerging détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, Mao invited President Richard Nixon to China. The two men met on 17 February 1972, shaking hands in front of a thicket of cameras in Mao's study. Mao apologized for his slurred speech and waved away Nixon's compliments. The policy implications of the visit were left to men other than Mao to sort out. Still, Mao enabled the meeting to take place, and he, along with Nixon, could take credit for initiating the first improvement in Sino-American relations since the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

Like other cold warriors, Mao Zedong, who died on 9 September 1976, left a mixed legacy. He was one of those responsible for introducing ideology into the realm of foreign policy, for defining opponents as enemies, for menacing others with his rhetoric, for maintaining large military forces and authorizing construction of an atomic bomb. Yet like the others, in the end Mao granted pragmatism primacy over ideology in foreign affairs. That he regarded the Americans as imperialists would not stand in the way of cultivating them if that proved necessary to preserve China's security and well-being in an increasingly complicated world.

RONALD REAGAN

By the time Mao Zedong died in the year of the U.S. bicentennial, it was clear that the Cold War had changed significantly. The Soviet Union, under Khrushchev and his successors, had thrown aside the cult of Joseph Stalin and had proved willing to consider limiting its nuclear arsenal if the United States would reciprocate.

The man who won the American presidency in 1980 and again in 1984 was instinctively suspicious of this effort for conciliation. Ronald Reagan was born (6 February 1911) and raised in small towns in Illinois. His memoir begins: "If I'd gotten the job I wanted at Montgomery Ward, I suppose I would never have left Illinois." Later in life Reagan recalled not small-town parochialism and racism, nor his father's alcoholic rages, but a life of summer days, lifeguarding at Lowell Park in Dixon, having fun at Eureka College, and after college taking a job in Des Moines in which he broadcast Chicago Cubs baseball games as if he were watching them, while in fact reconstructing them from a running telegraphic account sent from the field. He went to Hollywood in 1937 with a six-month contract from Warner Brothers studio. He became a star in B movies and took leadership of the Screen Actors Guild. He did not leave the United States during World War II, though he later claimed to have done so, even asserting that he had filmed Nazi concentration camps for the army. In fact, Reagan made war movies at home.

By the early 1950s Reagan was convinced that communists had infiltrated Hollywood and the Actors Guild, and he so told the FBI. His career in film was waning. But in 1954 the General Electric Company asked Reagan to host a weekly dramatic show on television. To promote the show Reagan went around the country talking with

workers at GE plants about life in Hollywood and about the virtues of private enterprise. In 1960 Reagan switched his party affiliation from Democrat to Republican, and in 1966 he surprised nearly everyone by beating the two-term Democratic incumbent for the California governorship.

Reagan served two terms as governor, a tenure marked by incendiary rhetoric. He insisted that people who accepted government welfare were chiselers or cheats, and he threatened a "bloodbath" if students in Berkeley kept taking to the streets to protest against Vietnam War. Reagan's stature grew. In 1976 he challenged the Republican president, Gerald Ford, and nearly gained the nomination by attacking Secretary of State Kissinger's policy of détente. When Ford lost the election to Jimmy Carter, Reagan was established as the Republican frontrunner in 1980. He thrashed Carter in that election, returning to themes that had made him famous: the venality of big government, the horrors of communism, and the unique ability of Americans to overcome all their problems and secure a luminous future.

Reagan's Cold War was a product of his experience in Middle America, in Hollywood, and on the circuit for GE; his chief source of information about the Soviet Union was *Reader's Digest*. He was not much interested in foreign countries. Like Mao he traveled abroad only reluctantly. Still Reagan knew what he did not like. The Soviet Union was an "evil empire," and its agents, he said at his first presidential press conference, "reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat," in order to foment "world revolution." The Berlin Wall should be ripped down, free elections should be held throughout eastern Europe, and the Soviet government should stop violating the human rights of its citizens. The Vietnam War had been "a noble cause." ("We should declare war on Vietnam," Reagan had said in October 1965. "We could pave the whole country and put parking stripes on it and still be home by Christmas.") Revolutions, or even experiments in socialism, were the result of Soviet imperialism.

Reagan brought to office a set of convictions rather than a foreign policy. He delegated to his advisers the task of turning his dreams and fears into directives. This might have worked if everyone agreed on how to do a thing, but as Reagan's men and women often disagreed among themselves, the result was frequently chaos.

Again and again Reagan displayed an alarming ignorance of his own nation's foreign policy. He misstated the name given by the CIA to the Soviets' largest long-range missile, and when his error was pointed out to him he accused the Soviets of changing the name in order to fool the West. He mistook defensive weapons for offensive ones, failed to understand the strategic difference between placing missiles in silos or putting them on mobile carriers, and claimed that neither bombers nor submarines carried nuclear weapons. He prepared for his 1986 summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, to be held in Reykjavik, Iceland, by reading the Tom Clancy thriller *Red Storm Rising*—because, he said, much of it was set in Iceland. Briefings of the president had to be short and snappy, reducible to a few small note cards or film clips. These were by definition devoid of detail or ambiguity, which tended to reinforce Reagan's black-or-white view of the world.

Yet the president was not altogether without assets as a foreign policymaker. He commanded the world's strongest economy. He put it into recession early in his first term, and ran up an enormous national debt thereafter, but the Gross Domestic Product nevertheless increased through the 1980s. Possessed of a sense of humor and an actor's charm, Reagan was liked even by those who disagreed with him. And despite his caustic characterizations of the Soviets and his resolve to build American military power until his enemies cried uncle, Reagan feared a nuclear holocaust and was determined to find a way to prevent it. Back in 1979 Reagan had visited the headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. At the end of his tour Reagan asked the base commander what the United States could do if the Russians launched a missile at an American city. NORAD could track the missile, the commander replied, but could do nothing to stop it.

Reagan was astonished. "We have spent all that money and have all that equipment, and there is nothing we can do to prevent a nuclear missile from hitting us," he said. To Reagan it seemed that, armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction, the United States and the Soviet Union had come to the brink of Armageddon.

There might be a way out. The loophole was a system of lasers or rockets, deployed in space, that could destroy or knock off course any missile launched by Russia at the United States. Proposed by Reagan at the end of a defense budget speech to the nation on 23 March 1983, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as "Star Wars," soon after became the

centerpiece of the administration's strategic planning. To Reagan it was a matter of logic and simple humanity: if you can prevent something as awful as a nuclear warhead from striking your nation, it would be irresponsible not to do so. But the Soviets reacted strongly against SDI. What Reagan had not said, they pointed out—and they assumed he realized it—was that a U.S. monopoly on missile defense would tempt the Americans to launch a first strike against them, secure in the knowledge that the Russians could not effectively retaliate. They were also concerned about a new arms race. The Americans would have to spend billions to develop SDI technology, while the Russians would be forced to increase their offensive capabilities in the hope of defeating the American shield. (The possibility of bankrupting the feeble Soviet economy had occurred to Reagan, though the strategic hazards of missile defense perhaps had not.) In any case, the Soviets said, meaningful arms negotiations could not take place between the powers so long as SDI remained on the table.

Reagan was disinclined to grant the Soviets any sympathy; moreover, he had found arms control distasteful. The Soviets continued, in his judgment, to stir up trouble around the globe: in the Middle East, Africa, and in Latin America, of special concern because of its proximity to the United States. When Reagan took office in 1981 the hot spot in Latin America was Nicaragua. Convinced that the Sandinista government was not only Marxist but a hemispheric agent of world communism, Reagan sought ways to unseat it. At the urging of William Casey, the director of the CIA, Reagan authorized the creation of an anti-Sandinista army, dubbed the contras, that would train in Honduras and harass the Sandinistas across the border. The contras were constituted mostly of members of Somoza's National Guard; at their peak they numbered about 7,500.

U.S. aid to the contras, and its related efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas, proved impossible to hide. In April 1984 the *Wall Street Journal* revealed that the CIA had mined Sandino harbor, hoping to discourage Nicaragua's trade. Congress now put its foot down, refusing to allow further funding of the anti-Sandinista war. Reagan branded the Sandinista government "a Communist reign of terror," and insisted that the United States had a moral right to overthrow it. The contras were "freedom fighters" similar to the American Founders. The administration would find alternative sources of funding for its sunshine patriots.

The Israelis refused to help, but the Saudis and the sultan of Brunei agreed to back the contras financially. Then National Security Council aide Oliver North, in the company of Casey and national security adviser Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane, had what North called "a neat idea." The fundamentalist Islamic government of Iran desperately wanted weapons to continue its war against Iraq. Despite its antipathy for the United States it was willing to buy U.S. arms and might out of gratitude intervene to secure the release of several American hostages then being held in Lebanon. North saw another benefit from selling arms to Iran: the money paid by the Iranians for the weapons might then be diverted to the contras. It would work as long as it was kept secret.

Word of the arms for hostages deal leaked out of the Middle East in November 1986. The contra connection was then uncovered as well. Congressional investigators wanted to know what role the president had played in the arms for hostages scheme and the diversion of monies to the contras, but either because he was stonewalling or because he genuinely could not remember what he had authorized and when, Reagan was unhelpful. He denied that he had known about the attempted swap, but documents indicated otherwise, and Reagan confessed, almost: "A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it's not." He continued to deny that he had known about the diversion of funds to the contras. Senator William Cohen, a member of the congressional group that investigated Iran-Contra, participated in two interviews with Reagan and concluded, "with Ronald Reagan, no one is there."

The Iran-Contra affair and the nuclear freeze movement undoubtedly made him more tractable in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, who emerged as the leader of the Soviet Union, declared his intention to reform the Soviet economy and pursue greater flexibility in foreign affairs, especially to move forward with arms control. At first suspicious that Gorbachev's offer to negotiate a meaningful arms agreement was a ploy to weaken U.S. vigilance, Reagan came ultimately to accept Gorbachev's sincerity, but he would not fully grasp the opportunity provided by Gorbachev's policy.

The obstacle to a full-scale nuclear rollback was SDI. At summits with Gorbachev in 1985, 1986, and 1988, Reagan continued to insist that defense against a nuclear attack could not be

wrong, especially if Armageddon loomed. When Gorbachev pointed out that a missile shield would enable the United States to launch a first strike with impunity, Reagan, who was amazed that anyone would think the United States capable of such a thing, offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets. Gorbachev thought this unlikely. He urged Reagan to agree to confine SDI to the laboratory for ten years; Reagan refused. Still, Gorbachev wanted arms reduction enough that he was willing to make cuts in the Soviet arsenal even in the absence of an agreement on SDI. The result was the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty of 8 December 1987, by which the Americans and Russians agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe. But Reagan's commitment to SDI slowed the progress of further arms negotiations.

Gorbachev then unmade the Cold War. He ended the bloody Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, released Soviet control of the eastern European satellites and the Baltic states, allowed the destruction of the Berlin Wall, wrenched the Soviet economy off its rusty statist moorings, began opening Soviet archives to scholars, and traveled the world, creating about himself an international cult far more Reaganesque than Stalinist. He brought change so quickly and with such verve that Reagan and his successors mistrusted it. George H. W. Bush, who followed Reagan to the presidency in 1989, reacted so slowly to Gorbachev's revolution that critics charged him with being "nostalgic for the Cold War." Bush finally got it and embraced what he called "the new world order," which meant that the United States would now call the shots. Meanwhile Ronald Reagan returned to California, firm in the belief that his policies had brought about the end of the Cold War but not fully understanding how. He was the last cold warrior. The Alzheimer's disease that dissolved his memory made for a sad yet fitting metaphor: a dark era had passed, and there was a world to be remade.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.* New York, 1969.

Brands, H. W., Jr. *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and the American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1988.

Brinkley, Douglas. *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971.* New Haven, Conn., 1992.

Cannon, Lou. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime.* New York, 1991.

Chace, James. *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World.* New York, 1998.

Clark, Suzanne. *Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric of the West.* Carbondale, Ill., 2000. The subtitle suggests how much the field of Cold War studies has changed since the early 1990s.

Conquest, Robert. *Stalin: Breaker of Nations.* New York, 1991.

FitzGerald, Frances. *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War.* New York, 2000.

Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War.* Stanford, Calif., 1993.

Hunt, Michael H. *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy.* New York, 1996.

Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy.* New York, 1986.

Khrushchev, Nikita. *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament.* Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Boston, 1974.

Mastny, Vojtech. *Russia's Road to the Cold War.* New York, 1979.

McLellan, David S. *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years.* New York, 1976.

Raack, R. C. *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1995.

Radzinsky, Edvard. *Stalin.* New York, 1996.

Reagan, Ronald. *An American Life.* New York, 1990.

Schmertz, Eric J., Natalie Datlof, and Alexej Ugrinsky, eds. *President Reagan and the World.* Westport, Conn., 1997.

Schram, Stuart. *Mao Tse-tung.* New York, 1966.

Spence, Jonathan. *Mao Zedong.* New York, 1999.

Tucker, Robert C. *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941.* New York, 1990.

Wills, Garry. *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home.* Garden City, N.Y., 1987.

Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; SUMMIT CONFERENCES.

Cold War Termination

Thomas R. Maddux

Most historians and foreign policy analysts in 1981 did not anticipate that within a decade the Cold War would be over and that it would end with relatively little violence and the end of the Soviet Union. Instead, they expected, like this author, to keep teaching their courses on the Cold War with new sections such as "Renewed Containment," "Détente II," and "Cold War IV." The widespread failure to remember the fundamental historical principle that change is continuous no matter how rigid and intractable problems appear to contemporaries led most historians to view the Cold War as an evolving but never-ending reality of international relations.

Historians did debate the central issues of causation, responsibility, and consequences of the Cold War as it came to its surprising conclusion. In the leading journal in the field, *Diplomatic History*, published by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, specialists reviewed many of the Cold War issues including the interaction of impersonal, structural forces such as the economic challenges faced by both sides and the relative policy contributions of major players such as President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Structural forces have received considerably less attention than the players in assessments on the end of the Cold War. There is widespread recognition that a stagnating Soviet economy definitely shaped Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* to revive a command economy dominated by the Soviet Communist Party and state. The American economy in 1981, however, also looked shaky. Reagan's predecessor, President Jimmy Carter, had battled soaring inflation and an energy crisis driven by shortages of gasoline and rising prices; Americans also lacked confidence in the face of a mounting challenge from the export-driven Japanese economy. Although Gorbachev struggled to transform the Soviet economy, the American economy revived after a severe recession in 1982 and took off into sustained growth, offering a striking contrast to the Soviet scene. As Soviet party officials attempted to maintain restrictions on use of copiers to limit the circulation of critical writings by Russians, American technology launched the next information revolution with the increasing spread of computers, from the mainframe and minicomputer of business and scientific research to the personal computer of the 1980s.

Cultural forces had less immediate impact on Soviet and American policymakers and remain more elusive with respect to demonstrating their impact on the endgame of the Cold War. Nevertheless, they shaped the long-term competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1980 the Soviet Union had fallen far behind in most significant areas, with a few exceptions such as length of time spent in space by Russian cosmonauts versus American astronauts orbiting the earth in the space shuttle. The Russians had long since lost out with respect to influence around the globe in areas such as the media, consumer products, and lifestyle. The emerging global interdependence of the late twentieth century brought increasing exposure to American television, Hollywood feature films, McDonald's, and American consumerism. As the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies struggled to keep their citizens from leaving, the United States once again became a mecca for global immigration.

The Soviet Union also had lost the ideological competition, a central feature of the Cold War since its origins. Although Gorbachev launched *glasnost* to open the door to new ideas and to reduce the remaining repression in the Soviet system as it struggled with the legacies of Stalinist totalitarianism, the Soviet leader faced a difficult challenge to overcome both the resistance inherent in the Soviet system as well as the stubborn opposition of party officials who had a vested interest in the status quo. Since Gorbachev emerged from within the party, he also had to

grapple with the increasing necessity for a fundamental discarding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in order to redirect both the economy and the political system in the direction of a European parliamentary system with respect for the rule of law and individual rights. Reagan, however, never had to make any adjustments in his vigorous articulation of America as the land of freedom, and he never passed up a chance (until near the end in 1988) to point this out to Gorbachev on issues ranging from human rights to the continuation of the Berlin Wall.

Yet these structural forces did not predetermine when the Cold War would end and how it would end. The players on both sides, as they interacted with these impersonal pressures, had the most to do with the actual historical dynamics, and the literature has emphasized the role of the players. Early American assessments written by leading U.S. officials including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d, and White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, as well as Ronald Reagan, give themselves credit for ending the Cold War. Through a peace-through-strength strategy based on increased defense spending, a shift to the new Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that posed a technological challenge to the Soviet Union, and a willingness to apply significant rhetorical and other pressures against the Soviet empire, Washington brought a successful resolution to the conflict.

The most thorough development of this perspective appears in Peter Schweizer's *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union.* Relying extensively on interviews with leading officials including Weinberger, National Security Advisers Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, and other officials who supported a hard line with respect to the Soviet Union, Schweizer focuses on the development and implementation of a strategic offensive led by William Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Casey's campaign aimed at resisting, weakening, and rolling back the Kremlin's effort to control Afghanistan, to retain a communist regime in Poland and hegemony in eastern Europe, and to increase Soviet access to Western technology and markets in order to modernize the Soviet economy and military forces. By the time Gorbachev took over as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985, the victory campaign had, according to Schweizer, significantly contributed to the problems that Gorbachev faced, so that he had few alternatives but to seek an accommodation with Reagan.

A second influential perspective puts more emphasis on the contributions of Reagan and Gorbachev and their chief diplomatic advisers, Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, than on Schweizer's hard-liners. In *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era,* Don Oberdorfer, a distinguished diplomatic correspondent for the *Washington Post,* emphasizes Reagan's shift to diplomacy with respect to Moscow by 1983 and the willingness of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to bring a fresh perspective and approach to Soviet diplomacy. Although Reagan and Gorbachev never achieved final agreements on all arms control issues, such as strategic missiles and SDI, Oberdorfer gives them credit for making considerable progress toward an end to the Cold War. He also gives credit to Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, and Secretary of State James Baker, despite their cautious initial response to Gorbachev, for managing the U.S. response to the collapse of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. In *The Great Transition,* Raymond Garthoff, a former Department of State official, shifts more of the credit for the way the Cold War ended to Gorbachev. Garthoff believes the hard-liner offensive, including Reagan's Cold War rhetoric, contributed to the resistance of Soviet officials to Gorbachev's initiatives and reduced opportunities for earlier accommodation and agreements on strategic weapons and SDI.

A third perspective focuses more directly on Gorbachev and his efforts to reorient Soviet domestic and Cold War policies. These studies have made extensive use of Soviet memoirs, interviews, and published sources and significantly enhance understanding of Gorbachev's role. In *Russia and the Idea of the West,* Robert English focuses on the origins of new thinking in the Soviet Union that came to fruition in Gorbachev's policies. English correctly notes that most of the new thinking emerged before Reagan arrived in the White House and that Reagan's military buildup, SDI, and the hard-liner "victory" campaign may have made it more difficult for Gorbachev to gain power and, with his "new thinking" advisers, implement fundamental changes in Soviet outlook and policies. Matthew Evangelista's *Unarmed Forces* and a 2001 article in the *Journal of Cold War Studies* has also expanded our understanding by focusing on Gorbachev's

political skills, which helped him persuade his Soviet critics to go along with his significantly new proposals on arms reductions, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and his goal of allowing the eastern Europeans to determine their own domestic systems.

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

All three perspectives note that little opportunity existed for significant changes in the Cold War before 1985. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union had attempted to maintain the détente relationship established with President Richard Nixon but at the same time pursue new opportunities to aid Marxist regimes. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 to restore reliable communist control of the government, the Carter administration abandoned any remaining hopes for an accommodation with the Soviet Union, most notably the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), and moved to aid the Afghan resistance to Soviet forces.

Moscow may have hoped that Reagan would follow in the footsteps of Richard Nixon and shift from a career of anticommunism to a strategy of détente with the Soviet Union, especially since the Kremlin had not achieved very much in its recent international activities and faced a mounting crisis with Poland in 1980–1981. Economic problems in Poland, along with the deterioration of the Polish Communist Party, had contributed to the rise of Solidarity, an independent labor union. Soviet documents published by the Cold War International History Project reveal the desire of Soviet leaders to avoid another military intervention but at the same time defeat the challenge of Solidarity and keep it from spreading into the Baltic states and the Ukraine.

Ideology blended with great-power Realpolitik and regime preservation in the Soviet deliberations. Although the politburo received very detailed reporting on the Solidarity movement and the extent of public and worker support for Solidarity, Soviet officials and their eastern European allies filtered the situation through their ideological categories and jargon. In reports to the politburo as well as meetings of Soviet officials and Warsaw bloc allies, "forces of counterrevolution," "enemies of socialism," and "petit-bourgeois ideology" served as substitutes for challenging analysis of the situation. During a Politburo meeting on 29 October 1980, Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov worried about a "raging counterrevolution underway" in Poland with Solidarity leaders like Lech Walesa trying to "take power away from the workers." Brezhnev and other officials also frequently referred to Western capitalist forces seeking to aid counterrevolution in Poland. When Marshall Wojciech Jaruzelski finally imposed martial law in December, Soviet officials quickly stepped up their assistance to arrest Solidarity leaders. As a member of the politburo, Gorbachev participated in the many discussions on Poland in 1980–1981 but in his recorded comments never questioned the pressure policies and the traditional class struggle analysis.

REVITALIZED COLD WAR

If Soviet leaders had hoped for renewed détente with Reagan, they were quickly disappointed by the rhetoric and policies of the new administration. As part of his transition from New Deal liberal Democrat during the 1930s and World War II to conservative anticommunist by the early 1960s, Reagan had developed a strong personal distaste for communism through his bruising battles with communists in Hollywood as president of the Screen Actors Guild and a strong opposition to the Soviet Union as the source of global communism. Reagan never endorsed Richard Nixon's strategy of détente and quickly stepped up public criticism of Moscow. In his first press conference, on 29 January 1981, Reagan responded to a question by dismissing détente as "a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims," that is, the promotion of world revolution. Reagan expanded his views in an address to the British Parliament at Westminster in 1982 with a call for a crusade for freedom and democracy that would "leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history" and pointed to the communist states in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself as prime candidates for this fate. Finally, in March 1983, Reagan used a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals to refer to the Soviet leaders as "the focus of evil in the modern world" and to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

The Kremlin resented Reagan's remarks but worried more about the campaign that hard-liners initiated to step up U.S. resistance to the Soviet empire and intensify a wide range of pressures on the Kremlin. Reagan and his advisers had argued in the campaign of 1980 that the United States

had fallen behind in the Cold War and needed a substantial defense buildup to catch up to the Soviet Union and its allies, most seriously with respect to a "window of vulnerability" related to strategic missile forces. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed a $32.6 billion increase to the defense budgets for 1981 and 1982, although Congress had already approved a 1981 budget with a 9 percent increase. Defense spending would increase from $142 billion in 1980 to $222 billion in 1982, and the Department of Defense anticipated requests for further yearly increases of 7 percent. After Congress approved the first defense budget in October, Weinberger presented a new request for a strategic modernization of U.S. forces, including plans to build a hundred MX missiles, six Trident submarines, three thousand air-launched cruise missiles, and a new Stealth B-2 bomber, and to reactivate the B-1 bomber that President Carter had canceled. Although the emerging deficit would prompt Congress to cut back the Defense Department's projected increase, Reagan's substantial increase clearly troubled Soviet officials as they attempted to ascertain the intentions of the new administration.

Hard-liners in the Reagan administration had the most influence with Reagan at the start and quickly pushed for a strategic offensive against the Soviet Union. According to Schweizer, the hard-liners, led by CIA Director Casey, the National Security Council staff under the direction of Richard V. Allen and William P. Clark, and Secretary Weinberger, with advisers such as Richard Perle and Fred Ikle, shifted their pre-1981 perception of the Soviet challenge to emphasize fundamental Soviet political and economic weaknesses. Casey frequently presented Reagan with unfiltered intelligence data on the Soviet economy that supported this assessment.

Reagan endorsed the recommendations of Casey and the NSC without much opposition from his advisers or Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who favored more negotiations with the Soviet Union than did the hard-liners. Most of the initiatives developed gradually and did not require either congressional approval or extensive publicity. Several focused specifically on economic objectives, including an effort to reduce Soviet hard currency earnings through the sale of oil and natural gas and stepped-up restrictions on the export of technology to the Soviet Union, as well as a CIA disinformation campaign to sell flawed technology and equipment to Moscow.

Along with the defense buildup, the most significant dimensions of the hard-liner campaign involved U.S. covert support for Solidarity in Poland and the Afghan mujahedin resistance to the Red Army. After the declaration of martial law in Poland and the arrest of Solidarity leaders, Reagan invoked economic sanctions against the Polish government and pursued a covert plan to aid Solidarity through financial assistance and communications equipment.

In Afghanistan the Reagan administration took over an existing Carter policy of aid to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan. Casey made numerous trips to Pakistan to bolster the government's commitment to the mujahedin. Casey also persuaded Reagan to increase the flow of arms, training, and assistance. When Moscow stepped up the war in 1985, Reagan approved an increase in high-tech weapons supplied to the mujahedin, which helped them blunt the Soviet offensive, including the delivery of Stingers, effective ground-to-air missiles that made Soviet helicopters and jets vulnerable below 15,000 feet.

THE REAGAN DOCTRINE, FREEDOM FIGHTERS, AND CENTRAL AMERICA

The hard-liner strategy certainly helped Solidarity stay viable and enhanced the mujahedin resistance. There were definite limits, however, to what the hard-liners could accomplish, especially when they attracted congressional and public attention to their aid to resistance movements against communist regimes. In October 1983, President Reagan expanded the campaign by calling for freedom against Soviet totalitarianism with aid to freedom fighters who challenged communist domination. Under this perspective, which acquired the title "Reagan Doctrine" after the 1984 election, Casey and the hard-liners pushed to extend covert assistance to a variety of movements including those in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Central America. Central America posed the most immediate challenge to Reagan and the hard-liner strategy, especially since the Soviet Union's role appeared distant and indirect with the exception of its alliance with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Washington faced the difficult challenge of how to deal with crumbling authoritarian regimes in Central America that the United States had supported throughout the Cold War. Should security and Cold War concerns receive priority or should Washington

attempt to support reform, representative government, and negotiations among the contending factions? The Carter administration had wavered on this question but ended up attempting to work with a popular coalition in Nicaragua that included the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN), which had overthrown Anastasio Somoza's regime there in 1979, and to encourage reform by moderates in El Salvador, where the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Forces (FMLN) challenged the authoritarian regime but had failed to overthrow it in a January 1981 offensive.

President Reagan and the hard-liner coalition preferred to emphasize Cold War concerns and moved quickly to step up U.S. aid to the government of El Salvador. Military aid jumped from $6 million in 1980 to $82 million in 1982, and economic aid to El Salvador tripled during the same period to $189 million. Washington also supported a moderate Christian Democrat, José Duarte, against the right and left and used Duarte's victory in the 1984 election to increase military aid to $196 million. U.S. training of El Salvadoran troops expanded and U.S. Green Beret advisers increased.

Secretary Haig wanted to go after what he considered the most direct source of communist influence, Fidel Castro's Cuba, with a naval blockade to shut off the flow of arms to Central America. Reagan's chief White House advisers, Michael Deaver, Edwin Meese, and James Baker, however, opposed any foreign adventures that would disrupt achievement of the Reagan domestic agenda, and they proceeded to keep Haig, but not Casey, from meeting alone with Reagan so that they could monitor the secretary's more aggressive Cold War scenarios. Haig also underestimated public and congressional resistance to a policy of direct U.S. involvement in Central America. Public opinion polls indicated majority support for staying out of the area, especially any U.S. involvement beyond economic aid, and the media stepped up its criticism in 1981 when a news photo revived memories of Vietnam by showing U.S. military advisers in the field carrying M-16 rifles instead of the handguns allowed under policy guidelines. Congressional reaction to El Salvador also limited the White House's options as representatives cut aid requests, demanded that the junta restrain the killing by security forces and right-wing death squads, and pushed for investigations on the killing of American churchwomen and labor advisers.

Washington faced an even more difficult challenge in dealing with Nicaragua and the Sandinista regime, a coalition increasingly dominated by Daniel Ortega and the FSLN. Washington maintained diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and engaged in discussions focused on persuading the Sandinistas to stop the flow of arms to the FMLN in El Salvador. CIA Director Casey, however, persuaded Reagan and the National Security Council to approve a covert operation ostensibly to interdict arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and to disrupt any Soviet-Cuban ties in Nicaragua. Casey turned to Argentinian military veterans to train Nicaraguans, initially veterans of Somoza's National Guard, into a 500-man force that would operate out of Honduras. House and Senate intelligence committees received some information from Casey about this operation and raised many concerns, particularly about the extent to which this force, which would be called the contras, would operate in Nicaragua.

From 1982 on, Reagan and his advisers found themselves in an escalating campaign against the Sandinistas in the face of continuing public and congressional criticism and resistance. As the number of contra forces grew, the army's Special Operations Division replaced the Argentinians and provided training, arms, and intelligence assistance. In April 1982, Washington increased its demands from the arms issue to an insistence that Managua follow through on earlier pledges to permit political pluralism and hold free elections as well as tolerate a mixed economy. Congressional concerns about contra raids into Nicaragua prompted the first of many attempted restrictions: an amendment in December 1982 by Representative Edward Boland that prohibited the CIA and the Defense Department from using funds to support anyone trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Casey's CIA heightened public and congressional criticism with operations to blow up Nicaraguan fuel storage depots at Caribbean coastal cities in October 1983 and to mine Nicaraguan harbors with small C-4 explosives that wounded fishermen and seamen and hit Soviet and British ships. Congress responded with a second Boland Amendment in June 1984 that cut off all lethal aid to the contras but not $27 million in humanitarian assistance. Casey and the National Security Council, with Oliver North as the manager of the supply effort to the contras, proceeded to turn for the next two years to other sources of funding including the diversion of funds from the sale of arms to Iran. The ensuing

Iran-Contra affair drove a number of the hard-liners out of the administration and considerably weakened and distracted Reagan in his handling of not only the Central American crisis but also direct relations with the Soviet Union.

Reagan persisted in the campaign to get renewed funding for the contras in annual battles over military and nonmilitary assistance and resisted various negotiated attempts to end the conflicts in Central America. When President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica advanced a new Central American peace plan in 1987 that called for ceasefires throughout the region, an end to outside military aid, and negotiations among all of the contending forces as well as free elections, Reagan and his declining number of hard-line advisers tried without success to head off the plan. Reagan remained adamant in his denunciation of Ortega and the Sandinistas as unreliable communists who would not keep any agreements that threatened their rule.

By the time George Bush arrived in the White House in January 1989, joined by Secretary of State James Baker, the Arias peace process had moved farther beyond Washington's influence. In February, Arias and the Central American presidents persuaded Ortega to agree to reforms and an election during February 1990. Bush and Baker moved to demobilize the contra camps in Honduras and test Arias's prediction that a withdrawal of military pressure would lead to a Sandinista defeat in the election in light of the resentment toward some of their more heavy-handed policies and accumulated economic problems. Secretary Baker also followed up on earlier conversations with Gorbachev concerning a Soviet willingness to encourage the Sandinistas to negotiate, a reflection of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations and his desire to reduce the drain of Soviet aid to Cuba and its allies in Central America. Gorbachev indicated a willingness to cut off arms shipments to the Sandinistas and urge them to accept the results of the election if Bush and Baker supported the Arias peace plan. When Violeta Chamorro defeated Ortega in the February election and a settlement in El Salvador brought an end to the conflict in 1992, Baker and Bush expressed both relief and satisfaction that the end of the Cold War had enabled them to achieve through negotiations what Reagan and the hard-liners had pursued unsuccessfully since 1981 through substantial aid, covert activities, and annual battles with Congress.

THE REAGAN REVERSAL?

Reagan looked, acted, and talked like an anticommunist Cold Warrior from start to finish in his doctrine about aid to freedom fighters and in his policies on El Salvador and Nicaragua. Yet Reagan did lower the rhetoric and move to meaningful negotiations with Gorbachev. Did this represent a reversal by Reagan, as Beth A. Fischer argues in *The Reagan Reversal* (1997)? Or did Reagan maintain a hard-liner perspective and accept concessions from Gorbachev as the Soviet leader moved to end the Cold War? Fischer suggests that by January 1984 Reagan was backing off of his hard-line rhetoric and rejection of negotiations because of a growing awareness that confrontation with Moscow could get out of control and lead to a nuclear Armageddon. Fischer points to three events after October 1983: the Soviet shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007, which not only horrified Reagan but raised the danger of a series of human errors producing a disaster; the controversial television movie *The Day After*, which focused on the effects of nuclear war on Lawrence, Kansas; and, third, Able Archer 83, war games carried out by U.S. and NATO forces in Europe that raised Kremlin concerns about a nuclear first strike to such a degree that the Soviets put their forces on alert.

Reagan was more multi-sided with respect to the Soviet Union and the Cold War than Fischer suggests. Although he never gave up on aid to freedom fighters, Reagan did respond to conflicting recommendations from his advisers and exhibited some flexibility toward Moscow before Gorbachev arrived. In the spring of 1983 hard-liners and Secretary of State Shultz encouraged Reagan to move in two somewhat contradictory directions. Hard-liners led by William Clark and the National Security Council strongly endorsed Reagan's speech on 8 March with its reference to the Soviet "evil empire" and his endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on 23 March.

Shultz disliked both speeches and SDI and did not know about the "evil empire" reference. When Shultz met with Reagan on 10 March with a well-prepared rationale for a new approach to Moscow, to his dismay he found the room filled with Clark and other National Security Council officials opposed to negotiations. As Shultz later recounted, he met privately with Reagan the next day and told him that "I needed to have direction from him on Soviet relations. I went through

with him again what I was trying to achieve. 'Go ahead,' he told me." Shultz noted that despite the green light from the president he had to be careful and keep checking back with Reagan on the "proposed route" to improved relations with the Kremlin. On SDI, Shultz indicated that he first heard about the strategic defense idea at a dinner with the president on 12 February and in a debate with Clark early in March. Shultz took his concerns to the president, emphasizing that Reagan was changing basic strategic doctrine without much scientific and technological basis or consultation within the administration or with Western allies. Shultz supported research and development consistent with the ABM Treaty and reliance on existing doctrine and the structure of U.S. alliances. Reagan, however, brushed aside the secretary's rationale and his offer to redraft the reference to SDI in Reagan's speech. The president pushed to announce SDI before it disappeared in the face of resistance and criticism from administration officials, Congress, allies, and public critics.

Shultz had more success when he persuaded Reagan, against the resistance of Clark and the National Security Council, to open a dialogue with Soviet officials. At the 12 February dinner with Reagan, Schultz suggested that Reagan meet with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. "Great," responded Reagan, although Clark and the National Security Council tried to head off a wayward president who had yet to meet with any Soviet official. For two hours Reagan and Dobrynin reviewed issues, including human rights and the Pentecostals, a small group of Christians who had been in the U.S. embassy in Moscow for five years and wanted to emigrate to practice their religion. According to Shultz, Reagan thoroughly enjoyed the discussion, wanted to be involved, and wanted to move forward. On 28 February, Moscow responded with a less than direct indication that if the Pentecostals left the embassy and went home they would eventually be able to emigrate. After the "evil empire" speech Reagan approved a response to Dobrynin, and the Kremlin began to allow the Pentecostals to leave. Dobrynin kept repeating "the less said publicly the better," and Shultz kept repeating "quiet diplomacy." From April through July, Shultz kept up the quiet diplomacy, Moscow released Pentecostals and family members, and Reagan stayed silent as promised.

REAGAN AND ARMS CONTROL

If Shultz or other advisers opened a path to negotiations with the Soviet Union, Reagan would pursue it, but he needed alternatives because the hard-liners rejected any meaningful negotiations with Moscow. Reagan always was confident that he could set aside his longtime hostility toward communism and the Soviet Union to solve problems, even the more intractable arms control issues, such as intermediate missiles (INF) and strategic missiles (START). The White House delayed resuming negotiations on either issue—both of which had been pursued by the Carter administration—until initiating the defense buildup. When public criticism, a nuclear freeze movement in western Europe, and pressure from Western allies finally prompted hard-liners, they developed negotiating positions that arms control negotiators believed were guaranteed to produce a Soviet rejection.

The hard-liner positions appealed to Reagan, and he used some of their recommendations to achieve much more than either the hard-liners or Democratic critics believed possible. On INF the Soviet Union had modernized its forces with the SS-20, a powerful missile that brought any city in western Europe within its range. The Carter administration had promised NATO allies that the United States would deploy a new generation of missiles, the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, and negotiate a reduction with the Kremlin. Weinberger's aide, Richard Perle, proceeded to develop the zero option of proposing to the Kremlin that it remove all of its missiles and that the United States cancel deployment of the Pershing. President Reagan went for the zero option because it involved meaningful arms reduction (unlike the previous SALT I and II accords, which had primarily put ceilings on the number of weapons) and because he could sell the zero option to the public.

On strategic weapons Weinberger and Perle again recommended to the president a negotiating stance that would ensure the absence of an agreement. They urged Reagan to support a dramatic reduction, particularly on the Soviet side, by insisting on a reduction in ballistic missile throw-weights that would reduce the Soviets' land-based, more powerful rockets by 60 percent but would not affect the U.S. forces. State Department specialists opposed this stance, but in order to win Reagan's endorsement they had to support a negotiating stance that would reduce launchers,

cut warheads by one third, and also include Perle's throw-weight ceiling. Again Reagan approved a position that would significantly reduce strategic missiles even as his negotiators on both sides believed the Kremlin would respond with another *nyet*.

GORBACHEV AND THE COLD WAR

The Soviet response confirmed their expectations as the Kremlin struggled with a series of elderly, incapacitated leaders: Brezhnev died in November 1982, followed by Yuri Andropov, who had a reform agenda but became ill within a year, and then Konstantin Chernenko, who was also ill. Even if Reagan had pursued more quiet diplomacy, it is very unlikely that he would have accomplished much before the arrival of Gorbachev in March 1985.

Gorbachev came to power as a new-generation leader who had both practical experience in the Soviet system as a party official and substantial exposure to "new thinking" within the Soviet intellectual elite. As Robert English persuasively demonstrates in *Russia and the Idea of the West*, Gorbachev had had long-term exposure to "new thinking" at Moscow State University (which produced many of the leading reformers), in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in travel to the West in the 1970s, in the reading of restricted works on socialism and the West, and in the development of close relations with Eduard Shevardnadze in the neighboring Georgian Republic.

After his return to Moscow in 1979, Gorbachev significantly expanded his quest for new ideas with reform economists and foreign policy specialists, surprising many of them with the extent of his reading and interest in reforms of Soviet relations with the West and with eastern European socialist countries. As head of the international affairs committee in 1983, Gorbachev interacted with new thinkers in foreign policy such as Yevgeny Velikhov, Georgy Arbatov, and Alexander Yakovlev. When Andropov appointed Gorbachev to direct a plenum on economic issues, Gorbachev brought in new thinking advisers and ideas for shaping a domestic reform agenda with some veiled international implications.

Gorbachev confirmed the suspicions of the old guard in the politburo, which had tried to deny him the chairmanship of the party. His bold ideas on domestic-economic reform, military cutbacks, and foreign policy with respect to Afghanistan and eastern Europe stimulated significant opposition. (He informed party leaders in eastern Europe, for example, that the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968, which insisted that a state that had joined the socialist camp could not leave, was dead.) Gorbachev, however, demonstrated superior leadership skills in outmaneuvering his critics through use of the prestige of the general secretary office and the politburo tradition of consensus behind the general secretary, as well as his personal skills at manipulating the agenda, persuading his critics, and replacing his adversaries with new thinking allies. In July 1985, Gorbachev replaced longtime foreign minister Andrei Gromyko with a colleague and confidant, Eduard Shevardnadze, who shared Gorbachev's belief in the need for economic and foreign policy reform. When resistance to his policies picked up in 1986, Gorbachev promoted Yakovlev as Central Committee secretary for ideology and replaced many Brezhnev supporters with new thinking advisers such as Anatoly Chernyaev as his personal foreign policy aide.

SUMMIT DIPLOMACY: GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985

When Secretary Shultz initiated discussions with Soviet officials for a summit conference between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan made a significant contribution to ending the Cold War by overruling hard-liner objections and by recognizing that Gorbachev provided new possibilities for at least a reduction of tensions and nuclear risks in the Cold War. Weinberger and the hard-liners opposed a summit with Gorbachev, but Shultz persuaded a wavering president to go ahead, especially since Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had indicated a significant interest in the reduction of the burden of strategic weapons to enable the Kremlin to stimulate economic reform. Shultz, however, failed in an effort to persuade Reagan to accept a trade-off between offensive missiles and defense with limits on SDI. Instead, the secretary found himself fighting something of a rearguard action against efforts by hard-liners to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 so that it would permit development, testing, and deployment of new space weapons.

Gorbachev also faced resistance to the Geneva summit and a significant arms control settlement, but he did start to shift Soviet positions.

Eastern European leaders and Soviet conservatives opposed any change in bloc relations and affirmed a class-struggle perspective in international relations. They pushed for an expanded offensive in Afghanistan and continued Soviet aid to anti-imperialist forces. In late August, however, Gorbachev signaled the possibility of a trade-off on offensive missiles and defense by dropping the longtime Soviet stance that called for a complete ban on SDI research, as opposed to a ban only on research outside of the laboratory. On 27 September, Shevardnadze followed up Gorbachev's comments with a proposed 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons in exchange for an agreement affirming the ABM Treaty against the development, testing, or deployment of space-based weapons. This represented the first of a significant number of concessions from Gorbachev on arms control that started to move the Soviet Union toward the U.S. position.

The summit did not produce significant movement in any of the three areas of arms control—intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate range missiles, and missile defense. It did establish the agenda for future summits, as the leaders agreed to hold two more meetings in Washington and Moscow, with regional issues such as Afghanistan and Central America and human rights issues receiving attention along with bilateral questions. Through substantial private exchanges during the two days, Reagan and Gorbachev initiated a personal relationship that started to break down entrenched stereotypes of the Soviet head of the evil empire and the American leader of capitalist imperialism. Shultz had finally brought Reagan into a policy of negotiation with the Soviet Union despite the continuing resistance of hard-liners, who leaked a letter by Weinberger on the day the president left for Geneva that warned the president against any agreements to restrain SDI or continue the unratified SALT II treaty.

In the aftermath of Geneva, Gorbachev faced the most serious challenges from critics who argued that he came home from Geneva without anything. The Soviet leader, however, moved the farthest to work out an accommodation with Washington. In January he proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and a response on INF missiles that moved toward Washington's position of zero on both sides. The prospect of getting rid of all missiles clearly interested President Reagan, who brushed aside the criticism of Richard Perle, the original author of the zero strategy, that Gorbachev was just engaging in propaganda. Gorbachev, however, had to use all of his powers of persuasion as well as the strong Soviet commitment to disarmament to persuade the Soviet military to accept his proposals.

Gorbachev went on to establish a new policy line on both the domestic and international fronts with the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in February. Before the congress, Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze met to work out a new philosophy of foreign policy with input from a number of new thinkers and with much personal struggle. They ultimately moved from Lenin's basic precept of a divided world and Marxist class struggle to a concept of an interdependent world that needed cooperation on global problems rather than an arms race and Cold War with the imperialist camp.

Shevardnadze went ahead in the Foreign Ministry to implement this perspective with new officials. Under this agenda the Soviet Union would aim at the reduction of regional conflicts, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the establishment of a security system in Europe, the significant reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, respect for neighboring states with a policy of noninterference, and the end of the Cold War with the United States. In May, Gorbachev presented this perspective to the Soviet diplomatic corps, including all ambassadors. Although this new thinking effectively abandoned the traditional Soviet Marxist-Leninist framework and any ideological rationale for a Cold War, practical implementation would be more difficult with both Soviet and American hard-liners, who remained suspicious.

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: OCTOBER 1986

Instead of new thinking in Washington, the old conflict between hard-liners and moderates persisted. Weinberger and Perle, for example, pushed to break through the SALT II restrictions that the United States still had not reached. The arms control bureaucracy also continued its usual disagreements, and Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle tossed a knuckleball into the field with a zero ballistic missile proposal. Shultz liked the idea as a way to get Reagan to agree to limit SDI, as less offense would reduce the need for defense. Only Paul Nitze, a veteran arms control negotiator, vigorously objected to the proposal as nonnegotiable and very disruptive to both the ongoing strategic

modernization program and to the Western allies. Nevertheless, Reagan went away with the zero missile proposal in July and linked it to SDI with a proposal to not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years and to continue research, development, and testing as permitted by the treaty.

After the disruptive FBI arrest of a Soviet scientific attaché, followed by the KGB arrest of an American journalist in Moscow, Nicholas Daniloff, Washington announced that Reagan would meet with Gorbachev in Iceland in fifteen days for discussions to complete arrangements for the next summit in Washington. The Reykjavik meeting, however, turned into an intense two-day summit in which a prepared Gorbachev attempted to obtain a significant settlement of offensive and defensive weapons. Gorbachev presented new proposals on START and INF that significantly moved toward Washington's position, to the increasing enthusiasm of Shultz and other officials. At the same time, Gorbachev continued to link agreement on these two issues with missile defense, insisting that both sides keep the ABM Treaty for ten years and confine all research and testing to the laboratory. Gorbachev wanted the offensive reductions, but the politburo and Soviet military insisted on the maintenance of the ABM agreement to prevent space weapons that could be used for offensive and defensive purposes.

Despite the disclaimers in their memoirs, Reagan, Shultz, and the U.S. delegation had not prepared for substantial negotiations and consequently had to scramble to prepare responses and counterresponses, at one point redrafting the U.S. position in an upstairs bathroom in Hofdi House. Reagan defended SDI and indicated that the United States would share the technology when it became available so that both sides could eliminate ballistic missiles. After discussions that continued through the first night of the meeting, the negotiators made progress on START and agreed to zero missiles in Europe for the INF agreement. SDI remained the main obstacle. Reagan and his advisers and Gorbachev began to maneuver less for an agreement during the afternoon session on the second day and more for an advantageous position with respect to public perceptions on the results. Since the United States had not prepared any offers to make in response to Soviet proposals, Shultz and his advisers put the zero missile proposal on the table. Reagan wanted to leave and suggested they take it up again at the Washington summit. The negotiators, however, went off into a series of confusing exchanges in which they ended up with a proposal to get rid of all strategic weapons—missiles, bombers, cruise missiles—until a failure to get any movement on SDI prompted Reagan to stand up and say, "Let's go, George, we're leaving."

The Reykjavik discussions initially looked like a failure, but the negotiations did foreshadow the eventual INF agreement signed at the Washington summit and the START agreement that President George Bush finally concluded in 1991. The very critical reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and Western allies to Reagan's willingness to give up all strategic weapons would have forced a U.S. retreat from this position if SDI had not blocked any preliminary agreement.

STAR WARS: THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

SDI could have been limited to the laboratory for ten years and the ABM Treaty affirmed as requested by Gorbachev without any real damage to meaningful research on defense technology. By the end of 1986 most of the exotic, space-based weapons such as the X-ray laser, chemical lasers, and other directed-energy programs had moved backward rather than forward toward the actual design of a weapons system. SDI research increasingly focused on kinetic-energy weapons, interceptor missiles fired from space or on the ground to destroy incoming missiles.

As Congress proceeded to cut fiscal year 1987 funding for SDI to 3 percent growth, versus the administration's request for 5 percent, or $3.5 billion, Weinberger and conservatives pushed for deployment of SDI despite the fact that the program remained a research program with nothing adequately tested for deployment. Hard-liners feared that if Reagan failed to persuade Congress to move to deployment, SDI would never make it out of the laboratory and would eventually be cashed as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Gorbachev.

During a prolonged battle with Congress over SDI in 1987 that intersected with the Iran-Contra affair and its damage to Reagan's confidence and political standing, the president refused to back off. In a push for a reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty that would permit testing, the White House succeeded in uniting Democrats and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the established meaning of the treaty. The Joint Chiefs

sent SDI back to the laboratory by insisting that any weapon would have to go through the standard Defense Acquisitions Board where it would have to fulfill a series of requirements starting with a statement of what the weapon could accomplish. Since SDI officials presented an initial plan that consisted mainly of theoretical components of space-based battle stations and ground-based interceptors, defense specialists strung out the review through the year and by 1988 had sent SDI back to the laboratory.

Although Reagan refused to make any deal that would limit testing and deployment of SDI, Gorbachev and Soviet leaders moved to detach the issue from an agreement on INF and START. Soviet officials had extensive experience with an ABM system around Moscow and shared the skepticism of American scientists about the Star Wars lasers and exotic technologies. They also recognized that any space-based system would be very vulnerable to attack. Yet they worried that the potential of American science and technology, combined with the expenditure of billions, could lead to a technological breakthrough and a first-strike capability. As Frances FitzGerald suggests in *Way Out There in the Blue*, information from Washington about the status of SDI research and a recommendation from Andrei Sakharov, a leading Soviet scientist recently released from internal exile, influenced Gorbachev's decision to unlink SDI from an INF agreement and START.

WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW SUMMITS: DECEMBER 1987 AND MAY 1988

Neither the Washington nor the Moscow summits achieved agreements on all of the arms control issues. At the Washington summit the leaders did sign an important INF treaty to get rid of all intermediate missiles, both in Europe and Asia. Weinberger and hard-liners joined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, resisted a START accord. Since the Joint Chiefs had never expected an agreement to be concluded, they had not worked out the force reductions that would be required by START, and they worried about Soviet statements that they might suspend any treaty if the United States engaged in SDI testing that violated the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Washington lacked an agenda to negotiate with Gorbachev, who arrived with numerous interesting proposals such as a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and joint Soviet-American support for the Central American peace process led by Oscar Arias of Costa Rica.

Beyond the INF Treaty, the most significant effect of the summits was in the public impact that Reagan and Gorbachev had in one another's capitals. Reagan played the genial host in Washington and Gorbachev swept the Washington media, intelligentsia, and congressional leaders off their feet, charming audiences with his dynamic personality, quick mind, and friendly demeanor. Crowds lined the streets as Gorbachev zoomed around Washington in a black limousine, and Gorbachev reciprocated with a spontaneous American-style movement into the crowd at Connecticut and L streets. Public opinion polls taken after the summit indicated that by giving a public endorsement of Gorbachev as his friend, Mikhail, Reagan weakened the traditional Cold War view of Soviet leaders and raised public perceptions that the Soviet threat and the Cold War had declined.

Reagan's visit to Moscow had a similar impact on the Soviet public. Reagan followed a carefully designed script with fourteen presentations that emphasized visual impressions and the emotional impact of Reagan on the Russian people as he acted out the ceremonies of the summit. Sounding the trumpet of human rights, Reagan also spoke to Soviet intellectuals and students at Moscow State University about freedom and democracy. On a morning walk in Red Square, Reagan and Gorbachev jointly held a small boy, like two candidates running for office. When asked later by a reporter about the "evil empire," Reagan replied: "I was talking about another time, another era." Just as Americans warmed up to Gorbachev, the Soviet public gathered around Reagan's visit and by the end applauded him in the streets.

END OF THE COLD WAR: 1988

As Caspar Weinberger followed many hard-liners into retirement, U.S. officials found it very difficult to recognize and act upon the significant changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Gorbachev stepped up the pace of change in 1987–1988 with economic reforms and a surprising push to democratize the party system, initially with internal changes for secret ballots and multiple candidates. The more Gorbachev pushed a *glasnost* opening, the more demands he encountered from domestic pressure groups of reformers to move toward a Western representative system that toler-

ated more than just the Communist Party and operated with a government independent of the party, an independent judiciary, a president and bicameral legislature, and respect for individual rights. Although faced with increasing conservative resistance, Gorbachev achieved politburo approval for his agenda except for a multiparty system. Gorbachev used the appearance of arms control agreements with the United States and the growing normalization of relations for additional leverage against his conservative adversaries.

Gorbachev and Reagan moved toward announcing the end of the Cold War. When exchanging the INF ratification documents in Moscow with Reagan, Gorbachev stressed that each of the four summit meetings had undermined the foundations of the Cold War. During his visit to the United Nations in New York City and his brief meeting with Reagan and president-elect George Bush, Gorbachev articulated a new international order free of Cold War competition and guided by self-determination. This further development of new thinking shaped Gorbachev's successful persuasion of the Soviet military and the politburo to agree in November to significantly reduce Soviet conventional forces and shift to a defensive strategy as well as to initiate planning for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe. At the end of the Moscow summit Reagan came close to agreeing that the Cold War was over in response to a reporter's question, but he hesitated and then repeated his favorite refrain on Moscow, "trust but verify." Later, as he left Washington for retirement in California, Reagan announced that the Cold War was indeed over.

BUSH, BAKER, AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1989

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker had participated in the evolving Soviet–U.S. relationship, but they found it difficult to keep up with the dynamic changes that Gorbachev had unleashed to end the Cold War as well as the increasing ethnic, national, and political tensions that erupted in the Soviet empire. Bush rejected Reagan's remark that the Cold War was over and initiated a strategic review that provided very little guidance when completed in mid-March 1989. Instead, the review reflected how American officials, like many of their Soviet counterparts, were finding it difficult to shift out of the Cold War paradigm of suspicion and competition. Bush, Baker, and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft preferred a return to stability and deterrence rather than the high-wire negotiations at Reykjavik and the antinuclear and anti-Soviet rhetoric of the hard-liners. Gorbachev's continuing moves to cut Soviet military spending and take Soviet missiles out of eastern Europe to support a request for the elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, however, prompted the White House to return to negotiations with Moscow in May.

Gorbachev had urged Communist Party leaders in eastern Europe to implement reforms and warned them that the Soviet Union would not bail them out with force as it had done since 1945. Poland began belated changes in the spring of 1989 when Jaruzelski opened talks with Solidarity leaders that led to an election for the new upper house in the Polish parliament with Solidarity sweeping ninety-nine of one hundred seats. Solidarity joined a coalition government in July, an action endorsed by Gorbachev, and elected a Solidarity prime minister. Bush and his advisers recognized that the United States should support Gorbachev's willingness to allow freedom in eastern Europe by avoiding giving any ammunition to Soviet hard-liners through triumphal statements on the situation or by efforts to recruit the eastern European states to join the West against Moscow.

In the fall of 1989 the pace of change intensified as Hungary opened its western border to allow East Germans to escape to the West and the Hungarian Communist Party abandoned Leninism to become the Hungarian Socialist Party. By the end of October, Hungary had become a republic with a representative government, and national elections held in 1990 voted out the old Communist-Socialist Party. In November the East German communists dumped the veteran party leader Erich Honecker, and East Germans dramatically forced open the Berlin Wall on 9 November. On the same night, the Bulgarian Communist Party discarded Todor Zhivkov, the longest-ruling party leader in eastern Europe, and within little more than a year the party joined Zhivkov on the sidelines. Demonstrations also escalated in Czechoslovakia, leading to the resignation of Gustav Husák, another veteran communist leader, and the eventual election of Václav Havel, a leader of the opposition.

By the time Bush and Baker met with Gorbachev at a summit in Malta in December, Baker and Shevardnadze had met several times and resolved most remaining arms control issues as

Gorbachev again offered to cut offensive strategic missiles without any agreement on SDI. Despite the stormy weather that kept the U.S. and Soviet leaders confined to a docked Soviet cruise liner, Bush successfully greeted Gorbachev with a series of proposals to remove Cold War economic restrictions against the Soviet Union and to step up the pace of the START negotiations.

Germany remained the most difficult challenge for Gorbachev and Bush. The collapse of eastern Europe in 1989 intensified Soviet conservative criticism of Gorbachev, with the prospect of a united Germany, raising memories of World War II, as the issue of greatest concern. With the assistance of Western allies and West German leaders, Bush and Baker successfully went to a "two plus four" negotiating approach, with the German regimes as the "two" and the World War II Allies as the "four." Despite the mounting problems that Gorbachev faced with independence movements in Lithuania and elsewhere, and increased resistance from the Red Army and Soviet hard-liners, Baker and Bush, in numerous meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev including a Washington summit in May 1990, patiently achieved a favorable settlement on Germany.

Bush and Baker had less success in satisfying critics when the focus shifted to the emerging disintegration of the Soviet Union. Liberals and moderates in Congress and the media had urged the White House to back Gorbachev, but when Gorbachev fell behind the demands for change, such as the Baltic states' insistence upon independence, these critics urged Bush to shift U.S. support to Boris Yeltsin, a former Gorbachev ally who, as president of the Russian Federation in 1991, was now leading the opposition movement seeking to get rid of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. U.S. conservatives and hard-liners, on the other hand, resisted offering any support for Gorbachev both because they remained suspicious that his ultimate loyalty was to communism and the Soviet party and because they hoped the rollback of communism in eastern Europe would reach Moscow and other communist regimes.

By moving to negotiate with Gorbachev on a growing number of issues in 1989–1991, Bush and Baker established a successful relationship with him. Although Gorbachev and his advisers wanted quicker and more U.S. support, they came to view Bush and Baker as sympathetic officials even when the latter felt compelled to criticize Gorbachev for some of the Soviet pressure used to resist independence in Lithuania. In the context of the tremendous changes that took place in eastern Europe in 1989 and the fragmentation that occurred in the Soviet empire with the independence movements in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and the Central Asian regimes such as Kazakhstan, U.S. officials achieved essential objectives and at the same time avoided excessive involvement in the internal turmoil and disintegration of the Soviet empire and communist system.

CONCLUSION

In his famous article in 1947 advocating a strategy of containment against the Soviet Union, the foreign service officer George F. Kennan addressed the issue of how to achieve a successful conclusion to the expanding conflict with the Soviet Union. Kennan suggested that a patient and thoughtful policy that blended pressure and negotiations would ultimately be successful when the Soviet Union found it impossible to hold on to its new empire in eastern Europe, given the powerful nationalist forces at play in the relationship, and when the Soviet leaders abandoned their Marxist-Leninist attachment to supporting revolutionary movements and accepted normal international relations with Western capitalist states.

Kennan came fairly close to anticipating the most significant forces shaping the eventual end of the Cold War, as formally announced by the Western allies and their new Soviet partner, Gorbachev, in 1990. The U.S. strategy of containment—pursued in different forms with different rhetoric by all presidents since 1945, and pursued with failure and excess in some areas—shaped the resistance that Soviet leaders faced, both to their domestic system and revolutionary-imperial foreign policies. The broader success of the American economy, technology, commitment to freedom, and cultural appeal also ultimately stood in striking contrast to what the Soviet system looked like in all of these areas.

The end result, however, was not predetermined. Although the general economic, political, and ideological decay of the Soviet system certainly shaped Soviet policy, different leaders than Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and other "new thinking" advocates could have resisted these forces. They could have held onto eastern Europe with force if necessary and circled the wagons against the Reagan hard-liner campaign, which faced its own problems with budget deficits, the SDI con-

troversy, and public and congressional resistance that limited the most significant Reagan Doctrine campaign to aid freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

Gorbachev and his new thinking advisers, along with Reagan and Shultz and their successors, Bush and Baker, contributed the most to shaping the endgame of the Cold War. Despite his career orientation and commitment to the Soviet Communist Party, Gorbachev made revolutionary changes in Soviet foreign policy even if his efforts to reform the Soviet economy lacked similar success. Through long exposure to new thinking ideas and advocates, Gorbachev moved as skillfully as he could to win over both Soviet hard-liners and Reagan and his advisers to a significant relaxation of the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, and the expensive and destructive global Cold War competition between the two countries. When faced with resistance at home and abroad from Reagan's Cold War suspicions and inflexibility on SDI, Gorbachev stepped up both campaigns, pushing the Soviet Union toward a Western parliamentary system and moving to abandon the fundamental Marxist-Leninist class and revolutionary precepts undergirding the Soviet perspective on international relations.

Washington policymakers certainly contributed significantly to both the way the Cold War ended and the fact that it ended. The support that Reagan and the hard-liners achieved for their "victory" version of containment, particularly in their aid to the Afghanistan resistance and to Solidarity in Poland, contributed to Gorbachev's successful reorientation of policy in both areas as necessary steps to wind down the Cold War. SDI and the defense buildup, on the other hand, probably increased the resistance of Soviet conservatives and the military to any arms control agreements and delayed Gorbachev's efforts to achieve significant reductions in this area. Yet Reagan did not remain just a preacher for the hard-liner campaign. In response to the persistent campaign of George Shultz and the overall impact of Gorbachev's personality and policies, Reagan warily but steadily opened up negotiations with the evil empire and, ultimately, agreed to significant changes in arms control. Although Bush and Baker initially stepped backward, they did engage in increasing meetings, visits, talks, and summits with Gorbachev in order to manage successfully the spectacular revolution of 1989 in eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the U.S. effort to establish a new relationship as the Soviet Union gave way to Russia and Gorbachev exited the stage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adelman, Kenneth. *The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summitry—A Skeptic's Account.* New York, 1989.

Baker, James A., 3d. *The Politics of Diplomacy.* New York, 1995.

Beschloss, Michael R., and Strobe Talbott. *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War.* Boston, 1993.

Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed.* New York, 1998.

Cannon, Lou. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime.* New York, 1991.

Cold War International History Project. *Bulletin* 5 (spring 1995) and 11 (winter 1998).

Crowe, Admiral William J. *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military.* New York, 1993.

Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986).* New York, 1995.

English, Robert D. *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War.* New York, 2000.

Evangelista, Matthew. *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1999.

———. "Norms, Heresthetics, and the End of the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (winter 2001): 5–35.

FitzGerald, Frances. *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War.* New York, 2000.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War.* Washington, D.C., 1994.

Gates, Robert M. *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War.* New York, 1996.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. *Memoirs.* New York, 1996.

Haig, Alexander M. *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1984.

Hogan, Michael J., ed. *The End of the Cold War.* New York, 1992.

Matlock, Jack F. *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union.* New York, 1995.

McFarlane, Robert C. *Special Trust.* New York, 1994.

Mendelson, Sarah E. *Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.* Princeton, N.J., 1998.

Menges, Constantine C. *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy.* New York, 1988.

Oberdorfer, Don. *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990.* New York, 1991.

Palazchenko, Pavel. *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter.* University Park, Pa., 1997.

Reagan, Ronald. *An American Life.* New York, 1990.

Regan, Donald T. *For the Record.* New York, 1988.

Shevardnadze, Eduard. *The Future Belongs to Freedom.* New York, 1991.

Shultz, George. *Turmoil and Triumph.* New York, 1993.

Talbott, Strobe. *Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace.* New York, 1988.

Weinberger, Caspar. *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon.* New York, 1990.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WARRIORS; COVERT OPERATIONS; DOCTRINES; GLOBALIZATION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Roland N. Stromberg

Collective security may be defined as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge themselves to defend each other against attack. The idea emerged in 1914, was extensively discussed during World War I, and took shape rather imperfectly in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and again in the Charter of the United Nations after World War II. The term has subsequently been applied to less idealistic and narrower arrangements for joint defense such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The shorthand term "collective security," not used until the 1930s, is more accurately "security for individual nations by collective means," that is, by membership in an international organization made up of all or most of the states of the world pledged to defend each other from attack. "Collective security" is a handier term, and it entered deeply into the international vocabulary when—from about 1931 to 1939—many hoped, in vain, that the League of Nations through its machinery for collective action might avert war by checking the "aggression" of the revisionist powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan.

EARLY HISTORY

Although the modern idea of collective security was born in 1914, it has roots in the distant past. Elements of collective security were present in some of the leagues of ancient Greek states, and likewise in the experiment of the Holy League in Renaissance Italy (1495). China saw some unsuccessful experiments in cooperative leagues of independent states in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. prior to a period of bitter warfare ending in the victory of one state that imposed unity. In his *De recuperatione sanctae terrae* (ca. 1306), Pierre Dubois produced a plan of this sort in Europe, and in the seventeenth century, Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, produced a more famous plan, which proposed keeping the peace by general pledges to defend the territorial status quo. Similar schemes flourished in the eighteenth century, when such philosophers as Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham were among the authors of "plans for perpetual peace." Among the romantic utopians of the earlier nineteenth century was Comte Henri de Saint-Simon. The little world of Swiss independent cantons proved an interesting laboratory for such experiments. Although it seldom worked effectively, collective security as a "universal alliance" of all the states within a given international system (which in former times could embrace a particular area such as China, Greece, Italy, or Switzerland) is a basic, archetypal mode of international relations, lying somewhere between total state egoism (in which states may be allied with each other in hostile or "balance of power" groupings subject to alteration) and a federated or unitary superstate that has managed to absorb the lesser sovereignties.

In the nineteenth century, the classic era of nationalism, Europe found little room for collective security. The nineteenth-century "peace movement" looked mainly in other directions. Quite vigorous in the decades preceding the outbreak of war in 1914, this world peace movement put its emphasis on arbitration, disarmament, and the growth of international law by voluntary agreement. In accordance with the spirit of the times, people felt that progress toward peace would come gradually and voluntarily. The long era of European peace embracing most of the period from 1815 to 1914, and especially from 1871 to 1914, was not favorable to the consideration of drastic plans. Most people complacently assumed that the Western world had set its feet firmly on a path that led slowly but inevitably to the extinction of war. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 reflected this outlook. Leading spokesmen of the pre-1914 period

rejected a "league of force" as impracticable and too extreme, although in the early 1900s there was some discussion of a European "league of peace" pledged to nonaggression and arbitration of disputes. Thus, for example, the French socialist Jean Jaurès suggested such a league in 1900.

In the realm of practical statecraft, the "concert of Europe" invoked from time to time was a nebulous conception without any permanent organization or specific constitution. A general congress of all the European powers might be assembled to deal with a particular crisis, as happened in 1856 and 1878, but this was really only an extension of the methods of traditional diplomacy, in which states negotiated with each other through their appointed agents of foreign policy. Multistate conferences of a more restricted membership, including the signatories to a particular treaty or convention, might also be held on an ad hoc basis, as, for example, the Algeciras Conference of 1906 that dealt with the Moroccan crisis. In such meetings of the powers there was at most a faint foreshadowing of a permanent and regularized international league or society.

WORLD WAR I AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The shock of August 1914 forced total reconsideration. The old ways of diplomacy—rival alliances and balances of power—appeared to have failed. One could no longer believe in the path of steady progress toward international order. Bolder remedies were needed if civilization was not to be destroyed by devastating wars. Numerous schemes soon proposed basic reorganization to end the "international anarchy" that, a consensus held, had been responsible for the coming of the war. The most important of these plans, beginning with Sir James Bryce's proposals in 1914 and including the American-based League to Enforce Peace, as well as the Fabian Society plan, asked the nations of the world to join a league or association of nations, and in so doing to agree to submit their disputes to arbitration or mediation before going to war and to apply penalties or sanctions to any member state that resorted to war without so doing. As Bryce put it, "The League shall undertake to defend any one of its members who may be attacked by any other State who has refused to accept Arbitration or Conciliation."

These theorists assumed realistically that the hour was not ripe for a world state and that sovereign states cannot be coerced, but they hoped that states would voluntarily accept and honor such a pledge in the cause of peace. Some critics thought that these collective security proposals did not go far enough, since states could still in the end resort to war; others felt they went too far, since no great power could or would bind itself in advance in any significant way.

Uncertainty also existed about who should belong to the league, especially with reference to the enemy powers in the ongoing war; about the mode of representation; and about the method of identifying aggression and responding to it. This far-ranging discussion tended to expose as many difficulties as it resolved. Underlying it was the urgent feeling that somehow the scourge of war had to be eliminated, under pain of the extinction of civilization, and that the old idea of "selfish nationalism" was bankrupt. Yet informed people also knew that nationalism was far from a spent force and that no chance then existed to set up a world superstate. Collective security hoped to establish a halfway house on the road to true world government. Its advocates frequently cited the analogy of a vigilante stage of law enforcement, one in which, prior to the arrival of formal government, settlers suppressed crime by forming a posse or voluntary citizens' organization.

During World War I, many organizations and individuals contributed to the formulation of plans for a league of nations. In the United States, the League to Enforce Peace included former president William Howard Taft, Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell, and a host of other prominent citizens. Lord Bryce or his colleague G. Lowes Dickinson may best be given credit for initiating the entire discussion, but an extensive British debate also featured books by Leonard Woolf and H. N. Brailsford, among others; a committee headed by Sir Walter Phillimore eventually produced an official British plan. The numerous plans varied in details, but all sought to unite the major states of the world in a permanent organization, in which they would be represented as states and which would have power to deal with their disputes and prevent war. The broad concept of a "league to enforce peace" was endorsed "not only by pacifists and thinkers, but by practical statesmen." It was the great idea of the years from 1914 to 1918, although skeptical criticism was not lacking even then.

Although there was some interest in collective security in France and in the neutral countries (the Netherlands, for example), the ideas

that were to be incorporated into the League of Nations came mainly from Anglo-American sources. It is a mistake to attribute these ideas preeminently to President Woodrow Wilson, as is frequently done. Wilson showed relatively little interest in any explicit plan for a league based on collective security principles until quite late. At Paris he played a part in framing the Covenant of the League of Nations but received assistance from his aide, Colonel Edward M. House, U.S. adviser David Hunter Miller, British advisers Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Cecil Hurst, and South African leader General Jan C. Smuts. Wilson did of course become an earnest and tireless advocate of the League of Nations Covenant.

This covenant, drawn up at Paris in 1919 and made part of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on a defeated Germany, was an incongruous amalgamation of the various ideas discussed during the war and was destined to have a disappointing life. Article 10, the most controversial and debated provision, seemed to demand of member states an obligation to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." But, in fact, the league, through its council (upper chamber), could only request them to act, not force them to do so. Some of the issues that were to plague collective security thus arose early: Is it possible to get binding commitments from states to suppress any future forcible alteration of the status quo? Is this even desirable, since the status quo may not be just or reasonable, at least not to everybody?

Although the French (for obvious reasons) asked for the creation of an international army under control of the League of Nations, this idea received no serious support. Frightened by the specter of American soldiers being summoned to fight on foreign soil at the behest of an alien organization, the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the United States did not become a member of the league, nor was the new, outcast Russian socialist state a member. Also excluded at first were the defeated powers of World War I. The league thus began life with serious, if not fatal, handicaps. In 1924 and 1925 the security-conscious states—such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had profited by the peace settlement, or France, which most feared any revision of it—unsuccessfully tried to clarify and tighten the security obligations of members.

It thus became evident that the league would have to function in ways other than as an agent of collective security standing guard against revision of boundaries. In the 1920s, Geneva became instead a place of diplomacy and conciliation, along with more modest forms of functional international cooperation. Germany's entrance into the league in 1926 signaled this change of perspective. For a number of years little was heard about plans to suppress war by joint military action; much was said of the uses of the league to help cultivate habits of negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. "Collective security" lay dormant. The events of the 1930s revived it.

American opinion in the 1920s strongly opposed any political involvement in the quarrels of Europe and was all but unanimous in rejecting an obligation to act as policeman in areas outside the Western Hemisphere. The treaties of peace executed after the war had become unpopular, and many regarded them as unjust and unlikely to last. The United States participated in most of the nonpolitical activities of the League of Nations and also played a leading part in the movement to "outlaw war" by voluntary renunciation, which culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), but it exhibited an almost pathological fear of any commitment that might entail the possible use of armed force in some "foreign quarrel." (Intervention in the small Caribbean countries lying at the doorstep of the United States might be another matter, although there was also a reaction against this sort of "imperialism.") This fear of repeating what a large majority of Americans now regarded as the terrible mistake of having entered World War I receded only slowly in the 1930s under the threat of a renewal of war in Europe and Asia. Initial American reaction to rumblings of conflict from 1931 on was to reaffirm vows not to be duped again by appeals to "save the world" by marching off to fight in Europe. The Great Depression intensified these feelings by intruding much more urgent questions of domestic recovery and reform. Isolationism reached its peak from 1934 to 1936, when legislation attempted to cut ties between the United States and all belligerent countries in the event of war, without discriminating between aggressor and victim.

THE 1930S AND THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The international disturbances of the troubled 1930s began with the Japanese extension of mili-

tary control over Manchuria in 1931. This was followed by the Italian campaign in Ethiopia in 1935 and Adolf Hitler's demands that the "fetters of Versailles" be smashed and that the German nation be allowed lebensraum (living space) for expansion. In 1936, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland (where, by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, it was not supposed to have armed forces) and in 1938 annexed Austria. Czechoslovakia followed in 1939. Faced with this determined assault on the post–World War I boundaries, diplomats in western Europe and in the Soviet Union, which joined the league in 1934, sought to make the machinery of the league an effective tool of war prevention by means of collective action against "aggression."

The attempt was not successful. Although Japan received a verbal rebuke from the league in 1933 for its behavior in Manchuria, it simply resigned from the league and did not end its forward policies in China, which may even have been stimulated by what was construed in Japan as a hypocritical insult. Following the eloquent appeal of Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie for aid, the league, under British leadership, tried to organize economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, but that did not prevent the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and probably helped move Benito Mussolini closer to Hitler's side. The embargo was not sufficiently enforceable to be effective. This fiasco, which ended in a British-French retreat from high principles to offer Italy a compromise deal (the Hoare-Laval proposals), did much to diminish enthusiasm for collective security through the League of Nations. Direct negotiations between the major European powers during the tense crises of 1938 and 1939 bypassed the machinery of the league.

But many came to believe that a more vigorous and less selfish support of the league might have checked the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany and prevented World War II. In much of the literature on the origins of the war, collective security appeared as the opposite of "appeasement," which had gambled on winning the goodwill of Germany by yielding to its demands. The lesson that one should never appease (yield to) the demands of an aggressive "criminal" nation became deeply engraved in the public mind during the grim years when Hitler's appetite only grew with eating. And the dishonor of the 1938 Munich "appeasement" did not prevent war the following year. Popular, too, was a similar thesis applied to Japan's expansion in the Pacific. Between 1938 and 1941, American opinion shifted dramatically toward the view that isolationism, or the avoidance of American responsibility to keep the world secure from aggression, had been a fearful blunder. To this was added the widespread belief that the United States should have followed Wilson's vision, joined the League of Nations, upheld collective security, and thus prevented World War II.

Critics were to cast doubt on this interpretation insofar as it involved the assumption that the league represented anything more than the sum of its parts. The league obviously commanded no military power of its own. If Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States could not see their way to thwarting Hitler's goals at the risk of war, as a matter of national interest, the league could not help them. If they would not help the league, it was impotent. The league might at most supply convenient machinery or a meeting place, but what really mattered was the will to resist, which was notably lacking in the democracies in these years. Some argued that the idea of collective security was even an obstacle to a firm policy, because public opinion at times, as in England in the mid-1930s, tended to look upon collective security and the league as a substitute for national power. Evidently, some people thought that if only the problem of stopping the dictators could be turned over to Geneva, nothing need be done by the separate nations. This clearly was a dangerous illusion.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLD WAR

World War II brought a surge of hope that a revised League of Nations, now supported by the United States and the Soviet Union and profiting from the lessons of the 1930s, might serve as the basis for a new international order. Because the League of Nations had become discredited, especially in the eyes of the Soviet Union, which was expelled from the league in 1940 for attacking Finland, it was necessary to create a new world organization. With strong support from American public opinion, the United Nations was officially established in 1945 after earlier conferences and discussions. It differed in some particulars from the League of Nations but reflected the same basic philosophy of collective security. In order to make it more effective, the United Nations Charter placed more power in the hands of the five major

states, which were given veto powers and permanent representation in the upper chamber, the Security Council, which had exclusive jurisdiction in security matters. Initially, the Security Council also had six nonpermanent members. (This was later expanded to ten.) Based according to the charter on "the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members," all of which pledged themselves to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," the United Nations endowed the Security Council with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," charging other members with a duty to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." Seven of the eleven votes were declared necessary to decide substantive issues, including the votes of all the permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. The Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and decide what to do, including taking "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." The idea of the "four policemen" (China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States), each maintaining peace in its area of the globe, was one popular formulation of this big-power conception of collective security, which encountered some criticism from the smaller countries but appeared practicable as a continuation of the wartime alliance against the Axis.

Once the war was over, amity dissolved in quarrels between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their continued goodwill and cooperation was a condition for United Nations success. The spreading post-1945 Cold War between the Soviet (and soon Chinese) and U.S.–west European blocs ensured the failure of collective security and rendered the United Nations increasingly irrelevant except as one more arena for the power struggle between the blocs.

Critics of collective security pointed out at this time that as a plan of war prevention it suffers from the defect of assuming the problem already solved. It assumes that the great majority of the world powers are naturally peace loving, and that war is caused only by the occasional transgressions of a bad nation, led into wickedness by unusual circumstances. If this is true, the problem of war is not so great in any case. Put concretely, if the superpowers could keep on friendly terms and cooperate for world peace, all would be reasonably well; if they could not, then no collective security plan could work. Under Cold War conditions, collective security's inclination to use force to defend peace—always something of a paradox—became a positive menace.

In 1950 the United States took the lead in persuading the United Nations Security Council to condemn the aggression of North Korea against South Korea, in a land left divided by the post-1945 Soviet-American rift. The apparently fortuitous absence from the Security Council at that time of the Soviet Union, which otherwise could have vetoed the resolution, facilitated this decision. A major war ensued in Korea, as United Nations forces, of which the great majority were American, turned back the North Korean "aggressors" and then invaded the north, only to encounter Chinese intervention. The paradox of calling war on this scale a peaceable "police action" struck home forcibly. Not everyone was then persuaded that North Korea was the aggressor, although, subsequently, clear evidence emerged that, encouraged by China and the USSR, it did launch an overt attack in 1950. Border incidents and provocations in an unnaturally divided land had been going on for several years, and the UN forces, commanded by an American general, Douglas MacArthur, seemed less those of the United Nations than of the United States. The armistice negotiated in 1953, which left the north-south border in Korea not far from where it had originally been, underscored the futility of the enterprise, if one thought of it as "punishing the aggressor." Although initially it was hailed as a successful application of collective security, and many continued to believe in resisting the expansion of communist power, the Korean War tended to discredit collective security.

THE DECLINE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

United Nations forces went into the Congo in some strength in 1961 under conditions of chaos and strife in that recently liberated former Belgian colony, as leaders spoke of "putting out a brush fire" before it became a major conflagration. The UN force in the Congo suffered from divided counsel, reflecting the divergent aims of the various interests involved: East, West, and Third World. The action was hardly a success and resulted in fresh disillusionment with use of the

United Nations as a military force. From this time on, "crisis management" took the form of direct negotiations between the powers concerned, or special conferences, with the United Nations usually playing a peripheral role as supplier of truce-observing teams.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization paved the way for thinking of regional resistance to communist expansion as "collective security." Created in 1949 as an alliance between states of noncommunist Europe with Canada and the United States, it was a reaction to the Soviet threat to Europe (real or imagined). American ideologists justified it as something more than an old-fashioned military alliance based as of yore on the realities of power in a world of hostile blocs. During the 1950s, it became a means of persuading the American people that they might, against all their ancestral instincts, take part in the tangled and violent affairs of the world without sullying their innocence; they would have many allies and act jointly against the forces of evil. The Cold War converted the term into a commitment to check, "contain," if not suppress the USSR and communism. Called "collective security," it was somewhat uneasily squared with the United Nations Charter by an appeal to Articles 51 and 52, which referred to the validity of "collective self-defense" via "regional arrangements." It was argued that the paralysis of the United Nations, resulting from Soviet noncooperation, forced recourse to such arrangements. In the wake of NATO's apparent success in "containing" Soviet expansion in Europe, American policy sought, with little success, to create other regional security groupings, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East.

The most traumatic international conflict of the 1960s, the Vietnam War, also had an anti–collective security fallout. The motives for American entry into Indochina initially included a feeling, derived from the collective security complex of ideas, that aggression was being checked in the spirit, if not exactly the letter, of the United Nations Charter. Behind the designs of North Vietnam to unite a war-divided country under its leadership, many saw the expansion of a monolithic Asiatic communism centered in China, and they invoked the lesson of the Hitler years: Draw the line and fight rather than allow "appeasement" to erode your position. Collective security as a factor in the crucial decisions of the Cold War is often understressed if not overlooked. It is forgotten that in Korea, then in Vietnam, the fighting was not just to check communism but to defend world order by punishing "aggression." Leaders like Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson might not have taken their agonizingly close decisions to send U.S. troops to far places without the reassuring motive of war prevention; the naked idea of simple American self-interest was not enough.

The initially small U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, joined by some forces from other SEATO members, swelled into the nightmare of major war as the conflict steadily escalated, creating a formidable backlash of public opinion against the war in the United States and elsewhere. Some of the key themes of collective security suffered severe damage in the revolution of opinion resulting from the Vietnam War (1957–1975). The so-called Nixon Doctrine announced an American withdrawal from unlimited commitments to serve as policeman in remote places. It may be added that during the Vietnam War, the United Nations was almost altogether excluded from important negotiations. At various times each side brought complaints of "aggression" before the Security Council—Laos in 1959 against Hanoi, Cambodia in 1964 against the United States and South Vietnam, the United States later the same year against Hanoi—but these resulted in no action and were employed chiefly for propaganda purposes. Both the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Paris Conference peace settlement of 1973 completely ignored the United Nations. This was unquestionably a blow to the prestige of the United Nations, although optimists might point out that the admission of Communist China to the United Nations in 1971 made it a more ecumenical body. Exclusion of mainland China from the United Nations had prevented use of that organization in matters involving Chinese interests.

The assumption of the classical collective security doctrine that "aggressors" were always wicked, rogue nations that ought to be resisted and punished, was contradicted in the notable case of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. However justified on grounds of ancient possession, redress of recent injustices elsewhere, or superior civilization, Jewish incursions into Palestine from the 1948 takeover surely constituted an aggression rarely equaled in modern history. But in the Arab-Israeli conflict the United States and most of its European allies supported the latter, making the Jewish nation virtually an ally and the recipient of

lavish support, from motives of sentiment and interest. In 1956, President Eisenhower (to the amazement of the Soviet leaders) was indeed so shocked by the case of planned aggression against Egypt of France and Britain along with Israel that a rift in the NATO alliance temporarily appeared. But thereafter the United States reverted to almost uncritical support of Israel, often voting in the United Nations with a tiny minority against any condemnation of the Jewish state.

"Collective security" is still frequently used to describe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this usage it merely means military cooperation between allied states or having allies for defense against a common enemy. Needless to say, "security" and "cooperation for security" are common terms. But, in its original sense, of a new plan for world peace based on a "universal alliance" and pledges to suppress war by joint action of all its members against aggression, collective security seems to have become a casualty of history. "The growing tendency for States to revert to a reliance on force as a means of resolving their international differences," as former UN Secretary General U Thant said in 1970, might be blamed on the United Nations itself or more often on the "selfishness" of powers that do not give it necessary support.

Revision of the UN charter as a means to improvement no longer arouses much enthusiasm; the roots of the problem are recognized as going deeper. Changes in the charter included enlarging the Security Council, but the five permanent members and the veto power remain the same. Paralyzed by the vetoes of the superpowers, the Security Council diminished in importance during the Cold War. Its concept of a dictatorship of a few big powers became outmoded in view of the flood of new, smaller states that has more than doubled United Nations membership since 1960. In the 1950s the General Assembly asserted its own right to recommend action in support of peace and security (the Uniting for Peace Resolution), but it can only recommend.

"Peacekeeping" is increasingly distinguished and dissociated from collective security, the stress being placed not on a large UN army capable of crushing an aggressor, but on small, noncombat units, serving only with permission of the host country and acting as observers of truces or as buffers along sensitive frontiers. Disputes and financial problems plagued even these forces, though they served useful functions in Cyprus and New Guinea, and on the Israeli-Egyptian border (intermittently). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than 40,000 UN peacekeepers were stationed around the world, at rather randomly chosen trouble spots such as East Timor and Sierra Leone, but—ill trained and forbidden anything but "neutral" actions—they were often pathetic. In November 2000, Indian and Moroccan soldiers of the UN force in Sierra Leone were withdrawn because they were not safe; assaulted and kidnapped, they had to be rescued by British troops (who did not plan to stay). Vows to improve this performance periodically came from UN headquarters but had little effect. Some private organizations like Oxfam, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International provided as much help. The outmoded UN membership structure allowed no place as permanent member of the Security Council for such important countries as Japan, India, and Brazil. Its own claims to internationalism were thus rather dubious.

A NEW FORM OF INTERVENTIONISM

In the last decades of the twentieth century, military interventions took a different form and were justified in different ways. Peace broke out among the major powers of Europe that had waged war against each other in the past so many times, for reasons that had little to do with collective action against aggression. The Cold War standoff between two great blocs that characterized the decades after 1945 also ended with the collapse of the Soviet communist side in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In other parts of the world, and indeed in southeastern Europe, the problem was less about armed aggression across borders than about upholding order within collapsing states. In her *New and Old Wars* (1999), Mary Kaldor described the new kind of violence as a "mixture of war, organized crime, and massive violations of human rights." Ethnic feuds that crossed boundaries, civil wars, guerrilla movements, and private armies appeared in states that were breaking up or, as in much of Africa, not clearly defined. For example, guerrilla warfare in Colombia, anarchy in Bosnia, and ethnic massacres in Burundi did not involve repelling an invasion of one nation by another. It was even hard to find an "aggressor": though blame might be placed on Serb wickedness in Bosnia and Kosovo, or on the Hutus of Rwanda and Burundi for unleashing the latest round of genocide in 1994, in fact these were ancient feuds in which both sides had been guilty many times. This did

not prevent brutal punishment of the Serbs for committing savagery in Kosovo, but this NATO action, not approved by the UN Security Council, was hardly a "collective security" success, leaving as it did the problem in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, still unresolved. When the United States and NATO decided in 1999 to condemn and then bomb Serbia for its atrocious actions in Kosovo, they chose a shocking episode of violence and genocide ("ethnic cleansing") that did not at all fit the collective security model, for here was no case of one nation assaulting another: Kosovo, like Bosnia, was a part of the Yugoslav state that Serbia headed. This was a civil war resulting from the dissolution of the Yugoslavia created in 1919.

Huge losses of life, dwarfing even those of the two great European or World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century, occurred in these new wars outside the Western world or on its fringes. A true holocaust took place in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, barely noticed at the time, conducted by a regime that Western governments recognized and evidently approved of. No one knows quite how many millions were slain, not by nuclear bombs or even guns but hacked to pieces by knives. In Algeria, a ferocious internal war took an estimated 100,000 lives, in massacres first by terrorist rebels and then by government death squads.

There were literally millions of killings in Rwanda and Burundi. So many other instances of deadly internal conflict throughout the world came into view that the public mind became saturated with them. They were usually in places formerly remote, but now very much a part of the international society, such as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, many parts of Africa from Angola and Sierra Leone to the Sudan, and so on. But they also appeared in southeastern Europe.

"Security" was not a factor in the new interventionism. Nobody thought of Serbia, much less Sierra Leone, as a threat to the security of the United States or Great Britain or the NATO powers, or indeed to anybody to any serious degree except themselves. In British Prime Minister Tony Blair's words, this was "a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated," an internationalism defined by intervention to prevent or punish "massive violation of human rights" or "crimes against humanity," committed usually by a government against its own people, or by one segment of its people against another. In the case of Bosnia, the motive for intervention was partly to limit and punish ethnic massacres, partly just to end the chaos and confusion of a region left stranded by the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The trouble with this doctrine was that its application was selective to the point of whimsy, and thus subject to the criticism of being hypocritical, even cynical. Russia did things in Chechnya similar to what Serbia did in Kosovo, but there was no thought of intervention, and only the mildest of protests, because Russia was, well, Russia, a great power still and a nuclear one. There were worse massacres in several places in Africa but no intervention. "Why do British troops help to bring peace to Bosnia and Kosovo but not to Angola and Sudan?" asked Douglas Hurd. The other problem was that where such humanitarian interventions did take place, they did little good and had to be prolonged into something like permanent occupations. (NATO and international forces entered Bosnia in 1996 promising to stay only a year; five years later they were still there with the situation almost as bad as before. Only the continued presence of UN forces prevented more bloodbaths; no legal system was in effect, and murder and gangsterism were prevalent. The punitive bombing of Belgrade left the economy not only of Serbia but also of much of the adjoining region a shambles.) British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued that a few such interventions might "deter future perpetrators of crimes against humanity," but this seemed to the highest degree improbable.

The Soviet Union's massive invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and 1980 elicited from the United States only the response of a boycott of the Olympic Games being held in Moscow, though subsequently much aid was given to the Afghan resistance. But in 1991, Iraq's attempt to seize its small neighbor Kuwait resulted in the Persian Gulf War, which repelled this invasion. Here was a classic case of aggression. The United Nations approved the response, which was overwhelmingly an American military action, although other NATO powers contributed. The Soviet Union was then in the process of dissolution, and its total disarray precluded any Russian veto. But many Middle Eastern countries remained aloof or disapproved, and the outcome was not very satisfactory. While Iraqi forces were defeated and expelled from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime that had launched the attack remained in power and the issue of how to handle Saddam Hussein became a headache and a source of divisions within the West for the next ten years.

DILEMMAS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In brief, the world seemed to be back in that state of international anarchy, in which power alone counted, from which it was to have been rescued by collective security. To sum up the analysis, collective security failed to find a compromise between national and world sovereignty because sovereignty is inherently indivisible. In the last analysis, sovereign states cannot be fully bound by pledges to act in some hypothetical future case, especially where such pledges involve the risk of war. Plans for collective security demand such ironclad commitments, or the system decays into just another instrument of national policy (as the United Nations has tended to become). United Nations actions do not supersede politics among nations; they become a branch of these politics. The United Nations only mirrors the existing international society. National sovereignties remain the basis of world politics, and in the last analysis these sovereignties will agree to cooperate only so far as that serves their interests. Such cooperation may indeed accord with their interests at times, but there is no assurance that it will. The larger powers (who, after all, must bear the major burdens of enforcing peace under a collective security system) have never been willing to give an unconditional commitment to carry out the commands of the world organization; they have always reserved for themselves some escape hatch. They have never been willing to set up an international army of any significant strength, under direct control of the League of Nations or the United Nations without strings attached. This is to say that it still is a world of nationalism and national states. If a world superstate could somehow be set up, this would obviate and supersede collective security, which in theory is a hypothetical stage somewhere in between. In the terminology of the German sociologist Karl Mannheim, collective security is a "relative utopia"—one that tries to be realistic but retains elements of fantasy.

An army under the direct control of the international organization, one that could be used without asking permission of the various member states, seems necessary to collective security; otherwise, as has been the case, it must make ad hoc requests for military contingents, which the various governments may or may not choose to honor, depending on their interests. If it had its own army, the United Nations would already be a world government, possessing sovereign powers over the subordinate member units.

One of the illusions of collective security, as was observed, seems to be that conflict is relatively rare, is a product of criminality, and can readily be recognized as "aggression" and as such suppressed by the great majority of law-abiding, peace-loving peoples. But conflict is both much more endemic in the world and much less possible to categorize as good and evil than this theory concedes. Aggression has proved much more difficult to identify and to define than collective security plans foresaw. In such clashes as those between Israel and the Arab states, North and South Vietnam, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and perhaps most others, there is great difficulty in ascertaining who in fact struck the first blow, as well as a certain aridity in making this the crux of the matter. Does aggression include indirect attacks such as subversion and propaganda? How far back in time should one carry the feud? What states were ever at war and did not each charge the other with the aggression? Historians still debate the responsibility for World War I and most other wars. In this respect, Hitler's unashamed Realpolitik from 1936 to 1941 was a rarity in the history of wars.

Although some have argued that any "breach of the peace" ought to be a signal for a "police action" by the world organization, regardless of who is responsible, or have suggested formal tests such as willingness to submit the dispute to an arbitrator or mediator, in fact the validity of the theory seems to depend on clear criteria of aggression. But attempts to reach a satisfactory definition of aggression failed in long years of debate, first in the League of Nations and then in the United Nations. Some argued that a definition is undesirable, because it could not cover all the contingencies and would be "a signpost for the guilty and a trap for the innocent." States might find themselves in the position of having to act against a friend or defend a foe. The reality of international relations in a world of particular sovereignties thus again confuses and thwarts the ideal of a pure collective security system. (After twenty-four years of effort, the United Nations Special Committee in 1974 did finally agree on a tortuous definition of aggression, but one too full of exceptions to be very helpful.)

There is also the argument of redundancy. A workable collective security order is one in which most of the powers are in harmony, and which has enough unity to agree on basic definitions, for example, of justice and aggression. It is significant that the idea has come into play in state systems

marked by considerable underlying cultural unity, as in ancient China or modern Europe. But if there is this much unity, there is hardly any need to install a system of collective security, for the problem will virtually solve itself. To create the formal institution of a League of Nations or United Nations does not alter the existing order of power and international relations.

Insofar as collective security is based on a firm defense of existing borders, it is open to criticism on the ground that this freezes the status quo. This raises the problem of justice. Many states will not accept the justice of existing boundaries, which probably reflect the results of recent war and may contain arrangements clearly unacceptable to the losers. Many groups fervently advance claims for the revision of frontiers at all times, as, for example, at the beginning of the twenty-first century with the Arabs and Pakistanis. Collective security thus was in danger of being labeled the selfish policy of satiated or victor states. (Germany consistently viewed it in that light between the world wars.) One must allow for some method of revising existing boundaries or one has condemned a dynamic world to immobility, which clearly is impossible. Proponents of collective security may urge "peaceful change," but how is this to come about? Their theory contains no specific answer. In a world without a single government possessing laws and courts that are binding on and acceptable to all, war must remain a possible last-resort remedy for injustice. Here we impinge upon arguments against pure pacifism and confront again the nonexistence of world government. It may be noted that support for wars of revolution and "liberation" runs counter to collective security's immobilism. Those who believe that there is indeed a "just war" for national independence, recovery of a region forcibly seized in the past by another state, overthrow of an oppressive government, or some other such compelling cause will defend the right to resort to it rather than submit indefinitely to an unjust peace. (In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United Nations General Assembly, with a Third World majority, voted that nations should wage war on the "racist" government of Rhodesia, not for violating any frontier, but for being unjust.)

Insofar as it is based on guaranteeing frontiers, collective security assumes not only that these frontiers are just but also that they are well-defined. Collective security was more suited to the classical European state system than to much of the world today, where boundaries are ill defined or even nonexistent, and where civil wars, wars of secession, and wars of "liberation"—sometimes with outside aid—are the most usual types of violent conflict.

Finally, the basic dilemma of collective security is—assuming its efficacy—that of waging of war to prevent war. War by any other name, including "police action," is still war. Of course, the advocates of collective security hoped that vigilant international police work performed in time would nip a potential war in the bud—stamp out the brush fire before it became a raging inferno. But experiences such as Vietnam suggest that well-intentioned interventions of this sort may result not in diminishing war but intensifying it. Intervention by outside powers, even if acting in the name of an international organization, is, after all, not usually apt to reduce a conflict. In principle, collective security abolishes neutrality; no state may stand aside and observe, all must become involved to stop a war. (The 1930s saw a considerable debate on the implications of the new doctrine for traditional neutrality.) But the venerable principle of neutrality may be valuable in confining the scope of a war. To abandon it may involve the risk of widening wars.

In this connection, "limited war" theorists and strategists advise accepting the inevitability of war while seeking to keep it as confined and limited as possible, rather than trying vainly to abolish it. Collective security has been accused of unrealistically demanding the total suppression of war, and in its anxiety to achieve that goal, blowing up every skirmish into an international crisis.

The criticisms have called seriously into question the workability of collective security, perhaps the chief idea of the twentieth century addressed to the problem of war. It was born of the shock of 1914 and nourished by the further horror of World War II. Its goal was to bring an end to the "international anarchy" of blindly competing states, acknowledging no limitations on their powers except those of brute force. Recognizing the existence of nationalism as a powerful fact not likely soon to be extinguished, followers of collective security conceded to realism that dreams of a world state are as yet wholly premature; they tried to build on the foundation of independent sovereignties a society or league of nations to which these sovereign powers would offer their voluntary cooperation, in the common interest of suppressing war. In the last analysis such a compromise between national and international sovereignty seems impossible—the gulf is unbridgeable. Those who are unprepared to

accept continuing prospects of rivalry between nations and peoples, mitigated only by diplomacy and leading intermittently to war, must face the formidable task of creating a world community able to support a world government.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bassett, Reginald. *Democracy and Foreign Policy: A Case History, the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–1933.* London and New York, 1968.

Bloomfield, Lincoln Palmer. *The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Boston, 1960.

———. *The U.N. and Vietnam.* New York, 1968.

Bowie, Robert R., and Richard H. Immerman. *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy.* New York, 1998.

Claude, Inis L. *The United Nations and the Use of Force.* New York, 1961.

Current, Richard N. "The United States and 'Collective Security': Notes on the History of an Idea." In Alexander DeConde, ed. *Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy.* Durham, N.C., 1957. Semantically helpful.

Finkelstein, Marina S., and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, comps. and eds. *Collective Security.* San Francisco, 1966. A handy collection of readings.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York and Oxford, 1982.

Goldstein, Avery. *Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-first Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution.* Stanford, Calif., 2000.

Haas, Ernst B. *Collective Security and the Future International System.* Denver, Colo., 1968.

Hatton, Ragnhild, and J. S. Bromley, eds. *William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680–1720, by and for Mark A. Thomson.* Toronto and Liverpool, 1968. A useful case study.

Hemleben, Sylvester John. *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries.* Chicago, 1943. Early history of the idea of collective security.

Howard, Michael Eliot. *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order.* New Haven, Conn., 2001.

James, Alan. *The Politics of Peace-keeping.* London and New York, 1969.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years.* Lexington, Ky., 1984.

Kuehl, Warren F. *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920.* Nashville, Tenn., 1969. A history of the American approach to international organizations to 1920.

Lefever, Ernest W. *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation.* Baltimore, 1967.

McNamara, Robert S., et al. *Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy.* New York, 1999.

Rappard, William E. *Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948.* London, 1948. A case study of interest.

Stromberg, Roland N. *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO.* New York, 1963.

———. "Uncertainties and Obscurities about the League of Nations." *Journal of the History of Ideas.* 23 (January–March 1972): 139–154. Mixes analysis with history.

Williams, Bruce Stockton. *State Security and the League of Nations.* Baltimore, 1927.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; PEACE MOVEMENTS.

COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM

Edward M. Bennett

Traditionally, colonialism is understood to refer to an area of the world acquired by conquering the territory or settling it with inhabitants of the nation holding it in control, thereby imposing physical control over the region and its population. There are two ways this condition may be terminated: the area may be freed of the control of the colonial power by allowing it to become an independent nation, or if the area is absorbed into the borders of the controlling nation.

The United States began its history as a colonial possession of Great Britain and confronted two other colonial powers in contiguous areas during its infancy and contested France and Spain for control of that territory. After the American Revolution, gradually the European powers were expelled, and the new United States expanded its influence by absorbing the contiguous territories until it controlled the area it occupies today. (Later, Russia was one of those powers expelled.) A debate has ensued concerning whether in this process the United States became a colonial power by its absorption of these areas. This discourse continues, but by the traditional definitions of colonialism, the American experience is quite different from that which characterized the European colonial tradition, as it was not until the late nineteenth century that the United States entered the race for noncontiguous colonies.

With the elimination of colonialism per se in the twentieth century, there emerged a new form, called neocolonialism, which may be defined as the establishment of a form of sovereignty or control without the encumbrance of physical possession or actual colonial rule. Here, the United States may be defined as a neocolonial power because it influences less powerful or Third World nations by its economic authority exercised through its control or preeminent influence on such agencies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. When this new colonialism began is another debatable question, but there can be no argument with the assertion that it was certainly in place shortly after World War II and may have begun with the Marshall Plan.

COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM

Colonialism began as a descriptive term and subsequently assumed a pejorative connotation. In recent times, most studies of the subject have focused attention on attacking both the idea and its practitioners but have also tended to confuse it with imperialism to such a degree as to blur the lines of distinction between the two. (Some people have argued that neocolonialism is a form of imperialism, but this is a specious argument because each has a distinct and separate existence.) It is necessary to discuss imperialism in the context of colonialism and to make the differences clear. For example, it is possible to be imperialistic without having colonies, but it is not possible to have colonies without being an empire. Thus, in the case of the Soviet Union, which exercised rigid controls over the economies of its small neighbors and forcefully absorbed within its structure Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the Soviets practiced imperialism but not colonialism. If Stalin had succeeded in holding Manchuria under his control at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union would also have become a colonial power. The United States, however, must be judged a colonial power because it holds American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, the latter formerly held as part of the strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific. Some of the islands of the trust area were not inclined to move toward independence and sought instead territorial status, while one large area, Palau, sought first a compact of free association with the United States and in 1994 became completely independent. In exchange for military base rights, which have not been exercised, the United States agreed to give Palau $700 million in

what was called "compact money" over a period of fifteen years.

A state possessing territories not incorporated within its borders, the native inhabitants of which are not granted the full rights or privileges of citizenship of the possessing state, is a colonial power. There is, however, a difference between colonizing an area and colonialism per se. For example, in the American experience colonialism did not exist while the United States was annexing contiguous areas on the continent of North America, for the areas being colonized were recognized as territories destined to be incorporated into the United States as an integral part of the nation.

While there were numerous efforts by various presidents and secretaries of state to make the United States a colonial power in the nineteenth century, none succeeded in permanently adding territory not destined for statehood until the United States formally annexed the Midway Islands in the Pacific Ocean on 28 August 1867, after their discovery in 1859 by the American N. C. Brooks. This was not, however, a true colonial venture, because the American purpose was to provide a way station and fueling stop en route to the Far East. The United States made no effort to develop the islands economically or politically or to populate them with colonists. Therefore, another definition of colonialism is that there must be a conscious effort on the part of the possessing power to develop or exploit the area in the interest of the possessor and to provide some form of government or control through colonial administrative machinery. This does not mean that the colonial power must necessarily neglect or abuse the interests of the native inhabitants of the territory taken as a colony, although more often than not such neglect and abuse does occur. It does mean, however, that the colonial nation has the power to impose its rule over the area and to assert its economic preeminence without resistance from the inhabitants of the area.

COLONIAL AMERICA

Probably no region under colonial administration received more considerate treatment by the mother country than Great Britain's colonies in North America, partly because they were peopled in the main by British subjects transplanted for the purpose of developing raw materials and markets for England. Where a colonial administration was imposed on an already existing and alien population, treatment of the native residents was less benign and generally considered more degrading by those thus possessed, depending on their level of civilization and organization at the time of conquest or occupation. For example, in the areas where Islamic or Asian culture, religion, and laws had existed for a thousand or more years there was often fierce resistance to being subjected to colonial status, whereas in parts of Central Africa, New Guinea, and Borneo, where the native inhabitants were less developed in an economic and material sense, the resistance was less prolonged or nonexistent.

If the American colonists were treated more as equals than most, they also resented more than most that they were not accorded exactly equal status with Englishmen who had not emigrated to the colonies. Therefore, when they rebelled and gained their independence, they had a particular dislike for the very concept of colonialism. Representatives of the new United States wrote their prejudices into the Constitution in 1789, insisting that new acquisitions must become states after securing sufficient population and complying with the laws of the land. This anticolonialism continued as the preeminent view of Americans and their government until the end of the nineteenth century when the new manifest destiny seized the popular imagination and propelled the United States into the race for colonies.

EXPANSIONISM AND MANIFEST DESTINY

When John L. O'Sullivan coined the term "manifest destiny" in 1845, it referred to the "destiny" of the United States to occupy and develop the American continent because of its superior institutions and form of government. Relative to its later counterpart, the "old" manifest destiny provided a modest program for the development and population of contiguous areas to the then existent United States. The new manifest destiny at the end of the nineteenth century bespoke a certain arrogance, since it claimed for Americans a superior system of government, a superior culture, and a superior race destined to carry mankind to the highest pinnacle of achievement. Many of the adherents of this philosophy extolled Yankee capitalism as part of the superior culture.

A man worthy of the task of educating the nation to the needs of expansion appeared in the

form of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose major work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* (1890), extolled the virtues of a big navy as the route to national greatness—which required colonies to extend the defense perimeters of a great nation, and a merchant marine to carry trade to and from the colonies that would be defended by the navy. Mahan's great fear was a forthcoming contest with a rising China, and by means of its navy he wished to put the United States in a position that would keep China confined to the Asian continent. In numerous books, articles, speeches, and through his classes at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Mahan bombarded Americans with his perception of the need for colonies. Ironically, while his impact was great in the United States, before World War I it was possibly even greater in Germany and Japan. Mahan was not nearly as interested in colonies for their commercial value as for their strategic value, but commerce became a selling point to attract a broad segment of the American public.

Social Darwinism added a sinister bent to the American urge for colonial expansion. American exponents of this pseudoscientific philosophy espoused by the Englishman Herbert Spencer adapted the concept of the survival of the fittest to the new manifest destiny, urging the spread of the Anglo-Saxon race and system of government to the less fortunate peoples of Asia and the Far Pacific. Such proponents of expansion for security motives as Theodore Roosevelt might stress the strategic value of port facilities in the Philippines, but they were drowned out by the more flamboyant spokesmen like Senator Albert Beveridge, who demanded annexation of the whole Philippine archipelago. Roosevelt warned President William McKinley that it was feasible to hold a military naval base to protect American interests in Asia, but possession of the whole of the Philippines would be a commitment that the American people would not support in the long run. His advice was ignored. Again in 1907, Roosevelt referred to the Philippines as an Achilles' heel, which should be given at least nominal independence at the earliest possible moment.

Various answers have been proposed for why Americans, with an anticolonial bias deeply ingrained in their political system, turned to colonialism, or, in other words, what the cause was of the development of the new manifest destiny. Obviously, social Darwinism and the hold that it established on the opinion makers in the United States provide one of the many answers. Richard Hofstadter ascribed America's outward thrust for colonies to what he called the psychic crisis. In *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (1965) he argues that the severity of depressions of the period created fears about radicalism that caused the upper-middle and upper classes in the United States to look for some diversion from internal crises, and they found relief by focusing on the expansionist issue. Restless energies, which had concentrated on internal development in the first century of American history, turned in some degree to external adventures, such as Frederick Jackson Turner feared they would with the closing of the frontier in 1890. Missionary enthusiasts saw fields available for the spread of Protestant doctrine. Idealists dreamed of lifting the yoke of European monarchists from the Western Hemisphere and then also from Asia. Some proponents of the Spanish-American War hoped to reunite the North and the South through this uplifting national endeavor. A search for markets motivated some enthusiasts for annexation of the Philippines. A desire to be included among the nations of great powers, which required colonial possessions in the late nineteenth century, proved yet another component to the expansionist movement. But Hofstadter's main emphasis in the psychic crisis rests on internal stimuli for external policy, not the least of which was the contest for political position as each of the major parties struggled to become the repository of public confidence.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

In a perceptive study of Sino-American relations pertaining to Manchuria in the period 1895–1911, Michael H. Hunt examines the forces that worked toward American involvement in China. He stresses the misperceptions that guided both powers' views of one another and their vital interests. He sees racism or ethnocentrism along with excessive provincialism as contributing factors on both sides, keeping the Chinese and Americans from seeing their true interest. Contrary to a number of writers who attempted to discover a carefully developed imperial plan underlying American moves in Asia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, Hunt found American imperialism to be ill-defined or haphazard in its goals. Many policymakers dreamed of cooperation with China in preserving and devel-

oping Chinese nationalism and of profiting by trade with this emergent nation. Opportunities for such cooperation existed but foundered on mistrust and misunderstanding.

An important conclusion that emerged from this study was Hunt's observation that while imperialism was in part a motivating force for a number of Americans promoting U.S. involvement in Manchuria, with some even demanding territorial concessions, the government dragged its feet on implementing imperial plans, did not stand firm on economic penetration, laid its faith in the open door, and criticized China for the failure of American policy. The Americans asked why the Chinese did not stand up to the powers trying to carve out spheres of influence, especially when the Americans gave them the Open Door policy to use as a weapon to deny special rights, while the Chinese asked why the Americans did not help to enforce the open door with more than words. Hunt also reinforced much of Hofstadter's argument concerning the importance of the psychic crisis as an influence on American foreign policy and the impetus to "look outward" as an escape from domestic problems.

George F. Kennan, the historian-diplomat, argued cogently for the idea that the legalistic-moralistic tradition of the United States accounted for adventures in imperialism without commensurate understanding of the burdens or responsibilities of empire by most Americans and some policymakers, especially President McKinley and his third secretary of state, John Hay. Hay, who assumed office on 30 September 1898, the day before the peace commission met in Paris to determine the settlement of the Spanish-American War, spoke the language of the new manifest destiny: "No man, no party, can fight with any chance of final success against a cosmic tendency; no cleverness, no popularity avails against the spirit of the age." Hay was a determined annexationist, but more significantly he was the author of the Open Door policy, proclaiming the need and obligation of the powers involved in Asia to maintain the open door to trade in China and the maintenance of China's territorial integrity. Later historians accused Hay of fomenting through the Open Door policy a kind of imperialism, one that denied the need for territory and promoted instead economic exploitation of areas not strong enough to resist it.

Kennan said Hay did not understand the far-reaching commitments assumed under the Open Door policy. It was part of the effort to ensure U.S. participation in the external world by legalism and appeal to the moral conscience of Americans defending China against the assault of the great powers at no cost save legal definition of the obligations of the powers. This is probably true as far as it goes, but it also was intended to guarantee the entrance into the Asian world of American power and influence through a door Hay and others considered to have been opened by the acquisition of the Philippine Islands. That he became disillusioned by the inability and ineffectiveness of the United States to win support for the open door does not in any way diminish his responsibility for it. Hay opened not a door but a Pandora's box with his policy, which the United States was to pursue through a tortuous maze to participation in the Pacific phase of World War II.

Marilyn Blatt Young, in her study of U.S. China policy from 1895 to 1901, corroborates much of Kennan's viewpoint on the inefficacy of open door diplomacy, the difficulties inherent in the legalistic-moralistic perspective that permeated the Department of State, and the tendency to be more concerned with chauvinistic interests than national interests. In addition, she points out the difficulties that plagued both China and the United States because of the view each held of the other as barbarians and the attendant implications of racism stemming from the perception of social Darwinism, which gained credence in the late nineteenth century. If imperialism was the American objective, it was so poorly contrived and so reliant on rhetoric and half-baked schemes failing of genuine government support as to be ineffectual.

Kennan was one of the early and chief spokesmen for the realist perspective in assessing right conduct in America's foreign relations and ascribing colonial expansion to a lack of realism in the formulators of the policy. Hay, Beveridge, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others who promoted the idea of empire for the United States failed to take into consideration, according to Kennan, the pervasive influence of anticolonialism in the United States, and failed to advertise the cost of empire to the American people, who were unwilling to bear the expense of defending what they had won by war or annexation. Believing that the Filipinos would welcome them with open arms, Americans were flustered and embarrassed when they were greeted instead with open rebellion. As soon as the empire had been acquired, agitation began to get rid of it, with mixed results. Incorporated territories (Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico) were retained

without much question. Where there was a desire to adhere to American protection (for example, American Samoa), responsibility was ultimately accepted (February 1929); but the Philippines demanded independence, and by means of the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934) were promised independence in 1944, which was postponed until 1946 because of Japanese occupation of the islands during World War II. The Virgin Islands, purchased from Denmark in 1917, became a U.S. territory, while other islands, too small for incorporation but important strategically, continued as possessions, such as Wake and Johnston islands. At the end of World War II, various Pacific Islands south of Japan—the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, which included Okinawa, and the Daito Islands, which were captured from Japan during the war—were later returned, the first three groups in 1968 and the rest in 1972. But during that time span they were under American rule. The last territories considered for annexation by an incorporation agreement were part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, under U.S. supervision as a United Nations trusteeship, including the Marshall, Caroline, Mariana, and Palau islands. Parts of the Caroline and Mariana islands asked for incorporation in 1975. It was determined in 1986 to grant the Caroline and Marshall islands sovereignty in 1986 and, as noted earlier, the Palau Islands in 1994.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. COLONIALISM

Realist and traditionalist historians have usually judged that the United States entered the colonization business by the back door at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries and could not wait to exit by the same route because being a colonial power was embarrassing and outside the American tradition. For example, in the traditional school, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Thomas A. Bailey, and Julius W. Pratt held such views, while among the realists Norman A. Graebner and George F. Kennan agreed to the extent that colonialism was not and did not become a part of the American tradition. Another group of historians, the New Left, argued that colonialism was a conscious expression of American capitalism, which had always been the determining force in American foreign policy and merely reached a conscious level of expression in colonialism. William Appleman Williams argued that colonialism was merely one phase of American imperialism, which became passé when it was discovered that economic imperialism that penetrated other areas by the force of dollars was superior to the actual possession of the territories that the United States wished to dominate. According to Williams and those of his persuasion, dollar diplomacy became the preeminent source of imperialism because it was easier to maintain, less embarrassing, and made it possible to eliminate the bother of colonial administration. But colonialism itself was merely an extension of the American experience and not an aberration.

One of the most respected historians associated with the New Left, Walter LaFeber, argued that there was no break in tradition. While he emphasized the economic forces behind the new manifest destiny, he recognized that other forces played a part in promoting it. He insisted that colonialism was part and parcel of the American experience, all of which was preparing the way for the surge to overseas colonial possession as a natural extension of the colonial spirit developing from the outset in America. One of the few historians normally classed in the realist tradition, Richard W. Van Alstyne, agreed with at least part of the New Left assessment that there was no break in the American pattern of expansion. According to Van Alstyne, the westward movement itself was an imperial endeavor preparing the way for further imperialism when the continent was filled or occupied.

These examples could be extended to include a number of other prominent diplomatic historians who have sided with the innocent victim-of-circumstances view of American colonial expansion versus the concept of the planned and persistent imperial thrust. Thus, the debate over how and why the United States became a colonial power at the end of the nineteenth century rages on, with definitive answers lying in neither camp.

It seems prudent to assume that like all significant events in the world's development there were many causes for American colonialism. Economic determinists assess greed or material benefits deriving from colonial possession as the determinate cause. This does not explain the correspondence of such advocates of the colonial experiment as Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, who laid stress on the importance of prestige and great-power status for the United States resting on the needs of security, which is or should be the primary consideration underlying the motivation for formulators of foreign policy.

Realist historians tend to examine colonialism as the result of some elements of the psychic crisis, the security motives, the spread of American industry and commerce, emotional appeals to liberal humanitarian objectives, social Darwinism, nationalism, and "egoistic nationalism," a term applied by the political scientist Robert E. Osgood to explain positions taken by Lodge and Beveridge, who flamboyantly expressed American national destiny without carefully examining the consequences. The traditionalists have been more inclined to focus on the idea of the aberration of anticolonial liberal democratic ideals. In some degree they are all correct, but because the realists take into account a multiplicity of factors arguing for colonial expansion and the retreat from colonialism that followed, they would appear to provide the most complete explanation.

Of course, there are also Marxist interpretations carried to the level of prediction by Lenin, who argued that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism, which would lead to the most flagrant exploitation of proletarians and to the ultimate collapse of capitalism as imperial rivalries led to struggles for markets terminating in enervating wars. What Lenin did not foresee was the Soviet Union's entrance into the imperial grouping through such practices as the economic exploitation of the states under its sway. While condemning the United States and other Western powers, historians of the Marxist persuasion first rationalized Soviet behavior and claimed there was not exploitation, or else dropped Russia as the exemplar of communist or Marxist principles and raised Communist China as a new model. Marxists and other economic determinists have also tended to lump together the Western colonial powers in defense of one another's interests and in support of racism, as in the case of American support of France in Algeria and Indochina, and of South Africa and Israel. This ignores Franklin D. Roosevelt's frequently expressed anticolonialism. It also overlooks such changes in position as the Department of State's shift concerning American support of South Africa until the apartheid regime was overthrown and replaced by an electoral process that allowed enfranchisement of blacks, permitting Nelson Mandela to become the first black leader of South Africa.

Ironically, while racism or ethnocentrism has undeniably played a determinant role in both colonialism and imperialism and the powers that practiced them have been justly criticized for the practice, those who were its victims have generally not illustrated a much better record in their treatment of other races or ethnic groups over whom they have been able to establish control. Fostered by the efforts to break free of colonial domination, virulent nationalism has led to extremist attitudes on the part, for example, of Arabs toward Jews, and Jews toward Arabs; of neighboring African tribes struggling to achieve preeminence over other tribes inside the borders of new states; of Chinese toward Tibetans and Indians; and of Indians toward Pakistanis and Pakistanis toward Indians. While this list is incomplete, it is still impressive of the evidence that the power to abuse is confined to no particular race. Perhaps the problem lies not in racism per se so much as in the corrupting influence of absolute power over another people. Some historians have attempted to identify racism as a phenomenon of one socioeconomic group exclusively or to whites versus other races, as though the problem would be eliminated if the world were socialist or the whites lost influence to the other races. They have not met the real challenge, which is that abuse rests with unrestrained power.

Ethnocentric behavior is a form of racism, which has permitted the Japanese to treat others of the yellow race as inferior when they held imperial control of the Chinese and the Koreans, and the Chinese to do the same when they have held similar power over Tibetans. The same phenomenon has permitted various tribal groups in Africa to persecute other tribes and the others to retaliate in kind. Ethnocentrism permitted Great Russians to maintain that their "little Slav brothers" inside and outside Russia's borders have needed special tutelage by their betters. Often ethnic bias is combined with religious bigotry, which accounts in part for the atrocities of the 1990s in Yugoslavia and the continuing contest in Ireland. What made racism identifiable with colonialism and imperialism was the unrestrained power of the colonial and imperial nations to abuse those over whom they held dominance. The decline of colonialism has not eliminated the problem, for the nationalism that grew in a virulent strain in the places formerly under colonial control has bred a similar virus.

Admittedly there are still areas that may be defined as colonial possessions, but generally, at the beginning of the twenty-first century they are headed for either incorporation within the possessing state, autonomous status within some sort of confederation like the British Commonwealth, or independence. For example, in some cases

there is the fiction of independence or autonomy, as in the continued possession of Samoa by the United States; French colonial administration of Martinique, St. Pierre, and French Guiana; and British control of such places as the Falkland Islands. There are, however, very few vestiges of colonialism left.

This, however, does not mean the end of imperialism, which has taken many forms. Economic penetration of underdeveloped areas has become a competitive replacement for colonialism and is absorbing the energies of the former colonial powers. Added to this form of exploitation of resources and capital control is a new element—the oil-rich Arab states that have emerged from colonial status and exhibited all the symptoms of nationalism and desires for political power they condemned in their former imperial masters. Colonialism is virtually dead, but imperialism continues as those nations with the economic or military power to perpetuate it have refused to give up the practice.

NEOCOLONIALISM

There is one more area which must be considered and that is neocolonialism. What this is depends on who is defining it. Socialist or communist writers have defined it as the efforts of the former colonial powers to maintain colonial control by other means. This definition lacks precision, as some of the neocolonial powers were in fact previously colonies, such as the United States. A largely accepted definition of neocolonialism is as follows: it includes retention of military bases, exploitation of resources, preferential trade treaties, imposed unification of colonies, conditional aid, and defense treaties. It also includes artificially created countries or combining countries into a group or federation. However, this grouping of countries is ill-defined in terms of whether they represent neocolonialism or not, as some of the Third World countries created in such combinations contend they are not dependencies in any way, although they may retain economic ties with the metropolitan power that previously held sway there.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Easton, Stewart Copinger. *The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism: A Historical Survey from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Present.* New York, 1964. Examines the motives and processes of colonial expansion and development in the nineteenth century and traces the reasons for the decline of colonialism and what happened to the colonial areas through 1964.

Graebner, Norman A., ed. *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1964. Argues that the new colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century was as much motivated by a quest for prestige as for economic advantages and that strategic position for security was always a part of the American strategy.

Hunt, Michael H. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* New Haven, Conn., 1973. Focuses on the attempts of the Chinese to use the United States to bolster defense of China's frontiers.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy: 1900–1950.* Chicago, 1951. Expanded edition, Chicago, 1984. A series of lectures for the Walgreen Foundation at the University of Chicago in 1950; provides a realist viewpoint on the development of American foreign policy at the turn of the century.

Kupchan, Charles A. *The Vulnerability of Empire.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1994. Examines the structure of empires and in the case of the United States gives security motives for the foundation of American neocolonialism.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1963. The author is more inclined to credit motives other than economic as contributing factors to America's colonial experiment, but argues that the empire was consciously acquired as a part of the traditional role of expansionism in American history.

Morgan, Dan. *Merchants of Grain.* New York, 1979.

Obadina, Tunde. *The Myth of Neo-Colonialism* (www.afbis.com/analysis/neo-colonialism.html). Provides a very perceptive assessment of the arguments for and against colonialism in its influence on African nations.

Pratt, Julius W. *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands.* Baltimore, 1936. The first important study that submitted the war and the imperial thrust to a multicausationist analysis.

Stuart Peter C. *Isles of Empire: The United States and Its Overseas Possessions.* Lanham, Md., 1999. Clearly defines the continuing debate over whether the United States is or has been a true colonial power and concludes it is and was but not without internal dissent over the issue.

Tompkins, E. Berkeley. *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920.* Philadelphia, 1970. A careful tracing of the debate over whether the United States should assume an empire.

Van Alstyne, Richard Warner. *The Rising American Empire.* New York, 1960. Argues that imperial expansion was part of American historical development and disagrees with the traditionalists that it was a departure from tradition.

Verlinden, Charles. *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization: Eleven Essays with an Introduction.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1970. Translated by Yvonne Freccero, this is a good description of the beginnings of colonialism in the fifteenth century and offers some explanations for its development in Western civilization.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society.* New York, 1969. Presents the United States as imperialistic from its inception and the colonial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century as a further expression of the traditional posture of an economically oriented society.

Young, Marilyn Blatt. *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901.* Cambridge, Mass., 1968. Does not believe the Open Door policy was effective, in part because the Department of State did not limit application of the policy to the extent that the United States was willing to enforce it.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; IMPERIALISM; ISOLATIONISM; MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS; OPEN DOOR POLICY; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Robert David Johnson

Executive agents dominated the international environment into which the newly independent United States entered. Absolute monarchs ruled in Prussia, Russia, and Austria, vested with nearly absolute control of their nation's conduct in world affairs. In France, the Estates-General had no effective voice in foreign policy. And even England, despite the growth in parliamentary power following the Glorious Revolution, maintained the fiction of executive unilateralism on national security matters.

By producing a government that vested substantial foreign policy powers in an elected legislature, the American Revolution truly was revolutionary. But the complicated structure established by the Constitution provided few clear boundaries separating Congress from the president, resulting in an almost constant struggle between the two branches. Apart from this internal contest for power, a few patterns have remained constant over most of American history. First, periods of divided government (in which party or ideological gulfs separated the two branches)—the 1850s, the late 1910s, the late 1960s and 1970s—have produced the most spectacular clashes between Congress and the president. But the more substantial shifts in power, usually to the disadvantage of Congress, have come when one party, normally operating with effective presidential leadership, has firmly controlled both branches of government. Such was the case under Thomas Jefferson at the beginning of the 1800s, William McKinley at the end of the century, Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, and Lyndon B. Johnson during the mid-1960s. Second, because Congress has tended to feature more dissenting voices, of both the left and the right, when the legislature has exerted its influence it frequently has pushed U.S. foreign policy toward ideological extremes. Finally, the concept of congressional power has been an inherently flexible one. While the abilities to declare war and to approve treaties are the most obvious grants of foreign policy authority the legislature received, Congress has more consistently made its presence felt on international questions through other tools, especially the appropriations power.

LEGISLATIVE POWER IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA

The revolutionary era bequeathed an appropriately ambivalent record regarding the legislative role in foreign affairs. The new country's first government, the Articles of Confederation, granted all international authority in the Continental Congress. But this structure proved awkward, and on two occasions the Congress divested itself of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy by appointing a secretary of state for foreign affairs. At the state level, too, executive power over militias rebounded to some degree as the revolutionary war proceeded. Finally, almost all who served as delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed that the Articles regime could not permanently protect the weak state from national security threats.

The convening of the Constitutional Convention thus coincided with a period of intellectual ferment regarding the proper executive-legislative balance in foreign affairs. It came as little surprise that the resulting document gave neither branch clear-cut dominance on international matters, but it seemed as if Congress would have the predominant voice in the new government's foreign policy. For instance, quite beyond the power to declare war, the legislature received the commercial powers (important given the framers' belief that economic affairs would dominate post-revolutionary international relations) and the ability to issue letters of marque (the eighteenth-century equivalent of a right to wage undeclared war). Yet legal scholarship has never developed a consensus on the pre-

cise extent of Congress's warmaking power, partly because the Constitutional Convention's Committee on Style changed the Constitution's wording from giving Congress the power to "make war" to the power to "declare war."

Beyond the warmaking issue, the question of constitutional intent grows even murkier. Several framers, notably Gouverneur Morris and James Madison, described the appropriations power as the ultimate guarantee of congressional predominance in foreign affairs. But the experience of the treaty-making clause (where, at the last minute, the framers involved the executive in the process after initially planning to grant all treaty-making power to the Senate) suggests that the intended balance between the two branches changed in the president's favor as the Constitutional Convention proceeded. Memories of the chaotic and indecisive foreign policy of the Confederation period may very well have caused the framers to reconsider congressional dominance in international affairs.

The diplomacy of the early Republic, however, featured a much weaker legislative role than even the most ardent advocates of executive authority could have anticipated. In a variety of initiatives, George Washington asserted executive primacy. His handling of the nation's first treaties—with the Indian nations and then Jay's Treaty with England (1795–1796)—decreased the Senate's advisory capacity. His proclamation of neutrality in the wars of the French Revolution and his response to the revolt in Haiti strengthened the executive's hand in interpreting treaties already on the books. When Congress investigated Arthur St. Clair's disastrous military defeat by Indians on the Ohio frontier in November 1791, Washington established a precedent by invoking executive privilege so that he could withhold documents from Congress.

Although rhetorically committed to a strong foreign policy role for Congress, Thomas Jefferson also articulated a domestic agenda that aimed to forestall the corrupting effects of industrialization through territorial expansion and overseas commerce. When forced to choose between strict constructionism and his ideals, he consistently selected the latter. The most spectacular case was the Louisiana Purchase, but the most constitutionally significant came in the wars against the Barbary states—North African states whose piracy threatened Jefferson's vision of the United States carrying on an active worldwide commerce in agricultural goods. The president undertook a naval campaign without a direct declaration of war, and his policy would be cited for generations to come to justify unilateral presidential warmaking. In addition, Jefferson's effective leadership of the Republican legislative majorities allowed him to bypass a rather supine Congress on foreign policy matters. Even James Madison, who justifiably lacks a reputation as a strong president, successfully expanded executive authority. Most scholarship now downplays the significance of congressional "warhawks" such as Henry Clay and John Calhoun in forcing the president's hand to enter the War of 1812. Moreover, beyond European affairs, Madison retained primacy over policy toward the revolts in Spanish America. He consistently opposed extending diplomatic recognition to the rebellious colonies, which, because the Senate had power to confirm all ambassadors, would have involved the legislature in Latin American policy. Instead, Madison relied on private agents, unauthorized by Congress, and thus expanded executive power even further.

In contrast to such executive assertiveness, congressional attempts to establish a foothold in international affairs floundered. As Washington demonstrated, the treaty-making power did not guarantee a clear role for the Senate in making foreign policy. At the same time, the failure of House Republicans to block appropriations to implement Jay's Treaty provided the first in a series of unsuccessful attempts by the lower chamber to increase its international role. That this setback established a precedent, however, would only gradually emerge; over the next quarter century, factions within the House repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of executive predominance in foreign policy. But such initiatives, emanating from arch-Jeffersonian forces around Albert Gallatin in the 1790s, the Federalists in the early 1800s, and the small band of "Old Republicans" led by John Randolph in the 1810s, all fell well short of majority support.

IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Why, then, did what appeared to be a constitutional structure evenly divided between the two branches so quickly tip in favor of the executive? The legacy of the colonial and revolutionary eras played a key role, as did the increasing professionalization of U.S. foreign policy. So, too, did the national security threat posed by the wars of the

French Revolution. Perhaps most important was the intimate link between international issues and the first party system, which caused most contentious foreign policy questions to be debated along partisan rather than institutional lines. Not surprisingly, therefore, the presidency of John Adams, characterized by a closely divided Congress and contentious relations between the two branches, broke relatively little new ground in terms of altering the legislative-executive relationship, at least in the long term. The last Federalist president, for example, made sure to obtain congressional approval for the technically undeclared Quasi-War with France.

The War of 1812 transformed both the international and domestic environment, and in the process it altered the nature of the legislative-executive relationship. In the international arena, the Treaty of Ghent, followed closely by the Rush-Bagot agreement demilitarizing the Great Lakes and the Adams-Onís Treaty obtaining Spanish Florida, ended any credible European threat to the country's survival. Domestically, the unity between the executive branch and a majority of the legislature did not survive the 1820s schism among the Jeffersonian Republicans. In this new context, members of Congress began using foreign policy issues to obtain political advantage over the executive. One example came in 1817 and 1818, when Henry Clay attempted to force diplomatic recognition of the Spanish-American republics through direct congressional action. Clay believed that the United States, as a state founded in revolution itself, should assist other colonies attempting to win their freedom. But the speaker of the House also realized his initiative would embarrass his chief rival for the presidency, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, and thus might work to his political benefit. Adams proved the more skillful politician, however, a trait he demonstrated again six years later when he discerned the electoral merit in a unilateral U.S. declaration opposing European recolonization in the hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine). Partisan concerns also appeared prominently in the first major foreign policy fight between the two branches during Adams's presidency, the resolution to obtain congressional backing of his effort to send U.S. delegates to the 1826 Panama Congress. A Senate filibuster delayed the appropriations necessary to fund the delegates' mission.

These skirmishes set the stage for the period between 1844 and 1860, which featured the most clear-cut intersection of partisan, institutional, and ideological battles matching Congress against the president. By 1860, the legislature's power on foreign policy reached, arguably, its highest point in American history. Few would have predicted this outcome when the expansionist James Polk captured the presidency in 1844. Without congressional sanction, Polk ordered U.S. troops into territory disputed between the United States and Mexico, triggering a battle between armed forces of the two nations. When Congress finally did consider a declaration of war, with fighting already under way, the administration used procedural tactics to ram the measure through both houses. Polk's conduct thus exposed him to the charge of usurping legislative prerogatives, reopening dormant debates about executive authority in foreign affairs. Meanwhile, the introduction of the 1846 Wilmot Proviso (which called for forbidding slavery in any newly acquired territories) eradicated the line between international and domestic matters by clearly linking slavery and expansion. At one pole of congressional opinion, abolitionists in the House aggressively made the case against expansionism. Led by John Quincy Adams (Whig-Massachusetts) and Joshua Giddings (Whig-Ohio), they transferred their opposition to slavery at home to an attack on imperialism abroad and used the war to indict the slave power's dominance of the nation's political structures. In the process, figures like Adams and Giddings showed how voices shut out of executive branch deliberations could make themselves heard through congressional action.

Partisan gridlock accompanied this ideological polarization, blocking any hope for Polk to retain the backing that he enjoyed in 1846, when only fourteen members of the House and no senators voted against the war declaration. The changing context of foreign policy issues splintered his electoral coalition, diluting support for the president's bid to annex all of Mexico. With Polk complaining privately about Congress having paralyzed his diplomacy, his term ended with Latin American policy immobilized by the sectionalization of manifest destiny, institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches, intense partisan attacks, and sharp disagreement between proslavery expansionists and abolitionist anti-imperialists.

In the end, a penchant for secrecy, bypassing Congress, and allowing his domestic base to atrophy undermined Polk's freedom of action. His successors, the Whig presidents Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, discovered that a foreign policy

THE U.S. SENATE AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Senate came into its own as a foreign policy force between 1850 and 1870. For most of early American history, the House of Representatives was the dominant actor on international matters. Talented politicians, like Henry Clay and Albert Gallatin, bolstered the power of the lower chamber. That the Senate conducted its debates in secret until the early 1800s decreased its public profile. And most contentious issues regarding both domestic and foreign policy—such as the War of 1812 and the Missouri Compromise—originated in the House.

In the 1830s the Senate began its golden age, peopled by the "great triumvirate" of Clay, Daniel Webster, and John Calhoun. But it was not until the end of the Mexican War that foreign policy power shifted to the Senate. The rise of the Republican Party, the institutional effects of the slavery issue, and the fact that most key initiatives in 1850s foreign policy involved powers assigned to the Senate but not the House (such as treatymaking and confirming ambassadors) facilitated the transformation.

The final factor in this process came during and after the Civil War, when Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner assumed the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sumner first attracted national attention during the Mexican War, when he delivered a public speech in Boston denouncing the conflict as immoral. He became a household name after being caned—in the Senate chamber—by proslavery Representative Preston Brooks.

As Foreign Relations Committee chair, Sumner demonstrated his political skills, showing how he could use the institutional powers of the Senate to rally support even from colleagues that did not necessarily share his approach to international affairs. Sumner most made his influence felt in 1870, when he almost single-handedly blocked President Ulysses S. Grant's treaty to annex the Dominican Republic. Future Foreign Relations Committee chairs of both parties—figures such as Augustus Bacon, Henry Cabot Lodge, William Borah, Arthur Vandenberg, and J. William Fulbright—built on Sumner's precedents.

focused on limiting U.S. expansionism through treaties with other imperial powers lacked appeal in a Congress increasingly polarized over expansionism. The first attempt of the Whigs in this regard was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, in which the United States and England agreed that neither would unilaterally construct a trans-isthmian canal; the party's second was the Tripartite Treaty of 1852, in which the United States, England, and France agreed to respect the status quo in Cuba. Furious Senate objections, from not only southerners but northern senators such as Henry Wilson, forced Secretary of State John Clayton to interpret his 1850 handiwork restrictively; similar Senate opposition prompted President Fillmore to shelve the Tripartite Treaty altogether.

In this environment, implementing a bold international agenda could not occur without stable congressional support. In meeting this requirement, the final chief executive of the period, James Buchanan, displayed a good deal of originality. Buchanan believed that, given the domestic tumult of the preceding decade, foreign powers would take him seriously only if he could prove that, in contrast to Polk, Taylor, Fillmore, and Pierce, Congress would not block his actions. The new president therefore attempted a variety of approaches to augment his position—at the legislature's expense. In 1858 he requested from Congress a resolution granting him discretionary authority to wage war against Paraguay, a procedure he later proposed expanding to all Latin American diplomatic issues. A year later, he sought to advance his most important goal—annexing Cuba—by urging Congress to appropriate $30 million to initiate the process. He (and his Senate critics) expected that once having spent the money, the upper chamber would not reject any future treaty bringing Cuba into the Union.

But in these and other initiatives Buchanan found himself consistently rebuffed by Senate Republicans. An ideological diverse coalition led by Republican Jacob Collamer of Vermont inflicted on the president an embarrassing defeat during initial consideration of the Paraguayan resolution. Collamer again played a leading role in attacks against the $30 million bill, and now Republicans with a higher national profile, such as New York's William Seward and New Hampshire's John Hale, joined them. This fierce opposi-

tion to the $30 million bill, for instance, attracted notice as far away as Madrid. William Preston, the minister sent by the administration to begin negotiations for the purchase of Cuba, was left to lament: "The character of the debate in Congress . . . has gone very far to revive the hopes of the Spaniards that they will be able to retain the island, and that our discord, and the distraction of party, will render the United States powerless in any struggle." The four decades following the Treaty of Ghent thus witnessed a legislature much more willing to launch (and much more effective in sustaining) ideological and legislative challenges to executive supremacy.

After 1860, however, the changing international and domestic environment caused congressional Republicans to reconsider their earlier conviction that Congress should reign supreme in U.S. foreign policy. During the Civil War, severe divisions over both military and Latin American issues split apart the GOP caucus. As Wisconsin Republican James Doolittle joked of his New Hampshire colleague John Hale, the upper chamber's most outspoken anti-imperialist, a "long habit of continued denunciation against the Administration or the party in power for fifteen or twenty years in succession has had some effect on the habits of his mind." In addition, with their party dominating the presidency throughout the period, Republicans grew less enamored (except during Andrew Johnson's presidency) with philosophical defenses of an active congressional role in foreign policy. That several leading members of the party struggled to use the congressional committee system to oversee the conduct of the Civil War undoubtedly reinforced this disinclination.

Despite these developments, Congress retained more than enough power to block aggressive international initiatives. The willingness of Gilded Age chief executives to uphold tradition and negotiate substantial agreements with foreign powers as treaties reinforced Congress's influence. The failure of the three most ambitious of these treaties—U.S. Grant's scheme to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, the 1884 effort to establish a U.S. protectorate over Nicaragua, and Benjamin Harrison's gambit to annex Hawaii in 1892—prompted future secretary of state John Hay to compare a treaty entering the Senate with a bull going into the arena, in that neither would depart alive. Hay's comment testified to the strength of the ideologically awkward but politically potent coalition of the remaining Republican anti-imperialists, such as Carl Schurz and Charles Sumner, and most of the body's Democrats. Once again, ideological extremes exerted a disproportionate influence in Congress. Senate Democrats cared little about anti-imperialism, but they believed that increased executive authority in international affairs would establish a precedent that presidents could later use to unilaterally advance the cause of civil rights. Congress even proved capable from time to time of acting in a more positive fashion, as in 1888, when majorities in both houses passed a resolution demanding that Grover Cleveland's administration initiate a conference of Western Hemisphere nations to address trade and other economic issues.

CONGRESS AND THE NEW CENTURY

Events at the turn of the century closed out this second era of executive-legislative relations. The political realignment generated by William McKinley's triumph in 1896 paved the way for closer partisan coordination between the executive and legislative branches (most prominently during Woodrow Wilson's presidency). As in the early years of the republic, party unity tended to dilute the strength of institutional conflicts and give the president more leeway. McKinley also employed a more active foreign policy, with the United States intervening in the Cuban-Spanish colonial war and then occupying the Philippines. The congressional response to the two conflicts provided a good demonstration of the range and limitations of the legislative role in turn-of-the-century international affairs. Regarding Cuba, consistent congressional pressure factored into McKinley's decision to declare war; at the same time, however, the Teller Amendment, which committed the United States to supporting Cuban independence, limited the president's options in 1899 and 1900. Consideration of the Treaty of Paris, under which the United States annexed the Philippines, offered a similarly ambivalent legacy. The Senate featured some of the imperialism debate's most articulate intellectual offerings. George Hoar was among the nation's most outspoken anti-imperialists, while Albert Beveridge countered that annexation would allow the United States to enter the ranks of the world's great powers. But the ultimate approval of the treaty had less to do with rhetoric than with congressional logrolling: McKinley granted Louisiana's Democratic senators control over the state's federal patronage in exchange for their

votes, which allowed the administration to reach the two-thirds total required.

In addition to the political realignment, other domestic factors influenced the congressional role in early 1900s foreign policy. Political activists in the Progressive Era, convinced of the inherently corrupt and conservative nature of Congress, championed a strong presidency as a base for reform. Meanwhile, the intellectual currents of the time envisioned the United States assuming a more active, even moralizing, international presence, a mindset that guided not only McKinley's Cuban and Filipino policies but much of his successor's agenda as well. These changes shattered the nineteenth-century balance of power between the two branches. Instead, the executive undertook frequently unsanctioned, aggressive moves, as in Theodore Roosevelt's sending troops to assist the 1903 Panamanian revolution or his establishing a U.S.-sponsored customs receivership in the Dominican Republic in 1905. Use of unilateral executive actions climaxed during the Wilson presidency, during which U.S. forces were dispatched to Mexico, Russia, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

Although the Gilded Age system thus came to an end, Congress certainly remained a restraining influence on Progressive Era presidents. The one clear executive victory on a treaty during this period—the approval of the Treaty of Paris—occurred only because of McKinley's skillful management of Congress during both the negotiating and approval processes. McKinley's successors lacked either his political tact or luck and paid the price. In 1905, for example, Theodore Roosevelt explained that he had not submitted a treaty to implement the Dominican customs receivership lest the future Foreign Relations Committee chair Augustus Bacon, "backed by the average yahoo among the Democratic senators," block the measure to get "a little cheap reputation among ignorant people." During the presidency of William Howard Taft, the Senate not only refused to approve proposed arbitration treaties with Britain and France but also denied attempts to create protectorates over Honduras and Nicaragua. While the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I might have served as the highest-profile example of congressional power during the Progressive Era, it was not an isolated example of the upper chamber asserting itself on international matters.

THE VERSAILLES ERA

That said, the League of Nations fight represented the most significant foreign policy confrontation between Congress and the executive in the first half of the twentieth century. It is ironic that failure to obtain Senate approval of the Treaty of Versailles plays such a role in Woodrow Wilson's historical legacy, because, in his first six years in office, Wilson had compiled a record at managing Congress unmatched by any chief executive since Thomas Jefferson. Using adept political skills, effective management of the Democratic caucus, and a keen ability to articulate his political vision to the public, Wilson had managed to push through Congress not one but two comprehensive reform packages. His record on foreign policy matters was slightly less stellar, but, nonetheless, given the complexity of the issues he confronted—not only the Great War but also the Mexican Revolution—he performed impressively.

By handing control of Congress to the Republicans, however, the 1918 midterm elections elevated Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the dual position of Senate majority leader and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Personal and partisan animus shaded Lodge's response to Wilson. Before Wilson's arrival on the national scene, Lodge (who, like Wilson, held a Ph.D. degree) had been the nation's most prominent scholar in politics. Lodge, who matched Wilson's partisanship, also recognized that the treaty's unamended passage would benefit the Democrats politically. The senator confronted a problem, however: the League of Nations seemed popular, and opinion among his Republican colleagues was badly divided. A few Republican senators, such as William Borah and Robert La Follette, opposed entering the league under any circumstances, primarily because they believed that European imperialist powers would dominate the organization. "Mild reservationists," such as senators William Kenyon and Porter McCumber, supported the treaty with only minor changes. Most Republicans joined Lodge in classifying themselves as "strong reservationists," a vague designation that amounted to outright opposition to the league as constructed by Wilson.

The treaty reached the Senate in the spring of 1919. Lodge's performance between then and the first vote on the document in November 1919 provided a textbook example of how a congressional minority could use the institution's powers to alter U.S. foreign policy. Lodge began by con-

vening lengthy hearings on the treaty, which gave the Republicans time to influence public opinion. But the hearings also exposed the many provisions in the Versailles Treaty in which diplomatic necessities had forced Wilson to compromise his ideals. As the summer progressed, criticism of the treaty escalated, from a wide variety of groups—ethnic Americans, especially of Irish ancestry, who saw the document as a sellout to the British; radicals and anti-imperialists, who viewed the treaty as a betrayal of American ideals; and nationalists, who worried that the collective security mechanism of Article X would rob Congress of its constitutional right to declare war. As a Senate critic, Lodge did not need to propose a positive alternative; he only had to ensure that one-third plus one of the members of the Senate would vote against approval. His determination, along with Wilson's equally passionate refusal to compromise and the parliamentary tactics of the Senate irreconcilables (the outright opponents of the league), paved the way for three Senate votes in which the upper chamber rejected the Treaty of Versailles and thus U.S. membership in the League of Nations.

The defeat of the Versailles Treaty confirmed the breakdown between Woodrow Wilson and the new Republican majority. But even before the 1918 elections, relations between the two branches had deteriorated. Before the U.S. entrance into World War I, the president was subjected to consistent barbs from Senate progressives for both his Mexican and his preparedness policies. Then, in 1918, Wilson confronted the dilemma of Congress exercising a prior restraint over his response to the Bolshevik Revolution: fear of a congressional investigation blocked a scheme to supply credits to Admiral Aleksandr Vasiliyevich Kolchak's antirevolutionary forces. When Wilson attempted to bypass Congress entirely by sending troops to Russia, the body employed the ultimate sanction: its power of the purse. In 1919 a resolution introduced by Senator Hiram Johnson to cut off funding for the intervention failed on a perilously close tie vote. This demonstration of the critical spirit in Congress convinced the administration that it had no choice but to withdraw the armed forces.

The intensity of the Versailles and Russian battles heightened the importance of foreign policy pressure groups of all ideological persuasions. The pattern continued during the 1920s, especially on military and Latin American issues. As would be the case later in the century as well, such groups tended to influence Congress more than the executive. In 1926, for instance, the U.S. Army's Chemical Warfare Service waged a highly effective lobbying campaign to prevent Senate approval of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, while anti-imperialists and peace groups helped soothe the U.S.–Mexican crisis of 1926–1927. In turn, the greater public interest in foreign policy highlighted the ability of Congress, especially the Senate, to frame consideration of international questions, especially at a time when political reporters spent as much time covering events in the Senate as they did at the White House.

No figure made better use of this environment than William Borah. Combining his power as Foreign Relations Committee chair with his long-standing identification with the issue, Borah positioned himself as the chief interpreter of the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war. He also launched his own venture in private diplomacy in an attempt to prevent a military conflict with Mexico. Those executive initiatives that cleared Congress during the 1920s, such as the Washington Naval Conference treaties of 1921–1922, further confirmed the legislature's influence: the treaties overcame strong Senate opposition largely because the Harding administration appointed two prominent senators, Henry Cabot Lodge and Oscar Underwood to the U.S. negotiating team. When Secretary of State Frank Kellogg proved less willing to involve Congress in his Latin American policy—during his tenure the United States sent marines to Nicaragua without congressional sanction and nearly severed diplomatic relations with Mexico—the legislature responded in kind: in 1929 the Senate passed an amendment authored by C. C. Dill to terminate appropriations for the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.

The Dill Amendment was the handiwork of the peace progressives, one of the most effective congressional blocs of the twentieth century. Although never more than twelve in the Senate, members of the group displayed remarkable acumen in advancing their ideological agenda. They first attracted notice in the 1910s, when senators such as Borah, La Follette, and George Norris offered an anti-imperialist, antimilitarist critique of Wilson's foreign policy. But the peace progressives made their mark in the 1920s, when they used the Senate's traditional tolerance of dissenters to influence the foreign policy of the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations. Their tactics included appropriations riders, public hearings to influence popular opinion, covert

cooperation with peace groups to leak embarrassing information, and using the prestige of their positions to cement transnational alliances with like-minded groups and individuals overseas. By the end of the 1920s, U.S. policy toward Central America and the Caribbean had moved strongly in an anti-imperialist direction.

And so, as the framers anticipated, foreign policy issues remained vigorously contested between the branches. This framework continued during the first several years of Franklin Roosevelt's administration. A domestic focus made Roosevelt reluctant to spend political capital on international matters, such as the protocol for adherence to the World Court—one reason why the Senate defeated the treaty. A leading opponent of the World Court was the peace progressive senator Gerald Nye, who, like many in the group, believed that pressure from munitions makers and bankers explained Wilson's decision to bring the country into World War I. In the throes of the Great Depression, a conspiracy theory against business carried a good deal of weight, and, when Nye opened hearings on the matter in 1934–1935, the affair attracted national attention. Secretary of State Cordell Hull complained how the Nye Committee's dominance of discourse on neutrality issues strengthened isolationist sentiments. Indeed, as the secretary anticipated, the hearings resulted in Congress passing the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1936. Ironically, during Franklin Roosevelt's first six years as president, the most important diminution of congressional authority on foreign policy issues came with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, when Congress willingly surrendered its power over foreign economic policy as part of the fallout from the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

Despite differences between eras, some common patterns emerged in the congressional approach to international relations between 1789 and 1941. The Dill and Hiram Johnson resolutions, for example, showed how powerfully military appropriations bills could influence foreign affairs. The prevalence of treaties, even though the upper chamber approved 86 percent of the 726 treaties it considered between 1789 and 1926, heightened the importance of formal roll-call votes in assuring at least some senatorial presence in the conduct of foreign policy. With the (albeit important) exception of tariffs, the House of Representatives played a minor role on international questions. (During one congressional session in the 1920s, for instance, the House Foreign Affairs Committee spent a week debating a $20,000 appropriation for an international poultry show in Tulsa, which one member recalled as the committee's most important issue of the whole session.) In the Senate, meanwhile, the Foreign Relations Committee reigned supreme. The upper chamber's considerable international powers fell under the control of a relatively small foreign policy elite, composed of Foreign Relations members and the few other senators—like the peace progressives—who exhibited intense interest in international matters.

The international threat associated with World War II altered this alignment. Perhaps no single piece of legislation highlighted the change more than the Lend-Lease Act of 1940, which passed despite knowledge that it would lessen congressional control over foreign policy. During World War II, determined to avoid the mistakes of the Wilson administration, Roosevelt hoped to place the Senate on record supporting U.S. participation in a postwar international organization. But the president did not want Congress to play an active role in forming postwar foreign policy. He strongly opposed the so-called B2H2 resolution (abbreviated for its sponsors—Senators Harold Burton, Joseph Ball, Lister Hill, and Carl Hatch), which called for the United States to join a postwar international police force. Working with Senate leaders, the administration instead championed a vaguely worded offering that praised the work of Cordell Hull at the 1943 Moscow Conference of foreign ministers. This was the first in a series of measures in which Congress was asked to provide advance authority for future executive action. Moreover, as would occur with similar postwar resolutions, the political and international conditions under which the Senate considered the substitute—after Hull had already completed his work—made it almost impossible to oppose the bill without repudiating executive commitments.

THE COLD WAR

The arrival of the Cold War further weakened the traditional levers of congressional authority. The nature of the communist threat placed the government on close to a permanent war footing, while the advent of nuclear weapons provided an immediacy lacking in any previous challenge to U.S. national security. In this new situation, a constitutional theory emerged claiming that the

commander-in-chief clause bestowed an independent foreign policy power upon the executive, an argument almost never previously advanced. On the domestic front, the perceived lessons of the late 1930s bolstered the Truman administration's strategy of equating its own foreign policy principles with the concept of bipartisanship. A century and a half before, Jefferson had shown how aggressive presidential leadership and partisan unity could work to diminish congressional authority. Now, Harry Truman looked to create a party unity between executive and legislature that did not exist, with the aim of stifling congressional dissent. Faced with a Congress controlled by Republicans between 1947 and 1949, the president essentially regarded congressional attacks not as legitimate institutional challenges but as nothing more than partisanship.

Not surprisingly, then, the early Cold War is not remembered as a period of intense congressional activism in the international arena. As Arthur Vandenberg conceded during his stint as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair in the Eightieth Congress, issues seemed to reach Capitol Hill only when they had developed to a point where congressional discretion was badly restricted. Indeed, what Truman's final secretary of state, Dean Acheson, dubbed the "Vandenberg treatment"—granting to the Michigan senator small, superficial concessions and a dose of public praise—aptly describes the common view of the congressional role in Truman's foreign policy.

In many ways, congressional power did diminish in the early stages of the Cold War, although this was partly because—as with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act fifteen years earlier—the legislature willingly surrendered its role. At times the body seemed eager to expand the president's foreign policy powers beyond even what Truman desired. Such sentiments explain the overwhelming approval of initiatives such as the National Security Act (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949), and the post-1950 expansion of the defense budget. They also affected the early congressional response to the Korean War; at the time, several senior members expressly asked Truman not to involve Congress in the decision. With the combination of NSC 68—the document that deemed the triumph of communism anywhere in the world a threat to U.S. national security—and the onset of the Korean War dramatically escalating the military budget, the beneficiaries of defense spending spread around the country. As a result, members of Congress who even considered opposing defense appropriations were vulnerable to the charge that they were not only subverting national security but also failing to protect the economic interests of their constituents. In the decade between the end of the Korean War and the end of John F. Kennedy's presidency, defense bills passed with an average of less than one negative vote in both chambers.

Until the Korean War began, however, the congressional response to the Cold War was considerably more complex. In 1947, even as the administration was uniting behind George Kennan's containment doctrine, Congress seriously considered three alternative approaches to world affairs. A small group of Democratic liberals supplied the most tenacious opposition to the Truman Doctrine, in which the president pledged to assist any government threatened by communist takeover. Led by Claude Pepper and Edwin Johnson, they charged that extending military assistance to undemocratic regimes in Greece and Turkey would contradict the internationalist ideals for which the United States fought World War II. To the administration's right, a sizable bloc of Republicans led by Senator William Knowland of California and Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota demanded that the administration reorient its foreign policy toward East Asia by aiding the Nationalists in China's civil war. Finally, nationalists ranging from the talented (Robert Taft of Ohio) to the unscrupulous (Pat McCarran of Nevada) questioned any initiative that would threaten U.S. sovereignty and argued that an activist foreign policy would dangerously strengthen the federal government. They instead advocated waging the Cold War through domestic measures that would crack down on communist sympathizers. This point of view enjoyed strong support in the House of Representatives, which was more subject to conservative pressures generated by the 1946 elections.

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER

The unusual breakdown of Congress played a critical role in the early stages of the Cold War. With a shaky base of congressional support, Truman had little choice but to work with internationalist Republicans: more than flattery was at stake in Dean Acheson's attempts to woo Vandenberg and his ideological comrades, Henry Cabot

Lodge II and H. Alexander Smith. The temperaments, ideologies, and inclinations of the internationalist Republicans made them players on virtually every foreign policy issue of the day. Their performance set the stage for a new way for Congress to exert influence: with the foreign policy powers of the federal government expanding at an exponential rate, members of Congress could maneuver through the resulting chaos.

From a completely different ideological perspective, other domestic forces also encouraged a congressional presence in the early Cold War. Following the elections of 1946, when Republicans captured control of both houses of Congress, more than half of the House GOP caucus petitioned for membership in the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). One of these freshmen, California congressman Richard Nixon, made a national name for himself with his activities on the committee, especially after he exposed perjury by the former State Department official Alger Hiss. With the committee championing the anticommunist cause in the House, Republican Joseph McCarthy took up the banner in the Senate. The Wisconsin senator was the rare member of Congress who could shape the national psyche, and both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had to deal with the consequences of his actions. In the process, while the liberal internationalist and Asia-first alternatives that Congress considered during the early portions of Truman's years fell by the wayside, the nationalists in Congress flourished.

Even during the height of his power, McCarthy sponsored no important laws; he sought to affect the national debate on anticommunism but eschewed the hard work necessary to pass legislation. Measured by that standard, the most influential member of the postwar Congress was Nevada senator Pat McCarran, who was responsible for two critical pieces of Cold War legislation: the McCarran Internal Security Act (1950) and the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act (1952). McCarran's position as a Democrat willing to buck his party's leadership and his considerable contacts with the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave him clout on Capitol Hill. In addition, the ability of figures like McCarran to work around the traditional congressional structure to have an impact—the senator's power base was the Judiciary Committee—provided a model for future congressional initiatives that challenged executive control.

In the years following Truman's decision to commit forces to the Korean conflict, Congress's role in warmaking notably declined, while the growth of executive agreements produced a similar diminution of the Senate's treaty-making power. These developments did not escape congressional notice. During the Truman administration, a group of nationalists led by Ohio's two GOP senators, John Bricker and Robert Taft, embraced the cause of congressional power. The duo argued that Truman-style internationalism would not be possible if Congress took its appropriate place as a partner of the executive on foreign policy matters.

With the election of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, liberal Democrats searched for a way to use congressional power to criticize the president without being labeled soft on communism. They urged a formal, symbolic role in framing policy, with the executive conceding the principle of legislative input in exchange for Congress allowing the president freedom of action to prosecute the Cold War. Hubert Humphrey (a member of the populist Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota) candidly described this stance as a "limited dissent." Indeed, as practiced in the Eisenhower administration, it actually came to less than that: Eisenhower pioneered the tactic—later made famous with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution—of submitting blank-check resolutions authorizing vaguely defined overseas actions. The relationship between Eisenhower and congressional Democrats suggested that genuine collaboration interested neither side.

But in many ways, a focus on the balance of power between Congress and the president misses the most important element in the legislative response to the early Cold War. That instead came in an internal congressional development: the creation of the culture of a Cold War Congress. The position of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee weakened as the international issues (warmaking and approving treaties) over which it had clear jurisdiction fell into disuse. Within Congress, the committee came under challenge from the newly created Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Armed Services Committee, which both proved less than zealous in challenging executive policies. With the expansion of the defense budget, influence especially shifted to the Armed Services Committee, which viewed itself less as an oversight body than as a defender of the Pentagon and as a gatherer of defense contracts for members' congressional districts. Other aspects of the national security state, especially the intelligence community, similarly stood beyond congressional control.

NEW MEANS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

By the end of the 1950s, then, it seemed as if Congress had lost much of its de facto input into the making of U.S. foreign policy. But two major exceptions to this pattern existed: subcommittee government and the foreign aid program. In part because of its relative youth (it had been created only in 1947), the Armed Services Committee proved much less successful at resisting challenges to its authority than had been the Foreign Relations Committee before World War II. That inability to defend its turf helps explain the postwar explosion of subcommittees dealing with foreign policy issues. Joseph McCarthy was the most prominent senator to use a subcommittee (of the formerly low-profile Government Operations Committee) to advance his own foreign policy agenda, but his activities are best viewed more broadly, as part of the decentralization of power within Congress on national security matters. Overall, the number of Senate foreign policy subcommittees grew from seven in 1946 to thirty-one two decades later.

Eisenhower's second term witnessed the establishment of three particularly important subcommittees, each chaired by a contender for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination. After the Soviets launched the *Sputnik* satellite, Richard Russell handed the issue over to his protégé, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, who chaired the Preparedness Investigations Subcommittee. In late 1958, Senator Henry Jackson introduced a resolution mandating a study of the National Security Council's performance. The resolution was reported to the Government Operations Committee—on which Jackson, not coincidentally, served—and over the next two years, a subcommittee chaired by Jackson conducted a wide-ranging investigation of Eisenhower's foreign policy that only tangentially related to the National Security Council. From a much different ideological perspective, Hubert Humphrey's Disarmament Subcommittee, an offshoot of the Foreign Relations Committee, looked to build a case for arms control initiatives. The hearings helped pave the way for the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961.

The decentralized committee structure gave senators interested in foreign policy questions an avenue for achieving direct influence—sometimes by facilitating informal ties with members of the national bureaucracy, sometimes through hearings that sought to influence political debate, sometimes by providing a vehicle for marshaling the appropriations power. Moreover, these three subcommittees starkly contrasted with the ineffective tactics associated with the "limited dissent," showing how members of Congress could—and did—influence national security policy even at the height of the Cold War. Until the early 1960s, the most effective congressional criticism came from the right. But that situation would soon change, since liberals would build upon the tactics pioneered by the likes of Jackson and Johnson to challenge the Cold War anticommunist consensus.

Subcommittee government also played a key role in bolstering congressional involvement in the foreign aid program. Moreover, because the Constitution required all revenue measures to originate in the House of Representatives, the lower chamber used foreign aid to enhance its foreign policy role. In another example of the power of foreign policy subcommittees, Otto Passman, the chair of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, regularly used his position to reduce the total appropriations requested by Eisenhower, and later John Kennedy, by 20 or 25 percent—an effort that was aided by the program's consistent domestic unpopularity. Passman thoroughly enjoyed the effort: he informed one harried Eisenhower administration official that his sole pleasure in life was cutting the foreign aid budget.

For the early postwar period, congressional conservatives, worried about the excessive cost and the support it provided to left-of-center regimes, provided the most vociferous criticism of foreign aid. As long as these conservatives remained the only opposition, a bipartisan coalition of northern Democrats and moderate Republicans provided the votes necessary for passage. But beginning in the early 1960s, the program started coming under attack from liberals, mostly in the Senate. Democratic senators such as George McGovern, Albert Gore, Frank Church, and Ernest Gruening contended that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had excessively employed foreign aid as a tool of the Cold War, showering dictatorial regimes with military assistance solely because of their anticommunist credentials. The senators began by offering amendments to deny foreign aid to governments that came to power through undemocratic means. They also gradually expanded their efforts to launch an attack on military aid that began to veer toward repudiating Cold War liberalism itself.

This new base of opposition developed at a critical moment, for in the early 1960s foreign aid assumed a new importance in containment policy. Kennedy's counterinsurgency theories dictated a considerable expansion in military aid expenditures. And the administration's boldest new international initiative, the Alliance for Progress, promised a multiyear U.S. commitment of economic and military assistance to Latin America. Unfortunately for John F. Kennedy, in 1963 Passman's conservatives and the Senate liberals joined forces in an awkward ideological alliance that inflicted a serious setback to the administration. In the aftermath, foreign aid bills became a favorite vehicle for policy riders on issues as diverse as human rights, expropriation of U.S.-owned property, and the foreign policies of recipient regimes. The pattern of congressional deference had started to break down well before the surge of congressional activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

THE VIETNAM WAR

The Americanization of the Vietnam War thus arrived at a time when Congress as an institution was looking for new avenues to shape U.S. foreign policy. Until 1964, Congress had played a fairly minor role on Southeast Asian matters. In 1954, Eisenhower had invited legislative leaders to comment on whether the United States should use its military to rescue beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu. But the president had little desire to send troops and almost certainly engaged in the charade so he would have an excuse to explain his lack of action to the French. The Kennedy years featured a more consistent level of congressional comment. Many of the same critics of foreign aid—Gruening, Gore, Church—also questioned the military and economic assistance program toward the dictatorial government of Ngo Dinh Diem and called for Congress to more aggressively counter administration policy. But at no point did a sustained legislative effort on Vietnam policy emerge.

That condition changed after Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963 and military conditions in Vietnam began to deteriorate. With only one exception, Johnson accomplished his goal of keeping public attention off Vietnam until after the 1964 elections. But that exception resulted in one of the most famous pieces of legislation in the postwar Congress. In August 1964, after North Vietnamese vessels reportedly attacked U.S. forces in the Tonkin Gulf, the administration introduced a resolution granting the president authority to take all necessary measures to repel the attack. The open-ended wording disturbed some senators, but the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, assured his colleagues that Johnson would never utilize the full breadth of the authority the Tonkin Gulf Resolution granted him. Although in retrospect Fulbright's words ring hollow, at the time his assertions seemed perfectly reasonable. Eisenhower and Kennedy had introduced similar offerings to deal with specific crises, and these had not resulted in a massive commitment of U.S. troops overseas.

By mid-1965, however, the increasing numbers of U.S. troops in Vietnam prompted a more active congressional response. For the rest of Johnson's term and most of Richard Nixon's, an increasingly powerful group of Senate liberals tried to end the war through congressional action. Perhaps their most important initiative came in 1966, when Fulbright convened public hearings on Vietnam policy that attracted a national television audience to witness divisions among the foreign policy elite regarding the administration's approach to matters in Southeast Asia. Indeed, although members of Congress failed to prevent the Americanization of the Vietnam conflict, their activities did help turn U.S. opinion against the war. In the process, Fulbright became the most powerful Foreign Relations Committee chair—and, perhaps, the most important congressional player on foreign policy matters—since William Borah in the 1920s.

Beyond the antiwar activities of Senate liberals were two other substantial areas of congressional involvement in 1960s foreign policy. The first centered on the wartime actions of congressional Republicans and prowar Democrats, such as Senators John Stennis (Democrat) and John Tower (Republican) and Representative Gerald Ford (Republican). Stennis and Tower were particularly significant because their extensive contacts made them the Capitol Hill voices for the military at a time when the Pentagon was often articulating its own perspective on international affairs. Second, quite apart from Vietnam, Senate liberals challenged Cold War principles elsewhere in the world. Because their dissent did not fully blossom until the United States already had tens of thousands of troops on the ground in Vietnam, Senate liberals always acted under some constraint. The full force

of their perspective emerged only in their positions on newer issues—such as Greece, where they demanded a cutoff of U.S. aid after the military coup of 1967, and Thailand, where their anti-interventionism offered a clear sense of their desired role for the United States in Southeast Asia.

CONGRESSIONAL DISSENT BEYOND VIETNAM

For several years in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most prominent of these Senate dissenters was Missouri's Stuart Symington, formerly a Cold Warrior and Harry Truman's secretary of the Air Force. Symington's break with the past symbolized the altered world of Congress in the early 1970s. The Missouri senator chaired one of the most important foreign policy subcommittees in U.S. history, one that launched inquiries of U.S. commitments in Thailand, Spain, and Laos and helped produce the 1971 National Commitments Resolution. In 1967 hearings looking into U.S. foreign arms sales, Symington offered a concrete demonstration of the link between military aid and foreign policy. In the 1968–1969 battle against the antiballistic missile (ABM), the first full-fledged congressional challenge to a Cold War weapons system, he showed that dissenters, who traditionally shied away from slots on the Armed Services Committee, needed detailed technical knowledge of military matters if they hoped to prevail in debates on national security policy. In his inquiry into U.S. agreements with Spain over military bases on the Iberian Peninsula, he uncovered how overseas bases, frequently obtained without congressional sanction, brought with them broader diplomatic requirements. And in the Laotian hearings, he offered a glimpse at how secrecy could obscure not only national security material but also secret wars that were occurring without legislative sanction.

In the broadest sense of the term, Symington himself was a transitional figure. His own transformation from a hard-line anticommunist to a skeptic of Cold War foreign policy helped him lead the Senate's transition into a more aggressive body on foreign policy matters. But his most significant achievement came in pioneering tactics that other liberals would use even as he himself faded from the ranks of active dissenters. Indeed, some of the highest-profile executive-legislative battles during the later Richard Nixon and early Gerald Ford administrations featured freshman liberals employing devices prominently used by Symington, such as the efforts of Iowa senators Harold Hughes and John Culver in the early 1970s. Both Hughes and Culver elected to join the Armed Services Committee rather than the Foreign Relations Committee; both cultivated allies in the military; and both used the information gleaned from those allies to undercut their opponents' credibility. Behind all of these efforts stood perhaps the most important transition point of the post-Vietnam era: the willingness of Congress to challenge executive supremacy on Department of Defense matters—on policy, on specific weapons systems, and in roll-call votes.

Members of Congress were prepared to use these revived powers. Liberals in the Senate, often using foreign aid riders, expanded on the ideological alternative they first had outlined in the foreign aid revolt. First, they charged that policymakers from the Johnson and Nixon administrations had subordinated traditional American ideals—such as support for democracy, human rights, and self-determination—to the anticommunist dictates of the Cold War. Second, they charged that the national security apparatus associated with the Cold War had given the military an excessive role in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Finally, they contended that a democracy required a foreign policy of openness—and that a foreign policy of openness required a consistent congressional presence in international affairs.

This dissent produced attacks against U.S. policy toward Latin America, Asia, and Africa, regions in which, critics contended, a misapplication of containment principles had produced policies that contradicted the country's image as a champion of international reform, employed military solutions to political or social problems, and allied the United States with ideologically undesirable regimes. For example, after Augusto Pinochet's military government assumed power in Chile in 1973, Representative Donald Fraser and Senator Edward Kennedy opened hearings on Pinochet's human rights abuses. Congress then enacted a series of measures to gradually end U.S. assistance to the regime. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 provided another opportunity to act, and Thomas Eagleton pushed through the Senate an amendment cutting off foreign aid to the Ankara government. Surveying the burst of activity, one European diplomat concluded, "It isn't just the State Department or the president anymore. It's Congress now."

But the most important of these congressional efforts concerned U.S. policy toward Angola, where a small Central Intelligence Agency covert operation mushroomed in mid-1975. The operation came to the attention of Iowa senator Dick Clark, who toured Africa in the summer of 1975 and returned home convinced that respecting Angolan self-determination would atone for earlier instances in which the anticommunist mindset of the Cold War had caused the United States to abandon its traditional anti-imperialist ideals. Concerned about the ramifications of the Ford administration's actions, he introduced an amendment to the 1976 foreign aid bill to cut off all covert assistance to Angola, thus forcing a public debate on the policy. In fact, he reasoned, publicity itself formed an appropriate method of oversight. A foreign aid amendment and the subsequent congressional debate provided the perfect vehicle. A few months later, the Senate passed an amendment to the Department of Defense appropriations bill introduced by John Tunney immediately terminating covert assistance to the Angolan anticommunists. The two amendments represented the high point of a congressional revolt against the anticommunist ethos of the Cold War and executive authority in foreign policy.

CONSERVATIVES AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER

That the amendments would not spawn ideological successors, however, was not apparent at the time. The congressional elections of 1972 and 1974 brought to Washington a sizable bloc of young Democrats for whom Vietnam rather than the postwar division of Europe provided their formative foreign policy experience. But while these Democrats shaped the congressional mentality of the era, the mid-1970s also witnessed a dramatic resurgence of the congressional right. Domestically, the social and cultural divisions of the 1960s—intensified by the antigovernment sentiments spawned by the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal—produced a climate conducive to the rise of conservatism. Internationally, the conduct of the Soviet Union led a new group of intellectuals—dubbed the neoconservatives—to demand a more assertive U.S. foreign policy.

The sponsors of the Clark and Tunney amendments hardly expected that their passage would open up new avenues for congressional conservatives to influence foreign policy. But over the next ten years, the amendments produced a host of unintended consequences. Their passage further eroded the Cold War institutional structure of Congress, in which the body had sacrificed potent foreign policy tools in deference to executive authority. But if this change represented a short-term victory for congressional liberals, subsequent developments defied expectations that empowering Congress would pave the way for an anti-interventionist, prohuman rights foreign policy. Instead, conservatives proved as successful as their ideological foes in utilizing the revitalized congressional power. Meanwhile, as Cuban-backed forces consolidated their position in Angola, the Clark amendment came under strong attack, beginning a process in which the amendment came to symbolize congressional recklessness and an overly idealistic foreign policy that failed to take into account national security needs.

Throughout much of the post–World War II period, most challenges to the legislature's institutional orthodoxy had come from liberals unhappy with the anticommunist foreign policies of the day. But the Tunney amendment also provided a precedent for members of Congress, regardless of their ideological persuasions, to use rejuvenated congressional power to challenge executive-branch foreign policy. President Jimmy Carter's international agenda suffered the consequences, coming under strong attack from senators who just a few years earlier had tried to block Tunney's initiative. In terms of immediately affecting policy, most of these conservative initiatives failed. But, as occurred with the liberal critics of containment a decade before, impassioned congressional debate framed the national discussion of foreign policy in a way that ultimately worked to the conservatives' advantage.

The newly strengthened conservatives had a more immediate impact on an area of traditional strength: national security policy. This effort culminated in the Senate battle against the SALT II treaty, which became the first arms-control agreement since the early 1950s that did not clear Congress. More important, the conservatives, led by Henry Jackson and Barry Goldwater, succeeded in beating back the Symington-led challenge to national security policy. By the late 1970s, in response to this conservative pressure, liberals such as John Culver, Carl Levin, and Patrick Leahy—the ideological heirs of the dissenters of the early 1960s—were on the defensive, attempting to show how their military philosophy would

not undermine the U.S. position in the world. Conservatives again dominated debate over the armed services. The late 1970s and early 1980s thus joined the McCarranite era of the early 1950s as rare periods when the congressional right set the national agenda on foreign policy issues.

The growth of the congressional right also helped seal the fate of the foreign policy framework laws passed in the early 1970s, the most prominent of which was the War Powers Act of 1973. In contrast to domestic affairs, where the increasing tendency to handle through judicial or investigatory means disputes that previously would have been classified as political tended to increase congressional power, the last fifteen years of the Cold War featured the failure of the War Powers Act and other measures designed to restore the balance between the executive and Congress to work as their sponsors had desired. (The War Powers Act, for instance, required the president to obtain congressional approval within sixty days of initiating any overseas military authorization. But because the measure gave the president the authority to decide when to start the sixty-day clock, it has proven impossible to enforce.) In part, these initiatives did surprisingly little to alter the fundamental balance between the two branches because the legislation placed such a high priority on abstract constitutional concerns. By making their offerings such a frontal challenge to presidential authority, the sponsors of framework legislation almost always needed to gain a two-thirds majority in both chambers to overcome a presidential veto. But to achieve this goal, they needed to water down their proposals, as in the War Powers Act, when John Stennis insisted on a host of concessions that weakened the bill in exchange for his supporting the measure.

For example, the Cooper-Church Amendment, which cut off funds for Richard Nixon's secret incursion into Cambodia in 1970, was notable for the willingness of its sponsors to deny that its adoption would constrain the powers of the commander in chief, to decline to call for an instant cutoff of funding for the incursion, and to consent to a modifying amendment upholding the president's power to act in emergency situations to protect the lives of U.S. forces without consulting Congress. Similar developments frustrated congressional attempts to pass a restrictive war powers measure, where negotiations between the House and Senate produced a law limiting the amount of time in which the president could unilaterally send U.S. troops overseas (ninety days) rather than limiting the justifications for such action. The bill also allowed the president to decide when troops were introduced into harm's way, thus triggering the start of the time limit, while a key strengthening amendment to include the CIA under the terms of the bill failed.

Many of the difficulties that had prevented Congress from assuming an active role using such formal assertions of its power persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, congressional investigations into the intelligence community produced less comprehensive reforms and more political problems for their champions than could have been anticipated when the hearings began in 1975. For example, Frank Church found that his chairing the Senate committee investigating CIA matters interfered with his pursuit of the 1976 Democratic nomination for president; his House counterpart, Otis Pike of New York, oversaw such an unruly inquiry that his report was repudiated by the House, and he retired from Congress two years later. And although both chambers ultimately established intelligence oversight committees, the CIA proved effective at using a variety of tactics to frustrate attempts at vigorous oversight, particularly during the tenure of Director William Casey, who served from 1981 until his death in 1987.

Casey's boss, President Ronald Reagan, received an overwhelming majority in 1980, carrying forty-four states and bringing with him a Republican-controlled Senate. Foreign policy played a key role in his campaign, as Reagan called for a massive arms buildup and a renewed ideological confrontation with the Soviets. In addition, the GOP nominee explicitly argued that Congress had grown too powerful and implicitly suggested that congressional actions (such as the Clark amendment) had harmed U.S. national security. Because Republicans controlled the Senate for most of his tenure, Reagan faced less effective opposition from the upper chamber than, arguably, any chief executive in the twentieth century. The House offered a different story: Democrats gained twenty-six seats in the 1982 election and had a comfortable working majority for the rest of the 1980s. Led by the partisan House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., and Majority Leader Jim Wright, surviving Watergate-era Democrats such as Thomas J. Downey, Michael Barnes, and Mike Synar came into their own during Reagan's tenure. In the process they made the House as formidable a foreign policy force as at any point in American history.

The Reagan years yielded a mixed legacy regarding congressional power. As had been the case essentially since their passage, the War Powers Act and other framework legislation failed to bolster congressional power. Reagan undertook three provocative military operations during his presidency, sending armed forces to Lebanon and Grenada and launching air strikes against Libya. The Libyan and Grenadan operations ended quickly, but, particularly in the case of Grenada (where the United States sent troops to topple a Marxist government), there seemed to be no justification for not invoking the War Powers Act. The president called the marines sent to Lebanon "peacekeepers," but the peace they kept favored the Maronite Christian president in the country's long-running civil war. Facing congressional criticism, the administration negotiated a compromise in which it promised to seek legislative authorization if the intervention lasted longer than eighteen months. Even in this instance, Reagan maintained that the decision did not imply that he recognized the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, and, indeed, Congress's willingness to accept the plan essentially made the 1973 law a dead letter. In the end, the troops were withdrawn before the eighteen-month limit after the bombing of the marines stationed at the U.S. embassy in Beirut.

While the Reagan years shattered hopes that the framework legislation could succeed, the 1980s did show that—as Gouverneur Morris and James Madison long before had predicted—the power of the purse provided an important tool for Congress to influence foreign policy. Throughout Reagan's term, members of Congress used appropriations riders, hearings, and other unconventional methods to challenge the administration's foreign policy, especially toward the Third World. Few would have predicted this development in the late 1970s, when conservative critics targeted initiatives like the Clark amendment and other congressional expressions favoring human rights diplomacy. Theorists such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's first ambassador to the United Nations, recommended distinguishing between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, with the former worthy of support—despite human rights violations—because of the anticommunist nature of most totalitarian governments. This critique grew more powerful as anti-American regimes came to power in Iran and Nicaragua; and Reagan, after his election in 1980, adopted the Kirkpatrick philosophy as his own.

This deemphasis on idealism provided an opening for Reagan's congressional critics. Perhaps the most effective was Michael Barnes, a scholarly Democrat first elected in 1976 who took over as chair of the Inter-American Relations Subcommittee following the defeats of several more senior Democrats in the 1980 elections. Barnes, the first Watergate-era Democrat to chair a foreign policy subcommittee, made the most of his opportunity. Reagan's policy of aiding the contras (anticommunist guerillas attempting to topple the Sandinista government in Nicaragua) dominated the debate regarding 1980s inter-American policy, but Barnes used his position to focus matters on human rights abuses by anticommunist governments in Chile, Uruguay, and Guatemala as well. Congressional criticism also helped cause a shift in U.S. policy toward Chile and the Philippines, where Reagan had come to office pledging to support the dictatorial regimes of Augusto Pinochet and Ferdinand Marcos. Examples of the pattern included senators with such diverse ideological viewpoints as Christopher Dodd, who led the Senate opposition to Reagan's policy in Central America, and Richard Lugar, who helped persuade the Reagan administration to end U.S. support for Marcos's regime in the Philippines. Moreover, a congressional willingness to use the appropriations power set the stage for the most important scandal of the Reagan years, the Iran-Contra affair, when the administration covertly funneled arms to anticommunist forces in Central America in direct contravention of the Boland Amendment. The revelation of the affair in late 1986 severely impaired Reagan's political standing and damaged his historical legacy.

CONGRESS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War broke down the established pattern of legislative-executive relations. The Cold War's conclusion accelerated the trend, which began with Vietnam and Watergate, of diminishing the federal government's role in the everyday lives of most Americans. The new international environment forced members of both branches to search for new ideological approaches to world affairs. And it coincided with—and perhaps contributed to—the most extended period of divided government (with one party controlling Congress and another the presidency) in American history.

Most academics and politicians had predicted that the end of the Cold War would establish a more consistent congressional presence in U.S. foreign policy because the threat of immediate nuclear attack had so dramatically receded. But the first post–Cold War president, George H. W. Bush, defied expectations, even though he faced a Congress controlled by Democrats for his entire term. Encouraged by his White House counsel, C. Boyden Gray, Bush proved extraordinarily aggressive at defending (and enlarging) executive prerogatives, using vetoes and especially presidential signing statements to outline a vision of presidential power whose scope would have stunned even a figure like Alexander Hamilton. A sign of his intentions came in his first year, when he sent marines to Panama in 1989—without congressional authorization—to remove from power and arrest Panamanian president Manuel Noriega, who was wanted in the United States on drug charges. Bush also rejected congressional attempts to influence policy toward the People's Republic of China, consistently vetoing bills to tighten sanctions on the Beijing regime after the Tiananmen Square crackdown against student dissidents.

Congressional Democrats, who generally outmaneuvered Bush on domestic issues, had more difficulty in adjusting to the post–Cold War environment. The new Senate majority leader, Maine senator George Mitchell, was a former judge and believed that framework legislation, if properly used, would allow Congress to play a greater foreign policy role. The run-up to the Gulf War of 1991 put this thesis to the test. After Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Bush, acting in concert with U.S. allies, eventually sent 250,000 troops to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. But, citing the measure's unconstitutionality, Bush refused to invoke the War Powers Act. After the 1990 midterm elections, the administration moved another quarter million U.S. forces into the region, clearly anticipating the possibility of offensive action. Bush officials suggested that the president would go to war with Iraq without requesting a declaration of war from Congress, citing his power as commander in chief.

Led by Mike Synar, a group of House Democrats petitioned the Supreme Court for redress. But in line with precedent, the Court declined to involve itself in foreign policy battles between the executive and legislative branches. (Indeed, the few decisions the high court did render on international issues, such as the 1983 ruling *Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha*, which ruled the one-house legislative veto unconstitutional, tended to weaken congressional influence.) Although Synar's effort failed, political pressure eventually persuaded Bush to submit a bill authorizing him to use force. The president did so, however, only days short of an announced deadline to initiate offensive action and with more than 500,000 U.S. troops stationed along the Iraq–Saudi Arabia border. In such an environment it came as little surprise that Congress supported the war declaration; perhaps the real shock came in the forty-seven senators who opposed the resolution.

The record regarding congressional power after the Gulf War was somewhat mixed. Like his predecessor, William Jefferson Clinton struggled with the effects of divided government: a crushing defeat in the 1994 midterm elections brought Republicans to power in both the House and the Senate. Moreover, unlike the Mitchell-led congressional Democrats during the Bush administration, the new GOP majority was fairly united ideologically and was determined to use congressional power to implement its agenda. Clinton experienced difficulties with Congress almost from the start of his administration. Legislative pressure in part forced the administration to reverse itself on issues ranging from Clinton's commitment to end discrimination against gays in the military to the president's decision to continue an ill-conceived humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Even the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993, Clinton's first legislative victory on a foreign policy matter (and, in many ways, the only significant one of his administration) came only after a bloody fight with Congress.

After 1994, a condition of almost permanent hostility between the president and Congress developed. Congressional Republicans offered a multifaceted program that coalesced into an unusually powerful—and effective—critique of the executive's approach to world affairs. Ideologically, the congressional Republicans had several basic viewpoints that reinforced each other. Some GOP legislators seemed eager to revive the Cold War, embracing a vehement anticommunism and supporting hard-line policies toward China, Cuba, and North Korea. Moreover, led by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the congressional Republicans used Congress's power of the purse to prevent the scaling back of the Pentagon budget, partly for ideological reasons, partly due

to a desire to funnel defense dollars to their home districts or states. From another angle, Republicans such as House Majority Leader Richard Armey of Texas boasted of their lack of overseas travel and espoused an anti-internationalism that targeted organizations like the United Nations. Most of the new wave of congressional Republicans also opposed overseas interventions—like Clinton's actions in Haiti and the Balkans—which they viewed as Wilsonian in theory.

Three other factors made the congressional power exercised by the 1990s GOP somewhat unusual. First, after their opposition to the Gulf War, congressional Democrats, for the previous forty years the more active of the two parties in seeking to utilize congressional power, all but ceased involvement on matters relating to foreign affairs. Second, after a series of weak leaders following the 1974 defeat of J. William Fulbright, the Foreign Relations Committee returned to a higher profile under the stewardship of the North Carolina senator Jesse Helms, whose aggressive posture made him a factor on virtually all international questions during the Clinton administration. Finally, the extreme distaste most congressional Republicans felt for Clinton gave party members a political incentive to oppose executive authority in foreign policy, as when Congress refused to renew Clinton's authority to "fast-track" trade agreements, a luxury enjoyed by every president since the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934.

Still, the performance of the congressional GOP sometimes failed to live up to its rhetoric. For example, while Clinton's ability to negotiate tariff deals was impeded, he acted unilaterally and in opposition to the stated congressional position when he intervened to prop up the Mexican peso in 1995. Similarly, in the midst of the war in Kosovo, he initiated hostilities without formally consulting Congress and then ignored GOP-sponsored legislation that seemed to call for him to terminate the operation. Regardless of the precise balance between the two branches at the end of the twentieth century, however, older patterns in congressional power remained in place: the role of the appropriations process and other unconventional methods in measuring the congressional presence in conducting U.S. foreign policy; the importance of party divisions in shaping attitudes toward the congressional role in world affairs; and the tendency of Congress to offer more ideologically extreme viewpoints on international matters than did the executive.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Accinelli, Robert. "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954–1955 Offshore Island Crisis." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 20 (spring 1990): 329–344. A good study of the limits of congressional power during the Eisenhower years.

Ambrosius, Lloyd E. *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition.* Cambridge and New York, 1987. The best published study of the League of Nations battle in the Senate.

Arnson, Cynthia. *Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America.* New York, 1989.

Ashby, LeRoy. *The Spearless Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920s.* Urbana, Ill., 1972. The best biography of the career of the 1920s Foreign Relations Committee chair.

Banks, William C., and Peter Raven-Hansen. *National Security Law and the Power of the Purse.* New York, 1994.

Bernstein, Barton, and Franklin Leib. "Progressive Republican Senators and American Imperialism: A Reappraisal." *Mid-America* 50 (1968): 163–205. An excellent study of the relationship between congressional power and liberal dissent before World War I.

Blechman, Barry M. *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy.* New York, 1990. A nicely done study of how Congress has influenced national security matters since World War II.

Cole, Wayne S. *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45.* Lincoln, Neb., 1983.

Franck, Thomas M., ed. *The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power.* New York, 1981. A somewhat dated volume that remains valuable for the depth of its coverage.

Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. *Foreign Policy by Congress.* New York, 1979.

Gaskin, Thomas M. "Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Eisenhower Administration, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1957–1960." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (spring 1994): 337–353.

Gibbons, William Conrad. *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships.* 4 vols. Princeton, N.J., 1986–1995. The standard account of Congress and the Vietnam War.

Gleijeses, Piero. "The Limits of Sympathy: The United States and the Independence of Span-

ish America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (1992): 481–505.

Griffith, Robert. *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate.* Lexington, Ky., 1970.

Hietala, Thomas R. *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1985. A good model of integrating congressional history with the broader study of U.S. foreign relations.

Hinckley, Barbara. *Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress.* Chicago, 1994.

Hoyt, Steven, and Steven Baker, eds. *Legislating Foreign Policy.* Boulder, Colo., 1984.

Johnson, Loch K. *A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence.* Chicago, 1988.

Lindsay, James M. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Defense Policy.* Baltimore, 1994. Much broader than its title suggests, the best book to date on Congress and the Cold War.

Logevall, Fredrik. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif., 1999. A remarkable example of how including the congressional perspective enriches the writing of international history.

Olmsted, Kathryn S. *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996.

Pastor, Robert A. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976.* Berkeley, Calif., 1980.

Paterson, Thomas G. "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years." *Diplomatic History* 3 (1979): 1–21.

Rakove, Jack N. "Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study." *Perspectives in American History,* n.s. 1 (1984): 207–248. The most thoroughly researched piece on congressional power in foreign affairs and the Constitutional Convention.

Reichard, Gary W. "Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952–1956." *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (1978): 37–65. A solid study of the Democrats' "limited dissent."

Ripley, Randall B., and James M. Lindsay, eds. *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1993.

Schoultz, Lars. *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America.* Princeton, N.J., 1981.

Small, Melvin. *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994.* Baltimore, 1996.

Smist, Frank. *Congress Oversees the Intelligence Community, 1947–1989.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1994.

Stone, Ralph. *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations.* Lexington, Ky., 1970.

Widenor, William C. *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy.* Berkeley, Calif., 1981. A model in congressional biography, of Wilson's leading foe in the League of Nations fight.

Woods, Randall Bennett. *Fulbright: A Biography.* New York, 1995. A much-needed study of arguably the most powerful Foreign Relations Committee chair in U.S. history.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; BIPARTISANSHIP; THE CONSTITUTION; ELITISM; FOREIGN AID; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PUBLIC OPINION; TREATIES.

CONSORTIA

Warren I. Cohen

As generally found in world affairs, consortia are multinational cooperative ventures designed to cope with some common problem, ostensibly apolitical. The best-known consortia, the so-called China consortiums, were banking syndicates—combinations of banking groups from several countries. Lacking adequate capital for export, the United States did not serve as a lender in international financial operations until the twentieth century. When it did begin to take part, American bankers proved to be imperfect instruments for national policy.

THE FIRST CHINA CONSORTIUM

In the early years of the twentieth century, a number of American financial institutions accumulated capital for which they sought foreign markets. J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and National City Bank of New York were prominent among firms interested in investing funds outside the United States. Opportunities for domestic investment were still plentiful: the United States remained a capital-importing nation, and Europe remained the world's banker until World War I. Opportunities for greater profit, however, were believed to exist abroad, and American bankers became deeply involved in the financial affairs of countries such as Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. To a lesser extent, some bankers and industrialists were interested in East Asia, especially China. China was attempting to modernize, preferred U.S. capital to European or Japanese, and the Chinese government was a better credit risk than a number of U.S. state governments.

There were, however, other kinds of risks involved in investing in China. The Caribbean was an American lake, dominated by the growing power of the United States, and investors were confident that the U.S. government would protect their interests in Caribbean countries. But in China all of the great European powers and Japan struggled for advantage, sometimes political as well as economic. With rare exception, the U.S. government had shown itself disinclined to become involved in Chinese affairs, unwilling to give American businessmen support comparable to that which their European and Japanese competitors might reasonably expect from their own governments. As a result, little U.S. capital could be found in China in 1909, when William Howard Taft became president of the United States.

Taft was eager to expand American influence and power, and his administration was noted for its use of "dollar diplomacy" to achieve its ends. Taft not only continued Theodore Roosevelt's support of U.S. economic interests in Latin America, but also backed enterprises in places as remote as Turkey. The most striking contrast between the policies of Taft and Roosevelt could be found in East Asia, where Taft refused to acquiesce in Japanese expansion in Manchuria. He believed that Chinese and Americans shared a mutual interest in preventing Japanese hegemony over China's northeastern provinces and that the development of American economic interests in that region would serve the interests of both nations—perhaps all nations. Several schemes for forcing American capital into Manchuria, most notably the "neutralization" plan of Secretary of State Philander Knox, a scheme for internationalizing Chinese railways, failed; but in China proper the Taft offensive met with one apparent success: American bankers were awarded a share in a loan for the building of the Hankow-Canton or Hukuang Railway and allowed to join what became known as the consortium.

A group of American banking firms had come together in the last year of the Roosevelt administration to explore investment opportunities in East Asia, but had not acted in the absence of interest in the White House or on the part of

the secretary of state. When Taft and Knox insisted, early in 1909, that the United States be allowed to participate in the financing of the Hukuang, the existing banking group was formally designated the American group and called upon to play the American role—if the British, French, and German groups, and their respective governments, as well as the Chinese government, would honor the American demand.

In June 1909, as a syndicate of British, French, and German bankers was about to conclude negotiations with the Chinese, Knox filed a formal protest, reminding the Chinese government of assurances it had given in 1904 that the United States would be able to share in any loan to build the Hukuang. Choosing to see the exclusion of the United States as an unfriendly act, Knox threatened to discontinue the remission of indemnity payments resulting from the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Responding to American pressures, the Chinese urged the British, French, and German bankers to share their concession with the Americans. Almost a year of haggling over the terms of American participation followed, featuring the personal intercession of President Taft and the Department of State's refusal to permit the American group to accept anything less than a full quarter share of all components of the project. The American group, recognizing that its share of the bond issue that would ensue from the Hukuang loan would likely require listing in European exchanges, was willing to compromise with the European bankers in order to retain goodwill and preserve their own profits. The Department of State, however, was far more concerned with American prestige and influence, presumably contingent on the American group's participating on a basis of absolute equality. Finally, in May 1910, an agreement was signed between the three European banking groups and the American group that not only permitted the Americans to share in the Hukuang loan but brought them into the banking syndicate. As of the signing of the agreement, bankers of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States were united in a four-power consortium, committed to sharing equally all future business in China.

But the creation of the consortium did not lead to the immediate consummation of the Hukuang loan. To the consternation of the bankers, the Chinese government backed away, fearful that coming to terms with the consortium would exacerbate mounting unrest in China and lead to a revolution. Opposition to foreign control of China's railways was growing among educated Chinese, and there was, in addition, a desire by provincial gentry to prevent central control of railways. The consortium bankers insisted that a preliminary agreement was binding upon the Chinese and asked for and received diplomatic support from their governments. The U.S. minister to China, William J. Calhoun, was greatly embarrassed by instructions that he demand that the Chinese conclude the loan negotiations. He argued that it was undignified, "unworthy of civilized powers," to force a loan on an unwilling government. But Calhoun's protests were brushed aside, and the U.S. government joined in the pressures to which the Chinese succumbed in May 1911. As the Peking government anticipated, conclusion of the £6 million loan led to increased violence in the provinces and ultimately to revolution.

Even Calhoun was willing to drop his opposition to the loan if the loan operations were essential to continued cooperation between the United States and its new European partners in China. In Washington, this cooperation was deemed vital to the furtherance of U.S. interests in China. Participation in the loan was a wedge for American investments, which would lead to expanded U.S. trade, greater public attention to East Asia, and a greater role for the United States in the political affairs of the region. By forcing the consortium to admit American bankers, the Taft administration assumed it had reserved a place at the table at which the future of China would be played out. As long as the game promised to be profitable, the bankers of the American group demonstrated a grudging willingness to play the pawn.

While negotiations over the American role in the Hukuang loan were under way, the American group responded favorably to a Chinese request for another large loan, partly for currency reform and partly for Manchurian development. The Chinese hoped that by turning to the American bankers they could obtain better terms than were available from European bankers—that they could play off the American bankers against the Europeans. To Knox, the Chinese proposal held the dual promise of American hegemony over Chinese finances and an opportunity to penetrate Manchuria in order to fulfill the goal of checking Japanese expansion there. The American banking group, however, brushed aside the visions of both the Chinese and the Department of State by insisting on offering the new loan to the European bankers. Again, the problem was the shortage of capital in the United States, which necessitated an

international listing of the bond issue for the loan to be floated successfully. If the American group offered the currency loan to the European groups, the Europeans might prove less disagreeable about having been forced to offer the American group a share in the Hukuang loan and allow the American group to list the bonds of both its loans on European exchanges. Profits for the American bankers would thus be assured. The Chinese were indignant, but once Knox was converted, he bludgeoned them into permitting the currency loan to be taken over by the consortium. The currency loan was never issued, however, because the revolution began.

The creation of the four-power consortium worried the Japanese and Russian governments, especially when they learned that part of the currency loan was earmarked for use in Manchuria. The Russians attempted to block the loan, and, failing at that, they tried unsuccessfully to destroy the consortium by urging the French—to whom they were closely tied, politically and economically—to withdraw. Ultimately, the Russians accepted French assurances that their interests in Manchuria could best be served if they too joined the consortium. As early as November 1910, while the Russians were still being obstructive, the Japanese concluded that their interests could be protected most readily from within and expressed an interest in membership in the consortium.

Knox was willing to allow both the Russians and the Japanese to have a share in the loan business, but not in the management of the consortium. The bankers of the consortium were not eager to share their profits with new partners. Both the British and U.S. governments tried instead to reassure the Russians and Japanese by specifying the particular Manchurian enterprises for which the consortium would provide funds, trying to demonstrate the absence of any intention to threaten the existing interests of the two Manchurian overlords. But the Russians and Japanese continued to fear that the Chinese intended to allow the consortium a monopoly on development loans in Manchuria and were still opposed to the terms of the currency reform loan in October 1911 when the revolution began.

As Ch'ing rule of China disintegrated and warfare spread along the Yangtze River, the U.S. government surrendered its hope of using the consortium or other forms of dollar diplomacy against Japan and Russia in Manchuria. With China less able than ever to protect its own interests in the frontier regions of the empire, Knox and his assistants concluded that American interests could be furthered only by cooperating with Japan and Russia, settling for an equal opportunity to trade in Chinese provinces under their control. The British Foreign Office reached similar conclusions, joining Knox in recommending that Japan and Russia be invited to join the consortium. Both France and Yüan Shih-k'ai, strong man and later president of the Chinese Republic, agreed; but the American bankers, reinforced by the Germans, both government and bankers, opposed Russian participation.

As Yüan's regime began to assert itself over the country, his prime minister, T'ang Shao-i, notified the consortium's representatives in Peking of his interest in a £60 million loan to enable the government to reorganize, pay off advances, and proceed with development projects. In return for an option on the reorganization loan, the consortium bankers agreed to an immediate advance on the currency loan. A few days later the consortium bankers learned that the Chinese had concluded another loan, with a Belgian syndicate that included the Russo-Asiatic Bank—the main instrument of the Russian equivalent of dollar diplomacy. To the Russian government and to bankers of England and France who were excluded from the consortium, the opportunity to disrupt the consortium's efforts to monopolize China's financial transactions proved irresistible. Similarly, the Chinese were delighted to find other bankers to play off against those who combined in order to dictate the terms under which China could obtain foreign capital. The consortium bankers were outraged and broke off negotiations with Yüan's government.

The few bankers involved in the consortium, of whatever nationality, wanted a monopoly over all Chinese loans. Their governments, especially the British and U.S. governments, were uneasy about the demands of their bankers and were more interested in establishing and preserving order in China and in using economic cooperation as a base upon which political cooperation in China could be built. The governments were more receptive to Chinese requests for a relaxation of the foreign controls that the consortium bankers demanded and were ready to admit Japan and Russia to the organization if that was necessary to facilitate operations in China proper. In addition, European political considerations made pacification of Russia imperative to France and Great Britain. Consequently, the French and British governments pressed for the admission of Japan and

Russia to the consortium, appeasing the consortium bankers by forcing British and French participants in the Belgian loan to withdraw, which led to cancellation of that transaction.

Although Japan and Russia were both interested in joining the consortium, they stipulated the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the organization's operations. The British and French governments were willing to accept the Russo-Japanese terms, and in May 1912, Knox assented, but it was June before a formula agreeable to all concerned could be discovered. In June 1912, the six-power consortium came into existence, and more money was advanced to Yüan's regime. Yüan used the money to consolidate his position against his enemies, especially against Sun Yat-sen's supporters in the south and in parliament.

As Yüan sought more money, the banking groups were caught up by the political machinations of their governments in the selection of foreign advisers to oversee the expenditure of the monies loaned. European politics prevailed as Britain, France, and Russia supported each other's proposals to the detriment of German suggestions. Yüan became increasingly irritated with the consortium, his political opponents anxiously opposed further loans, and the American bankers wearied of the entire process. The U.S. minister to China had never been comfortable with the loan operations, and by 1913, Sir John Jordan, the British minister, considered the consortium arrangements to be of benefit to the one British bank involved but detrimental to British interests generally. To the American bankers there appeared little prospect for reasonable profits. The U.S. government had abandoned hope of playing an important role in Manchuria. Only the principle of cooperation, to which the State Department had dedicated itself, remained. In 1913 the new U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson, did not consider cooperation with European or Japanese imperialists a virtue, and he refused the American group the support it no longer wanted. In April the American role in the consortium was terminated.

Wilson mistrusted the Wall Street bankers of the American group, and he mistrusted their foreign partners. He suspected the consortium of seeking to take advantage of China's weakness to infringe on Chinese sovereignty and to profit at the expense of the Chinese people. He wanted to help China but was determined to find another way. Yüan was pleased, hoping that an American loan on better terms would soon be available. But American money was not forthcoming, and Yüan, desperately in need of money, concluded the reorganization loan with the remaining five members of the consortium. His position thus strengthened, Yüan was able to crush a rebellion led by Sun's Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party.

By April 1915, with Europe embroiled in warfare, Wilson recognized Japan's intent to dominate China, as evidenced by the Twenty-one Demands (1915). To check Japanese imperialism and further American interests in China, he designed his own version of dollar diplomacy. Although hostile to the American group because of its monopolistic practices and attempts to infringe on Chinese sovereignty, Wilson was very much interested in the use of American capital to further the process of Chinese modernization. He failed, however, to elicit interest among other American bankers, and, in response to a request from the Chinese government in 1916, Wilson asked the American group to consider a loan to China.

The member banks wanted to disband the American group but were held together by their inability to rid themselves of their share of the Hukuang loan. They responded negatively to Wilson's proposition, refusing to compete with the consortium and willing to consider a loan outside the scope of the consortium only if the U.S. government would offer a guarantee that China would fulfill its obligations. The government would not offer a guarantee and appealed instead to the bankers' patriotism. But the bankers would lend to China only as a business proposition, and the matter was dropped.

When a U.S. bank outside the American group entered into a loan agreement with the Chinese in 1916, the other consortium banking groups protested angrily. Wilson rejected the protests, warning the British, French, Japanese, and Russian governments against excluding American bankers from participation in Chinese affairs. With most of these governments anxious to avoid conflict with the United States while involved in a life-and-death struggle with the Central Powers in Europe, their bankers could count on little support against an invasion of American capital. There was one hope: British, French, Russian, and Japanese bankers expressed a desire to see the United States rejoin the consortium, to co-opt the United States and contain the financial offensive the American bankers were now presumed capable of launching.

In March 1917 the American group notified the Department of State that it favored accepting the invitation to rejoin the consortium, contending that the time was ripe for advancing American commercial prestige. But Wilson was unyielding: loans should be made directly to China and not through the consortium. The president recognized the overtures from the consortium as an attempt to prevent independent American action.

THE SECOND CHINA CONSORTIUM

By June 1918 the Wilson administration was forced to concede failure in its efforts to find American capital for investment in China. Fearing that the Japanese, in the absence of American or European competition, would monopolize Chinese economic affairs, Wilson agreed to allow the American group to join its old associates in a new consortium. The American group was to become more inclusive, admitting to membership banking groups throughout the country, and it would pledge not to undermine Chinese sovereignty. In return, Wilson agreed to announce that the group was offering a loan to China at the suggestion of the government.

The Wilson administration had returned to the conception of an international banking consortium, because no other means could be found to move American capital into China. The American initiative for a new consortium was intended to serve the same purpose independent American loans would have served: the containment of Japanese economic expansion to preserve opportunity for U.S. expansion in China. Given Wilson's faith in the "liberal exceptionalism" of the United States, he readily assumed that U.S. expansion, unlike the Japanese variety, would be salutary for China—that Chinese and American interests were congruent.

For the American group, Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company met with representatives of the British, French, and Japanese banking groups in May 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference. Lamont proposed and reached rapid agreement on the American plan for pooling all future business in China and for pooling all existing loan agreements and options involving public subscription except those relating to industrial undertakings upon which substantial progress had been made. The efficiency of cooperation and the expectation of the exclusive support of their governments were attractive to the bankers.

In June, however, the Japanese group reported that its government insisted on excluding from the consortium agreement all rights and options held by Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan had "special interests." The Japanese expected the United States to consent to the exceptions on the basis of Secretary of State Robert Lansing's recognition of Japan's "special interests" in his 1917 agreement with Viscount Ishii Kikujiro. Once Japan's sphere in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was thus protected, the Japanese government viewed the consortium with favor, as a means of improving relations with the United States and as an instrument for checking the anticipated torrent of American capital.

The purpose of the consortium, as understood in Washington and London, however, was to eliminate special claims to spheres of influence and to open all of China to cooperative international development. Not only the Wilsonians, but also Lord Curzon, Great Britain's secretary of state for foreign affairs, considered economic imperialism an anachronism in the face of the nationalist movement that was sweeping over China. When the French government expressed fear that refusal to grant the reservations Japan requested would result in the Japanese finding friends outside the circle of their wartime allies, Curzon insisted that the Japanese request was inadmissible and expressed confidence that they would back down in face of the unanimity of the British, French, and American groups supported by their governments.

Months passed as the Japanese and U.S. governments exchanged mutually unsatisfactory counterproposals. In February 1920 Lamont went to Tokyo in an attempt to break the deadlock. One area for possible compromise existed, and the State Department had focused on it in December 1919: Japan's existing economic interests ("vested" interests in Manchuria and Mongolia) could be conceded, excluded from the scope of the consortium. Both sides moved slowly toward this position. To prod the Japanese government, Wilson authorized a threat to reveal the secret protocol of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, in which Ishii had committed Japan not to seek privileges in China at the expense of other powers.

As the negotiations proceeded, Lamont proposed an exchange of notes between the American and Japanese groups defining the attitudes of foreign bankers toward Japanese economic interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, specifying what would or would not come within the scope of the consortium. Lamont's plan would allow for the

acceptance of existing economic facts without giving official governmental recognition. Only the consortium would recognize Japan's economic interests. The American and British ambassadors to Japan liked Lamont's proposal, but the Department of State rejected it and suggested that Lamont reach an agreement on the basis of specific enterprises the Japanese wanted to exclude from the consortium's focus. The U.S. government would not accept a reference to the exclusion of any region of China. Lamont was angered by State Department scruples, but, insisting that Manchuria was in fact dominated by the Japanese and unattractive to nationals of the other banking groups, he was able to reach agreement with his Japanese counterpart on the department's terms. In April 1920 the Japanese government, in a last effort to strengthen the consensus within the leadership, bid once more for veto power over railway construction in Manchuria. If further concessions could be won from Japan's prospective partners, opposition to the agreement within Japan might be stilled. The effort alone might satisfy dissidents within the cabinet that the government had done all that was possible. But the U.S. and British governments held firm and the Japanese appeared to retreat.

In the following month, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the U.S. ambassador, Roland Morris, a "draft reply" to the American rejection of Japan's last set of reservations, claiming that the earlier note had not been presented for the purpose of raising new conditions but simply to avoid future misunderstandings. The Japanese government would not insist on explicit American assurances but would accept the general assurances offered previously and refrain from insisting upon discussion of the veto power it sought initially. The Japanese were satisfied to make known to the U.S. government their interpretation of the questions at issue.

Lamont and the American ambassador were pleased, interpreting the Japanese position as complete acceptance of the position taken by the U.S. government and supported by the British and French governments. But J. V. A. MacMurray, chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, argued that the Japanese had retracted nothing. MacMurray claimed that the Japanese note reemphasized Japan's claim to a veto on railway construction in Manchuria and had further placed on record their understanding that American assurances regarding Japan's right of self-preservation meant U.S. recognition of that veto power. But MacMurray was overruled; the Department of State accepted the Japanese draft, and the consortium negotiations were concluded.

MacMurray was probably correct when he contended that the Japanese, in addition to receiving explicit acceptance of all of their existing and some of their projected economic interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, had established a strong basis for arguing that the United States had conceded to Japan veto power over railway construction in Manchuria. Certainly that was the view that prevailed in official Japanese circles. But MacMurray's superiors in the Department of State had concluded that the choice was between accepting the conditions obtained or surrendering the idea of the four-power consortium. To the U.S. government there appeared no alternative means of preserving American interests in China. After March 1920, when the Senate for the third time rejected U.S. membership in the League of Nations, the consortium offered the best, perhaps the only, basis for cooperation with the powers in China.

With the formation of the consortium in 1920 and the subsequent agreements reached at the Washington Conference (1921–1922), Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States were committed to cooperation among themselves in assisting with the modernization of China. The consortium bankers were to provide the Chinese government with the funds it needed to build railroads and other major productive enterprises. But in the six years that followed the Washington Conference, China suffered from almost constant civil strife, and, despite prompting from the U.S. and British governments, the consortium did nothing to assist China's economic development: no loans were granted. The British frequently referred to the consortium as a financial "blockade," designed to prevent the Chinese government from obtaining funds it would presumably misuse.

Similarly, American businessmen anxious to develop or expand their interests in China failed to obtain needed capital. They did not lack support from the U.S. government, within which the Departments of Commerce and State competed to build up American economic interests in China. But American entrepreneurs in China, like the Chinese government, found the consortium an obstacle.

The core of the problem was the divergence between the interests of the Department of State and those of Lamont and his fellow bankers. The department wanted the consortium to provide

capital for China's development—to help in the creation of a strong modern China in which American interests would thrive. For the bankers, the remote promise of China could not compete with the more immediate promise of Japan. In 1923 the House of Morgan floated a $150 million loan for the Japanese government, and other smaller loans followed in the mid-1920s. American capital that might have been available to China was lent instead to the Japanese, and some of it, by indirect means—by being "laundered" or simply by freeing other capital—facilitated the expansion of Japanese interests on the Asian mainland. Because the Japanese were competing with the Chinese for American capital, they could use their position in the consortium to discourage loans to China. The American group, led by Lamont, accepted this process. In short, one of the two competitors for capital worked in collusion with the potential lender to deny capital to the other. However permissible among businessmen pursuing profit, it was not consistent with the ends of public policy. Conditions in China, however, left the Department of State no means for changing the direction of the flow of capital. Lamont proved to be remarkably skillful in leading State Department officials to believe that he shared their views but was held back by partners less interested in helping China.

Twice during the early years of the consortium's existence the ability of Lamont and his colleagues to avoid lending money to the Chinese was tested. In both instances, in 1922 and in 1923, the U.S., British, French, and Japanese ministers to China and the Peking representatives of all four banking groups recommended that the loans be granted. In both instances the diplomats and group representatives argued that the consortium could not afford to reject Chinese overtures. But in neither instance could Lamont be moved, supporting or being supported by the head of the British group or the Japanese government in his opposition to taking up the Chinese business.

For the next two years, until the violence subsequent to the May Thirtieth Incident radically changed the context, Lamont and his British counterpart, with at least the public support of their governments, sang in praise of the success of the consortium's negative effort. They had stopped wasteful borrowing by the Chinese government, and their cooperation had a salutary effect on relations among the powers in China. Despite dissatisfaction with the inactivity of the consortium, the U.S. and British governments were anxious to have it remain in existence. For the United States and Great Britain the consortium appeared to have assisted in checking the expansion of Japan's economic hold over China. For the British, continued Anglo-American cooperation in East Asia was itself a valuable end. And the Japanese indicated no dissatisfaction with the consortium, supporting a motion in 1924 to renew the agreement in perpetuity. France, the fourth party to the consortium agreement, appeared to its partners to be apathetic, unreliable, and forever bargaining for some trivial advantage, but supportive of the others when the agreement was renewed.

Although after 1923 there was never again serious consideration of a loan from the consortium to any Chinese regime, the organization continued to exist, at least in theory, until a decision in 1946 that the Japanese attack on U.S. and British forces in 1941 constituted abrogation of the agreement. The persistence of the consortium through the 1930s is remarkable because of the constant desire of the American group to withdraw and because of the determination of the British government to end the agreement in 1937. One stubborn man, Stanley K. Hornbeck of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, continually blocked dissolution, with an assist from the Japanese army in the summer of 1937.

The American group's desire to be rid of the consortium, voiced regularly by Lamont, reflected the leadership's conviction that there was no money to be made out of China and that continuation of the organization was not worth the bother or expense. From 1920 on, Lamont argued that there was no market for Chinese securities in the United States—that the American investor would not touch Chinese bonds until the Chinese demonstrated stability and paid off earlier loans, especially the Hukuang Railway loan, on all issues of which they had defaulted in 1925. After the Banking Act of 1933 prohibited banks of deposit from underwriting or offering securities, Lamont explained to the Department of State that his own firm and most members of the American group could no longer participate in loan operations even if they were to become feasible on a business basis. But for over a quarter of a century, Lamont deferred to the State Department's desire to maintain the consortium. It was not until January 1946 that he succeeded in getting the department to concede unequivocally that no useful purpose would be served by con-

tinuing the consortium, with or without the American group in it.

Despite their failure to get the consortium to lend money to China, officials of the Department of State fought to keep the organization in existence. Certainly it was not because American economic interests prospered. Lamont and his colleagues were concerned with their own profits and not with the expansion of the trade of their countrymen or with abstract conceptions of national interest. Sino-American trade remained static in the 1920s and rose slightly only in percentage terms for a few years in the early 1930s. The increase in American investments in China was not impressive. The American group hindered rather than helped the development of U.S. economic interests in China, as the Department of Commerce found when it tried to advance the prospects of American corporations.

Ultimately, men like MacMurray and Hornbeck fought to retain the consortium as a means of keeping the United States involved in East Asia, in the affairs of China. This had always been the fundamental purpose of a policy of cooperation with those powers earlier and more profoundly committed to activism in China. Without hitching a ride, the State Department's East Asian specialists, from John Hay's adviser, William W. Rockhill, through Hornbeck, feared not only that the United States would be deprived of an opportunity to expand its interests in their region, but also that interest in the area to which they were committed would cease to exist in the United States. The promise of U.S. expansion in China, however remote the reality, had become their raison d'être. The consortium, however inadequate, was the only vehicle they had for much of the interwar period.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF BANKERS ON MEXICO

Formed in 1919, the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico (ICBM) provides an interesting comparison with the second China consortium. Once again Lamont was the central figure on the American side, and once again the bankers demonstrated that they would act independently of other business interests or the wishes of their government in pursuit of their ends. The ICBM, however, never loomed as large in the plans of the Department of State's Division of Mexican Affairs as the China consortium did in the visions of MacMurray and Hornbeck.

Claiming pressure from European bankers, Lamont solicited the approval of the Department of State for the organization of an international committee of bankers in 1918. In 1919 approval to bring together American, British, and French banking groups concerned with investments in Mexico was granted by the department, with the proviso that control of the committee's policy remain in American hands. Swiss, Dutch, and Belgian banking interests were subsequently given token representation on the committee.

The primary concern of the bankers was to protect the holders of Mexican securities, especially those of the Mexican government. Lamont and his colleagues were at best marginally concerned with the primary issue dividing the U.S. and Mexican governments in 1920: interpretations of Article 27 of the Mexican constitution and its effect on the claims of American oil companies. Fearing debt repudiation, the bankers were unsympathetic to Washington's tactic of withholding recognition from the Mexican government as a means of forcing it to respect the property rights and claims of the oil companies. Whereas the government of the United States wanted all American claims against Mexico to be settled simultaneously, the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico exhibited few inhibitions about negotiating a separate settlement of Mexico's foreign debt.

Restrained initially by the Department of State, Lamont obtained approval to begin negotiations with the administration of Alvaro Obregón in 1921. In June 1922 the Lamont–De la Huerta agreement was reached, recognizing $500 million of indebtedness and arranging for eventual payment. This arrangement paved the way for the Bucareli agreements between the Mexican and United States governments in 1923, ameliorating the differences between the two and leading to recognition of Obregón's regime.

In the years that followed, Mexico had difficulty meeting the schedule established in the Lamont–De la Huerta agreement, and in 1925 Lamont negotiated a new agreement. Payment remained irregular, however, and negotiations between the ICBM and the Mexican government continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1930 considerable friction arose between Lamont and the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, his former partner Dwight Morrow. Morrow and the Department of State insisted that a separate agreement between the bankers and the Mexican government was contrary to the interests of both the

United States and Mexico. Choosing on this occasion to understate the connection between the ICBM and the Department of State, Lamont insisted that he had reached a private arrangement with the Mexican minister of finance and was not asking for the department's consent. Unable to sway Lamont or the Mexican ambassador to the United States, Morrow warned the Mexican government that the United States did not see the agreement with Lamont as a constructive step toward financial stability. The Mexican government capitulated, assuring Morrow it would not submit the agreement to Congress except as a package comprising provisions for all of Mexico's debts. A final settlement between the ICBM and Mexico was not obtained until November 1942 in the Suarez-Lamont agreement ratified by the Mexican congress and the foreign bondholders. Legal problems kept the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico in existence until at least 1948, when its unrecorded demise appears to have occurred. It did not have any political significance after 1930, when it alienated the Department of State. The department was not kept informed of subsequent negotiations between Lamont and Mexican authorities.

The International Committee of Bankers on Mexico resembled the China consortium in that both consisted of groups of bankers from several nations, brought together with the approval of their governments, but ultimately indifferent to the interests of their governments or of other businessmen. The bankers of the ICBM were concerned with their own particularistic interests: any benefit derived from their activities by their governments or other peoples was incidental.

The ICBM differed strikingly from the China consortium in its relationship to the governments of the members' groups. The committee was formed at the initiative of the bankers, and only the government of the United States indicated a deep concern for its activities. There were no international political problems because none of the other countries that were represented had political interests in Mexico. All accepted American hegemony in Mexico, in contrast to the response to Japan's claims to hegemony over Manchuria. The government of the United States had other interests in Mexico and many other ways to exercise influence there. It never saw the committee as an important instrument of policy. After the friction between the Department of State and Lamont in 1930, only the bondholders cared about the future of the committee.

CONSORTIA SINCE WORLD WAR II

International banking consortia, involving in particular American banks based in New York, continued to be engaged in financing projects in developing countries, especially in Latin America, where they became dangerously overexposed in the 1970s and 1980s. After World War II, however, the U.S. government, specifically its Agency for International Development (AID), and international organizations, specifically the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), became major sources of loans. Both AID and the World Bank, in which U.S. influence has generally prevailed, have served American foreign policy interests far more effectively than did the private bankers of the prewar era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Borg, Dorothy. *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938: From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War.* Cambridge, Mass., 1964. Contains an account of Hornbeck's views and of the fate of the second consortium during the 1930s.

Cohen, Warren I. "America's New Order in East Asia: The Four Power Financial Consortium and China, 1919–1946." In Kwan Wai So and Warren I. Cohen, eds. *Essays in the History of China and Chinese-American Relations.* East Lansing, Mich., 1982. The most comprehensive account of the second consortium.

Curry, Roy W. *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913–1921.* New York, 1957. Describes Wilson's initial attitude toward the American group and explains the Wilson administration's decision to create a new consortium.

Field, Frederick V. *American Participation in the China Consortiums.* Chicago, 1931. A clear and detailed description of both the old and new consortiums. The analysis of the problems of the old consortium is superior to the discussion of the new consortium; in the latter case, Field relied too heavily on Lamont for information.

Hoff, Joan. *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933.* Lexington, Ky., 1971. Provides a useful context for the workings of the second consortium and the ICBM, but Hoff did not have access to the Lamont papers.

Lamont, Thomas W. *Across World Frontiers*. New York, 1951. A charming but unreliable account.

Lewis, John P., and Richard Webb. *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*. Washington, D.C., 1997. The best starting point for examining the bank's work.

Porter, David. *U.S. Economic Foreign Aid: A Case Study of the United States Agency for International Development*. New York, 1990. Demonstrates how the agency functions.

Schmitt, Karl M. *Mexico and the United States, 1821–1973: Conflict and Coexistence*. New York, 1974. Includes reference to the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico in a chapter devoted to land and oil controversies.

Scholes, Walter V., and Marie V. Scholes. *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration*. Columbia, Mo., 1970. Contains an excellent discussion of the workings of the first consortium, based on multi-archival research. It is also important for the context of Taft's East Asian offensive.

Smith, Robert F. *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916–1932*. Chicago, 1972. Provides a thoughtful analysis of the problems of a less-developed country in a world in which international law is interpreted by advanced capitalist countries. Smith effectively uses the Lamont papers.

See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; WILSONIANISM.

THE CONSTITUTION

David Gray Adler

There is no comprehensive grant of a foreign affairs authority in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the constitutional text carefully enumerates and allocates to the three branches of government a series of specific foreign relations powers, responsibilities, and duties. The relatively lean text, and the fact that it omits mention of particular powers, has no doubt contributed to the constitutional tension, controversy, and occasional crises that have marked American foreign affairs. Nevertheless the Constitution vests in Congress the bulk of the nation's foreign policy powers, a design which assigns to Congress senior status in a partnership with the president for the formulation, management, and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The constitutional blueprint for foreign relations reflects the Constitutional Convention's conspicuous penchant for collective decision making and its fear of unilateral executive power.

This arrangement, however, has been overwhelmed in the post–Cold War era by sweeping assertions of unilateral presidential power that have laid the basis for a presidential monopoly over foreign affairs and advanced a conception of executive authority so capacious that it has produced a wide gulf between constitutional principle and governmental practice. To understand the constitutional allocation of foreign relations powers, it is necessary to examine the Constitution—the text, its design, the intentions of its Framers, and its history.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

The preference for collective, rather than individual, decision making runs throughout the constitutional provisions that govern foreign policy. In addition to its exclusive jurisdiction over legislation and appropriation, Congress derives broad authority from Article 1, Section 8, to "provide for the Common Defence," to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas . . . and offences against the Law of Nations," and make rules governing immigration and naturalization. Congress, alone, has the power to "declare War" and to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" as well as to develop rules regarding "Captures on Land and Water." Congress also possesses the authority to raise, support, and maintain an army and navy, to "make Rules" for the regulation and government of the "land and naval Forces" and to call forth "the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." It is also assigned the power and responsibility to organize, arm, discipline, and govern the militia.

As Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution indicates, the president shares with the Senate the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. Specifically, the president is granted the authority, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Another provision, known as the "supremacy clause," in Article 6, makes treaties, along with the Constitution and acts of Congress, the "supreme Law of the land." The constitutional grant of authority to the president to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Constitution assigns to the president only two exclusive roles in foreign affairs. He is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States," and he is enjoined by Article 2, Section 3, to perform two duties: "he shall receive Ambassadors, and other public Ministers," and "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." This list exhausts the textual grant of authority to the president and Congress in foreign affairs. The president's constitutional powers are

few and modest, and they pale in comparison with those vested in Congress.

The judiciary is assigned constitutional power that bears on the conduct of foreign policy. Article 3, Section 2, confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," while it generally lodges in the federal courts jurisdiction in "controversies between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."

The Constitution also imposes some significant and specific prohibitions, the effect of which is to ensure that control over foreign relations is vested in the national government. For purposes of foreign relations, federalism is virtually irrelevant. Bulked by the supremacy clause, federal acts are supreme and require the acquiescence of states. In *United States* v. *Belmont* (1937), the Supreme Court observed: "In respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State . . . does not exist." Thus, Article 1, Section 10, categorically forbids states from entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." Moreover, no state may, without the consent of Congress, "enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded," or in "imminent danger" of invasion. Other prohibitions touch upon the conduct of foreign affairs, although none of them in practice is very important. Thus, Article 1, Section 9, provides that no holder of any "Office of Profit or Trust" under the United States may "accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state," without the consent of Congress.

Some foreign affairs powers are not mentioned in the Constitution. For example, the Constitution is silent on the repository of authority to negotiate treaties, terminate treaties, recognize foreign governments and states, and make or declare peace. It may be plausibly argued that these powers are subsumed under enumerated grants of power or fairly inferred from the Framers' intentions or other constitutional provisions. This approach is faithful to the principle, articulated by the Court in *Reid* v. *Covert* (1957), that the government is "a creature of the Constitution. Its powers and authority have no other source." It has been asserted, however, that foreign relations constitute an exception to the principle that the federal government has only those powers expressly enumerated in the Constitution. In the controversial decision of *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* (1936), the Court announced that the president's powers over foreign affairs are not derived from the Constitution but are a direct inheritance from the Crown of England. That case involved the constitutionality of an embargo that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had imposed upon the export of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay during the Chaco War. Roosevelt had issued the embargo on the basis of authority delegated to him in a joint resolution passed by Congress.

In a bizarre opinion, Justice George Sutherland argued that federal power in the field of foreign affairs differed radically from that with respect to internal matters. He observed that the internal federal power had been carved from "the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states," but that this was not at all true of the control of foreign policy, which had never been in the possession of the states. Instead, he maintained, before the Revolution general power over foreign affairs had been lodged in the British Crown. But with the Declaration of Independence, "the power of external sovereignty had passed . . . to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States." The power over foreign affairs was "older than the Constitution" and had been inherited by the newly formed "Union" from the Confederation. It did not depend upon any direct grant of authority from the Constitution, for it is a necessary attribute of nationhood and sovereignty. Not only did the foreign affairs power inhere in the union, but it belonged to the president, who would exercise "plenary" power in his capacity as "sole organ" of American foreign policy, although the opinion did not explain how such authority came to belong to the executive.

Justice Sutherland's opinion has been roundly criticized. Scholars have criticized his reading of Anglo-American legal history by demonstrating that in 1776 states were sovereign entities. They point to Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation which stated: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power . . . which is not . . . expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." As sovereign entities, and jealous of their sovereignty, states only delegated powers to the Continental Congress. Through Article 9, for example, states delegated the war and treaty powers. That grant alone undermines Sutherland's premise that these powers were derived from a source other than the states. Moreover, even if it

were assumed that the power of external sovereignty had been by some method transferred directly from the Crown to the union, it remains to be explained why that power would be vested in the president. Justice Felix Frankfurter noted in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company* v. *Sawyer* (1952) that "the fact that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President." Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled on several occasions that the sovereign power in foreign affairs is held by Congress. There is nothing in Sutherland's theory that would explain the location of this power in the presidency.

The contention, moreover, that the conduct of foreign policy is not restricted by the Constitution is at odds with Madison's statement in *Federalist* No. 45 that "the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined . . . [they] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce." Thus the foreign affairs powers are strictly constitutional. Since *Curtiss-Wright* the Court has taken the position that foreign affairs powers are tethered to the Constitution. In *Youngstown*, Justice Hugo Black, speaking for the Court, delivered a weighty rebuke to the claim of "extra-constitutional" power. In the same case, Justice Robert Jackson dismissed Sutherland's claim of an extra-constitutional presidential power as mere "dictum." The theory of extra-constitutional authority is irreconcilable with the central premise of American constitutionalism: All powers of the government—expressed and implied—have been delegated by the sovereign. As a consequence of this constitutional principle, all governmental acts—executive, legislative, and judicial—must be grounded within the four corners of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The Constitutional Convention was called for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. Chief among the deficiencies were those that weakened the international position of the United States. Accordingly, few issues rivaled in importance the maintenance of national security and the conduct of foreign affairs, and thus the search for an efficient foreign policy design was a primary goal and an animating purpose of the convention.

There was broad agreement among American leaders that the foreign affairs flaws of the Articles of Confederation stemmed not from the absence of an independent executive but from the lack of authority granted to Congress. The Articles had created an ineffective national government that lacked coercive power over the states. Indeed, the outstanding characteristic of the Articles—state sovereignty—was reflected in theory by the fact that the governing document did not capitalize "united states," and in practice by the refusal of states to honor their federal obligations.

Contemporaries discussed three particular weaknesses. First, a depleted treasury undermined national defense and rendered the young Republic vulnerable to its enemies and adversaries. The Spanish in the South, British in the Northwest, and Indians throughout the land represented an ongoing threat. Second, without authority to regulate foreign commerce, Congress lacked bargaining power in its attempt to strike favorable trade agreements. Third, and most important, Congress had no power to prevent states from violating treaties negotiated in the name of the United States, which meant that individual states could undermine the reputation, integrity, and security of the nation. Indeed, the pervasive infidelity of the states to the international obligations and treaty agreements of the United States subverted the ability of the union to maintain its foreign credit and position as a sovereign nation. The frequent treaty violations, according to James Madison, justly known as the father of the Constitution for his role as its chief architect, constituted one of the principal "vices of the political system of the United States." They led Alexander Hamilton to lament in *Federalist* No. 22: "The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government?"

The inadequacies of the Articles—mainly the debilitating weakness of the national government—supplied a critical focal point for the Framers' deliberations. The convention's decision to create the supremacy clause was a pivotal move, for the declaration in Article 6 that, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States and all Treaties, . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the land, . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding," signified the end of "state sovereignty" and enabled the federal government to wrest control of foreign policy from the recalcitrant states.

While the supremacy clause certainly had profound implications for areas other than diplomacy, there is no exaggeration in the observation that it provided the sine qua non of a vital and vibrant national foreign policy.

The Articles of Confederation also supplied, in some key respects, a point of departure. The Articles had vested executive as well as legislative authority in Congress. Article 6 granted Congress control over the conduct of foreign policy, and Article 9 granted it "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war." But the Philadelphia convention had embraced the principle of separation of powers, and now the delegates were forced to fashion a division of authority between the legislative and executive branches.

The Framers might have adopted the English model for reasons of familiarity, tradition, and simplicity; like other nations, Britain concentrated virtually unlimited authority over foreign policy in the hands of the executive. For the Framers were of course thoroughly familiar with the vast foreign affairs powers that inhered in the English Crown by virtue of the royal prerogative. Sir William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century jurist, explained in his magisterial four-volume work *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765–1769) that the king exercised plenary authority over all matters relating to war and peace, diplomacy, treaties, and military command. Blackstone defined the king's prerogative as "those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone." The monarch's prerogatives, "those which are 'rooted in and spring from the King's political person,'" include the authority to send and receive ambassadors and the power to make war or peace. The Crown, moreover, could negotiate "a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind the nation," and he could issue letters of marque and reprisal, which authorized private citizens to perform military actions on behalf of the nation. The king, according to Blackstone, was "the generalissimo, or the first in military command," and he possessed "the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies." In the exercise of this lawful prerogative, Blackstone explained, the king "is, and ought to be absolute; that is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or resist him" (vol. 2, pp. 238–250).

The Framers' rejection of the English model could not have been more emphatic. Their discussion of foreign affairs in Philadelphia began on 29 May 1787 with the introduction of the Virginia Plan, which provided for the creation of an executive that, in addition to "a general authority to execute the national laws . . . ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." The apparent clarity of the proposal was illusory, however, since the Articles of Confederation had created only a single branch of government—Congress—and had not attempted to categorize powers as legislative, executive, or judicial. As a consequence the vague proposal allowed for the possibility that "Executive rights" might be interpreted to include the full panoply of foreign affairs and warmaking powers exercised by the English king—the authority to determine war and peace, and the powers of sending and receiving ambassadors and entering treaties and alliances, among others—all of which the Articles of Confederation had granted to Congress.

The prospect that the Virginia Plan might involve a transfer to the president of these broad powers provoked alarm in the convention barely a week into the proceedings, triggering a release of the Framers' deep-seated aversion to unilateral executive power in foreign affairs. In a critical debate on 1 June, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina stated that he favored a vigorous executive but feared that the Virginia Plan's proposal to place in a newly created executive the "Executive rights vested in Congress" might include its authority over decisions of war and peace, which, if delegated to a new executive, would make that office a "monarchy of the worst kind," an "elective one."

Pinckney's preference for congressional control over matters of war and peace was supported by his fellow South Carolinian John Rutledge, who argued against vesting such authority in the executive. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, second only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution and a future member of the U.S. Supreme Court, sought to assuage Pinckney's concerns by pointing out that "the prerogatives of the British Monarch" did not properly define the executive powers. Those prerogatives, he explained, included some powers that were of a legislative nature, among them war and peace. In fact, the only powers that Wilson considered to be "strictly executive" were enforcing the laws made by the legislature and the choice of officers not to be appointed by the legislature. Wilson agreed with Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who believed the executive was merely an agent of the legislature, which ought to retain authority over matters of war and peace. In the debate that day every speaker who addressed the issue shared that opin-

ion, including Madison, who reminded the convention that as a matter of definition, executive powers did not include war and peace. Moreover, the delegates, filled with misgivings and apprehension, voted to delete the ambiguous proposal to vest in the president the "Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." Later the Framers would embrace Madison's proposal to fix the extent of the executive powers through careful enumeration.

Wilson's reference to the "prerogatives of the British Monarch" captured the Framers' greatest fears about unilateral executive authority in foreign affairs. There was a deep worry in the convention's discussions about executive power, epitomized by Edmund Randolph's characterization of it as the "foetus of monarchy." The Framers' trepidations about executive power were greatly influenced by the constitutional crises and political convulsions of the seventeenth-century English Civil Wars. The absolutist claims of the Stuart Kings and the abuse of authority by manipulative ministers had hardened their view toward the executive. Their deep concern about executive abuse of power was not merely a reflection of their perceptive readings of history but also an outgrowth of their own experience, for the fear of power resonated from the colonial period. These pervasive fears, doubts, and concerns about executive power, which conduced to preclude, in the minds of the Framers, any unilateral presidential power over foreign affairs, were summed up by Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 75: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a president of the United States."

Behind the Framers' emphatic rejection of the British model, rooted in a deep aversion to an unrestrained, unilateral executive power, lay an equally emphatic commitment to the republican principle of collective decision-making, grounded in the belief that the conjoined wisdom of the many is superior to that of one. The Framers perceived a broad equatorial divide between the hemispheres of monarchism and republicanism, between the values of the Old World and the those of the New World. The convention's deliberate fragmentation of powers relating to diplomacy, treaties, and war and peace, and the allocation of the various foreign affairs powers to different departments and agencies of government, reflected the Framers' determination to apply the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances, the principle of the rule of law, and the elements of constitutionalism to the realm of foreign relations as rigorously as they had been applied to the domestic domain.

This critical decision represented a bold departure from the prevailing wisdom of the day, which urged the unification and centralization of foreign relations powers in the executive and warned that the separation of those powers would invite chaos, disorder, and even disaster. But the Framers brought a fresh outlook, a new vision, to foreign policy, one that recognized that the conduct of foreign policy includes some elements that are primarily legislative in nature, others that are essentially executive, and still others characteristically judicial. In *Federalist* No. 47, Madison observed that "treaties with foreign sovereigns" assume, once they are made, "the force of legislative acts." The Constitution, moreover, characterizes the power to declare war as legislative, and the power to conduct it as executive. The supremacy clause imposes upon judges the duty to enforce treaties as the law of the land. The Constitutional Convention discarded the British model as obsolete and inapplicable to the republican manners of the United States.

The purpose of this new constitutional arrangement for foreign affairs, a distinctively American contribution to politics and political science, was to require and implement collective decision-making—joint participation, consultation, and concurrence—by the political branches in the formulation, conduct, and management of the nation's foreign policy. The Framers supposed that the infusion into the foreign policy process of checks and balances would maintain the constitutional allocation of powers and, therefore, prevent executive unilateralism, aggrandizement, and usurpation. They believed, moreover, that the structure of shared powers in the conduct of international affairs, bottomed on the premise and promise of legislative deliberation, would produce wise policies and, in the words of Wilson, "a security to the people," for it would afford in Congress an airing of the various political, economic, and military interests that were bound up in the nation's external relations.

But two centuries of history and practice have witnessed the virtual eclipse of the Framers' blueprint for foreign affairs. The premise of congressional primacy has given way to executive

dominance, and the promise of joint participation has been subverted by presidential unilateralism. In the context of foreign affairs, the United States has been marching backward, for the president has largely secured the prerogatives of the English Crown that the Framers denied to him in the Constitutional Convention, and which the nation had roundly condemned since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. In truth, the rise of presidential hegemony, so ably captured by the title of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s influential book *The Imperial Presidency,* is the product of a regrettable mixture: one part usurpation and two parts acquiescence. Presidential aggrandizement of foreign affairs powers has been aided and abetted by a quiescent Congress, seemingly indifferent to the usurpation of its powers, and by a judiciary that has exhibited an attitude of deference to the executive, as reflected in its refusal to restrain presidential adventurism abroad.

The presidential monopoly of American foreign relations finds its justification not in constitutional norms but in the claims of necessity and national security, pleas that have flown high in the Cold War period and beyond, as the values of unity, speed, and dispatch have replaced the values of deliberation, concurrence, and consent. The growth of presidential power has been conspicuous in the aggrandizement of the war power and in the assumption of the authority to make international agreements, often in disregard of the principles and processes that govern the treaty power. It also has been reflected in the exercise of the president's duty to receive ambassadors, and in the executive's penchant for secrecy and the control of information.

THE WAR POWER

The Framers of the Constitution vested in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities, including full-blown, total war, as well as lesser acts of armed force, on behalf of the American people. The constitutional grant to Congress of the war power, which Justice William Paterson described in *United States* v. *Smith* (1806) as "the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war," constituted a sharp break from the British model. The Framers were determined to deny to the president what Blackstone had assigned to the English King—"the sole prerogative of making war and peace." The president, in his role as commander in chief, was granted only the authority to repel invasions of the United States. But what the Framers sought to deny to the president has become a commonplace. Indeed, executive usurpation of the war power in the period since World War II has become a dominant characteristic of American foreign relations as presidents have routinely committed acts of war without congressional authorization.

The war clause of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have power . . . to declare War [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." On 29 May, in an early debate in the Constitutional Convention on the repository of the war power, a clear understanding developed among the delegates that the power of "war and peace"—the power to initiate war—did not belong to the executive but to the legislature. On 6 August the Committee of Detail circulated a draft constitution that granted Congress the power to "make" war. This bore sharp resemblance to the Articles of Confederation, which vested the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war" to the Continental Congress. When the war clause was considered in debate on 17 August, the familiar voice from South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, was initially reluctant to place the power in the House of Representatives: "Its proceedings were too slow. . . . The Senate would be the best depository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions." Another South Carolinian, Pierce Butler, startled the convention when he announced that he "was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the nation will support it." Butler's opinion shocked Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who declared that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." Butler stood alone in the convention. There was no support for his opinion and no second to his motion.

The proposal of the Committee of Detail to vest Congress with the power to "make" war proved unsatisfactory to Madison and Gerry. In what must be regarded as one of the most famous joint resolutions in American history, Madison and Gerry moved to substitute "declare" for "make," and they explained that the purpose of the motion was to allow the president "to repel sudden attacks." The meaning of the motion was clear. The power to initiate war was granted to Congress, with the reservation that the president

need not await authorization from Congress to repel a sudden attack on the United States. There was no quarrel whatever with respect to the sudden-attack provision, but there was some question as to whether the substitution of "declare" for "make" would effect the intention of Madison and Gerry. Roger Sherman of Connecticut thought the joint motion "stood very well." He believed that it permitted the executive "to repel and not commence war." Virginia's George Mason announced that he "was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it," then said he preferred "declare" to "make." The adoption of the Madison-Gerry proposal made it clear that Congress alone possessed the authority to initiate war. The warmaking power was specifically denied to the president; he was given only the authority to repel sudden attacks against the United States. No delegate to the Philadelphia convention and no member of any state ratifying convention contested this understanding. James Wilson, one of the most penetrating constitutional theorists of the founding generation, captured the precise intent of the convention: this system "will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress."

At the time of the convention, the phrase "declare war" enjoyed a settled understanding and an established usage. As early as 1552 the verb "declare" had become synonymous with the verb "commence"; they both implied the initiation of hostilities. This was the established usage in international law as well as in England, where the terms to "declare" war and to "make" war were used interchangeably. This practice was thoroughly familiar to the Framers. Given the equivalence of commence and declare, it is clear that a congressional declaration of war would institute military hostilities. According to international law commentators at the time of the founding, a declaration of war was desirable because it announced the institution of a state of war, and the legal consequences it entailed, to the adversary, to neutral nations, and to citizens of the sovereign initiating the war. Indeed, this is the essence of a declaration of war: notice by the proper authority of intent to convert a state of peace into a state of war. But all that is required under American law is a joint resolution or an explicit congressional authorization of the use of military force against a named adversary. This can come in the form of a "declaration pure and simple," or in a "conditional declaration of war." There are also two kinds of war, those that U.S. courts have termed "perfect," or general, and those labeled "imperfect," or limited, wars. In 1782, in *Miller* v. *The Ship Resolution*, the federal court of appeals, established by the Continental Congress, stated: "The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of different kinds of war, distinguish them into perfect and imperfect: A perfect war is that which destroys the national peace and tranquillity, and lays the foundation of every possible act of hostility. The imperfect war is that which does not entirely destroy the public tranquillity, but interrupts it only in some particulars, as in the case of reprisals."

It was decided at the dawn of the Republic that the power of determining perfect and imperfect war lay with Congress. In *Talbot* v. *Seeman* (1801), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court that the war power of Congress comprises the power "to declare a general war" and also to "wage a limited war." The power of Congress to authorize limited war is, of course, a necessary concomitant of its power to declare general war. If the president might authorize relatively minor acts of war or perhaps covert military operations in circumstances not demanding full-blown war, that power could be wielded in a way that would easily eviscerate the Constitution's placement of the war power in Congress. But the Framers withheld from the president the power to work such mischief. The Constitution granted the executive only the authority to respond defensively to the initiation of war through sudden attack upon the United States. In *United States* v. *Smith* (1806), Justice William Paterson of the Supreme Court, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from New Jersey, explained that, in the event of an invasion of the United States, it would be lawful for the president to resist such invasion for the "plain reason that a state of complete and absolute war exists between the two nations. In the case of invasive hostilities, there cannot be war on the one side and peace on the other. . . . There is a manifest distinction between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made against us by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration. In the former case, it is the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war." But the president's power of self-defense does not extend to foreign lands. The Framers did not give the president the authority to intervene in foreign wars, or to choose between war and peace, or to identify and

commence hostilities against an enemy of the American people. Nor did they empower him to initiate force abroad on the basis of his own assessments of U.S. security interests. These circumstances involve choices that belong to Congress, under its exclusive province to change a state of peace into a state of war.

All of the offensive powers of the nation, then, were located in Congress. Consistent with this constitutional theory, the convention gave to Congress the power to issue "letters of marque and reprisal." Dating back to the Middle Ages when sovereigns employed private forces in retaliation for an injury caused by the sovereign of another state or his subjects, the practice of issuing reprisals gradually evolved into the use of public armies. By the time of the convention the Framers considered the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal sufficient to authorize a broad spectrum of armed hostilities short of declared war. In other words, it was regarded as a species of imperfect war.

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF CLAUSE

While the Framers granted Congress the authority to decide for war, they provided in Article 2, Section 2, that: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States." The Framers thus vested command of the military forces in the president, which meant that once Congress authorized military hostilities, the president as commander in chief would exercise authority to conduct and prosecute the war effort. As Hamilton explained in *Federalist* No. 74: "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." But the designation of the president as commander in chief conferred no warmaking power whatever; it vested in the president, as Hamilton proposed to the convention, only the authority to repel sudden attacks on the United States and to direct war, "when authorized or begun." In this capacity, he would direct those forces placed at his command by an act of Congress.

The Framers adopted the title of commander in chief and its historical usage from England, where it was introduced in 1639 by King Charles I. The title was used as a generic term referring to the highest-ranking officer in a particular chain of command or theater of action. But the ranking commander in chief was always subordinate to a political superior, whether a king, Parliament, or, with the development of the cabinet system in England, a secretary of war. The practice of giving the officer at the apex of the military the title of commander in chief and of making him subject to instructions from a political superior was embraced by the Continental Congress and by most of the states in their early constitutions. When, on 15 June 1775, the Continental Congress unanimously decided to appoint George Washington as "General and Commander in Chief, of the Army of the United Colonies," it issued instructions that kept Washington on a short leash. He was ordered "punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this, or future Congress of these United Colonies, or Committee of Congress." Congress did not hesitate to instruct the commander in chief on military and policy matters. This usage had been established for a century and a half and was thoroughly familiar to the Framers when they met in Philadelphia. It is probable that this settled understanding and the consequent absence of concerns about the nature of the post accounts for the fact that there was no debate on the commander in chief clause at the convention. It is telling, moreover, that there was no effort at the convention or at any state ratifying convention to redefine the office of commander in chief.

Hamilton's speech on 18 June captured the essence of the president's power as commander in chief when he stated that the executive was "to have the direction of War when authorized or begun." There was no fear of the legal authority granted by the commander in chief clause, and there is no evidence that anyone believed that his office as commander in chief endowed the president with an independent source of warmaking authority. The narrow, military role of the executive was explained by Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 69, in which he said the president's power as commander in chief "would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces . . . while that of the British king extends to the *declaring* of war and to the *raising* and *regulating* of fleets and armies,—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." The president as commander in chief was

to be "first General and Admiral" in "the direction of war when authorized or begun." But all political authority remained in Congress, as it had under the Articles of Confederation. As Madison explained it in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1798: "The Constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature."

THE WAR POWER IN PRACTICE

The early practice and understanding of the government on the issue of warmaking closely conformed to the constitutional framework. There was, throughout the nineteenth century, no instance of a presidential assertion of a unilateral warmaking power. But there were disputes in the margins.

In 1793 war broke out between Great Britain and France. President George Washington declared that the Treaty of Alliance of 1778 did not obligate the United States to defend French territory in America, and he issued a proclamation of neutrality. Whether this power belonged to the president or Congress set off a remarkable debate between Hamilton and Madison. In a series of articles signed "Pacificus," Hamilton defended the substance of the policy as well as the president's unilateral authority to promulgate it. Hamilton acknowledged that "the legislature have the right to make war on the one hand," but it remained "the duty of the Executive to preserve peace till war is declared." In the fulfillment of that duty, Hamilton argued, the president "must necessarily possess a right of judging what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the country impose on the government." By this time, France was involved in several wars, and Hamilton's concerns about the force and nature of the treaties was evident: Did they obligate the United States to assist the French in their foreign adventures? He properly denied the existence of any such ironclad obligation, but his view that the president possessed discretionary authority, as part of his "duty" to preserve peace "till war is declared," triggered a response from Madison, who wrote under the pseudonym of "Helvidius" and asserted that if Washington's proclamation were valid, it meant that the president had usurped congressional power to decide between a state of peace or a state of war. Despite this difference, both agreed that the power to initiate war is vested in Congress. Madison wrote that the "executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war; that the right of convening and informing Congress, whenever such a question seems to call for a decision, is all the right which the Constitution has deemed requisite or proper." It is to be emphasized that throughout their lives both Hamilton and Madison maintained the doctrine that it is for Congress alone to initiate hostilities. That agreement reflected the understanding of the war clause throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, presidents—Washington, Adams, and Jefferson among them—were particularly careful to avoid military actions that might encroach upon the congressional warpower.

In 1798 France repeatedly raided and seized American vessels. When asked whether a new law that increased the size of the navy authorized the president to initiate hostilities, Hamilton stated that he had not seen the law and that, if it did not grant the president any new authority but left him "at the foot of the Constitution," then the president had only the power to "employ the ships as convoys, with authority to *repel* force by *force* (but not to capture) and to repress hostilities within our waters, including a marine league from our coasts. Anything beyond this must fall under the idea of *reprisals,* and requires the sanctions of that department which is to declare *or make war.*"

Contrary to the claim that President John Adams engaged in an exercise of unilateral warmaking in the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800), the facts demonstrate that the war was clearly authorized by Congress, which debated the prospect of war and passed some twenty statutes permitting it to be waged. Moreover, Adams took absolutely no independent action. In *Bas* v. *Tingy* (1800), the Supreme Court held that the body of statutes enacted by Congress had authorized imperfect, or limited, war. In *Talbot* v. *Seeman* (1801), a case that arose from issues in the Quasi-War, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court, "The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry." In *Little* v. *Barreme* (1804), Marshall emphasized the control that Congress can wield over the president as commander in chief. One of the statutes passed by Congress during the Quasi-War with France authorized the president to seize vessels sailing to

THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

The rise of presidential hegemony over foreign affairs is perhaps the most outstanding, though lamentable, characteristic of a constitutional system that establishes congressional primacy. The emergence of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. aptly described in the title of his splendid book *The Imperial Presidency*—the exaltation of presidential power in foreign affairs—is deeply in conflict with the constitutional blueprint for the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. The Framers, who feared the exercise of unilateral presidential power in foreign affairs, rejected the conventional wisdom of their time—centralization of foreign affairs powers in the executive—and assigned to Congress senior status in a partnership with the president for the management of foreign relations.

That arrangement largely prevailed for most of the nation's first 150 years, but it succumbed to presidential domination in the post–World War II era. Thus constitutional governance of foreign affairs was a principal casualty of the Cold War, a chronic international crisis that afforded a pretext for the executive assumption of prerogative-like powers that the Framers had denied to the president.

In the context of the Cold War, Americans—members of Congress, judges, scholars, and reporters—exhibited fawning deference to the president in foreign affairs. Lacking confidence in its own information and judgment, the citizenry imbibed the rhetoric of presidential expertise, experience, and judgment; a literature of abnegation advised the nation of the virtues of unfettered executive control of foreign policy. The pervasive sentiment of the Cold War urged blind trust of the executive on the ground that he alone possessed the information, facts, and experience necessary to safeguard U.S. interests. And presidents acted the part. Executive usurpation of the war power became a commonplace; executive secrecy and control of information became the norm; and covert operations—military, political, and economic—avoided congressional radar and public perception. Congress was reduced to the role of spectator.

For many, presidential practice across two centuries confirms the wisdom of the original design, for the theory of executive unilateralism, as well as its traditional, underlying arguments, was exploded in the tragedy of the Vietnam War. Few doctrines have been so troubling, dangerous, and antidemocratic. It led not only to the Vietnam War and to the Iran-Contra affair but to the entrenchment of presidential supremacy in foreign relations, with its attendant military and policy failures from Cuba and Cambodia to Lebanon and Somalia.

Moreover, nothing in the broader historical record suggests that the conduct of foreign relations by executive elites has produced wholesome results. Indeed, the wreckage of empires on executive foreign policies provides ample evidence that, as the British jurist and diplomat Lord Bryce noted, the wisdom of "classes" is less than the "masses." The contention that the wisdom of one is superior to that of many is philosophically defective, historically untenable, and fundamentally undemocratic. Since Aristotle, we have known that information alone is not a guarantee of political success; what matters are the values of the system and ultimately those of its decision makers. There is "nothing more fallible," wrote James Iredell, a member of the first Supreme Court and a delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention, than "human judgment," a fundamental philosophical insight reflected in the Framers' embrace of the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances, and their rejection of presidential unilateralism in foreign affairs.

French ports. President Adams issued an order directing American ships to capture vessels sailing to or from French ports, but in the opinion for the Court, Marshall held that Adams's order had exceeded his authority since congressional policy set forth in the statute was superior to presidential orders inconsistent with the statute. Subsequent judicial holdings have reiterated the fact that the commander in chief may be controlled by statute.

As president, Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that his powers of war were limited to defensive actions. In his first annual message to Congress in 1801 he reported the arrogant demands made by the pasha of Tripoli. Unless the United States paid tribute, the pasha threatened to seize American ships and citizens. Jefferson responded by sending a small squadron to the Mediterranean to protect against the threatened

attack. He then asked Congress for further guidance, stating he was "unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense." It was left to Congress to authorize "measures of offense also." Jefferson's understanding of the war clause underwent no revision. In 1805 he informed Congress of the dispute with Spain over the boundaries of Louisiana and Florida. Jefferson warned that Spain evidenced an "intention to advance on our possessions until they shall be repressed by an opposing force. Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force."

Other early presidents, including Washington, Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson, also refused to exercise offensive military powers without authorization from Congress, which they understood to be the sole repository of the power to initiate war. There was no departure from this understanding of the war clause throughout the nineteenth century. In 1846 President James K. Polk ordered an army into a disputed border area between Texas and Mexico. One of its patrols was attacked by Mexican forces, which were defeated by the U.S. soldiers. In a message to Congress, Polk offered the rationale that Mexico had invaded the United States, which prompted Congress to declare war. If Polk's rationale was correct, then his action could not be challenged on constitutional grounds, for it was well established that the president had the authority to repel sudden attacks. If, however, he was disingenuous—if he had in fact initiated military hostilities—then he had clearly usurped the warmaking power of Congress. It is worth noticing that he made no claim to constitutional power to make war.

Although Congress declared war, the House of Representatives censured Polk for his actions because the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." It seemed evident that Polk had dispatched troops into the disputed area for the purpose of precipitating war by provoking a Mexican attack on American soldiers. His manipulative efforts were effective. Representative Abraham Lincoln voted with the majority against Polk. As president, Lincoln maintained that only Congress could authorize the initiation of hostilities. None of his actions in the Civil War, including the suspension of habeas corpus, the appropriation of funds from the U.S. treasury, or his decision to call forth regiments from state militias, each of which was eventually retroactively authorized by Congress, constituted a precedent for presidential initiation of war. Moreover, in the Prize Cases (1863), the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln's blockade against the rebellious Confederacy as a constitutional response to a sudden invasion that began with the attack on Fort Sumter. The Court stated that the president, as commander in chief, "has no power to initiate or declare war either against a foreign nation or a domestic state." Nevertheless, in the event of invasion by a foreign nation or a state, the president was not only authorized "but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority." According to the Court, the president had to meet the crisis in the shape it presented itself "without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact."

THE CONTINUING WAR POWERS CONTROVERSY

Until 1950 it had long been established and well settled that the Constitution vests in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate total as well as limited war. But at the midcentury mark, President Harry Truman asserted a unilateral executive warmaking power, and claimed authorization from the United Nations, to justify his decision to introduce U.S. troops into the Korean War without congressional authorization. Truman's decision in June 1950 to intervene in South Korea in order to counter the communist North Korean invasion commenced what was to become one of the bloodiest wars in America history. The president claimed that he acted in response to a UN Security Council call for military action. In fact, Truman had committed U.S. forces before the Security Council issued its request. Several senators and representatives attacked Truman's unilateral act on the floor of Congress as a violation of the Constitution. They point out that the UN Charter carried no specific obligation to go to war in support of its decisions any more than a treaty obligation alone could commit the United States to war without a decision to that end by both houses of Congress. Thus, Robert Taft of Ohio, in an embittered speech on the Senate floor,

charged that President Truman had "usurped power and violated the Constitution" by his Korean intervention. Despite constitutional doubts expressed by Taft and several other senators, Congress regularly appropriated ample funds to support the war. In reality, it had little choice in the matter, unless it wished to see an American army far from home overwhelmed in the field.

In 1951, while the Korean War was still in progress, Truman announced that he was sending four army divisions to Germany in support of the new U.S. obligation to defend the Continent, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the Lisbon and Ottawa agreements. It was obvious that a large-scale American army on the Elbe River opposite Soviet-occupied East Germany constituted a heavy American commitment to go to war in the event of a Soviet invasion of western Europe, regardless of any constitutional limitation upon the war power. Indeed, the American divisions were commonly described as a "trip wire" for the very purpose of committing the United States to war should such an invasion occur.

Truman denied that he need congressional authorization before deploying the troops in Europe, and his decision triggered the so-called "great debate" on the constitutionality of his action. Several senators, among them Paul Douglas and Thomas Connelly, argued that the president has the power under the Constitution to move troops overseas, both in pursuance of treaty obligations and by virtue of his constitutional powers as commander in chief of the armed forces. In contrast, Taft and John Bricker criticized the president's action as grossly unconstitutional.

The outcome of the debate was a substantial victory for the president. The Senate adopted a weak resolution expressing its "approval" of the president's action, but declaring it to be "the sense of the Senate" that in the future the president ought to obtain the approval of Congress prior to the assignment of troops abroad, "in the interests of sound constitutional processes and of national unity." The acquiescence of Congress in the fact of Truman's usurpation of power inaugurated a new theme in matters of war and peace.

Since then a steady pattern of presidential warmaking has developed: Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in Vietnam, Gerald Ford in Cambodia, Ronald Reagan in Lebanon, Grenada, and Libya, George H. W. Bush in Panama, and William Jefferson Clinton in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Bosnia, all without congressional authorization.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, President George H. W. Bush began deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia and other sites in the Middle East. By November, Bush had doubled the size of the deployment and established the capacity to wage war. Bush did not seek authorization from Congress, but persuaded the United Nations Security Council to authorize the use of military force, which it did on 29 November. Bush never sought authority (only support) from Congress, but on 12 January 1991 Congress authorized military action against Iraq. The approval, however, bore the appearance of a rubber stamp in the face of a presidential fait accompli, backed by a bloc of 439,000 U.S. troops that Bush had amassed in the region. There is surely nothing in the constitutional grant of authority to the president that justifies the deployment of troops, but in the postwar era, presidents frequently have deployed troops into hostilities or into situations in which hostilities were imminent, in numbers large and small and for durations long and short, a practice that has served to preempt the congressional power to decide on matters of war and peace.

Congressional acquiescence in the presidential usurpation of its authority to deploy troops has become a central factor in the demise of legislative control of the war power which, Madison stated, includes the power "to commence, continue and conclude war." President Bush's claim of UN authority—like Truman's in Korea or Clinton's invocation of authority from NATO to order air strikes against Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999—lacks credibility. These mutual security treaties provided that they would be carried out by the United States in accordance with its "constitutional processes," which vests in Congress the sole power to decide for war. The fact that treaties are the supreme law of the land does not imply that a mutual security treaty can amend the Constitution. In *Geofroy* v. *Riggs* (1890), the Court stated that the treaty-making power does not "authorize what the Constitution forbids, or [effect] a change in the character of government." Thus, the president and the Senate may not, through the exercise of the treaty power, deprive the House of Representative of its constitutional role as a joint partner in the warmaking power with the Senate.

Presidents have asserted a variety of arguments in defense of their unilateral military

actions. Invocation of the commander in chief clause has become a commonplace. As Justice Robert H. Jackson observed in the Steel Seizure Case (1952), the clause has been adduced for the "power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy." Yet neither the history of the clause nor the debates in the Constitutional Convention afford any evidence to support this presidential claim. Moreover, no court has ever cited it as a source of independent warmaking authority for the president.

Twentieth-century presidents including Truman, Nixon, and Clinton also have advanced the executive power clause as authorization for presidential warmaking. Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution provides: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." As we have seen, the claim that the executive power clause includes authority to initiate hostilities was considered and rejected in the Constitutional Convention. For the Framers, the phrase "executive power" was limited, as James Wilson said, to "executing the laws, and appointing offices." No delegate to the convention sought to ascribe to the president a more capacious understanding of "executive power" than that articulated by Wilson.

Advocates of a unilateral executive warmaking power also have invoked the "Lockean prerogative," or the doctrine of necessity, as a source of inherent presidential power. Drawing on John Locke's defense of the right of an executive to act for the common good, even if it requires breaking the law, defenders have adduced a similar claim for the president. But there is no evidence whatever that the Framers intended to incorporate the Lockean prerogative in the Constitution. The lack of a textual statement to that effect renders such an intent indispensable to the presidential claim of a constitutional power. In fact, the evidence runs in the other direction. Fears of executive power led the Framers to enumerate the president's power and to "define and confine" the scope of his authority. An undefined reservoir of discretionary power in the form of Locke's prerogative would have unraveled the carefully crafted design of Article 2 and repudiated the Framers' stated aim of corralling executive power.

Presidents have also asserted a presidential warmaking authority on the basis of his role as the "sole organ" of American foreign policy. In *Curtiss-Wright,* Justice Sutherland stated that the authority in foreign affairs was essentially an executive power, which he explained "as the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise, an act of Congress." Sutherland appropriated the term "sole organ" from a speech delivered by then Representative John Marshall in 1800 on the floor of the House of Representatives. Marshall noted: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations. . . . Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him." At no point in his speech did Marshall argue that the president's exclusive authority to communicate with a foreign nation included a power to formulate or develop policy. All Marshall had in mind was the president's role as the sole organ of communication with other governments, a rather unremarkable point, at that, since officials had acknowledged since the founding that the president was the "sole" channel of communication with foreign nations. Thus it was Sutherland who infused a purely communicative role with a substantive policymaking function and thereby manufactured a great power out of the Marshallian "sole organ" doctrine. Of course, the sole organ doctrine completely undermines the Framers' design for cooperation in foreign affairs. And, given the allocation of foreign relations power to both Congress and the president, the claim is by definition indefensible.

Extollers of presidential control of the war power also have fashioned the argument that executive warmaking, if repeated often enough, acquires legal validity. This is the contention that history has legitimated the practice of presidential warmaking. The argument rests on the premise that the president frequently has exercised the war power without congressional authorization. The actual number of these episodes varies among the several compilations, but defenders usually list between one and two hundred unilateral acts, each of which constitutes a legitimizing precedent for future executive wars. In detail and in conception the argument is flawed. In the first place, the lists are inaccurately complied. An error common to the lists—the claim that President John Adams initiated unilateral executive warmaking in 1798 in an "undeclared war" with France—is altogether false. The fact is that Adams took absolutely no independent action. Congress passed some two dozen statutes that amounted, so the Supreme Court said, to a declaration of "imperfect war," and Adams complied with those statutes. Moreover, many of the episodes involved initiation of

hostilities by a military commander, not by authorization from the president. If practice establishes law, then the inescapable conclusion is that every commander of every military unit has the power to initiate war. What is perhaps most revealing about presidential understanding of the constitutional locus of the war power is that in the one or two dozen instances in which presidents personally have made the decision unconstitutionally to initiate acts of war, they have not purported to rely on their authority as commander in chief or chief executive. Rather, in those cases the presidents have made false claims of authorization, either by statute or by treaty or by international law. It cannot be maintained that constitutional power, in this case the war power, can be acquired through practice. Writing for a unanimous Court in *Inland Waterway Corp.* v. *Young* (1940), Justice Frankfurter echoed a centuries-old principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence when he wrote: "Illegality cannot attain legitimacy through practice." If the president could acquire power through usurpation he might aggrandize all governmental power. Neither Congress nor the judiciary could lawfully restrain the exercise of the president's accumulated constitutional powers. This practice would scuttle U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, the most recent act of usurpation stands no better than the first.

In the post–World War II period presidential usurpation of the war power has been indulged by congressional acquiescence, for policy as well as political reasons. But it is unwarranted to conclude that presidential aggrandizement, indulged by congressional passivity, attains a legal status. Congress cannot divest itself of those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, a necessary predicate of the separation of powers doctrine. Neither congressional abdication nor acquiescence can accomplish a transfer of power to the executive. As the Court held in *Federal Trade Commission* v. *Morton Salt Company* (1950), harking back to an old axiom of English law, once powers are "granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more than non-existent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise."

In a somewhat anemic effort to reassert its control of the war power, Congress passed, within the context of the debate surrounding the Vietnam War, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, over President Nixon's veto. The statute sought to curb presidential warmaking and to require "the collective judgment" of the president and Congress before U.S. troops could be committed to hostilities. In the absence of a declaration of war or authorization by statute, the statute required the president to consult Congress before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities "in every possible instance," to report to Congress when he has done so, and to terminate the involvement after sixty days unless Congress authorized an extension. The resolution was criticized as an ill-conceived and poorly drafted piece of legislation. Its chief defect from a constitutional standpoint lay in the fact that it represented an unconstitutional delegation of the war power. In its grant to the president of the authority to choose an "enemy" of the United States, and to initiate hostilities against the nation, it not only repudiated the statutory aim of ensuring "collective judgment" of both branches, but it also vested in the president power that is denied to him by the Constitution. Virtually every American president who took office after its passage found ways to circumvent the resolution. Unconstitutional, ill-conceived, and ineffective, the resolution amounted to what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. described as a "toy handcuff," and by the early twenty-first century there was wide agreement that it ought to be repealed.

THE TREATY POWER

Assumption of broad foreign relations powers by the executive, largely built atop the removal of specific checks by the Senate, has claimed the treaty power as one of its principal casualties. The diminution of the Senate's constitutional role as a treaty partner could not have been envisioned by the Constitutional Convention, which, with less than two weeks left in its proceedings, vested in the Senate alone the power to make treaties. As late as 6 September, the draft constitution of the Committee on Detail had given the Senate the exclusive authority to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. During the debate Madison pointed out that the "Senate represented the states alone," and, consequently, "the president should be an agent in Treaties." Madison, who hailed from Virginia, along with other delegates from large states, were concerned about Senate control of the treaty power. As a result of "the Great Compromise," which gave states equal representation in the Senate, large-state delegates were seeking means to control the Senate. They feared that the Senate would be convulsed by regional economic and state interests that would compromise the national interests in the pursuit of commercial

treaties. A version of Madison's proposal eventually prevailed. Article 2 of the Constitution gives the president the "power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."

The convention's belated addition of the president to the treaty-making power reflected the Framers' desire to "check" the Senate in the formulation of foreign policy, an application to foreign relations of the doctrine of checks and balances and collective decision-making. There was nothing in the language of the provision, or in the records of the convention debates, to indicate that the president would assume the dominant role in foreign affairs. There was no hint that the president would enjoy any significant independent role in treaty-making. The requirement of a two-thirds majority acted to limit any independent power of the president in foreign relations. In fact, as Hamilton explained in *Federalist* No. 75, "the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the making of them. . . . It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by the president and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them." Hamilton's emphasis on the cooperative nature of treaty-making, from negotiation through ratification, is reflected in the further requirement of senatorial "advice and consent." The Framers borrowed the phrase from English parliamentary practice, which was descriptive of continuous participation in lawmaking. No bill could be enacted into law by the king without the advice and consent of both houses of Parliament. The employment of that phrase in the treaty clause was meant to convey Senate participation in all stages of treaty-making. It is not suggestive in any way of a treaty-making process that is divided into two distinct stages: negotiation by the president and approval by the Senate. But that phrase is otherwise employed in the appointment clause to indicate a process that does depend on exclusive and sequential steps: the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors."

When President George Washington first communicated with the Senate regarding the appropriate procedure for treaties, he assumed the process of negotiating treaties was a matter of joint participation. He advised a Senate committee that oral communications "seem indispensably necessary; because in these a variety of matters are contained, all of which not only require consideration, but some of them may undergo much discussion; to do which by written communications would be tedious without being satisfactory." This approach indicates an active, continuous, consultative role for the Senate. Washington, moreover, repeatedly expressed his intention to send "propositions" to the Senate, a solicitation of Senate "advice" on of treaties.

In a well-known message to the Senate on 21 August 1789, Washington stated his intention to meet with senators in the Senate chamber "to advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with the Southern Indians." Washington intended to seek the Senate's advice before, not after, the negotiation of a treaty. He met with senators the next day, put to them a series of questions, and sought their advice on the instructions that should be given to the commissioners selected to negotiate the treaty. Both sides were disappointed. Senators exhibited unease in relying solely on the information supplied by the secretary of war, who had accompanied Washington. The noise from carriages traveling past the chambers made it difficult to follow the discussion. When the senators announced that they would not commit themselves to any positions that day, Washington felt inconvenienced by the trip. He returned two days later and obtained the Senate's answers to his questions and its consent to the treaty, but he never again went to seek the Senate's advice on a treaty proposal.

It is a misreading of the incident to conclude that Washington had determined to exclude the Senate from any role in the negotiation process. Oral communications proved to be impracticable; but Washington continued to seek the Senate's advice through written communications rather than personal appearances. Senators were asked to approve the appointment of treaty negotiators and to advise on their negotiating instructions. Since the earliest day of the Republic, there have been many examples of executive-Senate discussions regarding treaty negotiations.

The twentieth century, however, witnessed the erosion of this joint effort and the assumption by presidents that negotiation was an exclusively executive concern. As an academic, Woodrow Wilson had argued, in *Congressional Government* (1885), that the president could treat the Senate with indifference. He encouraged the president to pursue negotiations independently, without consulting the Senate. He reasoned that after these

unilateral actions, the Senate could be bullied into granting its "consent," if not its "advice," with the nation's honor at stake. This "mousetrap theory" had disastrous consequences for the nation in the aftermath of World War I. One of Wilson's gravest miscalculations was his decision to exclude prominent senators from the negotiation of the Versailles treaty. Efforts by the executive to present the Senate with a fait accompli can backfire; the Senate may retaliate by adding amendments, shelving treaties, or rejecting them outright.

While the Constitution requires joint action by the president and Senate in making treaties, it is silent on the repository of the authority to terminate treaties. The Framers certainly were aware of the fact that treaties, for a variety of reasons, might require termination, and international law provided rules and regulations to govern their repeal. Madison and Jay, among others, seemed to believe that treaties ought to be terminated by the president and the Senate, and, historically, some have. But the historical record also includes repeal by unilateral presidential action and by Congress as a whole. Since Article 6 vests treaties with the same domestic status as federal statutes, treaties may be terminated by subsequent acts of Congress through the regular legislative process. The fact that the House of Representatives, which is not a part of the treaty power, can play a role in terminating, if not making, treaties, may appear to be anomalous. The same may be said of the argument for a unilateral presidential termination power, which would negate the philosophy of the convention and the entire foreign policy apparatus, which is erected on the premise of collective decision-making. The issue of the authority to terminate treaties came to a head in 1979 with President Jimmy Carter's announcement that he intended to terminate the 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The decision resulted in a lawsuit, *Goldwater v. Carter* (1979), in which the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of the case and dismissed it as "nonjusticiable." The practical effect of the decision left President Carter's act of termination intact. While the question of treaty termination was pushed aside temporarily, it seemed likely to become prominent again.

The president and the Senate may clash over the continued meaning of a treaty. Once a treaty takes effect, the president is principally responsible for its interpretations and implementation. A treaty is a law, and under the Constitution the president is charged with its faithful execution. But a president may not "reinterpret," that is, ascribe to a treaty a meaning contrary to what the Senate understood it to mean at the time it granted its consent. Disagreements have arisen between the president and the Senate on interpretations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, on the question of the amenability of that treaty to the development of new weapons systems. As a result it is likely that the Senate will carefully examine future treaties and make publicly known in clear terms its understanding of particular treaty provisions.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Reliance on the treaty power has declined since World War II, as presidents have increasingly turned to the use of executive agreements as a means of securing unilateral control of American foreign relations. When the president acts unilaterally, the agreement is referred to as a "sole executive agreement." When the president acts with the approval of a simple majority of both houses of Congress, the agreement is known as a "legislative-executive agreement." Presidents have "assumed" discretion to decide whether to pursue an international agreement as a treaty, a sole executive agreement, or in the form of a legislative-executive agreement. The president's decision typically hinges on political factors, including the likelihood of securing Senate approval. Presidents often have chosen to exclude the Senate in making some controversial and historic international pacts through the channel of executive agreements, among them, the destroyer-base deal with Great Britain in 1940, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945, the Vietnam peace agreement of 1973, and the Sinai agreements of 1975.

Controversy surrounds the legal authority of the president to make executive agreements. The practice of unilateral presidential accords with foreign nations conflicts with the constitutional emphasis on joint decision-making, and with the Framers' understanding of the reach and breadth of the treaty power, which Hamilton described in a letter under the pseudonym "Camillus" as "competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies of national affairs might require; competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among nations. . . . And it was emphatically for this reason that it was so carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate with the president, being required to make any

treaty whatever." The text of the Constitution makes no mention of executive agreements. Moreover, there was no reference to them in the Constitutional Convention or in the state ratifying conventions. The *Federalist Papers* are silent on the subject as well. There is, then, no support in the architecture of the Constitution for the use of executive agreements. Yet their usage has flourished; presidents claim independent constitutional power to make them, and the judiciary has sustained such presidential claims of authority. The question of the constitutional authority that affords presidents a unilateral capacity to make executive agreements is to be distinguished from what would properly be characterized as legislative-executive agreements, which Congress has authorized the president to make and usually inspire little controversy, if only because they are more desirable than unilateral agreements from a constitutional perspective.

Presidents have advanced four sources of constitutional authority: (1) the president's duty as chief executive to represent the nation in foreign affairs; (2) the authority to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; (3) the authority as commander in chief; and (4) the duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." These claims are particularly open-ended, undoubtedly in conflict with congressional powers, and they strain the reach of credibility. It may well be the case that the president, in the context of military hostilities authorized by Congress, may, in his capacity as commander in chief, find it desirable to enter into a cease-fire agreement with an enemy, although this would be subject to congressional control. It may be necessary as well, in a military context, for the president to strike an agreement regarding protection of troops or deployment of troops. But it is difficult to justify unilateral executive agreements on the basis of these other claims.

Congressional efforts to rein in the practice of executive agreements and stem the tide of unilateralism have been largely unsuccessful. The first and most prominent effort occurred in 1951, when Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the use and effects of executive agreements and treaties within the United States. Supporters of the Bricker Amendment, including leaders of the American Bar Association, found virtue in the proposal for various reasons. Some "resented," as Alexander DeConde explained, "executive agreements such as those made at Yalta," and sought to curtail presidential unilateralism in foreign affairs. Others were fearful of the effect within the United States of such treaties as the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, and the UN's draft covenant on human rights. Still others supported it as a useful "isolationist" response to the "internationalism of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

The Bricker Amendment, approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 1953, reaffirmed the Constitution's supremacy over treaties; required implementing legislation "which would be valid in the absence of treaty" before a treaty could be effected within the United States; and granted Congress the authority to regulate all executive agreements.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower opposed the amendment on grounds that it would hamstring the presidency in the conduct of foreign policy. In a letter to his brother Edgar, an attorney who supported the resolution, Eisenhower declared that it wold "cripple the executive power to the point that we become helpless in world affairs." The Eisenhower administration was keenly aware that most Republicans embraced the proposal and thus its opposition was carefully measured. After failing in his efforts to seek compromise with the Bricker forces, Eisenhower sought assistance from Senate Democrats. Senator Walter George of Georgia introduced his own amendment, which reiterated the Constitution's supremacy over treaties and executive agreements. In a key passage that reflected the widespread opposition to the expansive use of unilateral executive agreements, the George proposal would have required implementing legislation for executive agreements (but not for treaties) to take effect within the United States. The Eisenhower administration lobbied intensively for the defeat of both the Bricker and George proposals, principally because advisers believed it would strip the president of important prerogatives and transfer authority over foreign affairs from the executive to the legislative branch. The Bricker Amendment was defeated in the Senate on 25 February 1954 by a vote of 50 to 42. But the George Amendment fared better; it fell just one vote short of the two-thirds required for approval.

Congress has attempted to curtail the practice of making secret executive agreements. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee learned in 1969 and 1970 that U.S. presidents had negotiated significant covert agreements with South Korea, Laos, Thailand, Ethiopia, and Spain, as well as other nations. In response, Congress passed the Case Act of 1972,

requiring the secretary of state to send to Congress within sixty days the text of "any international agreement, other than a treaty," to which the United States is a party. If the president decided that publication would compromise national security, he could transmit it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs under an injunction of secrecy removable only by the president. But presidents from Nixon to Clinton ignored or circumvented the statute, and congressional enforcement efforts have been largely ineffective.

RECEPTION OF AMBASSADORS

Presidential reception of ambassadors and other public ministers, understood by the Framers as a clerklike duty, a mere administrative function, was transformed by presidents in the twentieth century as a wellspring of discretionary authority to determine which nations the United States would have relations with and what the tone and temper of those relations would be.

The reception of an ambassador entails consequences under international law, chiefly the recognition of foreign governments and states. The Framers, operating against the backdrop of international law principles that held that the sovereign nations have a duty to receive ambassadors from other sovereign nations, determined, as Hamilton explained in *Federalist* No. 69, to impose this duty on the president as a matter of "convenience." Hamilton said that the authority "to receive ambassadors and other public ministers . . . is more a matter of dignity than authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of government; and it was far more convenient that is should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor." Given Hamilton's explanation, there was no reason to view the "reception clause" as a source of discretionary policymaking authority for the president. In fact, Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution emphatically declares, "He shall, [not 'may'] receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," an injunction that stands in sharp contrast with the discretionary constitutional powers that the president may choose to exercise, such as the decision to "convene both Houses" of Congress. Thus, the Framers, as James Madison wrote in 1793, gave the president no prerogative whatever to reject foreign ministers. Madison explained that "when a foreign minister presents himself, two questions immediately arise: Are his credentials from the existing and acting government of his country? Are they properly authenticated?" Those questions, Madison noted, "are merely questions of fact," and if answered affirmatively, the president was duty bound to receive the minister.

The Framers' emphasis on the mechanical nature of the reception function, reflected their acceptance of the doctrine of de facto recognition, which requires diplomatic relations with the government that actually exercises controlling power, as opposed to the principle of de jure recognition, which counsels a determination of the legitimacy or legality of a governing regime. In a letter written on 30 December 1792 to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the U.S. minister to London, for the purpose of clarifying U.S. policy toward the revolutionary French government, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson explained the rationale behind the American doctrine of de facto recognition: "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under what forms it pleases and to change those forms at its own will."

The transformation of a humble administrative duty into a broad discretionary power to conduct foreign policy began under Woodrow Wilson. From 1913 to 1921 President Wilson, adhering to a theory of democratic legitimacy with respect to Latin American countries, refused to grant recognition to governments in that region that had come to power through revolution or violence when lawful constitutional means of achieving change existed. Then in 1920, Wilson, through Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, declared that the United States would not recognize the Soviet Union, on the ground that the USSR was dedicated to the revolutionary overthrow of other governments in the state system. During the next thirteen years successive presidents adhered to Wilson's unilateral decision to refuse recognition of the Soviet Union, a policy that went largely unchallenged by an isolationist Congress. Ironically, this process of turning the Framers' reception function into a broad-based presidential foreign policy tool reached its full development when, in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to reverse the policy and recognize the Soviet Union, under the same constitu-

tional authority that Wilson had abused to refuse recognition. Roosevelt's act of recognition then broadened into a unilateral agreement called the "Litvinov Assignment"—an agreement on property claims between the two nations. In *United States* v. *Belmont* (1937), Justice Sutherland upheld the validity of the agreement and said the pact derived its force from both the president's status as the sole organ of American foreign policy and his power to recognize foreign governments. Justice Sutherland stated that Senate consultation was not required. The Court again considered the validity of the Litvinov Assignment five years later in *United States* v. *Pink* (1942). Once more, the Court upheld the agreement, and enthusiastically embraced the "sole organ" doctrine and a capacious view of executive power. These decisions represented an exercise in judicial activism, and inflated the reception function into a towering structure of executive power. Thus in later years President Harry S. Truman felt authorized in his decision not to recognize the People's Republic of China as well as several of the communist satellite states of Eastern Europe. Under changing circumstances in later years, President Richard M. Nixon felt similarly authorized to reverse that policy in 1972 to extend what amounted to diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, an effort that was completed in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter fully "normalized" relations with China through a unilateral decision to recognize the regime of Beijing and derecognize the competing government in Taiwan.

For many observers the extraordinary power exercised by the executive in the conduct of foreign policy is a principal element in Schlesinger's "imperial" presidency, and it constitutes a major threat to the democratic foundations of the American constitutional system. Yet the practice of executive usurpation, revelations of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency abroad, the constitutional corruption inherent in the Iran-Contra affair, and the dangers posed by a pattern of unilateral presidential warmaking from Korea to Vietnam to Bosnia, have not moved Congress and the public to implement meaningful constitutional and political checks to halt presidential aggrandizement of power. Occasionally, individual members or even large blocs of members of Congress will challenge a unilateral presidential action. On 28 April 1999 the House of Representatives, by a tie vote, rejected a motion to authorize President Bill Clinton to conduct air and missile strikes against the former Yugoslavia. Clinton ignored the House vote and waged war on his own claim of authority. But the relatively infrequent and isolated criticisms that emerge from Capitol Hill have not risen to the level of an institutional challenge, in which Congress summons the will to defend its constitutional powers in foreign affairs. While defenders of the constitutional design for foreign policy might hope for a resurgent Congress, and even dare to dream of an ascendant Congress, there seems to be little political incentive for members to act because international issues rarely assume a significant role in election campaigns. There remains the possibility that some international issues, among them trade matters and environmental concerns, may assume greater importance among voters, which would transform those issues into constituent demands and thus stir Congress to assert its broad powers. However, George W. Bush declared early in his first term that he would halt U.S. participation in the Kyoto Accords, a worldwide effort to control global warming; announced that he would use military force to defend Taiwan against mainland China; and stated his intention to terminate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, all unilateral executive actions that constitute a rank usurpation of congressional powers. Yet those declarations brought forth few protests from Congress in defense of its constitutional frontiers and provinces. Indeed, at century's turn, congressional acquiescence in the face of executive aggrandizement seemed as fully entrenched in the practice of American foreign policy as it did when the imperial presidency first took flight.

For others, however, the vast discretionary power exercised by the president is the price the nation pays to safeguard its national security interests abroad and its freedom at home. Executive domination of foreign policy, it has been asserted, is a reflection of the overweening realities of the international realm, which cannot be adequately addressed by a Constitution that is no longer relevant to international politics. Congressional primacy has become obsolete. There remains a debate, one initiated in the Constitutional Convention two centuries ago, on the question of whether unilateral executive control of foreign policy or legislatively inspired collective decision making is more suitable in a nation grounded on republican principles. It may well be the case that the values underlying the war clause and the other constitutional provisions that govern the conduct of American foreign policy are as compelling today as they were two hundred years ago.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berger, Raoul. *Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth.* Cambridge, 1974. Penetrating study that includes valuable chapters on presidential power in foreign affairs and warmaking.

Bestor, Arthur. "Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined." *Seton Hall Law Review* 5 (1974). Powerful analysis of the legislative history behind the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution.

Casper, Gerhard. "Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign Policy: A Nonjudicial Model." *University of Chicago Law Review* 43 (1976). Influential study of foreign affairs from a legal and constitutional perspective.

Corwin, Edward S. *The President: Office and Powers, History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion, 1787–1984.* 5th rev. ed. New York, 1984. Very valuable on presidential powers in foreign policy.

DeConde, Alexander. *Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations.* Boston, 2000. Important account of the reasons why presidents engage in unilateral acts of warmaking.

Draper, Theodore. *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs.* New York, 1991. Detailed and critical analysis of the political, legal, and policy issues.

Ely, John Hart. *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath.* Princeton, N.J., 1993. Insightful critique of the constitutional debate and controversies surrounding the Vietnam War.

Fisher, Louis. "How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?" *American Journal of International Law* 83 (1989). An examination of the use of the power of the purse in foreign affairs.

———. *Presidential War Power.* Lawrence, Kans., 1995. Concise, penetrating analysis of the war power.

———. *Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President.* 4th rev. ed. Lawrence, Kans., 1997. Excellent examination of the separation of powers issues.

Glennon, Michael J. *Constitutional Diplomacy.* Princeton, N.J., 1990. Highly useful study of the constitutional arrangement for the conduct of foreign policy.

Hayden, Ralston. *The Senate and Treaties: 1789–1817.* New York, 1920. Fine historical and analytical study of the Senate's role in treaty making.

Henkin, Louis. *Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.* New York, 1990. Fine analysis of theoretical and constitutional issues relevant to foreign policy.

———. *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* 2d ed. Oxford, 1996. Excellent, comprehensive analysis of the constitutional law of foreign policy, with good footnotes.

Johnson, Loch K. *The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive.* New York, 1984. Examination of the nature, uses, and impact of executive agreements.

Keynes, Edward. *Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power.* University Park, Pa., 1982. Powerful, illuminating study of the legal issues surrounding the war powers debate.

Koh, Harold Hongju. "The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 107 (1959). Useful on relationships between treaties and acts of Congress.

———. *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair.* New Haven, 1990. Detailed examination of foreign relations law and the responsibilities of the three branches of government.

Lobel, Jules. "Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 134 (1986). Valuable examination of the legal and constitutional issues involved in limited war.

Lofgren, Charles A. "War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding." *Yale Law Journal* 81 (1972). Outstanding examination of the Constitutional Convention and constitutional governance of the war power.

Robinson, James A. *Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative.* Homewood, Ill., 1962. Concise study of foreign policy as Congress influences it.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency.* Boston, 1973. Acclaimed study of the evolution of presidential powers in foreign policy and warmaking.

Scigliano, Robert. *The Supreme Court and the Presidency.* New York, 1971. Useful catalog and discussion of judicial rulings on presidential power.

Sofaer, Abraham D. *War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins.* Cambridge,

Mass., 1976. Comprehensive analysis of the constitutional origins and early practice of foreign affairs powers.

Sutherland, George S. *Constitutional Power and World Affairs*. New York, 1919. Early publication of the future Supreme Court Justice's view on the constitutional law of foreign affairs.

Wormuth, Francis D. "The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique." *University of California Law Review* 60 (1972). Outstanding analysis of the constitutional issues involving presidential warmaking.

Wormuth, Francis D., and Edwin B. Firmage. *To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law*. Dallas, 1986. Nearly encyclopedic examination of war powers issues.

Wright, Quincy. *The Control of American Foreign Relations*. New York, 1922. Classic modern analysis of the subject.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

CONTAINMENT

Barton J. Bernstein

The containment doctrine, with its ambiguities and imprecision, was a major strategy and the guiding conception in American foreign policy from shortly after World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991, and some might argue that containment remained a policy into the twenty-first century for the United States in dealing with communist regimes in Cuba, North Korea, and China. In its most general form, containment denotes the American effort, by military, political, and economic means, to resist communist expansion throughout the world. But precisely because of the looseness of the doctrine and the differing interpretations, including questions about the selective application of efforts to stop communism, the doctrine's author, George F. Kennan, an influential foreign service officer in 1947 and later a respected private scholar, often opposed important tactics that many American policymakers defined as the implementation of containment: the global rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949–1950, the heavy military emphasis of U.S. policy in the 1950s, the extension of alliances to Asia and the Middle East, and the prolonged military involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. As Kennan stated in 1967:

> If . . . I was the author in 1947 of a "doctrine" of containment, it was a doctrine that lost much of its rationale with the death of Stalin and with the development of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. I emphatically deny the paternity of any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in situations to which it has, and can have, no proper relevance.

While agreeing on the desirability of resisting communist expansion, Kennan and others disagreed on whether the doctrine remained relevant, and how and where to implement it. Their disputes have often rested on fundamental differences about the capacity of American power, about the extent of American interests beyond western Europe, and especially about the nature of the communist threat. The last issue has raised many questions. Was the threat subversion, revolution, military aggression, economic encirclement, or some combination? With the exception of Yugoslavia, was world communism controlled by Joseph Stalin even after the successful Chinese revolution in 1949? After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and after the obvious Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, did the nature of the communist threat sometimes change, even well before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991? At times from the early 1960s, according to the proponents of containment, was the threat primarily China and wars of national liberation in the Third World, and not the Soviet Union mostly in the developed world? Was American policy in the 1990s and continuing into the twenty-first century in dealing with Cuba, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China often the policy of containment?

Beyond these important issues, scholars, as well as politicians and policymakers, have raised other questions: whether the doctrine in 1947 was new or necessary, whether it was ultimately self-defeating, whether it was active or passive, and whether it did or should have endured as American policy into the late 1980s and early 1990s and perhaps later. Many of the questions about containment, if it is interpreted as the general course of American foreign policy, become the basic questions about that policy itself, from Harry S. Truman's administration to the first years of President George H. W. Bush's and possibly beyond.

KENNAN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONTAINMENT

Writing mysteriously as "X" in 1947, George Kennan, then the head of the State Department Policy

Planning Staff, first publicly articulated the doctrine of containment in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947), the influential journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. That mid-1947 statement, it might be said, became the near-canonical expression of containment, though Kennan himself, even in the 1940s when operating in the State Department, provided various formulations in speeches and reports that departed, sometimes, significantly from the 1947 essay.

When his identity quickly leaked out, his Mr. "X" analysis was interpreted as official policy, because of his position in the State Department and because the essay seemed to justify a recent bold departure in American foreign policy: Truman's call on 12 March 1947, in the so-called "Truman Doctrine" speech, for economic and military aid "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Kennan's essay offered both a diagnosis of and a prescription for treating the Soviet threat; actually, he frequently termed it "Russian" and thus often used that adjective and the noun "Russia" to mean "Soviet" and "Soviet Union." His prescription attracted the most attention: the need to confront "the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where [the Soviet Union] shows signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful world." There would be perpetual crises, presumably frequent confrontations. Such a policy "must be . . . long-term, patient but firm and vigilant." Kennan predicted that it would increase enormously the strains in Soviet society, compel Soviet foreign policy to be cautious and circumspect, and produce the gradual mellowing or breakup of the Soviet system. Containment promised the liberation of Eastern Europe and an American victory in the long run, without preventive war. History was on the side of the West. His faith that the future belonged to democratic capitalism directly repudiated the Marxist faith that capitalism would crumble from its own contradictions.

Kennan's diagnosis of Soviet policy was central to his optimistic forecast and to much of his doctrine. Soviet policy was, he asserted, relentless but not adventurous—"a fluid stream which moves constantly wherever permitted to move toward a given goal." This patient but insatiable expansion, he explained, was the logical outgrowth of communist ideology. Soviet hostility to the West, in turn, was a result largely of the "neurotic world view" of Soviet leaders and of their need to create a foreign enemy to justify dictatorship at home. Their "world view" was both paranoid and functional; it misunderstood Western actions but also helped Soviet leaders to stay in power.

The Soviet policy, he stressed, could be altered only by Soviet authorities, not by any other national power. "Once a party line has been laid down," he asserted, "the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force." In that view, Soviet officials at the middle levels were basically automatons, and there were presumably no important differences among top Soviet leaders.

Kennan's message was clear: Soviet hostility was not a reasonable response to America's wartime policy or to earlier American actions, nor could negotiations ease or end this hostility and produce a settlement of the Cold War. His analysis became the new orthodoxy: the Soviet Union was "committed fanatically to the belief that with the United States there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional ways of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure."

THE BACKGROUND OF THE MR. "X" ESSAY

Kennan, a member of the first generation of State Department specialists on the Soviet Union, was born in Milwaukee in 1904 to a well-to-do family, attended Princeton University in the early 1920s, and, perhaps because of his provincialism amid the glitter of the eastern elite, developed the sense of the outsider. A man of rarefied intelligence and strained sensibility, he was in many ways a latter-day Jamesian character. He was sensitive to the slightest rebuff, to minor breaches in etiquette, but, judging from his memoirs, when he returned to the United States from foreign service overseas in 1937, remained curiously untroubled by the economic depression, with its ravaging poverty, in his own nation.

In the diplomatic service, Kennan happily found what he termed "protective paternalism" and seemed to delight in the ordered tasks, the requirements of discipline, the acts of civic responsibility, the applications of intelligence, and the dis-

tance from the United States. When the United States opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, Kennan became third secretary in Moscow. He later claimed that his four years in Moscow were "unavoidably a sort of liberal education in the horrors of Stalinism," and his hostility to Marxism and the Soviet system grew. They offended his taste, his sensibility, and his values.

During those early years in the Soviet Union, he had a zest to understand, to penetrate, and to participate in Russian society. He soon complained to Washington about repression in the Soviet Union, stressing, for example in 1937, that "the great majority of the Soviet citizens who have had . . . extensive social or official relations with diplomats during the past few years have now disappeared . . . they have been intimidated, arrested, exiled, or executed." Such politics, he told Washington in terms that could suggest personal grievance, had destroyed "any prestige and popularity which foreign envoys might otherwise enjoy in the eyes of the Soviet public."

Having become a fierce critic of the Soviet system, Kennan deplored America's welcoming the Soviet Union in 1941 as an "associate in defense of democracy," for this alliance, he complained, would identify the United States with Soviet oppression in Eastern Europe. By 1944, Kennan was already counseling that Soviet-American diplomatic collaboration was impossible. Fearing that the United States lacked "the political manliness" to stop the Soviets from carving out a sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, he proposed, in despair, that the United States might as well divide Germany, partition Europe into spheres, and define "the line beyond which we cannot afford to permit the Russians to exercise unchallenged power or to take purely unilateral action." This was the containment doctrine in embryonic form.

In 1944 and 1945, Kennan's analysis was unacceptable to many policymakers, including his immediate superior, W. Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union. Harriman and many American policymakers had often defined American interests in universalist terms to include Eastern Europe, but believed that Soviet-American cooperation was possible—that the Soviets would withdraw or reduce their influence and accede in this area to free elections. These policymakers concluded that American economic power and atomic prowess might compel the Soviets to accede to American wishes in this border area. Unlike Kennan, they believed that Soviet policy was alterable, that accommodations could be reached—on American terms.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by some historical interpretations, had temporarily acceded to Soviet control in much of Eastern Europe, and confirmed that arrangement at the Yalta Conference of the "Big Three" (with Premier Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill) in February 1945. But Roosevelt had also hoped to bring the Soviets into a condominium of great powers, to involve the Soviets in the United Nations, and, through a combination of deftness and toughness, to push the Soviets to soften their policy in Eastern Europe.

In certain ways, Kennan's analysis of the Soviet Union seemed closer to that of former President Herbert Hoover. Most notably, Hoover, who had long chafed at the growth of Soviet power in Europe, had serious doubts about negotiating with the Soviets. In mid-1945, Hoover even recommended, about ten weeks before the August atomic bombings of Japan and Soviet entry into the Pacific war, his own policy of containment. Hoover wanted President Harry S. Truman, who had just succeeded Roosevelt, to greatly soften the surrender terms for Japan in order to end the war before Soviet entry into the conflict and in order to restrain Soviet influence in Asia. Hoover had even proposed letting Japan retain Formosa and Korea, among other generous terms, in order to end the war well before the Soviets could gain territorial advantages in Asia.

Hoover's counsel failed, largely because his proposal—very soft surrender terms for Japan—seemed politically unacceptable in America. But neither of the two high-level administration officials he approached—Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Truman—seemed opposed, in principle, to Hoover's motivating desire to contain Soviet influence and power. These two American leaders, however, knew something important that was kept secret from Hoover and the American people—that President Roosevelt at Yalta, in return for Stalin's promise to enter the Pacific war within three months of Germany's surrender, had granted some important territorial concessions in Asia. State Department efforts to renege on those territorial terms failed in mid-1945, partly because Soviet armed intervention in the Pacific was still deemed necessary by American leaders in order to speed Japan's surrender and reduce U.S. casualties.

Practicing his own early form of containment in 1945, President Truman, disliking the fact

that the Soviets had an occupation zone in Germany and thus a role in the postwar reconstruction of that nation, acted to bar the Soviets from any role in the postwar occupation and reconstruction of Japan. In mid-August 1945, when Japan surrendered, Stalin hoped speedily to land troops in northern Japan to establish a Soviet presence in Japan, but Truman insisted, successfully, that Stalin back down. The Soviets nevertheless stuck by their mid-August agreement with the United States on Korea. The Soviets occupied only the northern half of Korea, and southern Korea was unoccupied by Allied forces, until the American troops arrived in September 1945, a few weeks after the Soviets could have taken over the south.

In early 1946, when Stalin publicly warned of future capitalist wars, called for Soviet military strength, and refused to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Department of State asked for an analysis of Soviet policy. That request evoked from Kennan his famous Long Telegram (about 5,500 words) of 22 February 1946, an early statement of his "X" essay. "The more I thought about this [opportunity]," he later wrote, "the more it seemed obvious that this was 'it.' For eighteen months I had done little else but pluck people's sleeves, trying to make them understand the nature of the phenomenon with which we in the Moscow embassy were daily confronted and which our government and people had to learn to understand if they were to have any chance of coping successfully with the problems of the world."

Kennan's telegram—explaining that the Soviet Union was expansionist, malevolent, warlike, and uncompromising—neatly expressed the emerging conclusions among policymakers in Washington. The response was, Kennan recalls, "nothing less than sensational." It lifted him from the relative obscurity of chargé d'affaires in Moscow, won the affection of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, brought Kennan a position at the newly created National War College, and gave him fame and popularity within the higher echelons of the Truman administration. Kennan had not offered new thoughts or insights, but rather, at a critical juncture, had phrased in telling words the emerging analysis within the administration.

According to some revisionist historians, his message arrived shortly after policymakers had moved away from "liberation" in Eastern Europe and the hopes of using "atomic diplomacy" to roll back Soviet influence there. The Soviets, while delaying elections in Bulgaria in August 1945, had not yielded further to implied threats. The result was a virtual stalemate in this area. While pledged to universalism, and wanting democratic governments and an economic open door in Eastern Europe, the United States was not prepared to go to war to achieve its goals there.

Two weeks after the Long Telegram, on 5 March 1946, Winston Churchill, now former British prime minister, delivered his Iron Curtain address. The Soviet Union, he asserted, did not want war, only the "fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of [its] power and doctrines." The implication was that the Soviet Union was insatiably expansionist and would use subversion and aggression to take over Europe and Asia. Churchill's clarion call to the West had the endorsement of President Harry S. Truman, who had read the speech in advance and presumably welcomed it as part of the administration's strategy of reorienting the American public for a "get-tough" policy toward the Soviet Union.

That strategy included exploiting the dispute in Iran, where the Soviet Union had not yet withdrawn its troops from Azerbaijan, an oil-rich northwestern province once part of czarist Russia's sphere of influence. In early 1946, the United States pushed this issue into the United Nations forum and insisted upon keeping the matter there even after the Soviet Union promised in late March to remove its troops in a few weeks. American success in this venture established for many policymakers that firmness could compel the Soviets to withdraw from recently occupied areas beyond Eastern Europe and to accede to American demands.

In the summer of 1946, Truman requested an analysis of Soviet policy. Simplifying Kennan's analysis in the Long Telegram, the resulting study (put together by White House assistant George Elsey and endorsed by Truman's counsel Clark Clifford) stressed the influence of Marxist ideology on Soviet action. The Kremlin leaders, according to that report, "adhere to the Marxian theory of ultimate destruction [of capitalist states] by every means at their disposal." Efforts at accord or mutual understanding would be "highly dangerous" for the United States, because concessions would raise Soviet demands. Warning that the Soviet Union might start war to spread communism, the report called for "resisting [Soviet] efforts to expand into areas vital to American security." Among the potential "trouble spots" requiring American attention were three in the Far East—China, which needed a "unified and eco-

nomically stable" system; Japan, which had to be reconstructed and made democratic; and Korea, which should be "united and independent."

"The language of military power is the only language which [the Soviet Union] understands," the Clifford-Elsey report asserted. Agreeing with the general tone and analysis of the report, which was still in draft form, Kennan urged the addition of a key paragraph, which with minor cosmetic changes ended up in the final report:

> Whether it would actually be in this country's interests to wage atomic and biological warfare against Russia in the event hostilities should develop is of course a question which would require careful consideration in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time. This decision might be influenced by a number of factors which can not now be estimated, but it is important that this country be prepared to use them if need be, for the mere fact of such preparedness may prove to be the only powerful deterrent to Russian aggressive action and in this sense the only sure guaranty of peace.

By late summer 1946, the Soviet Union's refusal to endorse the American plan for international control of atomic energy confirmed to policymakers that the Soviets were deceitful, suspicious, and uncompromising. How, Americans asked sincerely, could the Truman administration's offer, which they incorrectly deemed magnanimous, be rejected? Concessions were impossible. Compromise would not work. Kennan privately suggested that the United States use implicit "atomic diplomacy" to force the Soviets to accept the U.S. plan. He proposed, in the words of an associate, tactics "designed to convince the Russians of our serious intent and of the consequences if they chose to continue their present course." His proposal included the public announcement of "the construction of a new bomb-proof General Staff headquarters in a remote region"—a possible preliminary to war.

It is unclear whether or not Kennan in 1946 was mulling over the possibility of preventive war by the United States. He had given some thought to the prospects of actual war, and how it should be fought, if it occurred. Meeting during the summer with General Carl Spaatz, the chief of staff of the air force, Kennan said that the war, in the summary words of a minutes-taker's notes, should be "conducted by the U.S. [as] an air war in the strictest sense of the term." According to Kennan, there were only "about ten vital points" in the Soviet Union to be bombed in order to cripple the Soviet Union and force its speedy defeat. They were not primarily cities but production areas and railroads. He saw no need to try to invade and occupy the USSR after such air attacks, and anticipated a revolution in which "the Bolshevik regime would crack."

In mid-1946, when Kennan met with Spaatz, the United States only possessed about five or eight A-bombs, though Kennan, like many American officials, was not allowed to know the top-secret number. Thus, his sketch of a bombing attack on the Soviet Union may have implied nuclear weapons or conventional weapons, or, most likely, a combination of both kinds of bombs. He may not have known that his thinking about virtually a push-button war was markedly at odds with the emerging secret American military planning at the time in which there was usually an assumption that war, if it came, would involve a long, costly conflict between armies on the European continent. According to those plans, the bomb could be helpful, but not decisive.

Amid the growing East-West tension, with his own expanding reputation as a prescient Soviet expert, Kennan found additional opportunities to refine and advance his views in Washington and in other influential quarters. In January 1947, Secretary Forrestal, Kennan's benefactor, asked him to comment on a manuscript on Soviet policy, and Kennan went beyond the assignment to present on 31 January his own lengthy interpretation. His paper for Forrestal—based on an early January speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York—became the "X" essay. It was speedily cleared by the State Department, because Kennan's thoughts were compatible with emerging American policy. Upon publication of the essay, he became the recognized philosopher-diplomat of containment. He had synthesized the emerging wisdom and dignified it within an acceptable intellectual framework.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Four months before publication of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and while it circulated within the administration, President Truman launched what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Speaking before Congress on 12 March 1947, he called for a global crusade against encroaching communism and requested $400 million in military and economic aid, as well as military and economic advisers, to halt what he described as

communist aggression and subversion in Greece and communist threats to Turkey. The alternatives in beleaguered Greece, he contended, were totalitarianism or freedom. The world was at a critical turning point: the struggle was between the forces of light and darkness, of humanity and evil. America's commitment could turn back the hordes of oppression and guarantee freedom.

Although Truman never explicitly labeled the Soviet Union as the malefactor, his slightly veiled references left no room for doubt. Most policymakers then assumed that Stalin was supporting and planning the revolution in Greece, the intended recipient of most of the American aid. According to the later testimony of Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslavian revolutionary, Stalin opposed the revolution in Greece and tried to stop communist nations from supplying the Greek revolutionaries. Stalin was sometimes a counterrevolutionary, who believed, Djilas wrote, "that the creation of revolutionary centers outside Moscow could endanger its supremacy in world communism." American policymakers were apparently blinded by their own ideology, by their belief that the communist world was then monolithic, and by their conviction that Stalin was an ardent revolutionary and would extend communism whenever possible.

The Truman administration seized the opportunity to declare the Cold War in the Truman Doctrine speech. Until March 1947, partly because of some pro-Soviet attitudes in the United States and fears of a disastrous rift in the Democratic Party, policymakers had wavered publicly on whether the United States could reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union or whether the Russians were an implacable adversary. Resolving his earlier public ambivalence in March, Truman called for a global crusade against communism while limiting his specific legislative requests to Greece and Turkey.

Kennan, then in Washington at the National War College and active in the State Department's planning of the aid program, objected to the tone and ideological content of the message, and to some aspects of the program. Judging that the Turkish problem was one of morale that the Turks themselves could solve, he opposed military aid to Turkey. Truman's message, Kennan believed, went too far in its ideological analysis and in its global promises—the stark portrayal of two opposing ways of life and the open-ended commitment to aid free peoples everywhere. He feared that the Soviet Union might be provoked by the tone and crusading commitment to declare war.

Kennan's anxieties eased when the administration, in presenting its request to Congress, retreated from the promise of a global crusade and limited its commitment to Greece, Turkey, and western Europe. Like most policymakers, Kennan feared the results of a communist victory in Greece and linked that to what later became known as the domino theory: The triumph in Greece would destabilize the Middle East and weaken the morale of western Europe, so that the people there might "trim their sails and even abet" the victory of communism. For Kennan, the commitment to Greece was necessary, reasonable, and desirable; it was within American capabilities; it would halt "our political adversaries"; and its "favorable consequences will carry far beyond the limits of Greece itself." According to Kennan, other European nations, then beset by communist threats internally or near their borders, would gain hope and have confidence in the United States.

CRITIQUES OF MR. X'S DOCTRINE

Despite Kennan's doubts about some aspects of the Truman Doctrine, most commentators viewed Truman's speech and the "X" essay as parts of the same program—containment. Most unfriendly critics focused on the Truman Doctrine. They charged the United States with bailing out British imperialism in the Middle East, establishing American imperialism there, risking war against the Soviet Union, exaggerating the crisis, militarizing policy, abandoning negotiations, misinterpreting Soviet action, misunderstanding the civil war in Greece, supporting totalitarianism there, escalating the Cold War, and trying to scare the American people. Both right-wing critics like Senator Robert A. Taft, a leading Republican, and left-wing critics like Henry A. Wallace, who had recently left Truman's cabinet because of disagreements on foreign policy, agreed that the Soviet Union was not a military threat. A self-styled heir of Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy, Wallace argued publicly for a settlement of the Cold War and the avoidance of the arms race.

Shortly after Kennan's essay appeared, Walter Lippmann, the respected columnist and sympathetic critic of American foreign policy, published in a series of columns a penetrating critique of the containment policy, later collected as *The Cold War: A Study of U.S. Foreign Policy* (1947). Interpreting the "X" essay as the intellectual rationale for the Truman Doctrine, Lippmann

focused on the essay. It was, he contended, fundamentally wrong on two major grounds: it misunderstood the sources of Soviet behavior and offered recommendations for American policy that were a diplomatic and strategic "monstrosity."

Whereas Kennan had mostly stressed Marxist ideology as the major source of Soviet actions (belief in the "innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism"), Lippmann argued on the basis of Russian history that expansion—the quest for a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and power in the Mediterranean—was an inherited czarist ambition, not a communist innovation. By emphasizing the continuity of Russian and Soviet history, Lippmann minimized the role of communist ideology. Yet, curiously, in explaining Soviet behavior, he did not stress the long history of Western hostility and American opposition to the Soviet system. Unlike later revisionist historians, Lippmann was not placing the burden for Soviet-American antagonism on American, or Western, actions.

Lippmann agreed with Kennan that Soviet power would expand unless confronted by American power, but he objected on pragmatic grounds to Kennan's plan for the next generation or beyond: resistance with "counterforce" wherever the Soviets threatened, until the pressure destroyed or mellowed the Soviet system. Lippmann argued that this plan was too optimistic: America did not have the patience, the economic power, or the armed forces to contain the Soviet Union wherever it showed signs of encroaching and until it collapsed. Kennan's doctrine was strategically dangerous to the United States; it gave the Soviet Union the initiative, allowed the Soviets to choose for confrontation the areas near their border where they were stronger, and would ultimately lead to excessive demands upon American forces. Lippmann warned that the United States, compensating for inadequate military strength, would recruit and organize a "heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets," who might plunge the United States into crises or compel it to abandon them and risk charges of appeasement and "sell out." Kennan's strategy required the United States to create "unassailable borders" near the Soviet Union, which would be an unnatural alliance for the West. For Lippmann, the doctrine of containment, as represented by the "X" essay, failed the test of realism. The essay did not recognize the limits of American power and thereby threatened to involve the United States in dangerous alliances, and ultimately to sap American will and morale when the policy of confrontation did not bring prompt victory.

Lippmann's alternative strategy—later known as "disengagement" when Kennan publicly advocated it a decade later—called for the withdrawal from Germany and eventually from continental Europe of the armies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. This policy, Lippmann argued, would be the "acid test" of Soviet intentions, and, if successful, would reduce tension, eliminate troubling issues, move the two great powers toward a modus vivendi, contribute to a better life for many Europeans, and conserve American resources.

More important than this specific proposal, Lippmann was counseling the continuation of negotiations, the use of diplomacy, in order to achieve at least a partial Soviet-American settlement. The Truman Doctrine and "X"'s diagnosis, the columnist asserted, erred because they rejected diplomacy. "The history of diplomacy," Lippmann wrote, "is the history of relations among rival powers, which did not enjoy political intimacy, and did not respond to appeals to common purposes. Nevertheless, there have been settlements. . . . For a diplomat to think that rival and unfriendly powers cannot be brought to a settlement is to forget what diplomacy is all about."

Drawing less attention in 1947 than Lippman's analysis but more concern in the early 1950s was the savage critique of Kennan's thinking from the right in America. Containment, to those critics, was appeasement, accepting Soviet domination of much of Eastern Europe. In their judgment, containment was timid, if not pusillanimous. A notable critic, the right-wing James Burnham, who had once been on the anti-Stalin American left, charged that containment was the "bureaucratic verbalization of a policy of drift [concealing] its inner law. . . . Let history do it." These critics wanted action—penetration of the "iron curtain," overthrow of communist regimes, liberation of the "captive peoples." At minimum, there should be, these critics contended, America-directed sabotage, clandestine activity, and paramilitary involvement against the Soviets and what was regarded as their "stooge" governments in Eastern Europe. None of those proposed aggressive tactics, according to the right-wing critics, was countenanced or encouraged by containment. Those critics were actually very wrong—but they could not know about the then-secret American tactics.

Significantly, Kennan had often used the terms "Russian" to denote "Soviet" and "Russia" to mean "Soviet Union," thus casually ignoring the fact that many Soviet citizens (about 25 to 30 percent or about 45 to 54 million of the USSR's population) were not ethnic Russians, and that Russian history, when Kennan discussed it, was not actually the history of many Soviet peoples. Kennan's prominent critics in the 1940s and 1950s usually neglected this important difference. But occasionally some hyphenated Americans, especially Ukrainians, did stress what was called the "nationalities problem" (the fact that the Soviet Union was composed of a number of different nationality groups) and argue that the Soviet Union might come apart, under American-directed pressure, and splinter into different nationality-based states.

REFLECTIONS ON KENNAN'S ORIGINAL MEANING

Twenty years after Kennan's "X" essay, when publishing his memoirs, Kennan lamented publicly for the first time that his "X" essay had been misunderstood and that he had been mistaken for the architect of those very features of the Truman Doctrine that he had opposed. He had not intended to offer a doctrine, he claimed, but wanted to show that war with the Soviet Union was neither inevitable nor necessary, that there was no need to conclude from the failure of American concessions to the Soviets that there must be an eventual war between the two great powers. Kennan regretted that he had not explained his meaning of "counterforce" and, thus, had seemed to endorse the militarization of American foreign policy. In 1967 he claimed that by counterforce he had meant "not the containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."

Some scholars have regarded this belated explanation as disingenuous, as an effort to rewrite his past. Certainly, it is curious that, as a master stylist who presumably sought clarity, he chose a metaphor that was so clearly military to express what he claims was a nonmilitary meaning. Even some friendly critics suggest that Kennan's use of language revealed that he intended to propose more than just a political or economic response—also a military one.

Until 1955, despite Kennan's many speeches and articles, including the reprinting of the "X" essay in his *American Diplomacy* (1951), he never publicly clarified his 1947 meaning, never explained that his 1947 intentions had been grossly distorted. Even in 1967, he did not adequately explain his years of public silence before correcting the record. In his memoirs, however, he did provide a 1948 letter to Lippmann, which Kennan never sent, in which he clarified his understanding of the communist threat and of the American response. In that unsent letter Kennan wrote that he did not favor the stationing of military forces near the Soviet border to halt Soviet aggression, for the Soviets "don't want to invade anyone. . . . They don't want war of any kind. . . . They far prefer to do the job with stooge forces."

In clarifying his understanding of the Soviet threat, Kennan revealed in this letter that he considered the real communist threat internal but often military: "The violence is nominally domestic, not international, violence. It is, if you will, a police violence." The implication of this analysis, which he seemed to deny in 1967, was that small-scale American interventions might be necessary to deal with these "police" threats. For, presumably, Kennan did not think that the United States should rely in every case on words of support, friendly advice, and economic assistance, even if they were inadequate. In most cases, he assumed, they would be sufficient. But what if the "stooge forces" were not conquered so easily? Applying this logic in the 1960s, others could argue that the Truman Doctrine and the counsel of "X" shaped, if not dictated, the commitment of U.S. troops to Vietnam—a conclusion and policy that Kennan opposed by 1966.

In 1947 communism was, for Kennan, monolithic. It was in the service of Joseph Stalin. "Any success of a local Communist party," Kennan later explained, "any advance of Communist power anywhere [was] an extension . . . of the political orbit, or at least the dominant influence, of the Kremlin." Looking back on the 1940s, even in 1967, Kennan maintained that the Chinese Communist Party had been "an instrument of Soviet power"—a conclusion disputed by some experts who trace the Sino-Soviet rift back to this period and contend that Stalin opposed the revolution of Mao Zedong.

Yet, in the late 1940s, unlike in his "X" essay, Kennan actually started predicting that Chinese communism might become independent of the Soviet Union and even a threat to the Soviet state. "The men in the Kremlin," Kennan thought, might well "discover that this fluid and subtle ori-

ental movement had quietly oozed away between their fingers and there was nothing left but a ceremonious Chinese bow and a polite inscrutable Chinese giggle."

Placing himself in 1967 closer to Lippmann's views than the text of his 1947 essay may have justified, Kennan emphasized that "X" did not mean to bar negotiations, only to postpone them until issues could be settled. Whereas in 1947 Kennan had seemed to locate that time in the distant future, in 1967 he implied that he had thought it was quite near when he wrote the essay. Nor, he claimed, did he want a permanent division of Europe, only a temporary division until the possibilities for negotiations developed.

Commenting in 1967 on "X"'s 1947 analysis of Soviet motivations, Kennan lamented, "much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put out by alarmed congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy." This belated reassessment indicates how far in two decades Kennan and the American consensus had shifted. In 1947, however, his tough-minded, hostile analysis of Soviet policy won him respect within the administration and among scholars of the Soviet Union. Few then dissented or criticized him, even though he minimized Russian history and ignored Western hostility in explaining the sources of Soviet conduct.

THE SUPPLENESS OF CONTAINMENT

Although Kennan did not endorse the Truman Doctrine's global rhetoric, he, as well as many of its critics, applauded the Marshall Plan. Whereas the doctrine's military emphasis and ideological tone troubled many, the Marshall Plan with its promise of economic aid was attractive. To many Americans and Europeans, though not to Kennan or other policymakers, the plan seemed to offer a rapprochement to the Soviet Union, even an end to the division of Europe that the Truman Doctrine threatened. For Lippmann, the program of economic assistance was not a part of containment; but to Kennan and others in the administration it was simply another tactic in the implementation of containment.

Kennan, then head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, had worked on the Marshall Plan in early 1947 and was among those who conceived of it as a way of shoring up western Europe, improving its morale, halting communism there, prying the Eastern bloc out of the Soviet orbit, and weakening the Soviet Union. This American program of massive economic assistance promised to contain communism and Soviet expansion, maybe even to speed the liberation of Eastern Europe and hasten the destruction of the Soviet system—precisely the promise of the "X" essay. By Truman's own admission, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were "two halves of the same walnut."

To the public, the Marshall Plan seemed generous and friendly, partly because the United States invited the Soviet Union, as well as the Eastern bloc nations, to participate in the program. Kennan and other policymakers knew that Soviet membership was unlikely, for they had devised the plan to be unacceptable to the Soviets. It required that European nations provide data on their economy, open their land freely to American agents, and move toward economic multilateralism. As policymakers knew, the Soviets would neither relax secrecy, upon which they believed their security partly rested, nor adopt multilateralism, which would have required them to reorganize their economy and abandon state trading. As Kennan later acknowledged, the Marshall Plan also anticipated that the Soviets would be a donor nation—an expectation that would make the plan even more unacceptable to Stalin.

By reintegrating Eastern European trade back into western European channels, the plan promised to weaken Soviet power in the Eastern bloc and reorient it to the West. How long—Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, had asked earlier—could, say, Romania or Bulgaria remain independent of the West after the introduction of American capital? Or, for that matter, how could the East industrialize, following Soviet plans, if it joined the Marshall Plan and once more played the role of supplier of raw materials and agricultural products to the West? To halt this "rollback" of its influence, the Soviet Union blocked East European nations from joining the American program.

The Marshall Plan, like the Truman Doctrine, contributed to the division of Europe and probably to the hardening of Soviet policies in its bloc. When the United States successfully helped drive communist parties out of Western coalition governments in 1947 and 1948, the price was increased Soviet suspicion and stepped-up suppression of dissent in Eastern Europe. As a result of the Marshall Plan, in "a defensive reaction,"

according to Kennan, the Soviet Union ended democracy in Czechoslovakia with a brutal coup in February 1948. That analysis by Kennan differed greatly from the American public analysis in 1948, which interpreted the Czech coup as virtually an act of unprovoked Soviet aggression.

Kennan did hope that war with the Soviet Union would be unnecessary, but he did not rule it out. He even, at least briefly, considered the possibility of preventive war. If Germany and the USSR ever combined, or if the Soviets' "total war-making potential [increased] at a rate considerably faster than that of ourselves," he told an Air War College audience in 1947, the United States might have to move to preventive war. Echoing much of his analysis presented in his mid-1946 meeting with General Spaatz, Kennan stated in 1947 "that with probably ten good hits with atomic bombs you could, without any great loss of life or loss of the prestige or reputation of the United States as a well-meaning and humane people, practically cripple Russia's war-making potential." At that time, the United States—unknown to Kennan—only had about ten to twelve A-bombs.

Kennan himself in the years after his "X" essay struggled to define America's vital interests, because he understood, in a way left unclear in his "X" essay but emphasized by Lippmann, that the United States lacked the resources to get involved substantially wherever in the world communism seemed to threaten. In August 1948, Kennan included among the key U.S. interests the Atlantic community ("Canada, Greenland and Iceland, Scandinavia, the British Isles, Western Europe, the Iberian Peninsula"), as well as Morocco and the upper part of the west coast of Africa, many of the countries of South America (in the area from bulge northward), the area of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Japan, and the Philippines. That list, interestingly, excluded much of Africa and all of China, India, Korea, Indonesia, and Indochina.

Redefining his analysis in late 1948, he concluded that there were only five centers in the world of "industrial and military policy" of great value to the United States in terms of its "national security": the United States itself, Great Britain, Germany and nearby central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. This was, in a sense, a sophisticated economic-industrial conception of American national security, stressing that these areas, based upon their resources and populations, could threaten the United States militarily and that the American economic system also depended upon access to most of these areas. In the late 1940s, aside from the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet Union itself, the crucial areas, as defined by Kennan, were in the American orbit.

Emphasis on the importance of Germany and Japan, which before World War II were the key industrial powers in Europe and Asia, respectively, helped shape American postwar decisions to reconstruct these two nations economically and to anchor them in the American-directed international political-economic system. Partly under Kennan's aegis, the State Department urged the redevelopment of Germany in Europe to rebuild the western European economy, and of Japan in Asia so that the island nation could be the linchpin of American policy and of reconstructed international trade in that area.

Containment, as secretly conceived by Kennan and other policymakers, also involved various forms of covert action abroad. In early 1948 he secretly urged the government to create a permanent covert capability, including paramilitary activity and political and economic warfare. Under the then-secret National Security Council (NSC) paper 10/2, in June 1948, concealing his action, President Truman authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to handle such operations. They included both the blocking of left forces in the West (especially in Italy and France) in 1948, and clandestine assistance to anticommunist forces behind the "iron curtain." Put bluntly, covert activity could offer containment and, ultimately, liberation. Such efforts could speed the weakening of Soviet power, as forecast in Mr. "X"'s essay. Normally, as recommended by Kennan and approved by Truman, the covert action would be conducted in such a way as to maintain "plausible denial" that the American government was involved.

Whether or not covert activities, conducted without the knowledge of the American people, and generally without the knowledge or explicit approval of the Congress, lived up to the standards of traditional American value—democracy and public accountability—would be discussed only years later, when many of the CIA activities ultimately became known. Some critics, pointing to Mr. "X"'s own 1947 words ("To avoid destruction, the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation"), would contend that clandestine CIA activities violated Kennan's publicly implied values.

Thus, the angry right-wing criticism of containment as being passive, charges that were never fully answered by the Truman-government practitioners of containment, had the unintended effect of helping to conceal from the American people that their government was sometimes following a secret policy of "liberation." Liberation seemed to men like Burnham and generally to the American public in the 1940s and early 1950s as the near-antithesis of containment. But liberation was either the close ally of containment or perhaps, as some would later cynically suggest, even the hidden other side of containment.

Containment, mixed with occasional hopes of liberation, continued as the policy of the Truman administration. It was, in short, a counterrevolutionary policy that tried to prevent revolutions of the left, block subversion, eliminate instability ("the breeding ground of communism") in the West, and stop Soviet expansion. Containment, like most other competing American doctrines then, interpreted revolutions as communist and Soviet inspired.

Analysts then and later questioned the mainsprings of this anticommunism. Why did policymakers conclude that American security was threatened by revolution abroad? Did they simply fear that the Soviet Union might benefit and hence that the United States would lose? No. Nor did they fear Soviet military aggression in the short run, for well into 1947 no policymaker expected the Soviet Union to expand militarily then or in the near future. In the long run, American leaders were less sanguine. Some revisionist historians have analyzed the fears of policymakers in a larger ideological context: American leaders believed that the removal of markets and resources from the world economy would disrupt international trade, impair production, and weaken the international economy and, in turn, the American economy, which depended upon the international capitalist system and expanding trade. In this view, for some analysts, policymakers believed that American freedoms depended upon prosperity at home, and that the spread of communism abroad, by threatening the American economy, also threatened the American political system and its traditional freedoms. These policymakers also preferred the creation of democratic governments abroad, and believed that they were useful, if not essential, to the flourishing of the American political economy at home.

The containment policy did prove sufficiently supple for the United States to give Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavian government economic aid in 1949, a year after he had broken with Stalin and the Cominform. The containment policy, despite its counterrevolutionary implications, also proved sufficiently flexible in practice that policymakers greatly modified, and practically abandoned, it in one notable case (China), where the cost of armed intervention, in American dollars and lives, would have been exorbitant to block the communist revolution. Earlier U.S. economic assistance and military advisers had not been able to check the erosion of Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek's political and military power. By early 1949, U.S. policymakers recognized that they could not halt the communist revolution in China unless they were willing to commit millions of American soldiers and billions of dollars. Whatever the sources of American anticommunism, whatever the reasons for trying to halt communism, policymakers were aware of the relationship of means and ends; they knew that some commitments to allies and some interventions were too costly. China was such a case.

The administration dramatically applied the doctrine of containment to Asia in 1950, when the United States stressed negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan and military bases there; provided economic aid in May to the French, who were trying to prevent a communist triumph in Indochina; and intervened in June in Korea, in the civil war between the communist north and the American "client state" in the south. That intervention, and the policies soon following it, ended for at least a few years the hopes of policymakers that the Soviet Union and China might split, that Chinese nationalism might overthrow Mao or make him another Tito.

DISPUTES OVER THE APPLICATION OF CONTAINMENT: NATO, THE H-BOMB, AND NSC 68

In 1949–1950, when western European governments feared armed insurrection, Soviet military expansion, and the power of a revived West Germany, the United States constructed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to maintain stability, improve morale, block revolution, restrain Soviet pressure, and ease fears about the revival of West Germany. Kennan understood these purposes, but he still objected to the treaty, partly because he deemed it unnecessary. The United States would defend its vital interests (western Europe) with-

out a treaty, he declared; there was no need to request from signatories a reciprocal pledge that they would go to the aid of the United States. A simple American pledge would suffice.

This attack on legalisms did not cut to the core of Kennan's objections. "The Russians had no idea," he later explained, "of using regular military strength against us. Why should we direct attention to an area where we were weak and they were strong?" He forecast correctly that the pact would mean "a general preoccupation with military affairs, to the detriment of economic recovery and of the necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to Europe's difficulties." In a lame effort to avoid what the Soviets might regard "as an aggressive encirclement of their country," Kennan proposed the exclusion of Greece and Turkey, and probably Italy, as outside the North Atlantic area. His criticisms found no favor with Dean Acheson, the new secretary of state.

Containment, as Kennan recognized, was taking on a life of its own. He was its uneasy sire, torn between pride and distress; he could not restrict it to the paths he wished to follow. Although popularly regarded as its preeminent philosopher and spokesman, he was being relegated within the councils of policy to the outer orbit reserved for critical scolds, for men whose judgment no longer commanded respect. Kennan and Acheson were differing on important issues involving the implementation of containment. Their differences, in important measure, were rooted in the very ambiguities of the "X" essay, especially its definition of "counterforce" and the nature of the communist threat. NATO was partly a military response to the potential insurrections that Kennan, in his unsent letter to Lippmann, had described as political, but which others labeled as military.

After the Soviet testing of their first atomic bomb in August 1949, the Truman government, which had been secretly but slowly pursuing development for some years of a thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb, confronted the problem of how the United States should respond to the Soviets ending the U.S. nuclear monopoly a few years before the West had predicted. Part of the Truman administration's answer was to accelerate the effort to develop the thermonuclear weapon, which could be a thousand times more powerful than the World War II A-bombs and thus could kill millions, not simply many thousands. Within the State Department, Kennan fruitlessly opposed development of this H-bomb. Reversing his 1947 positions, he pleaded, unsuccessfully, for an American doctrine of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, and decried the prospects of nuclear war. He likened nuclear war "to the concepts of warfare which were once familiar to the Asiatic hordes," and contended that use of nuclear weapons meant that "man not only can be but is his own worse and most terrible enemy."

Kennan believed that the military needs of containment could be met within the limits of the current defense budget (about $13.5 billion): the development of highly mobile, small, unified forces to deal with the likely military threats of localized, limited conflicts. In 1949–1950 his analysis conflicted sharply with that of Paul Nitze, whom Acheson would soon name as the new director of the Policy Planning Staff, for Nitze was concerned with the overall threat of Soviet arms and wanted a greatly expanded budget to provide both a limited-war capacity and, more importantly, overall strategic superiority against the Soviets.

Joined by Acheson, Nitze stressed "the Soviet purpose of world domination," and they disregarded Kennan's fears that policy should not be set down in a single document, that it would lead to distortion and a freezing of policy. In part, perhaps, Kennan had learned a lesson from the reception of the "X" essay and its hardening into dogma, albeit an ambiguous one. But more important, he believed that Nitze and Acheson were overmilitarizing American policy and misunderstanding Soviet aims. Acheson later characterized the Nitze-Kennan debate as "stultifying," for he concluded that the question of emphasis in Soviet aims—whether the Soviet Union placed world domination or survival of the regime first—made little practical difference. For Acheson, there was still a considerable "degree of risk of all-out war which the Soviet government would run in probing a weak spot for concessions."

Kennan, looking forward to the future, claimed that he was thinking of disengagement in Europe and stressed that there was no Soviet military threat to western Europe. Defeated by Acheson, Kennan watched unhappily as NSC 68, the security document embodying the Nitze-Acheson plan, moved to the president's desk. NSC 68 would cost between $38 and $50 billion, and promised, ironically, to provide the global capabilities that the Truman Doctrine had outlined, that the administration had retreated from in 1947, and that Lippmann had believed the "X" essay was promoting. NSC 68, when it was accepted

after the outbreak of the Korean War, was a dramatic turning point, a bold new departure, in American foreign policy in terms of creating a larger capacity to extend and expand American commitments to stop communism.

THE KOREAN WAR: FROM CONTAINMENT TO LIBERATION TO CONTAINMENT

The Korean War led to the endorsement of NSC 68, vast expenditures for arms in Asia and in Europe, and the overextension of American power. American intervention in Korea was the most dramatic test to that date for containment. Although questions about the origins of the war linger, Truman and his advisers speedily concluded that North Korea had attacked South Korea, that Stalin had approved and planned the attack, and that the North Korean invasion was a Soviet test of American credibility and a possible preliminary to Soviet probes elsewhere—in Europe, perhaps in Germany. "This could be the Greece of the Far East," Truman declared to an associate.

Many later analysts would stress, in contrast to the dominant 1950s interpretation, that this shooting war had occurred in the context of an ongoing civil war since 1948 between the two parts of the then-recently divided Korea, and some historians would later argue that the Korean War was, in many ways, part of a revolution in Korea. According to such a view, the Korean War was primarily a war between Koreans, for the unification of Korea, and later evidence indicated that Stalin had even been reluctant to endorse the North's desire to attack. According to such evidence, Stalin had been wary and cautious, greatly fearing the commitment of Soviet power and prestige to the North's aim to unite Korea.

In late June 1950, over the course of just a few days, President Truman quickly expanded the American commitment and sent ground forces to assist the embattled South Koreans. At the time, his was a popular decision in the United States, even though he did not ask for a declaration of war. Kennan, among other advisers, agreed that "we would have to act with all necessary force to repel this attack." He had already urged that the United States should prepare for limited war, and Korea became the test case of his own counsel. The Kremlin, he concluded, had unleashed its puppets to try to block America's peace treaty with Japan and to exploit the opportunity in Korea created by America's withdrawal of troops. A major concern of Soviet policy, he reaffirmed in 1951, was "to make sure that it filled every nook and cranny available. . . . There was no objective reason to assume that the Soviet leaders would leave the Korean nook unfilled if they thought they had a chance of filling it at relatively little risk to themselves and saw time running out." Containment, then, could mean "counterforce" by military means—precisely what Kennan claimed the "X" essay did not counsel; and the military test was in Asia, not Europe, which had been Kennan's preeminent concern.

Late in June 1950, after President Truman had committed the U.S. Air Force to the war in Korea but the day before the president committed ground troops there, Kennan assessed the likelihood of direct Soviet military involvement in the war. He thought that such intervention was unlikely, and that the possibility of the Soviets at that time attacking the United States was "remote." He did not believe, he explained, that the Soviets had the military capacity, but, according to the declassified minutes, he "thought if the Russians got into a world war now they would have stumbled in, and in the long run this might be the best situation for us."

In July 1950, Kennan agreed with others in the government that the air force should operate beyond the Thirty-eighth Parallel, but thought that American war aims should be sharply limited: restoration of the status quo ante. Unfortunately, the Truman administration wanted to achieve more and would not negotiate in July 1950, when the Chinese accepted an Indian proposal for a settlement of this nature. Casting aside Kennan's counsel, U.S. policymakers rejected India's proposal, partly because it "would leave South Korea defenseless [before] a renewed North Korean attack." Even before U.S. ground troops crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel in October 1950 and moved toward the debacle near the Chinese border in late November, Kennan urged caution lest the United States overextend its lines and "frighten the Russians" into war. Unlike many policymakers then, he was content to limit the commitment of American power, not to try to "liberate" North Korea, but simply to stop what he later defined as a civil war ("'aggression' . . . was as misplaced here as it was to be later in . . . Vietnam"), and thereby to restrict containment. Kennan lost to Acheson and Truman, who wished to move beyond containment to "roll back" and "liberation." Korea, they then said, could not be "half slave and half free."

When in the fall and early winter of 1950–1951, the People's Republic of China sent in "volunteers," who pushed back U.S. troops and killed thousands of GI's, American policymakers promptly abandoned "liberation" and shifted back to containment. Some even denied that their war aims had ever included unification of the recently split nation and the vanquishing of communism there.

Relying on the strategy of containment, Truman and Acheson in early 1952, in opposition to their top-level military advisers, made decisions—involving mostly the insistence on voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war—that dragged out the armistice negotiations for more than fifteen months. That Truman-Acheson decision to insist on voluntary repatriation, instead of the standard procedure of automatic repatriation, was devised to give the United States a symbolic victory by establishing the unwillingness of many captured Chinese and Korean POWs to return to their communist homelands. According to Acheson, this new standard of voluntary repatriation might well stop communist nations in the future from going to war, lest their soldiers, when guaranteed voluntary repatriation, quickly surrender in order to flee communism.

LATER APPLICATIONS OF CONTAINMENT: EISENHOWER TO REAGAN

The stalemate in Korea led many frustrated Americans to question their nation's involvement in Korea, the tactics and purposes of limited war, and the policy of containment itself. John Foster Dulles, a Republican spokesman and State Department adviser who would become Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of state, issued the most forceful challenge. In "A Policy for Boldness," in *Life* (19 May 1952), Dulles castigated containment as negative and called for a new policy: one that would "liberate" the "captive peoples" of Eastern Europe and not shrink from the use of nuclear weapons in meeting communist military aggression. Sketching the strategy that would later be fleshed out and bear the name of "massive retaliation," Dulles proposed that the United States might retaliate anywhere ("where it hurts") "by means of our choosing." Such a strategy, he pledged, would deter communist aggression and eliminate limited war initiated by Soviet "stooges." His critiques and proposals, with some softening and hedging, became the Republican Party's foreign policy plank in 1952: it promised victory in the Cold War and liberation of Eastern Europe.

Despite the bold rhetoric of massive retaliation and liberation, the Eisenhower administration generally subscribed in its actions to the containment doctrine, moving to "liberation" clandestinely to use the CIA to overthrow the nationalist government in Iran in 1953 and to overthrow in 1954 the elected leftist but not communist government in Guatemala. The administration avoided both nuclear war and significant limited war, and restricted liberation mostly to words of encouragement, when revolution erupted in Eastern Europe. In Korea, after bombing some irrigation dams and obliquely threatening nuclear escalation, the Eisenhower administration accepted the division of the country and the return to status quo ante—Truman's original war aims. Despite the much-heralded "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek in 1953, the Eisenhower administration soon "releashed" him and restricted his actions. Having learned lessons from Truman's involvements in Greece and Korea, Eisenhower would not commit troops to the war in Indochina but used other tactics to prevent a communist victory in his time—the establishment of a client state that received about $2 billion in military and economic aid. Expanding commitments in Asia and the Middle East, along the general lines of NATO, the administration created security pacts, which, critics charged, extended American alliances and power beyond their natural limits. Under Eisenhower, the government used subversion and sponsored revolutions and small armed military interventions to overthrow suspected communist governments and to maintain stability. Eisenhower's major failure, judged by the standards of containment, was the rise in Cuba of a communist government allied with the Soviet Union.

Kennan in the 1950s never discussed in public the use by the American government, under Truman and then Eisenhower, of covert activities to weaken communist regimes. Instead, he deplored the public pressures for liberation, but carefully implied that the only truly meaningful calls for liberation required American armed intervention against the Soviet Union or at least in the Iron Curtain area. Kennan's careful omission of covert activities had the effect, whether intended or not, of implying that there were no such American operations and thereby concealing an aspect of U.S. policy in dealing with communism abroad.

The most marked shift from the earlier policy of containment was Eisenhower's decision (endorsed by Kennan) that negotiations with the communists were desirable and that some important differences in Europe might be settled. In 1955, for the first time since Potsdam in 1945, a president of the United States met with a Soviet premier. Although Eisenhower, Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, and Nikita S. Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, did not resolve important issues, their summit meeting at Geneva did ease East-West tensions. Kennan, among others, wanted the two nations to go further. In late 1957, echoing Lippmann's plea in 1947, Kennan proposed disengagement—the creation of a unified, independent Germany, withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany and Eastern Europe, and the elimination of nuclear weapons in that area. The Soviet Union had changed under Khrushchev, Kennan declared. There were new "realities." The Eisenhower administration, while implicitly recognizing some of these "realities," would not endorse the plan and even considered giving nuclear weapons to West Germany. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, denying that the Soviet Union had changed and warning against Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence, condemned Kennan for preaching a "new isolationism" and counseling a "futile and lethal attempt to crawl back into the cocoon of history."

Promising victory in the Cold War, John F. Kennedy's administration castigated Eisenhower for allowing communism in Cuba and for failing to provide a larger, more diversified arsenal that would give the United States "flexible options"—a capacity ranging from limited conventional war, through limited nuclear war, to holocaust. The Kennedy administration, while seeking to roll back communism in Cuba through CIA-directed assassination attempts on Castro (there is no clear but only suggestive evidence that President Kennedy knew or authorized these attempts) and the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, generally endorsed the containment doctrine and acted to enforce it by blocking communist expansion, including national liberation movements in Africa and Asia. The result was an escalated arms race and efforts to strengthen the faltering NATO alliance, but after the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy achieved in 1963 a limited nuclear-test ban treaty and moved toward détente—a policy opposed by Kennan.

Perhaps the most dangerous application of the containment doctrine in the Cold War occurred in October 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviets had clandestinely placed forty-two "offensive" missiles in Cuba, despite their private assurances to the contrary, and President Kennedy, in response, imposed a blockade (called a "quarantine" to avoid using the term "blockade," which in international law meant war) on all new arms shipments to Cuba to pressure the Soviet Union to withdraw its weapons. Privately, administration members believed the Soviets were testing America's (and Kennedy's) will and commitment, and probably hoping to use the missiles to buttress their policy to push the United States out of Berlin. Most likely, the Soviets were actually acting defensively: To protect the Cuban revolution, which seemed threatened by the United States, and to narrow the severely worsening missile gap, when the United States had about 175 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Soviets had only between about 20 and 40 in the USSR. The overall U.S. strategic superiority, as measured in bombers and missiles, was estimated as better than ten to one. In October 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis, a shootout at sea was avoided, the Soviets began to back down, and a Kennedy-Khrushchev deal was arranged to have the Soviets withdraw their missiles from Cuba partly in return for a secret American promise to withdraw similar missiles from Turkey, where Kennedy had only recently installed them. Only twenty-five years later was that secret deal—long denied by Kennedy stalwarts—fully acknowledged.

Under Lyndon B. Johnson, national liberation movements in Asia became the focus of administration energies, as the United States abandoned the surreptitious warfare that Kennedy had initiated in Indochina and openly applied the policy of military containment in Vietnam—a policy that Kennan challenged in 1966. Containment, he suggested, could be extended from Europe in the Stalin years to China in recent years, but the doctrine was ill-suited for Indochina. The costs were too high, Kennan explained to a congressional committee in 1966: "If we had been able, without exorbitant cost in American manpower and resources . . . to do better in Vietnam I would have been delighted, and I would have thought that the effort was warranted." He also thought that Vietnam might well follow an independent, not a Russian- or Chinese-directed foreign policy. While warning against "a precipitate and disorderly withdrawal [which could be] a disservice to our own interests . . . and even to world peace," he recommended liquidation of American involvement

"just as soon as this can be done without inordinate damage to our own prestige or to the stability of conditions in that area."

Undeterred by this unwelcome counsel, the Johnson administration publicly justified American intervention in Indochina as necessary to stave off communism, to defeat wars of national liberation, to establish the value of counterinsurgency, to affirm American credibility, to protect the security of the "free world," to halt the loss of dominoes, to maintain access to raw materials, to restore an important trading area for Japan, and, variously, to contain the Soviet Union or China, and sometimes both. The limited war proved to be one the United States could not win, as Kennan had lamented, and the cost in American lives and dollars, as well as the disruptions and protests at home, tore apart the nation. The war divided members of the elite, produced the defection of policymakers and old cold warriors, and ultimately compelled Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford to withdraw U.S. armed forces from much of Southeast Asia. Whether or not Nixon in the Paris agreement of January 1973 truly intended a permanent American pullout or only a temporary withdrawal, followed by a return as the southern government started to collapse, remains in some historical dispute. The decisions ultimately to withdraw and not return to Vietnam did not necessarily represent the abandonment of containment in principle, for that loose doctrine, at least since the fall of China in 1949, had always operated on the assumption that some interventions were too costly and too dangerous.

By the mid-1970s, with détente under Nixon and then Ford, scholars were unsure whether American policy still subscribed to containment. The détente with the Soviet Union, the recognition of communist polycentrism, the Sino-Soviet split, the erosion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the uneasy settlement in Southeast Asia, the rapprochement with China, and the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreements—all marked the distance that American foreign policy had moved. Yet, American assistance under President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, despite public denials, led to the overthrow of Salvador Allende's elected communist government in Chile in 1973 and the establishment of the harshly repressive government of General Augusto Pinochet, who a quarter century later would be indicted for war crimes. Under Nixon and Ford, the continued fear of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the efforts to maintain worldwide military alliances, and the desire to thwart national liberation movements all suggested that the policy of containment, modified at times, endured as a guiding principle in the conduct of American foreign policy through the end of the Ford administration in 1977.

Containment generally continued under President Jimmy Carter, and often it easily was mixed with his concern for human rights abroad. He initially seemed to want to work out better relations with the Soviet Union. He resisted getting tough when the Soviets and Cubans became involved in parts of Africa. But, in continuing and expanding the Nixon-Kissinger policy of playing off China and the Soviet Union, Carter's administration formalized relations with China in January 1979. In December 1979, when the Soviets moved troops into Afghanistan in a brutal war, Carter moved to a decidedly get-tough policy with the Soviet Union. The administration disregarded that Afghanistan had long been judged by some analysts as already within the Soviet sphere of interest. Carter contended, incorrectly, that the Soviets were aiming to move into the oil-rich Middle East. He proclaimed, in hyperbolic rhetoric, that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the gravest threat to world peace since World War II. He announced a "Carter Doctrine" declaring that the United States would act, unilaterally if necessary, to protect American interests against Soviet encroachments in the Persian Gulf area. Through the CIA, Carter provided covert aid to anti-Soviet, rebel forces in Afghanistan, including apparently those of Osama bin Laden, and thereby unintentionally helped nurture military groups that would later turn against other governments, including the United States, and be termed "terrorists" in the 1990s and in the early twenty-first century. Having already recently expanded the military budget, the Carter administration, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, again increased the U.S. military budget. In 1980, President Carter signed Presidential Directive (PD) 59 to provide a capacity to fight a prolonged, limited nuclear war.

President Ronald Reagan, building on the expanded defense spending of Carter's last two budgets, added significantly to American military spending. Reagan, moving beyond Carter's already heated rhetoric of 1979–1980, declared that the Soviet Union was a menace to world peace. Reagan called the USSR an "evil empire" in 1983, and yet, perhaps paradoxically, sought to work out some arms-limitation agreements on strategic weapons with the Soviets. In Latin America, fre-

quently employing clandestine means, Reagan's government provided aid for overthrowing the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua and sought to block efforts by the Sandinistas and left-wing rebels to overthrow the right-wing, U.S.-supported government in El Salvador. In 1985, in words that seemed to echo the ideology of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, Reagan announced the "Reagan Doctrine": "Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy [and to support those] on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua . . . to defy Soviet-supported aggression and [to] secure rights which have been ours from birth. . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense." In his last years in office, however, Reagan softened his anti-Soviet words and policies and struggled, amid contentions that he knowingly violated congressional mandates, to escape from the political debacle at home emerging from his government's secret trading of arms for hostages and then arranging for the monies from some of the arms sales to be funneled clandestinely to the anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua.

The American military buildup under Reagan put more economic and military pressure on the Soviet Union. Already wracked by economic inefficiency, beset by lurking crises of legitimacy at home and in its satellite states, and suffering under heavy military budgets, the Soviet system was unable adequately to reform itself. Some analysts and politicians (most often Republicans) would later argue that the Reagan policy of increased American military spending had been devised to pressure the Soviets to increase military spending, further dislocate their economy, and add to their already severe problems at home. But other analysts pointed out that Reagan publicly, and apparently privately, had argued for larger American military budgets not to injure the Soviet economy but because he had sincerely—but incorrectly—believed that the Soviet military system was very powerful and threatening to the West. The Soviets were far weaker than he and many administration advisers had recognized. In a sense, Kennan's 1947 Mr. "X" forecast of Soviet self-destruction would prove prescient in 1988–1989.

THE WANING RELEVANCE OF CONTAINMENT AND NEW CHALLENGES

In 1989, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, still struggling to reform the Soviet system after allowing in March the first free elections in the Soviet Union in seventy-two years, generally acceded to the defection of the Soviet satellites. Most dramatically, in November 1989, East Germany opened its border, and its citizens enthusiastically helped tear down the hated Berlin Wall, which had been erected in 1961 to halt the flow of East Germans to the West. In December 1989, Gorbachev declared that the Cold War was over. In early 1990, Kennan, now eighty-five and worried by Gorbachev's troubles in the Soviet Union, pleaded unsuccessfully for a more generous American policy toward the Soviets. Thus, as his 1947 prophecy of Soviet disintegration seemed close to coming true nearly a decade before the twentieth century ended, Kennan sought to devise ways of stopping that process because of the dangerous instability that might result. In early 1990 he also feared the de facto unification of Germany before other Europeans were prepared for that development, and urged in congressional testimony that "this dangerous situation which is developing has to be stopped in some way or other." The administration of George H. W. Bush, wary of taking the lead or significantly intervening in events, chose more cautious policies than Kennan had proposed. But in 1991, as the Soviet Union faced disintegration, President Bush, fearing the disorder there, actually counseled Ukraine (some 52 million people) not to leave the Soviet Union. But his words failed to halt the dissolution of the USSR. The Soviet Union formally dissolved in December 1991.

Containment—if understood primarily as an anti-Soviet policy—was clearly no longer relevant with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a number of states, and preeminently Russia, in place of the USSR. But among the challenges to Bush in his remaining thirteen months in office, to President Bill Clinton in his succeeding eight years (1993–2001), and to George W. Bush in his first year (2001) was to determine how much of the intrinsic anticommunism in the containment policy, as it had evolved between 1947 and 1991, was relevant in dealing with the very different communist regimes in Cuba, North Korea, and China. Up through 2001, all three U.S. administrations remained hostile to Cuba, and unwilling to open relations with Fidel Castro's government. All three American presidents continued to worry about North Korea, and instability on the Korean peninsula. For George H. W. Bush in 1989–1993 and Bill Clinton in 1993–2001, as well as the new George W. Bush presidency in 2001, generally the lure of trade

with China, and frequently the belief that soft words were better than hard words in improving human rights policies, would guide the uneasy but often shifting American policy toward China.

At the same time, international "terrorism"—sometimes conducted by foreign groups nurtured initially by earlier American covert aid, under Presidents Carter and Reagan, when those secretly funded military groups were opposing Soviet policies—periodically plagued the Clinton administration and George W. Bush's early administration, too. Such challenges occurred in a rather new world. It was one in which the containment of communism was no longer generally a major issue and the quest for world order would often be defined broadly to mean capitalism, and sometimes democracy and human rights, in an international system in which there was only one superpower, the United States. In that post–Cold War world, terrorism was generally viewed as anathema to America and its values. But some critics, usually analysts on the left, suggested, sometimes uneasily, that terrorism unfortunately was rather similar, not infrequently, to the hidden side—the "liberation" side—that earlier containment policy, in various American administrations, had applied to help weaken communism abroad. Such an unsettling argument, suggesting similarities between some post–Cold War terrorism and some secret Cold War "liberation" policies under the CIA, departed greatly from dominant American, and Western, thinking. The dominant view denied that there were any meaningful similarities. That dominant view was perhaps best expressed by President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in September and October 2001, when they, among many outraged Americans, sharply condemned the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., as assaults on the good by the forces of evil.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.* New York, 1969. Disputes Kennan on NATO and the Korean War.

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Eisenhower.* Vol. 2. *The President.* New York, 1984.

Arnson, Cynthia. *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993.* 2d ed. University Park, Pa., 1993.

Bell, Coral. *The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era.* London, 1977.

Berman, Larry. *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam.* New York, 2001.

Bernstein, Barton J. "The H-Bomb Decisions: Were They Inevitable?" In Bernard Brodie et al., eds. *National Security and International Stability.* Cambridge, Mass., 1983.

Bernstein, Barton J., ed. *The Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration.* Chicago, 1970. Relevant revisionist volume on the Cold War.

———. *The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues.* Boston, 1976. The issue of postwar "atomic diplomacy" is disputed in this work.

Beschloss, Michael R. *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963.* New York, 1991.

Brands, H. W. *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power.* New York, 1995.

Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years.* New York, 1988.

Burnham, James. *Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy.* New York, 1953.

Campbell, Colin, and Bert A. Rockman, eds. *The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals.* Chatham, N.Y., 1996.

Chang, Gordon H. *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972.* Stanford, Calif., 1990.

Chomsky, Noam. *World Orders, Old and New.* New York, 1994.

Costigliola, Frank. "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War." *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997).

Cumings, Bruce. *The Origins of the Cold War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes.* Princeton, N.J., 1981.

———. *The Origins of the Cold War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950.* Princeton, N.J., 1990.

Dallek, Robert. *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973.* New York, 1998.

Divine, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War.* New York, 1981.

Draper, Theodore. *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs.* New York, 1991.

Foot, Rosemary. *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1985.

———. *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China Since 1949.* New York, 1995.

Freedman, Lawrence. *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.* New York, 2000.

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964.* New York, 1997.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York, 1982.

———. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War.* New York, 1987.

———. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations.* New York, 1992.

———. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.* New York, 1997.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954.* New York, 1988.

———. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam.* Chicago, 1995.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Rev. ed. Washington, D.C., 1994.

———. *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War.* Washington, D.C., 1994.

Gati, Charles, ed. *Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War.* Indianapolis, 1974.

Gellman, Barton. *Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power.* New York, 1984.

Grose, Peter. *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain.* Boston, 2000.

Hixson, George L. *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast.* New York, 1989.

Hoff-Wilson, Joan. *Nixon Reconsidered.* New York, 1994.

Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952.* New York, 1987.

Hogan, Michael J., ed. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications.* New York and Cambridge, 1992.

Hyland, William. *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* New York, 1987.

Immerman, Richard H., ed. *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War.* Princeton, N.J., 1990.

Jackson, Henry. *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960.* New York, 1982.

Karabell, Zachary. *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962.* Baton Rouge, La., 1999.

Kaufman, Burton Ira. *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* Lawrence, Kans., 1993.

Kennan, George F. *Realities of American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1954.

———. *Russia, the Atom, and the West* New York, 1958.

———. *Memoirs, 1925–1950.* Boston, 1967.

———. *Memoirs, 1950–1963.* Boston, 1972.

———. *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950.* Expanded ed. Chicago, 1984.

Kimball, Jeffrey. *Nixon's Vietnam War.* Lawrence, Kans., 1998.

Kolko, Gabriel. *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945.* New York, 1968. Relevant revisionist volume on the Cold War.

———. *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience.* New York, 1985.

———. *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980.* New York, 1988.

Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko. *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954.* New York, 1972. Relevant revisionist volume on the Cold War.

Kuniholm, Bruce. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece.* Princeton, N.J., 1980.

Lacey, Michael, ed. *The Truman Presidency.* New York, 1989.

LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1975.* New York, 1976. Has a substantial bibliography.

———. *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America.* Rev. ed. New York, 1984.

———. *The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* New York, 1997.

Larson, Deborah Welch. *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation.* Princeton, N.J., 1985.

Leffler, Melvyn. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

LeoGrande, William M. *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998.

Lippmann, Walter. *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1947.

Litwak, Robert. *Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976.* New York, 1984.

Logevall, Frederik. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif., 1999.

Mastny, Vojtech. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years.* New York, 1996.

May, Ernest, ed. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68.* Boston, 1993.

May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow, eds. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Cambridge, Mass., 1997.

Mayers, David. *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1988.

Miscamble, Wilson. *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950.* Princeton, N.J., 1992.

Nathan, James A., ed. *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited.* New York, 1992.

Paterson, Thomas G. *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution.* New York, 1994.

Paterson, Thomas G., ed. *Containment and the Cold War: American Foreign Policy Since 1945.* Reading, Mass., 1972.

———. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963.* New York, 1989.

Prados, John. *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf.* New York, 1996.

Schmertz, Eric J., Natalie Datlof, and Alexej Ugrinsky, eds. *President Reagan and the World.* Westport, Conn., 1997.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy.* New York, 1989.

Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea.* Princeton, N.J., 1998.

Smith, Gaddis. *Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years.* New York, 1986.

Smith, Michael Joseph. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger.* Baton Rouge, La., 1986.

Stephanson, Anders. *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1989.

Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History.* New York, 1985.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999.

Ulam, Adam. *The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost Illusions, 1948–1991.* New York, 1992.

Williams, William A. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* 2d rev. ed. Cleveland, 1972. Relevant revisionist volume on the Cold War.

Wittner, Lawrence. *America's Intervention in Greece.* New York, 1982.

Wright, C. Ben. "Mr. 'X' and Containment." *Slavic Review* 35 (1976).

Young, Marilyn. *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990.* New York, 1991.

Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; COVERT OPERATIONS; DOCTRINES; DOMINO THEORY; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY.

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

David M. Pletcher

A special providence, some believe, has looked after the affairs of the United States through its history. If this is so, part of the concern has been geographical, for Americans have taken over more than one-third of North America, including much of its best land—a broad swath stretching from sea to sea across almost twenty degrees of latitude.

Before the United States came into being, the three most powerful nations of the world in turn occupied most of this territory but had to give way eventually to the irresistible American advance. Some Americans were quite aware of what they called their destiny; at their independence, for example, Gouverneur Morris (as he later remembered) thought "that all North America must at length be annexed to us—happy, indeed, if the lust of dominion stop there." Fortunately, Morris's vision proved an exaggeration.

As the American nation grew, it worked out a flexible combination of expedience, usually legal or moral. To overcome each obstacle and obtain for it the land it wanted, the most direct method was negotiation followed by a treaty of some sort, providing for a land cession and certain benefits or safeguards for its inhabitants. On two occasions the negotiation followed a victorious war, once with Great Britain and once with Mexico. In the first the enemy grew tired of fighting and sued for peace; in the second, however, the Americans had to occupy the enemy's capital city and much of its country. On a third occasion, again involving Britain, the outcome was a draw and brought only minor boundary adjustments. On the fourth and last occasion, the United States resorted to purchase—this was the vast territory of Alaska.

The reasoning of Americans in acquiring their territory differed with the occasion. The first acquisition, specified in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 ending the revolutionary war, came with independence itself. For the other acquisitions the Americans worked out a flexible combination of expedients, usually legal or moral, to overcome each obstacle; they thereby obtained the land they wanted. The most direct was negotiation followed by a treaty of some sort, providing for a cession and certain benefits or safeguards for its inhabitants. Another expedient of territorial expansion was purchase, again involving a treaty that usually contained other provisions and sometimes followed hostilities. There also was a lot of sheer luck—being at the right place at the right time. Behind the formalities of land transfer were such pressures as migration and trade that could bend or destroy boundary lines traced out on a map. The notorious mobility of Americans and their acquisitive instincts might thus defeat the plans of faraway Europeans. As Americans moved west across the continent these instincts were whetted by cultural contacts and reciprocal brutality between American settlers and their Native American neighbors and by prejudices against Spanish and French remembered from life in Europe and eventually against the mother country as well. As this developing American nationalism overcame the rivalry of individual colonies enough for cooperation during the Revolution and after, it inspired propaganda to reinforce expansionist instincts. While these factors encouraged expansionism in the New World, the international rivalries of the Old World claimed the attention and exhausted the resources of European rulers who would have liked to thwart the ambitious Yankees across the ocean if they could.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Americans acquired their territory in four great expansions. The first of these resulted from the negotiation of peace following the revolutionary war. After the British surrender at Yorktown on 19 October 1781, talk of peace spread in Paris and London and informal exchanges began

between representatives of both sides. (The Continental Congress in Philadelphia had been considering peace terms since 1779.) Talks stipulated the unqualified declaration of American independence as the first prerequisite and laid out extensive boundaries. While some members wanted to ask for all of Canada, the negotiating terms mentioned only the Ontario peninsula to the north, between Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario (the "Nipissing line") and territory around the Great Lakes as far west as the source of the Mississippi River. To the south, they optimistically included the eastern half of the Mississippi Valley down to 31 degrees, the northern limit of Spanish Florida and Louisiana. Cession of this lower valley was certain to be unacceptable to the ministers of France and especially Spain, who wanted to protect their nations' territory by shutting up the Americans east of the Appalachians. Agents of the two countries put pressure on Congress over the next two years with the result that by the Battle of Yorktown, instructions of June 1781 from Congress required the American peace commissioners to consult the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, on all matters except independence.

The Continental Congress named five commissioners to start negotiations, but only three played any active roles: Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay, who were already in Europe seeking loans and other aid. They had good reason to suspect the motives of their European allies, especially Jay and Adams. They were also aware of more conciliatory feeling in some British circles, especially one minister who was rising to a leading position in the government. This was Lord Shelburne, who saw a chance to attract the Americans away from Vergennes, renew the formerly prosperous Anglo-American trade relations, and perhaps eventually restore some sort of imperial political connection.

The first half of 1782 was a time of rumor and confusion in both London and Paris. Shelburne became prime minister, but the British and French continued naval warfare in the Caribbean, and King George kept up his stubborn refusal to recognize the colonies' independence. The American commissioners concluded that it would be more rewarding to negotiate separately with Britain and avoid Vergennes's interference, although the alliance treaty specified a joint settlement. A breakthrough came when John Jay received what he thought was evidence that France and Spain intended to make a private agreement on boundaries in the Ohio Valley to restrain the Americans. Without informing Franklin, the most pro-French of the trio, Jay sent an agent to Shelburne to argue for a Mississippi River boundary and indicate that he and his colleagues would negotiate separately for preliminary terms. Franklin approved Jay's action, and so did Adams, who arrived in Paris several weeks later from his own mission in the Netherlands.

Negotiation of a preliminary treaty took place during October and November 1782. Jay wrote the basic draft, but Adams, Franklin, and the British negotiators made so many changes and argued so heatedly that each major historian has assigned a different set of credits for individual sections. Recognition of American independence caused little trouble, but Franklin, who had always wanted to annex as much of Canada as possible, had to give up the Ontario peninsula. In its place he accepted an irregular boundary along the midpoints of four Great Lakes and a series of rivers and lakes west to the source of the Mississippi River. Unfortunately, this line missed the river, creating a gap that was not closed until 1818. In the interim, the British retained theoretically the right to navigate the river. The boundary then ran down the Mississippi to 31 degrees and eastward along that line and a nearby parallel to the St. Marys River and the Atlantic Ocean. The Americans' greatest territorial gain was the eastern half of the Mississippi Valley, a true seat of empire. However, a secret article (largely written by Jay) offered Britain another line north of 31 degrees as an inducement to retain the Florida coast and peninsula instead of turning it over to Spain. With Canada still a British colony, this would have put America's Atlantic trade in a pincer and kept Florida indefinitely out of its hands. (Fortunately, Spain, failing to recover Gibraltar in Europe, demanded Florida in its place.)

The preliminary articles disposed of the most important boundary questions, so the remaining discussions dealt with other matters. The most important of these were the colonial debts owed to British creditors, the treatment of loyalists living in America or owning property there, and the New England fisheries, concerning which Adams played the dominant role. Since nearly all of western Europe had been involved in the war, the British had accounts to settle elsewhere. This sometimes worked to the advantage of the Americans by distracting the British from North American affairs or placing an extra premium on American friendship. The American

commissioners were shrewd men of the world who took advantage of every opening offered them. (Adams and Jay were lawyers, Franklin a businessman and bureaucrat.)

During the two decades after the revolutionary war the major problems affecting U.S. foreign relations were commerce and western settlements. The British had recognized the irregular line along the Great Lakes as the northern boundary. However, even as the king signed the treaty, providing that the chain of border forts on American territory from Ogdensburg west to Mackinac should be evacuated "with all convenient speed," his home secretary was issuing an order saying in effect, "take your time." The cabinet in London was concerned about the future of the international fur trade and peaceful relations with the Indians north of the border, and it anticipated that the Americans would commit other treaty violations and thereby justify the retention of the forts. Not surprisingly, however, the suspicious Americans assumed that the British were trying to hold onto the West. In the early 1790s, when the British resumed fighting with the French, their violations of American neutrality reinforced the complaints of western settlers about British soldiers in the border forts and brought on a major crisis. In 1794, John Jay negotiated a treaty that averted a probably disastrous war by bringing about the evacuation of the forts and securing a few commercial concessions. For other reasons, Jay's treaty was highly unpopular and cost him his reputation, but it confirmed Americans' occupation of their northern frontier, especially since a victory over the Indians in northwest Ohio at the same time discredited the traditional allies of the British.

Just as important to the growth of the American West was its boundary on the lower Mississippi, into which all the valley's rivers drained, so that the entire trade of the area was funneled through New Orleans. When the Spanish took over control of the Gulf of Mexico coast from the British under the 1783 treaty, they tried to anticipate the flow of American settlers over the Appalachian Mountains by a number of defensive strategies. First, they encouraged the Indian nations of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi to form a buffer, but the development of trade with the Americans and the lack of Indian cohesiveness frustrated this effort. In the late 1780s they sent an emissary to persuade the American government to give up its efforts to open the lower Mississippi to trade in return for concessions to Americans trading across the Atlantic. However, the southern states (which had no large seaports but many western connections) formed a solid bloc in opposition. Finally, the Spanish government intrigued western leaders to secede and become a Spanish protectorate. A few, such as James Wilkinson, nibbled at the bait, but by this time the Constitutional Convention of 1787 foreshadowed a new government, strong enough to defend American interests in the West, and the Spanish efforts died out.

Although the Spanish could not prevent the migration of American settlers into the eastern Mississippi Valley, they denied them the right to ship their goods downriver to New Orleans and built several forts on the east bank, which they claimed as far north as the junction with the Ohio. The Americans, who held title to the east bank only from the British, had to wait and watch while Spanish politics moved languidly to and fro according to the progress of the French Revolution, then in its radical phase. From 1793 to 1795, Spain was actually an ally of its old enemy Britain against the Jacobins. In 1795 the Spanish withdrew from the war and indicated that they were ready to negotiate with the Americans—perhaps because they were nervous about the significance of the recent American Jay's Treaty with the British or because they had abandoned hope of stopping their westward migration. (Historians are still unsure.) The result was Pinckney's Treaty (1795), which was so popular that the Senate approved it unanimously. In it Spain recognized the 31-degree boundary and agreed to evacuate its forts (although this took two years). It also granted the Americans the right to navigate the lower Mississippi and warehouse their goods on shore while awaiting ocean shipment (the "right of deposit").

Like Jay's Treaty, Pinckney's Treaty confirmed an earlier expansion by giving the United States control over its borders. As Americans poured into the new states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, they shipped their products down the Mississippi to New Orleans and out into the Gulf of Mexico and the ocean to the east coast and Europe. American attention turned again to the Atlantic world, and the United States fought a brief naval war with France over neutral rights, which formally ended the alliance between the two countries but did no serious damage to either one. A new leader in France, Napoleon Bonaparte, won victories over most of western Europe and signed a temporary truce with Britain.

LOUISIANA

The short-lived stability in Europe was the background for the second great continental expansion gained by the American Republic. Napoleon, seeking new worlds to conquer, looked to North America and considered an economic empire on the British model, based on trade: Caribbean sugar to Europe, French manufactured goods to French settlers in temperate Louisiana, and temperate climate foodstuffs to the Caribbean to feed the slave labor there. It was at best a risky scheme, for a slave revolt had been raging in Santo Domingo, the principal French sugar island; Americans were pressing across the eastern Mississippi Valley; and French factories were not yet prepared to supply colonial demands. Most important, the French navy was too weak to defend this ambitious trade against the jealous British. Nevertheless, Napoleon persuaded Spain to exchange Louisiana for the Italian province of Tuscany (intended for the king of Spain's brother-in-law) and prepared an army for Santo Domingo.

When the new American president, Thomas Jefferson, learned about the secret retrocession of Louisiana, he instructed the U.S. minister to France, Robert Livingston, that he must bring Napoleon to sell the city of New Orleans to the United States. "[From] the day that France takes possession of New Orleans," Jefferson declared, "we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Livingston spent most of 1802 trying to convince Napoleon of the worthlessness of Louisiana without the Florida coast (which Spain refused to give up) and the near-certainty of friction with the United States. After several months of this deadlock, the Spanish government, which, with characteristic delay, had not yet carried out the retrocession, withdrew the right of deposit in New Orleans—for reasons about which historians are still uncertain. The American westerners, seeing their flourishing New Orleans trade thus abruptly cut off, flared up in protest, calling for action, and the Federalist Party, now out of power, began to demand a renewal of the war with France and the seizure of New Orleans. To gain time, Jefferson sent James Monroe, a well-known Virginian who was popular both in the west and in France, to join Livingston. During the three months between Monroe's appointment and his arrival in Paris, Napoleon impulsively decided to sell to the Americans not only New Orleans but the entire province of Louisiana, comprising the western half of the Mississippi Valley. As reconstructed by historians, the reasons for this momentous decision constitute one of the classic historic cases of multiple causation. In the first place, Napoleon's plan for an economic-based empire was falling apart. The conquest of Santo Domingo, the hub of the project, was going badly; yellow fever had decimated the French troops, and in November General Leclerc died of the disease. Napoleon had to send his successor troops that he had intended for the takeover of Louisiana from the Spanish. Those that remained were held in a Dutch port by an unusually hard winter. From his minister in the United States, Napoleon was learning of the American upheaval over the right of deposit, more serous than he had first thought. Finally, and perhaps decisive, tension in Britain and on the Continent suggested that the stalled war was about to break out again. Napoleon was beginning to turn his attention to possible hostilities in Europe, for which he would need funds.

Monroe and Livingston negotiated the terms of the purchase together, although each later tried to claim principal credit for the deal. The French asked 100 million francs at first but settled for 60 million ($11,350,000). The Americans, not having cash, arranged to pay in bonds at 6 percent. In addition, the United States assumed $3,750,000 of French citizens' claims, making the total purchase price about $15 million. The negotiations were hurried through in less than a month to forestall the outbreak of war or any interruption by Britain or Spain. The boundary of Louisiana was loosely drawn, but it clearly did not include East or West Florida or Texas, as some Americans later argued. Jefferson welcomed the news (which he had partly anticipated), although he was embarrassed by the doubtful constitutionality of the act. At first, he thought a constitutional amendment would be required, but he quickly dropped this scruple for fear that the providential deal might fall through at the last minute. Most of the Federalists held their peace too after a little grumbling.

The aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase was an anticlimax that took some of the bloom off Jefferson's successful first administration. After the negotiations were over, both Livingston and Monroe decided that the Louisiana Purchase included East and West Florida (that is, the peninsula and the Gulf coast to the Mississippi). On Jefferson's instructions, they put pressure on both Napoleon and the Spanish government with no success. Unwilling to go to war, Jefferson reconciled himself to a waiting game and got Con-

gress to set up Mobile Bay as a customs district and later to appropriate $2 million to have on hand in case of an unexpected opportunity. The sorriest development of the whole period was the Burr Conspiracy (1804–1806), in which Aaron Burr, an outcast after his duel with Alexander Hamilton, exploited western unrest to concoct what was either a secessionist intrigue or a filibuster plot aimed at Texas and Mexico.

Madison, less patient than Jefferson, resorted to covert force and guile. When the inhabitants of the Baton Rouge area grew restive under Spanish rule, he sent an agent to tell them that the United States would welcome a revolution and warned off the British, whereupon the inhabitants seized the feeble Spanish fort. The rest of West Florida and part of East Florida fell to George Mathews, a revolutionary war veteran who led a force of "patriots" across the border. When Madison's opponents attacked the illegality of the act, he repudiated his agent, much to Mathews's disgust.

Following the War of 1812, the Monroe administration reverted to diplomacy to complete the acquisition of Florida. But force and the threat of force were not wholly absent from the process. After peace returned, General Andrew Jackson, commander of the military district on the southern border, broadly interpreted his vague orders and led troops into East Florida to fight Indians and protect border settlers. In the process, he captured several Spanish forts and executed two British army officers who, he said, were inciting the Indians against the Americans. Spain protested but realized that it might lose Florida anyway without action and agreed to treaty negotiations, especially after Secretary of State John Quincy Adams answered the protest with an aggressive reply, "a great gun from Washington to Madrid," as Adams's nephew pronounced it. (The British also protested but then dropped the matter.) The treaty was mainly devoted to the west boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, which was drawn on a zigzag line from the Sabine River on the modern Louisiana-Texas border to the modern north border of California (42 degrees). Many nationalists, especially southerners, resented the relinquishment of the slight American claim to Texas, but thereby the United States gained the equally weak Spanish claim to the Pacific coast, which helped to redirect American political power toward the West.

The War of 1812 gained no new territory for the United States, but it was important for avoiding the loss of land to the north and northwest. The United States went to war proclaiming, "On to Canada!" and hoping to acquire the Ontario peninsula at last. The British, for their part, hoped to set up an Indian protectorate between the Great Lakes and the Ohio River, both to halt the American westward movement and to create trade. They also planned sizable boundary adjustments in New England, New York, and the Northwest. By 1814 the ambitions had shrunk so far that the negotiations produced a status quo ante peace. This was quite enough for the Americans, who received it with relief as a renewed guaranty of their independence.

Two postwar agreements, each having the effect of a treaty, refined and strengthened the original treaty of 1783 fixing the northern boundary of the United States. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 limited naval armament on the Great Lakes. The Convention of 1818 drew the northern boundary along the parallel of 49 degrees from the Lake of the Woods to the "stony mountains" and provided that the territory from the mountains to the Pacific coast should be occupied by British and Americans without injury to claims of either country (generally called "joint occupation"). The convention was to last ten years, renewable until denounced. It also ended two vestiges of the past, the "boundary gap" of 1783 and the much-argued British right of navigation on the Mississippi.

A large boundary gap had existed since 1783 at the eastern end of the north border, from the point where the forty-fifth parallel crosses the St. Lawrence River to that where the St. Croix River enters the Bay of Fundy (comprising the modern north borders of New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine). Local inhabitants disagreed as to which of several rivers was "the true St. Croix." Afterward, a trail of boundary commissions, documents, and maps led from the Peace of Paris to the Treaty of Ghent without any definition of "the North West Angle of Nova Scotia," the "northwestern-most head" of the Connecticut River, and other place names on the outdated Mitchell map of 1755. The War of 1812 gave new importance to the boundary controversy, for it convinced the British that they needed a military road between Quebec and Halifax.

The admission to the union of the state of Maine in 1820 also complicated the question, because Massachusetts still had land claims in the disputed area, so now there were two sets of governors, legislatures, newspapers, and citizenry

squabbling over geographical details, to say nothing of the federal government in the national system. Two efforts after 1815 to settle the question added further problems, because a boundary commission discovered that an expensive American fort at Rouse's Point had been built on Canadian soil through a surveying error. Also, a boundary line drawn by an arbiter, the king of the Netherlands, did not satisfy many Americans, who accused him of pro-British bias. The nationalist Andrew Jackson, however, thought the dispute had gone on long enough and tried in vain to get the king's award accepted.

It took a major Anglo-American crisis to bring about a solution to the Maine boundary problem. In 1837 a double revolution for self-government in Ontario and Quebec drew in hotheaded sympathizers and covetous expansionists from upper New York State, eager to strike a blow for freedom and mount a filibuster at the same time. A land war broke out in northern Maine when frontiersmen from both sides of the line discovered the Aroostook Valley, a pocket of fertile land, and started to fight over it. The commanding general of the American army, Winfield Scott, was sent to intervene and restore peace, and Britain appointed a diplomat, Lord Ashburton, to negotiate a settlement. He and Secretary of State Daniel Webster (who happened to be his personal friend) managed to draw a compromise line with information from sixty-year-old maps. By a curious anomaly, each side possessed information supporting the other side's case. Webster showed his maps to the Maine politicians to silence their objections; whether he also used money supplied by Ashburton has fascinated and baffled everyone who has written on the subject. In any case, it seems likely that Webster's attentions made a peaceful outcome possible but lost the United States about five thousand square miles of Maine woods and swamps. Smaller adjustments were made to the west in New Hampshire and Vermont, and the United States gained a sliver of land in New York, including "Fort Blunder" on Rouse's Point. More important was a cession of about six thousand square miles in Minnesota that proved later to contain some of that state's invaluable iron ore deposits.

The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in the president's annual message of December 1823, did not contribute directly to continental expansion, for much of it applied to Central and South America. However, one part of it, the noncolonization principle, foreshadowed the annexation of Alaska forty-four years later. In 1821 the czar of Russia, seeking to expand his control over his faraway colony, issued a ukase claiming its boundary to 51 degrees north latitude and forbidding non-Russian ships to come within one hundred miles of this coast. When a burst of protest from New England farming and fishing interests followed, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, their perennial champion, got Monroe to announce in his message that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonization. By implication Adams intended his warning for Britain as well as Russia. It had no basis for legality in international law, but the czar never enforced his ukase. In a treaty of 1824 Russia fixed the southern boundary of its colony at 54 degrees, 40 minutes—the "fifty-four forty" of a later American political slogan.

TEXAS AND THE MEXICAN WAR

The next great continental expansion of the United States comprised the entire western third of the lower forty-eight states, from the west boundary of the Louisiana Purchase to the Pacific Ocean. It was accomplished in only five years, from 1843 to 1848, but it was foreshadowed and prepared for by several migrations of American people, the spontaneous formation of governments on the American model, and the spread of an infectious propaganda resting on the brash assumption that American absorption of the desired territory was inevitable—that the Almighty had destined the territory for His "chosen people" as a kind of divine favoritism. This idea, like so many others in American colonialism, was inherited from the mother country. In the sixteenth century, the writings of Richard Hakluyt and others set forth the idea that, like the earlier Romans, Englishmen were preordained to take over, colonize, and develop the New World; no other people were capable of such a gigantic task. Destiny could be used just as easily to support American independence as to rationalize British imperial expansion, and revolutionary thought in the colonies was filled with echoes of the "city on a hill" and the "American Israel" blessed by Providence. Thomas Paine's statement in *Common Sense* that the Americans were fighting "the cause of all mankind" was only the most famous of many such declarations.

This potent propaganda, together with migration, American-style government, and an

overall sense of an inevitability went to work in Texas during the 1820s. Texas had been a province on the north border of New Spain. When Mexico took over in 1821, its leaders thought to replicate the prosperous growth of the United States by encouraging the migration of American settlers as models into sparsely populated Texas, despite the warnings of a few prescient critics that this would amount to "settling the Goths at the gates of Rome." Americans, mostly Protestants speaking only English, gladly settled on the fertile cotton bottoms of east Texas and brought their slaves with them. (Mexico was officially Roman Catholic and Spanish speaking, and its constitution declared all men equal.) The new American population established commercial ties with New Orleans, since the nearest Mexican centers lay far to the south, and the people of central Mexico had little interest in Texan affairs, being much involved in their own political struggles. Frictions led to quarrels, and despite the efforts of a few Texan leaders to patch up disputes, the province revolted for independence in 1836. The Mexican president, Antonio López de Santa Anna led an army north to crush the rebels into submission, only to blunder into defeat at the Battle of San Jacinto in east Texas. Santa Anna was captured and forced to sign a treaty recognizing Texan independence.

Evidence of overt U.S. participation in the Texan revolution is slim. President Andrew Jackson's public behavior was correct, but the Texan general, Sam Houston, was his friend, and he followed the military action with keen interest. The American people, especially in the lower Mississippi Valley, were very sympathetic and contributed money and supplies freely; frontiersmen flocked into the Texan forces. An American general, Edmund P. Gaines, led a few troops fifty miles across the border but contributed nothing to Texan success. Not surprisingly, some Mexican nationalists have always believed that U.S. intervention gave the Texans their victory, and a small plot thesis has grown up among American historians, but their evidence is shallow.

Most of the victorious Texans hoped for prompt incorporation into the American Union, but this proved impossible because the United States was then implacably divided over the question of adding slave territory. In Europe, Britain and France opposed letting the United States strengthen itself through annexation. The British wanted an assured supply of cotton for their mills, and some inconsistently supported Texan abolitionism, as well. These contrary forces produced nine years (1836–1845) of frustrating diplomacy, while the ramshackle republic of Texas maintained a precarious existence, its government housed in log cabins on the western frontier, and a weak American president, John Tyler, tried to put together an annexation coalition to ensure his reelection.

In 1844, Tyler managed to sign an annexation treaty with Texas, only to see it defeated in the American Senate, partly because it came to a vote in the midst of a hard-fought presidential election campaign. The victor was an expansionist Democrat, James K. Polk. He favored annexing Texas, but Tyler tried to anticipate him during the three months he had left in office. In his hurry, he used an untried method, a joint resolution in both houses of Congress. At the same time, a diehard British agent in Mexico made a last-minute effort to secure that country's recognition of Texan independence. His failure and the Texan acceptance of terms offered by the joint resolution brought the annexation question to a dramatic conclusion.

On the Pacific coast the process of annexing California and Oregon was going on while that in Texas was drawing to a close. After Mexico won its independence it neglected its distant border provinces, and in the early 1830s American merchants established trading posts along the coast at Monterey, California, and a few other small ports, which became centers of American influence. At Monterey, Thomas O. Larkin, the most important merchant, became a U.S. consul and an important source of information about conditions in California. By the 1840s these merchants were joined by American explorers, hunters, and trappers crossing the mountains. They soon developed another center of American influence at a backwoods fort near modern Sacramento built by John A. Sutter, a German Swiss, who obtained a Mexican land grant in 1840 and founded a polyglot settlement. The Hudson's Bay Company, moving southward from western Canada, formed the third corner of the triangle competing for influence in California. The Mexican government maintained loose control over these disparate elements with little or no supervision from Mexico City. Americans on the East Coast exaggerated the European, especially the British, threat to California, and even Anglophile Daniel Webster tried to include in his negotiations with Ashburton some provision for the transfer of the San Francisco Bay area to no avail. The degree of American nervousness about California was shown by Thomas Catesby Jones, commanding the U.S. Pacific Squadron. In 1842,

hearing a false rumor of an Anglo-American war, he took it upon himself to seize the port of Monterey, only to have to back out in an atmosphere of general embarrassment.

To the north of California, Americans were also much interested in the vaguely defined Oregon Territory, which the United States had occupied jointly with Britain since the northern boundary settlement at 49 degrees (1818). The British, who had explored and mapped the area as far as the Alaska border, had a better claim to it, but an American ship captain had discovered the mouth of the Columbia River, and the Lewis and Clark expedition (1804–1806) had explored the Columbia and Snake River valleys. Five years later, John Jacob Astor established a fur trading post and fort at Astoria, near the mouth of the Columbia, and in the Florida treaty of 1819 the United States acquired the Spanish claim south of the river. After that time, the Oregon question largely revolved around the triangle of land north of the Columbia River (modern Washington State), especially the coasts of Puget Sound, with their excellent harbors.

For the time being the British established monopoly control over the Columbia Valley through their fur trade and agriculture, and they even furnished food for the Russian settlements in Alaska. Meanwhile, the Americans, led by westerners in the House of Representatives, tried to alert their countrymen to the danger that Britain might forestall them in Oregon. In 1827 the two nations reviewed the whole question. The United States offered to extend the 49-degree line (established in 1818) and cede all of Vancouver Island to Britain (the eventual settlement); Britain offered only several ports on the Olympic peninsula, which its navy could easily take over in wartime. The joint occupation continued, and the Hudson's Bay Company remained the de facto ruling power in Oregon. To the disappointment of both governments, Webster and Ashburton decided not to included Oregon in their negotiations.

At this point the tide began to turn. A new British treaty with China raised trade possibilities in Asia, and British colonies in New Zealand and elsewhere began to compete for settlers with Puget Sound; also, the Hudson's Bay Company's interest in the lower Columbia valley began to cool. At the same time American concern over Oregon increased, and a new burst of speeches and memorials forced the issue on the public. Missionaries were sent out to work among the Oregon Indians, and their enthusiastic reports on the beauties of the country stimulated the migration of families and sometimes whole communities to Oregon. A trail of sorts had existed as early as the War of 1812, and by the 1830s it was an institution—up the Platte River, across the prairies and mountains, through South Pass, down the Snake River, and finally to the Columbia. (At Fort Hall an alternate route led into California.) Many travelers went as far as a tributary of the Columbia, the Willamette, whose banks resembled parts of the Middle West so much that it became a common goal. The climax of the migration came in 1843 as returning prosperity made possible improvements in equipment and supplies. To many observers it seemed that time was working for the Americans, and a group of Southern Democrats led by John C. Calhoun spoke out for "a wise and masterly inactivity." At that point Calhoun became Tyler's secretary of state. Since Britain had about concluded that the 49-degree line was the best it could obtain at that time, preliminary negotiations began between Calhoun and the British minister, but these became hung up on details, and soon the presidential election of 1844 intervened. In the campaign, western activists kept alive their demand for all of Oregon up to the boundary of Russian Alaska—a grant of land altogether unjustified by circumstances and likely to cause war with Britain.

The new president, Polk, brought about a wholly unnecessary crisis with Britain as he maneuvered to keep together the two factions of his party, the activists (western) and the pacifists (southern, led by Calhoun). First he took advantage of a British misstep to close off Tyler's negotiations, in which he thought the American position was too weak. Then he referred the whole question to Congress, so the western fulminations could alarm the British. It was at this point, and not earlier, that the slogan "Fifty-four forty or fight" spread across the country. After a heated debate, Congress voted to send Britain a mild, unthreatening notice abrogating the joint occupation. The British took the initiative, as Polk had intended, and the diplomats quickly settled on the forty-ninth parallel, awarding all of Vancouver Island to Britain. The British gave up the right to navigate the lower Columbia, avoiding possible commercial friction in the future. Thus, Polk carried off his policy through rigid party discipline but he risked a costly war for purely partisan gains.

American migration into California during the early 1840s, though smaller than that into

Oregon, continued to tip California toward the United States, thanks especially to the publicity given to the Sacramento–San Joaquin area by the well-known explorer John Charles Frémont, whose report on his two expeditions was a best-seller. In September 1844 a group of native Californians with some Americans overturned the local Mexican governor and set up their own virtually autonomous government. When Polk took office in March 1848, he intended to negotiate for California, and the War Department sent Frémont back into the province. The British also dispatched a warship to visit the north Pacific and be on hand in case of a local revolt. For its part, the Mexican government gathered several hundred soldiers as reinforcements for California, but on their way to the West Coast they encountered a local uprising and joined it, bag and baggage.

As the Texas question wound down in 1845, Polk set his Mexican policy in motion. It was both aggressive and defensive at the same time—to mount a strong front, assume the benefit of every doubt, and challenge every assumption of his opponent, while avoiding any overt act that might commit him beyond recall—a policy of bluff, indeed, but bluff with an avenue of retreat. Since Mexico had broken relations with the United States over the annexation of Texas, Polk sent an envoy to start negotiations, although by usual practice Mexico should have acted first. The envoy, John Slidell, was chosen largely for his fluency in Spanish. Polk instructed him to offer $5 million for the cession of Texas to the Rio Grande and New Mexico and $25 million for California, including San Francisco and Monterey. The president indicated later that Slidell might bargain beyond the figure for California but he made no mention of an explanation or indemnity for the already completed annexation of Texas. Even before Polk drew up these instructions for Slidell, he took care that his envoy should negotiate from a position of strength by stationing troops under General Zachary Taylor at Corpus Christi in southeast Texas.

In early October news arrived from Polk's agent in California, the merchant Thomas O. Larkin, that forced Polk to hurry his plans. Larkin described British and Mexican activities that seemed to point to a British seizure of the province. It is now known that Larkin's information, five months old, was based on rumor and entirely false, but it must have deeply shocked Polk and his cabinet. He sent off new instructions to Taylor, Larkin, and the commander of the Pacific Squadron, John D. Sloat. Taylor was to advance to the Rio Grande (the farthest line claimed by Texas). Sloat was to conciliate the Californians, keep his ships ready for further orders, and, if war broke out, seize the principal California ports; he was also reinforced. Larkin became confidential agent to report on developments and defeat any foreign efforts to control California. Separate orders were sent to Frémont in California. No one has discovered what these orders were or in particular how much freedom they gave to a notoriously flighty man of action.

Having set out his lines, Polk now had to wait to see their effect, while Congress plunged into debate over Oregon. Slidell arrived in Mexico at the beginning of December to find that the president, who favored negotiating but was only clinging to power, would not receive him. A new regime, more nationalistic and stubborn, soon took power, and Slidell resigned himself to waiting outside Mexico City and reporting on the situation. Meanwhile, General Taylor and his troops were marching to the Rio Grande, which they reached in March. They built a temporary fort across the river from the Mexican town of Matamoros (modern Brownsville, Texas). The Mexicans responded by sending a reconnaissance party across the river. On 25 April this force clashed with an American scouting party, took some prisoners, and shed the first blood of the war. At the same time, Polk recalled Slidell and he and news of hostilities on the Rio Grande arrived in Washington at the same time. On a Sunday morning, Polk, glad to have some justification for acting, called his cabinet together and drew up a war message. In this he branded the Mexicans as the aggressors and the conflict as a defensive one, "war by the act of Mexico." Polk's enemies in Congress, the Whigs and Calhoun, would not accept this, but Polk's Democrats introduced appropriation bills and other measures to support the troops, and presently patriotism blurred the distinctions, and a formal declaration of defensive war crept through. (Mexico too declared a defensive war.)

When the American cabinet discussed the goals of the war, the cautious James Buchanan (secretary of state) proposed a circular letter disavowing any territorial ambitions beyond the Rio Grande boundary for fear of a British or French intervention. Polk firmly vetoed such a statement. By the end of May he had decided on the annexation of all Upper California, New Mexico, and perhaps other parts of northern Mexico. As soon as

Congress passed the war bill, Polk ordered a blockade of the California coast and sent General Stephen W. Kearny, then in Missouri, to lead troops westward—eventually to occupy California. Taylor's initial victories over Mexico (Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma), as well as the settlement of the Oregon question, reduced the danger of British intervention in California. During June, before the news of war reached the west coast, Frémont touched off a revolt against the local authorities and captured the town of Sonoma—whether on instructions from Washington, no one knows for certain. Commodore Sloat after some hesitation proclaimed American rule. (Actual conquest, however, would await the arrival of General Kearny and his regular troops.) Events in the principal theater of war had less connection with continental expansion. Taylor pressed southward through Matamoros, Camargo, Monterrey, and Saltillo, but a fierce battle at Buena Vista in February 1847 convinced Polk that the army had reached a dead end. He created a second army, commanded by Winfield Scott, which landed at and captured Veracruz, then pushed into the interior of the country toward Mexico City. Reaching the central valley of Mexico, Scott finally occupied the capital in September 1847.

Polk had not originally intended to go so far. He expected a short war, having no idea of the Mexican sense of honor or stubbornness. So the war became a series of advances followed by pauses in which action was stopped to see if the Mexicans would yield. During one of these pauses, after Scott had occupied Veracruz, Polk appointed Nicholas Trist to join Scott as a commissioner and be ready to act as soon as the Mexican showed any interest in negotiating. (Trist was a minor official in the State Department. Polk did not care to send the elderly Buchanan so far away.) After the American capture of Mexico City, the Mexican government, by now controlled by moderates, retreated to an interior town. An important force working for peace was the British legation, because after the fall of Veracruz, the British government had resigned itself to an American victory and was now anxious to end the war as quickly and cheaply as possible. Trist, Scott, and Mexican representatives with British advisers discussed terms in Mexico City, and a man on horseback carried these to the Mexican government a hundred miles away for further discussion. Polk played no active role in the negotiation of terms, and, indeed, was so disgusted with the proceedings that at one point he ordered Trist to stop negotiating and come home. Fortunately, Trist disobeyed; for this, the vindictive president stopped his pay (Congress made an appropriation twenty-two years later.)

The treaty so torturously produced kept surprisingly close to Polk's early idea of the war's goals. It ceded to the United States all of Upper California and New Mexico and drew the U.S.–Mexico boundary at the Rio Grande and Gila Rivers. In return the United States was to pay $15 million and assume $3.25 million of American claims against Mexico. The cessions did not include Lower California or the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, which had been mentioned as a transit route for a railroad or canal, but the United States had not occupied these territories, and annexing them at that time would have presented serious problems. Considering the sectional rivalries the country faced, it had taken perhaps too much as it was. During the last months of the war, a movement grew in the United States to annex all of Mexico as the only way to reimburse the nation for the expense of the war. In addition, among the divided Mexican parties one left-wing group favored an American protectorate as the only way of pushing through changes such as clerical reform, which Mexico badly needed but could not manage by itself.

When Polk saw the treaty signed by his disobedient agent, he was furiously disgusted, but he swallowed his rage and transmitted the document to the Senate with minor changes. A coalition of extremists who wanted to annex more of Mexico and who wanted a peace without annexations threatened to defeat the treaty and throw the negotiations open again. Proceedings were delayed by the sudden death of John Quincy Adams in the House chamber and this may have provided time for common sense to prevail. Eventually, moderates gathered themselves together and approved the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Polk's amendments by a vote of 38 to 14.

THE GADSDEN PURCHASE

But the treaty did not complete American border expansion to the southwest. In the first place, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, like the one after the American Revolution, was based on an inaccurate prewar map, so a boundary commission had to run the whole line on the ground, a process causing new quarrels with Mexican state and federal governments. Second, Mexicans com-

plained that Indians north of the new border were increasing their raids into Mexico. They demanded that the United States carry out Article 11 of the peace treaty, requiring it to restrain the border Indians from raiding—an impossibility with the available infantry troops. Third, American filibusters crossed the border almost at will, seeking to detach Mexican states and complete the absorption process begun by the war. Fourth, American railroad interests discovered belatedly that the best route for a southern transcontinental railroad lay south of the Gila River in Mexican territory. Finally the question of rail transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, omitted from the peace treaty, was taken up by the commercially minded Taylor-Filmore administration, as Americans acquired interests in transit concessions.

All of these considerations figured in the effort of the Franklin Pierce administration to acquire more land from Mexico. Pierce appointed the railroad owner James Gadsden minister to Mexico and gave him a list of desired territories and corresponding prices to be offered. The maximum price was for Lower California and a good part of northern Mexico, the minimum for a strip of territory south of the Gila River big enough for the contemplated transcontinental railroad.

In Mexico, Gadsden's negotiating partner was Antonio López de Santa Anna, the opponent of the Americans through the Texas question and the Mexican War. Santa Anna was as eager as ever for money but wary of nationalist opposition to more land grants. Gadsden was a bumbling diplomat given to grandiloquent and imprecise language. Other complications were efforts by another agent from Pierce to insert the Tehuantepec question and a filibuster expedition to Lower California by the notorious guerrilla leader William Walker. Santa Anna, now desperate, put out feelers for British or French aid to no avail. In the end, he gave up a thin triangle of land south of the Gila large enough for a railroad and released the United States from Article 11 of the peace treaty. For this minimal grant, the United States agreed to pay $15 million plus $5 million for private American claims. The Senate was in the midst of a furious debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act but took up the Gadsden treaty, too. It lowered the purchase price to $10 million and somewhat increased the land area acquired. Outside the continent, it opened the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to American transit, but it did not give the United States access to the Gulf of California, as some had hoped.

ALASKA

The fourth and final great continental expansion that produced the present-day continental proportions of the United States was the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. From the late eighteenth century, both Russia and America had sought out the northwest coast of North America for furs, mostly of sea otters and seals; Americans also pushed the whaling industry into the north Pacific. After the United States acquired California in 1848, San Francisco became the center of trading companies and other enterprises extending their activities northward. The most striking of these expansionist ventures was Perry Macdonough Collins's project to extend a telegraph line across western Canada, Alaska, and the Bering Strait to Siberia, where it would connect with Russian and other European lines. (Unfortunately, it could not compete with Cyrus Field's transatlantic cable for investment funds.)

American public interest in acquiring Alaska had already been rumored occasionally. At the time of the Crimean War, some Americans were considering taking over Russian holdings in the Alaska panhandle to keep them out of British hands, but the British avoided this action by agreeing to neutralize Russian property there. Even before then, a few American expansionists, especially William H. Seward, a Whig senator from New York, were attracted to Alaska. Seward regarded it as the key to an expanded Pacific commercialism pointed toward the Far East, especially China, which had long been a magnet for expansionist American businesspeople. At this time, Russia was losing interest in its remote, unprofitable colony. Fearful that the United States or Britain would take it over without paying for it, the czar and his government decided on the sale to the Americans. As secretary of state, Seward eagerly received the Russian overtures, and he and the Russian minister to the United States drew up a treaty literally overnight. The American public and press were taken by surprise and Seward and his fellow expansionists had to put together an intensive lobbying campaign to sell the treaty to Congress. The United States paid $7.2 million to Russia, and historians feel that perhaps $200,000 of that went to congressmen in one way or another to buy their votes for the bill appropriating the purchase price. (Perhaps many would have voted for it anyway.) Not for the first time in American history, expansionism was temporarily discredited, and later efforts to purchase the Danish West

Indies and the Dominican Republic were voted down amid accusations of scandal. Nevertheless, the United States promptly set up a government in Alaska, and American business promoters started to take over Russian enterprises.

After the Civil War, the United States was unable to extend is borders northward into Canada. During the late 1860s, annexationism raised its head in British Columbia and Manitoba and then fell back. In the first case, Seward tried to encourage the discontented British Columbians, and in the second case, a group of New York and Minnesota railroadmen and other business interests tried to exploit a local rebellion early in the administration of Ulysses S. Grant. At an earlier date either case might have led to further continental expansion, but at this time, all the Americans could achieve was an arbitral award of the San Juan Islands by the German emperor in 1871. (These islands, left in dispute by a vague passage in the Oregon Treaty of 1846, were strategically located in the channel just off Vancouver Island.)

CONCLUSION

Why did American continental expansion come to such an abrupt halt after the Alaska purchase? Perhaps the unsavory rumors of corruption were responsible but bickering and carping had not lessened American ardor for long after the Louisiana Purchase or the Mexican War. More likely, the formerly irresistible American expansionist impulse encountered a powerful counterforce, for in 1867, only three months after the annexation of Alaska, the Canadians formed a self-governing dominion, and soon afterward, the regime of the first prime minister, Sir John Macdonald, began construction of a transcontinental railroad that would bind the dissident provinces such as British Columbia and Manitoba to the nation. Probably also American businessmen came to realize that economic ties could be as valuable to them as political control over a people who, like the Americans themselves, wanted to be independent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution.* New York, 1935. Old but especially good for boundary settlement.

———. *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1949. Solid accounts of several episodes from 1815 to 1830.

DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana.* Baton Rouge, La., 1976. One of several good accounts.

Garber, Paul Neff.*The Gadsden Treaty.* Philadelphia, 1923. An old work but still useful.

Jensen, Ronald J. *The Alaska Purchase and Russian-American Relations.* Seattle, Wash., 1975. More detail on the treaty negotiations.

Jones, Howard. *To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977.

Merk, Frederick. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation.* New York, 1963. A minority view of manifest destiny and events of the 1840s. Should be compared to Weinberg.

Morris, Richard B. *The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence.* New York, 1965. More detailed scholarship.

Pletcher, David M. *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War.* Columbia, Mo., 1973.

Saul, Norman E. *Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763–1967.* Lawrence, Kans., 1991. Cross-archival study of a complex relationship.

Stuart, Reginald C. *United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775–1871.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988. Covers the whole span of continental expansion.

Weinberg, Albert K. *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History.* Chicago, 1935. Still the standard work on the subject.

See also COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; IMPERIALISM; NATIONALISM.

The Continental System

Marvin R. Zahniser

The continental system was the name given to those measures of Napoleon Bonaparte taken between 1806 and 1812 that were designed to disrupt the export trade of Great Britain and ultimately to bring that country financial ruin and social breakdown. This term likewise refers to Bonaparte's plan to develop the economy of continental Europe, with France to be the main beneficiary.

Although the continental system was formally inaugurated with publication of Napoleon's Berlin Decree in November 1806, its historical antecedents can be traced as far back as the Anglo-French commercial wars that began late in the seventeenth century. The maxims of mercantilist thought nourished the propensity of France and Britain to inaugurate blockades and carry on commercial war. A common argument of the mercantilists stated that trade, shipping, industry, and the world's bullion resources were fixed quantities that could not be significantly increased or decreased by human effort. This concept led inexorably to the conclusion that nations could increase their wealth and power only by depriving other nations of their sources of wealth, such as trade. Commercial wars, therefore, if successfully prosecuted, promised a meaningful augmentation to a nation's wealth and diminution of an enemy's.

Profit was generated, in part, by increasing the volume and value of a nation's exports and in compelling competitors to purchase one's exports on disadvantageous terms while purchasing the least possible amount of the competitor's goods. A favorable balance of trade indicated that a nation's profits and wealth were increasing; this could be gauged by the flow of bullion into the country.

With every nation perceiving that its own advancement could be made only at the expense of others, each country began to pursue trade and tariff policies that differed little in war or peace. War simply stimulated nations such as France and Britain to accept even fewer goods from the enemy while pressing their own exports upon the other by every conceivable device. In addition, it was presumed sound economic policy both in war and peace to protect native industries by appropriately stringent tariff legislation.

A new intensity in these policies shortly followed negotiation of the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786 (Eden's Treaty). Britain was largely satisfied with the treaty, but it provoked bitter criticism in France. Revolutionary France soon began to drift back to the pre-1786 commercial policies. In 1791 the Constituent Assembly adopted a tariff with rates high enough to indicate the new trend. France finally denounced Eden's Treaty early in 1793, an indication of the growing strain in French-British relations and of French determination to protect their industries against British competition. With the execution of Louis XVI in mid-January and the outbreak of war on 1 February 1793, Britain and France resumed their long-standing attempts to strangle each other economically.

Rigid exclusionist policies of early revolutionary France were slightly eased during the ascendancy of Robespierre; they were, however, adopted and strengthened by the government of the Directory (1795–1799). The notorious decree of 18 January 1798 (29 Nivose, Year VI) laid down the principle that the cargo of a ship would determine its nationality; thus, any vessel carrying goods from Britain or its possessions became subject to confiscation, both ship and cargo. Ships stopping at British ports could not enter French ports. The severity of this measure produced a virtual French self-blockade. Likewise, the Directory supported the Navigation Act, passed by the Convention on 21 September 1793. This act prohibited foreign vessels from importing into France products other than those of their own nation or engaging in the French coastal trade. It is clear that these laws of the revolutionary regimes had essentially the same purpose as their

predecessors of the past two hundred years—to damage Britain by excluding British goods and ships and to foster French industry, agriculture, and the merchant marine by protecting them from British, and other, competition.

The harshness of French measures, prompted in part by the disturbing reality that British sea power was annihilating the French merchant marine, was bottling up the French fighting navy, taking possession of French colonies one by one, building an enormous carrying trade, and threatening to control neutral trade to its own advantage. Before 1789 there had been 2,000 French merchantmen; by January 1799 the Directory admitted that not a single merchant ship on the high seas flew the French flag. On the other hand, Britain's merchant marine prospered handsomely during these war years. Between 1793 and 1800 the number of ships under British registry rose from 15,000 to nearly 18,000.

British naval power appeared much less decisive than British mercantile superiority, overmatching the French fighting navy by only a two-to-one ratio. France believed it possible to reduce Britain's naval superiority by rapid shipbuilding and under Bonaparte launched major attempts to do so. French naval expenditures between 1803 and 1806 leaped from a projected triennium total of 240 million francs to more than 400 million francs.

NAPOLEON AND BRITAIN INAUGURATE WARTIME MEASURES

Coming to power through the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire, Year VIII (9 November 1799), First Consul Bonaparte, himself a mercantilist, became heir to French commercial traditions and current practices. He also inherited an unpalatable oceanic situation in which the French merchant marine had been driven from the high seas and the fighting navy had been destroyed or remained in port, fearful of the British navy. Bonaparte soon turned his enormous energies toward remedying these situations, but he wished for a period of internal consolidation before proceeding with his larger plans. Fortunately for him, the Second Coalition of 1799 soon dissolved. Russia, coming to fear British power in the eastern Mediterranean more than French ambitions, in effect withdrew from the coalition. When Austria was forced to sign the Peace of Lunéville in 1801, the Second Coalition disappeared. In March 1802, peace was concluded with Great Britain at Amiens. For the first time since 1792 no great European power warred with another.

Peace proved to be only an interlude. Britain viewed with great anxiety Napoleon's activities during the months of peace: reorganizing the Cisalpine Republic with himself named president and reorganizing the Helvetic Republic as the Confederation of Switzerland with himself as mediator. Bonaparte also supervised the reorganization of Germany, resulting in consolidated and enlarged German states that now relied on Bonaparte to maintain their position. Britain proved unwilling to countenance this continuing expansion of French influence. Picking a fight over Malta, Britain declared war in May 1803 and began the search for coalition partners. After Austria signed an alliance with Britain in 1805, Alexander I brought Russia into the alliance, completing the Third Coalition.

Britain did not wait for the Third Coalition to coalesce before inaugurating its own measures in response to Napoleon's. In June and July of 1803, Britain declared that the mouths of the Elbe and Weser rivers were under blockade, thus cutting off the entire trade of Hamburg and Bremen. On 9 August 1804 Britain also declared all French ports on the English Channel and the North Sea under blockade. In the spring of 1805 Britain placed major restrictions on the carrying trade of the United States (in the *Essex* decision), a response to increasing American attempts to trade directly between the Continent and the enemy's colonies. In June 1805 and July 1806, Britain also took additional measures that underlined its determination to see American trade with enemy colonies carried on only in ways supportive of British interests.

Between 1803 and 1805 Napoleon expended enormous energy in planning means to gain temporary naval superiority in the English Channel and thus be able to ferry a formidable army to the British Isles. Warships and troop-carrying barges were certainly being built in numbers sufficient to alarm Britain. After two years of frustration and lost hopes, Napoleon temporarily abandoned his invasion plans in August 1805 in order to meet the continental challenge of the Third Coalition. As part of his strategy, he ordered the Cádiz squadron to attack Naples. Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve, under a cloud and fearful that he was going to be recalled in disgrace, put to sea on 19 October with a combined Franco-Spanish fleet of thirty-three vessels. Two days later the blockading force of twenty-seven British ships, commanded by Hora-

tio Nelson, engaged the French fleet off Cape Trafalgar. When the battle of Trafalgar had ended, only one third of the Franco-Spanish squadron regained harbor whereas Britain did not lose a single ship. Any lingering hopes of Napoleon that England could be invaded and subdued by land armies had now to be abandoned. More indirect, subtle methods had to be devised to erode and eventually to destroy British power.

As Napoleon analyzed England, he perceived certain weaknesses that, if shrewdly exploited, could serve to disrupt its economy, provoke social unrest, and bring England to the conference table in a compliant mood. Napoleon believed the British economy vulnerable because he thought its prosperity was founded primarily on trade, rather than on its productive agriculture and industry. He also believed that by disrupting British export trade to the Continent and by forcing England into trade channels on disadvantageous terms, there would be a drain on Britain's bullion reserves. Dislocation of industry, banking, and the mercantile communities must occur as well as destruction of its overextended credit system. Strikes and other forms of social unrest must surely follow, placing the British government in a significantly weakened position. Since his own measures could be framed in such a way that French industry and agriculture would be protected, Napoleon felt certain of domestic support in pursuing a regulated blockade. Napoleon gradually persuaded himself that only a coordinated, Continent-wide refusal to accept British goods could produce the intended effects.

Napoleon was also propelled toward a trade war by Britain's blockading measures and by a series of his own military victories. While the British actions infuriated and challenged him, victories at Ulm and Austerlitz (October and December 1805) and the crushing defeat of Prussia at Jena (October 1806) led him to believe that he could compel, if not persuade, other continental nations to support him in enforcing anti-British trade measures. Napoleon himself later pointed to Jena as the antecedent to inauguration of the continental system, for that battle placed him in control of the Weser, Elbe, Trave, and Oder Rivers, and the northern coastline as far as the Vistula.

On 21 November 1806, some three weeks after his triumphal entry into Berlin, Napoleon issued his Berlin Decree. Announcing the decree as a measure of retaliation against Great Britain's blockade declaration of 16 May (Fox's blockade), Napoleon proclaimed the British Isles to be blockaded and all trade or communication with them prohibited. He likewise declared war on all British goods, prohibiting trade in British goods and all goods coming from Britain or its colonies. Further, every port on the Continent had orders to refuse entrance to every vessel sailing directly from any port of Britain or its colonies. A peculiarly brutal provision declared all British citizens in territory occupied by France to be prisoners of war and their property to be confiscated.

Contemporaries and some historians questioned the effectiveness of the Berlin Decree because Napoleon had no ships to blockade the British Isles or Britain's colonies. Ineffective (paper) blockades were declared by both powers, of course, but Napoleon believed France would stand on firmer legal ground in dealing harshly with foreign merchantmen, both neutrals and allies, if he could demonstrate they had violated his duly proclaimed blockade.

Others, following the arguments of the naval historian Alfred T. Mahan, have expressed surprise that the Berlin Decree, and subsequent decrees designed to strengthen the system, fell so harshly upon neutrals like the United States. Since France and its colonies were dependent on the merchant carriers of neutral nations to supply their needs, Napoleon, some claimed, should have wooed neutral trade rather than have treated it in a preemptive, cynical fashion. Such an argument does not properly weigh several factors in Napoleon's thinking. He reasoned that since Britain's navy controlled the high seas, neutral commerce could only come to the Continent on its terms. As Napoleon saw it, neutral trade was therefore ultimately British trade. Also, Napoleon was anxious to encourage hostility between Britain and the neutrals, hoping that the neutrals would, as his foreign minister said in 1810, "cause their rights to be respected." Neutrals who refused to trade with Britain must inevitably become part of France's continental system. Last, Napoleon believed the continental economy much more self-sufficient than Britain's. While the Continent might suffer some losses through denying itself neutral or British goods, the vulnerable British economy must experience catastrophe and ruin. If the French colonies suffered because of neutral trade denied them, one must remember that they survived only through British tolerance.

Napoleon's Berlin Decree gave Britain the excuse it needed to strengthen those measures designed to force neutral, that is, primarily American, trade into British ports. England had already

blockaded all French ports on the English Channel and the North Sea. By a series of orders in council in 1807, the most significant being that of 11 November, England prohibited intercourse between enemy colonies and the northern countries. Further, England forbade direct trade between enemy ports and other ports except when those "other ports" were either European British ports (such as Malta) or ports of the vessel's own nation. Thus, trade was prohibited between enemy and neutral ports other than in the ports native to the neutral ships. Britain planned to enforce these regulations by compelling neutral vessels into British ports for inspection, by demanding payment of customs duties, and by issuing licenses authorizing the vessel's journey. Finally, mere possession of the required French "certificate of origin," showing that the vessel's goods were of non-British origin, brought British confiscation of ship and cargo.

Napoleon retaliated in his two Milan decrees (23 November and 17 December 1807) by announcing that vessels submitting to any of the three basic British regulations (examination of cargo and papers, call at a British port, or payment of duty on the cargo) was thereby denationalized, becoming a proper lawful prize. French privateers became the chief enforcers of these decrees. Napoleon again demonstrated his cavalier attitude toward neutral trade some four months later when in the Bayonne Decree (17 April 1808) he ordered confiscation of all ships flying the American flag and entering the ports of France, Holland, Italy, and the Hanse towns. Since the United States had declared an embargo, Napoleon reasoned, ships flying the American flag must be British vessels in disguise. Under the Rambouillet Decree of March 1810, he seized scores of American ships and imprisoned hundreds of the captured crewmen.

THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS ECONOMIC WARFARE

The Rambouillet Decree underscored the cruel position in which the wars of the French Revolution and the continental system placed the United States. Articulation of the continental system, however, merely sharpened a major question confronting the United States since 1793: Would Britain or France become the primary benefactor of American trade? Federalist administrations essentially had answered that question through negotiating Jay's Treaty (1794) with Britain, but American ratification of this treaty contributed to the Quasi-War with France between 1798 and 1800. The war led to internal unrest, the eclipse of the Federalist Party, a widespread assault upon the civil liberties of dissenters, and a national hope that such a war would not again be necessary.

During the four years prior to enunciation of the continental system, and the responsive British measures, American commerce prospered remarkably. British, continental, West Indian, and South American markets all contributed their share to this era of great commercial prosperity. It was President Thomas Jefferson's and Secretary of State James Madison's mistake to believe that this lucrative interlude could and should continue. Nor did many American merchants seem to grasp fully that the continuing flow of trade and relatively open markets remained entirely at the discretion of the belligerents. When the belligerents began to announce their regulations concerning neutral trade, many Americans reacted with shock, indignation, and a determination that the measures be repealed or modified.

Jefferson and Madison's perspective on how to resist the continental system and related British measures is complex and interesting. Both were sympathetic to the larger purposes of the French Revolution yet distressed by the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and his bold aggressions against those nations resisting his program of conquest. However, both wished to keep their indignation within bounds, partly because they fervently hoped to persuade Bonaparte to help the United States deprive Spain of the Floridas at some opportune moment. Also, they struggled to keep some perspective on Napoleon; in essence, they viewed him as scum temporarily floating on the beneficial and permanent wave of the French Revolution. They believed that such a person should not be allowed to disrupt permanently the spirit of American and French comradeship arising out of their revolutions, so close in time and in their larger purposes.

In addition, Jefferson and Madison shared with Bonaparte the view that Britain was the greatest enemy of their respective nations. After all, they reasoned, Britain seized American sailors and forced them into naval service (impressment), in effect denying many Americans their right to life and liberty. Quite clearly, Britain remained the major culprit on the maritime trade issues, because it exercised effective naval power in regulating American trade while Bonaparte had

WAR IN DISGUISE

James Stephen (1758–1832), a crusty and argumentative British Admiralty lawyer, felt anger for years when he considered how the Americans were injuring Britain with their commercial carrying trade. Ever since 1800, those crafty Americans had been engaged in an enormous trade with the Continent because the British had allowed Americans to "neutralize" their cargoes from the French Caribbean by first landing them in America and paying a small duty. Even those minor British requirements were massively evaded by Americans; too few cargoes were landed and even small duties were quickly refunded by port authorities. From London, it appeared that Americans were growing rich while the British struggled to contain Napoleon, would-be dictator of the Western world. Ungrateful Americans, supposed lovers of liberty, assisted Napoleon and counted their coins while Britain defended America from Napoleonic incursions into the New World with great sacrifice.

Stephen, who hated Napoleon and Jefferson in equal measure, decided to urge his fellow citizens to crack down on the Americans. In October 1805 he published *War in Disguise; or, The Frauds of the Neutral Flags,* a pamphlet that appeared on the same day Admiral Nelson smashed the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar. Do not, Stephen warned, allow American neutral ships to continue trading freely with France; such trade "sustains the ambitions of France and prolongs the miseries of Europe." Since Britain ruled the oceans, why concede extensive rights to greedy neutrals, as Britain had in 1800? Why should Americans be allowed to prosper while Britain bled for freedom and the precious right of self-governance? When news of the Trafalgar triumph reached London, Stephen's arguments seemed even more convincing; Britain controlled the high seas and could enforce its will without contradiction. His powerful pamphlet became a best-seller in England for several months. Even those who favored leniency toward the American trade found his arguments difficult to refute.

British orders in council regulating American shipping soon followed. To a striking degree, they enacted policies suggested by Stephen. No longer could Americans neutralize their cargoes by landing them in an American port and paying a small duty. Britain was thus preparing in 1805 to reinforce Napoleon's coming continental system in making life miserable for the heretofore prosperous American commercial carriers.

power only to harass the trade lanes with commerce destroyers or to close continental ports to American trade. Finally, Britain continued to demonstrate contempt for the U.S. government by its ongoing intrigue with Native Americans in the Northwest Territory.

The historian Paul Varg has emphasized Jefferson and Madison's conviction that their infant nation should do its best to establish the rights of small naval powers. Since 1776, in fact, Americans had worked to expand the rights of neutral powers. Terms of the model treaty of 1776, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France in 1778, a commercial treaty with the Netherlands in 1780, Jay's Treaty in 1794, Pinckney's Treaty of 1795, and the Convention of 1800 with France all reflected America's intense concern to defend or expand neutral rights. Although Napoleon's trade restrictions were painful, the most bitter disappointments in defending neutral rights had occurred with the British, particularly with Jay's Treaty. A certain principled rigidity therefore operated in American-British diplomacy that was not active in defining the American-French relationship.

As they contemplated measures to counter the economic systems established by France's continental system and a series of British orders in council, Jefferson and Madison, his successor, were confronted by a puzzling domestic situation. Jefferson in particular was regarded by fanatical New England Federalists as a devotee of everything French and a tool of Napoleon. Federalist merchants presumed his persistent hostility to Britain and to the advancement of American trade, though on the latter point they were very mistaken. The belief that Jefferson and Madison acted from partisan motives when dealing with both Britain and France became especially troubling when such views were held precisely by those who would be severely affected if the

United States pursued a course of economic retaliation. Another complicating factor arose because these same Federalist merchants expressed willingness to endure most maritime hardships imposed by Britain, including a system of licensed trade, mainly because such conformance guaranteed the continuance of their trade and profits. They also shared Britain's horror of Napoleon and the French Revolution that had spawned him. The fact that these merchant-Federalists were largely located in New England also raised Jeffersonian anxiety that coercive commercial measures might be interpreted as politically inspired punishment for the one geographical section having continuing Federalist strength.

Thus, whatever policy or series of policies Jefferson and Congress adopted in reaction to the continental system or to British measures, certain difficulties lay ahead. Submission to foreign commercial regulations would disturb militant patriots and those who believed neutral rights should be defended on principle; resistance promised to alienate both merchants and agriculturalists with a vested economic or political interest in continued trade. It is therefore interesting to note how decisively Jefferson eventually pressed for an embargo, a measure certain to have profound internal consequences. Jefferson and Madison, however, were intellectual cousins to Bonaparte and to British statesmen in believing that severe economic measures were likely to bring offending nations to reason. In this sense the continental system, the British orders in council, and the embargo (with subsequent American commercial laws) were all grounded in common postulates about the persuasive power of protective economic measures. As events turned out, only the American economic measures had their desired impact, but even repeal of the offending British orders in council came too late to prevent war between the United States and Britain in 1812.

Neither Britain nor France fully grasped Republican anger concerning their economic measures because they did not fully understand the principled, lengthy stand of Republicans for unfettered free trade. As Drew R. McCoy has shown, Republicans committed early to expanding America's commerce as a means to develop a citizenry that would be industriously and usefully employed. In such conditions, a virtuous citizenry would develop, equipped to support the ideals of republican government. At the same time, free markets must contribute to happiness and prosperity abroad and thus lead to a more humane and peaceful world. Clearly, when France and Britain destroyed the free exchange of trade, causing unemployment and disruption, they were attacking not only America's direct economic interests but sabotaging one basis of building a sound republic and an enlightened world.

Jefferson's embargo policy provoked consternation in Britain and New England, primarily because of the hardships it imposed on Anglo-American trade. But it also aroused deep anger because it appeared intended to complement Napoleon's continental system. Since the United States was not free to trade with France, given British control of the high seas, an American self-blockade seemed obviously designed to injure Britain. Jefferson's immediate objective, however, was not to aid Napoleon but through withdrawal of American trade to avoid war and to persuade Britain to modify its offensive trade regulations. If the chief culprit, Britain, modified its regulations, Jefferson and Madison felt confident that Napoleon would likewise be forced to ameliorate the continental system. Such a modification must in turn attract American trade to the Continent and to French colonies in the Caribbean. Jefferson, not a pacifist, continued to consider the possibility of war, though he met resistance to that idea within his own cabinet and circle of supporters.

American domestic pressures against the embargo eventually became so severe that Congress moved toward repeal in the last days of Jefferson's presidency. Pressures came from many directions, some anticipated and some not. Jefferson's support began to erode within his own party; this circumstance reflected the difficulties of enforcing embargo measures at the state level, even where the governors were Republicans and supporters of the administration. Madison's succeeding administration, together with a wavering and troubled Congress, never subsequently crafted a series of measures to persuade France and Britain to ameliorate significantly their virtual warfare on neutral trade. The Non-Intercourse Act (1809), which became effective three days before Madison entered office, proved to be an embargo measure with a difference: commerce was restored with every nation except France and Britain, but provision was made that trade with those nations would be resumed as soon as they repealed their noxious decrees and orders.

When this measure proved unavailing, Macon's Bill Number 2 was enacted in May 1810. This mischievous law reopened trade with France and Britain but provided that should either nation

repeal its restrictive commercial measures, trade with the other power would be interdicted. Napoleon, who had learned about repeal of the embargo, saw an opportunity to stop American trade with Britain once again. He therefore informed Madison that as of 1 November 1810, he was conditionally revoking his Berlin and Milan decrees pertinent to American trade and called upon the United States to invoke nonintercourse against Britain. Madison understood Napoleon's action to be conditional upon Britain's revocation of certain orders in council.

With his eyes open, Madison decided to take the biggest gamble of his political life and presume that Napoleon intended to revoke his decrees before his precondition had been met. With questionable haste, Madison issued a proclamation in November stopping trade with Britain within three months if it had not canceled its orders in council. Britain refused to do so pending evidence that Napoleon had repealed his decrees. Since Madison could not prove Napoleon had acted, Britain refused to alter its measures. Bitter and embarrassed, Madison nevertheless encouraged Congress to renew nonintercourse against Britain, which Congress voted to do in March 1811.

Through Napoleon's shrewd diplomatic tactic and through Madison's untimely willingness to gamble, the United States once again became a reluctant partner in strengthening the continental system. The results of this episode, and the bitterness engendered by it, helped to pave the way for the War of 1812, for many Americans believed Britain had been inflexible and petty when there had been a chance to be constructive and conciliatory. Britain, angry because the United States seemed willing to help an aggressive conqueror such as Napoleon, found American actions to assist Napoleon further evidence of the Madison administration's fundamental ill will toward Britain.

It seems fair to say that the continental system, as manipulated by Bonaparte, played a crucial role in bringing about the War of 1812. The acts committed by Napoleon under the mantle of the continental system were serious enough to have provoked war with the United States; indeed, between 1806 and 1812, France and its allies had seized over four hundred American ships. But after considerable reflection, Madison and the Congress backed away from declaring war on France, believing Britain to be enemy enough.

The whole complex of maritime belligerent measures, of which the continental system was the centerpiece, had significant consequences for the United States other than the War of 1812. Because of trade interruptions of varying length, the enormous American carrying trade was hurt, as were American hopes to nourish a promising trade with Latin America and possibly East Asia. Also, domestic objections to Jefferson and Madison's seemingly pro-French policies were sizable and significant enough to provoke New England's Hartford Convention of 1814–1815, though reforms requested by the twenty-six delegates were moderate in tone. Aggressive federal enforcement of trade measures in the ports and states raised questions about the Republican Party's commitment to the primacy of local governance. On the positive side, some argue that American exclusion from continental markets proved to be a healthy stimulus to American invention and to manufacturing enterprises even though other sectors of the economy suffered unduly.

America's struggle with both French and British economic measures had a decided effect upon Republican concepts of political economy. The older ideals of full employment producing an industrious and virtuous citizenry could not be guaranteed by increasing foreign markets; other powers had the ability and will to close markets or restrict the American carrying trade. Gradually, Republicans became better disposed toward major manufacturing enterprise as a way to produce full employment and a balanced economy. Also, developing the American market itself became an attractive alternative to relying upon overseas markets controlled by Europeans. With the vast Louisiana Purchase territory waiting to be settled, Americans turned away from Europe and focused on other endeavors, an option not available to them since 1775.

Imposition of the continental system demonstrated the cruel situation in which small, neutral powers are placed when great belligerent powers determine to direct neutral resources to their enemies only upon disadvantageous terms or not at all. Jefferson and Madison's unsuccessful attempts to bluff or to pressure France and Britain underlined that truism of statecraft. Also, the experiences with Napoleon and the continental system reinforced the American belief that Europe remained the home of politically and morally corrupt politicians. George Washington's farewell advice on avoiding unnecessary entanglements with foreign powers received added emphasis through American experiences with Napoleon's economic system and Britain's cynical manipulation of American trade.

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM UNDERMINED

While Napoleon had substantial success in disrupting American-British trade, he found it difficult to achieve the larger objective: excluding British and British-controlled neutral trade from the Continent except on terms disadvantageous to Britain. The continental system continued to spring leaks. Portugal and Spain—particularly following the insurrection in Spain in 1808—served as ports of entry for goods from Britain and its colonies. In addition, Britain used depots along the coast of Europe as smuggling centers. British merchants crowded into these centers in great numbers in order to conduct business. From Helgoland in the North Sea, smuggled British and neutral goods made their way to Leipzig, Basel, Strasbourg, and Frankfurt. In the Baltic, Göteborg became the center for goods forwarded to Prussia, Poland, and Russia. Gibraltar, Sardinia, Sicily, the Dalmatian and Ionian Islands, and Malta most of all served as the depots for British goods in the Mediterranean. After Britain gained a foothold in Turkey in 1809, Belgrade and Hungary received British goods forwarded from Salonika and Constantinople. As late as 1810, Britain bought over 80 percent of its wheat from France or its allies.

Napoleon's need for money likewise undermined the continental system. Growth of an enormous smuggling trade deprived Napoleon's empire of desperately needed tax revenues. Searching for monies to pursue his campaign against Austria in 1809, Napoleon recognized the necessity to stem this tax loss and accordingly established a system of licensed trade in 1809 and 1810. For a time, Napoleon directly supervised granting these licenses. At first a secret operation, the license system was formalized through the Decree of St. Cloud on 5 July 1810. Licenses were sold for substantial, varying fees but often costing £14. In providing trading licenses, Napoleon virtually negated the rationale of his system. He angered his continental allies and associates by granting licenses in such a way that French economic needs and promotion of the French merchant marine were given first consideration. Needed British goods now flowed freely and legally into French ports. Coupled with the license system came the Trianon Decree of 5 August 1810, which raised tariffs on colonial goods to an exorbitant degree, so high in fact that smugglers saw nothing but good in the measure. Napoleon's need to build his war chest thus led him to abandon the continental self-blockade, but he did so in such a way that he made it appear the French empire had no higher purpose than the enhancement of French interests. He also confused both allies and enemies, for while the license system seemed designed to negate the smuggling trade, the new tariff rates furnished considerable incentive for the smuggling to continue.

Napoleon never formally ended the continental system, but inauguration of the license system in 1809 and adoption of the Trianon tariff rates in 1810 marked its virtual abandonment. The defection of Russia in 1810 proved the single greatest blow to the continental system, one that made further enforcement efforts ludicrous. Following Napoleon's downfall, the restored Bourbon regime quickly swept away the various edicts of the continental system. All that remained were the milder enactments of the commercial legislation passed between 1791 and 1793 and the continuing firm conviction that French trade and industry must be sheltered from foreign competition.

The continental system revealed the scope and some of the limitations of Napoleon's thinking and planning. It was Eurocentric in its focus, was dependent upon the Grand Army for its success, was nationalistic and traditional in its emphasis upon the promotion of French interests, and was parochial in assessing how far sea power could assist England in escaping Napoleon's net. He pursued his plan with method and a certain cunning but had to modify it drastically when resistance grew too great. Unfortunately for Napoleon the continental system proved politically counterproductive in that it fostered increasing hostility to French hegemony within Europe. Napoleon even had to dismiss his own brother, Louis, as king of Holland when he refused to prevent Dutch smuggling with England. Russia's failure to enforce the system after 1810 played a part in turning Napoleon toward his fateful venture to conquer Russia.

In terms of its primary goal, the continental system proved a failure. Britain suffered severely but devised a successful smuggling system to satisfy continental markets, developed new markets in Latin America and East Asia, and traded freely with the colonies of France. The war that Napoleon helped to provoke between Britain and the United States played no part in determining his larger destinies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bonnel, Ulane. *La France, les États-Unis, et la guerre de course, 1797–1815*. Paris, 1961. Describes in lucid fashion the effects of the continental system upon the United States.

Clauder, Anna C. *American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1793–1812*. Philadelphia, 1932. An old but useful analysis of trade statistics and maritime regulations.

Crosby, Alfred W. *America, Russia, Hemp, and Napoleon: American Trade with Russia and the Baltics, 1783–1812*. Columbus, Ohio, 1965. An important study for understanding why the continental system never effectively excluded neutral and British commerce from Europe.

Heckscher, Eli F. *The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation*. Oxford and New York, 1922. Especially useful in understanding the historical background to the continental system and provides a detailed analysis of the continental response to the blockade.

Hickey, Donald R. *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana and Chicago, 1990. The account of the Hartford Convention of 1814–1815 emphasizes that the twenty-six New England delegates, led by Harrison Gray Otis, were never secession-minded.

McCoy, Drew R. *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980. Places Republican foreign policy within the goals they sought for establishing a domestic society, emphasizing land and trade expansion, creation of virtuous individual citizens, and a better, more humane world.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*. 2 vols. London, 1892. Demonstrates the difficulties Napoleon experienced in effectively countering the naval power of Britain.

Perkins, Bradford. *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812*. Berkeley; Calif., 1961. Critical of Jeffersonian policies, the book is especially strong on the domestic political factors both in America and England that shaped policies leading to war.

Schon, Alan. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. New York, 1997. This single-volume biography, covering all of Napoleon's major activities, places his economic policies in the context of his larger ambitions.

Sears, Louis Martin. *Jefferson and the Embargo*. Durham, N.C., 1927. Supports Jefferson's positions on several disputed issues.

Spivak, Burton. *Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution*. Charlottesville, Va., 1979. Tells how English countermeasures to French policies brought both political and ideological crises upon Jefferson.

Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson*. New York, 1990. The authors are critical of Jefferson's failure to understand that America's future, and the creation of a better world, remained closely tied to the survival of England. They believe Jefferson virtually sided with Napoleon and the continental system.

Varg, Paul A. *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers*. East Lansing, Mich., 1963. Provides an astute analysis of the practical and ideological components in the thinking of Jefferson and Madison concerning foreign affairs.

See also BLOCKADES; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; NAVAL DIPLOMACY; NEUTRALITY.

Covert Operations

John Prados

Unlike many concepts in foreign affairs, the secret, sub rosa practice of covert operations has a formal definition officially approved by the president of the United States and embodied in a National Security Council (NSC) directive. According to NSC Directive 10/2, approved on 18 June 1948, a covert operation is an activity sponsored by the United States government against foreign states or groups that is so planned and executed that U.S. responsibility for it is not evident to an unauthorized person and that, if uncovered, the government can plausibly deny responsibility for the action. The operation could be unilateral, in support of a foreign state or group, and have a state or nonstate target—the key aspect is that the activity remain secret. Although not provided for in Directive 10/2, covert operations also can be conducted unilaterally or in conjunction with other friendly, or even adversary, intelligence services in pursuit of common objectives and goals.

Beneath the formal definition, the kinds of activity involved in covert operations fall into a number of broad categories. Chief among these are political action, paramilitary activity, psychological warfare, and economic warfare. The evolution of technology suggests strongly that operational incentives in intelligence work will shortly add a new broad category of cyberaction or computer warfare to the traditional covert action menu. A large-scale covert operation usually has components that involve many or all of these categories.

In political action the object is to influence the internal situation in a foreign country by manipulating local political conditions. Intervention in an election is at the high end of the scale in political action, and might involve financial support for candidates, media advice, technical support for public relations, get-out-the-vote or political organizing efforts, legal expertise, advertising campaigns, assistance with poll-watching, and other means of direct action. More subtly, local situations could be influenced by agents, such as officials of the country targeted for action making decisions in their official capacities that are in the interest of the political action. Mechanisms for creating and deepening opinions are of key importance in covert political action, which often therefore involves propaganda. Some of the earliest Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operations were political actions to influence elections. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, global and domestic interests in democracy and democratic values were such that intelligence agency political actions might be able to benefit from cooperation with or cover from private groups seeking to foment these kinds of institutions and values.

Political action may have objectives short of a change of government. This is particularly true given the perspective since the end of the Cold War, with nonstate actors increasingly dominating the attention of intelligence services. A hypothetical political action, one not known to be in progress but which very likely may be, would be an operation designed to worsen local conditions that permit drug cartels and international criminal enterprises to flourish.

In paramilitary operations the intelligence service (or military force) conducts activities similar to those of constituted military units. Again the target may be a nation or a nonstate actor, but the currency of influence will be force. An operation may involve unconventional warfare, such as commando raids, training, advice, equipment, or command of irregular forces; it may also include support of guerrilla activities, creation of secret networks to oppose an adversary even if a country falls, the active propagation of a coup d'état, collaboration with or reinforcement of local security forces (such as the creation of a security detachment to protect a foreign head of state), and other functions. A number of U.S. paramilitary initiatives

during the Cold War period involved cooperation with third country intelligence or military services.

In psychological warfare the object is to mold opinion in the service of other activities, such as diplomacy, political action, paramilitary operations, or open warfare. Activities in psychological warfare run the gamut of the ways in which people absorb information. Traditionally, this has meant leaflets, newspapers, magazines, books, radio, and television, all of which have to be harnessed to convey the propaganda message appropriate to the operation. In the twenty-first century, techniques will expand to cover electronic communication by computer and the Internet as well, and intelligence services can create leaflets, finance books, journals, or television/radio programs. They may employ officers to work as journalists, recruit agents of influence, operate media outlets, plant certain stories or information in places it may come to public attention, or seek to deny and/or discredit information that is public knowledge. A distinction is made in psychological warfare regarding whether the target audience is permitted to be aware of the originator of the material they are receiving. In all such propaganda efforts, "black" operations denote those in which the audience is to be kept ignorant of the source; "white" efforts are those in which the originator openly acknowledges himself; and "gray" operations are those in which the source is partly but not fully acknowledged. In psychological warfare theory the attribution of a claim or piece of information included in a psychological warfare campaign has a bearing on the receptiveness of the audience, so that planners consider questions of black versus white carefully.

Economic warfare is aimed at the adversary's production capability and scientific-technological (research and development) base. Often used as part of paramilitary operations or psychological warfare, this technique reduces the target's actual output, retards innovation, or lends weight to claims being made in propaganda. A campaign of this kind may involve paramilitary-style commando raids to sabotage or demolish targets, or on-site actions by agents or sympathizers with identical aims. This variety of covert action can also involve semiopen measures such as preclusively or preemptively purchasing items on global markets to keep them out of the hands of the adversary, or diplomatic actions intended to reduce or eliminate international markets for the adversary's products. In fact, varieties of possible action are limited only by the imagination of practitioners.

EVOLUTION OF COVERT OPERATIONS

Under the general label of "subversion," covert operations in fact have a lengthy history in warfare. Fomentation of rebellions by agents of another power has occurred many times in history; examples are British plots with royalist agents against Napoleon (1800–1804), French schemes to overthrow the government of Mexico (1861–1867), German plots in Mexico, Persia, and Turkey (1912–1916), and various governments' machinations during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Recruitment and employment of mercenaries, which can be categorized as a paramilitary activity, dates to at least the eleventh century, and accounts for a substantial fraction of forces in the field during periods of the Middle Ages. A major covert paramilitary operation, which eventually ended in full-scale military intervention, was France's provision of experts and equipment to rebels during the American Revolution (1777–1778). Spanish guerrillas fighting the French Empire (1807–1814) made a major contribution to the downfall of Napoleon I, while Boer commandos raiding into British South Africa (1895–1899) set the stage for the Second Boer War. An example of a political action would be the efforts of Sir William Stephenson and the unit he led, British Security Coordination, to encourage U.S. entry into World War II during 1940–1941.

While states and actors in international relations have always made efforts to convince audiences that their course is the righteous one, the targets of these information campaigns have shifted gradually over time. Propagandists in the American Revolution (1775–1783) sought to convince other Americans to support the rebellion and not the British Crown. In the French Revolution and the succeeding Napoleonic wars (1789–1815) the objects were similarly to justify actions by one's own side and denigrate the enemy. By the time of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), when the Paris Commune printed leaflets it distributed to German soldiers in an effort to dissuade them from continuing the fight, the target of propaganda began shifting to the adversary side.

During World War I (1914–1918) the whole idea of propaganda was taken to a new level. Possibly because the question of who was responsible for that conflict was deemed so controversial, and possibly due to its intensity as modern "total" war, World War I brought a focused practice of

propaganda. As the war continued, with frustrations mounting at the inability to achieve progress on the battlefront, and mutinies of soldiers in the French and Russian armies and sailors in the German navy, ideas for propaganda seemed more and more to have practical application. Propaganda coupled with political action figured in the German decision to provide a train and free passage home for Russian revolutionaries exiled in Switzerland, persons who eventually played key roles in the overthrow of the Russian monarchy. British propaganda in the United States plus astute leaks of intelligence (a telegram from the German foreign minister indicating an intention to conduct subversive activities in the Americas) had an important effect on the U.S. decision to enter the war.

There were more developments during the period 1919–1939. Nazi Germany for the first time created a cabinet-level government department named the Ministry of Propaganda. Since that time the propaganda and public relations roles of officials working in the information ministries of many nations have come to overshadow their role of providing knowledge to citizens. The Germans also created templates for effective propaganda techniques and built theories around them. Although the term "psychological warfare" is best credited to World War II, the main techniques and tenets of the theory existed by the 1930s and were tested by Germany, Italy, and Russia in their interventions in the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish war also proved important to the evolution of paramilitary operations, with the phrase "fifth column" used to denote a (subversive) force that attacks the adversary from within at the orders of an external foe, originating in that civil war.

World War II (1939–1945) featured the use of covert operations by all sides and the introduction of almost all the techniques utilized in modern times. The style of political manipulation used by Germany in Norway, Hungary, Romania, by Japan in India, Burma, French Indochina, by Great Britain in the Middle East, and by the United States in French North Africa all carried traditional propaganda activities to a new level and essentially created modern political action. The rise of popular resistance movements, to Germany in Europe—and to Japan in the Philippines, Burma, and China—brought demands for external assistance and led to the creation of organizations specialized in working with guerrilla movements, such as Great Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE). The ability of the resistance movements to conduct systematic activities behind enemy lines, including both simple espionage and more forceful sabotage and ambush, affirmed the notion that a "fifth column" could function, leading to the postwar creation of "stay-behind networks" intended to replicate the functions of the World War II resistance. At the same time, the notion of supplementing resistance activities with teams of specialists from the outside, and reinforcing their actions with carefully targeted commando raids, added depth and comprehensiveness to the entire endeavor. This carried paramilitary operations to a new level as well.

One resistance function added sabotage to older forms of subversion. Sabotage was used against enemy transportation systems, communications networks, and war production. These tactics could be useful in specific situations, such as the work of the French resistance in hampering German transport, and thus the response to the 1944 invasion of Normandy. The technique could also work generally, reducing war production or inflicting delays on critical shipments. In the sense of World War II as a "total" war, the subversive effort against the enemy war economy could be fitted together with regular military operations, such as the bombing of factories, and with import-export controls, preclusive buying of raw materials, and other measures to affect the adversary's economy. The experience brought a realization that a nation could wage economic warfare. Ultimately this added a new category to the varieties of covert operations.

Psychological warfare also attained new levels during World War II. The growth of electronic means of communication started before the war, and by 1939 had reached the point that broadcast radio was widely distributed among populations in every nation. This created a new field for the dissemination of propaganda, and every belligerent was careful to put its message on the airwaves. By the same token, one could mimic and masquerade as the enemy's radio broadcasters, gaining credibility for a propaganda message that might otherwise be rejected. This in turn opened a field in "black" and "gray" media operations, which pretended to various degrees to be those of the adversary.

In leaflets and newspapers and other older techniques, World War II brought a more systematic approach to psychological warfare. Scientific research became a major contributor, with theories of how people absorb information, how they

build belief systems, and why people change their minds. Psychological warfare planners began to make decisions on complete campaigns, with comprehensive activities in many media, consistent themes across the different forms, messages evolving over time (and modified to take into account actual developments on the war fronts), and specific goals and objectives. Opinion research and prisoner interrogation became an important guide for ways to frame the psychological warfare themes.

A further major development of World War II would be that belligerents realized that these distinct elements of covert operations could be combined into coherent efforts with multiple facets. In addition, one could build a "strategy," specific plans using numerous tactics to gain particular objectives. It is instructive that in at least three of the crucial war theaters of 1939–1945—western Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast/East Asia—the Anglo-American alliance created specialized headquarters to control all covert operations.

One more innovation of the 1939–1945 period was the creation of national-level organizations to carry out these activities. On the American side, for example, it is of interest that the initial entity in this field was formed to manage propaganda activity. This unit, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, soon metamorphosed into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a national intelligence organization headed by the same individual (William J. Donovan). The propaganda function continued to be consolidated, but under a second entity, the Office of War Information. Over a very short time the OSS became a full-service intelligence organization. Its branches for intelligence reporting (Research and Analysis), counterespionage (called X-2), and spying (Special Intelligence) were under a deputy director for intelligence and are not of concern here. But the OSS had a separate directorate for operations and that included branches for special operations (which worked with resistance networks), morale operations (for psychological warfare of the "black" and "gray" varieties), a set of operations groups (middle-size commando units tasked with specific targets), a maritime unit (for naval covert operations where necessary, but mainly to transport OSS officers and supply shipments to points behind enemy lines), and a special projects office (a parallel activity for highly sensitive operations, especially ones related to then-exotic weapons, such as atomic bombs or biological weaponry). At its late-1944 peak the OSS employed almost 13,000 men and women, about 7,500 of them overseas, with a fiscal year 1945 budget (in then-year dollars) of $43 million.

At the field level, OSS operations were carried out by "detachments." For example, OSS Detachment 101 served in Burma and mobilized an army of Kachin tribesmen against the Japanese. Detachment 202 worked in China, training nationalist Chinese, carrying out some sabotage missions, and having some contacts with the Chinese communists. In Europe, OSS detachments worked in the Mediterranean, where they assisted resistance forces in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and later in northern Italy. These operations succeeded an initial OSS penetration into French North Africa, from which later activities were controlled. Western European activities were controlled from London and included paramilitary actions in France, Norway, Germany, and Austria. In every one of these areas the OSS maintained a delicate relationship with allies, including secret services of Great Britain, France, and China. The covert operators of the OSS simultaneously learned from their allies and cooperated with them, but the nations frequently had cross-cutting purposes in local situations.

With the end of the war, President Harry S. Truman reorganized U.S. intelligence. Believing the existing OSS to have become superfluous, Truman dissolved it on 20 September 1945. The organization's analytical arm was folded into the Department of State as the Office of Research and Intelligence. The OSS espionage elements were attached to the Department of War as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Field detachments were broken up, with some personnel continuing on with the SSU, some going to related groups like the army's Counterintelligence Corps, and others demobilized. Psychological warfare capability at a reduced level continued within the army, and its ranger battalions contained whatever commando and unconventional warfare capability remained. The capacity for conducting paramilitary operations was entirely eliminated.

Two factors combined to change the system introduced in the immediate postwar period. One was President Truman's continuing dissatisfaction with the organizational structure of U.S. intelligence. In January 1946, Truman introduced an executive oversight body he called the National Intelligence Authority to supervise the work of a new director of central intelligence (DCI) who would run a central intelligence group. The new

arrangement continued to be unsatisfactory and in 1947, when Truman designated omnibus legislation to deal with universal military training, create a national military establishment and secretary of defense, as well as the National Security Council, the president included provisions for the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Signed into law on 26 July 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 continues to this day as the statutory authority underlying the CIA. Apart from laws that govern restricted aspects of intelligence work, such as retirement policy, the DCI's responsibility to safeguard sources and methods, the public identification of undercover intelligence officers, and the like, the 1947 act is the only charter the agency has. This is significant for covert operations because the 1947 act says nothing about them. Instead, all covert operations (and many other CIA activities as well) have been based on a single clause of the law, which states that the CIA can "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The mandate was simultaneously incredibly broad, very thin, and ambiguous, so much so that on at least four occasions (1947, 1962, 1969, and 1974) lawyers in the office of the CIA's general counsel warned that the statutory authorization was insufficient to cover covert operations.

The second factor that transformed intelligence roles and missions was the growth of hostility between the United States and Russia, which gave rise to the Cold War. This ideological conflict pitted democratic ideals against the authoritarian communist politics of Russia (then called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The Cold War struggle seemed to call for the kind of all-out commitment, including covert operations, that had characterized World War II. Thus the NSC directive on covert operations made explicit reference to communism and Russia in establishing provisions for covert action.

In response to demands for action the U.S. intelligence community and the executive branch quickly devised new entities for covert operations. The CIA, Department of State, and military pooled personnel and resources to form the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which assumed the mantle of authority. The NSC 10/2 directive had specifically ordered the CIA to create the Office of Special Projects, much like the OSS did, for this purpose, and this unit, renamed OPC, also absorbed the Special Procedures Group the CIA had formed to carry out psychological warfare in December 1947. By 1949, OPC had 302 personnel, seven overseas stations, and a budget of $4.7 million. By 1952 personnel had risen to 2,812 plus 3,142 contract employees, who were spending $82 million and working from forty-seven overseas stations.

One of the first major U.S. covert operations was intervention in Italian politics in 1947–1948 to prevent an electoral victory by the Italian communist party. This political action started a lengthy involvement in Italy, which continued through at least the 1970s; it also set the standard for CIA political action programs. A similar intervention in France was designed to weaken the French communist party, while actions on the propaganda/psychological warfare front included funding journals and newspapers (the CIA would have a controlling interest in the *Rome Daily American,* for example), the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the World Assembly of Youth, the "gray" broadcast station Radio Free Europe, and the "black" (at least initially) station Radio Liberty. Both the CIA and OPC began programs to furnish financial support to publications and books deemed suitable for advancing the anticommunist cause, and money was laundered through the Marshall Plan and the Ford Foundation among others. Much of this knowledge emerged in a spate of revelations in 1967, forcing President Lyndon B. Johnson to appoint a special commission under deputy attorney general Nicolas deB. Katzenbach to investigate these political actions. One lesson that would be repeatedly relearned is that covert operations are fraught with political consequence for the initiator as well as the target.

Paramilitary operations got under way in collaboration with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The Americans made a start in 1950–1952 by joining in an attempt to overthrow the communist government of Albania. The OPC, by this time, had lost its institutional independence and become part of the Directorate of Plans (DDP) within the CIA (in another 1952 reorganization the OPC and the directorate's other major unit, the espionage-centered Office of Special Operations, would be entirely merged) so that the actor on the American side of these operations was officially CIA. The CIA and SIS were allied in paramilitary operations into Russia (now Ukraine and Belarus), Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Much of the burden in those operations was carried by the SIS, but in Poland, where there would

be another combined paramilitary-political action, the CIA carried the burden. Every one of these operations was known to the adversary and had been penetrated by means of the Russians placing spies of their own within the CIA–SIS apparatus. All the operations failed by 1953. (However, it should be noted that anticommunist Russians continued efforts to make some kind of inroad into the USSR until at least the late 1950s.) The CIA moved on to greener pastures. The lesson here would be that covert operations against the communist enemy—the mandated target when the CIA created its covert operations program—were too difficult to carry out.

In general, operations proved most successful where the CIA had freedom of movement and good access, which in this period meant western Europe. A particular concern was the creation of stay-behind networks that would function just like the World War II resistance had in the event the Russians overran western Europe in a future war. Such nets were successfully created in virtually every western European country from Italy to Norway, including neutrals such as Sweden and even nations under military occupation like Austria. In some countries the secret networks were tied in to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense planning. In all of them the conservative political bent of adherents to the groups gave the CIA certain political contacts. Secrecy lasted for several decades, until a rash of detailed revelations during the early 1980s led to controversy, with parliamentary inquiries in more than one European country and attendant embarrassment for the United States. The lesson here contradicts an aphorism often heard from intelligence officers, that successes remain secret while only failures become known to the public. More accurately, every covert operation above a certain size will ultimately become known.

It would be during the early 1950s that the CIA's Directorate of Plans achieved its classic covert victories. One came in Iran in 1953 in conjunction with SIS, where the Americans and British induced an unusual coup in which a constitutional monarch overthrew the government of his own country. Here the shah of Iran, relying upon popular support of the CIA, had mobilized and ousted a left-wing populist cabinet to create a virtual military dictatorship. In another victory in 1954, the CIA overthrew the elected Labor Party (socialist to communist ideologically) government of Guatemala, through a combination of psychological warfare, paramilitary action by a small force, and diplomatic pressure. Again the successor government was a military dictatorship.

The shah of Iran managed to hold on to power through the late 1970s by a combination of economic modernization and political repression, but the suppression of moderate political forces in his country forced opposition to align with a fundamentalist religious movement that ultimately toppled the shah in a 1979 revolution. At that time the U.S. embassy would be taken over, and American diplomats (and the officers of the CIA station) held hostage for 444 days, with the United States painted as the "Great Satan" to the Iranian public. In the years since the Iranian revolution, the United States was unable to restore a balanced relationship with Iran. Worse, the Iranians supported terrorist groups in the Middle East through the 1980s, which significantly harmed American interests and took lives, hostages, and made other depredations in a succession of incidents.

In Guatemala the military government installed by the covert operation replaced a democratic tradition and handed power to other military regimes or authoritarian oligarchies that maintained authority by high security. Beginning in 1968 the military inaugurated a war against the peasantry that endured into the late 1990s, leaving more than half the population of the country displaced internally and with a death toll in excess of 60,000.

A lesson here is that covert operations successes do not always lead to achievements to be proud of, possibly due to the moral, political, and empirical compromises necessary in pursuit of the short-term action. In addition, long-term effects can be more detrimental to U.S. interests than the improvements gained by the original success.

A further characteristic of these covert operations is that they were aimed not at Russia or its Soviet bloc but at Third World countries. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in the end would be very active in covert operations, all of them against putative communist foes, and almost all in the Third World. Among these were projects carried out in Vietnam (1954–1956 paramilitary efforts), Eastern Europe (1953–1956 psychological warfare), Indonesia (1958 paramilitary), Laos (1958 political action; 1959–on paramilitary), Tibet (1959–on paramilitary), Cuba (1960–on paramilitary and economic warfare), and Congo (1960–on). Eisenhower bequeathed to John F. Kennedy a number of these ongoing activities. President Kennedy actually

assumed the entire blame for the dismal CIA failure at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, an operation whose dimensions had been set by his predecessor.

Aside from its effects on world opinion of the United States and consequences in Latin American diplomacy, the Bay of Pigs failure had a major impact on U.S. national security policy overall. President Kennedy and his advisers were induced to review ways of making policy, approving covert operations, and U.S. capabilities for covert and unconventional warfare. Kennedy determined to make the U.S. military, not the CIA, responsible for all paramilitary activity that met certain criteria. Kennedy also credited the CIA failure with instilling in him a new attitude of skepticism regarding advice from government bureaucrats. Finally, at the most fundamental level, Kennedy intimates report that in the wake of the Bay of Pigs failure, the president actually considered breaking up the CIA.

While President Kennedy changed the way he did business, he did not reduce reliance on CIA covert operations. Kennedy continued all the covert actions that had been in progress when he came to office. Far from giving up on the Cuba action after the Bay of Pigs disaster, he ordered a renewed project called Mongoose. Kennedy added major covert operations in Vietnam. In fact, where the Eisenhower administration had approved 104 covert operations in eight years, Kennedy's approved 163 in slightly more than three years. From political action in British Guiana to reorganized activity in Africa, the CIA's work was global during this period. Part of the rise in numbers of approvals can be accounted for by more stringent rules on what kinds of covert operations required National Security Council subcommittee approval—one post–Bay of Pigs reform—but reliance on the method nevertheless remained strong.

Kennedy's rules on approvals began an evolution of procedures, each time more explicit, that endured at least through the 1980s and that came to involve Congress as well as the executive branch. Even under the Kennedy-Johnson rules, most covert actions never rose to the NSC level. The Richard M. Nixon administration added a requirement that its NSC monitoring unit, called the 40 Committee, review annually the covert operations that were in progress. In 1974 reporting requirements expanded into Congress, with the CIA required to report to eight different committees under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. The agency chafed under this restriction and later won a reduction in the reporting requirements to where notifications must go to the Select Intelligence Committee in the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives. A "presidential finding" that a given operation is in the national security interests of the United States is the required notification. These findings, in turn, came into question during the Iran-Contra affair of the late 1980s, which raised questions as to whether findings could be retroactive, unwritten ("mental" in the phrase of Attorney General Edwin Meese), furnished after the activities in question had been carried out, and so on. Reforms that followed clarified the presidential finding system such that the documents are provided in advance, kept current, that covert operations are of a certain size, and provide other important details.

For a brief period during the Gerald R. Ford administration (1976–1977) the executive branch maintained its own Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor the appropriateness and implementation of covert operations. Otherwise this has been among many functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), except during the James Earl Carter administration (1977–1981) when that entity was temporarily abolished. Subject to presidential goals, style, and whims, such executive monitoring has been of limited utility; for example, it did not protect President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) from the excesses of Iran-Contra or other difficulties attributable to high-handed actions by his director of central intelligence, William J. Casey. Meanwhile, the NSC group approving covert operations has gone through a series of identity changes: 303 Committee (Johnson administration), 40 Committee (Nixon/Ford administrations), NSC Special Coordinating Committee (Carter administration), National Security Planning Group (Reagan administration), NSC Deputies Committee (George H. W. Bush, William Jefferson Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations); but the unit has retained essentially the same membership in terms of the offices held by participants.

The Johnson administration ended the covert operation against Cuba and phased out CIA action in the Congo. However, it encouraged a coup in Ghana and brought major intelligence resources to bear in Bolivia against Che Guevara, a hero of the Cuban revolution. In Chile the Johnson administration carried out a political action during the 1964 elections to prevent any victory by Chilean socialists. In Asia, the Johnson-era

CIA terminated the Tibetan paramilitary operation, attempted a political action in Indonesia (1965–1966), and carried out full-scale secret wars in Laos and South Vietnam. Johnson also continued CIA funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty's "gray" psychological warfare campaign.

In 1971, during the Nixon administration, funding for the radios stopped, no longer supported by Congress. This administration continued the secret wars in South Vietnam and Laos and escalated the latter by bringing into it whole battalions and artillery units of third-country nationals (in this case, Thais). The CIA's Directorate of Plans was retitled the Directorate of Operations. To benefit Israel, the administration carried out a mid-intensity paramilitary campaign in Iraq, arming Kurdish tribesmen to fight the national government. Nixon's best-known covert operation would be a large-scale political action in Chile aimed at preventing the emergence of socialist government and, when that failed, at creating such economic and social dislocation in Chile that the government of President Salvador Allende would topple. That occurred in 1973, giving way to a military dictatorship that held sway until the early 1990s. At the close of the century, General Augusto Pinochet, leader of the Chilean military junta, was defending himself from an array of foreign and Chilean criminal indictments flowing from his takeover and governance. The shift in international legal norms toward greater attention to human rights issues, termination of sovereign immunity in mass murder cases, and the absence of a statute of limitations for war crimes complicated recruitment for covert operations in the twenty-first century.

The end of America's Vietnam War (1961–1975), in which U.S. combat operations terminated in early 1973, brought a reduction in CIA covert operations capabilities as experts retired, their contracts were not renewed, and CIA proprietaries such as Air America were liquidated. One consequence would be fewer covert operations through the 1970s. The Ford administration initiated one significant paramilitary campaign in Angola, against a socialist majority party backed by Cubans and Russians. Halted by a Senate amendment prohibiting expenditure of funds, the Angola action attained the distinction of being the only covert operation formally ended by a congressional vote. The Carter administration worried about Angola but focused its covert efforts in west Africa and particularly Afghanistan, after the Russian intervention there at the end of 1979. The latter would be a fresh CIA multilateral initiative, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China enlisted to assist a paramilitary effort.

William J. Casey ran the CIA for the Reagan administration between 1981 and 1987. This period was more active for covert operations than any time since the Eisenhower years. Under Casey the CIA resumed covert assistance in Angola and conducted additional paramilitary campaigns in Mozambique, Chad/Libya, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Iran, and Nicaragua. It was reported in 1984 that fifty major covert operations were in progress at that time as compared to ten during the final year of the Carter administration.

An operation the CIA conducted at a low level in Cambodia had the United States in support of a communist faction that had murdered more than a million people when it was in power. In both Cambodia and Afghanistan, the United States was allied with erstwhile enemy the People's Republic of China. Afghanistan would be the closest the CIA came to a classic covert victory in the 1980s. Fundamentalist Muslim groups—armed by the CIA and trained by the United States—and Pakistan fought the Russians to a standstill and forced them to withdraw in 1989. But neither the CIA nor the Russians stopped aid to their respective factions in Afghanistan until 1992; a decade later fighting was still disrupting that country and had brought to power a faction that shielded terrorists whom the United States considered a major threat to its national security. Worse still, the terrorists benefited from CIA training—Arabs actually have a term, "American Afghan," for Muslim fundamentalist fighters who got their start in the CIA war of 1980–1989—and the sophisticated weapons the agency provided. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist strikes on New York City and Washington, D.C., one irony would be the fact that this action could lead the United States into an alliance with Russia in a further covert operation in Afghanistan.

In Latin America a CIA covert operation of the Reagan years led to a constitutional crisis in the United States. This was the paramilitary effort against the communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Standard paramilitary tactics proved ineffective enough that the CIA resorted to third-country nationals and a CIA-directed ("unilateral" is the term) mining campaign against Nicaraguan ports. The CIA then misled Congress about these actions, resulting in a suspension of

funds to the agency campaign. The zealous CIA director Casey combined with White House NSC staff aides to run the covert operation outside the system, using money derived from the sale of weapons to Iran. This involved President Reagan in several violations of U.S. law and called his leadership into question. The formal CIA program eventually resumed, and a negotiated end to Central American fighting ended the bloodshed, but in the United States a special prosecutor appointed by the court continued investigations and prosecutions of officials involved in these events until well into the administration of President George H. W. Bush.

Covert actions did not end with Reagan. In the Bush administration there were CIA paramilitary efforts in Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 and in Panama (1989). The CIA would also become quite involved in political action in Somalia in conjunction with the U.S. humanitarian intervention there (1992–1993). For the most part, however, the time is too recent to report very much regarding covert operations during either the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Judging from the policy statements, however, a high proportion of these can be expected to have been against such "nonstate actors" as drug cartels and terrorist groups. Prime examples are the actions initiated globally by the United States following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.

PROBLEMS OF COVERT OPERATIONS

It is significant that capabilities which the United States created to wage an ideological war against Russian communism have found their primary use against small nations in the Third World. In the aftermath of the Cold War, when American democratic ideals were extolled, the fact that covert operations posed an implicit political, paramilitary, and psychological warfare challenge to national self-determination in the Third World detracted from the luster of the United States. Suspicion of U.S. motives will also follow from public knowledge of the existence and practice of covert operations techniques.

It is problematic that more than fifty years after the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency no fundamental law existed that defined in detail the authority and responsibilities of U.S. intelligence. It remained questionable whether the legal authority to conduct covert operations exists in U.S. law. Part of the recurring struggle over the approval and authorization for covert operations arose precisely because the charter for the mission remained ambiguous. If the public adopted a different understanding of "intelligence matters" or rejected an expansive definition of "national security," the limited legal framework provided by the National Security Act of 1947 would disappear instantly.

Covert operations also takes the CIA, and U.S. intelligence more broadly, out of its ideal role of informing statecraft. In a covert operation the CIA is an action agency, with practical policy interests and a need to advocate them. This puts the agency into the ranks of the rest of the government, arguing options and furnishing a rationale to slant the intelligence analysis, the objectivity of which is crucial to policymakers.

From the standpoint of control and management, there is little evidence that the CIA and other agencies, including military agencies, are out-of-control, "rogue elephants" in the idiom of the 1970s. The danger is more one of overzealousness in the implementation of presidential directives, as demonstrated in the Iran-Contra affair. A process of continual review is necessary to supervise covert operations.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, covert operations are a complicating factor. The degree of covert activism contributes to a global image of the United States, and established images would be difficult to change even if the United States were to cease the practice of covert operations. Moreover, actions taken in the past can influence present events, even the far distant past and the modernist present as in the case of Iran. Covert operations also have unanticipated consequences both foreign and domestic, especially where overzealous operators exceed instructions.

Unfortunately, presidents almost always have a full plate of vital issues of the day. They rarely have the opportunity for the detailed examination and management of covert operations, as Kennedy learned painfully from the Bay of Pigs. The formula of using an NSC subcommittee for control has limitations of its own, and congressional oversight has been a two-edged sword. In short, problems of management have persisted and are likely to do so. On the other hand, covert operations have been seductive, promising action on intractable international situations seemingly outside the awkward framework of war powers, nonintervention in the internal affairs of foreign nations, and coping for ways to get at nonstate

actors. Some, especially former practitioners, hold up covert operations as a "third option" between doing nothing and going to war. The likelihood is that post–Cold War covert operations will be frequent, and that existing difficulties with the technique will endure.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Higgins, Trumbull. *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs.* New York, 1987. Presents a detailed analysis of one of the most spectacular covert operations failures.

Johnson, Loch K. *Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World.* New Haven, Conn., 1996. An overview of intelligence with insightful comments on covert operations.

Kwitney, Jonathon. *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World.* New York, 1984. Shows several examples of a process by which covert operations rebound to the detriment of the United States.

Moser, Charles, ed. *Combat on Communist Territory.* Washington, D.C., 1985. Essays that examine progress in various countries at the high point of Reagan-era covert operations.

Prados, John. *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf.* An in-depth survey of covert operations in which the author demonstrates common features and problems of use of these techniques. Rev. ed. Chicago, 1996.

Shackley, Theodore. *The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations.* New York, 1981. Argues for covert operations as a cost-effective alternative to military action.

Treverton, Gregory F. *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World.* New York, 1987. An investigator for the Church Committee warns of the inadequacies of covert action.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

Cultural Imperialism

Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht

Jamie Uys's humorous yet moving film *The Gods Must Be Crazy* narrates the story of what happens when a pilot flying across the Kalahari Desert of Botswana drops a Coca-Cola bottle into the midst of a tribal group. The confused aboriginals explain the object as a gift from the gods. But the bottle challenges and destroys the traditions and social mores of their world. To defy the object's destructive influence, the tribe sends out one of its members to toss the evil thing over the edge of the earth, a distance the clan believes is some twenty days' walk away. Uys's movie was so popular on the international market that its producers created a sequel. *The Gods Must Be Crazy* offered a conspicuous sample of American consumer imperialism and its victimization of the Third World. Released in 1981, the film struck a vital chord in the middle of what has come to be known as "The Grand Debate": Have Americans become cultural imperialists? Do manufacturers, policymakers, and other interest groups attempt to conquer and corrupt the rest of the world by flooding it with consumer products made in the United States of America?

Since 1945, the study of cultural transfer has formed a powerful tool for the analysis of America's interaction with other nations. But in contrast to other approaches, neither historians nor their peers in neighboring fields have ever devised a clear-cut terminology. Indeed, they have not even employed a single line of argument. Originating in political think tanks after World War II, the investigation of cultural transfer has made its way through academic institutes the world over, until it finally arrived in the public sphere in the 1980s. By far the most popular—or notorious—approach has been termed "cultural imperialism," a notion and an ideology that appealed to a long list of supporters in the 1960s and after, and that—because of its persistence and influence—deserves the attention of all scholars interested in the study of culture and foreign relations. However, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, and others have suggested that the notion of "cultural imperialism" should be replaced with a more fluid term that avoids what they regard as the naive active-passive dominator-victim dualism. Alternative terms include, for example, "cultural transmission" and "transcultural interaction." Students of culture and foreign relations should therefore use these terms with great caution and realize that they are based on specific arguments and interpretations.

THREE TRENDS OF CULTURAL TRANSFER

Cultural transfer does not represent a single, static trend or a set of criteria. Most historians of cultural transfer probably would deny that they all belong to one school. The specific meaning of the term is neither timeless nor free of ideological underpinnings. Instead, each meaning is generated out of its various discourses, its use. Since World War II, the study of cultural transfer has developed in cycles. Hence, its significance must be interpreted through historical lenses. First, the cold warriors deplored the absence of an active and forceful cultural diplomacy among U.S. officials. In contrast, their descendants, the critics of cultural imperialism, described the export of American culture as thinly veiled global capitalist exploitation. Finally, a third group of countercritics challenged the concept of cultural imperialism with a variety of different arguments. At the turn of the twenty-first century, a rather heterogeneous group of scholars argued that local resistance either modified or completely stymied imports as part of a global process. Begun as a purely political debate, the discussion has expanded into an increasingly academic dispute over culture as an instrument of power that either "functioned" or "did not function."

Scholars of U.S. cultural transfer are primarily concerned about U.S. cultural influence in the world but also deal with foreign influences in the United States. In contrast to their peers working in the field of political history, they look beyond the level of decision-making processes to figure out how culture, especially the export and osmosis of culture, can be explained as an instrument of political or economic power, a tool of international communication, and a dynamic force on its own. In particular, they seek to find out how governmental and nongovernmental actors exerted power abroad by importing and exporting material goods and ideas as well as by creating international networks and organizations. In this context, culture, and American culture in particular, does not connote a specific meaning but rather a conglomeration of aspirations, emotions, and identities shared by human beings living within a geographically and politically defined area. "Culture," contemplates Akira Iriye (1997), "determines what the ends of a nation are; power proves the means for obtaining them."

Cultural imperialism is based on the assumption that one nation tries to force its culture, ideology, goods, and way of life on another country. In the United States, critics of cultural imperialism as an instrument of diplomacy study the extent to which American culture reached and influenced foreign shores under governmental and private auspices. On one end of the spectrum, historians interested in cultural imperialism argue that postwar U.S. policymakers made a conscious effort to export American culture abroad in order to gain access to raw materials, cheap labor, and new markets for U.S. consumer products. On the other end of the spectrum, scholars have proposed to supplant the notion of cultural imperialism with cultural transmission, which seeks to deemphasize the question of agency and, instead, admits a more fluid concept of interaction.

In the past the idea and study of cultural transfer has appealed to many audiences outside of the academic world. It is this appeal to both scholars and the broader public that distinguishes the significance of cultural imperialism and cultural transmission from most other theoretical concepts discussed among diplomatic historians. Whether they liked it or not, since at least the early days of the Cold War, journalists, politicians, and intellectuals have fretted over the power and meaning of American culture abroad.

Since at least the 1960s, cultural imperialism has proven to be a tremendously popular and enduring concept. It has introduced culture as a variable into the study of foreign relations and thereby has significantly broadened the field. It has built the foundation upon which more than two generations of historians have based their research strategies and arguments. It has penetrated many academic disciplines, including musicology, sports, sociology, and political science. And it has left a long-lasting mark in the public arena; politicians the world over, for example, lament the manipulative influx of U.S. movies. Tiny nations, remote people, and unknown tribes find their way into the headlines of international journals through their outspoken protests against Western cultural imperialism. From Iceland to Latin America, Central Africa to the Philippines, local spokesmen presumably mourn the decease of their indigenous mores and traditions that is coupled with the rise of Anglo-American television and culture.

In harmony with the public debate, several generations of academics have struggled with questions of cultural transfer. Despite the scholars' intergenerational hostility and despite historians' increasing urge to defy old approaches for new configurations, students who desire to labor in the vineyard of cultural transfer need to know these interpretations. Each of the three principal trends still finds its way into early-twenty-first-century historiographical debates—and rightfully so. For despite all the ideological baggage, each trend offers viable methodological insights for research related to the meaning of American culture in the international arena.

In the years following World War II, policymakers and intellectuals began to believe that cultural diplomacy and cultural images made a difference in global politics. This assumption seemed radical if not revolutionary for most observers at the time. In 1938, when the State Department established the Division for Cultural Relations, many U.S. officials still criticized the use of culture as a diplomatic tool. Their reluctance reflected a consensus that culture belonged to the realm of creativity, public taste, and free enterprise. How and why should one win diplomatic negotiations by invoking art, music, books, and theater performances? On a more basic level, cultural programs were costly and there were no voters abroad to legitimize such investments.

After 1945 the situation changed as both U.S. diplomats and intellectuals began arguing that the United States needed to sell the American way of life abroad. Public figures as well as policy-

makers, such as the State Department consultant Arthur W. MacMahon, media czar Henry Luce, and Senator William Fulbright, encouraged governmental authorities to make more of an effort to influence foreign nations through culture around the world. In the early Cold War years, consequently, the American government created a number of organizations and programs, such as the United States Information Agency and the Fulbright exchange program, that sought to sell American culture—including literature, music, and art—abroad. The USIA was founded with the specific purpose of developing a cultural propaganda program for audiences abroad and to develop them with a full and fair picture of American life, society, and culture. The Fulbright program was created right after World War II to enable foreign students (notably German students) to study in the United States and become acquainted with the American way of life. Likewise, the program sent (and still sends) U.S. academics abroad to learn about cultural differences but also to act as informal ambassadors of the United States.

Designed in 1950, the "Campaign of Truth" was supposed to represent a psychological counterattack against Soviet indoctrination. Employing books, brochures, exhibitions, and lectures, the campaign was aimed at public opinion leaders and other "multipliers."

One might wonder why policymakers grew so interested in the American way of life. Why did they suddenly seek to impart American culture to others? First, on the ideological level, American culture was dizzily democratic; anything was allowed. American culture also seemed essentially resistant to autocracies on the left or the right, as reflected in the postwar consensus on liberalism manifest in the writings of intellectuals like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Daniel Boorstin, and Louis Hartz. Consequently, U.S. policymakers and scholars were convinced that the promotion abroad of an enterprise-based culture would help to spread democracy around the world and contain fascism, communism, and other repellent foreign ideologies.

Second, and on a more practical level, communist regimes, above all in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), made *Bildung* (knowledge, education) and *Kultur* (high culture) pivotal points of their own propaganda. The GDR government claimed to be a democratic institution and it attacked American culture as a manifestation of a degenerate democracy. Communist officials knew that Europeans identified strongly with their high culture. Public opinion polls taken between 1945 and 1950 revealed that many Germans dreaded the adaptation of democratic values at the expense of their cultural heritage. Communist propagandists had convinced German audiences that they could be communists and, simultaneously, admirers of high culture, such as the romantic music of the nineteenth-century composer Pyotr Tchaikovsky. According to their propaganda, democratic audiences in the Western world, in contrast, supposedly "drugged" their minds with jazz.

Third, in the decade after World War II many Americans felt a deep apprehension over what they saw as their worsening reputation in a world of cultural diversity abroad—new cultures, new nations, and new arms. Shortly after the Soviets launched the satellite *Sputnik,* Franz M. Joseph and Raymond Aron edited a collection of articles under the telling title *As Others See Us* (1959). In this book, some twenty representatives from all over the world portrayed their countries' impression of American society. The French, Aron asserted, detested America's "big industry, mass production, the lowering of standards in favor of the masses," as well as its race problems, superficiality, "industrial barbarism," and "the intellectual fodder offered to the American masses, from scandal magazines to digests of books." In the end, the book represented a most depressing analysis of America's image abroad. Most people believed that "Americans had done remarkable things in production and they had technical 'know-how,' but America itself was . . . [a] giant with the head of a lout."

Academic and journalistic investigations of American cultural transfer abroad in the late 1950s and 1960s underlined the prevalent belief that American information and exchange efforts represented a timid reaction to the Soviets' dynamic propaganda. "America is the greatest advertising country in the world," the journalist Peter Grothe complained in 1958. "Yet when it comes to the most important advertising campaign of all—that of advertising ourselves and the democratic way of life—we run a poor second to the Communists." Grothe reproached U.S. policymakers for not having made the most of cultural relations programs after World War II, blaming the small-mindedness and indifference of the president, Congress, and the American public. And sociologists like Princeton University's W. Phillips Davison demanded more effective pro-

grams with clear-cut values, detailed purposes, and a rigid selection and training of personnel. They urged policymakers to employ American books, films, and information programs as instruments to acquaint people the world over with U.S. history, politics, and culture. All people, in short, needed more American culture, and it was the government's task to export it abroad.

The men and women who took part in this debate, it should be added, employed a rather unspecific idea of American culture. Historians investigating the United States Information Agency—designed in 1953 to convince people abroad that U.S. goals were in harmony with their hopes for freedom, progress, and peace—have underlined the uncertainty to define the core and the ins and outs of American culture. As Laura Belmonte and others have shown, USIA's programs focused on areas that were regarded as representative of American culture and society, including consumer products, high living standards, and the advantages of a free-market economy. But throughout the 1950s the agency was hampered by conflicts over the content of its agenda and its mission. Michael Krenn has shown that at the World's Fair of 1958, endless debates over how to deal with the United States's "Achilles' heel" of race relations inhibited the entire organization of the U.S. exhibit.

In sum, until the 1960s the debate over the export of American culture remained primarily a political one. Its participants were civil servants, writers, and journalists who viewed the government's developing cultural programs abroad as worthy although insufficient weapons to contain totalitarianism in the world. These men and women did not ask whether foreign audiences would welcome such messages.

THE EMERGENCE OF A CULTURAL IMPERIALISM CRITIQUE

But in the late 1950s and early 1960s concern over the implications of American culture bounced back to Europe, where it inspired a debate that would dominate academia for the next thirty years. Indeed, academics everywhere increasingly internalized the debate on U.S. culture abroad but they also dramatically revised previous assessments. A blooming leftist movement associated capitalism with a host of things characteristic of twentieth-century society, including consumerism, modernity, bureaucratic "soulless" organization, and the conflict between society and the individual. Their findings would lay the groundwork for the study of U.S. cultural imperialism.

Again, the theme—a critical interpretation of American culture in the world—was not entirely new. Since the early 1900s, if not before, European conservatives such as D. H. Lawrence and Adolf Halfeld had criticized American civilization for its lack of soul and education. Americans, these writers argued, scoffed at high culture. Americans' essential national identity and values, such as productivity, efficiency, and rationality, stood in contrast to the most fundamental characteristics of *Kultur,* including quality work, contemplation, and the creative use of leisure. Many observers, that is, interpreted American civilization not just as plainly different from but as a treacherous threat to European culture.

The critics of the early 1900s found a faithful audience among post–World War II intellectuals. In the 1940s and 1950s, European leftists also began worrying about American influences, such as McCarthyism and consumerism. Horror-stricken at the term "mass," the Frankfurt School, a group of philosophers, sociologists, and historians, viewed the United States as a mass society with a mass culture that annihilated liberty, democracy, and individualism. The sociologist Herbert Marcuse stated that Americans represented a prime example of how human existence in advanced industrial societies remained passive, acquiescent, and unaware of its own alienation. In his writings, Marcuse developed the image of the "one-dimensional man" (the title of one of his books), an individual incapable of thinking dialectically and of questioning his society. Instead, humans had willfully subordinated themselves to the domination of technology and the principles of efficiency, productivity, and conformity.

The Frankfurt School was particularly worried about the demise of *Kultur.* Intellectual leaders such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Leo Lowenthal devised a theory based on Marxism that stressed the subliminal totalitarianism of news agencies, television, and broadcasting. Fostered by the media, American capitalism had turned into an economically and culturally repressive force. High culture no longer represented a foreign, opposing, and transcendental sphere that contrasted with reality. Instead, in the struggle between East and West, *Kultur* (that is, the individual philosopher, the preservation of theory, art, and high culture) had mutated into a propaganda tool and, thus, to a consumer good.

By materializing and mass-producing aspects of high culture, modern humankind had mutilated its original meaning.

The Frankfurt School influenced more than a generation of American thinkers. Disillusionment originating from the Vietnam War and domestic urban and student revolts captivated a culturally influential segment of Americans who came to condemn both the free-market economy and the U.S. government. The promotion of democracy by the United States seemed hypocritical and meaningless in the age of napalm bombs and the Watts riots. Journalists and scholars such as David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Vance Packard, and William H. Whyte studied the subject of the mass media in the 1940s and 1950s. They believed that the United States was the dominant promoter of capitalism around the globe and concluded from their study of the mass media that it represented a tool of U.S. capitalist ideology, perpetuating U.S. capitalism at home and abroad. To criticize the United States for its military involvement in the Third World, notably Vietnam, implied automatically a critique of American capitalism proper. Capitalism was bad because it threatened human wholeness, true individuality, the sense of community, social bonds, self-realization, and authentic values.

This critical interpretation of the nature of American capitalism profoundly influenced the writing on U.S. foreign relations. Discontent with the "realist" approach of historians such as George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and others, a new generation of "revisionists" shifted the study of the international system to the impact of domestic ideology as well as economic and social forces on U.S. diplomacy. And as American society grew wealthier, critics turned their attention away from the American working class to suppressed domestic minorities and the Third World, where they found that American capitalism, in search of new markets, raw materials, and cheap labor, acted as a victimizer, brutalizer, and exploiter. The making of American diplomacy had to be seen as part of America's capitalist political economy, argued New Left historians such as William Appleman Williams, because the health and persistence of the domestic economy depended on ever-expanding markets abroad. Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and others stressed the economic motivations of U.S. diplomacy and, thus, turned the investigation of the East-West conflict into a struggle between capitalism and socialism. U.S. policymakers constituted the foremost guilty party in this scheme because their actions were motivated solely by their greed, their quest for new markets that the Soviet Union did not even want.

The historiography of U.S. economic and political imperialism formed the foundation for the study of cultural imperialism. Although the term "cultural imperialism" had appeared in scholarly analyses before, it was only in the 1960s that this critique came to be a catchword as well as a coherent argument. The 1977 edition of the *Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought* defines cultural imperialism as "the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture." Critics of cultural imperialism were united in their portrayal of Western culture as an expansive, predatory force. They cast their critique in a structuralist framework that associates political ideas with an underlying discourse that, in turn, shapes the entire culture in the context of which such ideas are expressed. Unlike the discussants of the 1950s, who had called for more American culture abroad, the critics of cultural imperialism reproached the U.S. government and the business community for spreading that culture beyond U.S. borders.

FOUR DISCOURSES ON CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

John Tomlinson developed a most insightful critique, on the basis of which we can identify at least four different discourses of cultural imperialism. His categories are the media, national domination, the global dominance of capitalism, and the critique of modernity. Media imperialism is the oldest and by far most widely debated category. Most importantly, it relates to current political issues. The study of media imperialism originated in Latin America among students of communication research. In the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American economists interpreted their countries' economic relations to Europe and the United States by developing a theory of dependency. Chilean communication scholars quickly appropriated that concept when, at the time of the 1970 election that brought Salvador Allende to power, they began to admonish the United States for its involvement in Latin American affairs. One of the most dramatic and widely read essays written by these scholars came from Armand Mattelart, a professor of mass communications and

ideology at the University of Chile, and Ariel Dorfman, a literary critic and novelist. In *Para leer al pato Donald* ("How to Read Donald Duck," 1971), they held that in an effort to protect U.S. economic interests in Chile, the Central Intelligence Agency financed and fostered an arsenal of psychological warfare devices to indoctrinate the minds of the Chilean people, including Disney cartoons and other consumer products. They denounced Hollywood's distorted version of reality and cautioned Latin Americans against U.S. propaganda. The danger of Walt Disney, Mattelart and Dorfman believed, consisted of the manner in which the United States "forces us Latin Americans to see ourselves as they see us." The authors stated that the Chilean people would eventually free their own culture and kick out the Disney duck: "Feathers plucked and well-roasted. . . . Donald, Go Home!" Published shortly before the Chilean revolution, this essay appealed to readers far beyond the borders of Chile; *Para leer al pato Donald* went through more than fifteen editions and was translated into several languages.

American scholars quickly borrowed the concept of media imperialism. The Watergate scandal propelled suspicions of a conspiracy between the government and the media and of abuses of executive power. In a variety of studies, the communication scientist Herbert I. Schiller retraced a powerful connection between the domestic business, military, and governmental power structure on the one hand and, on the other, the "mind managers"—that is, the leaders of the U.S. communications industry—who in his view had conspired to manipulate minds at home and abroad. As Schiller saw it, nineteenth-century Anglo-American geopolitical imperialism had been replaced in the twentieth century by an aggressive industrial-electronics complex "working to extend the American socioeconomic system spatially and ideologically" across the globe. "What does it matter," Schiller asked in 1976, "if a national movement has struggled for years to achieve liberation if that condition . . . is undercut by values and aspirations derived from the apparently vanquished dominator?"

A second group of critics understood cultural imperialism as the domination of one country by another. To no small degree, this discourse grew out of the growing concern of the United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with the protection of national cultures, as well as the rising interest in the study of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, as represented by Benedict Anderson and others. In this interpretation, "culture" suggests a natural and static heritage of traditions that are akin to a certain country. It also serves as a tool of social control as important as controlling material resources. Hence, cultural imperialism implies the efforts of one country to undermine another country's cultural heritage by imposing its own. Frank Ninkovich's analysis of the State Department's efforts to establish an art program between 1938 and 1947 showed that during World War II, policymakers attempted to use artifacts of American culture, notably paintings, to promote "a sense of common values among nations of varied traditions." Just as free trade would have a liberalizing effect by contributing to other nations' economic well-being, art would create a common sense of culture. Simply put, if everyone agreed that American culture qualified artistically and aesthetically and also politically as a universal way of life and taste, it would indeed increase foreign acceptance of American values and American politics.

A third group of scholars interpreted cultural imperialism as the expansion and sometimes global dominance of U.S. consumer capitalism. Historians like Ralph Willet identified imperialist motivations within the American business community and government. Carrying this argument even further, others, such as Emily S. Rosenberg, claimed that in the twentieth century U.S. foreign policymakers had purposely begun to spread American culture, information, and the concept of a free and open economy in order to expand the national market abroad. Here, culture identifies capitalism in its most materialist form, encompassing goods and ideas associated with such goods, both of which foster homogenization. Culture is thus turned into an instrument to fuse different societies into one international economic system. E. Richard Brown (1982) denounced U.S. medical and health education programs sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation in pre-1949 China. They were a "Trojan horse," guided "in their conception and development by imperialist objectives." These programs, Brown held, "were more concerned with building an elite professional stratum to carry out cultural and technological transformation than with meeting the health needs of each country." The programs facilitated American control of foreign markets and raw materials.

The most persisting and intellectually challenging criticism of U.S. cultural imperialism, however, originated among a fourth group of

scholars who redefined the debate into a critique of modernity. The arguments of Jürgen Habermas, Marshall Berman, and others followed the outline of the Frankfurt School, which had originally launched the postwar investigation of cultural imperialism. Building on the writings of Marcuse and others, they depicted cultural imperialism as the imposition of modernity. They studied how the primary agents of modernity, such as the media, bureaucracy, science, and other social and economic institutions of the West, transferred the "lived culture" of capitalism to non-Western cultures. These scholars admitted that members of a recipient society had choices but that these choices were conditioned and manipulated by the modern capitalist environment in which these societies existed. Culture and modernity thus became a global prison.

In the eyes of Habermas and others, "modernity" represents the "main cultural direction of global development." Culture entails capitalism but also mass culture, urbanism, a "technical-scientific-rationalist dominant ideology," nation-states and a certain one-dimensional self-consciousness. The domination of these all contribute to the core meaning of Western "imperialism."

The critics of modernity were the first group that focused their analyses not on the question of agency but on the process of manipulation itself. They expanded the study from "American" to "Western" cultural imperialism that left out no field, no people, and no culture. While this perspective retained the term "imperialism," it also served as a forerunner for later trends in the debate over cultural transfer by moving the emphasis from the question of guilt to the actual process of cultural imposition. Because of its innovative approach, much of the critique of modernity has remained fashionable after most other critiques of cultural imperialism have ceased to influence the debate.

CRITICS OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM THEORY

Students who are interested in the concept of cultural imperialism should be aware of the unresolved theoretical and methodological problems within the debate. A number of scholars have claimed that the cultural imperialists "have shown remarkable provincialism, forgetting the existence of empires before that of the United States." Since the sixteenth century, European governments have developed a variety of cultural exchange programs, although they may not always have hoped to expand their empire by exporting their culture. The British in India and the Middle East, the Germans in Africa, and the French in Indochina all imposed their own culture abroad as a powerful tool to strengthen trade, commerce, and political influence and recruit intellectual elites for their own purposes. The historian Lewis Pyenson has shown that between 1900 and 1930, "technological imperialism"—the attempt on the part of state officials to employ scientific learning to form an international network of communication and prestige abroad—skillfully complemented German expansion in China, Argentina, and the South Pacific. In addition, new studies on U.S. policies in Asia and Europe have demonstrated that American policymakers did not hesitate to sacrifice economic (and ideological) objectives in order to realize geopolitical interests.

Individual case studies on private interest groups, such as philanthropic foundations, the American Library Association, and the press corps, show that often neither policymakers nor businessmen, but rather nongovernmental American organizations, were among the most active advocates of American culture and values abroad. The State Department as well as Congress were often reluctant to develop a full-fledged policy of cultural diplomacy. Often, these institutions were omitted from the process altogether.

Yet by far the most emphatic attacks against the critics of cultural imperialism came from Tomlinson, Frederick Buell, and others, who reproached authors such as Schiller for falling into the very trap they originally wished to avoid. Tomlinson stated that their rhetoric "repeats the gendering of imperialist rhetoric by continuing to style the First World as male and aggressive and the Third as female and submissive." In doing so, Schiller and others had assumed an imperialist perspective that viewed the Third World as made up of fragile and helpless cultures while at the same time serving the interests of Western modernity. It was said that the critics of cultural imperialism employed a theory suffering from a vague language of domination, colonialism, coercion, and imposition. Thus, ironically, the critics of cultural imperialism were made to seem the worst cultural imperialists.

Cultural imperialism, according to John Tomlinson, consists of the spread of modernity. It is a process of cultural loss and not of cultural

expansion. There never were groups of conspirators who attempted to spread any particular culture. Instead, global technological and economic progress and integration reduced the importance of national culture. Therefore, it is misleading to put the blame for a global development on any one culture. The notion of imperialism—that is, purposeful cultural conquest—is irrelevant; instead, all countries, regardless of whether they are located in the northern or southern hemisphere, are victims of a worldwide cultural change.

Since the mid-1980s, scholars have paid closer attention to both global and local aspects of the American and Western cultural transfer. Sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have stressed the peculiarity of individual cultures in the context of a nonbipolar world. Under the influence of resurfacing nationalism the world over, one group of scholars has studied the periphery in greater detail, producing analyses of individual communities that came in contact with American (or Western) culture after World War II. Inspired by the growing debate on globalization, a second group has opted for precisely the opposite approach. Instead of unilateral imperialism, it has developed a concept of global modernization.

Scholars of local responses to American culture have investigated individual case studies, weighing resistance against acceptance. Borrowed from both psychology and literary criticism, response theory addresses the preconceptions influencing the reactions of human beings exposed to an external impression such as a text, a sound, or a visual perception. Response theory moves the focus of research from the question of agency to the question of audience and reaction. Instead of looking at broadcasters and producers, these scholars investigate, for example, the audience of television shows like *Dynasty*.

Inspired by the public debate abroad over the impact of U.S. cultural imperialism, since about the mid-1980s response theory has affected nearly all studies of cultural transfer in history, sociology, and cultural studies. For example, *Culture and International Relations* (1990), edited by Jongsuk Chay, studies particular aspects of culture such as literature, music, religion, or television programs to calibrate the effects of American culture abroad. The authors' findings vary in their assessment of the impact of American culture, but they agree that indigenous people never simply accepted consumer goods from the United States. Reinhold Wagnleitner, for example, argued that Austrian youth revised the original meanings of jeans, Coca-Cola, and rock and roll into something new that accorded with their own needs; those consumer products offered not only comfort but also freedom from social constraints as well.

A number of scholars delineated a profound appeal of Western culture to non-Western countries, but challenged the assumption that U.S. policymakers and businessmen sought to manipulate certain target groups. Other studies focusing on the effects of cultural imperialism underlined the difference between foreign people and foreign governments. James Ettema, D. Charles Whitney, and others suggested in their studies of the media that audiences make conscious choices concerning what they listen to, read, and watch. Studies of underground movements in China and Eastern Europe in 1989 also demonstrate that in many cases, Western television programs inspired audiences to start a revolution against their own political leaders.

Another group of scholars concluded that audiences not only simply accepted the fruits of Western cultural imperialism but developed a strong resistance to American products and culture. Scholars of Islamic societies have consistently emphasized the stark opposition of orthodox Muslims to Western influences. Individual studies in cinematography, drama, literature, and cultural studies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa demonstrate that, notwithstanding the influence of Western goods, since the mid-1970s local audiences began to reject individual aspects of Western culture.

In many cases, a more detailed analysis of the origins of local resistance shows that peculiar local conditions informed it more than an outright condemnation of American culture. Under the intriguing title *Seducing the French* (1993), Richard F. Kuisel investigated economic missions, foreign investment, and U.S. consumer products in postwar France. He emphasizes that French opposition to U.S. culture "was (and is) about both America and France," because it intensified French fears of losing their cultural identity. Kuisel concedes that the French underwent a process of Americanization. But at the same time, they succeeded in defending their "Frenchness." French consumers found some American products appealing but they also continued to cherish and idealize French national identity, notably the idea of a superior French high culture.

Likewise, the average German citizen traditionally tended (and tends) to adhere to a more exclusive image of culture than his or her American counterpart. German *Kultur* traditionally stressed high culture and was closely linked to the enhancement of *Bildung*. It was ethnically bound, deeply rooted in German history, and—particularly in the case of the arts, music, and performance—dependent on state funding. After World War II, West Germans did not view the intrusion of American popular culture as cultural imperialism. To them, American culture remained always incompatible with *Kultur*. In other words, adoption of cultural artifacts does not necessarily translate into cultural and political adaptation.

The response theorists concluded that the model of a unilateral attempt to force consumer products and ideas on foreign nations is fundamentally flawed: resistance and cultural identity played a powerful role in the perception of American culture abroad. U.S. officials, in turn, were uncertain of the scope and nature of cultural exports. Their actions, furthermore, were quite comparable to the efforts of cultural diplomats of other countries. As Will Hermes concluded in the periodical *Utne Reader*, "American pop culture isn't conquering the world." Perhaps, he wondered, American cultural imperialism is "just part of the mix."

Informed by the poststructuralist approach, scholars from a variety of disciplines suggested in the late twentieth century that the term "cultural imperialism" be replaced with another term that seeks to circumvent the simplistic active-passive, dominator-victim dualism. For example, musicologists and anthropologists developed a variety of concepts seeking to broaden our understanding of global music interaction. Their suggestions, including "artistic sharing" and "transculturation," could easily be translated into other fields as well.

"Cultural transmission," for example, became one of the most appealing "post-imperialist" interpretations. The notion stemmed from the vocabulary of psychology, where it alluded to the interaction between cultural and genetic influences on human behavior. One of the most important historical accounts is a collection of essays, *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (1993). The contributors addressed diverse issues such as rock music in Italy and the reception of Disneyland in France. *Cultural Transmissions* describes the various avenues of acceptance, rejection, and alteration that audiences may choose when confronted with American culture.

Spurred by the vision of a "global village," another group of scholars has advanced a theory of "globalization." That term alludes to the compression of the world as well as to humans' increasing perception of the earth as an organic whole. Many understand this phenomenon simply as an economic development. Yet globalization is multidisciplinary in its causes and its effects. Its vague meaning allows researchers to interpret the term broadly; thus, it includes many features of modernization, including the spread of Western capitalism, technology, and scientific rationality.

Once again, the theme—globalization—was not at all new. Modern ideas on the interconnectedness of the world could be found as early as the writings of turn-of-the-twentieth-century German sociologists. Max Weber, for example, offered various conceptual frameworks of universalism beyond political borders. In "Soziologie des Raumes" (The sociology of space, 1903), philosopher-sociologist Georg Simmel argued that a national border is not a geographical fact with sociological consequences but a sociological fact that then takes a geographical shape.

This theme received renewed attention in the late 1980s when sociologists came to believe that socioeconomic relations everywhere were undergoing a profound change that resembled the Industrial Revolution in scope. No longer could cultures and societies be analyzed in the framework of the nation-state, these scholars believed. They argued that, first, any society is in a constant exchange with other societies; that, second, most countries consist of a multitude of cultures; and that, third, cultures do not necessarily reflect the borders of a nation-state. Sociologist Roland Robertson, one of the most prominent advocates of a global theory, proposed that a new concept replace the prevalent social scientific system of mapping the globe into three different worlds after the end of colonialism in the 1960s. Instead of a tripartite worldview, he outlined a vision of the globe as a more organic, interconnected, single network.

Inspired by this argument, students of cultural transfer moved their research away from its anti-American focus and toward a more global level, with no one identifiable enemy. Scholars replaced the concept of U.S. cultural domination with the study of Western cultural influence, but they disagreed over the relationship between manipulation and globalization. A few, like Orlando Patterson, still maintained that the mod-

ern process of worldwide cultural interaction could be interpreted as a clandestine American push for global uniformity. Others, however, like Peter Beyer, believed that globalization comes "quite as much at the 'expense' of" Western as of non-Western cultures, since both are part of a dramatic change.

Scholars such as Karen Fog Olwig employed the global approach to reflect on the tension between local and supranational cultural and political developments. Some of these analyses presented a despairingly bleak picture of the future cultural world order. Samuel Huntington, for example, invoked the specter of a "clash of civilizations," a World War III, where Western and Eastern societies would battle not for political and ideological reasons but as a consequence of cultural conflicts. Huntington argued that in the future people would identify themselves by reference to their faith, food, and local traditions instead of ideas and national political systems.

Charles Bright and Michael Geyer's 1987 account painted a more optimistic picture. They interpret the shift from Westernization to globalization as the fusion of tradition and modernity: "This is not Spengler's Decline of the West, but the beginning of a global reordering in which the West seeks its place in a world order it must now share with radically different societies. It is the beginning of a truly global politics." John Urry and Scott Lasch (1987) even theorized that the globalization of economic, political, and social relationships indicates the "end of organized capitalism." In a completely interconnected global economy, no one country will be able to control the market. Frederick Buell claimed in his book *National Culture and the New Global System* (1994) that for almost every academic discipline the "world of hybrid cultural production" was becoming the rule.

Interestingly, major critics of U.S. cultural imperialism, too, revised their earlier reproaches along these lines. Herbert I. Schiller, for example, reframed his argument in terms of world-systems theory. In an article published in 1991, he portrayed an expansive, transnational corporate authority that has replaced an autonomous United States in influencing all economic and cultural activity. Literary critic Edward Said, who analyzed the image of Orientalism in Western society, argued in *Orientalism* (1978) that the West culturally dominated the Orient by creating an artificial cultural vision of the latter "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience." His later study, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), detailed how Western authors and audiences developed a literary perspective on imperial geography distinguishing between "us" (the West) and "them" (the Third World). "Western imperialism and Third World nationalism feed off each other," Said summed up, "but even at their worst they are neither monolithic nor deterministic."

It would be misleading to abandon the notion of cultural imperialism and replace it with another, equally exclusive term. Scholars who are interested in the study of cultural transfer need to understand that culture, just like power, may be used to attain any number of objectives and to pursue any number of policies. Therefore, cultural imperialism is as suitable or unsuitable a designation as any other one. In the end, each term provides only one perspective on the chaos of cultural interaction. To understand and partake in the research in this field is to realize that there is no central paradigm. Instead, scholars must borrow insights from all three discourses retraced above. Originally begun as an almost public debate among politicians, journalists, and scholars, the discussion focused on the political advantage of cultural diplomacy and called for the dissemination abroad of more information on the United States and on American cultural artifacts. In the 1960s and 1970s, the topic became part of the nascent discussion of U.S. imperialism, which stressed the economic and psychological implications of culture; there was too much American culture abroad, scholars implied. But under the impact of worldwide resistance against American cultural imperialism and the influence of poststructuralism in the late 1980s, leading scholars in the field reconsidered their findings or developed new approaches. As the twentieth century ended, many no longer viewed the spread of American and Western culture exclusively as unilateral "imperialism" but as an ongoing process of negotiation among regional, ethnic, and national groups.

THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL TRANSFER STUDIES

At least four points of the debate on American cultural transfer abroad and on the question of where students of cultural transfer should turn next merit scholarly attention. First, the Internet revolution represents one of many events pointing to both globalization and multiculturalism,

implying that Americans may no longer be able to agree on the substance and meaning of their culture, let alone agree sufficiently to export the idea of an American culture. In a way, this discord echoes the original conviction that Americans have no culture worthy to export.

Second, at the same time, the American public has once again begun to fret over the portrayal of American culture abroad, thus reinventing the discussion of the 1950s. On 8 June 1997, the *New York Times Magazine* published a special issue titled "How the World Sees Us." International observers reluctantly admitted the preponderance of American power and culture. But they also stressed their respective countries' resistance. "American movies have achieved the impossible," exclaimed playwright Edvard Radzinsky in one article. "Russians are so sick of them that they have started watching films from the days of Socialist Realism." And American commentators concurred. "Some of America's cultural exports are so awful that you begin to suspect that we're using the rest of the world as a vast toxic waste dump," editor Michiko Kakutani said.

Third, the center of the debate is changing rapidly. Until recently, the discussion centered on the nation-state, with a few significant exceptions. After the end of the Cold War, however, scholars paid more attention to the individual entrepreneur. The debate, that is, shifted from a nation-centered critique to the study of the impact of private business. This change of argument not only obliterated national boundaries but, equally important, transferred the object under investigation from politics to capitalism.

Fourth, until the late twentieth century the debate in the United States centered almost exclusively on that century. With only a few exceptions, discussants seemed to agree that the transfer of American culture had no history before the formal establishment of a program and then an agency that was in charge of projecting U.S. culture abroad. Yet sociologists tell us that bureaucratic formations follow rather than outline the way of a political trend or need. By shifting the notion of cultural transfer from formal government programs to nongovernmental encounters, scholars have increasingly realized that cultural transmission has existed everywhere and much earlier in time. Indeed, cultural transmission often preceded formal diplomatic ties. Although their findings were for many years ignored in the debates over cultural transfer, students of American history have for decades been investigating nineteenth-century ambassadors of American culture abroad. They have looked at missionaries in China, soldiers in Cuba, and the encounter between American settlers and Indian nations. They have investigated actors, as in the examination of the exodus and exchange of private groups including political émigrés, businessmen, and artists. They have also studied ideas and products as transmitted, for example, by scientists, poets, tourists, and museum curators. Their findings underline the general point that there was quite a lot of cultural transfer prior to World War I.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Belmonte, Laura. "Defending a Way of Life: American Propaganda and the Cold War, 1945–1949." Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 1996. An excellent analysis of American cultural programs abroad.

Beyer, Peter. *Religion and Globalization*. London, 1994. Globalization theory is a staple of this sociologist.

Bright, Charles, and Michael Geyer. "For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century." *Radical History Review* 39 (fall 1987): 69–91.

Brown, E. Richard. "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism." In Robert F. Amove, ed. *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*. Bloomington, Ind., 1982.

Chaplin, Joyce E. *Subject Matters: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier, 1500–1676*. Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2001. Suggests possible future research topics.

Dorfman, Ariel, and Armand Mattelart. *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*. Translated by David Kunzle. New York, 1975.

Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955*. Baton Rouge La., 1999. Accentuates the independent role of mediators in the process of cultural transmitters.

Grothe, Peter. *To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of Communist Propaganda in East Germany*. Palo Alto, Calif., 1958. An introduction to the postwar consensus on the export of American culture.

Hermes, Will. "Imperialism: Just Part of the Mix?" *Utne Reader* 66 (November–December 1994): 19–20.

Hollander, Paul. *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1900*. New York, 1992. Describes the rise of an international critique of American consumer culture.

"How the World Sees Us." *New York Times Magazine* (8 June 1997).

Iriye, Akira. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*. Baltimore, 1997.

———. *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley, Calif., 2002.

Joseph, Franz M., and Raymond Aron, eds. *As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes*. Princeton, N.J., 1959. Provides summaries of early postwar assessments of America's image abroad.

Kuisel, Richard F. *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., 1993. An endorsement of response theory.

Neils, Patricia, ed. *United States Attitudes and Policies Toward China: The Impact of American Missionaries*. Armonk, N.Y., 1990.

Patterson, Orlando. "Ecumenical America: Global Culture and the American Cosmos." *World Policy Journal* 11 (summer 1994): 103–117.

Pells, Richard. *Not Like You: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*. New York, 1997.

Pyenson, Lewis. *Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences: German Expansion Overseas, 1900–1930*. New York, 1985. Points to forerunners of U.S. exports in other countries.

Robertson, Roland. "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept." *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (June 1990): 15–30.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945*. New York, 1982.

Schiller, Herbert I. *Mass Communication and American Empire*. New York, 1969.

Siracusa, Joseph M. *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists*. Port Washington, N.Y., 1973.

Smith, Anthony D. "Towards a Global Culture." *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (June 1990): 171–191.

Tomlinson, John. *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*. Baltimore, 1991. A concise critique of the critiques of cultural imperialism.

Urry, John, and Scott Lasch. *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Cambridge, 1987.

Wagnleitner, Reinhold. *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994.

Whitton, John Boardman, ed. *Propaganda and the Cold War: A Princeton University Symposium*. Washington, D.C., 1963.

Willett, Ralph. *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949*. London and New York, 1989.

See also CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES; GLOBALIZATION; IMPERIALISM; THE PRESS; PROPAGANDA; TELEVISION.

Cultural Relations and Policies

Akira Iriye

Cultural relations may be defined as interactions, both direct and indirect, among two or more cultures. Direct interactions include physical encounters with people and objects of another culture. Indirect relations are more subtle, involving such things as a person's ideas and prejudices about another people, or cross-national influences in philosophy, literature, music, art, and fashion. When cultural interactions deal with such matters as officially sponsored exchange programs or dissemination of books and movies, they may be called cultural policies. But not all cultural relations are cultural policies; there are vast areas of cultural interactions that have nothing or little to do with governmental initiatives. This essay, therefore, will deal primarily with broad themes in the history of American cultural relations, mentioning cultural policies only when they play a significant role in determining the nature of the overall cultural relationship with other countries.

The basic assumption here, of course, is that the United States is definable as a culture, as are all other nations in the world. In other words, each country has its own cultural identity in that it is defined by people who share certain traditions, memories, and ways of life. In this sense, all international relations are intercultural relations. The United States's dealings and contacts with, and the American people's attitudes and policies toward, any foreign country are conditioned by the historical and cultural outlooks of the two countries. Insofar as no two nations are completely identical, any discussion of foreign affairs must start with the assumption that we are analyzing two societies of different traditions as well as two entities embodying distinct sets of interests.

This is a different approach to the study of foreign affairs from the usual interpretations that stress military, security, trade, and other issues that affect a country's "interests." In terms of such factors, nations are more or less interchangeable. Balance-of-power considerations, for instance, have a logic of their own irrespective of the cultural identity of a given actor, as do commercial interests or national security arrangements. In a "realist" perspective, international affairs are comprehended in the framework of the interplay of national interests, and while each nation determines its own interests, all countries are similar in that they are all said to be driven by, or to pursue, considerations of their interests.

Cultural relations, in contrast, are both narrower and broader than the interaction of national interests. Instead of power, security, or economic considerations, cultural affairs are products of intangible factors such as a nation's ideas, opinions, moods, and tastes. Symbols, words, and gestures that reflect its people's thought and behavior patterns comprise their cultural vocabulary in terms of which they relate themselves to other peoples. Not so much a realistic ("rational") appraisal of national interests as a "symbolic" definition of a people's identity determines how they may respond to the rest of the world. In this regard, there are as many cultural relations as there are national cultures, and nothing as vague as "national interests" suffices to account for them. At the same time, cultural relations are also broader than the interplay of national interests in that they include cross-national interactions such as emigration and immigration, tourism, educational exchange, missionary and philanthropic activities, and various movements to promote human rights or the protection of the natural environment. These are cultural phenomena in that they cannot be reduced to security or economic considerations and deal with the interrelationships of individuals and groups across national boundaries.

A history of U.S. cultural relations, then, must deal with all those themes that together define a different world from the one consisting of sovereign rights and interests of nations. The bulk

of work in international relations still focuses on the latter phenomenon, and historians have only begun to take the former themes seriously as objects of study.

THE EARLY REPUBLIC TO THE CIVIL WAR: DEFINING AN "AMERICAN" CULTURE

From the beginning, Americans were interested in cultural themes in their foreign affairs. For one thing, at the time of the American Revolution the political and intellectual leaders were fond of stressing the multiethnic nature of the new republic. In most instances, to be sure, multiethnicity consisted of diverse European nationalities rather than distinctive racial groups. Compared with western European countries, the United States seemed unique in that no nationality constituted a majority of the nation, even though those of English stock represented nearly half the population. There were Welsh, Irish, Germans, French, Scandinavians, and others whose admixture with, and adoption of the language of, the English-speaking Americans impressed European visitors for decades after the Revolution. This was as much a cultural as a political undertaking; to establish a republic made up of people from many countries who imagined themselves to belong to the same community required some shared memory, a sense of Americanness, to distinguish the new nation from all others. How such a republic could survive in a world consisting of sovereign states, on one hand, and of large empires, on the other, was the key question.

One way for the American people to assure themselves that this could be done was through developing a fairly precise image of themselves. The idea of the "city on a hill," and the idealized self-perception that the Americans had struggled for the "rights of man," not simply the rights of Englishmen, implied the coming into existence of a new kind of nation and assumed that others, too, would look to the United States as a land of freedom and opportunity. Conversely, Americans would carry out their mission to spread the blessings of civilization and liberty to the less fortunate in distant countries. If, as so many writers asserted, America was the most progressive land in the world, it was because it was a country without archaic encumbrances, where men and women from many countries would come and work together to build a new, ideal community. Anybody, theoretically, could join the undertaking. By the same token, what happened here would be of universal applicability. If various races and groups could join together in the United States to realize an earthly paradise, there was no reason why they could not do so elsewhere in the world. It was in this sense that America was called humankind's best hope.

Such universalism implied a view of other peoples that was monolithic and an idea of history that was unilinear. Just as divergent groups who came to the United States would create one unified people, so the rest of the world would ultimately tend to that goal. The American dream would be realized globally, and the American experience would become a world experience. America would cease to be unique only when its ideals and institutions were firmly implanted in all parts of the globe. The entire world would become one great America.

This type of teleological idealism was quite obviously a cultural product and provided one basic framework in which Americans developed their cultural relations with other countries. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, this, the cultural framework, was probably the only way the majority of Americans knew how to relate themselves to others. Cultural relations in that sense were thus a vital aspect of national self-definition.

This can be seen in the ways in which Americans viewed non-European people. Europeans, of course, comprised the bulk of the population of the United States, and cultural ties across the Atlantic were quite important. At the same time, however, it was when Americans dealt, either directly or indirectly, with people outside Western civilization that their cultural self-awareness became most clearly articulated. For instance, they viewed Arabs, Hindus, or Chinese in the framework of their own self-definition. These people, in other words, would be judged in terms of their distance from the American ideals and of their capacity to approximate them—if not immediately, then in the future. It is not surprising that observers of non-European societies frequently argued about whether these societies would ever transform themselves and become more like America. The basic assumption was, of course, that at the moment they lacked most of the ingredients that made the United States so progressive. Native populations in the Middle East, South Asia, or East Asia were almost invariably described as ignorant, indolent, and oppressed by arbitrary

despots. They were the exact opposite of the Americans. Joel Barlow, poet and diplomat, described Hassan Pasha, dey of Algiers, as "a man of a most ungovernable temper; passionate, changeable, and unjust to such a degree that there is no calculating his policy from one moment to the next." William Eaton, appointed consul at Tunis by President John Adams, wrote of the "continual altercations, contentions and delays among the Arabs." "Poverty makes them thieves," he reported, "and practice renders them adroit in stealing." Similar expressions can be found at random in American writings on Turks, Chinese, Japanese, and other non-European nationalities throughout the nineteenth century.

A key question, given such an image of non-Europeans, was whether they had some redeeming qualities. On this point American universalism decreed that no people was so inherently depraved as to be totally incapable of attaining a higher level of civilization. The basic credo of American democracy was that any individual had certain abilities that could be developed to their potential if artificial restrictions were removed. Even those suffering under poverty and despotism were not entirely hopeless creatures. Given external stimuli to make them aware of alternative possibilities, and under favorable institutional conditions, they were certain to transform themselves. For, as the *Democratic Review* put it in 1839, "The same nature is common to all men . . . they have equal and sacred claims . . . they have high and holy faculties." It followed that Americans, having developed these faculties and made good their claims to progress, had a unique obligation to the rest of humankind. It was up to them, declared the *Knickerbocker* in 1840, "whether our fellow men shall reach the elevation whereof they are capable, and . . . whether or not [we shall] confer on them the most inestimable of all earthly boons, the boon of civilization."

It might be thought that in such a situation, there could be no genuine, equal cultural relations, especially with non-Europeans; Americans would interact with other societies and cultures through the cultural vocabulary of their own. Other peoples would merely be at the receiving end of American civilization without anything to give in return. Such, however, was not always the case. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century, when optimism regarding American values was most notable, appreciation of different cultural standards and achievements was not lacking. One has only to recall the great interest in porcelain, silks, paintings, and other objects brought back from China. Curiosity about other societies coexisted with a disdain for despotic institutions or alien religions. Samuel Goodrich's *A History of All Nations*, a popular textbook published in 1851, explained that while Asians on the whole were "slavish . . . superstitious . . . [and] treacherous," their arts compared favorably with those of Europe. "All the efforts of European art and capital," Goodrich wrote, "have been unequal fully to imitate the carpets of Persia, the muslins of India, the porcelain of China, and the lacquered ware of Japan." When the first Japanese embassy arrived at San Francisco in 1860, a correspondent for the *New York Times* recorded, "It makes a white man blush to see how much more simple, tasteful and sensible they were in their uniforms than our grandees were in theirs."

Such observations revealed a fascination with the strange and the exotic that appeared lacking in Western civilization. Some went a step further and found positive significance in things Oriental. No group was more interested in them than the Transcendentalists. As they grew dissatisfied with the Christian religion as it was practiced in the 1830s and the 1840s, they turned to Hinduism and Buddhism with a sense of fresh discovery. Their understanding of these Asian religions may have been superficial, but they were the first group of Americans who seriously viewed the non-West not as an object of their mission but as a good in itself, as something that might be relevant to their own life. Ralph Waldo Emerson, for instance, was struck by the pantheism of the Hindu religion, which perceived godliness in all beings and all things. The pervading sense of serenity and the absence of a rigid demarcation between self and nature appealed to one who found modern life increasingly distasteful. As he remarked in his celebrated Harvard Divinity School address of 1838, "moral sentiment" had "dwelled always deepest in the minds of men in the devout and contemplative East . . . Europe has always owed to oriental genius its divine impulses."

Only a handful of Americans went as far as the Transcendentalists in embracing the spirit of another civilization, but the appreciation of distinctive values and ways of life sustaining the Orient seems to have produced in many observers an awareness of cultural pluralism in the world. The East was much more than the negation of the West, an object of the latter's contempt or pity, something whose only hope lay in wholesale

transformation. For example, in 1854 the *New York Quarterly* reported the longing of a traveler for the life, manners, and climate of the Orient, which "all our comfort and all our facilities for travelling by steamers and railroads cannot satisfy or dispel." Three years later, dissatisfaction with the "matter-of-fact, work-a-day age" prompted James P. Walker to publish the *Oriental Annual,* an anthology of Eastern folklore and poetry.

Such expressions approach cultural relativism, the feeling that each culture has its own autonomous tradition and inherent characteristics that cannot be artificially changed by external stimuli. In nineteenth-century America, thoroughgoing cultural relativism was a rare phenomenon; but to the extent that some thought about the question, it became inexorably linked with the idea of human progress. If a distinct cultural tradition was a product of centuries of history, could it ever be significantly altered from without? Would it ever be possible to change peoples' ways of life? If they lived in abject poverty and suffered from despotic rule, was it not because they were so conditioned by tradition, and by their collective traits? In short, were they not living as they were simply because they were made to be that way?

These questions were of particular interest to Americans because they had obvious implications for the slavery dispute. Just as they debated among themselves whether black men and women were capable of education and progress, and if they would be better off in an industrial than in a plantation economy, Americans discussed colors other than white and black. According to a popular view, humankind was divided into white, black, yellow, brown, and red races, each with distinctive traits that were often considered immutable. Almost invariably, the black people were placed at the bottom of the hierarchy of races. Samuel Morton's *Crania Americana* (1839) asserted that the Caucasian race was characterized by "the highest intellectual endowments" and that the Mongolian race was "ingenious, imitative, and highly susceptible of cultivation," whereas the "Ethiopian" was "joyous, flexible, and indolent—the lowest grade of humanity." The bulk of humanity, being neither white nor black, thus belonged to the gray area between the highest and the lowest categories. It is not surprising that there were considerable ambiguities in American attitudes toward them. They had unique features, some of which could be readily appreciated by Americans, but this did not mean that they were the equal of Westerners.

United States cultural relations before the Civil War, then, were of particular significance when Americans dealt with cultures and societies outside Western civilization. Their responses combined the prevailing sense of Western superiority with some appreciation of the strange. Confidence in the universality of certain values was coupled with more rigid racialist thinking. The overwhelmingly European-centered cultural framework was undermined by some individuals who looked to the East as a fascinating alternative. On the whole, however, it would seem that non-Western cultures and peoples had not yet made a strong impact on American society. If there were intercultural relations between them, they were not equal but basically unidirectional.

EXPANSION AND THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

The situation did not change drastically after the Civil War, but there was a greater awareness of different civilizations than there had been earlier. Fundamentally this reflected the technological development of the last decades of the nineteenth century, when steam and electricity, as observers were fond of pointing out, narrowed distances between various parts of the world. One could travel far more easily and speedily than before, and news in one corner of the globe could be transmitted almost overnight to most other regions. Great migrations of people started from Asia to the American continent, and from Europe to Africa and South America. One saw more foreigners in one's lifetime than earlier. The opening of more and more Asian ports to Western trade served to introduce commodities from distant lands into the daily life of average Asians and Westerners. In many areas of the non-Western world, the process of reform and transformation began to remake traditional societies in the image of the modern West. But the very experience of modernization caused some hard rethinking about cultural values. Westernization meant a loss of innocence to many a non-Westerner, while the global character of the modern transformation often suggested to Westerners the dilution of their own identity.

These were extremely interesting phenomena, and most of the crucial questions raised then have persisted to this day. It may be said that toward the end of the nineteenth century, world history entered an age of globalization that had

cultural, as well as political and economic, implications. Economically, the phenomenon has been referred to as modernization, a neutral term suggesting that any society with certain endowments may opt for change. Modernized nations would establish global networks of capital, goods, and technology, which in turn would help further modernize their economies and ways of life. Such globalization had obvious implications for international cultural relations. Not only did the more advanced nations become more than ever interdependent economically, but they also came to share a great deal of information and technology. For Americans, this meant a more cosmopolitan outlook, a renewed awareness that they had a great deal in common with Europeans, Canadians, and other "civilized" people. It is not surprising that they took advantage of the new means of transportation and communication to travel, live, and even work in Europe, while the latter also sent its scholars, artists, and musicians to the United States. There was a great deal of cultural exchange across the Atlantic. Against this sort of cosmopolitanism, there were, to be sure, nationalists who insisted on the uniqueness of the American historical experience and worried that modern civilization was making all nations interchangeable. Some even argued that conflict of interest and even war, rather than shared outlooks and ways of life, would preserve the vitality of the nation. This, too, it must be noted, was a cultural question. The often heated debate at the end of the nineteenth century on the character and future direction of the American nation was thus a response to globalization. Cultural relations across the Atlantic were becoming ever closer, as Americans and Europeans came to view themselves as members of the same intellectual, artistic, and technological universe.

In the meantime, Americans joined Europeans in linking other parts of the globe closer together. They were, at one level, helping modernize those regions. Since the capital and technology necessary for modernization were in short supply in almost every non-Western country, Western capital had to be introduced; and this inevitably involved the coming of European and American financiers, engineers, and manufacturers who would employ native labor and middlemen to establish their economic institutions. Americans, even though in the aggregate their country was still a net importer of capital from Europe, were already active. They were instrumental, for instance, in the construction of the first railroad in China, in the 1870s. They invested in coastal shipping in China and Japan, established syndicates for obtaining railway concessions in Asia and the Middle East, and participated in the development of mines in all these regions. This was intercultural relations in a broad sense. Americans were relating themselves to other peoples through the medium of capitalist enterprises.

Although the profit motive was uppermost, an influx of foreign capital and technology invariably had noneconomic as well as economic effects on the targets of Western expansion. Americans in China, for instance, were never in a sufficient number to involve themselves at all levels of mercantile and industrial activities. They needed local personnel as interpreters, clerks, messengers, business assistants, and even associates, and as "compradors" who acted as liaisons between foreigners and officials. Such diverse contacts were bound to affect Chinese manners and ideas. In fact, among the most "Americanized" Chinese were those who lived in the treaty ports and learned modern capitalist practices. Associations such as local chambers of commerce provided a setting where Americans and Chinese met and conducted social affairs as well as business matters.

Politically, the process of globalization was synonymous with what was then called, and has since been called, imperialism. The world was divided into those who established control over distant territories and those who became objects of such control. A handful of imperialist nations appropriated among themselves the vast lands of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean as colonies, semi-colonies, or spheres of influence. This was a military-political process, since control necessitated that a power structure be imposed upon alien peoples. Without such a regime, it was feared that local instability would create a chaotic condition and threaten the interests of a particular imperialist nation or invite the extension of power by its rivals. It seemed impossible and unwise to leave things as they were. Americans, no less than citizens of other advanced countries, were exhorted to reach out to far corners of the globe to join the forces of imperialist expansion.

Imperialism even in such a narrow sense was an important chapter in intercultural relations, for the assertion of power over another people entailed both physical and mental contact. The Spanish-American War, for instance, called forth a fierce debate within the United States on

the wisdom of acquiring tropical colonies. Americans had never established territorial control over lands in the tropics, and they had to think hard about the implications of the new action. Since they had not given much thought to Filipinos or Puerto Ricans, they turned to what few books were available on these peoples. They read Andrew Clarke and John Foreman, among others—English authorities on the tropical islands. English colonialism provided an intellectual framework within which Americans discussed the new empire. They turned to Charles Dilke, Joseph Chamberlain, Henry Norman, George Curzon, and others to learn how colonies should be governed. Colonial administration seemed a very different matter from the governing of new territories in the continental United States or of the American Indians. The country would have to establish a new colonial service and train men and women fit for work in the tropics. The numerous magazine articles on these subjects during and immediately after the Spanish-American War attest to the impact of the war upon America's intercultural relations. The American people had to learn from scratch what it meant to be masters over an alien race.

This learning took various forms. At the popular level, war stories and novels were written to familiarize the general reader with conditions in the tropics, and children's adventure books sought to impart a sense of patriotic destiny to the younger generation. Quick reference volumes with revealing titles were also published, such as Thomas C. Copeland's *The American Colonial Handbook: A Ready Reference of Facts and Figures, Historical, Geographical, and Commercial, About Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam* (1899). Adult education programs such as the Chautauqua Society conducted seminars on the history of the Philippines. As a matter of course the academic community was selected to provide the intellectual leadership needed to deal with imperial problems, and it readily obliged. Universities established courses in colonial administration, imperialism, and tropical geography; and professional organizations such as the American Historical Association and the American Economic Association were engaged in turning out data and ideas that would be useful to the government in administering the new empire. The acquisition of overseas territories broadened the horizon for historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, who would have to redefine the scope of their respective disciplines to take advantage of the new opportunities. For example, the *American Anthropologist* noted in December 1898 that students of folklore would find "a rich field awaiting them in our territory." Anthropological studies of the Filipinos provided an intellectual underpinning for the establishment of a colonial regime over the islands.

In all this literature there was a feeling of excitement. Imperialism compelled Americans to encounter, mentally if not physically, a host of alien peoples, whereas earlier their experience had been limited to dealing with Indians and blacks. The result was to reaffirm the sense of America's cultural superiority, which was now much more openly linked to Britain than it had been earlier in the century. It was as if imperialism made the United States akin to Great Britain. The two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, it appeared, rediscovered their common heritage and vocabulary. They were both expansionists, many writers pointed out, better fitted than any other nation in the world for the administration of less-developed countries. They were to cooperate so that their respective empires would come to stand for enlightenment and efficiency. Elbridge S. Brooks was echoing a widespread sentiment when he told his young readers in *Lawton and Roberts: A Boy's Adventure in the Philippines and the Transvaal* (1900) that "the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of humanity and civilization. . . . [Untrammeled] liberty to the barbarian is as disastrous a gift as are unquestioning concessions to a republic which has been a republic only in name."

The last sentence reflected self-defensiveness about empire that was just beneath the surface optimism characteristic of the age of imperialism. In extending their control over alien races, Americans could look to the British for experience and guidance; but both of them had to confront the fact that as they advanced to far reaches of the globe, they were causing drastic changes in other societies. The non-Western parts of the world that earlier had been seen as decadent, static, or backward now seemed to be undergoing a period of profound crisis and instability as a result of the impact of Western technology, ideas, and institutions. If the expansionist thrust of the West was an inevitable development of history, then the consequent turmoil, confusion, and even anarchy in many regions of the world would have to be coped with. There were even more serious

problems. If non-Western peoples should discard traditional values for new ones, what would happen to their indigenous cultures? Would they ever become thoroughly "Westernized"? What if they were transformed only superficially and remained basically uncivilized even though the superstructures of their societies were modernized? Would they become pro-Western or anti-Western?

These were some of the most interesting questions in America's intercultural relations during the age of imperialism. That was why so much was written toward the end of the nineteenth century about the nature of Western relations with other cultures. The future destiny of American civilization seemed bound up with the larger question of the evolving relationship between West and non-West. For example, in June 1897, Benjamin Ide Wheeler, who was soon to become president of the University of California at Berkeley, declared in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* entitled "Greece and the Eastern Question" that the real question in the Middle East was "who is to lead, who is to champion, who is to represent Occidentalism in its antithesis between Occidentalism and Orientalism," an idea expressed in earlier decades but that now seemed an urgent question because of the resurgence of the East. Similarly, the naval strategist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan discussed the "stirring of the East" and posed the question of "whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its physical terms." Observers like Wheeler and Mahan agreed that the West's hope lay in its spiritual superiority to the East; even if the latter should catch up technologically and economically, and even though non-Westerners vastly outnumbered Westerners, the future of Western civilization was bright because of its unique heritage. Nevertheless, the fear was always present that the East might prove to be a formidable threat precisely because it lacked the West's refinement, humanity, and self-restraint. A modern Orient without the Occident's values might prove to be totally unmanageable. The West should therefore brace itself for what was termed by many "the coming conflict of civilizations" in the twentieth century.

The cultural monism of the earlier decades was thus giving way to self-consciousness and defensiveness in the age of imperialism. Such apprehension, to be sure, was limited to a minority of writers. Most Americans would have agreed with the historian John Fiske's optimism, as he expressed it in an article on the new "manifest destiny" in 1885, that "within another century . . . all the elements of military predominance on the earth, including that of simple numerical superiority, will have been gathered into the hands not merely of Europeans generally, but more specifically into the hands of the offspring of the Teutonic tribes who conquered Britain in the fifth century." Yet this type of complacency, reflecting a unilinear view of human (Western) progress, could not entirely accommodate some concurrent developments that had enormous implications for intercultural relations. Most notable among them were the growing fascination with non-Western civilizations and the influx of Asian immigrants.

LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENCOUNTERS: ART, RELIGION, AND EVERYDAY LIFE

Americans had always been curious about other peoples and had cherished imports from distant lands. But in the age of globalization there arose serious interest not only in curios and exotica of strange peoples but also in the fine arts, religions, philosophies, and ways of life of other countries, especially in the East. During the 1880s, the United States legation in Constantinople was headed by General Lew Wallace and by Samuel S. Cox, both noted for their favorable views of Oriental cultures. Wallace, the author of the popular novel *Ben Hur,* wrote of the "bloodthirsty and treacherous, recklessly brave and exceedingly beautiful" cavalry of the Ottoman Empire. "Even among the meanest of them," he wrote, "you will see noble, well-set heads of the finest mould, testifying to unmixed blood of the most perfect of living races." Cox recounted his experiences in the East in *Orient Sunbeams.* The message he sought to convey to his readers was that they should remove their prejudice toward people of different religions. He wrote of Islam: "Whatever we may think of its founder, however unacceptable may be some of his doctrines . . . yet as a scheme of religion influencing as many, if not more millions of people than Christianity, is it not worthy of being considered by other peoples?"

This sort of serious interest in what would later be called cultural anthropology was quite visible at the end of the century. The World's Columbian Exposition of 1893, held at Chicago to commemorate the four hundredth anniversary of Christopher Columbus's voyage, provides a good case in point. Close to 30 million people visited

the fair, which was spread over 686 acres of land in south Chicago. Most countries of the world participated, including Japan, which spent millions of dollars to construct buildings specifically for the fair and to present an exhibition of all aspects of traditional and contemporary life. Although this was not the first time that Americans had had an opportunity to examine Japanese artifacts closely—Japan had participated in the 1876 Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia—their observations led to awareness that Japanese culture was much more than a phenomenon to be appreciated in isolation from the rest of that people's life. If the Japanese craftsmen at the Columbian Exposition seemed polite, industrious, and capable of producing refined objects, this had to be related to the totality of Japanese history and values. Japanese civilization could not be understood only within the framework of Western moral standards. Indeed, it might be comparable on equal terms with American civilization; and it might be foolish to judge other peoples from the viewpoint of a self-centered value system. "I just made up my mind," says the hero of Carl Western's novel *Adventures of Reuben and Cynthy at the World's Fair* about the exposition, "that if they [the Japanese] were heathens, there were lots of things we could learn from them."

The Japanese were not the only heathens at Chicago. The Columbian Exposition coincided with the World Parliament of Religions, to which many non-Christian leaders were invited. From India came several prominent figures, including Swami Vivekananda, a Hindu leader noted for his belief that all religions contain truth. His arrival aroused much excitement among Americans. He not only attended the parliament but also traveled extensively in the United States. Americans were fascinated by his stress on religious toleration: "I preach nothing against the Great One of Galilee. I only ask the Christians to take in the Great Ones of India along with the Lord Jesus." To groups of ladies in Salem, Massachusetts, or Streator, Illinois, where he gave talks, it must have seemed quite a revelation that a Hindu monk should have so much to offer to contemporary society. Many were rude; in Chicago, Vivekananda recorded in his diary, "A man from behind pulled at my turban. I looked back and saw that he was a very gentlemanly looking man, neatly dressed. I spoke to him, and when he found that I knew English he became very much abashed." But the *Chicago Herald* probably expressed the predominant sentiment of those who heard Vivekananda's lectures when it wrote, "Vivekananda is undoubtedly the greatest figure in the Parliament of Religions. After hearing him, we feel how foolish it is to send missionaries to this learned nation." Far more than an object of curiosity, Indian civilization could be considered an important entity, even an alternative to the modern ways of life.

Perhaps the most logical embodiment of the emerging attitude was that of Ernest Fenollosa, a philosopher and art critic from Salem, Massachusetts. As a lecturer at Tokyo University in the 1890s, he was instrumental both in transmitting Western thought to the Japanese and in discovering the aesthetic value of Japanese art for Westerners. He taught the philosophy of Friedrich Hegel to students in Tokyo while establishing a collection of Japanese prints for a museum in Boston. The two activities were, from his point of view, of equal importance. Whereas earlier Americans had assumed their superiority and gone to non-Western parts of the world as missionaries and educators, he was convinced that West and non-West had a great deal to learn from one another. The two civilizations were of equal significance. Each had its distinctive cultural tradition, and together East and West constituted complementary halves of the harmonious whole that was mankind. The two were like the Chinese dichotomy of yin and yang, standing for contrasting pairs such as darkness and light, moon and sun, or female and male. The West, as Fenollosa saw it, represented masculinity, strength, and vigor; but it was never whole in itself. Only through a harmonizing relationship with the East, standing for femininity and refinement, could it sustain its existence. No wonder that Fenollosa's favorite analogy was to marriage. As he said in the preface to *East and West* (1893): "The synthesis of two continental civilizations, matured apart through fifteen hundred years, will mark this close of our century as an unique dramatic epoch in human affairs. At the end of a great cycle the two halves of the world come together for the final creation of man."

Not all writers were as sanguine as Fenollosa about the peaceful relationship between East and West. It was at the end of the century that Rudyard Kipling's phrase "East is East, and West is West" became popular. Lafcadio Hearn, a Greek-born American novelist who had long resided in Japan, published his *Kokoro,* a study of the Japanese mentality, in 1896, and stressed that a Westerner could never hope to comprehend the depth of the Japanese mind. In his words, "The

more complex feelings of the Oriental have been composed by combinations of experiences, ancestral and individual, which have had no really precise correspondence in Western life, and which we can therefore not fully know. For converse reasons, the Japanese cannot, even though they would, give Europeans their best sympathy." The overwhelming majority of Americans would probably have agreed more with Hearn than with Fenollosa. The popularity of David Belasco's play *Madame Butterfly* (1900) showed, if nothing else, that there was still a very widespread view that West and non-West might meet on a transient basis, but that their encounter produced tragic consequences because of their inability to understand one another fully.

One additional factor in the development of intercultural relations was the coming of Asians to the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century. Chinese laborers had arrived on the West Coast during the 1840s, but it was after the Civil War that their immigration and residence began to create serious social and political problems. And just when, in the 1880s, their influx was checked through treaty arrangements and congressional enactments, the Japanese began to arrive, first in Hawaii and, after the islands' annexation by the United States, in the western states. The bulk of these people were not exactly embodiments of Chinese or Japanese civilization. They were overwhelmingly poor, illiterate or undereducated, and without more than rudimentary skills. Still, they represented the societies from which they came, and to that extent their experiences in the United States constituted part of America's intercultural relations.

This is best seen in the rhetoric of the Oriental exclusionist movement. The exclusionists on the West Coast and their supporters elsewhere frequently resorted to the argument that the very fabric of American civilization was at stake. Should Asians be allowed to inundate the country, they said, not only would they compete with native labor because of their low wages, but they would also undermine the American way of life. Unlike European immigrants, they brought alien customs and modes of living and, unless checked, would most certainly Orientalize American society. The key to the Chinese immigration dispute, a writer pointed out in 1876, was that the Chinese "never adopts an iota of our civilization. . . . His civilization *displaces* exactly so much of our own; it substitutes Mongolianism." Similar expressions would be heard for many decades. The fundamental issue appeared to be the inevitable conflict of civilizations. Americans were called upon to consider whether their country was to remain Occidental or to become Oriental, under Asiatic influence. To those deeply concerned with the problem, it must have seemed axiomatic that East and West could never live together in peace and harmony. Such particularism was a reflection of the growing proximity, physical as well as geographical, of West and non-West in the age of globalization. At this level, then, America's intercultural relations exhibited narrowness and racial prejudice as defensive measures to preserve what were considered unique features of Western civilization.

Not all non-Westerners who came to the United States, however, were poor and illiterate laborers. A small minority of scholars, officials, businessmen, and other members of the elite visited the country, some to stay for a long time. They contributed to America's intercultural relations by associating with their counterparts in the United States and by articulating their views to Americans and to people at home. Some of them came with good classical educations, attracted to an America that was envisioned as a land of the free. For those who were highly educated and politically conscious, but who felt themselves alienated from their own lands for political or cultural reasons, the United States beckoned as a land of freedom, opportunity, and humanism. The image of America as the place to go for education was established in China and Japan by the end of the nineteenth century, as was the image that in the United States one could find a refuge from oppression and persecution in one's own country. Baba Tatsui, a young activist, left Japan for America to pursue his struggle for political rights, and many of his compatriots with socialistic views followed him. Sun Yat-sen engaged in revolutionary activities among Chinese in Hawaii and the United States. Some of China's constitutionalists also visited America, where they founded newspapers and conducted fund-raising campaigns.

What the United States meant to these visiting non-Westerners must be considered an important aspect of the country's intercultural relations. To many of them, this was "the sacred land of liberty," as the Japanese said. But there were others who were shocked by the contrast between that image and the reality. Uchimura Kanzō, the Japanese Christian leader, was repelled by materialistic excesses. Some returned to their homelands to spread certain images of the United States. It can be said that at this time there were non-American

as well as American agents of intercultural relations. The United States exerted subtle influences upon other countries not only through its own merchants, travelers, or missionaries but also through foreigners visiting the country. Often it was through America that the latter first encountered Western civilization, and the importance of this is hard to exaggerate. For better or worse, what they saw in the United States epitomized for them the essence of capitalism, constitutionalism, and Christianity. The experiences of a man like Uchimura, who had been introduced to Christianity through American missionaries in Japan but who came to the United States and discovered the gap between what he called Bible Christianity and American Christianity, are fascinating examples of cross-cultural interactions. It was as if America taught him what Christianity was not.

TWENTIETH CENTURY THROUGH WORLD WAR II: AMERICANIZATION AND REACTION

By 1900, then, there were already complex layers of intercultural relations, some subtle new forces and others that were crude echoes of the past, but all constituting parts of the developing trends toward globalization. These layers continued to evolve after the turn of the century. The history of intercultural relations in the twentieth century is extremely difficult to characterize, since it is an ongoing process. It is possible, however, to examine the period before the outbreak of World War II in terms of two contradictory currents: universalistic and particularistic tendencies. On the one hand, there was every indication that American influence was spreading to other lands; at the same time, there grew self-conscious opposition to American and Western cultural predominance in the world.

By the time of World War I, the United States had established its position as the leading Western power, not only in industrial production, trade, and foreign loans and investments but also in armaments and political influence. While this was not the same thing as cultural hegemony, there is little doubt that the United States came to stand and speak for Western civilization at a time when the European countries were engaged in fratricidal conflicts and disputes. One reason why President Woodrow Wilson wanted to postpone American entry into the war was his fear for the survival of Western civilization. He came to see his country as a guardian of that precious tradition, a sentiment shared by an increasing number of British. But similar views had also been expressed by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, who had come to take for granted the spread of benign American influence to the rest of the world. Civilization, as Taft never tired of saying, was based on an unlimited interchange of goods and capital, which in turn contributed to international peace, harmony, and understanding. Americans would carry their wares throughout the world and promote economic modernization and political awakening. Because of their superiority in technology, organization, and business practices, Americans were bound to emerge as the most influential group in the new world of enlightened international relations. They would be among the foremost agents of change in the twentieth century. Wilson fully accepted such ideas and elevated them to a vision of internationalism in which American values would reign—valid not as American but as universal values. No wonder that he was eager to promote missionary activities and was captivated by the idea of establishing American mandates in various parts of the world.

Because the European countries lost population, productive capacity, morale, and prestige as a result of the war, the United States was able to replace European power and influence in international affairs. American technology, epitomized by the automobile, dominated the postwar world, as did popular American culture such as jazz, radio, and motion pictures. In Europe one talked of the "decline of the West" after Oswald Spengler's book of that title was published in 1918, but somehow the West that was declining did not seem to include the United States. Observers such as the sociologists Thorstein Veblen and Pitirim Sorokin discussed the ramifications of the emerging mass society; but they implied that this was the way of the future, that developments in the United States portended what was to take place elsewhere. To understand modern society one looked at the United States. Whether one liked it or not, it seemed that Americanization was an inevitable phenomenon of the postwar world.

This was also the way American influence was perceived in non-Western countries. In Turkey, India, China, Japan, and elsewhere, the war had caused European prestige to suffer; but the United States appeared more vigorous and resilient than its European cousins. American trade was the most extensive in history, and a

growing bulk of it was conducted with non-European countries. Americans appeared in areas where earlier one had seen only Europeans, investing in oil fields and establishing manufacturing plants. John Dewey's instrumentalism became the most popular philosophy in universities throughout Asia, and women in distant societies turned to American women not only for fashions but also for political ideals and social visions, such as women's suffrage and population control. Jazz, baseball, and Charlie Chaplin became just as popular in Japan as in America. "Modern times" was synonymous with American culture for people of the 1920s. Even in the 1930s, it is possible to argue, American influence did not abate; the process of cultural Americanization proceeded unchecked until well into the decade. Visits by American baseball teams were always important news to the Japanese, often overshadowing any feeling of crisis as a result of the latter nation's imperialistic activities on the Asian continent. Charles Lindbergh was as well known across the Pacific as across the Atlantic, and even Japanese martial music had definite traces of American influence. Children and women shed their traditional costumes and started wearing Westernized clothes, and bars and cabarets mushroomed. In many ways Japan on the eve of Pearl Harbor was a society more Americanized than ever before.

While the interwar era, then, was a period of rapid Americanization, it is also true that the 1920s and the 1930s saw self-conscious opposition to, and even rejection of, the West by some non-Western countries. They began to assert their identity, no longer content to remain objects of Western expansion and receptacles of Western influence. This second trend, toward particularism, was already visible at the beginning of the century, when people everywhere noted signs that seemed to indicate the non-West's rise against the West. The Russo-Japanese War, which the Japanese took pains to characterize not as a racial conflict but as one between civilization and barbarism, nevertheless was cheered by non-Westerners from Egypt to China as a victory of a colored nation over a white nation. In the Near East and North Africa, Islam was becoming self-conscious and militant; Islamic spokesmen talked of an Arab renaissance and the coming jihad against the Christian West. Mosques began to be built in American cities.

The Young Turks, the Persian nationalists, and the Armenian revolutionaries felt betrayed by the peace settlements after World War I. Asians became disillusioned by the alleged universalism of Wilsonian internationalism when the Western powers failed to adopt a racial equality clause as part of the League of Nations Covenant. The Chinese were bitter toward the United States and Great Britain for their alleged failure to stop Japanese encroachment on Shantung. The Turks viewed the postwar settlement as an imposition by the Western nations at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. For these varied reasons, the international order after 1919 appeared to be an "Anglo-American peace," as Prince Konoye Fumimaro of Japan said.

Nationalism, which had been inspired by the modern Western example, became a force against the West in many non-Western countries during the interwar years. It took on a culturally particularistic meaning as Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and others asserted their distinctive identity as separate from European or American civilization. In China, for instance, nationalism was not only aimed at recovering rights lost to the imperialists; it also revealed itself in a movement to develop native Christian churches and to replace Westerners in administrative posts at colleges and universities. The fascination the Chinese felt for Marxism and Leninism was in part due to the anti-Western messages, explicit or implicit, that they found in these ideologies. Marxist-Leninist thought gave the Chinese a conceptual tool with which to attack Western capitalism as well as Western civilization. The wholesale transformation of the country after the pattern of the West was no longer seriously advocated. Now there were other models and other choices; some sought a Soviet-type revolution, while others visualized a combination of Chinese tradition with modern technology as the best way to save China.

More or less the same phenomenon of self-conscious reassessment of Western values could be observed in Turkey, India, Japan, and other countries. The trend was no doubt encouraged by the literature of pessimism that Europeans were producing in the decade after the war. Many of these writers expressed doubt that Western civilization could survive, and some turned to the East as a source of salvation. As an article in a February 1925 issue of the *Europaische Staats und Wirtschafts Zeitung* put it, "Our Western world is weary; not weary of life, but of strife and hatred. Indeed, our peculiar society and civilization have been found wanting. . . . Men are looking to the East unconsciously, and therefore sincerely. . . . The world of Asia draws us with its promise of

something new and something that will liberate." Eastern philosophers like Rabindranath Tagore and Vasudeo Metta were eager to oblige and to offer this "something" for which Westerners seemed to be looking. Unfortunately, very often their thoughts were utilized in Asia for nationalistic upheavals against pervasive Western influence.

The world crisis of the 1930s that culminated in World War II definitely had a cultural dimension; it may be argued that the major difference between the two world wars was the addition of the cultural factor in the second. World War I was mainly a civil war among Western countries, whereas World War II involved peoples of diverse cultural traditions and ideologies. It was in essence intercultural warfare. This was particularly true of the United States and its relations in Asia and the Pacific. Throughout the 1930s, Japan pursued an aggressive foreign policy and gave it an ideological sanction of pan-Asianism. The concept was transparently anti-Western. Asia, according to this view, was to reassert itself against the imperialistic exploitation by the West, which had cultural as well as political and economic aspects. For too long, Japanese nationalists declared, the West had permeated Asian life, subverting traditional values and destroying age-old social customs. Asians had ceased to be Asian; they had either become Westernized or objects of Western influence. They had lost their identities and their souls. If they were to regain these things, they must stand together as Asians and develop a regional system of cultural and economic autonomy. The ideology of Japanese militarism stressed the eradication of Western values from education, mass media, and daily living, and the need to return to the essence of national culture. Apologists for Japanese aggression also viewed pan-Asian regionalism as a viable alternative to both imperialism and particularistic nationalism, two vices that they attributed to the modern West. If Asia were to reject imperialism and yet to avoid repeating the experience of the modern nation-states constantly struggling against one another, it was imperative that Asian countries organize themselves into a regional system.

For the bulk of Americans, these events in distant Asia were of far less importance than their individual struggles for economic survival at home. But there was a genuine cultural dimension in the economic crisis, in that the values of bourgeois mass society seemed less and less relevant to the unemployed, the handicapped, and the racially segregated. Western civilization appeared to be seriously threatened from within, as evidenced by the growth of Italian fascism, German nazism, and Soviet communism. Americans, no longer sure of the eternal validity of middle-class precepts and symbols, often turned to Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin as possible saviors of civilization. At the same time, many of them embraced isolationism, in the belief that by staying out of war in Europe or Asia, the United States would be able to preserve what was left of civilization and help reconstruct Europe after it had been devastated by war. For a man like Charles Lindbergh, it was nothing short of a crime against Western civilization to enter the fray on the side of either Britain or Germany. Only the uncivilized in other lands would benefit from such fratricide.

In such a context, the war between the United States and Japan could be seen in a cultural context. The irony was that the combatants fought with modern weapons, utilizing all the techniques of scientific warfare. As noted earlier, despite its profession of indigenous values and pan-Asianism, Japan in 1941 was more Westernized than ever before. The decision to establish control in the areas of Asia that were rich in natural resources could also be seen as a device to proceed with further industrialization and economic strengthening. The Japanese dream of an autonomous empire was little different from a Western conception. Cultural particularism did not cloak these ambitions.

The United States, on the other hand, regained the sense of cultural identity and confidence when war came. The self-doubt and crisis-consciousness of the 1930s were replaced by a renewed faith in the essential soundness and goodness of Western values. The faith was expressed in the universalistic rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and the communiqués issued by the Big Three at the end of their meetings at Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945). The language reaffirmed the principles of peace, justice, and human rights, which were seen to be as relevant as ever because the Axis powers were pictured as the would-be architects of a world based on diametrically opposed values. It is true that many Americans saw the Pacific war in more parochial ways, stressing the racial aspect. To cite one extreme example from within the government, Captain Harry L. Pence of the U.S. Navy reiterated, at meetings of the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, that the war

involved the question of "which race was to survive." He favored "the almost total elimination of the Japanese as a race," saying, "Japan should be bombed so that there was little left of its civilization." Moreover, the Japanese "should not be dealt with as civilized human beings. . . . We should kill them before they kill us." Although representative of a current of opinion in wartime America, such views were not part of postwar planning. On the contrary, officials and opinion leaders continued to stress universalistic principles and to search for a new world order in which Japan, no less than other countries, would participate. Japan's surrender thus implied, at the level of cultural affairs, the recognition that particularism had failed and the acceptance by Japan of American ideas as more applicable to its needs.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE COLD WAR

Intercultural relations after World War II were far more extensive and diverse than earlier. The United States became the virtual inheritor of European civilization, emerging as the strongest and richest country in the world, capable of supporting the arts and financing scholarly and artistic undertakings. European refugees enriched America's cultural life. For the first time it could be said that American art was in the vanguard of modern art, not a pale reflection of European works. The same was true of literature and music. Unlike the period after World War I, however, there was much less self-consciousness about American culture. It was assumed as a matter of course, rather than asserted as a matter of principle, that American artists, novelists, and musicians were engaged in creative work that had relevance to the contemporary world as a whole. Europeans looked to the United States to discern artistic and literary trends. Moreover, American troops stationed in most parts of Europe transmitted American popular culture and lifestyles to the Old World. It became important for European intellectuals to study in the United States if they wished to keep abreast of developments in scholarship.

The impact on the non-Western world was no less great. American influence was transmitted through soldiers, officials, and businessmen who were scattered throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Consciously or unconsciously, they contributed to a deeper cultural involvement of America in other lands. America came to stand for what was fashionable and up-to-date. At the same time, Americans abroad collectively and individually increased their nation's awareness of other cultures and contributed to a greater appreciation of non-Western traditions. Many who were trained during the war as language specialists and intelligence officers retained their interest in foreign countries, and some of them became leaders in the postwar development of "area studies." American colleges began seriously teaching courses in non-Western civilizations and founded institutes to further research in these areas. There was also a flood of non-Europeans to the United States as war brides, students, and visitors. Through them Americans came into contact with non-Western ways of life.

This flowering of cultural relations after World War II was in many ways a culmination of the globalizing trend that had begun in the nineteenth century. Globalization had connected different parts of the world closer together; it had also manifested itself in imperialism. It had often provoked fierce opposition on the part of nations and individuals that wished to preserve their traditional loyalties and ways of life. In many ways the atomic bombs that brought World War II to conclusion also ended such opposition in the sense that war from now on came to be seen as truly global, something that was to be avoided at all cost if civilization were to survive. This meant that military conflict and confrontation would come to constitute a lesser part of international relations than earlier. To be sure, the estrangement among the victorious powers after 1945, known as the Cold War, did become a pervasive phenomenon and defined one facet of world affairs for nearly half a century. But it would be misleading to subordinate all other phenomena to the geopolitical confrontation. For the Cold War failed to prevent another, even more substantive development, globalization, from gaining momentum after World War II. And globalization was fundamentally a nongeopolitical phenomenon. U.S. cultural relations in the second half of the twentieth century may be understood in such a context.

It would appear that the old opposition between globalization, on one hand, and local identities, on the other, gave way to the virtually universal forces of global interdependence and interpenetration after World War II. These forces were economic, social, and cultural. Modernization provided one easily recognizable framework to comprehend this phenomenon. In the wake of a war that had divided the globe, there resurfaced

the idea that all the countries in the world were tending toward a more modern phase. Economic development, political democracy, and social justice appeared to be essential ingredients of modernity; and intellectuals discussed how such an outlook could be encouraged in a traditional society. Appreciation of non-Western civilizations often took the form of discovering elements in them that were potentially "modern." In this process, there grew some tolerance for cultural pluralism: not just greater appreciation for Japanese architecture, Chinese food, or Indian philosophy but economic, political, and social changes in those countries. The hope was that through such changes, coupled with the new outlook in postwar America, foreigners and Americans would come to a better understanding of one another. They would develop a common vocabulary of mutual respect as they cooperated to bring about a more modern world. The pace of globalization was being accelerated in a changing world. U.S. cultural relations contributed to globalization and at the same time to an appreciation of diversity. This was a far more significant story than the vicissitudes of the Cold War, for ultimately it was the globalizing world that put an end to the Cold War, not the other way round.

It might be objected that the Cold War did have a globalizing aspect. Not only did it provoke fears of a nuclear conflagration that would annihilate the whole world, but the vocabulary of the geopolitical confrontation often had global connotations. The Soviet Union and its allies spoke of a worldwide people's struggle against the evils of capitalism and imperialism, while the United States and its partners accused the opponents of infringing upon such universal values as freedom and democracy. Moreover, both sides frequently used cultural means to wage Cold War: propaganda, student exchanges, conferences of intellectuals, and the like. Even in the United States, where traditionally cultural pursuits had been considered to belong exclusively to the private sphere, the government did not hesitate to sponsor art exhibits, publications of journals, or meetings of labor leaders abroad in order to try to influence other countries' opinions. A cultural Cold War did exist, as did official cultural policies. But if such policies resulted in a growing interdependence among different parts of the world, it was more by accident than by design. What brought about the dissipation and, ultimately, the end of the Cold War were not these policies but the growing global consciousness, a product of cultural interpenetration, not of the geopolitical confrontation whose fundamental orientation was to divide the globe, not to unite it.

INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS SINCE THE 1970S

That international cultural relations became an increasingly crucial factor in defining the world may be seen in certain remarkable developments during the 1970s. It was then that such broadly cultural agendas as the protection of the natural environment and the promotion of human rights came to be considered vital aspects of international affairs. The United Nations conference on the environment that was held in Stockholm in 1972, for instance, was a landmark in that the protection of the physical universe from pollution, or of wild animals from excessive killing, came to be viewed as a matter of concern to the entire international community so that nations and peoples would have to join forces to achieve these objectives. Likewise, the promotion of human rights, whether of "prisoners of conscience," ethnic minorities, women, the handicapped, or other groups subject to discrimination, was seen as something that required international cooperation to undertake. World conferences began to be held, with or without the sponsorship of the United Nations, that addressed the rights of these diverse groups. Under the circumstances, United States foreign affairs, too, were becoming broader; not just the protection of security and national interests as traditionally understood, but the realization of a more livable world, both for humans and for the ecological system, would become an objective of foreign policy. President Jimmy Carter sensed these changing circumstances when he launched an initiative to seek alternative, cleaner sources of energy and to ensure the protection of human rights worldwide, even in countries that were allied to the United States in the Cold War. Cultural questions, broadly defined, were increasingly attracting the attention of Washington and other capitals.

The 1970s were also a remarkable decade in that it was the time when cultural diversity became a matter of serious concern in international affairs and, at the same time, when the number of nongovernmental organizations mushroomed, to supplement and in some instances even to supplant the work traditionally carried out by states. The two phenomena were interrelated in

that both reflected the growth of civil society and, by the same token, the decline of state authority. This was a circumstance that could be observed in the United States as well as in Soviet-bloc nations, among the rich as well as developing countries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its challenge to the power of both the United States (as in Iran) and the Soviet Union (as in Afghanistan) is but one extreme example of the emergence of religious and cultural diversity as a factor in international relations. And the fact that neither superpower was able to dislodge the religious fundamentalists by force indicated the growing importance of culture as a determinant of foreign affairs. Since the traditional state apparatus was not well equipped or prepared to cope with the crisis, it is not surprising that a host of nongovernmental organizations emerged to respond to the situation. Many of them were engaged in humanitarian activities to alleviate the suffering of people caught in religious strife, while others sought to promote dialogue among different religious and ethnic groups. With respect to environmentalism and human rights, too, nongovernmental organizations grew in number and influence. One cannot discuss U.S. foreign affairs during the 1970s without taking these developments into consideration.

What such developments suggested was the possible emergence of a global civil society, a world defined by cultural forces, groups, and agendas, as opposed to the traditional world consisting of sovereign states. The latter world, of course, still existed and behaved very much as sovereign states had always done, seeking to protect and promote their national interests. But national interests were now more broadly construed than earlier, and soon many in the United States and other countries began speaking of "human security" as a shared agenda for all nations. Not separate national securities and interests, but common interests defined by shared values were coming to be seen as a desirable goal for all nations. But this was not all. Even outside the framework of sovereign entities, the key framework for international affairs as traditionally understood, many nonstate actors, including multinational enterprises and nongovernmental organizations, were coming to play more and more active roles throughout the world. Theirs was an arena for an interplay of economic, technological, and cultural forces that were not necessarily bound by national units or considerations. That arena came to be called an international civil society by students of international relations during the 1970s and the subsequent decades who saw in its formation a fundamental challenge to the traditional state system.

How the challenge would be met, and whether the international civil society would some day come to establish a more viable world order than sovereign states, were questions that fascinated statesmen and citizens alike as the twentieth century drew to a close. During the 1980s and the 1990s, there was much debate in the United States as well as elsewhere about the changing nature of international relations. Did the end of the Cold War presage the coming of an indefinite period of U.S. supremacy in world affairs? Or, on the contrary, were all great powers, even including the United States, destined eventually to decline? Which power would take its place if the United States ever did lose its hegemonic position? Such geopolitically oriented questions, however, were missing the point. They ignored the fact that international relations were increasingly being defined by nongeopolitical forces and by nonstate actors. Many of these forces and actors were cultural, broadly speaking. The globalization of cultural activities, ranging from information technology to the spread of fast food, was continuing with its own momentum, promoted by multinational enterprises, international organizations, and many other nongovernmental entities. Sometimes globalization provoked opposition on the part of forces exemplifying cultural diversity, but this was a dualism that had always existed, as we have seen. What was remarkable as the century gave way to the new millennium was that the dualism was coming more and more to determine the shape of international political and economic, as well as cultural, affairs. Cultural relations were no longer marginal pursuits, if they ever were. For the United States as well as for others, culture was coming to claim center stage as they conducted their foreign affairs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chisolm, Lawrence W. *Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture*. New Haven, Conn., 1963. Biography that illuminates intellectual interchanges between Americans and Asians.

Cohen, Warren I. *East Asian Art and American Culture: A Study in International Relations*. New York, 1992. Analysis of the American reception of Asian art.

Costigliola, Frank. *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1984. A close examination of transatlantic cultural influences during the interwar years, going in both directions.

Diggins, John P. *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America.* Princeton, N.J., 1972. A detailed study of what Mussolini meant to various segments of the U.S. population.

Field, James A., Jr. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969. The best historical treatment of American cultural relations with Middle Eastern countries.

Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955.* Baton Rouge, La., 1999. A fascinating study of an attempt to reshape German culture after World War II.

Hay, Stephen N. *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India.* Cambridge, Mass., 1970. Another biography that casts light on the discourse on East-West relations.

Hixson, Walter L. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961.* New York, 1997. A good study of U.S. cultural policy during the Cold War.

Iriye, Akira. *Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations.* Cambridge, Mass., 1975. Includes several monographs on American-Japanese cultural relations.

———. "Culture and International History." In Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations.* New York and Cambridge, 1991. An essay that notes some of the landmark studies of the history of intercultural, as distinct from intra-cultural, relations.

———. *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations.* Rev. ed. Chicago, 1992. A multicultural treatment of American–East Asian relations.

———. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order.* Baltimore, 1997. Puts international cultural relations in the framework of the development of internationalism in modern history.

Isaacs, Harold R. *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India.* New York, 1958. American attitudes toward China and India.

Kloppenberg, James T. *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920.* New York, 1986. Analyzes transatlantic intellectual and political movements at the turn of the century, comprehending developments within the United States as an integral part of the story of the Western world's coming to terms with the realities of modernization.

Koppes, Clayton R., and Gregory D. Black. *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies.* New York, 1987. Study of wartime culture that focuses on use of the movies as a tool for indoctrination at home and propaganda abroad.

Kuklick, Bruce. *Puritans in Babylon: The Ancient Near East and American Intellectual Life, 1880–1931.* Princeton, N.J., 1996. Studies American fascination with and archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire and Near East.

Lancaster, Clay. *The Japanese Influence in America.* New York, 1963. Impact on American philosophy and literature.

Ninkovich, Frank A. *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950.* Cambridge and New York, 1981. Treats the origins and development of official U.S. cultural relations.

Northrop, F. S. C., and Helen H. Livingston, eds. *Cross-Cultural Understanding: Epistemology in Anthropology.* New York, 1964. Contains essays dealing with the problem of cross-cultural understanding.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* New York, 1990. One of the most penetrating analyses of the relationship between the cultural and other aspects of U.S. foreign affairs.

Park, Robert E. *Race and Culture.* Glencoe, Ill., 1950. Contains some of the earliest and most penetrating observations on the global "melting pot."

Pells, Richard. *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II.* New York, 1997. One of the few systematic studies of transatlantic cultural relations.

Reynolds, David. *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945.* New York, 1995. Study of American culture during the war that explicitly treats international affairs.

Rodgers, Daniel T. *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age.* Cambridge, Mass., 1998. Analyzes transatlantic intellectual and political movements at the turn of the cen-

tury, comprehending developments within the United States as an integral part of the story of the Western world's coming to terms with the realities of modernization.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945*. Rev. ed. New York, 1982. Argues that officials in Washington often informally cooperated with private businessmen, religious organizations, and philanthropic as well as other associations to spread the American way of life to other lands.

———. "Cultural Interaction." In Stanley I. Kutler, ed. *Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century*. Vol. 2. New York, 1996. Incorporates the vocabulary of cultural hegemony into a discussion of U.S. foreign relations.

Sumner, William Graham. *Folkways: A Study of Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals*. Boston, 1913. An American anthropologist who not only described but also raised methodological questions about the study of other cultures.

See also COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; GLOBALIZATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; IMPERIALISM; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

DECISION MAKING

Valerie M. Hudson

American foreign policy may be studied from a variety of perspectives. Historical narrative, institutional analysis, issue area examination, rational choice theory, study of ideational and legal evolution, gendered perspectives, and Realpolitik accounts are all valid and useful approaches to understanding not only American foreign policy but the foreign policy of any nation.

DECISION MAKING AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Decision-making approaches and theories fall within the subfield of foreign policy analysis, within the larger field of internation relations. Foreign policy analysis (known as FPA) is distinguished from other theoretical approaches in international relations by its insistence that the explanatory focal point must be the foreign policy decision makers themselves and not larger structural or systemic phenomena. Explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect the decision-making process. Thus, of all subfields in international relations, FPA is the most radically integrative theoretical enterprise. Investigations into the roles that personality variables, perception and construction of meaning, group dynamics, organizational process, bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, culture, and system structure play in foreign policy decision making are the core research agenda of FPA. But as Richard Snyder, one of the founders of FPA, and his colleagues Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin noted in 1954, these are only important as they have an impact on the only true agents in international affairs—human decision makers:

> In a sense, then, in the age-old philosophy of social science debate concerning whether agents or structures are the primary determinants of behavior in the social world, FPA comes down squarely on the side of agents. FPA is the agent-centered theory of international relations. Foreign policy analysts argue that without an account of human agency in international relations theory, one cannot develop a satisfactory account of change over time in international affairs. Furthermore, given the immense destructive power inherent in internation relations, explanations that omit an examination of the role and efficacy of human agency in using and containing that power do less than they ought.

Here, then, is yet another difference between FPA approaches and other accepted approaches to understanding international relations. Not only does FPA give an account of agency, but it gives a specific, rather than a general, account of agency. In such approaches as game theory and rational choice explanations of foreign policy, the actor is conceptualized as a generic, rational, utility-maximizing decision maker. In contrast, theories of FPA unpack that generic "black-boxed" actor and discover that the idiosyncrasies of the actor do affect foreign policy choice. To use terms coined by Alexander George, FPA is more interested in "actor-specific" theory than "actor-general" theory.

In sum, then, FPA produces radically integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific theory. In these three ways, it remains a unique and easily distinguishable subfield of international relations.

A Word About the Explanandum What is it that foreign policy analysts seek to explain? To use a common phrase, what is the dependent variable in FPA?

Despite attempts to formulate "foreign policy" in terms of consistently operationalized variables, it must be admitted that what is to be explained may vary across research programs within FPA. Some programs focus on foreign policy as an *output* of decision making; others focus

on the decision-making *process* in foreign policy. For example, the use of events data (discussed below) as one's dependent variable is an example of conceptualizing foreign policy as an output. In this tradition, foreign policy "events" gleaned from news media can be coded for some set of variables, such as the level of commitment implied by the event on the part of the acting nation. Standardized coding then allows for direct comparison of the outputs of various nation-state actors, as well as permitting a longitudinal analysis of the foreign policy behavior of one nation.

It is also possible to take a more process-oriented approach to what is meant by foreign policy. For example, one could use the policy positions of various actors as the dependent variable, tracing how a particular position becomes dominant within a decision-making group over time. One could walk the cat back yet another step and examine how such policy stances crystallize in the first place from basic cognitive processes such as perception, problem representation, and construction of meaning. Another step back would be to ask how the decision-making group comes to be in the first place, how structures and processes of groups are created and changed over time within a society. Role conceptions concerning the nation-state, and concerning various institutions and groups within the nation-state, could also be the focus of inquiry.

Both approaches to the explanandum in FPA have been fruitfully used, and insights from each type of research informs the other. It is true that choice of explanandum affects choice of methodology: aggregate statistical testing may be useful in events data studies, whereas process-tracing and interpretivist analysis might be more helpful with process-oriented conceptualizations of foreign policy.

SURVEY OF FPA THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Individual Psychology and Cognition Characteristics of the individual decision maker may be very important in understanding the decisions ultimately made. Harold and Margaret Sprout, in their pioneering work *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (1956), believe that analysis of this "psycho-milieu" is crucial to understanding nation-state foreign policy. Margaret G. Hermann argues that certain conditions increase the probability that the personal characteristics of leaders will affect foreign policy: when the decision maker has wide decision latitude within the governmental system, when the situation is nonroutine, ambiguous, or carries with it very high stakes, or when the policy under discussion is a long-term policy or strategy. In addition to these situational variables, the personality of a leader may also be more influential, according to Hermann, when the leader does not have formal diplomatic training or when the leader is not especially attentive or sensitive to changes in external circumstances.

Furthermore, the analyst must remain aware of the limitations and vulnerabilities of human beings, both in a physical sense and a cognitive sense. Physically, human decision making can be affected by stress levels, lack of sleep, acute or chronic illness, mental pathologies, medications being used, age, and so forth. For example, psychologists have found that decision making tends to be of higher quality when moderate levels of stress are present. Too low a stress level or too high a stress level can be counterproductive. But there are also cognitive limitations inherent in being human. The human brain is so complex that human beings often rely on reasoning shortcuts or heuristics to make decisions. Errors of representation, the "gambler's fallacy" (where the gambler believes that an outcome is more likely to occur if it has not occurred lately), and many other biases may affect choice. Furthermore, a person's ability to handle complexity has an upper limit: psychologists tell us that even the most conceptually complex human reasoner can only hold seven things in mind simultaneously. Robert Jervis explores these factors in depth in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976).

Humans are also a diverse lot in terms of their personal belief systems. At birth, each human begins to develop beliefs about how the world works and what is to be valued. In FPA, several scholars have created theoretical frameworks to typologize such belief systems. Margaret Hermann created a set of "foreign policy orientations" based on elements such as nationalism, belief in ability to control events, distrust of others, and task-affect orientation, among others. Alexander George promulgated the tool of "operational code analysis," wherein the analyst determines a leader's beliefs with reference to how best to accomplish goals. David Winter has sought to typologize the motivating forces for individual leaders. Such frameworks of analysis often rely on

the methodology of content analysis, where a leader's speeches and writings are analyzed thematically or quantitatively to provide insight into the specifics of his or her belief system. Learning and change in knowledge systems has been a focus of inquiry for Jack Levy, and Matthew Bonham's methodology of cognitive mapping of content-analyzed material can be used to trace changes in knowledge structures over time.

Small-Group Dynamics and Problem Representation It is arguably within the context of small-group deliberations that most foreign policy decisions are made. Thus, the study of group decision making becomes a very important element of FPA. As noted, FPA owes a great debt to Richard Snyder and his colleagues Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin for insisting that researchers look below the nation-state level of analysis to the actual decision-making groups involved.

With regard to small groups in particular, as opposed to larger collectivities such as organizations and bureaucracies, the seminal work is undoubtedly Irving Janis's classic *Groupthink* (1972). Using examples taken from the annals of American foreign policy, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, Janis was able to show how the desire to maintain group consensus and subjective feelings of personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision-making quality. Such groups wind up being "soft-headed" but "hard-hearted" as outgroups are dehumanized and ingroup decision processes become sloppier. A hallmark of groupthink is the risky shift, where the group is prepared to make riskier decisions than any individual member of the group would be prepared to make on his own. A sense of group invulnerability and omniscience creates psychological disincentives to rethinking the group's initially preferred policy or even to constructing contingency plans in the event of failure of that policy. A later generation of scholars advanced Janis's work and explored the scope conditions under which groupthink is more or less likely.

The study of how a group comes to an initial representation of the problem at hand, and how, then, the group members aggregate their differing preferences, is another research agenda at this level of analysis. One way of analyzing group problem representation is to view group discussions as the attempt to jointly author a "story" that makes the problem intelligible. Donald A. Sylvan and Deborah Haddad, in the volume *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (1998), suggest that such coauthorship allows for the action decision to be made collectively. When rival story lines are offered and collide, the group as a whole must work its way back to a consistent story line through persuasion and analysis. Yuen Foon Khong's important book *Analogies at War* (1992) demonstrates how the use of the conflicting analogies to frame the problem of Vietnam led to conceptual difficulties in reasoning about policy options. The "Korea" analogy gained ascendance, according to Khong, without sufficient attention paid to the incongruities between the two sets of circumstances. Thus, the debate over metaphors and analogies used to understand a new situation may predispose a group's policy response, possibly with tragic consequences.

How the structure and the process of a group affect decision outcomes, making some outcomes more or less likely, is also an interesting question. The role played by the members—as representatives of a larger group, or as autonomous actors—coupled with the size of the group and the leadership style used, may make deadlock more probable than agreement. These structural variables may in turn be influenced by rules for resolving conflict within the group, such as majority voting, two-thirds voting, or unanimity. Theory on coalition-building and bargaining may be invaluable in understanding how a particular decision is ultimately selected. Furthermore, certain types of leaders prefer certain types of group structures and processes. Theoretical leverage on the most likely outcome for various types of groups may be gained by these types of analysis.

Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Although actual foreign policy decisions may be made primarily in small groups, the policy positions of group members and the subsequent implementation of decisions made by small groups are only well understood when the analyst includes insights at the organizational and bureaucratic levels of analysis. American foreign policy is dominated by several large organizations, such as the Defense Department and the State Department, and the resulting web of organizations—the bureaucracy—may have a political dynamic all its own. Indeed, to see this bureaucracy as merely the executive arm of foreign policy is to underestimate the powerful political forces that drive organizations. These powerful motivations—the desire for expanded "turf," expanded budget, expanded influence vis-à-vis

other organizations, as well as the desire to maintain organizational "essence," "morale," and "culture"—may result in a radical undermining of the supposedly rational decision-making process in foreign policy. Morton Halperin's *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974) gives unforgettable examples of this unhappy dynamic with reference to the era of the Vietnam War.

Graham Allison's 1971 *Essence of Decision* (and its 1999 update) examines not only the subversion of rationality at the decision-making stage but also the subversion of rationality at the implementation end. Large organizations typically develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) that allow for quicker, more efficient responses than would otherwise be possible with collectivities numbering in the thousands or even millions of persons. Unfortunately, these SOPs are fairly insensitive to the nuances of external circumstances as well as to efforts by national leaders to adapt or modify them. Indeed, national leaders may not even comprehend that when they give an executive order it is first translated into a series of sequential SOP steps. This translation may leave much to be desired in terms of flexibility, creativity, and appropriateness. For example, Allison found that the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, given the order in 1962 to construct ballistic missile sites in Cuba, used the same SOP they had developed for doing so in the Soviet Union. This SOP did not include a provision for camouflaging the construction sites. Thus, American U-2s were able to photograph the sites, and American analysts were immediately able to identify what they were, giving President John F. Kennedy and his advisers a crucial window of time in which to compel the Soviets to abandon their intentions.

Domestic Politics Surely there is no better case than that of American foreign policy with which to demonstrate the influence of domestic political considerations on policymaking. The chief executive must stand for election every four years and as a result may be constrained in his ability to act as he otherwise would absent such electoral considerations. The Congress and the judiciary also have unique roles to play in American foreign policy, and players there may also be facing political imperatives. The two-party system of American politics also plays havoc with the rationality of decision making, as actors must not only think of their own well-being but the relative standing of their party vis-à-vis the other. Furthermore, the variety of vocal special interest and lobbying groups, not only national but also transnational in nature, is positively dizzying.

Robert Putnam suggests that we understand foreign policy as a "two-level game" being played by the leadership of the nation. At one level, the leadership is trying to retain its domestic political standing and enhance its electoral prospects and the electoral prospects of its allies. At another level, the leadership is trying to negotiate with foreign powers to achieve foreign policy objectives. A bad move at either level can imperil one's prospects at the other level. The astute leader attempts to create opportunities whereby moves at one level directly translate into advantage at the other. Interestingly, one counterintuitive finding is that the more constrained the leader can claim to be in the domestic arena, the more insistent he can be in the foreign arena. Thus, the threat that the U.S. Congress would never ratify a particular treaty can be used by administration officials to successfully maneuver other foreign actors to move closer to their own preferred bargaining position.

Of course, the reverse is also a recognizable phenomenon in international relations. Sometimes international situations or policies are used by the government to deflect domestic criticism and bolster support among its citizenry. The oft-noted "rally 'round the flag" effect, wherein an international crisis involving confrontation with a hostile power increases the approval rating of a president, is one that sometimes is purposefully used by an embattled regime. Both Argentina and Great Britain arguably used the Falklands controversy of 1982 for this purpose.

Joe D. Hagan has attempted to create a cross-national database of the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special reference to executive and legislative structures. His data set includes ninety-four regimes for thirty-eight nations over a ten-year period. He was able to assess whether foreign policy behavior, such as level of commitment in policy, is affected by political opposition. He discovered, among many other findings, that military or party opposition to the regime does indeed constrain possible foreign policy action.

In addition to more formal political group influence, there has been a robust research agenda tracing the relationship between U.S. public opinion and U.S. foreign policy. After World War II but before the Vietnam War era, it was an American truism that public opinion did not drive foreign policy, as "politics stopped at the water's edge." The Vietnam trauma undermined that con-

sensus, and this was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the rise of the global economy. Now Americans could see plainly that what happened in Thailand, for instance, might affect their pensions. International arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization could be seen to have local effects. The responsiveness of the national leadership to public opinion can be seen most plainly in the swift retreat of U.S. forces in Somalia following the downing of two American helicopters in Mogadishu, with television footage of a paratrooper's body being dragged through the streets by an angry mob. Truly, as many have said, there is now a tangible "CNN effect" that must be taken into account when studying American foreign policy.

Culture and Ideational Social Construction

Those FPA scholars who study the effects of culture and ideational social construction on foreign policy justifiably assert that what large collectivities believe to be true and believe to be good affects what those collectivities then do. The world is not only material—it is ideational—and often the ideational can be a more powerful force than the material.

One way to examine this issue is to investigate the effects of differences in culture on resultant foreign policy. Each national culture constructs a unique web of beliefs, meanings, values, and capabilities based on their idiosyncratic historical experiences. The "heroic history" of a nation is replete with lessons in what is precious and how one best protects those values. Such differences may aggravate internation hostilities, sometimes even unintentionally. For example, on the eve of serious negotiations, American negotiators are likely to state what they think an acceptable compromise would be and view their task as persuading the other party of the correctness of this view. Chinese negotiators, on the other hand, are likely to denounce their negotiating partner on the eve of serious negotiations, suggesting there can be no compromise at all. Unless each party understands the cultural proclivities of the other, fundamental misunderstanding and heightened hostilities may result.

Value differences may lead to misunderstanding as well. For example, Americans proudly proclaim that they would never negotiate with terrorists or give in to their demands. The Japanese, on the other hand, see no shame at all in negotiating with terrorists. When faced with a threat by another nation, the American response is to isolate and threaten that nation. However, in a 1999 study, Valerie A. Hudson found the Russian response was to befriend and trade with that nation so that the threat might be erased in a peaceful manner.

How do these differences in culture arise in the first place? They arise through a shared national experience that is interpreted by human agents who then undertake the task of persuading their compatriots that this interpretation is a good and appropriate one. Scholarly work has been done on each of these elements.

Helen Purkitt has used the methodology of "think-aloud protocol" to study how it is that an individual comes to an interpretation of a situation. Experimental subjects, including policymakers, were asked by Purkitt to verbalize their thought processes as they deliberated on policy issues. Purkitt thus was able to "see" which aspects of a situation were salient for which persons, how they synthesized uncertainty with analogy in their interpretations, and how soon it took for a particular interpretation to become accepted and treated as a natural interpretation for a situation. G. R. Boynton used textual exegesis of congressional hearings to investigate crystallization of understanding among committee members, finding that members would attempt to narrate a version of the events under question to each other and build a coherent narrative of the whole through smaller pieces upon which all could agree. Only when testimony had been translated into recognizable elements from this jointly constructed narrative were committee members able to fully understand the events.

In addition to the construction of meaning for individuals and small groups of decision makers, meanings may be constructed and shared among larger groups as well. National identity is continually evolving. Although the roots of national identity may lie in the history of the nation, it is current interpretation of that identity that may be more useful to the analyst. One important theoretical framework in this area of inquiry is the national-role-conception approach first developed by Kal Holsti in 1970. He argues that any social system, including a social system made up of nation-states, creates a set of differentiable roles that include both privileges and responsibilities. A variety of factors, including domestic conditions, distribution of power within the system of states, history, legal precedent, and others, help determine which nations gravitate

DECISION MAKING AND CUBA

It is interesting to note that several of the most important works in foreign policy analysis use the same case study involving U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba during the Kennedy administration. Specifically, the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 have received more attention by foreign policy analysts than any other cases. The two crises provide a neat set of intellectual bookends: How could the same president, surrounded by approximately the same advisers, mess up so royally in April 1961 and yet acquit himself so heroically and save the world from nuclear holocaust sixteen months later? Two of the most important works in the foreign policy analysis tradition, Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* and Irving Janis's *Groupthink*, use these cases to demonstrate the crucial role of decision making in international affairs.

Although one might think that such scholarly attention would eventually wane as the crises recede historically, events have sparked renewed interest. For example, the release in 1997 of tapes made by Kennedy during ExCom (Executive Committee) deliberations prompted a whole new wave of theoretical analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. In the spring of 2001, the main participants in the Bay of Pigs, including Fidel Castro, rebel commanders, and Central Intelligence Agency handlers, convened for a first-ever conference in Havana, and information heretofore secret, such as transcripts of Castro's radio communications from the field, were made public at that time.

One of the best ways to view the immense reconceptualization of these cases that all of this new information has brought about is to read Graham Allison's original *Essence of Decision* (1971) side by side with the latest version of the book by Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999). An important lesson to be gleaned is that our understanding of decision making rests in large part upon our understanding of the empirical historical realities of decision making. When you change the latter, you inevitably change the former.

toward which roles. A nation-state then develops a distinctive national role conception, which renders that nation-state's behavior more intelligible and predictable to the analyst. So, for example, though the United States may see itself in the role of a "bloc leader" (leader of the Western bloc), France views itself as a "regional leader" in Europe. Such self-conceptions may clash, as they often do in the case of France and the United States. National-role-conception analysis may uncover differences that might otherwise go unnoticed; for example Marijke Breuning points out that although Americans might lump Belgium and the Netherlands together as nations with very similar attributes, the Dutch tend to see themselves playing a proactive role in encouraging development in less developed countries due to their heroic history of involvement in exploration and colonization. Belgium, on the other hand, a creation of the major European powers, never took such an initiative and became a particularly indifferent former colonial power.

National identity or national role conceptions do change over time. Tracking that change involves detailed analysis of speeches and texts by those who help form opinion within society. Ideas are very useful to policy entrepreneurs, and identifying who is pushing what idea for what reason may help the analyst keep his or her finger on the course of identity evolution within a nation-state. Often ideas must be couched in the language of historical national identity to find favor with larger national audiences. For example, Hellmut Lotz noted in 1997 that on the eve of the Al Gore–Ross Perot debate over NAFTA, a sizable percentage of Americans were undecided over whether the agreement to include Mexico in a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada was a good thing or not. During the course of the televised debate, both men made reference to key themes of American national identity: the American Dream, American exceptionalism, American strength, American vulnerability, American isolationism, and so forth. Lotz found that the audience of undecideds resonated overwhelmingly with the Gore portrayal of America as strong and fearless rather than with the Perot portrayal of America as weak and needing to protect itself from

foreigners. Thus, despite the fact that both men were speaking in the context of shared meaning concerning America, Gore was the more successful policy entrepreneur, for he was able to sway voters to his position by means of his selective emphasis on strategically chosen aspects of American identity. In a similar vein, in a 1993 article Jeffrey Checkel was able to reconstruct the trail of policy-entrepreneur intervention in the development of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* policies. To trace the positions and the network contacts of persons holding particular ideas is a formidable task for the analyst, but one which is very rewarding if the focus is on possible change in, rather than continuity of, foreign policy direction.

STRUCTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FACTORS

Although foreign policy analysis places its focus on decision makers and decision making, government officials are not ignorant of salient features of the international system. Characteristics of the international system may constrain what policymakers feel they can do, but simultaneously may provide opportunities to advance their nation-states' purposes. Furthermore, nation-states can attempt to reflexively shape the system in such a way that their nation-state is more secure.

Two broad approaches to this topic may be differentiated. One approach is to examine the national attributes of nations, including a comparison of such attributes. Nation-state behavior and internation interaction may then be explained by reference to these attributes. Second, one could look at the system in a more abstract manner, by investigating non-unit-specific factors such as anarchy within a system, the existence of international regimes on particular issues, evolving conceptualizations of legitimate and illegitimate behavior within the system, and so forth.

Regarding the first, attribute-centered approach, one of the classic works of foreign policy analysis is the "pre-theory" framework of James Rosenau. In a seminal 1966 article, Rosenau suggests that the key to understanding a nation-state's behavior is to uncover its "genotype." That is, every nation has particular attributes that may make certain factors more determinant of its foreign policy than others. Using three dichotomous variables (size: small/large; wealth: developed/underdeveloped; accountability: open/closed), Rosenau posited eight genotypes: small/developed/open; large/underdeveloped/closed, and so on. Depending on the genotype of the nation under scrutiny, Rosenau then posits that certain factors would be more important for the analyst to investigate. So, for example, in a large/developed/open nation-state, Rosenau asserts that role variables (akin to national role conception) would be the most important factor, with systemic and idiosyncratic (for example, personal characteristics of leaders) being least important. On the other hand, in a small/underdeveloped/closed nation-state, idiosyncratic and systemic factors would be precisely those of greatest significance.

A more modern variant of this attributional approach is the theory of the democratic peace, which highlights the empirical fact that democracies virtually never go to war with one another. Although some have debated the definition of democracy (is Yugoslavia a democracy?), and others have suggested that democracy here is serving as a stand-in for a more fundamental factor such as cultural similarity, the behavior of nation-states is again being explained in terms of their attributes. Indeed, one might claim this approach can also subsume Marxist-Leninist explanations of war, which focus on the profit imperatives of imperialist states to explain the bellicosity of the European powers.

The second approach—more oriented to the structure of the system itself as opposed to the attributes of its members—is a well-established research tradition in international relations. Here, no matter what the attributes of states, the system itself may express properties that can be determinant of state behavior. So, for example, in the work of Kenneth Waltz, the primary factor affecting state behavior is the anarchy of the international system. In the absence of a world government, benign or tyrannical, able to enforce a code of behavior, states must help themselves, for they cannot trust other states in the system not to deflect from pledges of cooperation that they may have made. An emphasis on deterrence, a search for primacy and power, and a notable lack of cooperation even on important issues are all hallmarks of anarchy. Even states that actively desire to behave otherwise may be constrained by the straitjacket of system structure in this theory.

There may be other elements of the system that fine-tune the effects of anarchy. For example, the existence or nonexistence of intergovernmental organizations, the strength of international legal precedent, the number of poles of

power in the system (bipolar, tripolar, multipolar), the degree of globalization of interaction (including trade and communication), patterns of internation dependency, relevant technology (such as the development of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to hurl them half a world away), may all play a role in modifying the effects of anarchy. Some theorists assert that anarchy can be overcome among states dealing with particular issues, and real sacrifice and cooperation can then be expressed by the nation-state. Agreements on ozone depletion, destruction of chemical and biological weapons, renunciation of land mines, and so forth can be seen as examples of this interpretation.

Other scholars would go even farther and claim that nation-states can proactively shape and mold the international system. As one such theorist, Alexander Wendt, put it in 1992, "anarchy is what states make of it." Drawing upon the more ideational literature mentioned, Wendt and others believe that shared meanings develop between governments in the system and that such shared meanings can transform what happens in the world system. For example, norms against genocide, assassination, rape in war, torture, slavery, use of land mines, and so forth have arisen within the international system and are becoming a robust basis for international action. Before the 1990s it would have been inconceivable for the former president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, to have been held for an extradition hearing in Britain on the order of a Spanish judge. Yet by the turn of the twenty-first century Americans were wondering whether their own leaders might be tried for war crimes in a new international criminal court. These evolving norms did not arise from material conditions but from the formation of an ideational consensus or near-consensus.

In sum, then, the international systemic context of decision making must be factored into the theories of leader personality, small group dynamics, and bureaucratic and domestic politics that we have already examined.

Events Data No discussion of foreign policy analysis or decision-making theories would be complete without at least a cursory mention of events data. In most of the theories pitched at the subnational level of analysis mentioned, data indicative of the process of decision making hold center stage. Thus, content analysis of speeches and texts, analysis of tapes or records of group discussions, simulations and experiments, and process-tracing and other methodologies that lay bare the actual mechanics of decisions and their antecedents and consequences typically predominate the empirics of these theoretical efforts. We have previously mentioned that one could also focus on the outcomes of decision-making processes. The events data movement was designed to do just that.

Conceived when the social sciences were enamored of aggregate statistical testing of generalized hypotheses, the foreign policy "event" was to be the intellectual counterpart of the "vote" in the study of American politics. Votes could be tabulated, and a variety of statistical tests could be performed, to determine whether voting correlated with possible explanatory factors such as race, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and so forth. The foreign policy event was to have the same utility for international relations.

One could imagine tabulating every action every nation took every day, whether those actions be of a more diplomatic or rhetorical nature or something more concrete, such as the use of military force. A number of variables would naturally be coded, such as the identity of the acting nation, the identity of the recipients of the action, the date, and some scaling or categorization of the action itself. These events would be gleaned from open source material, such as newspapers and wire services. Once thousands of events had been collected, aggregate statistical testing for robust correlations, longitudinal tracking of the evolving relationships between any given nations, patterns preceding the outbreak of violence in the system, and a host of other potentially interesting questions could then be addressed.

Even the U.S. government was sufficiently interested in the potential of this data collection effort to fund various projects to the tune of several million dollars in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of these event data sets continued to be updated into the twenty-first century, some by computer programs. The more famous events data sets include WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey), COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank), CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations), and KEDS (Kansas Events Data Set).

Events data began to lose its appeal to the wider subfield as it became understood that much of the richness and complexity of decision making was simply missing in an events data format. Thus foreign policy analysis largely returned to the study of process variables more conducive to a focus on decision making.

Integrative Efforts We have spoken of foreign policy analysis as a radically integrative intellectual exercise that requires the analyst to know quite a bit about phenomena at a variety of levels of analysis, from leader personality to system characteristics. All of this information must then be filtered through one's model of the decision makers and the decision-making process in order to gauge what policy choices are most likely in a given situation. This is a fairly tall order, and yet the foreign policy and national security establishment of the U.S. government must make these types of analyses every day.

It would be desirable for the foreign policy analysis scholarly community to offer some advice on how this is to be done in a theoretical sense. How does one actually accomplish such integration? What are the possible outputs of such an integrative exercise? Perhaps not surprisingly, FPA scholars struggle to provide such advice. When Rosenau wrote his "pre-theory" article in the 1960s, with its goal of tracing the influence of factors across several levels of analysis, the most he could offer was a ranking of the importance of each level of analysis based on the genotype of the nation under study. Frankly, FPA has not progressed much past Rosenau's offering; almost forty years later very little self-consciously integrative theoretical work existed in FPA. The CREON II project (1971–1993) developed a creative theoretical framework for integration. Three fundamental components comprised the model. In the first, called Situational Imperative, the details of the situation at hand, including the type of problem, the relationships between the nation-states involved in the problem, the power distribution across the involved nations, and other variables would provide a macro-level "cut" at what the probable foreign policy choice would be. A second component, called Societal Structure and Status, would offer information from the levels of domestic politics and culture. The third and central component was termed the Ultimate Decision Unit. Into this component, representing the actual decision makers in their decision-making setting, information from the first two components of the model would be introduced.

Three types of ultimate decision units were envisioned. Each type of unit came with its own set of most important decision-making variables. For example, in a predominant leader decision unit, variables relating to the head of state and his or her interaction with advisers and style of processing information about the situation at hand would be most important. In the second type of unit, the single group decision unit, theoretical literature about small-group structures and processes, groupthink, and coalition building become crucial. In the third type of unit, the multiple autonomous actor decision unit, literature about bargaining and conflict resolution would be most salient. In another innovative move, country experts would be asked to provide the majority of the inputs for the models. Several empirical cases analyzed by the decision units model were presented in a special issue of the journal *Political Psychology* in 2001.

The Question of Evaluation Before concluding this survey of foreign policy analysis literature, it must be noted that although the contemporary focus is on explanation of foreign policy, the subfield began with the aspiration that the insights of FPA could be used to evaluate and improve the quality of foreign policy decision making. Many early FPA scholars, such as Irving Janis and Morton Halperin, understood that the price of low-quality foreign policy decisions was death for innocent persons, both combatants and noncombatants. Indeed, in an era of nuclear weapons, the scale of such tragic deaths could be massive. If no other subfield of international relations attempts it, at least FPA should shoulder the responsibility of revealing the true and large extent to which human agency shapes international affairs. By such revelation, useful lessons and insights for the policymakers of today and tomorrow might be drawn.

Although much of scholarly FPA has turned from that task, at the turn of the twenty-first century there were still scholars dedicated to its fulfillment. Alexander George, in particular, through such works as *Bridging the Gap* (1993), has done much to keep this normative agenda alive. Works in this vein, such as *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy* (2001), edited by Stanley Renshon and Deborah Welch Larsen, continued to appear. It is hoped that a fuller engagement of agential questions will arise again within the subfield of FPA. From such an engagement, greater policy relevance will be achieved, which would be a positive step forward.

CONCLUSION

The decision-making approaches and theories associated with the subfield of foreign policy

analysis are unique in international relations for their attention to the specific human agents behind every foreign policy choice. Rather than agent-general deductive systems, such as found in game theory, a more detailed and particularistic account of human agency is sought. In addition to this agential focus, a decision-making approach mandates that information from multiple levels of analysis be collected and synthesized in a parallel fashion as the actual decision makers collect and synthesize such information. FPA thus becomes a profoundly integrative theoretical enterprise as well.

This type of approach is noteworthy for its potential not only to integrate disparate variables from distinct levels of analysis but also to integrate currently disconnected domains of human knowledge and activity concerning international affairs. Two notable examples are the disconnect between international relations and comparative politics within the discipline of political science, and the disconnect between international relations and comparative politics as found in the academy on the one hand and the foreign policymaking establishment of the government on the other.

Decision-making approaches and foreign policy analysis can provide some needed connections here. By integrating variables at the supernational and national levels of analysis (the traditional purview of international relations) with variables at subnational levels of analysis (the traditional realm of comparative politics), FPA provides theoretical and empirical linkages that demonstrate how each subfield could usefully inform the other. By emphasizing the decision maker and the decision-making process, by exploring the agency inherent in foreign policy making, by pointing out useful lessons from the study of past foreign policy decision making's successes and failures, FPA has the potential to render the knowledge of the academy useful to real practitioners. Given the immense destructive power that can be unleashed at the international level, it is surely incumbent upon the academy to "bridge the gap" and offer its best insights as a contribution to the peace and safety of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, 1971. One of the best works of foreign policy analysis.

Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York, 1999. An update of an important work using material declassified in the 1990s.

Bonham, G. Matthew, Victor M. Sergeev, and Pavel B. Parhin. "The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiations." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 215–240.

Boynton, G. R. "The Expertise of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." In Valerie M. Hudson, ed. *Artificial Intelligence and International Politics*. Boulder, Colo., 1991.

Breuning, Marijke. "Culture, History, and Role: Belgian and Dutch Axioms and Foreign Assistance Policy." In Valerie M. Hudson, ed. *Culture and Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo., 1997.

Callahan, Patrick, Linda Brady, and Margaret G. Hermann, eds. *Describing Foreign Policy Behavior*. Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution." *World Politics* 45 (1993): 271–300.

East, Maurice A., Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann, eds. *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Studies*. Beverly Hills, Calif., 1978.

George, Alexander L. "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making." *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (1969): 190–222. Another seminal article for those interested in cognitive approaches.

———. *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C., 1993. An impassioned call for the academy to inform foreign policy decision making.

Hagan, Joe D. "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy." In Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston, 1986.

Halperin, Morton. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC, 1974. A classic on the subject.

Hermann, Charles F. "Decision Structure and Process." In Maurice East et al. *Why Nations Act*. Beverly Hills, Calif., 1978.

Hermann, Margaret G. "Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53

Heads of Government." In Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan, eds. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence*. New York, 1984.

Holsti, Kal J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (1970): 233–309. The seminal article on national role conception that started a new research agenda that continues to this day.

Hudson, Valerie M. "Cultural Expectations of One's Own and Other Nations' Foreign Policy Action Templates." *Political Psychology* 20 (1999): 767–802.

Hudson, Valerie M., with Christopher A. Vore. "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." *Mershon International Studies Review* 39 (1995): 209–238. A good and fairly comprehensive overview of the subfield of foreign policy analysis.

Janis, Irving. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. 2d ed. Boston, 1982. A classic that is well known in social science circles.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J., 1976. Another classic work on perception.

Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton, N.J., 1992.

Levy, Jack. "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield." *International Organization* 48 (1994): 279–312.

Lotz, Hellmut. "Myth and NAFTA: The Use of Core Values in U.S. Politics." In Valerie M. Hudson, ed. *Culture and Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo., 1997.

"Political Psychology." Special issue on the Decision Units model of *International Studies Review*, 2002.

Purkitt, Helen E. "Problem Representations and Political Expertise: Evidence from 'Think Aloud' Protocols of South African Elite." In Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds. *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge and New York, 1998.

Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (1998): 427–486. A foundational article that should be read by those seeking to link foreign and domestic politics.

Renshon, Stanley A., and Deborah Welch Larsen, eds. *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy*. New York, 2001.

Rosenau, James N. "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." In R. Barry Farrell, ed. *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*. Evanston, Ill., 1966.

Schrodt, Philip A. "Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis." In Laura Neack, Jeanne Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, eds. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1995.

Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. Glencoe, Ill., 1962. Arguably the work that began the decision-making theoretical enterprise in foreign policy.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*. Princeton, N.J., 1956. Another classic, emphasizing the need to integrate models of human decision making with models of the context in which those decisions are being made.

Sylvan, Donald A., and James F. Voss, eds. *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making*. Cambridge and New York, 1998.

'T Hart, Paul, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds. *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making*. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1997.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass., 1979. A classic of more mainstream international relations.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46 (1992): 391–425. A good introduction to the constructivist turn in international relations theory.

Winter, David G. *The Power Motive*. New York, 1973.

See also THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY; PUBLIC OPINION.

Department of Defense

Steven L. Rearden

A major change in the conduct of American foreign policy after World War II was the growing involvement of the military, represented by the Department of Defense. The explanation stems in part from the heightened concern for national security during the postwar period when much of the U.S. government became transfixed with waging the Cold War. During these years, as foreign affairs eclipsed domestic policy as the government's top concern, discussion of foreign policy options often dwelt on military courses of action, thereby assuring the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military services numerous opportunities to contribute views. Indeed, some secretaries of defense, like James Forrestal, Robert S. McNamara, Caspar Weinberger, and William Perry, played such a conspicuous role in foreign affairs that they seemed at times to rival the secretary of state. The result was a foreign policy that increasingly reflected the priorities and concerns of the Pentagon.

Even without the Cold War, however, a case can be made that the Defense Department's role and influence in policy circles would have grown appreciably anyway as the logical outcome of American experiences in World War II and its immediate aftermath. As the war ended, the security problems that preoccupied Washington policymakers were not just those associated with deteriorating Soviet-American relations, but also the obligations the United States was apt to acquire as a member of the recently created United Nations, the threats posed by atomic weapons and other new technologies, and the lingering memories of recent military setbacks like Pearl Harbor. The upshot was a growing acceptance that the country would have to have a larger, better-trained, and better-equipped peacetime military force than it had known in the past.

Created in 1949, the Department of Defense was an outgrowth of the National Security Act of 1947, which unified the armed services under a civilian secretary of defense. The debate in Congress leading up to passage of the 1947 legislation had its origins in the experiences of World War II, which, despite the overall success, revealed numerous flaws and shortcomings in command relationships and the allocation of resources among the military services. Aiming to avoid such problems in the future, President Harry S. Truman endorsed a War Department plan calling for a highly centralized and closely unified postwar military structure. The navy, fearing that such a setup would threaten the future of naval aviation and the independence of the Marine Corps, championed a competing plan that rejected outright unification in favor of closer coordination. The resulting compromise, enshrined in the National Security Act, borrowed from both sides but leaned more toward the navy plan, in the interest of avoiding what many in Congress worried might become "a Prussian-style general staff" at the Pentagon.

The responsibilities of the secretary of defense, as head of the new organization, cut across traditional lines. His main job was to provide "general direction, authority, and control" over the military departments, made up of the army, the navy, and a newly independent air force, which were now grouped together under a hybrid organization known as the National Military Establishment. But the secretary was also "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security." Exactly where the latter language came from or how it was meant to be applied are unclear. The most likely explanation is that it reflected the philosophy and influence of James Forrestal, secretary of the navy during the unification debate, who believed that the secretary of defense should be primarily a coordinator rather than an executive administrator. Truman never liked this loose description of the secretary's duties, and when the opportunity presented itself in 1949 to amend the National Security Act (at which time Congress converted

the National Military Establishment into the present-day Department of Defense and strengthened the secretary's authority), he insisted that the wording of the secretary's mission be changed to "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."

In addition to providing a framework for unification, the 1947 National Security Act created new machinery to promote closer coordination within the policy process. In practice this meant balancing competing claims of authority, influence, and resources among rival departments and agencies. In an effort to impose order on this situation, Congress created new mechanisms to help the president: the National Security Council to advise him on the formulation of overall policy; the National Security Resources Board to oversee future mobilization planning; and the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the gathering and analysis of intelligence. Although it was generally assumed that the military would be represented on each of these bodies, the only stipulation in the law was that the secretary of defense and the service secretaries would sit on the National Security Council.

EARLY EXPERIENCES

As a result of the National Security Act, the military establishment stood to gain considerably in its exercise of influence over peacetime foreign and defense policy. Forrestal, as one of the principal architects of the law, hoped that it would lead to closer politico-military collaboration, an area he thought had been slighted during World War II by what he saw as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's casual management style and haphazard approach to postwar planning. After the war, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, Forrestal thought it all the more imperative that military planning and foreign policy be brought into closer harmony. As the first secretary of defense (1947–1949), he looked initially to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be his principal politico-military advisers and adopted the practice of consulting with them on nearly every foreign policy matter that crossed his desk. In view of the proliferating number of foreign crises—in Greece, Italy, Palestine, Berlin, China, and elsewhere—the Joint Chiefs had numerous occasions to express their views and to exert their influence. Yet rarely did they make as much of these opportunities as they might have. Divided among themselves over budgetary issues, the allocation of resources, and the assignment of service roles and missions, they seldom presented a united front. Where the use of force might be involved, their recommendations tended to be so unrealistic that they scarcely received serious consideration outside the Pentagon. A case in point was their finding in the spring of 1948 that 100,000 U.S. troops would be needed for peacekeeping duties in Palestine, an estimate built on worst-case scenarios that officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and at the White House dismissed as overblown for budgetary purposes.

As it became clear that the Joint Chiefs were a less reliable source of advice than Forrestal had expected, he found himself turning to members of his immediate staff to deal with politico-military affairs. This was not something Forrestal had anticipated, nor did it fit easily into the organization he had planned for his office. During the unification debate, he had told Congress that in the interests of preserving service autonomy it would be counterproductive for the new secretary of defense to surround himself with too many aides and assistants who might interfere in the services' business. A small staff, he contended, would be more than adequate. Politico-military affairs became the responsibility of John H. Ohly, one of the secretary's three statutory special assistants, who oversaw a mixed staff of civil servants and uniformed officers borrowed from the military departments. Although Ohly usually stayed in the background, operating more as an administrator than as an adviser, his role was such that he could, and did, freely offer suggestions when it seemed appropriate.

Under Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson (1949–1950), politico-military affairs acquired a more formal and centralized structure, in line with Johnson's philosophy (as well as the increased authority he wielded as a result of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act), that the secretary of defense should exercise closer control over departmental policy. The impetus for the changes Johnson made in handling foreign affairs came initially from the State Department, which wanted a single point of contact with the Pentagon instead of having to deal separately with the OSD, the JCS, and the military services. One proposal up for consideration at the time Johnson took office in March 1949 was to vest primary responsibility for politico-military affairs in the JCS. Johnson, however, vetoed the idea in favor of keeping control in his immediate

office, thereby setting a precedent that would guide all future secretaries of defense. Over the next several months he moved policy responsibility for occupied areas from the army to OSD, ordered his immediate staff to monitor all correspondence between the military services and the State Department, and set up the State Liaison Section to serve as the central point of contact for all communications with the State Department other than sensitive intelligence matters.

An isolationist at heart, Johnson faced the somewhat personally awkward task of having to help implement two major foreign policy initiatives: the defense of Europe as part of America's obligations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in April 1949; and arming the allies under a companion measure, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, enacted that autumn. Less than enthusiastic about either, Johnson turned coordination of these matters over to an assistant, James H. Burns, a retired army officer whose heart ailment allowed him to work only part-time. Fortunately, Burns had two exceptionally able deputies: Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who handled military assistance; and Najeeb E. Halaby, who specialized in foreign military affairs, including NATO. Meanwhile, Johnson became involved in a running feud with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, which put a serious strain on State-Defense relations. Business between the two still managed to get done, but at a reduced pace with limited contacts and cooperation all around.

The low point came with the drafting of NSC 68 in the spring of 1950, when the State Department team, led by Paul H. Nitze, director of the Policy Planning Staff, effectively usurped leadership of what was supposed to have been a joint State-Defense endeavor. The product of the exercise was a paper tailored to Acheson's specifications, warning of great dangers ahead unless the United States abandoned the strict economy measures Johnson had imposed and stepped up the level of its military preparedness. From this point on, Johnson's credibility at the White House steadily diminished, until reverses at the outset of the Korean War that summer cast doubt on his continuing ability to manage the Pentagon and provided Truman with an excuse to fire him.

THE MARSHALL-LOVETT ERA

To replace Johnson, Truman turned in September 1950 to General George C. Marshall, army chief of staff in World War II and secretary of state from 1947 to 1949, who brought with him his former undersecretary of state, Robert A. Lovett, to be his number two (and successor, beginning in 1951) at the Pentagon. Truman held Marshall in the highest regard, and it is not surprising that, with Marshall's return to government, Acheson found his authority and influence somewhat eclipsed. Meanwhile, Truman also decided to upgrade the National Security Council, thereby imposing greater discipline and efficiency on the policy process and opening avenues for shaping high-level policy that had not existed for either Forrestal or Johnson. With the additional impetus of the Korean War generating a growing list of U.S. politico-military commitments around the globe, the Defense Department became immersed in foreign affairs to an unprecedented degree. Not until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations of the 1960s would a secretary of defense exert as much influence over foreign policy as did Marshall and Lovett.

In sharp contrast to the confrontational tone of Johnson's tenure, Marshall and Lovett both promoted cordial working relations between the State and Defense departments. Truman was disgusted with the constant bickering between Acheson and Johnson, and he looked to his new team at the Pentagon to put politico-military collaboration on a more sound and professional basis. The goal, as Lovett later described it while testifying before Congress, was "constant, close, and sympathetic cooperation" between the two departments. This included not only increased contacts at the uppermost levels of policymaking, but also direct consultations on a regular basis involving the State Department's regional assistant secretaries, the Policy Planning Staff, and the Joint Chiefs, something that Johnson had sharply curtailed.

Despite an atmosphere of improved cooperation, Marshall and Lovett continued the practice begun by Johnson of exercising close administrative control of foreign affairs through OSD, under what became in November 1951 the Office of International Security Affairs, headed by Frank C. Nash, one of the many Forrestal protégés still around the Pentagon. Nash had a broad charter that gave him the authority to coordinate "all activities" within the Department of Defense relating to international security affairs. Nash himself was intimately involved in practically every detail of the office's operations, serving as principal liaison with the National Security Council and as a key aide to Marshall and Lovett. It was

one of the Pentagon's most high profile jobs, requiring a judicious mix of administrative and diplomatic skills that continuously underscored the increasingly close relationship between military affairs and foreign policy.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS DURING THE EISENHOWER YEARS

During Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency (1953–1961), the Defense Department's involvement in foreign affairs continued to expand as military responses increasingly became a part of the U.S. strategy for containing communist expansion. Ironically, however, the secretary of defense himself was a relatively minor figure in shaping foreign policy decisions during most of this period. Stressing the need for sound management, Eisenhower selected former business executives as his first two secretaries of defense —Charles E. Wilson (1953–1957), who had headed General Motors, and Neil H. McElroy (1957–1959), former president of Procter and Gamble. Hired for their ability to run large enterprises, they operated on the philosophy that, above all, the secretary of defense should concern himself with the managerial side of the department and leave policy and strategy decisions to be hammered out in the National Security Council by the president, the Joint Chiefs, and Eisenhower's number one foreign affairs adviser, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Despite the limited role that Wilson and McElroy embraced for themselves, Defense Department involvement abroad continued to grow. Often the responsibilities were routine and dealt with administrative chores requiring prior defense arrangements with U.S. allies, such as those in NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), access to overseas bases, and the buildup, equipping, and training of allied forces under U.S. military aid programs. Accordingly, provisions had to be made to handle the influx of U.S. military personnel into foreign countries, arrange for the administration and allocation of assistance, define the duties and responsibilities of U.S. advisers, and negotiate agreements governing the status of forces, usually with the International Security Affairs office providing the initial liaison and coordination on the Washington end.

At the same time the department also faced a wholly new set of security problems arising from advances in military technology and corresponding decisions by the president and the National Security Council on how these advances would be exploited. The advent of thermonuclear and tactical nuclear weapons and of ballistic missile technology, coupled with Eisenhower's decision to "conventionalize" the atomic arsenal, raised problems of unprecedented political complexity and diplomatic sensitivity. Never before had any country possessed such enormous power with so few guiding precedents on how to manage it. As it turned out, some of these new weapons would be deployed abroad and shared with America's allies. How much control, if any, the host country would have over the storage, movement, and use of these weapons invariably invited prolonged discussion, both within the U.S. government and between Washington and foreign capitals.

The inherent importance of being able to deal effectively with these problems was manifest when in February 1953 Wilson promoted the International Security Affairs assistant to the rank of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. The decision to elevate the job (a move Lovett was on the verge of making when he left office) was long overdue, but as a practical matter its only real significance was to reaffirm the office's already well established place among the Pentagon's elite. In 1956, Wilson tried to upgrade the office to the rank of undersecretary, to place it on a par with the service secretaries. However, legislation that would have effected the change died in the House Armed Services Committee.

In fact, the mandate of the International Security Affairs office was never so clear as to give it undisputed control of politico-military affairs. Each of the services continued to maintain its own politico-military and international affairs section, which could be used to circumvent the secretary of defense and his deputies. Best organized for this purpose was the navy, which maintained regular informal communications with the State Department through its Politico-Military Policy Division. In addition, the chief of naval operations had his own "back channel" contacts abroad, which infuriated Secretary of Defense Wilson when he learned of them. And while International Security Affairs was supposed to be responsible for policies governing the programming of foreign military aid, it often encountered resistance from the Joint Chiefs and the military departments when it attempted to probe the details of their recommendations concerning program development and implementation practices. Had Wilson and McElroy taken a greater personal interest in foreign

affairs, many of these problems might have been avoided. But with secretaries of defense whose interests lay elsewhere, the assistant secretaries for International Security Affairs knew that they could count on little support and generally felt constrained from pressing their authority too far.

The situation started to change with the appointment in December 1959 of Thomas S. Gates, a Philadelphia banker, as Eisenhower's third secretary of defense. Although his tenure was short (1959–1961), it reestablished the secretary of defense as a major figure in foreign policy decision making. Occasionally criticized for trying to usurp the secretary of state's functions, Gates pursued a State-Defense partnership that would yield more truly integrated policies with less interdepartmental friction and parochialism. As a first step, Gates abandoned the practice of trying to control the flow of State-Defense business through his immediate office. Indicative of the results he hoped to achieve, he initiated regular one-on-one meetings with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and encouraged subordinates to do the same with their State Department counterparts in an effort to improve interagency cooperation and coordination.

Gates was also highly instrumental in shaping Defense Department responses in the increasingly important area of arms control and disarmament, where prior to Gates the Pentagon's support and endorsement of such measures had been lukewarm. Although Wilson and McElroy had spent considerable time and energy studying arms control proposals passing across their desks, they were forever confronted by the unremitting skepticism and apprehension of the Joint Chiefs, whose opinions on such matters carried considerable weight both inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. Since the chiefs knew that it was impossible for political reasons to keep arms control off the national agenda, they focused their objections instead on technical matters—the lack of adequate and effective verification measures, for example, or the debilitating consequences for research and development programs. As delaying tactics, these arguments worked well against such proposals as an atmospheric test ban and a cutoff of nuclear production. But they were also the kinds of arguments that wore thin after awhile and gave the Defense Department a reputation for contentiousness.

Gates was decidedly more inclined than his two immediate predecessors to bring arms control and disarmament into the mainstream of American defense policy. While he readily acknowledged to the press that there was a "negative attitude" in the Pentagon toward arms control, he was prepared to entertain any and all suggestions and told Eisenhower that he was thinking of appointing a special assistant on disarmament matters. Still, about the only arms control measures Gates was seriously willing to consider (without, as he put it, "a complete review of our force structure") were those that promised to result in some sort of U.S. advantage over the Soviets. Personally, Gates favored a cutoff of nuclear production, preferably sooner rather than later, not so much for disarmament purposes but to preserve what he estimated as a two-to-one American advantage over the Soviets in nuclear bombs and warheads. Moreover, he fully agreed with the Joint Chiefs that arms control for the sake of arms control was inherently dangerous, and that the administration should not allow itself to be stampeded into reaching agreements merely because of public opinion.

Whether Gates could or should have been tougher with the military on accepting the need for arms control falls into the realm of conjecture. Gates himself, although more open-minded toward such matters than Wilson and McElroy had been, was still very much committed to the concept of foreign and defense policies resting on ready military power rather than the negotiation of agreements with one's potential adversaries. Like Forrestal and Lovett, he was part of a generation whose view of international politics derived from memories and experiences of the 1930s, when military weakness and appeasement had seemed to invite oppression and aggression. International communism, to Gates's way of thinking, was basically no different from the Axis alliance that had bound Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and imperial Japan in World War II. Despite rumors and diplomatic reports of a growing Sino-Soviet rift, Gates remained convinced that there were no fundamental ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing, and that American foreign policy should treat such stories with utmost caution. It was, perhaps, a quintessential Cold War viewpoint, but not one that was uncommon or out of place for its times.

THE MCNAMARA ERA

If there was one individual who had more impact than anyone else on the Defense Department's

role in foreign affairs, it was Robert S. McNamara. Appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, McNamara served as secretary of defense until 1968, when the stalemated war in Vietnam prompted his resignation. Throughout most of his tenure, McNamara was an ardent advocate of American involvement in Southeast Asia and a key figure in planning and prosecuting the war. Indeed, in a very real sense, foreign policy toward Southeast Asia during these years was a product of the Pentagon, which was largely responsible for orchestrating the war. Victory, however, proved elusive, and as time passed McNamara saw his self-confidence and credibility steadily erode. Disillusioned and frustrated, he left office counseling withdrawal and stepped-up efforts at a negotiated settlement.

Yet the frustrations of Vietnam and their ripple effects were only part of the McNamara story. Indeed, without Vietnam, McNamara's tenure would probably be remembered as a period of extraordinarily positive accomplishments, from improved management of the Pentagon to reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and the initiation of the first serious efforts at strategic arms control. Outwardly, McNamara was an unlikely candidate to play such a major part in foreign affairs. A former president of Ford Motor Company, he seemed destined at the outset of his tenure to follow in the footsteps of Wilson and McElroy and become a business manager of the Pentagon. That he emerged instead as a pivotal figure in foreign policy was as much a product of his approach to the job of secretary of defense as it was the unique circumstances in which he found himself. The result was a far more active and involved Defense Department at all levels of the policy process, including especially high-level decision making.

Much of the power and authority that the Pentagon wielded under McNamara accrued by default rather than by design. President Kennedy had little use for the elaborate National Security Council system developed under Truman and Eisenhower, and in its place he substituted a slimmed-down version with limited capabilities for independent policy analysis. Further, he discontinued the practice of conducting elaborate annual national security reviews and expected the State Department to exercise primary responsibility for developing and coordinating policy. The weak link in this system proved to be Dean Rusk, Kennedy's choice as secretary of state. Although affable and intelligent, it soon became apparent that Rusk lacked the temperament and drive to carry out the job entrusted to him. Eventually it fell to McNamara to fill the void.

For the record, McNamara accepted the conventional wisdom that defense policy derived from foreign policy and that the Pentagon's function was to serve and assist the State Department. But in day-to-day practice, McNamara, with Kennedy's blessing, generally followed his own lead. The approach McNamara adopted was to supply his own foreign policy guidance, which he included with each budget submission to the president and in his annual reports (termed "posture statements" to give them more prestige) to Congress. Going beyond a purely military rationale, McNamara's posture statements offered broad justification for new and ongoing defense programs based on the manner in which they would contribute to furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives. "It was essential," McNamara recalled in an interview, "to begin with a discussion of foreign policy because that had to be the foundation of security policy." Although the State Department routinely submitted advice and comments, its views often arrived too late in the budget process to be reflected in the final documents forwarded to the White House and Capitol Hill.

For support, McNamara assembled a highly skilled and talented staff, dubbed the "whiz kids," who implemented a host of far-reaching administrative and managerial reforms. Some of the changes they and McNamara made, including the extensive use of computer-driven "systems analysis" models and mission-oriented budgeting techniques, proved controversial and hard for the military services to swallow. But there is no doubt that they gave the secretary a stronger and firmer hand, both in running the department and in projecting his influence into foreign policy. Moreover, they liberated the secretary from having to draw as often on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services for advice and analysis of politico-military problems. By the middle of the decade, McNamara had at his fingertips the most sophisticated and effective organization for analyzing and managing politico-military affairs that Washington had yet seen. Whether, as some critics charged, McNamara's reforms invited the further "militarization" of American foreign policy is debatable. Within the Pentagon, McNamara exercised an unprecedented degree of civilian control over the military and routinely used civilians in International Security Affairs and in other key positions to perform chores previously reserved

for the services or the JCS. If this was militarization, it was most definitely of the civilian-shaded variety.

All the same, the tendency to apply military solutions to serious problems abroad grew steadily during the 1960s. This was true not only in Southeast Asia but also in dealing with incidents in Cuba, Berlin, the Dominican Republic, and other Cold War flashpoints. During the late 1940s and 1950s, U.S. military power had relied in the first instance on the presumed deterrent effects of nuclear retaliation to cope with the threat of communist aggression. But by the 1960s, with the United States and the Soviet Union approaching effective parity in strategic nuclear power, it was no longer realistic to threaten wholesale nuclear destruction. Seeking a more credible posture, McNamara seized on the doctrine of flexible response as a means of providing the president with a wider range of options for dealing with critical international problems.

The essence of flexible response was a varied mixture of forces allowing a greater choice in military actions, with emphasis on containing any conflict below the level of a nuclear exchange. Developed initially with Europe in mind, McNamara hoped that flexible response would provide an alternative to the all-or-nothing mentality that then dominated NATO strategic planning. To achieve the desired posture, he urged stepped-up procurement of conventional forces and changes in the programmed use of nuclear weapons to allow for a "pause" or "firebreak" between conventional conflict and a larger war. European critics countered that such a strategy would be prohibitively expensive and that it would undermine nuclear deterrence and increase the risk of a conventional conflict. But with patience and perseverance, McNamara gradually brought the Europeans around. Adopted by NATO in 1967, flexible response was, on paper at least, a major break with the past, although in practice its effects were somewhat negated by the reluctance of the European allies to commit themselves to a sustained conventional buildup. Even so, flexible response remained NATO's governing strategic doctrine for the duration of the Cold War and into the early 1990s.

Another of McNamara's contributions was to help institutionalize a more serious attitude within the Defense Department toward strategic arms control and disarmament. What prompted McNamara's involvement was mounting evidence by the mid-1960s that the Soviet Union had embarked upon the deployment of two prototype antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, thus putting pressure on the United States to respond in kind. Dubious of the technologies involved, McNamara sought to avoid a costly and perhaps futile ABM competition by proposing negotiations with the Soviets to curb both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Although the Joint Chiefs remained skeptical about whether such talks would amount to much, they agreed with McNamara's basic premise that the strategic arms competition was getting out of hand and that restraint on both sides could serve a useful purpose. This was a dramatic turnaround from military thinking in the 1950s, and it went far toward paving the way for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and other arms control accords growing out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between Washington and Moscow in the 1970s.

Outside Europe, flexible response played a less conspicuous role in shaping American foreign policy. The escalating conflict in Southeast Asia defied the conceptual models that McNamara was so fond of applying, and by 1966 the United States found itself engaged in a war of attrition with North Vietnam. Nevertheless, McNamara approached the war as he generally approached other problems, seeking to reduce it to quantifiable proportions. Knowing McNamara's preferences, subordinates tailored programs and recommendations accordingly, stressing systems analysis techniques over less quantifiable means of assessing the war's progress and possible outcome. The use of statistical models, whether involving kill ratios, construction rates, frequency of incidents, or other indicators, gave a distorted picture of the war, often because the U.S. command in Saigon and the South Vietnamese government, knowingly or otherwise, provided erroneous data. By the time McNamara realized what was happening, the United States was so committed to prosecuting the war that there was no turning back without doing what he and President Lyndon B. Johnson considered serious damage to U.S. prestige and credibility.

McNamara's tenure at the Defense Department thus left a mixed legacy. While there was progress in curbing the menace of nuclear war, the United States found itself plunging ever more deeply into an ill-advised and ill-conceived conflict in Southeast Asia. McNamara demonstrated that a strong-minded and strong-willed secretary of defense could exercise enormous influence on American foreign policy. However, his immediate successors were leery of following suit.

POST-VIETNAM CHANGES

After Vietnam the role of military power in American foreign policy became less pronounced than it had been previously, a clear sign of popular misgivings over the war and of diminished confidence in military solutions to problems abroad. Indicative of the trend was the decision by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1969–1973) in 1970 to cease prefacing his annual reports to Congress with foreign policy reviews, as had been the custom during McNamara's tenure. Nevertheless, the Defense Department continued to figure prominently in the foreign policy process through its representation on interagency committees and the secretary's membership on the National Security Council. As a rule, the Defense Department supplied two representatives—one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, another from the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to each interagency forum while providing many of the action officers who made up the National Security Council staff. Although it was entirely conceivable that the president and his staff could have curtailed their contacts with the military, relying more on civilians from the State Department or elsewhere for advice, it was practically impossible to do so. The resulting policies may have been less overtly military in character, but they were still subject to military involvement in their development and execution.

One reason why the Pentagon acquired a lower foreign policy profile after Vietnam was that defense-related security problems in the 1970s gave way in importance to political and economic problems. The major exceptions were the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union, which required military participation on technical as well as policy grounds, and ongoing U.S. involvement in NATO and foreign military assistance programs to American client states like Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the Philippines. But otherwise attention focused on such matters as inflation, energy shortages, and other disruptions to the global political economy that were not normally high on the Pentagon's agenda. At the same time, a general improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow, known as détente, lessened the more overt dangers of an East-West confrontation.

The growing range and complexity of problems abroad invited the Defense Department to acquire more sophisticated means for approaching and handling foreign affairs. This included the staffing of a net assessment office in 1973, which operated under a broad charter to initiate studies of current and projected U.S. and foreign military capabilities; and the appointment in 1977 of an undersecretary of defense for policy, to oversee politico-military affairs, arms control, and the integration of defense plans and policies with basic national security policy. At the command and staff colleges run by the armed services and at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., lectures and courses on national security affairs became more commonplace alongside traditional studies in military science. Language training likewise received closer attention at service schools.

The net effect was to generate a far greater appreciation within the military for the complexities of foreign affairs than at any time in the past. Many junior officers who had served in Vietnam were highly critical of what they found to be their superiors' simplistic and naive views on foreign policy; as these younger officers rose to prominence in the late 1970s and 1980s they brought with them a keen interest in developing U.S. policies less wedded to Cold War stereotypes. A case in point was the Pentagon's more flexible attitude toward the communist regime on mainland China during the 1970s and early 1980s and its ready acquiescence in dropping support for Taiwan, once a bulwark against communism and a stalwart American ally.

FROM COLD WAR TO POST–COLD WAR

By the late 1970s the pendulum was beginning to swing back toward more active military participation in foreign affairs. The faltering of détente, an across-the-board Warsaw Pact buildup in Europe, and the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan all suggested that the Cold War was far from over and that U.S. foreign policy still needed the support of a strong U.S. military establishment. The response was a U.S. peacetime military buildup of unprecedented proportions. Begun toward the end of Carter's presidency, it gathered momentum under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s to become the largest such effort in American history. Among the programs that Reagan initiated were the creation of a 600-ship navy to give the United States a more effective global power-projection capability, offensive strategic forces that would be more survivable in a general nuclear war, and the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars" to its critics) to explore the

CASPAR WEINBERGER ON MILITARY POWER

"I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. . . .

"First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . .

"Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. . . .

"Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. . . .

"Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . . .

"Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . . . We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas. . . .

"Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."

— Excerpts from "Uses of Military Power," address by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at the National Press Club, 28 November 1984 —

feasibility of rendering intercontinental ballistic missiles "impotent and obsolete."

Whereas Carter sent U.S. forces into harm's way only once, during the Iran hostage crisis in 1980, and even then with great reluctance, Reagan did so time and again with rarely a second thought. His operating premise was that a successful and effective foreign policy and readiness to use military power went hand in hand. Insisting that military involvement overseas was unavoidable, he often turned to the Defense Department to conduct operations in direct furtherance of American policy. This included providing a buffer between the warring factions in Lebanon, escorting neutral tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf, punitive raids against Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, counterinsurgency operations in Central America, and the rescue of American civilians following a Marxist coup on Grenada in 1983.

Reagan also drew heavily on the military and Pentagon professionals to help staff his administration. His first secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was a retired four-star army general who had recently served as NATO Supreme Commander. Haig first came to prominence during the Nixon administration as Henry Kissinger's deputy at the National Security Council. During his year and a half as secretary of state under Reagan, Haig was often in the forefront of suggesting military pressure when diplomacy appeared to falter, especially in trying to counter Soviet and Cuban adventurism in the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa. Of the six national security advisers that Reagan had, two—Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter and Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell—were active-duty military officers. A third, Frank C. Carlucci, was a former deputy secretary of defense. Meanwhile, military officers "on loan" from the Pentagon continued to occupy key positions on the National Security Council staff; and after a succession of civilian heads, Reagan in 1987 named retired army Major General William Burns to direct the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Not surprisingly, Defense Department influence rose appreciably during the Reagan years, though not always in ways that yielded predictable outcomes. Indeed, in certain respects, the department found itself ill-prepared for the more demanding role that Reagan thrust upon it. The unpopularity of the military after Vietnam and years of flat defense spending had left what

many at the Pentagon considered a hollow force by the beginning of the 1980s. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning mechanism was now capable of generating an enormous array of military options from which the president could choose, the effective implementation of these plans was often hampered by the lack of trained personnel, reliable equipment and spare parts, interservice friction, and limited access to foreign bases. For these reasons, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–1987) and the Joint Chiefs were often averse to taking risks abroad, at least until the Reagan buildup had gathered its full momentum.

A further concern within the Pentagon was that stepped-up military involvement overseas would draw hostile reactions from Congress and the American public. Fearing another Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs cautioned against committing U.S. combat troops in Central America and insisted upon limiting U.S. military participation to a relatively small-scale assistance program, occasional exercises, and support of CIA-directed covert operations. The Joint Chiefs were likewise leery of becoming drawn into Lebanon, and when a terrorist bombing incident in October 1983 killed 241 U.S. servicemen, they believed their worst fears were confirmed. U.S. troops withdrew shortly thereafter. In a well-publicized speech of November 1984, entitled "Uses of Military Power," Secretary Weinberger laid down specific criteria that he thought should govern U.S. military commitments abroad. At the minimum, Weinberger argued, the armed forces should have a firm declaration of support at home, a clear-cut mission, and an agreed exit strategy from any operation in which they might become involved.

With so much at stake, Weinberger took a proactive stance toward foreign affairs that frequently led to friction with the State Department and the National Security Council. Like many of his predecessors, Weinberger required that State-Defense contacts have his prior approval. Adopting a broad view of his responsibilities, he insisted that the Defense Department should have a voice in practically every major foreign policy decision, not just those that might involve the use of military forces. As a direct consequence, he and Haig quarreled often and openly, so much so that the policy process seemed at times to grind to a halt. Weinberger's relations with Haig's successor, George C. Shultz, were only slightly better. In interdepartmental deliberations Weinberger fought hard for his views, often with success.

Weinberger was especially active in shaping the administration's stand on arms control and related issues. While framing an intermediate-range ballistic missile negotiating policy in 1981, he convinced President Reagan, over the objections of the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to hold out for a total global ban on theater-range ballistic missiles, a goal eventually realized in 1987. Weinberger also encouraged Reagan to persevere with the Strategic Defense Initiative, which critics dismissed as unworkable, but which Weinberger regarded as an exceedingly valuable military asset. Unlike Shultz and others in the administration, Weinberger was highly averse to seeing it bargained away. Although not as hostile to arms control as some of his critics maintained, Weinberger believed in negotiating from a position of strength and was dubious of being able to reach fair and reasonable agreements with the Soviets until the United States had improved its strategic posture.

While Weinberger sought to clarify the ground rules for the military's role in foreign policy, others sought to make it more responsive to such problems. Defense reform had been in the air since the debacle in Vietnam, and by the 1980s it took the form of a concerted effort in Congress to improve the performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint command structure, under which the worldwide deployment of U.S. forces operated. Long criticized as unreliable and ineffectual, the JCS was a prime candidate for legislative reform. Even many senior military officers agreed that the system was inefficient and sorely in need of an overhaul. In the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Congress attempted to address these concerns by providing for a stronger and more active JCS chairman, with full control over the Joint Staff. The joint commands received added authority to participate in the budget, procurement, and planning process, and there was to be increased training and emphasis on "jointness" throughout the armed forces.

The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms was to create a more unified and responsive defense establishment, although it was not until the Gulf War of 1990–1991 that the new machinery received its first major test. The war confirmed that in planning and executing such operations, the Department of Defense was probably better prepared and better organized than at any time since its creation. With the resources accumulated during the Reagan buildup, it was all

the easier to prevail. Simply having a large, well-equipped defense establishment may not have made a military response to Iraq's seizure of Kuwait any more likely than the use of other options. But it certainly proved to be an asset that President George H. W. Bush and his advisers fell back on when the time came to take action. Knowing that they had such assets readily available undoubtedly increased their sense of confidence and resolve to see the crisis through.

The Gulf War was the last hurrah for the large military establishment built up over the Cold War. The collapse of communism across Eastern Europe, starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and culminating with the dissolution of the Soviet Union late in 1991, signaled a fundamental geopolitical change. Henceforth regional security problems began to replace the threat of global war as the focus of American military planning. The principal architect of this shift in U.S. strategy was the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman from 1989 to 1993, General Colin Powell, whose concept of a smaller, more mobile "base force" helped guide the Defense Department through its post–Cold War downsizing. Subsequently, the department came to operate under what Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (1994–1997) described as a policy of "preventive defense." In practice, this meant trying to head off problems before they arose through Defense support of such measures as dismantling the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and NATO's Partnership for Peace program with the former Soviet satellite states.

By far the most demanding post–Cold War foreign policy tasks that the department encountered were those associated with peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Little anticipated when the Cold War ended, they proliferated rapidly in the 1990s and ranged from the policing of Iraqi air space (a carryover from the Gulf War) to refugee and famine relief in Africa and power-brokering in Haiti and the Balkans. For the Defense Department these were somewhat new or unique responsibilities that required a delicate weighing of diplomacy and military power, often under the aegis of a multinational or United Nations command. One such mission was the protection of UN famine relief workers in Somalia, which led to a bloody firefight in October 1993 between U.S. special forces and troops loyal to Somali strongman Mohamed Farah Aideed. Thereafter, the Joint Chiefs urged using technology in place of manpower in similar operations to reduce the risk to U.S. forces, advice the Clinton administration readily accepted. When called upon to help evict Serb troops from Kosovo in 1999, it insisted upon doing so at a distance, with a NATO-directed air campaign to apply the necessary pressure.

The beginning of the twenty-first century saw an emerging debate over the military's future role in American foreign policy. Many military planners and analysts still believed that the proper primary function of the armed forces was to guarantee the national security with ready war-fighting capabilities, and that doctrine, training, and procurement should be tailored accordingly. An opposing group, citing the growing U.S. involvement in peace enforcement, drug interdiction, and other low-intensity types of conflicts, argued for a more flexible force, with lighter, less sophisticated weapons, more mobility, and closer coordination with international organizations. The debate is ongoing and how it will play out remains to be seen. Either way, however, it seems clear that, as long as the United States is involved in the world arena, military and foreign policy will remain inextricably linked and that the Defense Department will continue to be a major factor in both the policy process and the conduct of American affairs abroad.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Betts, Richard K. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.* Cambridge, Mass., 1977. Crisis-oriented study of the military's role in policy.

Goldberg, Alfred, ed. *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.* Vols. 1, 2, and 4. Washington, D.C., 1984–1997.

Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy.* 7 vols. Washington, D.C., 1986–2000.

Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley. *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal.* New York, 1992. Most complete biography of the first secretary of defense.

Kinnard, Douglas. *The Secretary of Defense.* Lexington, Ky., 1980. Biographical profiles of key secretaries of defense.

Lederman, Gordon Nathaniel. *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.* Westport, Conn., 1999.

McNamara, Robert S. *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.* New York, 1995.

McNamara's reflections on Vietnam and what went wrong.

Shapley, Deborah. *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara.* Boston, 1993. Perceptive account of McNamara's successes and failures.

Trask, Roger R., and Alfred Goldberg. *The Department of Defense, 1947–1997: Organization and Leaders.* Washington, D.C., 1997.

Weinberger, Caspar W. *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon.* New York, 1990. A quasi-memoir dealing with selected issues.

Yarmolinsky, Adam. *The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society.* New York, 1971. A dated but still insightful examination of the military's role.

See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS.

Department of State

Jerry Israel and David L. Anderson

Upon his resignation in 1792, Henry Remsen, the first chief clerk of the Department of State, left the following instructions:

> Such of the Foreign Letters as are not filed away in the cases, are for the present put on my desk in two pigeon holes at the right hand side. The Consular returns are at the bottom of said desk right hand side . . . the drafts of foreign proceedings . . . are filed in said desk left hand pigeon hole. The letters from our ministers and *charge des affaires* now in commission Mr. Jefferson keeps. . . . A little attention will be necessary in separating the foreign from the domestic letters, as they are sent to the Office by Mr. Jefferson to be filed. My rule in making the separation was by reading them. The domestic letters to be filed in the Office down stairs, the foreign letters in the Office up stairs.

Nearly two centuries later, commenting on the move from "Old State" to headquarters in "New State" (1947) and finally, "New, New State" (1961), the diplomat Henry Serrano Villard wrote:

> Even this fantastically outside complex is inadequate. Spilling over into nine rented buildings, using nearly 1.5 million square feet of space, the State Department premises are already too small; if AID [Agency for International Development], ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and USIA [United States Information Agency] are added, the total is twenty buildings with 2,547,377 square feet. Offices are overcrowded, tenants must double up, conference rooms must be lopped off, new outlets sought.

The irony of these comparisons of simple and complex styles is that Villard's larger department was if anything less rather than more involved in the making of American foreign policy, the State Department's primary responsibility. Along these lines, in modern times, especially since World War II, one notes the competitive foreign policies of departments such as Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Treasury, Interior, and Health and Human Services, plus the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Reserve Bank, not to mention semiofficial business, scientific, cultural, and journalistic groups. By the mid-1960s, only one-fourth of federal personnel in U.S. embassies were employees of the State Department. In addition, there is the superior and sometimes competitive power of the president and groups or individuals on the White House staff and otherwise outside the State Department that the president may especially empower.

Henry A. Kissinger noted the paradox of an increasingly specialized, bureaucratized society having negative consequences for American policy and policymakers. Calling for a return to the individual and intellectual approach to problems and policy, not uncharacteristic of the formative age of Jefferson and Remsen, Kissinger writes of policy "fragmented into a series of ad hoc decisions which make it difficult to achieve a sense of direction or even to profit from experience. Substantive problems are transformed into administrative ones. Innovation is subjected to 'objective' tests which deprive it of spontaneity. 'Policy planning' becomes the projection of familiar problems into the future. Momentum is confused with purpose. There is greater concern with how things are than with which things matter." As Richard Nixon's national security adviser and then as secretary of state, Kissinger waged his own assault against the inertia of bureaucratized foreign policy.

Borrowing from the example of Remsen and the explanation of Kissinger, it is possible to observe—at least until the mid-twentieth century—that amidst efforts to institutionalize the apparatus of the State Department, what machinery there was rested on a precious few long-lived cogwheels. Working backward not quite all the way from Kissinger to Remsen, one traces a remarkable continuity within the careers of just three men: Wilbur J. Carr, with forty-five years of service (1892–1937); Alvey A. Adee, with forty-six

years in Washington (1878–1924) and seven before that for the Department of State in Madrid; and William Hunter, with fifty-seven years (1829–1886) as chief of bureau, chief clerk, and second assistant secretary (the latter two being key administrative posts held also by Carr and Adee).

As late as 1929, the Department of State was small and its central leadership even more scant. When Henry L. Stimson took office as Herbert C. Hoover's secretary of state, there were—including everybody from the secretary to chauffeurs, clerks, stenographers, and janitors—six hundred people. Yet Stimson, not unusually for the department, surrounded himself with an able, tight-knit group of assistants including Carr, Joseph Cotton, Francis White, and Nelson T. Johnson. Like Cotton, some assistants were new to foreign policy; others, like Carr and Johnson, had seen extended service in the consular and diplomatic corps. They blended together, however, to advise the secretary and the president on critical policy matters in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.

The history of the State Department until the mid-twentieth century was tied, it appears, to the history of the few men who had served as secretary of state or to their staffs. The role of the individual has since, however, become increasingly institutionalized, and with that change has come a State Department larger and yet often less effective than it was in its humbler days.

THE CALIBER OF LEADERSHIP

It is tempting to start at the very beginning with Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and the Virginia dynasty. Indeed, it must be noted that these Founders and "systems builders" used the State Department's highest official, not the vice president, as counselor and successor. Yet it remained for one of the second generation of American revolutionaries, John Quincy Adams, to achieve the golden age of American diplomacy and thereby establish the model, perhaps yet unequaled, of a great secretary of state. Adams dominated events in which the United States signed the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which concluded the War of 1812; issued the Monroe Doctrine; and strengthened American maritime power by agreeing with England to clear the Great Lakes of warships and by obtaining rights to fish off Labrador and Newfoundland. Under Adams's leadership at State, the United States extended its landed empire by annexing Florida, removing Russia from the west coast of North America, settling the Canadian boundary from the Great Lakes to the Rockies, and claiming, for the first time, the Pacific coast. Even amidst Adams's successes, however, the State Department and its secretary retained the highly personal and political character developed under the Virginia dynasty.

Adams himself dangled the post of secretary of state in front of Henry Clay in 1824 in what their political rivals, the Jacksonians, called a "corrupt bargain." While personally worlds apart, Adams and Clay were closer together in support of an "American system" of economic regulation and internal improvements than has been generally noted. Nonetheless, a pattern of granting political favors or rewarding factions with high office in the State Department was well established and would continue into the twentieth century with the appointments of William Jennings Bryan (by Woodrow Wilson in 1913) and Cordell Hull (by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933). Perhaps no period was more replete with political partisanship in the State Department than the years between Adams and the Civil War. First used by the followers of Andrew Jackson as patronage rewards, or the spoils of victory, the department's leadership positions were given—especially in the administrations of James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan—to proponents of southern slave expansion who styled themselves "Young Americans."

By 1860, and certainly after the Civil War, the rapid advance of the industrial economy of the United States and the transfer of power from planters to industrialists and financiers was closely mirrored in the composition of State Department leadership. In fact, resisting the divisive trends of the Young Americans, some department leaders such as Daniel Webster and William Learned Marcy had begun in the 1840s to develop interest in a new wave of expansionism directed toward California, Hawaii, and Asia. Foremost among postwar figures was William Henry Seward, next to Adams the greatest secretary of state of the nineteenth century.

Seward, like John Quincy Adams, was also an intellectual. He had read widely and well in the classics and contemporary works. His ties to Adams were as strong a link as was the more mundane relationship between Hunter and Adee, whose careers overlapped those of their more famous superiors. After Adams's death in 1848, Seward mourned, "I have lost a patron, a guide, a counsellor, and a friend—one whom I loved

scarcely less than the dearest relations, and venerated above all that was mortal among men."

Seward's State Department years saw the outline developed for a vast, coordinated American worldwide empire with its great continental base producing goods for the consumers of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. While Seward's master plan was not fulfilled during his tenure in office, it was followed carefully by such capable, if less visible, successors as William M. Evarts and Hamilton Fish.

With Evarts, in particular, the State Department began to take on its modern cast as an organization intent, in its own way, on "the fostering, the developing, and the directing of . . . commerce by the government." In October 1880, under Evarts's supervision, the State Department received congressional approval and appropriations for the publication of monthly consular reports, a step urged by local chambers of commerce throughout the country. Also characteristic of the years ahead, Evarts was a lawyer. Indeed, like many future secretaries of state, he was a dominant figure in the American bar at the time—a profession gaining increased significance in modern American business and government.

THE LEGAL MIND

A list of the secretaries and undersecretaries of state of the twentieth century reads like a hall of fame of attorneys: Elihu Root, Philander C. Knox, Robert Lansing, Charles Evans Hughes, Henry L. Stimson, Edward R. Stettinius, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, William P. Rogers, Cyrus R. Vance, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, and Warren M. Christopher, not to mention Huntington Wilson, William Phillips, Joseph C. Grew, Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, and Elliot L. Richardson. Indeed, a number of these men served both at the State and the Justice departments, and the number of secretaries of state who have also been attorney general is significant. The modern business flavor; cross-examining perception; studied, organized knowledge; attention to detail; and developed cynicism of the legal mind—as found, for example, in a Root or a Stimson—are important to note as traits common to the personnel of the Department of State. More precisely, those in leadership positions at State have often been Ivy League–trained, Wall Street lawyers whose careers have paralleled the growth of the American industrial system and policy. Such lawyers have been uniquely prepared to deal on a large scale with the organization of railroads, banks, and other developing enterprises at home and abroad.

Dulles's law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, was involved in the making of American foreign policy as early as the Panamanian revolution of 1903, in part engineered in a New York City hotel room by Phillip Cromwell. Stimson's clients included the Continental Rubber Company, the United States Printing Company, the National Sugar Refining Company, the Bank of North America, the Mutual Life Insurance Company, and the Astoria Power and Light Company. In such representations, Stimson, like his colleagues, was accustomed to high finance. In foreign policy matters, once in the service of State, a Stimson, Root, Dulles, or Christopher would easily fall into the conditions and attitudes emerging from a successful legal practice. Such men could easily talk as though they had the will and power to arrange a set of conditions for society. They were concerned, as always, with the important things: money, boundaries, goods, and, perhaps for the first time, guns.

Corporation lawyers derived their power from their relationship to the developing corporate economy they helped to construct. They had the power of expertise in legal matters. They also had the power of individuals who had a broader perspective of the total system and could thereby give advice to those functioning in narrower channels. By controlling various scientific, educational, and cultural projects through foundations and associations, they also could dramatically influence opinion and events in noneconomic aspects of American life. They served, in particular, as key people in educating persons who were going to be decision makers in foreign policy matters, which were less directly tied than domestic concerns to political and congressional sanctions. By taking the leadership at State and other departments (for example, Treasury), corporation lawyers came to dominate American foreign policy by the beginning of the twentieth century. They moved comfortably within expansionist objectives outlined by Seward. The primary concern of State Department officials became the articulation of a managed, professional structure by which to achieve this well-defined strategy.

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY

Developed—like all cabinet-level executive departments of the federal government—along the lines of precedent and personality rather than

constitutional or legislative sanction, the State Department until the twentieth century had little organizational rhyme or reason. From Jefferson and Remsen through to Evarts and Adee, the department functioned by tradition, and often did so rather poorly. For example, in 1906 an inspector of American consulates in Asia found two consuls who were decrepit; two otherwise unfit for duty; one morally suspect; one charged with coercing a sultan into paying a debt for which he, the consul, was collector; one charged with drunkenness and the issuance of fraudulent papers; and one, "a coarse and brutal type," against whom eighty-two complaints were registered. Pressure to restructure the consular service, the branch of the department charged directly with the responsibility of looking after American citizens and business interests abroad, came, in great part, from those business interests themselves. Nearly a decade of lobbying went into the executive order of November 1905 and the passage in April 1906 of a consular reorganization bill. The purpose of the pressure and the proposals produced by it was the same, "in a word, to put the entire diplomatic system on a business basis, and to manage it in the future in accordance with the principles of sound common sense." Such principles included more effective training programs. Selective language training in the foreign service began in 1895 through the assignment of officers as "student interpreters" to the American legations in Persia, Korea, and Siam. In 1902 ten student interpreter posts were created at Peking (Beijing) for Chinese language training.

Training in consular responsibilities dates from 1907, when seven new consuls were given thirty-day courses of instruction. The purpose was "to give novitiates in the consular service some practical training in the running of a consular office before sending them off to their posts." In 1924 additional training for diplomatic and consular officers began with the establishment of a foreign service school, which sent new officers to divisions of the department for several months before their assignment abroad. In the 1930s the renamed Foreign Service Officers' Training School provided junior officers with training in consular and commercial work after their two-year probationary tour abroad.

Increasingly, some officers were also sent to universities for graduate study. While all training was suspended during World War II, it was resumed after the war with the establishment of the Foreign Service Institute. In theory, the intention was to copy a business model by creating the most efficient system with the most efficient people. Such changes included revised entrance examinations and consular associations, in addition to the foreign service schools.

The reforms were perhaps best represented in the internal system of ratings and inspections used to rule on promotions. Forms, which eventually swelled to some 212 questions by the 1920s, and departmental retention and promotion rating codes were used to provide uniform standards for personnel decisions. The most significant concern expressed by the forms and rating codes was to be a measuring device of the "efficiency of the individual." It was hoped that such evaluations would purge the "decrepit, unfit, morally suspect, drunken and coarse and brutal types, *etc.*" from the consular service.

Deeply felt personal, status, and career differences separated the department's consular service from the diplomatic, which officially represented the government of the United States in international relations. Diplomats often considered themselves professional policymakers and were more bound to State Department traditions. Managers and planners, usually emerging, like Carr, from the consular side, were held in low esteem. One diplomat observed those "administrative types who inflate themselves with all sorts of rich and resonant titles like Career Evaluators, and General Services Specialists, and even Ministers of Embassy for Administrative Affairs. These glorified janitors, supply clerks, and pants-pressers yearn to get their fingers in the foreign affairs pie, and when they do, the diplomatic furniture often gets marked with gummy thumbprints."

It must be noted, however, that truly significant organizational reform in the Department of State did not stop at the consular-diplomatic demarcation. Diplomats such as Phillips and Grew remarked at how much of their work concerned the same business interests and pressures directed at the consuls. New departures were taken with a view to improving the efficiency of the State Department, not just one part of it.

Of most direct contact with the business-consular developments of the early twentieth century were modifications in the preparations of commercial reports. The Bureau of Statistics, a province of influential geopoliticians such as O. P. Austin, was renamed the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Although control of it was shifted to the Commerce and Labor Department in 1903, a corollary agency, the Bureau of Trade

Relations, was immediately established. The State Department advanced this effort to collect and analyze business data with the creation of the Office of the Economic Adviser in 1921. This position came to be held by important advisers such as Herbert Feis.

The State Department's approach to filing and record keeping, somewhat more detailed than in Remsen's day, was reworked several times in the twentieth century to provide greater systemization. Thus were created in turn the Numerical Files of 1906–1910 and the more comprehensive and efficient Decimal Files in 1910. In the 1960s began a subject-numeric system, and in the 1970s the department's central file was computerized. The Division of Information, created in 1909, took responsibility for preserving the department's data and publishing selected annual excerpts in the already established House of Representatives publication series, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). This series entered what has been called its "modern era" in 1921, under the supervision of Gaillard Hunt and another agency he headed called the Division of Publications. During and after World War II, tremendous growth in the number of pages of files and the widespread practice of stamping documents with secret classifications slowed release of FRUS volumes. In 1989 more than thirty years separated the publication of official correspondence from its original date, and Congress set a statutory goal of a thirty-year maximum elapsed time for issuing the volumes.

Of greatest precedence on the diplomatic side was the creation in March 1908 of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and the structuring of the whole State Department into a number of similar geographically grouped "divisions" in the years that followed. Before World War II, when the Department of State still numbered well below one thousand employees in all, these regional divisions were small, usually manned by only a few "desk officers" dealing with American embassies and legations overseas. Their purpose was to provide better machinery for the coordination of policy at all levels. In time, the five regional divisions (Europe, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, Inter-American, African) and a sixth desk, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (responsible for relations with the American mission to the United Nations), grew dramatically in size and complexity. An assistant secretary headed each bureau and supervised the close contact with American embassies in the respective areas of responsibility. Below the assistant secretary were office directors, each responsible for a small group of countries. The country desk officer was the "low man on the totem pole," concerned with policy toward a single foreign nation.

The culmination of all these administrative changes came in two efforts to make the various components of the State Department into "interchangeable" parts. First was the Rogers (Foreign Service) Act of 1924 and second was the movement known as "Wristonization" in the 1950s. The pressures and reasoning producing the Rogers Act, which merged the consular and diplomatic services into a single foreign service, were similar to those that resulted in the previously mentioned separate and more piecemeal reforms on both sides of the department. As Representative John Rogers remarked, business forces were united and once again exerting influence. He noted that "practically every chamber of commerce and trade organization in the United States and many of the American chambers and trade organizations functioning in other parts of the world have gone on record as favoring this particular reorganization of our foreign service." Rather than a radical departure, the Rogers Act was a culmination of the well-defined premises of efficient control and a transition to still further forms of administrative systemization. In place of the separation and distinction between the broadly separated categories of political interest in the diplomatic service and commercial interest in the consular service, there would be one unified Department of State.

With the increased size of the department, a movement had developed by the 1950s to merge still further the civil service staff of the State Department with the foreign service. With a shortage of personnel for positions, especially within the training programs, and a distrust between the "line" desk officers and the "staff" administrators, a committee was charged by Dulles with the task of additional State Department reorganization. The chairman of the committee was Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown University, and hence the merger of the two staffs became known as Wristonization.

This reform was not only another in a series; it also gave the first real evidence that the similar ones that had preceded it might not, after all, have been effective. Throughout the century, optimism had prevailed. Thus, Huntington Wilson had boasted in 1908, "I am happy to tell you that one of my pet hobbies, the politico-geographical divi-

A TALE OF TWO SPEECHES

In early 1950, two speeches, one by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the other by Senator Joseph McCarthy, illustrated the tension between pragmatism and politics in the modern State Department. Acheson's 12 January address to the National Press Club, "Crisis in Asia," was a model of pragmatic policy analysis. Also known as the "defense perimeter speech," because it placed Korea beyond America's line of defense in the Pacific, this talk was quite perceptive. Noting "bewilderment" in the American reaction to the communist victory in China in 1949, Acheson detected "a failure to understand [the] basic revolutionary force which is loose in Asia" and explained that "the communists did not create this but they were shrewd and cunning enough to . . . ride this thing into victory and power." Such sophisticated, accurate, and timely analysis was precisely what State Department bureaucrats needed to provide to policymakers.

McCarthy's 9 February speech to the Republican Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, advanced a strikingly different interpretation of what he labeled the "impotency" of U.S. policy. He charged that the United States had failed to prevent communist successes "because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. . . . This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous." In the senator's inflammatory rhetoric, the department's elitist past remained to haunt it in the frightening uncertainty of the early Cold War.

The staff analysis that went into the Press Club speech demonstrated State's bureaucratic expertise. Contrary to partisan complaints based upon distorted or nonexistent evidence, the level of patriotism, competence, and strategic toughness within the department was high, as exemplified by its shaping of NSC 68, the April 1950 program for militarized containment of global communism. State remained at the center of foreign policymaking in the 1950s, but damage to the department's credibility from McCarthy's excesses revealed the vulnerability of its expertise to political and ideological challenges.

sion, has at last received final recognition by the creation of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs . . . so I now have much better machinery for my direction of the Far Eastern business." Or after the Rogers Act, Grew felt the State Department had "a new order . . . established, a new machine developed." But the Wriston committee described well the catalog of State Department problems after a half century of such administrative reforms. In sum, there was a marked decline in public confidence in the State Department; a similar decline in morale in the diplomatic ranks; and failure to carry through on various legislative mandates such as the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which provided for inducting officers into all levels of the foreign service so as to make it more flexible and successful.

Although Wristonization itself was another management panacea, it drew attention to the fact that the State Department's "management of human resources has been irresolute and unimaginative." Even though the question of personnel management had been under repeated study, "substantially nothing has been accomplished." The committee remarked that "all modern personnel management organizations utilize machines to facilitate the mechanical tasks of keeping personnel records; the Department however has not effectively utilized such a system." In particular, Wriston's committee criticized the "occasional tinkering" and "token" programs of recruitment and training. Congress had intended the Foreign Service Institute to be "for the State Department, what the Naval War College, the Army War College, and the National War College are for the Armed Services—an advanced training ground for officers destined for high command." But since the institute had been given little attention by the department, it did not provide the kind of educational leadership and scholarship that had been intended. Such was characteristic of the State Department's general lack of a clear concept of training requirements, career planning, and development.

The Wriston committee missed the perhaps larger significance of the protracted failure of

management reforms and put all its faith in a still bigger and, it hoped, better structure. While many civil servants had been seriously involved in foreign affairs and thus would benefit themselves and the State Department by merger with the foreign service officers, a larger number of straight administrative employees (office personnel, for example) were trapped by the move into being diplomatic officers, for which they had neither ambition nor preparation.

The career uncertainty that these bureaucratic reforms injected into the department coincided with the chilling effect on creativity and responsiveness caused by McCarthyism's assault on the foreign service. Unfounded allegations of communist sympathies cost many veteran diplomats their jobs in the 1950s. McCarthyism was a grotesque extreme of a problem that had plagued State in the past and would burden it in the future, namely the tension between careerists and politicians. Foreign service officers were trained to suppress their personal views, but political appointees to posts in the department or partisan leaders outside often put pressure on careerists for political or ideological loyalty. Caution and conformity became the order of the day in the diplomatic service, with a resultant weakening of State's leadership role in foreign policy.

Forgetting, or perhaps choosing not to remember, that organizational reform enthusiasm similar to Wristonization had failed to deter and might be blamed for the bad situation now at hand, the brightest people in and out of the Department of State continued to talk of what could be done to increase management efficiency and policy effectiveness. Thus, one had come almost full circle from Remsen to Kissinger. The larger and more complex the State Department and the world became, the less important was the role of the department in making foreign policy. Instead of individual advice, the department became expert in institutional adjustments and its influence shrunk proportionally. A Rand Corporation think-tank study, *United States Policy and the Third World* (1967), never once mentioned the State Department.

As State's structure grew and its power vanished in the mid-twentieth century, its once high and mighty place became almost laughable. Thus, satires of departmental memoranda about such things as waste-power removal were not uncommon, nor were genuine titles such as chief of the administrative management and personnel division of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. While some flirted with participative management and Dean Rusk instituted a department suggestion box, few shared the Kissinger or Villard view that perhaps the goal might once again be "top-notch organization in which the human equation is not sacrificed to the Moloch of bureaucracy."

LEADERSHIP OR MANAGEMENT?

In the 1780s, Benjamin Franklin's diplomatic dispatches from France sometimes took months to cross the Atlantic. Two centuries later, flash cables or secure e-mail messages could be in the hands of the secretary of state within moments. Can, in short, the modern secretary of state, however talented and qualified, break free as Kissinger suggested from the management ethos?

The obstacles to such freedom were rather clear in duties and responsibilities of the secretary of state at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The secretary was a senior personal adviser to the president and the only cabinet officer primarily charged with looking at the nation as a whole in its relations with the outside world. The secretary of state was also the ranking diplomat in dealing with foreign governments at the same time that he served as an administration spokesman on American foreign policy to Congress, the country, and abroad. As chief of the State Department, the secretary was responsible to the president and accountable to Congress. Finally, the secretary was also in direct line to presidential succession. The modern secretary of state was thus adviser, negotiator, reporter of trouble, spokesperson, manager, and coordinator. One thinks of days filled with calls, conferences, talks with senators, ambassadors, delegations of private citizens, journalists, and bankers, not to mention the increasingly frequent global troubleshooting, all the time while running a department.

Secretary Stimson's biographer reports on one day, even in the more serene pre–World War II world, as follows:

> A conference at ten o'clock with Silas Strawn, the United States delegate to a conference at Peking on Chinese tariffs. At 10:30 a press conference followed at 10:45 by an appointment with Dr. McClaren of the Williamstown Institute. Between 11:00 and 12:00 receiving the Spanish Ambassador and a representative from the Bolivian delegation. They were followed by Senator Howell at 12:00, Congressman Keyes at 12:40

and General Allen at 12:55. After lunch at 2:30 he began to sign the official mail, a task he had finished by 3:30 when Congressmen Robinson, Thatcher, Walker, Newhill, Kendall and Blackburn called upon him and talked for an hour. Elihu Root, Jr., appeared at 4:30 and remained until 5:00. Just before going home the Secretary called James M. Beck, then a congressman, in New York. That evening he attended a dinner given by the Chilean Ambassador in honor of the Chilean Minister of Finance.

How against these activities does one formulate the basic strategies and plans of action required? Even if time and attention are found, more myriad problems await in terms of the delegation of authority to bureaus that distrust each other's prerogatives or to individuals anxious for good assignments and promotions. Each bureau, each office within a bureau, each officer, is improvising from day-to-day, unaware, unprepared, or uninspired in the work of partners, neighbors, and colleagues.

Against this setting, some post–World War II secretaries of state have stood out in the effort to orchestrate the department's activities. Most notably mentioned by those in the State Department, George C. Marshall, accustomed to command, and Dean Acheson, experienced on the Hoover Commission for government reorganization, brought about a sense of planning amidst the chaos. Most secretaries of state since World War II, however, have been less engaged with the department itself and more in touch with the White House. Some, such as Dulles, Kissinger, and Christopher, were out of town a lot. Baker was George H. W. Bush's closest personal friend. Shultz stayed in the post for seven years in part because he was a better organization man than most, but he often clashed with Ronald Reagan's conservative loyalists, who thought Shultz was too close to foreign service liberals.

The task for secretaries of state has been difficult because the role of the State Department is, in the last analysis, so weak. Primacy in coordinating foreign policy itself, the lifeblood of the State Department's leadership in the days of Adams and Seward, has been challenged and the counterattack has had few bases for claims to legitimacy. The Constitution says nothing of the State Department and refers only to "executive" and "presidential" responsibilities. Congress has never helped. The original legislation setting up the State Department also recognized the president as supreme. Even when granting power to the secretary of state, it has always been understood that he or she "shall act under the direction of the President." Such direction has wandered from giving State considerable room to those who have wanted State out of foreign affairs.

Some analysts of American diplomacy go even further to suggest that the State Department, while it never had a constitutional or legislative claim to primacy, did, at one time in the nineteenth century, come to hold such a position by tradition and that the department itself gradually allowed such power to erode. One of the first four departments to be established (along with War, Treasury, and Justice), the State Department came to view itself as the first among equals. This, in turn, led to an attitude of general superiority in the federal establishment—an attitude that, regardless of ability, the State Department had a special dispensation to control foreign policy. If other valid interests arose in other departments, the State Department worked for too long not to foster them but to cut them off. Thus began a movement to place control of foreign policy in more reasonable and responsive hands. Also, the "legal mind" and "administrative efficiency" movement made State more introspective and took it further from the center of integrated policy.

As the State Department failed to keep abreast and federal agencies multiplied, new voices emerged to decide, negotiate, and implement foreign policy. When the State Department cried "foul" but showed little aptitude, foreign policymaking moved elsewhere. The emergency experience of World War II, in particular, put personal presidential policy in the forefront. Self-defensively, the State Department took to eulogizing its establishment, and the American people had to be reminded frequently after the war that "the Department of State, under the direction of the President, in cooperation with Congress is responsible for the advancement of our foreign policy objectives."

In reality, however, such leadership moved most directly to the National Security Council. Created by the National Security Act of 1947 (the same statute that established the Central Intelligence Agency), the National Security Council was, in fact, charged with the responsibility of "effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security." It was provided with a staff and set about operating, close to the White House, as an interdepartmental committee with functions most immediately related to ques-

tions of foreign policy. Thus was created what the State Department had once been, a coordinating, orchestrating mechanism for the various elements of policy at the highest level. The State Department, at least in the contemporary United States, was not a part of the primary machinery by which the nation would set about to meet the demands of increased world leadership.

In the competitive world of Washington's bureaucratic politics, the State Department is one of the smallest players. Its annual budget and number of employees are dwarfed by such behemoths as Defense and Health and Human Services. Although the total amount is secret, the annual funds for the CIA far exceed those of State. With a lack of resources and an increasing centralization of foreign policymaking in the White House, it is not surprising that other departments and agencies in Washington often have more influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy than does the State Department.

Despite these challenges, the State Department has made various efforts to revitalize its headquarters' operations in the somewhat aptly named Foggy Bottom section of Washington. The program Diplomacy for the 1970s, embarked on by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and his chief assistant, Elliot L. Richardson, was one of the most publicized and professional. Yet it must be noted that when one scratches underneath the rhetoric of the program, it was, in short, still another management reform package, not unlike in design, if not in definition, the earlier programs that had failed and, in part, led to disaster for the department.

The Rogers-Richardson proposals at least incorporated the knowledge, which had begun with Wristonization, that structural reforms were not universally productive. Indeed, they noted, "substance can suffer at the hands of technique; spirit can be alienated from operation." The lessons of the participative managers, more serious than the mere superficiality of a suggestion box, were also deeply ingrained. A prime focus of Diplomacy for the 1970s was a new era in management-employee relations. Openness and creativity were encouraged. There was even concern, for the first time, for ensuring equal employment opportunities and new openings for women. The role of the foreign service wife was redefined, giving her more training and staff support for her unique position as an unofficial representative of the United States.

Still, characteristically, the new proposals clung to the same brass rings. First was the commitment to a belief that this was the only real, significant reform where all the acknowledged previous attempts were specious and superficial. All previous reformers of management guidelines had believed similarly about their proposals, from Huntington Wilson's geopolitical divisions through Wriston's merger. Second was a still-unshattered faith in techniques, no matter what the preamble, to solve problems. Demonstrating this faith was a program called Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA), under the aegis of the secretary's Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC). One of the tasks of the program was to provide a structural way back into the top echelons of decision making for the department by writing annual reviews designed to serve as common denominators for discussion in the department, the Inter-Agency Group of the National Security Council, and the White House. In turn, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation was to feed into an even more centralized executive council known as the Secretariat. The authors of Diplomacy for the 1970s proudly acclaimed this Secretariat, at the "heartbeat" of department operations, as "thoroughly modernized" and ready with "up-to-date techniques and equipment for high-speed telecommunications and automated information handling." Thus, Secretary Rogers urged development of a new operations center and improved information management known as Secretariat Automated Data Indexing System (SADI).

Into this nerve center of the Department of State in 1973 moved Kissinger, who had challenged the hegemony of efficiency while an outsider. It is difficult to perceive how a Kissinger or certainly a Remsen, Adams, Seward, Adee, or Evarts could function in the kingdom of PARA and SADI, that is, an environment where "substantive problems are transformed into administrative ones." What was the remaining role of leadership and policy in a department that could issue forth Airgram 5399, concerning the use of the title "Ms."? The message read in part: "The Department has added 'Ms.' to the personnel title codes . . . maintained in the automated master personnel file. All documents which access these codes and which are printed by the computer may now employ this form of address."

The "Ms." example reveals not only a preoccupation with management details but also a diversity problem in State. For the department specifically charged with representing the United States to the various peoples of the world, the career officers in State had always been remarkably homogeneous. In the 1970s the department

made great strides to catch up with other government offices in the area of diversity. The number of new female foreign service officers doubled during the decade, and by the end of the decade the department was actively recruiting African-American candidates. As a result, by the end of the century the number of female and African-American ambassadors had noticeably increased even before the nation had its first woman as secretary of state with Madeleine Albright and its first African-American secretary of state with Colin Powell.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the State Department continued its parade of re-reorganizations that had begun with creation of the first geographic division in 1908 and the professionalization of the foreign service with the Rogers Act of 1924. The Foreign Service Officers Act of 1980 aimed to make career officers more effective through reform of the promotion and recognition system. The bureaucratic pyramid of functional and geographic divisions was continually readjusted, but the process of getting a policy recommendation through this maze of specialists remained time-consuming and an obstacle to policy innovation. During the Clinton administration a new undersecretary of state for global issues was added to make the department more responsive to contemporary world problems, such as the environment and population growth. One of the most significant changes of the 1990s was to bring the previously independent U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the department to save costs and enhance management efficiency.

The explanation of the shifting power of the secretary of state and the department itself since World War II was not in internal organization, or in major historical events like the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, or in scandals like Iran-Contra. The key was in the growth of power and complexity of the modern presidency, beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt and continuing thereafter. Much public discussion focused on the relative balance of power between the National Security Council after its creation in 1947 and the State Department. During the Johnson years, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and national security advisers McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were seen as overshadowing Dean Rusk. Under Nixon, Kissinger dominated the policy process through his NSC staff and his direct access to the president within the White House. Reagan claimed that George Shultz would restore the primacy of the State Department, but Shultz was often in conflict with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and later the NSC staff over dealings with Iran and Central America. With the end of the Cold War, Bill Clinton elevated another player in the policy game, the secretary of commerce, as he gave priority to economic competitiveness. The determining consideration in all of these cases was how the president chose to exercise his executive prerogatives.

Despite efforts to improve its own organization, the State Department was unable to reclaim the leadership and coordination of foreign policy of which it had once been able to boast. The centralization of policymaking in the White House that had begun during World War II and increased during the Cold War remained. The National Security Council staff had the advantages of greater access to the president, more rapid response to changing situations, and more domestic political awareness than State. Indeed, bureaucratic battles between the department and the NSC staff at times—such as in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s—wrecked the policy process. No national security adviser after Kissinger ever equaled his level of control over decisions, but policy unity was always difficult. The Defense Department, CIA, NSC, and other departments often had as much or more input into foreign policy than did the State Department.

The juxtaposition of Airgram 5399 about the use of "Ms." and Remsen's original instructions put one in mind of a debate between two diplomatic historians about the utility of speedy publication of foreign policy files by the Department of State. While both scholars supported such a policy, their reasons differed dramatically. The first argued the administratively defensible position that quick access to such documents and the resulting historical monographs, sure to follow, would teach contemporary diplomats how to do a better job. More reflectively, the second historian suggested that while scholarship and research demanded quick access, better policy would emerge not from monographs, but from "wisdom."

Leadership, the quality of greatness inherent in the work of an Adams or a Seward, is still possible. The Department of State is not beyond its grasp. Yet one must conclude that its achievement slips further and further out of reach in the wake of those variables the department has come to identify as progress since the mid-twentieth century: complexity, bigness, and accelerated change.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy.* 2 vols. New York, 1949. A good biography of a great secretary of state.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, ed. *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.* Vols. 1–10. New York, 1928–1958. Good, short sketches.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, and Robert Ferrell, eds. *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.* New series. Vols. 11–19. New York, 1963–1980. Continues the older Bemis series with the same title.

Crane, Katherine E. *Mr. Carr of State.* New York, 1960. Gives a favorable view of a key middle manager.

DeConde, Alexander. *The American Secretary of State.* New York, 1962. Contains useful analyses.

Elder, Robert E. *The Policy Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1960. A landmark political science study.

Graebner, Norman A., ed. *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century.* New York, 1961. One of the most used sources for general, interpretive information.

Hartmann, Frederick H., and Robert L. Wendzel. *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World.* New York, 1994. Describes how policy is made in Washington, D.C.

Heinrichs, Waldo. *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition.* Boston, 1966. Besides being a biography of an important man, it traces the evolution of foreign policy implementation.

Ilchman, Frederick. *Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779–1939.* Chicago, 1961. A careful and documented study.

Kegley, Charles W., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process.* 3d ed. New York, 1987. Discusses State's relationship to other departments.

McCamy, James. *Conduct of the New Diplomacy.* New York, 1964. A revision of the author's previous volume, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1950), based on the intervening decade.

Morison, Elting E. *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson.* Boston, 1960.

Plischke, Elmer. *Conduct of American Diplomacy.* Princeton, N.J., 1950. A standard work.

Rubin, Barry M. *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1985. Analyzes the decline of State with regard to the National Security Council.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy.* New York, 1989. Examines Kissinger's significant role in shaping the policy process.

Stuart, Graham H. *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel.* New York, 1949. An older source of itemized changes.

Villard, Henry S. *Affairs at State.* New York, 1965.

White, Leonard. *The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History.* New York, 1948.

See also DECISION MAKING; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DOCTRINES; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

DETERRENCE

David Coleman

In one form or another, deterrence is a motivational force in many everyday relationships: a child learns not to misbehave for fear of being scolded by its parents; a potential criminal might decide against committing a crime for fear of being caught and punished; a nation may choose one foreign policy course over another out of fear of military or economic retaliation; or an international alliance may threaten war if any one of its members is attacked. In each case, one party has influenced the choice of another by threatening consequences that outweigh gains.

In the field of foreign policy, the threat and fear of retaliation has been a powerful force. Imperial powers have found that making an example of an enemy or lawbreaker ultimately provided a cheaper and easier method of controlling peoples than maintaining a large standing police or armed forces, conforming to the common adage that prevention is usually better than cure. To that end, Roman legions deliberately cultivated a reputation for ruthlessness to promote stability, and European imperial powers did everything they could to impress their technological and military prowess upon the peoples they commanded. But it is in the nuclear age that deterrence assumed a special significance and was refined from a mostly instinctive practice to a deliberate, if still inexact, science. Throughout the nuclear age, deterrence has been a dynamic concept propelled by technological and historical developments. In turn, the concept of deterrence came to influence those technological and historical developments.

THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE

In its most basic theoretical form, deterrence is an equation involving two parties, where one party weighs the gain it may make by pursuing a course of action against the price it may pay by the retaliation of the other party. By way of illustration, it is useful to consider two nations, Nation A and Nation B, whose interests collide on a particular issue. If Nation A is known to be considering a course of action contrary to the interests of Nation B, Nation B may signal its intent to retaliate if Nation A does indeed choose that course of action. This leaves Nation A with a decision. First, it must decide whether Nation B has the capability to carry out its threat, and, second, it must decide whether Nation B has the will to carry out its threat. And the deciding factor in both of these judgments is the credibility of Nation B's capability and will to carry out the threat. If, as a result of this cost-benefit calculation, Nation A decides not to go ahead with the course of action, then deterrence has been successful; but if Nation A decides that the gains outweigh the risk or price, and goes ahead regardless of the threat, then deterrence has failed. This example, though, provides only the barest outline sketch of how deterrence operates in the foreign policy arena.

The simplicity of the theoretical formula belies the complexity of international diplomacy in practice and critics of deterrence have focused on the relative rigidity of the formula compared to the fluidity and unpredictability of international diplomacy. Furthermore, deterrence rests heavily on certain assumptions about the parties involved and the way they will react. First, deterrence rests heavily on the belief that rationality will prevail throughout the process. Not only do the various parties have to behave in fundamentally rational ways, but each party must perceive the other as behaving in a fundamentally rational way. In practice, this leads to a complicated process of perception and counterperception as policymakers and intelligence bodies from each nation estimate and try to influence what the other is thinking.

Critics of deterrence rightly point out that the decisions of political leaders often do not fall

into neatly explainable categories and that however carefully the deterrence situation may be controlled, ultimately the decision is a subjective one. In foreign affairs as in everyday life, behavior in deterrence situations is based on instinct as well as reason and this instinctive element can never be confidently discounted. Moreover, the way both parties view the situation can be influenced qualitatively by any number of factors, including irrationality, misperception, poor judgment, or even just wishful thinking. In short, what may seem an unacceptable price to one person or under some circumstances could well be judged by another under different circumstances to be acceptable. Moreover, since history is filled with events that were quite simply unpredictable, it is clearly difficult to account with any certainty for the myriad of accidents, mistakes, and emotions that may play a part in a decision. At best, employing deterrence is an approximation, but in the thermonuclear age, with weapons capable of global annihilation, the stakes are higher than ever before.

Because deterrence is very much in the eye of the beholder, and actual intentions and capabilities are less important than the other side's estimate of those intentions and capabilities, the process of communicating and interpreting information is crucial. Known as signaling, this two-way discourse is open to a wide range of possible scenarios. One involves explicit communications, including public speeches and classified diplomatic correspondence. Another is implicit measures such as partial mobilization or the placing of forces on alert or more subtle measures designed to be detected by foreign intelligence bodies. Ideally, each method is designed to exploit the complex interplay of perceptions and counterperceptions.

Sometimes deterrence fails. Often in the history of international affairs the cost-benefit calculation has led to an unexpected result. In 1904 Russia ignored Japanese warnings that its policies would lead to retaliation, resulting ultimately in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1914 the Central Powers recognized that their policies risked drawing the Entente into war in Europe, but continued regardless. During World War II, Nazi Germany persisted with U-boat attacks on American transatlantic merchant shipping despite President Franklin D. Roosevelt's explicit warnings that it would likely provoke U.S. retaliation. In December 1941, despite U.S. military strength, Japan calculated that its interests were best served by a surprise attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor. In mid-1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev installed nuclear missiles in Cuba despite President John F. Kennedy's explicit warnings that doing so would provoke U.S. retaliation. And in 1991 the Middle East erupted in violence as Saddam Hussein ignored the threat of U.S. intervention should Iraq invade Kuwait.

STRATEGIC BOMBING

In diplomacy, threats that act as a deterrent have most often come in military form and have therefore implied the capability to project military power. Possessing a powerful navy gave Britain such a capability, but for much of its early history, the United States was not able to project military power and therefore made threats rarely and with questionable success. One notable deterrent effort was President James Monroe's unilateral declaration on 2 December 1823 of the independence of the Western Hemisphere, issued in order to deter Spanish intervention in Latin America and Russian expansion on to the American continent. Monroe's threat was twofold. First, he implied local military resistance if Spain tried to reestablish its colonies in Latin America or Russia expanded onto the American Northwest Coast. Second, he implied that if the European powers chose to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere then the United States would be forced to revoke its longstanding tradition of noninterference in European affairs. Ultimately, Spain did not try to reestablish its colonies, although this probably had less to do with Monroe's threats than it did with similar threats issued by Britain.

The advent of strategic bombing in the early twentieth century vastly increased the ability to project military force, and consequently led to the transformation of deterrence into its modern form. The twin technological developments of high explosives and aircraft that could deliver them to their targets made strategic bombing a decisive factor in modern warfare. It was first used in limited form in World War I in Germany's zeppelin (airship) attacks against Britain. German scientists had not only developed a way to incorporate poison gas into a bomb, thereby creating the first type of the weapons now classed as weapons of mass destruction, but had also developed a way to float zeppelins over enemy lines and drop their payloads on British cities. Although not widely recognized at the time, this ability to move beyond the confines of the battlefield and to attack an enemy's cities directly revo-

lutionized modern warfare as offensive strategic bombing threatened to break the defensive deadlock that had evolved from tanks, machine guns, and trench warfare.

At the same time it introduced a new factor that, although intangible, was no less powerful. Like the German V-1 and V-2 rocket strikes during World War II, the German zeppelin of World War I resulted in few deaths, but the potential that the technology seemed to hold for extending the battlefront from the trenches to civilian homes captured the British public's imagination to an extent that far outweighed objective casualty counts. For the first time a military weapon was used not only for the tactical calculations of policymakers, but also to strike terror into the home front, which had become an increasingly vital component of modern warfare. The fluid variable of civilian morale suddenly became as important as military morale as the civilian population reacted to the new threat to their homes and lives. Moreover, during World War II, as strategic bombing became vastly more effective (and deadly), the industrial and economic hearts of an enemy became additional viable targets. Allied long-range bombers all but destroyed the German industrial city of Dresden, while the American firebombing of Tokyo started fires that raged out of control for days at a time. With the development of the atomic bomb, a weapon blatantly unable to discriminate between military and civilian targets, strategic bombing was taken to its extreme.

The development of the atomic bomb was the culmination of the top secret Manhattan Project, an extraordinary collaboration of international scientists headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer that was backed by vast resources provided by the U.S. government. Stringent security precluded public debate about what role the new weapon would have, but among those few who had information about the project's overall objective and progress, there was growing awareness that the new weapon would be unlike anything that had come before; it would perhaps even create "a new relationship of man to the universe," as a committee chaired by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson put it. Such an unconventional weapon clearly required unconventional thinking. As Oppenheimer recognized, the elements of surprise and terror were as intrinsic to it as fissionable nuclei. In a top-secret report submitted to the War Department on 11 June 1945, a small committee chaired by physicist James Franck suggested that the psychological impact of the explosion might be more valuable to U.S. military objectives than the immediate physical destruction. In the hope that a demonstration of the destructive potential of the atomic bomb might be enough to compel the Japanese to surrender, the Franck Committee proposed a public demonstration in an uninhabited region.

After considering the various proposals, President Harry S. Truman concluded that a demonstration in an uninhabited region would likely be ineffective, and therefore ordered that the bomb be used against Japanese cities, a decision that has been passionately debated ever since. Some have argued that Truman's motivation was less the war in the Pacific than the impending contest with the Soviet Union and that as such it represented the opening gambit of so-called "atomic diplomacy," while others argue that the decision was not only militarily sound but necessary, and that it ultimately saved hundreds of thousands of American and Japanese lives. But whatever Truman's motives, at 8:15 A.M. on 6 August 1945, an American B-29 Superfortress long-range bomber named the *Enola Gay* delivered its single atomic bomb to the target of Hiroshima, the second most important military-industrial center in Japan. Upward of seventy thousand people were killed instantly in the blast. Three days later another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, killing at least twenty thousand. In the following weeks the death counts in both cities rose as the populations succumbed to radiation-related illnesses.

As the wire services flashed the story around the globe, journalists who had witnessed the Trinity test blast at Alamogordo, New Mexico, three weeks earlier on 16 July, were now free to write about what they had seen and help a startled world comprehend what had happened. The American public's reaction was a mixture of relief that the end of the war was in sight, satisfaction that revenge had been exacted upon the perpetrators of the Pearl Harbor attack, and a sober recognition of the responsibility the new weapon carried with it. In strategic terms, there was not yet such a thing as a U.S. atomic stockpile, despite President Truman's implication in his press statement announcing the Hiroshima bombing that atomic bombs were rolling off the production line. Had the first two atomic bombs failed to bring a Japanese surrender, some time would have passed before more were ready. Within days of the Nagasaki bombing, however, the Japanese leaders finally succumbed to the inevitable and formally

surrendered to General Douglas MacArthur's forces on 2 September 1945. From that moment, the priority for U.S. military forces was not building more bombs, but going home.

As the United States demobilized in the postwar period, relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. The coincidence of the beginning of the Cold War and the dawn of the nuclear age ensured that the history of the two would become inextricably entwined. During the early Cold War, the primary strategic contest was for Europe, and Germany in particular, but throughout the continent evidence mounted of a clash of interests and ideology. Within a few short years of the end of World War II, the U.S. government had publicly identified the Soviet Union as its primary strategic threat. And if war did break out in Europe, the Soviets had vastly more conventional forces and the geographical advantage as well. The challenge for U.S. defense planners, therefore, was to find a way to project the U.S. atomic force. Nevertheless, the planners moved slowly to devise a coherent nuclear strategy to serve foreign policy interests. Although fully recognizing that the Soviets would sooner or later develop the atomic bomb, American policymakers struggled to find a way to take advantage of the atomic monopoly. However, the American population was still weary from World War II and constrained military budgets were shrinking, so atomic development was a low priority. It was not until Dwight D. Eisenhower became president that a coherent deterrent role was found for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. But by the end of the Truman administration, defense budgets were growing rapidly, and that administration made some effort to bring military policy into the atomic age. Having recently witnessed how much sacrifice Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was willing to impose on his countrymen in the defense of the USSR, it was clear to U.S. policymakers that if war should break out between the two superpowers, the small stockpile of American atomic bombs that had been built up since Nagasaki would not guarantee victory.

In use, the atomic bomb was an offensive weapon. For the American atomic monopoly to be cast in a defensive role, that role had to be to prevent war altogether through the very threat of retaliation. Bernard Brodie, one of the first defense intellectuals to engage publicly the implications of the atomic bomb, succinctly summarized the momentous shift in military affairs that the bomb had sparked. "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars," Brodie commented in *The Absolute Weapon* (1946). "From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them." To that end, and recognizing that atomic weapons did not fall easily under the existing military force structure, the Truman administration in March 1946 created the Strategic Air Command (SAC) headed by General George Kenny. Adopting the motto "Peace is our profession," SAC's mission was to give the United States a long-term capability to project U.S. nuclear force anywhere on the globe. SAC's existence exemplified the paradox of deterrence strategies as summarized in the Latin adage *Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum* (Let him who desires peace, prepare for war). Unlike the case with conventional military forces, for the remainder of its existence SAC's success would be measured not by its performance in battle, but by its never having actually to engage in combat.

The Cold War contest was ultimately a strategic one, but it was more often manifested in a series of short-term political contests. Committed to a policy of containing communist expansion, the Truman administration found itself having to rethink its assumption that atomic weapons would deter simply because they existed. By the end of 1948 there was mounting evidence that the American atomic monopoly was having little success in deterring communist political expansion through Europe; the threat of communist subversion in Greece and Turkey in 1947, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the strong communist presence during the Italian election of April 1948 all seemed to provide evidence to that effect. And in the first truly nuclear crisis of the Cold War, the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949, the Truman administration could manage only a half-hearted atomic threat that, if Stalin had pushed the matter, would likely have been revealed as a bluff. In a move with the twin objectives of temporarily bolstering the flagging British strategic bombing force and sending an atomic threat to Stalin, American B-29s were deployed in Britain at the height of the Berlin blockade crisis. But this early attempt at nuclear coercion was unconvincing. The B-29s initially sent were not modified to carry atomic bombs; furthermore, it was public knowledge that there was no procedure in place to store atomic warheads overseas. By mid-1948 even Secretary of Defense James Forrestal had to admit that American military planning, including its nuclear strategy, was "patchwork" at best. If America's national security was to realize the full

THE WORSE THE BETTER

On 1 March 1955, Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke to the House of Commons:

"There is an immense gulf between the atomic and hydrogen bomb. The atomic bomb, with all its terrors, did not carry us outside the scope of human control or manageable events in thought or action, in peace or war. But when Mr. Sterling Cole, the Chairman of the United States Congressional Committee, gave out a year ago—17th February, 1954—the first comprehensive review of the hydrogen bomb, the entire foundation of human affairs was revolutionised, and mankind placed in a situation both measureless and laden with doom. . . .

"I shall content myself with saying about the power of this weapon, the hydrogen bomb, that apart from all the statements about blast and heat effects over increasingly wide areas there are now to be considered the consequences of 'fall out,' as it is called, of windborne radio-active particles. There is both an immediate direct effect on human beings who are in the path of such a cloud and an indirect effect through animals, grass and vegetables, which pass on these contagions to human beings through food.

"This would confront many who escaped the direct effects of the explosion with poisoning, or starvation, or both. Imagination stands appalled. There are, of course, the palliatives and precautions of a courageous Civil Defense . . . but our best protection lies, as I am sure the House will be convinced, in successful deterrents operating from a foundation of sober, calm and tireless vigilance.

"Moreover, a curious paradox has emerged. Let me put it simply. After a certain point has been passed it may be said, 'The worse things get the better.' The broad effect of the latest developments is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Soviet Russia by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality or near-equality of vulnerability with our small densely populated island and with Western Europe. . . .

"Then it may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

potential of the atomic bomb for deterrence, a thorough rethinking would be needed.

One solution preferred by many was for the United States to exploit the window of opportunity by launching a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. Former British prime minister Winston Churchill suggested sending Stalin an ultimatum stating that if he did not desist from his expansionist policies, U.S. planes would use atomic bombs against Soviet cities. The U.S. commander in Germany, General Lucius Clay, agreed. Other military voices in Washington lamented the wasting of an opportunity. The calls became more urgent as that window of opportunity seemed to be closing. When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device in August 1949, it caught the West by surprise. The mastering of the atomic process by Soviet scientists was not unexpected in a general sense, but beyond the inner sanctum of intelligence officials and defense planners, the Soviet achievement was never seriously anticipated beyond the vaguest of timetables. To make matters more alarming, two months later, in October 1949, Mao Zedong's Communist Party emerged victorious in China's civil war, a development seen in Washington as proof that Moscow's ambitions were not confined to Europe but were global.

THE THERMONUCLEAR REVOLUTION

The twin developments of thermonuclear weapons and long-range missiles ushered in a new phase of nuclear deterrence. Now, thermonuclear warheads hundreds or even thousands of times more powerful than atomic bombs could be attached to missiles capable of reaching other continents and destroying cities in minutes. In these circumstances, deterrence became not just a policy imperative but a necessity for the survival of the human race. It was clear that a new stage had been reached not only in the history of international affairs, but also in the history of humankind. J. Robert Oppenheimer famously

likened the situation to "two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life." In delivering a comprehensive evaluation of British and NATO nuclear forces to the British House of Commons in March 1955, Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed that a paradox was likely to define international affairs in the future: "After a certain point has been passed it may be said, 'The worse things get the better.' . . . Then it may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." Begun by technological innovation, the thermonuclear revolution aroused the most basic human fears and instincts.

In view of the apparently intensifying communist threat, and particularly in light of the recent development of Soviet atomic power, Truman in late January 1950 ordered a reexamination of U.S. strategic policy. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delegated the task to the new director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze. The result, a document known as NSC 68, was a lengthy and dramatic call to arms. Before long, the report concluded, the Soviet Union would have the capability to launch a surprise atomic attack on the United States. To deter such an attack, NSC 68 recommended a massive buildup in conventional and atomic forces and that, moreover, the United States should commit resources to developing a new type of weapon, a "super" bomb harnessing the power generated by fusing hydrogen atoms rather than splitting them. Preliminary research into such a weapon had been undertaken within the Manhattan Project by a team of scientists headed by physicist Edward Teller. But with no hope of immediate success and with military budgets shrinking in the postwar economic environment, the research was halted. Based on theoretical data, Teller predicted that a hydrogen bomb would be several hundred times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb and capable of devastating an area hundreds of square miles, with radiation traveling much farther. NSC 68 now proposed to resume H-bomb research at a greatly accelerated rate. After heated debate over the feasibility and morality of such a weapon, Truman ordered the project to proceed.

At the height of the debate about whether to proceed with the H-bomb project, communist North Korea launched an attack on pro-Western South Korea on 25 June 1950. Truman reacted by committing U.S. troops under the auspices of the United Nations. Since the deterrent had clearly lapsed or failed, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of UN forces in the theater, and General Curtis Le May, head of SAC, both recommended revitalizing it by using atomic weapons against Communist China. Truman, however, refused to expand the war and committed the United States to a limited conflict with limited objectives, a novel mission for American military forces.

For both political parties, Korea confirmed beyond a doubt that communist forces were on the offensive and that existing U.S. strategy was inadequate to stop them. The Democratic administration reacted by embracing NSC 68 and the massive military buildup it entailed, including the development of the H-bomb. For Republicans, Korea seemed to provide ample evidence for their charge that the Truman administration's approach to national security policy was based too heavily on reaction rather than prevention and therefore was putting the United States on track for financial bankruptcy. They argued that the primary failure lay not in the logistical difficulties of projecting U.S. military force to the distant shores of the Korean Peninsula, but in the administration's failure to prevent the war in the first place. The debate reached a crescendo in the presidential election campaign of 1952, as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, and his foreign policy adviser, John Foster Dulles, launched a sustained political attack on the Truman administration's foreign policy record.

Eisenhower and Dulles promised to take a new look at American national security policy and formulate a better plan for what was clearly going to be a long struggle with the Soviet Union. Dulles declared that the United States could not afford to keep fighting expensive "brushfire" wars like Korea and that what was required instead was an economically sustainable military posture designed to deter communist aggression over the long term. Since the United States could not in all likelihood compete with the Soviet Union in amassing conventional forces, Eisenhower and Dulles contended that the best use of American resources would be to invest in the next generation of nuclear weaponry and declare the intention to react to communist aggression "where it hurts, by means of our choosing." To illustrate Eisenhower's proposed deterrent strategy to the voters, Dulles called on the analogy of municipal police forces: "We do not station armed guards at every house to stop aggressors—that would be economic suicide—but we deter potential aggressors

DETERRENCE REDUCES COSTS

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's comments on massive retaliation were published in the Department of State *Bulletin* on 25 January 1954:

"In the face of this strategy [of Soviet expansion], measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.

"When the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some transformations were needed.

"It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves.

"It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to support permanently other countries; for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will.

"Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.' . . .

"We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.

"This is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred. That is the modern way of getting maximum protection at a bearable cost.

"What the Eisenhower administration seeks is a similar international security system. We want, for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at bearable cost. . . .

"The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."

by making it probable that if they aggress, they will lose in punishment more than they can gain by aggression." Massive retaliation, as Eisenhower's deterrent strategy came to be called, was designed to impose upon would-be aggressors a blunt choice: either to desist, or to persist with the risk of nuclear annihilation. The primary challenge for U.S. policymakers, therefore, was to make the other side believe that aggression carried a high risk of nuclear retaliation. To that end, Dulles declared that the administration would be prepared to engage in diplomatic "brinkmanship," a diplomatic policy some observers likened to the youthful, and often deadly, test of nerves known as "chicken." Eisenhower and Dulles argued that only by being ready to push the crisis to a point where the opponent backed down first would the United States be able to protect its interests. And in order to give communist leaders reason to pause, Eisenhower employed calculated ambiguity in responding to the question of whether a nuclear response would be automatic.

Once in office, Eisenhower and Dulles were confronted with the challenge of implementing the results of their promised New Look. Some of it was clearly impractical, even dangerous. Campaign promises of the political "liberation" of Eastern Europe were quickly abandoned after the June 1953 uprisings in East Germany. The deterrence strategy proved somewhat easier, although perhaps even more dangerous. Increasing the relative emphasis on nuclear technology as opposed to maintaining large standing conventional forces allowed the administration to cut defense expenditures by about 25 percent compared to the late Truman years, leading Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson to declare proudly that the Pentagon now had "more bang for the buck."

Having adopted massive retaliation as a long-term Cold War strategy, Eisenhower and Dulles found that strategy tested in the short term by a series of crises. Nevertheless, Eisenhower threatened massive retaliation in times of crisis sparingly and deliberately. In a series of confrontations with Communist China ranging from bringing an end to the Korean War in 1953 to the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, Eisenhower several times threatened nuclear attack. The primary focus of U.S. foreign policy, however, remained Europe. The struggle for Germany continued to manifest itself in crises over Berlin, which in turn presented U.S. deterrence strategies with perhaps their most serious test. Given the superior strength of Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the location of West Berlin deep inside communist territory, that city was militarily indefensible. The situation was, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright put it, "a strategic nightmare." The only

viable option available to the United States short of thermonuclear war was to deter the Soviets from moving against the city.

Simultaneous to these crises, the strategic balance was in a state of flux, which in turn affected thinking about deterrence. Although the Soviets had successfully tested their first atomic device as early as 1949, thoughtful observers recognized that one successful test did not make a deployable arsenal. By 1955, however, Soviet scientists had largely overcome the initial four-year lag and, particularly in the field of thermonuclear weapons, was on a par with the West. The Soviets still lagged far behind the United States both in quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, but the former's strategic arsenal was more than adequate to inflict considerable damage on the West and to play its own deterrent role. Furthermore, the accelerating arms race made it clear that the gap was narrowing. On 3 October 1952, Great Britain detonated its first atomic device on islands off the coast of Australia. Only weeks later, on 31 October, the United States detonated its first thermonuclear weapon. Less than a year after that, on 12 August 1953, the Soviet Union completed its first successful detonation of a thermonuclear device. In 1956 the first American tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe. These new weapons, designed for battlefield use in localized action, came in the form of army artillery shells, each with explosive power roughly equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb.

This rapidly accelerating arms race confronted defense planners with a new question: How much was enough to deter? During the Eisenhower administration two main schools of thought defined the debate. The first held that the U.S. stockpile should consist of just enough weapons to play a deterrent role, a concept that became known as minimum deterrence. The opposing school of thought held that the United States should maintain a large and constantly growing nuclear arsenal in order to be able to engage in redundant targeting, or allocating several weapons to each target. Known as "overkill," it was this approach of building up an overwhelming nuclear force that prevailed, largely as a result of unchecked bureaucratic politics. As a result, for the remainder of the decade, the Eisenhower administration invested deeply in building up the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

On 3 August 1957 the successful Soviet test of a new type of missile, with the potential capability of reaching the continental United States from a launch-point in the USSR, augured in a new phase of deterrence. This was dramatically confirmed two months later, on 4 October 1957, when Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces used the same type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to propel the world's first artificial satellite into space. That satellite, known as *Sputnik,* was in itself harmless, being little more than a nitrogen-filled aluminum sphere fitted with a rudimentary transmitter that emitted a distinctive "beep" every few seconds, but it would nevertheless have profound ramifications. For the world public, it offered a dramatic demonstration that suggested Soviet missile technology was ahead of the West's, especially when contrasted with a spate of well-publicized American test failures. The American public's fears were manifested in accusations that the Eisenhower administration had allowed first a "bomber gap" and then a "missile gap" to develop. In reality, neither gap existed, but the administration's critics made considerable political mileage of the issue. For deterrence theorists and practitioners, *Sputnik* also demonstrated that the mainland United States was for the first time vulnerable to direct missile attack, potentially opening a window of vulnerability that introduced new challenges to the viability of massive retaliation as a deterrent strategy. In response to *Sputnik,* the American government put new emphasis on missile technology and the space race. By the late 1950s U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) were based in Turkey and Italy, aimed at targets in the Soviet Union. In 1959 the first generation of American ICBMs, Atlas D missiles with a range of 7,500 miles, were deployed in California. The following year the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the final leg of what became known as the U.S. nuclear triad, were added to the U.S. arsenal to complement the strategic bomber and missile forces. By the early 1960s the Corona intelligence satellite program was sending back its first photographs of Soviet military installations, promising a quantum leap in the collection of military intelligence. Meanwhile, development continued of the massive Saturn V rockets that, by the end of the 1960s, would finally shatter any concept of safety in geography by propelling Americans to the moon.

Once again, technological developments introduced new challenges for deterrence strategy. Since missiles reduced to minutes the time available to respond to a nuclear strike, then conceiv-

ably the side that struck first would have an advantage if it could neutralize the enemy's retaliatory capability in that strike. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration implemented new procedures to protect its retaliatory capability. Beginning in 1952, SAC's primary strike forces were on twenty-four-hour alert to guard against surprise attack and so-called fail-safe procedures had been implemented. In highly classified Chrome Dome missions, B-52 Stratofortress bombers flew to within striking distance of enemy targets and waited for a signal to proceed. If no signal came, the planes returned to base. The procedures were designed partly to improve the response time of the nuclear strike force, but more importantly to ensure that the strike force could not be destroyed in Soviet first-strike attacks on airfields. Scattered and airborne, the strike force was less vulnerable. The same principle was also applied to command and control procedures. To reduce the risk that a Soviet first strike on a few central underground command centers might disable the entire U.S. nuclear strike force—possibly an incentive for a Soviet preemptive first strike—a fleet of air force planes were specially outfitted with command and communications equipment to be able to take control of the American nuclear arsenal in the event the central underground command center was destroyed or disabled. From 3 February 1961 through 24 July 1990, a Looking Glass plane was in the air at all times. Protected by mobility, these Looking Glass missions, along with the Chrome Dome missions, became key elements of the U.S. deterrent in the missile age by protecting America's second-strike capability.

MASSIVE RETALIATION QUESTIONED

From the mid-1950s, criticism of massive retaliation became increasingly vocal. As Eisenhower well knew, the most challenging aspect of implementing massive retaliation was that it required a leap of faith on the part of the adversary that the United States would respond to localized and small-scale aggression by launching a nuclear strike, a reaction that was increasingly akin to suicide because of the rapid advances the Soviets were making in nuclear technology. As a consequence, there were a growing number of calls for the United States and NATO to bridge that leap of faith by modifying the strategy of massive retaliation to what retired British Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard called "graduated deterrence." Only by being capable of responding in proportion to the threat, critics of massive retaliation argued, would nuclear threats become credible. Implicit here was a distinction between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, a distinction that massive retaliation explicitly disavowed. In 1957 Harvard professor Henry Kissinger elaborated on this argument by calling for increased investment in tactical nuclear weapons and acceptance of the possibility of limited nuclear war.

The observations of Buzzard and Kissinger were part of a trend toward public debate over nuclear policy. The increasing frequency of nuclear crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the growing absurdity of both superpowers' nuclear postures led to increased public concern with nuclear policy. For the first decade of the nuclear age, the American public had for the most part treated nuclear policy as "something best left to the experts," but by the end of the 1950s nuclear strategy had become a topic of public debate led by a cadre of increasingly visible professional strategists. Often civilians associated with think tanks such as the RAND Corporation, these professional strategists began to assume a new place in the U.S. military hierarchy and, in turn, in the public imagination. Scientists like Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, and Werner von Braun had all become national figures through their contributions to the technology of the nuclear age, and by the late 1950s civilian professional strategists like Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter, and Herman Kahn were becoming just as famous for their theorizing about how to use that technology. Although their fame most often came in the form of notoriety for their ability to discuss the absurdity of nuclear war in cold, calculating terms, they were nevertheless crucial for fueling the public debate. In the absence of hard evidence concerning Soviet decision making, these strategists were forced to form judgments about nuclear war without having any experience to draw on; thus, they substituted deductive hypotheses derived from the fields of political science, psychology, and economics for inductive historical experience. In a series of books, the most well-known of which is *On Thermonuclear War* (1960), Kahn challenged policymakers and the general public to get beyond what he called "ostrichlike behavior" and to "think the unthinkable." His central point, as he put it in *Thinking the Unthinkable* (1962), was that "ther-

monuclear war may seem unthinkable, impossible, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impossible."

The presidential election of 1960 further propelled the public debate on deterrence. Since Buzzard's call for "graduated deterrence" in 1956, Eisenhower's political opponents had adopted the strategy under a revised name: flexible response. Maxwell Taylor, the army chief of staff in the Eisenhower administration, had for some time been a voice of dissent on massive retaliation and had expressed his concerns in his book *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1960), in which he called for a reprioritizing of U.S. defense spending to place more emphasis on the ability to control the escalation of crises. When John F. Kennedy was nominated as the Democratic Party's presidential nominee, he quickly adopted flexible response as the basis of his military program.

The Kennedy administration thus came to office basing much of its military program on a political refutation of the Eisenhower administration's strategy of massive retaliation. Despite campaign promises to institute ways to control escalation and thereby make crises "safer," the Kennedy administration quickly assumed an aura of being in perpetual emergency. From the failed invasion of Cuba in April 1961, the renewed Berlin crisis just months later, and the civil rights crisis at the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, it appeared to many that the administration was careening from crisis to crisis. The first practical test of flexible response came in the summer of 1961, when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev revived his ultimatum to end Western rights in West Berlin and thereby once again provided U.S. deterrence strategy with perhaps its most difficult challenge. With the crisis brewing, and concerned that he had undermined his own credibility through the Bay of Pigs imbroglio a few months earlier, Kennedy responded with a massive buildup of conventional forces in Europe in order, in his words, "to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action." At the same time, he reaffirmed NATO's nuclear guarantee to the city. In turn, Khrushchev quietly lifted his deadline, as he had two years earlier.

Of all the crises confronted during Kennedy's short presidency, the Cuban missile crisis proved the most dangerous, with the United States and the Soviet Union coming closer to the brink of nuclear war than ever before or since. When Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet MRBMs, IRBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclear-capable medium-range bombers secretly in Cuba, where they would be positioned to strike most of the continental United States within minutes, his reasoning was to bolster the Soviet deterrent. Whether he wanted to use this deterrent in an offensive or defensive role has been debated by historians ever since. Once the deployments were discovered, Kennedy responded to the challenge by implementing a naval blockade of the island and threatening military action if the missiles and bombers were not removed. After a weeklong standoff, during which SAC's forces went on airborne alert, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles and a month later agreed to remove the bombers.

The crisis was resolved peacefully, but those who had witnessed the secret negotiations and the classified near misses had seen all too clearly how command and control might break down under crisis conditions. On the one hand, the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis without global destruction seemed to enhance the credibility of the deterrent on both sides. On the other hand, the missile crisis demonstrated that brinkmanship and ambiguity were simply too dangerous. Consequently, the crisis accelerated the momentum toward East-West détente. Formal negotiations to limit nuclear testing, which had been under way since 1958, finally bore fruit on 5 August 1963 in the form of the Limited Test Ban Treaty that effectively imposed mutual restraint on large-scale, above-ground nuclear weapons tests. And to reduce the risk of miscalculation and misinterpretation in a crisis, a communications hotline was established between the White House and the Kremlin.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)

Paradoxically, however, one interpretation of the missile crisis held that the decisive factor in its resolution had been America's nuclear superiority—that if the American nuclear arsenal had not been more powerful than the Soviet arsenal, the crisis might have turned out differently. Both sides subscribed to this interpretation at least in part, which led to a new round in the arms race just as both sides were moving closer to agreements on nuclear testing. During the mid- and late 1960s, the Soviet Union expanded its military expenditures so that by the end of the decade, Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces had a new generation of even more power-

ful ICBMs at their disposal. At the same time, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson abandoned the idea of seeking an overwhelming nuclear superiority and settled upon a new measure of nuclear striking power called "sufficiency." As defined by the administration it meant having the ability to survive a Soviet first strike with enough forces intact to retaliate with a devastating second strike. To do so, the emphasis would be placed on a better balanced triad structure of U.S. nuclear forces, consisting of missile, air, and naval strategic forces, together leading to the power to "assure destruction" to an adversary without engaging in a destabilizing arms race. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara argued that such a structure was both cost effective and stable, and it was retained as the structure of the U.S. nuclear force until the end of the Cold War.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were at relative parity. In terms of sheer explosive power the USSR had surpassed the United States and was in the process of developing weapons with even larger payloads and greater accuracy, but the United States retained the technological lead. With this parity came new challenges to deterrence theory. No longer did one side have a preponderance of strategic power, and it appeared doubtful that even a preemptive first strike would hold the advantage, since it was increasingly clear that neither side would survive a nuclear exchange without casualties measured in the millions. American policymakers quickly found, however, that the promise of mutual destruction in the bipolar contest with the Soviet Union was frustratingly ineffective in conflicts such as Vietnam, which fell outside of the strictly defined U.S.–USSR relationship.

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) lay at the heart of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that began in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969. The objective of the talks was not to reduce the arsenals of either side but rather to negotiate limits on future growth of those arsenals precisely to preserve mutual vulnerability. Two technological developments of the late 1960s threatened to destabilize the nuclear status quo: antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and the development of multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicles (MIRVs) technology. ABM systems, as they were conceived at the time, were designed to protect cities from incoming missiles. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed first-generation ABM systems that could in theory, if not yet in practice, offer protection against first strikes. Partly to overcome such an advantage, both sides had invested considerable resources in developing the technology of MIRVs, a system whereby one missile could deliver several warheads to independent targets. Although these new technologies were designed to cancel each other out, in truth they threatened to destabilize the mutual destruction deterrent and spark off a new arms race, a race that would not only be dangerous, but expensive. The SALT process, therefore, was designed to limit these technologies and keep each side vulnerable to attack by the other.

With strategic nuclear war finally recognized as unwinnable, President Richard M. Nixon ordered Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to review the military posture of the United States in light of recent technology. The result, known as the Schlesinger Doctrine, was essentially a refinement of flexible response, designed to balance Soviet bloc capabilities by threatening retaliation commensurate with the threat. Specifically, it enhanced the role of tactical nuclear weapons in a three-layered defense structure: conventional forces for conventional threats; tactical nuclear forces to counter tactical nuclear threats; and strategic nuclear forces to counter strategic threats. In essence, the Schlesinger Doctrine embraced what Henry Kissinger had proposed in the late 1950s: that a limited nuclear war was possible and was a desirable capability to have.

Despite President Jimmy Carter's efforts to further détente and continue the focus on nuclear sufficiency rather than superiority, the international and domestic political environments of the late 1970s actually pressured the administration to increase military spending drastically. During the presidential election campaign of 1980, the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan seized upon accusations made by prominent groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger, headed by Eugene Rostow and Paul Nitze, to accuse the Carter administration of allowing a window of vulnerability to open, claiming that détente had allowed the Soviets to gain a dangerous lead in the arms race to the point that even the hardened-silo Minuteman forces, the mainstay of the U.S. strategic missile force, were vulnerable to high-yield Soviet missiles. Reagan promised not only to neutralize that gap, but also to restore American military superiority and, to that end, deliberately strove to upset the balance of terror by focusing on defense rather than deterrence. The shift had important ramifications for the Cold War. Reagan

reauthorized the development of the B-1 bomber and the next generation of highly accurate and MIRV-equipped Peacekeeper missiles to replace the aging Minuteman forces. He also authorized development of a controversial radiation-enhanced weapon, the neutron bomb, which killed living matter but left nonliving matter relatively unscathed. At the same time, Reagan endorsed the recommendations of a high-level commission chaired by Brent Scowcroft calling for an evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs backed up by Peacekeeper missiles.

In 1983 President Reagan ordered a large-scale scientific and military project to examine the feasibility of a new generation of ABM defenses. Officially labeled the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), but more commonly known as Star Wars after the popular science-fiction movie, the objective was to develop a multilayered shield capable of stopping thousands of incoming ballistic missiles. In theory, lasers mounted on satellites, electromagnetic guns, and charged particle beam weapons would be used to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles anywhere from boost phase (soon after launch) to reentry (final descent to target). In championing the project, Edward Teller, the reputed "father of the H-bomb," made a dramatic and controversial return to the public debate of deterrence. Not only was the technology unproven, but it quickly became apparent that the price tag of such a system was almost impossible to predict and entirely impossible to pay. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union reacted angrily to what seemed a blatant disavowal of the 1972 SALT Treaty. Nevertheless, Reagan ordered the project to proceed. For the remainder of the 1980s, the Reagan administration struggled to find a way to make SDI a reality while at the same time continuing to pursue meaningful arms reduction.

AFTER THE COLD WAR

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR from 1989 to 1991, the bipolar balance of terror suddenly collapsed, and it became clear that the Soviet nuclear strength had been disguising severe internal weakness. Almost overnight, it seemed, the international environment had changed almost beyond recognition. But the U.S. and NATO defense postures, built up so carefully and at such expense over the previous half century, could not change so quickly; U.S. foreign and military policies relied heavily on deterrence and they would need time to adjust. For deterrence, this had profound and often unforeseen challenges.

As it happened, cutting forces was relatively straightforward; the more difficult stage of adapting military strategy to the post–Cold War situation was that of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. The problem was approached in two steps. First, the progress made over the previous decade in arms reduction was to be consolidated and advanced. The United States and Russia were committed to deep cuts in their strategic arsenals; under the terms of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) II treaty, those arsenals would be reduced to approximately one-third their size at the height of the Cold War, and both sides would eliminate the most destabilizing of the first-strike weapons, the MIRVed ICBMs. NATO, still formally committed to the defense posture of flexible response, concluded that it had to move away from a forward defense posture and that, accordingly, in the post–Warsaw Pact strategic landscape, substrategic, short-range nuclear weapons—that is, tactical IRBMs and MRBMs—no longer had a viable deterrent role. Consequently, at the NATO heads of state meeting in London on 5–6 July 1990, NATO committed itself to eliminating all nuclear artillery shells in Europe. At the same time NATO declared that it now regarded nuclear forces as "truly weapons of last resort." Simultaneously, negotiations were under way for what became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which provided for drastic cuts in both NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces stationed in Central Europe. In September 1991, President George H. W. Bush declared that the forward deployment of tactical nuclear forces was no longer a useful part of the U.S. deterrent and that he was therefore ordering the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from the U.S. Navy. Never fully abandoning Reagan's dream of an impenetrable shield against incoming missiles, the Bush administration quietly proceeded with a scaled-down version of SDI.

If the end of the Cold War drastically reduced the likelihood of strategic nuclear war, it nevertheless increased the risk of a small-scale nuclear exchange, mainly because of the growing problem of nuclear proliferation. In an effort to bring nuclear policy up to date and to confront head-on the problem that nuclear proliferation and the equalization of power that it created might one day work against the United States, the Clinton administration in late

1993 announced that it planned to redefine "deterrence." No longer would the emphasis be on preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, since that risk had declined markedly; instead, the focus would be on preventing the acquisition of those weapons. The announcement was followed up in September of the following year with a formal replacement of the MAD doctrine with "mutual assured safety" (MAS), a long-term program designed primarily to make Russia's military reductions irreversible by reducing not only the number of weapons themselves but also reducing the technological and industrial infrastructures needed for nuclear weapons development. Through economic incentives and technological aid, steps were taken to dismantle what Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the "infrastructure of fear." By November 1997, in the first formal presidential directive on the actual employment of nuclear weapons since the Carter administration, President Clinton formally abandoned the Cold War tenet that the U.S. military forces must be prepared to fight a protracted nuclear war. Nuclear weapons would still play an important deterrent role, but the emphasis on them would be reduced in keeping with the changing nature of the threats in the post–Cold War international environment.

While the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. military posture was reducing, the role of conventional weapons was increasing. Confronting crises in the Balkans and the Middle East, the United States and its allies demonstrated that they could now project conventional military force with great effectiveness. Exploiting the so-called "revolution in military affairs" of superior intelligence information coupled with technologically advanced conventional weapons, the United States and NATO were able to strike with overwhelming conventional military force in a precise and controlled manner, leading to successful combat in both regions while suffering few casualties. Such capability, demonstrated convincingly and publicly, became an important part of U.S. efforts to confront and deter what the defense community called "asymmetrical threats," or threats from rogue nations or terrorist organizations.

The role played by nuclear weapons and the deterrence strategies they bred since 1945 is a controversial issue. Many historians have argued that the very existence of nuclear weapons deterred the outbreak of another global war and kept what the historian John Lewis Gaddis called "the long peace" since 1945, while others have argued that other factors rendered major wars obsolete and that nuclear weapons were a largely irrelevant factor. Many others have argued that the sometimes absurd military postures that the existence of nuclear weapons encouraged greatly and needlessly increased the risk of global destruction and that the peace was maintained despite the existence of nuclear weapons. But whether a positive, negative, or irrelevant force, deterrence has made indelible impressions on the practice of foreign policy and the public imagination.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alperovitz, Gar. *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power.* 2d ed. New York, 1985. Makes a controversial argument that impending confrontation with the Soviet Union influenced Truman's decision to use the bomb against Japan.

Brodie, Bernard, ed. *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and the World Order.* New York, 1946. Various authors contribute to one of the earliest efforts to assess the implications of the atomic bomb for international affairs.

Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years.* New York, 1988. A first-rate historical study of the impact of the bomb on U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.

Buzzard, Anthony W. "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence." *World Politics* 8, no. 2 (January 1956): 228–237.

Dockrill, Saki. *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61.* London, 1996.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* Oxford, 1982.

Gaddis, John Lewis, et. al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945.* Oxford, 1999.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age.* Rev. ed. New York, 1962.

George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice.* New York, 1974. A groundbreaking work in the field of political science that uses historical case studies of ten nuclear crises that took place between 1948 and 1962 to examine how deterrence has been employed in times of crisis.

Gowing, Margaret. *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952.* New York, 1974. A thorough study of the early British nuclear program.

Herken, Gregg. *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950.* New York, 1980.

Holloway, David. *Stalin and the Bomb.* New York, 1994. Uses formerly closed archives to examine the early Soviet nuclear program.

Kahn, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War.* Princeton, N.J., 1960. The most widely read of several important books by this influential nuclear strategist. Challenges policymakers and the public to "think the unthinkable" and anticipate a post–nuclear war world.

Kaplan, Fred M. *The Wizards of Armageddon.* New York, 1983. An excellent study of professional nuclear strategists.

Kaufman, William W., et al., eds. *Military Policy and National Security.* Princeton, N.J., 1956. One of the earliest rebuttals of the massive retaliation doctrine.

Kissinger, Henry A. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1957. An influential rebuttal of massive retaliation that advocates the development of tactical nuclear weapons to make limited nuclear war viable.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. A meticulously researched account of the national security policy of the Truman administration.

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976.* Cambridge, 1979.

Mueller, John. "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security* 13, no. 2 (fall 1988): 55–79. Makes a controversial argument that nuclear weapons were largely irrelevant to keeping the peace during the Cold War.

Osgood, Robert E. *Limited War Revisited.* Boulder, Colo., 1979. A concise reevaluation of the notion of limited war.

Quester, George H. *Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy.* New York, 1966. The development of strategic bombing, with particular emphasis on the years from World War I to the end of World War II.

Rosenberg, David A. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." *International Security* 7 (spring 1983): 3–71. A meticulously researched account of American nuclear programs during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

Sagan, Scott D. *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons.* Princeton, N.J., 1993. Examines several of the Cold War's "near misses" and the chances of accidental nuclear war.

Schelling, Thomas C. *Choice and Consequence.* Cambridge, Mass., 1984. Applies economic principles and game theory to deterrence.

Stromseth, Jane E. *The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s.* Houndmills, U.K., 1987.

Taylor, Maxwell. *The Uncertain Trumpet.* New York, 1960. A rebuttal of massive retaliation that became extremely influential in the formulation of the Kennedy administration's defense program.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *History and Strategy.* Princeton, N.J., 1991. Important essays on various aspects of nuclear policy.

———. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of a European Settlement, 1945–53.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. Argues that nuclear weapons were a decisive factor in the peaceful division of Europe.

Williamson, Samuel R., Jr., and Stephen L. Reardon. *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1953.* New York, 1993.

Wohlstetter, Albert J. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1959): 211–234. Argues that technological advances will ultimately destabilize deterrence.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; DOCTRINES; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY.

Development Doctrine and Modernization Theory

Nick Cullather

Modernization theory, sometimes called development doctrine, supplied the working concepts through which the United States understood its obligations to unindustrialized, newly independent nations in the last half of the twentieth century. Described as both an ideology and a discourse, modernization comprised a changeable set of ideas and strategies that guided policies toward foreign aid, trade, nationalism, and counterinsurgency. Among its core precepts was the idea that the state of economic and political advancement enjoyed by the United States and the industrialized West was normative, and that it was in the U.S. national interest, as well as the general interest of all people, that steps be taken to bring the other two-thirds of humanity up to a comparable level. Social science theories explained the causes of Asian, Latin American, and African backwardness and suggested appropriate remedies.

Historians have traced modernization theory's intellectual lineage back to Aristotle, who first suggested that states followed a natural pattern of growth, like plants. But while linear progress is a recurrent theme in Western thought, it existed alongside Christian doubts about man's fallen state. Americans in the early Republic believed (as did Aristotle) that if societies grow naturally, they also decay. The idea that the process of human progress could be understood and controlled dates to the early nineteenth century, when France and Britain were struggling to reestablish their mercantile empires on a secular, commercial basis, and just before technology and scientific racism ushered in an era of guiltless imperialism. Since then it has tended to recur at times and places where systems of dominance required justification and explanation.

PROGRESS BECOMES MODERNIZATION

European liberals reconciled universalism and imperialism by arguing that although all men were not yet equal, they were ruled by universal economic laws and followed a common historical path. The philosophers Jean-Baptiste Say, John Stuart Mill, and Auguste Comte each contended that societies passed through successive stages from savagery through barbarism to finally reach a developed state that resembled industrial Europe. "Whoever knows the political economy of England, or even of Yorkshire," Mill claimed, "knows that of all nations, actual or possible." Comte called the science of human evolution "sociology" and proposed that the highest stage would be a "positive" society governed by science. American scientists similarly concluded that their own society was advanced relative to the surrounding peoples, who might with help "catch up." Lewis H. Morgan, a founder of American anthropology, speculated in 1877 that "American Indian tribes represent, more or less nearly, the history and experience of our own remote ancestors."

From this perspective the United States, as well as Germany—among the youngest of countries—could be seen as the oldest of societies, advanced beyond India or China in the arts of civilization. Seniority implied a duty to instruct and uplift, and a concept of trusteeship was integral to liberal developmentalism. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, German social theorists—George Friedrich List, Karl Marx, and Max Weber—debated the obligations and causes of economic progress. List asserted that the state held the primary developmental role; its true mission was to "furnish the economical education of the nation." Marx authored one of the boldest theoretical statements of the developmental vision, describing the "iron necessity" of historical laws that required the successive destruction of feudalism and bourgeois capitalism to make way for communism. He attacked the liberal developmentalists' assumption of trusteeship, which subordinated colonial subjects and domes-

tic labor and furnished a disguise for exploitation. Marx's and later Lenin's critiques of imperial trusteeship were so appealing to anticolonial insurgents that Cold War–era modernization theorists would conceive their project as an attempt to devise an alternative to communist developmentalism.

Nationalists in the subject states constructed their own visions of modernity, and by the 1920s development was the subject of a global debate among disparate factions of anticolonial modernizers, primitivists, jingoes, and reformers. Two members of the Indian National Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh C. Dutt, wielding British statistics and a historical perspective, demolished claims that the Raj acted for India's economic welfare. Dutt (using what would later be called a structuralist or dependency approach) showed that imperial taxes and terms of trade systematically milked India for England's benefit. "When I read Mr. Dutt's economic history of India," Mohandas Gandhi wrote, "I wept. . . . It is machinery that has impoverished India." Indian nationalists drew different conclusions as to the proper response. For Gandhi, development was the antithesis of community, and he urged a restoration of a preindustrial village economy. But Jawaharlal Nehru, insisting there was "only one-way traffic in Time," ruled out a return to communalism or Islamic theocracy. He represented a majority of Congress Party members who wanted to build an industrial India by wresting development planning from British control. In China, too, development became a principal rationale for the nationalist struggle. Sun Yat-sen authored an elaborate scheme that promised to cure China's backwardness as well as the global crisis of overproduction by using Western technology to dam rivers, build cities, and overlay China with a modern transport grid.

In the United States, "development" came into official use at the beginning of the twentieth century to distinguish the American civilizing mission from European colonial policy, which it resembled. "The Philippines are not ours to exploit," President William McKinley asserted, "but to develop, to civilize, to educate." Woodrow Wilson attested that the Allies were "fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples." In practice, the line between exploitation and development was porous. Gifts of science and technology facilitated economic and imperial penetration. Commodore Matthew C. Perry had presented the Japanese shogun with machinery and seeds, and by 1900, American agricultural missions, mining surveys, and sanitation experts made frequent stops in Japan and China. Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer circulated through South America in the 1920s modernizing currency and banking systems while opening new ground for U.S. investment. Educational and medical establishments, including the early work of the Rockefeller Foundation, were an extension of Christian evangelical missions.

An evangelical sensibility distinguished the American approach to development from the high-modernist ambitions of European colonizers and Asian nationalists. Early technical missions found their work "was not merely a matter of transferring scientific principles and factual data," Merle Curti observed, "it was more largely a problem of developing attitudes." Rockefeller initiatives in China in the 1920s and 1930s emphasized the transplantation of institutions and ways of thinking. American social science supported a perception of modernity as a kind of conversion experience. John Dewey, who defined American pragmatism in the 1920s and 1930s, conceived of freedom as development, as the realization of latent potential. The anthropologist Robert Redfield, writing in 1930, was the first to use the term "modernization" to describe linked processes of urbanization, literacy, secularization, and familial dismemberment. Although these were all concomitants of economic disruption, Redfield noted that modernization was fundamentally a cognitive, even spiritual event: A peasant, encountering a city for the first time, "develops a correspondingly new organ, a new mind." From the start, American modernization initiatives would measure achievement not by kilowatts or gross national product but by hearts and minds.

A TOOL FOR MANAGING DECOLONIZATION

New techniques devised during the 1930s and 1940s gave the sociology of modernization a harder, scientific edge. Demographers discovered the "demographic transition," a sudden drop in birthrate that served as a statistical marker of the arrival of modernity. National incomes accounting, invented by economists during World War II, measured the economic efficiency of nations relative to one another and across time. Talcott Parsons, a Harvard sociologist, served as advocate and symbol of the statistical, comparative turn in

the social sciences, sometimes called the "Parsonian revolution." To Parsons, societies and nations were integrated systems that could be disassembled and compared. The results of empirical observations, fed into theoretical models, would allow social scientists to predict the trajectory of a society, and to plot alternate outcomes given the introduction of variables like industry, mass communications, the cash nexus, or Western contact.

Thinking in Washington moved along a parallel track. The experiences of the New Deal and World War II, particularly the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Manhattan Project, reinforced confidence in the ability of science and planning to transform whole societies. Many in the Roosevelt administration believed such work would be essential to achieving a stable peace. David Lilienthal, co-director of the TVA, noted "a definite sequence in history from primitive or non-industrial conditions to more highly developed modern industrial conditions." American assistance could help societies avoid "wasted steps" in the transition. By the end of World War II, a number of suppositions about the nature of modernization were widely shared in academic and philanthropic communities and were gaining attention in government, although they had yet to be codified as theory or policy. Among these were the following precepts:

1. Development begins from a stable, uniform state of tradition. Since, as Redfield observed, peasants in Tepoztlan, Mexico, Melanesian islanders, and "the southern negro" are fundamentally identical in outlook and relationship to modernity, their developmental problems (and the solutions) would also be the same, regardless of geographic or historic differences.
2. All societies follow a common, linear path to modernity, passing through recognizable stages along the way. The final destination (known to development economists as "convergence") is a high plateau of industrialism and consumerism enjoyed by the urban societies of North America and Europe. Regardless of their point of origin, all cultures have the same trajectory. Nations with tragic histories could be assured they would not have a tragic destiny.
3. The journey can be accelerated in a number of ways but chiefly by contact with developed societies and through state interventions. Centralized planning was the essential feature of development work.
4. The most difficult part of the transition is psychological. Once the comforts of custom and old patterns of thought are rejected progress would follow its natural course. Development is thus not a process of accumulation but of release, the freeing of restrained energies and resources.
5. Development is above politics but has the capacity to create political gains and risks. Since states, regardless of political form or ideology, share an impulse to modernize, there would be a chance for the United States, as well as for rival powers, to take the lead in the global movement.

These ideas served as a template for the management of the decolonizing world. The sudden collapse of the European and Japanese empires following the Allied victory confronted the United States with the immense problem of redirecting the political and economic alignment of two-thirds of the world's population. The Soviet military triumph displayed the fruits of Stalin's industrialization drives, and newly independent regimes looked to the USSR as a model of rapid modernization. New international organizations—the United Nations and the World Bank—lent expertise and institutional backing to the development of postcolonial areas. Nonetheless, the United States faced its greatest problems in Europe and Japan, where reconstruction took first priority. Although the Marshall Plan was often mentioned as the inspiration for later modernization schemes, no attempts were made to duplicate its formula elsewhere. American officials felt its reliance on heavy industry, labor unions, and the welfare state could not be adapted to Asia or Latin America, where more fundamental issues—education, health, low productivity—had to be dealt with. These issues became more imperative as the Cold War intensified. Nationalist China's sudden collapse, despite a hastily arranged aid package, revealed the dangers of failing to address the poverty and corruption that seemed to accelerate the communist advance.

President Harry Truman's dramatic announcement in January 1949 of Point Four, a "bold new program . . . for the improvement of underdeveloped areas," placed development at the top of the national agenda and simultaneously galvanized a worldwide movement. Like McKinley, Truman contrasted development against "the old imperialism," but he was the first world leader

to apply the term "underdeveloped" to the subjects of the modernization process. The confrontation between colonizer and colonized, rich and poor, was, with one rhetorical gesture, replaced by a world order in which all nations were either developed or becoming so. Point Four affirmed the fundamental equality of nations recognized by the United Nations Charter while at the same time licensing interventions on an unprecedented scale.

Truman explicitly linked Point Four to American strategic and economic objectives. Poverty was a threat not just to the poor but to their richer neighbors, he argued, and alleviating misery would assure a general prosperity, lessening the chances of war. Moreover, the "triumphant action" of development superseded the merely ideological conflict of the Cold War. Communism and democracy were different routes to the same destination. Development in this sense was a hegemonic idea, presented not as the best but as the only possible course of action. (David Riesman observed in 1958 that alternatives to the Western and Soviet paths were simply unimaginable.) The response was startling. Truman "hit the jackpot of the world's political emotions," *Fortune* magazine noted. National delegations lined up to receive planning and assistance that a few years earlier might have been seen as a colonial intrusion.

The assignment of a World Bank technical assistance mission to Colombia in November 1949 reveals how this paradigm shift enabled an entirely new approach to managing the internal affairs of another country. Fifty years earlier it would have required gunboats for European and American creditors to seize Colombia's customhouses, but this delegation of European and American economists took charge of much more—foreign exchange, finance, banking, agriculture, transport, health, education, social welfare, and oil exploration—all at the invitation of the Colombian government, which assured implementation of the delegation's detailed plans. Development justified interventions on a grand scale and made accepting the instructions of foreign advisers the duty of every responsible government.

Point Four officials expected sudden, dramatic results from the introduction of American advice and technology. Norris Dodd, a Point Four agriculture adviser who later headed the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, described the sensation he created in northern Thailand by dispensing a few commonsense suggestions. "If I had been able to stay in that village another few hours," he believed, "we might have changed the fundamental agricultural methods for hundreds of miles around." Truman claimed there were "untold resources" in the underdeveloped regions needing only "somebody who knows the technical approach." He emphasized technology because of its mystique and the absence of alternatives. High rates of return on domestic investment and the chronic imbalance of payments known as the "dollar gap" made it nearly impossible to mobilize private capital for development, but engineering talent could easily be dispatched abroad. Point Four began by sending American engineering firms to Iran, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Korea, where they acted as purchasing agents, identifying applications for American technology and designing industrial, hydroelectric, and chemical plants and public works.

IMPORT SUBSTITUTION

In these early, untheorized foreign aid projects, American advisers worked out an impromptu strategy that came to be called import substitution industrialization (ISI). Engineers in Taiwan, noting that fertilizer imports consumed a large share of the island's scarce foreign exchange, imported equipment to manufacture artificial fertilizers domestically. They constructed hydroelectric dams to fuel the plants, and one by one they substituted domestically made articles for imported ones, freeing more capital for industrial expansion. In the Philippines and Turkey, U.S. financial missions imposed tax and exchange laws that accomplished the same result by placing barriers on the importation of products that could be made domestically. Import substitution policies shifted imports toward capital goods, equipment, and technologies and away from consumer goods and commodities, and in the process they enlarged state control over the economy. The success of such strategies often depended on the state's ability to administer controls effectively and without corruption.

Import substitution suited many new nations' vision of a gleaming industrial future. Nehru famously remarked in 1954 that dams were the temples of modern India and industry its religion. Surveying the immense Bhakra-Nangal canal, he observed that "when we see big works our stature grows with them, and our minds open out a little." Modernity was the goal and justification for many independence movements, and the

erection of a new steelworks or railway span hailed the arrival of full nationhood. The Olympian planning commissions that met at the Yojana Bhavan in New Delhi or at the Central Bank in Manila exercised an authority over the national economy that few colonial viceroys could equal. Import substitution policies also partially counteracted international trade patterns that kept newly independent states in the subordinate role of exporting raw materials to the industrial nations and importing finished goods.

In the early 1950s, structuralist theories located the causes of underdevelopment in lingering colonial trade patterns and recommended import substitution as a solution. Raul Prebisch, secretary-general of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), pointed to the deterioration of the terms of trade between the industrial and nonindustrial areas. Beginning in the 1930s, the value of commodity and raw materials exports declined steadily relative to the value of manufactured imports. Left unchecked, the "Prebisch effect" would widen the gap between rich and poor nations. Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist who had worked with the Rockefeller Foundation, delivered a series of lectures in 1955 at the Egyptian Central Bank in Cairo in which he explained that market expansion would cause inequality to increase, both internationally and within nations, unless counteracted by comprehensive planning and European-style state welfare programs. In Truman's usage, "underdevelopment" was a noun describing an age-old condition to be remedied with modern technology. Structuralists changed it into a transitive verb. Underdevelopment was a process; it was what the rich nations were doing to the poor nations.

Although the structuralist formula originated abroad, the United States endorsed the import substitution approach until the late 1950s. The State Department sympathized with nationalist ambitions short of expropriation or discrimination against U.S. investment, and preferred Prebisch's doctrine to the "extreme" economic nationalism of Argentine president Juan Perón. American support for import substitution stemmed from concern about the overdevelopment of U.S. heavy industry as a result of wartime mobilization. Capital goods purchases by industrializing nations provided a badly needed outlet for American production and a stimulus to European recovery. Import substitution aroused considerable opposition within the United States from congressional conservatives, adversely affected industries, and the *Wall Street Journal*, but the economic and strategic benefits outweighed the political costs, at least until 1958. When criticism prevented the Eisenhower administration from participating directly in drafting economic plans, private companies and foundations stepped in. A U.S. engineering firm drafted Taiwan's first four-year plan, and the Ford Foundation dispatched a team of economists to advise India's planning commission. As the United States turned against import substitution, structuralism survived as a critique of American development policies that ignored the built-in inequities of the world system.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In few places did Truman's bold new program generate as much excitement as in American universities, and by the end of the 1950s an enormous body of homegrown theory was poised to replace Point Four's ad hoc strategy. For social scientists in the 1950s, the economist John Kenneth Galbraith remembers, "no economic subject more quickly captured the attention of so many as the rescue of the people of the poor countries from their poverty." The federal government's growing defense and intelligence establishments opened a new sphere of activity for researchers skilled in statistical and comparative methods. As prominent practitioners rotated between federal appointments, foundation boards, and faculty positions, professional codes adapted. Government collaboration, and even direction, aroused few concerns about objectivity. Faculties adopted the Area Studies organizational scheme devised by the wartime Office of Strategic Studies and took on an agenda of applied research useful to government. Much of this work focused on the "Third World," a term coined to describe a new academic division of labor that segregated work on industrialized democracies (First World), problems of communism (Second), and the underdeveloped (Third) world.

Political as well as professional motives drew academics to the Point Four mission. The social sciences came under particularly heavy attack from McCarthyite inquisitions, as did their institutional sponsors, such as the newly capitalized Ford Foundation. A 1954 congressional investigation accused the Ford Foundation of financing

"the promotion of Socialism and collective ideas" in the United States. Development provided a safe outlet for social engineers whose New Dealism had become suspect. Sanctioned by development's anticommunist agenda, economists, planners, and researchers could apply abroad practices they were afraid to advance at home. The United States, in effect, exported its liberalism in the form of the energy and ideas of its best social thinkers and the funds of its largest philanthropies.

Within the national security establishment social scientists enjoyed prestige of a kind accorded in a later era only to software designers. Military and intelligence officials expected modeling techniques to be able to forecast the intentions and capabilities of foreign actors with increasing reliability. Psychology offered a particularly useful set of conceptual tools for engineering bloodless revolutions. Nuclear deadlock guaranteed that the Cold War would be fought largely in the Third World through techniques of subversion, propaganda, and attraction. In this atmosphere of expectancy and risk, government agencies and private foundations enlisted researchers to learn the secrets of modernization.

Foundations, government agencies, and universities jointly created institutional arrangements for generating theories of modernization. In 1953, with Ford Foundation assistance, the Social Science Research Council created a Committee on Comparative Politics among whose members Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, and George Kahin would make significant contributions to the modernization canon through the publication of the "Studies in Political Development" series. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a State Department–sponsored research program on psychological warfare, Project Troy, evolved into the Center for International Studies (CENIS) in 1951. Its founder was Max Millikan, an economist in the new field of national incomes accounting who had just returned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after a year as assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Millikan recruited an interdisciplinary team that featured Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Walt W. Rostow (economics), Edward Shils (sociology), Daniel Lerner (communications), Clifford Geertz (anthropology), and Lucian Pye and Ithiel Pool (political science). Millikan also designed a budget formula that channeled State Department money funneled through the CIA into studies on the Second World, while research on the Third World was financed by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations.

CENIS mimicked the institutional style and "problem-oriented" work habits of the Manhattan Project in its development of the atomic bomb, breaking into teams to devise specific solutions that would then be subject to general discussion and criticism by the whole group. Millikan put an emphasis on finding answers to the practical problems of policymakers, and CENIS's work product typically appeared first as classified memoranda distributed to federal agencies and later as book-length monographs. Benjamin Higgins described it as "a community of scholars arriving at the same broad analytical framework." Its principal achievements were the creation of a rationale for an enlarged foreign aid effort, along with a set of concepts—"technology transfer," "takeoff," the "expectation gap," "self-help"—that informed aid policy and scholarship for the next two decades.

THE ROSTOVIAN REVOLUTION

If Millikan was CENIS's organizer, Rostow was its inspiration, its "shining light," according to Higgins. The son of Jewish immigrants from Russia, Rostow went to Yale at age sixteen, finished in three years, and went to Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship. While still in his teens he decided with characteristic prepossession to devote his life to "two large ideas: one is the application of modern economic theory and statistical analysis to economic history; and the other is the relationship between economic factors and society as a whole." The force of his ideas was magnified by his gusto for expressing them. "Walt can write faster than I can read," President John Kennedy quipped.

As an army captain in World War II, Rostow had participated in an operation that foreshadowed his later work in development. Along with Charles P. Kindleberger and Carl Kaysen, both of whom would also be leading figures in postwar economics, he served as a bombing targeter in the Economic Warfare Division of the London embassy. There the young economists debated how best to dismantle the German economy from the air, whether the whole system had to be taken down together or if there might be specific points—a ball bearing factory or a refinery—that could be removed, bringing the entire war machine to a halt. "We sought target systems where the destruction of the minimum number of targets would have the greatest, most prompt, and most long-lasting direct military effect," Rostow

later remembered. In the run-up to the Normandy invasion, the targeters oscillated—just as development theorists later would—between a "systems" approach and a "bottleneck" approach, with Rostow on the systems side arguing for a comprehensive attack on German oil refineries and bridges. He lost the argument when General Dwight D. Eisenhower opted to hit the railroad marshaling yards in northern France. CENIS gave him a chance to prove his original judgment. Development was simply the opposite of bombardment, involving dropping in ingredients that would produce the quickest and longest-lasting economic (and political) gains.

Through CENIS, Rostow forged a consensus behind a developmental strategy known as the Big Push, "a development effort on all fronts," according to Higgins, "on a scale large enough to bring increases in productivity that would outrun population growth and promote structural change." Instead of targeting the industrial sector as import substitution did, large amounts of aid should go into "social overhead capital" such as education, administration, transport, and law. Properly timed, aid could generate a systemwide disruption that would shake a society from its traditional torpor and lift it into the modern age. The Big Push, sometimes called "balanced" development, was also a critique of President Eisenhower's aid programs, which were regarded as piecemeal efforts aimed at frontline states and with political strings attached. Development had to be an unconditional, massive, sustained effort, conveying the message, Rostow argued, "that we are in Asia to stay, not merely in a military sense, but politically and economically as well."

In memoranda and articles during the 1950s and in two seminal books, *The Process of Economic Growth* (1952) and *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960), Rostow elaborated a vision of development rooted in American history and national interest. Updating Comte's formula, he observed that each society passes through five identifiable stages. In the opening phase, tradition, society's tranquil rhythms are regulated by the harvest and disturbed only by natural calamity. As pre-Newtonian attitudes give way to a scientific understanding of the natural world, societies enter a stage of accumulation. The fund of social overhead capital grows unevenly. Social investments are "lumpy," he argued, and private investors are unwilling to tolerate the high initial costs, long gestation periods, and indirect returns. The state, therefore, has the primary role in nurturing social capital, as state and local governments did in the United States between 1815 and 1840.

As obstacles to growth are cleared and modern habits and attitudes gain momentum, the society reaches a stage Rostow memorably named "takeoff." "During the takeoff," he wrote in *Stages*, "new industries expand rapidly, yielding profits a large proportion of which are reinvested in new plant. . . . The new class of entrepreneurs expands; and it directs the enlarging flows of investment." Modernization planes along the lumpy surface of social overhead capital, bearing itself aloft on the force of its own acceleration. Rostow's aeronautical image highlighted not only his sense of the sharpness of the transition, a change in both the kind and direction of growth, but the dangers of this stage, for it is at the moment of takeoff that crosswinds, mechanical flaws, or pilot error are most likely to prove fatal. Takeoff, for Rostow, was a period of cultural, technological, and political upheaval, and its forward trajectory could either continue toward maturity (the fourth stage) or suffer a violent interruption or diversion onto a dysfunctional nationalist or communist route to modernity.

By measuring the ratio of investment to national income, Rostow could calculate when a nation would reach takeoff and how much aid it could usefully absorb. Within a few years the National Security Council used "absorptive capacity" as its principle criterion for aid. The United States passed into takeoff just prior to the Civil War, and it appeared to Rostow in the 1950s that both India and the People's Republic of China were entering this stage. He anticipated that the contest between the two nations, "the one under Communism, the one under democratic rule—would constitute a kind of pure ideological test of great significance" for the United States and the world. Rostow's theory redefined the Cold War as a contest fought on the terrain of development, and he advanced a number of arguments for a stronger American effort. By easing the transition to modernity, he told CIA director Allen Dulles, the United States could steal a march on history by creating an "environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve." Failing to do so would concede "to Moscow and Peking the dangerous mystique that only Communism can transform underdeveloped societies." The cost would also be limited. By targeting nations just reaching takeoff, the United States could exercise a decisive influence without incurring an indefinite obligation.

The United States own level of development provided another imperative for action. Rostow concluded that the United States had reached the terminal stage of the modernization process, the stage of high mass consumption, but its position there was insecure. High population growth, a deficit of social overhead capital, and the cost of the arms race created drags that might cause it to lose altitude. A steady flow of raw materials was essential. Preserving the U.S. fragile forward momentum required expanding world trade and energizing external markets for U.S. products. Rostow warned policymakers not to draw a false dichotomy between humanitarianism and selfishness. In development, the national interest and the interest of mankind were inseparable.

Rostow assigned an important role to soldiers during the transitional period. Assembling the preconditions for takeoff, he believed, required the efforts of an elite coalition of landowners, merchants, and politicians who favored centralization and were "prepared to deal with the enemies of this objective." Military men were the natural leaders of this movement, and throughout his career Rostow argued that military regimes could supply the stability and administrative competence needed for development. The Mann Doctrine of 1964, which made stability rather than democracy the prime goal of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Johnson administration, would later echo Rostow's reasoning.

Extending the stages-of-growth framework to the Soviet Union, Rostow refuted assumptions that Soviet development presented an alternative to the model of the capitalist West. By his reckoning, Stalin's forced modernization resembled the path taken by the United States some thirty years earlier; the principal difference was in its "abnormal" emphasis on the military and industrial sectors. To Rostow, communism was not the agent of modernization but a side effect of it. It was a "disease of the transitional process" likely to spread in any nation during the early, difficult stages of development. Instead of accelerating growth, it disfigured it, producing an unbalanced and dysfunctional modernity. Rostow's avowed aim was to supplant Marx as the inspiration for revolutionary intellectuals (the subtitle of *Stages* is *A Non-Communist Manifesto*), and he presented his doctrine as a universal theory of history.

Rostow's syntheses standardized the vocabulary used by the CENIS and Social Science Research Council groups, and the theories they produced are appropriately referred to as "Rostovian," although other members contributed significant innovations. Lucian Pye placed newly independent regimes on the psychoanalyst's couch and interpreted Southeast Asian communism in light of Erik Erikson's concept of "identity crisis." Both nationalist leaders and their constituents suffered from incoherent, immature identities that made them resentful of their modernized elders. Because "individuals can become reasonably acculturated far faster than societies can be reconstructed," modernizing societies underwent a "revolution of rising expectations," allowing communists to recruit impatient young men. The psychoanalytic perspective, Nils Gilman has pointed out, "positioned the social scientist as a dispassionate physician, lording his wisdom over a postcolonial nation bereft of legitimate subjectivity." CENIS and Social Science Research Council studies borrowed across disciplinary lines in ways that disregarded the objectivity standards of any single discipline. The medley of terminologies threw a protective screen around political or cultural presuppositions and tendentious reasoning.

The format of CENIS dialogue encouraged participants to theorize from an interlocking set of reified concepts. Much like the Marxist doctrine it responded to, Rostovian theory achieved its plausibility and explanatory power from the tight fit between its conceptual parts, rather than from the correspondence between any of the parts and the actual conditions they were meant to describe. David Lerner's pithy *Passing of Traditional Society* reveals the appeal and versatility of the CENIS schema. Lerner framed his study in a parable of modernization in the Turkish village of Balgat, where in 1950 a U.S. Information Agency interviewer recorded the opinions of several hundred villagers. Of these, three stood out: the village chief, a grocer, and a shepherd. The very act of soliciting opinions disturbed the chief and the shepherd, who balked at stating their views of distant leaders and nations. The grocer, on the other hand, was brimming with opinions, particularly regarding other people's business. Moreover, the interviewer learned that villagers sought out the grocer's opinions on such issues as what movies to watch when they visited Ankara. The chief and the shepherd, at opposite ends of the social spectrum, were pious, contented, and cautious; the grocer, a marginal figure, was skeptical, self-conscious, and with an eye for the main chance.

Lerner's theme is the psychology of the "transitional personality," the grocers whose restlessness would unsettle established orders and

lifeways, hastening the advent of modernity. When Lerner first visited Balgat in 1954 he found the village transformed. A new road and bus line, as well as municipal water and electricity, made it a suburb of the capital. The shepherd and his sheep had moved on, the chief's sons were now grocers, and the original grocer was dead but remembered as a prophet. For Lerner, the human instrument of modernization was the "mobile personality," the individual with a capacity to envision himself in another's place, a place better than his own. "Empathy," as Lerner called this quality, stirred people from traditional apathy, leading them to question old ways and hierarchies and making them full participants in the economic and political life of the new nation. Lerner's theory later provided a conceptual foundation for the strategic hamlet program and the forced depopulation of the Vietnamese countryside as a counterinsurgency measure. Pacification specialists expected relocation to generate mobile personalities among the refugees, stimulating them to discard village loyalties in favor of participation in national life.

With interviews and charts, Lerner established a relationship between the spread of mass media and the proliferation of the mobile psyche, but his empirical observations actually contradicted the implied link between psychology and material improvement. Lerner noted that neither the grocer nor anyone in Balgat had a hand in decisions about the bus service, water lines, or electricity. Balgatis ratified the changes by voting for the new ruling party and by preserving social hierarchies within the village and between the village and the center of power. Modernization came without help or hindrance from mobile personalities. Such discrepancies, however, did not disturb the model or its conclusions, which concern correlations among abstract variables (mass media, participation, satisfaction). The Rostovian approach answered structuralism by making structural inequities into one variable among many and eliding questions of causation and proportion. The result was a uniquely resilient theory, capable of absorbing and explaining away nearly any failure or challenge. Even nation building in Vietnam, Rostow later wrote, was a developmental triumph marred by "a difficult war."

Rostovian doctrine drew fire within social science disciplines (*Stages* got hammered by reviewers in economics journals) and from some generalists and policymakers who saw political agendas beneath the elaborate taxonomies. Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith noted that claims of aid's ability to induce takeoff were "convenient" considering that "once we admit that it is not the case, we become trapped in a series of previously complex problems." Louis Halle, a former State Department planner, found *Stages* to be "one long boast" about an idealized America leading the world into the future. It also evoked a suspiciously tidy vision of history: "this great, multifarious, fluid, and largely unknown world of ours is conceived as a child's plaything made up of a very few building blocks, all square and solid."

The CENIS framework gained the status of an orthodoxy almost overnight, an achievement that can be attributed to factors other than its strengths as theory. First, it furnished academic analysts and policymakers with a common language and a set of criteria for evaluating foreign aid as something other than a bribe offered in exchange for cooperation with U.S. policies. Second, it was a culmination of the social scientific enterprise initiated by Mill and Comte. While academics were eager to point out its imperfections, they were reluctant to question its perfectibility, because to do so was to challenge fundamental parts of the social scientific method (the comparability of societies, the application of reason to social change, the nature of progress). Finally, Rostovian theory resonated with American myths of national mission. It gave the United States the power and privilege of stepping in at the decisive moment in each nation's history to dispense the vital ingredients of progress. By touching societies that mirrored its own past, the United States could rescue itself from the decay and boredom of mass-consumption society. Two slogans Rostow contributed to the Kennedy campaign—the New Frontier and Let's Get America Moving Again—carried this message of regeneration. Development, in this formulation, was able for the first time to capture the popular imagination.

THE DEVELOPMENT DECADE

The new science of modernization arrived in Washington's hour of need. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet leaders eagerly pursued diplomatic overtures toward uncommitted nations. Premier Nikita Khrushchev theorized a division of the world between a "zone of war," comprising the industrialized states, and a "zone of peace," the principle arena of Cold War compe-

tition. In December 1955 he captured the international spotlight with a bold tour of Afghanistan, India, and Burma, the first visit by a Soviet leader outside of the communist bloc. In Calcutta the Soviets were greeted by a throng of more than two million. Along the way he offered trade and aid, and India accepted Soviet assistance in the construction of the Bhilai steel works, its flagship development project. The Soviet move stunned the Eisenhower administration, which concluded that Soviet aid would create bandwagon effects that would draw the rest of Eurasia into the communist orbit. Having made "neutralism" a dirty word, John Foster Dulles was chagrined at the resistance in Congress to any American-aid counteroffensive directed at nonaligned nations. To its growing alarm, the administration found itself faced with a new danger against which it was powerless to act.

The deadlock was broken in 1958 with the appearance of *The Ugly American,* a book that has been described as the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the Cold War. It was the work of William Lederer, a publicist working for the U.S. Navy and the CIA, and Eugene Burdick, a University of California political scientist. At Lederer's home in Honolulu in 1957, the two men decided that a novel was the best device for warning the American people that the Soviets were gaining an upper hand in the poor countries of Asia. The narrative is a collection of vignettes set in a fictional Southeast Asian nation where communist economic and political offensives are winning the allegiance of a disgruntled peasantry. Sophisticated Americans, diplomats with Boston accents and courtly manners, are pouring U.S. aid into dams, roads, and colossal engineering projects that alienate the local populace. Meanwhile, the ugly American, Homer Atkins, an agricultural adviser and the hero of the story, is making a genuine connection. The simple presence of Homer and his wife, two mobile psyches, in an Asian village creates a productive stir. Women come to marvel at the tidy home kept by Mrs. Atkins, and men watch as Homer applies his instrumental view of nature to ancient problems. Homer soon finds a counterpart, Jeepo, an empathetic, mechanically minded native, and the pair harness a bicycle to a pump, creating an irrigation-driven economic takeoff. Atkins offered readers a counterpoint to Pyle, the guileless title character of Graham Greene's *The Quiet American,* who was "like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm." Lederer and Burdick reassured readers that "average Americans, in their natural state . . . are the best ambassadors a country can have." *The Ugly American* bitingly attacked the administration's inaction and import substitution–style development aid, but its real achievement was to enfold Rostovian theory in myths of national identity and innocence.

Defying expectations that it would drop into an ocean of public indifference, *The Ugly American* remained on the *New York Times* best-seller list for seventy-eight weeks, sold an astonishing four million copies, and was made into a blockbuster movie starring Marlon Brando. The ensuing media frenzy put development on a par with the space race and created a new strand of populist internationalism that Senator John F. Kennedy seized to boost his presidential bid. Kennedy sponsored legislation to increase aid to India and announced the existence of an "economic gap" in Asia that was being filled by Soviet aid. In February 1958, Kennedy first met Rostow, and the modernization theorist moved into Kennedy's inner circle of advisers. Kennedy was drawn to the diagnostic precision of the CENIS model, and he adopted its language in his own critiques of foreign aid. The alliance of Rostovian theory and Kennedy-Johnson foreign policy ushered in the golden age of modernization theory in the 1960s. George Ball, undersecretary of state from 1961 to 1966, recalled in his memoirs the vogue for development economics in 1961 and "the professors swarming into Washington" who "talked tendentiously of 'self-sustaining growth,' 'social development,' the 'search for nationhood,' 'self-help,' and 'nation building.'"

In the first year of his presidency, Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, and the Agency for International Development (AID). He declared the 1960s the "Development Decade" and substantially increased the budget for foreign assistance. Modernization theory supplied the design, rationale, and justification for these programs. *Stages* had called for an expanded foreign aid effort organized exclusively around the development mission. Rostow implied and Kennedy had declared during the campaign that State Department bureaucrats used aid for short-run diplomatic advantage, making the separation of the Agency for International Development from State an essential first step. Likewise, Food for Peace took established agricultural surplus disposal programs and organized them around a developmental mission. Rather than dumping the excess produced by federal price supports (or using the

surplus to alleviate famine), the program's primary purpose was the generation of "counterpart" funds that could be steered into social overhead investment. At the administration's urging, the United Nations put food assistance on the same basis in its World Food Programme.

The Peace Corps institutionalized a belief (traceable through *The Ugly American* to Lerner and Redfield) that exposure to modern personalities could induce change. Kennedy announced the Peace Corps during the campaign and asked Rostow and Millikan to draft the proposal. Volunteers were expected to create a catalytic effect by introducing ideas from a higher point on the developmental arc. The Peace Corps sought not specialists but "representative Americans" who could transmit values by example. Theory informed expectations of what volunteers should achieve. Performing their assigned jobs as teachers or agronomists was considered secondary to the task of catalyzing community involvement in a spontaneous project. Many volunteers experienced at first hand the chasm between the theory and reality of development.

The most ambitious of Kennedy's development schemes, the Alliance for Progress, was planned along rigidly Rostovian lines. In anticipation of imminent takeoff in the Latin American countries, the Alliance for Progress called for a Big Push to raise investment rates, foster social capital, and induce thorough reforms in institutions, land tenure, and distribution of income. Once plans and institutions were in place, the alliance would ride a wave of rising expectations into the next stage of growth in which the Americas would be safe from the temptations of the Cuban model. Rostow predicted a transition to self-sustaining growth within the decade, allowing the administration to keep the problem of underdevelopment "off our necks as we try to clean up the spots of bad trouble." The anticipated follow-on effects, however, failed to materialize, and $20 billion in aid disappeared into the continent without leaving a noticeable accumulation of social capital. After the first year, growth rates were far below the ambitious target figures, and the press and Congress grew impatient with the alliance. As Michael Latham points out, Rostovian theory was never held to account for the alliance's failures. Instead, setbacks only reinforced the validity of concepts that provided explanations and remedies for failure. Theorists chalked up the alliance's problems to bureaucratic ineptitude, personnel problems, and stubbornly antimodern Latin leaders who refused to carry forward the reforms. Since the theory was rooted in the historical experience of the industrial core, it could not be invalidated by contradictory experience in periphery nations. Modernization funneled dissent into its own framework, where it could challenge the execution but not the conception of the plan.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, academic theorists continued to dispute within the overall consensus a number of issues that affected policy design. The balanced or Big Push approach saddled government with an almost unreachable standard for effective policy and encouraged a revived effort to identify "bottlenecks" that could be removed to stimulate disproportionate returns. Albert O. Hirschman reconfigured this debate with a theory that gained popularity after 1964 as the Johnson administration faced tighter budgets. In *The Strategy of Economic Development* (1958), Hirschman explained that small inputs, "inducement mechanisms," could push one sector into the lead, forcing others to catch up. Rather than using aid to advance an economy to a new equilibrium, as in classic Rostovian theory, aid programs should try to create disequilibria that, like loose electrons in an atomic pile, would trigger chain reactions. The difference between the two approaches can be seen in the Ford Foundation's efforts to reform agriculture in India. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the foundation sponsored a "package program" to improve conditions in fifteen rural districts on a broad front, including advances in education, health, farm equipment, irrigation, and crop diversification. Disappointed with the results, the foundation shifted in the mid-1960s to a strategy built around development and dissemination of dwarf wheat and rice varieties (the inducement mechanism). Since the new plant strains required chemical fertilizer, irrigation, and modern transport and distribution networks, other sectors would be pulled along by success, stimulating a "green revolution."

Another controversy concerned whether there was a single route to modernity and whether the experiences of Europe and the United States, the "first movers," represented the best model. Alexander Gerschenkron, William Lockwood, Clark Kerr, and others argued that the requirements of "late" developers differed and that cultural proclivities, particularly an authoritarian tradition, might dictate alternative paths. At the height of his influence, Rostow felt he was fighting a rearguard battle against those who esteemed

China's Great Leap Forward. But the "developmental state" school, while persistent, lacked policy clout until the 1980s, when the manifest success of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (and the clear disparity between their strategies and development orthodoxy) led the World Bank to endorse an alternate "export-led" growth model.

Population was a third contested area. In both classical and Keynesian theory, a growing population accelerates economic development. Adam Smith noted that it was the industrious poor who "generally bring up the most numerous families, and who principally supply the demand for useful labor," and John Maynard Keynes attributed the Great Depression of the 1930s partly to a catastrophic decline in births. This view prevailed among economists through the 1950s in no small part because of the coincidence of the baby boom and high growth rates in the United States. But a dissenting view articulated by John D. Rockefeller III and the Population Council gained influence toward the end of the decade. In 1958 a presidential review of foreign aid led by Theodore Draper concluded that rapid population growth threatened to cancel the effects of any aid infusions. Rostow argued in *Stages* that population posed a serious but not insurmountable obstacle to takeoff. Kennedy made population control part of the Agency for International Development's mission, and Lyndon Johnson intensified the emphasis, eventually making aid contingent on action to reduce fertility. In the 1970s both theory and policy swung back from that extreme position as a number of studies connected population increases with expansions in consumption and accumulation of social capital. By the 1980s, economic opinion was mixed, and the Reagan administration had repositioned population control as a moral issue.

THE DECLINE OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

The Vietnam War afforded rich opportunities for the application of theory, and association with the pacification effort accelerated the splintering of the Rostovian consensus. Pacification proceeded under a succession of modernization buzzwords—"rural construction," "revolutionary development," "civic action," "three-machine revolution," "Operation Takeoff"—and repeated failures sapped the enthusiasm of the modernizers. After Saigon and the modernizing regime of the shah of Iran fell in rapid succession, policymakers ceased to regard development as a counterinsurgency weapon. It had once been believed, according to Henry Kissinger, "that there was a sort of automatic stabilizing factor in economic development. That has turned out to be clearly wrong." But events in the industrialized world had already undermined the modernization paradigm. The rising tempo of urban riots following the Watts uprising in Los Angeles in the summer of 1965 disturbed the idealized image of the United States as the end point in the developmental process. In 1967 ghettoes in forty cities erupted. The Eighty-second Airborne had to be diverted from deployment to Vietnam to quell violence in Detroit. As the riots called American economic and political maturity into question, the belt of smog settling over the eastern seaboard and Los Angeles aroused fears that the United States had become dangerously overdeveloped. A growing environmental movement questioned the desirability of economic growth. Meanwhile, the student movement opened an attack on the "action intellectuals" whose theories sustained the Vietnam War.

Rostovian theory also came under intellectual attack from abroad. In 1968 the French sociologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was in *Vogue,* as well as on the pages of the *New Yorker* and *New York Times,* proclaiming that there were no superior and no inferior societies, and that supposedly apathetic primitives "possess a genius for invention or action that leaves the achievements of civilized people far behind." In an NBC television interview, the newscaster Edwin Newman pressed J. George Harrar, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, on whether "the Western nations, the richer nations" should impose their standards on the poorer countries if "we are simply presenting them with a different set of problems." Harrar replied that he could offer no justification for modernization "in terms of what we have done to ourselves" but that he was "afraid" that there was no turning back. This standoff characterizes discussions of modernization in the post-Rostovian age. In the early 1970s, social scientists on the left and the right toppled premises and tautologies at the heart of the theory, leaving an unsupported shell of prescriptions that policymakers continued to use. The academic study of development migrated outward from the pure social science disciplines to schools and institutes of applied policy studies. Policymaking bodies no longer relied on universities but on in-house experts and

think tanks to supply justifications and strategies for the use of aid.

The trauma of the 1960s split the discourse of modernization into two conversations, one academic, the other oriented toward policy. Occasionally, sounds from one conversation reached the other, but so indistinctly as to distort their meaning. "Civil society" became a fashionable term in both academic and policy circles in the 1990s, but while social scientists described it as a set of rituals for identifying and mobilizing the public, policymakers referred to support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious and private institutions. More often, the two conversations were simply separate. Within the university, Rostovian theory was replaced by a new structuralism in the form of dependency theory. In the 1960s, Latin American scholars had deepened and widened Prebisch's critique of the "unequal exchange" between North and South. Whereas Prebisch, Myrdal, and other early structuralists saw meliorist solutions within capitalism (redistribution, planning, and import substitution), *dependentistas* identified the instigators of those solutions, the state and the national bourgeoisie, as the core of the problem. Drawing on the Marxist tradition in Latin American thought, they argued that economic dependency created class alliances between elites at the center and the periphery, reproducing culture, social relations, and systems of exchange under the guise of development. The only way out of dependency was a mass movement of "popular forces" that would rupture connections to multinational corporations and international exchange and organize a socialist future.

Dependency theory reversed the optics of Rostovian theory, viewing development inward from the periphery rather than outward from the core. It adopted, with modifications, the reified concepts used by Marx and development economics, but it focused on the processes of underdevelopment rather than the dynamics of development. It recognized, as Rostovian theory did not, that local conditions are influenced primarily by a nation's subordinate position in the global economic hierarchy. To American scholars it offered the familiar typologies and analytic power of Rostovian theory but with a very different set of values. American consumers of dependency enlisted on the side of the Latin American popular forces. The principal texts, Andre Gunder Frank's *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967) and Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto's *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina* (1969), dominated the teaching and study of underdevelopment (especially of Latin America) at American universities in the 1970s and 1980s. Its influence extended to the history of U.S. foreign relations, both in its original form and as world systems theory, which has been described as dependency without the nation.

As an orthodoxy, dependency theory was open to attack, and in the 1980s and early 1990s scholars took it to task for reproducing many of the illusions of development theory. Socialist regimes displayed many of the patterns of cultural reproduction, class relations, and distorted development that *dependentistas* ascribed to capitalist nations. The hope that isolation and socialism would open a "way out" of dependency (the Myanmar model?) dimmed as scholars recognized the irresistible spread of global networks of culture and influence. The apparent movement of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea from semiperiphery to core within a capitalist framework forced modifications in dependency theory, while some of the leading theorists (Cardoso became president of Brazil on a neo-liberal platform) abandoned the approach altogether. Finally, new approaches—postcolonial and subaltern studies and postmodernism—moved the study of power relations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America toward issues of culture and knowledge-creation and away from economic development. The newer approaches appealed to a narrower, almost exclusively academic audience. By the 1990s, social scientists had completed their withdrawal from the heights of influence over policy and public opinion they had occupied in the early 1960s.

Within the Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and UN agencies, development doctrine continued to evolve in response to institutional constraints and political currents in the developed world. In 1968, under a new president, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the World Bank "discovered" poverty much as the Johnson administration had four years earlier. Declaring poverty a security threat to the rich nations, McNamara targeted enlarged aid funds at poverty within countries, encouraging programs that ignored issues of national investment and growth. Breaking the customary link between development and the nation that had prevailed since List, he freed the World Bank of concerns about absorptive capacity and state planning and enlarged its mandate. It invested

heavily in the green revolution, already under way in South and Southeast Asia, which promised (convincingly at the time) to eliminate hunger and alleviate rural poverty.

Development agencies were increasingly sensitive to concerns raised by the new environmental movement. Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* (1968), and Donella Meadows's *The Limits to Growth* (1972) grimly predicted that slow poisoning lay along the path of accelerating industrial growth and the chemical-dependent agriculture of the green revolution. E. F. Schumacher, a British economist and author of *Small Is Beautiful* (1973), another bible of the ecology movement, encouraged an "economics of permanence" that recognized that "there cannot be unlimited, generalized growth" on a planet with limited capacity. By questioning the very possibility of progress, environmentalism undercut the rationale and methods of development. In 1983 the United Nations assigned a commission on environment and development under Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland to reconcile the objectives of environmental health and economic growth. The Brundtland Report, issued in April 1987, popularized the term "sustainable development" to describe a strategy based on careful husbanding of resources, population control, and reduction of toxic wastes. Sustainable development (ecotourism, microenterprise, rain-fed agriculture) opened space for the collaboration of environmentalists and development experts. With some effort, dissent was once again funneled into the framework.

At the policy level, development doctrine continued to accept an idealized vision of the North Atlantic nations as normative, allowing theory to adapt to the political and economic sea change of the 1970s and 1980s. Reagan administration reforms supplanted the New Deal model, and when the collapse of the Soviet bloc opened a vast new field for development experts, they applied a set of prescriptions almost the reverse of the Rostovian formula. "Structural adjustment" called for the withdrawal of the state from the economy: privatization, the lifting of import and exchange controls, the "importation" of legal codes and standards, and the subjection of all sectors to "market discipline." Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government urged the Russian government to step aside and allow universal rules of the market to surface. Boris Yeltsin's administration in Russia issued vouchers giving the public a share in worthless state enterprises, while profitable natural resource monopolies were quietly grabbed up by party officials. With a seat in the legislature an "entrepreneur" could amass a fortune in windfalls from privatization and development aid. When the market failed to impose discipline, the Yeltsin administration followed a U.S.-prescribed course of "shock therapy," putting the ruble into free fall against the dollar and wiping out the savings of millions. As evidenced by poverty and suicide rates, Russia's barter economy ("Zaire with permafrost," according to one journalist) was in worse shape ten years after the Soviet breakup than it was under communism.

As ever, development doctrine dispensed advice but not apologies. Sachs admitted that he felt like a surgeon who had cut open a patient to find that nothing was where it was supposed to be, but apparently this was the patient's fault. Development experts accused a lingering "peasant" mentality and Russia's stubborn bureaucracy of undermining a theoretically sound plan. Structural adjustment schemes supported by the Clinton administration opened stock markets in Southeast Asian economies that until the early 1990s were clocking respectable growth figures. Portfolio investments poured in, inflating bubble economies in real estate and construction, then poured out, leaving a sticky residue of debt and unemployment. In a number of nations—Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Sierra Leone, Mexico—the decline of state control, followed by collapse of the market, created criminalized or "narco-economies." In 2001, President George W. Bush added minor modifications to the structural adjustment formula, advocating more grants for education and health initiatives to allow poor nations to increase productivity and pull themselves out of debt. This was thought to represent a small step forward even if the links between education and productivity, and productivity and debt reduction, remained unproven.

Historians are of two minds on the legacy of modernization theory. On the one hand, it has mobilized humanitarianism on a global scale and given the poor an entitlement to progress. On the other, it has licensed self-interested and sometimes brutal forms of intervention while peddling illusions as scientific certainties. Development aid has become a fixture in international relations. Nations and international agencies will continue to use it and to need principles and standards to guide its use and measure its effectiveness. A care-

ful study of past theories and the practices they inspired may enable them to approach these problems with self-awareness and a healthy skepticism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cooper, Frederick, and Randall Packard. *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge.* Berkeley, Calif., 1997. A collection of essays that provides a good introduction to the field of development.

Cowen, M. P., and R. W. Shenton. *Doctrines of Development.* London, 1996. Traces the development ideas from origins in the European Enlightenment.

Curti, Merle, and Kendall Birr. *Prelude to Point Four.* Madison, Wis., 1954. An early study of development in American foreign relations prior to Truman.

Gilman, Nils. "Paving the World with Good Intentions: The Genesis of Modernization Theory, 1945–1965." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California. Berkeley, Calif., 2001. Links Rostovian theory to the Parsonian revolution in social science.

Latham, Michael E. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000. An outstanding study of modernization's place in the Kennedy administration's Cold War strategy.

Lerner, Daniel. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.* New York, 1958. A seminal modernization study and one of the best examples of the discourse at the height of its influence.

Maxfield, Sylvia, and James H. Nolt. "Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital: U.S. Sponsorship of Import Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey, and Argentina." *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 49–81. Reveals that the United States systematically encouraged the strategy of import substitution.

Packenham, Robert A. *The Dependency Movement.* Cambridge, Mass., 1992. Follows the rise and decline of dependency theory in Latin America and the United States.

Pletsch, Carl E. "The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, circa 1950–1975." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 3 (1981): 565–590. Describes how academic politics and federal funding led American scholars to create the Third World.

Rostow, Walt W. *The Stages of Economic Growth.* Cambridge, 1960. The classic statement of Rostovian theory.

Simpson, Christopher, ed. *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War.* New York, 1998. Explores how modernization theory emerged from a collaboration between academe and the security establishment.

See also ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; FOREIGN AID; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; IMPERIALISM; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; PHILANTHROPY.

DICTATORSHIPS

David F. Schmitz

One of the most persistent and difficult problems that has faced the makers of American foreign policy, particularly in the twentieth century, has been the conflict between the desire to encourage democracy abroad and the need to protect perceived American interests around the world. Since its founding, the United States has been philosophically dedicated to supporting democracies and human rights abroad. This commitment is found in the most important documents and treaties of the nation, including the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and has been proclaimed by presidents and secretaries of state since George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. In addition, from its inception, the United States has been an expansive nation territorially, economically, and culturally. As a result, the American desire to promote democracy abroad has often conflicted with the support of dictatorships that promised stability, protected American trade and investments, and aligned themselves with Washington against enemies of the United States. American foreign policymakers have often supported right-wing dictatorships in their efforts to protect what they see as the national interest while opposing communist regimes and left-wing dictators. Dictatorships on the left have been seen as opposing both American political ideals and material interests. They have been, therefore, consistently criticized and opposed by the United States.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In order to understand American attitudes toward dictatorships, it is essential to survey the development of the ideology of American foreign policy during the nineteenth century. The desire for land and greater economic opportunity, combined with the commonly held view that the nation and its people were on a special mission, fueled the expansion of the United States. Territorial expansion was rapid, with the country growing from thirteen states on the Atlantic coast in 1789 to control over transcontinental North America by the end of the 1840s. The key was that this conquest was all done in the name of expanding liberty, as part of the mission of the United States to provide a moral example and guidance to the world. Expansion, therefore, was part of American political ideology from the outset. When establishing the Republic and the Constitution, one of the central questions the Founders grappled with was whether a vast territory could be compatible with a virtuous republic. Rome served as the most often-used historical precedent, and its lesson was that a republic could not expand and avoid the corruption and dictatorial power that emerged under Julius Caesar. It was generally believed that republics could only function and survive if they were the size of Greek city-states or Geneva. James Madison addressed this problem in *Federalist* No. 10 and provided an alternative view that solved the dilemma between expansion and a republic for the Federalists. Madison argued that expansion was a positive good for the nation and the ideology of republican values. With the proper constitution and checks on power, a large republic was not merely possible; it was necessary to maintain freedom. An expanding nation provided insurance against any faction, cabal, or region dominating national politics and seizing power. Institutional checks and balances were, therefore, aided by size. A large republic would guard against tyranny by making it impossible for a coherent majority or sizable minority to form and gain control.

The belief in an Empire of Liberty and vision of national greatness was captured well on the Great Seal of the United States with the inscription *annuit coeptis; novus ordo seclorum* (God has blessed this undertaking; a new order of the ages).

Throughout the nineteenth century this continued to inspire and guide Americans' actions and helped fuel the rapid expansion across the continent that John O'Sullivan termed "manifest destiny" in 1845. The notion of manifest destiny rested on the view that Anglo-Saxons had a right to land because they, according to Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, one of the most articulate exponents of manifest destiny, used it according to the intentions of the creator. By this reasoning, the material gains of the United States were not selfish acts, but benevolent undertakings in line with the principles of the nation. Manifest destiny became the ideological shield used to justify Indian removal and the taking of land from Mexico in the name of liberty and freedom. Nineteenth-century Americans did not see their actions as doing violence to their own moral instincts, religion, or republican and democratic values. With the belief that God willed that the United States control the continent, these actions could be carried forward without creating an ideological crisis.

The full expression of the compatibility of expansion and liberty came in Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 "frontier thesis." Turner, speaking at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, set out to provide an understanding of American history and development in the first century since the adoption of the Constitution. Central to Turner's thesis was the idea that westward expansion and the frontier experience were the key influences on American life and the development of American democracy, and it was this that made U.S. history and the American people unique. The United States was seen as an exceptional nation, free from the vices of Europe and its corrupt institutions. He argued, "Up to our own day, American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development." The frontier created and recreated an independent people and formed and regenerated American democratic government and values.

Yet, from the outset, challenges would appear in the world that created a paradox around the expansion of liberty and the support of democracy and human rights. The first of these was the French Revolution in 1789. Initially, it was welcomed by most Americans as a repeat of the American Revolution. The French appeared to be following the American example and the overthrow of their monarchy was seen as a harbinger of change from autocratic rule to a republican and a democratic future guided by the same enlightenment values that inspired the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. As the events in Paris took a more radical course and the impact of the revolution brought international conflict, however, the Washington administration became divided over whether to support France or not. The ensuing disorder and wars in Europe harmed American trade and raised questions about the proper extent of change and democratic rule for other people. The question of supporting and promoting change and democratic values had quickly proven to be a complex and difficult proposition.

The revolutions that swept South America and then Central America in the first decades of the nineteenth century further complicated the question of how to respond to the collapse of colonial empire and the rule of monarchs. As with France, most Americans initially welcomed the fall of Spanish rule to the south, but concerns were quickly raised about the stability of the new nations and the danger of other European powers taking advantage of the upheaval to impose their own rule in the former Spanish empire. The United States responded to these threats with the Monroe Doctrine that declared that Spain could not reimpose its rule on the already independent states of the Western Hemisphere and that the United States would not permit any new colonization or military intervention by any European power. In turn, the United States promised not to meddle in European politics. Thus, the United States asserted its authority to determine the political future and course of events for the rest of the nations of the Americas. These developments prompted Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to issue a warning to his fellow citizens concerning the dangers of foreign intervention and the tension between expansion and democratic rule. Adams argued that the United States should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Rather, the nation was better served in international affairs by upholding its own values and leading by example. It could seek to impose its will on other areas of the world, but in the process it would damage its own institutions and succumb to corruption.

By the middle of the century, a clear policy had emerged in Washington that the United States would recognize any government that could maintain itself in power and meet the minimum obliga-

tions of government. In 1848, Secretary of State James Buchanan, summarizing this policy, stated: "We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists, capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows."

Simultaneously, however, Americans developed other positions that would come to shape the nation's attitudes toward dictatorships in the twentieth century. Central to these were the notions of the racial inferiority of other peoples, the desire for stability and order in the world as necessary for the promotion and protection of American economic interests, and a growing fear of revolution. The concept of race has been an all-pervasive one in American history from the first contact with Native Americans and the importation of Africans as slaves. By the nineteenth century, an essentialist outlook dominated white Americans' thinking on race. Different people were placed in categories based on what were believed to be their inherent traits as peoples, groups, and nations. Anglo-Saxons were considered the most advanced race, carrying civilization wherever they went.

Groups were ranked in descending order of civilization and ability to govern and maintain stability. Other western Europeans were seen as near equals to Anglo-Saxons. The rest of the peoples of the world were categorized as either inherently dangerous or unfit for self-rule, and usually both. Latin Europeans and Slavs were seen as fundamentally undemocratic as people, and all non-Europeans were seen as inferior and in need of guidance and direction from "their betters." These views were buttressed by the development of the "scientific" idea of social Darwinism that held that the domination of western Europe and the United States over world affairs as well as their greater wealth were merely the working out of natural selection and the survival of the fittest.

These ideas were consolidated at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In the wake of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the Panama Canal zone, the maintenance of order in the Caribbean and Central America was becoming an ever-growing concern to the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt worried about the negative impact of unrest to the south on American trade and investments, and sought various means to preserve order through the assertion of police power over the other nations in the hemisphere. Roosevelt believed that the increasing interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations made it incumbent on what he saw as the civilized powers to insist on the proper behavior of other nations. In 1904, Roosevelt provided his rationale for why revolutions were dangerous and justification for American intervention in Latin America in what became the Roosevelt Corollary:

> If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotency, to the exercise of an international policy power.

Soon after, U.S. troops were dispatched to Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras to maintain order.

THE GREAT WAR AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Prior to World War I, therefore, the problems of unrest and disorder were seen as the manifestations of politically immature people, irresponsible individuals, or bandits. The postwar threats of nationalism and communism, unlike these previous disruptions, served to threaten the whole international system that the western nations operated within and forced American leaders to develop new approaches to these questions. In response to the broad revolutionary challenges of the 1910s, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, a persistent concern with order and stability emerged among American officials. The revolutions in Mexico, China, and Russia could easily spread given the economic and political dislocation that had occurred during the previous decade. President Woodrow Wilson initially responded to these challenges with a policy that sought to promote self-determination and political democracy internationally as the best means to secure American interests and prevent the further spread of revolution. In 1917, he led the nation into World War I to destroy autocratic rule and militarism in Europe. Wilson hoped that by promoting liberal,

democratic forces and states in Europe through his Fourteen Points he could solve the dual problem of war and revolution. The president placed his faith in the League of Nations as the mechanism that would allow peaceful, nonrevolutionary change to occur in Europe and guarantee collective security to prevent another war and concomitant revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution, however, shifted the president's attention from his battle with autocratic rule to the concern with revolution and containing communism.

President Wilson saw Bolshevism as a mistake that had to be resisted and corrected. He believed that the revolution in Russia was worse than anything represented by the kaiser, and that the Bolsheviks were a "group of men more cruel than the czar himself." A communist regime meant, according to Wilson, "government by terror, government by force, not government by vote." Furthermore, it ruled by the "poison of disorder, the poison of revolt, the poison of chaos." It was, the president believed, the "negation of everything that is American" and "had to be opposed." Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby reiterated Wilson's points when he set out the official United States policy of not recognizing the communist government in Moscow in August 1920. Colby wrote that U.S. policy was based on the premise that the "present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or the consent of any considerable portion of the Russian people." The Bolsheviks had forcefully seized power and were using the "machinery of government . . . with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power." Moreover, the "existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law." It was, therefore, "not possible for the government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia."

The policy of nonrecognition was based on the claim that a regime was illegitimate due to how it came to power and because it was a dictatorship that ruled by force against the will and interest of the people. Such nations were, therefore, a threat to American values and interests in the world. This policy would become a standard American diplomatic weapon for demonstrating its opposition to left-wing dictatorships and was used, most notably against China in 1949 after Mao Zedong's successful establishment of the People's Republic of China, Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba in 1961, and Vietnam in 1975 after the defeat of South Vietnam, to deny legitimacy, trade, and international aid to these governments and force political change.

The upheavals of World War I also led to a reevaluation of American views on right-wing dictatorships after the war. Republican policymakers rejected Wilson's criticism of autocracy and sought to back any individual or group they thought could ensure order and stability while opposing communism and protecting U.S. trade, investments, and interests. Beginning in the 1920s, American policymakers developed and institutionalized the logic, rationale, and ideological justifications for U.S. support of right-wing dictatorships that has influenced American policy ever since.

American officials first articulated their emerging rationale for supporting right-wing dictatorships in response to the post–World War I events in Italy. The United States came to support the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini based on a view that there was a Bolshevik threat in Italy and that the Italian people were not prepared for democratic rule. This unpreparedness and inability at self-government, American policymakers believed, created the instability that bred Bolshevism. These beliefs served to legitimize U.S. support of Mussolini in the name of defending liberalism. America's paternalistic racism combined with anticommunism to lead American officials to welcome the coming to power of fascism in Italy. The fascists, they believed, would bring the stability that would prevent Bolshevism and that was a precondition for economic recovery and increased trade.

This logic and rationale was quickly extended to other right-wing dictatorships, often after the overthrow of democratic governments, that were perceived to meet all of the qualifications for U.S. support: promise of political stability, anti-Bolshevism, and increased trade with the United States. The quest for order in a framework acceptable to Washington led the United States to support Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and Francisco Franco in Spain, and the Fourth of August regime in Greece during the interwar years. Similar to the situation in Italy, the specter of communism and the argument that the people of these nations were not yet ready for democracy underlay the United States support for these dictators. Moreover, in Latin America this policy had another benefit to U.S. officials. It allowed the United States to find a new means to establish

order in the region without direct military intervention. American forces had intervened no fewer than twelve times in different nations in the Caribbean basin. These actions, however, failed to provide long-term stability. Rather, as Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state from 1929 to 1933, noted, disorder continued to grow. Yet, if the United States tried to take the lead in the area, Latin Americans complained of American domination and imperialism. Right-wing dictators provided the desired solution by providing both imposed order while ending the cry against American imperialism.

U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships after World War I, therefore, represented a new development and departure from both the policy of promoting self-determination and political democracy internationally, and earlier tolerance of military and authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin America. American leaders grew preoccupied by international order in the wake of the disruption of World War I, the rise of radical nationalism combined with a decline of Western power, a questioning of traditional authority in nations, and greater demands for self-determination. This emphasis on order came to permeate policymaking in Washington, and the United States found strong-arm rule, the maintenance of stability, anticommunism, and protection of investments sufficient reasons to support nondemocratic rulers on the right. The often-quoted apocryphal statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt concerning Somoza of Nicaragua, "he may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he is our son-of-a-bitch," captures the American attitudes and policy toward right-wing dictatorships. While left-wing dictatorships would be opposed, those on the right found support in Washington. This "lesser-of-two-evils" approach to foreign policy, influenced by racism and at times irrational fears of communism, created blindness to the shortcomings of right-wing dictators, and led the United States to support and align itself with many of the most brutal regimes in the world.

WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR

This view, however, did not remain static. Pendulum swings in the policy appeared after times of crisis and failure. Most notably, the rise of Adolf Hitler and World War II provided a fundamental challenge to the idea that supporting right-wing dictators enhanced American interests and brought the debate over support of authoritarian governments to the fore within the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman administrations. Roosevelt confronted the problem of Nazi Germany at first by efforts to appease Hitler, a strategy he abandoned when it became clear that Germany was intent upon war. The wartime opposition to fascism and the triumph of the Allies made the promotion of democracy and change paramount concerns, and the opposition to authoritarian governments, such as Juan Perón's in Argentina and Francisco Franco's in Spain, became U.S. policy.

The Allied victory in World War II appeared to mark more than the defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy. It was to be, for many, the beginning of a new epoch. Central to that vision was the defeat of fascism and the triumph of democratic ideals and values over dictatorship and authoritarian rule. The world's nations had not only joined together in an antifascist coalition on the battlefield; they also produced documents such as the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations that extolled human rights, self-determination, and freedom. At home, Roosevelt spoke the lofty language of the Four Freedoms, criticized tyranny and colonialism, and talked of the expansion of American institutions and values to other parts of the world. For Americans, the postwar period promised the vindication of their nation's values and institutions. From these ideas emerged the remarkable achievements in postwar West Germany, Japan, and Italy of establishing democratic governments and the rebuilding of the economies of western Europe and Japan.

In other areas of the world, events looked equally promising as independence movements were on the march in Asia and Africa, and dictatorships were under attack and apparently destined to be a thing of the past. The fledgling United Nations refused to admit Spain, and most nations agreed with its request that they withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid in protest of Franco's rule, while Argentina's strongman Juan Perón found himself under attack for his refusal to break relations with Germany until the spring of 1945. Outside of the Soviet Union and the areas controlled by the Red Army, it seemed that democracy was the force of the future. Even postwar disputes with the Soviet Union and the emerging Cold War seemed to demand, in the name of consistency with American criticisms of the governments being established in Eastern Europe, that the United States oppose dictator-

ships and support the establishment of free governments. In 1946 the Truman administration adopted an official policy of opposition to all right-wing dictatorships.

Yet the question was not so clear-cut as American efforts at appeasement of Nazi Germany indicated. Franklin Roosevelt had still distinguished between a regime such as Hitler's that threatened peace and those, such as Somoza's, that apparently did not. Roosevelt and others often adopted a pragmatic rationale for defending dictatorships they favored, and moral judgments were only invoked when the government opposed a regime rather than provide a consistent principle on which to base decisions. Ultimately, the logic and policy developed during the interwar years would be carried into the post–World War II period. The success of establishing democratic governments in Germany and Japan notwithstanding, with the emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union, the policy pendulum swung back to the right. By 1947 the United States came again to prefer "stable" right-wing regimes in the Third World over indigenous radicalism and what it saw as dangerously unstable democratic governments. The pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine and the adoption of containment as the global policy of the United States brought about the change. Truman announced in March 1947 that the United States now faced a global contest between two competing and incompatible ways of life: democracy and totalitarian communism. Democracy represented government "based upon the will of the majority" expressed through "free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression." Communism meant the "will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies on terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms." It was now a bipolar world. It did not matter that many of the governments the United States came to support more resembled Truman's description of communism than democracy. If it was now a contest between only two ways of life, governments had to fit into one side of the divide or the other. Right-wing regimes became part of the free world no matter what the composition of their governments.

Truman had introduced important new variables into the basic assumptions of American foreign policy that were picked up by others. A distinction was now drawn between authoritarian dictators on the right and totalitarian dictators on the left. Autocratic regimes were seen as traditional and natural dictatorships for their societies while totalitarian regimes were classified as autocratic rule plus state control over the economy. The wartime view of fascism as the enemy had yielded to the danger of Soviet expansion. In this new understanding of the world, there was little room for moral arguments against right-wing dictators. They would be wedged into the free world, no matter what their record of abuses, as nations capable of being set on the course to democracy. No such hope was held out for communist nations. Authoritarian regimes now provided more than stability and the protection of American interests. They were a part of the "free world" and its struggle against communism.

In an analysis that became central to the Cold War justifications for supporting right-wing dictators, the Department of State argued that it was important to determine if a dictatorial regime was of the traditional Latin-American type, or if it was a communist or other police-state type. This distinction was crucial. The former were acceptable, but the latter had to be opposed. Further, it was necessary to distinguish between dictatorial governments who attempted to extend their influence beyond their own borders and those whose actions were not a threat to international peace and security. Communist states fell into the first category while authoritarian regimes did not. It was only totalitarian regimes that had to be opposed. Dictators such as Somoza in Nicaragua were mere authoritarians and deserved support. The Truman administration concluded that wherever dictatorships were overturned, the resulting governments were weak and unstable, making those nations susceptible to communist subversion. This idea was continued into the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, which believed that when a dictator was replaced, the communists gained. The United States, therefore, had to "back strong men" and dictators. The conclusion was clear. Right-wing dictatorships were historically part of the Third World, unavoidable, and deserving of American support. So-called totalitarian regimes, however, still had to be opposed in the name of freedom. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations, therefore, chose to work with authoritarian rulers or the local military, in nations such as Greece, Spain, Iran, and Guatemala rather than nationalist leaders or democratic forces that appeared vulnerable to communist takeovers.

In addition, American policymakers found new positive reasons to support right-wing dictators. Although the policy of supporting autocratic regimes violated the stated ideals of postwar American policy, officials believed it would serve the national interest of the United States and promote development in other nations. Based upon a paternalistic racism that continued to categorize non–western European peoples as inferior, vulnerable to radical ideas and solutions, and, therefore, in need of a firm government to maintain order, authoritarian regimes were viewed as the only way Third World nations could undergo economic improvements that would allow the development of more "mature" populations without succumbing to communism or radical nationalism. While this attitude undermined the avowed rectitude of American leaders, democracy was not seen as a viable option for newly independent nations or many countries in Latin America. Strong dictators, therefore, were believed to be necessary antidotes for the ills of political and social disorder and conduits for modernization. Hence, policymakers believed that support for authoritarian regimes protected liberalism internationally by preventing unstable areas from falling prey to Bolshevism while allowing time for nations to develop a middle class and democratic political institutions. Expediency overcame a commitment to the ideology of democracy because the policy appeared to provide immediate benefits. The United States gained friendly—if brutal and corrupt—allies who provided stability, support for U.S. policies, and a favorable atmosphere for American business.

Moreover, authoritarian regimes now provided more than stability and the protection of American interests. Through nation building they would be the instruments to the creation of strong and free societies. These views were supported by social scientists in the postwar years. Proponents of nation building and the moving of Third World nations through the proper "stages of economic growth" argued that stability and strong rule were a necessary stage in the development and maturation of these societies. The guiding premise of the Eisenhower administration was that "political and economic authoritarianism prevails throughout the underdeveloped world in general and represents the predominant environment in which the U.S. must associate its interests with those of the emergent and developing societies." In 1959 the Department of State concluded that right-wing regimes would be the conduits to modernization and provide a necessary stage in the development of Third World nations. Reflecting the influence and jargon of modernization theory, the Department of State noted that "our experience with the more highly developed Latin American states indicates that authoritarianism is required to lead backward societies through their socioeconomic revolutions." Moreover, if the "breakthrough occurs under noncommunist authoritarianism, trends toward democratic values emerge with the development of a literate middle class." Right-wing dictators would "remain the norm . . . for a long period. The trend toward military authoritarianism will accelerate as developmental problems become more acute and the facades of democracy left by the colonial powers prove inadequate to immediate tasks."

"It is of course essential in the Cold War," the State Department report continued, "to seek to promote stability in the under-developed countries . . . where instability may invite communism. A new, authoritarian regime, though less 'democratic' than its predecessor, may possess much more stability and may well lay the ground for ultimate return to a more firmly based 'democracy.'" The department found these to be "compelling reasons for maintaining relations" with authoritarian regimes in power. "In the bipolar world of the Cold War, our refusal to deal with a military or authoritarian regime" could lead to the establishment of regimes friendly with the Soviet Union. It was the task of the United States to discover "techniques whereby Western values can be grafted on modernizing indigenous developmental systems."

In the wake of the 1959 Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro's coming to power, the John F. Kennedy administration reevaluated U.S. policy toward Latin America and support for such regimes as Batista's. It decided to distance itself from authoritarian regimes and promote reform. Kennedy and his advisers worried that right-wing dictators were proving to be ineffective and even dangerous bulwarks against communism. They upset political stability as much as they protected it by frustrating desires for change and democracy, and they nurtured support for left-wing and communist opposition to their rule. The 1961 Alliance for Progress was the centerpiece of this vision, and the overthrow of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic a signal of change. This shift was not, however, primarily motivated by an ideological commitment to support constitutional governments at all times. Rather, it was seen as a

better way to combat communism, and the administration's actions never matched the bold rhetoric of the policy. The problem was how to break the dependence on right-wing dictators for order and promote change without unleashing revolutionary movements. Kennedy provided an excellent example of his concern about this dilemma in 1961 when discussing the Dominican Republic. "There are three possibilities," he said, "in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third."

Kennedy's policy quickly came into conflict with other American interests and the growing conflict in Vietnam, and his administration backed away from its policy of opposition to right-wing dictators in 1962. In the face of the continuing challenges of revolutionary nationalism and the choice between order and social change, the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations opted to again support military dictators over democratic governments they feared were slipping toward communism. The swing of the political pendulum back to supporting right-wing dictators took on the now-familiar ring of the need for stability in nations that were too politically immature to defend themselves against communism. With the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in November 1963, the crisis in Vietnam came to dominate the making of American foreign policy. Unrest and potentially unreliable governments were seen as dangerous invitations to Soviet advances.

The repositioning of the political pendulum on the right was completed in the first months of the Johnson administration. Following the assassination of Kennedy, Johnson backed away from the idealistic rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress. Facing continual unrest in Latin America and a rapidly deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam, Johnson sought to impose order. The Johnson administration supported the military overthrow of the João Goulart government in Brazil in 1964 as security and stability again took precedence over supporting social change and democratic rule. In 1965, when authoritarian rulers failed to provide the stability and bulwarks against communism that Washington demanded, Johnson decided that the United States had to impose order through military intervention in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. The Johnson administration's determination to establish stability and order acceptable to Washington, which had provided the basis for working with repressive dictators, forced the president to pursue the policy to its logical conclusion of a U.S. intervention to salvage the discredited regimes.

THE IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR

After 1965, American policy toward right-wing dictators became a contested issue. The Vietnam War served to undercut much of the logic and rationale used to justify American support of authoritarian regimes. Critics charged that in addition to the questionable morality of supporting right-wing dictators, the policy, while providing short-term benefits, usually led to larger problems for the United States in the long run, mainly long-term instability. Many supporters of the policy realized this danger, yet saw no other way to protect more pressing U.S. interests. Dictatorships created political polarization, blocked any effective means for reforms, destroyed the center, and created a backlash of anti-American sentiment that opened the door to radical nationalist movements that brought to power the exact type of governments the United States most opposed and originally sought to prevent. From Cuba to Iran to Nicaragua, and most tragically in Vietnam, the limits of this policy were discovered.

Support of authoritarian regimes was not completely abandoned by any means, as Richard Nixon's policy in Chile of supporting General Augusto Pinochet's overthrow of the government of Salvador Allende and the continued good relations with leaders such as the shah of Iran demonstrate. But the political climate had changed and policymakers were now forced to defend their position in public and take into account sustained criticisms of American support of dictatorships. For many, the Vietnam War and the postwar revelations of American covert actions in the Third World provided convincing evidence that the old policy of support for dictators was flawed and, more importantly, damaging to American interests and doomed to fail. Critics called for the United States to reorient its moral compass and to find methods other than covert activity and support of brutal dictators to advance American interests in the world. Although no complete swing of the policy pendulum took place, new views were heard and different approaches would be implemented, most notably President James Earl Carter's emphasis on human rights.

The establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) provided a central focus for investigations into American covert actions and support of right-wing dictators. The committee chair, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, summarized the position of many critics when he argued during the bicentennial year of 1976 that it was time to return to the objective of the nation's founders and place the United States at the helm of moral leadership in the world. Yet, as his committee revealed, that notion had fallen by the wayside, replaced by the support of brutal dictators, Central Intelligence Agency–orchestrated coups in democratic nations, and assassination plots against foreign leaders. For all of its efforts, the nation found itself involved in a divisive, immoral war in Vietnam and allied to countries that mocked the professed ideals of the United States. Church concluded that American foreign policy had to conform once more to the country's historic ideals and the fundamental belief in freedom and popular government.

President Carter echoed Church's views in his inaugural address when he called upon the American people to "take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem inevitably to be in our own best interests" and to let the "recent mistakes bring a resurgent commitment to the basic principles of our nation." Carter adopted a new policy of human rights. He declared that the United States should have "a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence . . . for humane purposes." The president was convinced that democracy was the wave of the future and the continued support of repressive dictatorships was not only against American ideals but also against the nation's self-interest. "Democracy's great successes—in India, Portugal, Spain, Greece—show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced." Moreover, Carter asserted that the nation was "now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear."

Carter succinctly summarized the criticisms of supporting right-wing dictators. "For too many years," the president announced, "we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach," he noted, "failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty." Carter, therefore, called for a policy based on a commitment to "human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy." The nation's policy must be guided by "a belief in human freedom." The old policy was, according to Carter, based on an inaccurate reading of history and the development of democracy. Strength and stability were not the prerequisites of freedom: "The great democracies are not free because we are strong and prosperous." Rather, Carter concluded, "we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free."

Carter was aware of the limits of moral suasion, and did not believe that change would or should come overnight. Moreover, he realized that he would have to continue to support certain allies despite their record on human rights. As Carter noted, he was "determined to combine support for our more authoritarian allies and friends with the effective promotion of human rights with their countries." He hoped for reform to prevent revolution. "By inducing them to change their repressive policies," the president believed, "we would be enhancing freedom and democracy, and helping to remove the reasons for revolution that often erupt among those who suffer from persecution."

Advocates of the old policy of supporting right-wing dictators blamed Carter, rather than the widespread popular discontent in their two nations, for the overthrow of two dictators in 1979 who were among America's staunchest allies, Somoza in Nicaragua and the shah of Iran. The most vocal critic was the future Ronald Reagan administration ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick. She captured attention in 1979 and again in 1981 with her blistering critiques of Carter's human-rights policy and public defense of supporting authoritarian regimes. Kirkpatrick contended that the United States need not apologize for its support of "moderate autocrats." Such a policy was in the national interest and not incompatible with the defense of freedom. Using Nicaragua and Iran as her examples, Kirkpatrick argued that autocratic governments were to be expected in these nations and the rule of Somoza and the shah of Iran was not as negative as their opponents claimed. In discussing the Somoza dynasty, Kirkpatrick claimed that that government "was moderately competent in encouraging economic development, moderately oppressive, and moderately corrupt." In addition, it was a bulwark against communism and a loyal ally of the United States. Little more

could be expected, she believed, given the development of Nicaragua.

Central to Kirkpatrick's argument was the concept of the fundamental difference between right-wing and communist dictatorships, what she called authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The crucial distinction, according to Kirkpatrick, was that "traditional autocrats leave in place existing allocations of wealth, power, status, and other resources," and "they do not disturb the habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who . . . acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill." The almost exact opposite was true, she claimed, for life under communist rule. Left-wing regimes established totalitarian states that create the type of "social inequities, brutality, and poverty" that traditional autocrats merely "tolerate."

The key to Kirkpatrick's argument lay in her claim that because right-wing dictators left traditional societies in place, "given time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for representative government," their nations could evolve from autocratic states into democracies. Totalitarian communist states, she flatly asserted, could not. Indeed, by their very nature, communist nations shut off any of these avenues toward development and, therefore, democratic change. Hence, right-wing dictatorships were an inevitable and necessary stage of government for Third World nations. Support by Washington was not only in the national interest but was helping to provide the necessary conditions for modernization and the development of democracy.

When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, he adopted Kirkpatrick's ideas as the basis for American policy and returned to supporting right-wing dictators while continuing American opposition to communism and heightening the Cold War. There was, of course, little that was new in Kirkpatrick's analysis or Reagan's policy. She had only publicly stated the rationale and arguments that were initially formed in the 1920s and further developed after World War II. It was rare, however, to have such a bold statement of the ideas and assumptions behind American policy toward dictatorships—on the right and the left—that were usually only discussed in such terms in policy memorandums and private meetings. It laid bare the contradiction between the U.S. claims that opposition to the Soviet Union and communist regimes was based on their denial of political rights to their citizens, while Washington supported governments that were equally as guilty of human-rights abuses and the denial of basic civil liberties to their populations. Moreover, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 demonstrated the fallacy of these arguments as democracy took hold in many nations formerly considered totalitarian and incapable of political change.

The end of the Cold War challenged many of the ideas previously used to justify American support of right-wing dictators and opposition to left-wing regimes. Anticommunism no longer provided a unifying theme for American policy, and no other single policy replaced it. Still, the conflict between the American efforts to promote democracy in other nations and the need to protect other interests remains. While the 1990s provided examples of Washington's support for the democratic process from the Balkans to Southeast Asia, the United States has also continued to support many dictators in the name of stability and economic development. Moreover, as the only superpower, the United States has found itself drawn into conflicts around the world. Some of these interventions have led it to back local efforts at democracy and self-determination, while others have seen it support the status quo. Without a full commitment to make the promotion of democracy and human rights as the top priority over other interests and claims, the only thing certain is that the dilemma of what attitudes to take toward dictators will remain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Les, and Thomas Paterson. "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s." *American Historical Review* 74 (April 1970): 1046–1064.

Filene, Peter G., ed. *American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917–1965*. Homewood, Ill., 1968.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Wilson and Revolutions, 1913–1921*. Washington, D.C., 1982.

Garfinkle, Adam, et. al. *The Devil and Uncle Sam: A User's Guide to the Friendly Tyrants Dilemma*. New Brunswick, N.J., 1992.

Horsman, Reginald. *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*. Cambridge, Mass., 1981.

Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987.

Johnson, Loch K. *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation.* Lexington, Ky., 1985.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "Dictatorships and Double Standards." *Commentary* (November 1979): 34–45.

———. "U.S. Security and Latin America." *Commentary* (January 1981): 29–40.

Latham, Michael E. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000.

Maddox, Thomas R. "Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism: The American Image of Totalitarianism in the 1930s." *Historian* 40 (November 1977): 85–103.

Park, James William. *Latin American Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870–1965.* Baton Rouge, La., 1995.

Pipes, Daniel, and Adam Garfinkle, eds. *Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma.* New York, 1991.

Ridge, Martin, ed. *Frederick Jackson Turner: Wisconsin's Historian of the Frontier.* Madison, Wis., 1986.

Rostow, W. W. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* 3d ed., New York, 1990.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House.* Boston, 1965.

Schmitz, David F. *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999.

Skotheim, Robert A. *Totalitarianism and American Social Thought.* New York, 1971.

Smith, Daniel M. "Authoritarianism and American Policy Makers in Two World Wars." *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (August 1974): 303–323.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1994.

Stephanson, Anders. *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right.* New York, 1995.

See also CONTAINMENT; DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY; HUMAN RIGHTS; RACE AND ETHNICITY; RECOGNITION; SELF-DETERMINATION.

Dissent in Wars

Russell F. Weigley and David S. Patterson

"These men are not being supported as we were supported in World War I." So the Vietnam War appeared in contrast to the crusade of 1917–1918 to a speaker addressing a reunion of the First Infantry Division in 1969 and reported by the military journalist Ward Just. American military men who fought in Vietnam widely believed that wartime dissent of unprecedented intensity uniquely denied them the support of their compatriots at home. Wartime dissent might never have become a lengthy subject had not the Vietnam War raised the issue to unaccustomed prominence and created a wider debate, ranging well beyond disgruntled military men, over the extent to which the threat of dissent against subsequent use of force might cripple American foreign policy. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ambassador to South Vietnam, wrote in *Swords and Plowshares* (1972): "As I see the lesson, it is that our leaders of the future are faced with a dilemma which raises questions as to the continued feasibility of a limited war option for future presidents faced with a compelling need to use military force in support of a national interest."

Yet the intensity of dissent during the Vietnam War was not so unprecedented as many critics of homefront attitudes thought. An exceptionally perspicacious military man of an earlier generation, General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff during World War II, said that the strategic planning for that supposedly popular war had to seek success in short order, because "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years' War." More than those who saw uniqueness in the dissent that marked the Vietnam War, Marshall probably approached the heart of the issue of dissent in any democratic, and particularly American, war: because democratic public opinion is impatient, popular support of a war depends on the war not dragging on indefinitely. If not simply a short war, to minimize dissent a war should be distinguished by continuous visible progress toward achieving popularly understood and approved goals.

In a 1973 study of dissent during the Korean and Vietnam wars, as reflected in public opinion polls, John E. Mueller similarly concluded in more precise fashion that dissent against war tends to increase with the duration of the war, or more specifically, that it can be expressed by the logarithm of the duration of the war and the casualties of the war. Thus, Mueller found that despite the apparent evidence afforded by the uncommon noisiness of dissent against the Vietnam War, the Korean War received less public support than the Vietnam War—until the latter conflict surpassed it both in duration and in its toll of American casualties.

To be sure, Mueller did not have available to him public opinion polls concerning earlier prolonged wars, and both the Korean and the Vietnam wars differed from many earlier American wars in that they failed to produce results generally recognizable as victory for the American armed forces and the defeat of the enemy. The historian may suspect that if polls such as those cited by Mueller had been taken during the American Civil War, they would show that the war was more popular in the North in November 1864, at the time of Abraham Lincoln's second election to the presidency, than earlier in the same year, in May 1864, when Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant was just beginning his slugging campaign in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania—despite the accumulation of weary months and horrifying casualties in the interval. The intervening months brought morale-building military victories, and especially the triumphs of Mobile Bay, Atlanta, and Cedar Creek not long before the presidential election. Korea and Vietnam never afforded any such satisfying battlefield successes. The historian therefore would suggest that the effects of time and casualties on the popularity of a war might be

at least partially offset by military victories, and especially by military progress toward some readily comprehended goal—for example, the destruction of the enemy armed forces pursued by Grant and his lieutenants in 1864.

Still, while in the end dissent in the North during the American Civil War was largely drowned out by a tide of military victories, until nearly the end the prosecution of the Civil War was nevertheless plagued by more internal opposition than was the later waging of World War II. It was easier to rally public support for retaliation against the Japanese after the attack on Pearl Harbor and for suppression of Adolf Hitler than to bind domestic political dissidents to the Union with the bayonet. The roots of opposition to a war can be found in the duration of the war, its casualties, and its measure of military success. But one cannot ignore the commonsense view that the war's political aims and circumstances have much to do with its popularity. Of course, the generation and expression of dissent even in wars of politically controversial origin are handicapped, because wars tend to appear as national crises so dramatically overpowering that they inherently require the whole nation to rally around the national standard.

Nevertheless, Mueller's analyses of recent wars and national emergencies tend to indicate—and the longer historical view would seem to confirm—that such a rally-round-the-flag phenomenon is fleeting. Even in the midst of wars, "politics as usual" soon tends to resume. The resumption of habitual political battles can then readily fuel dissent, especially because in the development of American partisan politics it has required a considerable accumulation of experience, and a considerable sophistication for partisan rivals of wartime administrations and congresses to learn to disentangle opposition to the incumbent political party from opposition to the war, and the process of disentanglement has never been complete. And as common sense would have it, the more politically controversial the origins of the war, the greater is likely to be the intensity of wartime dissent, especially if the political controversy involves conscientious opposition to the morality of the war, as in the Mexican and Vietnam wars.

Moreover, once initial patriotic enthusiasm subsides, the dissent fueled by partisan rivalries and the circumstances of the origins of a war can draw upon a still more fundamental source of restiveness, the traditional American hostility toward the armed forces and a traditional ambivalence, at the least, toward the very institution of war.

Once these persistent sources of dissent against war interact in wartime with the hardships, inconveniences, and simple nuisances inevitably attendant upon any war, and with the more or less severe political controversies of any war, the rise and expression of dissent become so likely, and in most wars have become troublesome enough, that wartime administrations have been perennially tempted to suppress dissent by the use of law and armed force, diluting the constitutional guarantees of free expression of dissent on the plea that the national crisis demands it. Supporters of wars have also been tempted to use informal extralegal means to eliminate dissent. Thus the record of such temptation and of consequent actions against dissent forms part of the history of dissent in American wars, although on the whole the ability of administrations and populace to resist these temptations is fairly heartening to believers in the American constitutional system.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Despite the quotation from General Marshall, the United States did manage to fight and survive a "Seven Years' War" at the very outset of national existence, the revolutionary war. It is possible that the revolutionary war was exceptional because it was so directly and unequivocally a war for national survival, with independence itself at stake. Modern nationalism is such a strong force that its survival may transcend ordinary rules concerning the depth of democratic support for war. It is at least as likely, however, that the safe emergence of the United States from the Revolution was largely a matter of fortunate historical accident.

Among British and Loyalist leaders there had developed a widespread impression by 1780, which lasted until October 1781, that for them the War of the American Revolution was almost won. In the southern colonies, 1780 witnessed the virtual completion of the reconquest of Georgia and South Carolina, and the following year Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis pursued the remnant of the revolutionary forces in the area all the way northward across North Carolina and planted the royal standard in that province. The remaining resistance south of Virginia, although highly and perplexingly troublesome, was mainly of the irregular sort that later generations would

call guerrilla warfare. Farther north, at British headquarters in New York, General Henry Clinton received consistently optimistic reports from his agents throughout the Middle Colonies. Typical was the conclusion of the prominent New Yorker William Smith that "the Rebels were a minority who governed by the army and that this [the revolutionary army] reduced, the Loyalists would overturn the usurpation." If it was the sole remaining prop supporting rebellion, the rebel army itself appeared well on the way to collapse. There had been a mutiny in the Massachusetts line as early as the beginning of 1780; in the Connecticut line in May 1780; in the large and critical Pennsylvania line at the beginning of 1781; and in the New Jersey line in response to the Pennsylvania mutiny. During this period General George Washington, the commander of the Continental army, repeatedly warned Congress that his army was on the verge of dissolution—from loss of supplies, pay, popular support, and internal morale. If Washington felt obliged to put on a show of pessimism in order to try to wring maximum assistance from a frugal Congress, accounts from other sources inside his army agreed with those of Clinton's informers that his exaggerations were small and that his army might collapse under the slightest British pressure, or simply expire. "Why need I run into the detail," Washington wrote John Laurens on 9 April 1781, "when it may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come."

Deliverance, of course, came. Clinton did not muster the energy or the self-confidence to pursue his opportunities with even the slightest vigor; he was thinking instead of how to woo back to British allegiance the faltering revolutionaries without in the process antagonizing Loyalists who were crying for condign punishment of the rebels as a reward for their own loyalty—that is, the very flagging of the Revolution paradoxically contributed to Clinton's perplexities and thus to his irresolution. Meanwhile, Lord Cornwallis, the other principal British military commander in America and Clinton's nominal subordinate in the South, lapsed into the opposite kind of bad generalship—recklessness. Cornwallis presented the revolutionary army with the opportunity to join forces with the French navy in a manner that entrapped him at Yorktown in October 1781. Although Cornwallis's blunders were egregious, Washington and his French allies were able to capitalize upon them on account of a most remarkable run of good fortune in weather and timing, to say nothing of what was to prove the only major French naval success against a British fleet in the whole second Hundred Years' War. The surrender of Cornwallis has no suggestion of inevitability about it but appears rather as historical accident. The United Kingdom in 1781 was no democracy, but the British government was far enough from a despotism and representative enough that it was having its own troubles in sustaining the war. The setback at Yorktown proved sufficient to push Britain into the hands of the peacemakers. Until Yorktown the American revolutionary cause had been in a much more perilous condition than the British cause, and except for the supreme good fortune of Yorktown it was the American cause that had been more likely to founder.

Dissent in the revolutionary war is otherwise difficult to measure on any scale similar to those applicable to later wars, when there was an established American government from which to dissent and more or less established channels of dissent. During the Revolution the prosecutors of the war on the side of the United States were themselves the dissenters from the accustomed American order of politics. The war was more confusedly an American civil war than the later war of 1861–1865, in which the antagonists were more clearly marked off from each other by geographical lines. Just as the revolutionary war was both a war for independence from Great Britain and a revolution seeking social change at home, so both thrusts of the war provoked their own sets of dissenters, with some who otherwise supported independence, for example, dropping out when the struggle set a course toward social revolution. In Pennsylvania, where the revolutionary movement most drastically changed the previous political order with the radically democratic Constitution of 1776, the sense of the revolutionaries that they must use the force of their new system of laws to compel the laggard to fall into their procession became most desperate, and it precipitated the most troublesome controversy in any province over test oaths of loyalty to the new regime. But everywhere, the revolutionary governments felt obliged to curb dissent with legal penalties of confiscation of property and political ostracism. Furthermore, the patterns of dissent were not easily predictable; loyalty oaths excited most controversy in Pennsylvania, where the Revolution became most radical, but dissent against the Revolution took its most ambitious military

form—and apart from the incursions of the British army required the nearest approximation of full-blown military campaigns to repress it—in the Carolinas, where the movement toward independence changed little in the previous social and political order. The sources of dissent and its manifestations were at least as varied as the motives that separately guided each colony into statehood.

THE QUASI-WAR AND THE WAR OF 1812

After the American Revolution, dissent in the next war presents a special case; the war did not last long enough, or amount to enough as a military operation accompanied by casualties, for the effects of duration to have much play, but in its origins the war was perhaps the most politically controversial in the history of the country. It was the Quasi-War with France of 1797–1800. With the American political system still in process of formation, and partisan political opposition still widely regarded as illegitimate, it was hardly more a war against France, however, than a war conducted by the Federalists, who controlled the executive branch and Congress, against the Jeffersonian Republican opposition. French depredations against American maritime commerce and the XYZ Affair precipitated naval conflict with the French. Yet the causes of the war never ran deep enough to generate even a brief initial enthusiasm—despite the XYZ Affair—in more than a few localities. Moreover, the Federalists used the war to push through Congress authorizations of substantial increases in the army, although President John Adams remarked that as for an enemy army for this force to fight, "At present there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here than there is in Heaven." Stephen G. Kurtz's conclusion is that the new army, whose officers were carefully screened to assure their Federalist partisanship, was to be the tangible instrument for suppressing Jeffersonianism—a political army to cow the opposition. Against this threat to the antimilitary tradition and against the Quasi-War that nourished the threat, dissent became so sharp that Kurtz also concludes that fear and resentment of the political army ranked with the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts as a cause of disaffection from the Federalists and thus of the Republican "revolution" in the election of 1800.

Historians can perceive a deeper stream of causation leading to the War of 1812 than to the Quasi-War. In 1812 there was a fuller, more widespread patriotic spirit generated by the conviction that longstanding British refusal to grant the United States the rights of independent nationhood at sea represented a threat to the very independence of the Republic. Nevertheless, to the Federalists, now reduced to the role of opposition, the War of 1812 appeared as much a partisan war conceived for the political benefit of the rival party and for the ruination of themselves as the Quasi-War had seemed to the Republicans. By 1812 the Federalist Party had become a sectional party; except for enclaves of strength in the Carolinas, Philadelphia, and New York City, it was a New England party, and its interests and those of New England had come to seem indistinguishable. For commercial New England, the War of 1812 was the hideous culmination of a perverse Republican policy of countering British and French depredations against maritime commerce by terminating American overseas commerce altogether. For New England, no cause of the old revolution had loomed larger than the Boston Port Act; now the Republican strangulation, not just of Boston's but of all New England's commerce, naturally suggested a Boston Port Act much magnified. Thus, if the Boston Port Act had offered just cause for withdrawing from the British Empire despite all the benefits and ties of loyalty that the empire represented, then some New England Federalists saw Republican restrictions upon commerce as cause for seceding from the American Union. Republican trade restrictions and the ensuing war seemed all the more perverse to the Federalists because unlike the Republicans, the Federalists saw Great Britain as the defender of all people's rights against a revolutionary France whose excesses had descended into Napoleonic tyranny, while the Republicans responded to both French and British maritime depredations with an increasingly anti-British policy leading at last to a war whose only beneficiary was likely to be Napoleon.

The vote of the New England members of the House of Representatives, except for frontier Vermont, on the war resolution of 4 June 1812, was nineteen against war, nine for, and three not voting—surely a clear alignment against the war, although not nearly so one-sided as some accounts might suggest. Connecticut and Massachusetts soon rejected federal calls for their militia, and Rhode Island and New Hampshire supplied only a handful of militiamen for federal service in 1812. Federalist Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts proclaimed a fast day to mourn

a war "against the nation from which we are descended," and New England Federalist leaders generally made no secret of their displeasure with the war. Nevertheless, New England's passive dissent threatened to turn into active resistance to the Republican administration only when the badly conceived war proved to be badly fought as well. Then twenty-six New England Federalists met in late 1814 at the Hartford Convention, "to protest," in the words of James M. Banner, Jr., "against the inept Republican management of the war with Great Britain and the whole system of Republican administration since Jefferson's election . . . to force the federal government to provide defensive help."

Early in the conflict, New England profited from it. Hoping to encourage New England's disaffection, Great Britain at first did not apply its naval blockade of the United States to New England. In the spring of 1814, however, with Napoleon defeated and Great Britain free to devote major military attentions to the American war, the British decided that making New England bear some of the brunt of the conflict would be a more productive encouragement to dissent. On 31 May 1814 the blockade was extended to the whole United States coast. Worse, British invasion of New England followed. In July an expedition from Halifax, Nova Scotia, took Eastport in the District of Maine; by early September, Lieutenant General John Sherbrooke had entered the Penobscot, taken possession of the whole Maine coast east of that river, and claimed the coast as far as New Brunswick. Towns around Cape Cod were raided, and under British guns Nantucket declared its neutrality. What brought the Hartford Convention movement to a head, according to established scholarship, was the inability of the government in Washington to provide respectable defense against these British attacks. The Federalist state governments and the Republican federal government still quarreled over who was to control the militia, the New England states insisting that in the crisis they must retain command of their militia for their own defense but that the federal government should pay the costs of defense. When early in 1815 Congress authorized compensation of state forces by the federal government, it met what Banner calls the Federalists' "central demand"; Harrison Gray Otis, perhaps the most influential Massachusetts Federalist, thought that passage of such an act earlier would have forestalled the Hartford Convention altogether.

This issue of defense was certainly more central to the Hartford Convention than the plots of secession that have sometimes been charged against the convention. The convention was engineered by the moderate leadership of the New England Federalist Party, of whom Otis was one example and George Cabot, the president of the convention, another, in order to press for effective action for defense and against Republican mismanagement. At the same time New England Federalists kept the political initiative in their section in their own hands—those of pragmatic politicians—and out of the hands of moralists, often led by the clergy, who increasingly couched their opposition to the Republicans in absolutist moral terms and were in fact likely to move toward extreme action, even including disruption of the Union. A convention of party leaders was an affair the pragmatists could control, and they did, confining the Hartford Convention to resolutions on behalf of federal support for state self-defense and proposals for constitutional amendments to pare the power of the Republican dynasty in Washington. This outcome fulfilled George Cabot's prediction that he could tell exactly what the convention would produce, namely, "a great pamphlet."

A delegation including Otis carried the Hartford resolutions to Washington, leaving Boston just after they learned of Andrew Jackson's victory at the Battle of New Orleans and arriving in the capital just in time for the celebrations of the Treaty of Ghent that ended the war in February 1815. Holding the convention and passing its resolutions were probably necessary to divert the New England extremists and maintain, for the time being, a viable Federalist Party in New England. But enough secessionist overtones were imputed to the Hartford Convention that Federalism was forever damned elsewhere for disloyalty in time of war.

THE MEXICAN WAR

The conventional wisdom surrounding what happened at the Hartford Convention consequently came to be that failure to support a war effort is likely to mean the death of a political party. Thus, in 1846–1848, when the Whig Party found itself opposed to the Mexican War, the party pragmatists argued that although they might challenge the policy of going to war, they must not fail to vote for funds and supplies to support the army that was fighting it. A rival faction of Conscience

Whigs nevertheless took the logical and principled position that if the war was wrong, supporting the fighting of it was also wrong, and that therefore opposition must be thoroughgoing at whatever risk to party fortunes. The resulting divisions within the Whig Party very nearly produced the fatal effect that the pragmatists hoped to avoid.

During the Mexican War the sources of Whig dissent were partially the same as those of Federalist dissent during the War of 1812. In both instances, New England was the stronghold of dissent, although opposition spread more widely from 1846 to 1848. In both instances, the grievances of New England against the administration in Washington included the administration's policies of westward territorial expansion, which implied a permanent diminution of New England's political power. In the Mexican War, of course, westward territorial expansion was immediately at issue. In both instances, fear of the diminution of New England's power sprang not only from direct political interests but from distaste for the whole southern and western economic and cultural system that the dissidents saw represented in the administration in Washington and in the administration's war. During the Mexican War such distaste for southern and western values was reinforced by the rise to prominence of the slavery issue, which had been merely a cloud on the horizon—although already perceptible—during the War of 1812. In August 1846 the Wilmot Proviso tied the slavery issue inextricably to the issues of the Mexican War by proposing to forbid slavery in any territory to be acquired from Mexico. In both instances, opposition to the war could draw upon and be reinforced by the self-conscious Christianity of New England tradition. New England dissent from the War of 1812 had in fact led to the founding of peace societies, which later helped mobilize opposition to the Mexican War.

In the 1840s the Christian antiwar tradition was readily mobilized against a conflict even more iniquitous than the War of 1812, in that the Mexican War could well be regarded—and is still regarded by some historians—as an act of aggression by the strong United States against weak Mexico. The mobilization of this Christian antiwar tradition in its New England centers, at a time when New England happened also to be experiencing its first great literary renaissance, gave an unprecedented literary aspect to dissent against the Mexican War, as illustrated by James Russell Lowell's *The Bigelow Papers* (1848) and Henry David Thoreau's essay "Civil Disobedience" (1849).

For all that, organized dissent against the Mexican War never attained a climax as notable, albeit ambiguous, as the Hartford Convention. The military campaigns of the war proved to be short and unvaryingly successful, which in turn proved an insurmountable handicap to effective dissent. Military success in fact diverted the pragmatic, political Whigs from the issue of whether to vote supplies to the more expedient issue of how to capitalize on the military fame of the victorious generals, Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, who chanced also to be Whigs.

Nevertheless, opposition to the Mexican War tended to grow more intense the longer the war lasted. When the conflict began in May 1846, only two members of the Senate and fourteen members of the House of Representatives voted against the bill, declaring that war existed "by the act of the Republic of Mexico." Congress authorized the president to call volunteers and appropriated $10 million for the conduct of the war. By the time the Thirtieth Congress assembled for its first session in December 1847, however, to be greeted by President James K. Polk's message that no peace had yet been obtained and there was no immediate prospect of one, Congress appeared much less ready to vote for more men and money, and certainly the Whigs were more determined to pin upon Polk and the Democrats responsibility for a war begun, as they interpreted it, not by Mexico but by American aggression. Furthermore, the Whigs had captured at least nominal control of the House, although their own divisions made their election of Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts as Speaker a very near thing, because the most dedicated Conscience Whigs refused to support Winthrop as too willing to sustain the war. The House then defeated a resolution declaring the war just and necessary. Opposition to slavery inevitably still influenced much of the opposition to the war, but even a southern Whig, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, could say, "The principle of waging war against a neighboring people to compel them to sell their country is not only dishonorable, but disgraceful and infamous." Playing upon the fact that hostilities had begun when Mexican troops attacked Taylor's forces after they had crossed south of the Nueces River, which Mexico claimed as the southern boundary of Texas, Representative Abraham Lincoln of Illinois introduced his "spot" resolutions calling on the president to say candidly whether the spot where the war began was Mexican or American soil.

Some powerful Democrats, too, had grown outspokenly critical—the elderly Albert Gallatin, who called it a war of subjugation; Thomas Hart Benton; even John C. Calhoun, who feared the war was becoming one for the conquest of central Mexico, which would bring into the Union a racially inferior people incapable of free government. Fortunately for the president, in the midst of congressional debate there arrived the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), negotiated in Mexico by Nicholas P. Trist, which ended the war with the annexation of Texas confirmed and California and New Mexico added to the United States, in exchange for a payment of $15 million and the assumption by the United States of American claims against Mexico. Although Polk had earlier repudiated Trist as his negotiator, and although some Democrats thought Trist's terms too generous toward Mexico, Polk submitted the treaty for ratification lest the increasingly noisy dissent prove able to paralyze him and make a good treaty henceforth impossible. Under public pressure to end the war as swiftly as could be done, the Senate ratified the treaty.

The opposition Whigs became the immediate political beneficiaries of discontent with the war. Some Conscience Whigs split off from the party to join with various northern Democratic factions disgruntled over the pro-Southern tendencies of all Polk's policies and to form the Free-Soil Party for the election of 1848; but this third party hurt the Democrats more than the Whigs. Choosing Zachary Taylor as their presidential nominee, the Whigs carried the White House. The expedient course of the party pragmatists in supporting war measures if not the war itself apparently had accomplished far more than merely warding off the fate of the Federalists. But the Whig success of 1848 was deceptive. Wartime strains upon the relations between Conscience Whigs and pragmatists had so weakened the party that it could not survive another bout with the slavery issue. The slavery crisis of 1850 broke open the cracks imposed on the party structure by the war and destroyed the party.

THE CIVIL WAR

The foregoing events obviously threw into question the conventional wisdom derived from the War of 1812 about what opposition to both war measures and war alike would do to an opposition party. Discarding the expediential course of the Whigs in the Mexican War, then, most of the Democratic Party leadership in the role of opposition to the new Republican Party during the Civil War chose to revert to a relatively uncomplicated kind of dissent. In general, its opposition to the Republican administration of Lincoln and to the Republican Congress in their conduct of the war was not disentangled from opposition to the war itself.

Democratic policy might have been different if the great Democratic paladin of the Middle West, Stephen A. Douglas, had not died almost at the outset, on 3 June 1861. Douglas had said that "The shortest way to peace is the most stupendous and unanimous preparation for war." But it would have been difficult for Douglas to hold his party to such a policy. The style of American politics at mid-nineteenth century was one of rough-and-tumble conflict, with the business of the opposition regarded as straightforward opposition to virtually everything the party in power stood for. In this context the maneuverings of the Whigs during the Mexican War could more readily be perceived as having been too subtle and devious by far. Furthermore, the war at hand was a civil war, and the Democratic Party and politicians of the North had long been the comrades and allies of the leaders of the Confederacy, against which the federal government was now contending. It was too much to expect a prompt, wholehearted embrace of old political enemies in common cause against old friends. This matter was especially crucial; historical studies of the Copperhead dissent that was to develop have attempted to tie it to various economic and social interests—assuming, for example, that poor agriculturalists might have objected to the business alliances of the Republicans. But the one consistent gauge of any district's tendency toward Copperheadism seems to have been the Southern ties of segments of its population.

Aggravating the latter dissent, and displeasing others who initially supported the war, as hostilities continued Republican policy came to include emancipation of the slaves. Therefore the issues of race and slavery again became intermingled with dissent in war, and the Democrats became the voice for all of white America's deep fears of racial equality, toward which Republican war policies could be interpreted as tending.

Finally, American parties, although diverse coalitions, were by no means without ideology. The ideology of the Democratic Party was well summed up in its favorite wartime watchword, "The Union as it was, the Constitution as it is."

This maxim rightly implied that the methods taken by the Lincoln administration to prosecute the war—centralizing methods threatening to transform the old loose federation of states into a consolidated nation—seemed to many Democrats so subversive of a proper Union and the true Constitution that a victory for Lincoln's Union would be scarcely more appetizing than the independence of the Confederacy.

The Democratic position was so close to a plague-on-both-your-houses attitude that it is not surprising that under the tensions of civil war, Republicans were likely to suspect nearly the whole Democratic leadership of Copperheadism. Furthermore, after Douglas's death the core of the Democratic membership in the House, thirty-six Representatives, subscribed to a pact of party unity conceived and drawn by Representative Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, who was candidly an obstructionist. After the summer of 1861, the Democratic congressional delegations offered much more nagging of the administration and parliamentary foot-dragging than willingness to sustain the war. Most Democratic leaders would have protested sincerely that they were not disloyal to the Union—the old Union. Much recent scholarship has been at pains to deny that even the leaders of the Copperhead faction among the Democrats were disloyal to the Union. But the insistence of these Peace Democrats that the only Union worth preserving was the old noncentralized Union makes this a distinction of limited practical application.

By the fall elections of 1862, the prolonged war and the disappointingly few victories—none in the crucial eastern theater—were reflected in the Democratic gains in the congressional and state elections. By that time too, the Emancipation Proclamation added abolition to the Union war aims and aggravated discontent with Lincoln's leadership. In the State of New York the Democrats elected Horatio Seymour to the governorship. During his campaign Seymour had called emancipation "a proposal for the butchery of women and children, scenes of lust and rapine, and of arson and murder." As governor he employed a states' rights rhetoric reminiscent of Jefferson Davis, and his scornful opposition to conscription contributed to the New York City draft riots of July 1863. In the Midwest the Republican governors of Indiana and Illinois believed that the newly elected Democratic majorities in their legislatures were in league with an empire of secret societies planning a coup d'état to ensure the victory of the Confederacy. The governors collected evidence that Indiana alone had 125,000 members enrolled in antiwar secret societies and that in Illinois 300 secret lodges met every Tuesday night. The Confederate government believed these and similar reports and sent agents to cooperate with the secret societies. Thus can a fratricidal war generate hysteria, because the threat of the secret societies was a chimera. No substantial danger ever emerged from their alleged plotting. The Confederate agents who made contact with them found the Copperhead malcontents unwilling to take risks or action, and no coup d'état ever had a chance of success because the overwhelming bulk of Northern sentiment—including that of the rank-and-file Democrats who continued to serve in or send their sons and brothers into the Union armies—remained determined to restore the Union by war, war-weariness notwithstanding.

This fact proved fatal to the Democratic Party's immediate antiwar policies and highly injurious to the party for many years to come. By the presidential election of 1864, the Democratic Party formed its ranks for the campaign around the principles that while the Union ought to be restored, Lincoln's centralizing war was the wrong way to restore it, and that in addition to being wrong the war was a practical failure. The Democratic platform of 1864 called for a cessation of hostilities "to the end that at the earliest possible moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." The assumption that peace could come first and be followed by restoration of the Union was one that was not supported in any of the attitudes of the Confederate leaders. Furthermore, to adopt the assumption would imply that all the sacrifices accepted thus far to seek reunion through war had been needless. Northern voters were not willing to concede that they had sustained so large an error so long, and at so high a price. In late August, Lincoln himself believed that war-weariness would defeat his bid for reelection, but the best remedy for war-weariness, a succession of military victories, intervened. On 5 November the electorate chose Lincoln for a second term by a margin of 55 percent, a respectable victory by the standards of American politics.

The Confederacy had its own problems of war-weariness and dissent. There were many contributing factors, but above all, Southern support for the war and for the Confederacy crumbled away as the South lost the battles. In contrast,

Northern support for the war solidified itself as the North at last won battle after battle. For partisan politics the consequence of this latter fact was that on 25 February 1865 *Harper's Weekly* could without much exaggeration proclaim: "We are at the end of parties." The Democratic Party had so identified itself with the idea of the war as a failure as well as a wrong that the Union victory left the party appearing impossibly myopic. So much had the Democratic leadership identified itself with opposition to the Civil War that during the war large numbers of War Democrats had felt obliged to join the Republican Party. So much had the Republican Party identified itself with the Union and the war that victory in the war represented such a complete vindication of the party that the memory of the war would go far to assure Republican supremacy in Northern politics for a generation. Heeding the implied warning, in no subsequent war has a major party been willing to risk joining its fortunes with those of dissent.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE FILIPINO INSURRECTION

In the small wars between 1865 and 1917, dissent would not have been likely to assume proportions highly troublesome for the administrations waging the wars even without such an object lesson. The wars with the Indians had become too remote from the interests of most voters, especially because they could be fought by a small professional army with a large enrollment of immigrants. Any given uprising and campaign was too brief to allow dissent to accumulate, with intervals of peace allaying such public concern as it developed. An Indian rights movement did generate growing support among eastern philanthropists, intellectuals, and some religious denominations, but never on a scale to seriously slow down the military conquest of the Plains tribes. The constraints both upon the army and upon the government's Indian policy, causing occasional spasms of congressional or executive peacemaking efforts, were more largely those of fiscal economy than of philanthropic concern.

Similarly, the war with Spain was brief enough and inexpensive enough in casualties that it was over before the customary initial patriotic enthusiasm had dissipated. Criticisms of the war effort came afterward and concerned the conduct of the war more than the war itself. The Filipino insurrection, the name most often applied to the Filipino-American War (1899–1902), which followed from the consequences of the Spanish-American War, was more unpleasant in every sense. It raised up anew the moral outcry against American expansionism at the expense of weaker peoples, which had agitated the opponents of the Mexican War. Suppressing the insurrection was a process prolonged enough (two and one-half years for the main insurrection on Luzon alone) and costly enough in casualties that it gave play to two of the principal wellsprings of dissent in war. Furthermore, the fighting involved guerrilla warfare in a difficult tropical climate, a type of combat that the European-style American army, attuned to European-style regularized war, has consistently found distasteful since its first major exposure to it in the Seminole Wars of 1816–1818 and 1835–1842. This distaste has also been shared by the society that supports the army. The strains imposed upon the army's patience by such irregular warfare in turn provoked acts of terrorism and atrocities against the Filipinos that still further exacerbated the moral dissent at home.

Nevertheless, dissent against the suppression of the Filipino insurrection never became a major political force. The outcry against this war, like the more general anti-imperialist movement of which it was a part, was the Indian rights movement writ somewhat larger. It was a movement centering in the eastern, or at least urban, aristocratic, and upper-middle-class intellectual and literary communities, with only occasional outposts in larger constituencies, such as Samuel Gompers in the labor movement; but it had no mass support. The inclusion of distinguished literary and academic figures gave it a high visibility, disproportionate to its strength. In the later era of public opinion polls, the evidence was to suggest—and more impressionistic evidence suggests it was already true—that except during a large-scale war touching numerous lives, foreign policy tends to be too remote from the concerns of most citizens and voters (again resembling the later Indian wars) for the "foreign policy public" to be very large. The opponents of imperialism and of the war in the Philippines were in this light the representatives of a schism within the elite segment of the population concerned with foreign policy that had propelled the nation into the Spanish-American War and overseas expansionism in the first place. The misgivings within that elite were severe enough to bring American territorial expansion overseas to an abrupt halt, with the elite foreign policy public in general soon

reverting to its more traditional opposition to that kind of expansionism. Meanwhile, although the opposition party (still the Democrats) flirted with anti-imperialism, the party pursued at most an ambivalent course and after its Civil War experience did not again embrace outright dissent against the war. Dissent remained anything but a mass movement. Although it seemed prolonged at the time, the suppression of the major part of the Filipino insurrection within three years made the affair brief by contrast with the later Vietnam War, with the forces involved and the American casualties also much smaller.

THE WORLD WARS

The unhappy experience of the Democratic Party during the Civil War was surely not the only cause of the reluctance of major parties to embrace dissent in subsequent wars. The discipline and cohesion that modern industrial societies impose upon their populations, in contrast to less-centralized and more loosely organized agricultural societies, had already helped maintain the united front of the North during the Civil War, and that discipline of industrialism had grown immensely stronger by the time of the great world wars of the twentieth century. In World War I, the unity of the populace of every major power in support of nationalist war and patient endurance of the populace through prolonged war confounded the expectations of numerous prophets who had forecast that modern wars would be so costly that they could last only a few months. By World War II the public discipline of the great powers had become even more impressive. Democratic America certainly was no exception to this pattern; if anything, it was the democracies that displayed the greatest social cohesion. In both world wars, dissent in the United States was confined to minuscule fringe groups, mainly of socialists, radical leftists, and pacifists, and conscription focused far more attention upon the conscientious objector than it had done in the Civil War. This change occurred not only because the government and the public demonstrated increasing sensitivity to the demands of the pacifist conscience, but also because the conscientious objector was much more nearly alone as a dissenter than he had been in 1861–1865.

Before the entrance of the United States into World War I on 6 April 1917, it is true, there had been significant dissent over the course in foreign policy that proved to be leading to war, most conspicuous among the protesters being the Progressive elements of President Woodrow Wilson's own governing coalition. Although after the war the intractable realities of international politics were to cause among this coalition a speedy disillusionment with support for the war, nevertheless from Wilson's war message onward throughout the war itself, all but a small fraction of this group were enthralled by the president's promise that the fight was for a reformation of the whole world, and they joined ranks behind the war effort. Not surprisingly, however, the considerable dissent that had surrounded Wilson's foreign policy before the war contributed to an expectation that there would be more dissent during the war than actually materialized. This expectation in turn contributed to passage of stringent espionage and sedition acts seeking among other things to suppress any utterances that might discourage recruiting or the united prosecution of the war. These acts were enforced not only by an enlarged body of federal investigative agents but also by the federally sponsored American Protective League of private citizens. Abetted thus by what amounted to vigilantes, attacks upon civil liberties and particularly upon free speech became absurdly disproportionate to a mere trickle of dissent. No cases involving wartime suppression of dissent reached the Supreme Court until after the war. Then Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's characterization of *Abrams* v. *United States* (1919) as involving merely a silly leaflet by an unknown man came close to what is likely to be the historian's view of all the targets of the espionage laws; but in *Abrams,* Holmes spoke for the minority of the court, and he himself had seen "a clear and present danger" in the earlier and not much different *Schenck* case (1919).

A greater sophistication and tolerance marked the government's attitude toward dissent in World War II—always excepting the relocation of more than 100,000 Japanese from the Pacific Coast. Tolerance could well be afforded. Although American entry into World War II was also preceded by much debate over the nation's course in foreign policy, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor assured that from the beginning of direct American participation there would be still less dissent than there had been in 1917–1918. Although such a leading Republican spokesman as Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio suspected Franklin D. Roosevelt of exploiting the war emer-

gency to fix the changes of the New Deal permanently upon American institutions, he and most other Republicans permitted themselves only the most cautious criticism of the conduct of the war, which they carefully distinguished from criticism of the war itself. "Every problem," said Taft, "must be approached in a different spirit from that existing in time of peace, and Congress cannot assume to run the war"—a far cry from the attitudes even of members of Congress of Lincoln's own party during the Civil War, let alone the opposition. In World War II as in World War I, a certain amount of trouble did develop between the government and the labor movement, over labor's threats to strike to ensure itself a due share of war prosperity; but this friction can hardly be said to have involved dissent over the war. In World War II, national unity survived even though the American participation lasted nearly four years and was by American standards costly in casualties, unlike the American participation in World War I. The most evident explanation for this national unity was the nature of the enemy and of the circumstances with which the war began. But the historian seeking the sources of unity should also keep in mind that once the initial defeats were overcome, it would be hard to find a long war marked by so consistent a record of military success as favored America and surely helped sustain American morale in World War II.

THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

One of the meanings of the worldwide restlessness that marked the 1960s may well be that the notable social discipline characteristic of the populations of industrialized countries in the first century of the Industrial Age was breaking down. If so, a fundamental shift in social organization may underlie the contrast between the unity with which the United States fought the two world wars and the reversion to major dissent and internal conflict in the Korean and Vietnam wars. But more immediate explanations for the contrast readily present themselves. The most frequently voiced explanation is that the world wars fitted much better than the more recent wars the traditional American image of the nature of war. From the colonists' first struggles with the Indians, in which each side fought for the very survival of its culture, this argument goes, Americans came to regard wars as total struggles for absolute victory or defeat. The very aversion to war and the military that was so much a part of American tradition implied that when the nation went to war, it must be under the most extraordinary circumstances, and that so immoral an instrument must be employed only against such moral enormities as demanded absolute destruction. The American Civil War reinforced these preconceptions as the North fought for and achieved complete victory over the Confederacy. The argument concludes that after such a history, Americans could well sustain their unity against the Axis Powers during World War II, but they could not readily accept a limited war such as the Korean War, in which negotiations with the enemy to bargain for objectives far short of his destruction accompanied the very fighting of the war.

Allowing for some oversimplification—not every American war had been fought for the enemy's destruction, as witness the conflicts of 1846–1848 and 1898—such an explanation captures much of the American attitude toward war and goes far to account for the frustrations of the Korean War. Dissent against the Korean War also was much encouraged by a peculiarly uneasy political atmosphere troubling the United States in 1950 even before the war began. World War II had produced not a satisfactory peace but a Cold War with communism and the Soviet Union, in which the United States government held out the prospect of no more triumphant an outcome than containment. So low an expectation was itself a drastic departure from popular expectations of what America might accomplish in the world. Moreover, from 1945 to 1950 the containment policy did not even produce a satisfactory restriction of communism. China, with all its historic attractions to the American imagination, fell to the communists. Then there broke out the prolonged, costly, and militarily stalemated war in remote Korea, a war which itself could be perceived as springing from the mistakes of Harry S. Truman, whose Democratic administration had allowed China to be "lost" and had then supposedly invited communist attack on South Korea by excluding that country from America's publicly proclaimed Pacific defense perimeter.

During the Korean War the opposition party, the Republicans, did not revert to the risks of outright partisan opposition, although they came close to that in such statements as Senator Taft's denunciation of the war as "an unnecessary war . . . begun by President Truman without the slightest authority from Congress or the people." Here Taft touched also on another source of pub-

lic dissatisfaction in the post-1945 limited wars, the unwillingness of presidents for various reasons to ask Congress to declare war. In such puzzling circumstances of undeclared war for limited but not clearly defined objects, it was not surprising that Republican objections came to focus on the theme that the war should either be fought to win or be terminated. This theme linked the Republicans with General Douglas MacArthur, the Far East commander whom President Truman felt obliged to relieve because of his insubordinate public calls for extension of the war in pursuit of "War's very object . . . victory."

The upshot of MacArthur's activities was the dramatic Truman-MacArthur crisis; but given the anomalies of the Korean War in terms of the American tradition of war, Korea would have provoked much the same partisan and popular discontent even if there had been nothing like that particular eruption. The concept of limited war was difficult for the sponsoring administration itself to master. The theorizing that was to make limited war a familiar conception at least to foreign policy and strategy intellectuals during the next decade still lay in the future. The Truman administration kept the Korean War limited not out of a sophisticated understanding of the conception but largely because of a misapprehension, namely that the war was a communist feint to divert American attention in preparation for a major Soviet offensive in Europe, and that, accordingly, American military resources must remain as much as possible concentrated in Europe and the United States. After China entered the war and destroyed the possibility of using the war to reunite all of Korea, the Truman administration lost its own enthusiasm for prosecuting the war, such as it had been able to summon up, and the administration became so eager for peace that it spared the enemy most military pressure as soon as it announced a disposition to negotiate. In these circumstances the negotiations dragged on inconclusively until the inauguration of a new government in Washington. With the very sponsors of the war so vague about its nature and objectives, so unskillful in its management, and so lacking in conviction that it was worth fighting, it is little wonder that public discontent with the prolonged bloodletting and the absence of clear military success made the Democrats extremely vulnerable in the elections of 1952. The electorate responded to Republican criticism of every aspect of the conduct of the war, and especially to the Republican candidate General Dwight D. Eisenhower's promise that somehow he would end it. With the help of the East-West thaw that followed the fortuitous death of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, President Eisenhower did end the war.

Dissent in the Vietnam War seemed to be still deeper and more widespread. Dissent certainly became a more conspicuous feature of the public scene, expressing itself in mass protest marches, demonstrations, and displays of civil disobedience. Public opinion polls indicate, however, that opposition to the Vietnam War grew stronger than opposition to the Korean War only after the Vietnam War had surpassed the Korean War in duration and in American casualties. The conspicuous public displays of dissent reflected not so much a greater opposition to the war in Vietnam than the war in Korea, but rather a shift in liberal opinion. Except for the extreme left wing, liberals had usually supported the Korean War as part of the staunch anticommunism that tended to mark their reaction to Stalinist Russia. By the 1960s, a less intransigent Soviet Union, the disruption of virtually all appearances of a monolithic international communism, and a rethinking of Cold War postulates in a more relaxed international atmosphere than that of the Truman years made liberals much less willing to support another war against a small Asian communist state than they had been in 1950–1953, especially when the Asian regime being supported by the United States was a distasteful blend of dictatorship and chaos. The conspicuousness of dissent against the Vietnam War was largely a product of the defection of many of the liberals from the foreign policy coalition of the establishment, because this group was an especially articulate one, in direct line of descent from the literary and academic dissenters against suppression of the Filipino insurrection. The conspicuousness of dissent against the Vietnam War was also much enhanced by employment of the methods of dramatizing dissent that liberals had learned from association with the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Measured against the apparent volume and the new tactics of dissent, the tolerance of the government for controversy displayed an advance over World War I, despite conspiracy trials directed against dissenters and the illegal methods of attempting to discredit Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the so-called Pentagon Papers to the press.

The liberal defection during the Vietnam War from the coalition that had supported the

Truman administration during the Korean War also reinforced the moralistic quality that dissent from the Vietnam War shared with dissent during the Mexican War and the Filipino insurrection. The liberal protest against the Vietnam War was another moral protest against an allegedly aggressive onslaught by the great and powerful United States against a weak and ill-armed adversary that was said to be seeking only the self-determination that America's own Declaration of Independence championed. Like dissenters during the Mexican War and the Filipino insurrection, liberal protesters against the Vietnam War charged that the war was betraying the highest ideals of the United States itself. Some of the more horrifying military expressions of modern technology, such as defoliation techniques and napalm, combined with an indiscriminate use of aerial and artillery bombardment by the American forces in Vietnam, gave special intensity to this moral protest.

Yet public dissent against the Vietnam War was not primarily moralistic. The conspicuous character of left-wing protest demonstrations against the war gave a misleading impression of the degree and the nature of the unpopularity of the war as compared with the Korean War. The left-wing protesters, especially the young among them, through the very tactics that made their protests conspicuous, antagonized moderate and conservative citizens. At any rate, the larger public discontent—including that discontent that most directly contributed to the electoral defeat of the original Democratic sponsors of the war and the triumph of their Republican opponents in 1968, much on the model of 1952—was not a moralistic dissent. It was again an expediential discontent that the issues of the war were puzzling in contrast to the great crusades of the world wars and that the Vietnam War was not being won.

THE GULF WAR AND AFTER

A major consequence of the U.S. military failure in the Indochina wars was the Vietnam syndrome—the anti-interventionist consensus in Congress and among the American public against sustained U.S. troop commitments in foreign crises. Unpleasant memories of the Vietnam debacle seemed to constrain American political leaders in the final quarter of the twentieth century from embarking on wars far away that might result in large numbers of U.S. casualties and still not bring quick victory.

The first two U.S. military undertakings in this period were short and occurred closer to the continental United States. Combined U.S.–Caribbean military forces landed on the island of Grenada in late October 1983 to protect lives and end the political chaos following a violent leftist takeover of the country. The "rescue mission," as President Ronald Reagan called it, quickly restored order and had mostly withdrawn by the end of the year. In December 1989 the U.S. Army decisively intervened in Panama to oust a dictator, curtail the drug traffic, and restore stability. Because both military actions were brief and successful, dissent was minimal.

Then dramatic political changes in the Soviet Union (including the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991) and its European satellite states brought the end of the Cold War. The anti-communist rationale that had helped to justify U.S. military involvement in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere disappeared. Conflict nonetheless persisted in the international system, and the United States, now the lone superpower, found itself confronted in the last decade of the twentieth century with a series of regional, religious, and ethnic controversies abroad. Although seemingly remote from immediate U.S. interests, America's leaders felt strong responsibility to play a prominent role in these conflicts, including the prospect of military intervention.

Of the several U.S. military interventions in the 1990s, dissent against U.S. involvement in the Gulf War was the strongest. Following the invasion and takeover of neighboring Kuwait by the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and his forces in the summer of 1990, George H. W. Bush's administration and the United Nations condemned the annexation and imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. When the strategy of economic strangulation failed to dislodge Hussein from Kuwait, the Bush administration mobilized a broad multinational coalition in the United Nations, which authorized military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait if its forces had not withdrawn from that country by mid-January 1991. The well-orchestrated gradual escalation of diplomatic and economic pressure on Hussein allowed time for extensive debate in the United States over the merits of prospective military involvement.

Public divisions on the Gulf War were mainly ideological, with opponents, many of whom were already committed to liberal and anti-war causes, forming coalitions composed mainly of student, religious, labor, African-American,

and human rights groups. On college campuses, for example, students claimed that young people were being asked to risk their lives in a crisis for which there were no vital U.S. interests, and the war could result in the reimposition of the military draft. Referring to the U.S. interest in regaining ready access to the rich Kuwaiti oil fields, a popular slogan, especially among more radical opponents, was "No blood for oil." A smaller, but articulate opposition from the conservative right argued that the Gulf War did not directly involve U.S. interests and, objecting to the international coalition, believed the United States should pursue its national objectives unilaterally. Proponents of U.S. action meanwhile emphasized Hussein's naked aggression in Kuwait and stories of Iraqi atrocities to counter antiwar advocates' moral protest.

Following President Bush's request in early January 1991 for congressional authorization to use U.S. armed forces to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, Congress openly debated and then approved resolutions endorsing U.S. military action against Iraq. The votes were fairly close, 52–47 in the Senate and 250–183 in the House, with divisions along party, ideological, and regional lines. Even without a decisive mandate for military action, however, the war effort, once begun, received strong popular American support, ranging between 70 and 80 percent in various polls, even after the allies began heavy bombardments of Iraqi military targets, which resulted in many civilian casualties. Opinion polls also indicated that U.S. women on the whole were inclined to have somewhat stronger reservations than men about the need for bombing and a military solution. When the air strikes failed to dislodge Hussein from Kuwaiti territory, a U.S.-led coalition of ground forces launched a military assault, which took only four days to drive the disorganized and demoralized Iraqi forces from Kuwait and obtain Iraq's surrender.

The swiftness of the U.S. military successes along with the often lighter-than-anticipated U.S. casualties sustained American public support for the Gulf War. Subsequent U.S. military operations abroad—in Somalia (1992–1994), Haiti (1994–1995), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999)—were likewise short-lived and without heavy casualties. The political anarchy and famine in Somalia prompted UN intervention, including thousands of U.S. forces, to bring humanitarian aid, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and nation-building to the African state. Poorly conceived and executed, the UN effort failed to restore political order, and ambushes and raids on the occupying contingents by Somali warlords resulted in the deaths of many American troops. U.S. public opinion, previously apathetic, directed its anger at the disastrous UN policies. President William Jefferson Clinton decided to cut the nation's losses, and dissent dissipated with the withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces from Somalia by early 1994.

In Haiti, an army junta's overthrow of a constitutionally elected government headed by Jean Baptiste Aristide in 1991 resulted three years later in a UN Security Council resolution authorizing a U.S.-led multinational force to invade and restore Aristide to power. Drawing on the War Powers Act of 1973, the U.S. Senate passed a nonbinding resolution requiring congressional approval before invading Haiti, but Clinton, like previous recent presidents, denied the right of Congress to restrict the commander in chief. The intervention quickly achieved its short-term political objective of restoring Aristide and political order, although a U.S.–UN peacekeeping presence continued in Haiti until 1997.

After UN forces and the major European nations failed to bring peace and stability to the ongoing political turmoil and fighting in the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton began to assume leadership of a U.S.–European coalition in response to the escalating conflict in Bosnia. Beginning in 1994, NATO planes made sporadic air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs who had violated no-fly zones and attacked "safe-haven" cities and towns for UN forces and Muslim civilians. Further reports of ethnic cleansing by Serbs and their intransigence resulted in more intensive NATO air assaults on Serb positions, and Clinton officials urged Congress to approve the deployment of several thousand U.S. troops to the beleaguered region. Polls suggested an almost even split in American opinion on military intervention in Bosnia. The House of Representatives first narrowly rejected the proposal. Following the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, which offered a framework for peacekeeping in Bosnia, Congress approved the deployment of 60,000 U.S. troops to implement the accords, although only by a very narrow margin in the House. Because large proportions of the American public and Congress were ignorant of or confused by the complex ethnic rivalries and conflicts in the Balkans, they wavered during the 1994–1995 crisis. While they seemed opposed to foreign military intervention, they also wanted the president

to respond to Serbian atrocities. Dissenters did not question the humanitarian needs to relieve the suffering in Bosnia, but argued that the nation's interests were not involved. In the end, the allied forces implementing the Dayton Accords in Bosnia had no U.S. combat casualties, and Clinton ultimately succeeded in announcing that U.S. troops would remain there indefinitely.

The public's deep ambivalence about involvement in the Balkans reemerged following Serbian forces' massacres of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (1999). Although many Republicans and Democrats in Congress held principled positions in supporting or opposing Clinton's authorization of U.S. and NATO bombing of Yugoslav positions, the partisan bitterness resulting from the recent impeachment and trial of President Clinton made more Democrats inclined to back the president. The Republicans by contrast were more unified in opposition. The failure of an antiwar House resolution as well as another one, by a tie vote, endorsing the air war suggested the hesitation. Meanwhile, the Senate approved the air strikes but rejected consideration of sending ground troops to Kosovo. Finally, after repeated NATO air strikes, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic capitulated and withdrew Serbian forces from Kosovo, and Congress agreed to fund NATO troops to maintain peace and order in the area. Because the air war lasted only seventy-nine days and occurred without a single U.S. casualty, dissent in the war never escalated.

In summary, dissent in war is not a new phenomenon in American history, born during the Vietnam War. All American wars have provoked dissent. Dissent is implicit in historic American attitudes toward war itself and is nourished when war becomes prolonged, costly in casualties, and indecisive. Because the American electorate has always shown only a limited patience for war, those troubled by dissent are mistaken when they interpret it as a new constraint upon the use of military force in American foreign policy. The constraint has been present from the beginning of American history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Thomas B., and Richard E. Baringer. *The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress: A Study of the Influences of Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting Behavior, 1861–1865*. Nashville, 1972. Approaches the subject indirectly but provides as satisfactory an index to dissent in the Confederacy as can be found.

Banner, James M., Jr. *To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815*. New York, 1970. Despite its very local emphasis, the best study of New England dissent in the War of 1812.

Bauer, K. Jack. *The Mexican War, 1846–1848*. New York, 1974. This full-scale study of the Mexican War is based on primary sources, and includes a good brief treatment of partisanship and dissent.

Bennis, Phyllis, and Michel Moushabeck, eds. *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*. Brooklyn, N.Y., 1991. A collection of articles by area specialists and journalists on the Gulf War, several of which are critical of and document opposition to U.S. policies in the region.

Blum, John Morton. *V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*. New York, 1976. The best survey of the American home front in World War II.

Brune, Lester H. *America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990–1992: Origins and Aftermath*. Claremont, Calif., 1993.

———. *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998*. Claremont, Calif., 1998. Both this and the previous entry provide useful surveys and contemporary analyses of U.S. foreign policy crises in the 1990s. They also contain extensive bibliographies of the monographs, articles, and memoirs dealing with these foreign policy issues of that decade.

Buzzanco, Robert. *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*. New York, 1996. A comprehensive work on opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War.

Calhoon, Robert McCluer. *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760–1781*. New York, 1973. Examines the Loyalists less in isolation and more in the whole context of the Revolution than do other works, therefore comes closest to treating the problem of Loyalism as a problem of dissent in war.

Curry, Richard O. "The Union As It Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the 'Copperheads.'" *Civil War History* 13 (1967). An introduction to Civil War dissent by way of a survey of the relevant literature.

DeBenedetti, Charles, and Charles Chatfield. *An American Ordeal: The Anti-War Movement of the Vietnam Era.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1990. A comprehensive work on opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War.

DeConde, Alexander. *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War With France, 1797–1801.* New York, 1966. Concerns a small war, but a formative one in shaping the limits and acceptability of dissent.

Jensen, Joan M. *The Price of Vigilance.* Chicago, 1968. A history of the American Protective League of World War I.

Just, Ward. *Military Men.* New York, 1970. Includes profiles of American soldiers during the Vietnam War and is useful for its portrayal of how the military perceived dissent.

Kurtz, Stephen G. *The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795–1800.* Philadelphia, 1957. Another study of the Quasi-War, with grim implications that the legitimacy of dissent in war might have failed to become an American tradition.

Kurtz, Stephen G., and James H. Hutson, eds. *Essays on the American Revolution.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973. Includes a number of the essays that touch on dissent. (John Shy's essay on the conflict as a "revolutionary war" especially has pertinent passages.)

Morison, Samuel Eliot, Frederick Merk, and Frank Freidel. *Dissent in Three American Wars.* Cambridge, Mass., 1970. In the perspective of the Vietnam War, Morison examines the War of 1812, Merk the Mexican War, and Freidel the Spanish-American War and imperialism.

Mueller, John E. *War, Presidents and Public Opinion.* New York, 1973. The most valuable effort to use public opinion polls to analyze the extent and nature of dissent in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Peterson, H. C., and Gilbert C. Fite. *Opponents of War, 1917–1918.* Madison, Wis., 1957. A standard work.

Polenberg, Richard. *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945.* Philadelphia, 1972. Offers a good introduction to issues of dissent and personal liberty.

Rees, David. *Korea: The Limited War.* New York, 1964. Written from the perspective of a British journalist applied to dissent in what Americans saw as a new kind of war.

Schirmer, Daniel B. *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War.* Cambridge, 1972. The fullest study of dissent during the Filipino insurrection, despite a perhaps inordinate focus on Massachusetts.

Schroeder, John H. *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848.* Madison, Wisc., 1973. Offers the most comprehensive study of Mexican War dissent.

Small, Melvin, and William D. Hoover, eds. *Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement. Essays from the Charles DeBenedetti Memorial Conference.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1992. A comprehensive work on opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; BIPARTISANSHIP; CONGRESSIONAL POWER; ELITISM; IMPERIALISM; ISOLATIONISM; JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE; PACIFISM; PEACE MOVEMENTS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PUBLIC OPINION; THE VIETNAM WAR.

DOCTRINES

Marc Jay Selverstone

Since virtually the earliest days of its existence, the United States has seen fit to announce in grandiose fashion its intentions and purposes to the world at large. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, the grandest statement of all, took aim at a foreign audience more than a domestic one. Subsequent declarations, often imbued with a millennial vision and a sense of exceptionalism, continued to broadcast the nation's principles far and wide. The emergence of the United States as a global power endowed those statements with increasing authority, for Americans as well as for those abroad. In time they came to take on the status of "doctrine," establishing the precepts of U.S. foreign policy.

For the most part, these doctrines sought to address immediate crises. Each involved diplomatic statements of intent; several of them spelled out specific actions in support of those intentions. For the most part, they sought to ground themselves in the traditions and lore of the American past. In an effort to establish that continuity, presidents have frequently referred to previous statements of policy, offering their own approaches as contemporary applications of enduring principles. Most of these declarations have carried weighty ideological content, venerating "free peoples" and the virtues of liberty. Yet they have been equally grounded in the language of national security, promoting the survival and safety of the American way. As a whole, they offer a thumbnail sketch of the history of American diplomacy.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

In many ways, the "doctrines" of American foreign policy take their cue from the Monroe Doctrine, the seminal statement of national purpose. Articulated in 1823, this doctrine reflects the concerns and aspirations of a young country, bold enough to assert its power on the world stage. In dictating that Europe maintain a "hands-off" policy toward the Americas, it established the United States as a global power, albeit one with limited, hemispheric ambitions. Those ambitions would expand, however, and in future decades the Monroe Doctrine would prove useful for interventionists and isolationists alike. As the most recognizable and perhaps most venerated of diplomatic principles, its hold on the popular imagination has been so strong that it has defined the limits of acceptable policy options, shaping the range of choices open to presidents for the better part of two centuries.

Any appreciation of the Monroe Doctrine must take into account the domestic conditions of a young America and the international dynamics of the European great power system. The United States had only recently withstood the economic and military challenges posed by France and Britain during the Napoleonic wars. The conclusion of hostilities in 1815 seemed to release a host of energies that Americans harnessed and then directed inward. Numerous projects dedicated to fostering a more robust national system—such as the building of roads and canals—expressed the desire of many to subdue the land. It was a project that Americans carried out with missionary zeal, believing it their destiny to inhabit and control vast reaches of space from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Extending the empire of liberty across the continent demanded that the United States shore up its diplomatic position, for that project of territorial expansion sought to absorb lands still coveted by several European states. One of those states was the empire of Spain, a world power from a previous era suffering the death throes of imperial overstretch. From Argentina to its holdings in North America, Spain's colonies in the New World were declaring their independence, a process that accelerated during the early years of the nineteenth century. Developments in connec-

tion with one of those holdings—West Florida—led Congress to establish a policy of "no transfer," which forbade the transfer of Spain's former colonies to any other European power. Interest in wrenching Florida free from Spanish control continued throughout the 1810s; by 1819 the United States was able to capitalize on Spanish weakness and secure title to Florida as well as to regions in the Far West. It was thus well on the way to enlarging the domains under democratic rule.

Support for political liberty was not wholesale, however. While Americans considered a more democratic world to be a more peaceful world—and more conducive to American interests—they questioned the ability of one and all to participate in the democratic experiment. Several members of the Monroe administration, including President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, regarded Latin Americans as poorly equipped for democratic government. Spanish misrule, Catholic hierarchies, and Old World cultures weighed heavily on those peoples, making U.S. officials leery of supporting revolutions that might ultimately fail—especially if Spain were to mount an effort to retake those lands. Concerns such as these led officials in the Monroe administration to curb their republican passions and withhold recognition. By the early 1820s, however, several of those nations had stabilized, warranting a more formal American commitment to their viability. That pledge would come via President Monroe's December 1823 address to Congress. Not only would the United States recognize those new nations; it would seek to prevent their recolonization by any European power.

While expectations of conflict with Spain created the general context for the Monroe Doctrine, the president's declaration stemmed from a more tangible and immediate dispute with Imperial Russia. The czar had long been interested in the Pacific Northwest, coveting the waters off the American coast as a valuable spot for commercial fishing. In 1821, Alexander I declared the waters above 51 degrees north latitude the exclusive province of the Russian American Company and sought to maintain ports as far south as San Francisco.

American officials were not the only ones eager to create a barrier between Europe and the Americas. British statesmen were similarly anxious about the signals coming out of continental Europe, particularly regarding the fate of imperial Spain. The breakdown of Spain's New World empire was accompanied by political disturbances at home; in the end, however, revolution abroad would not be accompanied by revolution at home as France invaded Spain in 1823, restoring monarchical control to the country. Fears that France, along with Prussia and Austria—the two other members of the Holy Alliance—were interested in regaining for Spain its American colonies unnerved the British. Such a reversal could threaten British holdings in the Atlantic as well as the balance of power in Europe.

These concerns led Britain to approach the United States in the hope of making a joint statement regarding the Western Hemisphere. The intended effect of that declaration would be to ward off Spanish efforts either to recolonize its lost domains or to transfer control of those nations to other European powers. In weighing the British proposal, Monroe sought the help of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Friends and political allies, both Jefferson and Madison leaned toward accepting the British proposal, an inclination Monroe shared. Secretary of State Adams, however, disagreed with both their appraisal of the situation and their recommended course of action. First, he pointed out, Spain was ill-prepared to reclaim its colonies, a condition that called into question the very basis of the British proposal. Moreover, even if the European monarchies were prepared to help Spain retake its lost domains, it would be foolish for the United States to throw in its lot with Great Britain. "It would be more candid," Adams argued, "as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France than to come as a cockboat in the wake of a British man-of-war." The United States, Adams was saying, should go it alone. It would brook no "interposition" by a European power in the affairs of the Americas, nor would it look kindly on efforts to subjugate newly independent states. For its part, America would refrain from inserting itself into the troubles of Europe, thereby consigning Europe and the United States to their respective and distinct spheres of influence. Those three principles—no interposition, noncolonization, and no interference—would become wedded to the fabric of American foreign policy, attaining the status of dogma for much of the nation's history.

While those principles have been considered sacrosanct by generations of Americans, government officials have taken great liberties with the Monroe Doctrine, invoking or discarding its precepts at will. The frequency with which politicians, scholars, and citizens have appealed to the doctrine, as well as the malleability it affords, has gen-

erated a fascination with this seminal statement of American policy, turning the study of it into a veritable cottage industry. Interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine have been changing since the middle of the nineteenth century, the time when scholars began to treat it with much gravitas.

One of those areas of debate concerns the very authorship of the doctrine. Historians have pointed to either John Quincy Adams or President James Monroe—with help from Jefferson and Madison—as the man more responsible for the doctrine's final form. Both Monroe and Adams sought to wall off Europe from the affairs of the Americas, and both men—though perhaps Adams more so than Monroe—were disposed to keeping America out of European affairs. Nevertheless, it was Adams who prevailed upon Monroe to make his statement a unilateral one, rejecting the idea that Britain and the United States establish their positions jointly. The most persuasive accounts have accorded Monroe and Adams equal responsibility, with Monroe supplying the document's idealism and Adams its geopolitical realism. Yet it was Adams's insistence that America make that statement alone, without the backing of Great Britain, that elevated the doctrine to its place in American lore. His ability to persuade Monroe on this score—arguably the most important aspect of the president's message—has even led one historian to cite the doctrine as America's declaration of diplomatic independence.

An ancillary debate has grown up around the issue of why the doctrine even appeared in the first place. Scholarship has revealed that fears of a Spanish intervention to reclaim its lost colonies—the context for the principle of nonintervention—were essentially groundless. By the time that Monroe made his statement in December 1823, the Holy Alliance had given up its plans, if any existed in the first place, for helping to reestablish Spanish colonial rule. The seeming irrelevance, then, of the Monroe Doctrine to the actions it sought to prevent has led historians to attribute more personal and political motives to its enunciation. In this account the presidential election of 1824 looms large, as Adams sought to outmaneuver potential rivals, some of whom were associates in Monroe's cabinet. Although an intriguing argument can be made for the relevance of these dynamics to the policy process, the weight of evidence seems to run against the argument that the Monroe Doctrine was more the product of political machinations than the principled stand of disinterested public servants.

Further scholarship has delved into the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, leaving historians to divide over its relative leanings toward interventionism and isolationism. These debates have often reflected concerns specific to the eras in which they took place. Reference to the doctrine, for instance, first appeared during the annexationist debates of the late 1840s. President James Polk would refer to it explicitly as justification for his policies of continental expansion. In that climate the Monroe Doctrine, with its apparent sanction of American privilege in the Western Hemisphere, captured the upsurge of nationalist feeling as the nation moved westward; indeed, historians have commented on the symbiotic relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the spirit of "manifest destiny," regarding those ideas as being—in the minds of nineteenth-century Americans—mutually reinforcing, if not identical.

Government officials and diplomatic historians would continually refer to the Monroe Doctrine throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, interpreting its rhetoric as support for their own isolationist or interventionist policy preferences. The doctrine would again assume an activist slant in the 1890s as Secretary of State Richard Olney invoked it with respect to the border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. According to Olney, British intervention in the quarrel would violate the time-honored principle of noncolonization; though sharp words were exchanged, tensions between the United States and Britain dissipated, inaugurating a period of much smoother relations.

Subsequent events would give the doctrine an increasingly interventionist spin. Fallout from the War of 1898 left the United States with a preponderance of power in the Caribbean, a power it codified with the Platt Amendment of 1901. Reserving for itself the right to intervene in Cuba's affairs, the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt began to mark out an entire policy toward the region that would expand upon Monroe's original dictum. What concerned Roosevelt was the ability of Latin American nations to pay their debts to European creditors. Fearing that a string of defaults might lead Europe to meddle in hemispheric affairs, Roosevelt chose to intervene in the economic and political lives of those nations, establishing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Episodes such as these have led historians to marvel at the doctrine's flexibility. As a statement of national interest, the Monroe Doctrine has appeared to

sanction economic imperialism in the Western Hemisphere as well as the missionary impulse to bring good government to the region. Whatever the case, scholars have offered ample evidence for the argument that such interventionism, whether in the service of cynical or noble motives, was absent from the doctrine's original formulation.

It has questionable relevance to American foreign policy in the twenty-first century. The self-imposed injunction against intervening in European affairs—broken on account of World Wars I and II—was altogether abandoned during the Cold War as U.S. troop commitments and armaments cemented the NATO coalition of west European states. American leadership during the air war against Serbian targets during the 1998–1999 Kosovo crisis invalidated whatever was left of that portion of Monroe's injunction. Likewise, U.S. administrations have alternately supported and condemned foreign involvement in hemispheric affairs. While the Reagan administration supported Britain's war against Argentina over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands in 1982, it clearly demanded that the Soviet Union follow a "hands-off" policy in connection with insurrectionary movements in Central America, as had the Nixon administration before it. Such actions suggest that if presidents are to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in the future, they will likely do so selectively, according to their assessment of prevailing geopolitical winds.

THE HOOVER-STIMSON DOCTRINE

While the framers of the Monroe Doctrine and its corollary limited their horizons to the Western Hemisphere, a later statement of national purpose would extend that horizon halfway around the globe. The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, named for President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, actually reiterated earlier pledges regarding American interests in the Far East. In doing so, it sent a mixed message: that while the United States would not recognize territorial changes realized by force of arms, it had no interest in coming to the defense of that principle.

The events precipitating the doctrine's articulation took place in northern China in September 1931, along a section of track on the South Manchurian Railway, which had been administered by Japan since the first decade of the century. An explosion near the railway, subsequently attributed to the Japanese military, was blamed by Japan on Chinese rebels. Japan used the occasion—thereafter known as the Mukden Incident—as a pretext to pacify ever-larger regions of Manchuria. Continued Japanese conquest alarmed the international community, prompting the League of Nations to condemn such aggrandizement. In an effort to underscore its concern, the league sought to enlist on its behalf support from the United States and the administration of President Herbert Hoover. On 7 January 1932, Secretary of State Stimson delivered notes to both Japan and China stating U.S. opposition to the course of events in Manchuria. Stimson's announcement was twofold: first, that the United States would not recognize any treaty that compromised the sovereignty or integrity of China; and second, that it would not recognize any territorial changes achieved through force of arms. It was a statement of pure principle, made even purer by the disinterest and inability of the United States to back up those words with deeds. Given the economic, military, and diplomatic constraints ensuing from the Great Depression, violations of the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine would bring public rebuke by the United States but little else.

Although the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine is often derided as a manifestation of pie-in-the-sky American idealism, its articulation made great sense to a great many at the time. Reflecting widespread revulsion at what the Great War had wrought—the enormous loss of life, manifold disruptions of European societies, and an overwhelming reluctance to repeat the mistakes of the past—the doctrine sought to marshal world opinion in the service of peace. Its appeal to universal standards of conduct reflected the emergence of a new mind-set in world affairs—that there was, in fact, such a thing as an international community and that certain norms governed its behavior. No statement was more emblematic of that consciousness than the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, an agreement signed by thirty-three nations outlawing the use of force as an instrument of national policy.

The doctrine was also rooted in the history of the region. Western interest in China stretched back hundreds of years, but the ability to exercise decisive influence on that country was a more recent phenomenon. Britain's 1842 victory over China in the first of the Opium Wars established a pattern whereby several countries, including the United States, were able to demand most-favored-nation trading status from the Chinese authorities. By the late nineteenth century, the imperial

powers were carving up China into separate spheres of influence. As China lay prostrate, U.S. Secretary of State John M. Hay proposed that those nations adopt an Open Door policy for China, an arrangement that would preserve China's territorial and administrative integrity while maintaining equal trading rights for all. It was Japan, however, that would mount the greatest challenge to the Open Door. Having gained a foothold in Manchuria following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan applied increasing pressure on China, resulting in its Twenty-One Demands of 1915. American remonstrations to Japan indicated that the United States would not recognize any agreements in violation of the Open Door, a position it reaffirmed in 1917 and then again in 1922. The Mukden Incident of September 1931 represented the clearest challenge to date of that long-stated U.S. position.

The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine also was part of the history of U.S. recognition policy. This policy dated to the early national period when Democratic-Republicans and Federalists, arguing bitterly over a proper response to the French Revolution, questioned whether the United States was obligated to carry out agreements signed with the ancien regime, and vice versa. The issue of diplomatic recognition would reemerge following the War of 1812, as a more assertive United States questioned the wisdom of establishing formal relations with a coterie of weak, newly independent Latin American nations; it was this debate, in fact, that was the backdrop for the Monroe Doctrine. The matter would demand executive attention once again during the administration of President Woodrow Wilson. A series of regime changes in Mexico—some of them bloody—led Wilson to withhold recognition of General Victoriano Huerta, reversing the general principle of conferring legitimacy on whoever could demonstrate de facto territorial control. The Mukden Incident would reopen the issue of whether, and on what grounds, the United States would recognize the sovereignty of a new controlling authority.

Despite America's absence from the League of Nations, U.S. officials hoped that body would act swiftly to resolve the crisis. To prod it into action, the United States sent an observer to attend its deliberations. This led to the formation of a commission of inquiry to investigate the dispute and report back to the league assembly. When in 1932 the commission announced its findings, which blamed Japan for the crisis, the Japanese delegation walked out of the League of Nations. In the interim, a new Japanese government had assumed power and embarked on the further conquest of Manchuria. It was this action, undertaken by Japan in the fall of 1931, that prompted Stimson to issue his policy of nonrecognition—a policy suggested, in fact, by Hoover himself.

Although Stimson had hoped his approach would garner European support, formal endorsements were not in the offing. Britain, reversing the role it had played earlier regarding the Monroe Doctrine, let America wave the banner of nonrecognition, hoping to benefit from that policy without having to tie itself too closely to the American kite. Ultimately, the League of Nations endorsed Stimson's pledge, although over the next several years a number of its members would recognize Japanese suzerainty over Manchuria.

By most any measure, the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine failed its first test. Only three weeks after the secretary of state delivered his diplomatic notes, Japan attacked the port city of Shanghai, extending its sphere of influence into central China. The United States refused to take action; Stimson wanted to impose sanctions on Japan, but Hoover was reluctant to engage the United States in measures he deemed tantamount to war. Moreover, given the domestic pressures Hoover was facing—including staggering unemployment figures, numerous bank failures, and a massive drop in consumer spending—it was all but impossible to send ill-prepared military forces around the world. The president hoped that China's size and culture would help it absorb the Japanese incursion, and that a dose of moral suasion would help convince the Tokyo leadership to cease and desist. Neither of these developments came to pass.

Insofar as Hoover dictated the nature of America's response during the Manchurian crisis, it seems wrong to castigate Stimson exclusively for policies that came to be associated with his name. Stimson envisioned a series of measures, increasing in severity, which he hoped would compel a Japanese change in behavior; the president, on the other hand, took the more isolationist position. Hoover, in fact, sought to wrestle authorship of the doctrine away from his secretary of state, a curious move given the manifest impotence of the measures it advocated. Yet grasping for evidence of leadership during the 1932 presidential campaign, Hoover wanted Stimson to consign its provenance over to the president. Eventually, Stimson did bestow that honor

upon Hoover. Nevertheless, its principles continue to be associated with Stimson, and any mention of a doctrine continues to bear his name.

The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine would continue to amass a sorry record during the 1930s as the new political orders in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Ethiopia—the fruits of German and Italian aggression and intimidation—received widespread international recognition. Fascism's ascendance, observers would argue, took its cue from Japan's earlier behavior in the Far East; reluctance to confront Japan emboldened Hitler and Mussolini, creating conditions for the greater horror to come. In this sense, the promulgation of both the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine and the League of Nations judgment might have done more damage to international peace than the withholding of such statements. The failure of both the United States and the international community to back up their words with effective retributive actions thus allowed the Japanese, and perhaps the Germans and Italians, to call the world's collective bluff, plunging hundreds of millions into global war.

Scholars have regularly disparaged the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine on those grounds, describing it as both toothless and dangerous. Some historians, in fact, have argued that Stimson's approach was even weaker than that of the League of Nations, for it offered no procedure for mediating the Manchurian dispute. Others have decried its reliance on "legalism"—the reliance on vague notions of universal norms to influence international behavior—at the expense of more "hard-headed" approaches to geopolitics. On the other hand, legal theorists have responded to the doctrine with guarded acclaim, pointing out that its injection of morality into global politics would help to shape an international consensus in the postwar era.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

While the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine sought to constrain Japanese militarism, the Truman Doctrine addressed a new and more global threat—that of international communism. The purveyor of that creed, the Soviet Union, had enjoyed a rocky relationship with the United States; since October 1917, Americans had looked upon the Soviets as outcasts and irritants. Then, during World War II, they became allies. With the emergence of the Cold War their status changed again, with Moscow now taking on the attributes of an implacable foe. President Harry S. Truman would help sear that image into the minds of Americans, most spectacularly when, on 12 March 1947, in a message before a joint session of Congress, he laid down a set of principles that would govern U.S.–Soviet relations for decades to come. "At the present moment in world history," Truman proclaimed, "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life." Too often that choice was not a free one. It would therefore be the policy of the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Although Truman chose not to identify those minorities or groups by name, their identity as communists was hardly in doubt. To help those free peoples—in this case, Greeks and Turks—withstand communist pressure, Truman would ask Congress to provide them with $400 million in economic and military aid. Yet far more than just Greece and Turkey was at stake, Truman proclaimed. The United States was caught in a global struggle between two opposing ways of life. Consequently, Truman deemed all of "the free peoples of the world" equally worthy of American assistance. By implication, then, the president's proposal was no mere stop-gap measure. As many in the press and government realized, it aspired to nothing less than the preservation of Western civilization.

Fears of postwar Soviet expansion had ebbed and flowed during 1946. The presence of Red Army troops in northern Iran well past the date established for their departure raised Western concerns about the nature of Moscow's intentions. Remonstrations by U.S. officials, however, led to a Kremlin withdrawal by late spring. Tensions would heat up later that summer as the Soviets pressured Turkey into revising the Montreux Convention—the protocol governing access to the Dardanelles—to allow for a joint administration of the Turkish straits with an eye toward the eventual establishment of Soviet bases in Turkey. Reports of Soviet troops massing along the Turkish border led the Truman administration to conclude that invasion might well be imminent. Turkish and American resistance led Moscow to drop its request, but Soviet behavior continued to worry U.S. officials.

Greece appeared to be the next target of the Soviet pressure campaign. Civil war between communists and monarchists had been raging in that country since the Nazi retreat of 1944, and neither the British, who stepped in as the occupy-

ing power, nor the Americans, who sent millions in aid, were able to quell the strife. Support for the communists came from the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, although U.S. officials feared—erroneously, as it turned out—that Moscow was the controlling force.

America's rise to power in the Mediterranean is also the story of Britain's fall from power. Previously, Britain had assumed the role of protector of the states in that area. With its economy in tatters following World War I, however, Britain found it could no longer play that role, and thus feared a Russian surge into the power vacuum it created. On 21 February the British embassy in Washington informed the State Department that Britain would soon be cutting off economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey.

Committing the nation's resources and prestige to the security and survival of Europe during an era of nominal peace was a radical departure for American policymakers. It certainly stood in stark contrast to Monroe's pledge not to intervene in European affairs. As a result, administration officials thought it necessary to portray the situation in the most dramatic of terms. The president's address to the nation therefore employed rhetoric bordering on the apocalyptic, casting the struggle with Moscow in a highly dualistic light. The choice facing America, Truman argued, was between two opposing and irreconcilable ways of life: between the virtues of democracy and the horrors of totalitarianism. Although the East-West conflict had become more ideologically polarized during the preceding twelve months, the administration had yet to frame it—at least publicly—in such a dichotomous fashion.

In doing so, the Truman Doctrine wove together several themes running through the national dialogue on the Soviet Union and thrust them out into the public realm with substantial force. One of them involved the image of "Red fascism." Although parallels between fascism and communism had been popular for years, the Truman Doctrine helped to work that image into the public consciousness, locking in the notion that Soviet Russia posed an equal if not greater threat to world peace than had Nazi Germany. The Truman Doctrine also contributed to the emergence of an equally powerful representation of the enemy: the "Communist monolith." Belief in the "monolith" presupposed that Greek communists, like all communists, were tools of the Kremlin. This was a viewpoint shared widely—and not without reason—by administration personnel and media figures alike. By minimizing the differences between any and all totalitarians, the Truman Doctrine reinforced that interpretation of communist behavior.

Not everyone in the administration embraced the overtly ideological cant of the president's speech. Officials such as policy planning director George Kennan, State Department counselor Charles Bohlen, and Secretary of State George Marshall thought Truman's comments either too dramatic, too overwrought, or too open-ended. Similarly, Walter Lippmann, the nation's leading journalist, likened the doctrine to "a vague global policy" devoid of any limits, and described it as "the tocsin of an ideological crusade." Indeed, fallout from the speech suggested that the public was—from the administration's point of view—focusing too narrowly on its military and ideological aspects and ignoring its economic dimension. The administration was thus caught in a public relations paradox. On the one hand, it sought to brief the country on what was transpiring in Europe; only by "shocking" the nation, it believed, could the American people grasp the issues at stake. Yet the resultant upsurge in anticommunist sentiment threatened to overwhelm the administration's capacity to manage it. Hoping to get the word out in a more sober fashion, a speech by Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson reframed the debate around the administration's preferred theme of economic reconstruction. Marshall would return to that theme in early June, laying the groundwork for the recovery plan that bore his name.

In the interim, Congress debated the terms of the Greek and Turkish aid bills. Their passage was by no means assured, for Republican victories in the 1946 election ushered in a Congress that was not in Democratic control for the first time since 1932. Many of those who now sat in the majority had won their seats on pledges of fiscal restraint and tax reduction. Lawmakers thus sought to limit the scope of Truman's policy, a restriction that Acheson refused to accept; future requests for aid, he stated, would receive consideration on a case-by-case basis. Congress raised additional concerns over whether the recipients of foreign aid could be considered democratic. Acknowledging that neither the Turkish government nor the Greek forces were paragons of liberal virtue, administration officials urged Congress to fund both groups nevertheless. Otherwise, they argued, both Turkey and Greece

would lose the ability to govern themselves and lay vulnerable to forces aided and abetted by the Soviet Union. Time was of the essence, Acheson declared; he and his associates urged quick action on the Greek and Turkish aid bills, arguing that the United States, and not the United Nations—with its clumsy machinery—was the proper engine for the aid program. Congress passed the aid measures and on 22 May Truman signed the bills. The Truman Doctrine was now the operative principle of U.S. foreign policy.

If the Monroe Doctrine established the general principles for subsequent declarations of American foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine established the more particular guidelines for the duration of the Cold War. It was the most dramatic statement issued by the administration since the emergence of conflict with the Soviets. It established a precedent of sweeping appeals to aid democratic forces, leaving to subsequent administrations the privilege of deciding precisely what constituted democratic behavior. Perhaps the greatest testament to its impact is the legislation and diplomacy that followed, more or less logically, from the premises it established. Within three years, the administration would usher through Congress bills establishing aid programs and treaties such as the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, committing the United States both economically and militarily to the defense of Europe. NSC 68, a 1950 National Security Council report to the president, and the attendant legislation that tripled the defense budget, likewise were expressions of the themes and arguments contained in Truman's speech. Indeed, for the next several decades, much of the nation's international behavior—from its involvement in Korea and Vietnam to its support of Afghani and Nicaraguan rebels—grew out of the postulates laid down in the Truman Doctrine.

Historians have long debated the merits and demerits of the Truman Doctrine. Some have described it as an inherently self-serving policy. For these scholars, the Truman Doctrine was the opening gambit in America's quest for global economic hegemony; the plan, they charge, was to make the world safe for American capitalism. To be sure, U.S. policymakers were acutely aware of economic concerns as they mapped out American strategy in the postwar era. Fears of a "dollar gap" in Europe mounted when American leaders considered the domestic implications of the continent's misfortune; the inability of Europeans to purchase U.S. goods threatened to slow down the American economic recovery, leading to renewed concern about recession and even depression. The Marshall Plan, as the argument goes, thus primed the American pump, allowing European consumers to maintain levels of spending adequate for U.S. economic vitality.

It is not entirely clear, however, whether American policymakers focused on those issues with such single-minded zeal. Administration officials certainly understood the reciprocal features of an economically vital Europe and United States and were no doubt interested in maintaining growth in the home market. But they also recognized the dynamic between the economic vitality of Europe and the political health of Europe; it was their contention that a vibrant economy, both home and abroad, was the best protection against communist gains. It was most likely this larger picture, involving a wider matrix of forces, that they had in mind as they contemplated their response to the British withdrawal notes of February 1947.

Scholars have also questioned the wisdom of Truman's rhetoric. Some have argued that his use of Manichean imagery locked the nation into a rigid, inflexible policy toward the Soviet Union. Diplomacy—the art of compromise—was all but impossible when one's counterparts were regarded as evil. Likewise, historians have argued, the persistence of that Manichean and monolithic framework prevented policymakers from recognizing difference and division within the communist world. An earlier appreciation of fragmentation in the Soviet bloc—and of downright hostility between some of its members—might have prevented America from pursuing some disastrous policy options, such as those involving the war in Vietnam.

These arguments need to be qualified, especially in light of evidence emerging from the former Eastern bloc. While the Truman Doctrine certainly did its part in establishing a powerful vocabulary for the Cold War, it seems as though the language it used reflected some fundamental truths about international communism. Stalinist Europe was very much a closed system, with the Soviet Union controlling much of what went on there. True, Tito's Yugoslavia was able to assert its independence from the Soviet grip, but that was the exception; the regionwide purge resulting from the Tito split only reinforced the tendency for the other Eastern European nations to do Moscow's bidding. Chinese Communists were no

more willing than their European counterparts to contravene Soviet wishes. Although tensions often resulted from tactical differences between Moscow and Beijing, on the larger questions the two stood side by side. As a result, American officials had little chance to court the Chinese Communists either before or after the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Things would change during the late 1950s and the 1960s, but so, too, would U.S. policy; the consensus established by Truman during the late 1940s would come unraveled as the nation plunged further into the jungles of Southeast Asia, leading another generation of policymakers to recast some of the early Cold War premises.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

By the mid-1950s the Cold War had undergone a transformation. Stalin's death in March 1953 ushered in a period of transition for the Soviet Union, prompting the Kremlin's new leadership to stabilize its own power as well as Moscow's position with regard to the NATO alliance. Yet changes in the international arena would encourage those men, as well as their counterparts in the West, to view the developing world as a new site for East-West competition. President Dwight D. Eisenhower would engage the Soviets in that global battle for hearts and minds, a conflict that threatened to become particularly fierce in a region vital to U.S. national security: the Middle East. Eisenhower's January 1957 pledge to defend that region from "any country controlled by international communism" recalled his predecessor's commitment to "support free peoples" resisting foreign aggression. Eisenhower's willingness to commit American troops to that project went beyond what Truman had offered in March 1947; still, both statements were cut from the same cloth. Working from the premises of the Truman Doctrine while extending its range of policy options, Eisenhower added his name to a growing list of policymakers whose statements had risen to the level of American political doctrine.

Like the Monroe and Truman Doctrines, the Eisenhower Doctrine grew out of a specific set of historical circumstances. Since 1946 the United States had sought to counter Soviet encroachment in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf; its program of assistance to Greece and Turkey, as well as its rhetorical defense of Iran, served to keep those nations within the Western orbit. Efforts to strengthen anticommunist forces in the region fell through, however, as Arab support for a Middle Eastern defense organization foundered over U.S. aid to Israel. Failure to erect a security structure for the Middle East in general—and for Western oil interests in particular—loomed large as the tide of anticolonialism grew in that part of the world.

Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser would rise to power on the force of anticolonialism, and the attraction of Nasser's equally potent message of pan-Arabism would pose further challenges to Western interests. The Eisenhower administration equated Nasser's radicalism and anti-imperialism with communism and hoped to contain the spread of those forces, a project of equal interest to Britain. In an effort to foster pro-Western sentiment, Britain tied itself to Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—each a nation bordering the Soviet Union—in a mutual defense organization known as the Baghdad Pact. Tensions in the region continued to ratchet upward as Nasser received arms from Czechoslovakia and, more dramatically, nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. The ensuing crisis over Suez damaged British and French prestige, embarrassed the United States, and resulted in a propaganda windfall for Egypt and the Soviet Union. Political power in the region thus seemed to be swinging away from the West and toward the communist world.

Eisenhower attempted to reverse that trend in early 1957. Addressing a joint session of Congress on 5 January, the president outlined what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, a plan of action for combating communism in the Middle East. A resolution designed to implement the doctrine authorized the president to provide economic and military cooperation and assistance to "any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East" fighting to maintain their independence. Money for that initiative, amounting to $200 million, would come from funds previously earmarked for the Military Security Act of 1954. Aside from providing economic aid, the resolution granted the president the option of using armed force "to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." After months of sometimes pointed debate—with lawmakers questioning both the imminence of communist aggression and the wisdom of granting the president a blank check for engaging U.S. forces—Congress passed the resolution, providing the

DOCTRINES ABROAD

During the Cold War, America's allies and enemies also resorted to doctrinal statements of policy. Here are two of the more noteworthy declarations.

The Hallstein Doctrine This doctrine was enunciated by the West German foreign minister Walter Hallstein in the context of the struggle to codify the postwar fate of the two Germanys and the shape of Eastern Europe. The Soviets had proposed that the two sides end their wrangling over Berlin and ratify the boundaries of the two German states. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who continued to endorse the Bonn government as the true government of Germany, resisted this plan and countered with his own statement of intentions. The Hallstein Doctrine declared that West Germany would have no relations with any country that recognized the existence ("entered into diplomatic relations") with the German Democratic Republic. The Bonn government followed through on its pledge, breaking off relations with Yugoslavia in 1957. Moscow's inability to settle the German question led Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, in 1958, to issue an ultimatum to the United States on the fate of Berlin, demanding the full incorporation of that city into East Germany. Failure to achieve that settlement heightened tensions over Berlin and contributed to Khrushchev's placement of missiles in Cuba in 1962. Cuba, in fact, became the second nation to run afoul of the Hallstein Doctrine, leading Bonn to break relations with Havana in 1960.

The Brezhnev Doctrine During the spring and summer of 1968, reformers in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, led by Alexander Dubcek, sought to create a new brand of socialism with a human face. Those moves, and the Czech leadership's resistance to Moscow's disapproval, occasioned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Defending his policy of force, Soviet premier Leonid I. Brezhnev maintained that "when internal and external forces that are hostile to socialism seek to reverse the development of any socialist country in the direction of restoring the capitalist system, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country appears, and a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, that is no longer only a problem for the people of that country, but also a common problem, a matter of concern for all socialist countries." President Ronald Reagan would cite the Brezhnev Doctrine in his own doctrinal statement of principles.

commander in chief with the tools needed to carry out the nation's foreign policy.

The administration would invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine a number of times over the course of the following two years. A political crisis in Jordan, which involved King Hussein's ouster of pro-Soviet members from his cabinet in April 1957, provided the first opportunity for doing so. Claiming that Jordan's independence was vital to the United States, Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean. When stability returned to Jordanian politics, Eisenhower attributed that relative tranquility to the American show of force. The administration would deploy naval and air units to the region for a second time in 1957, as Syria's acquisition of Soviet arms generated concern for the future independence of Turkey and Lebanon. Once again the conflict receded, and once again Eisenhower ascribed that development to American resolve.

Tensions in the region remained high nevertheless, with Nasserism adding a potent ingredient to the East-West conflict. Lebanon would bear the brunt of that mix when an internal political struggle mushroomed into an international one. President Camille Chamoun initiated that conflict in 1958, when he tried to circumvent the Lebanese constitution and extend his hold on power. Fearing a loss of control, Chamoun appealed to the United States for support under the Eisenhower Doctrine, citing Syrian meddling in Lebanese affairs as a pretext for his request. For six weeks the United States did not oblige him. It was not until 14 July, when a coup in Iraq installed a Nasserite and pro-Soviet regime in Baghdad, that the administration acted. Responding to Chamoun's renewed calls for support, and coming on the heels of British aid to Jordan, the

United States inserted fifteen thousand troops into Lebanon, the clearest application of the Eisenhower Doctrine to date.

Some have argued that Eisenhower's Eurocentrism and unfamiliarity with regional concerns blinded him to Middle Eastern realities, making him too willing to interpret the region's nationalist movements as hostile to U.S. interests. Much of this stemmed from Eisenhower's equating of Nasserism with communism. The president, in fact, attributed the Lebanese turbulence to the work of communist elements, a development that, he believed, threatened to engulf the entire region. His fear was that a single communist success might precipitate a domino-like chain reaction in which the governments of Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would each fall to the forces of Nasserism. Invoking the Munich analogy as well as the domino metaphor, Eisenhower declared Lebanon to be the victim of "indirect aggression from without," aggression that spelled trouble for pro-Western forces from Europe to Asia. His decision to send in the marines, therefore, stemmed largely from those broader concerns.

It is far from clear whether the destabilization of Lebanon would have resulted in the domino-like scenario Eisenhower envisioned. Nor is it clear whether anti-Western or pro-Soviet elements in the region would have been as hostile to America as Eisenhower imagined. Scholars have pointed to Iraqi general Karim Kassem as a case in point. Although Kassem would sign a defense treaty with Egypt and take his country out of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq emerged from the crisis as less ensconced in the Soviet camp than first believed. Neither of those measures—neither the arms deal nor the abrogation of the defense treaty—indicated complete subservience to the Kremlin. Moreover, while Kassem did increase his ties with Moscow, he also increased the flow of Iraqi oil to the West, hardly the response of an out-and-out Soviet lackey.

Historians have likewise questioned the wisdom of dispatching the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. While that show of force was supposed to deter Syria from meddling in Jordanian, Lebanese, and Iraqi politics, the move backfired, according to some historians, encouraging greater Arab unity in the face of Western intervention. Other scholars have claimed that the Eisenhower Doctrine sought to combat a threat that was largely imaginary. Nasser had no great affinity for the Soviet Union, and even less for Marxism. Rather, his anticolonialism was directed largely at Britain and France—not at the United States—leading Eisenhower to squander whatever good will he might have had with the Egyptian leader. Still others have cited Eisenhower's own actions as testaments to his doctrine's futility. Six months after the marines landed in Lebanon, they point out, the administration was reevaluating its entire approach to the Middle East, choosing to work with, and not against, Arab nationalism. By 1958 the Eisenhower administration was funneling over $150 million in aid to Egypt, hardly the result one would have expected prior to the doctrine's enunciation.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Eisenhower's vice president, Richard M. Nixon, would challenge the premises and augment the scope of Cold War presidential doctrines. One of Nixon's goals, in fact, was to limit the type of intervention that Eisenhower had joined in Lebanon, where the commander in chief responded to an international crisis by "sending in the marines." He would introduce his new approach on 25 July 1969, the very day that America began its lengthy retreat from the jungles and marshes of Vietnam. Speaking to reporters on the island of Guam, Nixon described the U.S. troop withdrawal in terms that endowed it with a broader, strategic rationale. Retrenchment, according to Nixon, would subordinate the nation's commitments to its interests, reversing the recent trend of American policy. Nixon's policy would likewise encourage friends and allies to marshal greater resources in their own defense, even as the United States continued to meet its treaty obligations. Finally, it would grant the United States greater flexibility to respond to new diplomatic realities.

Nixon derived these principles from his appraisal of the postwar international environment, the features of which, he argued, had undergone a recent and dramatic transformation. As Nixon explained, the United States was the only major country to escape the social and economic destruction of World War II. Consequently, in those first years after the war, friends and former enemies depended on the United States for aid in rebuilding their economies and resisting communist penetration. By the late 1960s, however, that first postwar era had given way to a new international configuration. Former recipients of U.S.

economic and military assistance were now capable of contributing more to their own defense; developing nations, at one time easy marks for communist agitators, now required less American help and protection. Of perhaps greater importance were the events taking place within the Eastern bloc. Soviet crackdowns on East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, as well as border clashes with China, were easing earlier fears of a monolithic communist movement. Those incidents, according to Nixon, testified to the "emerging polycentrism of the communist world," an altered landscape that presented the United States with "different challenges and new opportunities."

The Western alliance had also undergone something of a transformation. France withdrew from NATO's military command in 1966, challenging U.S. leadership of a united Western front. Britain, America's foremost partner in Europe, continued its fall from imperial glory, retreating from positions east of Suez in 1968. Economic troubles in both Europe and the United States would further tax the alliance, straining America's ability to "pay any price" for the survival of liberty. And the war in Vietnam continued to straitjacket America's flexibility and drain its resources.

Those realities led Nixon to reshape the rhetoric and practice of U.S. foreign policy. Although he accepted the premise that the United States remained "indispensable" to world peace and stability, Nixon also recognized the limits of American power. Other nations, he maintained, "should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours," a clear admission that the United States could not go it alone. America would, therefore, seek to balance the "ends" it desired in its foreign policy with the "means" available for doing so.

Nixon's Guam statement was the first indication that the president would be adopting a new strategic posture, prompting reporters to label its particulars the Guam Doctrine. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger resisted that appellation and sought to change it, believing that a statement of such importance should commemorate its originator rather than its place of origin. Yet the newly coined Nixon Doctrine was vague enough to require repeated and lengthy explanation. The president sought to clarify his intent in an address to the nation on 3 November 1969. First, he noted, the United States would "keep all of its treaty commitments." Second, it would "provide a shield" should a nuclear power threaten either the freedom of a nation allied with the United States or the existence of a country deemed vital to U.S. security. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Nixon vowed to maintain the outward flow of economic and military assistance in accordance with U.S. treaty commitments. "But," he added, "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."

Southeast Asia would be the setting for the most visible application of the Nixon Doctrine. In an attempt to extricate the United States from the war in Indochina, Nixon sought to "Vietnamize" the conflict by having indigenous troops supplant American forces. It was a program that took four years to complete, with the last U.S. troops leaving Saigon in 1973. That policy, part of a broader effort to reduce American commitments abroad, would also find a home in the Middle East, where Nixon tried to build his new security structure upon the "twin pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would benefit greatly from America's reliance on proxies, receiving a virtual blank check from Nixon and Kissinger to purchase enormous sums of American military hardware. It was a shopping spree that would boomerang on the shah—and on the United States—before the decade was out.

These manifestations of retrenchment were themselves part of a broader plan to alter relations with the Soviet Union and China. As he laid out in his Guam remarks, Nixon sought to capitalize on the "polycentrism" of the communist world. His visit to China in 1972 opened a new chapter in the Cold War; America would now practice "triangular diplomacy" and engage both the Chinese and the Soviets, creating new opportunities for U.S. foreign policy. One of those was in the field of arms control, where U.S. and Soviet officials sought to rein in a costly and dangerous arms race. Agreements regarding strategic weapons and antiballistic missile systems signaled a new spirit of cooperation between the superpowers, a relaxation of tensions that came to be known as détente. Given the overlap between those developments and his strategic vision, Nixon would ascribe his Soviet initiatives, as well as the commercial, cultural, and diplomatic ventures begun with the People's Republic of China, to the Nixon Doctrine as well.

Supporters hailed the Nixon Doctrine and the diplomacy of the Nixon-Kissinger team as a new, remarkable, and genuine alternative to the bitter contentions of the first postwar years. The domestic and international circumstances of the

late 1960s and early 1970s, they observed, simply would not allow for massive interventions along the lines of Korea and Vietnam. Instead, the United States would "balance" the distribution of power in the international arena rather than pursue preponderant advantage. Many commentators found this a welcome change, even a sign of political maturity. For the first time in the postwar era, the United States was to a great degree experiencing and acclimatizing itself to the limits of American power.

Critics of the doctrine divided over its novelty, meaning, and effect. Some regarded Nixon's policies in Southeast Asia—widening the war to Cambodia and dragging out American involvement for another four years—as fully consistent with the tactics of his predecessors. Others have charged that Vietnamization, a policy supposedly born out of a new strategic calculus, was less an inspired idea than an acceptance of, and rationalization for, failure. In fact, Nixon's use of proxies seemed to inaugurate a new phase of the Cold War; his successors would build upon that policy, supporting "freedom fighters" throughout the developing world. Far from signaling a lessening of tensions or an American retreat from the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine simply shifted the responsibility for fighting it. Now others would bear America's burden.

Still other scholars have questioned Nixon's use of proxy forces to safeguard American interests. Iran provides the most glaring example of that policy gone awry. In opening America's military coffers to the shah, Nixon fed the appetite of a ruler increasingly out of touch with his own people, accelerating tensions in a country deemed vital to the U.S. national interests. While that unrest derived most of its energy from internal factors, initiatives associated with the Nixon Doctrine contributed to such instability, paving the way for the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Detractors have also faulted the Nixon Doctrine for actually expanding the ranks of nuclear-capable nations. According to this critique, pledges to take friends and allies under the American shield left countries to wonder whether, and under what circumstances, they qualified for such protection. Nixon's failure to identify potential beneficiaries led nations such as Israel, India, Pakistan, and Brazil to join the nuclear club, preferring their own nuclear shields to the ambiguities inherent in an American one.

Finally, scholars have pointed out inconsistencies in the Nixon Doctrine. If its goal was to bring America's commitments in line with its resources, then pledges to aid countries threatened by communist subversion threatened to widen those commitments immeasurably. Application of the doctrine to the communist world seemed equally muddled. Although Nixon professed a recognition that international communism was polycentric rather than monolithic, he continued to oppose communist forces as though a victory for any of them was a victory for all of them, and especially for Moscow.

In the end, the Nixon Doctrine suffered from an inherent ambiguity. In trying to fashion a broad strategic posture for the United States, it became too diffuse, being associated with everything from détente to Realpolitik, to triangular diplomacy, to arms control, and to the use of proxy forces. In sum, it became the Nixon foreign policy agenda writ large. As such, it lacked a single, unifying principle tying administration initiatives together, even promoting one set of policies at the expense of another.

THE CARTER DOCTRINE

The era of détente would prove to be short-lived. Challenges to the Nixon administration emerged from both the right and left of the American political spectrum, questioning the moral basis as well as the geopolitical rationale of engaging the Soviets as equal partners. President James Earl Carter was no more adept at salvaging the spirit of cooperation than was President Gerald Ford before him. Carter's focus on human rights alarmed Soviet leaders, who were accustomed to Nixon's disregard for such issues. From Carter's perspective, a series of events, including conflict in the Horn of Africa and the discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba, led Carter to adopt a more hawkish position toward the USSR. Moscow's invasion of neighboring Afghanistan would bring him more firmly into the cold warrior camp. The Kremlin's December 1979 push south of its border jolted the administration, leading Carter to take several measures that, collectively, marked the clearest indication that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were in a free fall.

The president clarified the new situation one month later in his State of the Union Address of 23 January 1980. Referring specifically to the Soviet invasion, Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and

such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." By the following morning, the *New York Times* had given that policy a name: the Carter Doctrine.

Although the Soviet invasion was the proximate trigger for the Carter Doctrine, momentum for the president's policy shift had been building over the previous two years. Much of that energy flowed from concern over the fate of Iran. One of the "two pillars" undergirding America's security structure in the Middle East, Iran had been supporting U.S. interests for close to twenty-five years. Its position was so vital that the administration rarely, if ever, questioned Iran's ability to play that role; Carter himself labeled Iran "an island of stability" as late as January 1978. Yet in just over a year, the shah would be deposed, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would return from France and transform the country into an Islamic republic, and fifty Americans would be taken hostage by Iranian students and militants. With the Nixon Doctrine in tatters, U.S. policymakers sought to fashion a new strategy for the region.

Fears of regional instability were only partly responsible for Carter's movement toward a new strategic posture. According to the president, an amalgam of three distinct forces had combined to prompt his declaration of U.S. policy: "the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran." In all, a host of events had led the administration to conclude that American interests in the Persian Gulf were under grave threat. Only a more forceful statement of purpose could begin the process of redressing the regional and—in the administration's calculation—global balance of power.

The doctrine also emerged out of a long-running debate within the administration over its policy toward the Soviet Union. Carter's principal foreign policy aides, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, differed over the degree to which Washington should confront the Soviets. It was Brzezinski's contention that Moscow had never stopped probing for weak spots around the globe; for him, instability in both Central America and Africa testified to the Kremlin's continuing desire for ideological competition, especially in the developing world. Détente, he surmised, had merely allowed the Soviets to continue their expansionist thrust there under the cover of superpower cooperation. In contrast to Vance's preference for conciliation, Brzezinski had been lobbying for a more aggressive stance toward Moscow since the earliest days of the administration. A series of developments, including the discovery of Soviet soldiers in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, provided further support for Brzezinski's arguments. By the time that Carter delivered his State of the Union Address in January 1980, the Brzezinski approach had won out.

A host of measures associated with the Carter Doctrine followed quickly on the heels of its enunciation, signaling a new phase in Carter's approach to the Soviet Union and to his overall practice of foreign policy. Within a month of his address, Carter sanctioned the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force, a contingent of as many as 200,000 troops, designed to expedite the projection of American military power around the globe, and especially in the Middle East. He would take additional steps to improve America's combat readiness, preparing the groundwork for a reimposition of the military draft and asking Congress for a sharp increase in defense spending. Other policies would impinge on U.S.–Soviet relations as Carter enacted a partial grain embargo and boycotted the Moscow Olympics. Still further actions, whereby Carter withdrew a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty from senatorial consideration and extended the number of Soviet sites targeted by U.S. missiles, recast the nuclear dimension of the two countries' relationship. On top of those actions, Carter embraced Pakistani ruler Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, indicating his willingness to subordinate human rights concerns to the struggle against Soviet aggression. By and large, those measures appealed to a Congress eager for action after the previous year's indignities.

They also struck a chord with the American public. Opinion polls revealed general support for the president's statement, suggesting that Carter had correctly gauged the popular mood. Responding to criticism that Carter had engaged in pandering and political grandstanding, Brzezinski defended his president, explaining that the administration needed to make such a proclamation if only to steel the public for the demands ahead. Journalists, however, while hardly indulgent of Soviet behavior, interpreted Carter's speech as a fundamentally political move, designed to reshape the president's image at the outset of an election year. Scholars, too, have sub-

jected the doctrine to withering critiques. Some have described it as little more than empty posturing, crafted more to improve Carter's political fortune than to alter Soviet behavior. Still others maintain that Carter acted rashly, drawing conclusions about Soviet motives based on very little evidence—motives he himself would qualify throughout the remainder of his presidency. Still others have faulted the Carter Doctrine for its ambiguity, noting that it failed to define, with any sense of precision, the nature of aggression, the characteristics of an outside force, or even the boundaries of the Persian Gulf itself.

Moreover, scholars have argued, the Carter Doctrine and policies associated with it offered little in the way of tangible benefits. None of the measures aimed at the Kremlin—not the grain embargo, nor the Olympic boycott, nor the curtailment of additional trade—forced the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Nor did the president's unilateralism sit well with his European allies; only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supported Carter's approach. At the same time, however, European business capitalized on the chillier relationship as several firms concluded lucrative deals at America's expense.

While the Carter Doctrine secured few if any tangible gains—even its progenitor lost at the ballot box that November—it would continue to shape U.S. policy during the Cold War, largely because subsequent administrations bought into its premises. President Ronald Reagan and his advisers regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expansionist power; if anything, they, and the Bush administration that was to follow, were even more willing to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf from Soviet predations and political instability.

The Carter Doctrine also hastened the buildup of American arms, a process that was already under way by January 1980, and for which some historians give him high marks. It would be the Reagan administration, however, that would capitalize on the perceived need for military expenditures, expanding the size and cost, and revamping the shape, of America's military forces.

In relation to other Cold War presidential statements, the Carter Doctrine fit squarely within their rhetorical barriers. It maintained Truman and Eisenhower's focus on the Mediterranean and Middle East, a region that had become increasingly vital to U.S. officials in the aftermath of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing Arab oil boycott. Indeed, it echoed the excited language of both the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines, offering to assist those nations threatened by totalitarian aggression. And in associating himself with those two statements of national policy, Carter distanced himself from the previous two administrations. His willingness to intercede unilaterally in Middle Eastern affairs testified to the poverty of the Nixon Doctrine's "twin pillar policy," the very structure of which was now obsolete. Nevertheless, U.S. support for the Afghani resistance to the Soviet Union suggests that elements of Nixon's approach remained intact; the United States would continue to assist proxy forces resisting Soviet advances when such a policy proved fruitful, and would seek to impose its own forces when the situation demanded it.

THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

For the most part, the doctrines of American foreign policy have sprung largely from a sense of crisis in the world at large. From the early nineteenth until the late twentieth century, whenever presidents saw fit to articulate certain principles of American foreign policy, they did so in an environment of either apparent danger or impending opportunity. The Reagan Doctrine was no different. Presupposing a world of good and evil, it operated on the assumption that evil, in the form of the USSR, was gaining the upper hand. To Reagan and his advisers, examples of Soviet perfidy, including support for Marxist movements around the globe, were numerous; moreover, Soviet adventurism, from the Horn of Africa in the 1970s to Central America in the 1980s, showed no signs of abating. Reagan was intent on arresting that trend—a trend, he believed, that Carter had done little to reverse. Therefore, he adopted the rhetoric of the early Cold War, advocating policies equally assertive and bold in scope.

Reagan laid out that vision in his State of the Union Address of 6 February 1985. "We must not break faith," he declared, "with those who are risking their lives—on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth." The president went on to equate anticommunist forces with American colonists who had fought the revolutionary war, describing those latter-day patriots as "freedom fighters" for democracy. Providing aid to those groups was not only morally just but geopolitically sound. "Support for freedom fighters," Reagan avowed, "is self-defense." It would be months

before those declarations would take shape as a fixed statement of policy. In the interim, a further pledge to support "freedom fighters," made on 22 February by Secretary of State George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, lent added heft to Reagan's message. But it was neither Reagan nor his advisers who put the president's name to the set of policies he was announcing. Rather, it was Charles Krauthammer, a commentator on foreign affairs, who coined the term "Reagan Doctrine" in a *Time* magazine column of April 1985. Reagan's practice of waging Cold War through proxy forces had a long doctrinal pedigree, one that dated back to the early years of the Cold War. Presidents from Truman through Carter had all sought to aid governments or movements battling communism, but it was Reagan who, arguably, endowed that policy with its greatest energy. The belief that Moscow was supporting leftist movements in the Third World was one of the doctrine's guiding principles. As Reagan commented during the 1980 presidential campaign, "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world." Reagan himself chose to play that game early in his administration, authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency in 1981 to begin financing the "contra" forces battling the pro-Soviet Sandinista movement for control of Nicaragua. Funding for such anticommunist units suggests that the Reagan Doctrine appeared in practice long before it became enshrined as such.

Aside from injecting an explicitly moral component into the nation's conduct of foreign affairs, the Reagan Doctrine augmented the geopolitical rationale of earlier efforts. It was the administration's position that the Truman Doctrine's version of containment, which had been designed originally to thwart Stalin's aims in Europe, was obsolete. Since the 1950s the Kremlin had achieved considerable influence in the Third World, indicating that Moscow's ambitions were more global than originally imagined. This new reality, according to the administration, called for a revision of those basic postulates first laid down by Policy Planning Staff director George Kennan during the early years of the Cold War. With the Reagan team prepared to challenge the Soviets all over the globe, administration spokespersons began to call their approach "containment plus."

Reagan officials would add an offensive component to containment that was at least as explicit—and more wide-ranging—than anything that policy had sanctioned during the early Cold War. Secretary of State George Shultz, like Secretary John Foster Dulles before him, spoke of "rolling back" Soviet gains, recapturing nations and peoples for democracy. Yet Shultz pledged to do so in a new environment, where Moscow was a global power committed to the safeguarding of communist regimes. That Soviet conceit, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine—a 1968 statement by Premier Leonid Brezhnev declaring the irreversibility of socialist gains—was anathema to Reagan, "an arrogant pretension," as he termed it, "that we must face up to."

The administration's reluctance to cede virtually any ground to communism revealed another shift in America's Cold War policy and led Reagan to contravene a principle established in the Nixon-Ford years during the 1970s. That principle, known as the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine—after State Department counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt—upheld the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of according greater legitimacy to Soviet security concerns. Speaking to a gathering of U.S. ambassadors in December 1975, Sonnenfeldt urged the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans to seek a more "organic" relationship, downplaying the oppressiveness of that relationship while at the same time advocating a "more autonomous existence" for Eastern Europe "within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence." Displeasure with that position, on both moral and geopolitical grounds, led the Reagan administration to adopt a more aggressive, global policy that challenged the legitimacy of Soviet power.

Although Reagan was unquestionably supportive of the doctrine that bore his name, his role in formulating it seems to have been quite limited. His distance from that project accords with the operating style of a president whose involvement in the day-to-day tasks of policymaking was minimal at best. Clearly, however, Reagan was in tune with the doctrine's precepts—ideas that sprang from key advisers such as CIA director William Casey, UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Attorney General Edwin Meese. Speechwriters and publicists such as Anthony Dolan, Peggy Noonan, and Patrick Buchanan were equally important in shaping the message for public consumption. In the end, however, it was Reagan, through his mastery of public speaking, who sold it to the nation.

Reagan would implement his doctrine in a variety of locales around the world, from Asia to Africa to Central America. In Afghanistan, the

president sought to aid forces working to topple the pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Using means reminiscent of the Nixon Doctrine, Reagan provided the guerrillas with substantial amounts of military assistance in their battle against the invading Soviets. The administration offered similar support to Nicaraguan contras battling communist-dominated Sandinistas who had overthrown longtime dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Likewise, Reagan offered aid to anticommunists in Angola competing with the Soviet-backed government for control of that newly independent country. And in Cambodia the administration propped up a coalition of forces working to unseat a government installed by the Soviet-sponsored Vietnamese after Hanoi's invasion of 1979.

The track record of the Reagan Doctrine is mixed. The administration got what it wanted in Afghanistan: strong resistance to Soviet armed forces and an eventual troop pullout by Mikhail Gorbachev. To the extent that it accelerated popular distrust of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the war in Afghanistan—and the Reagan administration's contribution to it—helped bring down the Soviet empire and the USSR itself. Yet those immediate gains were offset in later years as Afghani forces turned on their former patrons, targeting U.S. interests around the world.

The Reagan Doctrine also gave a boost to the CIA, an institution that had come under fire during the 1970s as its abuses of power, investigated by Congress, came to light. Under the guidance of William J. Casey, the CIA resuscitated its operations division, carrying out policies largely shielded from public view. That emphasis on clandestine activity, however, would backfire during the second Reagan administration. Fears that "rogue" elements within the government were running U.S. foreign policy were borne out with the unfolding of the Iran-Contra affair, a political scandal that revealed how elements of the National Security Council undermined congressional legislation in an effort to aid the Nicaraguan rebels.

Scholars have questioned the distinctiveness of the Reagan Doctrine. The containment plus designation applied by its supporters suggested that the Reagan Doctrine added the element of "rollback" to the decades-old policy of restricting Soviet encroachment. In doing so, however, the administration exaggerated the novelty of its approach; though George Kennan might have called for engaging the Soviets on a more limited geographic basis in the late 1940s, by the time that Paul Nitze had replaced Kennan as head of the Policy Planning Staff in 1950—and certainly by the time that Truman had made way for Eisenhower—the United States was challenging communist and leftist movements far afield from the Soviet periphery. Similarly, Reagan's use of proxy forces echoed tactics used by every administration from Truman forward; indeed, the speech that launched the Reagan Doctrine included verbatim numerous paragraphs from Truman's 1947 speech. From Greek guerrillas to Guatemalan generals to anti-Castro Cubans to conservative Chileans, indigenous forces with anticommunist pedigrees had long fought America's Cold War battles on many a distant shore.

Others have criticized the administration for applying the Reagan Doctrine selectively. According to these observers, recipients of American aid were often lacking in liberal virtues; the Afghani guerrillas, for instance, hardly merited support on democratic grounds. Use of such proxies led commentators to label the Reagan approach as Realpolitik masquerading as morality, the very criticism Reaganites themselves had leveled at Nixon and Kissinger. It also led critics to charge Reagan with pandering to public opinion, since administration references to "freedom fighters" seemed more reflective of the president's domestic political needs than of the makeup of those forces receiving American assistance.

Aside from the more cosmetic aspects of the Reagan Doctrine, it is far from clear whether it succeeded in rolling back communist gains. Critics have charged that administration policies, such as those pursued in Nicaragua, actually retarded the emergence of stability and the growth of a more pro-American sentiment. Although the Sandinistas did lose at the ballot box in 1990, scholars have described similarly favorable outcomes in locales such as Cambodia and Angola as owing more to changes in the international arena than to Reagan's policies themselves. The breakup of Moscow's Eastern European empire in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered the geopolitical environment, undercutting support for pro-Soviet or Marxist regimes. Settlement of those regional conflicts, in ways largely favorable to Western interests, thus became easier to achieve.

Indeed, it is far from clear whether the allegedly greatest achievement of the Reagan Doctrine—the fall of communism itself—is attributable to Reagan at all. Historians have argued repeatedly that a host of troubles internal to the

Soviet Union—from a stagnant economy to a crisis of political legitimacy to the intractable nationalities question—were far more consequential to the undoing of the Soviet system than any challenge mounted by Reagan. Nevertheless, other scholars point out that Reagan gave the final push to the Soviet house of cards. It was his pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the argument runs, that bankrupted the Kremlin leadership, prompting a liberalization of the Soviet political economy that, in turn, loosed the forces that brought down the entire system. Likewise, it was Reagan's rhetoric that emboldened Eastern Europeans to become more assertive, leading to the events of 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Judgment on these matters still awaits a more thorough historical treatment.

Clearly, though, the last presidential doctrine of the Cold War was every bit as hawkish as the first. It sought to reinject a moral component to America's foreign policy, hearkening back to the language of the Truman years. In doing so, the Reagan team—rhetorically, at least—abandoned the amoral practice of Nixon-Kissinger Realpolitik, launching an all-out offensive against the "evil empire." Reagan's appraisal of the Soviets would undergo a shift, however, leading to a more productive relationship with Moscow, especially after the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev. Still, the administration remained hawkish in its approach to what it perceived as pro-Soviet forces. Working from a Manichean view of the world, the Reagan administration regarded all leftist regimes as tools of the Kremlin, a position that added greater force to its public rhetoric while possibly reducing the efficacy of its foreign policies.

CONCLUSION

At the most basic level, one can understand the doctrines of American foreign policy as statements of principle, designed to forestall crises or to meet them head on. The Monroe, Truman, Eisenhower, Carter, and Reagan Doctrines all sought to preempt actions deemed hostile to the United States by warning potential aggressors of American intent. They also pledged, save for the Monroe Doctrine, to support allied forces in their campaigns against predatory forces. To some extent, then, most of these doctrines carried deterrent qualities. The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine and the Nixon Doctrine stand out as exceptions: the former because it sought to compel the undoing of past actions as much as to deter future behavior, and the latter because it sought to do so many things, especially on the strategic level, with none of them targeting any specific threat.

In other ways, the story of America's foreign policy doctrines, at least during the Cold War, is the story of the United States supplanting Britain as a world power. Britain's inability to prop up pro-Western forces in Greece and Turkey precipitated Truman's request of $400 million in assistance for those two nations and a global commitment to aid others similarly imperiled. Eisenhower's pledge to aid Middle Eastern nations threatened by international communism came as a direct response to British, along with French, stumblings during the Suez crisis of 1956. Nixon's reliance on a "twin pillar" policy, while a recognition of America's limited resources, was itself brought on by Britain's withdrawal from territories east of the Suez.

And yet each of those statements exist as quintessentially, if not exclusively, American. Their content reflects the values of a nation imbued with a sense of mission to carry democratic principles around the world. Again, that sense of transcendent purpose shows up most clearly during the Cold War, yet previous statements contain elements of that creed. Nevertheless, the doctrines of American foreign policy are also clearly designed to promote the national interest. Whether they involved the creation of an Atlantic buffer between Europe and the Americas, or the defense of freedom—and free enterprise—in Europe itself, those doctrines have sought to protect American interests, be they material or nonmaterial, so that U.S. citizens could enjoy the blessings of liberty.

Those doctrines, in fact, reveal a close relationship between the missionary ideal of a more democratic world and the security ideal of a resilient America. For the most part, each presumes that the proliferation of democratic government would result in a more peaceful world and a more secure United States. Grounded in the belief that the peoples of the world are more desirous of peace than war, they posit that a government responsive to the will of the people would likewise seek pacific relations. These ideas are embedded in U.S. foreign policy doctrines from Monroe to Reagan. From the protection of democratic regimes in the Western Hemisphere, to the nonrecognition of military conquest in East Asia, to support for "freedom fighters" in the Middle East and around the world, those doctrines operated on the assumption that a more democratic world would be a safer world—and a more secure world for the United States.

At the same time, one might wonder why all presidents, especially from the middle of the twentieth century onward, did not have a doctrine of their own. Surely in an age of increasing American power, Franklin D. Roosevelt might have tapped into a legacy of past presidents and associated himself with a particular statement of purpose. Recent experience with such declarations, however, suggests at least one reason why a Roosevelt Doctrine failed to materialize. While the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary of Theodore Roosevelt were familiar concepts to Americans, the Stimson Doctrine—the latest in a growing line of policy proclamations—was hardly worthy of emulation. Moreover, previous statements of American purpose were made unilaterally; Franklin Roosevelt's grand declarations—most notably, the Atlantic Charter—were declarations of multilateral intent. Of Roosevelt's many pronouncements, therefore, the statement most likely to have merited doctrinal status might have been his 1937 pledge to "quarantine" aggressor states. Offered in response to Japanese depredations in China, Roosevelt's call for a moral embargo on predatory regimes was so vague, however, and supported with such little force, that a doctrinal statement of principle would likely have gone the way of Stimson's pledge.

The absence of a Kennedy Doctrine is also curious, though perhaps less so than at first thought. President John F. Kennedy devoted much of his energy to the Caribbean. After the Bay of Pigs debacle, however, Kennedy was loathe to commit himself publicly to the removal of the Castro regime, especially given the negative press the effort had received. Certainly it was an outcome Kennedy greatly desired, and he devoted considerable resources to its realization Yet it might have proved difficult to make so bold a statement on Cuba following his April failure. Indeed, it probably would have been ludicrous for him to have proffered a doctrine designed to rescue him from his earlier defeat. Moreover, having been roughed up by Nikita Khrushchev at the Vienna summit, Kennedy was in no position to be establishing rigid guidelines governing American policy. Aside from those considerations, Kennedy, his associates, and lawmakers in Congress had all spoken of the Monroe Doctrine both before and during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, so that a Kennedy Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine would have seemed superfluous.

Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, has received scholarly credit for various statements of principle; scattered references to a Johnson Doctrine do exist in the literature. In fact, scholars have identified two such doctrines: one relating to American policy in Southeast Asia, the other relating to U.S. policy in the Caribbean. The first Johnson Doctrine invoked several principles of recent American policy, including the Munich Analogy and the Truman Doctrine. He meant it to apply, however, specifically to Indochina. As he declared on 4 August 1964, the United States would "take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia." This first Johnson Doctrine, then, was synonymous with the ensuing Tonkin Gulf Resolution; in fact, they were one and the same. Scholars nevertheless usually invoke the resolution rather than the president in their treatments of the episode.

Johnson's second statement, concerning communism in the Caribbean, mirrors the one Eisenhower made regarding the Middle East. Delivered on 2 May 1965, following the insertion of U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic, this first Johnson Doctrine pledged "the American nations" to prevent the establishment "of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere." Its wording indicated the frustration policymakers felt at having to live with one communist regime only ninety miles from the United States. While Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic receive wide treatment in the literature, few scholars make reference to a "Johnson Doctrine" as such. Perhaps this is because of the "credibility gap" that opened up in the wake of the action. Claims that Dominican leftists were brutalizing the local populace and shooting at the U.S. embassy turned out to be false, prompting Americans to question the veracity of their president. Although the negative press Johnson received might have doomed his efforts to elevate the stature of his policy, equally rough treatment failed to prevent other grand statements, such as the one Stimson made, from rising to the level of doctrine.

In the post–Cold War era, the search for a guiding policy has proved frustrating and elusive, primarily because no international reality, such as that which followed World War II, has congealed. Nor were policymakers able to talk one into existence. President George H. W. Bush's "new world order" failed to materialize, although during the winter of 1990–1991 he was able to array a constellation of powers, the likes of which had never been seen, to resist the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush's successor, President William

Jefferson Clinton, was no more successful in attaching his name to any grand declaration of policy. While Clinton often spoke out in support of human rights, the tardiness with which the United States and the international community addressed the horrors in Rwanda and the Balkans indicates, perhaps, a problem with making sweeping statements about such issues. Establishing a doctrinal position on the evils of ethnic cleansing, for example, a position that might commit the United States to eradicating those practices, would likely compel a president to make good on that—a position that future presidents would likely resist.

Perhaps another reason for the absence of doctrinal statements lies with the nature of the international environment near the close of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War brought with it a diminution of public concern over a host of high profile issues, including the possibility of superpower war. Matters of "high politics," then, such as those involving the United States and Russia over the proliferation or reduction of nuclear arms, seemed less important than matters of "low politics," such as global trade and economics. While the Balkan conflict carried the seeds of a much wider war—indeed, that was part of the administration's reasoning for entering it in the first place—it never threatened the United States in ways that touched on the nation's very existence, in contrast to the superpower rivalry of the Cold War.

Still, during the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton, commentators attempted to affix doctrines to his name. None, however, seemed to have any staying power. Critics likened the Clinton Doctrine to a form of "social engineering," focusing on the president's attempts at nation building in Somalia or Haiti. Others have used the term when discussing Clinton's interest in "cooperative security" and his efforts to create an intricate web of economic interdependence. Again, only time will tell if these "doctrines" seep into the public consciousness.

Perhaps the most that can be said about the future of these grand statements of principle is that presidents will likely treat them as they have always treated them—with great amounts of discretion and latitude. Policymakers have routinely opted for liberal interpretations of these doctrines—the Monroe Doctrine being a case in point—invoking, discarding, or fudging their precepts at will. Nothing in the past offers any evidence for believing that future administrations will do otherwise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ammon, T. Harry. "The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision." *Diplomatic History* 5, no. 1 (winter 1981): 53–70. This and the response from Ernest R. May in the same issue provide a snapshot of the debate surrounding the circumstances of the doctrine's enunciation.

Arnson, Cynthia J. *Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America.* New York, 1989.

Berman, Larry, ed. *Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency.* Baltimore, 1990.

Combs, Jerold A. "The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine: A Survey of Interpretations by United States Historians." *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 27, no. 2 (1981).

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future.* Baton Rouge, La., 1982. The best monograph available on the origins, implications, and legacies of America's foreign policy doctrines, from the Monroe through Carter.

Daalder, Ivo. "And Now, a Clinton Doctrine?" *Haagsche Courant* (10 July 1999).

DeMuth, Christopher C., et al. *The Reagan Doctrine and Beyond.* Washington, D.C., 1988.

Ferrell, Robert. *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929–1933.* New Haven, Conn., 1957.

Fischer, Beth A. *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War.* Columbia, Mo., 1997.

Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948.* New York, 1972. Links the Truman speech with a corresponding loyalty-security program for containing communism at home.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "Reconsiderations: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 2 (1974): 386–402.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949.* Chicago, 1970. Includes a chapter on Dean Acheson's role in formulating the Truman Doctrine.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Washington, D.C., 1985.

———. "Détente and Deterrence in the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 1 (winter 1998): 145–148. On the Nixon Doctrine.

Gendzier, Irene. *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958.* New York, 1997. Covers the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Hyland, William G., ed. *The Reagan Foreign Policy.* New York, 1987.

Ivie, Robert L. "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1999): 570–591.

Johnson, Robert H. "Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine." *Political Science Quarterly* 103, no. 3 (autumn 1988): 509–529.

Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21–June 5, 1947).* New York, 1955. Offers the perspective of a State Department official and speechwriter who authored the 12 March address; a classic account of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. "NATO and the Nixon Doctrine: Ten Years Later." *Orbis* 24, no. 1 (1980): 149–164.

———. "The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: The Case of Greece." *Journal of the Early Republic* 13, no. 1 (1993):1–21.

Kaufman, Burton I. *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* Lawrence, Kans., 1993.

Kuniholm, Bruce. "The Carter Doctrine, the Reagan Corollary, and Prospects for United States Policy in Southwest Asia." *International Journal* (Toronto) 41, no. 2 (1986): 342–361.

Lagon, Mark P. *The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter.* Westport, Conn., 1994.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 4 (fall 1983): 245–266.

Lesch, David W. *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East.* Boulder, Colo., 1992.

Little, Douglas. "His Finest Hour?: Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis." *Diplomatic History* 20 (winter 1996): 27–54.

Litwak, Robert S. *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976.* New York, 1984.

Manning, Robert, and Patrick Clawson. "The Clinton Doctrine." *Wall Street Journal* (29 December 1997).

May, Ernest R. *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine.* Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

McFaul, Michael. "Rethinking the Reagan Doctrine in Angola." *International Security* 14, no. 3 (winter 1989–1990): 99–135.

Pach, Chester J., and Elmo Richardson. *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower.* Lawrence, Kans., 1993.

Perkins, Dexter. *A History of the Monroe Doctrine.* Rev. ed. Boston, 1955. The classic, and still the most persuasive, account of the doctrine.

Rabe, Steven. "The Johnson (Eisenhower) Doctrine for Latin America." *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 1 (1985).

Schmertz, Eric J., et. al., eds. *President Reagan and the World.* Westport, Conn., 1997.

Schweizer, Peter, ed. *The Fall of the Berlin Wall : Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 2000.

Smith, Gaddis. *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years.* New York, 1986.

———. *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993.* New York, 1994.

Takeyh, Ray. *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The U.S., Britain, and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–57.* New York, 2000.

Teicher, Howard, and Gayle Radley Teicher. *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush.* New York, 1993.

Telhami, Shibley. "Raise Stakes via a Clinton Doctrine." *Los Angeles Times* (3 November 1999).

Tucker, Robert W., ed. *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine.* New York, 1985.

Wittner, Lawrence S. "The Truman Doctrine and the Defense of Freedom." *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 2 (spring 1980): 161–187.

Xydis, Stephen G. *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–1947: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine.* Thessalonika, Greece, 1963. Provides solid background on the situation in Greece.

Zakaria, Fareed. "The Reagan Strategy of Containment." *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (autumn 1990): 373–395.

See also COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; CONTAINMENT; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; THE MUNICH ANALOGY; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; RECOGNITION.

Dollar Diplomacy

Eugene P. Trani

In his final message to Congress on 3 December 1912, President William Howard Taft looked back at the foreign policy followed by the United States during his administration and noted: "The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims."

Taft's remarks gave formal definition to the term "dollar diplomacy," a phrase synonymous with the diplomacy his administration pursued between 1909 and 1913. During those years the goal of diplomacy was to make the United States a commercial and financial world power. It was a narrowly constructed view of foreign relations, arising in great part out of the natural alliances between the corporate lawyers who came to people Taft's administration and the bankers and businesses that were their clients. Thus, the Taft administration concentrated on assisting American businessmen in the protection and expansion of investment and trade, especially in Latin America and the Far East.

The idea of protecting American commercial interests around the world was not new and had been part of the diplomacy of the United States since its earliest days. Efforts to trade with British and Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere, defense of the rights of neutrals to trade in wartime, and support of the most-favored-nation concept were all predecessors of dollar diplomacy. Yet dollar diplomacy was the subject of much controversy during the Taft administration and in the years that followed.

Much of the contemporary controversy over dollar diplomacy stemmed from the fact that Taft, the handpicked successor of Theodore Roosevelt, had embarked on a policy that differed from the one Roosevelt had followed. Roosevelt was an expansionist and had supported the American move into world affairs. For a variety of reasons, Roosevelt believed expansion necessary for the United States, with benefits for the rest of the world. He viewed foreign affairs in strategic terms, with Europe as the center of world power. He felt an affinity for Britain and based much of his diplomacy on cooperation between Washington and London. To be sure, Roosevelt supported the expansion of American business throughout the world, but he was much more concerned with the balance of power and improving the Anglo-American relationship. As a result, Roosevelt mediated the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the conflict between France and Germany over Morocco in 1906.

Taft came to office with a different view. Ever the lawyer, he viewed foreign policy in terms of legal institutions. He thus came to support arbitration treaties. He had differences with Roosevelt over Europe, feeling that the United States had little or no interest in events there. Taft kept the United States out of the second Moroccan crisis in 1911, and, while supporting mediation, he was not willing to mediate the Italo-Turkish War (1911) nor the first Balkan War the following year. Taft believed that the most important relations with Europe occurred in developing nations where the United States and Europe shared interests.

Taft's view of the role of American business in foreign policy also differed from Roosevelt's. Taft long had been concerned with foreign trade. He recognized that by 1909 the United States was producing more goods than Americans could consume and therefore had to increase exports. It was perhaps symbolic that during the Taft administration, in 1910 to be exact, that the United States began to export more manufactured goods than raw materials, changing the focus of trade from industrial nations in need of raw materials to lesser developed countries that required finished products. In this regard the developing areas of Latin America and East Asia seemed particularly

important. A concentration on economic opportunities in Latin America and East Asia, especially China, would have many benefits. Such a policy would help the American economy by solving the problem of overproduction. It would benefit recipient nations, bringing economic progress, which in turn would mean political stability; and stability would guarantee American strategic interests in underdeveloped areas. It was not surprising that in Taft's first annual message (7 December 1909) he stated: "To-day, more than ever before, American capital is seeking investment in foreign countries, and American products are more and more generally seeking foreign markets."

While Taft had ideas as to the diplomacy the United States should follow, he had no interest in serving as his own secretary of state, further distinguishing his administration from Roosevelt's. The man whom Taft chose to carry out his foreign policy, after refusals by Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, was Philander C. Knox, a wealthy conservative Pennsylvania lawyer then in the Senate. Knox had been attorney general between 1901 and 1904; and this fact, in the president's view, more than made up for his lack of experience in foreign affairs, since Taft wanted lawyers in his cabinet. Knox had been what is now known as a corporation lawyer, the Carnegie Steel Corporation being one of his clients. He was thus sympathetic to big business.

Knox shared Taft's views concerning the goal of American diplomacy—protection and expansion of economic interests. A State Department memorandum of 6 October 1909 pointed out that all developed countries were seeking trade and noted that trade was essential to American prosperity. There could be no more important task than expanded investment and trade. Diplomacy had to support American financiers and businessmen by finding opportunities abroad. The State Department appeared to anticipate the activities of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the 1920s, when Herbert Hoover was secretary of commerce, although Hoover strenuously objected to the concept of dollar diplomacy, making it a priority following his election to the presidency to eliminate its effects, particularly in Latin America. But locating commercial opportunities abroad was not enough for Knox and Taft. As the 1909 memorandum indicated, the United States would insist that Americans compete with Europeans in the developing countries by buying bonds, floating loans, building railroads, and establishing banks.

So it was that the State Department during the Taft years turned to dollar diplomacy. The policy gained support throughout the diplomatic corps, a fact that was especially important as Knox concentrated on policy and allowed subordinates to run day-to-day operations. Francis M. Huntington Wilson, first assistant secretary of state, presided over the daily activities of the State Department and carried out a reorganization of the department into geographical bureaus. Huntington Wilson, Willard D. Straight, and Thomas C. Dawson, the latter two the initial heads of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and the newly created Latin American Division, respectively, all shared the views of Taft and Knox on trade and investment.

When the administration talked about dollar diplomacy in Latin America, it was almost always referring to the Caribbean, which had strategic implications because of the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal. Concerned over the general instability of the Central American governments, Taft and Knox set a goal of stable governments and prevention of financial collapse. Fiscal intervention would make military intervention unnecessary. As Knox told an audience at the University of Pennsylvania on 15 June 1910: "True stability is best established not by military, but by economic and social forces. . . . The problem of good government is inextricably interwoven with that of economic prosperity and sound finance; financial stability contributes perhaps more than any other one factor to political stability."

Such statements did not mean that Taft and Knox were unwilling to use military power in the Caribbean. They did use it. They thought that fiscal control would lessen the need for intervention. They believed that the United States and nations of the Caribbean would both benefit. For the United States, an increase in trade, more profitable investments, and a secure Panama Canal would result. For the local inhabitants, the benefits would be peace, prosperity, and improved social conditions.

Taft and Knox believed that the way to control the finances of the Caribbean countries was to take over customhouses, following the example of the Roosevelt administration in the Dominican Republic. According to the Taft-Knox doctrine, it was important to get the Caribbean nations to repay European debts by means of loans from American businessmen or at least from multinational groups in which Americans participated. In Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and

Haiti, the United States pushed refunding schemes. The State Department believed that these sorts of reforms would end political instability in the Caribbean.

Nicaragua proved the classic case of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean. While the American economic interest in Nicaragua was small, the country had been an alternate route for the trans-Isthmian canal. The United States was sensitive to activities in Nicaragua. The longtime dictator José Santos Zelaya had never been popular in Washington and was seen as the cause of much instability in Central America, the result of his efforts to dominate the area. When Knox took control of the Department of State, he ordered withdrawal of the chargé d'affaires from Nicaragua, began to press private business claims against the Zelaya government, and sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to discourage a Franco-British consortium from making a loan. In cooperation with Mexico, the United States also sent warships to stop Zelaya from filibustering in Central America.

In October 1909 the situation became complex with the outbreak of civil war in Nicaragua. Insurgency centered on the eastern coast in Bluefields, a city dominated by foreign businessmen and planters. These foreigners and conservative politicians in Nicaragua followed the lead of General Juan J. Estrada. Foreign money, some of it American, bankrolled the revolutionaries. While declaring itself neutral, there was little question as to which side the U.S. government supported. Formal neutrality disappeared when Zelaya executed two Americans captured while fighting with the rebels. The United States broke off relations, asserting that the revolutionaries represented "the ideals and the will of a majority of the Nicaraguan people more faithfully than does the Government of President Zelaya."

Washington made known that Zelaya's resignation in late 1909 was not enough. Huntington Wilson pushed for expulsion of the liberal party from power, hoping the rebels would take control. U.S. forces landed at Bluefields to make sure fighting did not damage American interests. Successes followed for the insurgents, and by the end of August 1910 they had taken the capital, Managua. The United States expected fiscal reform in Nicaragua, and refused to recognize the new government until it had agreed to American control of the customhouses and to the refunding of the debt owed to British bankers by means of a loan from American financiers. Dawson went to Nicaragua to negotiate the terms of recognition.

This did not end the difficulties, for the American demands were unpopular. The United States went ahead with its financial program, even though the Senate delayed action on the treaty (known as the Knox-Castrillo Convention) worked out between Washington and Managua in June 1911, which called for refunding of Nicaragua's internal and external debts and administration of the customs by a collector approved by American officials. While the Senate debated, bankers went ahead with the rehabilitation of Nicaraguan finances, making a loan with the national railroad and the national bank as collateral. American citizens also began to collect Nicaraguan customs and to serve on a mixed claims commission, all in anticipation of Senate action. Much to the distress of Taft and Knox, the treaty died in a Senate committee in May 1912, along with a similar treaty with Honduras.

Another revolution broke out in Nicaragua in July 1912, and this also brought American intervention. Approximately 2,700 marines landed to protect U.S. citizens and property and to suppress the revolution, which was over by early October. Although the majority of the marines was soon withdrawn, a legation guard remained as a symbol of intervention until 1925. The Taft administration went out of office in March 1913, convinced that the policy it had followed in Nicaragua was correct. Intervention had proved necessary, the administration admitted, but it was only for a short time and continued fiscal intervention would make further military intervention unlikely.

The Taft-Knox policy toward Nicaragua, and for that matter toward the rest of Central America, was unquestionably offensive to Latin Americans. Even a goodwill visit through the Caribbean by Knox could not overcome suspicions. Knox said the United States did not covet an inch of Latin territory, but such utterances were not accepted south of the Rio Grande.

In the years after 1912, political leaders in both Latin America and the United States attacked Taft's policy toward Central America. Elihu Root believed that dollar diplomacy rekindled Latin fears and suspicions of the United States that he had worked so hard to overcome while secretary of state from 1905 to 1909. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson made clear that he would not support special interests trying to gain advantages in Latin America. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, finally approved in 1916, contained provisions similar to the second treaty

Knox had worked out with President Adolfo Díaz of Nicaragua in early 1913. Even so, Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan were much less interested in protecting U.S. businesses in Latin America than Taft and Knox. Dollar diplomacy as a policy was at an end in Latin America. Criticism of the policy continued. Like President Hoover, President Franklin D. Roosevelt renounced dollar diplomacy. Both presidents attempted to construct what became known as the Good Neighbor Policy in dealing with Latin America, and the concept of the Taft-Knox doctrine was all but dead by the time of the Hoover administration. In the long run, of course, American businessmen did increase trade and investment in Latin America, but it was World War I, not dollar diplomacy, that decreased European economic interests in that part of the world.

If the results of dollar diplomacy were meager in Latin America, where the United States was the dominant power, they were a disaster in China, the target for the Taft-Knox policy in East Asia. Of course, the situation in the Far East was difficult. In the late nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century much change had taken place. With victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, Japan had become the major power in the Far East. Theodore Roosevelt had supported Japan's new prominence in East Asia. He decided that Japan did not threaten American interests there. He saw the Japanese as a barrier to Russian expansion; a preserver of the balance of power in East Asia; protector of the Open Door; and stabilizer of China, a nation for which he had little respect. Roosevelt had backed Japan in its war with Russia and in 1905 had mediated the peace.

Roosevelt had hoped to arrange a balance of power between Russia and Japan after the war, but the Japanese victory was so decisive and other events in Japanese-American relations so important that he gave up on the Open Door in China, especially in Manchuria, which the Japanese began to close after 1905. Because of the need to protect the Philippines, which Roosevelt believed was the "heel of Achilles" of the United States, and the war scare that resulted from the Japanese immigration crisis, Roosevelt accepted Japanese expansion on the mainland of Asia. He came to feel that the Open Door was not worth war with Japan. The United States should do what it could to preserve interests in China, but should recognize Japan as the dominant power on the Asian mainland. In short, he gave a green light to Japanese expansion. One of the best expressions of this belief appeared in a letter to Knox on 8 February 1909, shortly before Roosevelt left office. He noted that Japanese-American relations were of "great and permanent importance." While immigration to the United States had to stop, the United States should "show all possible courtesy and consideration." The Taft administration had to understand that "Japan is vitally interested in China and on the Asiatic mainland." Since the Pacific coast of the United States was defenseless and "we have no army to hold or reconquer the Philippines and Hawaii," the country had to avoid war. Roosevelt felt that American interests in China were insignificant in American Far Eastern policy.

Even as his administration came to an end, forces were at work that would change Roosevelt's policy in East Asia. In 1908 Root had established the State Department's first geographic unit, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Headed by Willard Straight, the division opposed Japanese expansion in China, and this opposition was to dominate the division in the years between 1909 and 1941.

Roosevelt's East Asian policy thus was reversed. With urging from the State Department and because of a combination of motives—economic expansion, suspicion of Japan, faith in the future of China—the Taft administration decided to challenge Japan in China. During the Taft years, the Open Door Notes, which had frequently changed in meaning after 1900, assumed new importance in the Far Eastern policy of the United States.

In Far Eastern policy, department officials now proved important. Taft and Knox did not need convincing. Both believed China was the country of the future in the Far East and that if the United States desired influence with that emerging nation it had to increase its financial interests there. If the president and secretary of state had any doubts about such policy, they were overcome by State Department advice. Huntington Wilson, who had served in Tokyo, and Straight, who had been consul in Mukden, Manchuria, were both hostile to Japanese ambitions in China. They had tried unsuccessfully in the last days of the Roosevelt administration to enlarge the Open Door to include investment and trade. With Taft and Knox they had more success.

The Taft administration came to see investment in railway development and loans to the Chinese government as the means to increase influence in China. Knox demanded that American financiers be given the opportunity to join the

British, French, and German consortium in lending money to China to finance railroad construction in the Yangtze Valley, the so-called Hukuang Railway loan. When the demand met with European hostility, Taft appealed to the Chinese head of state: "I have an intense personal interest in making the use of American capital in the development of China an instrument for the promotion of the welfare of China, and an increase in her material prosperity without entanglements or creating embarrassments affecting the growth of her independent political power and the preservation of her territorial integrity." The State Department persuaded a group of investors to assume part of the loan. Knox grudgingly got his way, but only at the price of irritation in Britain, France, and Germany. In the long run, this project was a failure.

From the Hukuang loan the State Department turned to Manchuria. The result was the Knox neutralization policy, which more than any other proposal epitomized dollar diplomacy in China. In the fall of 1909, Knox proposed that American, Japanese, and European bankers lend China enough money to repurchase the Chinese Eastern Railroad, held by Russia, and the South Manchurian Railroad, in the possession of Japan. Manchuria would be neutralized and open to all commercial activities. Washington feared that southern Manchuria was being closed to non-Japanese influences. Knox realized that the Japanese would be difficult, but he thought the proposal would be supported in Europe. Britain, France, and Germany eventually decided to defer to the wishes of Japan and Russia, and in January 1910 the latter two nations rejected the plan. Only the Chinese showed interest, but that soon turned to concern when Russia and Japan agreed in July to cooperate in guaranteeing the status quo in Manchuria. Knox had only succeeded in driving the former enemies into a virtual alliance to prevent American interference in Manchuria. A companion proposal by Straight, who had left the State Department to head the American consortium planning a railroad that ran parallel to portions of the South Manchuria line, met a similar fate.

By the fall of 1910, Knox recognized defeat in his railroad plans for Manchuria. Throughout the rest of his term as secretary of state, he continued to work for increased American involvement in China, but through plans that did not contest the Japanese and Russians in Manchuria. He became involved in plans for a multinational currency reform loan, but the Chinese revolution that began in 1911 put an end to that scheme. The government that overthrew the Manchu then negotiated with a six-power consortium for a reorganization loan. Negotiations dragged on until the Taft administration left office.

Dollar diplomacy in China stimulated international controversy. The Taft-Knox policy succeeded in causing distress, irritation, and even anger in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Tokyo. Knox's clumsy attempts to help China only weakened the empire, since Japan and Russia agreed on a policy. The policy aroused controversy in the United States, where bankers were reluctant to participate. Roosevelt opposed the policy, writing to Taft in late 1910 that the Open Door in China could only be maintained by general diplomatic agreement. He noted that "as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the 'Open Door' policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war." Roosevelt was convinced that Japan was one such nation, and that the United States ought not to try to bluff the Japanese on the mainland of Asia, especially since Americans would never agree to fight a war there.

Wilson later withdrew government support from American investors planning the reorganization loan, charging that the loan violated Chinese sovereignty and threatened China with intervention. The American investors backed out of the loan, and the last of the dollar diplomacy schemes came to an end. In the long run, Wilson reversed his position, approving participation in a consortium in 1918. But Japan remained the dominant power in China until World War II, and Roosevelt's policy seemed valid in retrospect. Taft and Knox failed in their goal—to dislodge Japan from the Asian mainland.

There were other areas to which the Taft administration tried to apply dollar diplomacy, such as in Turkey. Breaking sharply with the traditional American policy toward the Ottoman Empire, which centered on protecting the rights of American citizens, the Taft administration attempted to share in the mining, irrigation, and railroad concessions then being negotiated by the Turkish government. Taft hoped that the United States would obtain a larger share of the commerce of the Near East. He was to be disappointed. The United States found the European powers too entrenched, and dollar diplomacy failed in Turkey. But Central America and China were the most spectacular examples of the doctrine.

The controversy over dollar diplomacy lasted well after 1913. Generally recognized by students of international relations as a failure, dollar diplomacy has engendered controversy concerning its motives and the people responsible for carrying it out. Some writers have argued that the policy was primarily economic, while others have contended that it was dominated by strategy, especially in Latin America. Others have defended the desire of the Taft administration to "do good" in Latin America and Asia, in some cases noting that its failure was probably owing more to diplomatic bumbling than imperialistic urges. The most recent writings of scholars have additionally argued that the logic of imperialism undermined the logic of "dollars for bullets," which ended up relying on military intervention to protect the interests of businesses and individual investors. In effect, dollar diplomacy created, rather than mitigated against, havoc. The most balanced account of dollar diplomacy, that of the historians Walter and Marie Scholes, has combined these motives and also noted that Taft's diplomacy anticipated U.S. foreign policy after World War II. Taft and Knox chose private capital as their instrument, whereas President Harry S. Truman used public capital. In both instances, the most important consideration was preservation of vital American interests abroad by helping underdeveloped countries establish viable governments and integrating them into the twentieth century.

Debate as to responsibility for the policy has taken two directions. Historians have argued over the roles of Taft, Knox, the State Department, and American businessmen. Straight has especially been the subject of debate. One account has convincingly argued that Straight's role in the Far East has been exaggerated. The most reasonable conclusion would seem that there was a common purpose among the advocates of dollar diplomacy.

Another direction of the debate over dollar diplomacy has been whether it was only one aspect of a continuous policy followed in the twentieth century by the United States—to expand American economic opportunities abroad. It is clear that Taft's predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, and his successor, Woodrow Wilson, as well as the rest of the American leaders in the twentieth century, supported the expansion of American business, up to and including the Clinton administration's crafting of the NAFTA agreement and approaching foreign relations with China on economic, rather than human rights, terms, to the dismay of many Americans and their congressional representatives. Indeed, the term "dollar diplomacy" was revived by the media to describe the thrust of U.S. foreign relations during the 1990s. There has, however, been no extensive scholarly investigation into the validity of using the policy of the Taft administration to define the economic foreign policy being carried out by the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century. No president, other than Taft, has made such a policy the principal goal of diplomacy. As a result, the term "dollar diplomacy" remains synonymous with the diplomacy of 1909 to 1913.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Latin American Policy of the United States.* New York, 1943. Although dated, the work is still valuable.

Cohen, Naomi W. "Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909–1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 45 (1959).

Coletta, Paolo E. *The Presidency of William Howard Taft.* Lawrence, Kans., 1973. Gives a comprehensive study of Taft's administration.

Collin, Richard H. "Symbiosis vs. Hegemony: New Directions in the Foreign Relations Historiography of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft." *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 3 (summer 1995), 473–497. An excellent historiographic article.

Drake, Paul W., ed. *Money Doctors, Foreign Debts, and Economic Reforms in Latin America from the 1890s to the Present.* Wilmington, Del., 1994.

Esthus, Raymond A. "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899–1910." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46 (1959). Important to see how the Taft administration tried to change the meaning of the Open Door policy.

Gardner, Lloyd C. "American Foreign Policy 1900–1921: A Second Look at the Realist Critique of American Diplomacy." In Barton J. Bernstein, ed. *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History.* New York, 1968. Argues the importance of economic motives.

Hunt, Michael H. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* New Haven, Conn., 1973. Disputes Straight's importance in the formulation of America's East Asian policy.

Israel, Jerry. *Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905–1921.* Pittsburgh, 1971. Stresses continuity in America's Far Eastern policy.

Kahn, Helen Dodson. "Willard D. Straight and the Great Game of Empire." In Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds. *Makers of American Diplomacy: From Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Kissinger.* New York, 1974. Portrays Straight as architect of dollar diplomacy in East Asia.

Minger, Ralph E. *William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900–1908.* Urbana, Ill., 1975. Gives extensive treatment to Taft's involvement in foreign affairs before he became president.

Mulhollan, Page Elliott. *Philander C. Knox and Dollar Diplomacy, 1909–1913.* Austin, Tex., 1966.

Munro, Dana G. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921.* Princeton, N.J., 1964. Cites the importance of strategy as the motivation of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean, and is very comprehensive.

Nearing, Scott, and Joseph Freeman. *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism.* New York, 1966. A socialist view in an update of a 1926 work.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930.* Cambridge, Mass., 1999. Goes beyond the defined period of 1909–1913.

Scholes, Walter V., and Marie V. Scholes. *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration.* Columbia, Mo., 1970. The best study of the diplomacy followed by Taft.

Smith, Robert. "Cuba: Laboratory for Dollar Diplomacy, 1898–1917." *Historian* 28 (1966). A revisionist account of relations with Cuba.

Varg, Paul A. *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897–1912.* East Lansing, Mich., 1968.

Vevier, Charles. *The United States and China, 1906–1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1955. A generally balanced treatment.

See also CONSORTIA; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; OPEN DOOR POLICY.

The Domino Theory

Edwin E. Moïse

Vietnamese communist leaders founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, but it took them until 1975 to achieve control of the whole country. For most of that thirty-year period, there were people who argued that communist control of Vietnam must be blocked, not just for the sake of Vietnam itself, but to prevent communism from spreading through Vietnam to other countries.

Historically, the spread of communism had usually involved proximity; of all the countries that were communist during the Vietnam War, only the Soviet Union and Cuba had become so without bordering on lands already under communist control. It was easy enough, therefore, to argue that if Vietnam were to become communist, this would increase the threat to neighboring countries. Some people did make the argument in this reasonable and realistic form. Others, however, found it inadequate. The only country bordering on Vietnam that did not already have a communist neighbor was Cambodia, a country of which few Americans had much awareness. To say that if Vietnam fell, Cambodia would be endangered, might not stir drastic action. To inspire a massive effort to save Vietnam, it was necessary to predict that a massive disaster would result if Vietnam were allowed to fall—great danger or even certain doom for a whole string of countries, most of which did not border on Vietnam. This prediction was given the name "domino theory" after President Dwight D. Eisenhower's classic statement of it at a press conference on 7 April 1954:

> Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. . . . When we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the [Malay] Peninsula, and Indonesia . . .

Eisenhower's language was contradictory; first he referred to the "certainty" that the last domino in the string would fall if the first one did, but then he referred to the "possible" sequence of events. Eisenhower seems not in fact to have believed that the fall of Indochina would be certain to trigger the fall of a whole string of other countries; he only thought the danger was very great. Others committed themselves more firmly to a prediction of doom. A few months before Eisenhower's press conference, Donald R. Heath—the U.S. ambassador to the Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)—had written that if the French abandoned their effort to save Indochina, "Only the blind could doubt the immediate Communist engulfment of Southeast Asia."

Some versions of the theory envisioned a longer row of dominoes than others. Eisenhower's classic statement had predicted the fall of everything down to Indonesia, but not of the Philippines or countries beyond. That was about average. Modest versions of the theory reached only as far as the fall of Thailand. The most extreme ones reached very far indeed. Thus, Walt W. Rostow, formerly Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser, said in 1969, the year the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam began, "There's nobody in Asia who doesn't understand that if we pull out of Vietnam, we'd have to pull out of all of Asia, the place would fall."

Even in its weaker form, with the fall of the dominoes treated only as a danger, not a certainty, the theory was a strange one. There was no previous country the fall of which to communism had triggered the rapid fall of a whole string of other countries. Why should it have been thought probable, or even possible, that the consequences following from the fall of Vietnam would be so much greater than those that had followed from the fall of China?

ORIGINS OF THE THEORY

To the extent that there was a historical foundation for the theory, it lay in the origins of World War II. Late in 1938 at the Munich Conference, Britain and France had allowed Adolf Hitler to take the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Many people believed in retrospect that Hitler would have been relatively easy to stop at that time, if the democracies had stood firm in defense of Czechoslovakia. There is no way to tell whether this belief was correct, but at least it was not obviously foolish. However, the opportunity to try to stop Hitler before he became too strong was not taken. Within less than two years after Munich, Hitler partitioned what had remained of Czechoslovakia; invaded and partitioned Poland; overran Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France; and started the Battle of Britain.

The end of World War II eliminated Hitler and his government, but Joseph Stalin remained. Stalin was a ruthless and extraordinarily brutal dictator, a mass murderer on a huge scale. He had emerged from World War II controlling not only the Soviet Union but also much of East-Central Europe. Stalin seemed obviously similar to Hitler, and some of the differences between the two—that Stalin ruled a larger area with a larger population and more industry than had Hitler, and that control of the international communist movement gave Stalin a worldwide influence—made Stalin seem a greater menace than Hitler had been. In 1949 Stalin got the atomic bomb, and the conclusion of the Chinese civil war brought the largest country in the world under communist rule, which many in the United States assumed to mean Stalin's rule.

Even before 1949 some people had begun to worry that any further territorial gains by Stalin or communism—little distinction was made between the two—could trigger a cascade effect, like the rapid sequence of Nazi conquests in the two years after Munich. Dean Acheson described in his memoirs the arguments he had used in February 1947 to persuade U.S. congressional leaders that they must support measures to prevent a Communist victory in Greece:

> I knew we were met at Armageddon. . . . Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic communist parties in Western Europe.

The geographic logic was rather peculiar. For Greece to have gone communist would not have opened up a single new country to communist contagion, assuming that communism spread by contagion like rot from one apple to another in a barrel, because the only non-communist country bordering on Greece was Turkey, and Turkey already bordered directly on the Soviet Union. The congressional leaders, however, seem to have found Acheson's case persuasive. It was also suggested that if West Berlin (a small and strategically valueless enclave in the middle of Soviet-controlled East Germany) were to be lost, then Western Europe as a whole would crumble and fall under Soviet domination.

THE THEORY EXTENDS TO ASIA

The pattern of thinking soon extended to Asia, where communist parties were engaged in armed struggles in several areas. The Chinese civil war was clearly tending toward a communist victory by the end of 1948. The First Indochina War, in which the Vietminh—a Vietnamese nationalist group under communist leadership—fought the French, was stalemated until 1950, when the balance tipped toward the Vietminh. Guerrilla struggles on a much smaller scale were occurring in Malaya and the Philippines, and there was a brief communist rebellion in Indonesia in 1948.

In November 1948 Madame Chiang Kai-shek, wife of the president of the Republic of China and quite popular in the United States, told the American people that "if China falls, all of Asia goes." This statement was given considerable publicity in the American press. In December the government of the Republic of China declared in a message to the U.S. Congress that "if China should unfortunately be conquered, the Far East will be sovietized and so would Asia and Europe." Several prominent Americans said much the same, but the theory that the fall of China would trigger a widespread disaster did not take hold at the top levels in Washington.

It was French government officials who originated the idea that the loss to communism of Indochina, or even a part of Indochina, would lead to the loss of a huge area. In January 1949 French president Vincent Auriol commented upon a proposal that France attempt to negotiate peace with

Ho Chi Minh. He rejected this idea, arguing that to negotiate with Ho, an "agent of Moscow," would lead to the loss not only of Indochina but of the rest of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia under Soviet control would constitute a barrier between the United States and Europe; the result would be to "hand over Europe to Russia." The later spread of the theory in the United States, however, was more a matter of independent invention than French influence, although the French did make an effort to spread it.

One might have thought that when the fall of China, the world's most populous country, to communism in 1949 failed to trigger the rapid loss of a string of other countries, Americans would have come to doubt that the loss of smaller and less important countries could trigger the disaster. Instead, the idea that the fall of Indochina, or just Tonkin in the northeastern corner of Indochina, could trigger a cascade of other losses, took hold within the U.S. government only after China had fallen without causing such a result.

In the last years of the Truman administration, the National Security Council staff tried to maintain some restraint about statements concerning the dire consequences of Indochina's fall. The State Department went a little further, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the most extreme, saying for example in April 1950: "The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. Their fall would . . . bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to the Communists."

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

When Dwight Eisenhower became president at the beginning of 1953, he appointed John Foster Dulles as secretary of state. Dulles pushed a very radical version of the domino theory, more extreme than had ever before been advocated by anyone so high in the U.S. government. At a meeting of the National Security Council on 31 March 1953, Dulles listed the vital strong points around the periphery of the communist bloc—Japan, Indochina, India, Pakistan, Iran, and NATO—and then, according to the record, "warned that the loss of any one of such positions would produce a chain reaction which would cost us the remainder."

In August 1953 President Eisenhower defined the threat in terms almost as extravagant: "If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malayan peninsula, the last little bit of the end hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible . . . all India would be outflanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no defense." Eisenhower acknowledged that it would be possible to stop this chain of events by major intervention even after Indochina fell, but he said that halting the process at any later point would be more expensive than stopping it in Indochina.

In early 1954, as it began to appear that a French defeat in Indochina might be imminent, Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was urging that the United States commit combat forces to Indochina, and he used the domino theory as a major argument. He said that if the communists gained control of the Red River delta, in northern Vietnam, they would win Indochina as a whole, and if they won Indochina they would then win the rest of Southeast Asia. The eventual fall of Japan would be probable. Sometimes he simply said each stage would trigger the next. At times he acknowledged that strong U.S. intervention might be able to prevent the fall of Indochina from causing the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia, but like Eisenhower the previous year, he said that intervention on a much larger scale would then be needed.

The press tended to endorse the domino theory, though not in its most extreme forms. Press versions of the theory typically suggested the fall at most of Southeast Asia, sometimes just the mainland of Southeast Asia, and indicated that this was likely to happen if Indochina fell, rather than saying it would definitely happen.

When the National Security Council met on 6 April 1954 to consider among other things whether the United States should intervene militarily in Indochina, President Eisenhower "expressed his hostility to the notion that because we might lose Indochina we would necessarily have to lose all the rest of Southeast Asia." But when Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey asked whether the United States should really be committing itself to oppose communism everywhere in the world, Eisenhower came close to endorsing the view that a few minutes earlier he had rejected. The record of the meeting first summarizes Eisenhower as having said: "Indochina was the first in a row of dominoes. If it fell its neighbors would shortly thereafter fall with it,

and where did the process end? If he was correct, said the President, it would end with the United States directly behind the 8-ball." The record then goes on to quote Eisenhower as having said that "in certain areas at least we cannot afford to let Moscow gain another bit of territory. Dien Bien Phu itself may be just such a critical point." The very next day, Eisenhower made in a press conference the famous statement of the domino theory that has already been quoted.

The oddity of the logic comes into clearer focus if one considers Burma. Eisenhower mentioned Burma specifically; Radford included it implicitly when he said that if the Red River delta fell to communism then the rest of Southeast Asia would also fall. China had become communist in 1949. Burma shared a long border with China, essentially undefended. A very large area along this border had been in dispute between China and Burma even before the communists came to power in China. Anticommunist forces were mounting armed raids into China from Burmese territory, which would have provided the Chinese with ample excuse for taking action against Burma if they wished to do so. Roads capable of carrying military supplies from China into Burma (the Burma Road and Ledo Road of World War II fame) existed, although they were probably in poor repair. Despite all of these factors, the Burmese government did not seem about to be overthrown by either Chinese or Burmese communists. Yet communist rule in Indochina, which had a land area about 8 percent of China's and a population 5 percent as large, barely bordering on Burma at all and having no military roads leading into Burma, was expected to cause the fall of that nation. While some of Eisenhower's remarks show at least a little caution, the part of them in which the domino metaphor occurs suggests not only that Burma would fall if Indochina fell, but that it would fall quickly. According to Radford, the fall of just the Red River delta (not bordering on Burma, with a population less than half that of Burma and less than 2 percent as large as that of China) would make the fall of Burma inevitable, when the fall of China had not made the fall of Burma inevitable. None of the proponents of the domino theory ever attempted to explain this oddity, to describe some way in which the international context had changed to make Southeast Asia more vulnerable to a chain reaction than it had been in 1949 when China fell.

The mechanism of the predicted disaster was not traced to concrete issues of strength. The domino theorists said that the fall of Southeast Asia as a whole would give the communists resources and population that would add dangerously to their strength, but they did not try to argue that the reason the fall of Tonkin, Vietnam, or Indochina would lead to the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia was that the population or resources of Tonkin, Vietnam, or Indochina would add decisively to communist strength.

The theory appears, instead, to have been based primarily on issues of symbolism and perception. If the United States allowed Tonkin, Vietnam, or Indochina to fall to communism, this would indicate to the world that the United States did not have the will to oppose communism. The communists would be encouraged to launch assaults on other countries, and the noncommunist countries, no longer trusting the United States to defend them, would be demoralized and would not resist the assaults. In effect, proponents of the theory appear to have been presuming that the United States could not adopt a policy of defending some areas but not others, because neither the enemies nor the friends of the United States would be capable of understanding such a policy.

Statements of the theory were often vague about the identity of the communists whose victory was feared, and never acknowledged that the takeover of a small country by domestic communists might have different implications than conquest by some larger communist country. When discussing the struggle in Vietnam in the early 1950s, American officials sometimes suggested that the country was in danger of being taken over by the Chinese, sometimes by the Soviets (note Eisenhower's comment, quoted above, that "Moscow" might be about to take Dien Bien Phu). Sometimes the likelihood of a takeover by Vietnamese communists was acknowledged, but in carefully restricted language; they were "Vietminh," or occasionally "Reds," but never "Vietnamese communists." The word "Vietnamese" had in fact dropped completely out of the vocabulary with which the U.S. government discussed the Vietminh in the late 1940s; calling Ho Chi Minh or his men "Vietnamese" would have granted them too much legitimacy. Very often it was simply "communists" of unspecified nationality who were said to be trying to take over Vietnam. The theory was similarly vague about which communists would take over the other countries of Southeast Asia should Vietnam fall. Occasionally it was predicted to be the Soviets, more often

the Chinese, most often just "communists" of unspecified nationality.

One reason the domino theory was so poorly thought out was that for many of its proponents, it was not so much a theory as a call to action. Whenever any country seemed about to fall to communism, anticommunists tried to persuade the American government and people to take action to prevent this from happening. In an effort to generate enthusiasm for the project, some of them always argued that the United States must hold the line against communism in whatever country was currently under threat, because that was where the chances of holding the line would be best; an effort to fall back and defend in some other country would be utterly hopeless, or would at least involve a much more difficult and dangerous effort than defending the country currently threatened. Also, since the country currently endangered was always a country where the communists were strong, the domino theorists were each time in the position of arguing that it would be easier to stop the communists in that country, where they were strong, than in some other country where they were much weaker.

The fact that the theory was basically a call to action helps to explain why so few people in the U.S. government chose to apply it to China in the late 1940s. China was very large, and an American commitment to prevent communist victory there seemed likely to be very expensive in money and lives. Few officials had much enthusiasm for a theory that might have obligated them to make such a commitment. Indochina was much smaller, and the prospects for blocking communist victory at reasonable cost seemed much better than in China. American officials therefore were more inclined to endorse a theory obligating them to defend Indochina.

It does not seem likely that Eisenhower tried to make a rational calculation of the effects that would follow from a Vietminh victory in Indochina, and concluded that the communist conquest of Indochina would have a tremendously greater effect on the Asian balance of power than had the communist conquest of China. For one thing, a rational calculation of effects should have produced a theory that was a bit more specific on things like the identity of the communists whose victory was feared. For another, if Eisenhower really believed that the collapse of the French position in Indochina would have so disastrous a result, it seems likely that he would have tried considerably harder than he did to prevent that collapse.

On the other hand, it is not likely that Eisenhower was deliberately and consciously lying when he propounded the domino theory. Five factors are all probably relevant to Eisenhower's statements, and those of most other proponents of the domino theory, including even Radford. First, what they really meant by their statements was that communism was expanding, and that this was very dangerous and should be stopped. Second, they genuinely believed this to be true. Third, they had not bothered to think much about whether the words they had used to express that belief were true if taken literally. For that matter, they tended to think about communist expansion in very vague terms; to them communism was something that "expanded," and they did not always ask themselves exactly how it expanded when they were thinking about this problem. Fourth, belief in the danger of communist expansionism was universal in the circles in which they moved, and maintaining that belief was considered morally obligatory. This stance deterred them from questioning the literal truth of any particular words chosen to describe the danger. Fifth, they were convinced that the communists had the same ambitions for conquest as Hitler. This implied that the communists were likely to embark on a massive campaign of overt international aggression—with Chinese armies pouring south through Laos and Thailand into the Malay Peninsula—as soon as they felt strong enough.

The legacy of the 1938 Munich Conference hung heavily over Americans of Eisenhower's generation. The lesson of Munich, as it was understood in the United States in the 1950s, was that aggression will go on until it is stopped, and that stopping it becomes more difficult the longer one waits to do so. The combined armies of the communist powers were by the 1950s larger than the Nazis had ever had, far larger than would have been necessary to initiate the feared wave of aggression had the communist leaders really been a unified group, with ambitions and daring that approximated Hitler's. American policymakers, seeing that the disaster had not yet happened, did not ask whether they really faced a Hitlerian menace. Instead they worried that even the smallest addition to the total of communist strength would finally trigger the deluge.

When France lost the battle of Dien Bien Phu and it became apparent that the first domino in the row was actually likely to fall, President Eisenhower did not descend into the despair that some of his previous statements would leave one

to expect. When asked about this at a press conference on 12 May 1954, he simply explained that he was working to ensure that the fall of the first domino would not knock down the rest of the row. Secretary of State Dulles had said the day before that the domino theory had been based on the assumption that the endangered countries would be facing the threat singly; he said that if they were bound together in an alliance, the theory need not apply.

The habit of American policymakers of saying, at any given time, that the country currently under threat was the final barrier, after the loss of which the forces of communist aggression would be so strong that there would be no stopping them at any acceptable price, is easier to understand if one bears in mind the alternatives. They could not say that the communists were not bent on world conquest; their peers would have called them dupes of the communists and their careers would have been destroyed. For the same reason, they could not say that the communists were weak enough so that even the addition of another country would not strengthen their expansionist drive to a dangerous extent. It was marginally acceptable to say that the communists were already so strong that they could be stopped only by a big expensive war, but this was an uncomfortable position to take, since the United States did not want a big expensive war. The only really acceptable thing to say was that the communists were still weak enough to be stopped cheaply if they were stopped immediately, but only if they were stopped immediately.

American policymakers faced a fundamental problem when they tried to win public support for programs designed to oppose communism in distant parts of the globe. Vietnam was a country of moderate importance. President Eisenhower wanted to make a moderate effort to save it from communism, not involving a degree of cost or risk grossly out of proportion to its real significance. If he had described the situation to the public in these terms, however, he would have been attacked from two directions: first, a large portion of the public, which did not even know where Vietnam was, would not have approved any risk or any expenditure had they been told that it was not a matter of high importance, and second, with the "Who Lost China?" debate still going on, it would have been extremely dangerous for any American political figure to have described the defense of Vietnam or any other country as a matter of less than the highest importance. Had Eisenhower said that the relatively modest efforts he was making were all Vietnam was really worth, he would have been accused of abetting communist aggression.

Eisenhower endorsed the domino theory rhetorically, and so strongly that he gave the theory its name, but he did not commit more resources to Indochina than the real importance of the area could justify. This worked for him in 1954, but he was storing up trouble in the long run. The domino theory slid out of view for several years, but it was waiting to reassert itself whenever some country in Asia seemed in danger of falling to communism. One of Eisenhower's last actions as president, on 19 January 1961, was to tell John F. Kennedy and the top foreign policy officials of the incoming Kennedy administration that if Laos were to fall to communism, it would be "just a question of time" before South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma did the same.

THE 1960S: HIGH TIDE OF THE DOMINO THEORY

The period from the early to the mid-1960s represented the high point of American belief in the theory. The proportion of top officials who endorsed it was higher than it had been in 1953 and 1954 under Eisenhower. Some of the 1960s officials—most conspicuously Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara—decided years later that the theory had been mistaken, but they confirmed that they really had believed it in the 1960s; their assertions of it had not been mere rhetoric.

Some authors have commented on the rise in the 1960s of the "psychological domino theory," a belief that the danger of allowing South Vietnam or Laos to go communist lay in what this would do to American "credibility." One country after another would decide that they could not depend on American assistance, and that it therefore was not worth trying to resist communism. They might submit without any massive invasion by foreign communist armed forces. At the same time, communist countries, no longer fearing the United States, would become more aggressive. Such ideas became more common in the 1960s, but this did not represent a total change in thinking. The phrase "psychological domino theory" is associated with that decade, but there had been an important psychological component to the domino theory ever since the late 1940s.

FUTURE PRESIDENTS SPEAK

"The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there—or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts—Philippines, Japan, Taiwan—have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea. . . .

"Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate—and most important—trouble spots, critical to the U.S. . . . We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a 'Fortress America' concept."

— Then-vice president Lyndon Johnson to President John F. Kennedy, 1961 —

"If South Vietnam falls, through U.S. withdrawal, political settlement, or neutralization (which is surrender on the installment plan), there is no doubt that Cambodia (already on the brink) will go; that Laos, practically gone now because of our gullibility, will go; that Thailand (which wants to be on our side but has held her independence by being on the winning side) will go; . . . and that Indonesia will go. . . .

"In three or four years, then, we would have the necessity of saving the Philippines. Could we avoid a major war to save the Philippines? . . .

"If southeast Asia goes Communist, Japan will eventually be pulled irresistibly into the Red orbit.

"If the United States gives up on Vietnam, Asia will give up on the United States and the Pacific will become a Red sea."

— Richard M. Nixon, 1965 —

In 1961 the Departments of State and Defense sent President Kennedy a joint memorandum, the product of prolonged deliberation at the highest level. William Bundy had written the first draft; U. Alexis Johnson and Robert McNamara, among others, had revised it. It stated: "The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation within the Communist bloc." The theory had sometimes been put in terms this strong or stronger under Eisenhower, but that usually happened when an individual was speaking without a prepared text. Strong statements of the theory had not appeared in formal documents coming from a wide group.

Policymakers were still vague about the identity of the communists to whom Southeast Asia would fall and about the mechanism of the fall. The most common scenario, when a scenario of some sort was presented, was that the nations of Southeast Asia would submit to unspecified Chinese pressures. Shortly before his death in 1963, when Kennedy was asked about the domino theory in a televised interview, he replied, "I believe it. I believe it . . . China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it."

The domino theorists' frequent vagueness about the national identity of the communists whose conquests they feared reflects a generally low evaluation of the strength of nationalism in Asia. They do not seem to have felt it mattered whether an Asian country was taken over by native communists or conquered by some larger communist power. They knew that the Chinese Revolution had not brought the Soviet army to the borders of Southeast Asia, and indeed that the Soviet military forces that Chiang Kai-shek had permitted at Port Arthur in the late 1940s had been withdrawn in the 1950s. They were aware that when North Vietnam came under communist rule in 1954, the Chinese army had not moved down to the seventeenth parallel, the border between North and South Vietnam. But they did not treat these facts as relevant to the question of whether the fall of South Vietnam to communism

would lead other Southeast Asian nations to fall under Chinese or Soviet domination.

The domino theorists also did not feel that the leaders of the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia could be trusted to care very much about preserving their independence. Even those nations that did not harbor strong domestic communist parties might easily be stampeded into accepting, without a fight, Chinese or Soviet domination. An exception, however, was made for South Vietnam. The domino theory was basically a call for the United States to pick South Vietnam as the place to take a stand against communism. Its proponents often exaggerated the strength of anticommunist nationalism in South Vietnam, trying to make it seem more attractive than it was, and more attractive than possible alternatives such as Thailand, as a place to make a stand.

As vice president, Lyndon B. Johnson in 1961 endorsed the domino theory without hesitation; he told President Kennedy that the United States must either hold the line in Vietnam and Thailand or pull its defenses back to San Francisco. In 1964 as president, however, he did ask questions. Johnson was trying to shift the priorities of the national budget away from military spending and toward his Great Society programs. He was, therefore, horrified by the prospect of making the major commitment of U.S. forces that seemed the only way to save South Vietnam from falling to communism. When he asked whether the domino theory was valid, the question was probably not purely rhetorical. Some mid-level officials, notably the intelligence analysts at the CIA's Board of National Estimates, said that the theory was not valid. But all the top national security officials—Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—ringingly affirmed the theory.

The Joint Chiefs were the firmest. When Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy, one of the second-level officials who doubted the theory, asked the Joint Chiefs whether it might not be possible to establish another defensive line and save the other dominoes, the Joint Chiefs strongly rejected this notion. "We have no further fall-back position in Southeast Asia. . . . Strengthening other areas of Asia, in the context of our having been pushed out of SVN [South Vietnam], would be a thoroughly non-productive effort militarily, and politically it seems dubious we'd even be offered the opportunity to attempt it." Thailand would fall "almost automatically"; Burma would probably fall.

Belief in the theory was also widespread outside the administration. Influential members of both houses of Congress made very strong statements about it. Richard Nixon, the future president, said in January 1965 that "if Vietnam is lost, all of Southeast Asia is lost." If the people of Southeast Asia decided, because of events in Vietnam, that the wave of the future was communism, "they are going to go Communist before the wave engulfs them." In a February 1965 Harris poll, an overwhelming majority (78 percent to 10 percent) said they believed that if the United States withdrew from South Vietnam, "the Communists would take over all of Southeast Asia."

The domino theory had always been a call to action. Lyndon Johnson felt in 1965 that he had no choice but to make an actual commitment of large-scale combat forces to Vietnam, and the fact that the domino theory said this commitment was necessary was an important part of his motive. But as the scale of the war expanded during the following years, belief in the theory faded. People endorsed the theory only if they were willing to endorse the commitment of enough resources to save South Vietnam, and as the definition of "enough" expanded to 500,000 men and beyond, the number of people willing to endorse the commitment shrank dramatically. There were still believers in the domino theory in 1968, but far fewer than there had been in the early 1960s. Also, the theory was openly derided by many, unlike several years before.

THE 1970S AND AFTER

Once the theory had become a bone of contention, some defenders of the war began to moderate the theory so as to make it more reasonable; then, opponents of the war would not be able to ridicule it and say that its absurdity symbolized the absurdity of the war. When Richard Nixon defended the domino theory in 1970, he did not say (as he had five years earlier) that other nations would promptly fall to communism if South Vietnam fell; he said only that such an event would be "immensely discouraging" to the non-communist nations of Asia, and "ominously encouraging" to China and the Soviet Union.

The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 did not trigger the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia or of any long string of dominoes. Cambodia had

already fallen before South Vietnam did. The fall of Laos was in a sense triggered by the fall of South Vietnam, but only because the Vietnamese communist leaders in Hanoi, who could have completed the communist victory in Laos long before, had been holding back because they feared a premature victory in Laos might complicate the struggle for South Vietnam. The United States did not have to fight a war on some line farther back to prevent the further spread of communism. Indochina under communist rule did not become a conduit for the application of Chinese pressure against Thailand. Instead, in the 1980s Thailand and China were allied against the communist governments in Indochina.

These events have not ended the arguments about the validity of the domino theory. Opponents of the theory say that it was proven false when South Vietnam fell without triggering the fall of most of Southeast Asia, and without the United States even having had to make any major effort to prevent the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia. Supporters of the theory say that it had been a correct description of the situation of the early 1960s. They say that the American defense of South Vietnam had provided a shield during the years when Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia had been vulnerable and China very aggressive. By the time this shield was removed in the 1970s, the Southeast Asian nations were stronger and China much mellowed. The most detailed form of the argument states that it was the firm American stand in Vietnam that gave anticommunist military officers the confidence to defeat the communists in Indonesia in 1965. The evidence for this argument, however, is very thin.

A cascade effect very much like that predicted by the domino theory swept communist regimes out, rather than into, power at the very end of the Cold War. In 1989 it became apparent that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev would no longer intervene to preserve communist governments in Eastern Europe. This emboldened anticommunist forces and so discouraged the communist leaders that in one country after another they allowed communist rule to be overturned without a serious fight. Communism collapsed in most of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself between 1989 and 1991.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jervis, Robert, and Jack Snyder, eds. *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland.* New York, 1991. A collection of essays.

Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965.* Princeton, N.J., 1992.

McMahon, Robert. "What Difference Did It Make? Assessing the Vietnam War's Impact on Southeast Asia." In Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds. *International Perspectives on Vietnam.* College Station, Tex., 2000.

Ninkovich, Frank. *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1994. Traces American statesmen's fears about international security, fears that eventually evolved into the domino theory, back as far as Woodrow Wilson and even Theodore Roosevelt.

U.S. Congress. *Congressional Record.* Vols. 100, 107–121. Washington, D.C., 1954, 1961–1975.

U.S. Department of Defense. *United States–Vietnam Relations 1945–1967.* 12 vols. Washington, D.C., 1971. Better known as the Pentagon Papers.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States.* Washington, D.C. See volumes from 1952–1954, 1961, 1982, 1984, and 1988.

U.S. General Services Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.* 33 vols. Washington, D.C., 1961–1974. Contains virtually everything Presidents Truman through Nixon said in public about the domino theory.

See also CONTAINMENT; THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT.

Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

Advisory Board

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman
San Diego State University

Nick Cullather
Indiana University

Chester Pach
Ohio University

William O. Walker III
Florida International University

ENCYCLOPEDIA *of* AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Second Edition

VOLUME 2

E – N

Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, and Fredrik Logevall, Editors in Chief

Louise B. Ketz, Executive Editor

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

GALE GROUP

THOMSON LEARNING

New York • Detroit • San Diego • San Francisco
Boston • New Haven, Conn. • Waterville, Maine
London • Munich

Copyright © 2002 by Charles Scribner's Sons

Charles Scribner's Sons
An imprint of the Gale Group
300 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Charles Scribner's Sons.

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy : studies of the principal movements and ideas / editors, Alexander DeConde ... [et al.]--2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-684-80657-6 (set : alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-684-80658-4 (v. 1) -- ISBN 0-684-80659-2 (v. 2) -- ISBN 0-684-80660-6 (v. 3)
1. United States--Foreign relations--Encyclopedias. 2. United States--Foreign relations--Philosophy--Encyclopedias. I. DeConde, Alexander.

E183.7 .E52 2002
327.73'003--dc21 2001049800

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z3948-1992 (Permanence of Paper)

CONTENTS

ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY 1
David Shreve

ELITISM 17
Alan K. Henrikson

EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS 33
Jerald A. Combs

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 49
Kurk Dorsey

EXCEPTIONALISM 63
Trevor B. McCrisken

EXTRATERRITORIALITY 81
Jules Davids and Jonathan M. Nielson

FOREIGN AID 93
Katherine A. S. Sibley

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 111
Armin Rappaport and William Earl Weeks

GENDER. 123
Laura McEnaney

GLOBALIZATION 135
Thomas W. Zeiler

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF 151
Darlene Rivas

HUMAN RIGHTS 173
T. Christopher Jespersen

IDEOLOGY 187
Jennifer W. See

IMMIGRATION 203
Roger Daniels

IMPERIALISM 217
David Healy

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 225
John Prados

INTERNATIONALISM 241
Warren F. Kuehl and Gary B. Ostrower

INTERNATIONAL LAW 259
Christopher C. Joyner

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK 283
Francis J. Gavin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 299
Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Klaus Larres

INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION 315
Doris A. Graber

ISOLATIONISM 337
Manfred Jonas

JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE 353
Terrence R. Guay

LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION 365
Richard W. Van Alstyne and Joseph M. Siracusa

MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS 381
Edward M. Bennett

MILITARISM 387
William Kamman

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 403
James A. Huston

MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE 417
Justus D. Doenecke and Michael R. Adamson

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 429
Burton I. Kaufman

THE MUNICH ANALOGY 443
Joseph M. Siracusa

NARCOTICS POLICY 455
William O. Walker III

THE NATIONAL INTEREST 473
H. W. Brands

NATIONALISM 485
Lawrence S. Kaplan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 499
Anna Kasten Nelson

NATIVISM 511
Geoffrey S. Smith

NAVAL DIPLOMACY 529
William R. Braisted

NEUTRALISM 543
T. Michael Ruddy

NEUTRALITY 559
Thom M. Armstrong

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 573
Klaus Larres

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY 595
Kenneth J. Hagan and Elizabeth Skinner

CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES

VOLUME 1

PREFACE xiii

CHRONOLOGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1607–2001 xvii
Richard Dean Burns and Louise B. Ketz

AFRICAN AMERICANS 1
Brenda Gayle Plummer

ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES . . 13
Warren F. Kimball

AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES 29
Kenneth J. Grieb

ANTI-IMPERIALISM 49
Robert Buzzanco

ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION 61
Calvin D. Davis

ARMED NEUTRALITIES 73
Ian Mugridge

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 79
Richard Dean Burns

ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE 105
Michael T. Klare

ASYLUM 117
Michael Dunne

BALANCE OF POWER 131
A. E. Campbell and Richard Dean Burns

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 141
J. David Singer

BIPARTISANSHIP. 155
Randall Woods

BLOCKADES 171
Frank J. Merli and Robert H. Ferrell

THE CHINA LOBBY 185
Warren I. Cohen

CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY 193
Kinley Brauer

COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS 207
Walter L. Hixson

COLD WAR ORIGINS 223
Anders Stephanson

COLD WARRIORS 241
Andrew J. Rotter

COLD WAR TERMINATION 257
Thomas R. Maddux

COLLECTIVE SECURITY 273
Roland N. Stromberg

COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM . . . 285
Edward M. Bennett

CONGRESSIONAL POWER 293
Robert David Johnson

CONSORTIA 313
Warren I. Cohen

THE CONSTITUTION 323
David Gray Adler

CONTAINMENT 345
Barton J. Bernstein

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION 365
David M. Pletcher

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 377
Marvin R. Zahniser

COVERT OPERATIONS 387
John Prados

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 397
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES . . . 409
Akira Iriye

DECISION MAKING 427
Valerie M. Hudson

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 439
Steven L. Rearden

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 451
Jerry Israel and David L. Anderson

DETERRENCE 463
David Coleman

DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY 477
Nick Cullather

DICTATORSHIPS 493
David F. Schmitz

DISSENT IN WARS 505
Russell F. Weigley and David S. Patterson

DOCTRINES 521
Marc Jay Selverstone

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 543
Eugene P. Trani

DOMINO THEORY 551
Edwin Moïse

VOLUME 3

OIL 1
David S. Painter

OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION 21
William Appleman Williams

OPEN DOOR POLICY 29
Mark Atwood Lawrence

ORGANIZED LABOR 45
Elizabeth McKillen

OUTER SPACE 61
Roger Launius

PACIFISM 73
Charles Chatfield

PAN-AMERICANISM 83
Thomas M. Leonard and Thomas L. Karnes

PARTY POLITICS 99
Fredrik Logevall

PEACEMAKING 113
Berenice A. Carroll

PEACE MOVEMENTS 129
Robert H. Ferrell

PHILANTHROPY 141
James A. Field, Jr., and Tim Matthewson

POST–COLD WAR POLICY 153
Richard A. Melanson

POWER POLITICS 169
Thomas H. Etzold and Robert L. Messer

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS 179
Albert Bowman and Robert A. Divine

PRESIDENTIAL POWER 195
Alexander DeConde

THE PRESS 221
Ralph B. Levering and Louis W. Liebovich

PROPAGANDA 239
Kenneth A. Osgood

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD 255
Burton F. Beers

PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE . 265
Raymond A. Esthus

PUBLIC OPINION 275
Melvin Small

RACE AND ETHNICITY 289
John Snetsinger

REALISM AND IDEALISM 311
Norman A. Graebner

RECIPROCITY 329
Robert Freeman Smith

RECOGNITION 345
Paolo E. Coletta

REFUGEE POLICIES 357
David M. Reimers

RELIGION 371
Leo P. Ribuffo

REPARATIONS 393
Carl P. Parrini and James I. Matray

REVISIONISM 407
Athan G. Theoharis

REVOLUTION 425
Jeremi Suri

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 443
Ronald E. Doel and Zuoyue Wang

SELF-DETERMINATION 461
Betty Miller Unterberger

SPECIAL-INTEREST LOBBIES 483
William Slany

SUMMIT CONFERENCES 501
Theodore A. Wilson

SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY 513
Vojtech Mastny

TARIFF POLICY 531
Thomas W. Zeiler

TELEVISION 547
Chester Pach

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM . . . 563
Brian Michael Jenkins

TREATIES 571
J. B. Duroselle and Ian J. Bickerton

THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT . . . 597
Larry Berman and Jason Newman

WILSONIANISM 617
Tony Smith

WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY . . . 627
Roger R. Trask

EDITORS AND ADVISERS 637

CONTRIBUTORS 639

INDEX 643

Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

Economic Policy and Theory

David Shreve

Merging in numerous ways, economic theory has often been linked to U.S. foreign policy. When the United States began its life as a fledgling exporter of raw materials vitally dependent upon connections to Liverpool merchants, crude economic theories accompanied virtually all deliberations and pronouncements on foreign affairs. As the nation grew in size, population, and wealth, this connection became less apparent and, indeed, far less critical or commonplace. By most estimates, foreign trade rarely exceeded 5 percent of the American gross national product. Moreover, after significant growth and increasing specialization in export markets in the late nineteenth century, levels of international market integration that prevailed in 1914 were equaled again only in the 1990s, albeit with far less market segmentation than in the earlier period. The information gaps of that earlier period have almost completely disappeared.

Only when it emerged as a world power following the two world wars did the United States again endeavor to combine the latest in economic theory with virtually all of its foreign policy concerns. The rise of professional economics had much to do with this resurgence; so did the demands for the cooperation and rebuilding made virtually indispensable by both economic depression and destructive and widespread conflict. Institutionalization of professional economic advice, most of which followed the Great Depression and World War II in the twentieth century, brought economic theory into the limelight, where it joined readily and quite seamlessly with heightened international concerns for peace and prosperity. Here it began by acknowledging as well the growing awareness that domestic prosperity was at least partly hinged to global prosperity.

The adaptable theories of giants such as the British economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo notwithstanding, economic theory previously had been applied only loosely to U.S. foreign policy concerns or, as it was in the early Republic, only in forms of a largely prescientific character, too amorphous and philosophical to construct a lasting bond or significant transgenerational analysis. Here it had often reflected little more than a concern for how one might either tease out the factors behind international commercial advantage or better discern both commercial limits and commercial potential in world markets. Falling loosely under the rubric of "mercantilism," such concerns seldom reflected anything approaching a scientific method or cognizance of recent or past advances in economic theory, and they seldom attracted those social scientists interested in testing the theoretical challenges of pioneers such as Smith and Ricardo. Smith's suggestion that political economists must find a theory that comports with maximum wages and modest profits, for example, along with Ricardo's critique of landlord-based economic exploitation, remained obscured by conventional analyses designed mostly to promote commercial interests.

Despite this tendency toward limited, mostly superficial economic analysis of international affairs, discussions of monetary policy in the early Republic often veered into the analysis of international factors and approached levels of sophistication unmatched by many twentieth-century analysts. In some ways, for example, late nineteenth-century U.S reliance on a gold standard with fixed exchange rates represented a departure from an earlier, more flexible bimetallic monetary policy—to which the nation would ultimately return. The alteration, in 1834, of Alexander Hamilton's 15:1 silver-to-gold valuation of the dollar—to a 16:1 ratio—largely kept silver dollars out of circulation, limited the worldwide potential of later Nevada silver discoveries, and signaled the advent of a more restrictive, even emasculating, U.S. monetary policy. Ceding control of domestic monetary policy to the vagaries of international gold flows, and the overall level of

international commerce to the total gold supply, policymakers had essentially ignored existing economic theory, however immature, in favor of economic policy handcuffs.

But talk of trade clearly occupied the minds of far more policymakers and economic theorists than did international currency analysis. Smith's theories, principally those found in his groundbreaking synthesis published in 1776, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* focused attention squarely on international trade, proffering an analysis designed to integrate trade policy and consumer welfare. Smithian analysis of how to pay for war (taxation versus borrowing)—designed to make its costs more obvious and disabling—also filtered into a great number of American foreign policy debates and was digested and considered fully by both late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American leaders. David Ricardo's early nineteenth-century postulates regarding comparative advantage—the notion that two nations may gain through trade even if one can produce everything more efficiently than the other—had percolated, as well, into policy circles in both Great Britain and the United States. Few of these theories, however, found anything but temporary or comparatively insecure footholds in the policy arena until the mid-twentieth century.

From the American economists who toiled for the Strategic Bombing Survey during World War II to those serving today as consultants on currency stabilization, economic theory has now permeated virtually every conceivable foreign policy analysis and situation. It no longer remains confined principally to questions of international commercial advantage or even international trade. At the same time, its chief occupation has most often been limited to three major areas: trade policy, international monetary policy, and policies for international growth and development (for developed, developing, and undeveloped nations). Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system for international currency stabilization in the early 1970s, monetary policy has become much more newsworthy; much more often the subject of policy discussions, high and low; and has increasingly become the preoccupation of many skilled economists and specialized policy advisers. Likewise, growth and development policy also increased in significance in the late twentieth century, albeit mostly as a result of both increasing numbers of American, European, and East Asian multinational corporations and increasing emphasis on development that emerged along with post–World War I and post–World War II rebuilding efforts. As the welfare of these companies came to depend increasingly on rising prosperity abroad, and as altruism merged increasingly with self-interest in prominent rebuilding or relief efforts, more people naturally came to ask how such prosperity should be created or sustained.

Analysis of trade policy, however, continues to engage economic theorists more than any other large foreign policy concern. Indeed, a great number of international monetary policy analyses are, in effect, designed to explain how international money affects international trade.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Although Adam Smith (1723–1790) is regarded today as the progenitor of "laissez-faire" economic theory—where self-interest, limited government, and the unbridled profit motive converge to produce the ideal political economy—his economic theory really began on much more limited grounds.

Beginning with the overarching belief that the best political economy produced a regime of high wages and low prices—and modest profits—Smith created what many regard as the first modern economic theory, a theory constructed squarely upon a critique of British international trade in the late eighteenth century. When Smith spoke of restraint in critical terms, for example, he most often referred to import restrictions, not restraint of the individual and his single-minded pursuit of wealth. With much of Smith's general theory lost to the questionable interpretation of his lofty, somewhat more malleable rhetoric, one is left mostly with a trenchant special theory. Like the French Physiocrats who preceded him, Smith constructed his theory upon the notion that government promotion of trade most often came at the expense of groups or individuals who were less powerful but more significant, economically, than the commercial exporters favored by such promotion. For the Physiocrats, these individuals were farmers; for Smith, consumers.

Thus began both a long-running debate on the economic merits of free trade versus protectionism and trade promotion, and on a course of theoretical formulations built partly on the criticism of policies that favored commercial interests over agricultural counterparts. Placing the con-

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES AND BRETTON WOODS

Although the area around Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, possesses one of the least reliable climates anywhere in the United States, it was chosen as the site of the 1944 international conference for post–World War II international economic planning precisely because it promised a potentially pleasant climate. "For God's sake do not take us to Washington in July," wrote the British economist John Maynard Keynes to the American Harry Dexter White in May 1944, "which would surely be a most unfriendly act." White, who had joined the Treasury department in 1934 and had become Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau's chief planner for postwar international economic policy was Keynes's chief intermediary with the Roosevelt administration. The "White Plan" for postwar international economic cooperation, leaked by the London *Financial News* in April 1943, became the principal blueprint which guided postwar planning in general and the Bretton Woods conference in particular. Lord Keynes was the chief British spokesperson, a confidant of White's, and, as it turned out, chiefly responsible for choosing the site of the conference.

Convened on 1 July 1944, and held at the Mount Washington Hotel at Bretton Woods, this groundbreaking conference opened only a short distance from the peak of the highest summit in the American Northeast. On 12 April 1934, the weather observatory on its summit recorded a sustained wind gust of 231 miles per hour, a record that has yet to be equaled anywhere on the planet. It is a place reckoned by many to be one of the windiest places on earth, and attracts a multitude of visitors today, many drawn by the strange lure and challenge of unpredictable conditions. Snow has fallen on the peak in every month of the year, and temperatures below freezing are not uncommon at any time.

There is little doubt that Keynes, who suffered from heart ailments and who would die of a heart attack in 1946, preferred the chance of a blustery climate in July to the potential for oppressive heat and humidity in the nation's capital. And though the conference concluded by eschewing Keynes's plea for both an international reserve currency (that he had given the name "bancor") and an international overdraft fund, it was the masterful British economist who ensured that the more than seven hundred delegates from forty-four nations would meet to plan the postwar international economic order in the Presidential Range of New Hampshire's White Mountains.

sumer at the heart of his theory, rather than the producers favored in eighteenth-century British policy, Smith ensured that such consumers would always be represented in subsequent economic theory related to international trade. Favors granted by governments to resident exporters, Smith pointed out, might well benefit those producers only at the expense of resident consumers, leaving almost everyone less well off. Hereafter, these consumers would be removed from trade policy calculations only by ignoring relevant and advancing economic theory. Freer trade—perhaps anticipating the theory of the "second-best" enunciated by James Edward Meade and Richard Lipsey in the 1950s and the "scientific tariff" theories promulgated by Harry G. Johnson in the 1970s, became a means to improve domestic purchasing power for the first time under Smith's formulation.

Although it ultimately came to be submerged within later economic theories that often ignored its most immediate postulates, Smith's analysis was highly regarded in the early American republic. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson—attracted, perhaps, to Smith's reshaping of physiocratic, agrarian-centered critiques of commercial subsidy—regarded it as the paragon of contemporary political economy. Smith's trade theories would also help establish a general pattern for regional political battles in the early nineteenth century (for example, the 1828 "Tariff of Abominations"). Vice President John C. Calhoun's challenge to American protectionism, nascent despite its implicit connection to the special interests of southern slaveholders, may well have anticipated both the consumer-based populism in the American South during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the underconsumptionist economic theories of the mid-twentieth-century followers of John Maynard Keynes. His focus on the costs of effective and proposed U.S. tariffs was constructed squarely, if unwittingly, on the back of Smith's trade theory.

If Smith pointed economic theory toward the potential general benefits of freer trade—couched within a broader, somewhat more ambivalent philosophical treatise—then David Ricardo (1772–1823) transformed it into a more single-minded pursuit of improved economic analysis. Ricardo's masterpiece, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,* first published in 1817, contributed greatly to the analysis of wage determination, pricing, and tax policy. But most famously, perhaps, it also gave us the law of comparative advantage. Explaining how a nation may gain by importing a good even if that good can be produced at home more efficiently (by allowing it to devote more resources to the production of goods at which it is most efficient), Ricardo revealed previously unrecognized advantages to a regime of freer trade. He also suggested the kind of rigorous analysis upon which all subsequent theory of international economics would have to rest. Indeed, few economists can yet escape Ricardian challenges, especially in the ongoing analysis of price determination and the relative importance of wage and profit levels. And though policymakers tend to conform to the characterization of the nineteenth-century British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli—encouraging free trade as an expedient rather than a principle—it is also likely that they can seldom avoid beginning the analysis of any trade policy regime without the admonishments of both Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: FROM TRAILBLAZERS TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY PROFESSIONALS

The British philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) updated (and endorsed) much of Ricardo's analysis with his 1848 publication, *Principles of Political Economy.* The first to emphasize that allocation of resources and distribution of income are two somewhat distinct roles performed by modern market systems, Mill parted company with earlier classical economists by suggesting that policy could indeed shape the distribution of income. The late nineteenth-century (principally 1871–1877) analyses of William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) in England, Karl Menger (1840–1921) in Austria, and Leon Walras (1834–1910) in Switzerland saw the emergence of the marginalist school of economic theory. Reorienting economic analysis away from theories of price determination that had relied exclusively upon supply-side factors or the costs of production, the marginalist school significantly updated the analyses of Smith and Ricardo and the classical economic theory built upon their writings. Beginning their theory of prices (and therefore of production and allocation as well) with consumer behavior and consumer choice, the marginalists moved economic theory closer to the consumer-centered philosophy espoused, but never developed systematically or mathematically, by Smith. Walras would do this to great effect, for example, with his creation of demand functions, mathematical functions that for the first time expressed the quantities of a given product or service as they were determined collectively by consumer income, consumer preference or taste, product price, and product price relative to other related goods or services.

Until the assiduous efforts of Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) on behalf of the discipline and profession in England, however, economics was the vocation of few in academe, public policy was constructed with little or no professional economic advice, and international trade theory in particular had progressed only a little past its Smithian and Ricardian foundations. Academic chairs in political economy had been established early in the nineteenth century, but throughout much of that century most were either vacant or held as a secondary occupation. Jevons, Menger, and Walras, in fact, all worked in professions outside of academe before being appointed to chairs in political economy at universities in England, Austria, and Switzerland. Jevons's government post as an assayer in Sydney, Australia, appears to have convinced him, in fact, that public officials required more—and more consistently offered—professional economic policy advice. Despite their later association with schools of free-market or even anti-government economic analyses, the progenitors of the marginalist revolution gravitated to economic theory out of concern for public policy, much of which centered on international affairs and international trade. Like Jevons, Menger, and Walras, the first professional economists found themselves holding academic chairs in political economy; the fledgling science and public policy were undeniably woven together. Until the twentieth century, however, the designation implied no distinct body of knowledge or craft. In Ireland, for example, it fell initially under the instruction of law, changing soon after into a course of study geared principally to business or industrial management.

Professor of political economy at the University of Cambridge from 1885 to 1908, Marshall began his teaching career in 1868 at St. John's College, Cambridge, as a lecturer in moral sciences. When he retired from teaching in 1908 to devote his final years to writing, he had succeeded in establishing a new honors examination (tripos) in economics and politics (1903) at Cambridge, had bequeathed to economic analysis the critical distinction between the short run and the long run (in what he called "period analysis"), and had established political economy as a distinct subject worthy of widespread study and generous public attention. The London School of Economics opened in 1895, and Oxford University offered its first diploma in economics in 1903, attesting to the rising popularity and increased relevance of economic study. Marshall's direct contribution to international trade theory was limited to his analysis of two-country trade with intersecting "offer curves" and its concomitant analysis of demand elasticity (how the increase of goods offered by one nation might affect the quantity of goods offered by a trading partner). The term "elasticity," so widely used by economists today to denote the ratio of change between dependent and independent variables, was Marshall's invention. More significantly, his attention to the professional standing of economists, his willingness to engage in policy debate and to observe real economic conditions and changes, and his conscious linking of modern economic analysis to classical foundations paved the way for the most significant twentieth-century breakthroughs in international trade theory.

Marshall's major work devoted to international trade issues, *Industry and Trade*, published in 1919, may well have lacked theoretical consistency or structure precisely because it considered so closely recent trends and activities in British and world trade networks. Indeed, his attention to the practical reach of modern economics led to the frequent inclusion in all of his writings of cautionary notes on what might or might not be successfully "impounded" in analytic assumptions about dynamic economic processes. These caveats remain significant today. For Marshall, any accurate depiction of dynamic economic processes required more information than was ever possible to obtain, an insight proved increasingly sound by the limitations and shortcomings of the newest and most ambitious computer-generated models.

Marshall also created a theoretical path that tended to consolidate and synthesize previous lines of economic analysis constructed upon a classical and orderly market-clearing conception of the economic world. As economic science matured and academic posts in political economy proliferated around the turn of the twentieth century, a classical consensus emerged, much of it constructed upon Marshall's edifice. With his *Theory of International Trade, with Its Application to Commercial Policy*, published in 1936, Gottfried Haberler introduced an expansive reformulation of this emerging consensus by fitting it with the dynamic language of general equilibrium analysis. The benefits of free trade could subsequently be viewed in terms of both direct and indirect effects, bringing free trade theory closer to real world phenomena. And though German historical economists and American institutional economists, such as Thorstein Veblen, pointed dramatically to the ways in which economic reality differed widely from the behavior predicted by classical economic theory, they offered no compelling theoretical substitute.

Only the economic dislocations of World War I and the onset of the Great Depression compelled economists to urge greater caution and to force the construction of new theoretical pathways, many of which highlighted and served questions of international trade. That levels of international trade had declined so precipitously during the Great Depression—by two-thirds in nominal dollar terms and by one-third in real, inflation-adjusted terms—made it virtually impossible to consider new economic ideas without an unwavering focus upon international trade.

The principal economists of this interwar period nudged theory onto different planes and punctured much of the prevailing orthodoxy regarding general economic adjustment, unemployment and investment, and the influence of money and interest rates. Free markets were judged increasingly as artifacts of the imagination and as abstractions toward which behavior was often inclined but seldom made manifest without significant gyrations, fits and starts, or failings of even the simplest economic prophecy. Free trade orthodoxy, however, proved to be something else; it depended in part upon a free market framework for much of its explanatory power, yet it also came to be viewed increasingly as a sphere of potentially unrestricted behavior existing atop a large assortment of thoroughly regulated or more artificially cultivated domestic economic affairs. In the face of rising skepticism toward the usefulness of the free market abstraction, and rising trade protection-

ism—the first significant departure from freer trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century—the tenets of the prevailing free trade orthodoxy emerged virtually unchanged.

In 1921 the American economist Frank Knight (1885–1972) published *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit,* in which he distinguished between insurable risk that could be mostly ascertained and uninsurable uncertainty that proved impossible to predict. Almost ten years later the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) published *Monetary Equilibrium* (1930), in which he introduced the terms "ex ante" and "ex post," underscoring both the distinction and the relation between expectations and outcomes and the unpredictable ways in which savings equaled investment. And in 1936 the British economist John Maynard Keynes, a former student of Alfred Marshall's, published *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* in which he questioned both the microeconomic and the automatic and instantaneous market-clearing foundations of inherited classical theory.

Yet, despite increasingly numerous challenges of this kind, the implications and tendencies of inherited theory on questions of international trade remained virtually untouched. After extensive involvement with the German reparations question after World War I, as well as the debate surrounding the British return to the gold standard in 1924, Keynes had surely proven his interest in international affairs. Later in his career he looked increasingly to the United States for the most practical and noteworthy application of his increasingly refined economic principles. And Keynes's *General Theory* did carry implications for how nations might best effect freer trade and how domestic policy formulation should account for the dislocations and perturbations introduced by an increasingly open and free international trade network. But these implications were in no way an assault upon the general free trade consensus. Indeed, few direct theoretical challenges to free trade emerged in the late twentieth century, despite recurring offensives launched by politicians and various labor movements, and the relatively desperate reaction to economic recession.

From the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in Geneva, Switzerland, on 1 January 1948, through the seven GATT revisions and negotiating rounds beginning in 1955 (and within World Trade Organization negotiations after 1994), free trade resumed its ascent in policy-making circles. Crafted as a means to expanded multilateral trade in the post–World War II era, GATT began with nine signatories (including Cuba) and expanded to include 128 by 1994; in 1995 it was subsumed under the newly formed World Trade Organization. Pausing only for the briefest moments during late twentieth-century recessions that paled in comparison with the calamity of the 1930s, free trade-centered theory found itself with fewer and fewer detractors and policy once again conformed generally to theory.

***Implications of* The General Theory** Despite the perceptible ascendancy of Keynesian economics in the second half of the twentieth century, many of the questions raised by Keynes in *The General Theory* remain unsettled. His own followers, for example, continue to argue over whether Keynes described an economy that commonly achieved equilibrium—albeit at unacceptably low levels of output from time to time—or one characterized by continuous oscillations around a stable point or plateau. Few would argue, however, that Keynes did not describe an economy that converged on equilibrium—whether it could ever reach that point or not—by means of changes in income and output rather than through rapid and responsive price adjustments. Indeed, as Janos Kornai later explained, such tendencies may well be universal in modern, mass-production economies, whether capitalist or not. In Kornai's formulation, when confronted with underutilization and excess capacity, Western capitalist economies produced unemployment, whereas the command economies of the East, former and present, produced shortages of consumer goods. Under both schemes, price adjustments played no significant role. This may explain in part why officials in the People's Republic of China have in recent decades been so eager to learn Keynesian economics. Although Keynes left much of the explanation of sticky prices to his successors, he noticed the obvious way in which interest rates, wages, and commodity prices responded in Great Britain and abroad. And since they moved too slowly, haltingly, or imperceptibly to clear markets effectively enough to secure full employment, this led Keynes to his revolutionary conclusions regarding effective demand and the causes of economic stagnation or recession.

Ironically, regarding trade among nations, Keynes had first overlooked this kind of adjustment. The Swedish economist Bertil Ohlin (1899–1979) did much to establish his reputation

by disputing Keynes's rendering of the post–World War I German reparations problem, which Keynes had couched solely in terms of relative price changes. Although prejudiced somewhat by his belief that geographic endowments ordained Germany to lead the European economy, Keynes also believed that Germany faced a double burden under its requirement to pay reparations as determined under the armistice. First, it had to tax its citizens to pay for reparations, and second, it had to cheapen its export prices relative to its import prices by lowering wages at home (to effect export surpluses needed to transfer marks to foreign reparations creditors). Ohlin noted that the first burden would likely remove all necessity for the second; new German taxes sent abroad would simultaneously lower German demand and increase the demand of Germany's foreign creditors. And this would effect higher levels of German exports and lower levels of German imports without any relative change in the levels of German wages or export goods.

While Keynes eventually termed the debate "muddled" due to his insistence on the genuine possibility that creditor nations might entomb the German payments in hoarding or newly erected import barriers—a possibility largely ignored by Ohlin—the latter's argument had made its mark. Indeed, not long afterward, Keynes moved swiftly through a series of theoretical gyrations—building on and then dispensing with the quantity theory of money; finishing his *Treatise on Money* (1930) by reemphasizing in part his reparations policy argument and, at the same time, orienting himself more toward a general theory built upon a closed, static economy that underscored Ohlin's emphasis upon output or demand changes. Here, currency transfer and associated international trade problems diminished in importance and could be solved with less restricted currencies or special taxes on income from foreign lending. Free trade theory could march on not because it guaranteed the most efficient placement of all resources or global full employment, but because it only helped, and could largely be ignored if one could both loosen the "furtive Freudian cloak" of the gold standard-based, fixed exchange rate regime and focus instead on the stabilization of demand at home. Within a few years of the publication of the *Treatise,* Keynes encouraged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to make the currency and exchange policy of the United States "entirely subservient" to the aim of raising output and employment.

Heckscher-Ohlin, Factor-Price Equalization, and Real Free Trade Patterns If the abstract economic advantage of free trade had been well established by the late 1930s, the way in which free trade actually worked required additional explanation. Building upon "The Influence of Trade on the Distribution of Income," an article written in 1919 by his teacher, Eli Heckscher (1879–1952), Bertil Ohlin undertook analyses that would consolidate more completely the preeminence of the free trade persuasion in the process. Heckscher, under whom Ohlin had studied from 1917 to 1919 at the Stockholm School of Economics and Business Administration, and whom Ohlin succeeded in 1930, envisioned his article as a minor updating of classical Ricardian theory, which had, like Ricardo's Law of Comparative Advantage, done nothing to address the reasons for the existence of such advantage. Using both Heckscher's paper and his own graduate research, Ohlin staked out a theoretical position that began to explain the existence of comparative advantage, suggested the stringent real world requirements for the exploitation of free trade principles, and in part revived location theory, a substantial part of Adam Smith's cosmology that had been lost to most economists outside of the German historical school. Walter Isard's subsequent work in the economics of location and in regional economic studies, reflected principally in his 1956 publication *Location and Space Economy,* followed in part this theoretical pathway reopened chiefly by Bertil Ohlin.

As illustrated in Ohlin's *Interregional and International Trade* (1933)—for which he won the 1977 Nobel Prize—the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem explained how a nation will tend to have a relative advantage producing goods that require resources it holds in relative abundance (and an advantage importing those goods that require relatively scarce resources). If a nation possesses a relatively greater abundance of labor than its trading partners, for example, it will most frequently export products derived most intensively from labor, rather than capital, inputs.

In 1922, Ohlin had submitted a paper to Francis Edgeworth (1845–1926), Drummond professor of political economy at Oxford and Keynes's coeditor of the *Economic Journal,* in which he introduced the mathematical outlines of what would become the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Though Keynes responded to Edgeworth's request for comment with a curt "This amounts to

nothing and should be refused," it was one of Keynes's foremost American disciples, Paul Samuelson, who further refined the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. It soon became a staple of virtually all general economics texts, including Samuelson's own best-selling work, first published in 1948.

Samuelson's *Economic Journal* article, "International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices," also published in 1948, underscored and refined Ohlin's theoretical work. In this article, Samuelson exploited Heckscher-Ohlin to provide a polished mathematical explanation for how free trade might well serve as a substitute for the free mobility of capital and labor. He extended the theorem to reveal how the change in price of an internationally traded commodity effects a similar change in the income of the factor (labor or capital) used most intensively in producing it. From this followed what he termed the factor-price equalization theorem: as free trade narrows differences in commodity prices between nations, it must also, under the same conditions, narrow differences in income accruing to the factors of production. Thus, free trade naturally lessens the differences and resulting imbalances introduced by immobile or relatively immobile workers, factories, or natural resources.

By dropping one modifying assumption of Ohlin's theory after another (zero transportation costs and import duties, flexible exchange rates, immobile capital, etc.), Samuelson revealed both the positive force and efficiency of a hypothetical free trade regime and the stringent conditions necessary to carry out such a regime. Indeed, as the empirical work of Wassily Leontief revealed, Heckscher-Ohlin did not always fit the real world. Building on his groundbreaking work in input-output studies, Leontief noted in his "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Capital Position Re-Examined" (1954) that American exports tend to be labor intensive while American imports are mostly capital intensive, results in direct opposition to those suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Likewise, when put to the test, the purchasing power parity theory—developed principally by another of Ohlin's Swedish professors, Gustav Cassel (1866–1945)—appears to have equal difficulty fitting real world conditions. Relating free trade flows to international currency matters, purchasing power parity suggests that the purchasing powers of currencies in equilibrium would be equivalent at that rate of exchange. The exchange rate between any two national currencies should, in other words, adjust to reflect differences in price levels in the two nations.

The chief factors that account for the breakdown of purchasing power parity—currency speculation in foreign exchange markets, an abundance of goods and services that are not traded internationally, the extensive trading of financial assets, and the difficulty with which both general domestic and comparable international price levels are determined—also account in part for the potential invalidity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. That Leontief found an apparent contradiction in the U.S. example may only suggest that its economy is both more varied and complex than that of most other nations, and that its behavior consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin pattern may simply be more readily found within its regional, as opposed to international, trading networks.

Such theoretical insights proved to make Samuelson a virtually indispensable economic policy adviser. Indeed, as chairman of the task force advising president-elect Kennedy in 1960–1961 on economic policy (and Kennedy's first choice for chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers), Samuelson may well claim paternity of Kennedy's efforts on behalf of free trade. The Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of 1962, the first significant American legislative sponsorship of free trade since the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, bore the stamp of Samuelson's theoretical work and policy advice. Well aware of the elusive conditions under which an ideal free trade regime might be enacted, Samuelson provided a sound theoretical footing for the pragmatic approach reflected in the TEA, one of President Kennedy's few major legislative victories. Giving rise to the so-called Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, which reduced import duties on industrial goods worldwide by approximately 35 percent (and by a remarkable 64 percent for American-produced goods), the TEA also included new restrictions on textile imports. A historic milepost on the road to greater trade liberalization, the TEA nonetheless reflected a pragmatic appraisal of real-world economic conditions and policy limitations. Trade liberalization for manufactured goods was likely impossible without the textile industry protections.

Lingering Theoretical Challenges Appointed to teach international economics at the London School of Economics in 1947, James Edward Meade (1907–1995) launched a book project to

help him better grasp the ideas he hoped to convey to his new students. The resulting *Theory of International Economic Policy,* published in two volumes (*The Balance of Payments* in 1951; *Trade and Welfare* in 1955), attempted to integrate domestic and international policy, pre-Keynesian price effects with Keynesian income effects, and abstract free trade patterns with real world tendencies that often included or necessitated trade control. Recognizing and underscoring the notion that legitimate government assistance (international market research, for example) is often difficult to distinguish from subsidized trade protection, Meade discovered the "theory of second best." In Meade's formulation, abstract free trade models may well produce less than optimum outcomes, given real world conditions or tendencies. His theory of the second best revealed how a free trade regime might countenance alternative policies that diverged from absolute free trade principles, protecting the authentic gains from freer trade in the process. Subsequent to Meade's discovery, few criticisms of free trade outcomes found anything but a loose theoretical foothold, especially so if the free trade regime itself became the object of criticism. After Meade, few of these criticisms represented broad theoretical challenges to the growing free trade orthodoxy but were, instead, reminders that imperfect conditions and irrational economic behavior had to be accommodated—or isolated and marginalized—within the prevailing regime.

The chief ongoing quarrel with increased trade liberalization appears to be a criticism of theorists and policymakers who conflate international free trade with domestic free markets, or international trade with international capital flows. With the recent advent of policy initiatives such as Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), it has become easier to make such a conflation. Promulgated by the World Trade Organization, TRIMs are measures that force nations to compensate foreign investors for rules imposed after their initial investment (such as minimum wage increases). But free trade need not imply a policy of strict noninterference on the part of national governments (or even international organizations); some, like Charles Kindleberger, have suggested that government-sponsored domestic prosperity may even be a prerequisite for the enlargement of free trade networks abroad. If such enlargement requires that one prosperous nation serve as a lender or buyer of last resort, and be willing to sacrifice parts of some internationally exposed markets in the process, then this may well be the case.

As free trade theory and policy burnished their standing among policymakers worldwide in the last quarter of the twentieth century, economic circumstances continued to raise nagging questions. The distributional effects of trade often appeared to undermine general prosperity; protectionist regimes often appeared beneficial if introduced skillfully enough to avoid retaliation; free trade appeared to undermine environmental protection in developing nations. The Prebisch-Singer theory arose directly in response to rising distributional problems, particularly those that surfaced in the southern hemisphere. Named for Raul Prebisch (1901–1986), professor of economics at the University of Buenos Aires and the first director-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and Hans W. Singer, German-born UN economist who had trained under both Joseph Schumpeter and Keynes, the Prebisch-Singer theory suggested that international free trade reinforced harmful economic development practices in the developing and least developed countries. Because colonialism had produced unsustainable economic structures in these nations based on the encouragement of exports—most of which were inexpensive raw materials—Prebisch and Singer argued that trade protection and import substitution strategies were necessary if these developing nations were to strike out onto a sustainable path of growth and prosperity.

An agreement to set up a common raw materials price support fund of $750 million, after deliberations at the fourth UN Conference on Trade and Development, came as a direct result of Prebisch-Singer. Prebisch later suggested, however, that he was motivated primarily by the promise of industrialization, well suited to policies of import substitution but not, perhaps, to the labor surpluses so evident in the developing economies. Noticing later that increased wealth and increased demand for imports in developed nations might well improve the terms of trade for developing countries, Singer also modified his theoretical conclusions and policy recommendations. The slow maturation of the Latin American economies in the early post–World War II period, combined with rising American and European prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s (especially the latter decade), perhaps masked the ways in which protectionism and import substitution may have easily become self-defeating strategies. These developing nations matured and came to depend

increasingly upon external markets and capital only a few years before the stagflation, oil price hikes, and higher interest rates of the 1970s obliterated gains on both sides.

The apparent success of East Asian protectionist regimes in the late twentieth century and the onslaught of developing world environmental crises also cast doubt upon the superiority and applicability of free trade theory. But here, as well, theorists have largely acknowledged that protectionist regimes can flourish only when foreign sources of prosperity offer forbearance and accommodation in place of retaliation or increasing autarky. Absent undemocratic political systems and regressive fiscal and monetary policies, most theorists have also inferred that global free trade need not prevent environmental stewardship, just as it need not prevent lessened inequality within or between nations. Most have concluded that it is economic growth itself and the associated capital intensity that bring pressure on the natural environment. Free trade has essentially been implicated, then, in environmental crises as little more than the handmaiden of economic growth. If free trade is not distinguished from the absolute free market, however, such theoretical conclusions often remain opaque and virtually incomprehensible. And since the theoretical gains from freer trade tend to be as regressive as the theoretical gains from economic growth in general, the conflation of free trade with laissez-faire only serves to make trade theory even more ambiguous. Linking trade theory to development and growth theory, Gunnar Myrdal and others urged deliberate policy initiatives, without which lessened inequality and growth would prove unattainable. Failing to make that distinction, they argued, would place "second best" policy and the progressive, compensatory measures it often required beyond reach and would render free trade incapable of fulfilling its modest theoretical promise.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY

International monetary policy attracted few economic theorists before the twentieth century. Only when historic mercantilist concern for the accumulation of specie, and the rapid adjustment of interest rates under the gold standard, gave way to greater concern for mass unemployment did it begin to garner much theoretical attention. Before that, few who suffered at the hands of recurring gold outflows and restrictive domestic monetary policy were in any position of influence to either arrest such trends or call for new policies and theory with which to assail or question the prevailing regime. Exchange rates and gold reserves were defended at almost any cost, interest rates moved precipitously to reverse potentially large capital outflows, and investment planning could proceed under the assumption of minimal or virtually nonexistent exchange rate risk. However secure it rendered investment planning, this approach often proved that it would require, above all else, the willingness to sacrifice output in the name of exchange rate stability. As industrialization reconstituted American and European labor markets, this approach also implied recurring episodes of mass unemployment.

Much as it had with international trade theory, the shock of world war and the Great Depression gave great impetus to change. And just as these events compelled economists to rethink the theories that had somehow prevented them from capturing or explaining real world tendencies in international trade, so they forced economists to train their sights anew on questions of international money. The Baring-Argentine financial crisis of 1890 and the U.S. depression of 1890s had also focused much attention on international currency problems, but economic theorists were as yet unequipped to respond directly or forcefully. It was not until the later crises and the even more widespread economic calamity of the 1930s that economic theory began to respond with analyses directed at international monetary policy. It was at this time that the United States, for example—closely following its European counterparts—began to compile international balance of payments accounts, records of its transactions with the rest of the world. It was also at this time that Keynes and others began to urge new ways of conducting international monetary transactions, actively seeking theoretical insights by which changes could be guided and accommodated. "To close the mind to the idea of revolutionary improvements in the control of money and credit," Keynes warned, "is to sow the seeds of the downfall of individualistic capitalism."

To Keynes, the early twentieth century had proven the extent to which nations would resort to currency devaluation as a lever to improve their balance of trade, seldom improving in the process either their own terms of trade or the opportunities inherent in a flourishing and expanding trade network. As balance of payments accounting had

become more common, many Western nations had come to believe that unilateral currency devaluation would, in the absence of reciprocal action, improve the terms of trade. It would make a nation's own exports cheaper in terms of foreign currency and would, of course, make imports equally more expensive. It was not uncommon to find, however, the price of imports rising under such an initiative to the point where the aggregate value of imported goods continued to outpace the value of the higher, newly attained level of exports. Abba Lerner, in his 1944 publication *The Economics of Control,* introduced what eventually came to be called the Marshall-Lerner criterion, a theoretical rule with which one could determine the positive or negative outcome of such a devaluation. Assuming that factors such as supply constraints do not enter into the picture, Lerner showed that if the price elasticity of exports plus the price elasticity of imports is less than 1, then the increased cost of the imports exceeds the value of the growth in exports. Moreover, if a nation began with a large sum of foreign liabilities denominated in foreign currency, devaluation of its own currency might well add terrific sums to its net interest payments. With competitive devaluation added to the mix as a likely outcome, perhaps only after an interval of unilateral manipulation and worsening results, the terms of trade could seldom be rendered any more reliable or propitious. Global trade diminution became an increasingly likely outcome.

With a little prodding from Bertil Ohlin and others, Keynes's theoretical insight here was to recognize that in modern industrial economies, monetary policy would simply have little effect in restoring balance through price deflation. It would regulate external balance, instead, by causing unemployment, lower incomes, and decreased imports. He then seized upon the notion that exchange rate mechanics mattered far less than international liquidity. Though gold, the pound sterling, and the U.S. dollar had all proved somewhat useful in attempts at securing substantial international reserves with which to conduct increasing levels of trade, even the highly regarded British and American currencies remained vulnerable to the deflationist tendencies Keynes so abhorred.

Bretton Woods and the Triffin Dilemma As the end of World War II approached, Keynes and many of his American counterparts began planning for the postwar period. The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 convened with a sharp focus on both the monetary fragility of the interwar period and the theoretical prescriptions of Keynes and his growing legion of American disciples. The conference proved successful in reorienting the world's economic exchange system away from the constraints of the gold standard. Exchange rates were fixed and pegged, and could be adjusted within limits only during periods of "fundamental disequilibrium." Because Keynes and the head of the U.S. delegation, Treasury assistant Harry Dexter White, hoped to insulate government domestic policies from the misdeeds of currency speculators, Bretton Woods called for explicit capital controls. It also created the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organization designed to provide a cushion of international reserves to nations caught in a persistent current account deficit. The IMF would also serve as the final arbiter of fundamental disequilibrium.

In the end, however, Keynes's preoccupation with international currency reserves gave way to the overriding American concern for exchange rate stability. His proposal for an International Clearing Union, under which international liquidity could be expanded without reliance upon a single currency, never came to pass, mostly due to widespread fears that it would prove to have an inherent inflationary bias. It included provisions for bank "credits," extended to surplus states, and an artificial bookkeeping currency he called a "bancor," to maintain exchange rate stability. Overdraft provisions (up to $26 billion initially for member states) were proposed as well, to prevent contractionary domestic policy measures or competitive devaluations undertaken in the defense of embattled currencies. The IMF, however, acknowledging part of Keynes's theoretical contribution, did arrange for lending quotas (based mostly on the relative value of recent trading levels). In theory, these might have been utilized for both reconstruction and investment, and like the Clearing Union, could become a means to increased international liquidity. Unprecedented inflation in the immediate postwar years, however, altered the real value of IMF quotas to the point that short-term currency stabilization proved to be the only feasible activity. And since the Bretton Woods system came to be anchored upon the U.S. dollar (pegged to gold at $35 per ounce) rather than any type of new reserve asset, international liquidity would also depend in large measure upon worldwide confidence in a currency destined to wind up in a precarious overhang or glut position. Indeed, generous Marshall

Plan assistance, combined with larger than anticipated Cold War military outlays, quickly transformed a dollar shortage expected to last for some time into a dollar glut. By about 1953 the dollar gap or shortage had disappeared.

Although the modest U.S. payments deficits of the mid-1950s represented little more than a sensible response to varying levels of worldwide savings and investment requirements, Yale economist Robert Triffin noted that the dollar's unique position in the fixed exchange rate Bretton Woods system posed a fundamental dilemma. As the anchor of the system and the chief reserve asset, the flow of dollars into foreign accounts would necessarily outpace the flow of other currencies into American hands. Yet, despite the salutary effect such reserves would have on international trade in general, Triffin speculated that confidence in the dollar as a store of value would decrease as its numbers and its role as a reserve asset increased. Dollar accumulations overseas would engender an increasingly risky situation governed by a self-fulfilling prophecy. The implication of this dilemma was that international liquidity depended upon either a return to the Keynesian approach and a new independent reserve asset, or an end to fixed exchange rates pegged to the dollar value of gold.

Although the Lyndon Johnson administration tried to move in the direction of the former option, by introducing special drawing rights (informally, "paper gold") into IMF operations, they failed to catch on as a source of genuine, day-to-day international liquidity. Previously, John Kennedy's undersecretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs, Robert Roosa, had arranged for a series of mostly stopgap measures designed to ease the dollar overhang and stanch the attendant gold outflow. Negotiated offsets (purchase of U.S. goods by nations receiving U.S. military aid), swap arrangements (U.S. agreement to exchange U.S.-held foreign currencies for dollars at a future date to protect foreign banks otherwise reluctant to hold large sums of dollars), and the December 1961 "General Arrangements to Borrow" (a large, short-term borrowing arrangement that gave Great Britain and the United States additional IMF resources to avert a speculative currency crisis) were among the measures employed by Roosa and his successor in the Johnson administration, Frederick Deming. Afterward, the only remaining questions concerned the way in which the world would manage the departure from the Bretton Woods system and the nature of the floating exchange rate system certain to take its place. The end came quite abruptly after a decade of patchwork revisions, holding operations, and stopgap measures. President Nixon's decision of 15 August 1971, to end the guaranteed conversion of U.S. dollars into gold at $35 per ounce, announced after a series of Camp David meetings with top-level economic advisers, effectively ended the Bretton Woods international monetary regime.

Floats, "Dirty Floats," and the Tobin Tax

While floating exchange rates theoretically promised greater scope for expansionary domestic policies—part of Keynes's hope for the Bretton Woods blueprint—large, speculative movements in currency value and rapid, unsettling episodes of capital flight remained distinct possibilities. Indeed, financial transactions soon dwarfed those in goods and services in the post–Bretton Woods era; potentially large and rapid movements became all the more likely. But the demand for reserves did diminish along with the adoption of floating exchange rates, and increased capital mobility opened up the potential for other, more varied types of reserves in general. Nations also adapted, instinctively, by accepting floating exchange rates but with currency management intact. Few currencies were ever allowed to float freely, and instead central bankers most often practiced a "dirty float"; large swings were to be checked by rapid central bank buying and selling in currency markets. This is why Barry Eichengreen has suggested that the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–1995 was "the last financial crisis of the nineteenth century," resembling in a fundamental way the Baring crisis of 1890. In both cases, central bankers rallied around the system by rallying around a besieged currency (and, coincidentally, a Latin American nation).

With ample room for speculation and capital flight, however, theorists have more recently come to question the stability of the prevailing system. Currencies have likely become more volatile, capital flight has become an increasing malady, and trade has lost ground to multinational production due to the increasing currency market volatility. It is in this context that economists have debated the potential for capital controls and, as James Tobin often described it, the means by which policymakers might potentially throw a little "sand in the gears," reducing volatility in the process. Chief among the theoretical contributions or policy proposals here is the international currency transactions tax, or "Tobin tax." Proposed initially by the Yale economist James Tobin, such a tax would be small (typically proposed at 0.1 percent) and

placed upon all international currency transactions. Theoretical debate on the Tobin tax has thus far focused upon the potential for offsetting effects. Would a transactions tax decrease volatility by increasing the costs to speculators, or would it increase volatility by reducing the total number of transactions, producing "thinner," more vulnerable markets in the process? Because it would not distinguish between speculative transactions and those conducted on behalf of trade, would the transactions tax reduce levels of trade as it reduced speculation, or would it increase trade by reducing currency market volatility? If introduced, could the tax be applied widely enough (that is, fairly and equitably) by wedding it to the policies of developed nations, or would it be difficult to enforce uniformly, and therefore conducive to avoidance and resulting misallocation?

Although free trade remains a contentious political idea, economists have increasingly devoted their attention to the related problems of capital flows, currency speculation, and international monetary instability. And though many economists predicted at the time that the end of fixed exchange rates would give nations the freedom to create fiscal and monetary policies of their own choosing (unencumbered by exchange rate parity concerns), few remained as sanguine by the end of the twentieth century. Introducing foreign trade and capital movements into a closed economy model, Robert Mundell described in the 1960s and 1970s how a floating exchange rate regime would, by connecting government fiscal stimulus with higher interest rates, capital inflows, and currency appreciation, automatically render fiscal stimulus ineffective. The currency appreciation, he argued, would lower net exports to the point where any fiscal stimulus that gave rise to them in the first place would be completely eliminated. Despite its less suitable conformity to large, as opposed to small, open markets, the apparent lack of correlation between government deficits and interest rates, and the numerous real world examples of currency appreciation tied to comparatively low interest rates, Mundell's pessimistic appraisal of modern fiscal policy remains the dominant analysis for floating exchange rate regimes.

DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH THEORY

Economic growth theory remains the most difficult to master of all modern economic theories. It requires advanced mathematical skills (differential calculus) and, as a result, also introduces assumptions and limitations very difficult to account for or envision. Even if one excludes the possibility of perpetual disequilibrium—however close it may come to a precarious balance—the passage from one equilibrium state to another typically excludes any notion that underlying conditions may change with time as external variables exert change upon them. To do otherwise would be to require mathematical reasoning so complex and fragile that it would likely render all resulting models completely impractical by exposing them to the hidden, often increasing feedback effects of the most minute errors.

Although he was a leading biographer of John Maynard Keynes and a promoter of Keynesian economics, Roy F. Harrod was also among the first to leave behind Keynes's theoretical focus on a static economy. Although Keynes avoided taking a similar step on his own because he wanted to focus on existing problems of underutilization rather than apparent ongoing cycles of growth and recession, Harrod was more interested in the latter, effectively inventing growth economics in the process. His 1939 *Economic Journal* article, "An Essay in Dynamic Theory," gave rise to growth theory by introducing the notion of a steady-state equilibrium growth path from which actual growth most often diverged. Harrod also revealed how such a divergence fed upon itself, widening the gap between steady-state and actual economic trajectories.

Recognizing only a few years later (1946) that investment created additional productive capacity capable of being exploited only when further increments of investment gave rise to new income, Evsey D. Domar developed a simple model corroborating Harrod's theory. Known thereafter as the Harrod-Domar model of dynamic equilibrium, this model and accompanying theory were adopted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) immediately after World War II, setting the stage for the pending marriage of growth theory and third world economic development. Although intended for use in the analysis of advanced, developed economies like that of the United States, the World Bank quickly adopted it as a way to determine the amount of aid required to lift poor nations onto a more prosperous growth path. Aware in the 1950s that his model was being applied without questioning the relationship between aid and investment—or inequality, con-

sumption, and investment—Domar disavowed its use. As decolonization proceeded apace after World War II, however, it was inevitable that growth theory would come to be employed in this fashion.

Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson, both, like Harrod, among the first in the Keynesian camp, endeavored to highlight the importance of income distribution to economic growth. Mostly due to his 1960 presidential address to the American Economic Association, "Investment in Human Capital," Theodore W. Schultz publicized the work begun in the 1950s by Jacob Mincer and popularized the notion that education and training were as critical to development as technology and industrialization. Hollis Chenery, Simon Kuznets, and Irma Adelman all questioned the notions that growth depended solely upon industrial development and that growth automatically engendered greater equality, lessened poverty, and promoted a self-sustaining pattern of development. Kuznets's famous "inverse U relationship"—between national income per capita and inequality, positive in poor nations and negative in advanced national economies—sparked numerous rounds of debate, including Adelman's study of semideveloped nations that contradicted Kuznets's assertion.

Until Raul Prebisch, Hans Singer, Dudley Seers, and others criticized the assumption that poor nations were simply primitive versions of their more advanced, wealthier counterparts, however, few of these theoretical developments questioned the theoretical claim that investment in machinery, however effected, automatically engendered growth. Although Prebisch in particular seemed enamored of the possibilities for industrialization of the developing world and import substitution policy, he placed equal, if not overriding, emphasis on the elimination of unemployment, poverty, and inequality as a prerequisite for industry-led growth. Developing world debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s, evident in nations that had adopted the Prebisch-Singer theory and government intervention designed to implement it, spawned an even more vigorous countermovement marked by criticism of government intervention.

The "total factor productivity growth" approach, developed principally out of Robert Solow's groundbreaking work in capital theory in the 1950s, also questioned the primacy of capital formation in general or investment as a simple means to economic growth. Solow developed, for example, "vintage" models of growth that underscored not just the size of a given nation's capital structure, but also its age or vintage. The newer the technology, the greater its productive capacity, and—following Albert O. Hirschman on the "unbalanced" character of economic growth—the greater its linkage to key industries—on both the input and output sides. Research and development, scientific advances, and the processes of technology diffusion—all seemingly outside the scope of economic policy—evidently played as significant a role as policy itself. Vigorous debate on this issue ensued, most notably due to the emergence of empirical studies suggesting that government policy and high investment often appeared to spell the difference between nations that grew more or less rapidly. Joseph Schumpeter's earlier suggestion that oligopoly allowed firms to compete on the basis of technological innovation rather than price hinted at the role conceivably played by policy and burgeoning investment. Much like Kindleberger's lender of last resort—a nation that could afford to liberalize trade and share the wealth—Schumpeter's oligopoly capitalist could provide room for full employment and rising shares to labor as well as produce the profit margins with which to assume risky research or investment outlays. Unmitigated free market competition, it seems, would be incapable of the same. Amartya Sen posed theories of development, social choice, and inequality that suggested similar conclusions. Clarifying the conditions under which collective decisions can best reflect individual values and stressing the way in which poverty and inequality restrict economic choice and freedom, Sen forced economists and policymakers to consider general welfare and development in terms beyond reported changes in per capita income or gross national product.

Economic theory has for centuries remained a significant part of foreign affairs related to trade, money, and development. This is especially so for the foreign affairs of the United States, less dependent on international trade than many other nations but connected vitally to all by virtue of its dominant currency and ascendant role in international economic institutions. Since the emergence of stagflation in the 1970s, its history of adapting foreign policy to advances in theory has been marked by both indecision and a willingness to countenance only the most confident and simplistic versions of new economic theory. The debt crises of the 1980s and monetary turmoil of the 1990s did little to alter this course. And though

heterodoxy remained distant and beyond the ken of most policymakers, the foreign affairs of the United States remained wedded integrally to the counsel of economists, both active and defunct.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bordo, Michael D., and Barry Eichengreen, eds. *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System.* Chicago, 1993. A collection of essays examining the origins, operations, and legacy of the Bretton Woods international monetary system.

Dornbusch, Rudiger, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics." *Journal of Political Economy* (December 1976). Influential article examining the potential volatility of a regime of floating exchange rates.

Gardner, Richard N. *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Order.* New ed. New York, 1980.

Haberler, Gottfried. *Theory of International Trade, with Its Application to Commercial Policy.* Translated by Alfred Stonier and Fredric Benham. London, 1965. First work to place Ricardian trade theory in a general equilibrium framework.

Harrod, Roy. *The Dollar.* 2d ed. New York, 1963. History of the post–World War II transition from dollar shortage to dollar glut.

James, Harold. *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods.* Washington, D.C., and New York, 1996. Detailed history of international monetary affairs from the 1970s.

Keynes, John Maynard. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.* Edited by Donald E. Moggridge. 30 vols. London and New York, 1971–1989. Although other volumes in this set are also relevant to studies of international economic policy and theory, volumes 5, 7, 25, and 26 are particularly useful.

Kuznets, Simon. *Growth, Population, and Income Distribution: Selected Essays.* New York, 1979. Essays on the origins of inequality, including the inverse-U relationship theory.

Lerner, Abba. *The Economics of Control.* New York, 1970. Reprint of 1944 publication in which Lerner introduced the Marshall-Lerner criterion for analyzing the effect of exchange rate changes on the balance of payments.

Marshall, Alfred. *Industry and Trade: A Study of Industrial Technique and Business Organization and of Their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes and Nations.* London, 1919. Influential British economist's last work. Less well organized than his more famous text, but brimming with questions and observations that became critical parts of modern trade theory.

Meade, James. *Theory of International Economic Policy.* 2 vols. London, 1966. British economist's Nobel Prize-winning study of international trade that integrates Keynesian and pre-Keynesian analyses, domestic and international economic policy. First published in 1951 and 1955.

Myrdal, Gunnar. *International Economy: Problems and Prospects.* Westport, Conn., 1978. Analysis of international trade and money with an emphasis on developing world economic problems. An update of Harrod's analysis of departures from equilibrium and their essentially cumulative effects.

Ohlin, Bertil. *Interregional and International Trade.* Cambridge, Mass., 1967. Work in which the Nobel prize-winning economist introduced the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade.

Pitchford, John D. *The Current Account and Foreign Debt.* London and New York, 1995. Concise analysis of international payments operations and problems.

Ricardo, David. *Works and Correspondence: Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.* Vol. 1. Edited by Piero Sraffa. First volume of a ten-volume collection of Ricardo's writings. Edited over 30 years by an influential Cambridge economist whose fear of teaching was so profound that the editorship of this series and other smaller tasks had to be invented (principally by John Maynard Keynes) to keep him on the Cambridge faculty.

Samuelson, Paul. "International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices." *Economic Journal* (June 1948). A corroboration and updating of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade.

Sapsford, David, and John-Ren Chen, eds. *Development Economics and Policy.* New York, 1998. Recent survey of development economics theory and related policy applications.

Seers, Dudley, and Leonard Joy, eds. *Development in a Divided World.* New York, 1970; Harmondsworth, U.K., 1971. Collection of essays documenting developmental economic problems unique to developing nations.

Singer, Hans Wolfgang, and Sumit Roy. *Economic Progress and Prospects in the Third World: Lessons of Development Experience Since 1945*. Aldershot, U.K., and Brookfield, Vt., 1993.

Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edited by Kathryn Sutherland. New York, 1998. Arguably the first scientific analysis of domestic and international economic affairs, first published in 1776.

Thomas, Brinley. *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy*. 2d ed. Cambridge, 1973. History of the U.S. trade network with Great Britain, with emphasis on European demography and migration.

Tobin, James. "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform." *Eastern Economic Journal* (winter 1978): 153–159. Seminal article in which the Tobin international currency transactions tax was first proposed.

Treverton, Gregory F. *The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political Economics of Alliance*. Athens, Ohio, 1978. History of U.S. efforts to manage the post–World War II dollar glut in one European country.

Triffin, Robert. *Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility*. New Haven, Conn., 1961. Influential book examining the unique and potentially troublesome role of the U.S. dollar in the Bretton Woods system. Introduced the "Triffin dilemma."

See also FOREIGN AID; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; TARIFF POLICY.

ELITISM

Alan K. Henrikson

A theory of wide-ranging importance in historical and political thought, elitism as applied to foreign policy seeks to explain how that policy is made—by whom, in whose interest, in what manner, for what purpose, and with what results, including possible benefits for the policymakers themselves. A causal relationship generally is posited, or at least implied, between the composition of the policymaking group and the content and consequences of the policy it makes. Typically, the explanation of policy is to be found in the machinations of persons belonging to or admitted to a small coterie representing a wider privileged class, at the very top levels of society—an elite. A recurrent issue in elite analysis is that of whether the elite consists principally of the decision makers themselves or whether the elite is instead mainly the socially superior part of a community from which decision makers are drawn. The former view, which tends to be that of diplomatic historians and other scholars who focus on particular events, emphasizes the *actors* who are involved. The latter view, which tends to be that of sociologists and political scientists who compare overall patterns and may be interested in predicting, as well as explaining, public policy, emphasizes the *structures* that produce policy decisions. Common to most elite analyses is an assumption that there is some connection between actors, or power holders, and the structures, or social and governmental frameworks.

The English word "elite," adapted from the French *élite,* derives from the Latin *eligere,* a verb meaning to pick out, choose, or select. There is thus a meritocratic element in the concept. The exclusiveness of an elite group, especially in a nominally "classless" country such as the United States, with a republican form of government and democratic social institutions, is not based merely on birth or on wealth. It is, in principle, based as well on individual merit and on achievement—the person's intelligence and skill, courage and energy, and, of particular relevance in foreign policymaking, expertise and experience. Like wine, diplomats and other statesmen are often thought to get better as they grow older, achieving the status of "wise men." The role of women in the foreign policy elite, as it is sometimes called, has not been equal, though there is a trend toward greater representation of women in international service.

The broad sensibility needed for foreign policymaking in the United States and elsewhere was usually thought to owe something to an individual's family background. In the late nineteenth century a wealthy family could embark on a grand tour of Europe, and even around the world, that would expand a young person's horizons and permanently inform his or her outlook. Before (and even after) passage of the 1924 Rogers Act—which combined the U.S. diplomatic service and the less elitist consular service and established a merit-based classification system for officers—the American foreign service was, as the historian Martin Weil entitled his 1978 book, "A Pretty Good Club." This almost familial milieu was well described in many diplomatic memoirs and biographies, for example that of Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew by Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. (1966). Increasingly, however, the knowledge and skills needed for the practice of diplomacy and for international policymaking generally include a firm grasp of economics and an acquaintance with science as well as working proficiency in languages besides English and French. This may entail specialized study and preparation at postgraduate schools of international relations or equivalent professional training.

In the United States, international service was further democratized by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as well as the reforms proposed by the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (Hoover Commission) in 1949 and by a committee formed under President Henry M. Wriston of Brown University

in 1954. These reforms were aimed partly at familiarizing the domestically based civil service with the world and partly at preventing the foreign service from losing contact with American life. "Wristonization," as the effort was informally called, resulted in some integration of qualified members of the domestic civil service into the foreign service, though not at the expense of the latter's sense of itself as a select profession.

CLASSICAL AND NEW ELITE THEORY

Although the idea probably always has been present in some form, elitism emerged as a recognizable and clearly defined part of Western political thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The leading contributors to the theory were Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels. These writers attacked classical democratic thought and also Aristotle and Karl Marx. Majority rule, they insisted, is impossible. Every society is divided into those who rule and those who are ruled; and the rulers constitute only a small minority of any society. Aristotle's classification, which divided political systems into three types (rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by the many), does not fit reality either, for no man is capable of ruling by himself, and the many, too, lack the ability to govern. It is the few, under any political system, who exercise effective control. And Marx, with his emphasis on a class struggle that in the end (following the victory of the working class) leads to social harmony in a classless society, was also wrong. History features a continuing struggle among elites. That struggle will never end, and a classless society cannot be created. Moreover, to the pioneers in the development of elitist theory, Marx placed too much emphasis on economics and not enough on politics, which could be autonomous.

Classical elitist theory did not maintain merely that the active, socially recognizable people in a country made its important decisions—whether from within offices of government, from somewhere behind the scenes, or from completely outside the state apparatus. It emphatically asserted that the common man, however numerous within a society in absolute or relative terms, did not. Analysts of elites, who generally focus on the distribution of power rather than on the allocation of values, or on property and other wealth forms, differ somewhat over the degree of participation in government or, more generally, the political process that is necessary for a member of the elite accurately to be judged a member of what Mosca characterizes as "the ruling class." A society's elite is usually thought to be a stable entity, self-sustaining and constant over time. Yet the actual group that is in office can change markedly and very quickly. The concept of an elite therefore may need to be understood as encompassing all those who *might* govern as well as those who in fact *do* govern.

However "elite" is precisely understood, elitist theory is clear in the basic point that a minority, rather than the masses, controls things. The general population of a country—the common man—is ineffective. Even in societies with elections and other democratic mechanisms, it is posited, the ruling elite functions in a way that is largely independent of control by a popular majority. However, it made need a justifying doctrine. That the elite ordinarily functions according to a "political formula," in Mosca's term, is what makes its rule effective and acceptable to the masses. Thus, in theory, there can be a democratic elitism, however paradoxical that may seem.

A "new elite paradigm," building on the work of Mosca and other classical theorists, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s among comparative political sociologists. It drew attention to the occurrence, and the important effects, of divisions that may arise within the elite of a society. Its central proposition, as stated by John Higley and Michael Burton (1989), is as follows: "A *disunified* national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of *unstable regimes* that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals. A *consensually unified* national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a *stable regime* that may evolve into a modern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and other facilitative conditions permit."

In the United States, normally, internal and external conditions have favored consensual unity within the nation's elite. Of course, the American Revolution and, later, the Civil War, are the major exceptions to this generalization. During those periods, divisions ran so deep as to produce counter-elites. As the political sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr., and the political historian C. Vann Woodward have shown, the reconciliation between North and South that occurred following post–Civil War Reconstruction was in significant part a result of a complex bargain

between the elites in formerly opposed geographical sections. After the late nineteenth century, issues of foreign policy have on occasion divided the American elite as well. A by-product of this has been a widening of participation in the national debate over foreign policy. That this amounts to a "democratization" of American foreign policymaking, however, is highly disputable.

FROM IMPERIALISM TO REVISIONISM

American thinking about the relationship of elites to foreign policy began to develop around the year 1900 during the debate over imperialism. Most elite theorists, or commentators applying elite theory, have viewed policy from the Left, although not all have done so. There is also a conservative, or Rightist, elitism, sometimes politically ideological but more often having a traditional religious or cultural perspective on matters of public life. Such conservative elitists have been somewhat less inclined to address issues of foreign policy.

Most American critics having a view of society as headed, if not actually led, by elites have stressed the influence of business groups. These were seen to have had a role in causing the U.S. war with Spain and the subsequent effort to dominate the Philippines. A few denunciators of such overseas ventures, including socialists such as Daniel De Leon and Eugene V. Debs and populist reformers like William Jennings Bryan, openly blamed imperial expansion on the greed of the commercial and moneymaking classes and on trusts and syndicates looking for new fields to exploit. Most opponents of imperialism at the time did not fully develop such a radical view, but an English writer, John A. Hobson, supplied a theoretically coherent version of it in *Imperialism* (1902). He interpreted the imperialist dynamic as being the result of a capitalist drive for greater profits than were available at home and also for security for investments made in overseas territories. In studying the American reaction to not only U.S. but also British imperial engagements such as that against the Boers in southern Africa, the historian Ernest R. May, in *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (1991), surmises that Americans, "already disillusioned by the Philippine war and concerned about the growing power of trusts, probably found Hobson's arguments especially attractive."

Putting the whole subject in a broad comparative frame from a transnational perspective, the Norwegian political sociologist Johan Galtung, in the essay "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" (1971), interprets imperialism not so much as the result of the drives or motives behind it as the product of a structured, collaborative relationship between elites. He abstractly outlines one elite "center" inside the imperial power and another, smaller center inside the colonial country. He then theorizes that imperialism succeeds when the relationship between the two elites is "harmonious," or smoothly functioning and mutually profitable, but that it is bound to fail if it is not. Galtung's theory helps to account for the breakdown of British control over southern Africa. It also helps to explain the failure of the United States to achieve "harmony" with the Philippines, whose native leadership in large part refused to collaborate with American authorities and henceforth were subdued by military force. What is pertinent here is that a significant part of the American "center" also refused to enter into such a collaborative relationship, one of imperialism.

It has been shown that in the United States those who most prominently opposed U.S. territorial expansion in Asia following the Spanish-American War were themselves in many cases members of the American elite, if not mainly from the ruling political class or dominant economic group. Many were of an older type, for whom the early American Republic rather than the current and purportedly liberal British Empire was an appropriate model for the country. In *Twelve Against Empire* (1968), Robert L. Beisner observes that the leading anti-imperialist figures he studied generally "all shared the same biases and for the most part cherished the same conservative vision of an ideal American society." They were "elitists," he emphasized, and as such "they were not so much interested in conserving a system of economic privilege for themselves as in defending a style of life and a social tone against the leveling influences of *arriviste* businessmen and the democratic masses." Most of these, being themselves white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant (later to be called the WASP type), had long been concerned that increased immigration, from sources other than certain countries in western Europe, might alter the racial and religious character of American society. Taking over the Catholic Philippines wold only add to this perceived risk.

Previously, Ernest May notes, the American elite as a whole had been "overwhelmingly anti-

colonialist." In the late 1890s, however, the nation's ruling classes began to divide, with some, mostly of a younger generation, identifying with England's liberal imperialists and becoming enthusiasts for a similar high-minded American imperial expansion. The split between imperialists and anti-imperialists cost the American elite some of its influence and also its control over public opinion. May writes: "In 1898–1899, this not only made for an intra-elite debate about whether the United States should or should not acquire colonies; it legitimated a much wider public debate. Less educated and less cosmopolitan Americans could speak with greater freedom because they could take sides with one set of opinion leaders against another." Arguably the elite division had a permissive effect, allowing persons who previously had been merely "talkers" to become, if not real authorities, then frequently quoted "advisers."

In that era there were few American scholars who systematically employed elitist theory, or at least an awareness of the role of leadership groups, in attempting to comprehend the structure of American society. One who did was the pioneering sociologist Edward A. Ross. "Every editor, politician, banker, capitalist, railroad president, employer, clergyman, or judge has a following with whom his opinion has weight. He, in turn, is likely to have *his* authorities," Ross observed in *Social Psychology* (1908). "The anatomy of collective opinion shows it to be organized from centers and subcenters, forming a kind of intellectual feudal system."

Much more broadly, a Progressive outlook, shared by Charles A. Beard and other historians as well as by leftist and reform-minded politicians, disposed Americans to detect "hidden" influences responsible for the country's social direction and political decisions—for example, in permitting monopolies to operate. With the beginning of World War I in July 1914, explicit arguments about the class or group domination of American public life gained greater prominence. When the war started, President Woodrow Wilson asked Americans to be "impartial in thought as well as in action." Congress's declaration of war in April 1917—at the president's own request and following repeated protestations of U.S. neutrality—was something that required an explanation.

Critics on the Left, many of them strongly opposed to the war decision on grounds that it was inimical to the interests of the workingman or out of an ideological pacifism, supplied an explanation that stressed the malign influence of an economic elite. The centers of it were seen to be located on the East Coast, in the financial and industrial elites of New York and other Europe-oriented cities. Particular individuals such as J. P. Morgan, the Rockefellers, and the Du Ponts were named. Somewhat more generically defined groups, notably international bankers and the munitions makers—or, simply, "Wall Street" and war-profiteering "merchants of death"—were identified as being responsible for causing the country to join in the European carnage. They were thought to favor the overly ambitious peacemaking efforts led by President Wilson and his friend Colonel Edward M. House, along with his group of experts called the Inquiry, that resulted in the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant, which many feared would be an "entangling alliance."

This interpretation of history, with its emphasis on economic factors, resembled Marx more than Mosca, Pareto, or Michels. Also unlike those European theorists who accepted the idea of a permanent ruling class, the American accusers of the "interests" did not regard elite domination of society and determination of national policy as inevitable. The "people"—who, in the view of critics, had been, or at least should have been, opposed to intervention in the war because it meant suffering and loss rather than profit for them—could and should be put in control.

A number of writers during the 1920s were participants in a "revisionist" historiography that challenged official explanations of the war and the claim that U.S. intervention was caused by Germany's assault on America's maritime rights. Further, these writers augmented what was essentially an economic conspiracy theory by finding other, noneconomic forces at work: British propaganda, pro-British official bias, and Wilsonian idealism. Harry Elmer Barnes, C. Hartley Grattan, and others whose work is assessed by Warren I. Cohen in *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I* (1967) accorded considerable weight to the activities of political leaders, above all President Wilson himself and even certain diplomats, such as his ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Walter Hines Page, who was known for his Anglophile tendencies.

World War I revisionism became politically relevant during the 1930s as many Americans grew alarmed about the fateful course that American foreign policy might take. The 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing Great Depression

reinforced doubts about America's private economic leadership. Barnes, Grattan, and Beard, who turned his attention from domestic history to current foreign policy, stressed the inability of banking and commercial elites to redefine the American "national interest" to suit themselves and their international connections. A Senate investigating committee, headed by North Dakota Republican Gerald P. Nye and consisting mainly of isolationists, publicized this general historical interpretation—the "devil theory" of war, as Manfred Jonas called it in *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941* (1966). The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, the major policy expressions of the isolationism of the time, were designed to keep the United States out of future wars by placing restrictions on three dangerous parts of the American elite that had gotten the country into the last war: international bankers, armaments manufacturers, and presidents of the nation.

The other side of anti-elitism is populism, a belief not just in the political rightness of majority rule but also in the people's inherent goodness and wisdom. In 1937, Representative Louis Ludlow, Democrat of Indiana, proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would require a popular referendum before Congress could declare war. The premise of Ludlow's scheme, one of many of the same type made during the interwar period, was that only small groups would seek American intervention in foreign wars. The people, if asked to decide, would guard against this. The Ludlow amendment gained considerable support, which increased after an American gunboat, the USS *Panay*, was sunk by Japanese bombers on the Yangtze River in December 1937. But it never came to a final vote in the House of Representatives.

As elitist theories began almost to make policy, two revisionists grew unhappy with them. Walter Millis argued that the American people, rather than their leaders, had made war possible in 1917–1918. Charles Beard recognized that the people as a whole had become dependent on wartime purchases by the Allied powers. He continued to fear the influence of bankers and politicians, but he also feared that of farmers and other large groups having a stake in foreign trade. Logically but unrealistically, Beard called for a sharp reduction in U.S. dependence on such trade and for a more concentrated economic development of America, a doctrine called "continentalism." He imagined that this could be done through a more equitable division of wealth and thus a more widely exercised purchasing power. Determined to stay out of war, he would, if necessary, use state power to scrap the capitalist system.

This emphasis on the people, and their economic needs, became background discussion as the events leading to U.S. involvement in war commanded immediate attention. As Nazi Germany overran France and as the United Kingdom and the United States began to coordinate their naval operations, Beard, for one, became convinced that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was masterfully engineering the entry of the United States into another world war by dramatizing incidents in the Atlantic. In *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941* (1952) another revisionist, Charles Callan Tansill, saw the biggest "incident" of all, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, as the culmination of Roosevelt's strategy. In Tansill's view, the president provoked a war in the Pacific that he could not obtain in the Atlantic in order to cloak his domestic political failures and come to the aid of the British Empire.

During the period of America's involvement in World War II, the influence of economic interpretations of U.S. government policy and action fell off considerably, as military imperatives dominated official thinking and conduct. To be sure, there were those who suspected the motives, short-term and especially long-term, of the corporate "dollar a year" men who went to Washington to manage war production. The accomplishments of American industry during the war, under relatively little state supervision, did restore much of the reputation that American business had lost. Major decisions, however, were made by the president and his closest advisers, notably the secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, and the senior military leadership, including General George C. Marshall. New government entities such as the Office of Scientific Research and Development, headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, significantly contributed to the war effort by managing the contracts for the secret production of new weapons including the atomic bomb. Diplomacy during the war was conducted mostly by President Roosevelt himself at leaders' conferences with his British and Soviet counterparts, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The State Department under Cordell Hull was somewhat eclipsed, though it did concentrate on postwar planning.

FROM MCCARTHYISM TO THE NEW LEFT

In order to shape a better world order, what could be considered a series of elite groups assisted the Department of State in its planning process. The most central of these, the Inquiry-like War and Peace Studies project of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, which received support from the Rockefeller Foundation, became part of a civilian advisory committee that reported directly to Assistant Secretary of State Leo Pasvolsky in Washington, D.C. Among the subjects addressed by the various study groups under the aegis of the Council on Foreign Relations was the structure for a new international organization to replace the League of Nations, which was generally thought to have failed. This blueprinting effort contributed to what eventually became the Charter of the United Nations.

The influence of the council's War and Peace Studies project should not be exaggerated. By 1944 the memoranda of the project, which previously had been circulated confidentially to the State Department, were made available to the general membership of the council for private reading. "Such indications that the ideas produced by the studies staff did not need to be kept secret," comments Robert D. Schulzinger in an irreverent but informed assessment, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council of Foreign Relations* (1984), "demonstrated both the Council's success in raising issues of international cooperation and collective security and the drab conventionality of its approach."

In Washington, what has been called a revolution in foreign policy—the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization—took place, with a fair measure of bipartisan congressional support for the Democratic administration under Harry S. Truman. The quick succession of World War II by the Cold War did not permit relaxation. Many wartime military chiefs entered the national leadership structure, including George C. Marshall, who served President Truman as his personal representative to China and subsequently became secretary of state and then secretary of defense. Marshall was emblematic of the new place of the "warlords," in the lexicon of the radical sociologist C. Wright Mills (*The Power Elite,* 1956), who argued that the military had moved alongside the big corporations and the machinery of the state itself in America's "higher circles." General Marshall did indeed wield enormous organized power in what some scholars, including the historians Daniel Yergin and Melvyn Leffler, have characterized as the American "national security state."

Perhaps most exemplary of the elite type, as some perceived it, was Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose aristocratic manner represented "the British accent" in American diplomacy, as the historian John T. McNay suggests in *Acheson and Empire* (2001). An Episcopal bishop's son from Connecticut who became a Washington lawyer, Acheson wrestled with "a conflict that would be evident throughout his life: an intellectual attachment to democratic values pitted against a personal elitism that caused him to view with condescension 'the vulgar mass of humanity,'" as Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas put it in *The Wise Men* (1986), describing Acheson and a circle of friends who epitomize the style and outlook that dominated American foreign policy after the war. Sartorially elegant, meticulously mustached, and verbally fastidious, Acheson would later title his memoir *Present at the Creation* (1969), compounding the impression he perhaps inescapably gave of arrogance. He was elitism's very embodiment—Groton, Yale, Scroll and Key, Harvard Law School, Covington & Burling, and then the cabinet, to which, however, he did not seem particularly to aspire but, rather, only to deserve.

In part because of his manner, Acheson was a red flag to some politicians, notoriously Joseph R. McCarthy, the junior Republican senator from Wisconsin, who accused Acheson of "coddling" communists in the State Department. McCarthy was among the conservatives who believed that the setbacks the United States experienced internationally in the early years of the Cold War—the "loss of China" to communism in 1949 and the near collapse of South Korea when invaded by North Korea in 1950—were the result of high-level policy mistakes. Imagining "a great conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man," the senator found the answer in "the traitorous actions by those who have been treated so well by this nation."

With his accusing finger pointed at Acheson and even the respected General Marshall, as well as more vulnerable officials, McCarthy carried out an anticommunist campaign that was, in its social-psychological basis as well as in its rhetorical method, anti-elitist. To the extent that it was grounded, it was based on populism, a conviction that "the people," the majority of the U.S. population that lived outside centers of sophistication,

properly should rule but were losing their ability to do so. McCarthyism reflected what the historian Richard Hofstadter has termed "the paranoid style" in American politics. To be sure, McCarthy's credibility was in question. To accuse the highest authorities in the land of treason, as he did, required a temerity that could only be justified by the actual truth of the charges. McCarthy's ultimate inability to produce significant proof finally undermined his crusade, but not before it had cost some of the expert "China hands" in the State Department their jobs and, moreover, cautioned many other members of the educated upper class to think twice about entering government service or any other form of public life. It was more comfortable, and safer, for those who were securely employed to remain in good positions in industry, finance, and academe—the institutional niches of the "silent" generation.

McCarthyism failed partly because it did not offer a substitute elite. It merely threatened the existing one, which, entrenched in institutions, survived. The administration of John F. Kennedy brought into government a younger generation that had come of political age during World War II but had not been responsible for political decisions during the conflict. Kennedy nonetheless drew heavily on older leaders of what was called by the journalist Richard A. Rovere the "American Establishment," seeking counsel and reassurance during events such as the perilous 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As Leonard Silk and Mark Silk authoritatively recount in *The American Establishment* (1980), this notion of an Establishment—the word derives historically from the establishment of a state church, the Church of England—had been popularized in Britain in the 1950s by the historian A. J. P. Taylor and the journalist Henry Fairlie. The "heart" of the American Establishment was the New York financial and legal community, in the view of the Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who served as a special assistant in the Kennedy White House. The Establishment's "front organizations" were the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie foundations along with the Council on Foreign Relations, as he noted in his memoir *A Thousand Days*. Its "organs" were the *New York Times* and the journal *Foreign Affairs*.

Curiously, President Kennedy, though himself unmistakably a member of the American upper class (Boston branch, Irish Catholic), did not personally know many bankers, industrialists, leaders of the bar, university presidents and deans, foundation officials, generals, and others who constituted America's nonpolitical, institutional leadership. Nor was he very familiar with the New York financial and legal community, at the Establishment's center. It thus was a measure of that elite's power that a significant number of Establishmentarians entered his cabinet. He filled the position of secretary of state, for example, with Dean Rusk, a former senior State Department official who had been president of the Rockefeller Foundation, on whose board were a number of older Establishment figures including Robert A. Lovett and John J. McCloy, both of whom were assistant secretaries of war during the Roosevelt administration. Perhaps the best example of an Establishment man who entered the new administration was Douglas Dillon, who became secretary of the Treasury. Dillon, son of Clarence Dillon of the New York banking house of Dillon, Read and Company, had served as undersecretary of state in the outgoing Eisenhower administration. An internationalist more than a partisan, he easily made the transition from a Republican to a mainly Democratic cabinet.

The American Establishment, though "predominantly Republican," acknowledged Schlesinger, "possessed what its admirers saw as a commitment to public service and its critics as an appetite for power which impelled its members to serve Presidents of whatever political faith." Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both "had drawn freely upon them," as Schlesinger shrewdly explained, "partly to avail themselves of Establishment competence, partly to win protective coloration for policies which, with liberals in front, would have provoked conservative opposition. It was never clear who was using whom; but, since it *was* never clear, each side continued to find advantages in the arrangement."

President Kennedy, as the journalist David Halberstam observed in a similarly knowing but more critical account, *The Best and the Brightest* (1972), "believed in the Establishment mystique." At the beginning of the 1960s, there was little criticism from outside the Establishment or dissension within it either. "Rarely had there been such a political consensus on foreign affairs," Halberstam commented. Containment was good, communism was dangerous, and foreign aid bills, required to keep the Third World from going communist, could be politically debated in Congress. "Besides," Halberstam noted of Kennedy, "he was young, and since his victory over Nixon was slimmer than he had expected, he needed the

backing of this club, the elitists of the national security people. And he felt at ease with them," more so than he did with liberal "Democratic eggheads" with causes to push.

The American foreign policy consensus fractured when the Vietnam War began, as did the Establishment, although the cause-and-effect relationship is uncertain. Never a perfectly solid or solitary monolith, the Establishment began to fall apart, its cracks widening to open spaces for other, new participants to enter. Teaching then at Harvard University, the historian Ernest May remembers, "I thought I saw in progress in the mid-1960s something similar to what had taken place in the late 1890s," when the American elite had split over imperialism and the Philippine conflict. At the start of the Kennedy administration there had been a near consensus about the need, in the words of Kennedy's inaugural address, to "pay any price, bear any burden . . . support any friend, oppose any foe." But the televised hearings conducted by Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator J. William Fulbright and teach-ins at Harvard and many other universities throughout the country were evidence of serious division within the American foreign policy elite. However, that this dissension in elite circles was, as May suggests, responsible for "bringing in its train a great expansion of the public prepared to argue opinions" is not a total explanation. An alternative view would assign more autonomy to the American public itself, enabled by television and other media to be more attentive, while coming to doubt the justice and wisdom of the war being conducted in their name. The massive public reaction to the apparently successful North Vietnamese Tet offensive in January 1968, which caused President Lyndon B. Johnson to decide against running for another term and to opt for a partial bombing halt and peace talks, would tend to support this view.

Coinciding with, and to a considerable degree a part of, these events was the emergence of a political New Left and a corresponding revisionist historiography, which challenged the very premises of American foreign policy, then and earlier. Locating the causes of the Cold War and the later Vietnam struggle less in external threats to the United States than in factors within it, including the influence of powerful elites, the new revisionists dominated academic discussion for a time and also shaped the public debate. The seminal work was William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1972), an idiosyncratically radical critique of U.S. foreign policy and its leadership as being inherently expansionist, using the "open door" principle both as an ideological motivation and as a diplomatic instrument—in the manner of Mosca's "political formula"—in carrying out American imperialism. Other writers, including those in the Williams-influenced "Wisconsin school," did monographic work on particular periods. The Vietnam War itself was subjected to detailed New Left analysis, with researchers finding precise evidence of American corporate and other elite manipulation of U.S. policy, implicating, for example, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and the Roman Catholic Church. While sometimes lacking historical perspective and interpretive balance, these studies had a powerful effect in discrediting the foreign policy of the United States and also those, members of various elites, involved in making it.

FROM GEOPOLITICS TO TRILATERALISM

The ambivalence regarding Vietnam of many in the American Establishment itself as well as in the American electorate was evident in the election in November 1968 of Richard M. Nixon, a Californian Republican semi-outsider and former hard-line cold warrior, to the presidency. Declaring the purpose of "peace with honor," President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, a refugee from Nazi Germany who became a celebrated professor of government at Harvard, carried out a strategy of gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces ("Vietnamization") while using air strikes to demonstrate America's will, even while engaged in peace talks with representatives of Hanoi in Paris. The effort was institutionally and politically very complex, requiring emotional balance as well as brain power.

In order to help hold the government and country together, and possibly also to gain personal reassurance as well as policy confirmation, Kissinger in particular cultivated the elite, among whom, however, he carefully picked and chose. "On a personal level I can never forget the graceful—I might almost say gentle—way in which Dean Acheson welcomed me to Washington when I arrived as national security adviser, and the wisdom and patience with which he sought thereafter to bridge the gap between the perceptions of a Harvard professor and the minimum

KISSINGER'S "WISE MEN" (AND WOMEN)

"Some of my education was supplied by consulting many men and women who had been prominent in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. For the entire postwar period foreign policy had been ennobled by a group of distinguished men who, having established their eminence in other fields, devoted themselves to public service. Dean Acheson, David K. E. Bruce, Ellsworth Bunker, Averell Harriman, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, Douglas Dillon, among others, represented a unique pool of talent—an aristocracy dedicated to the service of this nation on behalf of principles beyond partisanship. Free peoples owe them gratitude for their achievements: Presidents and Secretaries of State have been sustained by their matter-of-fact patriotism and freely tendered wisdom. While I was in office they were always available for counsel without preconditions; nor was there ever fear that they would use governmental information for personal or political advantage. Unfortunately, when I came into office they were all in their seventies."

— *Henry Kissinger,*
White House Years *(1979)* —

requirements of reality," as Kissinger recalled in *White House Years* (1979). He was particularly gratified when Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, scion of an old Maryland family who had served as U.S. representative in London, Paris, and Bonn, agreed, at the age of seventy-two, to represent the Nixon administration in the difficult peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese in France. "We were on a long road, certain to be painful," Kissinger wrote. "But with David Bruce as a companion its burdens would be more bearable. And any effort to which he was willing to commit himself had a strong presumption of being in the national interest." The importance of the sustainment that Kissinger, an immigrant to America, received from his association with Establishment figures like the aristocratic Bruce, who seemed to represent as well as recognize the U.S. national interest, was surely profound, if difficult to estimate precisely.

With the very different administration of Jimmy Carter, an almost complete outsider from Plains, Georgia, who had been a submarine officer in the U.S. Navy and a pro–civil rights governor of his home state, the Establishment seemed to have lost out. This would be a mistaken impression. In an attempt to formulate a completely new, post-Vietnam foreign policy consensus for the country on a different basis from the essentially power-oriented, "geopolitical" focus of the Nixon and subsequent Gerald Ford presidencies, President Carter emphasized human rights, nuclear disarmament, and "interdependence."

This last was a concept associated with the Trilateral Commission, a nongovernmental group of North American, European, and Japanese leaders who were focusing not on East-West competition but on North-South cooperation. Intellectually, its approach appealed to Carter. The initiative (and the resources) for the formation of this elite group came from David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank and the Council on Foreign Relations, following his return from a Bilderberg Conference in Holland early in 1972. With Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University as executive secretary, the Trilateral Commission enlisted some 145 "commissioners"—bankers, industrialists, labor leaders, lawyers, politicians, academics—from the three Trilateral regions. Among the politician members invited (co-opted, a skeptic might say) to join the U.S. group was James E. Carter, Jr., as his name then was listed. Carter was grateful for the chance. As he wrote in his campaign autobiography, *Why Not the Best?* (1976), "Membership on this commission has provided me with a splendid learning opportunity, and many of the other members have helped me in my study of foreign affairs." As Leonard and Mark Silk reported, when Carter became president, some 40 percent of the U.S. members of the Trilateral Commission became members of his administration (the co-optation was mutual).

One of these was the New York corporate lawyer and former high-ranking Defense Department official Cyrus R. Vance. "If, after the inauguration," President Carter's closest aide from Georgia, Hamilton Jordan, had injudiciously said in a widely quoted statement, "you find Cy Vance as secretary of state and Zbigniew Brzezinski as head of national security, then I would say we failed." Indeed, it did seem as if the Carter people had been forced to give in. "There can be no doubt today," commented Robert A. Manning in

the nonestablishment journal *Penthouse,* "that David Rockefeller and his Trilateral Commission have succeeded in seizing control of America's foreign policy." Such fears should have been partially laid to rest, commented the Silks, when National Security Affairs Adviser Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance started feuding over arms control and other issues.

These internal differences within the Carter administration notwithstanding, the Trilateral concept, and the international associations that came with it, broadened the purview of American foreign policy, making it more truly global. In place of the shifting "triangular" diplomacy handled, sometimes arbitrarily, by Nixon and Kissinger alone in a way that seemed to place America's relations with Moscow and Beijing on the same, or even higher, plane than its established relations with London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, and Tokyo, there would now be a new emphasis on working with neighboring Canada, the western European powers, and Japan in a more structured and reliable trilateral formation. The policy aim was to coordinate the decisions of the so-called industrial democracies so as not only to stabilize their own economies but also to enable them to grow consistently in order to absorb more of the primary and other products of developing countries. Newer issues such as protection of the global environment and the universal promotion of human rights also were placed on the agenda. That radical critics of Trilateralism, such as Holly Sklar and others (1980), saw it as "elite planning for world management" bothered but did not deter David Rockefeller and his fellow commissioners, outside government or in.

FROM REAGANISM TO CLINTONISM AND BACK TO BUSHISM

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and particularly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of that year brought the U.S. government suddenly back to geostrategic thinking and produced a shift in elites. The holding of U.S. embassy personnel as hostages by young Islamic militants in Tehran seemed to immobilize the Carter administration. Carter's defeat in the election of 1980 by the conservative former Republican governor of California, Ronald Reagan, replaced talk of "interdependence" with assertions of "strength," a readiness to defend U.S. interests around the world—unilaterally, if necessary. The relevant elites for Reagan were not international bankers in New York, Frankfurt, or Tokyo but the very rich businessmen in California who, remaining behind the scenes (as his "kitchen cabinet"), had long financed and in other ways facilitated the actor-politician's career. This West Coast elite expected, and got, a resolute defense of the Free World against Soviet-supported insurgencies and a worrisome Soviet arms buildup. In the important field of economic policy, the ideology of the "magic of the marketplace" replaced technocratic discussion of international "policy coordination."

Within the broader American Establishment, there was considerable repositioning, not just between coasts. Long-established organizations of business leaders like the Conference Board and the Business Roundtable gained in influence. Among the policy-oriented research institutes, those like Brookings, being moderately liberal, were overshadowed somewhat by the newer and highly energized conservative American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation. The Hoover Institution, situated on the campus of Stanford University, also gained in status and influence. While not dominant in the actual policymaking process, within government itself, these conservative think tanks assisted the Reagan administration by providing informed, articulate commentary useful in the national debate over foreign policy, defense strategy, and economic philosophy. President Reagan, the "great communicator," was able through his skillful use of the media to express much of his message to the American public directly. It was simplified but well crafted for mass effect.

The "CNN factor"—twenty-four-hour-a-day worldwide cable TV—emerged as an actual historical force during the subsequent presidency of George H. W. Bush. When the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, when anarchy broke out in Somalia, and when internecine violence began in Yugoslavia, CNN was there, and its reports commanded American and worldwide attention. There was speculation, exaggerated but perhaps having an element of truth, that media moguls such as CNN's owner, Ted Turner, were capable of setting the agenda of American foreign policy, presumably to improve their outlets' ratings and increase their profits. Although assimilable to the general idea of corporate capitalism, the notion of a distinct "media elite" emerged to compete with old theories about the influence of traditional establishments in America.

The rise in importance of the media—particularly "new news" sources including talk radio, cable TV, and the fledgling Internet—did create a new competitiveness among would-be opinion leaders within the government or outside it. Even the dignified Council on Foreign Relations was prompted to engage in public "outreach," in the form of traveling panels and radio programs. It also gave its journal, *Foreign Affairs*, a more polished look. The council had been startled when, as he began his run for the presidency, George Bush resigned his council membership. He also ceased participating in the Trilateral Commission. Having formerly been U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, chief of the U.S. Liaison Office (ambassador) in Beijing, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency, these were natural affiliations for him to have. But it was no longer clear that such connections were needed by political aspirants, or even advantageous for them.

The emergence of Bill Clinton, from Hope, Arkansas, was further evidence of uncertainty and flux among American elites. He himself was a mixture of backgrounds and influences. A man of modest beginnings but prodigious energy and ability, he graduated from Georgetown University in Washington, interned there in the office of Senator William Fulbright, won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, and completed his education at Yale Law School. He then returned to Arkansas and rose smoothly to its governorship. Except for longtime "Friends of Bill" (many of them fellow lawyers by training), new acquaintances made in Hollywood and in salons in Georgetown, and comradely relations with his fellow governors, he was relatively independent of powerful interest groups and even the national Democratic Party.

His administration, in its composition, was intended to "look like America" and, owing to the large number in it of women, African-Americans, and Hispanics, it did somewhat. The impression it gave of diversity was reduced, however, by the reality that many of its inner figures had received their educations at the same few institutions, principally Harvard, Yale, and Stanford. Like President Clinton himself, nearly all were government-focused. As Thomas R. Dye observed in *Who's Running America? The Clinton Years* (1995), "Almost all top Clinton officials are lawyers, lobbyists, politicians, and bureaucrats; very few have any background in business, banking, the media, or the military."

The Clinton administration at the outset emphasized the essential connectedness—the "inextricable intertwining," in a phrase used by Secretary of State Warren Christopher—of foreign affairs and domestic affairs. The main practical effect of this doctrine, which seemed to reject the idea that foreign policy required specialized geopolitical understanding, was aggressive trade promotion. This effort was led by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, who went abroad with retinues of American business leaders, and by President Clinton himself, who pressed for the negotiation of multilateral trade accords including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) arrangement, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and, prospectively, a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The increasing stake of the United States in large overseas markets and investment outlets powerfully conditioned the Clinton administration's policy. In dealing with the People's Republic of China, for instance, President Clinton ultimately "de-linked" the issue of human rights and that of the extension of most-favored-nation trading rights, which were made permanent. This surely reflected the ever-enlarging American economic interest specifically in China but, more generally, a globalizing world economy. Many elite interests were subsumed in this Open Door–like expansionism.

The administration of Texas governor George W. Bush, the first son of a former president to become president himself since John Quincy Adams followed John Adams and a reminder of the curious "dynastic" factor in America's open and democratic politics, was even more conspicuously committed to the defense of America's business interests. A businessman himself, President Bush had only limited personal experience in foreign affairs except with bordering Mexico. In Texas it was said that his worldview was formed by the Midland Petroleum Club, though the example of his father's rich international involvement must have somewhat informed it too. A kind of political throwback, he surrounded himself with (or was surrounded by) many of his father's former advisers. The person he selected as vice president, Richard Cheney, formerly a White House chief of staff and also secretary of defense, was chairman of the Halliburton Corporation, a Houston-based oil-equipment firm. Cheney was a proponent of an energy policy that emphasized increasing supply rather than energy conservation or environmental protection, and no doubt influenced the president's quickly made decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. President Bush's remark,

"We will not do anything that harms our economy because first things first are the people in America," somewhat masked his solicitude for corporate interests. So, too, did his blunt denunciation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, though negotiated by a Republican administration, as "a relic of the past." He surely was reinforced in his suspicion of the restrictive ABM Treaty by the man he appointed as secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, another corporate CEO who had been White House chief of staff and secretary of defense. Most pertinently, as chairman of a bipartisan commission that in 1998 had produced the Rumsfeld Report, the new secretary was a strong advocate of building a national missile defense (NMD) system, if necessary with the United States doing so alone.

Environmentalist associations and arms control groups at home and abroad weighed in heavily against what seemed a hard-right political turn, which the uncertain outcome of the November 2000 U.S. presidential election did not seem to warrant. The popular majority, which the Democratic candidate Al Gore had won, clearly had not chosen such a radical departure. The president seemed to be a captive of his Texas cowboy persona, perhaps of defensive feelings about having been established in office by the U.S. Supreme Court and of the interested elites in the Bush camp.

Viewed from many perspectives, especially from outside the country, the younger Bush was initially perceived as the most divisive president of the United States since Ronald Reagan. Foreign opinion, including the influence of European and other elites, had an impact on U.S. decision making. Not merely President Bush's trip to Europe in June 2001 to meet his counterparts in NATO and the European Union but also the media-reported popular reactions abroad to the stark positions he had taken brought about immediate adjustments in at least the presentation of his policies.

This responsiveness was something new. In Galtung's transnational scheme of analysis, the "center" in America was being harmonized with, and to some extent by, "centers" of influence within Europe. The intra-institutional processes of the NATO alliance and also of the increasingly structured U.S.–European Union relationship described by Éric Philippart and Pascaline Winand as an "Ever Closer Partnership" (2001), as well as the interpersonal chemistry of relations at the leadership level, made the new president, and administration, much more sensitive to foreign, particularly European, opinion. This was evident not just with regard to foreign and security policy matters, including global warming and military defense, but also cultural and moral matters, such as the death penalty.

For elite theory, as applied to international relations, this pattern of development is instructive. The intellectual and social division over policy issues may increasingly become cross-national, with elites in one country joining with elites in other countries to influence the publics, as well as the governments, within. The American "foreign policy elite" has always been internationally minded to a degree, though actual contact with its counterparts elsewhere has been limited. In an age of nearly instant global communication, with travel and networking made easier than ever before, it is likely to become more even globalist in outlook. In the process of globalization, the elite itself may be globalized.

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: ELITISM VERSUS PLURALISM

The idea that a cosmopolitan elite has controlled, even actually dominated, American foreign policy and diplomacy is a difficult thesis to evaluate. The subject is an elusive one. Part of the reason is the uncertain relation of elites to institutions, of actors to structures. There is a continuing debate among sociologists, political scientists, and other commentators on American social patterns between those who see power as founded on and inhering in institutions, including, but not limited to, the formal institutions of government, and whose leadership almost by definition constitutes the elite, and those who see power as requiring actual participation in decision making, which can be somewhat extra-institutional. Institutions and their representatives may not in fact be actively involved in important historical events. Outside forces, including a variety of organized groups and even unassociated individuals, may at times participate in them very effectively. The former, institution-oriented view, stressing positional power and latent influence, sometimes is called the "elitist" school. The latter, more group-oriented view, requiring actual involvement and impact to prove the reality of power, is commonly known as the "pluralist" school.

C. Wright Mills believed that "great power" —such as foreign policy entails—must be institutionalized and, more specifically, that America's

leaders are institutional elites because they are the ones who possess formal authority in the country. Among scholars who later emphasized this was Thomas Dye, whose book *Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership in the United States* (1976) and its sequel volumes attested to this view in detail, "naming names." Somewhat similar, though concentrating on persons occupying powerful institutional positions who come to government and other command positions from what is regarded as the "upper class," was G. William Domhoff, whose book *Who Rules America?* (1967) and other studies carried on a more radical tradition. Both were basically on the "elitist" side. The opposing view, that mere potential control and formal authority are not enough, and that an examination of actual decisions made in America shows a wider variety of participants, was perhaps most influentially stated by Robert A. Dahl in numerous works, including *Who Governs?* (1961), a study of local politics in New Haven, Connecticut. This, the "pluralist" view, resists the argument that there is a single power structure, describing instead a basic competition for power and control.

Such an approach offers not a hierarchical model of American politics but a polyarchical model, suggesting that different groups of individuals exercise power in different sectors of society, that they acquire power in different ways, and that the interplay among them has an indeterminate outcome. It should be noted that neither the so-called elitists nor the so-called pluralists see the mass of the population as capable of leadership. This basic point is shared with Mosca, who posits a permanently ruling minority of variable composition. Elitism theorists see groups as being socially and in other ways interlocked, operating in monopolistic or at least oligopolistic fashion. Pluralism theorists see intergroup dynamics, much less constrained by social and other structures, as the essence of American policymaking. According to the pluralists, the public, though incapable of directing itself, can maintain its freedom and thereby preserve American democracy by choosing among rival elites that compete for its favor.

A question that has not adequately been addressed in most of the pertinent sociological and political scientific literature is whether the making of foreign policy is essentially different from the making of domestic policy. There is some evidence, to be sure, of a difference between elite opinion and mass opinion with regard to foreign policy, especially now that the Cold War international consensus has somewhat broken down. Eugene R. Wittkopf and Michael A. Maggiotto have found (1983) that elite views among Americans tend to be more "accommodationist" as well as "internationalist," and American mass, or public, opinion tends to be more "hard-line" and "isolationist." Nonetheless, it still may be supposed that "politics stops at the water's edge," and that such internal differences, involving opinion only, make little difference, on the traditional premise that foreign policy—the actual management of it—is an elite preserve.

In general, it still is true in the United States that foreign affairs is an elite sphere, with those in office running things. The federal government is recognized constitutionally as the nation's "one voice" in speaking to the world. Increasingly, however, America's international relations, which include more than policymaking and formal diplomacy, are coming to involve and affect a much wider array of direct participants, official and unofficial. This may challenge the institutionalized elite character of U.S. foreign policy and its conduct. It may be that the only way the American foreign policy elite, or Establishment, can retain its historical and accustomed control will be to continue to outcompete the growing list of participants by concerting more closely with elite counterparts in other centers, through interallied consultation and meetings such as those of the Group of Eight. The more that transnational "civil society" penetrates the global plane of power and influence, however, the more the making of foreign policy in the United States is likely to become pluralistic, and anti-elitist.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean G. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.* New York, 1969. An ornately written, historically informative public autobiography of an American diplomatic exemplar.

Beisner, Robert L. *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900.* New York, 1968. An elegant set of biographical sketches, well compared and contrasted, of members of a mostly conservative elite opposed to U.S. imperial expansion.

Cohen, Warren I. *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I.* Chicago, 1967. The best treatment of the subject.

Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs?* New Haven, Conn., 1961.

Domhoff, G. William. *Who Rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967.

Dye, Thomas R. *Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership in the United States.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976.

———. *Who's Running America? The Clinton Years.* 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1995.

Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971): 81–117. A seminal essay, powerfully reinterpreting imperialism as a set of interconnected center-periphery relationships.

———. *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective.* New York, 1980. A full development of Galtung's complex model of the international system, aimed at transforming it.

Gill, Stephen. *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission.* Cambridge, 1990. A well-constructed study of the Trilateral Commission that is also an attempt to develop "a historical materialist theory of international relations."

Halberstam, David. *The Best and the Brightest.* New ed. New York, 2001. Originally published in 1972. A sprawling but scintillating journalistic treatment of U.S. policymaking during the Vietnam War, with numerous short biographies.

Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition.* Boston, 1966. Rightly described as a majestic diplomatic biography dealing with institutions and policies as well as its central figure and other persons.

Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989): 17–32. A statement of the "new elite paradigm," emphasizing the importance of elite divisions and elite settlements.

Hofstadter, Richard. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays.* New York, 1965. A distinguished American political and intellectual historian's critique of "conspiracy" theorizing in the United States, and also of "pseudo-conservatism."

Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made.* New York, 1986. An admiring group biography of Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett, Dean Acheson, John McCloy, George Kennan, and Charles Bohlen—"two bankers, two lawyers, two diplomats"—by two editors of *Time.*

Jonas, Manfred. *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1966. The best analytical treatment of isolationist thinking, with a focus on isolationist leaders rather than on American isolationist opinion or organization.

Kissinger, Henry A. *White House Years.* Boston, 1979. Inscribed "To the memory of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller," his early patron, the first of Kissinger's monumental volumes recording his central role in U.S. foreign policymaking.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

May, Ernest R. *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay.* Chicago, 1991. A new edition of his 1968 book, with an introduction by the author that includes a retrospective assessment of relevant scholarship.

McNay, John T. *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy.* Columbus, Mo., 2001. Acheson's affinity for imperial-style international relations, owing in part to his family background, is shown to go beyond the secretary of state's clothing and mannerisms.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite.* 2d ed. New York, 1999. Originally published in 1956. The controversial work that introduced this phrase to the American language.

Mosca, Gaetano. *The Ruling Class: Elementi di Scienza Politica.* Edited and revised by Arthur Livingston and translated by Hannah D. Kahn. New York and London, 1939. The major statement of classical elitist theory, including the "ruling class" concept progressively developed by the Italian jurist-politician.

Philippart, Éric, and Pascaline Winand, eds. *Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations.* Brussels, 2001.

Rovere, Richard H. *The American Establishment and Other Reports, Opinions, and Speculations.* New York, 1962.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House.* Boston, 1965. A politically partisan but highly professional and polished account of foreign policy, mainly during the brief Kennedy presidency.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations*. New York, 1984. The first scholarly study of the council to make use of its archives, but not governed by an "inside" perspective.

Silk, Leonard, and Mark Silk. *The American Establishment*. New York, 1980. A clearly written, informative, and balanced interpretation.

Sklar, Holly, ed. *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*. Boston, 1980. Somewhat amateurish in part, and to be handled with care, but a collection of radically oriented essays that is a repository of interesting information.

Weil, Martin. *A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service*. New York, 1978.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Rev. ed. New York, 1972. A search for the roots of U.S. foreign policy, found to be involved with the Open Door principle. A New Left classic.

Wittkopf, Eugene R., and Michael A. Maggiotto. "Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Toward America's World Role." *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983): 303–334.

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston, 1977.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; IMPERIALISM; ISOLATIONISM; REVISIONISM; TELEVISION.

EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS

Jerald A. Combs

For most of America's history, the word "embargo" was used to refer specifically to a prohibition on the departure of ships or exports from a nation's own ports, whereas the words "boycott" and "nonimportation" were used to describe prohibitions of imports or ship entries, and "nonintercourse" was used to describe a total prohibition of trade with a nation. But the word "embargo" also was used generically to refer to all stoppages of trade.

Since World War II, the growth of modern economic institutions and relations has afforded governments, especially rich and powerful ones like that of the United States, an arsenal of commercial weapons extending far beyond an outright stoppage of trade, including denial of aid and loans, commodity dumping, import and export limitations, revocation of most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, and freezing assets. As those means increased, the word "embargo" seemed less applicable to the wide range of economic coercive measures that the United States, the United Nations, and other entities were using to accomplish noneconomic goals. The preferred term now is "sanctions." In eighteenth-century Europe, an embargo was generally a prelude to a formal declaration of war. A civil embargo prohibited a nation's own ships from leaving port; a hostile embargo affected all ships in the port, foreign or domestic. Neutral ships caught in the embargo might even be forced into the service of the belligerent nation. The right to do this was called the power of angary. By imposing an embargo before declaring war, a nation could keep friendly ships from falling into the hands of the enemy and hold enemy ships hostage for future contingencies.

European powers rarely resorted to an embargo as a weapon in itself rather than as a prelude to war, although there were two exceptions to this in the sixteenth century: a French grain embargo against Spain and a threatened Turkish wheat embargo against Venice. In most cases, European nations had little incentive to consider a broader use of embargoes because geographical proximity made conventional military attacks easy and effective. Besides, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries constituted the age of mercantilism, in which people believed that national power depended upon exports exceeding imports. Thus, most diplomats expected an embargo of long duration to hurt the embargoing nation more than its enemy. An extreme example of this philosophy was Great Britain's famous blockade of Napoleonic France, which was not designed to starve France but to compel it to accept British imports or receive no trade at all.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA

The United States was the first modern nation to make significant use of the embargo as a substitute for, rather than a prelude to, war. Being three thousand miles from the centers of European power, the United States was not in imminent danger of invasion if it resorted to economic warfare, and for most of its early history, the United States had a small army and only a moderate-sized navy. America also had been a colony whose major physical ties to the mother country had been those of trade. Since the American colonies were of value to England primarily as economic entities that provided between a third and a sixth of the entire trade of the empire, it stood to reason that the colonists would think first of commercial measures if they were seeking to coerce the mother country. They were convinced especially that the West Indies were dependent upon imports of American food and lumber for survival. They reasoned, then, that an embargo would be a formidable weapon against any nation with colonies in those islands.

But Americans were reluctant to resort to a complete embargo. They had economic interests

and mercantilist ideas of their own that militated against such a measure. In the decade preceding the American Revolution, the colonists wielded economic weapons against many of Britain's unpopular measures, but in each case the chosen weapon was a boycott rather than an embargo. In fact, when George Mason proposed that Virginia embargo certain exports to protest the Townshend Acts of 1767, his fellow members of the Virginia legislature specifically rejected the idea, adopting nonimportation and nonconsumption resolutions instead. Similarly, the Continental Congress, meeting in 1774 to respond to the Coercive Acts, quickly adopted nonimportation. But the Virginia delegation insisted that any embargo be delayed until September 1775, by which time the Virginia planters could sell off their tobacco crop. Congress agreed. Then, when actual warfare broke out in April, the members moved immediately to forbid all exports without congressional permission. The embargo was soon lifted when Congress found that it was hurting America more than Britain. After a lengthy debate, America's ports were thrown open to all nations except Britain, and Congress was soon begging the French for naval help to get American ships out of their home ports.

Despite this failure, most members of Congress were still convinced that the United States could wield economic weapons effectively. They remembered that the British had repealed the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts at least partly in response to boycotts, and they were convinced that, during and after the war, foreign nations would pay a high price to divert American trade from Britain to themselves. When Congress appointed Benjamin Franklin as minister to France, it instructed him and his colleagues to offer only American trade as bait for France to enter the war as an ally of the United States. Although quickly enough disabused of the hope that France would accept so little for so much, Americans continued to believe that once the war was over, European powers would scramble over one another to offer concessions for access to American markets and goods. But when peace was restored, Europeans returned to their mercantilist systems and closed the United States out of most colonial markets. So, once again Americans contemplated commercial retaliation.

Because the Articles of Confederation left trade regulation in the hands of the individual states, it was found impossible to coordinate any retaliatory policy. The Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia met in part to correct the situation. But southerners were fearful that the commercial Northeast, using its greater population for voting advantage in Congress, would wield the weapon of commerce too freely. The South demanded that any navigation law should require a two-thirds vote of each house for passage. Ultimately, the convention reached a compromise. The Constitution would permit the federal government to levy taxes on imports; taxes on exports would be constitutionally prohibited. Exports could be embargoed, but they could not be taxed.

Despite this evidence of southern opposition to export taxes, several southern leaders still believed devoutly that economic sanctions could be America's primary diplomatic weapon. The leaders in this movement were Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. When the first Congress met after ratification of the Constitution in 1789, Madison used his position as a leader of the House of Representatives to begin a campaign for a broad use of commercial weapons that would last for more than twenty years. Angry at Britain for closing American ships out of the British West Indies and for refusing to sign a trade treaty with the United States, Madison told Congress that America could force Britain into a more amenable posture by threatening to divert American trade from Britain to France. He did not propose anything so drastic as an embargo at this point; he merely called for higher duties on imports from unfriendly nations than from friendly nations. The shipping interests and their congressional representatives had been strong supporters of commercial retaliation against Britain during the hard times of the Confederation period, but now, in a time of rising prosperity, they changed their minds. Led by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, they defeated Madison's proposals in session after session. Hamilton and his supporters thought British trade too valuable to the United States to risk using it as a diplomatic weapon, and they feared that British retaliation would hurt America far more than America could hurt Britain.

When war broke out between Great Britain and revolutionary France in 1793, Madison and Jefferson saw a new chance for the use of economic sanctions, and introduced discriminatory duties against England in the House. Hamilton and his followers in Congress rallied against the proposals, with Fisher Ames of Massachusetts complaining that "Madison & Co. now avow . . . that we will make war, not for our commerce, but with it; not to make our commerce better, but to

make it nothing, in order to reach the tender sides of our enemy, which are not to be wounded in any other way." Ames and his fellow Federalists argued for military preparedness and negotiation rather than commercial retaliation. They succeeded until early 1794 in putting off Madison's proposals, but when the British suddenly swooped down on American ships trading in the French West Indies and captured more than 250 of them, Madison and the Republicans introduced even more stringent measures, such as sequestering British debts and stopping all trade with England.

Compelled by the public's outrage to do something, the Federalists agreed on a short-term general embargo as the least harmful alternative. By embargoing all ships, foreign and domestic, in American harbors, the measure would ostensibly affect all nations alike, thus avoiding a direct challenge to Great Britain. It also could be defended as a traditional precautionary step in case of war, and the Federalists could deny that it had anything to do with the Republican campaign for commercial coercion. Thus, with mixed motives, Congress passed a joint resolution in March 1794, laying a hostile embargo for thirty days. This was later extended for another month, and President Washington was empowered to resume the embargo if the public safety required it.

The Federalists then resumed their crusade to strengthen the army and navy and thwart the rest of the Republican program for commercial retaliation against Britain. They sidetracked the bill for sequestering British debts, and Vice President John Adams cast the tie-breaking vote in the Senate against a total prohibition of British trade, imports as well as exports, which had passed the House. Meanwhile, the Federalists persuaded Washington to send John Jay to England as a special envoy to negotiate with the British and head off the war crisis. When Jay returned with a treaty promising not to interfere in any way with Anglo-American trade in exchange for a minimum of British concessions, the Republicans cried that using America's commercial weapons would have been far more effective than exchanging them for so little. After a bitter battle, the Federalists got the treaty ratified by the narrowest of margins in 1796. On the heels of that victory, they then elected John Adams to the presidency over his Republican rival, Thomas Jefferson.

Adams, however, found the French as bitter about Jay's Treaty as the Republicans. The French counted on Americans as carriers of their commerce because the British had swept the seas clear of most French ships. The Americans, by compromising with the British rather than fighting for America's neutral rights, hurt French trade as badly as their own. The French responded by capturing American ships, claiming the right to do to the Americans whatever the Americans allowed the British to do to them. The Federalists and Adams were less reluctant to oppose the French revolutionaries than they had been to resist the British, but they used the same techniques they had used in the Jay's Treaty crisis: military preparations and negotiation. Their only concession to Republican theories of commercial retaliation was an embargo on French trade passed in July 1798, after negotiations had broken down over the XYZ affair. Even this was clearly a precautionary war measure rather than a substitute for a military response. Ultimately, Adams made peace with France, splitting the Federalist Party and enabling Jefferson to defeat him for the presidency in 1800. The embargo would soon receive its supreme test as a substitute for war.

THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The Treaty of Amiens (1802) brought a temporary peace to Europe, which allowed President Jefferson to concentrate on domestic programs and to purchase the Louisiana Territory. Then, the Napoleonic Wars resumed, and Jefferson found himself in the same predicament his predecessors had faced. Once again the belligerents interfered with American trade and captured American ships. In the early years of the wars, British offenses were more numerous and blatant than those of the French, often taking place within sight of the American coast and involving the impressment of American seamen and the raiding of U.S. commerce. Jefferson began his program of retaliation with the Nonimportation Act of 1806, barring certain British imports. It was more a gesture to demonstrate American determination on the eve of negotiations than an all-out attempt to coerce Britain, and the Republican negotiators, James Monroe and William Pinckney, did no better than their Federalist predecessor, John Jay. Jefferson and his secretary of state, Madison, rejected the treaty their negotiators sent back from Britain because it failed to prohibit impressment. The envoys were instructed to renegotiate the treaty, eliminating the excessive appeasement of Britain. Such a task, Monroe and Pinckney realized, was hopeless.

Meanwhile, another event drove Jefferson and Madison toward stronger measures. On 22 June 1807, a British vessel, the HMS *Leopard*, fired on an unsuspecting U.S. naval ship, the USS *Chesapeake*. The British attackers then mustered the crew of the *Chesapeake* and removed four men who were alleged to be British deserters. This violation of American sovereignty brought a loud outcry even from many Federalists, and Jefferson could easily have had a declaration of war. He delayed six months, until he received news of a British order in council barring all nations from trading with any part of Europe except the Baltic area. At the same time, he learned that France had begun capturing American ships in enforcing Napoleon's Berlin Decree. Jefferson then called upon Congress not for war but for an embargo. He and his followers in Congress defended the move on two separate grounds. On the one hand, it would be a proper precautionary move in case of war; on the other, it might in itself coerce Great Britain. Thus, he appealed to two very different groups. Those who wanted war should have been put on their guard by the fact that the administration secured a rejection of the original plan to embargo foreign as well as domestic ships, and specifically refused to place a time limit on the measure. But the two disparate groups were united for the time being by the ambiguity of the measure. The Senate passed the Embargo Act in a single day in December by a vote of 22 to 6; a few days later the House did the same by a two-to-one margin.

As the months wore on, America's ardor for war cooled. Jefferson was soon left with no alternatives but to continue the embargo as the sole coercive weapon or to abandon the measure entirely, in a humiliating retreat. He decided to continue the embargo. But, as he introduced supplementary measures designed to close loopholes in the law, the Federalists leaped to the attack. Between the embargo and the supplementary laws there was no connection, declared Barent Gardenier, representative from New York. One was a prelude to war, preventing ships from going out and being captured; the other, a measure of coercion in itself. Gardenier and his fellow Federalists insisted that only French influence could inspire so foolish and wicked a measure as a permanent embargo. Jefferson was strong enough in Congress to override these objections and force through stringent enforcement acts, including elaborate bonding procedures, precautionary seizures, and general search warrants. But the unpopularity of the embargo, especially in New England, led to widespread defiance, smuggling, and criticism. As a result, the Federalists' electoral vote in 1808 was triple that of 1804, and their share of the House of Representatives was doubled.

The embargo was no more successful abroad than it was popular at home. France, of course, was unaffected by the embargo, since its trade had already been substantially cut off by the British blockade. British trade was affected. The embargo substantially reduced American exports to Britain, and the Nonimportation Act of 1806, which unlike the embargo was directed explicitly at Great Britain, reduced British exports to the United States. This affected Britain's foreign exchange, and gold began leaving the country. The price of gold rose from 8 shillings per ounce in 1807 to 110 shillings per ounce in 1813, embarrassing the Treasury and precipitating discontent over wages and prices. In most other areas, the Embargo Act and the Nonimportation Act did not wound Britain severely. The stoppage of America's cotton exports was actually welcomed by many British merchants, who had warehouses so full they had been worried about a glut. It did harm many workers in the textile industry, setting off a riot of weavers in Yorkshire; but they were not people with much political leverage.

Meanwhile, the revolutions in Spain and the Spanish colonies in Latin America opened new markets and sources of supply for Britain, which helped compensate for the loss of trade with the United States. The Nonimportation Act of 1806 was no more effective than the embargo, since it exempted cheap textiles and manufactured goods, those things the United States needed most from Britain but also the goods Britain most needed to export. The sight of British ships arriving in American ports with these goods galled the American merchants, whose own ships were rotting at the wharves. They were not much consoled that the embargo forced British vessels to leave in ballast. In the West Indies, too, the embargo failed. It hurt the French West Indies more than the British because the British had ships to supply their islands, while the French did not.

As the failure of the embargo abroad became apparent and disaffection at home continued to rise, the Republicans had to retreat. During Jefferson's lame duck period, he abandoned his direction of Congress, which promptly replaced the Nonimportation Act and the Embargo Act with the Nonintercourse Act of 1809. This act reopened trade with all nations

except Britain, France, and their dependencies. But the purposeful vagueness as to just which nations would be considered British or French dependencies, and the lack of a navy to enforce these regulations outside U.S. territorial waters, made the new law an invitation to smuggling. It, too, was soon abandoned and was replaced by Macon's Bill Number Two (1810), throwing trade open to all nations with the promise that the United States would cut off trade with the enemy of any nation that would respect America's neutral rights. When Napoleon promised to respect those rights, Madison, Jefferson's successor, cut off trade with Britain, despite the fact that Napoleon never actually lived up to his promises. When economic weapons again failed to coerce Britain, Madison recommended, and Congress declared, war. Actually, Britain had finally abandoned some of its orders in council before the American declaration. But news of the repeal failed to reach the United States before Congress voted. When the news did arrive, Madison refused to consider peace unless impressment also was eliminated. So the war went on.

Ironically, two months before the United States declared war, Congress had laid yet another embargo on Great Britain. It was specifically a measure to prepare for war, and it expired shortly after the war began. But Madison was not satisfied. He pushed another embargo through Congress in 1813. This had little effect on the southern states because the British were already blockading them; but in New England, which the British left unblockaded as a mark of favor to the section most opposed to the war, the embargo hit hard, increasing discontent and leading to threats of secession. Madison and his followers refused to admit the uselessness of the measure until the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 opened the markets of Europe to the British and destroyed what little leverage the embargo had.

In the euphoria of what Americans considered a victorious and glorious defense against Britain in the War of 1812, the American people nearly forgot the humiliations they had suffered in the commercial warfare period and the early fighting. Republican partisans cast the blame for the failure of the embargo on the Federalists and the New Englanders who had defied the law, saying that only such subversion prevented the measure from coercing Britain. But this rhetoric did not erase America's bitter memories of its attempts at economic sanctions, and it would be many years before the United States tried them again.

THE CIVIL WAR

For decades after the War of 1812, peace in Europe gave the United States a chance to expend its diplomatic energies on westward expansion, where it did not need economic weapons. Population pressure and diplomatic maneuvering were often adequate, and where they failed, outright military action was possible because these areas were physically contiguous. Not until the Civil War was the weapon of economic sanctions once again taken up, this time by the Confederacy. The South was convinced that "cotton was king" and essential to both British and French industry. After the North instituted a blockade of the entire Confederacy, the South decided to enhance that blockade by embargoing exports of cotton. The Confederacy urged southerners not to plant cotton until the war was over, and they burned more than two and a half million bales. Unfortunately for the South, the bumper crop shipped in 1860 had already given Great Britain an oversupply of cotton, and cotton factors actually welcomed the shortage as a chance to reduce their supplies. Shortages did begin to occur by 1862. Four hundred thousand workers lost their jobs. Many of these workers advocated British intervention on behalf of the South to restore the cotton supplies; but their political impotence, the increasing supplies of cotton from Egypt, and the growing realization that the South would lose the war doomed their efforts. As the war went on, even southerners found the embargo too painful, and they cooperated in running more than a million and a half bales of cotton through the northern blockade. Once again an economic sanction had proved to be a disastrous failure.

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY THROUGH THE INTERWAR YEARS

From the Civil War until after the United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful economy in the world, America used economic sanctions more sparingly. Gone was the confidence that economic sanctions could substantially affect a powerful enemy. In this period, sanctions were used more as a gesture than as a weapon. They might be used to indicate moral disapproval or to keep the United States out of foreign wars. They might be used as a warning of firmer measures to come, or as a futile substitute for war when armed force was impolitic. But

Americans no longer regarded economic sanctions as an extraordinarily potent weapon in their foreign policy armory.

In 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution granting the president authority to bar the export of coal or war matériel from American seaports during the Spanish-American War. This embargo was merely an adjunct to war, not an important weapon in itself. President Theodore Roosevelt stretched the authority of this law in 1905 to keep weapons from falling into the hands of revolutionaries in the Dominican Republic, where the United States had taken control of the customs. In 1912, when the government of Francisco I. Madero protested American shipments of arms to Mexican rebels, Congress gave President William Howard Taft more specific authority to handle the situation than it had delegated to Roosevelt. It amended the 1898 resolution to provide that when there existed in any Western Hemisphere country conditions of domestic violence promoted by U.S. arms, the president should proclaim that fact. This would make exports of arms or munitions illegal except as the president provided. In effect, this gave the president the right to provide arms to whichever side he favored. Taft used this authority to embargo all arms to Mexico, but when a revolt broke out against the reviled Victoriano Huerta, President Woodrow Wilson lifted the embargo so that arms could be shipped to Huerta's opponents. When the United States recognized the government of Venustiano Carranza, it restored the embargo but made American arms available to Carranza's forces near the U.S. border. Then Pancho Villa began raiding in the area, so Wilson sent General John J. Pershing across the border after him and removed the exemption to the embargo. Thus, the United States had begun a regular use of arms embargoes as a means of controlling or manipulating domestic revolutionary situations in the Western Hemisphere, as well as using them to prevent aid to nations with which it was at war.

During this same period, U.S. businesses began serious overseas operations and another kind of embargo made its appearance—the capital embargo. Throughout most of American history, capital embargoes applied only to loans involving the public sale of foreign bonds and were quite informal. The government had only to recommend against a loan, and foreign bonds would not find purchasers because prospective buyers knew that the government would not enforce payment if the borrowing country should default. Thus, Taft's secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, discouraged a loan to China during the revolution of 1911, and Wilson discouraged a consortium seeking to reorganize a loan to China in 1913. Wilson also advised against loans to the belligerents during World War I but reversed that policy in 1916. In March 1922 the State Department made its informal policy official by announcing the hope that American corporations contemplating loans would check with the department first.

Just prior to World War I, Wilson dusted off the idea of a broader use of economic sanctions as a means of forcing the British to reduce their interference with American shipping to the European continent. In September 1916, he persuaded Congress to pass a law permitting him to ban imports and deny clearance for any departing vessels. After his reelection in November of that year, he hinted to the British that he might use that authority to embargo arms or deny clearance to vessels refusing to carry goods for firms blacklisted by the British. Since the British blockade had already cut off trade to Germany, any embargo would hurt only the Allies, thus paralleling the situation in Jefferson's day. Wilson never actually exercised his authority because he was more concerned with German submarine warfare than with the British blockade or blacklist. He did not want to find himself in the position of Jefferson and Madison, locked in a dispute with both belligerents at the same time or allied with the wrong nation because it capitulated more quickly to U.S. sanctions.

With the entry of the United States into the war, Congress embargoed all supplies to the Central Powers by passing the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. This embargo was wielded against the neutral powers of Europe, driving them into agreements to limit trade with the Central Powers in exchange for vitally needed goods from the United States. These agreements, along with blacklisting and limits on coal supplied to ships seeking refueling at U.S. ports and bases directed against firms within neutral countries suspected of trading with the enemy, tightened the economic noose that the Allied blockade and American embargo placed around the Central Powers and contributed substantially to the Allied victory in World War I.

After the war there arose in the United States a general revulsion against American involvement in world politics, and the policy of using economic sanctions as an alternative to political or military entanglements came to play an important part in

ON SANCTIONS

Historians, analysts, and politicians differ passionately about the efficacy and morality of America's record in using sanctions, as one can readily see from the following quotations:

"A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist."

—Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, vol. 1, p. 9.—

"We use sanctions so often—nearly 100 times this century—that they have become America's grand diplomatic experiment. This experiment, repeated many times, shows [that sanctions do not work and are America's folly]. . . . A nation boycotted is not in sight of surrender: recall North Korea, Cuba, and Iran. . . . In achieving 'high' foreign policy goals, sanctions are not a substitute for force, but they can be a prelude to force—consider Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia. . . . Contrary to [Woodrow] Wilson's belief, economy sanctions have turned out to be an offer that nearly every target can refuse—not only powerful China, but also powerless Panama."

—From Gary C. Hufbauer, "Economic Sanctions: America's Folly," in Singleton and Griswold, pp. 91–92.—

"Sanctions can offer a nonmilitary alternative to the terrible options of war or indifference when confronted with aggression or injustice."

—National Conference of Catholic Bishops, quoted in Haass, p. 2.—

"[Sanctions] do not work. . . . it is important for us to recognize as a nation the enormous value of having American businesses engaged around the world. To recognize that engagement does more to encourage democracy and freedom, to open up societies, to create opportunities for millions of people who up until now have not been able to participate, than just about anything else we can do."

—Richard B. Cheney, "Defending Liberty in a Global Economy," quoted in Singleton and Griswold, p.27.—

"It is indisputable that the myriad pressures generated by the many forms of sanctions imposed on South Africa forced the previously immovable and inflexible system of apartheid to recognize the necessity of change."

—Jennifer Davis, "Sanctions and Apartheid: The Economic Challenge to Discrimination," in Cortright and Lopez, p.181.—

"The economic sanctions continued to strangle the people of Iraq, and the country has been pushed to the verge of collapse, placing the life of its civilian population in great peril."

—Bashsir Al-Samarrai, "Economic Sanctions Against Iraq: Do They Contribute to a Just Settlement?" in Cortright and Lopez, p. 135.—

the debate over the shaping of a new foreign policy for the United States. As a kind of prelude, Congress made two minor gestures in 1922. It expanded the arms embargo of 1912, which had previously applied only to Western Hemisphere countries, and permitted the president to embargo arms to countries where the United States exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction whenever there existed conditions of civil violence. This law was directed primarily at China. Also in 1922, the State Department recommended against credits to Soviet Russia because that nation refused to pay its war debts. But neither this capital embargo nor the refusal to recognize the Bolshevik regime hindered American trade with the Soviets.

Consideration of a broader use of the arms embargo began later in the 1920s. Some influential Americans wanted the president to have authority to embargo arms and munitions to any aggressor nation. They saw this measure as a chance for the United States to cooperate with the League of Nations. They were fearful that America's traditional policy of neutrality, which insisted on a neutral's rights to trade with all belligerents, would undermine any system of collective sanctions the league might undertake. Conversely, American

cooperation in those sanctions would strengthen the league and the system of collective security immeasurably. Thus, they argued for a discretionary embargo, which would allow the president to embargo arms to aggressor nations but to supply arms to the victims of that aggression.

The movement for cooperation with the league ran head-on into a growing countermovement inspired by disillusionment with World War I and a belief that American involvement in the war had been manipulated by munitions makers and other so-called merchants of death. This countermovement, too, called for an arms embargo, but its advocates insisted that the embargo be impartial. The purpose should be to keep the United States out of any future wars, not to deter future wars by the threat of collective sanctions against aggressors. This debate created a groundswell of support for some sort of arms embargo. By the mid-1930s, only a few congressional voices, along with the weapons manufacturers themselves, still called for adherence to America's traditional policy of enforcing a neutral's right to trade with belligerents in any commodities whatever.

Although the debate over arms embargoes began in 1928, Congress did not pass the first Neutrality Act until 1935. Henry Stimson, secretary of state in the late 1920s, favored a discretionary embargo to strengthen collective security but received little support from President Herbert Hoover. Without strong administration backing, the measure failed. Hoover was particularly adamant against imposing economic sanctions on Japan for its aggression in Manchuria, sanctions strongly favored by Stimson. Instead, Hoover forced Stimson to retreat to an ineffective policy of refusing to recognize any gains Japan might make, a policy ironically known as the Stimson Doctrine.

Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the presidency pledged to Stimson's policy of discretionary embargoes. Such an embargo actually passed the House in 1932. But when it encountered opposition in the Senate, Roosevelt consented to an impartial embargo, a complete negation of collective security. When his own advisers, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull, objected to his concession, Roosevelt agreed to drop the whole matter, and the embargo died.

The issue was revived during the next congressional session, however. Bolivia and Paraguay were engaged in the Chaco War, and the administration wanted to cooperate with the League of Nations in an arms embargo against both nations. Roosevelt could have supported a general impartial embargo on all warring nations; one was already before the Senate. But he still hoped for a discretionary embargo, and so he settled for a specific resolution embargoing arms to Bolivia and Paraguay only. This was the first time the United States had adopted an embargo avowedly for the purpose of stopping a war between two countries, and in that way it could be seen as a step toward collective security. In fact, it strengthened the concept of an impartial embargo because it stopped arms to both countries. The widely publicized Nye Committee hearings and the publication of several best-selling books further strengthened the concept of an impartial embargo by promoting the idea that American economic interests, particularly the munitions makers, had been responsible for America's entry into World War I. Perhaps even more important in the movement for an impartial embargo were the growing crises in Europe and Asia, as Japan, Germany, and Italy engaged the other powers in an arms race and embarked on campaigns of territorial expansion. Many hoped that the United States could escape the coming conflagration by embargoing arms and thus not repeating the supposed error of becoming involved in World War I.

The result of this growing movement was the Neutrality Act of 1935. Rejecting an administration bill allowing discretionary embargoes, Congress instead passed a mandatory impartial embargo on arms to belligerents, closed American ports to belligerent submarines, and prohibited Americans from taking passage on belligerent liners. The administration managed to limit the act to six months' duration, and then to use it for its own purposes. When Italy attacked Ethiopia, Roosevelt, to show America's displeasure with Italy, put the Neutrality Act into effect and declared a further "moral embargo" on any trade with the belligerents that was not covered by the Neutrality Act. Although supposedly impartial, the actions hurt only Italy. The United States had no trade with Ethiopia, and Ethiopia had no passenger liners to suffer from a prohibition against American passengers.

Although these actions may have given America some spiritual satisfaction, they had little effect on the course of world events. American businesses defied the moral embargo, and the League of Nations embargo omitted oil from the list of prohibited exports. Since oil was Italy's most vital need, the conquest of Ethiopia continued apace. This failure notwithstanding, Congress renewed the Neutrality Act in 1936 and added a

provision prohibiting loans to belligerents. The administration and the business community managed to stave off a movement for an impartial general embargo rather than a mere arms embargo, but sentiment for a general embargo gained considerable strength as the year wore on.

When civil war broke out in Spain later in 1936, Congress honored the administration's request to embargo arms to that country. As Germany and Italy began to provide massive support for Francisco Franco, liberals put considerable pressure on the U.S. government to lift the embargo and supply the Loyalists. But the embargo remained. The advocates of collective security had been defeated again.

In 1937, congressional pressure to expand the arms embargo to a general embargo applying to all belligerents frightened many businessmen, and they sought a way to sidetrack the issue. Presidential adviser Bernard Baruch came up with a suggestion of "cash-and-carry," arguing that as long as American goods were purchased and transported by belligerents, the capture or sinking of the goods would not affect the United States. In return for other concessions, the administration succeeded in making the cash-and-carry principle discretionary, to be instigated with the rest of the Neutrality Act only at the option of the president. Roosevelt was also willing to accept cash-and-carry because he realized it would favor Britain and France; Great Britain controlled the seas and could ensure that only Allied ships would reach the United States to take advantage of the offer. The Neutrality Act of 1937 passed Congress just one day before the expiration of the act of 1936 and was flown to the presidential yacht in the Gulf of Mexico for Roosevelt's signature.

The Neutrality Act of 1937 was the high-water mark for advocates of an impartial neutrality; the decline of the movement had already begun. American sentiment was heavily against Franco's forces, and many regretted the embargo on arms to his opponents. Then, in 1937, Japan renewed its war against China. By rights, Roosevelt was supposed to embargo arms and loans to both nations and, if he chose, to establish the cash-and-carry policy. But both of these actions would favor Japan, since China needed the arms and credits, whereas Japan needed neither. Also, Japan was a sea power capable of taking advantage of the cash-and-carry policy. Roosevelt avoided this dilemma by pointing to the technicality that no official declaration of war had been made. Thus, he refused to invoke the Neutrality Act, enabling private loans and arms to continue to flow to China. Roosevelt followed this action with his famous quarantine speech and then imposed a moral embargo on exports of aircraft to Japan. Although isolationism remained strong and Roosevelt was forced to retreat from his quarantine policy, the American people generally accepted his tacit ignoring of the Neutrality Act. The United States was beginning to use sanctions as weapons against aggressors rather than as a means of avoiding conflicts.

WORLD WAR II

In 1938 Roosevelt failed to secure revision of the Neutrality Act. It was not until Germany invaded Poland in 1939, setting off World War II, that Congress revised the act. Even then, Roosevelt had to disguise his actions by claiming that the arms embargo actually endangered the peace of the United States. He also offered to bar American ships from designated war zones. He was thus able to persuade Congress to place arms on the same cash-and-carry basis as other commodities. He then went on to greater aid measures, such as the destroyer deal and lend-lease.

But while Roosevelt turned from sanctions toward measures of positive aid to Europe, in Asia his administration moved toward a more pointed use of embargoes against Japan. Japan relied heavily upon American oil and metals to supply its war effort in China. Any threat to stop those exports would have a significant impact on Japanese plans. The swing of public opinion and the revision of the Neutrality Act in 1939 allowed Roosevelt to take some action on behalf of China. So, in May 1939 the United States notified Japan that it was withdrawing from the 1911 Treaty of Commerce. According to terms of the treaty, in six months the United States would be free to limit or terminate exports to Japan. Roosevelt hoped this would give the Japanese pause, but Japan continued its war in China. The U.S. government hesitated to implement sanctions for fear that they would drive Japan to replace the embargoed items by invading new sources of supply. This would most likely be Southeast Asia, where French, British, and Dutch colonies were supplying those same vital materials to America's allies in Europe. The six-month period of grace passed, then a year, with no sanctions applied.

In July 1940, a cabinet change in Japan signaled a more aggressive Japanese policy in South-

east Asia. With that, the United States imposed an embargo on aviation gasoline and high-grade scrap iron to Japan. This embargo affected only a fraction of exports to Japan, and the U.S. government went to some lengths to justify the embargo on the grounds of American domestic needs rather than any displeasure with Japan. Still, the embargo signaled the Japanese that the United States would oppose any moves against Southeast Asia.

Instead of backing down, Japan accelerated its search for more secure sources of vital raw materials. It extorted concessions from the Dutch East Indies, coerced Vichy France into allowing Japanese occupation of northern Indochina, and began negotiations for an alliance with Germany and Italy. The United States responded with a complete embargo on scrap iron, but this was followed the very next day by the formal announcement of the Axis pact. The United States continued to expand its embargo, extending it to tools, iron, steel, copper, bronze, and many other critical metals. When the United States intercepted Japanese messages detailing plans for further expansion in Southeast Asia and reports arrived that Japanese transports were moving on southern Indochina, Roosevelt decided on a last-ditch gamble to stop Japanese expansion. He issued an order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. Only a special license from the U.S. government could release Japanese assets to pay for American exports, including, most critically, oil. When the British and Dutch joined the oil embargo, it cut off the vital Southeast Asian sources of raw materials as well. With only a two-year supply of petroleum, Japan either had to give up the war in China or secure its own sources of supply. Japan first tried diplomacy, but negotiations with the United States failed, and Japan declared war. During World War II, the United States used the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act to impose a complete embargo on the Axis powers.

COLD WAR SANCTIONS

The United States emerged from World War II as the only great power whose economy had escaped the conflict relatively unscathed. Consequently, it was a potential reservoir for rebuilding war-torn nations and was often the sole supplier of critical goods. Such economic power inevitably made economic sanctions an attractive option for the United States in the Cold War, despite the dismal record of embargoes in American history. Economic sanctions were often the only recourse for the United States when fear of nuclear war or other political constraints put limits on the use of military force.

In 1948, the United States began a campaign of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union that would last more than fifty years. In March of that year, the Department of Commerce announced restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union and its European allies. Congress formalized these restrictions in the Export Control Act of 1949. Originally, Congress intended this act as a temporary measure to keep arms and strategic materials out of the hands of potential enemies, but the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 made the Cold War more rigid and the measure became permanent. In 1951, the United States attempted to strengthen these sanctions with the so-called Battle Act. According to this act, the United States would refuse assistance to any nation that did not embargo strategic goods, including oil, to the Soviet Union and nations subject to its influence. Under pressure from its allies, the United States accepted many exemptions from this act and it was not notably effective.

For many years, the embargo on the Soviet Union was quite severe. The embargo on Eastern European countries was less stringent, in hopes of driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and its allies. Two of the most independent East European nations, Poland and Romania, were given particularly mild treatment. With the growing détente of the 1970s, trade restrictions on the Soviet Union and its allies were increasingly lightened, most notably in the permission granted the Soviets to purchase large amounts of American wheat when Soviet crops failed in 1973. But restrictions were tightened again after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In 1983, Ronald Reagan approved the National Security Decision Directive 75, which set the policy of using economic pressure to limit the foreign policy and military options of the Soviets. This stricter regime of sanctions led to considerable conflict with America's allies on the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), especially over the export of oil and gas equipment.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a major debate broke out over the contribution that the campaign of economic sanctions had made toward the fall of the Soviet empire. Many former officials in the Reagan administration credited sanctions with a significant role in the disintegration of the Soviet economy and therefore of the

Soviet Union itself. On the other hand, the leading work on the effectiveness of economic sanctions—Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (vol. 1, p. 137)—concludes that although the United States did succeed in denying some arms and key technologies to the Soviets, the collapse stemmed from internal inefficiencies rather than U.S. economic sanctions.

Ironically, the most effective use of economic sanctions made by the United States during the Cold War in Europe was against its own allies, Great Britain, France, and Israel, during the Suez Crisis of 1956. When those three powers concerted to invade Egypt in response to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, President Dwight Eisenhower not only warned them to retreat, he began a massive sell-off of British pounds and embargoed U.S. oil shipments to the three nations. For one of the few times in history, sanctions stopped a military invasion in its tracks.

During the Cold War in Asia, the United States imposed embargoes on North Korea, China, and North Vietnam. These were severe embargoes established under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The embargo of China and North Korea began in 1950, during the Korean War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles insisted that the embargo continue after the war, but America's allies protested, arguing that such trade should be under the same regulation as trade to Eastern Europe. The United States used the Battle Act to prevent this, but in 1957 gave way to allow its allies to trade with China and North Korea. The United States, however, maintained its own unilateral embargo until 1969, when the administration of Richard M. Nixon lifted restrictions on most trade to China except for strategically important goods. The economic effect of the embargo on China was minimal because China itself chose to restrict imports to what it could pay for with its few exports. China found all the imports it needed in Europe anyway.

The United States reimposed some sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. President George H. W. Bush suspended arms and some commercial contracts but maintained China's most-favored-nation status. Congress, however, continuously threatened to remove that status in order to apply pressure against China over its record on human rights. Using the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which was originally designed to force the Soviet Union to permit Jewish emigration, Congress required the president to certify annually that China was respecting human rights before he could renew its MFN status. Ultimately, in 1999, President Bill Clinton narrowly succeeded in convincing Congress to grant China permanent MFN status and permit China to join the World Trade Organization. Clinton argued that the best way to influence China was to keep it engaged in the world economy and polity. The likelihood that the United States would resort to economic sanctions to influence China's human rights policy in the near future diminished as a result of this decision, but the United States continues to hold out the possibility of sanctions against China's nuclear proliferation policies by restricting Chinese access to advanced technologies.

While the United States relaxed its harsh economic sanctions against China a few years after the Korean War, it maintained those sanctions against North Korea because of human rights violations, a nascent nuclear building program, and a continuing military threat to South Korea. In 1994, North Korea's concessions on its nuclear program led the United States to lessen the restrictions and offer some aid. A famine in North Korea and the growing détente between North and South Korea have brought some increase in that aid, but U.S. sanctions against North Korea were still quite severe at the turn of the century.

Economic sanctions accompanied America's war against North Vietnam just as they did previous U.S. conflicts. The Eisenhower administration suspended all export licenses for North Vietnam in 1954, shortly after the Geneva Convention temporarily divided Vietnam in two. President Lyndon Johnson extended those sanctions to a prohibition of all commercial and financial transactions with North Vietnam when the war escalated in 1964. Although the peace agreement signed in 1973 included a provision for renegotiating economic ties, the final conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam in 1975 resulted in an extension of the sanctions to all of Vietnam. President Jimmy Carter moved toward easing those restrictions, but he was thwarted first by congressional opposition and then by Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Thus, sanctions remained in place until February 1994, when Bill Clinton ended the nineteen-year trade embargo.

America's Cold War embargoes and sanctions in the Western Hemisphere were somewhat different from those in either Europe or Asia. Rather than being attempts to punish military adventures or to slow the arms buildups of major powers, the United States used sanctions to desta-

bilize weaker regimes that were too friendly to the Soviet Union or otherwise threatened stability and U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.

The United States levied the most stringent and long-lived of its sanctions against Cuba. In 1962, following the embarrassing defeat at the Bay of Pigs, President John F. Kennedy expanded a set of piecemeal sanctions that had been imposed on Cuba after its 1959 revolution by using congressional authorization to embargo all trade with Cuba. The United States then brought pressure on the Organization of American States and the NATO allies to follow suit, especially by threatening to deny aid to, and penalize companies of, nations continuing to trade with Cuba. The OAS did embargo trade except for food and medical supplies, but there was considerable leakage. More important, the Soviets granted large subsidies to keep the Cuban economy afloat, primarily by trading oil to Cuba for sugar on extremely favorable terms.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the elimination of its subsidies devastated the Cuban economy. Some in the United States thought that the end of the Cold War should lead to a termination of the Cuban embargo as well. But others, especially the Cuban exile lobby in Florida, thought that the end of Soviet subsidies provided a chance to tighten the embargo and finally oust Castro. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, with an eye on Florida's twenty-five electoral votes, tightened restrictions on U.S. foreign subsidiaries trading with Cuba, on the grounds that Cuba needed to improve human rights on the island. The U.S. Congress went even further. In 1996, it passed legislation sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton to apply economic sanctions to any U.S. ally that continued to trade with Cuba. President Bill Clinton threatened to veto the legislation until Cuba shot down two civilian planes being flown toward Cuba by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The furor this created in the midst of the 1996 presidential election brought Clinton to sign the Helms-Burton Act, but bitter protests from America's allies and Clinton's own inclinations caused the president to suspend the most onerous provisions of the act indefinitely. America's allies continued to simmer over this attempt to force their participation in the U.S. embargo of Cuba, especially because the United States was passing similar legislation to coerce an expansion of existing embargoes against Libya and Iran. In the annual votes of the UN General Assembly that urged the United States to abandon its sanctions against Cuba, the United States found itself increasingly alone. Meanwhile, Castro hung on to power and continued to defy the United States.

Sanctions against other Latin American nations during the Cold War were somewhat more effective. When President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic tried to have President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela assassinated in 1960, the United States limited the Dominican sugar quota and successfully pressed two-thirds of the OAS members to vote for an embargo on oil, trucks, and spare parts to Trujillo. The sanctions did play a part in the fall of Trujillo's regime, but the assassination of Trujillo and subsequent threats of military force against his successors played a larger part.

Sanctions also played a minor part in the military coup that ousted Joao Goulart of Brazil in 1964. They destroyed the viability of Salvador Allende's government in Chile, which made it easier for the Chilean military, with U.S. support, to overthrow Allende in 1973. Sanctions helped to strangle the economy of Nicaragua under the Sandinistas and secure the election of the opposition UNO party favored by the United States in 1990. Finally, the denial of aid and loans to Manuel Noriega's government in Panama sowed much discontent, paving the way for the U.S. invasion of Panama and the arrest of Noriega in 1989. Thus, economic sanctions against regimes in Latin America during the Cold War had a more obvious effect than they did in Europe or Asia, primarily because those regimes were already weak and unstable, and received little outside help from the Soviet Union. But, even then, sanctions in Latin America most often required covert activities and military action to succeed fully.

Because the United States had fewer vital interests in Africa than in Europe, Asia, or Latin America, there were fewer instances of American economic sanctions. The United States did institute sanctions against Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s to counter Soviet influence. But in the two major instances of embargoes and sanctions, South Africa and Rhodesia, the United States was a reluctant and partial participant in UN sanctions rather than an initiator of them. This was because the human rights objectives of the sanctions, with which the United States for the most part sympathized, threatened America's Cold War interests in the strategic materials supplied by South Africa and Rhodesia. In both cases, therefore, the United States supported limited sanctions as a moderate

alternative to the more militant actions demanded by a majority of United Nations members.

From 1951 to 1962, the United States embargoed any arms to South Africa that could be used domestically to support apartheid; it extended that embargo to all arms in 1962. The United States and its allies, Britain and France, voted consistently against attempts by the United Nations to apply further sanctions, however. Jimmy Carter tightened arms sanctions slightly, but Ronald Reagan reversed course with his policy of "constructive engagement." Reagan specifically undercut a concerted UN move to impose wider sanctions on South Africa in support of the independence of Namibia by tying any action on Namibia to the exodus of Cuban troops from Angola. Congress, however, steadily pressed for tighter sanctions and, in 1986, overrode Reagan's veto to extend sanctions beyond arms to loans, new investments, and many imports. Combined with the sanctions of the United Nations and the refusal of many private banks to roll over South African loans, these economic pressures contributed significantly to the internal pressures from black anti-apartheid rebels that finally brought the white regime to accept a new constitution installing majority rule in the 1990s.

In Rhodesia, when Ian Smith declared independence from the British Commonwealth in 1965 as a means of maintaining white rule, the United States followed the lead of Great Britain in the United Nations. The United States first joined a 1966 embargo on oil, arms, and spare parts along with a boycott of major Rhodesian products; it then moved on to a complete embargo in 1968. While responding to these initiatives of the United Nations, the United States voted against proposals that called on Britain to use force against Rhodesia. The United States cast its first veto ever in the Security Council to defeat such a measure in 1970. In 1971, a coalition of conservative legislators led by Harry F. Byrd, Jr., sponsored an amendment forbidding the United States to boycott products from noncommunist countries unless it also boycotted such products coming from communist nations. Because the United States was importing much of its chromium from Russia instead of its usual supplier, Rhodesia, the Byrd amendment opened the door once again to imports of Rhodesian chromium. Although South Africa and Portugal had tacitly defied the embargo to the point that Rhodesia's exports and imports were almost back to the pre-embargo level by 1972, the American action was the first formal defiance of United Nations economic sanctions. This congressional action seriously embarrassed the United States in the United Nations until 1977, when the Carter administration secured the repeal of the amendment and reinstituted the sanctions. By 1979, Smith had succumbed and agreed to majority rule.

SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The Carter administration enhanced the use of sanctions for human rights purposes in areas outside Africa as well. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the administration of Gerald Ford resisted a 1973 congressional initiative that would have denied aid to nations that violated human rights, but Carter was more favorable to this tactic. With Carter's support, Congress attached riders to military aid bills denying aid to South Korea, Chile, Uruguay, the Philippines, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Ethiopia, Argentina, and Zaire. Carter used his presidential prerogative to expand further the list of nations denied security aid on human rights grounds to include Bolivia, Haiti, and Iran. Reagan reversed course on this and vetoed legislation that tied aid to human rights, but with the end of the Cold War, the United States once again adopted sanctions on human rights grounds, most notably against China, Iraq, and Serbia.

In the 1970s, the United States also began using sanctions specifically against terrorism. Congressional legislation in 1976 and 1977 prohibited aid and exports to nations abetting terrorism. At the behest of Congress, the State Department began issuing lists of nations supporting terrorism. These lists included Libya, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, South Yemen, and Iran.

In the same decade, the United States and many other nations began using sanctions to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These sanctions sought to stop trade in items related to nuclear weapons with nations that refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nations most affected were Brazil, Argentina, India, Pakistan, and Iraq.

POST–COLD WAR SANCTIONS

With the end of the Cold War, the United States had greater success in persuading other nations to

join it in imposing sanctions against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and violations of human rights. Rival powers on the UN Security Council no longer automatically vetoed sanctions that affected their respective allies. The two most prominent crises in which broad multilateral sanctions played a major role were the Gulf War of 1991 and the meltdown of the former Yugoslavia. Sanctions in these cases succeeded in devastating the economies of the two rogue nations at the center of the crises, Iraq and Serbia. But in the end it took military force to compel the leaders of those countries to make major changes of policy.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States and the UN Security Council sanctioned all Iraqi trade and financial aid. But Saddam Hussein defied the bans and received substantial supplies through sympathetic Palestinians in Jordan. He also made a firm peace with Iran, thus securing his borders. As Saddam showed no signs of relenting on Kuwait, President George Bush began pushing his allies for military action. Many American leaders, including the former chairman of Reagan's joint chiefs of staff, Admiral William Crowe, argued that continuing sanctions might well force Saddam to settle without further bloodshed. Bush's own joint chiefs, led by General Colin Powell, were also reluctant to go to war, but were willing to do so if overwhelming force were used to avoid another Vietnam. Bush agreed, and the resulting Operation Desert Storm routed Saddam's army. But the allied armies stopped before taking Baghdad or capturing Saddam himself. They then signed an agreement with Saddam that restored Kuwait's border and permitted inspections to ensure the dismantling of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam defied those agreements, and the United States and the United Nations continued their sanctions to try to bring him into line. Nevertheless, Saddam held out for more than a decade while the sanctions regime slowly declined. The United States and its allies exempted some Iraqi oil from the sanctions under strict controls to see that the money was used for humanitarian purposes within Iraq and to compensate Kuwait for war damages. But Saddam managed to divert some of that aid to maintaining his regime. He also smuggled oil, with the cooperation of Iran and others, to keep himself afloat. Meanwhile, Russia, France, and other nations pressed for further loosening or even ending the sanctions, on the grounds that Saddam had sufficiently conformed to his agreements and that the embargoes bore most heavily on innocent civilians.

Multilateral sanctions also played a major part in the Balkan crises of the 1990s. After the death of Tito, Slobodan Milosevic began appealing to Serbian nationalism as a substitute for the collapsing communist ideology that previously had sustained his position. As a result of growing Serb militancy, Slovenia, Croatia, and then Bosnia declared their independence. Milosevic used his control of the Yugoslav army and heavy weapons to invade Bosnia and Croatia in support of the Serb inhabitants of those areas. He then expelled or massacred all non-Serbs in the conquered areas, in a program dubbed "ethnic cleansing." The Croats and Muslims often returned the favor of ethnic cleansing when they had the chance, but the imbalance of power gave them fewer of those opportunities.

The United States under George H. W. Bush left the Europeans to furnish a few thousand UN troops to deliver humanitarian aid to besieged areas while America led the Security Council to impose an economic blockade of Serbia. By 1994, the blockade had worn Milosevic down to the point that he deserted the Bosnian Serbs and joined the embargo against them in hopes of getting the sanctions lifted against Serbia. But the Bosnian Serbs refused to quit. In July 1995, they brushed aside a UN force protecting the sanctuary of Srbrenica, massacred the adult males, and brutalized many others. Finally, the United States and NATO began a major bombing campaign that, combined with pressure from a rejuvenated Croat army, forced Milosevic to the peace table. At Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, Bill Clinton succeeded in hammering out a peace agreement to be enforced by an enlarged UN contingent to which the United States would contribute one-third of the troops.

Milosevic, however, began a similar ethnic cleansing program in Kosovo in 1998. Despite the reluctance of Russia, the NATO allies restored sanctions against Milosevic. They eased them when he agreed to negotiate with the Kosovar Muslims, but nothing came of the talks, and Milosevic resumed military activities in Kosovo. It was clear to all that mere sanctions would not change Milosevic's policy, so NATO resorted to threats, and finally the use of force. A devastating ten-week bombing campaign ultimately brought Milosevic to retreat from Kosovo in favor of a UN peacekeeping force that included U.S. troops.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. SANCTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States also imposed economic sanctions in cases far less serious than Iraq and Serbia after the Cold War. It was imposing sanctions against forty different nations as of 1999. Certainly, the United States was using sanctions more often than any other nation. In fact, many critics believed that its use of sanctions had gotten out of hand. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, a major compilation of case studies by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott concerning economic sanctions as exercised throughout the world in the twentieth century, concludes that sanctions worked only about one-third of the time, usually when they were exercised decisively rather than gradually, had multilateral rather than mere unilateral support, and were directed at rather weak and unstable regimes (vol. 1, p. 93). Truly altering a nation's fundamental political or military policy most often required military force. The history of sanctions in American history as narrated here seems to bear out that analysis.

On the other hand, sanctions have served purposes beyond the most ambitious one of changing another nation's fundamental policy decisions. Sanctions have signaled to adversaries, allies, and America's domestic constituencies the seriousness of an issue. They have prepared domestic constituencies for the possibility of armed conflict by making clear that all peaceful options were being tried before resorting to war. They have weakened the economies of adversaries in ways that interfered with their preparations for conflict. And they have served as an object lesson for future adversaries. Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein demonstrated that determined regimes can survive powerful sanctions for an extended period of time, but the ravages on their economy certainly ensure that no nation will risk such sanctions lightly in the future.

Nevertheless, sanctions also have produced nationalist reactions in target nations that stiffened rather than weakened resistance to America's foreign policy goals. Moreover, even friendly nations often refuse to go along with U.S. sanctions, and the economic effect is simply to transfer commerce from the United States to other countries. In the end, then, sanctions are a tempting means for the U.S. government to try to coerce cooperation with its policies by means short of war and to signal its determination at home and abroad, but in the absence of the threat or use of military force, embargoes and sanctions do not often succeed in changing a nation's fundamental policies, and they impose costs on the initiator as well as the object of such measures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Combs, Jerald A. *The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers.* Berkeley, Calif., 1970. Deals with the struggle between Madison and Hamilton over economic retaliation, culminating in the embargo of 1794 and Jay's Treaty.

Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez. *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s.* Boulder, Colo., 2000. Surveys of U.S. and UN sanctions against Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda. The authors argue that sanctions are a valuable tool and can work if they are carefully designed to include carrots as well as sticks.

Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez, eds. *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post–Cold War World.* Boulder, Colo., 1995. A collection of essays with contrasting views on the efficacy and morality of sanctions. There are specific case studies of the sanctions against Iraq, Serbia, Haiti, and South Africa.

Day, Erin. *Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States against Specific Countries: 1979 Through 1992.* Washington, D.C., 1992. A reference work compiled by the Congressional Research Service.

Divine, Robert A. *The Illusion of Neutrality: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Struggle over the Arms Embargo.* 2d ed. New York, 1979. An excellent account of the sanctions contained in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s.

Gibbons, Elizabeth D. *Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy under Assault.* Westport, Conn., 1999. Documents the impact of sanctions on unintended victims, the general population.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961. A brilliant exposition of American ideas of economic warfare during the nation's formative years.

Haass, Richard N., ed. *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy.* New York, 1998. An outstanding group of essays covering the

post–Cold War sanctions against China, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and the former Yugoslavia.

Hanlon, Joseph, ed. *South Africa: The Sanctions Report. Documents and Statistics.* London, 1990. A collection that spells out the economic impact of sanctions on South Africa.

Heinrichs, Waldo. *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II.* New York, 1988. A good discussion of Roosevelt's use of sanctions against Japan before World War II.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.* 2d ed. 2 vols. Washington, D.C., 1990. An encyclopedic work that contains case studies of most of the twentieth-century sanctions discussed in this essay.

Jensen, Merill. *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution, 1763–1776.* New York, 1968. A good account of pre-Revolution economic action.

Kunz, Diane B. *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy.* New York, 1997. Contains much on sanctions since 1945.

May, Ernest R. *The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917.* Cambridge, Mass., 1959. An excellent account of how Woodrow Wilson dealt with the Allied embargo against Germany before World War I.

Moore, John Bassett. *A Digest of International Law.* 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1906. A good reference source for early American precedents.

Owsley, Frank L., and Harriet C. Owsley. *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America.* 2d ed. Chicago, 1959. The most complete work on King Cotton diplomacy during the Civil War.

Perkins, Bradford. *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812.* Berkeley, Calif., 1961. The best work on the economic measures leading to the War of 1812.

Preeg, Ernest H. *Cuba and the New Caribbean Economic Order.* Washington, D.C., 1993. Details the problems with the unilateral U.S. embargo against Cuba.

———. *Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest.* Washington, D.C., 1999. An opponent of unilateral economic sanctions examines the U.S. embargoes against Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Myanmar, and China.

Singleton, Solveig, and Daniel T. Griswold, eds. *Economic Casualties: How U.S. Foreign Policy Undermines Trade, Growth, and Liberty.* Washington, D.C., 1999. A collection of passionate essays by politicians and analysts opposed to sanctions.

Spivak, Burton. *Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution.* Charlottesville, Va., 1979. The best work on Jefferson's embargo.

Waldmeir, Patti. *Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of a New South Africa.* New York, 1997. Recounts the successful use of sanctions in South Africa.

See also BLOCKADES; CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; NAVAL DIPLOMACY; OIL

Environmental Diplomacy

Kurk Dorsey

Environmental diplomacy can be broken into two general categories: conventions regulating the use of natural resources, and conventions regulating pollution. In each case, the central problem is that political boundaries rarely reflect biological boundaries, so that as national economies consume resources and produce pollution, they spread environmental problems far beyond their national boundaries. The sheer size of the U.S. economy has given it both the power to degrade the environment around the world and the influence to push diplomatic efforts to protect the environment. For most of its history, the United States has been one of the leading nations in the field of environmental diplomacy, but at the end of the twentieth century the United States found itself more often on the outside, as global discussions produced treaties that were increasingly unacceptable to the U.S. government. This loss of leadership has coincided with a shift away from bilateral treaties, first to small multilateral treaties and then to conventions that are open to every nation. That shift has been a logical reaction to an increasing international awareness that some of the biggest threats to human society come from global environmental problems, but it has meant that the United States has been less able to shape the course of events to its liking.

Environmental diplomacy has almost always been a secondary, or even tertiary, goal of U.S. foreign policy. Simultaneously, though, it is often the product of intense domestic political pressure, as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have done a masterful job of putting their members' concerns on the diplomatic agenda. As such, it usually reflects the primary diplomatic and domestic goals of the time. Hence, in the twentieth century, such trends and policies as progressivism, the Good Neighbor Policy, containment, détente, and environmentalism, as well as the state of the national and world economy, all played crucial roles in shaping specific treaties. In addition, the increase in scientific knowledge as well as public awareness of and faith in that science were crucial elements in shaping the course of environmental diplomacy during the twentieth century. The United States has almost always been a strong proponent of using science as an impartial tool in international environmental protection, particularly in moving away from static treaties to dynamic bodies that can address changing problems. Finally, one must acknowledge that just as there are formal and informal forms of diplomacy, so too are there formal and informal kinds of environmental diplomacy. While the focus here is largely on conventions and treaties, it should be remembered that the sheer appetite of the United States for imported goods created an unintended international environmental impact that might actually be greater than that generated by formal environmental diplomacy.

THE UNITED STATES–CANADA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

Although the term "environmental diplomacy" is a creation of the late twentieth century, the United States has in fact been negotiating access to natural resources since its independence from Great Britain. One could certainly interpret westward expansionism as environmental diplomacy, as the United States strove to acquire the most valuable resource of all, relatively untapped land and the various forms of mineral and living wealth that came with it. More obviously, repeated deals with Great Britain between 1783 and 1910 were a sustained effort to secure access to the grand fisheries off Newfoundland, including those for cod and several other species. These two efforts were, in a way, complementary, as fishing was dear to the New England states and landed expansion was perhaps more appealing in the South and West. In

any case, the efforts of the United States and its northern neighbor to work out fisheries deals were the start of a long and generally fruitful history of bilateral cooperation on both resource use and pollution control.

John Adams and his son, John Quincy Adams, personified the New England obsession with access to the Grand Banks. At the urging of the elder Adams, the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which ended the revolutionary war, ensured that U.S. fishermen would have the liberty to fish within three miles of British territory in North America, as well as the right to continue to catch fish on the high seas. Throughout the nineteenth century, the two nations continued to struggle over these fisheries, with special difficulty interpreting the meaning of the 1783 treaty.

Not accidentally, the next attempt to regularize fishing relations came during the younger Adams's term as secretary of state (1817–1825). The Treaty of Ghent (1815), which ended the War of 1812, had not reopened Newfoundland's inshore fisheries to the United States, but many New England fishermen pressed their luck by returning to their old haunts, and as a consequence often found their vessels confiscated. Tension forced the two nations to negotiate a new convention in 1818, which explicitly spelled out which areas were open to U.S. fishermen and which were closed, as well as shore points that could be used for drying and curing fish. Great Britain agreed that these limited areas would be open to the United States forever.

It turned out that "forever" was also open to interpretation, so the Grand Banks dispute did not go away. In the 1850s, the British threatened again to close the inshore fisheries; in the ensuing Marcy-Elgin Agreement of 1854 they traded access to all of Newfoundland's waters for a reciprocity deal between the United States and British North American colonies. After the Civil War, the United States repudiated Marcy-Elgin, and negotiations opened once again. The Treaty of Washington (1871) not only resolved the Alabama Claims but also settled questions of duties on fish products and access to Newfoundland's shoreline. Congress eventually abrogated this treaty in 1885, opening the way for yet another agreement, this one emerging from the Joint High Commission meetings in 1888. Because of congressional intransigence, this agreement was never formalized, but the two sides agreed to abide by it for many years, until in 1905 Newfoundland imposed its own set of restrictions on American fishermen.

Finally, in 1907, Great Britain and the United States agreed in principle to arbitration. In 1909 they sent the matter to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, as each side presented lengthy arguments to justify either expanded or restricted U.S. access. After months of deliberation, the court issued a complex ruling that resolved the outstanding disagreements and left London with the right to make reasonable regulations. Apparently, "reasonable" has not become the subject of any serious dispute since then.

This fisheries dispute consumed a remarkable amount of time for the young United States, reflecting the importance of both the North Atlantic Triangle (Great Britain, the United States, and Canada) and the raw materials involved. The terms of discussion were quite traditional, as negotiators never considered conservation of the cod and other valuable species, nor did they really address the problem of shifting technology. In a sense, the diplomats could not create a permanent solution because the environment, the technology, the fishing patterns, and the markets that shaped human fishing were all interconnected and all changing constantly. In short, they were trying to create static solutions to dynamic problems. This has been a recurrent shortcoming of environmental diplomacy.

Such problems were not insoluble though, as the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention revealed. The North Pacific fur seal first drew the attention of Europeans when Russian explorers encountered it in the Bering Sea in the late 1700s. The seals breed on rookery islands, with the vast majority using the Pribilof Islands of Alaska, although they spend about three-quarters of their lives on the high seas. They became the subject of intensive hunting early in the 1800s, when sea otter populations crashed, and it turned out that the thick coats that kept them warm in the ocean were quite appealing to people.

Russian management of the seals, limited though it was, sufficed as long as the seals were remote from centers of human habitation and Russia could claim both the breeding islands and the seas around them. When Russia sold Alaska to the United States in 1867, at the same time that British Columbia was rapidly gaining population, hunting of fur seals became a diplomatic issue. The U.S. government leased the Pribilofs and their inshore waters to a private company for twenty years and limited that company to 100,000 skins per year. Both the government and the stockholders profited immensely until the

early 1880s. By then, sailors out of Victoria, as well as a few from U.S. ports, had begun to kill large numbers of seals on the high seas. The response of the U.S. government was to accuse Canadian sealers of piracy and seize their ships, arguing that it owned not only the seals but also the eastern Bering Sea. Such an argument did not get very far in London, where the British generally showed restraint despite their strong support for freedom of the seas. Neither side wanted to back down, nor could either justify military action.

The first move toward compromise, in 1891, was crucial for two reasons. First, the two nations agreed to arbitrate their dispute if necessary; second, they appointed a four-member scientific committee to study the issue during a visit to the Bering Sea. The scientists, like the diplomats, failed to find any common ground beyond the obvious conclusion that fur seal numbers were declining. Still, their very presence—coupled with an 1892 joint scientific commission to study the fisheries along the U.S.–Canadian border—showed that the United States and the British Empire were beginning to consider that science might offer solutions to disputes over use of resources. Given the deadlock, the two nations were headed for arbitration. In 1893, after weeks of arguing and the production of sixteen volumes full of documents, arbitrators created a buffer zone and a closed season meant to protect the seals from pelagic hunting.

Although at first the ruling settled the U.S.–Canadian disagreement, the solution turned out to be temporary, as again shifting behavior and populations left a static agreement behind. Canadian sealers responded by crossing the ocean and demolishing the small Japanese and Russian herds, after which they then began to leave the industry; in response, the Japanese government lifted limits on its pelagic sealers, who promptly crossed the Pacific and took large numbers of Pribilof seals, as they were not bound by the arbitrators' ruling. The seal population continued to decline; the herd that once numbered 2.5 million was slipping toward 200,000 early in the twentieth century.

After many starts and stops, in 1911 the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia worked out a deal that allowed some flexibility. The key component was a ban on pelagic sealing, which U.S. scientists had shown unequivocally to be the cause of the decline of the seal herd. In exchange, Canada and Japan received a fixed percentage of the skins harvested from the Pribilofs each year, and they allowed the United States to decide how many, if any, seals were to be taken. In effect, the United States had purchased the other nations' right to catch seals on the high seas. They had been willing to sell in part purely because of economics, but also because the United States had pressed hard that pelagic sealing was both immoral and scientifically indefensible.

The North Pacific Fur Seal Convention was one of the first great successes in environmental diplomacy. The species rebounded quickly to more than two million individuals; all four sides were reasonably happy with the deal; and all agreed that they were willing to conserve the species. The convention broke down in 1941 on the eve of World War II, but after the war international management resumed and continues today, even though the harvest for the fur trade has ended.

In the use of science as a tool of, and conservation as a goal of, diplomacy, the fur seal negotiations proved to be something of a harbinger for North American diplomacy. In 1906, Secretary of State Elihu Root proposed that the United States and the British Empire resolve three outstanding issues: the Newfoundland fisheries, boundary waters control, and inland fisheries. On the third issue he specifically proposed that the protection and conservation of the fisheries should be a central goal. After much fruitless haggling—a facet of environmental diplomacy just as any other kind of diplomacy—Great Britain and the United States signed a treaty to regulate the fisheries along their common border; this brief treaty stood out for its emphasis on a joint regulatory committee based on a scientific understanding of the fisheries. Years later, Congress killed the treaty by failing to enforce it, but it lived on as a model for later agreements.

Attempts to apply the model to just the sockeye salmon fishery in the Northwest began with frustration but eventually met with success. Scientists and regulators met often, proposed solutions frequently, and watched them collapse consistently. On some occasions the culprits were Americans, other times they were Canadians; sometimes they were fishermen, other times diplomats. In 1929, Ottawa rejected a salmon treaty; in 1930, the U.S. Senate returned the favor. Disagreements arose over two main issues: the division between U.S. and Canadian catches and the waters to be covered. Finally, in 1937, after some minor modifications, the Senate reversed course and approved the 1930 treaty, which established the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries

Commission. This commission involved Canadians and Americans in scientific research as a central tool in managing and allocating the catch of this most valuable fish species. In 1985 it was replaced by the Pacific Salmon Treaty, designed to address problems that had not been imagined in the 1930s, such as renewed political clout among the First Nations and greater foreign fishing on the high seas. Still, the startling protest by Canadian salmon fishers in July 1997, when they blockaded a ferry bound for Alaska and burned an American flag, demonstrated that diplomatic solutions rarely met everyone's requirements.

In the wake of Root's 1906 initiative, in 1909 Canada and the United States signed the Boundary Waters Treaty, which formed the International Joint Commission (IJC), with powers to regulate pollution, rivers, and the like. The treaty created a system of arbitration to find those solutions that eluded the members of the IJC. Water pollution, though, remained a low priority. On a few occasions, the two nations have established measures to reduce pollution in the Great Lakes, with a 1972 water quality agreement standing out as the most important.

Over time, the IJC found itself moving into air pollution issues, including most famously the Trail Smelter case. The Trail Smelter opened for business in 1927 and quickly earned a reputation for ruining agriculture on both sides of the British Columbia–Washington border. The smelter's owners offered to pay for damages, but they could not agree on terms with U.S. farmers, who in turn called in the Department of State. In 1941, after years of haggling, the IJC crafted an agreement to resolve the dispute based on "the polluter pays" principle. For many years, the Trail Smelter case appeared, like the fur seal arbitration case, to be a symbol of the ability of Canada and the United States to resolve their differences amicably. In recent years, however, critics have noted that diplomats and regulators deliberately kept the ruling narrow so that it would not impact other sources of transborder pollution. For example, the historian John Wirth noted that the Trail Smelter case, rather than being a victory, in fact impeded international efforts to control pollution for thirty years.

While the Trail Smelter case focused on a Canadian pollution source, a quick study of wind currents and the U.S.–Canadian boundary would suggest that the vast majority of transborder air pollution runs north, not south. As fate would have it, the industrial heartland of the United States was not only built above a belt of sulfurous coal but under wind currents that run right into the most populated parts of Canada. Nature in turn left eastern Canada especially vulnerable to acid rain—there was very little limestone to act as a natural buffer, especially in lakes and ponds popular with both locals and tourists, and the forests were easily damaged by sustained pollution. By the 1970s, Canadian politicians were complaining loudly about acid rain and calling for the U.S. government to control industrial emissions, especially from the Ohio Valley. The Reagan Administration addressed acid rain with great reluctance, suggesting first that the scientific evidence was unclear, then in 1982 simply declaring that acid rain was not an issue. In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced a treaty to coordinate joint research into acid rain. Still, no steps to curb acid rain were put in place until after passage of the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1990, which mandated a reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions.

The bilateral Canadian-American relationship has also addressed wildlife protection in North America. Most famously, in 1916 the two countries signed the Migratory Bird Treaty (MBT), which protected most species of birds that lived north of the Rio Grande. The MBT divided birds into three categories: game, insectivorous, and others. Game birds could be hunted during specific seasons; insectivores were permanently protected; and those listed in the third category got protection just because they were popular. Like the fur seal treaty before it, the MBT succeeded because it combined solid science, economics, and appeal to people's fundamental ideas about aesthetics. The rationale for protecting birds was that they were beautiful *and* useful.

Still, the treaty stirred controversy because its motivation was largely domestic. Conservationists had pushed through Congress a law to protect migratory birds in 1913, but most of them believed that the Supreme Court would declare it to be unconstitutional. With Root's support, they focused on the idea that the treaty clause of the Constitution in Article 6 trumped the Tenth Amendment's notion that residual powers were reserved to the states, and they began to push for treaties with other countries to protect migratory birds. That they settled for the adjective "migratory" suggested that they were still very conscious that the states had the right to protect birds that did not migrate across state lines. As in the fur seal convention, the animals'

movements were central to their presence on the diplomatic agenda. When in 1920 the Supreme Court ruled on the treaty's enabling legislation in *Missouri* v. *Holland*, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes placed wildlife protection squarely in the lap of the federal government, and it has not left there since.

Since 1920, the MBT has served as the basis for bird protection throughout the United States and Canada, since the enabling legislation has been updated frequently, and it has also served as a model for three other bilateral treaties. In 1936 the United States and Mexico signed a Migratory Bird Treaty that had been on the conservationists' wish list since 1913. That treaty did little to change U.S. law, although it did add birds of prey to the protected lists, and its main value was to export U.S. ideas about bird conservation to Mexico. In 1972 the United States signed a similar deal with Japan in order to protect birds in the Pacific. And in 1976 the Soviet Union joined the club with an agreement to protect birds that migrated in the northern Pacific.

A few conclusions can be drawn from the U.S.–Canadian environmental connection. First, one can well ask about the treaties that ought to have been executed but never were. The fisheries of the Great Lakes were the scene of intense competition, but only the failed treaty of 1908 attempted to regulate them in any way. Rather than make a sustained effort to work with fishermen to create a sustainable fisheries regime on the lakes, the two governments dropped the issue and focused on local regulations that were doomed to failure. Simply put, there was no strong lobbying group or government agency committed to freshwater fisheries conservation, and now there is no commercial fishery of consequence on the lakes and many native species have been severely depleted.

Second, many treaties that are completed often are held up by strong economic opposition, sometimes until it is too late. It usually takes some dire emergency to move these treaties forward at the last moment. The fur seal convention could have been completed years earlier, but stubbornness in Ottawa and Washington prevented leaders from making a few minor sacrifices until it was almost too late for the species. The water quality agreements in the Great Lakes came long after the International Joint Commission had declared all of the boundary waters far too polluted to drink—only a catastrophe like the fire on the Cuyahoga River compelled the two sides to take any serious action. No doubt, much of the opposition to cleaning up the lakes came from the industrial concerns that would be forced to change their ways.

Third, by comparison, there have been very few treaties to regulate the environment between Mexico and the United States. In part, this trend reflects the smaller border between the two and perhaps some environmental differences in the borderlands and their species. But it also reflects differences in levels of competition—Canada and the United States were similar enough societies to demand the same goods from the same source—and deep diplomatic suspicion. The Mexican War and U.S. opposition to the Mexican Revolution, not to mention deep religious and cultural differences, left Mexico uncooperative and the United States aloof. The great differences between U.S. relations with Mexico and those with Canada suggest that environmental diplomacy requires a great deal of goodwill and trust. For all of their disagreements and harsh comments, the United States and Canada have fundamentally trusted one another since Canadian Confederation in 1867. The same certainly cannot be said about Mexico and the United States. One need look no further than the sorry state of the rivers shared by Mexico and the United States to see how far these two neighbors have to go to bring their relationship to a standard that Canada and the United States have shared for years. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992 and the subsequent creation of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation may well result in a leveling of the environmental relationship among the three countries, but it is not clear what the level will be.

Fourth, two large countries can solve a number of problems with bilateral diplomacy, but even then there are limits to what they can do. Just because of sheer land mass, the United States and Canada are in a position to create and solve important environmental problems in a way that is probably unique. And yet, for all of their efforts to protect birds, they really cannot save the scores of species of neotropical migrants that winter in Latin America without cooperation from at least a dozen nations. Likewise, a solution to the sealing crisis eluded them until they satisfied Japan. In short, bilateral diplomacy normally tackles relatively easy questions; as a consequence, when an environmental problem involves more countries, the diplomacy becomes significantly more important and more complex.

EARLY MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS

While there had been a handful of multilateral conservation agreements before 1940, none were so sweeping as that year's Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (CNP). U.S. scientists and conservationists conceived the CNP in the 1930s as a means to spread what they considered to be obvious ideas about conservation. Each nation, they proposed, ought to set aside national parks, national reserves, natural monuments, and wilderness areas, all of which already had been established in some form in the United States. They also thought that each signatory ought to protect endangered species and migratory birds, which revealed the convention's roots in the early conservation movement. The scientists worried, despite the Good Neighbor Policy, that Latin American governments might well suspect their motives. Therefore, at the 1938 meeting of the Pan-American Union, delegates sympathetic to the idea created a study committee of Latin Americans. They came back in 1940 with a draft treaty full of ideas suggested first by the U.S. scientists. The Pan-American Union's official stamp was sufficient to give the CNP legitimacy.

By 1942 nearly every nation in the Western Hemisphere had signed on, even though few of them were in a position to fulfill its terms. There were relatively few scientists in Latin America, few conservation nongovernmental organizations such as the National Audubon Society, and few parks or reserves already established. In the face of these difficulties, only Costa Rica did much to set aside large tracts of land. Even the United States failed to take the convention very seriously, as it did not move to protect endangered species as a group until 1966. Granted, the outbreak of World War II distracted attention from nature protection, but the war also served as a catalyst to sign the treaty as a show of unity and cooperation.

While the CNP was not the first environmental treaty to draw in dozens of countries, it provides an excellent example of the two fundamental difficulties of multilateral environmental diplomacy. First, it is a challenge to coordinate policies for countries with vastly different levels of economic development. Not surprisingly, the United States and Guatemala had very different attitudes toward conservation of land and wildlife, based on differences in industrialization, population, wealth, and landmass. Some citizens of Latin American states suspected that part of the U.S. agenda was keeping their nations in a state of economic subservience, while the U.S. scientists and conservationists who created the convention believed that they were simply passing on the wisdom that they had learned the hard way, as well as ideas that were inherently good in any society. Later in the century, differences among rich and poor societies along the same lines would hamstring other efforts to protect the environment.

Second, enforcement mechanisms are usually the first thing to be dropped from such a treaty. Most governments in the Western Hemisphere were willing to say that nature protection was a valuable goal. Few were willing to be held to any specific promises. None would accept the possibility of penalties for failing to live up to the CNP. This pattern repeated itself for the next sixty years. The rhetoric of environmental protection has been unusually appealing, but few governments will sacrifice their sovereignty over internal resource decisions or forgo the possibility of economic development for the sake of environmental protection. If forced to choose between signing an environmental protection convention with real teeth or risking public censure for failing to sign such an agreement, most governments will take the risk of criticism. If anything, the United States was just as reluctant as any country to risk its sovereignty, even though it often had the least distance to go to live up to its obligations.

The reluctance of the United States to push for strong enforcement mechanisms—and the implications of that policy—can be seen most clearly in the long efforts to control whaling. By the early twentieth century, the vast majority of whaling was confined to Antarctic waters, with whales being caught and then brought back for processing to shore stations in such remote places as South Georgia Island. There whalers could be tightly controlled by licenses issued by the European colonial governments. Two technological innovations in the 1920s, the stern slipway and condensers for producing freshwater at sea, allowed whalers to process whales at sea on large floating factory vessels. Whaling companies in Norway and Great Britain quickly worked out the logistics for expeditions involving a floating factory and up to a dozen smaller whale catchers, which could stay at sea for months at a time, catching whales, processing them for their oil, and then delivering the oil to any port in the world. In short, because they could operate on the high seas and fly any flag they chose, they were extremely difficult to regulate.

In 1931, after two years of discussion, the League of Nations produced the Geneva Convention for the Regulation of Whaling as a first step toward international control of the industry. The twenty-six signatories, including landlocked Switzerland, agreed that all whaling vessels would be licensed, that calves and nursing females would be protected, and that they would conduct more scientific research. Despite sponsorship by the suspect League of Nations and the limited nature of U.S. whaling operations, the United States participated in the drafting of the convention, signed it, and ratified it in 1935, all because doing so was an easy way to placate domestic conservation interests.

The 1931 convention did nothing to address the real problem, which was massive exploitation of a finite number of whales. Only a huge glut in whale oil, which was used mainly for margarine, curtailed whaling operations in the early 1930s. In fact, the British and Norwegian whaling companies did more than any government to regulate whaling and save whales by their own private agreements to limit production. The problem was that they could not work with other foreign companies, especially those from Germany and Japan, that were pursuing whaling for national reasons as much as private economic gain.

Over the objections of industry, the United Kingdom and Norway called another conference on whaling in 1937 to craft a tougher convention. They set an open season for Antarctic whaling, created rules for efficient use of whale carcasses, and banned the hunting of certain endangered species. The United States, led by Dr. Remington Kellogg, took an active role, even though U.S. companies contributed only 3 percent to the world's whaling catch. Germany was also an active participant, which was a victory, but Japan refused to abide by the 1937 convention or any of its subsequent protocols. Not only were the signatory nations unable to do anything about Japanese whaling, they faced strong internal pressure from their own whalers who wanted the same freedom from regulation that the Japanese had.

Attempts to rectify the problems of the 1937 convention came to a halt when World War II erupted, and yet the war also played an important role in shuffling the interests of the nations involved in whaling diplomacy. On one hand, Japan and Germany found themselves at the mercy of the victorious Allies. On the other hand, the United States found itself somewhat unwillingly thrust into the position of global leadership. And most whaling ships found themselves on the bottom of the ocean floor. In short, the opportunity was there for a recasting of global whaling operations.

Under Kellogg's influence, the United States, a nation that neither caught nor consumed baleen whales, decided to seize that opportunity. With the reluctant compliance of Norway and the

REMINGTON KELLOGG

Remington Kellogg may have been the single most influential person in the history of efforts to regulate whaling, and he is therefore an excellent example of how one person can—and sometimes cannot—shape environmental diplomacy. In 1930, after receiving his Ph.D. from the University of California for his work on whale fossils, Kellogg worked at the Smithsonian Institution as a curator of mammals. As such, he was the closest thing that the Department of State could find to an in-house expert to send to the League of Nations meeting on a whaling convention. For the next thirty-five years, Kellogg served the cause of international conservation as an adviser to the Department of State, a delegate to the IWC meetings, and chair of the commission. The State Department took no step on whaling matters without consulting him, although it did not always follow his advice.

Most importantly, Kellogg urged the Department of State to use the opportunity provided by World War II to grab control of whaling diplomacy from Norway and the United Kingdom. He feared, rightly, that the British and Norwegians would be more concerned with harvesting whales in the aftermath of the war than with conserving them. Only American leadership, he concluded, could give science its proper place relative to the whalers, who seemed to have too much say in London and Oslo. Kellogg, then, was one of the most active advocates of a strong IWC and, indeed, one of the people most disappointed by its failures. His last meeting of the commission came in 1964 at Sandefjord, home to the Norwegian whaling fleet. At that meeting, the whaling countries fended off powerful scientific arguments that whaling needed to be curtailed before the industry destroyed itself, and Kellogg came home embittered by the experience. It was not the happy ending for which some might wish, but it is emblematic of the difficulties of pushing conservation through diplomacy.

United Kingdom, in the fall of 1946 the United States engineered the writing of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. By 1949 enough nations were on board to create the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which, for all of its flaws, is one of the oldest international bodies with a mandate for conservation. The IWC was a step forward in that it established rules for annual meetings to update whaling regulations, it relied explicitly upon the advice of scientists, and it tightened the restrictions on whalers.

That the IWC failed to conserve whales is more a reflection of the limits imposed on it in 1946 than a reflection of the personal failings of its members. Once again, the drafters chose not to have any mechanisms to enforce conservation regulations. Kellogg had strongly advocated trade sanctions against whaling nations that did not join the IWC, but U.S. diplomats decided that trade policy and conservation issues should not be intertwined. The convention created new problems by giving members the right to object to any amendment to the original regulations and thereby exempt themselves from it. In later years, these two facets would be the target of vehement criticism among environmentalists, but the Department of State insisted on them on the reasonable theory that whaling nations would not join any organization that threatened their sovereignty. In other words, a conservation organization could have clout or members, but not both.

What a whaling commission could have was symbolic value and persuasive powers. In fact, it is clear that those two objectives were high on the list of the U.S. scientists and diplomats who drew up plans for the commission and subsequently defended it during its darkest moments. If nations, including the United States, were unwilling to surrender their sovereignty, they were still willing to listen to other nations' arguments. In fact, scientists counted on their ability to present rational, irrefutable arguments to recalcitrant commission members as the only viable means to build the necessary consensus. Even after it became apparent that persuasion was not going to stop Soviet cheating, Panamanian indifference to inspection, or U.S. efforts to restore Japanese whaling, U.S. and British diplomats supported the IWC as an important symbol that the nations of the world could cooperate in regulating the high seas—there was no need for South American nations to resort to such unsporting institutions as the 200-mile territorial limit in the name of conservation.

The IWC became the scene of some bruising political battles in the 1970s and 1980s, when the United States led a coalition of countries fighting for a moratorium on commercial whaling. By 1972, only three nations had any significant commercial whaling operations: Japan, the Soviet Union, and Norway, and Norway's industry was a mere shadow of its former self. As the surging environmental movement bore the greatest responsibility for pushing the moratorium, it was easy for the United States to support a measure that would hurt only its Cold War opponent and a major economic rival that seemed intent on destroying the U.S. auto industry. After several years of trying to push a moratorium through the IWC, only to see the whaling countries suggest that they would leave the commission rather than accept a moratorium, it became clear that the United States would have to use its own economic power to make any headway. Using the 1971 Pelly Amendment and the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, Congress gave the president the authority to place unilateral sanctions on fishing rights of countries that continued to hunt whales in the face of IWC regulations. It is debatable how much impact these sanctions had, but they were at least marginally important in leading to the 1982 decision by the IWC to ban commercial whaling.

While the whaling commission might be the best known example of multilateral environmental diplomacy, it was certainly not the only postwar example of several nations convening to resolve their differences. The 1946 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries agreement was the first of several multinational treaties to regulate pelagic fisheries. Beginning in 1959 there was a series of treaties to regulate and protect the resources of Antarctica, including minerals and marine life. And there have been occasional isolated conventions, such as the 1987 agreement among five northern nations to protect polar bears. In each case, these treaties have brought together a set of countries with a mutual interest in a specific, local resource. Given a reasonably small number of countries with focused interests, the United States has been able to lead consistently.

GLOBAL CONVENTIONS

Beginning in the 1950s, thanks largely to United Nations activism and pressure from countries emerging from decolonization, the nations of the world began to gather in huge conferences to dis-

cuss truly global issues. One of the first of these grand global conferences was the 1958 meeting of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and over the next forty years it would be followed by several major attempts to unite the scores of nations of the world on key issues of diplomacy. In these discussions, the United States gradually found itself losing influence and often choosing not to lead. As environmentalism gathered steam in the 1970s, it served as a force to criticize the consumerism of the United States and its role in the Cold War, which helped push the U.S. government away from a leadership role. In addition, the United States found that its sheer power, and ties to former colonial powers, made it a target of developing nations more often than their leader.

The law of the sea negotiations started out with a focus on navigation, although marine resources were never far below the surface of the agenda. In fact, while pollution and fisheries disputes were important postwar motivators for the UN to call the conference, the aforementioned claim by Ecuador, Peru, and Chile in 1952 to a 200-mile band of territorial waters was one of the most important driving forces. The 200-mile limit was also one of the most controversial issues, as the conferees failed to reach an agreement on territorial waters at either the 1958 meeting or UNCLOS II in 1960. Only with the third meeting, which began in 1972 and ran off and on for ten years, did delegates accept the idea of the 200-mile zone.

The resource issues, which at first seemed fairly straightforward, became increasingly difficult to solve. In 1958, one of the four conventions signed addressed fishing and conservation in territorial waters. But that same conference, and the second one in 1960, failed to come to terms for fishing beyond territorial seas, in part because they failed to agree on a definition of those seas. Even after 1993, when the Law of the Sea Convention went into effect, fishing nations could not agree on regulating the seas beyond the new 200-mile economic zones. While treaties covering some regions and some species are open for signature, nothing has been completed, despite intense pressure from environmentalists to ban such practices as long-line fishing and drift-netting. The surprising incident of 1995, when Canadian warships fired on Spanish fishing vessels just outside of Canada's 200-mile zone, suggests that some sort of law is needed to cover these contested fisheries. And yet, as of 2001, only twenty-nine nations, including the United States, had ratified the supplementary agreement managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.

The most controversial point had nothing to do with swimming marine resources, but rather with those that have been lying on the ocean floor for millennia—mineral nodules. In the 1960s companies exploring the seabed discovered areas covered with rocks full of manganese, nickel, copper, and other valuable and reasonably scarce minerals. At UNCLOS III in 1982, governments split dramatically over how companies should get access to these minerals. Developing nations, often referred to as the Group of 77, argued that the minerals were the common property of mankind; therefore, an international agency should control the nodule fields, and companies that wished to exploit them would have to transfer technology to poorer countries and pay hefty fees. The United States and other developed nations countered that resources on the high seas had always been free for the taking by anyone with the capital and fortitude to take the necessary risks.

At UNCLOS III, the conferees adopted language closer to the Group of 77 nations' desires, and the Reagan administration refused to sign the convention solely because of the deep seabed articles. After a further twelve years of negotiations, the United States finally found a Deep Seabed agreement to its liking, in part because zealots on both sides were coming to the conclusion that mining there might never be economically feasible. Not only did the United States ratify the convention in 1994, but by then 159 states had at least signed, meaning that just about every national government in the world offered some form of support for the Law of the Sea Convention. When one considers that the UN has forty-two landlocked members, the signature count is especially impressive.

By the 1970s the huge meetings to discuss some global issue had become common, and in fact it is now hard to imagine a year without some grand conference sponsored by the UN. The factors that made such conferences more feasible, such as improvements in air travel, applied of course to environmental conferences, which were themselves furthered by both the strong wave of environmentalism sweeping around the world and the growing sense that some resources were simply the common heritage of humanity and therefore within the purview of all nations, not just a privileged few. Not only did new conven-

tions and conferences come together, but membership rose dramatically in some old organizations, such as the IWC, which grew from fewer than twenty members to more than fifty in a few years. Not surprisingly, then, the 1970s witnessed a slew of conferences to deal with global issues, such as trade in endangered species, wetlands protection, and the general condition of the human environment.

None drew more attention than the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. The UN had sponsored large meetings on resource conservation and protection in 1949 and 1968, but they had been limited in their scope. In 1969 the UN accepted Sweden's proposal to host a global conference on the human environment, broadly defined. When delegates from 114 countries and 500 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) met in 1972, they ensured that the environment would have a prominent place on the diplomatic agenda for decades to come.

As one might expect, UNCHE had both its share of conflicts and cooperation. The first conflict came from the decision of the organizers to invite West Germany but not East Germany, which triggered a boycott from the Soviet bloc. Of course, that conflict contributed to the easing of negotiations by removing most Cold War tensions at the conference. Likewise, developing nations split from their industrialized compatriots in assessing the nature of the threat—was it pollution and the diminution of natural resources, or did economic imbalance lead to the other problems? Again, this disagreement led to some conciliation, as the Western nations agreed in principle that equitable distribution of wealth would lead to a healthier human environment, and both sides agreed that development agencies had to do a better job of considering the environmental impact of their decisions.

In the end, the Stockholm meeting had three practical consequences. First, NGOs gained their status as leaders in environmental diplomacy. Second, the delegates created the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to serve as a global agency for environmental protection. Third, they produced 109 recommendations for action at local, national, and international levels.

With Stockholm as the impetus, in 1973 the United States took one of its last bold leadership steps by sponsoring the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). In many ways, it was one final example of exporting conservation strategies, as the U.S. Congress had recently passed a tough new endangered species act that served as an ideological template. The goal of CITES was to halt the commercial exploitation of endangered species, with the hope therefore of pulling them back from the brink of extinction. Nations that joined CITES promised not to allow importation of species declared endangered by any other member of the convention. In addition, CITES had a means for scientists to list species as endangered if the home government failed to do so. Threatened species could be put on a "gray list," which allowed only limited trade. At present, about 5,000 animals and 25,000 plants are listed as protected under the convention. Finally, and most critically, CITES actually included provisions to sanction nations that failed to halt trade in endangered species. The United Arab Emirates, Thailand, and Italy have all been punished by CITES, and El Salvador and Equatorial Guinea joined the convention because of sanctions pressure. In all, 154 states are parties to CITES, with the United States holding the distinction of being the first nation to ratify it in 1974.

Despite that rare display of teeth and tusk, CITES still has the problem of any environmental convention. If it enforces the rules strictly, it runs the risk of losing members, who will then be legally free to trade for all of the endangered species parts that they desire. Those who administer such conventions must decide if they would rather bend over backward in the hope of persuading rogue states to abide by the rules eventually, or punish them and hope that global public opinion and political pressure will deter them from leaving the convention. CITES's own evidence suggests that most of its members do not abide by its rules, nor do they wish to be shown the door, which suggests that it can do more than just turning a blind eye to infractions in the hope that nations will slowly develop a willingness to abide by these rules.

One of the holes in CITES was that it said nothing about habitat preservation, a subject covered in a few other treaties. The 1971 Ramsar Agreement required parties to protect at least one wetland of special significance. The convention does provide signatories with the right to revoke protection in case of national emergency, but only if the government provides sufficient compensation in the form of further protection of other sites. While 125 nations had signed on to Ramsar by 2001, they were only slowly getting around to protecting the wetlands in question. In a manner

reminiscent of the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection, the wealthy nations that could afford to protect wetlands had already done a great deal of work, whether the United States with its vast system of National Wildlife Refuges or Great Britain with its impressive chain of preserves owned by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Even so, it took the United States until 1987 to ratify the convention, and it has designated fewer hectares as Ramsar sites than some smaller, poorer countries, such as Tanzania.

In contrast to Ramsar's narrow focus on wetlands, in 1972 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sponsored an agreement to preserve sites of special cultural and natural value, the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The notion of a treaty to protect sites of cultural value dates back to at least the 1950s, but it was a U.S. idea in 1965 to combine cultural and natural sites into a single convention, and the United States was the first nation to ratify the convention in 1973. By 2001, 164 nations had become parties, making it one of the most inclusive pieces of environmental diplomacy. Member states have access to a small pool of money, about $3.5 million annually, to help them plan for listing and protecting sites, but they join mainly for reasons of public opinion and prestige, and 122 nations had listed nearly 700 sites at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The United States is one of the few countries that listed more natural sites than cultural, with eleven of its eighteen being national parks.

In an attempt to follow up on CITES, Ramsar, and the World Heritage conventions, in 1979 the UN opened for signature the Convention on Migratory Species. The negotiators began with a premise that U.S. conservationists had acted upon at the turn of the twentieth century, that migratory animals inherently needed international cooperation for their protection. Parties agree to protect habitat for endangered and threatened species, pass laws to protect them from hunting, and study them to learn more about means of protecting them. Seventy-four nations ratified the agreement, mostly from Europe and Africa. The United States, like Russia and China, did not sign, but U.S. wildlife officials cooperate with policies from the Convention on Migratory Species. This cooperation suggests a recurrent problem, that the U.S. government is especially reluctant to accede to a convention that might override its own laws.

As if exhausted from the spate of treaties in the early 1970s, the world did not create another major piece of environmental diplomacy until the middle of the 1980s, when it tackled the problem of ozone-depleting chemicals. Ozone, a collection of three oxygen atoms, serves as a shield in the upper atmosphere against ultraviolet radiation from the sun. As such, it makes life on earth possible. In the 1970s, scientists theorized that ozone would break apart when it came into contact with chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a family of chemicals widely used in Styrofoam, refrigerants, and aerosol cans. CFCs had been invented in the 1930s, and they seemed like the ideal chemical—inert, nontoxic, cheap, and useful in a variety of ways. But by the 1980s, a move was afoot to ban them based on theoretical concerns.

In a move that surprised many people, the usually antiregulatory Reagan administration vigorously supported efforts to ban CFCs. In part, this position depended on the strong position of U.S. industry to benefit from a ban on CFCs, and perhaps in part it grew from the president's own brush with skin cancer. The first step came in 1985, when delegates from twenty nations met in Vienna and signed the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which did no more than commit the signatories to unspecified actions to protect the ozone layer. In addition, they agreed that the UN Environment Programme would monitor the ozone layer and conduct research on it. In short, the signatories could agree on nothing more specific than the theory that the ozone layer was probably in trouble. They did, however, agree to a U.S. proposal to meet two years later to create a binding set of rules.

The discussions evolved from multilateral to global in 1987, as delegates from sixty states convened in Montreal. Evidence that humans were somehow eroding the ozone layer was still sparse, as the famed ozone hole over the Antarctic had just recently become known, and its causes were absolutely uncertain. Still, there can be no doubt that the ozone hole had caught the attention of the U.S. public, although the delegates themselves seemed largely unmoved by it—they were driven still by the scientific theories. Over objections from industry in Japan, western Europe, and, to a lesser extent, the United States, the delegates formally named CFCs as the culprits. Through the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, they agreed to cut production of these chemicals in half by 1999.

In retrospect the Montreal Protocol was at once one of the most amazing pieces of environmental diplomacy and obviously flawed. Working

largely on complex scientific theory rather than compelling data, diplomats from around the world agreed that a seemingly benign chemical had disastrous potential and therefore had to be curbed dramatically. At the same time, critics pointed out that developing nations, such as India, China, and Brazil, needed CFCs to raise their standards of living, but the convention said nothing about transferring technology to them. Finally, many Europeans condemned the convention as too strict, while many U.S. environmentalists and industrialists worried that it would be unenforceable.

To address this range of concerns, delegates from eighty-one countries met in Helsinki in 1989. With further research showing that the ozone problem was not just theory, they agreed to ban all CFC production by 2000. In addition, they drew up schemes to facilitate technology transfer, and they tightened up the rules. The next year in London they finalized all of the details of these agreements, and in 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would eliminate CFC production by 1995.

The U.S. position on the ozone layer makes especially puzzling its general lack of leadership in the 1990s. On the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm meeting, the nations of the world met at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Known formally as the UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Earth Summit was supposed to provide leaders a chance to assess and build upon the accomplishments of the 1972 meeting. One of the accomplishments of the meeting was the production of a massive document, known as Agenda 21, as a follow-up to the 1972 recommendations for action. In addition to the thousands of activists who attended on their own, 170 nations sent delegations, many led by their head of state, but President Bush publicly vacillated about attending. Rather than taking an opportunity for leadership, Bush was concerned that he might find himself boxed into an uncomfortable position. In the end, he paid a brief visit, but he was unable either to rally other nations to his positions or even tame the dissent within the U.S. delegation.

On two important issues the United States found itself out of step with the majority of the world's governments. First, and perhaps most controversially, the conferees agreed to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The UN Environment Programme had been working on this convention for four years, goaded by alarming reports of the extinction of hosts of species, many of which had never been scientifically catalogued. The final convention required signatory nations to take appropriate steps to preserve their own biodiversity, and it established a fund for helping poorer countries do just that. Bush noted that the United States already did more than any other country on both points. The real point of disagreement came with the convention's provisions on biotechnology and intellectual property. In a debate reminiscent of the discussions about minerals on the deep seabed, U.S. officials argued that American companies had far more to lose than gain because the protections for their patents were insufficient. Despite great pressure at home, abroad, and within the U.S. delegation, Bush refused to sign the CBD. A year later, after consulting with both business and environmental leaders on an interpretive statement, President William Jefferson Clinton signed the convention just days before it was closed to signatures. While 186 governments signed the CBD, the United States is one of only seven—including such pariahs as Afghanistan and Yugoslavia—who have not ratified it.

The other major agreement to come out of the Earth Summit was the Framework Convention on Climate Change. As concern about the ozone layer was heating up, scientists began to fear that the Earth itself was heating up because of human economic activity. In particular, they were coming to the conclusion that industrial emission of so-called greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide, was resulting in a slow but steady warming of the earth's temperature. By 1989 the UN had endorsed the idea of a convention to curb global warming, and the Rio meeting provided an opportunity to sign an agreement that had been finalized the month before. As usual, there was a split between the developing world and industrialized nations over who should pay for the technological advances necessary to address global warming. In addition, the United States split from its industrialized partners by opposing any hard targets for emissions levels. Without U.S. willingness to commit to anything specific, the convention was necessarily vague. Signatory nations agreed that humans were causing climate change, that more research was necessary, and that they would meet five years later to set specific targets.

In 1997 they convened again at Kyoto, Japan, to update the climate change accord. Each nation received targets for reduced emissions of greenhouse gasses, with the U.S. target set at a 7 percent reduction on 1990 levels by 2012. The

Kyoto Protocol takes effect when at least fifty-five nations, which in aggregate produce 55 percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, ratify it, but as of 2001 only thirty-seven nations had in fact completed the ratification process. While the United States is one of eighty-four states to have signed the protocol, the Clinton administration did nothing to move it forward in the Senate. Once again the split between the developing and industrialized worlds presented an insurmountable obstacle. Under Kyoto, nations such as China and India have to make no firm commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Leaders of those nations argue that they deserve the opportunity to pursue economic growth as the West did before. But many opponents of the protocol in the United States say that they will not accept any agreement that does not commit every nation—and especially the two most populous—to some restrictions. In the fall of 2000, diplomats met at The Hague to iron out differences in the protocol, and they came very close to a deal that would have placated concerns of the United States and some of its allies, notably Canada, Australia, and Japan, by offering credits for the carbon absorption action of forests. European environmentalists took the lead in killing this compromise; within months the new U.S. president, George W. Bush, announced that the United States would no longer work within the Kyoto framework, which his aides described as "dead." Efforts to implement the Kyoto Protocol continued to go forward, but it seemed unlikely that greenhouse gas emissions could be curbed without the enthusiastic support of the United States.

The United States has by no means dropped from its active role in environmental diplomacy, even when various administrations are not strongly committed to environmentalism, and it still uses its power to cajole other countries into such conventions. The administration of the younger Bush surprised many people in the spring of 2001 by signing on to a convention to ban the use of persistent organic pollutants, such as DDT and PCBs. These chemicals have been outlawed in the United States for many years, but U.S. companies still exported them. Instead of focusing on lost export revenue, the administration noted accurately that the convention was necessary to stop these chemicals from winding up in the wind and water currents that bring them to the United States. Likewise, in twelve embassies around the world, the Department of State has recently established centers to promote regional environmental cooperation, which will in turn further the work of the department's Office of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. And yet the action of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations toward the Kyoto Protocol makes clear several points: the United States, because of the sheer size of its economy and the vast cultural influence of its society, is still the most powerful force in environmental diplomacy; it is also now the power most likely to break up potentially stringent conventions; and unless the United States and the two future behemoths, China and India, can bridge their differences there will be little progress on environmental diplomacy. No global agreement on the use of resources can move forward if the prime consumers of resources fail to cooperate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bailey, Thomas. "The North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911." *Pacific Historical Review* 4 (1935): 1–14.

Benedick, Richard Elliot. *Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet.* Enlarged ed. Cambridge, Mass., 1998. A fascinating firsthand account by a U.S. diplomat of international efforts to protect the ozone layer.

Campbell, Charles Jr. "The Anglo-American Crisis in the Bering Sea, 1890–1891." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 66 (1961): 395–410.

———. "The Bering Sea Settlements of 1892." *Pacific Historical Review* 32 (1963): 347–368.

Carroll, John E. *Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and A Prospective of Canadian–U.S. Transboundary Environmental Relations.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1983. Examines post-1945 issues in transborder pollution and shared resource use from a natural resources perspective.

Chacko, Chirakaikaran Joseph. *The International Joint Commission Between the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada.* New York, 1968. The best single study of the International Joint Commission.

Dorsey, Kurk. "Scientists, Citizens, and Statesmen: U.S.–Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era." *Diplomatic History* 19 (1995): 407–430.

———. *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.–Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in*

the Progressive Era. Seattle, 1998. Analyzes early treaties to protect birds, seals, and fish in North America.

French, Hilary F. *Partnership for the Planet: An Environmental Agenda for the United Nations.* Washington, D.C., 1995. One of the leading members of the NGO community presents an agenda for future environmental diplomacy.

Hollick, Ann L. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea.* Princeton, N.J., 1981.

Innis, Harold A. *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy.* Rev. ed. Toronto, 1978. A classic work in the field that examines the regulation and use of oceanic fisheries.

Levering, Ralph B., and Miriam L. Levering. *Citizen Action for Global Change: The Neptune Group and Law of the Sea.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1999. Demonstrates the roles of private citizens in shaping UNCLOS III.

Lytle, Mark. "An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History." *Diplomatic History* 20 (1996): 279–300. The first work that any historian interested in environmental diplomacy should read.

McNeill, J. R. *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World.* New York, 2000. An ambitious synthesis and analysis of modern global environmentalism.

Roos, John F. *Restoring Fraser River Salmon: A History of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, 1937–1985.* Vancouver, 1991.

Sand, Peter H., ed. *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments.* Cambridge, 1992.

Susskind, Lawrence E. *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements.* New York, 1994.

Tolba, Mostafa K. *Global Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating Environmental Agreements for the World, 1973–1992.* Cambridge, Mass., 1998. One of the UN's leading environmental diplomats draws lessons from twenty years of work.

Tønnessen, J. N., and A. O. Johnsen. *The History of Modern Whaling.* Translated by R. I. Christophersen. Berkeley, Calif., 1982. The best single volume on whaling, the whaling commission, and the whaling industry.

Tucker, Richard P. *Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World.* Berkeley, Calif., 2000. Shows the environmental impact of the U.S. informal empire.

Wirth, John D. *Smelter Smoke in North America: The Politics of Transborder Pollution.* Lawrence, Kans., 2000. The most valuable interpretation of the Trail Smelter Case and subsequent U.S.–Mexican pollution problems.

Young, Oran R., George J. Demko, and Kilaparti Ramakrishna, eds. *Global Environmental Change and International Governance.* Hanover, N.H., 1996. A number of political scientists analyze the new trends in environmental diplomacy and their impacts on sovereignty.

See also ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; GLOBALIZATION; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; TREATIES.

EXCEPTIONALISM

Trevor B. McCrisken

"American exceptionalism" is a term used to describe the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history; a nation that is not only unique but also superior. Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to use the term "exceptional" to describe the United States and the American people in his classic work *Democracy in America* (1835–1840), but the idea of America as an exceptional entity can be traced back to the earliest colonial times. Jack P. Greene's analysis of a wealth of contemporary materials has established that by "the beginning of the nineteenth century the idea of America as an exceptional entity had long been an integral component in the identification of America." Many scholars of the belief in American exceptionalism argue that it forms one of the core elements of American national identity and American nationalism. Deborah Madsen, for example, contends that exceptionalism is "one of the most important concepts underlying modern theories of American cultural identity." It is a central part of the American belief system or what Benedict Anderson calls its "imagined community."

The ways in which U.S. foreign policy is made and conducted are influenced by the underlying assumptions that Americans hold about themselves and the rest of the world. Like most nations, the United States has a distinctive pattern of policymaking that is determined by unique aspects of its national culture. Each country's historical and cultural heritage, its montage of national beliefs and experience—its national identity—has an influence, whether consciously or not, upon the way it practices politics. U.S. foreign policy is driven by a variety of causal factors including strategic, economic, political, and bureaucratic interests; international and domestic pressures; the personalities and agendas of policymakers; and the actions of other nations. However, the belief in exceptionalism, since it is a core element of American national identity, has an important underlying influence on foreign policy activity. This belief is one of the main ideas that, according to Michael Hunt, has "performed for generations of Americans that essential function of giving order to their vision of the world and defining their place in it." Although such views are not "codified in formal, systemic terms," Hunt shows that the evidence for their existence and influence can be found in the "private musings" of policymakers and, more importantly, "the public rhetoric by which they have justified their actions and communicated their opinions to one another and to the nation." The belief in American exceptionalism provides an essential element of the cultural and intellectual framework for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Two main strands of exceptionalist thought have influenced U.S. foreign policy. One is that of the United States as an exemplar nation, as reflected in ideas such as the "city upon a hill," nonentangling alliances, "anti-imperialism," "isolationism," and "Fortress America." The other, often more dominant strand is that of the missionary nation, as represented by the ideas of "manifest destiny," "imperialism," "internationalism," "leader of the free world," "modernization theory," and the "new world order." Both strands have been present throughout the history of U.S. foreign relations.

WHAT IS EXCEPTIONALISM?

The focus here is on the belief in American exceptionalism and its influence on U.S. foreign policy rather than directly addressing the question of whether U.S. foreign policy itself can be measured as exceptional. Indeed, Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown have found little empirical evidence for claims that American foreign policy behavior is exceptional. Faults and blemishes riddle American history as much as that of any other

nation. In foreign policy, the United States has a far from untarnished record. The colonization and expansion of the new nation were accompanied by the displacement or destruction of the indigenous population. Times of war have been plentiful, with the United States imposing its will on peoples in countries as distant as the Philippines and Vietnam, ordering the internment of large numbers of its own citizens, and committing atrocities like any other warfaring nation. Yet despite the abundance of evidence indicating that the United States is just as fallible as any other nation, there has remained throughout American history a strong belief that the United States is an exceptional nation, not only unique but also superior among nations. As Daniel Bell (1989) has argued, in the United States "there has always been a strong belief in American exceptionalism. From the start, Americans have believed that destiny has marked their country as different from others—that the United States is, in Lincoln's marvelous phrase, 'an almost chosen nation.'"

Lepgold and McKeown observe that American leaders make "unusual internal justifications" for their actions abroad, using "idiosyncratic symbols and metaphors . . . based on national self-image and values." It is the belief in American exceptionalism that most commonly provides these symbols and metaphors. Throughout American history, exceptionalist belief has framed the discourse of foreign policymaking by providing the underlying assumptions and terms of reference for foreign policy debate and conduct. Scholars disagree, however, over whether exceptionalism amounts to an ideology as such. Michael Hunt argues that the belief in "national greatness" is a central element of the ideology behind U.S. foreign policy. Alternatively, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy contends that exceptionalism amounts to a "para-ideology" because its influence underwrites much of U.S. foreign policy but it does not have the coherence of a traditional ideology. John Dumbrell argues that American democratic liberalism is the ideology underpinning U.S. foreign policy but a belief in American exceptionalism is a central element of that ideology. It was Richard Hofstadter who observed, "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one." The idea of "America" as a bastion of democracy, liberty, equality, individualism, and constitutionalism has given meaning and identity to millions of Americans throughout U.S. history (see Huntington, chapter 2). American nationalism, according to Hans Kohn, is not built on the usual elements of nationhood such as shared language, culture, common descent, or historical territory, but on "an idea which singled out the new nation among the nations of the earth." This idea was a "universal message" that American values and principles would benefit the whole of humankind. John Fousek agrees that this belief in the exceptionalism of the United States is a "core theme of American nationalism" that has been expressed most commonly in the "long-standing tradition of thought about American chosenness, mission, and destiny." Anders Stephanson has also shown how a "destinarian discourse" accompanied nineteenth-century American expansion and how it continued to shape the way Americans understood their place in the world during the twentieth century. The belief in American exceptionalism has been central to the formation of American national identity, and thus can be seen to have provided a significant part of the cultural and intellectual framework within which foreign policy has been made.

THE BELIEF IN AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Exceptionalism is a fluid and adaptive idea that can be interpreted in different ways. Therefore it is necessary not only to identify its major assumptions but also to consider its two main strands—the exemplary and the missionary—and the outcomes these different views have for foreign policy. Three main elements of exceptionalist belief have remained relatively consistent throughout American history.

First and foremost is the belief that the United States is a special nation with a special role to play in human history. Throughout American history there have been repeated claims that the United States is the promised land and its citizens are the chosen people, divinely ordained to lead the world to betterment. This notion goes back to the very beginnings of colonization. The New World was regarded as a virgin land upon which its new inhabitants could attempt to perfect society through social, political, and religious experiment. Americans have been charged by God with the task of reforming themselves and the world—they are a redeemer nation. The United States is thus guided by the invisible hand of God, and American actions are the result of divine will. At the same time, though, the chosen people are exposed to temptation and corruption, most often

from abroad or from subversives within. Americans are thus being constantly tested and must undergo continual self-inspection. When they do seem to fail or commit wrongdoing, it is because the forces of evil are working against them. But even in such circumstances, Americans maintain their purity because their intentions are good and they will strive on with their national experiment.

The second main element of exceptionalist belief is the New World's separateness and difference from the Old World of Europe. In Europe, Americans believed, self-interested monarchies exploited the majority of their own people, then sought imperial expansion abroad to increase their treasures, boost their reputations, and increase their power relative to other monarchies. The political systems were invariably corrupt, and pandered to the needs and desires of the traditional elites, leaving little or no means for commoners to improve their lot in life. In contrast, the New World was committed to freedom, morality, and the betterment of humankind.

The third main element of exceptionalism is the belief that the United States, unlike other great nations, is not destined to rise and fall. Americans will escape the "laws of history" which eventually cause the decay and downfall of all great nations and empires. Americans believe their nation is the leader of progress in the world. Practically everything that the United States does as a nation is regarded as pushing forward the boundaries of human achievement, be it in politics, industry, technology, sports, the arts, even warfare. Certainly there are some mistakes made, but they are few, they are learned from, and they are improved upon at the next attempt. No matter how many setbacks they may face along the way, Americans will continue forward resolutely, striving for progress toward forming an ever more perfect union. Americans think of themselves as exceptional, then, not necessarily in what they are but in what they could be. For this reason the sense of exceptionalism can never die, no matter how unexceptional the nation may appear in reality. Exceptionalism persists because of what it promises just as much as, if not more than, what it delivers. It is tied to what it means to be an American: to have faith in the values and principles that caused the nation to be founded and to continue to exist.

Advocates of both the exemplary and the missionary strands of exceptionalist belief tend to share each of these assumptions. Where they differ is in how they believe these assumptions should translate into American actions with regard to the rest of the world. All exceptionalists believe very strongly in the basic benevolence of their actions toward other nations. National motives are not perceived as being driven solely by the desire for material gain but also by a dedication to principles of liberty and freedom for all humankind. A corollary of this belief is that it is the duty of the United States to help the rest of the world follow the example of the chosen people.

Followers of the exemplary strand of American exceptionalism have mostly advocated that the United States remain somewhat aloof from the world's troubles and lead by example. Americans should strive to perfect their own society as much as possible without interfering in the affairs of others. To intervene abroad, the exemplarists argue, not only would probably harm the other nation but also most likely would undermine the American experiment at home. Far better, then, that the United States should have peaceful trade relations abroad but concentrate on building a model society for others to copy rather than forcing the benefits of American life on others.

Adherents to the missionary strand of American exceptionalism who advocate U.S. expansion or intervention in the affairs of other nations nevertheless believe that, unlike other nations, the United States is incapable of seeking dominion over other peoples in its self-interest. The American government will project its power abroad not to subjugate other nations but to help them become like the United States, to become free and democratic. These Americans seem to believe that inside every foreigner there is the potential, even the desire, to be an American. To be an American, after all, is not a birthright but the willingness to believe in a certain set of political and social principles and values. The missionary strand of American exceptionalism suggests that all the people of the world want to be like Americans, whether they realize it or not. This assumption has led Americans to find it very difficult to understand that other peoples may place different values on things and have different perceptions from Americans of how the world should be. In fact, both forms of exceptionalism hold, rather paradoxically, that the unique American political values and principles are actually universal in their nature. The United States is regarded as the embodiment of universal values based on the rights of all humankind—freedom, equality, and justice for all. It is the exceptional champion of these rights, but they are shared by all humans, whether they are Americans or not.

Certainly not all Americans believe wholeheartedly in all these aspects of American exceptionalism. Many Americans are all too aware that major problems exist within their society, many of which they may never adequately solve. They accept that in an increasingly interdependent world the United States cannot claim dominion in international affairs and that when they do intervene abroad, Americans very often undermine the very principles they claim to be defending. Scholars also disagree over the importance of the belief in American exceptionalism. The majority of the academic works on the history of U.S. foreign relations neglect or discount the influence of exceptionalist beliefs. Nevertheless, a growing body of scholarship does recognize that the belief in American exceptionalism has been a persistent and major underlying influence on U.S. foreign policy. These works recognize that despite the inherent contradictions and frequent circularity of exceptionalist thought, the "recurring rhetoric" of the belief in American exceptionalism reveals it to be what Michael Kammen has called "a cultural reality and potent force." The belief in American exceptionalism should not be dismissed as "mere rhetoric," but acknowledged as an important and influential idea that contributes to the framework of discourse in which "policymakers deal with specific issues and in which the attentive public understands those issues." This is not to say that the belief in exceptionalism is the root cause of all foreign policy. Although the following analysis reveals the prevalence of the belief in foreign policy discourse, it should be remembered that at every turn policy was shaped and driven by more tangible determinants such as the preservation of national security, the demand for overseas markets, or, indeed, the personal ambitions of policymakers. As Anders Stephanson makes clear in his study of manifest destiny, the destinarian discourse he identifies did not "cause" policy as such. It was, however, "of signal importance in the way the United States came to understand itself in the world and still does." The same is true about the broader idea of American exceptionalism—it is not "a mere rationalization" but often appears "in the guise of common sense."

THE ROOTS OF EXCEPTIONALISM

The idea of America as an exceptional entity dates back to colonial times. Its roots can be found in the thought of Puritan settlers who regarded the North American continent as a promised land where a new Canaan could be built as a model for the rest of the world. The earliest expression of this belief that continues to live on in American public memory comes from John Winthrop, a Puritan leader and first governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony. Winthrop delivered a lay sermon aboard the *Arbella,* during its passage to New England in 1630, in which he declared that his fellow settlers "must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are upon us." Winthrop's words were circulated in manuscript form and have since become one of the main formative texts of American self-identity and meaning. Inherent in this notion of the city on a hill is the belief that the American colonists, and those who have followed them, were uniquely blessed by God to pursue His work on Earth and to establish a society that would provide this beacon for the betterment of all humankind.

American exceptionalism, however, has not only religious but also secular roots. The American Revolution and the formative years of the new Republic reinforced the idea that the United States was a chosen nation which would be an experiment in human society. In his influential revolutionary pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776), Thomas Paine argued that it was America's separateness and difference from the Old World that demanded its independence. Paine saw America as a special land where humankind could "begin the world over again" by establishing a political society built on new, progressive ideas. The framers of the Constitution built on this idea in 1787. Theirs was to be an ambitious political experiment. The United States would be a society based on a republican system of government ensuring the preservation of certain individual rights. Although they were relatively pessimistic about its chances, the framers' greatest hope was that the constitutional framework they had created would allow the United States to develop over time into the most perfect republican society in the world. The geographic isolation of the American continent from Europe seemed to offer hope that the United States could protect itself from falling prey to the degenerative nature of the Old World. As Thomas Jefferson observed in his First Inaugural Address (March 1801), the United States was "kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations of others." Jefferson and others did

not suggest that Americans would be immune from temptation, but they did indicate that, with eternal vigilance, the United States could be prevented from succumbing to the same vices that had destroyed other great nations.

Providential and republican ideology thus combined to firmly entrench the idea of exceptionalism at the center of American national identity. In these early forms it was initially the exemplar strand of exceptionalism that clearly dominated. The United States would provide a model of freedom, liberty, and democracy from which the rest of the world could learn. It would be an example, a beacon of light—a city on a hill. In early U.S. foreign policy, the notion of the United States as a separate, aloof nation was also dominant, but would come to be challenged by a growing missionary spirit as the Republic became stronger and more successful.

THE INFLUENCE OF EXCEPTIONALIST BELIEFS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the earliest years of the Republic, both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson called upon Americans to actively seek to preserve their nation's unique position of aloofness from the world's ills. In his Farewell Address of 1796, Washington warned against "permanent alliances," while Jefferson, in his First Inaugural Address (March 1801), advised that Americans should avoid "entangling alliances." Such pronouncements laid the foundations for a foreign policy characterized by high levels of unilateralism and so-called isolationism. Jefferson nevertheless presided over the first major expansion of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and contributed to the notion that a republic needed to grow in order to remain healthy with his view of the United States as an "empire for liberty."

President James Monroe further emphasized the difference between American and European intentions in foreign affairs on 2 December 1823, in what became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe declared the Western Hemisphere closed to European colonization, warned against European interference in the affairs of the Americas, and signaled the intention of the United States to be the region's dominant power. Although the Monroe Doctrine was based largely on strategic interest, it was couched in terms consistent with the belief in exceptionalism. Monroe stressed that the United States held nothing but goodwill toward the world's nations and emphasized that the U.S. policy of noninterference in European affairs marked it apart from the imperialistic nations of the Old World. As Monroe's Secretary of State John Quincy Adams had stated famously on 4 July 1821, the United States "goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy." Adams was expressing another crucial element of the conviction that the United States would avoid repeating the faults of the Old World. The United States is deemed exceptional because it is believed to be incapable of seeking dominion over others in its own self-interest. It would, then, avoid the temptations that had caused all great nations to seek expansion of their power by conquering and subjugating other peoples. If the United States did intervene abroad, it would be for the good of others, in the name of higher principles. As Adams insisted, America's "glory is not dominion, but liberty."

This belief in the basic benevolence of all U.S. actions abroad was further emphasized by President James K. Polk in his reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine on 2 December 1845. He emphasized that the United States had taken upon itself the responsibility not only for its own freedom and security but also for that of all the nations in the Western Hemisphere. According to Polk, the United States did not pursue wars of conquest, but it would do whatever necessary to defend the independence of the Americas. It would not tolerate the interference of a self-interested imperial power in its region yet, paradoxically, it considered its own interference in a neighbor's affairs as being to the benefit of the neighbor. Such a policy was, of course, the declaration of an ambitious state seeking hemispheric dominance. But subsumed within the doctrine was an assumption that American intervention would not amount to self-interested foreign interference. According to the tradition of exceptionalism, the United States is incapable of doing ill to others, and therefore the nature of its interference in the Americas would be inherently more benign than that of any other foreign power. Polk stretched the credibility of such claims with the war against Mexico in 1846. In his public rhetoric, he justified his ambitions for the acquisition of new land and the provocative nature of his actions toward Mexico by couching the conflict in terms that were consistent with his pronouncements on the exceptional nature of U.S. foreign relations, and cast the United States as the innocent party. Indeed, a new phrase had entered the

American vocabulary that helped explain westward expansion as an integral part of American exceptionalism.

MANIFEST DESTINY

The war with Mexico and the annexations of Mexican territory that followed were believed by most Americans to be the result of their "manifest destiny." The term is generally attributed to John L. O'Sullivan, a Democratic newspaper editor from New York. O'Sullivan's conception of manifest destiny came to national attention through an editorial in the *New York Morning News* on 27 December 1845, which claimed the right of the United States to Oregon territory disputed by the British: "And that claim is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us."

In his classic book *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (1935), Albert K. Weinberg defines manifest destiny as being "in essence the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently, unique rights in the application of moral principles." He relates how the idea soon became "a firmly established article of the national creed." The idea of manifest destiny is one of the clearest expressions of the belief in the exceptional nature of the United States. Territorial expansion was justified by Americans because they believed theirs was a special nation chosen by Providence to spread its virtues far and wide. As Weinberg has shown, nineteenth-century Americans laid claim to new land using a variety of justifications subsumed under the idea of manifest destiny. Americans believed they had a natural right to expand, and that territorial propinquity determined that they must spread across adjacent lands in North America. American expansion was also thought to be divinely blessed because it would cause the extension of democracy and freedom. Americans argued further that they should expand because they would use the land in ways more beneficial to and desirable for the progress of humankind than could its often sparsely distributed existing inhabitants.

The Mexican War saw a further element of manifest destiny emerge that became a central aspect of the belief in the exceptional nature of American interaction with other nations. Most Americans found moral vindication for the war in what Weinberg characterizes as "the conception of a religious duty to regenerate the unfortunate people of the enemy country by bringing them into the life-giving shrine of American democracy." The Mexican War seemed to confirm the belief among Americans that if the United States did involve itself in the affairs of other peoples, it was not in order to subjugate them but to help them realize their right to the same liberties and freedoms for which Americans had fought in the War of Independence. Countless Mexicans and Native Americans may have perceived events rather differently, but that was of little concern to the exceptional vanguards of civilization and progress.

By the mid-nineteenth century, then, with westward expansion justified by manifest destiny, the missionary strand of exceptionalism was becoming the dominant form. At the end of the nineteenth century, with historian Frederick Jackson Turner having declared the frontier closed, Americans undertook an overseas intervention which is generally regarded as the event that signaled the arrival of the United States as a world power. The highly popular Spanish-American War of 1898 was supposedly fought to secure basic rights of freedom for the oppressed peoples in Cuba and other Spanish colonies. Yet the war gave way to a conflict in the Philippines that left blood on American hands and ignited a nationwide debate over whether the United States was living up to its principles as an exceptional nation or whether it would assume an empire in the tradition of the Old World powers.

THE IMPERIALISM DEBATE AND EXCEPTIONALISM

The Spanish-American War was described by Secretary of State John Hay as "a splendid little war; begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that Fortune which loves the brave." When the war began, little thought was given, at least publicly, to the possibility of an American empire. Yet no sooner had American forces begun to win victories over the Spanish than calls for annexations became widespread. The Treaty of Paris, which officially ended the war on 10 December 1898, recognized eventual Cuban independence, but provided for

EXPRESSIONS OF EXCEPTIONALISM

"Wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are upon us."

— John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity" (1630) —

"It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no great distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."

— George Washington, Farewell Address, 17 September 1796 —

"America . . . goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all."

— Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Fourth of July Address, 1821 —

"And that claim [to Oregon] is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us."

— John L. O'Sullivan,
New York Morning News,
27 December 1845 —

"Destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world's leadership."

— Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address, 20 January 1953 —

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty. . . . [T]he energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world."

— John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961 —

"Our [foreign] policy is designed to serve mankind."

— Jimmy Carter, commencement address at University of Notre Dame, 22 May 1977 —

"Americans resort to force only when we must. We have never been aggressors. We have always struggled to defend freedom and democracy. We have no territorial ambitions. We occupy no territories."

— Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, 25 January 1984 —

"The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. America, and only America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear [in the world]."

— Bill Clinton, address at George Washington University, 5 August 1996 —

the cession to the United States of Spain's other colonies in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. What ensued was a protracted and bloody struggle for control of the Philippines that caused many Americans, known as the "anti-imperialists," to openly question the annexation policy.

The great debate over American overseas expansion saw the two main strands of exceptionalist belief come into direct conflict with one another. Americans on both sides of the imperialism debate utilized arguments based on their beliefs about the exceptional nature of the United States. They did so even when they recognized what they regarded as legitimate economic, strategic, political, racial, or constitutional reasons for or against the annexation of overseas territories.

The commercial and strategic advantages of annexation provided the rationale for most

expansionists. Yet many expansionists also expressed their conviction that annexation was a morally acceptable policy because it was the duty of the United States, as God's emissary, to extend freedom and democracy whenever possible. It was their divine destiny that called the Americans to free Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam from the grip of Old World imperialism. They believed it was the special duty of the United States to help those people overcome oppression and guide them toward the light of the principles of liberty and freedom. The expansionists frequently argued that America was not simply imposing its own brand of Old World imperialism. Rather, they argued, it was adopting these childlike nations so they could be nurtured to maturity and statehood. In time, once they were ready, these nations could choose for themselves whether to be independent or join the Union. The imperialists, drawing upon the tradition of manifest destiny, were strong believers in and advocates of the missionary strand of American exceptionalism.

The anti-imperialists, on the other hand, had a different view of the special American role in the world that reflected the exemplar strand of exceptionalism. They were more concerned that, having ousted the Spanish, the United States should leave the liberated states to determine their own destinies, in keeping with the American dedication to the idea that governments derive their power from the consent of the governed. The anti-imperialists emphasized the aspects of exceptionalism that regard the United States as being above the meddling immorality of Old World imperialists. They argued that the United States is special because it does not involve itself in the affairs of others, particularly not a nation on the far side of the Pacific Ocean that could hardly be considered within the U.S. geographic sphere of influence. As Charles Eliot Norton made clear, he and his fellow anti-imperialists believed that the transformation of the United States into an imperial power "sounded the close of the America exceptionally blessed among the nations." The anti-imperialists aimed to preserve the exceptionalist nature of the U.S. by preventing Americans from seeking dominion over other peoples in the way that other world powers did. As well as moral arguments, they also gave political, economic, constitutional, diplomatic, racial, and historical reasons for their opposition to annexations. But although their individual opposition varied, the essence of their protest was that they feared the United States was acting in a manner inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Founders. Thus both imperialists and anti-imperialists believed they were arguing for conduct consistent with the idea that the United States was an exceptional nation with a special role to play in human history. They both agreed that the U.S. was different from—indeed, better than—other nations; where they disagreed was on the precise nature of that exceptionalism.

THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The anti-imperialists failed to raise widespread public opposition to the McKinley administration's annexation policy. They could not convince the American public that the policy was contrary to American principles, and consequently the Philippine insurrection was defeated, and Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines were annexed. Despite their inability to prevent the annexations and the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, the anti-imperialists were a useful check against the annexationist fever and contributed to the return to the more usual American sentiment of anticolonialism. While the anti-imperialist movement quickly faded after the failed presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan in 1900, so did the desire for American imperialism. While European powers were partitioning China, the United States called for an open door trade policy and the protection of China's territorial and political independence.

That the American desire for overseas possessions had subsided appeared to be confirmed on 6 December 1904 by one of expansion's greatest advocates. President Theodore Roosevelt reaffirmed the belief that Americans did not seek imperial dominion over other nations. In a speech adding a further corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, he proclaimed: "It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such that are for their welfare." Roosevelt made clear that he believed the United States had nothing but benign intentions with regard to foreign relations. However, he did stress that the United States felt an obligation to help protect the freedom of peoples in the Americas not only, as Monroe had declared, in the face of foreign aggression but also if their citizens faced internal threats to their freedom.

In his speech, Roosevelt effectively pulled together the two main strands of exceptionalist belief. As a rule, he argued, the United States should stay out of the affairs of other nations and concentrate on forging a more perfect union in the spirit of the Founders, thus providing an ever more appropriate example for the rest of the world to follow. However, when extreme circumstances demanded it, the United States, as the chosen nation, had the "manifest duty" to protect the rights that it promoted if their survival was threatened abroad. Roosevelt's reasoning would help define foreign policy discourse for many years to come, with the tension between these two elements of exceptionalism often at the center of debate.

WOODROW WILSON AND EXCEPTIONALISM

In many ways, Woodrow Wilson personified the belief in American exceptionalism. As Robert E. Osgood argues: "Wilson's national altruism . . . was an integral part of his temperament and his philosophy of life, inseparable from his personality." Wilson's idealism was firmly grounded in the belief that the United States was a nation set apart by its values and principles from the rest of the world. He believed strongly that the "force of America is the force of moral principle" and that the "idea of America is to serve humanity." Long before he became president, Wilson wrote of his conviction that the United States had a "plain destiny [to] serve [rather than] subdue the world." Later, as president, he would contend that this destiny to serve was the only possible motivation for American actions in the world. Wilson held that "morality not expediency" must be the guiding principle of all American policy. He applied this principle to the use of American military force. As Frederick Calhoun argues, Wilson "showed no aversion to fighting if the end justified the means." As Wilson stated, he believed that while other nations used force "for the oppression of mankind and their own aggrandizement," the United States would use force only "for the elevation of the spirit of the human race."

Wilson declared that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." Nevertheless, he frequently used military intervention in efforts to help other peoples become, in his opinion, more democratic and orderly. Wilson sent American troops into Mexico twice, to Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, as well as maintaining the military "protection" of Nicaragua. He also intervened militarily twice in the Russian civil war. Wilson best expressed his attitude toward such interventions in 1914: "They say the Mexicans are not fitted for self-government and to this I reply that, when properly directed, there is no people not fitted for self-government." Wilson was a clear advocate of the missionary strand of American exceptionalism.

When Wilson finally made the decision to enter World War I in April 1917, he justified his action in highly idealistic terms that enabled the American people to come to regard the war as a crusade. Most famously, the determination to "make the world safe for democracy" was proclaimed by President Wilson as he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. The United States, in keeping with its traditions, was joining the hostilities according to Wilson with nothing but the most benign intentions and a sense of a higher purpose. Portraying involvement in the conflict as a just cause in terms consistent with the belief in American exceptionalism was a direct and deliberate appeal to the public and a way to help silence opposition. It was also the only way that Wilson could assuage his own doubts about American involvement in the war. The rhetoric that accompanied intervention made it clear that the United States, in keeping with its strongest principles, was taking a stand against autocratic tyranny, much as it had against the British in the American Revolution and against the Spanish over Cuba. Wilson argued that a peaceful and harmonious postwar international order based on the principle of universal freedom and democracy, as enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, could not be established while autocratic imperialism sought dominance in Europe. Although legitimate political, economic, and strategic justifications for intervention existed, American involvement in World War I was thus justified and conducted in terms consistent with the missionary strand of the belief in American exceptionalism.

ISOLATIONISM AND WORLD WAR II

The tradition of nonentanglement with the affairs of Europe and other countries found a new name in the interwar years: isolationism. The U.S. Senate rejected President Wilson's vision of an international organization, the League of Nations,

committed to maintaining world peace through arbitration of conflict and mutual respect of the independence and territorial integrity of all member states. Isolationists believed the United States should not be under obligation to any other nation. As Jefferson, Washington, and others had observed, the United States was uniquely blessed with geographic isolation from the degeneracy of the Old World. With friendly, unthreatening neighbors at its northern and southern borders and vast oceans to the east and west, the United States had little to fear from foreign attack. Why should it jeopardize this exceptional degree of peace and security by involving itself with the affairs of others? Wilson's successor, President Warren G. Harding, made clear in his Inaugural Address (March 1921) that "Confident of our ability to work out our own destiny, and jealously guarding our right to do so, we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World. We do not mean to be entangled."

Harding and others did not believe that the United States should have no contact whatsoever with the outside world, but that it should remain aloof from the petty squabbles and adversarial alliances common in Europe while maintaining its traditional interests within its own hemisphere. It would seek to return to the role of having nothing but peaceful relations with others and to present an exemplary nation to which the rest of the world could aspire. The isolationists used language and arguments that were consistent with the exemplar strand of the belief in American exceptionalism.

The two strands of exceptionalism, however, again came into conflict during the interwar period. A major public debate took place between the isolationists and the "internationalists" who believed the United States had a duty to intervene in world affairs. When Britain and France declared war on Germany in September 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as expected, declared U.S. neutrality. The isolationist impulse found enough popular approval to cause the Roosevelt administration to seek ways of assisting Britain and France short of intervening directly in the war. But this final popular attachment to isolationism was shattered by the surprise Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other American bases in the Pacific on 7 December 1941. The reality of a devastating military strike on American territory silenced isolationist claims. The threat posed by Germany and Japan was obvious enough to enable the public to base their support for joining the war on political and strategic reasoning, at least after Pearl Harbor. Yet Roosevelt still felt the need to employ exceptionalist rhetoric to justify American intervention. In his fireside chat to the nation following the Japanese attack, he assured the American people that "When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. We Americans are not destroyers—we are builders."

In January 1942, Roosevelt declared that American victory in the war would be a "victory for freedom." He made clear that a central U.S. war objective was to establish and secure "freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear everywhere in the world." The "Four Freedoms" rooted the war effort in one of the central ideas of American political culture. The contrast between freedom and fascism was a central metaphor in American public discourse and official rhetoric throughout the war. Even before the United States entered the war, the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) had indicated that Roosevelt believed the United States must assume global responsibilities after Germany and Japan were defeated. To win the war would not be enough. An allied victory must lead to lasting peace and security in the world based upon universal values and principles traditionally espoused by Americans. To lead such a future was an American responsibility and duty that would not only promote U.S. interests but also those of all humankind. Roosevelt acknowledged that American power in itself brought responsibility, but he also invoked the providential idea that it was God's will. In his final inaugural address (20 January 1945), he claimed that God "has given to our country a faith which has become the hope of all peoples in an anguished world."

No matter how convincing the strategic or other tangible reasons for U.S. intervention in World War II, Roosevelt, like presidents before him, couched his justifications in terms consistent with the belief in the exceptional nature of the United States. That he did so when American security was so clearly threatened is substantial evidence that exceptionalism frames the discourse of U.S. foreign policymaking.

THE LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD

The allied victory in World War II seemed to confirm beyond doubt for Americans that the United

States was an exceptional nation with a special role to play in human history. Even before the United States entered the war, Henry Luce, the influential publisher of *Life* magazine, wrote an essay (17 February 1941) in which he declared that the twentieth century should be considered "the American Century." Luce argued that the United States must "accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence . . . [with] . . . a passionate devotion to great American ideals." By 1945, Luce's vision seemed correct. The United States not only stood victorious but also was the strongest nation in the world militarily and economically. But rather than retreat to the role of exemplar, it remained engaged in world affairs in the postwar years to a greater extent than ever before.

The United States pursued a foreign policy of activist internationalism after World War II as it replaced one global enemy with another. Soviet communism and its containment soon became the focus of U.S. foreign policy as more than forty years of Cold War began. Although strategic, economic and political interests were its central determinants, U.S. Cold War foreign policy and the broad public consensus that supported it were underpinned by an ideology of what John Fousek identifies as "American nationalist globalism" that was rooted in the missionary strand of the belief in American exceptionalism. Anders Stephanson agrees that the "operative framework" of Cold War policy was "the story of American exceptionalism, with its missionary implications."

President Harry S. Truman has been described as "a staunch exponent of American exceptionalism" who frequently referred to the United States as "the greatest nation that the sun ever shone upon." For Truman, the victory in World War II demonstrated American greatness, but it also placed on the United States the responsibility of ensuring peace and freedom in the postwar world. Successive presidents and other public officials and opinion leaders persistently portrayed the Cold War in stark, Manichean terms as a battle between good and evil. The United States was "the leader of the free world" that must prevail and save humanity from the "evils" of communism. Truman provided the guiding principles for American Cold War policy during an address to a joint session of the Congress on 12 March 1947 which became famous for containing the so-called Truman Doctrine. It was the duty of the United States, he contended, to do whatever was necessary to protect the rights of free, democratic nations around the world. In keeping with its traditions, the president claimed, America did not seek dominion over those nations in exchange for their freedom. Truman assured the Congress that "I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." The task facing the United States was a critical one, he declared, if the values and principles that it held so dear were to survive the challenge of communism and truly enable the world to be led out of darkness: "The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation."

Following World War II, President Truman believed that merely to provide an example for the rest of the world to follow would no longer be enough. He was arguing that the United States, as the chosen nation, must take up the gauntlet and defend the rights of free peoples everywhere against what Americans regarded as totalitarian aggression and subversion. The Cold War ethos was, then, firmly grounded in the missionary strand of American exceptionalism. The Truman Doctrine helped define the policy of containment toward the Soviet Union and its allies that was employed by successive U.S. administrations during the cold war. Each of Truman's successors also utilized the language and ideas of American exceptionalism to reinforce the nature of the battle with communism.

Yet it was not only in presidential public rhetoric that the Cold War was defined and discussed in terms of ideas about American destiny, duty and exceptionalism. For example, George Kennan, the original architect of the containment policy, ended his influential article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in the journal *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947) by arguing: "The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation." He claimed that the "thoughtful observer" would not object to the Cold War but would "rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on

their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear." Kennan, who was often critical of moralism in foreign policy, had nonetheless used the traditional language of exceptionalism to advocate his strategy for containing Soviet communism.

During the Cold War, as Michael Hunt has observed, the private communications of policymakers and even secret national security documents were frequently "couched in the stark and sweeping terms usually reserved for crusades." For example, the authors of the secret National Security Council Paper Number 68 (NSC 68), the document that defined the course of U.S. Cold War policy in 1950, made clear that "Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership." They described the Cold War as "a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin." It was "imperative" that the forces of "freedom" prevail, so the United States must, therefore, build up its political, economic, and military strength. This document was designed only for the eyes of other policymakers yet it was built around the idea of free world leadership that, as Fousek argues, "became the controlling metaphor in U.S. foreign policy discourse throughout the postwar period."

Many Cold War policies reflected exceptionalist assumptions about the American role in the world. The Marshall Plan (1947) for the economic reconstruction of postwar Western Europe was designed to revive European economies using not only American money but also practices and principles. The United States, in the tradition of the redeemer nation, was fulfilling its responsibility of leadership through a program that not only provided benefits for itself but also for the peoples of war-torn Europe. Similarly, modernization theory provided the rationale for much U.S. Cold War policy toward the developing world, particularly during the Kennedy administration. Modernization theorists believed that all societies pass through sequential stages of progress from "traditional" to "modern" and that the West, and in particular the United States, was the "common endpoint" to which all peoples must irresistibly move. Significantly, these influential social scientists also argued that the United States could help underdeveloped countries along the way from being stagnant, traditional societies to active, modern ones—a transition which would not only bring advantages to the peoples of those societies but also to the United States. What made this theory so appealing, according to Michael Latham, was that it gave an "objective" justification for U.S. intervention in other nation's affairs; it provided a useful weapon in the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union; and it also fit with American values and traditions, in particular the notion that the United States is an exceptional nation with a mission and duty to be the engine of human progress. As Latham observes "modernization reinforced the connections between strategic concerns and assumptions about America's role as a moral, benevolent world leader." Modernization theory shaped the formation, influenced the major practices, and informed the public presentations of so-called "nation building" programs such as the Alliance for Progress with Latin America, the Peace Corps, and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. Each program was designed to exemplify the altruistic, benevolent impulses of the United States while also being advocated as an objective, scientifically proven method for aiding developing nations. In the early 1960s, Latham contends, the strength and influence of modernization as an ideology ensured the "continuing power of the widespread belief that America was both called to and capable of remaking the rest of the world."

Not all Americans, however, accepted uncritically the tenets of the Cold War consensus. African Americans in particular focused on the apparent contradiction of the U.S. demanding freedom and democracy throughout the world when such rights were still widely denied to large numbers of its own citizens at home. The civil rights movement used claims of America's leadership of the free world to argue that racial equality must also be achieved in the United States. Such demands contributed to the many advancements made in race relations during the 1950s and 1960s. On the whole, though, raising objections to the Cold War consensus was difficult, even dangerous, particularly during the earlier years of the Cold War, not least because foreign policy dissent was frequently equated with "fundamental disloyalty to the nation and its values."

By the late 1960s, however, much of the Cold War consensus had begun to break down and large numbers of Americans were questioning the direction of U.S. foreign policy, particularly toward Vietnam. The intervention in Vietnam had been conceived in terms consistent with the belief that the United States was the leader of the free

world with a duty to contain communism and protect "free peoples" from aggression. But the war's conduct and the resultant defeat of American objectives would raise serious doubts about both the Cold War consensus and the exceptional nature of the United States.

VIETNAM AND THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM?

In 1975, following the fall of Saigon, the sociologist Daniel Bell declared "The End of American Exceptionalism." He argued that the "American Century . . . foundered on the shoals of Vietnam." Bell concluded: "Today, the belief in American exceptionalism has vanished with the end of empire, the weakening of power, the loss of faith in the nation's future." The chastening experience of Vietnam had made Americans realize that "We are a nation like all other nations."

Americans invariably refer to the Vietnam War as a tragedy or a national trauma. Vietnam divided opinion in the country as no other event had since the Civil War. It contributed to the breakdown in the Cold War foreign policy consensus. It diverted resources from domestic reform programs and caused high levels of inflation and national debt. It created an atmosphere of distrust and even hostility between the public and the government. The United States had failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam. For the first time in the nation's history, the United States had lost a war. Americans could not help but feel that all the lives and resources expended in Vietnam had been wasted. The United States was supposed to be an exceptional nation, above the corrupt immorality of the rest of the world. Yet in Vietnam its leaders had conducted a war whose legitimacy was questionable and whose objectives were often unclear and increasingly unattainable. The nation's leaders were accused of employing inhumane forms of warfare and of persistently lying to the American people about how the war was progressing and what was being done to bring about a victory. This sense that the American people could no longer trust their leaders was further compounded by the events and revelations surrounding the Watergate affair. The United States seemed to have shown itself to be just as fallible and unexceptional as any other nation in history. The experience of Vietnam raised serious doubts among Americans about the traditional belief that the United States is an exceptional nation.

Yet there was evidence to suggest that the idea of the United States as an exceptional nation would survive the defeat in Vietnam. As in previous times of domestic disagreement over foreign policy content and direction, advocates on both sides of the Vietnam issue utilized the rhetoric of exceptionalism in their arguments. President Johnson and others used the language of exceptionalism to justify American intervention. Meanwhile, the opposition of many of the war's protesters stemmed from a belief that the United States was conducting itself in ways that were inconsistent with the values and principles upon which the nation was founded. That did not necessarily mean that those opponents rejected such values. On the contrary, many believed they must oppose the war in order for those values to be reaffirmed. Like the anti-imperialists of 1898, those who opposed the Vietnam War often did so in terms that were consistent with the belief in American exceptionalism. Although the belief in exceptionalism was certainly shaken by the events surrounding Vietnam, the continued use of its rhetoric during the war indicated that the belief would survive this latest "trauma" or "time of trial" in American history.

EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM

The experience of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the other "traumas" of the 1960s and early 1970s caused many Americans to doubt or even cease to believe that their nation's actions were consistent with the values and principles upon which their society was supposed to function. Following Vietnam, Americans suffered what was labeled a "crisis of confidence" concerning the future of their nation and its purpose in the world. But the belief in American exceptionalism was not destroyed by the experiences of Vietnam and Watergate. Indeed, each post-Vietnam president consistently attempted to bolster American self-confidence and revive the perceived moral legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy, usually by rhetorically justifying actions in terms consistent with the belief in American exceptionalism.

Jimmy Carter's self-proclaimed objective was to restore the "moral compass" to the making of U.S. foreign policy. He attempted to follow a foreign policy rooted in what he perceived as the values and principles upon which the United States was founded. Carter attempted to conduct

a foreign policy consistent with the belief in American exceptionalism, particularly through his human rights policy. But the record of Carter's administration shows that moral principles, even in the application of the human rights policy, were usually superseded by strategic, economic, and political interests. Despite repeated appeals to exceptionalist rhetoric, Carter failed to revive American self-confidence and, particularly during his last year in office, following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizing of American hostages in Iran, he was widely criticized for contributing to the sense that the United States was in decline.

Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, was the greatest advocate of the belief in American exceptionalism during the post-Vietnam era. Reagan imbued his public pronouncements with exceptionalist symbolism and imagery, describing the United States as "a land of hope, a light unto nations, a shining city on a hill." He was a true believer in the exceptional nature of his country. He sought to overcome the crisis of confidence in the United States by largely denying that any problems existed. Reagan insisted that the United States was the greatest nation on earth and that so long as Americans maintained that belief, they would be able to overcome any crises they faced. In foreign policy, he took a tough rhetorical stance against the Soviet Union, which in stark exceptionalist terms he condemned as the "evil empire." He also conducted a massive arms buildup, and demonstrated a willingness to employ force, all in an attempt to overcome the perception of weakness that had characterized Carter's presidency.

Reagan succeeded in bolstering American self-confidence, but his claims that the United States had renewed its strength and overcome the limits imposed by Vietnam were largely illusory. Despite standing tall rhetorically, the president was still reluctant to employ the full power of the United States to back up his strong words. For all the posturing of his foreign policy rhetoric, the Reagan administration employed U.S. military force only twice, and then in extremely low-risk, limited operations against Grenada (1983) and Libya (1986). The only other major deployment of armed forces was as part of the ill-fated peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (1982–1984). Otherwise the administration was prepared to use force only by proxy in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. Ronald Reagan was far from the overtly activist foreign policy president that his image would suggest. He did couch all his foreign policy in terms of the missionary strand of American exceptionalism but, despite his insistence that all his actions were taken in keeping with the values and principles on which the United States was founded, policies such as the covert war in Nicaragua and his exchange of arms for hostages with Iran indicated that the reality of Reagan's foreign policy did not live up to the claims of his exceptionalist rhetoric.

George H. W. Bush admitted to having a problem with what he called the "vision thing," but, like his predecessors, utilized the language of American exceptionalism in his foreign policy. Following the end of the Cold War (1989–1990), Bush advocated a "new world order" based on global cooperation and the rule of law rather than force. The new world order was Bush's answer to the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world. It was a vision of how the world's nations could strive collectively to achieve, and then maintain, international stability. Significantly, though, Bush maintained that world order was possible only with the leadership, guidance, and protection of the United States—it would continue its tradition as a redeemer nation. For all his talk of universalism, Bush's new world order was distinctly an American idea which assumed that traditional American values and principles had universal applicability. Bush's vision also ensured freedom of action for the United States. The United States would not be subservient to the collective will of the United Nations, but would define and follow its own priorities, preferably with—but if necessary, without—the support of the international community. The new world order was in fact a clear expression of exceptionalist thinking.

Bill Clinton, too, couched his foreign policy in terms of American exceptionalism. He repeatedly identified the United States as "the world's only indispensable nation." Clinton made "democratic enlargement" one of the cornerstones of his foreign policy. The United States would actively support and promote the spread of democracy and free market economies throughout the world. This policy, like so many before it, was underpinned by the idea that unique American values, principles and practices had universal applications.

THE VIETNAM SYNDROME AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Throughout the post-Vietnam era, both the main strands of exceptionalist belief have been influen-

tial on the discourse and content of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the tension between these two strands has defined many of the debates over the post-Vietnam direction of foreign affairs, particularly with regard to foreign interventions and the use of force. The United States has remained highly engaged in international affairs, but with added pressure that its conduct be exemplary and consistent with its traditional values and principles. Policymakers and public alike have sought to avoid "another Vietnam" by ensuring that foreign policy actions are conducted in keeping with the perceived lessons of that conflict. The defeat of U.S. objectives by a technologically inferior enemy in Vietnam indicated that there were limits to American power. The nature and extent of these limits, however, continues to be a major source of debate, and has come to dominate discussions over foreign policy in each post-Vietnam administration. The term "Vietnam syndrome" became widely used to describe the collective lessons and legacies of the war, particularly in the political-military realm. Although there is no nationwide consensus on the lessons of the Vietnam War, a pattern has developed in policymaking that has remained relatively consistent across post-Vietnam administrations, especially in the threat and use of force. The Vietnam syndrome, in its political-military sense, amounts to a set of criteria that should be met if the United States is to commit troops to combat. These criteria must be satisfied if public support for military intervention is to be sustained. Presidents feel the need to maintain public support for their foreign policy largely because this grants it the moral legitimacy that became so lacking in Vietnam. To avoid another Vietnam, policymakers have therefore followed the central criteria of the Vietnam syndrome: that the United States should not employ force in an international conflict unless just cause can be demonstrated, the objectives are compelling and attainable, and sufficient force is employed to assure a swift victory with a minimum of casualties.

These conditions for the use of force form the content of the Vietnam syndrome and have become increasingly institutionalized with each successive administration. They have been codified in the Weinberger Doctrine, proposed by Reagan's Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in November 1984, and the Powell Doctrine espoused by Colin Powell, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the administration of George H. W. Bush and secretary of state under George W. Bush. Even though, as Powell himself has argued, administration officials do not formally go down a list checking off the specific conditions of the Vietnam syndrome, it is clear from public and archival accounts of the decision-making process that deliberate steps are taken to ensure these conditions are met before use of force is authorized. The planning and conduct of all major uses of force since the Vietnam War have been influenced directly by the Vietnam syndrome. Even the Gulf War, which George H. W. Bush claimed "kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all," demonstrates how strongly the syndrome's influence persists. The planning and conduct of the Gulf War, with its emphasis on an air war and in particular the decision not to pursue the war to Baghdad once the objective of liberating Kuwait had been achieved, was carefully designed to comply with all of the Vietnam syndrome's central tenets: use force only as a last resort in the pursuit of what can be demonstrated as a just cause with compelling objectives that can be achieved swiftly using maximum force with minimal casualties. Far from "kicking the Vietnam syndrome," the Gulf War helped to institutionalize it.

The Vietnam syndrome actually has the effect of reinforcing and perpetuating crucial elements of the belief in American exceptionalism. It is designed specifically to ensure that the United States does not commit itself to another conflict like the Vietnam War. A central purpose of the syndrome is to avoid situations in which the United States could suffer another military defeat. By following policy based on the Vietnam syndrome, U.S. policymakers can be reasonably assured of achieving victory, and thus reinforcing the exceptionalist belief that the United States is a superior nation which always succeeds in its objectives. The Vietnam syndrome also prevents the United States from undertaking military commitments involving long-term occupations of hostile foreign territory. This requirement perpetuates the exceptionalist notion that the United States does not seek the conquest and subjugation of foreign nations. Finally, and most significantly, if it follows the Vietnam syndrome, the United States will use force only in situations where Americans can perceive a just cause. Whenever a just cause is conceived by American policymakers, no matter whether its roots are economic, strategic, political, or otherwise, it will be couched in terms of American exceptionalism. By following what is perceived as a just cause, any administration will perpetuate the belief that the United States pur-

sues only policy that is consistent with its exceptional values and principles. In this sense, the belief in exceptionalism is self-perpetuating and the Vietnam syndrome does nothing to change that situation; in fact, it reinforces it.

The Vietnam syndrome acts as a constraint on American action in world affairs. It places limits on the strength, resolve, and capabilities of a nation which Americans regard as all-powerful and superior to other nations. In this sense the power of the Vietnam syndrome in the making of American foreign policy suggests that the United States is no longer an exceptional nation but is just as limited in its actions as any other country. Yet, paradoxically, the Vietnam syndrome actually acts as a guarantor of the continued acceptance of the belief in American exceptionalism. If the Vietnam syndrome is followed, then the United States can continue to be at least perceived as an exceptional nation because it will always win its wars, it will remain committed to its tradition of not conquering foreign land for territorial expansion, and it will resort to force only in the pursuit of just causes. The nature of the Vietnam syndrome is a clear example, then, of how the belief in American exceptionalism continues to frame the discourse of U.S. foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Americans are not unique in their belief that theirs is an exceptional nation. Many, if not all, countries have shared such national vanity at some time or another in their histories. The French *mission civilisatrice*, the British Empire, and the Third Reich, for example, were all accompanied by their own versions of exceptionalism. Americans are clearly not alone in holding exceptionalist beliefs. Neither are they unique in pursuing foreign policies that are informed by those cultural beliefs. In all countries policymaking is based to a certain extent on assumptions formed from unique elements of national culture.

The fact that other nations have their own forms of exceptionalism, however, does not diminish the effects that the belief in American exceptionalism has on the making of U.S. policy. As the United States remains arguably the most powerful nation in the world, it is important to recognize the consequences that the belief in American exceptionalism has on U.S. foreign policy. Political, economic, and strategic interests are the major determinants of U.S. foreign policy. But no matter what the root reasons for a foreign policy decision are, that policy is usually couched in terms consistent with American exceptionalism. Use of this rhetoric assures substantial public support for policy and has proved very effective throughout U.S. history.

This fact begs the question of whether the use of exceptionalist rhetoric is simply a manipulative tool designed to win public approval for policy. Do American policymakers formulate their desired policy, then cloak it in terms they believe will assure the greatest possible public and congressional support? Certainly officials within most U.S. administrations have acknowledged that couching policy in terms of exceptionalism would have positive effects on public opinion, but to suggest this is the only reason for such language being employed would be to ignore other evidence. Nowhere in the public or archive record, including declassified accounts of National Security Council meetings, is it even implied that once a particular course has been chosen, it will then be packaged in exceptionalist terms. In fact, exceptionalist language is not used only in public explanations of policy; it is also used by policymakers themselves in policymaking sessions behind closed doors. Presidents and their foreign policy advisers frequently use arguments couched in exceptionalist language during private meetings and in personal memoranda. They do so even when perfectly good practical arguments for policy options exist, and they often couch even strategic, economic, or political justifications in exceptionalist terms. It appears to be automatic for American public officials to conceive their policies in terms that represent some notion of the exceptional nature of the United States. They do so not simply because it will be politically advantageous but also because those terms form a natural part of the language they use to understand the world around them. American exceptionalism exists deep within the American belief system, and many of its assumptions are shared by the public and officials alike. It therefore provides the framework for much of the discussion of foreign policy, its presentation by officials, and its realization.

Throughout U.S. history the tension between the exemplary and missionary strands of American exceptionalism have been among the defining characteristics of foreign policy. They have survived challenges to their continued acceptance, such as the imperialist debate of the 1890s and the defeat in Vietnam. They form a core element of American national identity, and

will continue to provide the cultural and intellectual framework for the making of U.S. foreign policy. Foreign observers in particular often regard with contempt or confusion the use of exceptionalist rhetoric by U.S. policymakers. But if we are to truly understand the ways in which U.S. foreign policy is conducted, it is essential that we take seriously the intellectual and cultural framework in which it is made.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* Rev. ed. London, 1991.

Baritz, Loren. *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did.* New York, 1985.

Bell, Daniel. "The End of American Exceptionalism." *The Public Interest* (fall 1975). Reprinted in his *The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys 1960–1980.* Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

———. "'American Exceptionalism' Revisited: The Role of Civil Society." *The Public Interest* (spring 1989): 38–56.

Brands, H. W. *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, 1998.

Calhoun, Frederick S. *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy.* Kent, Ohio, 1986.

Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs.* New York, 1983.

Dumbrell, John. *The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy.* Manchester, U.K., and New York, 1990.

Fousek, John. *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000.

Greene, Jack P. *The Intellectual Construction of America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993.

Hofstadter, Richard "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines." In Daniel Aaron, ed. *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History.* New York, 1952.

Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987.

Huntington, Samuel P. *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony.* Cambridge, Mass., 1981.

Kammen, Michael. "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration." *American Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (March 1993): 1–43.

Kohn, Hans. *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay.* New York, 1957.

Latham, Michael E. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000.

Lepgold, Joseph, and Timothy McKeown. "Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional?: An Empirical Analysis." *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 3 (fall 1995): 369–384.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword.* New York, 1996.

Luce, Henry. "The American Century." *Life* (17 February 1941).

McCrisken, Trevor B. *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1974.* Basingstoke, U.K., and New York, 2002.

McEvoy-Levy, Siobhán. *American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War.* Basingstoke, U.K., and New York, 2001.

Madsen, Deborah L. *American Exceptionalism.* Edinburgh, 1998.

Merk, Frederick. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation.* Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1953.

Ryan, David. *U.S. Foreign Policy in World History.* London and New York, 2000.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Cycles of American History.* Boston, 1986.

Shafer, Byron E., ed. *Is America Different?: A New Look at American Exceptionalism.* Oxford, 1991.

Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford, 1999.

Stephanson, Anders. *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right.* New York, 1995.

Tuveson, Ernest Lee. *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role.* Chicago, 1968.

Tyrrell, Ian. "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History." *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1031–1055; Michael McGerr, "The Price of the 'New Transnational History,'" pp. 1056–1067; and a response from Tyrrell, pp. 1068–1072.

Weinberg, Albert K. *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History.* Baltimore, 1935, and Chicago, 1963.

Whitcomb, Roger S. *The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition.* Westport, Conn., 1998.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY; IDEOLOGY; IMPERIALISM; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; NATIONALISM; PUBLIC OPINION; REALISM AND IDEALISM; THE VIETNAM WAR.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Jules Davids and Jonathan M. Nielson

A vital function of American diplomacy is the protection of persons, property, and trade interests of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized, in foreign countries. Such protection is commonly referred to as "extraterritoriality." However, extraterritoriality was also applied within the United States in regions claimed by or ceded to sovereign Indian nations. For example, beginning in the 1830s in Indian Territory (Oklahoma), Indians charged with offenses on white land and whites charged with offenses on Indian land within the territory were compelled to stand trial in white courts in Missouri. Extraterritoriality embodies a regime of protections, immunities, and exemptions, claimed on behalf of citizens of one nation living abroad, from the legal system and territorial jurisdiction of the state in which they are resident. Such immunities may be limited, that is, they are restricted to a specific territory or region. Or they may be unlimited or nonspecific, that is, global in their application. Guaranteeing such protection, especially in Islamic and Asian countries, resulted in the eventual development of a system of extraterritoriality which the United States established through negotiation or unilateral imposition in fifteen nations: Algeria (Algiers), Borneo, China, Egypt, Iran (Persia), Japan, Korea, Libya (Tripoli), Madagascar, Morocco, Samoa, Tanzania (Zanzibar/Muscat), Thailand (Siam), Tunisia (Tunis), and Turkey (Ottoman Porte).

In establishing such a regime of diplomatic relationships, the United States drew upon established theoretical principles and historical antecedents. The principle and practice of extraterritoriality is fundamentally a state's de jure claim of sovereignty and a de facto expression of its diplomacy and foreign policy. Most authorities would accept the broad view that sovereignty is a system of order and relationships among states that is based on a "mutual recognition of one another's right to exercise exclusive political authority within its territorial limits." Whereas sovereignty involves a state's claim of jurisdiction over citizens within its borders, extraterritoriality extends those claims beyond them.

ORIGINS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

While the practice and claims of extraterritoriality originated in antiquity, most notably in Egypt, Greece, and Rome, it was during the Middle Ages that its modern principles were established. As early as the twelfth century, Italian cities such as Genoa, Venice, and Pisa secured protection for their merchants in Egypt, Constantinople, and the Barbary States of North Africa. In northern Europe, the Hanseatic League obtained jurisdictional rights for its merchants within its trading region. During the next three centuries, Turkey granted so-called capitulary rights to Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Germany, Russia, Spain, Portugal, and the United States.

The problem of guaranteeing such protection, especially in the Islamic and Asian countries, was responsible for the eventual development of a system of extraterritoriality. Although differences in cultures, religions, and legal systems between Western Christian countries and those of Africa, the Near East, and Asia motivated Western countries to secure legal and economic exemptions for their nationals, the roots of extraterritoriality can be traced to ancient times. During antiquity, legal rights and obligations in Egypt, Greece, and Rome were deemed an integral part of membership in the community and could never be extended to aliens—the "strangers within the gates." However, merchants and traders traveling to distant lands were often permitted to reside and to establish trade factories, to manage their own affairs, to build temples, and to live according to their own customs, ceremonies, and rites.

By the end of the eighteenth century, a significant change had occurred in the concept of extraterritoriality. Before the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War and established the basis for the modern European system of nation-states, the notion of territorial sovereignty had not taken definite and concrete form. Sovereignty was generally viewed as personal rather than territorial, and it was related to the theory of the personalization of laws: that a foreigner carried his own law wherever he went. It was the ruler's duty to protect those who swore personal allegiance to him. Such allegiance was usually rendered by military service, and, in the case of Asian nations, by the payment of tribute as well. Following the Treaties of Westphalia, however, the concept of territorial sovereignty collided with the notions of personal sovereignty and the personality of laws, especially when the national right of territorial jurisdiction became a basic tenet of Western international law.

The recognition of territorial sovereignty in the West had a profound impact on the Ottoman Empire and in the Orient, where the principle that law was personal rather than territorial persisted for a long period of time. It affected, in particular, the relationships between Christian Europe and the Islamic and Asian countries, which were viewed as outside the pale of "civilization." Since these states were considered beyond the sphere of international law, it was held that European subjects and citizens had to be protected from the barbarities of "uncivilized" peoples, at least until the latter conformed to the standards of law and justice that Europeans considered just and equitable. Europeans chafed at the idea of being subservient to the laws of "inferior" civilizations. Such subservience, they felt, did violence to their dignity, pride, and concepts of justice. On their part, Muslims and Chinese held foreigners in disdain because they believed in the superiority of their own virtues and civilization.

From the earliest times, foreign ambassadors, government officials, and diplomatic representatives were granted a special status and exemption from local jurisdiction. This privilege later became known as the right of "exterritoriality." Diplomatic immunities were acknowledged in Western countries and in most non-Western states as well. Extraterritoriality was distinguished from exterritoriality in that it applied not simply to foreign diplomats and government officials, but to foreign nationals residing abroad. The special rights and immunities involved were specifically defined in treaties, and were not reciprocal. Although initially the bestowal of extraterritorial rights did not connote any loss of territorial sovereignty, but instead symbolized the beneficence of the grantor state, such was not the case following the Treaties of Westphalia. The imposition of extraterritoriality clearly came to represent the superiority of Western Christian countries over inferior, backward, and "uncivilized" peoples. In this sense, modern extraterritoriality served not only as a protective shield but also as an instrument to further penetration and imperialistic expansion.

MOROCCO

Before the Declaration of Independence, colonial Americans who engaged in trade in the Mediterranean and with the Barbary States were dependent upon the British for protection from Barbary piracy. France had led the way in securing definite rights or protection not only for foreigners but also for natives in the employ of foreigners. The first treaty granting these privileges was concluded between Morocco and France in May 1767; other nations soon gained similar rights through a most-favored-nation clause. When the United States declared its independence in 1776, England withdrew its admiralty passes. To prevent the plundering of American ships, a committee of the Continental Congress immediately urged the negotiation of a treaty with France to obtain a royal pledge to protect and defend American vessels as effectively as England had previously done. Although Louis XVI promised in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and France, signed on 6 February 1778, to interpose with the Barbary States "for the benefit, convenience, and safety" of his American ally, this agreement proved to be of little value.

After the American Revolution, the U.S. Congress took the initiative to establish direct contacts to secure the protection of American ships and seamen in the Mediterranean area. In May 1784, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin were commissioned to negotiate treaties with the Barbary States. When an American ship, the *Betsey,* was seized by Moroccan pirates and taken to the port of Tangier, the commissioners authorized Thomas Barclay, the U.S. consul general at Paris, to go to Morocco and act as their agent to conclude a treaty with Morocco. Barclay's mission was successful. In

1786 he signed an agreement with Sultan Sidi Mohammed, which was ratified by Congress on 18 July 1787. This treaty, which established the basis for American extraterritorial rights in Morocco, was modified and renewed in 1836 and again in 1886, and remained in effect until 1956. The United States soon negotiated treaties with the dey of Algiers in 1795, with the sultan of Tripoli in 1796, and with the dey of Tunis in 1797; it did not relinquish these treaty rights until 1912, when Libya became a colony of Italy. But neither the treaty with Morocco nor those concluded with the Barbary States provided protection to American commerce. Tripoli declared war on the United States in 1801, and hostilities ensued with the Barbary pirates until 1816, when new treaties were imposed upon Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunisia. Following the War of 1812, the United States was no longer harassed by piracy in the Mediterranean.

In the Islamic countries, the protectorate system created serious difficulty. Under bilateral treaties, European consuls obtained both almost complete jurisdiction over the persons and properties of their own nationals, and the right to offer this protection to anyone they employed. These persons were not subject to local law and were exempt from all personal or direct taxation or forced levies. The system lent itself to abuses, since many local citizens gladly paid large sums of money to secure these exemptions.

Foreign consuls found the selling of protection an excellent way to augment their incomes. As early as 1859, the Moroccan government demanded more careful regulation of the protectorate system. Complaints were also voiced against the unwarranted interference by consuls in the local courts. Efforts to remedy the situation were made in 1877, when the sultan sought to limit and control the extent of foreign protectorate claims, and to obtain the return to Moroccan jurisdiction of Moroccan subjects who, after naturalization in a foreign country, had returned to live in Morocco. But the discussions with the diplomatic corps brought no agreement, and the United States, while expressing its willingness to remedy the abuses, insisted that naturalized citizens were equal to native-born citizens, and therefore not subject to Moroccan jurisdiction if they returned to that country.

At the Conference of Madrid in 1880, protectorates were the main item on the agenda. Britain favored conceding to Moroccan demands, whereas France urged that no abridgment be made on the right of protection. The conference adopted the French point of view, and the Convention of Madrid not only validated the protectorate system but also, by clarifying, defining, and legalizing the situation, strengthened it by converting the former bilateral treaties and simple consular agreements into an international convention. After the Madrid Convention an orgy of protection selling began, and the protection problem became linked to political penetration.

During the latter decades of the nineteenth century, imperial rivalries steadily exerted a profound impact on extraterritoriality. As European powers pressed to partition Africa and carve out their colonial empires, the danger of the dismemberment of Morocco became increasingly ominous. In 1871 the sultan of Morocco, fearful that his country might be partitioned by European countries, offered to place his entire nation under an American protectorate. Although refusing to accept the offer, the State Department proffered its friendly offices to prevent such an act. To forestall dismemberment or the establishment of hegemony in a region by any one power, and at the same time ensure the maintenance of treaty rights and extraterritoriality, the United States espoused the creation of international settlements, such as that in Shanghai, which had been set up in the 1850s, and the Open Door policy.

Political and economic competition among the European powers intensified efforts to maintain and broaden extraterritorial rights. In Morocco particularly, a decisive shift occurred from concern with persons and property to an interest in economic exploitation and trade. The Moroccan crisis that almost triggered conflict between France and Germany, and was a prelude to World War I, was occasioned by Germany's desire to prevent French economic control of that country. The intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt in this dispute led to the Algeciras Conference in 1906. While the Act of Algeciras effected a compromise that guaranteed equality of economic opportunity and the Open Door, France and Spain secured privileged positions with the Moroccan police force.

The interests of France, Spain, and Britain converged on Tangier, which overlooks the Strait of Gibraltar. England and Germany strongly favored internationalization of Tangier, but France resisted this proposal, insisting on French and Spanish preponderance. Following the Act of Algeciras, France swiftly took steps to establish a protectorate over Morocco. Germany attempted

to counter this move by dispatching a gunboat, the *Panther,* to Agadir to "protect German interests." This action, in 1911, precipitated a second Moroccan crisis. But again a compromise was reached. In a Franco-German accord, concluded in November 1911, Germany conceded France a free hand in Morocco in exchange for a sizable slice of the French Congo. After firmly establishing its position in Morocco, and working out arrangements with Germany and Spain, France agreed to cooperate in the creation of an international regime for Tangier, modeled on the International Settlement of Shanghai. A statute was finally approved by most of the Algeciras powers by November 1914.

The American extraterritorial treaties with Morocco were very similar to those with other Islamic states. However, abrogation of American extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco was a complicated matter. France established a protectorate in Morocco in 1912, designating special zones for Spain and an "international zone" in Tangier. After the protectorate was established, France began pressing the United States to renounce its extraterritorial rights.

Following the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco, many countries surrendered their capitulatory rights. With the signing of the Tangier Statute in 1923, the protectorate system was eliminated. England was the last of the signatory powers to formally renounce its right of protection and all capitulatory rights, in a 1937 accord with France. But the United States refused to accept the Tangier Statute or the modification in 1928 that officially established the basis for the internationalization of the city. Since Americans had few political or economic interests in Tangier, Washington decided it would be more advantageous to remain outside the international settlement, thus retaining both its diplomatic status and its extraterritorial rights.

Some vestiges of extraterritoriality persisted after World War II. For example, American extraterritorial rights were not ended in Morocco until 1956, when Moroccan independence was attained; the final economic integration of Tangier was secured only in October 1960. When the United States finally gave up its extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco, one issue was its desire to support Arab nationalism without antagonizing France. Moreover, it was sensitive to the danger that the Soviet Union could exploit Moroccan irritation with American extraterritorial claims. Finally, the United States wanted to preserve its military bases in the region and increase the number of American troops.

TURKEY

Meanwhile, prompted by developing interests and problems of missionaries and trade in the Ottoman Empire, the U.S. government initiated direct contacts with Turkey. Efforts to arrange a treaty of amity and commerce were initiated in 1799, but a Turkish-American agreement that extended capitulation privileges to the United States was not concluded until 1830. Article IV of that treaty stipulated that "citizens of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and not being charged or convicted of any crime or offense shall not be molested; and even when they have committed some offense, they shall not be arrested and put in prison, by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their minister or consul, and punished according to their offense."

Although the treaty recognized that American plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases would be subject to Turkish law, this was not enforced. Indeed, while the United States relinquished some narrow judicial authority to Turkey with respect to land and real estate transactions in 1874, it continued to claim broad extraterritorial rights, in large measure because it considered the Turkish legal system to be unjust. As the State Department put it, "The intercourse of the Christian world with the Mohammedan world is not founded upon the principle of the law of nations," because "International Law, as professed by the civilized ideas subsisting between them [is] based upon a common origin, and an almost identical religious faith." With the outbreak of World War I, Turkey was the first country to take advantage of the conflict by declaring its intention to rid itself of the capitulatory regime. In September 1914 the Turks, asserting that the capitulatory rights were "in complete opposition to the juridical rules of the century and to the principle of national sovereignty," proclaimed that Turkey's relations with all states would be based on the "general principles of international law" after Turkey abrogated the capitulatory agreements, effective 1 October 1914. The United States promptly denied Turkey's right to abolish the capitulations unilaterally, claiming that such action could be taken only by agreement among all the nations concerned. Nevertheless, Turkey made it clear that it considered the capitulations dead.

Turkey experienced dramatic social, political, and legal changes in the early twentieth century. Kemal Ataturk's nationalist revival and secularization of Turkey helped transform the legal system by granting non-Muslims more equal legal status with Muslims. With these reforms, extraterritoriality did not seem necessary to protect the legal rights of Americans in Turkey. Therefore, the United States was willing to renounce extraterritoriality, Ambassador Joseph Grew informed Turkish foreign minister Tevfik Aras in 1931.

CHINA

Although the Ottoman Empire was the first to enact a capitulatory system that established the basis for extraterritorial privileges, it was in China that the extraterritoriality system was developed most extensively. The origin of extraterritoriality in China has been traced to the T'ang dynasty (618–907). As early as the ninth century, the Chinese allowed Arabs to reside and trade along the coast of Chekiang province and to govern themselves under their own headman. When the Portuguese arrived in Macao in 1557, the emperor permitted them to live according to their own customs and laws. In the first treaty with Russia in 1689, China agreed that each nation would be responsible for its own subjects.

However, though China treated all barbarians equally, permitting them to enjoy the blessings of Chinese civilization and granting to all the privilege of trade, barbarians were required to accept China's conditions of trade. The Chinese exempted foreigners from their law in part because they believed that foreigners lacked the capacity to understand the complex rules of Chinese society; in part because such exemption freed the Chinese from the difficulty of trying to govern aliens who had strange customs, language, and traditions; and in part because the Chinese felt the barbarians should be given a chance to observe their civilized way of life and, by so doing, eventually become assimilated. The Chinese always insisted upon complete control over foreign residence, and Westerners ultimately secured the acknowledgment and extension of extraterritorial rights only by the threat or use of force.

In China, the tribute system established the basis of relationships with barbarians. Foreigners who wanted to trade with China were compelled to abide by the rules and regulations set forth by the emperor. Until the first Anglo-Chinese (Opium) War (1839–1842), Western merchants accepted China's institutional framework and adapted to Chinese requirements of trade. This meant adhering to the Canton system, which confined all foreign trade to the Canton area—the "factory" section of the city and at Whampoa and Macao—and its supervision by the Co-Hong, a Chinese merchants' guild. The Canton system in effect preserved a tribute-and-trade nexus that coincided with the traditional Chinese way of dealing with barbarians.

The Opium War shattered this institutional arrangement. It was replaced by the Western "treaty system," built on treaties signed by China with England, the United States, France, and Russia. The British-dictated Treaty of Nanking (1842) led to the collapse of the Co-Hong system; the opening to trade of the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai; and the altering of relations with China. The treaty system pivoted on two significant stipulations: a most-favored-nation clause, which automatically extended concessions granted by China to one nation to other treaty powers, and the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Before the Opium War, the British and other Europeans had willingly acknowledged, for the most part, China's jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. But a gap steadily widened between the British and Chinese on the interpretation and procedures of the law, on matters of responsibility, on evidence, and on punishment. On occasion, the British resisted compliance, particularly by refusing to surrender their nationals who were accused in homicide cases. Westerners were also alarmed by the Chinese practice of torturing prisoners and by the corruption of Chinese magistrates and judicial authorities. Americans, however, readily submitted to China's laws and jurisdiction to avoid interference with trade.

The position of the United States changed drastically after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, and the supplementary Bogue Convention (1843), which gave British consuls limited jurisdiction to deal with crimes committed by British nationals. Although England first took the initiative in asserting jurisdiction over British subjects in China nearly a decade before the Chinese formally agreed to the principle of extraterritoriality, no direct steps were taken to establish a court of justice, with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction, at Canton. Because this measure was opposed by the Chinese and lacked approval of Parliament and the public, England hesitated to

take any action. As a result, the imposition of an extraterritoriality system in China was effected mainly by the United States.

Caleb Cushing, who was appointed the first official American envoy to China in 1843, was responsible for obtaining China's full recognition of the principle of extraterritoriality. Cushing argued that jurisprudence of Western Christendom alone guaranteed equitable treatment of foreigners. "This fact," he boldly claimed, was "the result of evidence of the superior civilization and respect for individual rights consequent thereon, which prevail in Christendom." Cushing insisted that the United States demand extraterritorial rights in China for American citizens, not as a concession on China's part, but as a principle of established international law.

Cushing's major achievement was the negotiation of the Treaty of Wanghia, signed on 3 July 1844, which granted the United States the right not only to determine punishment of American offenders but also to exercise absolute extraterritorial jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. Article XXI of the treaty stipulated: "Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal acts towards citizens of the United States, shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China: and citizens of the United States, who may commit any crime in China, shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the Consul, or other public functionary of the United States, thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States." From the mid-nineteenth century to World War II, American diplomacy in China was occupied with problems relating to the administration of judicial affairs, shipping regulations, piracy, and claims. Other matters that explicitly concerned extraterritorial rights dealt with the buying and leasing of land; crimes against American persons and property; ensuring the guarantee of fair trials, whether in Chinese courts or consular courts; the safety of travel inland; and the rights to trade, to worship freely, and to propagate the faith. At the same time, extraterritoriality became a cloak for the development of successful foreign commercial enterprises and a means to secure control over much of China's foreign trade. It also offered a protective shield to Christian missionary activities, buttressed the creation of international settlements, and stimulated the use of foreign gunboats. By the twentieth century, the protection of Americans and other foreign nationals was provided not only by gunboats but also by the presence of foreign troops.

Between 1842 and 1942 the principal symbol and exercise of foreign power in China were the treaty ports, small territorial enclaves or enclosures where foreign governments established extraterritorial jurisdictions throughout much of coastal and eastern China. In them were located foreign consulates, local offices of foreign businesses and commercial concerns, concessions, and settlements. Here also were separate courts, police with foreign officers and staff, and often small military and security forces.

Treaty ports, usually on the coast or along navigable waterways, were open to foreign commerce and contained a Chinese maritime customs office administered by foreigners. In many instances these ports had a de jure foreign district. Direct commercial activities, residence, and property rights were restricted to designated treaty ports and other specified cities open to foreign trade.

Settlements and concessions were municipalities separate from the surrounding Chinese cities. Both foreigners and Chinese were allowed to lease or own property and to live in the settlement area. Foreign nationals dominated the municipal councils of these settlements until the late 1920s. Settlements were generally considered Chinese soil governed by foreigners. Concessions were de jure colonies of the nation leasing the property. Most were organized with a municipal council that had ultimate administrative and political authority over the concession. The law of a concession, which was leased foreign soil, could exclude Chinese and nationals of other countries excluded from entry, residence, and property ownership.

Setting up the machinery and administrative apparatus of the extraterritoriality system produced many problems. For example, down to 1906, few American consuls in China had adequate knowledge or competence to handle legal disputes. Many consuls were attached to American mercantile firms; their meager consular fees and dependence on commercial houses seriously affected judicial administration. Bias for one's own nationals could not be eliminated. Moreover, the complexity of laws and procedures, and the difficulties of appeal, as well as of securing witnesses or producing evidence for trials of foreigners who had committed offenses in the interior, made the handling of cases onerous. The creation of a mixed court at Shanghai in 1864 sought to remedy these judicial problems; a Chinese magistrate presided and a foreign consular "assessor" sat with him as a

co-judge. Although the removal of consular appointments from politics and the establishment of the U.S. court at Shanghai in 1906 helped to improve the situation, the abuses of extraterritoriality persisted.

In the 1840s, the Chinese were not aware of the implications of extraterritoriality or of other concessions granted to foreigners. Nor were they disturbed by consular jurisdiction, since it did not directly affect China's political structure. But as foreign control over the Chinese economy steadily increased, these expectations rapidly disappeared. First applied to about 350 foreigners in five treaty ports, the extraterritoriality system by the beginning of the twentieth century was extended to about ninety treaty ports and some twenty-five ports of call for steamships, and embraced approximately a third of a million foreign residents.

For more than a half-century after the Opium War, China was racked by insurrections, economic dislocations, and the spread of European and Japanese imperialism. Compelled to accept the West's goods and ideas, China by the turn of the twentieth century reached the depths of humiliation with its defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion, and the signing of the Boxer Protocol in 1901. The latter provided for a huge indemnity and the permanent quartering of foreign troops in the capital as legation guards.

Nationalism and reform movements, however, steadily gained momentum. As they did so, the "unequal treaties" and extraterritoriality in China increasingly became targets of attack. To counter the agitation, the Western powers and Japan signed a series of treaties in 1902 and 1903. The agreements indicated the willingness of these powers to help China in its efforts to effect judicial reform so that extraterritoriality could, in time, be ended. In the treaty of 1903, the United States conferred upon China more jurisdiction over domestic affairs, including mineral rights, coinage, and the regulation of trademarks, patents, and copyrights. Article XV conditioned the renunciation of extraterritorial rights on the "Westernization" of Chinese law: "The government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, the United States agrees to give every assistance to such reform and will also be prepared to relinquish extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in doing so."

When China entered World War I on the Allied side in 1917, steps were immediately taken to cancel the extraterritorial privileges of Germany and Austria. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Chinese delegation set forth a program that called for the return of all foreign concessions, settlements, and leased territories; the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality; and complete tariff autonomy. But to their dismay and anger, Woodrow Wilson endorsed Japan's claims to Shantung, which had been obtained in 1914 by the expulsion of the Germans. Delegates at the Paris Conference refused to reconsider the Shantung question or China's arguments on the abolition of extraterritoriality. As a result, the Chinese declined to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

After World War I, extraterritoriality was viewed as a key symbol of foreign domination. At the Washington Conference in 1921–1922, the Chinese delegation again made a strong bid for recognition of its full sovereignty. But the United States, Britain, France, and Japan balked at agreeing to treaty revisions. Although the Nine-Power Treaty (1922) confirmed China's independence and its territorial and administrative integrity, the agreement upheld the existing privileges of the signatory powers in the country. China secured only the promise of a study on the question of extraterritoriality, and real tariff autonomy was postponed indefinitely.

Although the Western powers and Japan resisted the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China, stressing that significant treaty revisions had to await China's progress in legislation and adoption of adequate judicial reforms, the extraterritoriality system deteriorated during the interwar years. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution made itself felt in China, spurring the growth of nationalism and radicalism in the country. Affirming its desire to deal with China on the basis of equality, the Soviet Union renounced extraterritoriality, and in May 1924 a Sino-Soviet agreement officially relinquished Russia's privileges.

Although the Washington Conference adopted a resolution that provided for the establishment of a fact-finding commission to investigate extraterritoriality in China, the chaotic conditions in the country and a squabble between France and China over Boxer indemnity payments delayed the convening of the Commission on Extraterritoriality until January 1926. After

almost a year of investigation and the assembling of a mass of detailed information on China's judicial system and practices of extraterritoriality, the members unanimously concluded that until more effective judicial reforms were carried out, the abolition of extraterritoriality was unwarranted.

In the meantime, the Nationalist revolution coalesced under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, and by 1928 defeated the northern government. Pledged to end the extraterritoriality system, the Kuomintang (Nationalists) adopted a provisional constitution in October and immediately took steps to establish a new basis of relations with foreign powers. At the end of the year, China reached agreements with Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain that provided for tariff autonomy; accepted, in principle, the ending of extraterritoriality; and promised that rights would be relinquished when other states had done so.

In May 1929 the Kuomintang government announced that it intended to promulgate civil, criminal, and commercial laws to replace the extraterritoriality system. Three months later, it issued regulations that ended the provincial and local handling of diplomatic matters and prescribed new procedures for dealing with aliens. But the Nationalists did not unilaterally abrogate extraterritoriality. They expressed the hope, instead, that the system could be abolished by mutual consent by 1 January 1930. Since the United States and Britain insisted upon a gradual relinquishment of extraterritorial rights—and only if China gave evidence of improvements in its judicial system that ensured "effective enforcement of jurisprudence"—the Kuomintang declared its dissatisfaction with this response. On 28 December 1929, the Western powers were informed that beginning 1 January 1930, "all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the Central and Local Government of China." This mandate was qualified two days later, when China stated its intent was merely to abolish extraterritoriality in principle. With the understanding that 1 January would be regarded simply as the date from which the process of gradual abolition would be said to have commenced, Washington, London, and Tokyo agreed to further negotiations "within a reasonable time."

For almost a year and a half, the United States and Britain attempted to work out an acceptable agreement with China. By June 1931 the points in dispute were resolved, but London, Washington, and Tokyo left final agreement in abeyance, pending an examination of the treaty terms. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria on 8 September 1931, the treaties, not yet ratified, were suspended indefinitely. Efforts to resume negotiations and to arrive at final agreements on the abolition of extraterritorial rights were made in the mid-1930s, but the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 once again halted the discussions.

The issue of extraterritoriality was not further considered until World War II. After Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and America's entry into the conflict, the State Department decided that it would be advantageous to end extraterritoriality. On 11 January 1943, China simultaneously concluded with the United States at Washington, and with Britain at Chunking, the Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters. By these treaties, together with exchanges of notes, the United States and England surrendered not only their extraterritoriality rights but also their unilateral privileges in China that had previously been acquired by the "unequal treaties." American and British nationals would now be subject to the jurisdiction of the government of the Republic of China, in accordance with the principles of international law and practice. The long-standing grievances relating to extraterritoriality, concessions, settlements, legation quarters, and the right to station foreign warships in Chinese waters and foreign troops on Chinese soil were thus ended.

JAPAN

The United States also strengthened the basis for extraterritorial rights in Japan. This was accomplished by Townsend Harris, a New York businessman and merchant who was appointed the first American consul at Shimoda, Japan, in 1855. Three years later, in July 1858, he concluded a treaty of amity and commerce that greatly extended the privileges secured by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1854. Perry's treaty, which opened Japan, contained no extraterritorial provisions, but Harris persuaded the Japanese to grant Americans jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters.

Although critical of the inefficiency of Japanese judicial administration, the Western powers were negligent—as they had been in China and

elsewhere—in improving the system of extraterritoriality. Gross interference occurred in the enforcement of Japanese laws, especially with regard to quarantine regulations, drawn up in 1873, and the control and regulation of the opium trade. The British minister, Sir Harry Parkes, adamantly insisted that British subjects could be tried and punished only for violation of British laws. He declared that the Japanese government could not enact laws applicable to British nationals. The United States and the Netherlands opposed this position, claiming that there was no danger in recognizing all Japanese laws as long as the power to try and punish foreigners remained in the consular courts. England subsequently modified its policy.

During the 1880s the Japanese government raised the matter of treaty revision. A concerted attempt was made to secure tariff autonomy and the repudiation of extraterritorial privileges. These efforts provoked vigorous opposition, especially from England. Despite this resistance, Japanese leaders took steps to obtain full judicial autonomy by completing the codification of their laws. At the same time, they pressed for an immediate end to consular jurisdiction over matters relating to police administration, partnerships between Japanese and foreigners, and customs affairs. In January 1882 a preparatory conference for treaty revision, attended by the ministers of twelve treaty powers, was convened at Tokyo. Japan proposed the abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in five years and the employment of foreign judges in Japanese courts during the transition period. In return, the Western powers were offered an extension of foreign rights to residence and land tenure within treaty ports and the opening of the country to all foreigners. By 1885 a general agreement was reached that the treaties should be revised. On 1 May 1886, the official conference of the treaty powers opened at Tokyo, and after many lengthy sessions a draft jurisdictional convention was approved.

Although the prospects for treaty revision looked bright, they were quashed by the strong popular opposition to Westernization and the proposals advanced by Japan's leaders. Agitation was especially directed against the system of mixed courts and the promise to submit the constitution of the courts and the codified laws to the Western powers for their approval. Unable to reach a general agreement, the Japanese attempted to abolish extraterritoriality and to obtain tariff autonomy by bilateral treaties. The United States was first approached, and in February 1889 the American minister, Richard D. Hubbard, concluded a treaty with Japan that included the abolition of consular courts in five years. His successor, John Franklin Swift, opposed the treaty's adoption, and Secretary of State James G. Blaine withheld it from the Senate. Meanwhile, Japan signed new treaties, practically the same as that with America, with Germany and Russia.

In 1890 the British agreed to treaty revision, on condition that Japanese jurisdiction over foreigners would be postponed for five years and that the newly codified Japanese laws would be in actual and satisfactory operation for one year before the expiration of that period. In July 1894 the compromise Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed. The agreement specified that foreigners would be treated on an equal footing with Japanese in regard to travel, residence, and trade. Consular jurisdiction and foreign settlements were abolished. The implementation of the treaty was made contingent upon the satisfactory operation of Japan's newly codified laws, and provision was made for its termination at the end of twelve years.

The United States thus was not the first power to relinquish extraterritorial rights in Japan. Further delays were caused by Washington's objection to a clause in the Anglo-Japanese treaty that provided for the reciprocal rights of entrance, travel, residence, and property ownership. However, after Japan agreed to include a clause for mutual exemption of laws relating to laborers and labor immigration, a new treaty was signed in November 1894. Early in 1895 the American-Japanese treaty was ratified by both nations. Japan fulfilled all of the conditions that had been specified within the prescribed period of time, and in 1899 extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Japanese Empire was abolished.

The ending of extraterritoriality in Japan coincided with Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and its emergence as a major world power. However, the retreat of the Western powers in Japan did not immediately have an impact on other countries.

PANAMA

Extraterritorial jurisdiction continues to exist in the Panama Canal Zone, where, on the basis of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, the United States exercises "all the rights, power and authority within the zone" that it "would possess if it

were the sovereign of the territory . . . to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the [Panama] Republic of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." Although in 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson indicated a willingness to negotiate a new treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles in 1974 affirmed this desire, it was not until 1978 that President James Earl Carter's administration was able to persuade the Senate to ratify treaties recognizing Panama's sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Canal Zone by the year 2000.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY EXTRATERRITORIALITY

For the most part, the extraterritoriality system that prevailed in the nineteenth century, and was maintained, especially in China, down to World War II, is now a relic of the past. However, military status-of-forces agreements negotiated after World War II with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, among others, embody in a new form extraterritorial jurisdiction affecting American military personnel abroad. However, the abandonment of regional or national extraterritoriality by the United States did not mean the abrogation of all extraterritorial claims. Beginning in 1945, U.S. courts commenced redefining the scope of their sovereign jurisdiction over the activities of American corporations doing business abroad.

In three significant cases the United States broadened the definition of sovereignty and proprietary economic hegemony. Authority for such claims was the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. However, in its first substantive ruling involving application of the Sherman Act to overseas commercial disputes, the Supreme Court issued a narrow opinion restricting extraterritorial rights. In *American Banana Company* v. *United Fruit Company* (13 U.S. 347), the Court asserted in essence that extraterritoriality was appropriate only on the high seas or in countries where unjust laws prevailed. Subsequently, it declined to assert the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in Costa Rica and stated that the Sherman Act did not apply outside of American sovereign (that is, territorial) jurisdiction. Indeed, in a similar case, *Underhill* v. *Hernandez* (168 U.S. 250), the Court ruled that "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own country."

Since World War II, the Supreme Court has abandoned this narrow interpretation of sovereignty. In a series of rulings—*United States* v. *Aluminum Company of America* (148 U.S.2d 416), *Timberlane Lumber Company* v. *Bank of America Nt&SA* (549 F.2d 597), and *Mannington Mills, Inc.* v. *Congoleum Corp.* (595 F.2d 1287)—the Court has evolved complex tests for ascertaining what constitutes an "act of state," and has come to justify claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction to address the growing economic interdependence of the global economy. It would appear that the United States gradually has broadened the nineteenth-century definition of exclusive territorial sovereignty, now clearly transcended by twenty-first-century developments. It has been replaced by new legal conceptions of sovereignty and by the principles of universal rights that are imperative in international relations, especially in developing countries that once were colonies. There appears to be a growing legal sensitivity to the global impacts of activities by states beyond narrowly territorial considerations that will challenge them to creatively define what were once condoned as "extraterritorial rights."

Finally, it is appropriate to note the application of extraterritoriality in matters of ocean travel, airspace, and international terrorists. Whereas private vessels are subject to local laws, rights of extraterritoriality extend to state-owned vessels in foreign territorial waterways and ports, where they are customarily exempt from local jurisdiction. Likewise, the advent of national "territorial airspace" has given rise to extraterritorial claims, although such claims have found little consensus for an international regime beyond limited bilateral agreements.

In response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies and their personnel, in 1999, Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed into law, legislation making terrorism abroad a crime punishable as if the attack occurred in the United States (and thus was subject to U.S. laws). In accordance with normal diplomatic practice, the United States retains jurisdiction over its diplomatic officials abroad. It also claims jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel on American military bases abroad. The United States has also criminalized some activities engaged in by Americans abroad. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits American companies from paying bribes to foreign officials. However, this legislation is very different from the past practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Americans abroad, because it cov-

ers American companies. It is, in a sense, a hybrid of regional and global extraterritoriality.

Many states have enacted "blocking statutes" that prevent their citizens and companies from complying with American extraterritorial laws and court rulings. They include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The European Union and the Organization of American States have also lodged formal protests against American extraterritorial claims.

Clearly, then, the concept of extraterritoriality historically has been an evolving expression of state sovereignty, which, one suspects, will continue to transform to meet the needs of an ever-changing international system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbey, Phillip R. *Treaty Ports and Extraterritoriality in China* (www.geocities.com/vienna/5048/treatyol.html). Offers a detailed discussion of treaty ports, concessions, and legations.

Anderson, David L. "Anson Burlingame: American Architect of the Cooperative Policy in China, 1861–1871." *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 13 (1977). Explores the formative stages of American policy and its contrasts with European practices.

Bevans, Charles I. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949*. 13 vols. Washington, D.C., 1968–1976.

Bland, Randall Walton. *The Black Robe and the Bald Eagle: The Supreme Court and the Foreign Policy of the United States, 1789–1953*. San Francisco, 1996. Provides authoritative discussion of the Court's role overseas in shaping American diplomacy and foreign policy.

Burley, Anne-Marie. "Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine." *Columbia Law Review* 92, no. 8 (December 1992). Offers useful discussion of sovereignty and interstate relations.

Chan, K. C. "The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China, 1942–43: A Study of Anglo-American Relations." *Modern Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977). Explores Allied discussions with the Nationalist government for a new relationship with China.

Clyde, Paul H. "Attitudes and Policies of George F. Seward, American Minister at Peking, 1876–1880: Some Phases of the Cooperative Policy." *Pacific Historical Review* 2, no. 4 (1933). Contains Seward's views on extraterritoriality and other matters.

Congressional Quarterly Press. *A Collection of Treaties and Alliances Presented to the United States*. Washington, D.C., 2000. Provides one of the best sources for these diplomatic instruments and specific treaty provisions regarding extraterritorial rights.

Davids, Jules, ed. *American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China. Serial I. The Treaty System and the Taiping Rebellion, 1842–1860*. 21 vols. Wilmington, Del., 1973. Volumes 8–11 contain documents on consular regulations, judicial affairs, and major cases and problems relating to extraterritoriality in China.

Fishel, Wesley R. *The End of Extraterritoriality in China*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952. An excellent, well-balanced account of the abolition of extraterritoriality in China.

"From Personalism to Territoriality: State Authority and Foreign Policy in Medieval and Modern Europe." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, 16–20 April 1966. Offers substantive analysis of extraterritoriality, its early European practice, and the nature of the American regimes in China, Turkey, and Morocco.

Grayton, Jeffrey T. "From Here to Extraterritoriality: The United States Beyond Borders." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Toronto, Canada, March 1997. Offers substantive analysis of extraterritoriality; its early European practice, and the nature of the American regimes in China, Turkey, and Morocco.

Griffin, Joseph P., ed. *Perspectives on the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust and Other Laws*. Chicago, 1979.

Hackworth, Green Haywood. *Digest of International Law*. 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1940–1944. These volumes, published by the State Department, include the original texts of diplomatic documents on extraterritoriality.

Hall, Luella J. *The United States and Morocco, 1776–1956*. Metuchen, N.J., 1971. Explores the American involvement in Morocco.

Hinckley, Frank E. *American Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient*. Washington, D.C., 1906. An old work but still useful as a survey of American consular jurisdiction in Turkey and East Asia.

Jones, Francis Clifford. *Extraterritoriality in Japan and the Diplomatic Relations Resulting in Its Abolition, 1853–1899.* New York, 1970. Jones's thesis, originally published in 1931, this is the best detailed study of the extraterritoriality system in Japan.

Keeton, George W. *The Development of Extraterritoriality in China.* 2 vols. London and New York, 1928. Comprehensively surveys extraterritoriality in China from a historical and legal point of view.

Krasner, Stephen. "Sovereignty: An International Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 1 (April 1988). Offers interesting discussion of the changing nature of sovereignty.

Lacey, John R., ed. *Act of State and Extraterritorial Reach: Problems of Law and Policy.* Chicago, 1983.

Land, Dieter, and Gary Born, eds. *The Extraterritorial Application of National Laws.* New York, 1987.

Liu, Shuh Shun. *Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Decline.* New York, 1969; originally published 1925. Viewing extraterritoriality from the perspective of the Chinese, Liu traces its origins and development, the problems of consular jurisdiction, and the reasons for its decline in China.

Lowe, A. V., ed. *Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: An Annotated Collection of Legal Materials.* Cambridge, Mass., 1983. An indispensable guide to these sources.

Malloy, William M. *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776–1932.* 4 vols. Washington, D.C., 1910–1938. One of the best sources for these diplomatic instruments and specific treaty provisions regarding extraterritorial rights.

Mooney, Eugene F. *Foreign Seizures: Sabbatino and the Act of State Doctrine.* Lexington, Ky., 1967.

Rosenthal, Douglas E., and William M. Knighton. *National Laws and International Commerce: The Problem of Extraterritoriality.* London and Boston, 1982.

Stuart, Graham H. *The International City of Tangier.* 2d ed. Stanford, Calif., 1955. Explores the background to the creation of the international city of Tangier and its problems from the standpoints of geography, history, and diplomacy.

Susa, Nasim. *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature.* Baltimore, 1933. Emphasizes custom and usage as the major reason for the granting of capitulary rights to foreigners by the Islamic states.

Thomson, Janice E. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe.* Princeton, N.J., 1994. Provides interesting discussion of the complex relationship among these interests.

Townsend, James B. *Extraterritorial Antitrust: The Sherman Act and U.S. Business Abroad.* Boulder, Colo., 1980.

Trask, Roger R. *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914–1939.* Minneapolis, Minn., 1971. Offers insights into the normalization of Turkish-American relations.

Treat, Payson J. *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853–1895.* 2 vols. Stanford, Calif., and London, 1932. Based primarily on archival sources, this study thoroughly surveys American-Japanese relations and includes extensive material on Japan's efforts to secure treaty revision and the abolition of extraterritoriality.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (spring 1992). Explores modern concepts of power in international context.

Zimmerman, James Michael. *Extraterritorial Employment Standards of the United States: The Regulation of the Overseas Workplace.* New York, 1992. Offers essential discussion, legal precedent, and case law.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD.

Foreign Aid

Katherine A. S. Sibley

The United States government first recognized the usefulness of foreign aid as a tool of diplomacy in World War II. Such a program, policymakers believed, would fulfill three goals: it would furnish humanitarian assistance to needy peoples, it would promote liberal capitalist models of development in other countries, and it would enhance national security. The U.S. commitment to foreign aid since has amounted to well over $1 trillion in current dollars—not counting hundreds of billions more donated through the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies. Always a controversial program, foreign assistance drew its broadest support in the early Cold War era. At that time, the effort to undermine communism permeated all other aid considerations, including the plight of the poor, the expansion of democracy abroad, and U.S. economic goals that might be served by foreign assistance, such as stimulating private investment and opening up markets to American products. All of these objectives, however, generated wide support from members of Congress, ranging from those whose chief focus was U.S. security to those who were most interested in developing the Third World.

In the Vietnam era, however, the consensus of support began to unravel. Like the war itself, foreign aid programs were variously attacked as imperialistic, paternalistic, harmful, wasteful, or just plain useless. (Indeed, these imperialistic attributes of aid had contributed to the United States's own birth—without the assistance of the empires of France and Spain, the nascent republic would hardly have survived.) Although American foreign aid has changed its emphasis frequently since the Vietnam era in response to such criticisms, the flow has never stopped and has continued to generate calumny from all sides of the political spectrum. Notwithstanding these attacks, foreign aid has undoubtedly racked up some solid achievements. Third World residents have experienced great advances in their standard of living since the 1960s. The eradication of smallpox, the halving of poverty, the doubling of literacy from 35 to 70 percent, and the sharp rise in life expectancy from forty-one to sixty-three years, are evidence of this. Unfortunately, such improvements have not headed off a broadening economic gap between the rich and poor nations. For instance, Africa's average annual income in adjusted dollars in the 1990s was about the same as it had been in the 1960s, approximately a dollar a day. There, too, the AIDS epidemic has proved as devastating as smallpox. The great ambitions of President John F. Kennedy for foreign aid (see sidebar) were not met in the 1960s "decade of development," nor have they been realized since.

During the Cold War era, bilateral assistance (on a government-to-government level, including that channeled via nongovernmental organizations) broke down in unadjusted dollars to $139 billion in military and economic assistance to the Middle East and South Asia, $70 billion to East Asia, $48 billion to Europe, $29 billion to Latin America, and $23 billion to Africa. In the 1990s, both the demise of the Soviet Union, whose influence U.S. foreign aid was long designed to check, as well as the spectacular economic growth of such former aid recipients as South Korea, led the United States to adopt new targets. Indeed, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared in 1999, "traditional notions of 'foreign aid' have become virtually obsolete." The 1997 State Department strategic plan outlined the following goals for foreign aid: creating "institutions that support democracy, free enterprise, the rule of law and a strengthened civil society"; providing humanitarian aid; and "protecting the United States from such specific global threats as unchecked population growth, disease, the loss of biodiversity, global warming, and narcotics trafficking." At the turn of the twenty-first century,

U.S. funds were defending peace in Kosovo, East Timor, and the Middle East, dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, disarming drug dealers in Central America, democratizing Nigeria, and developing the armies of America's erstwhile enemies, the former socialist countries. Yet, as Albright herself acknowledged in 2000, the programs continued to support very traditional aims, such as "promoting U.S. exports, spurring overseas development and helping other countries to achieve viable market economies"—in other words, expanding the adoption of liberal capitalist norms of development. While recipient countries have certainly changed, the United States continued to spend about the same amount as it had at the end of the Cold War, utilizing Cold War foreign aid instruments like the Foreign Assistance Act and the Agency for International Development. According to the State Department, in 2000 the United States spent $16.5 billion on foreign operations, ranging from the Peace Corps ($244 million) to the foreign Military Training Program ($4.8 billion).

THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN AID

Prior to World War II, U.S. government-to-government assistance and loans were extremely rare and limited to emergency situations. The impulse to spend money to spread goodwill and influence abroad was not absent, of course: in the nineteenth century, private individuals supported such causes as Greek independence in the 1820s and victims of the Irish famine in the 1840s; later, major corporations set up international philanthropic arms like the Rockefeller Foundation. During and after World War I, the U.S. government became directly involved in disaster relief, assisting German-occupied Belgium and sending $20 million to Russian famine victims in 1921. Subsequently, enormous U.S. lending helped rebuild Germany and other countries, alongside the efforts of American religious organizations like the American Friends Service Committee and the Young Men's Christian Association. The U.S. loans stopped, however, in the Great Depression and were never repaid. Campaigning in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised that the United States would sanction no more such foreign investments.

But military aid continued to flow throughout the interwar years to pro-U.S. regimes in neighboring countries, including Cuba, Mexico, and Nicaragua. During World War II, moreover, the State Department's Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, set up the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, which furnished food and sanitation assistance as a counterweight to Nazi influence in Latin America. In the late 1930s, President Roosevelt developed a Western Hemisphere Defense Program to further U.S. influence in the region with greater trade and cultural ties, as well as military aid. Like the subsequent $50 billion lend-lease program for Europe and Asia, which included the first major U.S. effort to export arms outside Latin America, these initiatives were all defense measures. They were supplemented by other programs, such as the $6.1 billion that the United States contributed to the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas program from 1943 to 1951, as well as the $2.6 billion it furnished the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration from 1943 to 1947. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States also sent military surplus items to France, Britain, Nationalist China, and the Philippines, where it maintained bases following independence in 1946. Such assistance remained ad hoc, since Congress as yet resisted an expansion of U.S. military aid. "We should not be sending military missions all over the world to teach people how to fight in American ways," said the Republican senator Robert Taft of Ohio.

Also during World War II, the Bretton Woods Conference led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), two key instruments of economic relief and reconstruction that were aimed at ending the kinds of economic nationalism that many felt had led to the Great Depression and the war. The IMF established the dollar as the international currency, facilitated international trade, and made loans to governments to fix trade imbalances; the World Bank ensured that foreign investment in developing areas would be less risky by extending loans for reconstruction and development projects, and promoting investment and international trade. The United States dominated both organizations, in 1945 holding one-third of the votes in each and supplying one-third of the financing of the bank, or $3 billion. At century's end, the United States still supplied one-fifth of all IMF funds, and these institutions and their policies continued to generate controversy. In September 2000, at World Bank–IMF meetings in Prague, the debts owed by Third World governments sparked riots as thousands of protesters, dissatisfied with the agencies' debt relief policies

and the pace of economic globalization, threw Molotov cocktails and rocks at police and at such bastions of global capitalism as a McDonald's restaurant, cutting short the meetings.

THE COLD WAR FOREIGN AID PROGRAM, 1947–1953

The postwar commitment of the United States to foreign aid stemmed from its vast aid role in World War II but also involved a number of new considerations. Initially, American foreign aid programs in the early Cold War demonstrated the nation's assumption of the economic and political role previously played by Great Britain, as exemplified by the Truman Doctrine and its support to such former British clients as Greece and Turkey. The United States also used foreign aid to promote free-market standards for development, including the integration of West European economies and the curtailing of economic protectionism, through such instruments as the Marshall Plan. These programs, and especially the Marshall Plan, would greatly benefit the U.S. economy by generating orders at home. Finally, and most importantly, these efforts were designed to prevent the spread of international communism. By early 1946, U.S. policymakers were becoming increasingly convinced that the Soviet Union had embarked upon a path toward world domination. The following year, the State Department official George F. Kennan called for "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies," and the United States adopted containment as its doctrine for dealing with the Soviet Union.

It was Soviet pressure in the Mediterranean that led the United States to announce the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, thereby launching its Cold War foreign aid program in earnest. Extending an unprecedented peacetime aid amount of $650 million, the doctrine proclaimed that "it must be the policy of the U.S. to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." It was the first time that the United States had put cold cash as well as warm bodies, in the form of technical advisers, behind the containment policy. In a joint session of Congress, Truman declared that totalitarian regimes "spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife," and thus, U.S. help—the only help available, he declared—was necessary to stop the spread of communism.

Less than three months later, the United States proposed the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program, in response to the postwar economic crisis in western Europe that many U.S. officials felt would only make it easier for communist parties to take hold there. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, outlining the aid plan in an address at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, stated that the United States "should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace." If not for American aid, the Truman administration contended, no parliamentary regime in western Europe would survive and U.S. security would therefore be threatened. The Marshall Plan provided a $12 billion package to sixteen countries in western Europe that not only rebuilt the economies of its recipients but also instituted liberal economic practices such as lower tariffs and instruments to coordinate economic policies.

U.S. officials envisioned that foreign aid, by establishing beneficiaries' internal political stability, promoting their general economic development, and building military strength, was the best way to counteract Soviet expansion. As the program grew during the Cold War, aid recipients fell into two categories: forward defense countries bordering the communist bloc as well as those located in other strategic areas like South Asia and the Middle East, and the less strategically placed countries. In the forward defense countries, but also in sensitive areas like Latin America, aid was often designed to support existing, pro-American governments, through arms and personnel as well as through economic aid to mitigate internal discontent. It was hoped that aid would prevent these countries from falling into the Soviet orbit, which as a result often put the United States on the side of reactionary domestic forces, as was the case in Vietnam, Iran, and Cuba.

Economic assistance programs faced resistance in a tight-fisted Republican postwar Congress, but Cold War threats helped squelch such recalcitrance. Foreign aid quickly expanded to include the economic stabilization of non-European areas, as well as a new emphasis on military assistance. For example, the United States gave limited aid to such nations as South Korea, the Philippines, and Iran. Its biggest expenditure outside of Europe was the $2.5 billion in military and economic aid to the Nationalists in China, aid that continued even after Chiang Kai-shek's gov-

ernment had proved itself utterly beyond help. Then, at his inauguration in January 1949, Truman put forward a pioneering foreign aid proposal that included (1) support for the United Nations; (2) U.S. programs for world economic recovery; (3) support for "freedom-loving countries against aggression"; and 4) "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas." In the wake of China's "fall" to communism, and the Soviet atomic blast, the military threat of Soviet expansion appeared grave, and Truman's third point, to assist "freedom-loving countries," was quickly put into effect. In October 1949, two months after the United States had officially joined NATO, the Truman administration created a Military Assistance Program under the auspices of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, with a budget of $1.3 billion. Expenditures continued to rise, and in its first three years, as Chester Pach has noted, the program extended $8 billion in military aid to western Europe, largely with the aim of enhancing "the psychological attitudes and morale of our allies." Despite controversies that have dogged military assistance ever since—for instance, that it was an unwieldy program with "no organized, careful thought about what it was that we were trying to do," as Secretary of State Dean Acheson aptly put it—the program continued to grow. U.S. officials reckoned that if military aid were not continued in ever larger amounts, demoralization would set in, weakening western Europe's military position still further.

Point Four, which the inaugural address is best remembered for, was the basis for the Agency for International Development (AID), a $35 million program that provided technical assistance to the Third World. The Point Four program, according to a State Department official, sought "to strengthen and generalize peace . . . by counteracting the economic conditions that predispose to social and political instability and to war." Europe, now recovering with Marshall Plan aid, would no longer be the major recipient of American economic assistance. Despite Europe's continuing importance, as Acheson told Congress in 1950, "economic development of underdeveloped areas" had become a national concern, since "our military and economic security is vitally dependent on the economic security of other peoples." The process of decolonization had made these countries a key battleground in the Cold War, with both Russia and America vying for influence over the newly formed nation-states of Asia and Africa. (Another undeveloped area, Latin America, received less attention in the 1950s.) The UN and the World Bank also shifted their focus from reconstruction of war-torn Europe to the problems of the Third World at this time. The Third World's stash of raw materials further heightened its importance. In 1952 the President's Materials Policy Commission recommended that the United States look to the countries of Africa, the Middle East, southern and southeastern Asia, and Latin America for imports of minerals and tied aid programs to this end in the 1950s.

Truman's initiatives were incorporated into the Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951, which succeeded the Marshall Plan and offered a new program of economic and, especially, military aid both for Europe and the developing world. In its first year, for example, the act extended to Europe a combined military and economic package of $1.02 billion; in 1952, as the Korean War ground on, it included $202 million in military support to Formosa (Taiwan) and Indochina. In the wake of National Security Council document NSC 68 of 1950, which had called for large-scale military aid along with an enormous defense buildup, security-related assistance would become a hallmark of the Eisenhower era (1953–1961). Thus, while military assistance had been a little more than a third of the $28 billion in aid that the United States had extended during the Marshall Plan era (1949–1952), during the succeeding eight years, it was almost 50 percent of a larger, $43 billion total. Meanwhile, technical assistance under Point Four went to such countries as Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea (where the United States had a large surveillance post), Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and Iran. Latin America was largely left out of Point Four until the end of the 1950s, although certain countries in which the United States countered perceived communist threats received significant security assistance.

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND EXPANSION OF FOREIGN AID

Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, demonstrated the popular sentiment toward foreign aid when he declared in 1951, "We can't go on supporting countries all over the world with handouts just because we like them—or any other reason." Indeed, many members of Congress in this era

were reluctant to vote public funds for development purposes, because they believed that such funds should not replace private investment. Beginning with the Marshall Plan, aid had been traditionally aimed at stimulating private investment through trade liberalization and by making improvements in the global economic climate. In fact, in his first State of the Union message, President Dwight D. Eisenhower unabashedly proclaimed that the explicit purpose of American foreign policy was the encouragement of a hospitable environment for private American investment capital abroad. He called for trade, not aid. Such hard-headed motives did not preclude a significant expansion of U.S. economic aid in the Eisenhower administration, however, as confirmed by a significant augmentation of U.S. Export-Import Bank loans and an increase in soft loans in 1954. Cold War pressures as well as the lobbying efforts of individual countries helped further this trend, and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the first single piece of legislation to embrace the entire foreign assistance program, became the instrument for this new policy. The United States also launched the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act in 1954, commonly called the Food for Peace program, which was still thriving a half century later. This program initially authorized $350 million in food surplus shipments, payable in local currency. Known as Public Law 480, it was the product of some heavy lobbying by Senator Hubert Humphrey, a Democrat who hailed from the farm-filled state of Minnesota. Designed to "increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to improve the foreign relations of the United States and for other purposes," Public Law 480 would authorize $3 billion in sales by 1956 and become an important element in the foreign aid program, while helping to lower U.S. food surpluses. The foodstuffs served as a development subsidy, enabling recipient countries to sell them on the domestic market and then use the proceeds for development projects. Unfortunately, food aid significantly damaged Third World producers, including many Indian farmers, pushing India close to famine in the 1950s and 1960s.

In addition to providing food, foreign aid was also an important weapon of anticommunist intervention during the mid-1950s. After the United States brought down Iran's nationalist, anti-American prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953, replacing him with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it gave that country $85 million in foreign aid, and the shah's army was soon among the best-equipped in the Middle East. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also used foreign aid to gain friendship and allies in Latin America. In 1954, the United States intervened in Guatemala to overturn the regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán and assist in the military coup of Carlos Castillo Armas. Guzmán, according to U.S. Ambassador John Peurifoy, "talked like a communist, he thought like a communist, and he acted like a communist, and if he is not one, he will do until one comes along." American aid to Guatemala, which had amounted to just $600,000 over the preceding ten years, rose to $130 million in the six years following Castillo Armas's coup. One of Guatemalan aid's most vigorous supporters was Vice President Richard Nixon, who touted construction of the country's Inter-American Highway as promoting everything from trade to security. Guatemala thus became a "testing ground" in the Eisenhower administration's newly expanded foreign aid program.

At the same time, however, U.S. officials grew increasingly uncomfortable with another Latin American client, Cuban leader Fulgencio Batista, who used American military aid meant for "hemispheric defense" against his own people in the late 1950s. Washington welcomed his departure and, initially, the ascendance of Fidel Castro. Soon, however, American military aid, training, and scuba suits would be furnished to the Cuban foes of the Soviet-leaning Castro, though to little effect. In 1957, the State Department's International Cooperation Administration set up a Development Loan Fund chiefly to assist India, which faced a serious foreign exchange crisis. This program represented the first significant use of subsidized (or soft) loans, which by the end of the decade would become the most important tool employed in U.S. foreign aid programs, replacing development assistance. By 1961, the World Bank had also set up a soft loan agency, the International Development Association. U.S. and World Bank lending to India helped the government build fertilizer plants, power plants, highways, railroad locomotives, and airplanes. In the process, however, it strengthened India's national economic planning apparatus, as Shyam Kamath noted in a 1994 article, and "facilitated the growth of the public sector at the expense of the private sector." Thus, though the United States professed that its aid and technical assistance was aimed at creating a better environment for invest-

ment and a more liberal economy, as the Indian example shows it often assisted instead in the entrenchment of heavy-handed central planning agencies in the Third World.

As the loans to India demonstrated, the less-developed countries continued to be a vital battleground for U.S.-Soviet competition. In January 1957, in response to the deepening of relations between Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, the Eisenhower Doctrine pledged U.S. support to any nation in the Middle East that wanted help "resisting armed attack from any country controlled by international communism," and Congress approved a $200 million economic and military aid program for the defense of this region. Then, as 1960 ushered in the "development decade" (see sidebar), Washington finally recognized its largely neglected neighbors at the Conference of the Organization of American States in Bogotá, pledging $500 million for the Inter-American Fund for Social Development. This fund included a bank to furnish improved sanitation, housing, and technical training, in order to enable "the individual citizen of Latin America to live a better life and to provide him the fullest opportunity to improve his status." At the Punta del Este Conference the following year, the Kennedy administration would launch the Alliance for Progress. This program, funded largely by the United States, had as its goal the modernization of Latin America through reform of its political and economic structures, and the injection of capital and technical assistance.

THE PEAK OF PRESTIGE: FOREIGN AID UNDER KENNEDY

Upon entering office in 1961, President John F. Kennedy very much hoped to burnish the image of American foreign assistance, which had been skewered in such recent books as Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer's best-selling *The Ugly American* (1958), a novel about an ignorant, insular set of foreign service officers-at-large in Southeast Asia, hopelessly losing the battle to communism owing to their maladroit application of foreign aid. Kennedy saw the Peace Corps as one way to revamp this impression of America abroad. The notion of volunteers living alongside those they sought to help was a far cry from *The Ugly American*'s out of touch bureaucrats and was particularly appealing in an era that came to represent the "high-water mark of idealism concerning what overseas aid could achieve," as Paul Mosley wrote. Kennedy established the agency by executive order less than six weeks after he took office.

While *The Ugly American* no doubt had a salubrious influence on him, perhaps the president should have paid closer attention to a far more chilling and penetrating critique of American foreign intervention in this era, Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1955). In this novel, an arrogant, clean-cut young American character, Alden Pyle, idealistically destroys innocent lives in order to save the Vietnamese from communism, eerily foreshadowing the U.S. role in that country that Kennedy helped propel in the early 1960s, in part through foreign aid.

In September 1961, Congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), still the governing charter for U.S. foreign aid. Like the MSA earlier, the FAA attempted to systematize all existing foreign aid programs and included a Development Loan Fund, which would assist with large projects, as well as a Development Grant Fund for technical development. In addition, the FAA provided a "supporting assistance" program (later called the Economic Support Fund) to promote economic and political stability and launched a program to protect American business abroad, the antecedent of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Later that fall, the Agency for International Development (USAID) opened for business, coordinating U.S. assistance programs under the aegis of the State Department. As this flurry of activity shows, Kennedy was a great promoter of foreign aid, which he envisioned as part of his goal to "pay any price, bear any burden" to assist the free world. The fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960s, he said idealistically, "is not negatively to fight Communism . . . it is to make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth . . . economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand." As Michael Hunt notes skeptically, Kennedy and other foreign aid advocates were convinced that "thanks to American wisdom and generosity and to the marvels of social engineering, the peoples of these new nations would accomplish in years what it had taken the advanced countries decades to achieve."

Despite Kennedy's words, fighting communism remained a priority. By its very dynamic, as he recognized, the modernization process that was necessary for economic growth could also

JOHN F. KENNEDY'S SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON FOREIGN AID

"Is a foreign aid program really necessary? Why should we not lay down this burden which our nation has now carried for some fifteen years? The answer is that there is no escaping our obligations: our moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations—our economic obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people . . . and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom.

"To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous. . . . For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperiled. . . .

"The whole southern half of the world—Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life. . . .

"[T]hese new nations need help for a special reason. Without exception they are under communist pressure. . . . But the fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960s is not negatively to fight communism: Its fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that . . . economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand. . . .

"The 1960s can be—and must be—the crucial 'Decade of Development'—the period when many less-developed nations make the transition into self-sustained growth—the period in which an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions and insecurity. . . .

"We must say to the less-developed nations, if they are willing to undertake necessary internal reform and self-help . . . that we then intend during this coming decade of development to achieve a decisive turnaround in the fate of the less-developed world, looking toward the ultimate day when . . . foreign aid will no longer be needed."

— *From* Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1 January to 31 December 1961 *(Washington, D.C., 1964): 203–206* —

unleash unpredictable forces, including mass unrest. This was just the sort of milieu that communists might exploit through sponsorship of internal insurrection, "the so-called war of liberation," as Kennedy put it in a June 1961 speech. An American military response alone would be ineffective in combating such uprisings; aid, too, was necessary, as it would "help prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feed." Foreign assistance *and* American counterinsurgency expertise, it was believed, would steer countries through these difficult transitions without their resorting to revolutionary, communist regimes.

As USAID administrator Fowler Hamilton put it plainly to Congress in budget hearings in 1962, "The communists are active. The total commitments they are putting out now run on the order of $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion a year." Fortunately, "the free world" was more than holding its own, supplying the Third World with $8 billion in both aid and private investment. "I think that we have the resources and the good sense to prevail," said Fowler, mindful of his budgetary ambitions.

Yet Representative Marguerite Stitt Church of Illinois raised one of foreign aid's most vexing questions during Fowler's testimony. While agreeing with the importance of defending "the cause of human freedom, as exemplified by the ideals of this country," she also worried that the emphasis still placed on major huge projects "would not reach the lives of the 'little people' whom we must touch." A similar plea was made at the time by the foreign aid analyst John D. Montgomery in *The Politics of Foreign Aid,* who argued that the United States was too willing to overlook the undesirable aspects of certain recipient regimes, giving the United States the reputation of being "divorced . . . from the social progress" of the people in these countries.

As such observations revealed, even in the heyday of foreign aid the program faced sharp criticism. Representative J. L. Pilcher asserted that despite over $1 billion already spent in Vietnam, leader Ngo Dinh Diem's lack of popular support

would mean that the country would be "in the hands of the communists" within twenty-four hours of the departure of U.S. troops—not such an inaccurate prediction, as it turned out. "Where is all our economic aid going to help stop communism in that country?" he wondered. It was an unanswerable question, and the spending continued.

Indeed, U.S. representatives in the newly decolonizing countries quickly learned that aid would get them improved access to government officials, and by 1963, there were twenty-nine aid programs operating in Africa. Some members of Congress, however, remained dubious about the expansion of foreign aid, and, for that reason, Kennedy asked a prominent detractor of foreign assistance, General Lucius Clay, to look into the matter—the confident Kennedy certain that even the critic Clay would be convinced of the program's value once he looked into it. However, Clay's committee's findings showed that "these new countries value their independence and do not want to acquire a new master in place of the old one . . . there is a feeling that we are trying to do too much for too many too soon . . . and that no end of foreign aid is either in sight or in mind." Clay's verdict as to the indeterminate nature of this program was certainly borne out. And despite Kennedy's fervent conviction of the effectiveness of foreign aid, programs like the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were hard-pressed to meet the social and economic challenges they confronted in the Third World.

Kennedy's idealism, too, could not alter the fact that throughout the 1960s, foreign aid programs were conceived with increasingly close attention to U.S. security interests. Foreign assistance remained largely focused on keeping the Third World from turning to communism, and included support to strengthen resistance to internal communist movements as well as to meet the external Soviet threat. Funds for infrastructural improvements and education were a favorite vehicle for these objectives. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, demonstrating the close link Washington envisioned between aid and U.S. predominance in the Cold War, declared in 1964 that "the foreign aid program . . . and the military assistance program [have] now become the most critical element[s] of our overall national security effort." Making the connection even more precise, President Lyndon B. Johnson added that the foreign aid program was "the best weapon we have to ensure that our own men in uniform need not go into combat."

Actually, foreign aid went right into war alongside the soldiers in Vietnam, as part and parcel of the large U.S. pacification program in the southern half of that country. Vietnam drew the fervent involvement of USAID, which, as Nicholas Eberstadt has pointed out, made that country the donor for nearly half of its development grants by 1966. Much of this went to fund the ill-fated strategic hamlet program and other disastrous measures, which, while feeding the dislocated South Vietnamese, gutted their economic foundations and thus worked exactly against the traditional objectives of foreign aid. But at the same time, the United States also showed its sensitivity to indigenous economic conditions by hosting the Tidewater conference in Easton, Maryland, where representatives of seventeen nations mobilized in 1968 in response to the threat of famine in India. Their work led to the "green revolution," a movement that brought innovations to agricultural cultivation in the Third World to produce more staple foods and prevent famine.

FOREIGN AID IN CRISIS: THE VIETNAM EFFECT AND "NEW DIRECTIONS"

Despite such successes, disillusionment arising from the deepening commitment in Southeast Asia led many Americans across the political spectrum to disparage foreign aid, and for the first time such criticisms were heard at the highest levels of the U.S. government. For much of the post–World War II period, the policymaking establishment held foreign assistance as sacrosanct in American politics and diplomacy and often oversold its virtues to a skeptical public and Congress. Democratic and Republican administrations outbid each other in extending aid programs; liberal and conservative members of Congress joined in bipartisan voting on aid appropriations, even as individual members grumbled; and labor, management, religious, and educational groups all voiced approval of foreign aid. Yet the interventionist consensus articulated in the Truman Doctrine and Point Four, and widely supported for two decades, foundered in Vietnam. Arguments that for twenty years had given the greatest urgency and immediacy to the cause of foreign aid—including the threat of communism, the need for continued access to vital raw materials, the economic benefits to be gained through increased trade, and the political divi-

dends to be reaped in terms of peace and democracy—lost much of their force, at least temporarily. At the deepest point in U.S. involvement in the Third World, many Americans began to question the rationale for any involvement.

Thus, by 1970, Washington had dropped its commitment in Africa to ten countries, and in 1971 and 1972 the Senate refused to fund foreign assistance at all, although a year-end catchall resolution covered the budgets. Antiwar legislators joined members of Congress who opposed government waste in tightening the reins on USAID, as the agency became subject to heightened congressional oversight that gave legislators veto power over even the smallest items. Despite considerable public and congressional debate over the objectives and techniques of foreign aid programs—particularly from conservatives in both parties who objected to what Representative Otto Passman called "the greatest give-away in history"—Congress decided to keep foreign aid in the 1970s, although revising its aims significantly.

Meanwhile, Third World nations were also becoming increasingly critical of the existing system of aid distribution. Rejecting reform proposals of the foreign aid establishment such as those contained in the Rockefeller Report (1969), which urged the United States to widen its use of private investment, skills, and other initiatives, these nonaligned nations proposed a new international economic order, which Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello note called for "the regulation of global market forces in the interest of the development process" through a program of subsidies and other supports for exports. Critics of the proposal like Nicholas Eberstadt, however, claimed that it was simply an attempt to "disassembl[e] the liberal international economic order . . . augmenting instead the capacity of states and the authority of their leaders to plan their local economies" at Western expense.

In the self-critical angst that characterized the late Vietnam era, the United States was only too willing to shed its old shibboleths about capitalism's virtues. Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the Mutual Development and Cooperation Act, also passed that year, the liberal capitalist model for Third World progress and its associated large-scale development projects came under withering criticism. The mantra of the 1973 reforms, known as "New Directions," became the goal of meeting "basic human needs." USAID focused on programs that assisted in the provision of food, medicine, and housing, especially in rural areas, rather than more grandiose infrastructure projects. The act's categories of assistance grants and development loans were replaced with "functional categories aimed at specific problems such as agriculture, family planning, and education," an organizational structure that has largely remained. The new program in some ways resembled the technical assistance efforts of the early 1950s, but in keeping with the move away from liberal capitalist tenets, the U.S. effort emphasized instead top-down government "development planning" as the best tool to foster Third World growth. Unfortunately, this was often "planning without facts"—especially when Texas-style cattle raising proved untenable in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank, meanwhile, participated in a $2.4 billion investment in African agriculture in the 1970s, largely for vast state farms and irrigation programs, with dismal results. In a 1994 article, James Bovard attributed these failures to inappropriate technology as well as "soil unsuitability." By the 1980s, food output in Africa had fallen 20 percent from twenty years earlier. Governments' zeal for complex technologies in place of simple and workable changes, coupled with widespread political corruption, was largely responsible for the disasters in Africa.

In the 1970s, the United States increasingly turned to the World Bank and similar agencies as a favored instrument for dispensing aid, a process called multilateralization. Ostensibly, multilateral aid diluted the pressure that bilateral aid placed on recipient countries, although these agencies' funds came with their own chafing leash. During Robert McNamara's tenure at the bank (1970–1981), its lending rate increased thirteen times, from $883 million to $12 billion. This aid was not always helpful to the people of the Third World. In his article, Bovard quotes a former executive director of the International Monetary Fund, who charged that such "unseemly" lending only ratcheted up Third World politicians' control over their own people, assisting the repressive collectivization programs of such leaders as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in the early 1970s and the brutal social engineering of the Vietnamese government later in that decade.

THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS: FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO MARKET REFORMS

When President Jimmy Carter entered office in 1977, he made human rights an important prior-

ity in U.S. foreign policy, and this focus led him to cut back on aid to such brutal regimes as that of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile-Mariam. Military aid, however, continued to the Somalian enemies of the now Soviet-backed Mengistu; by 1980, 75 percent of total African aid was going to the Horn of Africa, reflecting Cold War priorities. Carter's human rights campaign helped reform oppressive governments in Brazil and Argentina, but elsewhere, such as in El Salvador, South Korea, and China, Carter's message was more inconsistently applied, with security interests outweighing human rights concerns. Most egregious, perhaps, was his approach to Iran, where Carter, despite strong congressional criticism, sold the shah of Iran sophisticated AWACS radar systems. American support for the shah helped lead to the revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. At the same time, Carter administration officials sought to deflect criticisms that USAID was a U.S. foreign policy "tool," and they removed it from the State Department, placing it under the new International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). USAID remained closely connected with the State Department, however, and foreign aid continued to serve America's state interests. (The IDCA was closed down in 1998.) Carter also continued a practice begun in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War of extending heavy aid to the Middle East, especially Israel and Egypt, following the 1978 Camp David peace accords between those two nations. In 2001 Egypt and Israel remained the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.

When Ronald Reagan entered office, his rhetoric harked back to the Eisenhower administration in its emphasis on traditional liberal capitalist models of development that would stimulate private investment, an outlook that over the following decade slowly took hold in the foreign policy establishment, replacing the 1970s New Directions ethos. By the 1990s, this model was manifest in the foreign aid establishment's support for globalization, essentially a process that promotes the opening of national borders and the internationalization of economic and social ties through capitalist models of free trade and investment. However, in the 1980s, USAID administrator M. Peter McPherson could still insist that overpopulation, not underinvestment, corruption, and mismanagement, was the "primary obstacle" to Third World development. Indeed, the United States continued to fund hopelessly crooked regimes in order to keep them from linking up with the Soviet Union, like that of Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). As an exasperated USAID official noted later, Washington's $2 billion investment in Zaire "served no purpose."

During the Reagan administration military aid once again became a high priority, with more than 40 percent of U.S. bilateral aid being distributed in the form of loans for military training and equipment between 1981 and 1986. Outside of Israel and Egypt, a good deal of this aid went to Central America's anti-leftist regimes, including the government of El Salvador. Another key shift in foreign aid in the Reagan era was the new importance placed on Africa. Owing in part to the efforts of a growing number of African-American members of Congress, as well as the increasingly influential nongovernmental organizations, Congress created the Development Fund for Africa, which, as Carol Lancaster notes could not be "raided" by other programs. By the early 1990s, the U.S. African effort had more than recovered from the cutbacks of the early 1970s. USAID had programs in forty-three African countries, with thirty field missions.

While the United States certainly changed priorities in its economic aid programs in the wake of Vietnam, Congress was ready to gut military programs in this era. In 1976, President Gerald Ford tried to stem congressional zeal for cutting military assistance, as exemplified in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which called for such aid to be "reduced and terminated as rapidly as feasibly consistent with the security of the United States." Ford compromised by cutting such assistance in the 1977 budget. However, Congress then passed the International Security Assistant and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which made legislators the final arbiter of arms transfers and deployment of military advisers abroad.

The 1980s, however, also saw a growing debt crisis in the Third World, as many countries defaulted on their foreign obligations. In Africa, debt grew from $55 billion to $160 billion between 1980 and 1990, and servicing the debt proved a crippling task for many governments. The International Monetary Fund and other multilateral agencies, reflecting the growing ethos of "neo-liberalism" in this era, emphasized the importance of markets and market-based reforms to get nations out of debt. Continued aid was made contingent upon policy reforms designed to bring stabilization, such as cutbacks on borrowing and currency devaluation. Gambia, for instance, devalued by 90 percent. In Nigeria, the

World Bank made loans conditional on the ending of subsidies and large-scale irrigation schemes and the furthering of market reforms. In many countries, however, these changes often proved as difficult and culturally dissonant as cattle raising had in the 1970s. As Nguyuru Lipumba noted in a 1988 article, in countries like Tanzania, "streamlining public enterprises and letting them operate as commercial enterprises . . . without central government interference is considered a second-best policy."

THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. foreign aid programs faced a deep crisis. Senators like Patrick Leahy proclaimed that American aid had lost its purpose and vision and that its connection to foreign policy goals was tenuous at best. This transitional period has provided an opportunity for business groups, among others, to call for a more traditional use of aid: to provide markets for U.S. exports, a sentiment that also led to the 1992 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The NAFTA negotiations were a direct result of Mexico having moved away from more traditional patterns of Third World development, including import substitution and high tariffs, toward a more open market in the 1980s. Such economic openness was touted by foreign aid officials as the best means to improve the plight of the Third World.

The post–Cold War reassessment of aid also brought sharp budget cuts, and by 1997 USAID had lost twenty-four foreign missions and one-third of its staff from a peak in the early 1990s. While traditional in-country development did not disappear, the new emphasis on globalization helped create an agenda of transnational issues, or problems that affect a community of nations, often in a specific region. In 1993, the Clinton administration established the Task Force to Reform AID and the International Affairs Budget, which offered a number of broad-based initiatives reflecting the new transnational perspective on foreign aid such as preventing the spread of disease, environmental destruction, and drug trafficking, and addressing concerns such as child survival, migration, population growth, and the promotion of democracy. The task force's Wharton Report became part of the administration's Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act proposal, which called for making foreign assistance more amenable to "emerging international realities"—thus challenging the more narrowly construed national security premises of the venerable Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This effort did not succeed. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms decided in 1994 that cuts to foreign aid were more important than an ambitious retooling: "We must stop this stupid business of giving away the taxpayers' money willy-nilly." However, some revamping was unavoidable; the world *had* changed. To assist the former socialist states, in 1994 Congress enacted the Freedom Support Act and the Support for East European Democracies Act. USAID accordingly set up its Center for Democracy and Governance and an Office of Transition Initiatives. Sixteen Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries were targeted for assistance ranging from election financing to media advice. As a result of such initiatives, in 1996 the United States was giving aid to more countries (130) than it did in 1985. Still, traditional priorities did not disappear; while more countries were now getting development aid, it was a small total compared to the security aid that went to the two nations of Israel and Egypt.

The 1990s were also a decade of close reexamination of foreign aid in the international giving arena. The United Nations Development Program issued a study in 1996 that noted that in the 1980s, 100 countries, or 1.6 billion people, had experienced economic decline—despite enormous amounts of global aid. Most of these countries had lower average incomes in 1990 than in 1980, and almost half had smaller incomes than in 1970. The few who seemed to be holding their own were civil servants, whose salaries totaled 20 percent of Zambia's GNP, for instance.

Foreign aid's role in forestalling crises looked dubious too. Much U.S. aid, for example, had gone to so-called "collapsed states," meaning states that have fallen apart due to mismanagement, corruption, civil war, or oppressive leadership, including Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. And where states survived, it became difficult to argue that such aid did not have distorting effects on local economies. In 1995, for example, such funds accounted for 46 percent of Lesotho's government expenditures; 77 percent of Ghana's, 97 percent of Malawi's, and an unbelievable 101.4 percent of Madagascar's. In the 1990s, recognition of this fact and its contribution to corrupt practices led the United States

to cut off bilateral aid to fifty countries. Washington later replaced some of this aid with assistance designated for humanitarian purposes. The AIDS epidemic in Africa, which by 2001 had created 11 million orphans, was a major impetus behind this new agenda.

In 2000, Congress allocated $715 million to child survival programs that promote maternal and child health and provide vaccines, oral rehydration therapy, and education. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, backed by corporate constituents including the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, have played a leading role in administering these programs. In 1995, in fact, NGOs registered with USAID spent $4.2 billion on overseas programs, and fourteen of them raised more than $100 million in cash and kind, including government food and freight assistance. These ranged from the giant CARE, with a total of $460 million, to Project Hope with $120 million. The NGO projects were often both simple and innovative. Project HOPE, for instance, used USAID funds to work with tea plantations in Malawi to provide health care for women and children.

Another priority was the promotion of democratic politics in the so-called Second World of former socialist countries. In Serbia, U.S. aid supported resistance movements like Otpor, whose activism helped bring about the ouster of the dictator Slobodan Milosevic. Aid administrators were also tying their works to new transnational priorities. The Clinton administration's Climate Change Initiative, for example, assisted forty-four countries in lowering greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, growing sensitivity to local economies prompted the United States to begin to send farmers along with food supplies in the Food for Peace Program. More than five thousand were sent abroad in the 1990s. Perhaps the largest priority as far as spending was concerned were peacekeeping efforts. These included the well-established programs in the Middle East as well as newer initiatives in the Balkans and in Northern Ireland.

The USAID Development Assistance request from Congress for 2001 illustrated the new global priorities, with $234 million for economic growth, $12 million for human capacity development, $92 million to support democratic participation, $225.7 million for the environment, and $385 million for population programs and protecting human health. The increase in spending on child survival, which rose from $650 million to $724 million between 1998 and 2000, was notable, as was the rise in the International Fund for Ireland (that is, Northern Ireland), which rose from $2.4 billion to $2.7 billion, and the Assistance to Independent States, which rose from $770 million to $836 million. The new emphasis on such programs as child health, which overshadowed development aid, highlighted a continuing debate among the foreign aid establishment as to the relative merits of relief initiatives versus developmental ones.

U.S. economic assistance in the early twenty-first century came through many channels. For example, the Development Assistance program was a mammoth account that included such programs as the Narcotics Control Program of the Department of State, the Development Fund for Africa, Economic Support Funds, Support for East European Democracy, Food for Peace, the InterAmerican Foundation, and the Peace Corps. In addition, many U.S. cabinet agencies, like the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, also provided their own aid and technical assistance programs in such countries as Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine.

GLOBALIZATION'S IMPACT ON FOREIGN AID

Many of the new priorities reflected a growing recognition of the ongoing process of globalization, which has flourished since the breakdown of rigid trading blocs in the former communist world, as well as the embrace of free trade by Third World nations such as Mexico and South Korea. As noted, it has also brought new attention to transnational issues such as environmental destruction, infectious disease, and terrorism. Globalization has certainly greatly accelerated international communication and trade. It has, for instance, allowed U.S. exports to Central America to double since 1992 to almost $10 billion annually. The process has won a wide following in U.S. foreign aid circles; in 1989 a study conducted by USAID pointed to a seven-point annual growth rate difference between the most and least open economies. In 2000, the World Trade Organization (WTO), an international body that promotes free trade and supports developing countries with technical assistance training, published a paper by Dan Ben-David and L. Alan Winters that argues

that poor countries engaged in free trade are able to lift their living standards. The authors cite the experience of South Korea, whose economy jumped 700 percent since the 1960s. In a similar study of eighty countries over four decades, the World Bank agreed that economic openness is linked to higher living standards and growth. The rise of globalization has thus been used by foreign aid administrators to make the case for liberal capitalist models of development, and has undermined the 1970s ethic of direct government-to-government economic transfers to the Third World. As a result, while USAID did not abandon its development projects, it began to tailor them more closely to market results. Yet the U.S. support for just such policies, as exemplified in its leading role in the agencies that promote globalization such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, has opened it to criticism that it is forcing them onto Third World nations who would prefer a different path to development.

The 1999 World Trade Organization summit in Seattle, Washington, vividly revealed the wide opposition to globalization, drawing a huge force of protesters from both poor countries and wealthy ones. Many of the protesters would agree with the arguments of Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, who have asserted that the WTO "work[s] hand-in-hand with the IMF and the World Bank to impose the Corporate Agenda on developing countries." This corporate agenda, they write, seeks "to reduce all barriers to downward leveling of environmental, labor, and social costs" The American Friends Service Committee went so far as to claim that globalization "has undermined basic rights, cultural and community integrity, the environment, and equity . . . [and] caused economic insecurity." Critics point out that it has also lessened the importance of nations that once could use their resources or strategic locations as bargaining chips for aid, and has helped to create global disasters like the banking crisis in Asia in 1997–1998. Moreover, while some Third World nations like Mexico and Chile were enjoying rebounding economic success from globalization, many were being left behind.

Despite the critics, the process continued apace; in 1998, U.S. exports to the Third World reached $295 billion, showing the increasing importance of these markets to the global economy. Meanwhile, foreign investment in developing nations rose from $70 billion to $118 billion in just two years, 1996–1998. But some globalization supporters have pointed out that Americans and other Westerners could help still further by fully embracing the process themselves and allowing larger quantities of the most impoverished nations' goods to land on their shores. In a 1994 article J. Michael Finger pointed to the stark fact that developed countries' protectionism "reduces developing countries' national income by roughly twice the amount provided by official development assistance."

FOREIGN AID'S CRITICS

Attacks on globalization and its supporters in the foreign aid establishment, interestingly, resembled earlier excoriations of the imperialistic taint of foreign aid programs. In a 1987 study, Michael Hunt contended that "development was the younger sibling of containment" and "drew its inspiration from the old American vision of appropriate or legitimate processes of social change and an abiding sense of superiority over the dark-skinned peoples of the Third World." Writing in 1978, Ian J. Bickerton noted that "foreign aid has enabled former colonial powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, to maintain their historic political, economic, and cultural ties with former colonies . . . it is precisely this network of Atlantic-European domination and imperialism that forms the basis of the current aid programs." This assessment was echoed by the World Trade Organization protesters in Seattle, who accused the United States and other Western countries of perpetuating a mechanism of worldwide economic imperialism—née globalism. In the view of globalization's critics, this process is just another way for rich countries like the United States, with only a fraction of the world's population, area, and natural resources, to manipulate the global money market, to control much of the world's trade, and to reserve most of the world's raw materials for its own use.

In many ways, of course, foreign aid does continue the relationship that began under an earlier, imperialist past, particularly for colonial powers like Britain, France, and Belgium. Yet many other countries, such as the Scandinavian nations and Canada, who lack an imperialist history, have also become foreign aid donors, as Olav Stokke noted in a 1996 article. An overemphasis on the imperialism of foreign aid overlooks the importance of their "humane internationalism," which he termed "an acceptance of the principle

that citizens of industrial nations have moral obligations" to the outside world.

Beyond the crimes of imperialism, foreign aid has also been vilified for aiding and abetting despotic regimes that have done little for their people. Scholars such as Hunt, Thomas G. Paterson, Richard H. Immerman and many others have criticized the United States's historic penchant for supporting right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East in order to inhibit the forces of "international communism." Analysts like Nicholas Eberstadt, Doug Bandow, Peter Boone and others agree that aid keeps oppressive political elites in control, but they have focused their critiques more broadly on the overall ineffectiveness of this aid in meeting its stated aims. In several African countries, governments have been so corrupt and countries so wracked by civil war that foreign aid has served only to line the pockets of dictators. While such funds have certainly helped mitigate illiteracy and disease in much of the world, their record of lifting countries out of poverty is more mixed. Many countries have been aid recipients for as many as three decades, including Chile, Egypt, India, Sudan, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia.

Besides being often ineffective, in some cases aid has been actually damaging. Relief worker Michael Maren, a veteran of the massive Operation Restore Hope campaign in Somalia during the early 1990s, recalled that "the relief program was probably killing as many people as it was saving, and the net result was that Somali soldiers were supplementing their income by selling food," even as rebel forces were using it to further their warfare on Ethiopia. In another ironic example, the U.S.-supported World Bank gave $16 million to Sudan to fight hunger while Sudan's government was starving its own people. Foreign aid, then, has been attacked by critics for imperialistically exploiting the Third World for Western interests, distorting economies, hurting local farmers and peasants, and consolidating the grip of local elites at the expense of the average Third World resident.

Nicholas Eberstadt argues that a chief reason for the inefficacy of U.S. aid is because it has not supported policies that are congruent with American values, including "the defense of liberty" and "the promotion of justice." Instead, the United States has too often relied on a "materialistic" policy limited to financial aid to oppressive regimes, overlooking the plight of those who continue to live under them. Yet Carol Lancaster, a former deputy administrator of USAID who readily admits the failure of aid in many African countries, contended in a 2000 article that foreign aid nevertheless has been "an extremely useful tool of U.S. diplomacy." She points to progress in lowering the rate of poverty worldwide, from 28 percent in the late 1980s to 24 percent a decade later, and to the trend of rising living standards in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. By the end of the twentieth century, these trends had yet to affect much of Africa. Further, she argues that a new policy of foreign aid, one that emphasizes humanitarian relief, democracy, human rights, and development—the latter to be limited to the poorest countries—is precisely the mechanism to further an American "diplomacy of values." Such aid will bring "soft power" to the United States, enhancing "the credibility and trust that the U.S. can command in the world."

This continued emphasis on values recalls the spirit of the 1985 Live Aid concert, orchestrated by rock star Bob Geldof in response to a devastating famine in Ethiopia. This and subsequent events helped create among their numerous participants a "constituency of compassion"—and a conviction that famine was a concern that the world community should respond to. At the time, however, critics dismissed this as so much sentimentalism and called for "development experts" to tackle the problem instead.

In the post–Cold War world both America's money and its position as the world's only superpower have made its global economic influence more significant than ever, especially in remaining areas of tension such as the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia. Peacemaking in such areas has emerged as perhaps the leading foreign policy problem facing the United States, and foreign aid remains the vehicle for most of the money that goes to these areas. In the Balkans, for instance, a promise of $500 million in U.S. aid helped end the war in Bosnia. The Israeli-Arab conflict has proved more intractable, though this seems unlikely to stem the flow of U.S. aid. Of the $3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants proposed in the 2001 budget to buy defense products and services, Israel was to receive just under $2 billion and Egypt $1.3 billion. In addition to this military aid, the State Department's Economic Support Fund also listed a $2.3 billion allocation for Israel and Egypt, with $840 million for the former and $695 million for the latter. Despite such hefty grants, Israel requested several billions more for advanced weapons systems not covered by the requested amounts.

Some critics have questioned how consistent these expenditures are with American values or with U.S. interests. As the Center for Defense Information's Rachel Stohl writes, "Selling weapons to these countries can perpetuate autocratic rule. . . . United States programs should not contribute to the prolonging of these 'un-American' practices." Leon Hadar of the CATO Institute, moreover, argues that the United States should drop its heavy commitment to Middle East peacekeeping, making room for regional powers such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to get involved instead.

In addition to providing aid to Israel and Egypt, the FMF funds have been used for detonating mines, fighting narcotics traffic, helping to dismantle nuclear weapons in Russia, and integrating Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic within NATO. FMF aid, indeed, was part of a sizable U.S. foreign military assistance program that amounted to $17.4 billion in 2000, including both State and Defense Department programs. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), for instance, provided military training in the United States for personnel from thirty countries. While the Pentagon asserted that the $50 million program inculcated its students with American values and human rights principles, one of its member institutions, the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, came under attack beginning in the 1980s for its connection with military adventurism in Latin America. Nineteen of the twenty-six members of the El Salvadoran military implicated in the murder of six Jesuit priests in that country in 1989 were alumni of Fort Benning. Adverse attention led the school to change its name in late 1999 to the Center for Inter-American Security Cooperation.

Far larger than IMET is the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales Program, which racked up $12.1 billion in government-subsidized sales abroad in 2000 on such items as the M1A2 tank and the F-16 aircraft. A similar but much smaller effort is the Excess Defense Articles program, which exports military surplus through sales or grants to such countries as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Poland, and Greece. Under the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. president also has "drawdown authority" to use defense monies for foreign emergencies as he sees fit. In 2000, President Bill Clinton put $80 million toward such causes as peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and a program to promote democracy in Iraq.

CONCLUSION

While U.S. economic and military aid continued to grow modestly at the turn of the century, it comprised a far smaller percentage of total global assistance than was the case in the early Cold War. In the late 1940s, during the height of the Marshall Plan, the United States provided 60 percent of the globe's foreign aid; by 1993, its portion had dropped to 16 percent. But the United States has not been alone in decreasing its foreign contributions. In the 1990s, international development assistance declined by one-third in real terms, dropping from $61 billion to $52 billion between 1992 and 1998. Development assistance fell to an average of 0.24 percent of GDP in advanced countries by 1998. The most generous country was Norway, which gave away nearly 1 percent of its GNP; the United States, by contrast, donated only 0.1 percent, the smallest of all members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. However, the United States did furnish the second-highest dollar figure in 1998, $8.8 billion; Japan topped the list with $10.6 billion.

Owing to such expenditures, by the mid-1990s Third World governments owed almost $2 trillion to Western loan agencies and governments. The African debt alone surpassed $230 billion. Beginning in 1996, the IMF and World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), an attempt to provide significant debt relief (up to 80 percent) based on a program of economic restructuring in the debtor nations. However, when few countries proved able to sustain the restructuring requirements, the funding institutions announced HIPC II in 1998, a bolder initiative that targeted $100 billion in debt reduction. By April 2001, $20 billion in debt had been cancelled for twenty-two countries, eighteen of which were in Africa. Over time the reductions were to bring associated total relief of $34 billion to these countries. When combined with other existing debt relief programs, reductions would amount to $55 billion, about a two-thirds reduction. The millennial year also saw the launching of the international Jubilee 2000 coalition to lobby for further debt relief, using the biblical terminology of a jubilee year, based on ancient Israel's practice of forgiving debts on a fifty-year cycle. To the great enthusiasm of a crowd gathered for a Jubilee 2000 meeting in December of that year, British Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that Britain would cancel or

"hold in trust" the debt payments of forty-one countries.

Debt-relief efforts were certainly expected to provide a break for poor nations. However, the fact remained that in 2000 the average person in the richest twenty countries earned thirty-seven times more annually than the typical resident of the poorest twenty nations, double the gap since 1960. Foreign aid, which USAID claims has been responsible for a great deal of the progress in lessening poverty, disease, and illiteracy, indeed may have stopped that gulf from being even wider. The reasons for a continuing gap defy easy explanation, and in general are tied both to rising growth rates in the First World, including a great expansion in private capital, as well as the continuing political, social, and economic problems of the developing world.

With the end of the Cold War's communist threat and a widening perception that foreign aid monies have been ineffective, wasted, or turned to corrupt purposes, America's foreign aid program underwent increasingly close scrutiny. As noted, humanitarian relief and child rescue emerged as the most notable new priorities in the 1990s, supplanting the development paradigm and its oft-discredited large-scale projects. Moreover, a new ideological purpose arose to replace the old Cold War consensus. Upon entering office in January 2001, President George W. Bush cut off U.S. funding to all foreign NGOs with family planning programs that provide abortion or abortion counseling, restoring a policy that his father, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan also employed, dating back to 1984. At the same time, the longtime critic of foreign aid Jesse Helms called for channeling foreign aid funding directly to religious charities and NGOs, separate from the efforts of USAID's "cold, heartless bureaucrats," as he put it.

American economic and military aid programs, for all their shifting priorities, contested results, and popular distaste, have long outlived the span that their early adherents predicted, and at the turn of the twenty-first century it appeared likely that foreign aid would continue. One may hope that in the next half century, either owing to aid, investment, political reform, or some other set of factors, the developing world will have come much closer to reaching the results predicted by John F. Kennedy for the 1960s "decade of development."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baldwin, David. *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943–1962.* Chicago, 1966. A valuable discussion of the political aspects of American policies of economic development.

Bandow, Doug. "Foreign Aid: Help or Hindrance." Cato Policy Analysis No. 273, 25 April 1997. A strong critique of U.S. foreign aid policies.

Ben-David, Dan, and L. Alan Winters, "Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty." World Trade Organization Special Study No. 5. 1999.

Bill, James A. *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of Iranian-American Relations.* New Haven, Conn., 1988. A critical look at a controversial relationship.

Boone, Peter, and Jean-Paul Faguet. "Multilateral Aid, Politics and Poverty: Past Failures and Future Challenges." In Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, eds. *The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1998.

Bovard, James. "The World Bank and the Impoverishment of Nations." In Doug Bandow, ed. *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World.* Washington, D.C., 1994.

Brecher, Jeremy, and Tim Costello. *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up.* Boston, 1994. The authors strongly critique globalization and argue for greater assistance to the Third World.

Eberstadt, Nicholas. *Foreign Aid and American Purpose.* Washington, D.C., 1988. A powerfully argued critique of foreign aid that suggests American values are missing from the foreign aid calculus.

Edkins, Jenny. *Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid.* Minneapolis, 2000. A study of responses to famine, heavily influenced by postmodern theoretical approaches.

Feis, Herbert. *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1964. A strong defense of foreign aid reflecting the ethos of the early 1960s.

Finger, J. Michael. "The High Cost of Trade Protectionism to the Third World." In Doug Bandow, ed. *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World.* Washington, D.C., 1994.

Hancock, Graham. *Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business.* New York, 1989. A highly critical analysis of international aid agencies and their results.

Hogan, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*. New York, 1987. Still the most comprehensive overview of the program.

Hunt, Michael. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New Haven, Conn., 1987. A well-researched critique of the ideological roots of U.S. diplomacy.

Kamath, Shyam J. "Foreign Aid and India's Leviathan State." In Doug Bandow, ed. *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World*. Washington, D.C., 1994.

LaFeber, Walter. *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750*. New York, 1989. A useful and highly readable survey.

Lancaster, Carol. *Aid for Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done*. Chicago, 1999. A highly useful, comprehensible, and even-handed survey.

———. "Redesigning Foreign Aid." *Foreign Affairs* 79 (September-October 2000): 74–88.

Landes, David. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York, 1998. An innovative study of deep-rooted causes of poverty and wealth.

Lipumba, Nguyuru. "Policy Reforms for Economic Development in Tanzania." In Stephen K. Commins, ed. *Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank: Hard Questions, Costly Choices*. Boulder, Colo., 1988.

Montgomery, John D. *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia*. New York, 1962. A supportive analysis of foreign aid, based on the author's study of the American program in Vietnam.

Mosley, Paul. *Foreign Aid: Its Defense and Reform*. Lexington, Ky., 1987. An optimistic analysis of foreign aid.

Nijman, Jan. "United States Foreign Aid: Crisis? What Crisis?" In Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, eds. *The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid*. Syracuse, 1998.

Pach, Chester J., Jr. "Military Assistance and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress." In Michael Barnhart, ed. *Congress and United States Foreign Policy*. Albany, N.Y., 1987. An important study of congressional attempts and effectiveness in influencing foreign military aid.

———. *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991. Excellent study of the formative years of this program.

Smillie, Ian, and Henny Helmich, eds. *Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development*. London, 1999.

Stohl, Rachel. "Middle East Remains Attractive Market for U.S. Arms." In Center for Defense Information *Weekly Defense Monitor* 4, no. 7 (17 February 2000).

Stokke, Olav. "Foreign Aid: What Now?" In Olav Stokke, ed. *Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges*. London, 1996.

Streeter, Stephen M. *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961*. Athens, Ohio, 2000. Argues that the Eisenhower administration intervened in Guatemala to protect U.S. interests against Third World nationalism more than in response to a communist threat.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report 1996*. New York, 1996.

U.S. Department of State, Agency for International Development. *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*. Washington, D.C., 1990.

U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2d session. *Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a Draft Bill to Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, and for other Purposes*. Washington, D.C., 1962.

See also CONTAINMENT; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; TARIFF POLICY.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Armin Rappaport and William Earl Weeks

Freedom of the seas is one of the original and most important principles in the history of American foreign policy. American statesmen have, in essence, defined it as the right of all peoples to travel unmolested in international waters in both war and peace. Historically, it has been one of the chief means by which the United States has influenced international affairs; the vigorous assertion of the principle of freedom of the seas has been a major cause of four armed conflicts: the Quasi-War with France in 1798, the Barbary Wars, the War of 1812, and World War I.

ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

The concept of freedom of the seas predates the American nation, arising in the European world amid the heightened rivalries of the European state system in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was on the principle of freedom of the seas that King Francis I of France disputed the exclusive right in certain seas that the pope had granted to Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century. Later, Queen Elizabeth I of England proclaimed: "The use of the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people or private man." Perhaps the most notable assertion of the principle of freedom of the seas was the book *Mare Liberum* (1609) by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. Grotius defined the seas as being, like the air, limitless and therefore common to all people. Despite Grotius's efforts, European mercantilist powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries generally sought to control as much of the world's oceans as they could.

From the beginning of the American nation, U.S. political leaders championed the view that the seas ought to be free in war as well as in peace. As John Adams said in 1783:

> The United States of America have propagated far and wide in Europe the ideas of the liberty of navigation and commerce. The powers of Europe, however, cannot agree as yet, in adopting them to their full extent. . . . For my own part, I think nature wiser than all the courts and estates of the world, and, therefore, I wish all her seas and rivers upon the whole globe free.

Benjamin Franklin was of the same mind. In 1782 he said, "In general, I would only observe that commerce, consisting in a mutual exchange of the necessaries of life, the more free and unrestrained it is the more it flourishes and the happier are all the nations concerned in it." The American assertion of the principle of freedom of the seas thus became closely connected to the principle of freedom of commerce. Applied in wartime, these principles translated into the right of citizens of neutral states to carry on their normal trading pursuits without interference by the belligerents, unless that trade was in a narrowly defined list of war goods destined for a belligerent. Throughout its history, with two exceptions—the Civil War and World War I—the United States has been the principal proponent and defender of that view.

The American position on freedom of the seas was first expressed on 18 July 1776, when John Adams presented to the Continental Congress the report of a committee of which he was chairman and whose other members were Benjamin Franklin, John Dickinson, Benjamin Harrison, and Robert Morris. The committee had been appointed some five weeks earlier and had been charged with preparing a "plan of treaties to be entered into with foreign states and kingdoms." Its report proposed a model set of articles concerning neutral commerce in wartime to be included in treaties of amity and commerce with other powers. On 17 September of the same year, Congress adopted the committee's proposals, which thereupon became the first official American statement on the freedom of the seas.

The proposal contained four articles: first, should one of the signatories be at war and the other neutral, the citizens of the neutral could trade with the enemies of the belligerent in all items except contraband of war, the latter being limited to arms, munitions of war, and horses (food and naval stores were specifically excluded); second, citizens of the neutral could trade with the enemies of the belligerent in noncontraband not only from enemy ports to neutral ports but also between ports of an enemy; third, enemy noncontraband found in neutral ships was not liable to confiscation by the belligerent ("free ships make free goods"); and fourth, neutral goods, whether contraband or noncontraband, found in enemy vessels were liable to confiscation.

These principles, known collectively as the Treaty Plan of 1776, and clearly favorable to neutrals, were not invented by Adams and his colleagues. For more than a century they had been a part of the international maritime scene and had been practiced by neutrals and belligerents during the great dynastic wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, albeit with occasional modifications. They had also been incorporated in several treaties between European powers, most notably France and Great Britain in 1655, 1686, and 1713.

It is not surprising that Adams's committee proposed, and the Congress accepted, the maritime principles of 1776. For one thing, they were a natural and logical concomitant of the Declaration of Independence. It seemed only reasonable that the "unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" should extend to the high seas. More important, the principles were consistent with the visions that the Founders had for the new republic's future. As Adams noted, the country was to "be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations." It would take no part in Europe's wars. Rather, American merchants would be the great neutral carriers of the needs of the belligerents, and for that role they would need the protection of the maritime principles of 1776. Should the United States find itself a belligerent at some future time, a liberal interpretation of the rights of neutrals would still be useful and important. The Founders never expected that the American navy would be large and powerful enough to protect American shipping in wartime—neutral vessels would have to be depended upon to handle American commerce, and for that they would need the cover of the principles of 1776.

American diplomats succeeded in incorporating the cherished maritime articles into the first bilateral treaty signed by the new republic. In 1778 the Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce contained almost without change the language and the substance of the Treaty Plan. But that was only the beginning of the nearly universal acceptance of the American position. Three more agreements—with the Netherlands in 1782, with Sweden in 1783, and with Prussia in 1785—also included the maritime articles of 1776.

Meanwhile, in 1780 the Russian empress, Catherine the Great, had announced that her country's neutral commerce in the war then raging between England and its former colonies would be governed by four principles. Three of them—free ships make free goods, freedom of neutrals to trade between ports of a belligerent, and contraband limited to arms and munitions—came directly from the Treaty Plan of 1776. The fourth—that a port be considered legally blockaded only if there were a sufficient number of vessels at its mouth to make entry dangerous—had not been dealt with by Adams's committee in 1776. It was, however, included in a new treaty plan adopted by the United States in 1784. At Russia's invitation, seven other nations adhered to Catherine's principles. Thus, of the great powers only Great Britain refused to be bound by the liberal maritime principles. Hard though they tried, the American commissioners negotiating the peace that ended the war between mother country and colonies could not get the principles incorporated into the final treaty. English statesmen, envisioning their country more often belligerent than neutral—and big-navy belligerent, at that—rejected the American overtures. The treaty said nothing about the rights of neutrals.

AFFIRMING FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN THE EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD

A challenge to the principle of freedom of the seas arose soon after the conclusion of the revolutionary war. In 1784 American commercial shipping in the Mediterranean, lacking the protection of the British navy, came under attack from the North African kingdoms along what was known as the Barbary Coast. In 1794, Congress, tired of paying tribute to the Barbary pirates and urged on by New England merchants devastated by ship seizures, passed the Naval Act of 1794, reestablishing the U.S. Navy and authorizing the con-

struction of six frigates to defend American interests in the Mediterranean. President Thomas Jefferson, without seeking congressional approval, dispatched several naval campaigns against the North African kingdoms culminating in the conquest of Tripoli in 1805. In 1815 a U.S. naval squadron bombarded Algiers into agreeing to end its attacks on American shipping. Thus was the principle of freedom of the seas successfully asserted by force.

The wars of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic eras posed an even greater challenge to the principle of freedom of the seas. When war erupted between France and Great Britain in 1793, the United States at once declared neutrality and soon became the chief neutral supplier of belligerent needs. France was legally bound by the terms of the Treaty of 1778 to treat American commerce according to the principles of 1776. Britain, having entered into no agreement with the United States on neutral and belligerent rights, was free to halt, by all means possible, trade between France and America. Unwilling to fight the war at so serious a disadvantage, French warships soon violated the provisions of the 1778 treaty and treated American commerce as the British did. When England and the United States signed a convention in 1794 (Jay's Treaty) that specifically included naval stores on the contraband list and stated that enemy goods were not protected by the neutral flag, France was furious that American diplomats had not forced Britain to accept the principles of 1776. The result was an intensification of French depredations upon American neutral commerce that led in 1798 to an undeclared Franco-American maritime war. Known as the Quasi-War, it lasted until 1800.

France and England made peace in 1802, but war broke out again in the following year. This second phase of the great struggle was marked by intense efforts by each belligerent to prevent neutrals from trading with its enemy. As the chief neutral suppliers and carriers, American citizens suffered severe restrictions on their trade. In 1812 the United States went to war, in part to defend its citizens' neutral rights.

It was true, of course, that the war was fought only against Britain, but not because France's conduct was less reprehensible. Congress, in fact, gave serious consideration to declaring war against both nations. In the end, however, a war against two enemies was unthinkable and Britain was chosen over France for the very good reason that its navy, not France's, dominated the seas and committed the largest number of violations of American neutrality. The point to remember is that the nation risked its lives, its treasure, even its continued existence, in order to defend the rights of its citizens to travel and trade unmolested on the high seas in wartime.

President James Madison, when touching upon maritime reasons for requesting hostilities, referred specifically only to "mock blockades" and to "violations of our coasts" as evidence of Britain's perfidious conduct. More generally, he spoke of Britain "laying waste our neutral trade" and plundering "our commerce . . . in every sea." He surely had in mind three British practices, all contrary to the principles of 1776. One was the interdiction of American trade between ports of the enemy, which England justified on the basis of the Rule of the War of 1756. That rule, established during the French and Indian War of 1754–1763, declared that a trade closed in peacetime could not be opened in wartime. In conformity with mercantilist doctrine, France, as well as every other European nation, prohibited foreigners from engaging in the trade between ports. In wartime, however, when the superior British navy made it unsafe for French vessels to carry the traffic, it was thrown open to non-French bottoms. Thus, the rule deprived American merchants of a lucrative trade. When they sought to evade it by touching at a neutral port (most often in the United States) en route between the two enemy ports, the British were not fooled. Their cruisers picked up the American vessels and their prize courts condemned them on the grounds that the ultimate destination was, in fact, an enemy port and that the voyage between the two enemy ports was "a continuous voyage only ostensibly broken at a neutral port." The two other British practices were the inclusion of naval stores and foodstuffs on the contraband list and the confiscation of enemy goods found in neutral ships.

Now a belligerent, the United States made every effort "to pay the strictest regard to the rights of neutral powers." Naval commanders were instructed "to give them [neutrals] as little molestation or interruption as will consist with the right of ascertaining their neutral character," and the orders were carried out. Neutral rights were respected. Insofar as the war was fought in defense of American neutral rights it proved futile, for the treaty ending the war made no mention of the subject.

Between the end of the war with Britain and the opening of the Civil War, the United States

continued to push for the acceptance of the principles of 1776 and the provision on blockade in the Treaty Plan of 1784. To some observers it seemed anomalous that the United States, on the threshold of becoming a significant naval power, should continue to support liberal maritime principles. A clue to the riddle was provided by Secretary of State Henry Clay, who noted in 1828 that the United States did not expect to become involved in maritime wars because its "prosperity is so evidently connected with the preservation of peace." And, he implied, even if the country should become involved in a war—and as a big-navy belligerent—it would value "the general cause of humanity and civilization [which] will be promoted by the adoption of these maritime principles [above] pecuniary interest." Thus, between 1824 and 1850 the United States concluded treaties with ten Latin American republics and one with Prussia incorporating the liberal maritime principles. Efforts to commit Great Britain to the principles remained unsuccessful.

The War with Mexico (1846–1848) provided the United States with the occasion to practice what it preached. Its policy toward neutrals was governed by the instruction of the secretary of the navy to commanding officers of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, issued on 24 December 1846: "The President has desired to subject neutral commerce to the least possible inconvenience or obstruction compatible with the exercise of the belligerent right necessary to the success of our military operations." One year later, explaining the U.S. position to the newly appointed commander in the Pacific, the secretary wrote: "No present advantage . . . should induce us to depart from that liberal interpretation of the laws of nations which we have always contended for as protecting the interests of neutrals against the violent claims of belligerents." Indeed, in the matter of blockade, contraband, and enemy goods on neutral ships, the United States adhered strictly to the principles of 1776 and 1784.

Six years after the end of the Mexican conflict, the Crimean War broke out and the United States again found itself a neutral—but with two important differences from the period of 1793 to 1812. This time Great Britain and France were on the same side, fighting Russia, and they made clear their intention to pursue a liberal course toward neutral commerce insofar as neutral goods on enemy ships and enemy goods on neutral ships were concerned. In both instances the goods, except for contraband, were to be free from seizure. Russia adopted the same principles and incorporated them in a convention signed with the United States in July 1854.

Encouraged by the action of the three belligerents, especially by that of Great Britain, and recognizing that for Britain and France the policies on neutral rights covered the duration of the war only, the U.S. government sought to incorporate the rules in a multilateral treaty and make them a principle of international law. Secretary of State William L. Marcy, in instructions sent to the American ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg in 1854, enclosed a draft treaty, noting: "The United States are desirous to unite with other powers in a declaration that . . . [the rules] be observed by each hereafter, as a rule of international law." In his annual message to Congress in December of the same year, President Franklin Pierce voiced the same hope.

The three belligerents did, in fact, "unite with other powers in a declaration" on maritime law at the peace conference that met in Paris in the winter and spring of 1856. Four principles constituted the Declaration of Paris, signed on 16 April 1856 by representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey: first, privateering is, and remains, abolished; second, the neutral flag covers enemy goods, except for contraband; third, neutral goods, except for contraband, are not liable to capture under the enemy flag; and fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective.

The Declaration of Paris proved highly gratifying to the United States. The liberal view on neutral rights that it had so vigorously championed for more than half a century had at last been written, if only in part, into international law. Particularly welcome was the end of British opposition. Still, the United States found itself in the curious situation of refusing to become a party to the declaration. The reason lay in the article on privateering. As Secretary of State Marcy pointed out in a lengthy note to the French minister in Washington, the strong-navy powers could afford to renounce privateering because they could effectively prey upon enemy commerce with their public armed vessels; small-navy states, like the United States, lacking an adequate number of warships, had to rely upon private armed vessels to destroy the enemy's goods. Only if the words "and that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband"

were added to the first article would the United States sign the declaration.

That principle—the complete immunity of (noncontraband) private property—had been advanced by the United States for many years. It was a logical extension of the liberal position on neutral rights. First suggested by Benjamin Franklin in 1780 and again in 1782 for inclusion in the peace treaty ending the War of Independence, it was included in the Treaty Plan of 1784 and incorporated into the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1785 with Prussia.

The signatories of the declaration did not summarily reject the American amendment. They deferred action pending a careful examination of the problem and the opportunity to consult among themselves. By March 1857, when President James Buchanan assumed office, no action had been taken and the new secretary of state, Lewis Cass, told the American ministers to suspend negotiations on the subject until the president had time to study "the questions involved." The president, preoccupied with problems closer to home, never did get around to the matter; thus, the United States lost the opportunity to incorporate into a multilateral treaty its historic and traditional position. Because the four principles of the declaration were considered indivisible by the signatories, the United States could not adhere to numbers two, three, and four while rejecting the first.

REVERSING COURSE IN THE CIVIL WAR

Viewed from a different perspective, the failure of the United States to become a party to the Declaration of Paris proved advantageous, for in the Civil War, which broke out in 1861, the United States remained free of any international legal commitments regarding neutral rights vis-à-vis the major naval powers of the time. For the first time in its history, the United States was the preponderant belligerent naval power, and that freedom would permit it to pursue any course at sea calculated to increase the chances of victory. As a matter of fact, the United States did expand its belligerent rights during the war and did constrict those rights of neutrals that it had championed since the earliest days of the Republic.

Early in the war, Secretary of State William H. Seward informed the principal neutral powers that American policy toward their commerce would be governed by the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris. And the United States did, during the course of the war, respect the principles of "free ships make free goods" and the freedom from seizure of neutral goods (not contraband) in enemy ships. On blockade, however, the United States strayed far from its traditional position. It is true that Seward insisted that a blockade not maintained by an adequate force need not be respected and that every effort was made to station a sufficient number of vessels at the blockaded ports to prevent entry and exit. It is true, too, that the British government accepted the existence of an effective (and, hence, a legal) blockade and respected it. But it is also true that in an effort to make the blockade more effective, the United States indulged in some highly questionable practices that the British had used when a belligerent in the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1793–1815) and against which the United States had protested vigorously. One, called the long-range blockade, was accomplished by "flying squadrons" of swift warships that patrolled the sea-lanes and intercepted neutral vessels far from a blockaded port, seizing them if there were grounds for believing their destination to be a blockaded port. Another was to place neutral ports (in Britain, the Bahamas, Mexico, and the West Indies) under surveillance and capture vessels as they left the protection of territorial waters, presumably for a port under blockade. In addition, Union warships took as prizes on the high seas neutral vessels coming from and going to neutral ports, on the ground that the ship and its cargo were ultimately destined for a blockaded port. American prize courts upheld the seizures, considering the voyage between the neutral port of origin and the blockaded port as one continuous, albeit broken, voyage. The doctrine was also applied to contraband. It was strange to find the United States applying the doctrine of continuous voyage, which had been so objectionable when practiced by the British in the wars against France.

In the matter of contraband, the United States did not publish an official list; but the secretary of the Treasury, in a circular sent to collectors of customs at several Southern ports where the blockade had been lifted, enumerated articles considered contraband and therefore banned from the ports. Among them were arms, munitions, and war supplies, as was to be expected. But the list also included naval stores and a host of other items, such as ardent spirits, corn, bullion, printing presses, coal, iron, lead, copper, tin, brass, telegraphic instruments, wire, and marine

engines—and those were not to be expected. They flew in the face of the historic American resistance to an expanded contraband list.

Why the United States turned its back on history and tradition, and exchanged the role of champion of the rights of neutrals for that of defender of the rights of belligerents, can be explained only in terms of a sacrifice of principle for expediency. Winning the war was the overriding factor in determining the nation's policy. Nothing else mattered.

EXPANDING THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: 1865–1914

From the end of the Civil War to the opening of World War I in 1914, the United States did not concern itself greatly with the freedom of the seas. It was a neutral in three wars during the period (Franco-Prussian, Boer, Russo-Japanese), but none of them presented any serious problems on the seas. The United States was a belligerent once during this period (against Spain), but that conflict was too brief to raise any serious maritime issues. There was, however, one significant development in American policy toward neutral commerce during the Spanish-American War—the division of the contraband list into absolute and conditional contraband. The former included articles primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes and destined for an enemy country; the latter included articles that might be used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances, and would be subject to seizure only if actually and specifically consigned to the military or naval forces of an enemy. In the latter category, foodstuffs and coal were the most important items. This division became a permanent feature of American policy when it was incorporated into the United States Naval War Code, adopted in June 1900.

If there was one preoccupation of American diplomacy concerning neutral and belligerent rights and duties, it was the effort to secure international acceptance of the principle of the immunity of private property at sea. The adoption of such a broad principle, long sought by American diplomats, would have applied to all private property, both neutral and belligerent, replacing the more specific provisions covering neutrals, such as "free ships make free goods." It was the subject of negotiation with the North German Confederation in 1870, and was incorporated into a treaty of amity and commerce with Italy in 1871. In December 1898, President William McKinley asked Congress for authority "to correspond with the governments of the principal maritime powers with a view of incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerent powers." Five years later his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, reiterated the plea. In the instructions prepared for the U.S. delegation to the First Hague Conference in 1899, the chief item was on immunity of private property at sea; the instructions for the delegates to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 included a congressional resolution of 1904 supporting the same principle. All these efforts proved in vain, however. The United States did not succeed in gaining international acceptance of the doctrine.

The United States did, nonetheless, have the satisfaction of seeing many of its other principles adopted at an international congress that met in London during the winter of 1908–1909, convened at the call of Great Britain. The ten maritime powers represented (Germany, England, Austria-Hungary, the United States, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia) agreed on a code of prize law that would be administered by an international prize court hearing appeals from national prize courts set up by belligerents. In seventy-one articles contained in ten chapters, precise and detailed rules were established governing blockade, contraband, nonneutral service, treatment of prizes, determination of a vessel's character, convoy, transfers to a neutral flag, and visit and search of vessels. Taken together, the rules that made up the Declaration of London were favorable to neutrals, which may account for the fact that the British House of Lords refused to ratify them (after the House of Commons had given its approval). Thus, they were not binding on any of the other signatories.

WORLD WAR I: A CRITICAL TURNING POINT

The United States sought, at the outbreak of war in August 1914, to have the warring nations accept the Declaration of London as the guide in their treatment of neutrals. Germany was willing, but England was not. As the preponderant navy belligerent, England was not willing to surrender the advantage to be derived from the lack of legal restrictions.

The plight of the neutrals, particularly the United States—the one most heavily involved in the carrying trade—was cruel indeed. As in the titanic struggle between France and England from 1793 to 1815, the only rule followed by the belligerents was expediency. No holds were barred, no measure was neglected that might contribute to the defeat of the enemy. Each contestant used to the utmost the weapon it knew best. German submarines stalked the seas, but mainly the waters surrounding the British Isles, sinking every vessel it could catch—enemy or neutral—carrying supplies to Britain. The British surface navy roamed the oceans enforcing measures designed to halt all traffic to Germany. Those measures were numerous and comprehensive, and reflected the cumulative experience of a nation for which the sea had been a lifeline for three centuries. The contraband list was extended to include the widest variety of articles and the distinction between absolute and conditional categories, which Britain had adopted at the same time as the United States, was gradually blurred until it disappeared altogether.

The blockade of Germany was not effective, in that ships were not stationed at German ports to prevent entry and exit but were, rather, placed in the North Sea and The Downs, a roadstead in the English Channel, from which the traffic to the Continent was more easily controlled. It must be pointed out that the two belligerents were under no legal obligation to treat American commerce according to American wishes. There was no body of international maritime law binding the warring countries (the Declaration of London not being in force and not having been signed by the United States), nor were they bound by any bilateral treaties with the United States concerning the treatment of neutrals. Visit and search were not conducted at the point of interception on the high seas; neutral vessels were taken into British or other Allied ports for a detailed and careful examination of cargo and papers. Neutral mails were opened and inspected for contraband and for clues as to destination of cargo. The principle of "free ships make free goods" gave way to the practice of detaining all goods on neutral vessels of enemy origin or ownership. Neutral firms that dealt with the enemy were put on a blacklist and forbidden to trade with the Allies, while neutral vessels that did not conform to certain conditions laid down by the British were subjected to "bunker control" and denied coal, oil, and other refueling supplies. Finally, the doctrine of continuous voyage, hitherto applied to absolute contraband only, and where the second leg of the broken voyage was by sea, was applied to conditional contraband, and where the second leg was over a contiguous land frontier.

The United States, caught between the two belligerents, protested both the violations of its neutral rights and the destruction of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. The protests to Germany were sharper, more insistent, and more demanding than those to England, although the policies of both were equally oppressive and damaging. The reason for such discrimination was stated by President Woodrow Wilson when he compared the British to thieves and the Germans to murderers. The former, he said, seized property, a matter that could be adjudicated at the end of the war, while the latter took lives, which were lost forever. There was, of course, another cause for the partiality to the British: Americans were entangled, emotionally and economically, with the British, which made a rupture of relations with them unthinkable. The United States finally went to war against Germany in 1917 to uphold its rights as a neutral and to defend the principle of the freedom of the seas, not only for itself but for other nations as well (the "challenge is to all mankind," said the president). The move might be viewed as the fulfillment of the task set out by Secretary of State Robert Lansing in a note sent to the British government in October 1915 that described the nation as "championing the integrity of neutrals . . . [which] the United States unhesitatingly assumes."

The deep concern the United States exhibited for its neutral rights, as well as for the rights of others, between 1914 and 1917 vanished the moment the country joined the Allied cause. Indeed, as a belligerent the United States outdid its allies in trampling upon neutral rights. The justification of a harsh policy toward neutrals lay in the necessity for winning the war and defeating the enemy of mankind's freedom—on the seas as elsewhere. The neutrals were not impressed by America's beneficence; they were shocked. As one Danish newspaper noted, "It was as a spokesman of the *freedom of the seas* and the *rights of neutral countries* that America came into conflict with Germany, and finally went to war. It would be a strange debut for her to start by committing exactly the same kind of outrage which Mr. Wilson pretended to fight against in the interest of the neutrals." As a matter of fact, the belligerent policy of the United States need

not have been so unexpected. It was heralded in a remark made by Secretary Lansing in 1915. He noted: "It was of the highest importance that we should not become a belligerent with our hands tied too tightly by what we had written. We would presumably wish to adopt some of the policies and practices which the British had adopted, though certainly not all of them, for our object would be the same as theirs . . . to break the power of Germany."

Almost every practice against which the United States protested as a neutral it pursued as a belligerent—the blacklist, bunker control, sweeping contraband list, postal censorship, and broadest interpretation of the doctrine of continuous voyage—rather as it had done during the Civil War. In fairness, it must be noted, however, that certain British practices were not adopted by belligerent America. The United States did not join Britain in the blockade or in the routing of neutral vessels into ports to facilitate searching them.

As World War I came to an end, the American view of the freedom of the seas underwent a considerable change. It came about as a consequence of Woodrow Wilson's dream of a new postwar international order. In that order the concept of freedom of the seas would not be used solely to describe the problem of the rights of neutrals to trade in wartime; it would have a much broader meaning. As stated by the president in a message to the Senate on 22 January 1917, it would mean the right of every nation to have free access to "the open paths of the world's commerce." And, he went on to say, "The paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and co-operation." One year later, on 8 January 1918, Wilson further elaborated his concept of freedom of the seas in his Fourteen Points. The second of them called for "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants." It should be noted that by the last qualifying phrase, Wilson indicated that restrictions on freedom of the seas could be effected only by the League of Nations, the new international organization for maintaining the peace, when acting to chastise a peace-breaking nation.

Unfortunately, certain nations were not prepared to accept so broad and bold a definition of freedom of the seas. Britain, particularly, balked at its being incorporated into the peace treaty. The British could not afford to leave so vital an element of their national security in any hands other than their own. "This point we cannot accept under any conditions," said Prime Minister David Lloyd George. "It means that the power of blockade goes; Germany has been broken almost as much by the blockade as by military methods; if this power is to be handed over to the League of Nations and Great Britain were fighting for her life, no League of Nations could prevent her from defending herself." France and Italy took much the same view. Said the French premier Georges Clemenceau, "War would not be war if there was freedom of the seas."

For his part, Wilson would not "consent to take part in the negotiation of a peace which did not include freedom of the seas [and] . . . unless Lloyd George would make some reasonable concessions on his attitude upon the freedom of the seas, all hope of Anglo-Saxon unity would be at an end." To avoid such a breakdown among the Allies, which would give Germany so great an advantage, the British finally accepted the point as a basis for discussion at the conference, but on the understanding that they "reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference." The point was never seriously discussed at the conference, and the treaty ending the war made no mention of it. Thus, Wilson's effort to redefine the principle came to naught.

Between the two world wars the freedom of the seas did not figure prominently in international affairs. After the breakdown of the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho called for a conference of the great powers to codify the rights of neutrals and belligerents on the high seas in wartime, but nothing came of it. It was clear that the United States and Britain would not agree—the former supporting the liberal view of neutral rights and the latter championing a broad interpretation of the rights of belligerents. In 1929 Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas introduced a resolution in the Senate that would have revived in some measure the Wilsonian dream of the United States joining other nations in denying the freedom of the seas to an aggressor. Appreciating the fact that America could not participate in the League of Nations' enforcement machinery by virtue of nonmembership, he proposed that should the League of Nations declare a nation to be a violator of the peace, the United States would withhold from that country "arms, munitions, implements of war, or other articles for use in war." Thus, there

would be no danger of the United States clashing with League of Nations states in the protection of its neutral rights. Sentiment in America, however, was not ready for a policy of taking sides in an international struggle. A similar effort in 1933 by the U.S. representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference failed for the same reason.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY

The outbreak of World War II in 1939 found the United States, for the first time in its history, a neutral unconcerned with the defense of its rights at sea. It had, by drastic legislation enacted between 1935 and 1939, voluntarily withdrawn from the business of supplying the needs of the belligerents. It had also curtailed the travel of Americans on belligerent passenger vessels and had circumscribed trade with neutrals by keeping American ships out of certain areas, designated as combat zones, adjacent to neutral ports. It had, in short, surrendered its traditional insistence that the rights of neutrals be respected.

Before long, however, the country abandoned the role of passive and withdrawn neutral and became virtually a co-belligerent, supplying the Allied powers with the sinews of war. The restrictive legislation was repealed in November 1941 and a vast flow of American goods in American ships started moving across the Atlantic. Now the term "freedom of the seas" was once more on the lips of American statesmen as German submarines, operating in wolf packs, attacked the Anglo-American maritime lifeline. President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in May 1941:

> All freedom—meaning freedom to live and not freedom to conquer and subjugate other peoples—depends on the freedom of the seas—for our own shipping, for the commerce of our sister Republics, for the right of all nations to use the highways of world trade, and for our own safety. . . . As President of a united, determined people, I say solemnly: we reassert the ancient American doctrine of the freedom of the seas.

He had already, in September 1940, labeled submarine warfare as defiance of the "historic American policy" for which, "generation after generation, America has battled . . . that no nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world . . . unsafe for the commerce of others." And in August 1941, when Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill drew up the Atlantic Charter, a blueprint for the postwar world, the seventh of eight principles was the hope that "such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance." Thus, the two leaders reiterated the broad concept of the freedom of the seas first proposed by Woodrow Wilson.

Like the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, the several treaties negotiated after World War II made no mention of the freedom of the seas; and as the Covenant of the League of Nations had ignored the principle, so did the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, the hope of Franklin Roosevelt suffered the same fate as did the dream of Woodrow Wilson. The unrestricted right of all people to enjoy the freedom of the seas is still not guaranteed by international agreement. Indeed, since the end of World War II the United States has on three occasions taken actions that tended to limit the use of the seas by other nations. The first time was in June 1950, at the outbreak of the Korean War. President Harry S. Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosa Strait to prevent the Chinese communists from attacking Formosa and to keep the forces of Chiang Kai-shek from mounting an assault on the mainland. The Soviet Union promptly labeled the action a blockade, which the United States as promptly denied. As evidence to support its contention, America pointed to the fact that commercial traffic in the strait was unimpeded and untouched. The interdiction applied only to naval forces.

The second occasion came in October 1962, when President John F. Kennedy, upon learning that the Soviet Union had built missile sites in Cuba and had supplied Cuban premier Fidel Castro with missiles, proclaimed his intention "to interdict . . . delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba." He called the policy a "strict quarantine," yet it had all the markings of a blockade. Vessels were to be stopped, visited, and searched within certain prescribed zones and along certain routes. The Soviets considered it a blockade and protested on the ground that a blockade could be instituted only in wartime. To escape that anomaly, American lawyers called it a "pacific blockade," which international law permits as a means for one nation to seek redress, short of war, from another. The legal difficulty surrounding the use of that term was that in a pacific blockade only the blockaded nation's ships could be stopped and seized—not those of a third party. In this instance Soviet ships were the object of search and seizure. Whatever the terminology,

it was clear that the United States had used naval forces to interfere with shipping on the high seas, albeit for the lofty motive of self-defense.

The third example of postwar American practice centered on President Richard M. Nixon's mining of North Vietnamese ports in May 1972. Again there was confusion as to the legal status of the act. Nixon denied the Soviet allegation that it was a blockade. The *New York Times* called it a "semi-blockade." The difficulty was compounded by the fact that the action took place not on the high seas but within the "internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam," to use the words of the Department of State's legal officer. And, indeed, there was no interference with freedom of navigation beyond North Vietnam's territorial waters. Judged by the classic nineteenth-century definition of blockade, the act could not be called a blockade. But by the mid-twentieth century, many of the traditional and historic concepts that made up the doctrine of the freedom of the seas were being altered to suit new conditions of international relations.

One major change concerned the extent of territorial waters. For centuries, the territorial waters of a state were calculated at three miles (a cannon's range). At a conference held in 1930 at The Hague for the codification of international law of the sea, the three-mile limit was adopted officially and the marginal sea was declared to belong to the state. At the same time, several nations, wishing to exploit, without competition from other nations, extensive fishing beds and mineral resources in the subsoil, made claims to a more extended area—up to two hundred miles. The United States made no such claims, but in 1945 President Truman announced the creation of "conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States" for the development of fishing. Similarly, the continental shelf in the same contiguous areas was to be exploited for its natural resources. No specific limits were put on the contiguous areas, but it was known that the government favored an extension of the territorial waters from three to twelve miles and the creation of an economic zone of two hundred miles.

THE UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

To settle the problem, conferences were held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 and at Caracas in 1974, but no agreement was reached. At Caracas the United States pushed the twelve- and two-hundred-mile limits, providing freedom of navigation and of scientific research in the economic zone was assured for all nations—"a balance between coastal states' rights and duties within the economic zone"—but some nations appeared hesitant about diluting their sovereignty in the zone.

Finally, in 1982 a comprehensive United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty agreement was reached that established the twelve-mile limit for territorial waters and the two-hundred-mile "exclusive economic zone" that the United States had pushed for. The historic pact deemed the

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: DEFINITIONS

"Innocent passage" means the right of warships, merchant ships, and fishing vessels to pass without warning the territorial waters of a state in a manner that is not—in the words of the Law of the Sea Treaty (part II, article 19/2)—"prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State." Beginning in the 1970s the United States vigorously resisted efforts to require warships, nuclear-powered vessels, or vessels carrying environmental hazards to give notification prior to passing through the territorial waters of a sovereign state.

"Right of transit passage" refers to the principle articulated in the Law of the Sea Treaty (part III, article 38) guaranteeing all vessels and aircraft the right to pass through or over straits less than twenty-four miles wide at their narrowest point, that is to say, straits in which the twelve-mile territorial sea claim may have territorialized waters that formerly were international. Such straits include Gibraltar, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and Malacca in the South Pacific.

"Archipelagic sea-lanes passage" applies the principle of right of transit passage to archipelagoes, most importantly Indonesia and the Philippines. It guarantees unmolested passage for ships and aircraft through and over archipelagic waters, defined as the area encompassed by the drawing of baselines around the outermost islands of an archipelago. Archipelagic sea-lane passage is guaranteed in part IV of the Law of the Sea Treaty.

world's oceans the "common heritage of mankind" and represented a dramatic shift away from Grotius's notion that the seas were free owing to their boundlessness. Now the seas were understood to be a zone of interdependence in which all nations (including landlocked ones) had a stake. Although the Law of the Sea Treaty substantially affirmed American notions about the freedom of the seas, the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush refused to sign it because of restrictions it placed on private enterprise regarding deep seabed mining. In July 1994 the Clinton administration, after negotiations leading to the modification of the deep seabed mining provisions, signed the pact; the Senate, however, perceiving that the treaty still hindered the U.S. freedom of action on the high seas, refused to provide the two-thirds majority needed to ratify it. As of 2001 the United States was not a signatory to the treaty, which went into effect on 16 November 1994 after ratification by sixty nations.

DEFENDING FREEDOM OF THE SEAS INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The expansion of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones by many nations since World War II encouraged some states to restrict in various ways free passage on the high seas, a phenomenon known as "creeping sovereignty." To resist what American diplomats termed the "excessive maritime claims" of certain states, the United States instituted in 1979 a freedom of navigation policy designed to assert its historic commitment to a broad definition of freedom of the seas. This policy aimed to meet encroachments on the right of passage either by sea or air by a three-pronged strategy of diplomatic protest, operational assertion, and bilateral or multilateral negotiation. The operational assertion part of the policy resulted in several high profile incidents including challenging in 1986 Libya's claim that the Gulf of Sidra was a historic inland sea subject to its complete control and the 1988 bumping of U.S. warships by Soviet naval vessels while exercising the right of "innocent passage" inside the twelve-mile territorial limit in the Black Sea. In 1989 the latter incident resulted in a joint statement signed by Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Schevardnadze affirming the right of American warships to conduct innocent passage through Soviet territorial seas.

For more than two hundred years, from the very beginning of the Republic, the tendency of American policy has been to enlarge rather than to restrict the rights of nations on the seas—that is, except in certain periods when the country was at war and the national interest dictated the extension of American rights at the expense of other nations. The determination and consistency with which the principle of freedom of the seas has been asserted is testimony to its central importance in the history of American foreign policy. It represents the effort to extend American notions of international law and universal human rights to the oceans of the world. It constitutes a massive de facto extension of American sovereignty to the watery borders of all nations. And throughout the nation's history and into the foreseeable future it has been and will be job of the U.S. Navy to enforce the principle of freedom of the seas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amacher, Ryan C., and Richard James Sweeney, eds. *The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives*. Washington, D.C., 1976.

Borgese, Elisabeth Mann. *The Drama of the Oceans*. New York, 1975.

Charney, Jonathan I. "Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock." *Foreign Affairs* 55 (1977).

Digest of United States Practice in International Law. 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1973–1980. Contains documents and narrative describing United States policy.

Gidel, Gilbert. *Le Droit international public de la mer*. 3 vols. Châteauroux, France, 1932–1934. A monumental and exhaustive account of the law of the sea.

Hagan, Kenneth J. *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. New York, 1991.

Howarth, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991*. New York, 1991.

Hyde, Charles C. *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*. 2 vols. Boston, 1922. A classic and standard account that deals with a wide range of matters pertaining to the freedom of the seas.

Jessup, Philip C. *Neutrality, Its History, Economics, and Law*. 4 vols. New York, 1935–1936. An excellent account dealing with the practices of all the major maritime nations from the eighteenth century to the end of World War I.

Jia, Bing Bing. *The Regime of Straits in International Law.* New York, 1998. Gives detailed analysis of the new procedures governing passage through international straits.

Long, David F. *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798–1883.* Annapolis, Md., 1988.

Moore, John Bassett, ed. *A Digest of International Law.* 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1906. A comprehensive account that fully covers maritime matters and deals with all phases of international law as practiced by the United States. The *Digest* is not a narrative but a collection of documents and cases interspersed with comment; the work has been carried forward chronologically by Green Hackworth, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1940–1944), and Marjorie Whiteman, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1963–1973).

Roach, J. Ashley, and Robert W. Smith. *United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims.* 2d ed. The Hague, 1996. Provides a heavily documented analysis of the freedom of navigation policy.

Rothwell, Donald R., and Sam Bateman, eds. *Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea.* The Hague, 2000. Discusses the various aspects of the Law of the Sea Treaty.

Savage, Carlton. *Policy of the United States Towards Maritime Commerce in War.* 2 vols. Washington, D.C., 1934–1936. A narrative with documents that covers the period from 1776 to 1918, giving a clear and concise account.

Swing, Jon T. "Who Will Own the Oceans." *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976).

Van Dyke, John M., et al, eds. *Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony.* Washington, D.C., 1993. Assesses the implications of the Law of the Sea Treaty on traditional notions of freedom of the seas.

Whipple, A. B. C. *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines.* New York, 1991.

See also BLOCKADES; CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY; THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; NEUTRALITY.

GENDER

Laura McEnaney

Although historians have been studying gender for several decades, the study of gender in American foreign policy is a relatively new phenomenon. Indeed, the proliferation of scholarship on this topic in the 1990s suggests that gender has become a permanent and theoretically significant category of analysis for the historian of American foreign relations. It is important to note, however, that this approach has generated lively debate among many historians. In journals and on-line forums and at conferences, scholars at the beginning of the twenty-first century continued to argue about the degree to which gender has affected the creation, conduct, and outcomes of international diplomacy.

WOMEN AND GENDER: DIFFERENT APPROACHES

Many people understandably but mistakenly equate the study of gender with the study of women when, in fact, these are fairly different enterprises. Historians who study women (many but not all of them women) look at women's activities and contributions in various economic, political, cultural, and spatial contexts. Practitioners of women's history see all women as historical actors: they look at an individual woman or women together in social movements, at notable and elite women or anonymous, "ordinary" women, at women in the kitchen or women in the streets. Since the 1970s (and even earlier), women's historians have argued that historical narratives have largely ignored women's experiences, yielding an incomplete, or even misleading, portrait of the American past. Through critical analysis of traditional primary sources—and by uncovering sources that historians previously did not think worthy of study—women's history seeks to expand and complicate our histories of industrialization, electoral politics, and warfare, to name only a few topics. Historians of women insist that their scholarship should not merely add a new set of female characters to the plot line of American history, but rather that the whole story needs to be tested, reconsidered, and revised.

The study of gender is an outgrowth of women's history, which is why people tend to view the study of gender and women as the same thing. The scholarly interest in gender emerged as practitioners of women's history, informed by scholarship in anthropology, psychology, and literary criticism, began to ask critical questions of their own methodologies. Shifting the focus from women to gender, historians of gender explore how males and females (sex) become men and women (gender). That is, to study gender is to examine how a society assigns social meanings to the different biological characteristics of males and females. Historians who study gender see it as a cultural construct—something that human beings create and that changes over time. The differences between men and women, they argue, are rooted in society, not in nature, and as such can be historicized. Moreover, gender scholars point out, if women's lives have been shaped profoundly by gender prescriptions, then so, too, have men's. Cultural ideals and practices of masculinity and femininity have been created together, often in opposition to one another; therefore, both men and women have gender histories that must be analyzed in tandem. Indeed, gender studies is relational in that research into the history of gender ideals and practices is always linked to investigations about the operation of the economy, the construction of racial ideologies, the development of political institutions, and other phenomena typically studied by historians.

So what does it mean to do women's history in comparison to gender history? Actually, most historians in this field do a little bit of both. Still,

whereas a women's historian would focus on, for example, women's labor force participation during World War II, a gender historian would examine how gender ideologies shaped the organization of labor on the battlefield and the home front, and how the war remapped the meanings of masculinity, femininity, and labor. Put another way, women's historians foreground women as historical actors, while gender historians foreground ideological systems as agents of history. Certainly, those who do women's history engage the question of how gender norms shape women's experiences and struggles, but they tend to focus on women, as such, more than they examine historical ideological shifts in the meanings of masculine and feminine. At the same time, gender historians do not ignore women altogether; rather they interrogate the very meaning of the term "woman," highlighting historical changes in the construction of masculinity and femininity, manhood and womanhood. Again, many historians do some combination of both, combing the documents for clues about how men and women have both shaped and been shaped by gendered beliefs, practices, and institutions.

The theories and methodologies of gender history have been adapted to many fields, but the integration of gender into the study of American foreign relations has been slow and uneven. Part of the reason for this is that the "high" politics of diplomacy seem far removed from the politics of everyday life that have long been the concern of gender and women's history. Until the late twentieth century, both diplomatic and women's historians were themselves inattentive to the connections between their fields and thus very few conversations took place across the disciplinary divide. Scholarly work in various disciplines since the 1980s, however, has revealed important links between American diplomacy and American culture, and the most recent scholarship reflects a more self-conscious attempt by historians to identify a dynamic interrelationship between the creation of foreign policy and the construction of gender.

FINDING WOMEN IN FOREIGN POLICY

The integration of these two seemingly disparate literatures—gender studies and diplomatic history—is ongoing, and it is important to note that this subfield is still "under construction." Nevertheless, it is possible to describe and analyze the myriad approaches historians have used thus far. One of the first ways historians have made gender visible in foreign policy is by spotlighting the presence and contributions of the anomalous women who have shaped American foreign policy. This approach reveals how women like Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Eleanor Dulles (the younger sister of John Foster and Allen), and first lady Eleanor Roosevelt have influenced foreign policy in a variety of roles—as elected officials, lobbyists, mid-level bureaucrats, and even first ladies. More recently, women such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Madeleine Albright, and Condoleeza Rice have risen to the highest levels of statecraft. President Ronald Reagan appointed Kirkpatrick in 1980 to be the U.S. representative to the United Nations. Kirkpatrick's staunch anticommunism and advocacy of a reinvigorated national defense fit comfortably in the Reagan administration, and she became a widely known spokesperson for Reagan's foreign policy positions. President Bill Clinton, too, selected a woman to represent U.S. interests at the UN. Albright served several years at the UN until Clinton appointed her secretary of state in 1996. Secretary Albright was the first woman to serve in that role, and in 2001, President George W. Bush made Rice the first woman assistant to the president for national security affairs.

Tracking these "firsts" and the careers of other notable but lesser known women in the diplomatic corps marks an important contribution to the literature simply because it makes women visible. Biographical information on how these women worked their way through institutions controlled by men can yield important insights about the role of feminism in paving the way for their entry, and about the challenges involved in managing a career in a field still populated with very few women. This approach also encourages scholars to not simply acknowledge women such as Kirkpatrick or Albright but to evaluate their contributions and legacies. Many critical questions have emerged from this literature about the weight of women's influence in foreign policymaking (Albright, for example, enjoyed much more access to policy inner circles than did Kirkpatrick), about whether female policymakers' contributions reflect "a woman's view," and whether American women can effect more change if they operate inside or outside of policy circles.

Still, this quasi-biographical approach to gender and foreign policy has some significant limitations. It tends to focus on elite women, so it is narrow by definition. As a result, we lose something of the story of how the nonelite majority of

American women have shaped foreign policy through different means. Further, its "notable women" orientation just adds women to the story, leaving untapped the methods, questions, and theories that define diplomacy and the discipline of diplomatic history itself. Finally, this approach also supports (probably unintentionally) the misguided notion that truly exceptional women, with enough resources and pluck, can enter the inner circle of statesmen, and that the vast majority of women cannot, because of either native inability or subjugation by a male power structure. Neither of these notions can be supported historically, nor are they the intended arguments of writers, but the impressions remain. Many more important biographies and studies of such women need to be done, but they can contribute only modestly to the knowledge about gender and American foreign relations.

Beyond this approach lies another, broader in scope, more inclusive of nonelite women, and more sensitive to the array of historical forces that have shaped women's inclusion or exclusion from foreign affairs. In this approach, women are written into the history of foreign relations as missionaries—emissaries of Americanism. These more prosperous white women (teachers, reformers, and members of faith communities) become part of the larger narrative about the energetic expansion of the United States in the late nineteenth century, and here they can be cast as both villains and victims. Historians have documented the ways in which women missionaries exported "civilization" to nonwhite populations through "uplift" programs that valorized whiteness, Christianity, and conventional gender and family ideologies. Some newer work has complicated this story further, suggesting that women such as turn-of-the century female travelers abroad and the women photojournalists who documented the violence of the Spanish American War participated in missionary types of civilizing projects, even if not formally engaged in missionary work themselves. At the same time, however, all of these works acknowledge that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century gender systems prevented women's participation in diplomacy (and domestic electoral politics), relegating women to a separate sphere of foreign affairs. Excluded from formal policymaking, these women were still political actors; they promoted the tenets of American foreign policy through the means available to women of their status. Like their sister reformers who worked in immigrant communities in American cities, female missionaries practiced their "social housekeeping" on a global stage. In this approach, then, women become visible in the dramas of foreign policymaking as collaborators in exile, historical actors who support the worldviews and expansionist agendas of male foreign policymakers but only from a position of exclusion.

Like women missionaries, women in peace movements tried to participate in foreign policymaking from the outskirts. Historians have found in peace histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a meaningful paper trail of women's participation in important national and international debates about U.S. foreign policy. In examining the theories, strategies, and tactics of organized women's peace movements, it becomes difficult to capture the whole of their contributions to policymaking. Historians hold different views about the degree to which peace movements generally have influenced decision makers' choices about interventions and arms buildups. Moreover, historians of women's pacifism have tended to focus less on the policy impact side of the story and more on the social movement story—that is, how it was that women in different eras were able to muster the ideological and material resources to create and sustain movements that addressed foreign policy issues long considered to be "men's business."

It is difficult to generalize about the politics of women's peace movements, because female pacifism has both enshrined conventional gender roles and advanced the ideas of feminism. One safe generalization might be that women in peace movements have capitalized on their outsider perspective; their very exclusion from the "man's world" of diplomacy enabled them to criticize—more perceptively, they argued—the overseas adventurism of the United States. Many female peace activists, whether mothers or not, claimed a maternal identity as the basis of this outsider critique of American diplomacy. Although there was no national, independent women's peace movement before 1914, there were individual women and small peace groups that lobbied in various locales. In these activities we can see a nascent feminist peace consciousness developing over the course of the nineteenth century, and much of this activism sprung from female reformers' maternalist sensibilities. These women, largely middle class, white, and Protestant, argued that U.S. expansion overseas should not extend what they charged were male values of conquest and

acquisition, but rather should reflect women's purity, virtue, and maternal morality. By the late nineteenth century, many nationally organized women's groups, such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), had fully incorporated a peace plank into their reform agendas. In fact, the WCTU created a Department of Peace and Arbitration in 1887, which enabled them to link more systematically their crusade against alcohol (a critique of male violence in the family) with a campaign for peace (a critique of male violence overseas).

Over the course of the twentieth century, through both world wars and after, female pacifists continued to claim the mantle of motherhood as an entry into foreign policy politics. Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, these later activists nurtured the notion of a maternalist citizenship, a concept that included not only the demand for the vote, but a full voice in governmental affairs, electoral politics, and any other arena in which foreign policy was made. During the years of World War I, for example, we see the emergence of what Harriet Hyman Alonso calls the "suffrage-pacifists," women who saw peace issues as inextricably linked with women's suffrage. The formation of the Woman's Peace Party in 1915 reflected this fusion of peace and women's rights; its platform called for arms limitation, international jurisprudence and peacekeeping, an end to the war in Europe, and the right to vote for women. Representation from numerous women's clubs at the founding meeting, including the WCTU, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the Women's Trade Union League, and the Women's National Committee of the Socialist Party, reveals the breadth of interest in suffrage-peace politics. Social reformer and Woman's Peace Party leader Jane Addams encouraged women already active in local matters to pay attention to international affairs—to link local with global. Addams and others noted that peace activism was a natural extension of women's nurturance of family and community, and the Peace Party's appeal to "the mother half of humanity" reflected their maternalist orientation.

Years later, well after women won the right to vote, motherhood continued to be an important identity and organizing base for women's peace groups. In 1961, Women Strike for Peace, an organization of "concerned housewives," called on President John F. Kennedy to "end the arms race—not the human race." They, too, claimed the experiences and insights of motherhood as a foundation for activism. As caretakers of the nation's children, they argued, all women had a responsibility to lobby for peace. Taking a multitude of positions on issues from the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 to U.S. intervention in Vietnam, members of Women Strike for Peace went further than mere criticism of U.S. policies: they argued passionately that the moral, maternal citizenship they embodied promised a new path to more harmonious local, national, and international relationships.

This ideological fusion of motherhood with peace made women's entrance into national debates about global affairs more hospitable than it might have been had they argued for participation based on more feminist principles of justice and equality. But as historians have aptly pointed out, women's pacifism was a politics of feminism as well as maternalism. Indeed, women active in peace movements saw a connection between militarist diplomacy and male supremacy, and they infused their critique of American foreign policy with a critique of male domination. Maternalist peace activism enabled women to understand not only their exclusion from the military state, but also their cultural and economic disenfranchisement in American society as women and mothers. They identified a link between military violence abroad and domestic violence at home. They argued that the violence of war devalued and destroyed women's values and women's work, since it was women—as mothers—who created and sustained life. The war machine was male owned and operated, they claimed, and an American foreign policy based on military intervention was the logical culmination of men's domination in the workplace, politics, and the family. In this sense, many women activists (especially those in the second wave of the feminist movement) went further than mere condemnation of their exclusion from policymaking bureaucracies—they denounced the whole system itself. These ideological currents could be seen in both nineteenth- and twentieth-century peace movements, and it is significant that women's participation in peace movements often grew out of and coexisted with activism in abolitionist, suffrage, and other feminist causes.

Although the focus on women missionaries and pacifists has been instrumental in writing women into the history of American foreign policy, this approach, too, has its problems. It can often assume an essentialized femininity (the idea that women are all the same) across all racial, class, and

regional boundaries. At the same time, it can posit a theory of female difference—that women are a special class of human being, uniquely nurturant, maternal, and peaceful. As historians have suggested, this seemingly powerful vision of women can lead to their exclusion from politics and policymaking, based on the assumption that women would be unfit or somehow corrupted by the rough and tumble world of diplomacy.

More importantly, ideas about women's inherent pacifism are not true. As many studies have demonstrated, women have been an integral part of military engagements as auxiliary military forces, production workers, and home front volunteers. In fact, women themselves have invoked a maternalist ideology to endorse as well as oppose military preparedness and war. And, of course, American foreign policymakers have often depended on the rhetoric of maternalism and family to whip up popular support for their decisions. At different historical moments, American women have strenuously affirmed and participated in a whole range of military mobilizations.

Taken together, these histories reveal women's varied levels of engagement with American diplomacy. They underscore the fact that "women were there" in the making of foreign policy: there were a few in policymaking circles, more in missionary work, and even more in peace movements. Yet finding them has not made it easy to generalize about the meanings of their presence, for women were positioned differently in relation to the state that made foreign policy decisions, and they viewed and acted on those decisions in different ways. Perhaps the most important outcome of writing these women into diplomatic history is that now scholars must widen their lens as they seek to understand how foreign policy has been made and implemented by varieties of historical actors in varied political contexts.

SEEING GENDER IN FOREIGN POLICY

If finding women in foreign policy has broadened the study of American foreign relations, then locating gender has stretched the discipline even further. In the most basic sense, applying a gender analysis to the study of American foreign policy is an attempt to see things differently, or to see new things entirely. Like other tools of analysis, gender offers another angle, another peek into the complicated world of policymaking. Diplomatic historians who use gender analysis are no different than their colleagues in the field; they, too, seek answers to longstanding questions about the emergence of colonialism, the development of tariff and trade policies, the rise of anti-imperialist movements, the origins of the Cold War, and the like. The use of a gender analysis does not preclude the use of any of the customary methodologies of the historian; gender merely adds to the historian's toolbox.

As explained earlier, the emergence of gender studies has made it possible for historians not only to find women but to see both women and men as gendered actors. Indeed, the research on women and femininity as historical subjects has inspired new investigation into the histories of men and masculinity. This has opened a rich vein of scholarship that does not take men's participation in foreign affairs for granted; rather, it interrogates how masculine values and worldviews have shaped diplomacy, enabling students of foreign policy to see anew how normative ideas about manhood inform policymakers' decision making in both domestic and international contexts.

But a gender analysis shows us more than masculinity in action; it offers a critical tool for understanding power in all of its guises. Seeing gender enables historians to scrutinize the organization of power in any arena, from the most public to the most intimate. Gender ideologies can represent relationships of power as innate, fixed, or biologically rooted, but gender history can make transparent the human agency behind those "natural" relationships. Gender analysis can also reveal how ideologies of masculinity and femininity are embedded in language and social structures; the language of warfare, for example, depends on gendered ideas of strength and weakness, protector and protected, which, in turn, shape how an institution like the military utilizes men and women to carry out American foreign policy. A gender analysis can be powerful precisely because it interrogates power itself; it raises fundamental questions about how particular groups have achieved dominance by naturalizing power relations that are, in fact, humanly constituted.

Cold War history offers an illustrative, although by no means exclusive, case of how gender analysis can affect the study of American foreign policy. It was in this field where scholars first began to commingle the study of politics, culture, and gender to expand traditional narratives of diplomatic history. The Cold War's rich imagery of nuclear apocalypse and hyperbolic talk of

GENDER: VOICES FROM THE DOCUMENTS

"The harsh fact of the matter is that there is also an increasingly large number of young Americans who are neglecting their bodies—whose physical fitness is not what it should be—who are getting soft. And such softness on the part of individual citizens can help to strip and destroy the vitality of a nation. . . . Thus in a very real and immediate sense, our growing softness, our increasing lack of physical fitness, is a menace to our security."

— John F. Kennedy on men's physical fitness and national strength, 1960 —

"The new stronghold of national security is in our homes. . . . For the first time, the personal defense of our homes is . . . being rated as co-*equal in importance* with our military defense."

— Katherine Howard, Federal Civil Defense Administration Women's Affairs Division, on family responsibility and Cold War national security, 1954 —

"This group of women came together to protest in the name of Womanhood against the cruelty and waste of war, and to give united help toward translating the mother-instinct of life-saving into social terms of the common good."

— Women's International League for Peace and Freedom statement, 1919 —

"Exactly as each man, while doing first his duty to his wife and the children within his home, must yet, if he hopes to amount to much, strive mightily in the world outside his home, so our nation, while first of all seeing to its own domestic well-being, must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations without."

— President Theodore Roosevelt on men's domestic and international responsibilities, 1901 —

"What does all this mean for every one of us? It means opportunity for all the glorious young manhood of the republic—the most virile, ambitious, impatient, militant manhood the world has ever seen."

— Senator Albert J. Beveridge on the annexation of the Philippines in 1900 —

patriotism and subversion first caught the attention of historians of culture and social history, who sought to explain the relationship between the social-cultural politics of the postwar home front and the diplomatic politics of the Cold War. This work tended to locate gender and national security themes in popular culture (film, mass-circulation magazines) and in the burgeoning social scientific "expert" literature translated for public consumption. Scholars have traced how messages about muscular masculinity and dangerously aggressive femininity made their way into the films, novels, advice columns, and even comic book literature of the era. According to this research, new opportunities for women's independence unleashed by World War II (as witnessed by women's rising participation in the postwar wage labor force) generated new fears about the stability of gender roles and family practices. Female independence, often portrayed in popular culture in highly sexualized ways, was likened to the lethal potency of a mushroom cloud. Social science experts and popular advice literature advocated family stability—and female domesticity, in particular—as antidotes to the past disruptions of World War II and the future uncertainties of the nuclear age. This scholarship revealed intriguing symbolic linkages between the generalized anxiety about atomic energy and the popular apprehension about the slow but steady transformations in gender roles and family life.

In a similar vein, historians have pondered how containment doctrine, a policy hatched in high-level diplomatic circles, became a language and practice in the popular realm. Historians of the family and sexuality, for example, have explored how anticommunism and national security policies became manifest in everyday life. The

ambient fear of nuclear annihilation, paired with concerns about the resilience of the nuclear family, spurred campaigns to "contain" the social forces that might prove disruptive to gender and family traditionalism. In fact, scholars have argued, postwar America's red scare was as much an attempt to root out nontraditional gender roles and sexual practices as it was an effort to secure America's foreign policy dominance. The preoccupation with national security abroad was bolstered by a security effort at home that enshrined "family values." According to popular cold warriors, with Joseph McCarthy being merely one of a chorus of voices, only heterosexual nuclear families with breadwinner fathers, stay-at-home mothers, and children could anchor a patriotic domestic security endeavor. Anything outside of that configuration was suspect, probably subversive, a potential menace to national security.

This gender conservatism underpinning the red scare was more than simply a cultural mood. Historians have shown it had concrete policy manifestations as well. Despite the changing gender and sexual practices of the wartime and postwar years, McCarthy-era intolerance led to the criminalization of homosexuality, resulting in the federal government's purge of gays and lesbians in government service. Advocates of the purge argued that homosexuals were "sex perverts" whose tastes and habits imperiled national security. Like communists, gays and lesbians could avoid detection and spread their propaganda under the radar screen. Homosexuals were dangerous as well because they were gender outlaws: mannish women who could not be domesticated and weak-willed, "sissified" men who could not stand firm and tall against communist aggression, at home and abroad. The theme of the "homosexual menace" pervaded postwar political culture, reaching from the very top echelons of the federal government to the most local bureaucracies and organizations. Using the screening and firing mechanisms of President Harry Truman's loyalty-security program, anticommunist officials were able to either screen out or discharge thousands of gay and lesbian citizens from government service. This episode illustrates how policymakers, opinion leaders, and ordinary folk imagined gender and sexual dangers as foreign policy or national security dangers. Without a gender analysis, these symbolic and material linkages would be difficult to see.

This early scholarship on the gendered meanings of Cold War culture and the national security state was highly suggestive, urging historians to think about connections not yet made and pointing out directions for future study. This work took the traditional approach of historians—document analysis—and pushed it into new directions, borrowing from postmodern approaches that take discourse (written and spoken language, images, and symbols) analysis seriously. Historians saw in this Cold War discourse rich and varied gender meanings that could broaden our understanding of how language constructed the national security environment in which policymakers formulated their momentous decisions. In the broadest sense, the work on gender, culture, and foreign policy provocatively suggests that the relationship between text and context is more than incidental—that text actually constructs the historical context, it does not merely reflect it. This work has also performed an invaluable service to both diplomatic and social history, because it has successfully linked these heretofore separate historical literatures. The fusion of this previously bifurcated historiography of the postwar era has yielded a more complex understanding of the Cold War as a creature with both domestic and diplomatic dimensions.

Still, the first historians to do this work tended to look for a gender–foreign policy connection primarily in popular culture, leaving unanalyzed the gender content of the more traditional documents (letters, memos, telegrams, agency reports, treaties) found in presidential and security agency archives. In fact, there was arguably a kind of gendering of the sources themselves, whereby scholars who wanted to find gender in diplomacy tended to look at popular discourses (gendered feminine) rather than at the records of diplomacy (gendered masculine). This left the impression, as Amy Kaplan (1994) has argued, that gender "enters diplomatic history only through the aegis of culture." More recent scholarship on gender and Cold War foreign policy has built on these earlier approaches, and historians continue to fine-tune and adapt the methodologies of literary and cultural studies to traditional historical analysis of diplomacy. Much of the newer work on gender and foreign policy now analyzes gender in sources that few postwar Americans would have laid eyes on. Cold War historians excavate the classified archival materials of presidents, defense bureaucracies, military leaders, intelligence agencies, and nongovernmental actors engaged in diplomacy at various levels. Their analysis of these institutional documents produced in relatively

remote political environments is no different than the cultural historian's analysis of documents produced for mass consumption. Like Cold War films or science fiction literature, traditional diplomatic documents are cultural artifacts that can reveal something about the operation of gender in the Cold War era.

An examination of particular moments in Cold War history from the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations may help readers see how this work is done. Diplomatic historians have long debated questions about the emergence of chilly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Volumes have been written about how the two superpowers sought military, economic, and territorial advantages as they tried to construct a postwar world hospitable to their own interests. Many scholars have focused on the development of the doctrine of containment, foreshadowed by the 1947 Truman Doctrine (which pledged the United States to fight communism in Greece and Turkey), and then articulated more thoroughly by George Kennan, the State Department analyst who penned the now famous "long telegram" in early 1946, followed by the "Sources of Soviet Conduct" article in July 1947. Historians have scrutinized Kennan's policy recommendations and rhetorical flourishes for decades, but until the late 1990s, no historian had done a close textual analysis that incorporated gender analysis. In fact, the question of how gender has shaped the political assumptions, worldviews, and policies of cold warriors has yet to be asked in a systematic way for the whole of the Cold War. Nevertheless, new studies have yielded some compelling findings on particular episodes in Cold War history.

Using the insights of gender studies, historian Frank Costigliola found that George Kennan's writings were rife with gendered metaphors that represented the Cold War as an emotional, sexually charged struggle between a man and woman. Kennan's favorite analogies to describe the changing postwar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union depended heavily on gender, family, and sexual ideologies and imagery. For example, Kennan likened the relationship between Soviet citizens and their government to a wife who becomes gradually disillusioned with her husband and seeks a divorce from him. Russian people, in general, were gendered feminine, Kennan's way of conveying his firm view that the Soviet citizenry was beholden to their cruel and despotic government, gendered as a hypermasculine authority figure. In his telegram, Kennan went so far as to portray the Soviet government as a rapist who tried to exert "unceasing pressure" with "penetration" into Western society. These gendered metaphors and tropes are not just casual talk; they are the stuff of politics, according to Costigliola and others. Kennan's writings shaped the political environment in which policymakers thought about and negotiated with the Soviets; the invocation of highly gendered and sexualized motifs, Costigliola notes in "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration'" (1997), "created an emotionalized context" that made the exaggerations of a Soviet threat seem "rational and credible," thus closing off deeper deliberation about the reality and dimensions of that threat. Other scholars, too, have delved into diplomatic sources to see how policymakers relied on gender to understand diplomatic relations between states. Historian Michelle Mart examined the gendered discourses of U.S. relations with Israel in the Truman and Eisenhower years. In this case, gender helps explain how Israeli Jews became worthy of a close relationship with the United States from 1948 through the 1950s, that is, only after they had proclaimed statehood and strenuously resisted subsequent Arab attacks. An analysis of the diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Israel reveals that the manly pursuits of statehood and warfare transformed Israeli Jews, in the eyes of the U.S. policymakers, from marginal global players to muscular fighters, sex symbols, and triumphant underdogs. Jewish "tough guys" had proven their mettle in the battle for statehood, and the reward for their virile and vigorous struggle was a dependable, long-term alliance with the United States. Gender defined the parameters of that alliance, for a tough-minded masculine orientation was considered by U.S. policymakers an important indicator of a country's fitness for a close political and military alliance with a global superpower.

A study of U.S. relations with India in the same time period reveals how the very gendered perceptions that enabled diplomatic partnership with the Israelis disqualified India as a serious player in Cold War politics. According to a study by Andrew Rotter, America's postwar relationship with India was structured, in part, by the gendered perception that India's desire to remain a neutral player in the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union was a signal of its passivity and cowardice. American policymakers, frustrated with India's desire for neutrality, por-

trayed India itself and Indian diplomats as feminine, meaning in this case, weak-willed, irrational, naive about world affairs, and ultimately undependable. Cold War gender ideologies that valorized masculine rationality and decisiveness as a counterpoint to feminine emotionality and passivity thus shaped policymakers' views that India was acting like a frightened woman who could not be relied upon to sustain a long-term diplomatic alliance in Asia.

Moving forward from the Cold War diplomacy of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations into the early 1960s, scholarly work has uncovered the centrality of gender to the policy assumptions and decision making of the Kennedy administration. John F. Kennedy's cultivation of youth, energetic patriotism, and moral courage has been discussed widely. As historian Robert D. Dean argues, scholars and media observers of the Kennedy presidency have often cited President Kennedy's preoccupation with "toughness" as an issue of personal style or habit, not a matter of gender politics. In fact, Kennedy's foreign policy interests and energies were a reflection of his views that American manhood was threatened by indulgent consumption at home and communist insurgency abroad, both of which required the diplomatic muscle flexing of tough-minded cold warriors. Kennedy's physical fitness programs would strengthen youth at home, while his new Peace Corps would dispatch an energetic corps of youth to all ends of the globe to fight the Cold War with American ideology and first-world technology. Meanwhile, his counterinsurgency measures, embodied by the elite Green Berets, would counter Soviet aggression by discouraging any potential—and quashing any real—Soviet-sponsored indigenous uprisings. In essence, Dean claims, Kennedy's policies were a projection of his perception that American men had grown soft and idle in the postwar period, and that the antidote to this crisis of masculinity was an infusion of bellicose and brawny political leadership at home and abroad.

We can reach further back in time, to the nineteenth century, to apprehend gender meanings in American foreign policy. Kristin L. Hoganson's 1998 study about the operation of gender in the Spanish-American War, for example, nudges historians to confront difficult questions about the causal role of gender in American foreign policy decisions. Like the scholarship on gender and the Cold War, her study is premised on the notion "that the conduct of foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum, that political decision makers are shaped by their surrounding cultures," and that "inherited ideas about gender" are a part of that culture and thus shape profoundly the views of foreign policymakers. In the case of the Spanish-American War, Hoganson states that gender ideals "played an exceptionally powerful and traceable role" in the decision to go to war. Advocates of intervention in Cuba and the Philippines believed that international aggression would fortify American nationalism and manhood at the same time. They drew on nineteenth-century ideas about "manly" character and citizenship, arguing that a war for territorial and economic expansion would energize and rehabilitate American manhood, which, they claimed, had grown soft without the challenges of frontier expansion, agricultural production, and warrior experience. Layered upon these concerns was another: women's growing political activism and their insistence on the right to vote. An imperial war, according to interventionists, would certify gender traditionalism (man as protector, women as the protected) and restore the manly (and womanly) virtues and character that were the basis of American democracy.

Interestingly, we see a striking repetition of gender themes between the foreign policy environments of the late nineteenth century and the Cold War era: a perceived crisis of masculinity (notably, associated with consumption in both centuries), an emergent anxiety about women's independence, and a confidence that a virile and robust American diplomatic posture abroad could go far to solve the twin problems of gender disorder at home and global threats abroad. In both periods of expansionist impulse, concerns about masculinity and femininity merged with concerns about affairs of state. Whatever the century or whatever the case study, then, late-twentieth-century scholarship made big and insistent claims that gender ideologies were a fundamental part of foreign policy formulation. In all of the examples cited, it appears that gender shaped the identities of foreign policymakers themselves before they arrived in Washington, and that it continued to shape their assumptions, anxieties, aspirations, and actions once they were fully ensconced in diplomatic circles.

GENDER AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Historians who study gender will find all of the above themes familiar, but scholars who have not

yet tangled with gender analysis in their studies of foreign policy might find the approaches dubious and the conclusions unconvincing. Indeed, since gender topics first appeared in the pages of diplomatic history journals, historians have debated the merits of gender analysis at conferences, in on-line forums, in journals, and in their own monographs. One of the reasons for this debate is that some of the gender-themed studies of American foreign relations gained momentum in fields outside of diplomatic history and, indeed, outside of the history discipline itself, in the more literary-focused arena of cultural studies. Skeptics of the gender approach have wondered aloud what diplomatic historians can learn from stories about sexual metaphors, "tough Jews," feminized Indians, and the gender tropes of imperial expansion and war. They have accused gender historians of paying too much attention to issues of representation at the cost of asking hard questions about causation. Some have argued that gender scholars have borrowed too heavily from other disciplines and have introduced questionable theories, methodologies, and insights into the field.

These criticisms are important and worth some elaboration. In fact, a great deal of the work on gender is indebted to postmodernist and cultural studies approaches, which cross disciplinary boundaries, take language seriously, and insist that historians interrogate not only the construction of reality in primary documents but the social construction of their own historical narratives. Cultural studies approaches differ, of course, but all involve close scrutiny of the unarticulated assumptions that underlay the legitimation, expression, and resistance of power. As Costigliola observes in "The Nuclear Family" (1997), "gender norms acted as silent organizers" of power in the diplomatic and political realms. Perhaps, then, what has made gender analysis controversial in diplomatic history is the fact that those who recognized these silences in their documents have also exposed some of the methodological silences of their discipline as well. Turning their critical eye from primary to secondary sources, gender scholars have provocatively suggested that gender norms might have also tacitly shaped the historiography of American foreign relations, thus calling into question some of the disciplinary "truths" of diplomatic history. Drawing on the insights of postmodernism, these scholars have argued that the historiography itself is a social construction, and that narratives about foreign policy (or any historical phenomena) are human creations, subject to the inherited biases and assumptions of time and place.

Such challenges to the discipline and its historiography have evoked spirited criticism of postmodernism, gender analysis, and critical theory in general. Some historians claim that postmodernist gender approaches are jargon-filled intellectual exercises that have done little to enlighten the key debates in the field. More than a few have said that investigations of language and representation have taken diplomatic history too far afield from its traditional units of study (the nation-state, for example) and its tried and true methodology of document analysis and synthesis. In particular, critics have challenged the postmodernist claim that historical evidence does not benignly reveal a "real" world or a central "truth," and that the evidence itself is a selective representation that can suppress multiple truths and heterogeneous realities. They maintain that such critical approaches, of which gender analysis is an elemental part, have spilled too much ink probing language and ideology rather than apprehending the real reasons for foreign policy decisions and outcomes.

While critics have argued that the new work on gender has better explained the connections between gender, culture, and diplomacy, rather than causation, those whose scholarship has been integral to this historiographical turn maintain that clear causation is hard to identify for any scholar, working on any problem, in any era. In fact, most gender scholars would agree that gender analysis does not explain reductively a single cause for a particular action, and that sometimes, gender meanings are not the most salient or significant aspects of a historical puzzle. Rather, they would argue, gender analysis abets the historian's effort to get closer to a reasonable and reliable set of explanations about a particular historical problem. Historians who seriously engage gender do not shy away from questions about causation, but they tend to approach overarching causal explanations with caution. The precise effect of George Kennan's "long telegram" on policymaking, for example, is impossible to discern, but it seems clear that his writings simplified what should have been a complex debate about Soviet intentions, and that his highly gendered, emotional musings naturalized—and thus rationalized—a set of diplomatic maneuvers that positioned the Soviets as unreliable allies and credible threats. In the case of the

Spanish-American War, the societal panic about masculinity in decline reveals how gender "pushed" and "provoked" warfare as an antidote to the changes in nineteenth-century family and gender relations. And in the case of President Kennedy's foreign policy programs, the gender experiences of Kennedy and his elite policy cohort, along with the gender ideologies and anxieties of the postwar era, motivated the president to respond to his Cold War environment as an Ivy League tough guy who could martial the resources to assure American hegemony.

These debates about gender and causation will, no doubt, continue, but in some ways they may miss the point. No historian has endowed gender with monocausal superpowers; in fact, many scholars of gender point out that the causal relationship between gender and foreign policy needs to be teased out even further. And although asking the "how" and "why" questions continues to be a staple of the discipline, perhaps historians need to reexamine this preoccupation with causation. The studies of Kennan and Kennedy are instructive here. As Costigliola's "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration'" has made clear, the questions about gender's causal effects in foreign policy formulation "arise from the premise that there must be single, clear, unequivocal causes for policies and actions," a premise that historians have repeatedly tested and found wanting. Even vocal critics of the gender approach have acknowledged that no single theory or explanatory framework can possibly explain the complexities of American foreign policymaking. As Dean has aptly stated, "gender must be understood not as an independent *cause* of policy decisions, but as part of the very fabric of reasoning employed by officeholders." And so, too, it should be for historians—that gender become one part of the fabric of our historical analysis, not a separate, unrelated path of inquiry.

Together, women's history and gender studies have enabled historians to conceive of foreign policy more broadly, inviting more actors, methods, and theories into the endeavor. A gender analysis offers one way to recast and expand the debates about the history of diplomacy. Its newness, relative to other approaches, has generated both excitement and skepticism, and as new work is published, historians will have new opportunities to debates its impact and merits.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alonso, Harriet Hyman. *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1993.

Cohn, Carol. "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals." *Signs* 12 (winter 1987): 687–718. A gender analysis of nuclear strategy debates.

Cooke, Miriam, and Angela Woollacott, eds. *Gendering War Talk*. Princeton, N.J., 1993. An interdisciplinary collection on gender and war.

Costigliola, Frank. "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War." *Journal of American History* 83 (March 1997): 1309–1339.

———. "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance." *Diplomatic History* 21 (spring 1997): 163–183.

Crapol, Edward P. *Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders*. Wilmington, Del., 1992.

"Culture, Gender, and Foreign Policy: A Symposium." *Diplomatic History* 18 (winter 1994): 47–70. A collection of articles and commentaries on the application of gender analysis to diplomatic history.

Dean, Robert D. "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic History* 22 (winter 1998): 29–62.

D'Emilio, John. "Bonds of Oppression: Gay Life in the 1950s." In his *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities*. Chicago, 1983. Discusses links between anticommunism and containment of sexuality.

Enloe, Cynthia. *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives*. London, 1983. One of the earliest works to theorize about women, war, and international relations.

———. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley, Calif., 1989. A useful primer on gender and foreign relations.

Goedde, Petra. "From Villains to Victims: Fraternization and the Feminization of Germany, 1945–1947." *Diplomatic History* 23 (winter 1999): 1–20.

Harris, Adrienne, and Ynestra King, eds. *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics*. Boulder, Colo., 1989. An introduction to issues of women, gender, and peace activism.

Higonnet, Margaret Randolph, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz. *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars.* New Haven, Conn., 1987.

Hoganson, Kristin L. *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars.* New Haven, Conn., 1998.

Hunter, Jane. *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China.* New Haven, Conn., 1984.

Jeffords, Susan. *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War.* Bloomington, Ind., 1989.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. *Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917–1994.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1995.

Kaplan, Amy. "Domesticating Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic History* 18 (winter 1994): 97–105.

Mart, Michelle. "Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948–1960." *Diplomatic History* 20 (summer 1996): 357–380.

May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era.* New York, 1988. An analysis of gender, family, and Cold War culture.

McEnaney, Laura. *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties.* Princeton, N.J., 2000. Includes lengthy analysis of women, gender, nuclear preparedness, and the national security state.

Meyer, Leisa. *Creating G.I. Jane: Sexuality and Power in the Women's Army Corps During World War II.* New York, 1996. A discussion of gender, sexuality, and military mobilization.

Papachristou, Judith. "American Women and Foreign Policy, 1898–1905: Exploring Gender in Diplomatic History." *Diplomatic History* 14 (fall 1990): 493–509.

Rosenberg, Emily S. "Gender." *Journal of American History* 77 (June 1990): 116–124. An overview of historiographical approaches on women, gender, and foreign policy.

———. "Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness." *Diplomatic History* 22 (spring 1998): 155–176. A useful discussion of gender, critical theory, and diplomatic history.

———. "Consuming Women: Images of Americanization in the 'American Century.'" *Diplomatic History* 23 (summer 1999): 479–497.

Rotter, Andrew J. "Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947–1964." *Journal of American History* 81 (September 1994): 518–542.

Smith, Geoffrey S. "National Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States." *International History Review* 14 (May 1992): 307–337.

Swerdlow, Amy. *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s.* Chicago, 1993.

Tickner, J. Ann. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security.* New York, 1992.

Wexler, Laura. *Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000. A study of female photojournalists and the gendered representations of war and foreign relations.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; PACIFISM; PEACE MOVEMENTS.

GLOBALIZATION

Thomas W. Zeiler

Globalization became a buzzword following the end of the Cold War, but the phenomenon has long been a factor in the foreign relations of the United States and has deep roots in history. To the extent that it meant the expansion of trade and investments, it can be defined as economic expansion, as in the transition from territorial expansion in the nineteenth century to the increasing internationalization of markets in the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War II, economic internationalism, or the suggestion of growing interdependence of nations and the development of international institutions, seemed to capture the essence of what more recently has been termed globalization. But such usages are too limited; they do not adequately define a phenomenon that shaped American diplomacy and its constituent elements of economics and culture.

DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

"Globalization" is a fairly new term. Professor Theodore Levitt, a marketing professor at the Harvard Business School, apparently first employed it in a 1983 article in the *Harvard Business Review.* It is arguable, however, that the basic concept dates to the first humans. Defined broadly, globalization is the process of integrating nations and peoples—politically, economically, and culturally—into a larger community. In this broad sense, it is little different from internationalization. Yet globalization is more than this incremental process that over the centuries has brought people and nations closer together as technological innovation dissolved barriers of time and distance, and enhanced flows of information promoted greater awareness and understanding.

The focus, as the term suggests, is not on nations but on the entire globe. Consequently, a more sophisticated definition might emphasize that contemporary globalization is a complex, controversial, and synergistic process in which improvements in technology (especially in communications and transportation) combine with the deregulation of markets and open borders to bring about vastly expanded flows of people, money, goods, services, and information. This process integrates people, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and nations into larger networks. Globalization promotes convergence, harmonization, efficiency, growth, and, perhaps, democratization and homogenization.

Globalization also has a dark side. It produces economic and social dislocations and arouses public concerns over job security; the distribution of economic gains; and the impact of volatility on families, communities, and nations. Many also worry about a growing concentration of economic power; harm to the environment; danger to public health and safety; the disintegration of indigenous cultures; and the loss of sovereignty, accountability, and transparency in government. These, too, are issues that have been topics of concern to American diplomats and foreign policymakers throughout the twentieth century.

There are two principal drivers to globalization: technological innovation and changing ideas about how to organize and regulate economic activity. Rapidly changing technologies for transportation and communications continue to dissolve the barriers of time, distance, and ignorance that once complicated long-range relationships. In the twentieth century some of the most important technological innovations that changed diplomacy were the jet plane, satellite communications, fiber-optic cables, and the Internet. Ideas also shape globalization, particularly the widespread belief that free trade, private enterprise, and competitive markets promote efficiency and economic growth. Another set of ideas also influences the globalization process: the belief among international lawyers that harmonization of stan-

dards, rules, and legal systems is the most appropriate way to resolve business conflicts. The impact of technology and ideas are the building blocks of globalization, and have shaped U.S. power, policy, and diplomatic conduct.

The globalization process has other independent drivers. In the history of the modern world, a rising population in less-developed areas frequently has triggered emigration to areas of economic opportunity, and this in turn has frequently produced a stream of remittances to family members who remained behind. Famine and malnourishment, as well as the need for energy and industrial raw materials to support advanced economies, also affect the globalization process, promoting greater flows of materials, food, and goods, and thus enhancing the interdependence of people and economies. Also, two World Wars, a Cold War, and the Great Depression disrupted in significant ways the ongoing globalization process through much of the twentieth century. Finally, leadership is an important element of all human activity. Had the United States, as the world's leading economic and military power in the twentieth century, not committed its public policy to promoting an open, and nondiscriminatory, international economic system, it is quite possible that the globalization process would have taken a different course—perhaps one that gave priority to regional blocs.

In explaining the emergence of globalization, it is almost trite to observe that the underlying forces of technology and economics have transformed the traditional nation-state system and compressed once-formidable barriers of time and space. But post–Cold War globalization did just that, although the process had roots in the late-nineteenth-century growth of American power. The concept, therefore, requires scholars of foreign relations to leap outside of the normal parameters of the nation-state and political-military affairs and take into account such elements as the flows of goods, services, and money; the increasing international mobility of people (and especially business professionals and skilled workers); the emergence and growth of large corporations that view the world as a single market in which they allocate resources, shift production, and market goods; the expansion of financial, legal, insurance, and information services; and the interconnections of cultures, customs, political processes, and ideas.

Mindful that the concept addresses historical transformations, scholars in political science, economics, linguistics, anthropology, geography, law, art, and film studies help to define the term. Political scientists, economists, and business historians have accurately identified techno-economic globalization as the precursor of other forms of globalization, such as transnational cultural exchanges. That is, the open and expanding market, in a synergistic relationship with technology (including scientific developments), has given rise to concomitant political, institutional, social, intellectual, and diplomatic changes. Economics and technology exert an enduring impact on international relationships, seemingly proceeding on their own separate tracks but not immune from events.

This calls into question the interpretation of economic determinists, for globalization complicates while it also complements Marxism, corporatism, and the like. To be sure, the power of markets associated with money, goods, services, and information facilitates international relationships, but it does so in diverse ways. Wealth is only one of the critical factors propelling the global economy. When viewed from a perspective of globalization, Marxism overemphasizes capitalism's contradictions of overproduction and underconsumption, diverting attention from the impact of economic and business concerns on diplomacy. Corporatists tend to discount the influence of strategic, humanitarian, and idealist considerations in government circles and within the private sector as well, while world systems theorists draw on an international lineup of states rather than global, private-oriented networks.

Traditional approaches to diplomatic history, including post-revisionism, also ignore the globalization construct in that they relegate economics and technology to a second tier in their levels of analysis. Globalization requires attention to nongovernmental actors, including religious and philanthropic organizations, consumer and environmental groups, workers, and unions, along with those active in business and finance. By including these groups, globalization lends an appreciation to the variety of concerns in U.S. foreign relations, from national security to advancing national ideals to humanitarian concerns.

Globalization is also not event or crisis driven, which are common foci for diplomatic historians. Instead, it explores the factors that are significant to diplomacy in the long run. For instance, the dispute between Guatemala and the United Fruit Company that led to the ouster of the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in

1954 is considered a crisis point in Cold War diplomacy. But just as important is discussion of the efforts of Carl Lindner, owner of United Fruit's successor, Chiquita Brands. He opened Western European markets to exports of Central American bananas by using the power of the purse to reward American politicians of both parties, thus placing his agenda at the cutting edge of U.S. trade diplomacy toward the European Common Market. Diplomatic history can account for such actions, which are often hidden by more traditional approaches, by placing the Guatemala episode and other flash points in the context of the globalized expansion of business and culture.

With its application to the many strands of the historiography of U.S. foreign relations, it is clear that globalization promotes new ways of explaining American diplomacy. And because globalization is a historical phenomenon, scholars and commentators can draw on it as an interpretive device to examine change and continuity across the world at various times. Technology and economics have long colluded with each other, beginning at least with the Industrial Revolution. Yet conquests, trade, slavery, and religious expansion, across the world as it was then known, have occurred farther back than that. The spread of Islam, the Crusades, the Roman Empire, and continuous agricultural revolution all represented the inexorable push of the market and technology that lay at the foundation of globalization. Economic globalization undergirded strife, growth, and interchange within and beyond local boundaries throughout history, but the globalizing economy, through the penetrating impact of technology, has also changed culture and politics. Globalization is of a synthetic quality in that it addresses the factors that comprise American diplomatic history; it helps group priorities in foreign relations and explain them in a coherent way.

FIRST ERA OF MODERN GLOBALIZATION: TO 1914

The current brand of globalization in American diplomacy can be traced back to the post–Civil War era, when internationalization and Americanization emerged in U.S. ideology and expressions of power. From this period to World War I, globalization came under the rubric of Anglo-American control of the transatlantic economy. From about 1850 to 1914 an international economy existed, managed by Great Britain, resting on free trade and open capital markets and reliant on colonies and developing areas as resource bases and on consumers in advanced nations. It was in the midst of this first international industrial economy that the United States rode to world power on the strength of its economic muscle and competed with Europeans, spurred on by production and technological inventions.

This period did not experience the revolutionary form of globalization that characterized the post–Cold War years, with their highly synchronized and integrated worldwide communications, transportation, and politics. In the earlier era, less production was attributed to foreign operations. Those affected by globalization were mostly of the elite, rather than the masses, in the early twentieth century. In the pre–World War I period, it was clear which nation controlled production, marketing, culture, and the like, while the multitrillion-dollar world market of the 1990s and beyond had no natural owners. The velocity of globalization in the pre-1914 years was immensely slower than at the end of twentieth century, as were the volume and the scope. The years before World War I did not witness the fundamental transformation in the global economy that started in the last century's final two decades.

Evident in the earlier era, however, were improvements in technology and a greater volume of world economic connections that indicated the influence of globalization on American power, diplomacy, and the economy. However, remarkable changes wrought by new business networks were not fully understood by diplomats back then. Some policymakers noted the importance of new technology and economic relationships; the presidents of these times, for instance, became more aware of global economic concerns. That was particularly true of William McKinley, known for the protectionist tariff with his name but actually a far-sighted globalizer. But they could not possibly foresee all of their applications. Movement toward globalization occurred, nascent and incomplete and interrupted by events of the twentieth century though it was. Thus, it is fair to argue that globalization offered, and offers, a new paradigm in which to view not only diplomatic history, but world history as a whole.

By the twentieth century, the United States had begun to replace Britain's colonial and trans-Atlantic systems of free trade and government-run transportation and communication networks. The new form of organization was a structured but open economic system of private enterprise

and business-friendly public support for access to foreign markets, inventions, immigration, and adherence to international law. Private enterprise could export and produce abroad, the fruits of America's leadership in technology and intellectual property. People and ideas could move easily, facilitating the outward diffusion of America's political ideals and cultural values. America practiced an informal imperialism—in which investment and trade accompanied missionaries and, on occasion, the military—that gradually superseded British industrial and agricultural power.

The early era of globalization, before World War I, was greased by the technological leaps of transportation improvements like the steamship, and by marvels like the Suez and Panama Canals, which sped European and American commerce around the globe. Transatlantic cables, then direct telegraph links to Latin America and connections through British cable to Asia, allowed American investors and merchants to communicate faster abroad, thus expanding their markets. The great expositions of the age—in Chicago in 1893, Omaha in 1898, Buffalo in 1901, and St. Louis in 1904, as well as later gatherings in West Coast cities—publicized American achievements and the promise of empire based on progress in technology. Global connections shrunk the world itself.

Globalization was also driven by the emergence of America in the international economy. Capital exports, the plethora of inventions with American trademarks that were sold overseas, and a greater presence in financial markets boosted U.S. power. For instance, one of the most successful exporters was a capital goods firm, the Baldwin Locomotive Works of Philadelphia, whose engines came to symbolize power, speed, and the march of civilization. In 1900 Baldwin exported an average of one engine a day, shipping locomotives to South America, Africa, Asia, Australia and Europe. Exports soared after its engines gained recognition for their speed and for hauling weight up steep grades. At the turn of the twentieth century, Baldwin locomotives climbed Pikes Peak, hauled the Trans-Siberian Express, roamed the Argentine pampas, and whistled past the Egyptian pyramids. In the British Empire, American firms won contracts for building railroad bridges in Uganda and supplying rails for the construction of Cecil Rhodes's Cape to Cairo Railway, a project intended to develop British trade in Africa. Elsewhere, in the world's breadbaskets, Argentine, Australian, and Russian farmers used U.S. machinery to gather grain. Here were the companies that engaged in the international economy, as well as the privately run globalized market that was outside the realm of states.

Such economic connections promoted cultural ones as well. Thus, early signs of globalization in cultural exchanges were evident in sports (the Olympic Games), marriage, tourism, entertainment (Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show), the temperance movement, missionary work, and philanthropy. Regarding the latter, American-led internationalization in the years before World War I involved magnates like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, who turned to global philanthropy to counteract the label of "robber baron" and to advance their social concerns. Carnegie bequeathed millions to build public libraries in the United States and throughout the British dominions. For his part, Rockefeller established a huge foundation with a global mission to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world. The oil baron personally contributed some $530 million to foundations and his son added another $537 million, which went for medical and scientific research, public health, education, and international exchange programs. The Foundation combated yellow fever and tropical African diseases. In China it established Peking Union Medical College to spread knowledge of medicine and sanitation, conduct research, and support the medical activities of Western missionaries. In addition, Carnegie's associate Henry Phipps in 1908 donated enough money so that Washington, D.C., could host the sixth International Congress on Tuberculosis, a disease that had killed thousands across the world. His contemporary, Darius Ogden Mills, funded an expedition to Chile in 1912 that measured over three hundred of the brightest stars in one-quarter of the sky surrounding the South Pole.

Besides the globalization of science and medicine, the fortunes of Americans were also spent on human rights causes. Jacob Schiff, the famous head of the banking firm Kuhn, Loeb and Company, turned his attention in 1906 to funding the American Jewish Committee, an organization dedicated to alleviating the persecution of Jewry at home and abroad. A host of banking, mining, and export firms, moreover, poured money into relief projects before World War I. For example, the New York Merchants Association raised $8,000 to help the victims of the Valparaiso earthquake of 1906, Guggenheim Sons, W. R. Grace and Company, and others more than matched this amount. In sum, the rich in America transferred

some of their wealth to the international stage, in the process moving outside the realm of nations to influence the world economy. This is the essence of globalization.

DISRUPTED GLOBALIZATION: 1914–1939

The period from the end of World War I to 1950 also experienced some elements of globalization as new technology joined expansion in finance, trade, investment, and culture throughout the world. Yet in a major sense this was an era of deglobalization: first, the international economic system malfunctioned or broke down; then, during the Cold War, the world divided along ideological fissures.

World War I accelerated the expansion of U.S. business overseas. American firms were especially successful in replacing dominant British firms in Western Hemisphere and Asian markets. In addition, war requirements created a soaring U.S. demand for raw materials, especially copper, iron, and other key mineral products. Soon American firms, with the help of their government, began scouring the world for essential raw materials. Rubber companies acquired plantations in Sumatra, sugar producers expanded operations in Cuba, and meat packers enlarged their operations in South America. Paper companies opened pulp and papers mills in Canada, while mining companies purchased nitrate, iron, and copper mines in Chile. Oil companies explored China, the Dutch Indies, and other remote regions and invested heavily in unstable Mexico. War needs drove much of this overseas expansion, but American business leaders were not oblivious to long-term opportunities.

President Woodrow Wilson left an enduring mark on U.S. foreign relations, especially in providing American leadership for the postwar economic and financial system. But if he was the father of internationalism, then he also presided over the disruption of globalization. The defeat of the Treaty of Versailles demonstrated the variations in thinking about globalization. Prevailing sentiment was not prepared to abandon nationalism even as the expansive course of global commerce and investment and America's role in the world maintained their momentum. Americans would not fully adopt Wilsonian ideals until after the Cold War. In addition, globalization took a backseat to revolution. Mexico's new constitution under the Carranza government of Venustiano Carranza provided for restrictions on foreign ownership of land and subsoil resources. This meant that American investors would be limited to oil reserves; at the broader level, the clash was between nationalism and international legalism, with the former winning out. In Russia, the Bolshevik government survived a shaky start, including a civil war in which Americans participated, to create a decidedly anti-capitalist regime. At first the Soviet Union promoted globalization of the masses but not capital, lashing out at the imperialist nature of capitalist globalization. Moscow then retreated to building a socialist state under Communist Party control at home. Thus, the world started to split ideologically and politically even as Wilson's vision reached its expressive high point.

Yet many bankers and administration officials still sought outward, long-term solutions to promote peace and prosperity. Because Europe had bought three-fifths of American exports before the war, freer trade was a national interest after World War I. More generally, policymakers embraced internationalism. Understanding that the Great War had caused an explosion in U.S. exports and imports, that suffering farmers could be aided by overseas expansion, and that America held a key role in global finance, Republican administrations of the 1920s did not separate the international from the domestic. They pushed for globalism, albeit a less political brand than Wilson's. Global disarmament indicated one side of Republican engagement in the world. This effort energized citizens, diplomats, and businessmen into even more cooperative, internationalist endeavors during this era than before the war.

Cultural internationalism grew stronger as nations created numerous associations designed to facilitate global ties. An International Office of Museums, and International Congress on Popular Arts, and an International Society for Contemporary Music fostered linkages and understanding. In the United States, political scientists began studying the causes of war and universities offered new courses in various national histories and languages, all a reflection of the need to understand the global context in which America operated. Americans organized hundreds of scholarly discussion groups, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, a multinational association of journalists, academics, and businessmen based in New York City. The new Guggenheim Foundation funded artistic projects and scholarly research, focusing on Latin American intellectuals. The

Institute of International Education funded and directed foreign students to universities throughout the United States. Asians were the main beneficiaries, but increasingly, Latin American and European youth traveled to America to study. In this globalized ethos, Americans believed in peace and prosperity wrought by international contact. The influence of such private activity on foreign policy was extensive, demonstrating that globalization continued to some degree. Disarmament was one arena, regional stabilization and multilateralism another, and arbitration yet another.

Business made global connections in the 1920s. Air transport and travel became a reality under the machinations of Pan American World Airways under the leadership of Juan Trippe. American trade and investment multiplied. Along with the spread of radio, cinema was not only an American phenomenon but a global one as well; people around the world listened and watched the new media and thus developed some common cultural markers. Hollywood stars such as Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford were known worldwide, for example.

Nonetheless, the onset of the Great Depression and World War II dealt a setback to further globalization. The globalizers of the 1920s—the Republican presidents and bureaucrats, the business and banking establishments—were ultimately limited by their own ideology and by the powerful concentration of forces that elevated the domestic economy over the international order. The effort at privatizing decisions and policy ultimately grounded itself on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and imperial trade preferences of the 1930s, which reserved British Empire markets for member states and excluded or discriminated against outsiders such as America. And politics could not be taken out of the economy; businessmen could not be trusted with, nor were they capable of, running the global system of trade and finance. The Republican governments promoted the ideology of technoglobalization but often refused to take responsibility through policies of running the world economy. They were unwilling to make the tough moves that involved political haggling at home—on matters like reducing war debts and tariffs, for instance—that were requisites to continuing their brand of internationalism. This proved especially so when economic times spiraled from prosperity to misfortune during the Great Depression.

Paradoxically, however, as governments turned away from efforts to harmonize and integrate the international economy to cope with domestic distresses, advances in technology continued to erode the barriers of time, distance, and ignorance that separated nations and people. Some of the most significant improvements in air travel and mass communications, particularly the movies and short-wave radio, took place during the 1930s. At a time when dire economic circumstances compelled most government leaders to think local, a few leaders in government and business dared to speak up for closer international economic cooperation. Thus, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the head of International Business Machines (IBM) and the International Chamber of Commerce, mimicked Secretary of State Cordell Hull in proclaiming that freer international economic relations meant world peace, and that if goods did not cross borders, he feared that armies would.

A WORLD DIVIDED: 1940–1950

World War II further threatened Anglo-American-style globalization. The Axis powers—a loose coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan—resorted to military force to overthrow the post-Versailles world order and to establish closed, regional systems dominated from Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo. The conflict afforded the United States a second chance to provide leadership and to promote its vision of a peaceful, prosperous, and united world. The Roosevelt administration pressed plans for international rules and institutions that would structure the post–World War II global economic and political system. In joining technology with national security, the war forged an enduring partnership among business, government, and science. Afterward, the new military-industrial complex would sustain America as an economic and military superpower, develop endless frontiers for scientific discovery, and speed the globalization process.

In effect, scientists and their laboratories, with government funding and direction, contributed in a major way to the success of the war effort, and in the process they developed many new products that had commercial applications which would transform the postwar world. Atomic energy, for instance, had many peaceful applications, particularly as a source of electrical power. The mass production of penicillin transformed the treatment of disease. Also, radar provided the basis for microwave cooking. The first computers appeared during World War II to assist

the military with code breaking and long-distance ballistics calculations. ENIAC, one of the first, was a huge machine, occupying 1,800 square feet and using 18,000 bulky vacuum tubes. Not until the development of transistors and the microchips that resulted from them could cheap and reliable computing power be loaded into desktop and portable units. The transistor, which was developed in 1947 and 1948, grew out of wartime research on silicon and germanium at Bell Telephone Laboratories in New Jersey. The transistor led directly to the technology of the personal computer, which itself spawned the globalized information age in the last third of the twentieth century.

No industry benefited more from wartime cooperation and federal contracts than aviation. At the outbreak of war the Boeing Company of Seattle, renowned for its seaplanes and engineering skills, had fewer than two thousand employees and was on the verge of bankruptcy. From this inauspicious beginning the company flourished on the strength of its bombers (the B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-29 Superfortress). Employment rose to nearly forty-five thousand. At the end of the war Boeing, on the strength of its experience and reputation in military aircraft production, turned its attention to the civilian market, using the B-29 as the basis of the luxurious 377 Stratocruiser that Pan American used on Atlantic routes. It contained a spiral staircase and a downstairs bar, but was soon superseded by the four-engine 707 passenger jet, launched in 1954. The latter also had roots in military work to develop a jet tanker and from wind tunnel experiments with jet engines during World War II. Thus, with government assistance, American companies like Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed would come to dominate the rapidly expanding world market for civilian aviation.

Growth was also in order for consumer goods, which were also foundations for later globalization. Robert W. Woodruff, who had taken over the Coca-Cola Company in 1923, aimed to make his beverage an ordinary, everyday item for Americans and people around the world. He built on his foreign operations, particularly in Europe, during World War II by having Coke accompany the military overseas. Soldiers not only identified with Woodruff's product during and after the war but heroes requested it—as did an American pilot who crashed in Scotland and asked, upon regaining consciousness, for a Coke. The beverage was so pervasive that the Nazis and Japanese denounced it as a disease of American society. By war's end the company ran sixty-three bottling plants across the globe, on every continent. Its net profits in 1948 soared to $35.6 million, elevating it to near-universal acceptance as the world's beverage of choice.

The Cold War dashed the hopes of internationalists who would have facilitated the globalization of the world economy, but still strides were made toward the technoglobal system, induced particularly by governments working through the United Nations. In these instances, officials instilled international law and arbitration processes in the international economy, yet another foundation of globalization. For instance, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) pushed for global rules to govern the dynamic medium of air transport and travel. The objective was to establish international law, as well as promote order, safety, and efficient development in aviation, although ICAO authority remained limited by national desires to control lucrative commercial air traffic. The ICAO, established on a permanent basis in April 1947, provided the framework for the vast expansion of commercial airspace after World War II. By the late 1960s its 116 member nations connected markets around the world more closely by integrating various technical aspects of airplane transport, such as air navigation codes, as well as by devising a mechanism to resolve civil disputes, promote simpler procedures at borders, and boost Third World development in civil aviation—all enhancing globalization through air transport.

The protracted Cold War struggle that divided the world into two spheres of influence—one led from Washington, the other from Moscow—prompted national security considerations, rather than invisible market forces, to define international relationships. Governments continued to regulate trade and financial exchanges, despite efforts to lower barriers and promote commerce. But America's technological advantage, adaptable production processes, and access to resources, so decisive in the struggle against Axis aggressors, helped win the conflict. Also, a new generation of U.S. political and corporate leaders, familiar with mistakes made at the end of World War I when the United States shunned overseas responsibilities, chose to accept this second opportunity to guide the world. Furthermore, as it turned out, these internationalists were also better salesmen than Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his heirs, who presided over a

decrepit, controlled Soviet economy unable to satisfy basic consumer wants. Aware that a troubled world had an insatiable appetite for American values, goods, and services, U.S. leaders exploited their comparative advantage in communications and marketing to advance the American dream of democracy, mass consumption, and individual enterprise. In the long Cold War, the formula of guns, butter, and liberal ideals eventually proved a winner that spread American values on a global basis. Without America's Marshall Plan, support for Japan, and containment of the Soviet Union, the history of the Cold War might have turned out quite differently, and likewise for the course of globalization. Had the USSR won the Cold War, Soviet-directed expansion would have been far different—far more capricious, authoritarian, and state-managed—than the American-led alternative based on the rule of law, democratic elections, open markets, and the relentless energy of technology and entrepreneurship. Thus, the era of globalization that began near century's end evolved, ironically, from the deglobalized structure of the Cold War.

GLOBALIZATION UNDERCURRENTS: 1951–1972

The indicators of globalization were present throughout the superpower struggle. Prosperity and peace brought greater individual mobility. Before World War I an average of 1.5 million people arrived annually at U.S. shores, with about half that many departing. Travel lagged until after World War II and then revived. Two million people arrived in 1956, 10 million in 1970. Immigration, which fell to a low of 24,000 in 1943 and stagnated during the Depression and World War II, revived slowly after the war, reaching 327,000 in 1957. The largest numbers of immigrants—many of them war refugees—continued to come from Europe, and at this time particularly from Germany. Air travel also took off. Before the 1940s the typical traveler from abroad came by sea; after World War II the traveler arrived by air. On domestic routes the number of revenue passengers rose rapidly from 6.6 million passengers in 1945 to 48.7 million in 1957 and 153.4 million in 1970. On international routes the rise was equally dramatic: from 476,000 in 1945 to 4.5 million in 1957 and 16.3 million in 1970.

Despite Cold War crises and the further regionalization of the world economy, highlighted by the launching of the European Common Market in 1957 (which lured massive American investment), a revolution in critical technologies—including transatlantic telephone service, satellite communications, computers, and jet travel—accelerated the globalization process and ushered in a new era of rapid intercontinental travel, instantaneous communications, and economic interdependence. America's humbling experience in Vietnam, dollar woes, and the rise of oil exporting nations in the 1970s did not dampen globalization. Americans still enjoyed the benefits of unprecedented prosperity spurred by technology and economic expansion overseas. They bought new homes equipped with the latest labor-saving appliances, vacationed and studied abroad, and followed breaking news and sporting events abroad on new color television sets receiving signals transmitted via space satellites. Despite domestic political turmoil, technoglobalization continued to press forward, gradually transforming the world of separate nations.

Marshall McLuhan, a Canadian who analyzed the impact of mass media on society, made the metaphor of the "global village" famous in 1962 as a reference to the new electronic interdependence that had recreated the world. At the time, McLuhan was concerned largely with how noninteractive communications like radio and television were homogenizing the world: everyone watched the same sporting events, news, and soap operas. He identified a significant trend. The late 1950s was a period of enormous change as technical developments in aviation, transportation, and communications brought cost reductions and improved service. People, goods, and capital began to move across borders, creating interactive bonds among people and between nations. These flows integrated markets, harmonized tastes, and homogenized cultures.

Some of the most significant advances involved air transportation for people and freight. In 1957, Boeing, having gambled 25 percent of its net worth on development of a long-range passenger jet, launched the 707-120, designed as both a tanker for the air force and a civilian jet. Equipped with long-range Pratt and Whitney J-57 engines, it halved flying time across the Atlantic and opened the era of cheap air travel. The number of passengers departing internationally on scheduled airliners rose 340 percent (from 4.3 million to 18.9 million) from 1957 to 1973 as airlines introduced tourist-class fares. A round-trip flight, New York to London, fell to $487. The

THE FAB FOUR AS GLOBAL PHENOMS

Defying the label Americanization, the Beatles epitomized globalization. They emerged in the new era of rapid travel and electronic communications, influenced by black rock 'n' roll brought to Liverpool by American sailors and spurred by their initial fan base from nightclubs in Hamburg, West Germany. Beatlemania seized England in 1962, grew in popularity in Australia, and emerged on the Continent. "I Want to Hold Your Hand" broke the Beatles into the lucrative U.S. market in January 1964, the first song by a British artist to top the American charts. The hit spread to the non-English-speaking world. The Fab Four then debuted in the United States on the Ed Sullivan Show, playing to a television audience of 73 million people, about 60 percent of total U.S. viewers. Mass global hysteria set in. Between 1963 and 1968, they sold $154 million worth of records and became the first band to sell out sports stadiums worldwide. In 1965 the queen honored them for their contribution to the British foreign trade balance. Two years later, they took part in the first live global satellite broadcast, representing Britain on "Our World," a special originating in eighteen countries on five continents. Wit, cleverness, and aggressive marketing catapulted the Beatles to fame, but they also tapped into the growing cohesion of youth worldwide that attested to the cultural and economic pressures of globalization. Timing the release of their 1967 album *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band,* for maximum exposure, they caused a mini-explosion within the Beatles craze itself, as youth across the planet apparently bought the record and played it in unison. It was a moment of unified pop culture. The Beatles flowed across borders, commercially and culturally, exploiting communications technology and open markets—elements of the globalization process.

arrival of the wide-bodied Boeing 747 in 1969 further expanded capacity and drove down costs. Originally designed as a cargo carrier, it could accommodate two containers side by side that could be transferred to trucks; soon, high-value goods were moving swiftly by jet freighter. It also offered lower operating costs at a time when fuel prices were rising.

Thus, by the early 1970s improvements in air transport made it possible for business to source suppliers and serve markets globally. From 1957 to 1973 the number of revenue ton miles for air cargo on scheduled international flights rose 866 percent from 128.2 billion tons in 1957 to 1.2 trillion ton in 1973. It would be a decade before the full impact of these improvements worked their way through the marketplace. Air service continued to expand rapidly and airfares fell. Charter service grew rapidly on the transatlantic route and fares on scheduled airliners fell below $200 (New York to London) by 1970. Millions of college students read Arthur Frommer's best-seller, *Europe on $5 a Day* (first published in 1957), put on their backpacks, and set out to see Europe and learn about "foreign affairs." Meanwhile, improved engine design and weight reduction led to longer-range planes. In 1976 Boeing launched the 747 SP, which had the capacity to carry 233 passengers nonstop with full payload between New York and Tokyo. By 1989 Boeing was producing the 747-400; it could carry 412 passengers for up to twenty hours at subsonic speeds.

Along with the arrival of reliable, efficient jet freight in the late 1960s, other important cost-saving developments occurred in maritime shipping, including containerization. In the 1950s longshoremen could typically handle from ten to fifteen tons of cargo per hour. The use of truck-trailer, standard-size containers, brought productivity up to from six hundred to seven hundred tons per hour. This meant faster ship turnaround, better coordination, and lower transportation costs. Beginning in April 1956, when the trucking executive Malcolm McLean first moved loaded trailers between two U.S. port cities on an old World War II tanker, containerization took off. Grace and Matson lines adopted it in 1960 and the rush to containerization peaked in 1969, during the Vietnam War. In addition, the international shipping industry developed specially designed ships for automobiles (the first auto carriers could handle from one thousand to two thousand cars) and LNG (liquified natural gas) tankers after the 1973 war in the Middle East..

Improvements in communications also boosted the globalization process. Until the mid-1950s individuals could not communicate quickly and easily across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. In 1927 commercial telephone service using high-frequency radio opened between New York and London. But this interactive advance was not designed for mass communications. Radio telephones were noisy, unreliable, and costly—forty-five dollars for the first three minutes. September 1956 brought the most significant improvement in communications in over a century when American Telephone and Telegraph opened the first transatlantic telephone cable (TAT-1) by using microwave amplification techniques. The number of transatlantic telephone calls soared—climbing slowly from 10,000 in 1927 to 250,000 in 1957, and then jumping to 4.3 million in 1961. Soon large corporations such as Ford began using the telephone cable to exchange information and coordinate their overseas operations from their U.S. headquarters. While telephone cables improved business communications among metropolitan centers, large areas of the world could not take advantage of telephone communications. Starting in the 1980s, satellite communications ended this isolation and made the emerging global village truly interactive.

The arrival of jet planes and transoceanic telephones facilitated business expansion, but so did American scientific leadership. World War II and the early Cold War saw many technological advances, and U.S. firms moved quickly to commercialize products from military research. Between 1945 and 1965 the number of patents granted in America more than doubled, rising from 25,695 to 62,857. Five times as many patents went to U.S. firms as to foreign corporations. As late as 1967 the United States accounted for 69 percent of research and development in major countries. A good illustration was the transformation of IBM, which took its domination into the global marketplace.

The Cold War generated momentum for globalization in other ways, too. National Science Foundation, National Space and Aeronautics Administration, and Defense Department contracts spurred basic research throughout the 1960s, and space research particularly spun off growth in intelligence gathering, electronics and engineering, and weaponry. Laboratories hired thousands of corporate engineers to work on missile and aerospace projects, and clusters of companies and laboratories sprouted up near major academic institutions. The space program's budget steadily increased to $1.2 billion by 1962, and steps were taken to orbit a man around the earth (via the Mercury Project from 1959 to 1962), and eventually to send him to the moon (through the Apollo Project in 1969). These were the precursors to the space shuttle and satellite communications of the 1980s and beyond, which fueled the globalization of information.

DECENTRALIZATION ACCELERATES: 1973–1989

From the mid-1970s onward the process of world political and economic decentralization, so essential to globalization, picked up momentum. The technological transformations allowed American and other multinational firms to escape national regulations, and also helped free ordinary people from the boundaries of the nation-state. In addition, the rise of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil cartel shifted global economic power away from the West. Free exchange rates, unfixed from the gold-dollar standard, gave great flexibility to international investors. American businesses would weather the energy crises and the final phase of the Cold War in different ways. With U.S. tariff barriers continuing to fall and foreign competition surging into the American market, high-cost domestic industries such as steel, autos, and machine tools lost market share to new entrants from abroad. But many big- and medium-sized firms did well in a changing, competitive environment. Firms with leading-edge technologies took advantage of market-opening opportunities to expand abroad. In the era of jet travel and networked business communications, the battle for market share was increasingly fought on a global playing field, involving all of the world's major high-income markets—Japan, Europe, and North America. Companies and nations converged as global markets for standardized consumer products appeared; transnational companies now sold the same reliable, low-priced goods in Brazil as they did in Biafra.

Even as the economic changes occurred, however, and despite the re-ignition of Cold War tensions during the late Carter and early Reagan administrations, ideological shifts occurred that reflected the emerging age of globalization. One was a new international outlook encouraged by better communications, transportation, open borders, deregulation, and the revival of nineteenth-

century, laissez-faire liberalism. Business leaders began to think globally and to develop global networks that could exert influence over national political leaders through money and ideas. During the energy crisis of 1973, America's corporate elite reached out to foreign business leaders. Led by Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller, they formed the multinational Trilateral Commission in 1973, with members from business, politics, law, and academia in America, Western Europe, and Japan. The idea was to facilitate cooperation among resource-rich nations, but outside of government supervision. Similarly, European business leaders began to meet in Davos, Switzerland, in 1982 to develop a common international strategy for European business. This network expanded in the 1980s to include world business and political leaders. In those years it launched the annual World Economic Forum, held every January and bringing together the world's movers and shakers to network, deal, and discuss public policy issues. Similarly in America during the Carter and Reagan years, business lobbying expanded from initial efforts to contain unions to the pursuit of an active agenda of deregulating markets, cutting taxes, and promoting free trade.

The deregulatory business agenda reflected another important paradigm shift that encouraged globalization. The Washington consensus had stressed an active and expansive role for the federal government, but in the 1970s economic thought turned toward a less-regulated marketplace. Under the influence of academic economists Murray Weidenbaum and Milton Friedman, a neoclassical attack on Keynesian interventionism was launched during the Reagan years. It emphasized entrepreneurship, reliance on the Federal Reserve System and monetary policy to manage the economy, tax relief, labor-market competition, deregulation, fluctuating exchange rates, and free trade in goods. In time, this consensus came to include free trade in money, or capital account convertibility.

President Ronald Reagan can be credited with fostering the second era of techno-economic globalization by expounding on the possibilities for freedom, political and economic, under U.S. leadership. He was the first president to push openly for free trade and privatization of government services, and one of the first to appreciate how new technologies of communication were transforming the marketplace and weakening the authority of totalitarian regimes. As he left office the technoglobal revolution was accelerating, bringing major changes to economics and politics, and to culture and society as well. His successors wrestled with the implications of globalization at home and abroad. They initiated new integrative bodies that restructured the global economy, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), institutions that emphasized a rules-based economic system and liberalization of international commerce and that further integrated business processes worldwide. The freer exchanges of goods, capital, and culture inherent in globalization arose from the Cold War's ashes and took America into a new era in which transnational contacts rivaled state power.

AMERICAN-LED GLOBALIZATION: 1990–2001

The Clinton administration perceived that globalization had the potential to harmonize behavior, customs, and politics and usher in prosperity, development, and democracy. As the world's only superpower, the United States would lead the way toward openness, free access, and political stability. Also, President William Jefferson Clinton's enthusiasm for globalization was not shared by all Americans; many wondered if globalization was both inevitable and desirable. As the new millennium began, the business community seemed united in support of globalization, but among ordinary people there were concerns about jobs, food safety, harm to the environment, sovereignty, cultural homogenization, and the like. Americans were as unsure about the costs and benefits of this second era of globalization as they had been during the first one before World War I.

The Clinton administration veered from postwar history and adopted the universalist, integrative, and democratic posture of globalization. Economics replaced security on the U.S. policy agenda; globalization was the focus. The administration tied free markets to democracy. After the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the president placed economic diplomacy at the center of foreign policy, supporting the consolidation of market democracy throughout the world, an ideology that put him in stride with global business but at odds with many in his own party who were tied to the traditional big government, worker-protection liberalism of the past.

The outpouring of analyses of globalization grew during the mid-1990s. Scholars, journalists,

and politicians focused on the concept and process, but above all, on its influence. The widespread use of the Internet (304 million people in 2000) brought the issue into homes throughout the world. When added to the Clinton administration's oftentimes single-minded purpose of expanding American trade and investments overseas, the establishment of NAFTA and the WTO, and the soaring rebound of the U.S. economy from a recession early in the 1990s, globalization had a certain cachet among Americans of all political stripes and economic status.

Americans were not the only ones anxious over globalization. In western Europe and many developing countries, globalization was a dirty word, associated in the public mind with American sneakers, blue jeans, burgers, and videos. The French were most skeptical. In one poll, 65 percent said globalization increased the gap between rich and poor; 56 percent thought it threatened national identity. The French Ministry of Culture sought to rally Europeans and to restrict access for Hollywood films and American television programs.

Around the world, defenders of traditional values sought to block the spread of American-style pop culture, but globalization proved a worthy foe. Iranian religious fundamentalists raided homes to confiscate videos and satellite dishes, and in neighboring Afghanistan the Taliban closed movie theaters, burned films, and denied schooling to women. Try as they might, the fundamentalists could not eradicate this powerfully projected alien culture. Their efforts merely benefited smugglers and the flow of contraband. Many discreetly hid satellite dishes to access Western television. The failure of Islamic fundamentalists to stamp out Western influences, like the inability of state-controlled societies in Eastern Europe to block the appeal of Western democracy and consumerism, demonstrated the power of mass communications in the era of satellites and videocassettes. It also underscored the global appeal of American values to the young, the well-educated, and the affluent, an amorphous yet tangible element of U.S. power in the world.

Yet the argument that globalization led to American cultural dominance ignored the appeal of the competition. At the time anti-globalization demonstrators were protesting in Seattle against the WTO in December 1999, children throughout America were gripped by the Japanese fad game Pokemon. Film industries in India and Hong Kong presented competition to Hollywood, and MTV discovered the need to vary its formula in the world's various regional markets—providing, for example, Chinese music in China and Hindi pop in India. True cultural globalization, not just Americanization, was in effect.

Among the world's cosmopolitan elite—business leaders, government officials, academics, and media types—the requirements of globalization produced a convergence. English became the predominant language of commerce and transnational communications, and business and government leaders wore Western business suits, flew in the same airplanes, stayed in the same hotels, read the same newspapers (the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Financial Times*), and communicated with cellular phones and e-mail. The acceptance of American-style globalization reflected the success of U.S. business, the need to play by the rules of the world's largest open market, U.S. leadership in technological innovation and the information revolution, and the attraction of America's universal values. It also reflected the victories over fascism, militarism, and communism during the twentieth century that allowed the Anglo-American powers to establish the United Nations system, design the institutions of international economic and financial collaboration, and press for acceptance of common standards and the rule of law that were so crucial to globalization.

The post–Cold War era of economic globalization, however, also represented a synergistic dimension in which changes in technology, business strategy, and government policies combined to produce effects far more profound than the sum of incremental steps. The changes hinged on the integration of capital markets, the growing irrelevance of national borders, and the technological leveraging of knowledge and talent worldwide. As the Internet was empowering ordinary people with information, governance of the global system became more segmented in functional supranational institutions run by specialized elites. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the WTO, and the Bank for International Settlements set the rules and handed out sanctions.

Integration and mobility were keys. Production, capital flows, and workers were increasingly integrated into a global marketplace dictated by transnational corporations. In 1970 there were 7,000 transnational corporations; in 2000 the numbers were some 63,000 parents and 690,000 foreign affiliates as well as a large number of interfirm arrangements. Gross product affiliated with the production of transnationals increased faster than global GDP and global exports. The foreign

affiliates of transnational corporations employed six million persons and had foreign sales of $2 trillion. Their reach in every aspect of the world economy—from production to distribution—grew exponentially. In the last half of the twentieth century, international trade accelerated. The world economy grew sixfold in that time, climbing from $6.7 trillion in constant prices to $41.6 trillion in 1998, while global exports of goods rose seventeenfold, from $311 billion to $5.4 trillion. Much of the growth occurred among units of transnational corporations and involved services, which represented one-fifth of total world trade at the end of the century. From 1970 to 2000, the volume of foreign direct investment rose almost fifteenfold; in the latter year it was twice that of 1990. By then, dozens of nations had enacted special laws to attract foreign capital.

Financial globalization, reflecting the integration of equity and bond markets, was another powerful factor driving world economic integration and growth. As in late-nineteenth-century Britain, the upper and middle classes increasingly invested their savings overseas. The assets of U.S.-based international and global mutual funds climbed from $16 billion in 1986 to $321 billion in late 1996. Forty-four million American households held mutual funds, compared to 4.6 million in 1980. Moreover, the velocity of foreign exchange transactions spiraled. In 1973 average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets was $15 billion compared to $60 billion in 1983, $880 billion in 1993; and an estimated $1.5 trillion in 1998. Moreover, in a world of electronically integrated financial markets, money flowed into and out of countries in response to changing market conditions. In 1996 foreign investors put $100 billion into Asia; the next year they withdrew $100 billion.

Technology abetted globalization. World production of technology multiplied six times between 1975 and 1986; international trade in technology soared nine times. Improvements in communications and transportation abetted the process. In 1956, eighty-nine telephone conversations took place simultaneously through the transatlantic telephone cable. By the end of the millennium, about one million conversations occurred simultaneously by satellite and fiber optics. Add in e-mail and faxes and the ease, speed, and volume of communications have been magnified. Between 1955 and 1998, ship tonnage rose sixfold; the unit cost of carrying freight by sea fell 70 percent between 1920 and 1990. The volume of air freight soared from 730 million to 99 billion ton-kilometers. As with shipping, costs fell sharply. Between 1930 and 1990 the average revenue per mile for air transportation dropped from 68 cents to 11 cents (in constant dollars).

Cheaper airfares also enhanced individual mobility. Between 1950 and 1998 international tourist arrivals rose twenty-five-fold—from 25 million to 635 million. By 2000, two million people crossed a border somewhere in the world every single day. Some of them were political refugees; others simply seeking economic opportunities. At the end of the twentieth century, some 150 million people lived outside the country of their birth. This amounted to 2.5 percent of the world's population, or one in every forty people. Many of them remitted earnings to families and relatives in native countries. From 1970 to 1998, the number of immigrants living in America tripled from 9.6 million to 26.3 million. It is estimated that immigrants from Central America remitted $8 billion a year to their home countries during the last years of the twentieth century. Many of the foreign students who entered the United States for graduate education remain, contributing to the brain drain from developing lands but augmenting the supply of highly trained professionals in America. In 1990 one-third of Silicon Valley's scientists and engineers were foreign born.

Many of the less educated who remained in their homelands, moving from countryside to city, have joined the global economy. Labor became part of a global assembly line; transnationals working for the Nike Company and other multinational firms assembled products from components manufactured in factories throughout the world, while management, administration, and research and development were done at the headquarters. Service jobs in law firms, insurance, and data entry focused on electronic production, which meant that jobs flowed in and out of countries at great speed. Globalization had, simply, changed the world and its business, including the projection of national power and diplomacy.

Along with the globalization of brands like Nike, McDonald's, Coca-Cola, and Marlboro, the process also benefited sports teams. Michael Jordan's star qualities, as well as the global reach of satellite television, established a worldwide following for the Chicago Bulls. Soccer's Manchester United and baseball's New York Yankees also appealed to extensive audiences. An influx of eastern European players strengthened the international appeal of the National Hockey League. The National Basketball Association's open-door policy

to talent attracted forty-five foreign players from twenty-nine countries, and as a result the NBA broadcast in 210 countries and forty-two languages. Major League Baseball, which began opening its season in foreign locations, inaugurated the 2001 season with 854 players, 25 percent of them born outside the United States. As a result of Ichiro Suzuki's success with the Seattle Mariners, the team's home games were televised live in Japan. Thousands of Japanese baseball fans even flew to Seattle to attend home games of a club owned by Nintendo president Hiroshi Yamauchi.

Along with rapid growth and increasing integration of markets, however, the age of globalization produced greater volatility. The Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 underscored the vulnerability of the market-driven globalization system and how quickly strife could spread in a world linked by high-velocity communication, financial, and transportation networks. The Asian economic crisis also showed globalization's impact in the political arena. It aroused concerns about the merits of Western-style, free-market globalization to an extent that street protests, stimulated by the economic downturn, forced Indonesia's dictator of thirty-two years from power while politicians jockeyed for control in Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Malaysia.

Over the preceding decade Wall Street, Washington, and international financial institutions had encouraged emerging economies to deregulate capital markets and open to foreign banks and financial institutions, but countries in Latin America and Asia paid for the deregulatory bonanza. By opening their markets, they made themselves susceptible to pressures from abroad and the international economy, and also lost independence over their fiscal policies. Abrupt changes in one country, region, or the world economy reverberated throughout these poorer nations, causing crises. Yet the bankers and U.S. financial officials blamed the catastrophic consequences on crony capitalism, the lack of transparency and inadequate disclosure of financial data, the absence of independent regulatory authorities, and the inadequacy of accounting standards. They stressed the benefits of liberalization under the process of globalization.

Opposition to the pro-globalization agenda emerged among a disparate alliance of activists concerned about the environment, labor standards, and national sovereignty. In 1992 the first Bush administration had refused to accept the entire Rio de Janeiro Treaty that protected biodiversity of plant and animal species. An argument also erupted over the existence of global warming, which many scientists and environmental groups blamed on the emission of carbon-based gases into the atmosphere. A total of 150 nations, including the United States, signed the Kyoto accord of 1997 that pledged to reduce such global emissions to 5.2 percent below the 1990 level. America would cut its release of carbon-based gases by 7 percent. But President Bill Clinton faced staunch opposition from powerful business interests such as the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers who thought the agreement flawed. The Senate voted 95 to 0 to oppose the protocol if developing countries like China and India were not also required to cut their emissions. As a result, the administration never sent the agreement to Capitol Hill for ratification. The debate over global warming continued into the 2000 election when Democratic candidate Al Gore insisted that America join the Kyoto pact nations and GOP candidate George W. Bush countered that additional studies were needed to better understand the problem. It was clear that, just as with the economy, globalization of environmental concerns might require international intervention. Environmental concerns indicated that there was not a consensus on globalization.

Many people, especially in the labor and environmental movements and within academia, shunned this new globalization system, and argued that globalization undermined stability and prosperity and was leading to the disintegration of national economies and cultures. According to this view, workers had become pawns in transnational corporate agendas, the environment had been deregulated by the free-market rules of the WTO, and financial markets had been so decontrolled that the joint efforts of a handful of individuals could destabilize entire nations (as in Indonesia in 1997). The anti-globalization protesters took to the streets to voice their objections. The WTO ministerial meetings convened in Seattle in December 1999 to plan a new set of world trade negotiations called the Millennium Round, but huge demonstrations shut down the meetings. Seattle turned out not to be an isolated event; there were later demonstrations at gatherings sponsored by the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank, and Davo's World Economic Forum.

There were also optimists who saw the free market and meteoric advances in technology as a

great boon or as an irreversible phenomenon that could not be halted. They announced that the world had entered a period of unity (unlike the divisive forty-five-year Cold War) that rewarded flexibility, high technology, and individualism.

Public opinion polls showed Americans divided on such issues as globalization and free trade. In general, those in the middle class and below voiced protectionist sentiments or questioned the fairness of NAFTA and the WTO. Among those warning of the perils of globalization were Pope John Paul II, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and former South African president Nelson Mandela.

As the twenty-first century opened, the globalization revolution continued to roll forward. While the global spread of information, the integration of markets, and the erasure of borders had the potential to promote global peace, prosperity, and the convergence of basic values, there was a dark dimension often ignored by corporate boosters. For one, globalization benefited organized criminals as well as corporations. The turnover of the criminal economy was estimated at about $1 trillion annually. Narcotics accounted for about half, but a trade in people was also lucrative. Gangs moved from four to five million people annually and earned some $7 billion in profits. In the health area, globalization presented a number of challenges. Public health officials worried that increased human mobility enhanced opportunities for microbes. The risks ranged from trade in illegal products and contaminated foodstuffs, divergent safety standards, indiscriminate spread of medical technologies and experimentation, and the sale of prescription drugs without approval of national authorities. With some two million people crossing borders daily, industrialized nations faced threats from emerging infectious diseases, exposure to dangerous substances, and violence such as chemical and bioterrorist attack. Furthermore, the spread of information on the Internet empowered individual terrorists like the Unabomber to exact their own revenge on global society.

Globalization was a phenomenon of the twentieth century, although it was often hidden from view. Its effects on diplomacy were enormous. In the age of instantaneous communication, rapid transport, and volatile markets, it was apparent that complexities of international relationships had moved far beyond the expertise of professional diplomats and foreign ministries. Diplomats and governments no longer served as gatekeepers. In the networked world, individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and officials communicated rapidly and regularly. But while technological innovation and information had networked millions of individuals into a system without central control, it is worth emphasizing that governments helped fund the networking revolution. The U.S. government had supported basic research in high-speed computers, telecommunications, networking, and aviation, all essential to the interconnected world of globalization. Moreover, Washington's commitment to market opening, deregulation, and liberalization of trade and finance provided the policy impetus that led to a variety of international agreements and arrangements promoting an open world order. Thus have diplomacy and techno-economic globalization been linked since the post–Civil War era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaronson, Susan Ariel. *Taking Trade to the Streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape Globalization.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2001.

Adler, William M. *Mollie's Job: A Story of Life and Work on the Global Assembly Line.* New York, 2000. By one of the growing number of critics from the labor side.

Anderson, Sarah, and John Kavanagh. *Field Guide to the Global Economy.* New York, 1999.

Barber, Benjamin R. *Jihad vs. MacWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World.* New York, 1996. A classic account of the cultural debate over globalization.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Globalization: The Human Consequences.* New York, 1998. Covers the dark side of globalization.

Beck, Ulrich. *What Is Globalization?* Cambridge, U.K., and Malden, Mass., 2000.

Boli, John, and George M. Thomas. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875.* Stanford, Calif., 1999. Explains one of the institutional elements of globalization.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age.* Washington, D.C., October 9, 1998. Discusses how globalization has changed diplomacy.

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., and James W. Cortada, eds. *A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present.* New York, 2000.

Dragsback Schmidt, Johannes, and Jacques Hersh, eds. *Globalization and Social Change.* London, New York, 2000.

Eckes, Alfred E., Jr., "Backlash Against Globalization?" *Global Economic Quarterly* 1 (June 2000): 117–122.

Everard, Jerry. *Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation State.* London and New York, 2000.

Fraser, Jane, and Jeremy Oppenheim. "What's New About Globalization?" *The McKinsey Quarterly* 2 (1997): 168–179. Accessible and informative account of the velocity and scope of late-twentieth-century globalization compared to other eras.

Friedman, Thomas. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree.* New York, 1999. A spritely, optimistic analysis.

Giddens, Anthony. *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives.* New York, 2000.

Gray, John. *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism.* New York, 1998. A leading British conservative intellectual criticizes globalization.

Greider, William. *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism.* New York, 1997. Anecdotal but in-depth criticism of the business globalization process by a leading progressive.

Held, David, et al. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture.* Cambridge, 1999.

Holton, Robert J. *Globalization and the Nation-State.* London, 1998. For the role of the state and politics.

Jameson, Fredrick, and Masao Miyashi, eds. *The Cultures of Globalization.* Durham, N.C., 1998. Excellent starting point for understanding the cultural aspects.

LaFeber, Walter. *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism.* New York, 1999. A leading diplomatic history revisionist analyzes globalization through the career of a famous sports star.

Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli, eds. *The Globalization Reader.* Malden, Mass., 2000. Extensive coverage of all aspects of the phenomenon.

Levitt, Theodore. "The Globalization of Markets." *Harvard Business Review* 61 (May–June 1983): 1–11. The article in which the term "globalization" was coined.

Luttwak, Edward. *Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy.* New York, 1999.

Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge. *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and the Hidden Promise of Globalization.* New York, 2000.

Mittelman, James H. *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance.* Princeton, N.J., 2000.

Oloka-Onyango, J., and Deepika Udagama. *The Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights.* New York, 2000. A useful United Nations–based summary, including globalization's noneconomic impact.

O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1999. One of a handful of historical treatments.

Prakash, Aseem, and Jeffrey A. Hart, ed. *Responding to Globalization.* London, New York, 2000.

Rodrik, Dani. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, D.C., 1997. Articulate and thought-provoking early warning about the negative effects of globalization.

Rupert, Mark. *Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order.* London and New York, 2000.

Sassen, Saskia. *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money.* New York, 1998.

Soros, George. *The Open Society: Reforming of Global Capitalism.* New York, 2000. Warnings of impending collapse from a giant of global finance capital.

Tomlinson, John. *Globalization and Culture.* Chicago, 1999. Highly theoretical treatment of the complex interaction of culture in international society.

Wallach, Lori, and Michell Sforza. *The WTO: Five Years of Reasons to Resist Corporate Globalization.* New York, 2000. Criticism of the globalization phenomenon from Wallach, one of the protest organizers.

Went, Robert. *Globalization: Neoliberal Challenge, Radical Responses.* London, 2000. Concise but balanced assessment.

Zachary, G. Pascal. *The Global Me: New Cosmopolitans and the Competitive Edge—Picking Globalism's Winners and Losers.* New York, 2000.

Zeiler, Thomas W., and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. *Globalization and the American Century: A New Historical Paradigm.* New York, 2002. First history that addresses the synergistic relationship of globalization and U.S. diplomacy since the late nineteenth century.

See also COLD WAR TERMINATION; CULTURAL IMPERIALISM; CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; INTERNATIONALISM; POST–COLD WAR POLICY.

Humanitarian Intervention and Relief

Darlene Rivas

The phrase "humanitarian intervention and relief" reflects recent usage. Yet the types of activities that it incorporates have a long history. At times, natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, or human-compounded disasters such as famine or war, have caused great human suffering and material damage, resulting in efforts to provide relief in the form of basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter. Despite the view that Americans have shown exceptional generosity, the practice of caring for the victims of disasters is as old as human communities and is widespread among cultures. The scale of the human response to human suffering has changed, however, largely because of the development of institutionalized structures to provide relief, and Americans have been at the forefront of such development. In the modern era, the idea that states or peoples should respond to victims of calamities in other states has grown dramatically. Especially since World War II, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations for humanitarian assistance have multiplied and become institutionalized.

Debates about humanitarian assistance abroad have increasingly focused on whether states have a right and even a duty to alleviate distress, and whether the acceptable means include forcible intervention to end suffering and protect human rights. Intervention implies interfering in a situation in order to change an outcome. It may or may not indicate the use of force in achieving its objectives, although in the recent past that has been a key issue in its definition. Humanitarian relief and intervention implies short-term rather than long-term action. In the period after World War II, however, what began as efforts to prevent imminent harm increasingly took on the character of efforts to promote social and economic development or provide longer-term protection of civilians during intractable civil conflicts. Nation building, efforts to promote economic and social development, and peacekeeping seemed to follow efforts at humanitarian intervention and relief, with the distinction between these efforts becoming increasingly blurred.

Both humanitarianism and self-interest have inspired actions by individual Americans and the U.S. government to provide assistance and relief to people of other nations. The idea that individuals, nations, or governments intervene purely to promote the well-being of other humans is contested. Some believe that the essence of being human is to be humane, to act out of compassion, kindness, and sympathy so as to aid fellow humans in distress or danger. Others, however, believe that people act only out of self-interest. Indeed, some biologists conduct research to understand what they deem as the aberrant behavior of individuals who sacrifice their personal interests for the good of others. Considerations of whether humans behave solely on the basis of survival mechanisms largely ignore moral and ethical studies, religious or otherwise. The most common position avoids extremes, holding that humans often act out of humanitarian impulses, but that these are neither purely altruistic nor purely selfish.

The question of how states or governments respond used to be less murky. National self-interest, including the promotion of the well-being of the state's citizens and its survival, has been the raison d'être for the state. Yet with economic, demographic, and technological change in the twentieth century, some observers suggest that the erosion of borders has created an international community in which old conceptions of national interest are inappropriate. The interrelationships of a global community, and increasingly common values as evidenced by the development of international law in support of human rights, seem to warrant international responses to human distress wherever it may be found.

EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELIEF

The United States and the other nations born of the Enlightenment laid claim to the notion that nations could be based on ideals as well as interests. Religious beliefs also contributed to American conceptions of their role in the world. In addition to developing a vision of a city on a hill, a model community as exemplar to the world, the Puritans and other Christian groups emphasized the importance of doing good, which was interpreted in light of the biblical injunction to love thy neighbor. In the nineteenth century, millennial hopes of hastening the Kingdom of God also inspired some Americans to work for an ideal society that elevated or protected human rights. To many Americans the expansion of liberty through the spread of American-style institutions promised to free humanity everywhere from political oppression, and in the twentieth century, to free them from poverty.

A commitment to public good in the colonial and early national eras resulted in providing relief for the poor or those injured by disasters, which was usually conducted by those closest to the victims, members of one's religious organization, or local communities, but at times by colonial or state governments. There was some stigma attached to poor relief, but victims of fires or floods received greater public sympathy. Emergency relief escaped the stigma associated with poor relief, because victims of disasters were viewed as suffering only temporary misfortune. Such victims escaped questions as to whether they were morally unfit or somehow deserved their fate. Indeed, in times of emergency Americans quickly proved adept at organizing; they created private agencies to alleviate human suffering, since generally that was not seen as the responsibility of the state. Most assistance went to local communities. Early in the Republic's history, however, there were both public and private efforts to help victims of disaster abroad.

In 1812 a Venezuelan earthquake resulted in as many as ten thousand deaths. Concern about the extent of devastation, sympathy with the republican cause in Latin America, and hopes for commercial ties should Venezuela win its independence from Spain resulted in an appropriation of $50,000 from Congress for the purchase of food to avert famine. This type of federal appropriation was rare in early American history. Fires in Canada in 1816 and 1825 spurred private donations in Boston and New York, primarily raised by merchants and churches. Certainly, much human suffering occurred during this period, and when reports from merchants or consuls or other Americans stirred sympathy, Americans sent aid to, for example, survivors of French floods or to victims of famine and disease in the Cape Verde Islands.

Americans often responded to international crises because of cultural and political affinity. The prospects for republican government in Latin America and in Europe sometimes led to calls for intervention, but Congress resisted the impulse to do so. George Washington's pleas to remain neutral and avoid entangling alliances deeply impacted American views of their role in the world, particularly after the War of 1812. In 1821 Greeks rose against Turkey. Some Americans saw themselves as heirs to the freedom represented by ancient Greece. The portrayal of Muslim Turks as barbarous and the Christian Greeks as noble and civilized fed American prejudices. Support for the Greek cause provoked interest by groups as diverse as women's organizations and university students in a spate of fund-raising, and even in talk of government support. In 1824 Congress debated a resolution in support of Greek independence. It failed, however, and the government refused to allocate funds for either the Greek cause or Greek relief. Some Americans volunteered to fight, but they were few in number. Money already raised was used to purchase limited amounts of arms. In 1827 and 1828, however, the most significant support was in the form of relief assistance to the victims of violence. Individuals, churches, and other organizations like the Ladies Greek Committee of New York raised funds, purchased clothes, foodstuffs, and other supplies, and shipped them to Greece. Around $100,000 worth of goods was sent during the spring of 1827 and another $59,000 the next year. Samuel Gridley Howe, a Boston doctor and later an ardent reformer, helped coordinate the delivery of the relief aid. Americans, largely missionaries and diplomats, supervised the distribution of clothes and food, which were designated for civilians. As would future deliverers of relief aid, Howe soon engaged in efforts to provide more lasting assistance. Granted government lands for the purpose, he organized an agricultural colony that eventually included fifty families.

The next instance of large-scale relief led to an ardent debate in Congress over the constitutionality of congressional appropriations for for-

eign assistance. Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky proposed that the United States provide $500,000 for famine relief for Scotland and Ireland in 1847. Some proponents of relief argued that doing nothing was unconscionable, even if providing help violated the constitution. Some suggested pointedly that the United States was willing to coerce Mexico to "sell" land but was unwilling to alleviate human suffering in Ireland. Opponents argued that the measure was unconstitutional, and their argument won. On the other hand, naval vessels helped in delivering assistance raised through voluntary donations. Relief assistance came largely as a result of humanitarian and religious appeals whose effectiveness was increased by anti-English sentiment. The hope that feeding starving Irish would keep them in Ireland and away from American shores motivated some contributions. According to Merle Curti in *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (1963), some Americans contributed as a way to relieve personal and national guilt for participation in the Mexican-American War. Americans sent aid, but they did not distribute it. This was left to British government officials, the Catholic Church, and the Central Relief Committee of the Dublin Society of Friends (Quakers).

In the nineteenth century, opposition to relief led on occasion to criticism of the political and economic systems that created the conditions leading to famine, as in the case of Ireland and later Russia. Relief assistance, however, did not come with expectations or requirements for change. Except for isolated instances of technical missions, and more often in the case of missionary efforts, there was little attempt to reorder other societies in the nineteenth century.

Instances of relief efforts grew along with the nation, almost all of it on a voluntary basis. Famine was the most common disaster that brought forth American resources, although concern for victims of war or political violence also stimulated American relief efforts. Missionaries and diplomats often brought word of the need for assistance in places like Crete, Persia, China, and Turkey. Areas like Africa that had been colonized by other nations were hardly ever at the forefront of American concern. While the U.S. government rarely appropriated funds for the relief of disasters in other countries, there were occasional episodes in which American military forces provided limited assistance. For example, if a U.S. naval vessel was nearby, crew members sometimes assisted local populations in disaster, as in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, in 1825; Nicaragua in 1852; Peru in 1873; and Chios, Greece, in 1881.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, international law and various institutions addressed the issue of humanitarian relief to those involved in war. In Europe, a movement emerged to improve treatment of the wounded in the wake of the Crimean and Austro-Italian wars. Swiss philanthropist Henry Dunant inspired the founding of the Red Cross after witnessing the hardships faced by the wounded and medical personnel at the Battle of Solferino. Within the space of two years, support for his idea led to the Geneva Convention of 1864, which elaborated the principle that both the injured and medical personnel should be treated as neutrals during war. Later Geneva conventions and protocols extended these provisions to war at sea, then to prisoners of war, and later to protection of civilians in enemy and occupied territories, with an emphasis on the needs of refugees and displaced persons. But although it had a tradition of neutrality, the United States was slow to join this international movement because of America's tradition of avoiding noncommercial treaties.

When these international developments began, the United States was in the midst of a destructive Civil War. In America's early wars, care of wounded soldiers was provided by family members and limited numbers of military medical personnel. Local communities, religious groups, and women's groups sometimes organized relief efforts to get supplies and medical care to their loved ones.

The Civil War, with wider consequences than previous calamities requiring American assistance, witnessed even greater voluntary mobilization. Women of high social prestige in both Union and Confederacy established organizations like the Women's Central Association of Relief in New York to help provide clothing and other supplies. The growing movement for an expanded role for women in nursing during war as well as desperate need led other women to volunteer for a more direct role in the relief of suffering. This voluntary relief movement had lasting importance, since women tapped into popular conceptions of gender roles, arguing more and more successfully that women brought uniquely feminine compassion to assist the

wounded. Professional standards for nursing, a gendered profession, would expand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ladies' Soldiers Aid Societies provided food and other services at camps behind the front lines.

The mobilization of relief during the Civil War set new precedents in organization. In addition to local efforts, the United States Sanitary Commission, a voluntary yet government-approved organization, was established with the aim of coordinating the activities of the local groups. The Sanitary Commission organized the collection and delivery of supplies and appealed for funds, raising $5 million by the end of the war.

The Civil War also provided experience in dealing with refugees. Inspired to action first by the needs of "contrabands"—slaves fleeing the ravages of war who went behind Union lines—sympathetic individuals founded voluntary organizations called freedmen's aid societies to provide food and clothing to contraband camps. Soon, Congress entered into relief and refugee efforts, creating the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, established in March 1865 to provide relief assistance to southerners, black and white. The Freedman's Bureau, as it evolved, also came to provide rehabilitation or reconstruction, making efforts not only to feed and clothe refugees but also to provide freedmen with education and assistance in negotiating job contracts and in leasing or purchasing land. The issue of the constitutional right of the federal government to engage in these kinds of activities led to fierce struggles over the Freedman's Bureau and contributed to its eventual demise. The pattern of dealing with emergency needs to relieve human suffering, followed by attempts to create conditions in which the victims of disaster could build or rebuild institutions and sustainable economic activity, would be repeated in the twentieth century.

Civil War experiences raised hopes for U.S. approval of the Geneva Convention of 1864. Although the United States did not participate officially in the 1864 conference, Charles S. Bowles, a member of the Sanitary Commission, attended the convention as an American observer and reported on the commission's experience. Congress was reluctant to support an international treaty that seemed to undermine the American principle of nonentanglement with other nations. Secretary of State William Seward refused to consider the treaty, arguing that it was political and would violate the principle of U.S. neutrality. Henry W. Bellows, who had headed the Sanitary Commission, Bowles, and other members of the commission created the American Association for the Relief of Misery on the Battlefield in 1866, lobbying futilely for Congress to ratify the Geneva Convention. Seward and, later, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish continued to reject U.S. participation in the treaty.

Another veteran of Civil War relief efforts was ultimately more successful in convincing American statesmen to support the Geneva Convention. In 1870 Clara Barton, who had gained pubic attention during the Civil War for her relief activities, met members of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. Inspired, she worked with the national organizations of the Red Cross during the Franco-Prussian War and later during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. She tirelessly argued for a Red Cross in the United States, and wrote a pamphlet, *The Red Cross of the Geneva Convention: What It Is* (1878). In it she emphasized not only the potential for Red Cross activities in war, but the role it could play in peacetime in the United States to provide relief in the wake of disasters and emergencies. Recent devastating fires in Chicago and Boston as well as floods, industrial accidents, outbreaks of disease, and other emergencies required organized action and Americans in growing numbers supported the Red Cross largely because of its potential to help at home. Barton also petitioned Presidents Rutherford B. Hayes, James A. Garfield, and Chester A. Arthur to promote the ratification of the Geneva treaty. Barton's success came all at once. She finally succeeded in establishing an American Red Cross (ARC) in 1881 and in 1882, with the support of Secretary of State James G. Blaine, the United States Congress ratified the Geneva treaty.

In its early years the ARC was mostly involved in disaster relief at home rather than relief to victims of war, but its future role in world affairs would be extensive. Although a latecomer to the League of the Red Cross, the name of the federation to which national organizations belong, the ARC had some impact on the international movement. Henry Dunant had suggested the Red Cross should also assist in disaster relief, and the International Committee of the Red Cross considered such activities as a part of their role. The adoption by the ARC in 1884 of an explicit article calling for relief of suffering in times of peace was known as the American Amendment.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND INTERVENTION IN THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

United States approval of the Geneva Convention occurred in the context of increasing engagement in international political affairs. Motivated by a search for markets for increasing industrial and agricultural production, a desire to enhance security and expand influence, and a sense of national importance and confidence in its political values and institutions, the United States flexed its power and asserted its role as a force for human improvement. A global economy was increasingly connected through enhanced transportation and communication technology. People, goods, and information flowed rapidly among areas of the world that were far apart. While the reporting of world events had long influenced public sentiment in favor of relieving human suffering, the expansion of diplomatic, commercial, missionary, and recreational connections spawned wider interest in distant wars and disasters. Competition for circulation and low journalistic standards prompted sensationalized accounts of human distress. Large efforts focused on Russian famine relief in 1892, when Americans offered $1 million in goods and services. A former missionary to India, Louis Klopsch, the editor of the *Christian Herald,* supported the Russian famine effort and relief for victims of the Indian famines of 1897 and 1900. The *Christian Herald,* like other newspapers, published lurid accounts of the effects of starvation and guilt-inducing appeals for relief funds.

Although in the 1890s the ARC primarily engaged in domestic disaster relief, it cooperated with three major relief efforts abroad. The first was in response to the famine in Russia in 1892. The second was a relief mission in 1895–1897 to Armenians in Turkey. Again, the media played an important role in galvanizing American opinion to intervene. In the first instance, Russian crop failures from drought brought sympathetic outpourings of grain and other food supplies from the Midwest. Various groups participated in the effort, and the American Red Cross coordinated the shipments. An estimated 700,000 people were saved in one month from starvation.

Not long after this effort, news came from American missionaries and diplomatic personnel of the persecution of Armenian Christians in Turkey, allegedly by Kurds with the tacit approval of Ottoman officials. Americans were outraged by the reports. Pleas for assistance came from the American Board of Foreign Missions and the Armenian Relief Committee. After hope for European intervention dimmed, the ARC—led by Clara Barton—undertook a relief mission to Turkey. Barton convinced Turkish officials that the ARC would play a neutral role, assisting all victims of the ethnic and religious conflict. Under the protection of the Turkish government, the ARC team traveled into the zones where conflict had occurred, appalled at the loss of life, hunger, malnutrition, and disease they witnessed. The relief efforts included distribution of food and medicine, but American relief assistance also involved efforts to help restore economic activity through aid in reopening shops to gifts of seeds and tools to reestablish agriculture. These activities ceased after several months because of a lack of funds and reports of further carnage.

However, the attempt to provide humanitarian relief set a precedent for action within a country where the state was implicated in violence against minorities or insurgents. There had been hopes of a more official intervention. But a congressional resolution to intervene and to support the establishment of an independent Armenia never got out of committee, although Congress did pass a joint resolution that called on the president to support European powers in pressuring the Turkish government to end the carnage. Humanitarian relief had widespread support; humanitarian intervention did not.

The United States was about to emerge as an imperial power, complete with subject colonies. Yet this development originated with humanitarian concern for the victims of a repressive government and violence spawned by a Cuban struggle for independence from Spain in the 1890s. As Cuban rebels waged guerrilla war, both insurgents and Spanish officials engaged in acts of cruelty and excessive violence. Governor General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau initiated the infamous *reconcentrado* policy, in which civilians were moved into reconcentration camps to isolate the rebels from the civilian population. Spanish atrocities were easy to believe for Americans, many of whom harbored anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic bias. Moreover, the initial refusal of Spanish officials to undertake reforms frustrated first Grover Cleveland's and then William McKinley's administration to seek a diplomatic solution.

The American press, including the competing *New York Journal* of William Randolph Hearst and *New York World* of Joseph Pulitzer, reported sensational accounts of Spanish abuses. Then

came the sinking of the USS *Maine* in Havana harbor in 1898, which was widely viewed as a Spanish act. Still, McKinley resisted forcible intervention. He did, however, call upon the public for relief funds, to be forwarded to a Central Cuban Relief Committee that included the ARC, the New York Chamber of Commerce, and the *Christian Herald.* Fund-raising ran into some difficulty because some Americans thought forceful action to end Spanish rule, rather than relief or charity, was necessary. The Red Cross in Havana coordinated the distribution of food, clothing, and medicine. A turning point in American support for intervention came after Senator Redfield Proctor traveled to the Cuban reconcentration camps, accompanied by an entourage that included Barton. Appalled by the miserable conditions in the camps, including inadequate food, sanitation, and health care, Red Cross personnel provided relief supplies and set up health facilities for the internees. Back in Congress, Proctor outlined to his colleagues the appalling conditions facing civilians in the camps. McKinley's efforts at diplomacy increasingly turned on ultimatums, which the Spanish refused to accept. In April 1898 McKinley and Congress opted for war.

Humanitarian reasons motivated many Americans to support war with Spain. The desire to end the needless hunger and deaths of innocents seemed a just cause, even a Christian duty. Furthermore, proponents of American intervention could refer to the Teller Amendment—which proclaimed that the United States had no intention of annexing Cuba—as evidence of U.S. selflessness. Some, though, were caught up in an emotional frenzy of nationalism, seeking national prestige and power through "unselfish" intervention. U.S. intervention in the Cuban war for independence had economic and political reasons as well, namely to end the destruction of American property in Cuba and to bolster the political standing of the Republican Party. At the end of the war, moreover, U.S. imperialists, like their European counterparts, justified annexation of territory by citing a duty to uplift and civilize other peoples for their ultimate good. Violent means to that end, especially in the Philippines, shook Americans who believed the United States acted out of altruism, not selfishness.

With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the largest international relief activity in the nation's history to that point began. Much of the relief activity was coordinated by the ARC, which faced its biggest undertaking to that point. McKinley declared the ARC the sole representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross under the Geneva Convention, and it followed a pattern that would recur in future wars. In wartime, the national Red Cross organization served the state. Competition between the Army Medical Corps and the Red Cross limited the activities of the Red Cross in some ways, and much of its work involved helping the military at home; after the war, however, the ARC also aided the victims, both military and civilian, in Cuba. Around six thousand tons of food and clothing, valued at $500,000, were distributed by the ARC in Cuba, and further assistance was provided in Puerto Rico.

THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The Spanish-American War set off alarms that the United States was ill-prepared to fight in war. The "splendid little war," as it was called by John Hay, U.S. ambassador to Britain, was actually a lesson in poor management and planning, with soldiers suffering disease exacerbated by inadequate sanitation and poor food. Progressive-era efforts at the rationalization and organization of modern society extended to the military, but they also affected relief efforts of the kind conducted primarily by the ARC. Increasingly, the ARC faced charges of inept management, and foes targeted the personal leadership of its founder. In 1900 the ARC was incorporated by Congress and in 1905 it underwent reorganization and reincorporation. The ARC was subjected to a national audit by the War Department and officials of the government were placed on its Central Committee. In a sense the ARC, recognized under the provisions of the Geneva treaty, was now a quasi-governmental institution. While still funded by private donations, it was now akin to other Red Cross organizations in other nations in its relationship to the state. Still, the organization remained small and had difficulty in raising funds, especially on a consistent basis.

Before World War I natural disasters rather than wars were the focus of the international activity of the ARC and other, more spontaneous (ad hoc), organizations. The most significant assistance went to Asia and Italy, with lesser amounts going in response to crises such as an earthquake in Costa Rica, a fire in Istanbul, a typhoon in Samoa, and a cholera outbreak in Tripoli's Jewish community. Occupations by U.S. armed forces in

the Caribbean region led to military relief efforts during disasters, but given the larger consequences of occupation, the assistance did little to endear the United States to local populations. Limited assistance was provided for civilian victims of war in the Balkans and in Mexico. Famines in Japan and China drew sympathy. Missionaries and commercial interests there drew attention to the plight of the starving after crop failures in Japan and flooding in China. While many voluntary organizations participated, Theodore Roosevelt designated the ARC as the official relief agent to deal with the crisis in Japan. Over $245,000 worth of money, food, and supplies was sent to Japan, where the Japanese Red Cross oversaw the receipt and distribution of relief assistance. The large foreign presence in China was the context for an international effort composed of diplomats, businessmen, missionaries, and some Chinese, who created the Central China Famine Relief Committee. In addition to providing foodstuffs, the committee promoted public works and distributed seed. Much of the U.S. aid was funneled through the ARC, which participated in the relief effort.

The deep American economic and missionary involvement in China and concerns about the poverty and vulnerability of the local population led to efforts to move beyond temporary relief measures. American observers noted that repeated flooding along the heavily populated rivers of northern China resulted in frequent famine. Dismayed that relief efforts were required again and again, and confident that American engineering could find a solution to the underlying problems, the ARC initiated flood control schemes, a major departure from its customary practice. The Chinese government paid for American engineers retained by the Red Cross to study the problem and propose a solution. In 1914 they completed a proposal for a flood control project in the Huai River basin, with a cost estimated at $30 million. The ARC agreed with the Chinese government to assist in rallying U.S. bankers to the cause, but the eruption of World War I sidetracked their efforts. The Red Cross had spent over $1 million in China before World War I and would again provide relief. However, despite later Chinese requests that the Red Cross again join in supporting the Huai River project, the ARC determined that it was outside the scope of its activities.

Another departure from early Red Cross practice occurred in Italy. In 1908 southern Italy suffered a destructive earthquake and tidal wave near Messina. The resulting campaign to raise contributions to the Red Cross disaster fund was wildly successful. Americans provided over $1 million. Some relief money went directly to Italian relief agencies, but in contrast to the experience in Japan, charges of abuses of funds and unwise expenditures led to a decision by ARC officials to direct relief efforts themselves. American missionaries and religious organizations also participated in relief efforts. Once again, the Red Cross experimented in this period with assistance that went beyond the scope of immediate relief of hunger or sickness. Because so many Italians were left homeless, Congress appropriated funds for the construction of housing for the displaced. The ARC combined its resources with this federal funding and, along with U.S. naval personnel and Italians, participated in an early experiment in prefabricated home construction using partially constructed cottages shipped from the United States.

Before World War I the ARC primarily involved itself in disaster relief, but there were exceptions. The Mexican Revolution spawned intense human suffering and widespread displacement. In response, churches, the ARC, and spontaneously organized local groups provided sporadic relief. Much of the relief efforts were concentrated along the U.S.–Mexican border and conducted by local organizations, including local chapters of the Red Cross. The ARC expended only $125,000, a minuscule sum given the extent of the humanitarian crisis. A special appeal by President Woodrow Wilson brought in only $69,000. Civil breakdown in Mexico, along with physical destruction of transportation, fears of anti-American sentiment, and uncertainty of political protection from competing political factions led the Red Cross to undertake just a few projects. The lack of empathy generated by the Mexican Revolution, compared to the response to the Italian earthquake, may be explained in part by the contrast in American attitudes toward victims of natural disaster and victims of political and social violence. Frustration over economic losses from the revolution, indifference or outright hostility resulting from racism, fears of political radicalism, uncertainty about how the seemingly intractable conflict would be resolved, and reflexive disdain for Mexican disorder may have hardened Americans to the plight of the suffering.

The Mexican Revolution posed a special dilemma for humanitarian relief efforts because the United States occasionally intervened in the conflict. The ARC was presumably neutral, but matters were confused by its recognition by the

government and the fact that at this time the president of the United States was also the president of the ARC. In this era legal problems arose because the Mexican revolution was a civil conflict. The judge advocate general of the army ruled that the Geneva provisions for Red Cross neutrality during war did not apply, because the belligerents in this conflict had no legal status. Practically, the American Red Cross could operate only insofar as warring factions agreed to give it protection.

WORLD WAR I

World War I transformed humanitarian relief. The magnitude of the conflict, the extent of civilian suffering, particularly in occupied areas, and the destruction and consequences after the end of hostilities accelerated the rationalization of humanitarian relief. Organizations, both temporary and permanent, embraced the challenge of alleviating human suffering, creating new precedents for international cooperation. Among the new organizations was one that would have a long legacy in foreign assistance, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), an association of Quakers. Spontaneous organizations such as the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, the American Jewish Relief Committee, Christian Science Relief, and the Smith College Relief Unit sprang up. Established organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation, which set up a War Relief Commission, and the YMCA and the Salvation Army participated. In all, 130 U.S. agencies involved themselves in war relief. The ARC, the oldest and most organized relief group in 1914, had less than 150 chapters and twenty thousand members. The agency had a new national headquarters in Washington, D.C., signifying its arrival as part of the American establishment. When World War I began in Europe, the ARC offered war relief only to sick and wounded combatants. It sent medical and hospital supplies, and at first even established hospital units. Soon it was obvious that civilians were in dire straits, particularly in occupied nations like Belgium. Under the leadership of Henry P. Davison, chair of the War Council of the ARC, the organization engaged in intensive fund-raising and publicity. The ARC raised $400 million during the war and immediate postwar for relief. Membership grew from 250,000 in early 1917 to 21 million at the start of 1919.

An individual whose reputation took on heroic proportions emerged as the most important figure in the history of American humanitarian assistance and relief, with the singular exception of Barton. Herbert C. Hoover, Quaker, Stanford-trained engineer, and millionaire had spent his early career in international mining endeavors, primarily in Australia and China. His first experience at providing relief came in Tientsin, when he and his wife, Lou, helped distribute food and supplies to anti-Boxer Chinese. Appalled by the devastating effects of German occupation, American diplomats called for relief for Belgium. They asked Hoover, who was in Europe, to head what became the American Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) and was later transformed into an international undertaking. The primary goals of the CRB were to provide food to prevent starvation and, by its neutral presence, to offer protection to the population. It was the start of almost a decade of American relief efforts in Europe.

Efforts to provide relief required close cooperation with the belligerents. The image of starving Belgians swayed British officials to reject the seemingly callous position of those like Winston Churchill, who believed that feeding Belgians helped Germany and impeded Britain's war goals. Conflicts with the belligerents emerged, yet Hoover cajoled and manipulated German and British officials throughout the war to keep the relief program going.

Hoover attempted to distribute relief assistance in ways that kept the Belgian economy functioning. Although some food was handed out freely, Hoover purchased wheat (mostly from the United States) and sold it at fixed prices to millers, who then sold flour at fixed prices to bakers, and so on to consumers. Belgian town leaders also helped distribute food in an equitable manner. While Hoover favored voluntary efforts, he sought public funds since the CRB required more resources than the organization could raise through private donations. Voluntary contributions totaled $52 million to the CRB. But the organization spent about $1 billion between November 1914 and August 1919. Much of it was Belgian money in banks outside of Belgium, British and French government funds, and U.S. government loans, which came after 1917.

The CRB also coordinated relief in northern France after 1915, and made some effort to provide relief in other parts of Europe. Suffering in Poland and Serbia in particular gained American attention. The CRB cooperated in a limited way with the Rockefeller Foundation to extend relief

to Poland, but Britain opposed Polish relief. Talk of starving Poles bolstered public support for the war. Despite U.S. diplomatic pressure on Britain to permit food for Poland and on Germany to stop requisitioning Polish food, both countries remained intransigent and little was accomplished, except for some food shipments for children. These relief attempts, however, spurred later support for Polish independence, in part by promoting the organization of Polish American lobbies, which along with Polish constituents in other countries rallied to press for Polish interests. Also, while President Wilson was already moving toward support for Polish independence, the failure of relief to Poland helped stimulate sympathy and thus domestic political support for an independent Poland. Efforts to provide relief to Serbia won more support from Britain than the United States. Hoover thought Serbian relief too complicated and he resented British efforts to tie Polish relief to relief in the Balkans.

When the United States entered the war, Belgian relief was turned over to the Comité Hispanico-Hollandais, with figureheads at the helm in the persons of the king of Spain and the queen of Holland. Hoover still ran the show, but now he did so from Washington. The CBR ended its activities in 1919. According to auditors, its overhead costs came to only about one-half of one percent. Some 2.5 million tons of food at a value of $300 million fed nine million people in France and Belgium. As David Burner concludes in his biography *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life* (1979), these projects "constituted a superb accomplishment, technically, morally, and practically."

ARMISTICE AND REHABILITATION

When America entered the war, Hoover headed to Washington, D.C., as U.S. food administrator; he was a volunteer receiving no salary. His goal was to rationalize the production and distribution of food for the war effort. When the war ended in November 1918, Hoover transformed the Food Administration into the American Relief Administration (ARA) to help Europe recover from the devastating aftermath of the war. On 24 February 1919 Congress appropriated $100 million for the ARA. Undamaged by war, the United States provided the bulk of relief assistance, including food, medical supplies, other goods, and credits to Europe after World War I. Concerned for efficiency and for U.S. public relations, Hoover insisted that Americans, rather than the Allies, supervise the relief efforts.

Hoover and other Americans were motivated by humanitarianism and other factors. Food surpluses in pork, wheat, and other commodities, fostered by the Food Administration's efforts to stimulate production to support the war effort, now served to feed Europe. Hoover was criticized for being motivated more by concern for the American economy than by genuine humanitarian feeling. Hoover claimed food was not political, but it occasionally was. He ensured the flow of food to nurture new countries in eastern Europe, but to discourage Bolshevism in Hungary, Hoover temporarily withheld food aid from Bela Kun, leader of the communist revolution there. Certainly, Hoover believed that food and other supplies would help provide greater order and stability. Food promoted peacemaking in that sense, and if at the same time it reduced the appeal of Bolshevism, all the better. On the other hand, Hoover opposed an Allied invasion of Soviet Russia.

After the armistice the Allies held back humanitarian relief to the defeated powers until Germany signed the peace terms. When they did, Hoover tried to get food to Germany partly to use up the American surplus but largely out of his desire to feed hungry people. The AFSC helped coordinate relief assistance to Germany. In some ways it served as a buffer between the ARA, which had helped Belgium and was seen as anti-German, and the German American community. It was expected that the German Americans would offer substantial support for German relief, especially since they had contributed proportionately less after the war than Hungarian, Polish, and South Slavic Americans.

Hoover assisted the German relief effort by providing $5 million in ARA funds. The ARC became deeply involved in providing civilian relief once the war ended. The Inter-Allied Relief Commission recommended that the ARC focus on civilian relief in eastern Europe. Surplus army food, equipment, and supplies were handed over to the Red Cross following congressional approval. It was not until 1923 that the American Red Cross brought the last of its foreign civilian relief workers home. Once again, while relief was intended to respond to an emergency, occasional attempts were made to have a lasting impact on the societies where relief was provided. For example, in central and eastern Europe the Red Cross helped communities develop health centers that were designed to promote child welfare.

In late 1919 the publicly funded ARA endowed private organizations for specific tasks, essentially privatizing the relief effort. One such organization was the Children's Relief Bureau, later renamed the American Relief Administration Children's Fund. Although it continued to provide important feeding and health services to Europe's children, it also was the vehicle by which the ARA became a private relief agency under Hoover's leadership. Although Hoover had objected to U.S. intervention against the Bolsheviks, he used the ARA to provide support for the anti-Soviet White Russian forces. The ARC also offered relief to the anti-Soviet forces.

In 1921 Hoover, now secretary of commerce, responded to word of a devastating Russian famine in the Volga region. American assistance for famine relief included the work of the ARA, the Volga Relief Society, the Southern Baptist Convention, the American Friends Service Committee, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, and others. Despite concern in the United States that the assistance would succor the Bolshevik regime, Hoover was successful in rallying new congressional appropriations for the ARA. Agricultural interests supported such funding because of eagerness for subsidies, but the measure passed largely because of a widespread understanding that regardless of anti-Bolshevik feeling, this famine threatened large-scale suffering. Soviet authorities, at first suspicious, cooperated with Hoover, and American relief assistance prevented the loss of millions of lives.

Domestic American support for the relief effort was high when the war ended, but Americans soon turned inward, disillusioned by the results of war in Europe, consumed by developments at home, and eager to return to their regular peacetime pursuits. Despite pleas by ARC officials that relief work counteracted the threat of Bolshevism, Americans were less willing than during the war to support relief efforts either through volunteer activities or financial contributions. Despite the decline in giving, it still exceeded prewar levels. In 1919 and 1920, $35 million was spent in the United States and $75 million was spent for overseas relief. By the end of 1922, $15 million in additional funds went to foreign relief.

Total U.S. relief efforts in the armistice and rehabilitation period were approximately $1.255 billion. Much of it came from the ARA, the European Relief Council, and other U.S. agencies (including loans and congressional appropriations); about 10 percent came from the Red Cross. In an unprecedented effort, a cooperative fund-raising campaign called United War Work raised $200 million for seven relief organizations. Despite extensive American generosity, loans required repayment and would later spark European resentment against the United States.

While many relief organizations had ceased operations by the early 1920s, some, like the AFSC, became permanent. The American Red Cross grew dramatically. Increasingly, the ARC was operated by paid professionals rather than volunteers. The monthly payroll grew from less than $12,000 per month in 1914 to $1 million in 1919. As support for foreign relief fell, ARC officials determined to expand domestic operations. Increasingly, the ARC engaged in activities designed to promote health and well-being on a permanent basis rather than concentrating on responding to emergencies. While this shift focused largely on the domestic front during the interwar period, it set precedents for an expanded understanding of the role of relief agencies that was later applied abroad.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

In the 1920s public interest in international affairs declined, partly out of weariness with Europe and disillusionment with international diplomacy. However, Americans still responded to disasters abroad such as famines and earthquakes. A Japanese earthquake in 1923 led to a large outpouring of relief assistance, which the navy helped deliver.

The 1930s saw a renewal of international conflict, and while Americans strongly supported neutrality, they contributed to relief efforts in China and Spain and for persecuted Jews. Economic hardship during the Depression, however, reduced the success of fund-raising. In 1938 the ARC tried to raise $1 million for China relief. It was unsuccessful. The Committee for Impartial Civilian Relief in Spain failed to reach its goal of $300,000. But while Americans sought to stay out of war, the conflicts in China and Spain provoked partiality toward one side or another.

European Jews suffered increasingly from harsh anti-Semitic policies as the decade wore on. Jewish Americans had long participated in relief efforts, and in 1914 the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), a multinational organization, had been formed to provide relief to Jews persecuted in Europe. Much more than a relief agency, its

leaders sought to combat anti-Semitism and promote a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The JDC did not just assist Jews. For example, it assisted in famine relief in Russia without regard to religion. The JDC and other Jewish organizations such as the American Palestine Appeal grew in the 1920s, although they differed over the goal of Zionism, which was the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The JDC and other groups provided relief assistance in the 1930s for Jews in Europe and migrants to Palestine and elsewhere.

The Japanese war in China led to a great outpouring of sympathy for the plight of the Chinese. Chinese Americans raised relief funds, as did the American Red Cross, churches, missionaries, and business leaders. Seven agencies working together established United China Relief, buoyed by such prominent supporters as *Time* publisher Henry Luce, who had long promoted Chinese cultural affinity with the United States; Pearl Buck; Paul G. Hoffman; David O. Selznick; Thomas Lamont; and John D. Rockefeller III. The honorary chairman was Eleanor Roosevelt. Despite its success, United China Relief was criticized for its high administrative costs. Still, funds sent to China provided basic necessities and supported Chinese Industrial Cooperatives that employed Chinese refugees and produced a variety of goods, including some for the military resistance to Japanese. The immensity of Chinese suffering continued as China fought Japan and faced civil conflict.

The Spanish Civil War represented the type of civil conflict in which even neutral groups like the ARC had been reluctant to operate. To provide relief assistance, specialized organizations such as the Spanish Child Welfare Association and the Committee for Impartial Relief of Spain joined with the ARC and long-established religious relief groups, including the Mennonite Central Relief Committee, the Brethren Board of Christian Education, and the American Friends Service Committee, all from religious peace traditions. The most active group was the American Friends Service Committee, which coordinated relief and fed hundreds of thousands of hungry people, especially children. Shortages of supplies led to the practice of weighing children and keeping records to determine who most desperately needed food. While a desperate compassion motivated this practice, it was also consonant with the growing rationalization of relief efforts. The ideological nature of the conflict led to tension both within the AFSC and between the relief effort and Americans at home who chose sides. The U.S. government, despite neutrality legislation, provided agricultural surpluses through the U.S. Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, which was given authority by Congress to offer wheat to the Red Cross in 1938.

After the outbreak of war in 1939, organizing and fund-raising activity for relief purposes expanded. The Neutrality Act of 1939 required voluntary agencies engaged in relief to register with the State Department and keep it apprised of their activities. The law did not apply to areas outside of Europe, like China, the Soviet Union, or Finland, but only to belligerent nations. It also exempted the ARC. From 1939 to 1941, when the United States entered the war, almost $50 million was raised for the relief of civilians and refugees by registered voluntary agencies. Congress appropriated $50 million for the ARC, which continued to receive donated funds. The Department of Commerce reported $174.4 million in goods and funds sent abroad, which included relief sent to areas not covered by the neutrality legislation.

WORLD WAR II

During World War II the U.S. government extended its role in relief and rehabilitation assistance. It also asserted control over the many voluntary agencies that were a hallmark of the American experience in humanitarian relief. The neutrality legislation of 1939 required detailed information from organizations involved in activities with states at war. Philanthropic organizations engaging in foreign activities, including relief organizations, had to be licensed by the State Department. The department refused to allow relief assistance for refugees in Axis-occupied countries. This limitation, of course, continued after the United States entered the war. Despite the efforts of Herbert Hoover, who organized the Committee on Food for the Small Democracies to undertake relief along the lines of the CRB in World War I, President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to allow relief to German-occupied countries on the grounds that this would help Germany.

Public criticism of frivolous and unscrupulous fund-raising and of high overhead by some agencies gave credence to the U.S. effort to oversee the voluntary agencies, but the primary goal of the State Department was to assure that they operated in the service of larger policy goals. During the war the government sought to keep the relief agencies' operations efficient and to avoid overlap

with the ARC, with which it preferred to work. In the spring of 1941, Roosevelt named Joseph E. Davies to head the new Committee on War Relief Agencies, later the Relief Control Board (RCB). Through consolidation, the number of licensed voluntary agencies was reduced from 300 at the end of 1941 to 67 by war's end. The agencies were organized into country groups. After the war the Relief Control Board became the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, which did not require licensing, although it did decide which private groups would get government funds. In addition, during the war a private group known as the Council of Voluntary Agencies worked with the RCB. Although voluntary groups continued to raise funds from the American public, they relied heavily on government resources. From 1939 through 1954 government funding to voluntary groups totaled $54 million for Russia, $38 million for Great Britain, $36 million for Palestine, $35 million for China, and $30 million for Greece.

During World War II the ARC made a sharp distinction between civilian war relief and services for American armed forces. While the ARC provided supervisory and coordinating functions for relief to civilians, it generally did not send personnel to direct civilian war relief during World War II, except for some milk distribution to children in North Africa and limited efforts in Italy. Instead, civilian war relief delivery became the province of the state through the armed forces, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation (OFRR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The Red Cross spent as much as half of its funds on returning servicemen and women and their dependents. The government's extensive role in relief and rehabilitation contrasted sharply with its practice in World War I.

Another departure from World War I regarded measures for providing relief to prisoners of war, the latest addition to the Geneva Convention role for the Red Cross. The combatants in World War II were, except for the Soviet Union and Japan, signatories to the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The convention established the principle that national relief societies could work among prisoners of war to assure humane treatment, with the assumption that the International Red Cross would direct such activities. German authorities allowed the Red Cross to send packages according to the rules, but the Japanese government had never ratified the Geneva Convention and did not permit International Red Cross inspection of its prisoner of war camps or give safe conduct to neutral relief ships. During World War II, attempts by relief organizations to provide relief to prisoners of war set enduring precedents. The State Department gave the ARC authority to coordinate all relief supplies to American soldiers held by enemy powers. In addition to government financing and cooperation from the navy and army, the ARC spent over $6 million providing relief to prisoners of war with weekly food packages to American prisoners of war and monthly packages to many Allied prisoners of war. Other supplies, including clothing, toiletries, and medicine, were sent as well. The International Committee of the Red Cross also carried out inspections to make sure camp authorities complied with the terms of the Geneva Convention. Standards were uneven in the various camps and over time, but given the hardships of the war, it was clear that the Geneva Convention and the activities of the Red Cross ensured humane treatment for prisoners of war of nations signatory to the agreement. Unfortunately, since the Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention, its prisoners of war were badly treated by the Germans, and prisoners of Soviet forces also faced harsh conditions and brutal treatment.

Most prisoner of war relief supplies went to prisoners in Europe. Some International Red Cross officials were permitted to inspect Japanese prisoner of war camps in some parts of the Philippines and Japan, but inspectors were not permitted in most camps in Asia. Japanese officials permitted limited delivery of relief supplies, but not on a regular basis, and some relief supplies sat in Vladivostok until the end of the war, when they were finally distributed to liberated prisoners.

German concentration camps were filled with civilians (including political prisoners) and did not come under the purview of the Geneva Convention. Whether detention or extermination camps, internees faced intolerable conditions, and the International Red Cross was not permitted to inspect them. Millions died in such camps, including Jewish victims of the Final Solution, the Nazi campaign to eliminate European Jews.

RECONSTRUCTION

The United States cooperated with other nations to provide relief in World War II, but as in the previous world war, the leadership and resources

came largely from the United States. In 1942 President Roosevelt placed the OFRR under the direction of Herbert H. Lehman, and when it merged into the UNRRA he made sure Lehman headed the new multinational agency. Despite Herbert Hoover's protests that the UNRRA would allow too much Allied influence on American relief, Roosevelt saw to it that the UNRRA would largely be directed by the United States. The UNRRA provided relief assistance to refugees and communities devastated by the effects of war.

By 1946 President Harry Truman was worried that some UNRRA funds were going to communists, so he stopped providing U.S. contributions. The United States continued to provide relief and rehabilitation assistance, particularly in occupied Germany and Japan, with the U.S. Army administering much of it until 1947. Concern for reconstruction as well as relief guided U.S. policy. The United States oversaw the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the end of the war; it offered loans so that governments could purchase needed supplies. The Marshall Plan, or the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), initiated in 1947, represented a commitment by the United States government to foster the long-term rehabilitation of Europe and its dependencies through massive foreign aid, including grants and loans. While initiated out of concern for continued suffering and fear of communist inroads among discontented populations in Europe, the ERP signaled an end to emergency relief efforts and the transition to foreign aid for development.

The ARC also stepped up its activities with the war's end, playing a particularly valuable role in dealing with refugees and displaced persons, including prisoners of war and internees of concentration camps. Voluntary agencies, some representing church groups, labor organizations, and colleges and universities, offered relief services as wartime control measures were lifted. The government welcomed such groups, which extended the resource base for operations and demonstrated overwhelming generosity and concern by Americans moved by extensive suffering. Some groups focused on non-European regions such as China, but most American attention and resources went to Europe.

THE COLD WAR

As the Cold War began, an institutional framework to respond to humanitarian emergencies came into existence. The United States played a primary role in the development of the major institutions of the international relief and rehabilitation network—including the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO)—and contributed significantly to the funding of such organizations. Although the United States could not completely control the directions of these institutions, the State Department carefully oversaw U.S. relations with these intergovernmental organizations, and their growth did not displace unilateral efforts. Voluntary organizations, increasingly institutionalized, frequently served the larger purposes of American foreign policy as well as their own relief goals.

The functions and priorities of U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations shifted from emergency relief to economic and social development. Rising aspirations for political and economic independence in European colonies sparked greater U.S. attention to these underdeveloped areas, later known as the Third World. Fear of Soviet communist expansion into those areas generated efforts to promote economic development in order to undercut communist appeal. Increasingly, foreign aid became a permanent practice. The academic community produced development studies that emphasized the need to link political, economic, and social development and which suggested that the United States could assist nations to develop. Organizations involved in foreign assistance proliferated and moved from a focus on emergency relief as a response to disaster to attempts to solve underlying conditions of poverty that often led to crises. During the immediate postwar era, much relief was sent to Europe; afterward it went increasingly to the Third World. While some voluntary agencies resented government efforts to use them in the service of American foreign policy, others reveled in the role. As the government expanded its involvement in foreign relief, federal grants became easy money in comparison to the tremendous effort required to raise private funds.

An organization that reflects many of these trends is the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). In 1945, twenty-two American organizations collaborated to found what was originally called the Cooperative for American Remittances in Europe. At first a parcel service, the organization shipped "CARE

packages" of Army surplus food to friends or relatives of Americans in Europe. Soon, specially prepared packages of purchased items were being sent to strangers in Europe, and then to Asia and the developing world. CARE packages captured the imagination of the American public, and celebrities like Ingrid Bergman helped spread the organization's appeal. CARE eventually stopped sending the famous packages and, like other such organizations, expanded from relief during emergencies into other areas including health care and development advice and assistance. CARE relied heavily on government grants as well as private donations.

During the Cold War, much CARE activity was focused on areas of strategic significance to the United States, such as the Phillippines in 1949, Korea in 1951, and Vietnam in 1966. In the early 1950s, relief assistance was targeted to areas of political concern including Korea (through UN auspices, during the Korean War), Yugoslavia (to encourage its break with the Soviet Union), and India (which was offered food loans, not grants). In 1954 Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), later known as Food for Peace. Under Title I of this legislation food surpluses, owned by the U.S. government, were sold at reduced rates to foreign nations and could be sold in the open market. This use of the market was intended to deter charges that the United States was dumping its surplus and to alleviate concerns about fostering dependence on relief assistance. Title II provided for U.S. food surplus to be used as grants for humanitarian assistance. Most of this food surplus was distributed through the auspices of the nongovernmental groups, especially CARE and Catholic Relief Services. In practice, both Title I and Title II food aid usually went to allies or friendly governments.

In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration reconsidered food assistance, hoping that the rationalizing of food needs and distribution would combat world hunger and malnutrition. Food assistance remained political, although the new emphasis on economic development meant that food aid went to development programs as well as for emergency assistance. The United Nations, increasingly conscious of the significance of food, created the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1963. Reflecting the new emphasis on development, only 25 percent of WFP funds were targeted for emergency relief. U.S. organizations like CARE continued to work with the American government through the Agency for International Development (AID), which was charged with coordinating both relief and economic development assistance, with the priority on development. The world's reliance on U.S. food to handle world crises led President Lyndon B. Johnson to call for greater multilateral cooperation to handle famines like those faced by India in the mid-1960s. Indeed, world agriculture was changing, with nations like Canada also being well-endowed with agricultural surpluses. However, in the early 1970s a world food crisis emerged as the U.S. agricultural surplus dwindled and bad harvests in the Soviet Union and elsewhere taxed world food supplies. The wealthier food-importing nations purchased at higher prices, leaving the poorer nations unable to afford what remained. Food assistance reflected U.S. strategic priorities. Food shipments to Southeast Asia made up half the commodities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act in 1974, leaving less available for the Sahel region in western Africa, wracked by famine caused by an extended drought.

Increasingly, a network of organizations responded quickly to humanitarian crises. Although relief organizations extended their functions to focus on development, most retained their capacity for responding to disasters. Despite the more permanent character of a large number of institutions like CARE, Save the Children, American Near East Refugee Aid, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and Lutheran World Relief, ad hoc responses to natural disasters sometimes led to the creation of short-term organizations or committees to handle a crisis, often but not always by coordinating through other, more permanent, relief agencies like the American Red Cross. Such emergencies as flooding in Bangladesh, an earthquake in India, a hurricane in Central America, and famine in Ethiopia led to outpourings of voluntary private assistance as well as government aid. Refugees from civil conflicts, such as the thousands of Southeast Asians who fled Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s, generated similar outpourings of assistance, with the added complication that relief organizations had to work with suspicious governments. In such cases, while intergovernmental organizations sought to help, the nongovernmental organizations were often able to maneuver more successfully to provide relief. While critics complained of overlapping and duplication of effort, inefficient fund-raising, inadequate or unfair distribution of food, cultural

insensitivity and racism, excessive emphasis on institutional self-preservation, impersonal and unfeeling treatment of the suffering, corruption and mismanagement, poor analysis by media and relief organizations, inattention to underlying causes of crises, and a host of other flaws in the network, international relief was largely effective in reducing immediate suffering and resolving emergencies.

The phrase "repeat disasters" came into use as certain areas faced recurring crises. For example, in the early 1970s famine in western Africa resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths. Some of the same regions faced an even worse crisis in the 1980s. Such events heightened calls for means to prevent or mitigate disasters. In the 1960s and 1970s foreign aid came under increasing criticism, and some of those criticisms were applied to relief assistance. Food aid often undermined self-reliance, injuring indigenous agriculture by reducing incentives to produce and tempting governments to rely on free or inexpensive foreign food to the detriment of their own farmers. Critics pointed out that food relief, not just food aid, could have this effect, citing as an example the response to a 1976 Guatemalan earthquake. An abundant Guatemalan harvest spoiled as people stood in line for free food. Short-term relief of disaster rarely faced such criticisms, but short-term relief efforts continued to face charges that they failed to address underlying political, social, and economic conditions that lead to continued distress. Efforts to reduce the effects of dependence and to foster dignity resulted in renewed emphasis on developing indigenous organizations for relief, particularly in areas subject to recurring crises. International assistance increasingly operated in cooperation with such local organizations, some private, many governmental.

Much of the criticism of foreign aid was linked to the political uses to which it was sometimes put. Clearly, all disasters did not receive the same response. When Nicaragua suffered a devastating earthquake in 1972, President Richard M. Nixon provided aid to the dictatorial pro-U.S. regime. When Hurricane Fifi devastated Honduras in 1974, the regime of General Oswaldo López was out of U.S. favor because he supported labor and land reforms and had nationalized the timber industry. Fifi left 8,000 dead and as many as 300,000 Hondurans homeless, yet U.S. assistance was not forthcoming. López slowed the pace of reform and eventually resigned.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE COLD WAR

Humanitarian assistance had long implied the potential of forceful intervention. International responsibility for the protection of human rights and alleviation of human suffering led to the development of international institutions, including the multinational United Nations. The development of international law, from the Geneva conventions to the response to the Holocaust at Nuremberg and the UN Declaration of Universal Rights increasingly reflected the idea that the international community could hold individuals and nations responsible for violations of human rights. Still, what this meant in practice was not clear, and the United Nations was based on respect for national sovereignty. So despite some precedents for humanitarian intervention, the notion that states could intervene in other nations' affairs to protect human rights was not pursued with great vigor until after the Cold War had ended.

Still, Cold War competition led to numerous interventions by the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War was not only a strategic contest but also an ideological one, each side felt compelled to proclaim the moral basis for their actions, resulting in dubious claims that such interventions as that of the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and that of the United States in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983, were for humanitarian purposes.

Each side could argue that their political and economic system served humanity's interests, while the other side's represented oppression and the violation of human rights. In such a contest, the definition of "humanitarian intervention" could apply to any superpower attempts to influence a nation to choose sides. By the late 1960s and the 1970s, backlash against this idea spread as some Americans grew frustrated with the nation's foreign policy as a whole, but in particular toward its policy in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam intervention, ostensibly to uphold freedom in the face of communist aggression, alienated Americans as they realized the vast physical, ecological, and human destruction it was causing and as they grew to doubt not necessarily the ability of the United States to defeat the enemy, but its capability to build a nation. By 1979 and 1980, when Vietnam intervened in Cambodia to end the murderous holocaust initiated by Pol Pot and the

Khmer Rouge, Americans supported relief efforts for the tens of thousands of Cambodian refugees. On the other hand, they did not support U.S. intervention. The relief efforts were carried out almost entirely by nongovernmental relief agencies, such as Oxfam, a British relief agency, Catholic Relief Services, and the AFSC.

Although there was a revival of support for intervention in the name of humanitarianism during the presidency of Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989, it was highly contested. For example, Congress placed curbs on the ability of the Reagan administration to assist the contras in Nicaragua against the leftist Sandinistas, despite administration claims that the Sandinistas were violating the human rights of Miskito Indians. In fact, during the 1980s Reagan faced constant criticism from voluntary humanitarian organizations regarding the administration's policy toward El Salvador. They charged his administration with failing to intervene on behalf of victims of that nation's civil war, choosing instead to support the government despite its failure to curb abuses by the military and right-wing death squads.

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA

The end of the Cold War brought tremendous changes. Triumphalists hailed the victory of democracy over communism, claiming it heralded a new age of freedom. New ideas circulated regarding approaches to humanitarian relief and intervention, many of them reflecting a new optimism, even hubris, about the ability of humans, in the form of the international community, to reduce human conflict and suffering. Perhaps the approaching millennium influenced such trends. In 1989 the United Nations General Assembly declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The goal of reducing vulnerability to destruction was not new, witness Red Cross flood control planning in China in the early twentieth century. Meteorological advances after World War II led to progress in predicting some natural disasters. Satellite imaging later increased information on creeping desertification, the process by which land grew increasingly arid and unsupportive of vegetation.

There was also awareness of the human role in magnifying the effects of natural disaster, both because of political crises and human pressures on the environment. Environmental degradation in the form of deforestation and desertification were the result of human decisions. Poor urban populations settled on tree-denuded hillsides, for example, vulnerable to the impact of flooding and mudslides from hurricanes. Growing confidence in the ability to reduce the impact of disasters emerged from a sense that there was a confluence of helpful technology with greater understanding of the human sources of disaster. In *Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action* (1987), Randolph Kent wrote, "In the final analysis disasters are about vulnerability, and vulnerability—whatever the disaster agent—is created by mankind." Absent was a sense of fatalism or talk of "acts of God." If humans created problems, humans could solve them. In 2001, the USAID/OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) website declared cheerily "Where There's A Will, There's A Way." "Prevention, reduction, preparedness" were the focus of USAID/OFDA, resulting in such programs as the Central American Mitigation Initiative (CAMI). After Hurricane Mitch hit Central America in 1998, President William Jefferson Clinton promised $11 million to establish CAMI to assess vulnerability and suggest plans to reduce it.

As the disaster relief network sought ways to prevent future disaster by relying on science, engineering, and organization, there were also increasing calls for building democracy. Humanitarianism was no longer narrowly defined as a compassionate response to human suffering but included the responsibility to protect human rights. Human rights were defined to include universal rights to basic material goods like food, clothing, and shelter and to political freedom as well. If these rights were denied, the human community had an obligation to intervene to preserve and protect them, whether this violated the sovereignty of nations or not. Whether or not the United States should undertake such interventions alone or multilaterally was another question hotly debated, but the idea of a responsibility to police other nations grew as the twenty-first century began.

Proponents of humanitarian intervention sometimes sought to support and enhance the leadership role of the United States. They might prefer that the United States intervene multilaterally, but believed it should lead its allies and international community. To others, the end of the Cold War paved the way for intergovernmental institutions to grow in effectiveness, unhampered by competition between superpowers. They believed in the idea of a global community.

In the 1990s the United States, in conjunc-

HUMANITARIANISM AND SENSATIONALISM

In the 1990s scholars and pundits spoke of the "media effect" or the "CNN effect" because of their sense that the American public responded to foreign crises based on visual images. Concerned with the consequences of the immediacy of information, critics worried that the U.S. government, under public pressure, would make decisions based on emotional responses and inadequate analysis. Thus, television images of precision bombing in Iraq led to American confidence in the humaneness of contemporary war, while images of emaciated, starving Somali children and the brutal indifference of other Somalis resulted in cries for intervention.

Critics of the media complained that journalists often misunderstood the crises about which they reported, relying on relief or aid workers for information, or even intentionally manipulating opinion to foster public pressure on politicians on behalf of the journalists' pet causes. Americans were accustomed to seeing images of starving children on television as relief and development organizations sought to raise funds by evoking compassion. Save the Children pioneered in television and print advertisements of pitiful, blank-eyed children to help raise funds for its efforts. World Vision filmed and aired documentaries of its activities, often showing actress Sally Struthers caring for unclothed and hungry children while appealing for assistance. Critics charged that such images bolster stereotypical perspectives of other peoples, and imply helplessness and victimization rather than resourcefulness and dignity.

Sensationalized accounts of human suffering. however, have long been used to enhance giving. In the early days of the American republic, broadsides, newspapers, and sermons offered dramatic descriptions to promote fund-raising. In 1832 initial reports of hunger in the Cape Verde Islands stirred little sympathy until dramatic accounts of misery (including a comparison to Dante's Hell) spurred citizens from Portland to Philadelphia to Richmond to raise generous funds. In the 1890s sensationalist press accounts stirred support for intervention in the Cuban struggle for independence against Spain. Less well-known are similar stories of starving Russians, with reports of desperate peasants eating hair, leather, grass, leaves, and even each other. This type of reporting was powerful. Indeed, Clara Barton found it helpful to assure skeptical Turkish authorities that she did not have any journalists with her. The power of words and images to evoke compassion has long been problematic.

tion with the United Nations or the Organization of American States (OAS), engaged in humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. The United States and the UN did not intervene to stop all human rights disasters—the most notable examples, including Sudan and Rwanda, being in Africa. (The French conducted a limited intervention in Rwanda, and the international relief network provided humanitarian relief.) Noninterventionists complained that humanitarian explanations for intervention masked ulterior motives or that U.S. policies had served to create the very crises they were now addressing. From a very different perspective, others suggested that the U.S. national interest was not at stake and deplored the possibility that the lives of Americans and innocents might be lost while "doing good." Some opponents argued that the United States should set its own house in order, spending its resources and energies at home on behalf of American workers or to combat American poverty. Some feared a tremendous drain on American resources in areas of intractable conflict.

In 1991 the United States intervened with allies in Operation Desert Storm to force Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. While the Bush administration portrayed the intervention in humanitarian terms, important strategic interests were at stake. The claim of humanitarianism was weakened because although President George Bush had urged the Iraqi Kurd and Shi'ite minorities to rise up against Saddam, the United States stood by while the dictator repressed them. However, the Bush administration initiated a relief effort, Operation Provide Comfort. Along with the United Nations, the United States set up refugee communities along the northern border of Iraq in a predominantly Kurdish region. A security zone was established and a no-fly zone instituted for

protection. Because the Kurds could be isolated geographically, it was easier to intervene at a low cost in lives (although not in military resources) than in the later Bosnia and Kosovo crises.

Despite its strategic purposes, the Persian Gulf War had the flavor of a humanitarian intervention because although Hussein continued to defy Western attempts to weaken his regime, his military power and potential to wage destructive war was limited as UN inspectors discovered and oversaw the destruction of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capabilities. On the other hand, a new humanitarian crisis emerged as the Iraqi people suffered from an embargo to force Hussein's compliance. The embargo reduced stocks of food and medicine as well as stifling the flow of oil. Measures to increase the flow of basic items were restored after harsh criticism of this policy.

The United States had occupied Haiti in the early twentieth century. Resulting mostly from strategic and economic concerns, the early occupation was also a result of an American sense that the United States could make Haiti reform its political institutions to provide greater democracy. Reforms also included efforts to improve the health and well-being of Haitians. Near the end of the twentieth century, the United States intervened again. A political crisis in Haiti resulted when in 1991 a military faction toppled the elected regime of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. For three years a military regime ruled Haiti, with as many as five thousand dying in the political violence that ensued. Meanwhile, Haitians left the country in boats, creating a refugee crisis. The OAS and the UN's efforts at mediation failed. The UN, attempting to monitor human rights in Haiti, was expelled in mid-1994. Pressure mounted for a military intervention to restore Aristide to power. President Clinton favored a multilateral response, and along with the United Nations prepared a multinational force (MNF) to enter Haiti. With the MNF on the way and in the midst of talks with former President Jimmy Carter, the military government of General Raoul Cedras agreed to permit the MNF to land and oversee a peaceful governmental transition. Troops numbering twenty-one thousand landed in Haiti. Initially hailed as a successful humanitarian intervention, disillusion grew as the Haitian political situation deteriorated. Troops remained in Haiti, although their mission was redefined to peacekeeping in 1995 and then peace building in 2000, after the last of the U.S. troops departed.

In the early 1990s scenes from Somalia, located on the horn of Africa and wracked by civil war, stirred Americans. In addition to images of skeletal, desperate people, they also witnessed the abuse of the weak at the hands of the strong as the private armies of competing warlords stole food sent through humanitarian auspices. Guilt may also have moved Americans. During the Cold War the United States had been a patron of dictator Siad Barre after he left the Soviet orbit in 1977. U.S. economic and military assistance had distorted the Somalian economy. With the end of the Cold War, aid to Somalia dried up and Barre lost out in an emerging civil war. American and international humanitarian organizations sought to provide relief to civilians caught up in this turmoil, but they found themselves in danger and the relief supplies at the mercy of competing warlords. UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt complained that Westerners, including the United States, were paying more attention to the Bosnian crisis than the Somalian one.

President George H. W. Bush decided to take action in Somalia. His advisers suggested that the case of Somalia was quite different from Bosnia, where they opposed intervention. While each was in some sense torn by a civil war, it seemed that intervention in Somalia would save hundreds of thousands of lives by halting starvation. In addition, it seemed that while political efforts to promote mediation would be required, the whole process could be done quickly. This was important, because in the post-Vietnam era the United States had developed criteria for intervention that called for an "exit strategy" to avoid open-ended commitment. Another factor that may have stirred Bush was the desire to expand the post–Cold War mission of the American military in response to some domestic pressures to downsize and others to maintain a strong military. Humanitarian intervention might satisfy both sets of critics. Operation Restore Hope was thus initiated in December 1992, when Bush sent in 23,150 U.S. troops. Americans celebrated as Operation Restore Hope met its early goals by organizing and protecting the distribution of relief supplies and fostering mediation between rival clans. Although the United States had intervened militarily with the blessing of the UN secretary general, the United Nations oversaw much of the relief effort.

Unfortunately, the U.S. presence in Somalia soon became an irritant to Somalians. President Clinton reduced U.S. forces, but left a small contingent as part of a larger UN peacekeeping force.

General Mohamed Farah Aidid, with whom the Americans had cooperated to conduct relief operations, began to harass the UN troops. After twenty-four Pakistani troops were killed by Aidid's forces, the U.S. forces sought to capture or kill Aidid. Hostilities between the United States and Somalians grew as U.S. forces were increasingly viewed as an imperial, invading power. After eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Clinton made plans to bring all U.S. forces home, leaving the United Nations with the responsibility to oversee peacekeeping in Somalia. In retrospect, observers agreed more on intervention in Somalia than in Haiti. The general consensus was that the widespread starvation had been averted by the time of the killing of U.S. forces, and that the intervention failed when the political goal turned toward capturing Aidid. Earlier recognition of the consequences of growing anti-Americanism might have led to a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. What troubled critics of humanitarian intervention was what they saw as the unrealistic goal of nation building. Competing perspectives over whether it was more moral to respond only to an immediate emergency or also to address the underlying conditions that led to the emergency seemed irreconcilable.

In 1991 and 1992 Yugoslavia dissolved into civil war. The demise of the Communist Party's monopoly on power in 1989 had paved the way for the rise of nationalist political leaders who sought greater autonomy or even independence for their regions. Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in 1991. In turn, Serbia and Montenegro under the leadership of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic created a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and initiated policies to intimidate non-Serbian ethnic groups in Croatia and Bosnia. With assistance from Milosevic, the Serb minority in Croatia fought the Croat ethnic majority, and the Serb minority in Bosnia battled the Croat and Muslim majority. Croatia won its independence. In Bosnia, the civil war dragged on, although it declared independence in April 1992. The international community watched these developments in horror, because one of the characteristics of this civil war, practiced by all sides on at least some level, was what came to be called ethnic cleansing. Villages or entire regions were violently swept clean of Serbs, or Croats, or Muslims by opposition forces who hoped to gain control of an area for their own ethnic group. The shooting of unarmed women and children shocked observers, as did reports of mass rapes of Muslim women by Serbs. Despite comparisons by some to the Nazi holocaust and talk of genocide, however, both Americans and Europeans reacted in uncertain fashion.

The question of intervention to prevent human suffering, to prevent holocaust, was debated in multiple arenas: in Europe, in the United States, in the United Nations. Using force for humanitarian purposes provoked ambivalent responses. Moreover, historical precedents for intervention in civil war were not promising. The specter of Vietnam loomed in the United States, as did the more recent fiasco in Lebanon in 1983. There were political consequences and emotional anguish when American service personnel lost their lives in what many Americans viewed as hopeless endeavors. Therefore, the United States thus at first portrayed the problem as a European one and encouraged European solutions. Europeans had similar concerns, and in addition Germany faced constitutional limits on its ability to use force except in self-defense or in defense of allies. The international community understood the complexity of ethnic animosities in the former Yugoslavia and the intransigence of such conflicts to political solution. Stopping the carnage seemed undeniably important, yet assigning resources to what promised to be an indefinite, long-term commitment seemed unwise. Most of the military options in which the Europeans and United States were willing to engage involved air strikes that, while punitive, seemed unlikely to promote a long-term cessation of ethnic violence. As chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, opposing intervention, pointed out that the only effective way to end violence was to send in ground troops, which all sides were reluctant to do.

President Bill Clinton wavered indecisively from indications of possible forceful action to declarations that the United States could not fix Balkan problems. In February 1994 Clinton gave Serbs surrounding Sarajevo an ultimatum to abandon their siege. At the last minute the Serbs complied, although only after several Serbian planes had been shot down by U.S. jets acting under NATO auspices. Attempts to mediate the conflict were finally successful, resulting in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The settlement partitioned Bosnia between Muslim and Croats on the one hand and Serbs on the other. This political solution seemed the only way to prevent continued violence, yet it worried many observers because old animosities continued to simmer. The diplomatic solution, achieved through threat of force, was seen

as an example of successful humanitarian intervention. But the violence was not over, and international attention soon turned to Kosovo, a predominantly ethnic Albanian area of Yugoslavia.

In the name of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, Milosevic encouraged the repression of Kosovar Albanians, often through the offices of the Serbian police in Kosovo. In response, the Kosovo Liberation Army retaliated with bombings and attacks on Serbian police and government officials. In 1988 UN resolutions denounced the abuse of civilians by the police, established an embargo against Yugoslavia, and warned that the international community would consider "additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."

Representatives of the United States, the European Community, and the Russian Federation comediated peace talks. In mid-March 1999 the talks broke down, and on 20 March, Serbia launched an offensive in Kosovo, burning homes, killing ethnic Albanians, and driving them into the mountains and into neighboring Albania and Macedonia. With U.S. approval, NATO began forceful humanitarian intervention in the form of air strikes on 24 March, which Russia condemned. NATO targeted sites in Belgrade such as the Yugoslav and Serbian interior ministries, Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party headquarters and his home, and Serbian state television. But air strikes also killed civilians, including sixty-four Kosovars in a convoy and eighty-seven Kosovar Albanians in an air attack on Korisa. In addition, three U.S. airmen were captured by Serbia and several pilots were killed. An international incident occurred when NATO planes hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three. Russia continued to criticize the bombings and suggested to China that the bombing of its embassy was deliberate.

Meanwhile, relief to refugees in Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia was undertaken primarily by organizations of the United Nations such as UNHCR that oversaw the needs of refugees in Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. Some refugees gained temporary or even permanent entry into the United States. As more and more reports of ethnic cleansing seemed verifiable, the UN war crimes tribunal indicted Milosevic and four other Serbians for crimes against humanity.

This was no disaster relief operation. In Kosovo providing relief from suffering meant intervention to stop mass killings. While traditional relief aid was offered by UN agencies, the International Red Cross, and nongovernmental organizations, an additional goal of the operation was the protection of civilians, not only Kosovar Albanians but also Serbs who faced vengeful reprisals. Getting in, restoring "normal" life, and getting out was not a viable option. As in Somalia, it was clear that humanitarian intervention had to be followed by peacekeeping, which in UN practice had come to mean efforts to maintain ceasefires while remaining neutral between warring parties. British, French, and U.S. troops were chosen for the purpose. In 2001, forty thousand NATO troops remained in Kosovo and in Macedonia, where ethnic tensions threatened to create a new humanitarian emergency.

Rwanda gained international attention in the spring and summer of 1994. Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down, an incident followed by terrible slaughter in a competition for power fueled by ethnic rivalry between rival Hutus and Tutsis. The Rwanda Patriotic Front moved through the countryside, murdering civilians, mostly Tutsis, as they went. UN forces in the country left, having no mandate to intervene. Some human rights organizations called for international action to stop the massacres, which resulted in over half a million dead. French forces created a safe zone in southern Rwanda, but that was the extent of international intervention. As over 800,000 Rwandan refugees fled to neighboring Zaire, American and other relief organizations swung into high gear, offering typical relief assistance. Cholera swept through refugee camps and shortages of supplies plagued the relief effort. Some criticized the relief community for failing to do more, expressing confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the relief community. Should the relief network do something to stop the genocide, to relieve suffering under dangerous conditions, to use its cumulative voice in the international community to explain the political sources of the violence? The decision by the United States not to intervene disappointed even some critics of intervention, who could agree with interventionists on stopping genocide. Charges of racism and inconsistency in American foreign policy were made.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that forceful humanitarian intervention violates state sovereignty. Debates on international law and philosophy focus on this

problem. Do human rights inhere only in states, which reflect particular cultures, or are there universal rights that supersede the laws of states? Statists argue that human rights can only be guaranteed by the state, not by an international community. International law is between states, not individuals. If a state violates a people's rights or restricts their liberty, it is up to the people to make the necessary changes. Liberty, by its very nature, cannot be won by outsiders. Supporters of intervention argue that states which fail to protect citizens' rights forfeit their international rights. They point to the weakness of many oppressed peoples, who have no recourse to advance their own liberty without assistance. Moreover, some proponents of humanitarian intervention argue that not only does the international community have a right to intervene, but a duty to do so. The history of genocide in the twentieth century, from the massacres of Armenians to Jews to Cambodians, has impacted both interventionists and noninterventionists, with even many of the latter supporting intervention in the case of massacre or genocide. The problem is more complex when it is asked what rights so violate international norms that states should intervene. What if a state engages in torture or kills its opponents? Is one such death enough for intervention or thousands or more? If parts of the population are denied basic needs or rights like free speech and the right to organize, should other states intervene? Most interventionists argue for proportionality, the idea that the response of the international community should be proportional to the nature of the violations. This includes calculations of the damage to property and loss of life that will occur when force is applied as well as the extent of the violations.

While there has been much discussion on these points in recent years, the underlying tension between these positions has a long history. Statesmen like George Washington and John Quincy Adams warned of the dangers of intervention and advocated a position akin to the Puritans, that the republic of liberty should stand as a beacon, living by its example rather than seeking to mold other peoples. As the United States emerged as a world power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such a limited view became increasingly unpopular—but, ironically, largely because of a similar underlying premise, that the United States should use its power to advance human progress. In the late twentieth century, U.S. policy reflected ambivalence and competing perspectives. Confidence in American values and institutions and the seeming convergence of liberal values in the world seemed reason enough to assert American power to protect human rights. On the other hand, historical experience seemed to suggest that nation building was a complicated task and that well-intentioned intervention could lead to unhappy consequences. Another factor at century's end was that in many ways the United States not only led, but followed, as international nongovernmental human rights organizations and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations also set agendas. In the 1990s Pope John Paul II and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali both pressed for humanitarian intervention in certain cases as not merely a right, but a duty.

Humanitarian assistance (as opposed to intervention) is designed to relieve suffering and prevent imminent loss of life that results from natural or human-made disasters. Despite growing dissatisfaction with the limited scope of humanitarian relief, its short-term duration, and its inability to promote fundamental structural changes in societies, relief efforts will continue so long as humans respond as humans. The American-led international relief network reflects historic continuities. Despite institutionalization and pressures toward self-preservation and bureaucratization, U.S. nongovernmental institutions for humanitarian relief reflect diverse segments of American society, experience wide success at raising funds, and offer compassionate service to ameliorate human distress in crisis situations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bolling, Landrum R. *Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Development.* Boulder, Colo., 1982.

Bremmer, Robert H. *American Philanthropy.* 2d ed. Chicago, 1988.

Burner, David. *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life.* New York, 1979.

Curti, Merle. *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1963. The most comprehensive survey of the history of American international relief efforts.

Curti, Merle, and Kendall Birr. *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938.* Madison, Wisc., 1954.

De Waal, Alexander. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa.* Bloomington, Ind., 1997.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. *The American Red Cross: A History.* New York, 1950. A detailed survey of the early history of the American Red Cross.

Field, James A. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969.

Garrett, Stephen A. *Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention.* Westport, Conn., 1999. Discusses philosophical and legal arguments for humanitarian intervention.

Gorman, Robert F. *Historical Dictionary of Refugee and Disaster Relief Organizations.* International Organizations Series, no. 7. Metuchen, N.J., 1994.

Hoover, Herbert. *An American Epic.* 4 vols. Chicago, 1959–1964. Hoover's own account of his relief activities.

Kent, Randolph C. *The Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action.* New York, 1987. An analysis of the network of organizations that responds to disasters, including nongovernmental organizations, governments, and intergovernmental organizations. Kent favors the development of an international relief system that is more effectively coordinated.

Kuperman, Alan J. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda.* Washington, D.C., 2001.

Minear, Larry, and Thomas G. Weiss. *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community.* Boulder, Colo, 1995.

Nash, George H. *The Life of Herbert Hoover.* 2 vols. New York, 1983, 1988.

Nichols, J. Bruce. *The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work, and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1988.

O'Hanlon, Michael. *Saving Lives With Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention.* Washington, D.C., 1997. A 1990s argument for selective use of force in humanitarian intervention with conditions for its application.

Osgood, Robert. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations.* Chicago, 1953.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945.* New York, 1982. Humanitarian intervention and relief are not the focus of this book, but it is one of the few examples of diplomatic history monographs that incorporate this aspect of American foreign relations.

Ross, Ishbel. *Angel of the Battlefield: The Life of Clara Barton.* New York, 1956.

Rotberg, Robert I., and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises.* Washington, D.C., 1996.

Shawcross, William. *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and Modern Conscience.* New York, 1984. A reflective discussion of the response to disasters, based largely on an eyewitness to the international response to the mass slaughter in Cambodia from 1979 into the early 1980s.

Technical Assistance Information Clearing House. *U.S. Non-Profit Organizations in Development Assistance Abroad.* New York, 1956–. Published in varying years by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies.

Tesón, Fernando R. *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality.* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1988. A philosophical defense of humanitarian intervention, with a discussion of the evolution of international law.

Wallerstein, Mitchel B. *Food for War—Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context.* Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Larry Minear, eds. *Humanitarianism across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War.* Boulder, Colo., 1993.

Weissman, Benjamin M. *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921–1923.* Stanford, Calif., 1974.

Wilson, Joan Hoff. *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive.* Boston, 1975.

Winters, Paul A, ed. *Interventionism.* San Diego, Calif., 1995. A textbook providing an overview of arguments on interventionism, this book reflects much of the debate on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.

See also FOREIGN AID; HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PHILANTHROPY.

HUMAN RIGHTS

T. Christopher Jespersen

Since its inception as an independent nation, the United States has claimed a special relationship with the issue of human rights. When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, he captured—as well as spoke to—the yearnings of the colonists along the eastern seaboard of North America to break free from tyrannical rule across the Atlantic Ocean. Theirs was a collective action, of a people striving to achieve the right to determine their own form of government, but Jefferson's rhetoric struck a balance between those collective aspirations and the rights of individuals. It is worth noting that his most famous words on the subject of individual rights—"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness"—are preceded by the collective right of "one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another." Since 1776, Jefferson's sentiments as both an expression of collective as well as individual human rights have continued to draw the attention of peoples around the globe. Although Jefferson was primarily concerned with focusing on the specific grievances and complaints the colonists had against the British king George III, his language gave expression to larger sentiments, coming partly from the Enlightenment philosophy that had recently swept the Western world. As a result, his words seemed transcendent in thought, though they were not necessarily so in their application.

Indeed, there was one major problem with what Jefferson wrote. The nature of his insistence on the collective right of peoples to determine their own form of government, not to mention the right to pursue happiness as individuals, when juxtaposed with his ownership of slaves and his subsequent refusal to disavow the practice by releasing them, draws attention to the danger of assessing the United States' stand on human rights by national rhetoric alone. Or as David D. Newsom expressed it more recently, "United States diplomacy in the human rights field suffers inevitably from the contradictions between promise and fulfillment." Ever since 1776, America's diplomatic policymakers have spoken to the issue of human rights in both the collective and individual manifestations, and no one more eloquently than Thomas Jefferson. But as Newsom warned, the actual implementation of policies designed to address those concerns have not always lived up to their high-sounding intentions.

A major surprise occurred 225 years after Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, when the United States failed to retain its seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Coming in fourth in the voting in May 2001, behind France, Austria, and Sweden, the United States missed out because only three spots were available. Representatives from forty-three countries had pledged to Secretary of State Colin Powell prior to the vote that they would cast their ballots for the United States, more than enough for the United States to keep its place. But when the results were tabulated, it became clear that fourteen of them had not done as promised, leaving the United States off the commission for the first time since its creation in 1947.

At first glance, the removal of the United States, while Sudan, Libya, and China kept their seats because of the geographical division of placings, seemed almost Orwellian. That the land of Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, Eleanor Roosevelt, and James Earl Carter, to name only four of the nation's most ardent and eloquent proponents of human rights, was excluded from the panel, while on it sat clear violators of their own people's rights like Sudan, where slavery still exists and where religious persecution and civil war have raged for decades, Libya, where dictator Muammar Qaddafi has ruled for decades through brutality against his own people and whose sup-

port of terrorism has been documented on a number of occasions, and China, where the government massacred protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and where the persecution of groups like Falun Gong continued a decade later despite international pressure, appeared to make a mockery of the whole notion of a commission dedicated to monitoring and improving human rights conditions around the world.

In the aftermath of the vote that removed the United States, columnists and political pundits in Washington called the act outrageous, and cartoonists had a field day with images of Libya, Sudan, and China setting the human rights agenda. The consensus seemed to be that the United States had been wronged and that the nation's absence from the commission ridiculed the entire notion of promoting human rights. But the long history of America's relationship with human rights displays a series of domestic and international contradictions between the policies pursued and the rhetoric espoused by administration after administration. Considered in total, these contradictions raise serious questions about the nation's commitment to the very idea of human rights. In short, Newsom is right: the gap between ideal and practice has been substantial, and upon closer scrutiny, the American record on human rights has been far more ambiguous, less consistent, and marked by more blemishes than jingoistic boosters of national honor would like to admit.

INITIAL CONTRADICTIONS

For the first century of its existence the United States, despite the language of the Declaration of Independence, did not advocate policies to effect human rights changes in other countries. Until 1865 the country faced a serious problem: no matter how eloquent Jefferson's pronunciation that all men are created equal, slavery remained a contentious domestic matter, indicating quite clearly that some men were not as equal as others. Slaves were considered property, not individuals, and the Supreme Court endorsed this idea with the Dred Scott decision in 1857. A resolution came only through a bloody, four-year civil war. Notwithstanding a northern victory and aggressive efforts by Radical Republicans in Congress to reform the South in the late 1860s and 1870s, the states of the South moved shortly after those years to impose a system of economic and political control over African Americans through sharecropping and Jim Crow segregation. The pattern of the southern states' actions received national ratification when the Supreme Court yet again provided its imprimatur for racist practices. This time the Court's *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* ruling in 1896 allowed for separate and decidedly unequal (despite pretenses) facilities for blacks and whites.

Meanwhile, Asian immigrants trying to enter the United States on the West Coast received a vastly different reception than the Europeans entering the nation through Ellis Island over three thousand miles to the east. Conditions on San Francisco Bay's Angel Island, where they were held pending review of their status, were deplorable, and more and more Chinese were barred from entering the United States after 1882. Finally, in the West, Indian tribes were forced off their lands to accommodate an onrush of white settlers to the region.

In short, human rights did not constitute a force in American diplomacy prior to 1913. The nation's struggle with slavery, the mistreatment of Asian immigrants, the efforts to relocate, if not eradicate, Indians, and the national proscription on women participating in the political process meant that the nation had far too many serious problems of its own to address. In addition, the nation had not reached the level of international prominence it would later achieve. The entrance of Woodrow Wilson into the White House, coupled with the outbreak of World War I, changed all that.

WOODROW WILSON

When the European nations went to war in August 1914, President Wilson saw the conflict as a sign that the old international system created by the Europeans had failed. Now was the time for new leadership. Wilson sought to create mechanisms for ensuring peace and stability, and one of his concerns was for the peoples of other nations. Wilson wanted to reconfigure the old diplomacy and replace it with an open system, one based on cooperation and communication. An ardent and eloquent advocate for liberalism, Wilson believed that democracy should prevail as the system of political governance around the world. In speaking to this issue time and again, he advocated the collective human rights of peoples to determine their own fates. More specifically, he pledged himself to the rights of eastern European peoples to choose their own form of

government as the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed at the end of the war.

Wilson's call to liberalism came at a moment in world history when the United States rose from a regional power to a global one. American economic prowess provided the equipment and munitions France and Great Britain needed to fight the Central Powers from 1914 until the American entrance into the war in 1917. When they could no longer pay cash for the goods, the United States provided loans. In short, Woodrow Wilson possessed the economic and military clout to back up his calls for recognizing the collective rights of certain peoples.

The president's international commitment in this area, however, was not matched by any personal dedication to ensure that African Americans be allowed to participate in the domestic political process, nor did his push for self-determination extend to the victims of European colonialism in Africa, India, or East Asia. Like his predecessor from Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, Wilson was both eloquent and passionate on the theoretical rights of peoples, and he had problems reconciling his rhetoric with his practices. In addition to offering a hearty endorsement of D. W. Griffith's virulently racist film *Birth of a Nation* (1915), for example, Wilson pursued a domestic program shortly after coming into office that segregated the federal service, one of the few places where African Americans could enjoy some semblance of equal employment opportunities.

Regionally, Wilson acted with what had become customary American arrogance when he dispatched marines to Haiti in 1915, denying Haitians the right to determine their own political system. Indeed, Wilson intervened with military force more times in Central America and the Caribbean than any other president. He also spurned the inclusion of a racial equality clause at the Versailles Conference in 1919 when the matter was raised by the Japanese delegation. Better for the Japanese to be given territory in China against Chinese wishes than have any language referring to racial equality make its way into the final text.

Despite his actions toward nonwhites inside and outside the United States, Wilson managed to articulate the notion of peoples freely determining their own government, an idea that continues to draw the attention of repressed peoples around the world. Unfortunately, Wilson was thinking solely of those peoples in eastern Europe who had lived under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In part, he was worried about how to contain the spread of communism coming out of the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and one way he hoped to achieve that goal was through the creation of a series of small states in the region, a sanitary cordon to thwart the movement of communism westward.

Wilson's rhetorical proclamations notwithstanding, the United States found it difficult to implement diplomatic policies that adhered to his commitments regarding democracy and collective rights. If anything, starting in the 1920s the United States began a consistent policy of supporting right-wing dictatorships around the world. As the historian David F. Schmitz has astutely noted in his study of U.S. support for these types of leaders, "promoting human rights and democracy demands a toleration of instability and change in regions considered crucial to American business or defense, often leaving no clear choice between conscience and self-interest and making strong, stable right-wing dictators attractive to policymakers." Thus, the ability of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to bring stability and order to his nation during the 1920s meant more to American policymakers than his fascist inclinations. All three Republican presidents during the decade agreed that "order and stability had to be the primary considerations," stated Schmitz.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 in conjunction with British prime minister Winston Churchill, the two leaders followed in Wilson's footsteps by renouncing any intentions for territorial acquisition and by proclaiming the right of all peoples to determine their own form of government. This did not mean that the British prime minister had suddenly experienced a change of heart and was now prepared to recognize the independence of all His Majesty's colonies. Churchill understood the provisions differently from Roosevelt, and the president did not have a problem with that, although he did ultimately wish to see an end to European colonial holdings. The context to this announcement, of course, was World War II, which had begun in September 1939, and which was not going well from the Allied perspective at the time of the Atlantic Charter. Germany had defeated

France, invaded the Balkans, and was aggressively pushing back Soviet troops along the Eastern front. Great Britain stood alone in the West, since the United States had yet to enter the war. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to cast the struggle in moral terms, with the one side committed to freedom and collective rights in clear contrast to the despotism of the fascist nations.

Domestically, Roosevelt acquiesced to political pressure by issuing the executive order that allowed Japanese Americans along the West Coast to be rounded up and placed into camps in the interior. In all, 110,000 Japanese Americans were moved and the Supreme Court, which ruled the infringement on their civil rights to be perfectly legal in *Hirabayashi* (1943) and *Korematsu* (1944), once again acquiesced in the denial of individual liberties.

Although he did not take up the interventionist approach in Latin America with the same degree of alacrity as Wilson, neither did President Roosevelt press on the issue of human rights. He ignored the actions of the brutal dictator Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. He reached agreements with fascist leaders in Spain (General Francisco Franco), Vichy North Africa (Admiral Jean Darlan), and Italy (Pietro Badoglio from 1943) in an effort to win the war. Human rights were not expressly a part of the fight against fascism in Asia and Europe, but they were very much a part of the basic differentiation between the two sides.

Their different ideas about fundamental human rights became glaringly obvious at the end of the war as Allied troops made their way into the concentration camps set up by Germany to oversee the extermination of the entire Jewish population in Europe. Scenes of mass graves, crematoriums, and emaciated survivors testified to the Nazi determination to commit genocide.

THE UN DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN

With the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the United States stood militarily triumphant and economically prosperous in 1945. Whereas the rest of the world's powers had suffered from the fighting, the United States possessed a combination of military, economic, and political power that, when combined with strong moral leadership, meant that its pronouncements on human rights could, if provided with sufficient backing, carry real weight.

In the place of Wilson's failed League of Nations came the United Nations, and prominent amongst its considerations was the issue of human rights. In 1948 the United Nations issued its Declaration of Human Rights, which listed, among others, the right to life, liberty, security of person, nationality, recognition before the law as a person, and freedom of movement, including leaving one's country of residence. People had the right to marry, own property, think freely in conscience and religious beliefs, have an opinion and express it freely, assemble peacefully, and take part in the functioning of government—thirty articles in all. It stated that people shall have the right to a free education, at least at the elementary level; people shall have the right to work; they shall have the right to "rest and leisure," and the right to "a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being" of the individual and family, "including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services." Playing a crucial role in the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights was Eleanor Roosevelt.

President Harry S. Truman offered his strong support for the UN's human rights work. At the same time that he spoke out in favor of protecting human rights worldwide, the president experienced political disappointment domestically. He failed in his effort to secure passage of a federal antilynching law. In many parts of the South, white citizens took matters into their own hands when it came to offering justice to African Americans who had either committed crimes or were simply thought to have committed them. Many times a mob hunted down the alleged perpetrator and executed a swift form of punishment, which usually involved hanging without the benefit of the legal proceedings. That this practice still existed in postwar America, and that certain senators refused to allow the passage of federal legislation outlawing it, spoke all too chillingly to the failure of the United States to practice what it espoused in the field of human rights.

Truman pressed ahead just the same. At a ceremony for laying the United Nations building's cornerstone on 24 October 1949, he spoke of the link between individual human rights and security: "The member nations have learned from bitter experience that regard for human rights is indispensable to political, economic, and social progress. They have learned that disregard of human rights is the beginning of tyranny and, too often, the beginning of war." Truman indicated

that the success of the UN would be "measured by the extent to which the rights of individual human beings [were] realized," and he also included "economic and social progress" in the equation for determining success in realizing those goals.

The next year at Gonzaga University, Truman brought his message of individual human rights into the domestic sphere, speaking of the need to prevent "discrimination in our country because of religion, color, or national origin," all three of which were basic tenets of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Truman then indicated that "the same moral principles that underlie our national life govern our relations with all other nations and peoples in the world." Domestically, the president backed up his talk with action. He appointed a presidential Committee on Civil Rights to investigate the domestic situation; asked Congress in February 1948 to pass legislation to address the recommendations made by the committee; barred discrimination in federal employment that July; and moved to end discrimination in the armed forces, though the last of those would not be accomplished until the Korean War.

Much of what Truman did in the area of civil rights was politically motivated, to be sure, but Truman also worried about the ability of the Soviet Union to exploit America's racial problems internationally. His administration decided to support, through a legal brief, the effort to overturn the Supreme Court–sanctioned discrimination against African Americans as set forth in the *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* decision. The president and many of his staff recognized the problems created internationally by the country's hypocritical position: publicly advocating human rights for peoples worldwide, while systematically denying those very same rights at home to some of the nation's citizens because of their skin color.

BROWN V. *BOARD OF EDUCATION* AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Unlike Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower possessed, at most, a tepid commitment to human rights, and his noticeable lack of enthusiasm evidenced itself in a number of telling ways. First, Eisenhower supported the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in overthrowing or attempting to overthrow governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Cuba (1960, though it was President Kennedy who ultimately authorized the ill-fated Bay of Pigs mission in April 1961). Indeed, in the case of Guatemala, the CIA abetted the overthrow of the democratically elected leader, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, ostensibly because his government was riddled with communists and constituted a threat to regional stability, although questions of land reform and their impact on U.S. business interests clearly played a role.

Eisenhower occasionally echoed Wilson's commitment to see peoples around the world determine their own form of government, but he did so primarily as part of a broader anticommunist effort. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was particularly strident in his anticommunism, but his rhetorical calls for Eastern European freedom ran into problems in 1956 when Hungarians sought to control their own destiny and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, found such actions unacceptable. In November, Soviet troops arrived in Budapest to quash the revolution. Shortly after the brutal outcome to the episode was apparent, President Eisenhower used the occasion of Human Rights Day on 10 December 1956 to express the nation's "deepest sympathy" for "the courageous, liberty-loving people of Hungary." But that was all; nothing more was done.

The real problem for the administration came in the form of the civil rights movement domestically and the growing attention it received outside the United States. The Supreme Court reversed *Plessy* in its historic decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* in May 1954, a ruling followed in 1955 by the Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama, and then by the refusal of Arkansas governor Orville Faubus to allow the integration of Little Rock's Central High School in the fall of 1957. A clearly distressed Eisenhower was compelled to call in the National Guard to enforce the court's decision and to protect from mob violence the African American students who were scheduled to attend the high school.

The embarrassment over strident domestic opposition to integration and to the equal participation by African Americans in the nation's social and political systems hurt the nation's image abroad. At the 1958 World's Fair in Brussels, as Michael L. Krenn has insightfully noted, the Eisenhower administration ran into trouble with the American exhibit. One State Department memo observed that continuing racial discrimination, along the lines of what had happened in Little Rock the previous year, "clearly result[ed] to some extent in the weakening of our moral position as the champion of freedom and democracy." Want-

ing to assert the nation's moral superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but having to concede that there were continuing domestic problems over integration, the State Department sent an exhibit to Brussels, "Unfinished Business," that acknowledged some of the problems still faced by African Americans. Although popular with audiences that visited the American pavilion, "Unfinished Business" closed for "renovations," which was a euphemism for deleting the sections that dealt with segregation and thus raised the ire of southern politicians back home. Senator Herman Talmadge, for example, a Democrat from Georgia, declared that segregation "was an issue for the individual states of America and 'cannot by any stretch of the imagination be said to be one of legitimate concern to the citizens of other countries.'" Of course, that has traditionally been the argument of all governments accused of violating their citizens' human rights, whether it be the United States in the 1950s; the apartheid government in South Africa in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; China after Tiananmen Square; or the Taliban government in Afghanistan early in the twenty-first century.

THE KENNEDY, JOHNSON, NIXON, AND FORD PRESIDENCIES

David P. Forsythe has argued that not much with respect to human rights happened during the 1960s, largely because the Kennedy administration was cut short by assassination and the Johnson administration became preoccupied with Vietnam. Yet however brief his time in the White House, President John F. Kennedy recognized the problem created by opposition to civil rights at home for the nation's international standing. Speaking before the United Nations in 1963, nearly fifteen years after the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Kennedy remarked, "The United States of America is opposed to discrimination and persecution on grounds of race and religion anywhere in the world, including our own nation. We are working to right the wrongs." Indeed, Kennedy, who argued that the competition with the Soviet Union was moving from Europe to the countries of the Third World, where mostly darker-skinned peoples lived, understood the need to address prejudice at home in order to appeal effectively to those peoples abroad. For his part, Lyndon B. Johnson ushered through two of the most important pieces of civil rights legislation in American history: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Johnson brought the power of the federal government to bear so as to ensure that the states could not continue discriminating against African Americans. The United States was finally beginning to act in the domestic sphere in accordance with its proclamations internationally.

Human rights lost ground as a matter of importance in the nation's diplomacy under President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser (and, later, secretary of state), Henry Kissinger. The two emphasized geographical, political, and strategic considerations. Human rights, whether individual or collective, were of little concern to them. In his rush to embrace Communist China in a geostrategic partnership against the Soviet Union, for example, Kissinger basically cast aside the collective rights of the Taiwanese, who had been America's ally in the Pacific against communist aggression since 1949. Kissinger's disdain for human rights came through clearly at other times, too. From the administration's support for the military overthrow of the democratically elected socialist Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 to the secret bombing of Cambodia from 1969 to 1973, the Nixon White House valued anticommunism, the exercise of power, and promoting stability over human rights.

Richard Nixon resigned in August 1974 and his successor, Gerald Ford, did not exhibit any greater concern for human rights. Later, Ford would claim credit for supporting human rights by virtue of his signing the Helsinki Accord, also known as the final text from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was signed by thirty-three nations in Helsinki, Finland, in 1975. At the time, however, the Ford administration thought of the agreement as more of a strategic pact than as one that brought a new human rights emphasis to U.S. diplomacy. It was the western European nations that insisted on the insertion of Breadbasket Three, which asserted that "the participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Since the Soviet Union also signed the agreement, this language later became useful in criticizing Soviet practices in Eastern Europe.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVISM

A backlash arose from the lies about the Vietnam War told to Congress by Presidents Johnson and

Nixon, and from Nixon's blatant usurpations of power, leading to the rise of what became known as the imperial presidency. In the 1970s representatives and senators took matters into their own hands and asserted themselves more aggressively into the nation's diplomatic processes, including the area of human rights. One of the most prominent in this respect was a Democratic representative from Minnesota, Donald Fraser. Beginning with hearings in 1973 before his subcommittee of International Relations Committee, Fraser repeatedly raised the issue of human rights and made it a matter of legitimate diplomatic discussion. Human rights would no longer be an afterthought.

More than simply discussing the issue, moreover, Congress decided to act. In 1974, it strengthened law relating to trade and human rights when it passed the Trade Assistance Act; section 504 specifically dealt with human rights, indicating that aid should be linked to human rights considerations. In 1978 that language was changed to make mandatory the link between assistance and human rights considerations. Also in 1974, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act. Named after Democratic Senator Henry Jackson from Washington and Democratic Representative Charles Vanik from Ohio, the amendment insisted that for other nations to receive most-favored-nation status for trade purposes, they had to be certified as allowing their citizens the right to emigrate. The amendment targeted the Soviet Union for its refusal to allow Jews to leave for Israel. In 1976 Congress created the position of coordinator of human rights in the Department of State. As a result, the State Department reports on human rights conditions in countries receiving U.S. aid, totaling eighty-two in 1977. Twenty-three years later, and no longer focusing solely on aid recipients, the State Department published reports on 195 countries through its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. In short, congressional action during the 1970s brought human rights into the nation's diplomatic considerations to an unprecedented degree.

PRESIDENT JAMES EARL CARTER

In this human-rights-friendly environment, Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976. Carter has justly received much attention for emphasizing human rights as part of his administration's diplomacy; he did not, however, invent the issue. Gaddis Smith has, along with other writers, shown that, in Smith's words, "Carter joined the crusade and made it his own." The principle impetus came from Congress, to the point that even such a strong supporter of human rights as Carter found himself arguing that Congress took human rights considerations too far. Still, Carter was more committed to promoting human rights than any other president into the early twenty-first century, in both words and action. As he wrote in his memoirs, "Our country has been strongest and most effective when morality and a commitment to freedom and democracy have been most clearly emphasized in our foreign policy."

Having grown up in the rural segregated South, Carter linked the issue of civil rights for African Americans with the promotion of human rights abroad and cited President Truman, of all the recent presidents, as "the strongest and most effective advocate of human rights on an international scale." He acknowledged problems with the nation's past conduct, admitting that "much of the time we failed to exhibit as an American characteristic the idealism of Jefferson or Wilson," but he rejected the accepted wisdom that the nation had to choose between realism and morality: "To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence." His secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, concurred fully in the need to promote human rights; even National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, himself more in tune with the geopolitical and strategic mind-set of Henry Kissinger than were Carter or Vance, conceded in his memoirs that "a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy would advance America's global interests by demonstrating to the emerging nations of the Third World the reality of our democratic system, in sharp contrast to the political system and practices of our adversaries."

Carter understood the inconsistency in the nation's past talk about human rights when considered alongside its efforts to deny rights to some of its own citizens. In his memoirs, he acknowledged that "I know perhaps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human rights have not always been attained in the United States, but the American people have an abiding commitment to the full realization of these ideals." The problem for Carter was that despite his efforts to ensure that the nation's commitment to human rights was total and unconditional, he like his predecessors (and successors) had to deal with

the international situation as it was, not as he wanted it to be. Thus, while he criticized certain governments, including the Soviet Union and the military regime in Argentina, for violating their people's basic human rights, he laid himself open to charges of inconsistency, if not hypocrisy, by ignoring violations in strategically vital allies like Iran, the Philippines, and South Korea.

Still, Carter made human rights a public commitment for his administration, in contrast to many of his predecessors. Speaking before the United Nations on 17 March 1977, he told the delegates, "The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a historical birthright to be associated with this process." Secretary of State Vance spoke on 30 April 1977 at the University of Georgia School of Law on the integrity of the person, the fulfillment of basic needs, and classical civil and political liberties that required protection. Vance raised certain questions that needed to be asked when investigating human rights in other nations: What were the specifics of the human rights situation under examination? What were the prospects for effective action to bring about change? What were the historical and other perspectives needed to evaluate the situation reasonably? He also offered a slightly tempered sense of what could be expected: "We must always keep in mind the limits of our power and of our wisdom. A sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others."

President Carter followed on 22 May 1977 with a commencement speech at the University of Notre Dame, where he outlined his administration's premises for the nation's diplomacy. The first item that he mentioned was human rights: "We have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy," he stated.

Carter followed these words with deeds. First, on 1 June 1977 he signed the American Convention on Human Rights, an agreement that was reached between the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere seven and one-half years before on 22 November 1969 but not officially endorsed by either Presidents Nixon or Ford. Second, although it was Congress that mandated so many of the changes that led to greater attention being paid to human rights during the 1970s, it was Jimmy Carter who appointed an assistant secretary of state for human rights effective August 1977. His choice for the post was Patricia M. Derian, an aggressive advocate for civil rights albeit lacking diplomatic experience. That, however, did not cause her to back down from confrontations with seasoned diplomats, She repeatedly clashed with more traditionally minded State Department personnel, like Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke on East Asian issues or Ambassador Terence Todman on Latin American matters. Derian did not shape every position the administration took, but she gave concrete evidence of a newfound commitment to human rights, however short lived it ultimately turned out to be.

As international events unfolded in 1978 and 1979, Carter began to focus his energies on more traditional considerations in the nation's diplomacy. First came the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in the horn of Africa, which National Security Adviser Brzezinski viewed as a Soviet proxy war for control over yet another vital region. Further difficulties arose with the collapse of traditional right-wing allies in Nicaragua (Anastasio Somoza in 1979) and Iran (Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1979). Andrew Young's resignation as ambassador to the United Nations in August 1979 effectively ended Carter's push on human rights in that international organization. And things only got worse. In Iran, students stormed the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and took Americans hostage. A month later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Concern over human rights quickly fell into the background, and nowhere did that become clearer than in South Korea. When President Park Chung Hee was assassinated in October 1979 and succeeded by a military regime led by Chun Doo Hwan in December, and when that government decided to suppress brutally an uprising in the southern city of Kwangju in the spring of 1980, Carter said nothing, despite his earlier criticisms of Park's record on human rights. Administration officials feared that South Korea could become another Iran. In short, even a president as rhetorically committed to promoting human rights as Jimmy Carter found himself overwhelmed by strategic considerations that weighed in on the side of protecting stability.

PRESIDENTS RONALD REAGAN AND GEORGE H. W. BUSH

Congress and President Jimmy Carter made enough of human rights as a central tenet of American diplomacy so that subsequent chief executives could not ignore the issue entirely, regardless of

how little attention they really wanted to give the matter. The Reagan administration, for example, took Kissinger's emphasis on geographical, strategic, and political considerations, combined that with its own brand of politically conservative, fervent anticommunism, and added the requisite dose of human rights rhetoric in castigating the Soviet Union, all the while supporting right-wing dictators throughout the world. The spokesperson for the administration on this topic was the ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick. In a 1979 article she had criticized the Carter administration for failing to discern the difference between authoritarian (good) and totalitarian (bad) regimes around the world. The former were to be embraced as friends and allies, because of their ability eventually to change and their present inflexibility when it came to communism. The latter regimes not only would not change, they were communist. Matters of human rights abuses by authoritarian leaders were far less important in her schematic than their willingness to tow the anticommunist line. This was the theoretical framework the administration wanted to employ in its support of right-wing dictators.

The Reagan administration, therefore, offered its full support for repressive governments in places like El Salvador and Guatemala. In both countries the administration lied and covered up numerous atrocities and human rights abuses by the military, all in the name of supporting anticommunism. But from President Reagan's perspective, his predecessor's policies had fared no better. In a 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said with respect to the Carter administration's contradictory behavior on human rights, "We took countries that were pro-Western, that were maybe authoritarian in government, but not totalitarian . . . [that] did not meet all of our principles of what constitutes human rights, and we punished them at the same time that we were claiming detente with countries where there are no human rights." Secretary of State George P. Shultz assessed the situation similarly. He pointed to the differences between the East and West on moral principles, principles from which their basic policies arose. He argued that human rights could not be used to spurn other nations. That was a cop-out, he insisted, stating that although it made certain Americans feel better about themselves in their righteous indignation, it did not promote the kind of real change that improved human rights. On the contrary, according to Kirkpatrick and Shultz, U.S. pressure on Iran, Nicaragua, and South Vietnam in the 1970s to conform to certain human rights practices brought about these regimes' downfalls, which decidedly worsened the day-to-day circumstances faced by the millions of peoples in those countries.

The practical test for the Reagan administration position came in South Africa, where the administration took to the idea of working with the apartheid regime in the hope of bringing about affirmative changes in race relations there. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker coined the term "constructive engagement" when discussing the administration's policy toward the white minority government. The idea was to reassure the South African leaders of American support in their time of transition to democracy. That was the option preferred by the administration; the other was to isolate South Africa through sanctions in an effort to force the situation. Congress, as it had during the 1970s, took a more activist position and in 1986 passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed economic sanctions on South Africa until significant changes were made, in direct opposition to the Reagan administration's constructive engagement policy.

Elsewhere, the Reagan administration appeared to have better luck, though not because of its dedication to constructive engagement or democratic principles. In the Philippines, longtime dictator Ferdinand Marcos stepped aside and allowed the election of Corazon Aquino in 1986, but the principal impetus for change came from the Filipinos. Reagan hesitated at key moments until the matter was all but decided.

The Bush administration made much the same argument on constructive engagement with respect to China in 1989, even after the government had cracked down on the Tiananmen Square protestors, using the People's Liberation Army to crush them on 3 June. Bush secretly sent two high-ranking advisers—National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger—to Beijing on 30 June to assure the Chinese leadership that his administration still intended to promote Sino-American relations once the furor over Tiananmen died down. The president sent the two to China again in December, the same month that the administration announced the release of $300 million in business contracts between American corporations and the Chinese government that had been suspended in the wake of Tiananmen. The administration was intent on downplaying human rights violations.

EXTRADITION, NATIONAL LEADERS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

On 16 October 1998 Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón issued an extradition order for former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, who was in Great Britain for medical treatment at the time. Although the British government eventually permitted Pinochet to return to Chile in March 2000 because of his supposed poor health, Britain's highest court, the Law Lords, had ruled on 24 March 1999 that the charges against Pinochet were so serious—including the murder and torture of Chileans—that they overrode defense counsel's argument that Pinochet was immune from prosecution under Britain's State Immunity Act of 1978. In short, Pinochet could be held legally accountable for his actions while head of state.

In 1999, Henry Kissinger published the third volume of his memoirs, in which he explained the reasons why the Nixon and Ford administrations supported Salvador Allende's overthrow in 1973 and then endorsed the regime under General Pinochet that followed. First, he asserted that the dangers posed by communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere were real, citing Fidel Castro in Cuba and leftist guerrilla activities elsewhere. Second, Kissinger argued that Allende was determined to destroy the democratic institutions in Chile and replace them with a communist dictatorship. Kissinger's defense thus turned on denying involvement in Allende's overthrow and recalling the Cold War context to justify supporting Pinochet.

The Pinochet ruling in Britain gave some officials reason for pause: the United States has held other nations and their leaders accountable for violating human rights, but eventually American leaders may be placed under the same microscope. There is something very chilling, and quite healthy and appropriate, about the prospect of some deliberative body being able to sit in judgment of actions taken by the United States. The notion that American leaders will be held accountable for violating human rights is certainly dim, but such accountability would bring equity to the way in which human rights violations are handled around the world.

On 20 December 1989 the United States invaded Panama. The official reasons floated for the invasion ranged from harassment by Panamanian Defense Forces of American military officials (and their wives), to Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega's involvement with drug trafficking, to human rights violations. The drug connection was well-known in the early 1980s, but Noriega then cleaned up his act to the point where he received a letter from the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1986 that thanked him for his cooperation in stopping the drug trade. The last of the reasons given was a sheer fabrication, since the Bush administration was more than willing to ignore much more serious human rights violations in China and Iraq or, closer to home, in El Salvador and Guatemala.

THE CLINTON YEARS

Since 1989 the United States has faced a number of humanitarian crises, including ones involving the gross violation, either individually or collectively, of human rights. In 1994, for example, some in the Hutu majority in Rwanda orchestrated massive killings of Tutsis beginning in April. The brutal massacres clearly violated the UN's Declaration of Human Rights, but governments around the world refused to intervene to stop the killing. The administration of William Jefferson Clinton purposely avoided using the word genocide because to have uttered it publicly might have obligated the United States to take action under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved in December 1948 but not signed by the United States until 4 November 1988. Instead, the administration used phrases like "acts of genocide." When questioned as to the difference between genocide and acts of genocide, Christine Shelley, a State Department spokesperson, responded that "clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label." When pressed as to how many "acts of genocide" were needed to constitute "genocide," Shelly answered, "That's just not a question that I'm in a position to answer." In other words, better

to avoid the issue through linguistic parsing than acknowledge what was truly happening and doing something about it. President Clinton apologized for America's inaction while visiting Rwanda in 1998, but that was years after 800,000 people had been massacred.

The proliferation of independence movements in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse apparently arose in partial response to Woodrow Wilson's call at the end of the First World War to support such efforts. To their surprise, however, those groups seeking U.S. assistance in their attempts to form independent governments ran into traditional American worries about instability possibly ensuing. In 1999, to cite one example, the leaders of Kosovo traveled to Rambouillet, France, to discuss its status within Yugoslavia. Meeting with American secretary of state Madeleine Albright, they found the United States much less keen than they had hoped regarding their desire to separate from Serbia and what remained of the Yugoslav republic. From the American perspective, supporting independence for Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent: What of the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Tibetans in western China, and the Taiwanese? If those peoples also publicly asserted their desire for independent states, the consequences could possibly involve the United States in a major war, especially in the case of Taiwan. Hence, the Clinton administration remained exceedingly cautious about supporting the collective human rights of the Kosovars, despite their obvious suffering at the hands of the Serbian authorities led by Slobodan Milosevic.

AMERICA'S RECORD AT HOME

In 2001, Francis Fukuyama wrote about the debate between "rights" and "interests" and what difference it makes to speak of "human rights" as opposed to "human interests." More specifically, he delved into why certain groups assert claims to rights when what they are really discussing are interests. In a sense, this is merely a broadening of what Jefferson began when he wrote of the "right" to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The United Nations declaration is about "universal human rights," not human interests, and after incisively noting the distinction between the two, Fukuyama concluded that the reason for the proliferating assertions of "rights" in the half century after the UN's declaration had to do with how "rights trump interests because they are invested with greater moral significance." The problem with injecting human rights issues into the nation's diplomacy, he insisted, was that they set up a basic premise for the nation's diplomacy that could never really be fulfilled: "A country that makes human rights a significant element of its foreign policy tends toward ineffectual moralizing at best, and unconstrained violence in pursuit of moral aims at worst." Jimmy Carter seemed to have discovered that the hard way.

On another level, Americans still fail to understand how arrogant some of their national pronouncements on human rights seem to peoples in other countries. While condemning human rights infractions elsewhere, Americans blithely go about ignoring or rationalizing their own society's violations. To cite one example, polls generally show that a vast majority of Americans consider the death penalty a domestic matter, and popular support for allowing states to execute prisoners convicted of certain crimes remains high, although revelations in the late 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated the inconsistent, indeed arbitrary, way in which the death penalty is frequently applied, not to mention the fact that a good number of death-row inmates had recently been proven innocent through DNA testing. The governor of Illinois went so far as to suspend all executions pending a review of the state's legal system regarding capital cases. Nongovernmental organizations that monitor human rights abuses around the world, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, regularly cite the use of the death penalty as a violation of human rights, and the United States receives special mention since some of its states also allow for individuals under the age of eighteen to receive the death penalty for certain crimes. That puts the United States in the same league as Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, nations not normally listed as standing at the forefront of the world's human rights protectors. And it gets even worse. In 2001, 52 percent of all death-row inmates were African American or Latino, far in excess of their percentage of the general population, which in 2000 stood at 24.8 percent, suggesting a disparity based on racial and ethnic prejudice. Yet the Supreme Court has ruled that statistical findings of uneven sentencing across racial lines regarding capital cases do not constitute sufficient evidence of racial bias. An intent to discriminate must be proven in each case, the court ruled, a nearly impossible burden for defen-

dants appealing their convictions. The United States signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but by 2001 had not ratified it, largely because of objections to the covenant's prohibition against using the death penalty on individuals under the age of eighteen.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

That the United States failed to retain its seat on the UN Commission on Human Rights, on second thought, begins to look less and less outrageous when the long history of the nation's own violations is considered. Compounding those problems is resentment at the fact that the United States is the only truly global power. The administration of George W. Bush has not done much to allay concerns or ease tensions. Its unilateral decision to reject the Kyoto Agreement on curbing global warming, its resolve to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty with Russia in order to pursue a National Missile Defense plan, and the refusal to send Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN Council on Racism in Durban, South Africa (and then the withdrawal of the delegation) all seemed to mark even more examples of American arrogance.

The Bush administration argued that it sent only a low-level delegation to Durban to protest the language already proposed by Arab delegates calling Israeli's treatment of Palestinians as racist; the president also objected to discussing reparations for past acts of slavery. Whatever the reasons, the Bush administration should have weighed the importance of the nation's past leadership in the field of human rights against its displeasure over particular language in draft texts prior to the start of the conference. David D. Newsom was right to call attention to the disparity between the ideals articulated by the likes of Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, or Eleanor Roosevelt and the reality of the actions pursued or not by the United States. But Jimmy Carter was right when he argued that the nation could not shirk its duty to promote human rights just because of its own imperfections.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981*. New York, 1983.

Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York, 1982. The most vocal president on human rights in the nation's history discusses his reasons for making it so important to his administration's diplomacy.

Chomsky, Noam. *Deterring Democracy*. New York, 1991. Essential for understanding the duplicitous language employed by policymakers to rationalize actions.

Forsythe, David P. *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*. Gainesville, Fla., 1988. A very good discussion of Congress's assertiveness after 1973.

———. "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect." *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (autumn 1990): 435–454. One of his many excellent writings on the topic, this one being especially useful as a summary.

Fukuyama, Francis. "Natural Rights and Human History." *The National Interest* 64 (summer 2001): 19–30.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "Dictatorships and Double Standards." *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45. The classic criticism of the Carter administration's policies.

Kluger, Richard. *Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality*. New York, 1977.

Krenn, Michael L. "'Unfinished Business': Segregation and U.S. Diplomacy at the 1958 World's Fair." *Diplomatic History* 20 (fall 1996): 591–612.

Lapham, Lewis. "The American Rome: On the Theory of Virtuous Empire." *Harper's Magazine* (August 2001). A biting analysis of the hypocrisy in American diplomacy and human rights.

Mower, A. Glenn, Jr. *The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Eleanor Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter Eras*. Westport, Conn., 1979.

———. *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: The Carter and Reagan Experiences*. New York, 1987.

Newsom, David D., ed. *The Diplomacy of Human Rights*. Lanham, Md., 1986. Good collection of articles that covers a wide range of topics relating to the subject.

Schmitz, David F. *Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999. A chilling reminder of how stability has usually trumped human rights in, among other

things, considering what governments to support.

Smith, Gaddis. *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*. New York, 1986. A helpful and succinct overview of the Carter administration, including its emphasis on human rights.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, N.J., 1994. A ringing and eloquent endorsement of the benefits provided by America's efforts to promote democracy, but best if read in conjunction with Schmitz.

Vance, Cyrus R. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. New York, 1983.

Vincent, R. J., ed. *Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and Responses*. Cambridge, 1986.

See also FOREIGN AID; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE; RECOGNITION.

IDEOLOGY

Jennifer W. See

In the last few decades of the twentieth century diplomatic historians increasingly turned their attention to the study of ideology. Previously scholars had largely ignored ideology, choosing instead to focus upon economic or political interests in their explanations. More and more, however, historians found explanations centered on economic imperatives and geopolitical calculations insufficient, even anemic, and many began drawing on new approaches borrowed from other disciplines. The work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, in particular, has proven influential among historians and social scientists, offering a powerful tool for understanding the content of ideology and for uncovering its role in policymaking. Geertz's conception of ideology as part of the context within which social interactions unfold has played a significant role in the renewed interest in how ideology influences foreign policy. A rich literature has developed around this subject.

Nevertheless, scholars of American foreign policy still disagree sharply over the importance of ideology in the policymaking process and precisely how it determines outcomes. Even those who emphasize the primacy of ideology in shaping policy concede it is an elusive concept. In particular, at the level of specific policy decisions—and foreign relations historians in the United States have tended overwhelmingly to focus their attention on policymaking—ideology has a way of disappearing. Moreover, little consensus exists over theoretical issues such as definition.

Nowhere has the debate been more intense than among scholars of the Cold War. This dynamic in part results from the intense attention that diplomatic historians have devoted to the superpower conflict—a quick glance through a half dozen back issues of the journal *Diplomatic History* makes clear just how overrepresented the post-1945 period has been. But the nature of the Soviet-American rivalry has also forced scholars to confront the issue of ideology, because both superpowers used strongly ideological rhetoric during the period. Did policymakers during the Cold War believe the ideological claims they made about the world in their public statements, and shape policies accordingly? Or did ideology represent an instrument of politics used to win over their publics and serve as a kind of ex post facto justification for decisions reached on other grounds? Despite the lack of consensus, the intense and ongoing debate over the Cold War highlights both the challenges and the importance of examining ideology.

WHAT IS IDEOLOGY?

According to *Webster's Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary*, "ideology" is "visionary theorizing." Alternatively, it is "a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture," or "a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture." Malcolm Hamilton, in his article "The Elements of the Concept of Ideology," offers a more scholarly formulation, writing that ideology is "a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating and/or justifying a particular pattern of political and/or economic relationships, arrangements, and conduct." The historian Michael Hunt, meanwhile, views ideology in more specific terms as performing a particular function: it is "an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality." These are just a few examples of scholars' many efforts to define ideology.

Expanding upon these three examples, however, we may construct a meaningful definition. It might read as follows: Ideology is a shared belief system that may serve at once to motivate and to

justify. It generally asserts normative values and includes causative beliefs. How do things happen? What does it all mean? An ideology may be utopian and progressive or protective of the status quo. It offers a way in which to order the world, defining enemies and allies, dangers and opportunities, us and them. Ideologies are formal, structured, and involve their own particular logic, often appearing in the guise of science or objective knowledge. Ideology is implicated in collective action, as criticism, goad, explanation, or promise. It is represented in symbols and beliefs held by a community and is publicly expressed. Ideology is at once philosophy, science, religion, and imagination.

ANTECEDENTS

The concept of ideology is generally considered to date from the early nineteenth century, when French theorists, the idéologues, sought through a science of ideas to discover truth and dissolve illusion. For the idéologues, ideology represented a neutral, scientific term. It soon, however, took on a more negative and even pejorative connotation. (The contemporary term "ideologue" derives from this history.) The nineteenth-century reaction against the French Revolution, which for conservatives represented Enlightenment rationalism taken to dangerous extremes, struck the first blow to ideology's reputation. But it was the work of a nineteenth-century revolutionary that truly sundered ideology from its rationalist beginnings.

For Karl Marx ideology had more to do with illusion than truth. In his best-known works, such as *Capital,* the German philosopher and revolutionary provides surprisingly little explanation of either the role or the nature of ideology. Yet Marx has had a lasting influence on the understanding of ideology. Marxist theory finds the determinants of social reality in material factors and especially in economic structures. Marx argued that human society was passing through a series of historical periods or stages. A different form of economic organization—feudalism, capitalism, and eventually communism—each with its own dominant class defined the various stages. And this is where ideology comes in: For Marx ideology served the interests of the dominant class, whether kings or merchants. Ideology acted as a camera obscura, to use one of his many metaphors for the concept, providing individuals with a distorted view of reality. The view through the camera obscura concealed the realities of class conflict that define social relationships. It created the alienation of workers in capitalist society and slowed the inexorable revolutionary progress toward the end of history, the communist utopia. Only Marxist theory, which offered a true vision of history, was free from ideological distortion.

Marx's views proved enduring. Although subsequent theorists further developed his ideas the outlines of his view remained largely unchanged, and ideology continued well into the twentieth century to be understood as an instrument to justify power. Lenin represents perhaps the most significant and influential of Marx's successors. To Marxist theory Lenin added a revolutionary caste of intellectuals who could provide an ideology for the working class. These revolutionary intellectuals exposed the economic and social realities obscured by the ideology of the dominant class, thereby intervening in the progress of history. In Leninist theory revolution became not just inevitable but also intentional. Ideology took on a more conspiratorial aspect, since now it could be created and manipulated. The revolution of 1917 in Russia, engineered in part by Lenin's Bolsheviks, seemed to attest to the connection between ideology and revolutionary upheaval.

Marxist ideas, however, came under challenge in the early decades of the century by sociologists such as Karl Mannheim and Max Weber, who sought a more objective understanding of the term. Mannheim, for one, understood ideology as a worldview, or *Weltanschauung,* shared by a particular social group. For Mannheim, Marxism represented just one example of an ideology. But common usage still largely followed the dictates of Marxist theory: ideology was distorting and irrational, an instrument of power. Max Lerner, writing in the 1930s, declared that ideas were weapons. Most Americans shared this view, and influenced by the events of 1917 and the experience of World War II, identified ideology with totalitarianism. The particulars of Marxist-Leninism and the excesses of Nazi Germany linked ideology with the enemies of American ideals. It was something others—like Hitler or Stalin—had. Students of totalitarianism such as Hannah Arendt reinforced these views. In her influential *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Arendt wrote that totalitarian states had introduced into international affairs a new and dangerous dynamic. To these states she attributed a neglect of national interests, a contempt for utili-

tarian motives, and an unwavering faith in an ideological fictitious world. Terror and ideology became inseparable in her interpretation. Yet at the same time, amidst the explicitly ideological rhetoric of the Cold War, many American observers remained curiously blind to the importance of ideology in American society.

The work of realist writers such as George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau, however, challenged the notion that American foreign policy remained devoid of ideology. The "realists," as they called themselves to emphasize their critique of idealism in international affairs, became especially prominent in the early 1950s. For these writers ideology acted as a cover for the "real" interests that drove foreign policy. In Morgenthau's 1948 *Politics Among Nations,* the struggle for power that defined international politics wore an ideological disguise. This disguise might prove impenetrable to even the policymaker himself. For realists like Morgenthau ideology holds the danger of distraction and delusion while at the same time serving as justification and cover. Whereas in Marxist theory ideology provided a camera obscura image of class interests, for these writers state interests represented the "reality" that ideology distorted. The idea of ideology as obscuring power politics and "real" interests appeared in Kennan's writing explicitly tied to American foreign policy. In *American Diplomacy,* Kennan described American foreign policy in the twentieth century as woven with "the red skein" of legalistic moralism. Kennan argued that legalistic-moralistic tendencies had long marred American diplomacy and called on policymakers to remove their ideological blinders and pursue a policy based upon calculations of interest. Kennan never explicitly labeled this moralistic-legalistic "approach" as ideology. Yet the analogy remained clear.

Beginning in the 1960s revisionist historians and New Left critics such as William Appleman Williams further developed the idea of ideology as at once driving and distorting American policy. But for Williams the problem with American foreign policy lay not in its moralism. Rather, drawing on the Marxist link between ideology and political economy, Williams in his 1959 *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* discovered the "open door." He defined open door ideology as a belief that American prosperity and security depended upon an informal empire of markets around the globe. Market capitalism underlay this ideology, of course, and Williams argued that it had served only to lead American policymakers astray. In his revised 1972 edition of *Tragedy,* he wrote that Vietnam offered a clear example. Williams described the war in Vietnam as a disaster born of efforts to extend the reach of America's informal empire abroad. It represented one more incident in a history of "blustering and self-righteous crusades." In the context of Vietnam, the realists and the New Left agreed on this point, if little else: American ideology served to obscure and distort American interests, drawing the United States into an endless, and hopeless, crusade against communism. Ideology thus stood reaffirmed as a corrosive blight rather than a creative force. Williams's take on ideology and foreign policy proved influential among historians and shaped scholarship during the 1960s and 1970s. The Marxist connection between political economy and ideology along with the conception of ideology as distortion remained alive and well.

But in the field of anthropology, Clifford Geertz was turning away from these ideas. No longer should ideology carry the negative baggage of distortion and concealment traditionally loaded upon it, he argued. Beginning in the 1970s Geertz began to separate it from the role of maintaining power relationships. Instead the anthropologist redefined ideology as an integrated and coherent system of symbols, values, and beliefs. Although still at times the province of a dominant class or group and able to act in the context of power, ideology takes on a broader meaning in Geertz's interpretation. Rather than obscuring social relationships, ideology both formulates and communicates social reality. Geertz's understanding of ideology depended upon his conception of culture, which offers a context within which events can be "thickly" described and which is embodied in public symbols. Within the context of culture, ideology provides a necessary symbol system to make sense of the world, especially significant in times of crisis or rapid change. And here is a crucial distinction between Geertz's understanding of ideology and Mannheim's *Weltanschauung:* For Geertz, ideology is publicly expressed and can be found in the rituals and symbols of a society, not just in the heads of individuals. Thus for the student of culture ideology offers an entrée into the ways in which societies understand their collective experiences, daily realities, and identities. Through the lens of ideology one can read the truth of a culture and society.

Subsequently, Michael Hunt extended the insights of Clifford Geertz to the study of American foreign policy. And for many in the field, Hunt's book proved a revelation. In *U.S. Ideology and Foreign Policy,* Hunt argues that three main ideas constitute American ideology: the promise of national greatness, a hierarchy of race, and a fear of social revolution. American ideology entwined the fate of liberty at home and abroad with a sense of mission and a belief in America as an agent of progress. The efforts of Woodrow Wilson in 1918 to secure acceptance of his Fourteen Points provide a case in point. In Hunt's view Wilson sought a leading international role for the United States, promoting liberty abroad and ensuring Anglo-Saxon cultural supremacy. Like the critics of the 1960s and 1970s, Hunt finds that ideology had largely led Americans astray. Significantly, however, it was the details of the ideology Americans had adopted rather than ideology in itself that had caused all the trouble. By changing the symbols and language of American foreign policy, Hunt offers the possibility of altering its substance.

Other scholars working across disciplinary lines of sociology, political science, and history have similarly turned their attention to the close study and interpretation of ideology and culture. Drawing on the work of French theorists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, they examine the language used by policymakers and analyze the meanings, or "genealogies," of the very words that compose policy. By placing language at the center of social reality, the "linguistic turn" reaffirms ideology's importance. For postmodernists, language constitutes reality; that is, we cannot understand the world around us outside of the words that we use to describe it. For these theorists language serves to replicate and reinforce power relationships much in the way that ideology had in Marxist theory. Postmodernist scholars of the Cold War have explored the meaning of national security and the images of contagion and disease that were often used in the context of Cold War foreign policy. Others, like David Campbell, have examined closely the ways in which foreign policy and the language used to describe it reinforce identity and serve to define a state. In *Writing Security,* Campbell argues that the United States represents an imagined community par excellence, which relies on the language and metaphors of its foreign policy to affirm its existence. For these scholars, the ideas and the language are the reality of foreign policy.

HOW DOES IDEOLOGY CAUSE POLICY?

The renewed interest in ideology and the demand by scholars like Geertz that social scientists and historians must take it seriously has prompted a crucial question: How does ideology cause foreign policy? In Geertz's work this question was intentionally evaded. In his view ideology could not be a cause of action. Ideology is a part of culture and as such acts as the context of, and provides the language and symbols for, social action. Postmodernist theorists have proven similarly uninterested in traditional questions about the causes of the phenomena they study. But for historians, the question of causes, of how things happen, is central to their project. Critics of Hunt's work have raised just this question. How, for example, did the American belief in a hierarchy of race influence particular decisions? Neither have political scientists proved willing to abandon the question of causes. Although theorists of foreign policy increasingly accept that ideas and ideology, not just interests, matter in foreign policy, for many political scientists and historians, ideology needs a "causal mechanism"—a way to act on policy—in order to be useful in explaining events.

This remains a sharply contested issue. Some scholars have focused on institutions and groups of policymakers, arguing that over time these take on a shared culture and world view that influences policy. Others have taken a biographical approach, searching through personal papers in an effort to uncover the beliefs and cultural heritage of individual policymakers. The work of the theorist Walter Carlsnaes suggests one answer to the problem of causation. Like Geertz, Carlsnaes views ideology as a contextual variable in decision making. In *Ideology and Foreign Policy,* Carlsnaes argues that ideology does not cause foreign policy; the decisions of statesmen do. Yet those decisions are made in a particular context, in which ideology is significant. Policymakers react to a particular situation and draw on ideological and cultural resources to make their decisions. While ideology does not intervene in international politics directly, it thus remains a significant determinant of policy by influencing the participants.

This formulation suggests an important pair of insights: Foreign policy cannot be understood in terms of ideology alone, but neither can ideology be ignored. Policymakers struggle for power and respond to threats and opportunities just as realists like Morgenthau have long held. But ide-

ology provides a context—open to analysis in the way of Geertz—that serves to condition those responses and shape the particulars of decision making. The sociologist Max Weber, in his 1913 essay "The Social Psychology of the World's Religions," aptly envisioned ideas as determining the track along which action is pushed by the dynamic of interest. Ideas and interest are separate yet entwined. Interests come out of the context in which policymakers operate and are revealed in the language and the form of their decisions. In this way ideology, despite not serving as a direct cause of policy, remains a significant part of foreign policy.

IDEOLOGY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Four themes in particular form the frame for American foreign policy during its first hundred years: independence, territorial expansion, belief in a national destiny, and commerce. Throughout, ideological visions combined with a hunger for land and territory, a healthy respect for European power, commercial interests, and fears for American security. From the vantage point of the present, American foreign policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries appears relatively inactive and isolationist. Compared with the global reach of American foreign policy during the Cold War and after, the Monroe Doctrine, for example, seems a small thing. Yet the experiences of the early republic contributed lasting pieces to the ideological perspective from which Americans came to view the world in the twentieth century and beyond.

The history of American foreign policy begins with the assertion of independence. One historian, Bradford Perkins, has characterized the American Revolution as "an act of isolation." Although the colonial relationship with Britain was soon severed by the Treaty of Paris (1783), the theme of independence reoccurred throughout the foreign policy of the early Republic. Americans envisioned a New World free from what they saw as the corrupting influences of the old. John Quincy Adams, for one, articulated a "Doctrine of Two Spheres," dividing the Old World and the new. And George Washington famously warned in his Farewell Address in 1796 against "entangling alliances" with Europe.

Perhaps the most significant expression of new world separatism came in the Monroe Doctrine of December 1823. The Monroe Doctrine had two main elements. First, President James Monroe asserted that the Americas were "not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." Although the United States did not propose to challenge existing colonial territories, it pledged to resist any further extension of European power into the Western Hemisphere. The second aspect of the Monroe Doctrine asserted U.S. opposition to European intervention in New World conflicts. The president declared that his government would view any European effort to intervene in Latin American affairs as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." Monroe set up his country as the protector of the New World, though he had little power as yet to back up his claims. The Monroe Doctrine was nonetheless of lasting significance: As Bradford Perkins has written, the 1823 statement amounted to a "diplomatic declaration of independence."

The great powers of Europe, especially Britain, France, and Spain, did not acquiesce all at once to this division of the world. Following the war for independence from the British empire, the United States spent the early years of the nineteenth century in the Quasi-War with France after refusing to join Napoleon's war against Britain. Then, after an embargo on both British and French trade failed, the republic found itself again at war with Britain. The United States fought the War of 1812 to protect neutral trading rights, but most contemporaries viewed it as a second war for independence. The Treaty of Ghent (1814), which ended the war, changed little, but it did ratify American independence from Britain. Although Europeans generally denied the legitimacy of the Monroe Doctrine, characterizing it as a statement of ambition rather than reality, none of the great powers openly challenged it, allowing Americans to believe themselves successful. Throughout the nineteenth century European preoccupations such as the Crimean War (1854–1856) left Americans largely to their own devices, encouraging the illusion of isolation from European conflicts and a belief in a true separation of the Old World from the new.

A second theme of early foreign policy was a belief in American destiny. Few among the early generation of Americans questioned that their new nation was meant for greatness. In part this belief came from the Puritan heritage. The United States represented a "city on a hill" that God had chosen for a special destiny and mission in the

world. This mission was understood over time in different ways, but the survival of America's republican government remained central. Early Americans believed that republican government was fragile, easily corrupted into tyranny from above or anarchy from below. After all, the republican experiments of the past had ended in failure. Moreover, the French Revolution raised significant questions for Americans about whether republican government could succeed elsewhere in the world. The excesses of the French Revolution, in particular the Terror (1793–1794) and the eventual rise of Napoleon as emperor (1804), reinforced a sense of exceptionalism and superiority in the American mind. This sense of superiority also had a racial aspect. American destiny was an Anglo-Saxon destiny. As Hunt explains, belief in racial hierarchy was part and parcel of American ideology.

The mixture of mission and race played out in a third theme of early foreign policy: expansion. For nineteenth-century Americans geography was destiny. To the west lay an empty continent, and expansion was nothing less than inevitable. For Americans at the time the same divine providence that had guided the founding seemed to sanction a right to expansion. In the 1840s the writer John O'Sullivan gave name to this impulse: manifest destiny. O'Sullivan believed in the inevitability of American greatness and the necessity of the American example for the world. Americans must "carry the glad tidings of peace and good will where myriads now endure an existence scarcely more enviable than that of the beast of the field," he wrote. The United States had a mission "to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." The new nation would make "manifest" the virtues of freedom and Anglo-Saxon civilization. As the historian Anders Stephanson explains, manifest destiny served as a legitimizing myth of empire. Manifest destiny helped reconcile the national mythology of exceptionalism and virtue with ambition and acquisitiveness. Americans thus understood their territorial expansion in a particularly American way, drawing on ideas deeply embedded in their cultural heritage and self-identity.

And the United States quickly overspread the continent. Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase (1803) marked the first major expansion, extending the boundaries of the United States to the Mississippi River. Subsequently, John Quincy Adams became a key architect of American expansion, negotiating the 1819 Transcontinental Treaty with Spain, which extended American claims all the way to the Pacific. These claims did not go entirely unchallenged, as the British sought to retain their foothold in the Pacific Northwest and Mexico claimed significant portions of the Southwest. Moreover the issue of slavery complicated considerably the process of admitting new states into the union. And of course the continent was not empty: The Cherokee and Iroquois among others tried desperately to keep their ancestral lands. But with a combination of war and treaty the United States managed to secure hold over much of the continent by mid-century. Racial attitudes of superiority helped rationalize the bloody and dangerous work of subduing the native populations, as did the ideology of destiny and divine mission. At the same time, race paradoxically limited American expansion to the south. During the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), President James K. Polk turned away from conquering the whole of Mexico, believing that Latin Americans were not ready for republican government. This belief in Latin American inferiority proved lasting, though ambivalence toward spreading democracy did not.

The final ingredient of early foreign policy was commerce. Revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams argue that the search for markets has driven American foreign policy from the beginning. Commerce and efforts to protect American trade in particular have always been an element of foreign policy. Americans have long shown a tendency to assert universalistic claims and champion neutral rights that serve American interests. The rebellion against Britain was in part over trading privileges. Even more so was the War of 1812. There were territorial issues and domestic political positions at stake in the War of 1812, but maritime rights were central to the American grievance with Britain. The United States opposed the British efforts to blockade France by decree, known as a "paper blockade," and demanded that Britain recognize the principle of "free ships free goods." Goods transported by neutral American shipping should be immune from seizure by British naval forces and American seamen free from impressment into the British navy, argued the Madison administration. The War of 1812 did not resolve these issues, though the principles of free trade and neutral shipping won some protection under international law in subsequent decades.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Secretary of State John Hay passed the Open Door Notes to the other great powers. Hay hoped to establish the principle of free trade and open markets. The subject was the China trade, but the principle involved transcended the particulars. Much as the Monroe Doctrine expressed a long-held belief in the separation of the Old and New Worlds, the open door notes signified the importance of trade and commerce to American policymakers. Williams has argued that the open door represents the keystone of American foreign policy. Americans have throughout their history sought to secure global markets, an open door, for American goods. To Williams and other revisionist scholars, the impetus of the open door has made for an inherently expansionist U.S. policy that has in effect created an informal empire under the guise of asserting neutral rights. Revisionists exaggerate, perhaps, the dominance, the power of the open door, but trade and commerce nonetheless have remained central elements of the story.

Until the end of the nineteenth century American ideology had little influence beyond its borders. The mythology of the founding and the other tenets of American identity served to reinforce unity at home. Most Americans perceived the United States as a nation apart and clung to isolationist attitudes. But growing American power and widening commercial and political interests meant a turn to a more activist foreign policy beginning in the early years of the twentieth century. The first president of the new century, Theodore Roosevelt, proved an able champion of American power, sending his new navy around the world. Roosevelt also involved himself in Old World diplomacy, winning a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Events in the Old World soon ensured that Roosevelt's successors would see little alternative but to continue the project of asserting American power.

World War I (1914–1918) and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia stand together as the defining events of the twentieth century. World War I brought to an end the Habsburg and Turkish empires, opening the question of nationalism and self-determination in eastern and central Europe. The Bolshevik Revolution, meanwhile, introduced a new ideology to the world: Marxist-Leninism. The conflicts created by the combination of declining empires, unleashed nationalisms, and new ideologies proved lasting, shaping events for the rest of the century. President Woodrow Wilson, who served from 1912 to 1920, proved a pivotal figure who redefined American traditions to meet the new circumstances of the twentieth century. The growing power of nationalism, the ideological challenge of Marxist-Leninism, and the revolutions set loose by retreating empires: to these challenges Wilson brought a distinctly American response.

Wilson has remained a controversial figure. Scholars have variously seen him as a starry-eyed idealist and as a wise statesman who pursued a kind of enlightened realism. An idealist Wilson certainly was. The president believed in the perfectibility of man and his institutions and that extending democracy could make for a more peaceful world. He sought to channel nationalism into democratic direction and find an alternative to the political arrangements of the past, in particular the secret treaties and multinational empires he believed had brought about the Great War. He hoped the orderly legal arrangements of the League of Nations would prevent conflict while at the same time protect traditional American interests in free trade and neutrality.

With a liberal's fear of radicalism Wilson intervened in the Mexican revolution (1910–1915) to "teach Mexicans to elect good men." With equal distaste for conservatism he saw little reason to regret the breakup of the multinational Habsburg empire in central and eastern Europe. And with a traditional American ambivalence toward social change he sought to turn back revolution in Russia, fearing the challenge to property rights Marxist-Leninism seemed to represent and the instability the revolution threatened. The president believed in democracy. But he also saw spreading democracy abroad as a way to ensure the American way of life at home. In this he abandoned his predecessors' pessimism about the possibilities for republican government elsewhere. The United States should not only serve as an example, but also actively promote liberal values abroad. In Wilson, moralism, ideology, and interest entwined in an activist, universalist liberalism. That Wilson's vision ran aground against the radicalism of revolution, the impossibility of intervention on behalf of self-determination, and the institutionalized rivalries of the European great powers in no way lessened its lasting influence.

Yet despite the universalist implications of the Wilsonian vision, the United States in the interwar period limited its involvement in world affairs, refusing to join the League of Nations. This is not to say that the U.S. withdrew entirely

from the world during the 1920s and 1930s. It participated in naval conferences with the other great powers and tangled with Japan in the Pacific, but not with the kind of far-reaching universalist claims and hopes of 1918. For all the importance Wilsonian ideology seemed posed to have in shaping American foreign policy in the aftermath of World War I, it was rivaled by isolationism. Prosperity at home took precedence over idealism abroad, particularly after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.

But this aloofness from the world could not last. The 1933 Nazi seizure of power in Germany meant little to most Americans at the time, but its effects soon rippled throughout the international system. After the invasion of Poland in 1939 the United States was not entirely uninvolved in World War II but proved able to avoid direct intervention. Instead President Franklin D. Roosevelt made his country an arsenal for democracy against Germany and its allies. After Japanese pilots bombarded Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, however, events again drew the United States into a pivotal role in world affairs, and it faced the challenge of reconciling its traditions and self-image with the ways of the world.

Although Wilsonianism was held responsible by the 1940s for the failed peace settlement of Versailles, it still exerted a powerful hold on the American imagination. The bipartisan support for the United Nations, the new collective security organization proposed in 1945, and Roosevelt's wartime rhetoric testified to the continued power of Wilsonian ideals. But against these hopes the post–World War II peace felt fragile, in part as a result of the new vulnerability that technology imposed and Pearl Harbor symbolized. The lessons of history hard learned at Munich and Versailles combined with old beliefs in American mission and exceptionalism as policymakers of the 1940s wrestled with the dilemmas of the postwar world. It soon became clear, even as World War II was coming to a close, that chief among these dilemmas was the reality of Soviet power. Within two years of the end of the war, a unique kind of conflict, soon dubbed the Cold War, was on. America's new vulnerability had an agent, Soviet communism, and a panacea, the strategy of containment.

THE COLD WAR

Traditional scholarship on the Cold War assigned a central but sharply circumscribed role to ideology. The writers of the 1950s drew on the official rationales that the Truman administration had used to explain the nature of the Cold War and the necessity for the American Cold War policy of containment. This literature portrayed the Soviets as bent on expansion, driven by a combination of traditional interests and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The United States in response acted prudently and pragmatically to defend its interests against this obvious security threat. This view did not go unchallenged. Although initially an advocate of containing the Soviet Union, George Kennan soon joined another realist critic, Walter Lippmann, and turned against his creation. Kennan argued that the Truman Doctrine overcommitted the United States by defining American interests in ideological and expansive terms. For Kennan and Lippmann both, ideology influenced not only Soviet but also American policymakers. Beginning in the 1960s revisionist scholars turned traditional scholarship on its head, arguing that American, not Soviet, policy was ideological, and that the Soviet actions in the immediate postwar period were motivated by legitimate security needs.

In reaction to the sharp disjunction between revisionist and traditional scholarship, historians working in the 1970s and 1980s set aside ideology altogether and redefined the Cold War as a traditional conflict of interests between two great powers. This conflict came as the inevitable outgrowth of World War II and particularly the power vacuum in central Europe resulting from the destruction of Germany. Louis Halle in *The Cold War as History* famously describes the two superpowers as scorpions in a bottle. They could not help but come into conflict. Writing very much in this tradition, Melvyn Leffler argues in his award-winning account of the Truman administration, *A Preponderance of Power,* that American policymakers were driven by national security considerations and sought to increase American power in the postwar world. In *A Preponderance of Power*, ideology has little to do with American policy. Instead, American policymakers acted out of fear for American security. Truman and his advisers were prudent in reacting to the possibility of Soviet aggression, yet they were foolish to seek so exaggerated a security for the United States. Although the wisdom of American policymakers and the question of Soviet intentions remained a subject of scholarly disagreement, ideology seemed to fall out of the picture. For a time, there the debate rested.

But in the 1990s newly available archival sources from the Soviet side of the conflict reopened the question of the relationship between ideology and the Cold War. Writing in 1997, John Lewis Gaddis declared in *We Now Know* that the new Cold War history must of necessity concern itself with ideology. Similarly, Martin Malia in *The Soviet Tragedy,* an account of Soviet foreign policy, places ideology at the center of the conflict between East and West and argues that the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution virtually guaranteed the Cold War that followed. The Russian scholars Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov also emphasize ideology in their interpretation of Cold War Soviet foreign policy, though in their account Marxist-Leninism and self-interest combined to shape Stalin's decision making.

American ideology has received less attention, but the arguments of this new scholarship implied a role for American ideology as well. Two scholars in particular, Odd Arne Westad and Anders Stephanson, emphasize the importance of American ideology during the Cold War. As Westad states in his 2000 Bernath Lecture, "It was to a great extent American ideas and their influence that made the Soviet-American conflict into a *Cold War.*" Meanwhile, Stephanson finds in Cold War documents a particularly American language of politics built around the opposition between "freedom" and "slavery." The kind of ideological absolutism embodied in Patrick Henry's famous "Give me liberty or give me death" lived on in America's conceptions of the Cold War world. Ideology thus seemed to have returned to a central place in the analysis of the Cold War.

Amidst this rediscovery of ideology, however, Marc Trachtenberg, in an important 1999 book, *A Constructed Peace,* argues precisely the opposite: the Cold War in fact had little to do with ideology at all. In Trachtenberg's view the central problem of the postwar world was power, specifically German power. Soviet and American leaders in the postwar period understood this reality, and far from being influenced by ideology pursued their interests with cool calculation. This is not to say that the superpowers did not distrust one another, or that there were not very real conflicts of interest between them. But the conflicts were precisely that: of interest, not of ideology. Trachtenberg argues that the Cold War began as a result of Soviet actions in Iran in April 1946, actions that American policymakers perceived as signaling expansive intentions. In response the United States tightened its hold on western Germany, and the Cold War rivalry ensued. The crucial question of the Cold War continued to be the problem of Germany, although much of the actual conflict took place on the periphery. Once the superpowers reached a settlement on Germany, which Trachtenberg argues occurred in 1963, the Cold War was for all intents and purposes over.

The gap between those who write in terms of national security and those who emphasize ideology remains wide. The relationship between ideology and national security is often portrayed as an either-or proposition: either ideology or national interest motivates policymaking. Ideology tends to be associated with irrational or particularly aggressive actions. And in fact the literature has tended to portray the more aggressive side of the Cold War rivalry as the more ideological. For traditionalists this meant the Soviet leadership acted according to the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, while for revisionists it was American policy that had fallen victim to the siren song of ideology. In this respect the literature treats ideology as a kind of pathology of policymaking. Moreover, national security is often treated as a given, a kind of objective truth that exists unchanging across time and space. By this logic leaders on all sides of the Cold War conflict understood the risks and opportunities they faced in much the same way. Each calculated his (and they were all men) options and reactions carefully and rationally and shared similar goals of ensuring territorial security and increasing state power. Calculations complete, policymakers reached into the same toolbox for the means to achieve their goals. Perhaps they did.

But as Tony Smith asserts in his study of twentieth-century American foreign policy, *America's Mission,* "security definitions arise out of particular domestically engendered perceptions of foreign affairs." Ideology acts to define the boundaries of legitimate action and to define what is dangerous and what is not. It is thus complicit in the process of creating interests and defining national security, because ideology provides the context within which policy decisions are made. As a result we must take seriously historical experience, the language policymakers use, and the very different tools on which they rely to pursue their ends. Foreign policy decisions are rarely made in a vacuum, and domestic political debates influence the process. During the Cold War, and particularly in the United States, ideological context conditioned foreign policy outcomes. Ideology defined the issues at stake.

For Americans the issue at stake became the survival of freedom, and Soviet communism became the primary threat. This view did not come all at once. Although suspicious of Soviet intentions, to be sure, Truman and especially his secretary of state James Byrnes remained open to efforts at accommodation and compromise with the Soviet Union throughout 1945 and the early months of 1946. Meanwhile, officials like Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and George Kennan, chargé d'affaires in Moscow, were raising the alarm, prompting debate within the administration over how to deal with the Soviets in the postwar world. In February 1946, Kennan telegraphed some eight thousand words from his post at the embassy in Moscow. His Long Telegram offered one of the first interpretations of Soviet policy. Similar views were already floating around the corridors of Washington policymaking bureaucracies, but Kennan, as he would do several more times in the early Cold War, put American attitudes into articulate form.

Kennan described the Soviet Union as committed "fanatically" to the belief that there could be "no permanent modus vivendi" between East and West. In Kennan's view the Kremlin's perspective resulted from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and a traditional and instinctive insecurity. Marxist-Leninist ideology and the closed society that limited contact with the outside world had a hypnotic effect on Soviet officials, leaving them unlikely and unable to question their assumptions about the West. Kennan argued that Soviet policy could not be changed by talk; it was "highly sensitive to the logic of force." He warned that much depended upon the "health and vigor" of American society and urged his colleagues in Washington to have the "courage and self-confidence" to protect American traditions. "World communism is like a malignant parasite. . . . This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet."

The Long Telegram echoed earlier traditions of exceptionalism and mission, which likely in part explains its appeal to official Washington. Kennan's analysis made the rounds (it appears in the personal papers of nearly every major figure in the Truman administration), and most agreed with its analysis. The Soviet Union represented a clear threat to American values and to freedom at home and abroad. The Kremlin sought to expand communist influence throughout the world, and it would not be deterred by negotiation. The American way of life increasingly appeared under siege to many of these officials. Soviet actions in eastern Europe, particularly in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, as well as the April crisis in Iran, seemed only to confirm these fears. So too did the emergence of strong communist parties in France and Italy. At the same time, however, the crisis in Iran proved resolvable by diplomacy when Iran made a protest to the United Nations. Even better, the apparent Soviet acceptance of the UN's decisions in the case suggested that the new organization was not doomed as many had feared. Moreover, in July 1946 the Paris Peace Conference began and by the end of the summer successfully concluded peace treaties with the Axis powers, though a German peace treaty and particularly the problem of reparations remained on the table. Despite the alarmist language of many administration officials in their private memos and growing public suspicion of Soviet intentions, the possibility of postwar settlement was not yet foreclosed.

But the limited diplomatic successes of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference could not erase the growing fears of the threat Marxist-Leninism posed to American society and interests. A September 1946 report prepared by White House staffers Clark Clifford and George Elsey reveals that the perspective expressed by Kennan's Long Telegram was taking hold throughout the administration. The Clifford-Elsey report expressed the opinion of its authors to be sure, but the two officials drew on documents prepared by all of the major policymaking institutions, and their views were thus informed by the combined wisdom of the Departments of State, War, Navy, and Commerce. The report placed the U.S.–Soviet relationship at the center of American foreign policy. It expressed no ambiguity about Soviet intentions: "Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination by the U.S.S.R." This aim could not be turned aside by conventional diplomacy, and the authors borrowed Kennan's interpretation that the Kremlin leadership believed in the impossibility of peaceful coexistence between Marxist-Leninism and capitalism. Like Kennan, Clifford and Elsey took Soviet rhetoric and ideology seriously. The pronouncements of Kremlin leaders such as Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov represented the reality of Soviet policy. The United States must prepare itself for total war, the authors declared. Economic aid programs and an information policy (propaganda, like ideology,

was something the other side had) articulating the benefits of American society and the goals of U.S. policy should not be neglected. But the United States should never lose sight of Soviet preparations for eventual war with the "capitalistic powers," preparations that represented a direct threat to American security. By autumn 1946 the language and content of the Clifford-Elsey report was emblematic of the emerging consensus held by official Washington.

The fate of Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace signaled perhaps more than anything else the hardening of this new perspective. Wallace had long argued for negotiations with the Soviets, and in September 1946 he expressed his views publicly in a speech at Madison Square Garden. Wallace argued that the United States should work to allay Russian suspicions and distrust and recognize Soviet security needs in eastern Europe as legitimate. In retrospect there seems to be little in Wallace's speech that is particularly radical. But his apparent support for a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe set off a firestorm of controversy. The tone of the speech created a dissonant echo amidst the increasingly hard-line atmosphere of official Washington. An embarrassed President Truman, who had upon cursory reading endorsed Wallace's address, demanded the secretary's resignation. Arguments that the United States should attempt to resolve the diplomatic disputes that separated the superpowers and that the Soviets acted in eastern Europe out of legitimate security concerns slipped increasingly to the margins of mainstream opinion. Consensus about ideological conflict in the postwar world, the expansive tendencies of Soviet Union, and the necessity for a policy of containment was taking hold, and American policy evolved to match these views.

By the end of 1946 American officials increasingly turned away from negotiating with the Soviets. When Secretary of State James Byrnes returned from a December conference of foreign ministers meeting in Moscow, where he had attempted to conclude agreements on eastern Europe and international control of atomic energy, he faced sharp criticism. To American observers Stalin showed every sign of emulating Hitler in his efforts to expand Soviet power, his allegiance to ideology, and his willingness to break agreements. Both policymakers and the informed public drew on the analogy of the Munich Conference (1938), at which British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain bargained away territory in Czechoslovakia in the hope that he could achieve peace for all time. Chamberlain failed. And the lesson Americans learned was that dictators could not be trusted, appeasement only fed greater ambition, and negotiations suggested weakness. It is striking how powerful in fact this analogy became and how often officials referred to it during the postwar period. The decision largely to renounce negotiation and the tools of traditional diplomacy held an appeal linked to the American heritage of exceptionalism and aloofness from the messiness and compromise of European politics. The failed diplomacy of 1939 fit neatly into the existing preconceptions and predisposition of American diplomacy. And the "lessons" of history seemed to lend legitimacy to the desire to contain Stalin's Soviet Union and wait for it to fall victim to its own "internal contradictions."

But containment meant more than a policy of waiting. Beginning in spring 1947 the United States turned ideas into action. In late February the British government notified the Department of State that the British would be forced for financial reasons to withdraw its support from Greece. In the midst of a civil war, Greece had become a site of a great power contest, lying as it did in a strategic corner of the Mediterranean. Anxious to prevent Soviet influence from taking hold in Greece, the Truman administration resolved to take action. The decision resulted from a combination of ideological and strategic interests: Greek geography rendered it significant from a strategic perspective. But American policymakers also feared the spread of communism into Greece and believed that from Greece the contagion would almost certainly spread to Italy and France. Greece offered a test.

It was a test that Harry Truman met with a commitment to defend freedom throughout the world. In a speech before both Houses of Congress on 12 March 1947, Truman asked Congress to fund economic and military aid to Greece and to neighboring Turkey. The president emphasized that the United States had a responsibility to protect freedom worldwide, declaring that "the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms." Continued peace depended upon American leadership. Truman drew a close connection between poverty and totalitarianism and argued that the United States must provide economic and political support for freedom. The United States should stand on the side of self-determination—by intervention, if necessary. "I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way,"

the president told Congress. Implicit in Truman's statement, of course, was the belief that most of the world's peoples would choose a way of life compatible, if not identical, with that of the United States. A *New York Times* article declared that "the epoch of isolation and occasional intervention" was over. An "epoch of American responsibility" was just beginning. The American impulse to withdraw from the world, suggested by the decision to "contain" the Soviet Union, stood alongside the Wilsonian mission to spread democracy. The tension between these two impulses determined the nature of America's Cold War policies.

In part the ideological content of Truman's speech represented a tool of politics. Truman required congressional support to put his policy into action, and the administration needed to head off any perception that the U.S. decision to intervene in Greece represented an effort to shore up the British empire. Yet the ideological content went deeper than public rhetoric, since these were terms that had appeared in confidential government documents such as the Clifford-Elsey report throughout the preceding months. Officials within the administration thought in these terms themselves, and thus public rhetoric matched private perceptions. Subsequently, with the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, the United States added economic aid to Europe to its arsenal against the Soviet Union. Secretary of State George C. Marshall declared that the policy was not aimed at any particular country but instead against "hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." But to most observers, the goal was clear. A rebuilt western Europe tied to the United States by a flow of dollars and trade would offer a significant barrier to Soviet expansion. The parasite of communism preyed upon societies weakened by poverty and unstable institutions. The Marshall Plan offered an answer.

The following month in an article published in *Foreign Affairs,* George Kennan summarized the new consensus for the educated public. The Soviet Union holds within it the "seeds of its own destruction," he declared. Despite Kennan's claims to objectivity, his analysis of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," as the article was entitled, revealed as much about the ideological content of American conduct as it explained about the Soviet Union. Kennan declared that "the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances." Marxist-Leninism provided the ideology, which together with geography, a history of invasion, and Stalin's personal paranoia resulted in dangerous and expansive tendencies. Kennan argued that Soviet ideology taught that the outside world was hostile and not to be trusted. Capitalism and socialism could not long coexist. Moreover, in Kennan's interpretation, the Soviet Union pictured itself as a center of socialist enlightenment adrift in a dark and misguided world. The logic of history was on its side and in the long run, revolution was inevitable. Here was a rival city on a hill.

To Kennan the challenge that Soviet communism posed to the United States offered a test of faith and an opportunity for reaffirmation. In the closing paragraph of the article he wrote that the Soviet challenge offered "a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations." Kennan believed that American virtue and strength at home translated into power to meet the Soviet threat abroad. By maintaining its free society the United States could best counter the appeal and the promise that Marxist-Leninism offered. The United States stood as a model of freedom for the world, an alternative to totalitarianism, and a shining example in a hostile world. He wrote that the United States should "offer gratitude to providence," which had chosen the United States for the great task of resisting the spread of Soviet communist oppression and protecting freedom at home and abroad. For history had "plainly intended" that the United States bear the burdens of moral and political leadership. The city on a hill must become the leader of the free world. Failing to arrest the spread of communism would lead to destruction and the end of freedom everywhere. Although Kennan came to be identified as the father of containment, he came to question the implications of his creation, criticizing American foreign policy as overly ideological in 1951 in *American Diplomacy.* Ironically, he failed to realize the degree to which his own worldview was shot through with "the red skein" of ideology.

Realist scholars like Marc Trachtenberg are correct to emphasize that American policymakers reacted to the perceived dangers and opportunities of particular situations. In this respect external conditions drove America's Cold War foreign policy. The problem of Germany, the occupation of Japan, and the future of Europe represented real dilemmas for policymakers. And the global political and economic instability of the immediate postwar period posed a potential danger to American security and prosperity. But American

policymakers' interpretations of these threats and opportunities was influenced by American concerns about freedom, independence, exceptionalism, and democracy. For them the source of both economic and political instability came from the Soviet Union and in particular the nature of the Soviet state. Truman and his key advisers defined the Soviet Union in explicitly ideological terms. The threat was not the power of the Soviet state (in fact, most administration officials considered the Soviets the weaker of the two superpowers) so much as the appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the promise of revolution that it held.

Contrast this with the perspective of the British Foreign Office, which in the early months of the postwar period retained its nineteenth-century concern with maintaining a balance among the main European powers and protecting their imperial holdings. For British policymakers, at least initially, the threat to postwar peace came from an unequal division of the spoils and an extension of Soviet power. This distinction between the worldviews of the Foreign Office in London and the Department of State in Washington highlights the role of ideology in providing the context for policy decision making. For realists ideology is an instrument of policy; it serves to rationalize and justify decisions already made. Yet as Stephanson explains in "Liberty or Death," "an instrumental view of ideology as rhetorical means to strategic ends misses the question." Why did policymakers choose the particular language they did and how did they come to "inhabit" it? While the power vacuums and risks of the postwar world may have provided the occasion for a more activist foreign policy, American ideology determined the form American intervention in the world would take, defined the nature of American national interests, and informed the decisions that issued from Washington. Ideological suspicion of communism reinforced distrust of Soviet intentions. Americans viewed all dictators as the same, and all compromise as appeasement. At the same time, these fears warred with traditional American ambivalence toward European affairs and intervention abroad. American Cold War policy grew out of these contradictions. Containment drew from the ideological foundations of liberalism, anticommunism, and American mission.

The superpower conflict soon stalemated in Europe. By the 1960s Soviet and American positions had hardened, and little change seemed likely. Moreover, the ideological rivalry seemed to ease, such that some commentators such as Walter Lippmann began to believe by the early 1960s that the Cold War might be ending. Yet despite signs of a willingness to coexist in Europe and to open the way to a more "normal" diplomatic relationship through arms control and the like, the Soviet-American rivalry continued unabated in the Third World. Throughout the postwar period instability and conflict infected the old colonial areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as the imperial powers retreated. Rapid social and economic change hit the newly created postcolonial states, and they became ripe for outside intervention. Here was a crucial arena of the Cold War conflict.

At times at the invitation of local elites and at times of their own decision, the two superpowers intervened throughout the Third World, playing a violent and risky game of dominoes. And like Wilson in Mexico, American policymakers throughout the postwar period attempted to curb the radicalism of social change and to intervene on behalf of self-determination. Under the Cold War imperative of containing the spread of communism, they argued that the United States was spreading democracy abroad and acting on the side of right. Often, however, the United States supported very undemocratic regimes, such as those of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala. The effort to contain communism more often than not contradicted the lingering Wilsonian heritage. A deep ambivalence toward social change and revolution conflicted with the goal of spreading democracy abroad, particularly in societies long subject to colonial control. Thus, for every Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy administration's economic development program for Latin America, there was a Somoza in Nicaragua or a Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam.

Nowhere did the contradictions among American ideals and the demands of American interests explode so spectacularly as Vietnam. And like the scholarly debate over the Cold War, the literature on Vietnam is rich with disagreement. Two studies of the Johnson administration illustrate this disjunction clearly. Lloyd Gardner in *Pay Any Price* emphasizes what he sees as the powerful hold that liberal ideals had over President Johnson. For Gardner, Johnson's intervention in Vietnam resulted from a deeply held belief in liberalism and an effort to promote American ideals abroad. A student of Williams, Gardner similarly finds tragedy amidst the ruins of American

policy. Johnson's efforts to transplant liberalism and promote economic development amidst social revolution in Vietnam could not but end in failure.

Fredrik Logevall, by contrast, finds that liberal ideology mattered relatively little in Johnson's decision making. The president, Logevall argues in *Choosing War,* certainly had a vision for the future of Vietnam, a future shaped along liberal principles. But the driving force in his decision making was not that vision but rather his fears for his domestic political as well as his personal credibility. In Logevall's account the president and his advisers were gloomy realists on Vietnam in the key months following the 1964 election. Many of them were pessimistic about the prospects for success in the war, and many privately questioned whether the outcome really mattered to U.S. security. Thus Johnson's liberal rhetoric and economic development programs provided the window dressing for what was in reality a cynical and self-serving use of American power.

CONCLUSION

The disparity between these two accounts highlights the complexity of ideology and the continued disagreement among scholars over its role in the policy process. Moreover, the experience of the United States in the Third World reveals clearly how difficult it is to understand the role of ideology and how ambiguous that role can be. How, for example, do we reconcile American ideology of liberalism with the support of dictators such as Somoza? Must we see ideology as little more than a cynical tool of justification? Or did American officials truly believe in the rhetoric they used? If they believed it, did it drive their decision making? The answer to these questions seems to be an unsatisfying "sometimes." But that in itself is significant. "Sometimes" means that as scholars we must approach the empirical evidence with an open mind, willing to find ideology as a primary cause of decision making or as mostly irrelevant to the policy process. It seems reasonable to conclude that some periods of American history proved more ideological than others, and that some administrations were more influenced by it than others. Moreover, while ideology may always lurk in the background, it may be pushed aside by other considerations in the evolution of particular decisions.

In the context of the Cold War, an open-mindedness toward ideology seems especially important. The Cold War was not only a classic political power struggle, but neither was it a purely ideological conflict. The Cold War rivalry arose over the traditional problems of creating a stable postwar settlement and in particular finding a solution for the instability of central Europe. But the Cold War was also a rivalry between two states that each embraced a universalist ideology (Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy, respectively), each made certain predictions about the future, and each held certain causative assumptions about the world. American foreign policy during the Cold War thus entwined ideology and interest. A close study of the period shows us the importance of ideology in foreign policy. To ignore ideology in the context of the Cold War is, in some respects, to miss the point.

At the same time, however, renewed scholarly interest in ideology and the continuing debate over its significance has revealed the difficulties the concept entails. For foreign relations historians, causality is a central concern. They want to zero in on why appeasement failed in the 1930s, or how the Cold War began, or why exactly the United States intervened in Vietnam. Finding the role of ideology in the context of these questions is quite a task. Little wonder that many have dismissed ideology altogether, and that even those who have embraced it have often done so with misgivings and qualifications. Yet despite these complexities, we should not too quickly consign ideology to the scholarly rubbish heap. As Geertz has pointed out, events unfold within the bounds of culture, which is open to interpretation. Thus, an awareness of the ideological context of particular decisions adds a layer of complexity and richness to our analysis. It allows us to understand why some policy options appeared more appealing than others, and why some received no attention at all.

Consider for a moment one final example. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, some among John F. Kennedy's advisers argued that the president should authorize a surprise attack on Cuba in an effort to destroy the Soviet missiles. It would have been a dangerous move. Moreover, it is likely that practical considerations would have prevented the plan from progressing beyond the conference table. Yet in rejecting the idea, Kennedy cited none of these reasons. Instead the president referred to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. At the time Franklin Roosevelt had called it a day that would live in infamy. For Kennedy, a surprise attack on Cuba did not fit his image of

the United States, and this policy option was quickly ruled out. To be sure, ideology did not determine the outcome of the missile crisis. But an examination of the ideological context of the decision offers us a greater degree of understanding of the Kennedy White House.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism.* New ed. New York, 1973.

Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Rev. ed. Minneapolis, Minn., 1998. An analysis of American foreign policy from a postmodernist perspective.

Carlsnaes, Walter. *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization.* Oxford and New York, 1987.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.* Oxford and New York, 1997.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Safe For Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923.* New York, 1987.

———. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam.* Chicago, 1995.

Geertz, Clifford. "Ideology as a Cultural System." In David E. Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent.* New York, 1964. See also "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." In Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York, 1973. Of Geertz's many writings, these two essays offer the clearest explanation of his views on ideology.

Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History.* New ed. New York, 1991.

Hamilton, Malcolm B. "The Elements of the Concept of Ideology." *Political Studies* 35 (1987): 18–38. A useful analysis on the question of definition.

Hunt, Michael. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987. An excellent starting place on the subject from a historical perspective. For an explanation by the same author of the complexities of ideology as a category of analysis, see "Ideology," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations.* New York, 1991.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy.* Expanded ed. Chicago, 1984. The classic realist critique of American foreign policy.

Larraín, Jorge. *Marxism and Ideology.* London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1983.

Leffler, Melvyn. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. Highlights the role of national security calculations in early Cold War policymaking.

Logevall, Fredrik. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif., 1999.

Lukacs, John. *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age.* New York, 1993.

Malia, Martin. *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991.* New York, 1994.

McCoy, Drew R. *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980. An analysis of the role of republican ideology in early America.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776.* New York, 1997.

McLellan, David S. *Ideology.* Minneapolis, Minn., 1986. A straightforward introduction to the subject.

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* 5th ed. New York, 1973. See especially chapters 7–8.

Mullins, Willard A. "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 66 (1972): 498–510. A helpful if somewhat dated survey.

Perkins, Bradford. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865.* Vol. 1. Cambridge and New York, 1993.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1994. Ideology, and particularly Wilsonian ideology, is central in this account of American foreign policy. For a contrasting view that examines American intervention in the Third World, see David F. Schmitz. *Thank God They're On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999.

Stephanson, Anders. *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right.* New York, 1995. A short but thoughtful look at how an ideology of destiny has shaped American foreign policy. An interpretation of American ideology during the Cold War

by the same author is "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U.S. Ideology." In Odd Arne Westad, ed. *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation, Theory.* Portland, Ore., 2000.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. A history of the Cold War written from a realist perspective.

Weber, Max. "The Social Psychology of the World Religions." In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.* New York, 1948.

Westad, Odd Arne. "Bernath Lecture: The New International History of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 24 (2000): 551–565.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* 2d ed. New York, 1972. The classic revisionist work on American foreign policy.

Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

See also OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION; REALISM AND IDEALISM; REVISIONISM.

IMMIGRATION

Roger Daniels

Immigration and immigration policy have been an integral part of the American polity since the early years of the American Republic. Until late in the nineteenth century it had been the aim of American policy, and thus its diplomacy, to facilitate the entrance of free immigrants. From the 1880s until World War II—an era of immigration restriction of increasing severity—the diplomacy of immigration was chiefly concerned with the consequences of keeping some people out and, after 1924, when Congress made the diplomatic establishment partially responsible for immigration selection and its control, with keeping some prospective immigrants out. Since 1945, after only seemingly minor changes in policy during World War II, and partly due to the shift in American foreign policy from quasi-isolation to a quest for global leadership and hegemony, immigration policy has become less and less restrictive. Cold War imperatives plus a growing tendency toward more egalitarian attitudes about ethnic and racial minorities contributed to a change in immigration policy.

Many foreigners clearly understood that there were certain ironies in these long-term changes. No one was more aware of this than the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Visiting Washington in 1979 during a time when the United States was urging the Soviet Union to allow more Jews to emigrate, the Chinese leader, according to Jimmy Carter's memoirs, told the American president: "If you want me to release ten million Chinese to come to the United States I'd be glad to do that." Obviously, Deng was "pulling Carter's chain," but it is not clear from the text whether the Georgian realized that. Immigration was part of the raison d'être of the early Republic. One of the complaints in Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was that George III had "endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands." The Constitution, while not mentioning immigration directly, did instruct Congress "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" (Article 1, Section 8) and provided that naturalized persons might hold any office under the Constitution save only President and Vice President. (Article 2, Section 1). The only other reference to migration referred obliquely to the African slave trade, providing that "the Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight" (Article 1, Section 9).

In 1790 Congress passed the first naturalization act, limiting those eligible to "free white persons." This put the new nation on a collision course with Great Britain, which, although it had naturalization statutes of its own, often refused to recognize the switch of allegiance of its subjects. The question of the impressment of seamen was one of the issues that troubled Anglo-American relations from 1787, when the first of many American protests against impressment was made, until the end of the War of 1812. Foreign Secretary George Canning put the British case nicely when he declared that when British seamen "are employed in the private service of foreigners, they enter into engagements inconsistent with the duty of subjects. In such cases, the species of redress which the practice of all times has . . . sanctioned is that of taking those subjects at sea out of the service of such foreign individuals." Impressment, of course, became one of the issues that led to the War of 1812. After that the British recognized, in practice, the right of naturalization, but one of the ongoing tasks of American diplomatic officials has been trying to ensure that naturalized American citizens are recognized as such when they visit their former native lands. This has been particularly a problem for men of military age during time of war.

While barring the African slave trade at the earliest possible moment in 1808, immigration "policy" in the new nation universally welcomed free immigrants. American leaders understood that immigration was necessary to fill up their largely empty and expanding country and would have endorsed the nineteenth-century Argentine statesman Juan Bautista Alberdi's maxim that "to govern is to populate." Even Millard Fillmore, while running for president on the nativist American Party ticket in 1856, found it necessary to insist that he had "no hostility to foreigners" and "would open wide the gates and invite the oppressed of every land to our happy country, excluding only the pauper and the criminal." Actually the gates were open, and Fillmore's suggestion of restriction on economic grounds would not become law until 1882. As long as American immigration policy welcomed all free immigrants there were no policy issues for American diplomats to negotiate. Immigration first became a special subject for diplomatic negotiation during the long run-up to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

A few Chinese had come to the United States—chiefly to East Coast ports—in the late eighteenth century in connection with the China trade. After American missionaries were established in China, some Chinese, mostly young men, came to the eastern United States for education without raising any stir. But relatively large-scale Chinese immigration, mostly to California beginning with the gold rush of 1849, produced an anti-Chinese movement. Before this movement became a national concern, Secretary of State William H. Seward appointed a former Massachusetts congressman, Anson Burlingame, as minister to China in 1861. He was the first to reside in Beijing. A radical former free-soiler and antislavery orator, Burlingame supported Chinese desires for equal treatment by the Western powers. While still in Beijing, he resigned his post in late 1867 and accepted a commission as China's first official envoy to the West. With an entourage that included two Chinese co-envoys and a large staff, he traveled to Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States seeking modification of China's unequal status. He was successful only in Washington. There he negotiated in 1868 what became known as the Burlingame Treaty—actually articles added to the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). The 1868 agreement, China's first equal treaty, was ratified without controversy and contained the first immigration clause in any American treaty:

> The United States and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance and also the mutual advantage of free migration and emigration . . . for the purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents . . . but nothing contained herein shall be held to confer naturalization upon the citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.

The United States would never again recognize a universal "right to immigrate," and by 1870 the anti-Chinese movement was becoming national. Spurred by economic distress in California and a few instances of Chinese being used as strikebreakers in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, anti-Chinese forces stemming largely from the labor movement made increasingly powerful demands for an end to Chinese immigration, usually blending their economic arguments with naked racism. That summer Congress was legislating the changes in the existing naturalization statute impelled by the end of slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment. Republican Senator Charles Sumner and a few other radicals wanted to make the new naturalization statute color blind, but the majority did not wish to extend that fundamental right to Chinese. The new statute amended the eligibility from "free white persons" to "white persons and to aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent."

In 1876 Congress created a joint congressional committee to investigate Chinese immigration. It took testimony in the Palace Hotel in San Francisco just before and after that year's presidential election. By that time both national party platforms had anti-Chinese planks. The Republican version was somewhat tentative, declaring it "the immediate duty of Congress to investigate the effects of the immigration and importation of Mongolians." The out-of-power Democrats denounced "the policy which tolerates the revival of the coolie-trade in Mongolian women held for immoral purposes, and Mongolian men to perform servile labor." The majority report of the joint congressional committee claimed that the Pacific Coast had to become "either American or Mongolian," insisting that there was "not sufficient brain capacity in the Chinese race to furnish motive power for self-government" and that "there is no Aryan or European race which is not far superior to the Chinese." The committee report urged the president to get the Burlingame Treaty modified and Congress to legislate against

"Asiatic immigration." The report was presented to Congress while it was settling the election of 1876, so no immediate action was taken. After much debate the next Congress passed the so-called Fifteen Passenger bill, which barred any vessel from bringing in more than fifteen Chinese immigrants. The sticking point for many was the existing Burlingame Treaty: some wanted to override it completely while others wanted to wait until the treaty was revised. The bill also instructed the president to notify the Chinese that portions of the treaty were abrogated, which passage of the bill would have accomplished.

Rutherford B. Hayes responded with a reasoned veto message that accepted the desirability of stemming Chinese immigration. He argued that the Chinese manifested "all the traits of race, religion, manners, and customs, habitations, mode of life, segregation here, and the keeping up of the ties of their original home . . . [which] stamp them as strangers and sojourners, and not as incorporated elements of our national life." But, he insisted, there was no emergency to justify unilateral abrogation of the treaty, which could have disastrous consequences for American merchants and missionaries in China. He promised that there would be a renegotiation of the treaty.

A somewhat protracted diplomatic renegotiation was completed by the end of 1880, and the new treaty was ratified and proclaimed in October 1881. It unilaterally gave the United States the right to "regulate, limit, or suspend" the "coming or residence" of Chinese laborers, but it allowed Chinese subjects "proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers now in the United States to go and come of their own free will and accord."

In the spring of 1882, Congress passed a bill suspending the immigration of Chinese laborers for twenty years. President Chester A. Arthur vetoed it, arguing that while a permanent bar to Chinese labor might be eventually justified, prudence dictated a shorter initial term. Congress responded by repassing the bill but with a ten-year suspension, and Arthur signed it into law in May 1882. The law prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers—defined as "both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining"—after 4 August 1882. It also provided that any Chinese who was in the country on 17 November 1880—the effective date of the Sino-American treaty—or had come between that date and 4 August 1882 had the right to leave and return. The law, as opposed to the treaty, did not spell out who was entitled to enter, although it did specify that diplomats and other officials of the Chinese government doing government business, along with their body and household servants, were admissible. Fines for bringing Chinese in illegally could run as high as $1,000 per individual, and vessels landing Chinese illegally were liable to seizure and condemnation.

Thus, what is commonly called the Chinese Exclusion Act—its proper title is "To Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese"—became law. The typical textbook treatment is a sentence or two, sometimes relating it to other discriminatory treatment. Its real significance goes much deeper than that. Viewed from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, the Exclusion Act is clearly a pivot on which subsequent American immigration policy turned, the hinge on which the poet Emma Lazarus's "Golden Door" began to swing toward a closed position. It initiated what can be called an era of steadily increasing restrictions on immigration of all kinds that would last for sixty-one years. It was also the first time that immigration policy per se became a focal point of a bilateral diplomatic relationship between the United States and another nation.

During the exclusion era—1882–1943—the problematic enforcement of changing immigration statutes and regulations for Chinese created future diplomatic problems, brought the principle of family reunification into American immigration policy, shaped the culture of immigration enforcement in the United States, and established a precedent for negotiations about American immigration policies. Various changes, generally of a more restrictive character, were added to the Chinese exclusion laws and regulations between 1882 and 1902, when a modified law extended them "until otherwise provided by law." These changes exacerbated relations and triggered repeated negotiations between the two nations.

The most significant of these negotiations occurred in the aftermath of the Geary Act of 1892, which not only extended exclusion for ten years but also required that all Chinese in the United States get a residence certificate (a kind of internal passport) within a year or be deported. The statute also reversed the usual presumption of innocence and provided that "any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent" was deemed to be in the country illegally unless he or she could demonstrate otherwise. This set off a mass civil disobedience campaign orchestrated by Chinese-

American community organizations. They urged Chinese Americans not to register and hired a trio of leading constitutional lawyers to challenge the statute. Their suit, *Fong Yue Ting* v. *United States* (1893), was expedited to the Supreme Court, which quickly ruled, five to three, against Fong and two other litigants. Justice Horace Gray, writing for the majority, held that Chinese, like other resident aliens, were entitled "to the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of persons and of property, and to their civil and criminal responsibility," but insisted that the Constitution could not shield them if Congress decided that "their removal is necessary or expedient for the public interest."

At the time of the Court's ruling only some 13,000 Chinese had registered; perhaps 90,000 had not and were presumably liable to immediate deportation. But both cabinet officers responsible for enforcement—Treasury Secretary John G. Carlisle and Attorney General Richard Olney—instructed their subordinates not to enforce the law. Carlisle estimated that mass deportations would cost at least $7.3 million and noted that his annual enforcement budget was $25,000. Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham confidentially informed the Chinese minister, Yung Yu, that Congress would soon amend the law so that Chinese could register even though the deadline had passed. In November 1893, Congress extended the deadline by six months, and in that time about 93,000 additional Chinese registered and received the disputed certificates.

While relations between China and the United States were complicated by actions of the federal government toward immigrants, those between Italy and the United States deteriorated because of discrimination by lesser governmental bodies. There was widespread violence directed against Italian Americans, but one outbreak in particular had the most serious international consequences. On 15 October 1890 the police superintendent in New Orleans was murdered by a group of men using sawed-off shotguns; before he died he whispered that the Italians had done it. He had been investigating so-called Mafia influence among the city's large Italian-American population. New Orleans authorities quickly arrested almost 250 local Italian Americans and eventually indicted nineteen of them, including one fourteen-year-old boy, for the murder. Nine were brought to trial. On 13 March 1891 the jury found six not guilty and could not agree on three others. All nine were returned to jail for trial on another charge. The day after the verdict, a notice signed by sixty-one prominent local residents was placed in the morning newspaper inviting "all good citizens" to a 10 A.M. mass meeting "to remedy the failure of justice." A mob of perhaps 5,000 persons assembled, and, led by three members of the local bar, went first to the arsenal where many were issued firearms and then to the parish prison, where they shot and killed eight incarcerated Italians and removed three others and lynched them. Three or four of the victims were Italian citizens and the others were naturalized American citizens. None of the mob was ever punished.

Local public opinion hailed the result, as did much of the nation's press. The *New York Times* wrote that the victims were "sneaking and cowardly Sicilians, the descendants of bandits and assassins" but insisted in the same editorial that the lynching "was not incited by any prejudice against Italians." The Italian government protested, demanding punishment for the lynchers, protection for the Italian Americans of New Orleans, and an indemnity. President Benjamin Harrison himself, acting during an illness of Secretary of State James G. Blaine, directed the American minister in Rome to explain "the embarrassing gap in federalism—that in such cases the state alone has jurisdiction," while rejecting all the demands. There was nothing new about this. Similar responses had been made by the federal government in a number of previous instances, most notably in 1851 when Spaniards had been killed in New Orleans; in 1885 after the Rock Springs, Wyoming, massacre of twenty-eight Chinese miners; and in a whole host of other outrages, mostly against Chinese in the Far West. In all of these cases the president eventually called upon Congress to make an ex gratia payment. Congress, after debate, did so, and the matters were ended. For the Rock Springs affair, for example, the payment was nearly $150,000.

The lynching of Italians in New Orleans took a somewhat different course to the same essential result. Exasperated by the initial stonewalling, the Italian government recalled its minister in Washington but did not break relations. There was foolish talk of war in the press—all agreed that the Italian navy was superior to the American—and naval preparedness advocates used the speculation to their advantage. Eventually good relations were restored, but Harrison settled the matter without the traditional reference to Congress. In his December 1892 message to Congress Harrison reported the payment of

$24,330.90 (125,000 francs) to the Italian government, a little over $6,000 per person. The money was taken from the general appropriation for diplomatic expenses. Congress was furious—or pretended to be—because of executive usurpation of its prerogatives and reduced the fund for diplomatic contingencies by $20,000.

A more complex and potentially more serious situation developed from the mistreatment of Japanese in the United States—more serious because of the growing hostility between the United States and Japan over conflicting plans for Pacific expansion and more complex because both local and national discrimination was involved and because major tensions about Japanese immigrants continued for more than two decades. Long before diplomatic tensions over Japanese immigration to western states and the Territory of Hawaii surfaced, Tokyo had shown concern about possible mistreatment of its immigrants in America. As early as the 1890s internal Japanese diplomatic correspondence shows that there were fears in Tokyo that emigrant Japanese workers in the United States, who in many places were filling niches once occupied by Chinese workers, would eventually evoke the same kinds of official treatment—exclusion—that Chinese workers had experienced. This, Japanese officials were convinced, would negatively affect Japan's ambitions to achieve great-power status. The greatest fear—Tokyo's worst nightmare about this subject—was that someday there would be a "Japanese Exclusion Act." This fear—and eventually resentment at the result, which was in effect exclusion—so pervaded Japanese culture that for decades Japanese texts continued to refer to the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 as the "Japanese Exclusion Act."

Anti-Japanese activity had flared in race-sensitive California as early as 1892, when there were fewer than 5,000 Japanese persons in the entire country. In 1905 the state's leading newspaper, the *San Francisco Chronicle,* began what can be called an anti-Japanese immigrant crusade—a crusade that the rival publisher William Randolph Hearst soon made his own. In the same year San Francisco labor leaders organized the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, the California legislature passed a resolution calling on Congress to "limit and diminish Japanese immigration," and two California congressmen introduced the first bills calling for exclusion of Japanese into Congress.

Although these events all took place beneath the radar of national press consciousness, they did not escape the notice of the man in the White House. In May 1905, Theodore Roosevelt fumed in a (private) letter about the "foolish offensiveness" of the [mostly Republican] "idiots" of the California legislature, while indicating sympathy for the notion of exclusion of Japanese and muttering about their being "a serious problem in Hawaii." Two months later he instructed the U.S. Minister to Japan, Lloyd C. Griscom, to inform Tokyo that "the American Government and . . . people" had no sympathy with the agitation and that while "I am President" Japanese would be treated like "other civilized peoples." In his prolix annual message of December 1905, Roosevelt insisted that there should be no discrimination "against any man" who wished to immigrate and be a good citizen, and he specifically included Japanese in a short list of examples of acceptable ethnic groups. In the next paragraph, Roosevelt, who had signed the 1902 extension of Chinese exclusion without hesitation, made it clear that Chinese laborers, "skilled and unskilled," were not acceptable.

Almost a year later, on 11 October 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education ordered all Japanese and Korean pupils to attend the long established "Oriental" school in Chinatown. The announcement attracted little attention in the San Francisco press and seems to have been ignored outside California until nine days later, when garbled reports of what had happened were printed in Tokyo newspapers claiming that all Japanese pupils had been excluded from the public schools. Roosevelt reacted quickly. He wrote his high-ranking Harvard classmate Baron Kentaro Kaneko that he would take action; he also met with and gave similar assurances to the Japanese minister, Viscount Siuzo Aoki, and dispatched a cabinet member and former California congressman, Secretary of Commerce and Labor Victor H. Metcalf, to San Francisco to investigate the matter. In his December 1906 annual message the president formally recommended legislation "providing for the naturalization of Japanese who come here intending to become American citizens." Roosevelt made no serious effort to get such legislation introduced, let alone passed, and just two months later Secretary of State Elihu Root, in reacting to a Japanese proposal that acceptance of exclusion be traded for naturalization, informed American negotiators that "no statute could be passed or treaty ratified" that granted naturalization.

Secretary Metcalf's report was made public on 18 December 1906 and showed that rather

than the hundreds or thousands of Japanese pupils discussed in the press there were only ninety-five Japanese students in the entire San Francisco school system, twenty-five of them native-born American citizens. He did find that twenty-seven of the aliens were teenagers enrolled in inappropriate grades because of language problems; the most extreme example was two nineteen-year-olds in the fourth grade. Metcalf's report recommended that age-grade limits be enforced, something that was acceptable to the Japanese community. Otherwise Metcalf found the segregation order unjust and against the public interest. But since the Supreme Court's decision in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* (1896) had affirmed the legality of racial segregation in the United States, the federal government had no power over a state's right to practice it. California politicians of all parties, undoubtedly representing the will of their constituents, adamantly refused to mitigate their discrimination in any way, and, in the session of the legislature that began in January 1907, proposed enacting more anti-Japanese legislation. Roosevelt and Root set to work to ameliorate the situation, and, in something over a year, worked out a solution that is known as the Gentlemen's Agreement, the substance of which is contained in six notes exchanged between the two governments in late 1907 and early 1908. It is instructive to note that Root actually instituted an action in the northern federal district court of California to prohibit segregation of alien Japanese schoolchildren, who enjoyed most-favored-nation rights under the existing commercial treaty with Japan, but could do nothing for the pupils who were American citizens.

In the event, no suit was necessary. Roosevelt summoned members of the school board to Washington, jawboned them in the White House, and got them to rescind their order in February 1907. (The only Japanese pupils actually segregated in California were in a few rural districts around Sacramento. Although that segregation continued, no fuss was made about it, so the Japanese government, which was concerned with "face" rather than principle, never complained.) Then Congress passed an amendment, drafted in the State Department, to a pending immigration bill, which enabled the president to bar by executive order persons with passports issued for any country other than the United States from entering the country. Japan, in turn, agreed to mark any passports issued to laborers, skilled or unskilled, who had not previously established American residence, as not valid for the United States. But the eventual agreement allowed Japan to issue passports valid for the United States to "laborers who have already been in America and to the parents, wives and children of laborers already resident there." Thus the principle of family reunification, which would become a hallmark of American immigration policy, was first introduced as a part of the process of restricting Asian immigration.

The Gentlemen's Agreement is an excellent example of the "unintended consequences" that have characterized much of the legal side of American immigration history. The diplomats and politicians involved assumed that with labor immigration at an end the Japanese American population would decline and the problems that its presence created in a white-dominated racist society would gradually fade away. They did not realize that through the family reunification provisions of the agreement tens of thousands of Japanese men would bring wives to California. Many if not most of these were "picture brides," women married by proxy in Japan to men who in most instances they would not see until they came to America. Most of these newly married couples soon had children who were American citizens by virtue of being born on American soil, which meant that the American Japanese population grew steadily. Eventually the anti-Japanese forces in the United States campaigned without success for a constitutional amendment that would repeal the "birthright citizenship" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and make the children of "aliens ineligible to citizenship" similarly ineligible. (In the 1970s nativist forces in the United States revived such demands but with a different target: they proposed making the American-born children of illegal immigrants ineligible for automatic citizenship.) When the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect there were probably some 60,000 Japanese persons in the continental United States, the vast majority of them aliens. By 1940 there were more than 125,000, more than two-thirds of them native-born American citizens. Many white Californians and other concerned westerners who had been assured that the Gentlemen's Agreement was tantamount to exclusion came to believe that they had been betrayed by the uncaring politicians back east.

But even before the demographic consequences of the Gentlemen's Agreement became clear, a second crisis arose over Japanese immigrants. This one erupted in 1913 and focused on land rather than on people. Although most Japan-

ese immigrants had come to California as laborers, many soon were able to become agricultural proprietors. As early as 1909 bills had been introduced into the California legislature barring the sale of agricultural land to Japanese, but Republican governors then and in 1911—the California legislature met only every other year—cooperated with Republican presidents in Washington and "sat upon the lid," as Governor Hiram W. Johnson put it. But in 1913, with Johnson still governor and Democrat Woodrow Wilson in the White House, the lid was off. Although Washington was again taken unawares by the crisis, Tokyo had been expecting it. Its consul general in San Francisco had warned in November 1912 that "the fear-laden anti-Japanese emotion of the people [of California] is a sleeping lion." By the time Wilson took office on 4 March 1913, bills restricting Japanese and other alien landholding had made considerable progress in the California legislature. The Japanese ambassador, Sutemi Chinda, called on the president during Wilson's second day in office: his dispatch to Tokyo quoted Wilson as saying "that the constitution did not allow the federal government to intervene in matters relating to the rights of the individual states." After much debate and publicity, in mid-April the California legislature passed legislation forbidding the ownership of agricultural land by "aliens ineligible to citizenship." This, of course, pointed the bill at Japanese, although it also affected other Asians. Californians argued that the discrimination—if such it was—was caused by federal rather than state law.

Even before Governor Johnson signed the bill, angry anti-American demonstrations erupted in Tokyo: the California legislature had again helped to create an international crisis. The Wilson administration, while trying to adhere to traditional states' rights doctrines, nevertheless felt that it had to at least seem to be taking action. Wilson sent Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on a cross-country train trip to Sacramento to meet with Governor Johnson and the legislature and urged that the bill not be enacted before Bryan arrived. In the event, Bryan's trip was anticlimactic. Unlike Roosevelt and Root, Wilson and Bryan had nothing to offer the Californians in return for moderation. Bryan returned to Washington, and Johnson signed the Alien Land Act into law: eventually ten other western states passed similar measures.

The California law, which was strengthened in 1920, was relatively ineffective. Japanese farmers and the white entrepreneurs with whom they dealt evaded the law in a number of ways, most of which had been foreseen by Johnson and his advisers. The two major methods were placing land in the name of citizen children or leasing rather than purchasing the land. For a few relatively large-scale operators adoption of a corporate form was also effective. When the California legislature passed an amendment to the land act barring "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from exercising guardianship over their citizen children, the federal courts ruled that such a statute violated the constitutional rights of those children to have their natural parents as guardians.

These disputes, of course, helped to poison relations between Japan and the United States, which were already problematic on other grounds. During the Versailles treaty negotiations and in early sessions of the League of Nations, Japan tried to get questions of immigration and racial equality discussed but the imperialist powers successfully stifled every attempt. (Of course Japan did not have clean hands in such matters, but that is another story.) The final and most traumatic act in the conflicts between the Pacific powers over immigration came in 1924 and involved federal rather than state discrimination.

By the 1920s the American people and the Congress were ready for a general and massive curtailment of immigration. Prior to that time statutory immigration restriction based on race or national origin had been directed only at Asians. The Immigration Act of 1917—best known for imposing a literacy test on some immigrants—had created a "barred zone" expressed in degrees of latitude and longitude, which halted the immigration of most Asians not previously excluded or limited. The first statute to limit most immigration, the Quota Act of 1921, placed numerical limits on European immigration while leaving immigration from the Western Hemisphere largely alone; it did not directly impact Japanese immigration, which was still governed by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907–1908. Under the 1921 act Japan got a small quota, and Tokyo could not and did not complain that the law was discriminatory. Had Japan been treated as European nations were in the 1924 statute, it would have received the minimum quota of 100, but the version of the more generally restrictive 1924 law that passed the House contained overt discrimination against Japanese by forbidding the immigration of "aliens ineligible to citizenship." In an ill-starred attempt to preserve the Gentlemen's Agreement, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes suggested verbally that

THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1965

The Immigration Act of 1965 changed the face of America and is one of three laws passed that year—the others being the Voting Rights Act and the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid—which collectively represent the high-water mark of twentieth-century American liberalism. Yet the immigration statute was not always so perceived. At the signing ceremony on Liberty Island, with Ellis Island in the background, President Lyndon Johnson minimized the act's importance: "The bill that we sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives, or add importantly to our wealth and power."

The law, in fact, changed the focus of immigration to the United States, greatly increasing the share going to Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and, through its heightened emphasis on family migration, led to a massive increase in the volume of immigration. Johnson was not dissimulating in his assessment. He was repeating what his advisers in the State and Justice departments had told him. They had focused on righting what they saw to be past mistakes of American immigration policy, and Johnson, following them, stressed the wrong done to those "from southern or eastern Europe." Members of both departments had testified before Congress that few persons from the Third World would enter under its provisions, and it is highly doubtful that the law would have been recommended or enacted had anyone understood what the results would be. Political scientists later developed the concept of unintended consequences. As Stephen M. Gillion points out in *"That's Not What We Meant to Do"* (2000), the 1965 Immigration Act is one of the prime examples of this phenomenon.

Japanese Ambassador Masanao Hanihara write him a letter explaining the Gentlemen's Agreement, whereupon the American would transmit the letter to the Senate in an attempt to get the offending phrase removed. The note, which was not in itself either threatening or blustering, did contain the phrase "grave consequences" in referring to what might happen if the law were enacted with the offending phrase. Henry Cabot Lodge and other senators insisted that the phrase was a "veiled threat" against the United States and stampeded the Senate into accepting the House language. In *The Presidency of Calvin Coolidge* (1998), the historian Robert H. Ferrell presented evidence suggesting that Hughes and others in the State Department either drafted or helped to draft the original note, something that all those concerned categorically denied at the time and later.

How grave were the actual consequences? No one can say. Japan and the United States might well have engaged in what became a "war without mercy" even if no Japanese immigrant had ever come to America. But some authorities, such as George F. Kennan, have argued that the "long and unhappy story" of U.S.–Japanese relations were negatively affected by the fact that "we would repeatedly irritate and offend the sensitive Japanese by our immigration policies and the treatment of people of Japanese lineage."

The 1924 act, which established a pattern of immigration restriction that prevailed until 1965, also established a "consular control system" by providing that aliens subject to immigration control could not be admitted to the United States without a valid visa issued by an American consular officer abroad. Visas were first required as a wartime measure in a 1918 act and were continued in peacetime by a 1921 act, but they were primarily an identification device. The 1924 act for the first time made the visa a major factor in immigration control. Although the State Department often claimed that Congress had tied the government's hands, the fact of the matter is that since 1924 much actual restriction of immigration has been based on the judgment of the individual federal officials administering it. That responsibility has been shared between the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), then in the Department of Labor but switched to the Department of Justice in 1940. The diplomatic control is exercised by granting or failing to grant visas; the INS control is exercised largely at the borders, although since 1925 some INS personnel have been attached to some American embassies abroad as technical advisers. (The number of foreign countries with INS personnel has fluctuated. At the outset of the twenty-first century they were operating in thirty-

eight countries. In Canada and a few other places, mostly in the Western Hemisphere, it has become possible to clear U.S. immigration and customs while still on foreign soil.)

The American foreign service—which was white, Christian (overwhelmingly Protestant), and elitist—had long exercised a largely negative influence on American immigration policy. Consular reports had provided much ammunition for the immigration restriction movement since the late nineteenth century. The tenure of Wilbur J. Carr as, in effect, head of the consular service from 1909 to 1937, placed a determined and convinced anti-Semitic nativist in a position to shape the formulation of both immigration and refugee policy. We now know that Carr, a skilled and manipulative bureaucrat, regularly fed anti-immigrant excerpts from unpublished consular reports to restrictionists such as Representative Albert Johnson, chief author of the 1924 immigration act. One Carr memo to him described Polish and Russian Jews as "filthy, Un-American and often dangerous in their habits." Many American consuls shared these views. Richard C. Beer, for example, a career officer serving in Budapest in 1922–1923, complained that the law forced him to give visas to Hungarians, Gypsies, and Jews who were all barbarians and gave his office an odor that "no zoo in the world can equal." Other consular officials, who might not have held such views, took their cues from their chief and the whole tone of the foreign service. During what was left of the "prosperity decade" after 1924 the INS and the State Department were pretty much on the same nativist page, although some INS officials resented their loss of control.

Although there were no statutory limits on immigration from independent nations of the Western Hemisphere until 1965, President Herbert Hoover administratively limited Mexican and other Latin American immigration by use of the highly subjective "likely to become a public charge" clause that had been on the statute books since 1882. The clause had originally been designed to keep out persons who for reasons of physical or mental disability were patently unable to support themselves. From the Hoover administration on, the clause has been interpreted at times to bar persons who were able-bodied but poor. The prospective immigrant could be stopped at the border or at an immigrant receiving station by INS personnel or could have a visa denied by someone in the diplomatic service in the country of origin.

The onset of the Great Depression temporarily reduced immigration pressures—during two years in the early 1930s more immigrants left the United States than entered it—but an entirely different situation developed after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany. The unprecedented situation of large numbers of refugees and would-be refugees stemming from a western European power had not been foreseen by the drafters of American immigration legislation. The United States had an immigration policy but not a refugee policy. Congress had previously been favorable to political and religious refugees. Restrictive immigration acts dating from the nineteenth century barred persons with criminal records but always specifically excluded those convicted of political offenses. As late as 1917, in the part of a statute imposing a not very strenuous literacy test as a criterion for admission, Congress specifically exempted any person seeking admission "to avoid religious persecution."

By 1933, however, under the stresses of the Great Depression and after going through what John Higham has aptly termed the "tribal twenties," Congress was in no mood to ease immigration restrictions. And although some of the later apologists for the lack of an effective American refugee policy before the onset of the Holocaust put all or most of the onus on Congress, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt must share that blame. There was nothing even resembling a new deal for immigration policy. To be sure, New Dealers at the top of Frances Perkins's Department of Labor, which continued to administer the INS until 1940, were much more sympathetic to immigrant concerns than the labor movement bureaucrats who had previously run the department. But the anti-immigrant culture of the INS continued. Moreover, the State Department's personnel and policies about immigration and many other matters were little affected by the New Deal. The administrative regulation of immigration was tightened during the early years of the Depression by both sets of government agents: the consular officials abroad and the INS at the borders.

Jews and others seeking visas in the 1930s quickly learned that some American consuls were better than others. George S. Messersmith, consul general in Berlin in the early 1930s and minister to Austria before the *Anschluss*, at a time when the German quota was undersubscribed, gained a positive rating from Jewish individuals and organizations. Even more proactive for refugees was Messersmith's successor in Berlin, Raymond

Geist, who on occasion actually went to concentration camps to arrange the release of Jews with American visas. Although there is no thorough study of the work of American consular officials in Europe during the period between 1933 and Pearl Harbor, it is clear that men like Messersmith and Geist were exceptions and that the majority of consuls were indifferent if not hostile to Jews desiring American visas. The signals consuls received from Carr and other officials in the State Department certainly encouraged them to interpret the law as narrowly as possible.

For example, when Herbert Lehman, Franklin Roosevelt's successor as governor of New York, wrote the president on two occasions in 1935 and 1936 about the difficulties German Jews were having in getting visas from American consulates, Roosevelt assured him, in responses drafted by the State Department, that consular officials were carrying out their duties "in a considerate and humane manner." Irrefutable evidence exists in a number of places to demonstrate that, to the contrary, many officials of the Department of State at home and abroad consistently made it difficult and in many cases impossible for fully eligible refugees to obtain visas. One example will have to stand as surrogate for hundreds of demonstrable cases of consular misfeasance and malfeasance. Hebrew Union College (HUC) in Cincinnati, the oldest Jewish seminary in America, had a Refugee Scholars Project that between 1935 and 1942 brought eleven such scholars to its campus. The 1924 immigration act specifically exempted from quota restriction professors and ministers of any religion as well as their wives and minor children. There should have been no difficulties on the American end in bringing the chosen scholars to Cincinnati. But in almost every case the State Department and especially Avra M. Warren, head of the visa division, raised difficulties, some of which seem to have been invented. In some instances the college, often helped by the intervention of influential individuals, managed to overcome them. In two instances, however, the college was unsuccessful.

The men involved were Arthur Spanier and Albert Lewkowitz. Spanier had been the Hebraica librarian at the Prussian State Library, and after the Nazis dismissed him, a teacher at the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums. After *Kristallnacht* in November 1938, Spanier was sent to a concentration camp. The guaranteed offer of an appointment was enough to get him released from the camp but not enough to get him an American visa. The president of Hebrew Union College had to go to Washington even to discover why this was the case. Warren explained that the rejection was because Spanier's principal occupation was as a librarian and because after 1934 the Nazis had demoted the *Hochschule* (a general term for a place of higher education) to a *Lehranstalt* (educational institute), and an administrative regulation of the State Department not found in the statute held that a nonquota visa could not be given to a scholar coming to a high status institute in the United States from one of lower status abroad. Lewkowitz, a teacher of philosophy at the Breslau Jewish Theological Seminary, did get an American visa in Germany. Both men were able to get to the Netherlands and were there when the Germans invaded. The German bombing of Rotterdam destroyed Lewkowitz's papers, and American consular officials there insisted that he get new documents from Germany, an obviously impossible requirement. Visaless, both men were sent to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Lewkowitz was one of the few concentration camp inmates exchanged, and he reached Palestine in 1944. Spanier was murdered in Bergen-Belsen. If highly qualified scholars with impressive institutional sponsorship had difficulties, one can imagine what it was like for less well-placed individuals.

Apart from creating difficulties for refugees seeking visas, the State Department consistently downplayed international attempts to solve or ameliorate the refugee situation. For example, in 1936 brain trusters Felix Frankfurter and Raymond Moley urged Roosevelt to send a delegation that included such prominent persons as Rabbi Stephen S. Wise to a 1936 League of Nations conference on refugees. The president instead took the advice of the State Department and sent only a minor diplomatic functionary as an observer. It was then politic for him to accept the State Department's insistence that "the status of all aliens is covered by law and there is no latitude left to the Executive to discuss questions concerning the legal status of aliens." When Roosevelt wanted to do something to he could almost always find a way. Immediately after the *Anschluss*, he directed that the Austrian quota numbers be used to expand the German quota, and shortly after *Kristallnacht*, he quietly directed the INS that any political or religious refugees in the United States on six-month visitor's visas could have such visas extended or rolled over every six months. Perhaps 15,000 persons were thus enabled to stay in the United States. On more public occasions however,

such as the infamous early 1939 voyage of the German liner *Saint Louis*, loaded with nearly a thousand refugees whose Cuban visas had been canceled, he again took State Department advice and turned a deaf ear to appeals for American visas while the vessel hove to just off Miami Beach. The *Saint Louis* returned its passengers to Europe, where many of them perished in the Holocaust.

After the Nazis overran France, Roosevelt showed what a determined president could do. In the summer of 1940 he instructed his Advisory Committee on Refugees to make lists of eminent refugees and told the State Department to issue visas for them. An agent named Varian Fry, operating out of Marseilles and with the cooperation of American vice consuls, managed to get more than a thousand eminent refugees into Spain and on to the United States. Those rescued by these means included Heinrich Mann, Marc Chagall, and Wanda Landowska. But at the same time, Roosevelt appointed his friend Breckinridge Long as assistant secretary of state. A confirmed nativist and anti-Semite, Long was in charge of the visa section and thus oversaw refugee policy. The president eventually became aware of the biases in the State Department, and when he decided in mid-1944 to bring in a "token shipment" of nearly a thousand refugees from American-run camps in Europe, he put Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes in charge. Vice President Walter Mondale's acute 1979 observation that before and during the war the nations of the West "failed the test of civilization" is a sound assessment of American policy.

Two other wartime developments should be noted. First, the State Department became involved in American agricultural policy in connection with the wartime Bracero program, which brought temporary Mexican workers to the United States for work in agriculture and on railroads. The Mexican government was, with good reason, apprehensive about the treatment they might receive, so the State Department was in part responsible for the United States living up to its agreement. Second, the State Department was responsible for the wartime exchanges of diplomats and other enemy nationals with the Axis powers. It was also concerned with the treatment of American civilians in enemy hands, particularly Japan, and because of that justified concern persistently argued for humane treatment for both the few thousand interned Japanese nationals in INS custody and the 120,000 Japanese Americans, both citizen and alien, who were in the custody of the War Relocation Authority.

The war years also witnessed a historic if seemingly minor reversal of American immigration policy with the 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Few episodes show the connection between immigration and foreign policy so explicitly. President Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress urging the action. Speaking as commander in chief, he regarded the legislation "as important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace." Since China was a U.S. ally and its resistance depended in part on "the spirit of her people and her faith in her allies," the president argued for a show of support:

> We owe it to the Chinese to strengthen that faith. One step in this direction is to wipe from the statute books those anachronisms in our laws which forbid the immigration of Chinese people into this country and which bar Chinese residents from American citizenship. Nations, like individuals, make mistakes. We must be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and correct them.

In addition, Roosevelt argued that repeal would silence Japanese propaganda and that the small number of Chinese who would enter would cause neither unemployment nor job competition. The president admitted that "While the law would give the Chinese a preferred status over certain other Oriental people, their great contribution to the cause of decency and freedom entitles them to such preference. . . . Passage will be an earnest of our purpose to apply the policy of the good neighbor to our relations with other peoples."

The repeal of Chinese exclusion was thus sold as a kind of good-behavior prize not for Chinese Americans, thousands of whom were then serving in the U.S. armed forces, but for the Chinese people. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's hint about future policy was right on the mark. Within three years Congress would pass similar special legislation granting naturalization rights and quotas to Filipinos and "natives of India," and in 1952 it would enact legislation ending racial discrimination in naturalization policy. By that time the emphasis was on winning "hearts and minds" in the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND

Even before the Cold War came to dominate almost every facet of American policies toward the rest of the world, attitudes about immigration and immigration policies were beginning to

change, as were the policies themselves. The increasing prevalence of an internationalist ideology, membership in the United Nations, and a growing guilt about and horror at the Holocaust all combined to impel the United States to do something about the European refugee crisis symbolized by the millions of displaced persons there. After some crucial months of inaction, Harry Truman issued a presidential directive just before Christmas 1945 that got some refugees into the United States. One important and often overlooked aspect of this directive enabled voluntary agencies, largely religious, to sponsor refugees, which virtually negated the application of the "likely to become a public charge" clause in such cases. Previously, sponsorship of most refugees without significant assets had to be assumed by American relatives. But it was only after passage and implementation of the Displaced Persons Acts of 1948 and 1950 that the United States could be said to have a refugee policy, one that the increasingly more diverse personnel of the State Department helped to carry out. That legislation brought more than 400,000 European refugees into the United States and expanded the use of voluntary agencies—later called VOLAGS (Voluntary Agencies Responsible for Refugees)—such as the Catholic and Lutheran welfare organizations and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Association. In addition, U.S. sponsorship of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and membership in its successors, the International Refugee Organization and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, contributed to changed attitudes about and policies toward refugees even though general immigration policy remained tied to the quota principle introduced in 1921–1924, which lasted until 1965.

Even the notorious McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952—a quintessential piece of Cold War legislation that passed over Truman's veto and seemed merely to continue the restrictive policies begun in 1921 and 1924—contained liberalizing provisions that were more significant than most of its advocates and opponents realized. Chief of these was the total elimination of a color bar in naturalization. While some of the impetus for this came from liberals on racial issues, the push from those impelled by Cold War imperatives was probably more important. State Department representatives and others testified how difficult it was to become the leader of what they liked to term the "free world" when American immigration and naturalization policies blatantly discriminated against the majority of the world's peoples. In addition, a growing understanding that an important diplomatic objective was to win the hearts and minds of peoples and not just the consent of governments made diplomats more aware of the significance of immigrants and immigration. For example, when Dalip Singh Saund, the first Asian-born member of Congress, was elected in 1956, the State Department and the United States Information Agency sponsored him and his wife on a tour of his native India.

Although the word "refugee" does not appear in the 1952 immigration act, an obscure section of it gave the attorney general discretionary parole power to admit aliens "for emergency reasons or for reasons in the public interest." This was the method that Roosevelt had used in 1944, without congressional authorization, to bring in nearly a thousand refugees. This allowed the executive branch to respond quickly to emergency situations such as the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Cuban revolution of 1959. Between the displaced persons acts of the Truman administration and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981 about 2.25 million refugees were admitted, with about 750,000 Cubans and 400,000 refugees from America's misbegotten wars in Southeast Asia the largest increments. Since during that period some 10.4 million legal immigrants entered the United States, refugees accounted for some 20 percent of the total.

Although most textbook accounts trace the transformation of post–World War II immigration and immigration policy to the act signed by Lyndon Johnson in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty in 1965, that is a gross exaggeration. The reality can be better glimpsed by considering the numerical incidence of immigration to colonial America and the United States over time. No official enumeration of immigration took place before 1819, but most authorities agree that perhaps a million European and African immigrants came before then. Between 1819 and the enactment of the 1924 immigration act some 36 million immigrants arrived. Between 1925 and 1945—with immigration inhibited first by the new restrictive law and then much more effectively by the Great Depression and World War II—nearly 2.5 million came, an average of fewer than 125,000 annually. In the decade before World War I more than a million came each year. Well into the post–World War II era, many authorities felt that as a major factor in American history immigration was a thing of the past, but as

LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. BY DECADE, 1951–1998

Decade	*Number*
1951–1960	2,515,479
1961–1970	3,321,677
1971–1980	4,493,314
1981–1990	7,338,062
1991–1998	7,605,068 (eight years only)

the table indicates, based on INS data, this was a serious misperception.

With the self deconstruction of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, domestic policy began to reassume paramount importance in American policy, including immigration policy. Input from the Department of State assumed less significance in immigration matters than during the Cold War era, although the increased volume of immigration greatly taxed and often overtaxed American embassies and consulates. For example, the State Department was given the responsibility of administering the lottery provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 and its successors. The department announced on 10 May 2001 that for the 2002 lottery its Consular Center in Williamsburg, Kentucky, had managed to sift 10 million qualified entries while rejecting an additional 3 million applicants for not following directions and notified 90,000 potential winners chosen at random what they had to do to gain admission to the United States as resident aliens. Each overseas applicant would have to pass an interview examination for eligibility at an American consulate; those applying from within the United States would apply through the INS. Only a maximum of 50,000 of the 90,000 could actually win and gain admittance to the United States along with certain of their qualified dependents. All paper work would have to be completed by 30 September 2002. Anyone who did not have a visa by then lost the presumed advantage of winning. Applications for the 2003 lottery were scheduled to take place during the following month, October 2002.

The major functions of IRCA were the so-called "amnesty," which legalized some 2.7 million immigrants illegally in the United States, the majority of whom were from Mexico, and the promise of effective control measures to "gain control of our borders" by more effective interdiction of illegal border crosses and intensified deportation of remaining resident illegals. This created great fears in many nations of the circum-Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, whose economies were greatly dependent on immigrant remittances, that large numbers of their citizens would be excluded and their remittances ended. These fears were chimerical; borders remained porous. But, in the meantime, to cite just one example, President José Napoléon Duarte wrote President Reagan in early 1987 requesting that Salvadorans in the United States illegally be given "extended voluntary departure" (EVD) status, an aspect of the attorney general's parole power enabling illegal immigrants to remain. While EVD was usually granted on humanitarian grounds, Duarte stressed the economic loss if immigrant remittances ceased. Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, who had opposed EVD on humanitarian grounds, now supported it, but the negative views of the Department of Justice and the congressional leadership prevailed. Forms of EVD or its equivalent were put into place during the Clinton presidency for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans by both the administration and Congress.

The State Department also had to deal with increasing complaints from foreign countries about the execution of its citizens by the criminal justice systems of American states, most of which had been practicing capital punishment with increased enthusiasm at a time when many nations had abolished it. Since it is a legal action, the United States cannot even consider paying compensation of any kind.

The more than 25 million post-1950 immigrants, as is well known, have changed the face of America. As late as the 1950s, immigrants from Europe, who had contributed the lion's share of nineteenth- and early-twentieth century immigrants, still were a bare majority of all immigrants. By the 1980s, thanks largely to the liberal 1965 immigration act and the Refugee Act of 1980, the European share was down to about 10 percent, and immigrants from Latin America and Asia predominated. Although anti-immigrant attitudes again came to the fore in 1980s—sparked in part by Ronald Reagan's warnings about being overrun by "feet people"—and some scholars saw "a turn against immigration" and predicted effective legislative restriction of immigration, those

feelings were not turned into an effective legislative consensus. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, immigration continued at a very high rate, and screening and facilitating that influx continued to be an important aspect of the work of American diplomacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Breitman, Richard, and Alan M. Kraut. *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933–1945.* Bloomington, Ind., 1987. A good account of nativist sentiment and activity in the State Department.

Corbett, P. Scott. *Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians Between the United States and Japan During the Second World War.* Kent, Ohio, 1987. Tells the story of the State Department's Special Division.

Daniels, Roger. *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life.* New York, 1990. Surveys immigration and naturalization policy.

———. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion.* 2d ed. Berkeley, Calif., 1991.

Dinnerstein, Leonard. *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust.* New York, 1982. Fundamental to an understanding of the postwar shift in American policy toward refugees.

Fry, Varian. *Surrender on Demand.* New York, 1945. Fry, whose papers are at Columbia University, tells his story.

Gillion, Steven M. *"That's Not What We Meant to Do": Reform and Its Unintended Consequences in Twentieth-Century America.* New York, 2000. A series of case studies, including one on the 1965 immigration act.

Higham, John. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1955. The classic work on American nativism.

Karlin, J. Alexander. "The Indemnification of Aliens Injured by Mob Violence." *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 25 (1945): 235–246. Treats indemnification for victims of violence.

Loewenstein, Sharon. *Token Refuge: The Story of the Jewish Refugee Shelter at Oswego, 1944–1946.* Bloomington, Ind., 1986. Describes the first mass shipment of refugees.

Meyer, Michael A. "The Refugee Scholars Project of the Hebrew Union College." In Bertram Wallace Korn, ed. *A Bicentennial Festschrift for Jacob Rader Marcus.* New York, 1976. Most instructive about difficulties to refugee admission created by the State Department.

Mitchell, Christopher, ed. *Western Hemisphere Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy.* University Park, Pa., 1992. A collection of essays largely by political scientists.

Peffer, George Anthony. *If They Don't Bring Their Women Here: Chinese Female Immigration Before Exclusion.* Urbana, Ill., 1999.

Reimers, David M. *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America.* 2d ed. New York, 1992.

———. *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration.* New York, 1998. Along with *Still the Golden Door,* this book is part of the cutting edge of late-twentieth-century immigration history.

Sandmeyer, Elmer Clarence. *The Anti-Chinese Movement in California.* 2d ed. Urbana, Ill., 1991.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931.* Middletown, Conn., 1975. Although many works on the foreign service ignore its immigration functions, this work is a happy exception.

Schwartz, Donald. "Breckinridge Long." In John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, eds. *American National Biography.* New York, 2000. This sketch makes the subject's prejudices explicit.

Smith, David A. "From the Mississippi to the Mediterranean: The 1891 New Orleans Lynching and Its Effects on United States Diplomacy and the American Navy." *Southern Historian* 19 (1998): 60–85.

Wilson, Theodore A. "Wilbur J. Carr." In John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, eds. *American National Biography.* New York, 2000. This laudatory sketch of Wilbur J. Carr ignores Carr's prejudices and his role in immigration policy.

See also ASYLUM; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; REFUGEE POLICIES.

IMPERIALISM

David Healy

Imperialism, in its most precise traditional usage, means the forcible extension of governmental control over foreign areas not designated for incorporation as integral parts of the nation. The term is commonly used to mean any significant degree of national influence, public or private, over other societies; but to some it refers principally to foreign economic exploitation with or without other actions. In all usages, however, the essential element is that one society must in some way impose itself upon another in a continuing unequal relationship. Thus, American expansionism dated from the beginning of the national experience, while its evolution into true imperialism occurred only in the later nineteenth century.

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

The expansion of the United States from 1803 to 1853 into contiguous areas such as Louisiana, Florida, Texas, the Oregon territories, and the Mexican cession is not best described as imperialism, although it contained related elements. This expansion involved lightly populated areas in which the influx of settlement from the older portions of the nation soon constituted the great bulk of the inhabitants. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, a profoundly anti-imperialist measure, had early defined the process by which such areas could be divided into prospective states and ultimately brought into the union as equal members. The resulting expansion represented the continuous extension of a single society over vast neighboring areas, rather than the takeover of one society by another.

The North American continent was not unoccupied; indigenous Indian tribes were found in every part of it, while the areas taken from Mexico contained many scattered settlements, particularly in California and around Santa Fe. Neither the people nor the government of the United States showed much interest in such preexisting societies; the aim of the United States was to brush them aside and replace them with the society and culture of the incoming majority. This was particularly true in regard to the Indians; rather than take over Indian society, the whites virtually destroyed it. The process was tragic for its victims, and Americans' constant assertions that they were peopling an empty continent contained the seeds of hypocrisy. There were nevertheless important differences between the movement of such a settlement frontier and the establishment of a true empire. For example, while the United States acquired half of Mexico's national territory between 1845 and 1848, the transfer entailed less than 2 percent of the Mexican population. Broadly speaking, the Mexican War was fought to gain territory, not a captive people, and the land thus gained would be populated largely from the existing United States. For purposes of comparison, the activities of the British in India, where they ruled a teeming alien society, and the British in Australia, where they settled a continent and built a self-governing nation, were so dissimilar that the use of a single term to describe both cases does more to obscure than enlighten. Prior to the Civil War, American expansion came closer to the Australian example, though dispossessing a more numerous indigenous people, and the end result cannot be accurately classified as imperialism.

There were, of course, common features in the earlier expansion and later imperialism of the United States. Chief among these were a strong sense of national mission and special destiny, a general confidence in the unique superiority of American institutions, a belief in the inequality of races and peoples, and the very habit of expansion itself. The expansionism of "manifest destiny" could lead toward true imperialism, as in the abortive movement to annex all of Mexico during the Mexican War. If westward expansion

was not the same as imperialism, it furnished some of the materials out of which the latter could grow.

POST–CIVIL WAR PERIOD

The purchase of Alaska in 1867 ended the period when new territory was assumed to be on the path to eventual statehood. By that time the nation's policymakers were already debating a new and more truly imperialist form of expansion. Schemes to acquire Cuba, by purchase or otherwise, had been current from 1848 onward, while in 1870 the Ulysses S. Grant administration negotiated the annexation of the Dominican Republic, only to see the Senate reject the instrumental treaty. Critics of this latter scheme were quick to point out the break with tradition implicit in the quest for territory already compactly settled by an alien society. Such a society could be assimilated into the nation proper only with great difficulty and over a long period, or more probably it could not be assimilated at all. Thus, the United States had to choose between incorporating an unassimilated people into its federal system, thereby endangering its integrity, or ruling them as colonial subjects in violation of the right to self-government supposedly inherent in the American political system. Foreshadowed by the earlier opposition to the all-Mexico movement of the late 1840s, the Senate debate over the annexation of the Dominican Republic developed the main lines of the controversy over imperialist expansion and marked the maturing of an active anti-imperialism in the United States.

For a generation after 1870, projects for further expansion attracted little support in the United States, and most people assumed that imperialism had become a dead issue. A number of developments, however, prepared the nation for imperial ventures at the end of the century. Chief were the rapid industrialization and soaring productivity of the national economy, which made the United States the leading industrial power by 1900. Increasingly conscious of their numbers, wealth, and strength, and proud of their unique institutions and sprawling territory, Americans began to aspire to a place for their country among the world's great powers. The severe economic depression of the 1890s added material aims to the drive for prestige, as the nation's business leaders and political spokesmen hoped for economic salvation in increased exports of American manufactures. By the mid-1890s, a new mood had brought a reappraisal of America's world position.

While largely internal forces first prompted the nation's leaders to look outward, the global sweep of European imperialism was reaching its high point, providing both the model and the final impetus for the new activism. Initially, Americans reacted to European imperialism as a threat to be repelled, fearing its penetration into the Western Hemisphere. Still mindful of France's incursion into Mexico in the 1860s, Americans were startled by a French project in 1879 to build a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Later they also came to see Great Britain as a potential interloper, inspiring Secretary of State Richard Olney to a famous warning against such penetration during the Venezuelan crisis of 1895. Fears of European encroachment undoubtedly added urgency to the drive for Hawaiian annexation after 1894 and figured in discussions of Caribbean expansion later in the decade. One result of such fears was advocacy of a sort of preemptive imperialism, a conviction that the United States should seize desirable areas before a rival power got them.

In addition, the constant example of the European powers in time led many in the United States to take a more positive view of imperialism. Thirsting for national prestige, they saw that colonies were highly valued status symbols in Europe and that colonial empires had already swallowed up most of the non-Western world. Furthermore, if Europeans claimed to spread civilization to unenlightened peoples, did not the United States have a more compelling mission to implant its own superior institutions? Finally, the theorists of the Old World had proclaimed that colonial empires could provide strategic bases, captive markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities—in short, could alleviate the persistent distresses from which the American economy suffered.

By 1895 a small but growing number of American politicians, publicists, naval officers, and businessmen supported a modest expansionist program. This generally included the annexation of Hawaii, the acquisition of one or more base areas in the West Indies, and the construction of an isthmian canal across Central America to facilitate naval and mercantile movement between the eastern United States and the Pacific Ocean. Some also aspired to the peaceable annexation of Canada, while others wished to challenge

British political and economic leadership in South America. But virtually all limited their ambitions to the Western Hemisphere, and most to areas traditionally within the sphere of American interests. While this program fell short of a full-fledged scheme of empire, it gave a specific direction to expansionist currents and reinforced the appeal of the imperialist idea.

Many Americans continued to be suspicious of imperialism, but others found that it was increasingly easy to identify imperialism with many aspects of the American tradition. Territorial expansion, a strong sense of national mission, and a dynamic economic growth had been dominant themes in American history. The belief in the inequality of man, which imperialism demanded, offered few problems at a time when the South was even then perfecting a system of segregation and disfranchisement of blacks, the West was in the final stages of suppressing the Indians, and the East fulminated against the inferiority of the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Currently popular theories of social Darwinism held that the various races of man progressed at differing rates according to their place on the evolutionary scale, or failed to progress and fell victim to "natural selection." No one believed more devoutly in progress than Americans, and the presumed duty of carrying progress to backward lands was popularly called "the white man's burden." This combined belief in progress and human inequality, along with boundless self-confidence and a hope of gain, constituted the principal attitudes that underlay imperialism.

Whether the imperialist appeal was chiefly economic, psychological, nationalist, or idealistic has long been the subject of contention. In fact, it was all of these, and perhaps more. The most fundamental explanation of the global imperialism of the nineteenth century was that the Western world, containing a relatively small minority of the world's people, had achieved a virtual monopoly of effective power. The development of the nation-state enabled the effective mobilization of a society's resources, and coincided with the growth of modern science and industrialization. The latter developments created societies of unprecedented wealth and armed them with weapons of unparalleled destructiveness, while the steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, and the oceanic cable greatly diminished the distances that separated the Western peoples from the rest of the world.

The disparity of power between "modern" and preindustrial societies reached its maximum in the nineteenth century, and it was this disparity that was, quite directly, the driving force behind the breakneck colonialism of the period. Conscious of their strength and brought into close contact with weaker peoples, Europeans quickly developed a sense of superiority and discovered desirable goals to seek in vulnerable foreign places. The process soon created its own mystique, which could be shared by almost any member-state in the Western world. While American imperialism had special national characteristics—as did that of England, France, Germany, and other nations—during the 1890s, American imperialism was not essentially different from the parent European variety. Its American disciples believed otherwise, having as firm a faith in their own uniqueness as their European rivals.

THE ERA OF GLOBAL IMPERIALISM

Although this new thinking rapidly gained ground during the 1890s, it took the shock of tangible events to bridge the gap between ideas and action. After a revolution in Hawaii, which American officials actively abetted, the proposed annexation of Hawaii in 1893 reawakened the debate over colonial expansion but was blocked by the transfer of the presidency from Benjamin Harrison to Grover Cleveland. It was rather the revolt that began in Cuba in 1895 that ultimately mobilized the emotions and ideas of the new expansionism. In 1898 the United States was drawn into a struggle between Cuba and Spain that had brought mass suffering and wholesale destruction to its very borders. An aggressive national pride, emotional partisanship in favor of the Cubans, and tangible damage to American trade and property—all worked to arouse the public and the press, while the dramatic destruction of the battleship *Maine* acted as a spark to these combustibles. Originally regarded by most Americans as a crusade to free Cuba, the Spanish-American War quickly took on an expansionist thrust. The retention of Puerto Rico, Spain's other Caribbean colony, was soon regarded as a necessary war reparation. Strategically the key to the Pacific, Hawaii was annexed during the war by a joint resolution of Congress. Even the cries to free Cuba gave way to protests that the Cubans needed a period of tutelage before essaying complete self-government.

It was the Philippine Islands, however, that most forcefully brought the imperialist issue to a head. Large, populous, alien, and distant, they neither fell within the traditional geographical scope of American expansionism nor seemed even remotely assimilable to the American federal system. In the United States there had been little thought of acquiring the Philippines before the Spanish-American War, but once war came, the U.S. armed forces attacked them because they represented valuable enemy territory that was highly vulnerable. The initial American victories quickly led to a national conviction that the United States now controlled the islands and was responsible for determining their destiny. Expansionists were quick to argue that the nation should not turn the Filipinos back to Spanish misrule, while to let them drift would invite an Anglo-German struggle for their control. On the other hand, American rule could bring enlightenment to the islands, and their proximity to China might aid American penetration of what was assumed to be one of the great world markets of the future.

Expansionism carried the day, and the peace treaty with Spain provided for American possession of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. Hawaii had already been separately annexed, and Cuba was subjected to a three-year military occupation followed by a theoretically sovereign independence in 1902. In fact, however, Cuba became a self-governing protectorate of the United States, with the latter nation retaining important governmental controls and the right of military intervention at its discretion, under the terms of the Platt Amendment of 1901. In the Philippines, meanwhile, an armed independence movement revolted against American rule in 1899, and the ensuing three-year Filipino-American War introduced the Americans to the frustrations and mutual atrocities characteristic of antiguerrilla warfare. The public had expected the Filipinos to greet the advent of American rule with cheers and were disillusioned to meet with hostility instead. Critics questioned the utility of the new colony and the morality of subduing it by force. While U.S. forces finally succeeded in crushing all resistance, anti-imperialists made the most of the contradictions inherent in spreading enlightenment at the point of a bayonet. Colonial empire quickly lost its glamour in the United States, while less formal techniques of expansion gained easier acceptance from the relative success of the Cuban protectorate program. In the twentieth century, American imperialism would be characterized by the extension of influence or control rather than by the outright annexation of territory.

THE ADVENT OF INFORMAL EMPIRE

After 1900 the American public lost interest in its new colonies, but the United States continued to expand its power in essentially imperialist ways. This was true principally in the Caribbean region, where the creation of formal and informal protectorates characterized American foreign policy in the period after the Spanish-American War. The war had spurred interest in the building of an isthmian canal, which was to be built as a national project; and following Panama's secession from Colombia in 1903, the project became a reality. The great strategic importance of the Panama Canal, thereafter joined with the considerable American stake in Cuba and its direct sovereignty over Puerto Rico, drew the nation further into Caribbean affairs.

Still fearful of European intervention and solicitous of the growing American economic interest in the area, policymakers in Washington viewed the chronic political instability of the Caribbean and Central American nations as an invitation to foreign penetration and an obstacle to local development. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, claimed for the United States an "international police power," which entailed a general right to intervene and keep order in the Western Hemisphere. Not only Roosevelt but his successors, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, steadily expanded American hegemony in the Caribbean. By World War I, Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua were in some kind of protectorate status, while Puerto Rico remained an outright colony. Actual military interventions occurred in Cuba (1906–1909), Haiti (1915–1934), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), Nicaragua (1912, 1927–1933), and Panama (intermittently and on a lesser scale).

Besides the use of special treaty relationships and military force, the United States attempted to maintain a "monopoly of lending," under which Caribbean governments would borrow money only in the United States; it also established customs receiverships in several countries, which effectively placed their government revenues under control of the United States. Meanwhile, private enterprise had permeated the region with

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY

"It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save as are for their welfare. All this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. . . .

"Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them."

— From President Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to Congress, 6 December 1904 —

American investment and business activity, while the one-crop economies of the Caribbean nations made them heavily dependent upon the American market. Thus, the nominally sovereign states of the Caribbean area were subject to American controls, both formal and informal, which made their real status essentially colonial.

After 1898, the United States was also active in the Far East, but its impact was weaker there than in the Caribbean. Faced with a huge and populous China, and competing with most of the other major world powers, American policymakers could not aspire to regional dominance or military solutions. The "dollar diplomacy" of the William Howard Taft administration (1909–1913) attempted to foster American investment in China and to create international financial arrangements, which would impose a Caribbean-style "monopoly of lending" upon the government of China. This attempt to mobilize American economic strength as a diplomatic tool accomplished little in the Far East, however, on account of both the difficulties of the situation itself and the limited interest of the nation's business and financial leaders. The earlier Open Door policy of 1899–1900, therefore, remained the principal basis of policy. It represented little more than an attempt to obtain a general agreement to preserve the existing treaty system of shared control in China, and thus equality of economic opportunity in China for the United States. The policy was not very effective, and the Chinese market never came near to meeting the inflated expectations of the West. In general, the limited objectives and relative ineffectiveness of American activities in the Far East fell well short of real imperialism in this period, although the United States was long a party to the treaty system by which the Western powers jointly had imposed a limited protectorate upon China.

ISOLATIONISM AND THE WORLD WARS

American participation in World War I led to a revulsion against overseas commitments, which reached its peak in the Senate rejection of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the new League of Nations. Rising domestic criticism in the 1920s brought about the liquidation of the military government in the Dominican Republic and moderate relaxation of American political controls elsewhere in the Caribbean. At the same time, however, the U.S. government and business community cooperated in pushing American exports and foreign loans, leading some later historians to envision an "open door imperialism" based on American economic influence abroad. An alternate view was that the United States did indeed seek such economic influence, but that most Americans then thought it possible to separate the political and economic aspects of international relations in a manner considered unrealistic by later generations.

The Great Depression of the 1930s brought an even greater emphasis on the economic side of foreign policy and a corresponding decline in interest in other aspects. The Good Neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt brought the dismantling of Caribbean military interventions and

political protectorates, at the same time that Latin America was tied more closely to the American economy by means of reciprocal trade agreements. The Philippine Islands were set on the path to independence in 1934, while the Neutrality Acts of 1935–1938 were designed to minimize economic ties to belligerents in foreign wars. The Monroe Doctrine took on a new theoretical formulation as an association of hemispheric equals for collective security, and the isolationist majority in the United States eschewed any national interest in the world's affairs outside the Western Hemisphere. American imperialism was declared to be dead, never to arise again.

At the end of the 1930s there was a rapid reversal of thinking largely caused by the early victories of Nazi Germany during the new European war, and particularly by the shock created by the fall of France in 1940. Americans quickly became internationalists, the new consensus being that the world's democracies must stand together to check the crimes of "gangster nations" like Germany, Italy, and Japan. It now appeared that peace was indivisible and that the United States must be concerned with events in every corner of the globe. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor late in 1941, the United States went to war in both Europe and Asia. During World War II, the United States fought as a member of a coalition that included Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Nationalist China, and many lesser members—a circumstance that drew the United States even further into global affairs. Mobilizing enormous fighting power and productivity, Americans found themselves at the close of the struggle with their armed forces deployed in Europe, Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, Australasia, and Latin America.

THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

World War II humbled or drastically weakened every great power except the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which emerged with greatly enhanced power and prestige. In a world full of power vacuums, this dangerously simplified bipolar balance contributed to a growing rivalry between the two superpowers, as did the strong but mutually contradictory ideas of mission that each possessed. Initially competing for hegemony in Europe, this postwar rivalry soon became global in scope, and American military and political commitments proliferated. At the same time, the preeminent economic position of the United States at the end of World War II much enhanced its influence abroad and gave it great weight in shaping the economic structure of the noncommunist world. Thus, American influence over other societies reached a new high and took many different forms. In the Caribbean, the United States supported anticommunist military ventures in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961), and in 1965, out of fear that a leftist government would come to power, intervened in the Dominican Republic. In East Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, and, later, South Vietnam and Cambodia became heavily dependent upon U.S. military aid. Japan grew into an economic giant but retained close ties to the United States. Other initiatives in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere made American activities truly global.

In the economic sphere, the United States overwhelmingly became the chief investor, source of credit, and supplier of new technologies. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the American dollar was the yardstick of international currency exchanges, while an American-sponsored drive toward freer world trade facilitated American exports of goods and money. The purchase of foreign subsidiaries and the development of multinational corporations gave American business enterprise increased influence abroad, while many foreign nations found their principal export markets in the United States.

The political and economic impact of the United States was accompanied by significant social effects. American-style mass consumption spread its appeal everywhere, as the elite of half the globe rushed to emulate the lifestyles of New York and California. American tourists, motion pictures, and television programs went everywhere, while students flocked to American universities from all over the world. Even an economically advanced country like Japan assimilated American models of dress and amusement, and readily accepted bondage to the automobile.

Some viewed the international vogue of American lifestyles and consumer products as cultural imperialism, or a thinly veiled form of economic exploitation. Others deplored the subversion of native cultures and the consequent destabilization of traditional societies by the tide of westernization. Many twenty-first-century scholars, however, are skeptical of the idea of a one-sided cultural aggression, citing the eagerness with which Eastern Europeans and others sought Western fashions, films, and popular

music even when their governments attempted to shut these things out. In this view, developments in the Western world have set off an irresistible global cultural change, in which cross-fertilization complicates any notion of a simple one-way influence. Terms such as "modernization" and "globalization" are used to suggest a generalized force beyond the control of any one society. It was nevertheless the United States that led the way in the process.

In any case, the worldwide distribution of U.S. military bases, security agreements, investments, multinational corporations, foreign-aid programs, and open and undercover political activities gave rise to the charge that American imperialism had not only revived but had expanded over enormous areas. Some critics described an "open door empire" in which American foreign policy sought to impose everywhere the conditions necessary for the penetration of American exports and enterprise, while keeping underdeveloped nations in a state of perpetual economic colonialism. From this point of view, the term "imperialism" applied to virtually every overseas activity of the United States.

Given the undeniably great impact of the United States in the postwar world, the issue was not whether there had been an American influence on other societies but whether that influence was best described as imperialism. Since the United States annexed no territory during the period in question, the most obvious form of imperialism does not apply; there was no formal empire. There were, however, attempts at neo-imperial control of other states. In 1965 the Dominican Republic experienced a U.S. military intervention that imposed a new president, who was retained in power for many years by the active use of American influence and machinations of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Ronald Reagan administration (1981–1989) supported civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua in an attempt to bolster right-wing regimes against leftist opponents. Other cases could be cited, but blanket assertions of imperialism went too far. It was doubtful terminology to apply that label to the postwar American record in Europe. It is true that the United States threw its influence into an effort to erect a liberal-capitalist system in Western Europe, just as the Soviet Union worked for Marxist-Leninist states in Eastern Europe. Given a virtual power vacuum in one of the world's vital centers, no less was to be expected of either superpower. It is also true that the Marshall Plan and companion policies were designed not only to aid European economic recovery but to boost European purchases of American exports. Yet the end result was not merely exploitive, for it helped to recreate in Western Europe one of the great industrial centers of the world, which soon offered stiff competition to the United States itself. Like Japan, West Germany pressed American manufacturers hard in their own markets and often bested them in markets abroad. In time, many European states became effective competitors. To call this performance economic imperialism is both misleading and intellectually counterproductive.

The U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia during the 1960s ended in the following decade in humiliating failure and a national reappraisal of the American role abroad. For a time, the shadow of Vietnam inhibited further overseas adventures, but the global network of American commitments and interests continued largely intact. Foreign involvements reappeared with the previously mentioned Reagan administration's activities in Central America, as well as its military deployments in Grenada (1983) and Lebanon (1984), but on a limited scale.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union changed the global situation fundamentally, leaving the United States as the only superpower. The Cold War justification for foreign military interventions thereby disappeared, but new reasons for such ventures multiplied. In varying scales of magnitude, U.S. armed forces were deployed in Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999), the latter including a bombing campaign against Serbia. By far the largest overseas operation was the Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq, which involved more than 500,000 U.S. troops to protect the industrial world's oil supply, but motives for the other interventions varied widely. In Somalia, for example, where no visible U.S. interests were at stake, the goal was to remove the obstacles to feeding a starving population, and in Bosnia and Kosovo it was to prevent the outbreak of regional war and prevent mass genocide. Some saw the United States as world policeman, others as global bully, but none could deny the reality of the nation's power and influence virtually everywhere on the globe.

As the world's strongest and wealthiest nation for the last half century, the United States was responsible for its full share of neo-imperialist hegemony. At times, however, it acted abroad in conjunction with less powerful nations that

lacked the American capacity to project force quickly to crisis areas. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Gulf War both saw U.S. military power enlisted in the service of a broad coalition of nations and interests. Operating within a highly competitive global economy, U.S. economic power was great but hardly hegemonic, while its cultural influences were eagerly received in large parts of the world even if deeply resented in others. No single definition can contain the enormous variety of American activities, motives, and effects on the world; certainly the term "imperialism" cannot.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. "Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War—A Critical Review." *Diplomatic History* 24 (summer 2000). Traces the evolving debate about U.S. cultural expansion since 1945.

Healy, David. *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s.* Madison, Wis., 1970. A multi-causal approach that shows the convergence of numerous and dissimilar forces in the movement for overseas empire.

Hollander, Paul. *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990.* New York, 1992. A stimulating look at the views of the naysayers, domestic and foreign.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1963. Depicts American overseas expansion as creating a commercial empire in order to serve a drive for export markets.

Lundestad, Geir. *The American "Empire" and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Prospect.* New York, 1990. Explores the ambiguities of American power abroad.

May, Ernest R. *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power.* New York, 1961. Sees the expansionism of 1898 in terms of an eruption of public opinion that swept the nation's leaders before it.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945.* New York, 1982. A useful broad-gauge approach.

Thornton, A. P. *Doctrines of Imperialism.* New York, 1965. A short but good conceptual study of imperialism.

Trask, David. *The War with Spain in 1898.* New York and London, 1981. The best work on that conflict.

Weinberg, Albert K. *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History.* Baltimore, 1935. Still a standard work on the ideology of continental expansion.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Cleveland, Ohio, 1959. An influential book that helped launch a revisionist movement in American diplomatic history and popularize an "Open Door School," which held that the economic goals of capitalism were central to the formation of U.S. foreign policy.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS; OPEN DOOR POLICY; PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

John Prados

Observers over the years have provided many definitions for the term "intelligence." Many of these definitions are burdensome, or technical, or drawn directly from the term of art. Intelligence is simply information, gathered however necessary and arranged in such fashion as to be of use to those who require it. In foreign policy (and national defense) intelligence guides the hands of policymakers and helps them conduct relations wisely. (However, there are aspects of intelligence that can be obstacles to wise policy.) Foreign policy without intelligence can succeed, but at greater cost and difficulty than well-informed initiatives. In American foreign policy, at least since the end of World War II, there has been a conscious effort to harness intelligence in service of national goals.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Careful selection, integration, and analysis distinguish intelligence from other information. In the United Sates, where practitioners have made a greater effort than in most other nations to develop a conscious theory of intelligence, the terms "intelligence cycle" and "intelligence process" now denote the procedure by which information is brought to the support of policymakers. Because in the theory the word "process" is also used as a verb—to mean the act of taking information and converting it into useful intelligence—this essay will use the term "intelligence cycle."

The intelligence cycle consists of a number of sequential stages, beginning with realization of what is unknown or uncertain. Officials can ask to find out about those subjects, or intelligence officers themselves may point out a gap in information, actions that lead to an order to collect data on that topic, known as an "intelligence requirement." Some kinds of information can come only from particular sources, so the capability to gather data from a particular source may be limited, or indeed there may be several ways to get at a piece of knowledge. This means that how to meet an intelligence requirement is a matter of choice, another stage of the cycle. The act of choosing how to gather given intelligence is known as "collection tasking." What many people think of as the totality of intelligence—the act of actually securing the data—is a stage of the cycle called "collection."

In principle, in developing any kind of fact-based knowledge, collection must necessarily be by source, while appreciation is by subject. Many facts from a variety of sources may bear on a given subject. Different sources might be a photograph, a radio intercept, a newspaper article, a report from a spy, a diplomatic exchange, a scholarly paper, a radio broadcast, or the like. A given source may supply information on more than one subject, and subjects can be as diverse as a nation's military power, its economic position, or the health of a leader. Therefore, an act of transformation must occur in the cycle; this is termed "processing." The American conception is that "raw" information data is processed to become "finished intelligence." Occasionally, raw dispatches are given to policymakers, but most often they benefit from the skills of professionals who analyze the data to compile finished intelligence reports. This analysis is a further stage of the intelligence cycle, and the act of printing or otherwise creating the finished report, called "production," is another. Of course, the report is useless unless it actually reaches the policymaker who needs it; circulation of finished intelligence constitutes a stage of the cycle called "dissemination." Users of the data can then supply feedback on what they liked or did not like, or what they still want to know or find out, thereby completing the cycle by generating new intelligence requirements. Obviously, this is an oversimplified account of a series of repeated and interrelated

steps that may impact on each other as well as on the finished intelligence report, but it does supply a basic picture of how intelligence is derived.

To make this picture more concrete, consider the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In that event of Cold War history, the United States was gravely concerned over Russian military aid to Cuba. President John F. Kennedy publicly warned the Soviet Union not to supply Cuba with certain types of weapons. That created a collection requirement for U.S. intelligence to verify that the specified categories of weapons were not in Cuba. Russian cargoes arrived in Cuba by ship, and the United States had a number of spies in Cuba, as well as reports from Cuban refugees arriving in the United States. In addition, the United States had access to diplomatic and intelligence reporting from allied nations, primarily the United Kingdom and France. U.S. intelligence also had its own diplomatic and intelligence reporting from Eastern European countries and direct from the Soviet Union. These sources enabled U.S. intelligence to see that Soviet shipments were arriving in Cuba in great numbers.

The Central Intelligence Agency, one of the primary entities in the American effort, responded with a program of aircraft reconnaissance over Cuba, using U-2 spy planes to photograph suspicious targets. One U-2 flight brought back pictures that caused the CIA director to suspect the Russians of deploying weapons (antiaircraft missiles) in such fashion as to deny a reconnaissance capability over Cuba, an action he believed was intended to enable the quiet placing of Soviet offensive weapons (the kind Kennedy had warned against) in Cuba. A few weeks later, several refugee and agent reports indicated a possibility that offensive missiles were being deployed at certain locations in Cuba. Previous intelligence reports by the CIA and the U.S. intelligence community, called national intelligence estimates (NIEs), had found no offensive weapons in Cuba, but additional U-2 flights were eventually scheduled, and one of them checked the suspect areas identified by agents. That flight discovered Soviet missiles on 14 October 1962, leading President Kennedy to decide on a quarantine (blockade) of Cuba and other diplomatic actions. Maritime intelligence subsequently kept close track of the progress of Soviet ships steaming toward Cuba, aerial intelligence monitored the cargoes aboard the ships and the progress of the missile sites in Cuba, and intelligence reports thereafter kept Kennedy closely informed.

A WORLD OF SECRETS

Almost every kind of information can be relevant to intelligence, as becomes evident by reviewing the variety of intelligence outputs. Diplomacy requires information on the private opinions, negotiating positions, and political factors impinging upon actors with whom foreign relations are being conducted. This political intelligence may need to be supplemented by economic intelligence, which covers such areas as resources, national economic organization and strength, labor skills, industrial processes, long-term growth trends, foreign trade, balance of payments, and other information. Military intelligence is of key import and ranges beyond simple counting of numbers of men, ships, and planes. Naval and air intelligence may consider necessary information different from that needed by ground force experts. All will want material on foreign forces, but also predictions on how those forces may change in the future, and on the quality and flexibility of their support systems, weapons technology, trained manpower, planning processes, and the like. Filling in those blanks, in turn, requires more recourse to economic intelligence, as well as scientific and technical intelligence. The latter attempts to judge the capabilities of weapons by reference to data regarding scientific achievement, industrial base, research and development programs, general levels of technological sophistication, and other information.

Judgments in any of the particular intelligence fields may be influenced by additional kinds of information. These include biographical intelligence on the individuals who may be key actors in policies or programs in which intelligence may be interested. In addition, there is basic intelligence, which is a compendium of social, demographic, geographic, economic, and other data about societies of interest to the analyst.

There is also intelligence that is primarily about the adversary's own intelligence organizations and activities. A foreign nation, even a friendly country, may be of interest for the intelligence operations it conducts, the results achieved with a given style of organization, the threat it poses, some opportunity offered, some specific activity parallel to or interfering with friendly activities, or for many other reasons. In addition, separate intelligence requirements, collection, and analysis may be conducted for the precise purpose of carrying out an operation against a foreign intelligence service, most commonly in espionage or in attempts to recruit an agent.

The above represents a wide panoply of information that can be relevant, truly a world of secrets. The concept that so much raw information is required is a relatively recent development. In the United States, with arguably the most sophisticated approach to intelligence, the practice of closely meshing and piecing together huge arrays of information of many different kinds to derive knowledge on a single discrete question dates from only about World War II (1939–1945). At that time, benefiting from British (and other) experience, and building on a foundation of code breaking, the United States fashioned methods that relied upon several pillars of intelligence, representing different kinds of collection techniques. In the Cold War period and after, those techniques were successively improved and integrated, in a process that continues today. In contrast, prior to World War II, intelligence reporting remained episodic, focused on a single (or a few) sources, and did not explicitly aim at information for policymakers, except where given reports seemed to demand it.

A good example of crosscutting influences and the impact of different kinds of intelligence reporting is the history of U.S. intelligence on Soviet nuclear missile programs. In the period immediately after World War II, scientific, economic, and biographical data, along with intelligence sharing with British allies, enabled the United States to discover that the Soviet Union was pursuing creation of an atomic bomb. Predictions by U.S. military intelligence and the nascent CIA were not accurate on when the Soviets would acquire nuclear weapons, in part due to Soviet espionage, which reduced the technical uncertainties associated with the Soviet program. On the other hand, U.S. scientific intelligence in the form of atomic test monitoring aircraft provided instant knowledge that a nuclear test had been carried out in August 1949.

Predicting the rate at which the Soviets might manufacture nuclear weapons; their ability to deliver such weapons against the United States, either by bomber aircraft or by ballistic missiles; and the attendant production rates for those weapons became priority issues for U.S. intelligence. These concerns drove intelligence tasking and even technological research and development programs (especially those for the U-2 and SR-71 aircraft and the CORONA/Discoverer KH-4 photographic reconnaissance satellite) through the 1950s and even into the 1960s. The CIA sought to recruit agents for information in these same areas, and defectors leaving Russia, along with German scientists returning from working in Russia, were interrogated for their knowledge. Estimates of Soviet factory floor space, fissile materials availability, and other items were compiled from the intelligence and used to predict the size of the Soviet bomb and the delivery vehicle inventory.

In intelligence estimates between 1955 and 1960, the CIA successively overestimated Soviet bomber and missile forces. These estimates led to decisions by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to build up U.S. bomber and missile forces to very high levels, in fact levels that arguably led Soviet leaders in the 1960s to create land- and submarine-based missile forces far greater than required for basic security. Meanwhile, Eisenhower's confidence in his intelligence also led him to offer, at the Geneva Summit of 1955, an "Open Skies" plan for mutual verification of nuclear forces and confidence building, which Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev rejected. In a negative impact of intelligence, in 1960 another Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit scheduled for Paris was aborted as a consequence of the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960.

The planes and satellites provided U.S. intelligence with unprecedented information-gathering abilities. They served as platforms for high-resolution cameras to take pictures or for sensitive radio and electronic recording equipment to monitor radio communications or electronic emissions of all kinds. Even though Eisenhower prohibited further overflights of the Soviet Union after the U-2 was shot down, satellite capabilities soon replaced and outshone those of the aircraft. In this period, as John F. Kennedy took office as president in January 1961, the United States also enjoyed excellent data from a Russian agent, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer of the Soviet military intelligence with access to much highly secret information of interest to the CIA.

During the 1960s the arms race between U.S. and Russian missile forces continued to be the focus of the secret world of intelligence. This arms race was punctuated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It was not until after the crisis that the Russians had a dependable ballistic missile capable of mass deployment in a protected mode. The Soviet Union began to build these missiles at an increasing rate. President Kennedy, who had discovered that the gap in missile strength actually favored the United States, relied upon this intelligence in canceling further U.S. production, capping the land-based missile forces at 1,052.

The Soviets continued to deploy until they reached the figure of 1,512 in the early 1970s.

Predicting how quickly the Russians would increase their missile force, at what level they might curtail deployment, and whether they would also field novel technologies such as ballistic missile defenses or multiple independently targetable warheads became the key intelligence issues of the 1960s. The CIA and other agencies, even with the considerable intelligence gathered by their machine spies, underestimated the numbers of Soviet missiles in the long term (that is, beyond those under construction, which could be directly observed by reconnaissance satellites). On the other hand, the intelligence estimates did much better on predicting when the Russians would acquire new technologies. However, the estimates seem to have been less influential in the major weapons decisions made by the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who initiated multiple warhead programs for both land-based (Minuteman III) and sea-based (Poseidon) missiles, as well as development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft (eventually the B-1 bomber).

Growth in Soviet strategic forces moved the United States to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Johnson administration concluded a nonproliferation treaty and other agreements prohibiting nuclear weapons on the seabed or in outer space. Johnson also attempted to open talks on strategic nuclear weapons, but the effort was canceled in August 1968, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. The administration of Richard M. Nixon followed up and actually began Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in mid-1969, culminating in the SALT I agreement, signed on 26 May 1972. The course of those negotiations was influenced by diplomatic intelligence the United States picked up from Russian officials—in particular a technical collection program codenamed "Gamma Guppy," in which the United States intercepted radiotelephone conversations among Russian leaders, as well as information gleaned directly from Russian negotiators. The intelligence estimates also gave the Nixon administration confidence that its negotiations covered relevant issues and that it had a handle on what Soviet strength would be under various possible outcomes. After the SALT I agreement, intelligence verified compliance, tracked technological developments, and assisted follow-up negotiations for SALT II and the two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II), plus the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Various intelligence disputes occurred in the 1970s and 1980s that affected these negotiations and U.S.–Soviet bilateral relations, but the essential point is that many types of intelligence reporting were relevant and that the intelligence had crosscutting influence.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

In the U.S. system there are various documents that reflect intelligence appreciations, each with different standing. With knowledge of the generic type of an analysis, the observer can better understand the importance of intelligence.

National Intelligence Estimates The national intelligence estimates (NIEs) represent the highest category of intelligence document (or "product"). The director of central intelligence (DCI), the official who heads the entire American intelligence community, is responsible for the NIEs. He is advised in this by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, a committee on which sits the head of each U.S. agency in this field. The NIEs are drafted by a subordinate unit on the basis of "contributions" from the member agencies. Since 1973 the drafts have been written by area specialists known as national intelligence officers, who collectively constitute the National Intelligence Council. Before 1973 the drafters were generalists in an office subordinate to the Board of National Estimates. Some DCIs (including all since 1973) have had the council/board within their own office; a few earlier intelligence leaders subordinated the board to the CIA's Directorate for Intelligence. Either way, the director has always had the power to require that specific language (and therefore particular substantive judgments) be included in an NIE. There is also a procedure whereby agencies belonging to the National Foreign Intelligence Board can take exception to a conclusion in the NIE, usually expressed as a footnote to the main text. (At times these dissents have appeared as footnotes or as appendices to a paper or have been written in the main text, depending on the preferences of the director, but the colloquialism for a dissent in an NIE remains to "take a footnote.") A change in intelligence appreciations that occurs after an NIE has been issued is reflected in a paper known as a "memorandum to holders" of the NIE. A more important change can require a fresh estimate. Presidents, national security advisers, and top officials have varied in the amount of attention they pay to NIEs. Dwight D. Eisenhower

and Lyndon Johnson accorded them great importance; Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush paid little heed; others have been somewhere in the middle. Perhaps the main significance of NIEs has been political—these documents represent the considered opinion of the U.S. intelligence community; their substance can be expected to leak if presidents take actions contrary to them, embarrassing the senior policymakers. The NIEs also have a more formal role in weapons system acquisition decisions and military budget planning that should not be ignored.

Special National Intelligence Estimates Like the NIEs, special national intelligence estimates (SNIEs) are created by the interagency process of drafting and review. Their scope and content differ, however. The NIEs tend to be long-term studies of large subjects, for example, the NIE 11/3-8 series, which were five-year predictions for the evolution of Soviet nuclear forces. The SNIE is an analysis of the near-term impact of a specific course of action. For example, in July 1965, when the United States intervened in South Vietnam with massive ground forces, SNIE 10-9-65 analyzed foreign reactions to the new deployment. Similarly, in July 1961, when the United States considered military intervention in Laos, SNIE 58-2-61 predicted probable reactions to this and several other possible courses of action. The national estimates tend to be produced following set schedules, and the SNIEs most often at the request of the president or other senior officials. Partly for this reason the SNIEs can garner more attention than the NIEs.

President's Daily Brief President Harry S. Truman was the first chief executive to demand daily intelligence on key subjects. Since then every president has gotten this kind of reporting, though the form has varied. For Eisenhower, the reports went to his staff secretary, Colonel (later General) Andrew J. Goodpaster, who created summaries he related to the president. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were provided a president's intelligence checklist, and the president's daily brief (PDB) nomenclature was in use by 1968. During the Clinton administration a vice president's supplement has been added to reflect that official's special concerns. The PDB is an example of "current," as opposed to estimative (predictive), intelligence. Because it reflects immediate events and concerns, the PDB tends to get the most attention. For example, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H. W. Bush, related that Bush devoured the PDBs but had little time for the NIEs.

Other Current Intelligence Publications In the United States, intelligence has long supported the government with daily, weekly, or other periodic reports containing the latest data. These range from daily briefings for directors (the CIA takes care of the DCI; the Defense Intelligence Agency, of the secretary of defense; and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, of the State Department), to newspaper equivalents to digests of communications intercepts or photo imagery. The *Central Intelligence Bulletin,* published since the 1950s, and the *National Intelligence Daily,* started in the 1970s, are classic examples of the genre. At the turn of the millennium, excluding the PDB, intelligence published about ten different dailies containing current intelligence items and at least as many weeklies or monthlies, including such titles as *Terrorism Review, Narcotics Monitor, Organized Crime Report, Illicit Finance Review, Proliferation Digest,* and *Arms Trade Report.* Burgeoning U.S. interest in global trade is reflected in the daily (five times a week) started under the Clinton administration, *Economic Executives' Intelligence Brief.* In general, the current intelligence field is characterized by increasing specialization, which follows from explosive growth in interagency centers focused on single issues or sets of issues.

A further initiative of the 1990s, a product of the computer age, is a distributed information network connecting intelligence analysts and policymakers. Originally called Intelink, this system gives users immediate access to current data on subjects of interest. The system also permits officials to rise above the simple database and contact analysts directly for the most current knowledge. This kind of distributed network has the potential to change the way current intelligence is disseminated, modifying the intelligence cycle by reducing the importance of publication of reports as part of intelligence production.

One more type of intelligence product from specialized intelligence agencies or staffs also bears mention. The National Security Agency produces a paper, *The SIGINT Digest,* which describes daily developments, the knowledge of which is derived from signals intelligence. Similarly, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency produces *World Imagery Report,* which serves the same function, although it is produced in the for-

mat of a television news broadcast. In terms of format, the television news approach for delivery of intelligence information has gained in popularity in recent years, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency both now create some film-type reports.

Warning Intelligence A significant type of intelligence, usually ignored because of its similarity to current intelligence, is data intended to warn policymakers of sudden major developments, such as the outbreak of wars, military coups, or comparable crises. The director of central intelligence employs a national intelligence officer (NIO) for warning who is specifically responsible for this function. The NIO is backed by an interagency committee of second-tier officials from the intelligence community that meets weekly. Both the committee as a group and the NIO have the authority to issue warning memoranda that activate crisis management efforts by the U.S. government. The warning committee also maintains a checklist of potential hot spots and troublesome situations anticipated in the next half-year or so. The committee reports twice a month on the countries and issues carried on the list. An example of warning occurred in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 included a military buildup along the Kuwaiti border that caught the attention of the NIO and led him to issue a warning memorandum some hours before the invasion began.

Basic Intelligence Much analytical work builds upon data maintained and updated on a constant basis. Economic statistics; biographies of foreign leaders and officials, not to say adversary intelligence officers; and information on nations' populations, political parties, transportation infrastructures, and the like are all necessary from time to time. The intelligence agencies all utilize research libraries and have units that produce such basic intelligence. At the CIA the Office of Support Services (formerly the Central Reference Service) performs this task. Its best-known publication is called *The World Factbook*, though it also produces monthly statistical collections and biographical registers.

PILLARS OF INTELLIGENCE

With outputs of so many different kinds, it is clear that information requirements must necessarily be massive. Intelligence has long since ceased to be a game of spy versus spy and has become a field in which almost every imaginable source is plumbed for its contribution to the whole. Alongside the secret agents are ranged what former CIA director Richard Helms called in a 1967 speech the "machine spies." The raw information is massaged by analysts and value is added to it by careful comparison, review, and fitting together what are, in effect, jigsaw puzzles. Intelligence authorities are loath to discuss these "sources and methods," but the outlines of the process are readily apparent and an understanding of this process is important to according intelligence its correct place in American foreign policy.

Until the early nineteenth century, spies remained virtually the only source of intelligence, while intelligence organizations were most notable by their absence. Both organizations and technical means of intelligence collection began to enter the field about the time of the American Civil War. Scientific inventions drove these changes as the twentieth century opened, World War I demonstrated a continuing need for intelligence, and World War II provided a huge impetus for all kinds of intelligence collection methods. The coherent theory of intelligence discussed in this essay also began to come into focus with World War II. The sophistication of all techniques has improved constantly since then, and the Cold War served to spotlight evolving methods. Intelligence is now characterized by a synergistic dynamic in which information requirements drive technological improvements, while scientific talent solves collection problems, thus making new information important and creating fresh requirements.

Agents Spying has been characterized as "the second oldest profession," in the sense that its attempts to divine an adversary's intentions and capabilities are recorded throughout history. Agents remained important even in the era of the machine spy, for some kinds of information cannot be gathered by technical collection means. In the post–Cold War era, with an intelligence focus dominated by terrorism, drug trafficking, international criminal activity, and concerns regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, much of the key thinking and decision making of adversaries took place in a manner more accessible to the spy than to the machine. As cost became a factor as well, it was evident that in many cases spies were cheaper than machines, even with the extensive networks of the CIA and

other agencies for the care and feeding of spies. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, spies were the province of the CIA's Directorate of Operations and the Defense Human Intelligence Service of the Defense Intelligence Agency. There were continuing conflicts, to some degree inherent in the nature of this kind of activity, between employment of spies to gather intelligence and their role in covert action, political action, or other fields. In addition, there were difficulties from a human rights perspective, because individuals recruited as agents frequently had checkered pasts. Only in the 1990s did the United States establish standards for personal character in individuals recruited as agents, and these were sometimes honored more in the breach than in the observance. Spies remained a necessary evil.

Individuals to be recruited were often identified by a third party and sometimes solicited by them as well. All aspects of the agent's relationship with intelligence were handled by a case officer, a CIA (or other agency) person who was not himself or herself the spy. The case officer typically reported to the CIA station in the country in which the espionage took place, though in exceptional cases a relationship might have run directly to headquarters. Material from agents was rewritten by "reports officers" before being circulated to analysts who used it to compile finished intelligence of the kinds noted already. Some policymakers, for example national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration, insisted upon being shown the raw agent reports.

Attachés The diplomatic service assigns individuals to posts in foreign capitals as commercial, economic, and cultural attachés. These posts are often used by the CIA and other agencies to provide a cover occupation for intelligence officers overseas. More important, the military services openly send officers to foreign countries as attachés. These officers provide a channel of communication between the U.S. military and foreign services, provide occasional diplomatic assistance, and more or less openly gather intelligence. The practice of sending military attachés in general dates from the late eighteenth century and was adopted as a standard by Napoleonic France (1799–1815). In the United States, the army colonel Emory Upton conducted a two-year research visit to Europe and Asia in the 1870s and demonstrated the value of military officers gathering information abroad.

The U.S. Navy also conducted such roving visits beginning in 1870. Naval attachés (the Marine Corps shares in naval attaché assignments) have been permanently stationed in foreign nations since 1882, army attachés since 1889, and air force attachés (first as part of the Army Air Corps) since the 1930s. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) administers the attaché program, using officers seconded from all the armed services. Reports go to DIA, where they are used in publications and circulated to other intelligence agencies. Attachés can provide considerable amounts of information, even from closed societies. For example, in 1954 an air attaché in Moscow furnished the initial intelligence on a Soviet heavy jet bomber. Similarly, U.S. naval attachés in Japan before World War II reported on Japanese technological improvements, including early data on oxygen-powered torpedoes, the highly capable Zero fighter, the large-caliber guns of the Yamato-class superbattleships, and other matters. Military attachés in Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic) during that same period sent home valuable material on Soviet military doctrine and organization.

Combat Intelligence Often ignored, combat intelligence is acquired by military forces in the course of their activities, and not only in wartime. A wide variety of intelligence can be encompassed by this category, which includes things learned by scout patrols sent out by ground forces, data from interrogation of prisoners (and defectors), lucky finds by forces in the field, and observations made during normal operations. Information from defectors proved a fruitful source during the Cold War, and would merit its own category except that interrogation of prisoners—the same function—fits more naturally into this category.

A few examples illustrate this category nicely. Union armies in the Civil War made a lucky find in September 1862 when a copy of General Robert E. Lee's orders to his Army of Northern Virginia was discovered wrapped around some cigars shortly before the Battle of Antietam. In World War II, German prisoners taken before the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944) revealed details of preparations for an attack that were not taken seriously, leading to surprise of U.S. troops along the front. Beginning in March 1978, in the course of normal operations, the submarine USS *Batfish* detected and followed a Soviet Yankee-class ballistic missile submarine for some seventy-seven days,

thereby gaining key information about the practices and habits of these Soviet strategic forces. In 1983 information from the Russian intelligence officer and defector Oleg Gordievsky proved critical in interpreting a series of Soviet moves indicating they believed nuclear war might be at hand. The case of the war scare of 1983 also shows directly how this kind of intelligence can be reflected in analytical reports, since Gordievsky's information was incorporated in a special NIE done in early 1984.

Scientific Intelligence Scientific intelligence is gleaned from study of technical or scientific documents (often research papers) produced by the intelligence target, or from direct examination of equipment or machinery captured from an enemy in wartime or somehow acquired during peace. Scientific intelligence reached a takeoff point during World War II when the effort to gather information in this fashion first became systematic. Notable examples from that period include British successes in countering radio navigation systems used by German bombers in the Battle of Britain (1940), and in deceiving the Germans as to the accuracy of their rockets and ramjets (V-weapons) launched against Great Britain in 1944–1945. A U.S. example is the capture and analysis of the Japanese Zero fighter aircraft, results of which were incorporated into the design of a countering aircraft, the Grumman F6F Hellcat. A Cold War example is how the United States learned of Soviet aircraft design techniques from examining a MiG-25 supersonic aircraft whose pilot flew it to Japan to defect in 1977.

Electronic Intelligence Related to scientific intelligence in that it is also analyzed by scientists, electronic intelligence, too, received a great boost in World War II. It involves the reception and recording of electronic emissions, usually from radars, or of the telemetry transmissions from guided missiles, ships, or aircraft undergoing testing. Scientists are able to deduce from this information the radio frequency bands and other characteristics of radars, or a variety of information about systems being tested. Submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and space satellites have all been used to gather electronic intelligence. From the 1940s until at least the 1980s the United States maintained a vigorous program of flights by aircraft equipped to collect electronic intelligence along the periphery of the Soviet Union, China, and other communist countries. These flights, known in the trade as "ferret" operations, numbered over 20,000 and account for the vast majority of the planes shot down in the course of Cold War spy flights. In August 1964 the American destroyers involved in the Gulf of Tonkin incident in the Vietnam War were on an electronic intelligence mission. The same was true of the ship *Liberty,* attacked by the Israeli air force during the Six-Day War (June 1967), and the ship *Pueblo,* captured by North Korea in January 1968. Similarly, a U.S. Navy EP-3E reconnaissance plane off the southern Chinese coast became involved in an incident on 1 April 2001, when a jet fighter of the People's Republic of China subjected the American plane to such intense harassment that the two craft collided. The Chinese aircraft was lost, and the American plane had to make a forced landing in China, where the crew was held in custody for eleven days, until the United States made a formal statement that could be taken as an apology. In general, gathering electronic intelligence has been among the most dangerous kind of intelligence missions, and has provoked serious diplomatic repercussions as well. On the other hand, electronic intelligence can be quite useful. An example can be taken from 1978, when telemetry data from Russian missile tests indicated that a certain Russian ICBM was being tested with more reentry vehicles than it was credited with by diplomats negotiating the SALT II treaty. In this case the result was to negotiate new definitions for the treaty on how to count missiles for inclusion in the categories allowed by the treaty.

Communications Intelligence Communications intelligence is a large subject that includes secret writing, codes and ciphers, transmission and interception, and decryption. All these are aspects of the process of gaining access to, and then knowledge of the contents of, the private communications of a target, whether an individual or a state. This type of intelligence has probably existed as long as there have been spies, given the advantages of knowing what a spy was reporting. Government messages have long been sent in code, and breaking those codes offers knowledge of the inner thoughts of the opponent. In modern usage, messages are most often sent by radio, cable, teletype, E-mail, or other forms of electronic transmission. These communications are subject to interception, and this source of intelligence is considered among the best (and most sensitive, from a security standpoint). The general label of "communications intelligence" used

here encompasses all aspects of contriving to intercept messages, analysis of the transmissions, decryption and decoding of the contents, and translation and making the results available to friendly intelligence analysts. In the United States each of the armed services has a component dedicated to communications intelligence, and all feed material to an umbrella civilian unit, the National Security Agency (NSA). With increasing technical sophistication the personnel requirements for collection of radio transmissions have decreased—the armed services alone employed roughly 120,000 people for this purpose in the 1960s, but the number went down to about half of that by 2000. The NSA employs approximately 20,000 people. With much of the burden of collection switched to satellites, ground stations have been abandoned in Pakistan (1969), Ethiopia (around 1975), Subic Bay in the Philippines (1985), and Berlin (about 1995). In 2000 there were still ground stations in Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and, by means of liaison relationship, in China. Diplomacy and foreign aid required to maintain communications intelligence ground stations have been a complicating factor in U.S. foreign policy.

Special collection operations are sometimes conducted by the CIA or other agencies for the benefit of the NSA. Best known of these are the tunnels built in Vienna (1949) and Berlin (1945–1955), and under the Russian embassy in Washington, D.C. (1985–?), for the purpose of placing listening devices and taps on telephone or teleprinter cables. Diplomatic fallout adverse to the United States occurred when these operations were revealed. In almost every case the target became aware of the special collection activity before its public revelation, and used that knowledge to feed false information to U.S. intelligence. Another special activity involved the use of submarines to secretly place taps on telephone cables underwater in the Russian Far East.

Communications intelligence works like a huge vacuum cleaner, and for all of its difficulties has proved a highly valuable intelligence source. Communications provided key information on the structure and activities of Soviet armed forces; important insights into negotiating aims of Soviet-American arms control talks from the 1970s to the 1990s; data on Chinese involvement in the Korean War; vital information on North Vietnamese commands and on the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War; material on Soviet maneuvers in various international crises; knowledge of the activities of drug cartels and others using telephone communications from the 1980s on; and much else. Communications intelligence played a huge role in World War II, a significant role in World War I, and evolved continuously from the moment when Morse code telegraphy began in the 1850s.

Photographic Intelligence Images taken with a camera have been an intelligence source since World War I. Observation from above ground level increases the scope of this intelligence, and aerial observation has been in use since a French officer used a balloon to watch the Austro-German enemy at the Battle of Fleurus in 1794. In the American Civil War balloons were used in this manner, and the first recorded instance of aerial photography dates from that time. The airplane was an important scout in World War I, with cameras soon added, and purpose-built cameras and aerial photography reached a stage of advanced development in World War II. During the Cold War the U.S. Air Force used specialized reconnaissance squadrons for overhead photography. In the mid-1950s the CIA joined the effort, first with high-altitude photo planes (the U-2 and SR-71) and then space satellites (CORONA, or KH-4, with follow-ons, currently up to KH-12). Sophisticated films, cameras, computer-driven digital readout techniques, and database-linked photo interpretation techniques have made overhead reconnaissance a premier intelligence source. The National Reconnaissance Office, formed in 1960 but whose existence was admitted only in 1992, controls the production and operation of satellite systems (aircraft reconnaissance systems known today remain under the auspices of the air force). Interpretation of imagery and circulation of intelligence reports based on photographic intelligence is the province of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, formed in 1995 from components merged from the CIA and the Pentagon.

Some photography other than overhead reconnaissance is also important to intelligence. Submarines have taken pictures through their periscopes of coastal targets ranging from invasion beaches to adversaries' naval bases. Casual pictures taken by private citizens ("Aunt Minnie photographs") may show objects of intelligence interest. In addition, a quite critical contribution through photography is made by the miniature cameras that secret agents use to surreptitiously photograph documents, and the microdot and

other photographic methods used to assist the communication of secrets from agent to handlers. These aspects of photography, and related research and development to create the cameras, are the responsibility of the CIA's directorates of administration, science and technology, and operations.

Domestic Collection Intelligence services acquire some information directly from Americans or from foreign citizens who are not agents or spies in any traditional sense. An individual traveling to a foreign country might be asked about impressions gained during the visit. Journalists, missionaries, and others residing abroad have frequently been a source for well-grounded local information. Academics expert in a certain field can provide information or perspectives of which agency personnel are unaware. Businesspeople may have valuable contacts and knowledge. At times, such as the period of the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this kind of collection from individuals was such a significant source that the CIA made efforts in advance to ask persons traveling to that country to be alert for information on specific matters. This technique remains useful in closed societies. At one time the CIA maintained the Domestic Contact Service to gather this information. The function still exists, although the work of that office has been subdivided elsewhere within the agency.

Open Source Information Evaluations of sources of intelligence consistently find that perhaps 80 to 90 percent of information necessary to intelligence can be obtained from sources that are completely public. The term "open sources" has become current for this category of material, which includes newspapers, magazines, technical journals, scientific papers, books, video programs, information that appears on the Internet, and similar items. Since the mid-1990s there has been a more explicit effort to improve the collection and use of open source material. For a short time the CIA contemplated a major directorate for open sources, but eventually settled on the Office for Open Source Collection, which today is located within the Directorate for Science and Technology. Open source information is highly desirable in that its collection involves no political or diplomatic obstacles, often includes material that already has been analyzed to some extent, and is relatively inexpensive compared to data gathered from technical collection sources. A significant drawback lies in the fact that intelligence officers and the policymakers who rely upon them often attribute greater credibility, almost automatically, to information that is "born secret," simply because it is secret.

Liaison with Friendly Intelligence Services Foreign intelligence services with which the United States is allied or maintains private relations are significant sources of information. The best known of these relationships is that with the British, forged during World War II and regularly renewed since. Similar relationships exist with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Israel, and other nations. Some relationships are multilateral and general in nature, similar to military alliances. Others pertain to specific subjects. Some relations exist even with former enemies, such as between the United States and Russia on organized crime. Sharing of intelligence information varies with the degree of trust—for example, the United States shares a wide range of information with Great Britain, but much less with France. The use of the CIA as an intermediary, such as between Israel and the Palestinian Authority from 1998 to 2001, can also have diplomatic aspects. The question of liaison relationships is also complicated by efforts of the partners to spy on one another. United States–Israeli intelligence cooperation soured after 1985, when naval intelligence analyst Jonathan J. Pollard was revealed as an Israeli agent. More recently, French–U.S. relations have been complicated by allegations that the nations engaged in industrial spying against one another, a situation that led to the recall of a CIA station chief in Paris in February 1995. Interests in preserving intelligence relationships may factor in diplomatic initiatives in many instances.

Counterintelligence The work of uncovering foreign spies in one's own country or intelligence services is termed counterintelligence or counterespionage. This work predates creation of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, having been a major focus of U.S. naval intelligence even during the prewar years. From its inception the CIA had a counterintelligence staff within the Directorate of Operations; in recent years this has risen to the status of a center combining both CIA and FBI resources and headed by an FBI official. Counterintelligence can be a double-edged sword. The knowledge and access to secret infor-

mation of counterintelligence units made them a favorite target for the Soviet secret service during the Cold War, as epitomized by the Russian recruitment of British counterintelligence chief Harold ("Kim") Philby, who, after years of suspicion, fled to Russia in early 1963.

The existence and duration of counterintelligence investigations can also have a negative impact on an intelligence organization. During the 1960s, when James J. Angleton headed the CIA's counterintelligence staff, inquiries aimed at suspected (but innocent) agency officers came close to paralyzing the CIA's foreign intelligence effort against the Soviet Union. Some observers argue that the reaction to the excesses of the 1960s was to dismantle much of the counterintelligence effort, leading to a permissive climate in which espionage flourished—thus "the year of the spy" in 1985, during which half a dozen major spies for Russia or China were uncovered, and the cases of Aldrich Ames (1994) and Robert Hanssen (2001), each of whom succeeded in spying for Russia for at least a decade without being caught.

Counterintelligence failures like these invariably lead to more stringent security regulations and regular monitoring and reinvestigation of veteran intelligence officers. In the United States there are demands for the broad use of polygraph (lie detector) tests, whose utility and accuracy are disputed. The net effect of heightened security, aside from catching spies, is that at some level the work of everyone engaged in intelligence becomes more difficult due to the compartmentalization, degree of precaution, and breadth of disclosure to security officials. In turn, this makes personnel retention a problem. In addition, stringent counterintelligence regimes inhibit the recruitment of spies in the adversary's camp because of the fear that the agents are enemy personnel deliberately attempting to mislead the side recruiting them. Consequently there is a trade-off between efficiency of intelligence work (with danger of espionage as a result) and tight security (with the consequence of lowered morale and performance from intelligence officers). The United States has not yet been able to solve this equation and has vacillated between extremely permissive and tight regimes.

Leaks of information owing to espionage damage the credibility of intelligence, with both policymakers and the public; relations with cooperating intelligence services (which fear information they share may end up in the hands of enemies); and the cohesion of the intelligence community. Counterintelligence is necessary but poses a continuing dilemma.

EVOLUTION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

A factor in American history since the revolutionary war, the intelligence community that uses the methods here discussed and produces the kinds of data enumerated is necessarily the product of a long evolution. At the time of the Revolution, there was no such thing as the "community" of today; there was not even an organization in the conventional sense. Spying was largely a freelance business. Paul Revere's ride in April 1775 alerting colonists to a British foray from Boston—a classic example of warning intelligence—was a personal initiative. For the most part, generals ran spies directly as part of their scout services. This was the relationship between British General Henry Clinton and his agent Major John André, as well as that of George Washington with spies John Honeyman and Joshua Merserau, and scouts like Knowlton's Rangers (Nathan Hale, possibly the best known revolutionary war spy, was a volunteer from that unit.) This approach continued through the Civil War, which saw the beginnings of a distinct intelligence mission. In 1861–1862 General George S. McClellan relied upon Allan Pinkerton's organization, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, for both intelligence and counterespionage work. Many of the Pinkerton reports exaggerated Confederate strength, and McClellan's successors terminated the Pinkerton connection, but spying nevertheless became much more systematic. No formal arrangements for spying existed on the Confederate side, but there, too, agents were often used. Scholars of the period have identified more than 4,200 persons who functioned as spies, informants, guides, scouts, and so on. President Abraham Lincoln's assassin, John Wilkes Booth, certainly a Confederate sympathizer, may have been a southern agent as well.

After the Civil War the U.S. military began to collect information on foreign militaries more systematically. In 1866 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox went to Russia on an official information-gathering mission. In 1882 the Office of Naval Intelligence became the first official U.S. intelligence agency. The army created an information office in 1885 that became the Military Intelligence Division in 1918. World War I stimulated growth of both units, as well as the

Cipher Bureau within the State Department on 17 June 1917. The latter contained a code-breaking unit that achieved notoriety (revealed in the 1930s) for unraveling Japanese instructions to their diplomats at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922, an early illustration of the utility of intelligence. The code-breaking unit was abolished in 1929, but State continued to play a coordinating role among U.S. agencies in the field right through World War II.

The need for coordination grew when President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation, previously entirely involved in crime solving, to carry out counterespionage activities in Latin America. Roosevelt also created a propaganda organization with quasi-intelligence functions, the Office of Coordination of Information, in 1941. This soon evolved into a true intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with propaganda left to the Office of War Information. The OSS developed both analytical and operational sides, greatly benefiting from the pillars of intelligence developed during the war. When the OSS was abolished in 1945, its espionage (and counterespionage) elements went to the War Department, while its analytical unit was absorbed by the State Department, eventually becoming the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that exists today. The other former OSS elements, meanwhile, had a difficult time within the War Department, where OSS counterespionage was seen to be in competition with the army's Counterintelligence Corps, and its espionage nets as having little to contribute.

A far cry from the dreams of former OSS chief General William J. Donovan for a peacetime permanent intelligence service, the postwar situation resulted from decisions by President Harry S. Truman, who was concerned primarily with ending the ravages of war, and not especially fond of Donovan or his ideas. With a growing Cold War in 1946 and later, Truman worried more about intelligence. He approved formation of the National Intelligence Authority in January 1946, under which the former clandestine units from OSS were gathered with the Central Intelligence Group. This order also created the post of director of central intelligence. But the National Intelligence Authority proved to be moribund, and the Central Intelligence Group, of very limited utility, was stymied by the departments of government in competition with it. In 1947, as part of the National Security Act (Public Law 80-253), which also established the Department of Defense and National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency became the legally authorized U.S. foreign intelligence organization. As Truman described his intentions to an aide several years later, he had wanted a unit to take the intelligence flowing to him from "200 different sources" and boil it down to make presentations—exactly the kind of activity at the heart of the intelligence cycle described at the outset of this narrative. Functions of the National Intelligence Authority were taken over by the National Security Council (NSC) while the CIA absorbed the Central Intelligence Group.

For several years the CIA grew slowly and gradually acquired missions. Covert operations and political action were added to the agency's basic analytical and espionage functions with the formation of the Office of Policy Coordination by NSC directive in 1948. A 1949 review by a panel of outside consultants found flaws in CIA operations and led to covert action and espionage both being merged in the Directorate of Operations (called the Directorate of Plans until 1973). Agency work interpreting photography led to formation of the National Photographic Interpretation Center in 1953, which the CIA ran on behalf of the entire intelligence community until the 1995 creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The need for development of machine spies obliged the director of central intelligence to conduct certain research programs, such as U-2, SR-71, and CORONA development, directly out of his own office, but this became formalized in 1962 with creation of the Directorate of Science and Technology (called Directorate of Research until 1964). The Directorate of Administration is responsible for support, security, data processing, recruitment, printing, finance, logistics, training, and other functions.

Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who played a key role in the elaboration of the original legislation creating the CIA, left intelligence shortly before the actual creation of the agency. President Truman continued to appoint military officers as his directors of central intelligence, with Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter presiding over the CIA's first few years but damaged by a controversy regarding whether the CIA had been surprised by the outbreak of the Korean War or by Chinese intervention in that conflict. Walter Bedell Smith, an army general, instituted important reforms, including strengthening CIA analytical capabilities with the Directorate of Intelligence and the Board of National Estimates.

It was Smith who began the practice of assembling the interagency National Intelligence Estimates. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, DCI Allen W. Dulles emphasized covert operations and began the U-2 and other scientific development programs. Dulles served on into the administration of President John F. Kennedy, but the CIA's spectacular failure at the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, a covert operations disaster in April 1961, effectively bankrupted his leadership, and he left the CIA that fall.

During the 1950s the U.S. intelligence community as a whole assumed the basic shape it still retained at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Code-breaking branches of the army and navy had contributed greatly to the outcome of World War II, and each of the services had retained its unit subsequently; the air force and marines added their own radio intelligence branches as well. In search of better coordination, the joint Armed Forces Security Agency was created in 1949 but, beset by interservice rivalries, never achieved its intended effect. President Truman replaced this unit with the National Security Agency in 1952. President Eisenhower, concerned with the multiplication of satellite intelligence mechanisms, and with infighting over programs between the CIA and the air force, created the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in 1960 (although its existence remained a secret until 1992). President Kennedy, upset with the tendency of the armed services intelligence branches to promote views favoring their parent services, set up the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961. Armed forces intelligence regenerated over time, and the services always remained crucial in the NSA- and NRO-led activities. Not until 1995, when President William J. Clinton approved formation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a merging of offices from the Pentagon, CIA, NRO, and the services, was any new national-level intelligence agency added to the community. All these units are agencies of the Department of Defense. These agencies also operate in some of the most highly technical—and expensive—areas of intelligence work. The result is that the secretary of defense controls the vast majority (85–95 percent) of the intelligence budget even while the director of central intelligence carries the official mantle of leadership in the community.

Beginning with John A. McCone, director of central intelligence from November 1961 to April 1964, DCIs have made a more intense effort to lead the community, often through procedures for coordinating among the various agencies, multiyear budget studies, or setting requirements for intelligence collection. These efforts have met with very limited success. The Pentagon's control of a large proportion of appropriated funds has been a key obstacle but not the only one. In the case of the FBI and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and certain other entities, small elements of large government departments participate in the intelligence community but are responsible to cabinet officials over whom the DCI has no authority. The actual degree to which a director of central intelligence can lead the intelligence community is a recurrent issue in American policy.

McCone and his successors, notably Richard Helms (1966–1973) and Williams E. Colby (1973–1975), faced the major task of integrating the new intelligence technologies into the old framework. Satellites, sophisticated electronic emissions receivers and recording devices, underwater receivers, airborne interception mechanisms, computer data handling and image interpretation, and many other innovations transformed the intelligence business during the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, the sheer volume of information collected that was deemed to have intelligence value grew astronomically. Finished intelligence reports that used all the new information were a great improvement over earlier products, as exemplified by the way the missile gap dispute was resolved through the advent of satellite photography. But management of the new mechanisms, scientific research and development for intelligence purposes, funding these expensive systems, and finding ways to use the information without compromising the security of intelligence collection all posed problems for community leaders. These issues recur as new generations of intelligence technology reach the hands of operators.

The opposite side of the same coin is the need for old-fashioned spies, "human intelligence." The machines gather vast amounts of information whose importance is difficult to gauge. The inside information given by agents is often a key to interpretation. This issue became salient during the 1970s, and virtually every policy review of intelligence since then has upheld the need for more human intelligence sources. In response to the felt need, the CIA redoubled efforts to recruit agents. During the Cold War the agency enjoyed considerable success; in the Viet-

nam War and against China spying proved more difficult. On terrorism and drug trafficking, key intelligence questions of the 1990s and the twenty-first century, the need for spies was still acute. At the same time evolving human rights and moral standards make unacceptable the recruitment of agents whose character would have been ignored in an earlier age. There will be continuing tension between different aspects of agency interest in human intelligence.

A thorny issue that has also recurred for U.S. policymakers is the degree to which intelligence does, or should, directly impact on U.S. foreign policy. The ideal concept has been that intelligence speaks truth to power; that is, secret information to policymakers informs decisions that are made on the basis of this private knowledge. In theory, the information is disinterested and devoid of private agendas; in practice this is often not the case, even for simple intelligence analysis. One reason alone justifies the existence of the CIA, despite the many objections made about it: this organization provides presidents and their top officials with a source of information independent of the government departments responsible for actions. Military intelligence traditionally takes the most dire view of the threat, thus justifying large defense budgets and weapons purchases to counter that threat. In war, military intelligence reports most optimistically on the results of operations. In the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo War (1999), military intelligence estimates of the effectiveness of bombing in every case had to be revised downward after they were made. During the Vietnam War, there were notorious controversies between the military, both air force and DIA, and the CIA over the degree of success obtained in bombing North Vietnam. For its part, State Department intelligence sees possibilities for negotiation where none may exist. Here, too, the CIA can play a cautionary role.

However, the pure archetype of intelligence theory is difficult to achieve in fact. Directors of central intelligence can be, and have been, asked for their opinions on policy subjects. The mere act of a president putting his DCI on the spot by asking an opinion takes the CIA (and the intelligence community more broadly) out of the role of neutral arbiter and inserts it into the policy process as an interested player. Declassified records of the National Security Council, which are currently available for a period spanning the 1940s through the 1970s, show DCIs Allen Dulles, John A. McCone, Richard Helms, William Colby, and George H. W. Bush all commenting on policy, not merely intelligence matters. When more documents covering these and later periods become available, they will undoubtedly demonstrate the same pattern for other DCIs. It is the president's prerogative to solicit advice from anyone, not excepting intelligence officials, but this adds to the difficulty of preserving separation between intelligence and policy roles.

Another facet of the problem of preserving a separation in roles arises from the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. That statutory responsibility may conflict with policy in ways we are not aware of today. Desire to protect an intelligence source may lead a director to furnish disguised or watered-down information that presents less than a full picture. Conversely, full disclosure may result in compromise of sources. For example, it has been reported that during the Carter administration, a leak from an NSC staffer led the Soviet Union to arrest aircraft designer Adolf Tolkachev, who had been one of the CIA's most valuable sources. Directors of central intelligence must be aware of the dangers that lie at the nexus of policy and intelligence.

A further aspect to the policy-intelligence conundrum is that the CIA, and the intelligence community more broadly, do have certain policy interests. In particular, these arise when intelligence engages in covert operations. Political action in western Europe during the Truman administration; paramilitary operations in the Far East, South Asia, and Latin America during the Eisenhower administration; and paramilitary actions in Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan during the Reagan administration all represented real U.S. foreign policy initiatives in which the CIA was a principal player. To say that agency advice to a president can be divorced from policy interests in such cases is wishful thinking. It is also nugatory to argue that such covert operations are small items that can safely be ignored within the confines of a larger global policy. The Kennedy administration's failure with the CIA invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 had major impact on Kennedy's predispositions in many policy areas. The Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration triggered a near-constitutional crisis in the United States. Another Reagan-era covert operation, the CIA paramilitary action in Afghanistan, encouraged the development of, and provided weapons and training to, fundamentalist Islamic guerrillas

who transformed themselves into anti-U.S. terrorists in the years after the war. As of 2001, Islamic terror was construed to be one of the top national security threats to the United States. Programmatic interests in supportive capabilities, such as military special forces, intelligence satellites and booster rockets, information and propaganda resources, and so on, are clearly also areas where intelligence has an actual policy stake. In short, the separation of intelligence from policy has always been imperfect and waxes and wanes depending on the president, his policy proclivities, and the constellation of senior officials surrounding the chief executive.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Intelligence can have great value in foreign policy and national security, but good intelligence is difficult to come by. Among the leading foreign policy dilemmas posed by intelligence is the need to frame relations with nations as affected by certain aspects of the spy business. The desire to maintain ground bases for certain technical collection means, or for covert operations, may drive decisions on economic and military assistance. General bilateral relations can be affected by nations' spying against one another, particularly when major agents are caught and revealed or ships and aircraft crash or are captured. A desire to recruit agents may dictate waiver of human rights concerns that should be upheld, with the consequent danger of difficulties should such relationships surface. The desire to preserve a stream of intelligence sharing may be threatened by friendly nations spying on one another, or by fears of secret information leaking to third countries. In addition, bilateral relations can be directly affected by intelligence covert operations, while the general image of the United States in the world can be influenced by impressions of how ready the United States may be to resort to covert operations.

In theory, intelligence represents a disinterested purveyor of unbiased information to the president and other leaders. This ideal remains an ideal because presidents are people—they ask for help and advice, recommendations on anything from policy to politics. Directors of central intelligence can be pulled into the policy fray even if they would prefer to avoid it. In addition, the notion that intelligence does not have any real policy interests of its own is flawed, for directors of central intelligence may also be drawn into policy issues due to their responsibility to protect sources and methods. The policy versus intelligence question remains a live issue in America.

Finally, there are issues that may require policy decisions that are directly intelligence matters. Most obvious is the budget—how much should the nation pay for intelligence, and are the data worth the outlays? Related budgetary issues include the distribution of funds among technical collectors, agents, development programs, analysts, support functions, and the rest. Information issues include the emphasis to be placed upon current reporting versus that devoted to long-range prediction. Also vital is the packaging of intelligence—what kinds of reports of what types are the most useful? An information issue that persists is the relative emphasis to be given to secret, as opposed to open source, information. Then there is the technical issue of the tension between the need for high-security counterintelligence and the desire for the most efficient intelligence community. At the apex is the community role of the director of central intelligence—how much leadership can or should the director exercise, and can or should Department of Defense and other players in the intelligence field be brought under the director's authority?

These are not the only recurring issues regarding intelligence and American foreign policy, but they are among the most salient. Each of the issues is relevant to structuring intelligence to best support American policy. All of the issues can confidently be expected to arise in the future, whatever their status may be in the present context. For this reason alone, they should be carefully considered.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew, Christopher. *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush.* New York, 1995.

Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency from the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century.* New York, 2001.

Brugioni, Dino A. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.* New York, 1991.

Gates, Robert M. *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War.* New York, 1996.

Kent, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1949.

Peebles, Curtis. *The Corona Project: America's First Spy Satellites.* Annapolis, Md., 1997.

Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces.* Princeton, N.J., 1986.

———. *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf War.* Chicago, 1996.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. *The U.S. Intelligence Community.* 4th ed. Boulder, Colo., 1999.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WARRIORS; COVERT OPERATIONS; DECISION MAKING; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PROPAGANDA; TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM.

INTERNATIONALISM

Warren F. Kuehl and Gary B. Ostrower

Internationalism in American foreign policy has had different meanings for nearly every generation of citizens and diplomats. It has been associated with all forms of external contact with the world, the relationships becoming more extensive and political with the passage of time. As a foreign policy, it has usually been viewed as the antithesis of isolationism, and in that sense it has involved political commitments or "entanglements" through multinational treaties as well as membership in international organizations. In a broader context, it has also encompassed official and unofficial nonpolitical activities—economic, social, cultural, and scientific—usually evidenced through affiliation with specialized international societies or agencies. Some internationalists have thought in terms of a universal community, a broad brotherhood of people with common concerns, needs, and aspirations that exists as a reality beyond the confines of nation-states. In recent times, internationalism has taken on a new meaning under a doctrine of responsibility, with the United States assuming the burden of "policeman of the world," both unilaterally and multilaterally.

THE EARLY YEARS

Long before isolationism became an established policy in the nineteenth century, citizens of the American colonies recognized that they could not live apart from the rest of the world. They existed within an imperial system that involved them in numerous crises and four world wars (Queen Anne's War, King William's War, King George's War, and the French and Indian War), mostly related to trade and territories. Early Americans understood that international law applied to them as they redefined their relationships toward their neighbors and their mother country. William Penn reflected the cosmopolitan atmosphere when he drafted his *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (1693), in which he called for a congress of states to promote stability. Evidence of a broad perspective also appeared in a colonial union, the New England Confederation of 1643, and in the suggestion for joint action embodied in the Albany Plan of 1754. Joseph Galloway's proposal for an Anglo-American council in 1774 also expressed a cosmopolitan outlook. Such experiences, as well as an awareness of the Iroquois League of the Five Nations, may explain why revolutionary leaders like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine spoke favorably of an international organization. Certainly, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of 1789 revealed a general awareness that sovereign states could combine to promote their interests.

Events during and after the Revolution related to the treaty of alliance with France, as well as difficulties arising over the neutrality policy pursued during the French revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars, encouraged another perspective. A desire for separateness and unilateral freedom of action merged with national pride and a sense of continental safety to foster the policy of isolation. Although the United States maintained diplomatic relations and economic contacts abroad, it sought to restrict these as narrowly as possible in order to retain its independence. The Department of State continually rejected proposals for joint cooperation, a policy made explicit in the Monroe Doctrine's emphasis on unilateral action. Not until 1863 did an American delegate attend an international conference. Even so, Secretary of State William H. Seward reflected prevailing views by refusing to sign an 1864 multilateral treaty related to the Red Cross. The United States did not subscribe to such a convention until 1882. Thereafter, cooperation on economic and social matters seemed acceptable, but political issues, especially those involving Europe, were generally avoided until the end of the century.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ORGANIZED INTERNATIONALISM

Although most citizens accepted the principle of isolationism, scattered voices throughout the nineteenth century called for a more cooperative stance toward the world. As early as the 1830s the American Peace Society, under the direction of William Ladd, sponsored essay contests concerning international organization, and in 1840 Ladd utilized many of the ideas in drafting his well-known *Essay on a Congress of Nations*. His proposal for both a political body and a judicial agency gained considerable public notice through petition and educational campaigns during the ensuing years. After Ladd's death in 1841, Elihu Burritt, a reformer known as "The Learned Blacksmith," presented the congress of nations program to European pacifists with such regularity that they referred to it as the "American idea."

The Civil War in America (1861–1865) and conflicts in Europe (1854–1856, 1870–1871) undermined the peace movement, but a developing interest in the law of nations kept alive the concept of global cooperation during the last third of the century. Several societies emerged to promote the codification of international rules of behavior and to encourage the settlement of disputes through arbitration by a third party. These were not new ideas, but leading citizens in many nations around the turn of the twentieth century seized upon the arbitration concept to guarantee a warless world.

This activity contributed substantially to the evolution of thought concerning an international organization. As countries signed arbitration accords, men—and a few women—began to think beyond such limited agreements. Agencies would be needed to implement the treaties; laws would have to be codified. As John Westlake, an English law professor, observed, "When we assert that there is such a thing as International Law, we assert that there is a society of States; when we recognize that there is a society of States, we recognize that there is International Law."

The arbitration settlement in 1871–1872 of the Alabama Claims, an Anglo-American dispute over damages caused by Confederate cruisers, led to the signing of many other arbitration agreements during the next four decades. Most were disputes involving monetary and boundary claims and questions arising under treaty clauses; this discouraged pacifists, who hoped to see accords calling for all controversies to be arbitrated. They rallied to promote their goal, gaining public endorsement in the 1890s. The Lake Mohonk (New York) Conference on International Arbitration, which began in 1895 and met annually through 1916, united American civic, business, religious, and educational leaders in a quest to institutionalize arbitration. Proponents recognized that the Senate would not subscribe to unlimited agreements, so they agreed that matters involving national honor and vital interests be exempted. Their support resulted in the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain in 1897, which called for the arbitration of monetary and territorial differences. As expected, the Senate exempted disputes affecting national interest and honor, and then insisted that the Senate have authority to exempt from arbitration any dispute submitted for settlement. Even these safeguards did not satisfy the extreme isolationists. After adding yet other reservations, the Senate refused to ratify the treaty.

These developments had a lasting impact upon American internationalist thought. First, arbitration accords encouraged the exploration of cooperative methods of resolving disputes and breached barriers that had kept statesmen from previously examining such subjects. Second, these experiences warned internationalists that they must be cautious about proposals for a union of nations. It was quite clear by the time that the United States fought Spain in 1898 that Washington would not assume obligations that would weaken its sovereignty or jeopardize interests deemed vital to its welfare. Finally, the advances in arbitration influenced discussions at the first genuine international assembly of nations, the Hague Conference of 1899.

ARBITRATION AND LEGALISM

U.S. delegates at The Hague supported a convention to create the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Because the Court was little more than a list of names of persons who could be called upon to hear issues, because the convention exempted matters of national honor or interest, and because the submission of disputes was optional for governments, isolationists in the Senate put up little serious resistance. The convention proved popular, especially after the American delegates added a proviso that ratification would not mean abandoning traditional policies of nonentanglement or policies like those found in the Monroe Doctrine.

The convention fertilized the young internationalist movement. By 1900 a number of persons had presented plans that would move the world beyond courts of arbitration. Most of these called for a world federation that vaguely reflected the American political experience. Benjamin F. Trueblood, secretary of the American Peace Society, advanced the idea in *The Federation of the World* (1899), in articles, and in lectures. The interdependence of men and nations, he argued, would lead inevitably to "a complete political union of the world, a great international world state, built up somewhat on the pattern of our union of States, with supreme legislative, judicial and executive functions touching those interests which the nations have in common." Trueblood quickly cautioned that he envisioned no powerful agency. The union would operate primarily in a legislative and judicial capacity, without a formal executive, and it would possess no authority to compel its members to maintain peace. Between 1899 and 1914 a wide variety of proposals appeared, with a few internationalists devoting exceptional thought and time to the subject. Their suggestions unquestionably influenced the twentieth-century movement toward international organization, and their writings reflected a number of basic assumptions. First, they believed that an inexorable evolutionary process was at work. That process included the arbitration treaties, the willingness of governments to cooperate at The Hague in 1899, and the budding interest of governments in a court of justice. Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1907 enunciated this viewpoint when he declared that the importance of The Hague meeting of 1899 was that it made a follow-up meeting possible. Out of this he foresaw law, order, and peace. Said Root, "The world has entered upon an orderly process through which, step-by-step, in successive conferences, each taking the work of its predecessor as its point of departure, there may be continual progress toward making the practice of civilized nations conform to their peaceful professions."

Raymond Bridgman, a Boston journalist, echoed Root in a volume of essays, *World Organization* (1905). He saw continued meetings as the foundation stone for an international body. It could begin with a legislature modeled after the U.S. Congress, and then be followed by a court and an executive agency. New York attorney Hayne Davis also reflected this philosophy in articles published between 1903 and 1912. A "United Nations" would emerge, said Davis in what appears to have been the first use of that term. Just as the United States had been forced to develop a more perfect government after the Revolution and the Confederation period, so would the world be compelled to build a better system to keep the peace.

This evolutionary concept appeared in nearly all of the internationalist proposals. Each began by calling for further development of the arbitral network through a series of treaties that would bind nations together. Then states could explore other ways to promote their common needs. Events seemed to confirm such logic. Between 1903 and 1914 governments concluded more than 162 arbitration accords, and in 1907 the Second Hague Conference convened. The State Department kept step by negotiating a series of treaties in 1904 and 1905 that respected the Senate's concern for American rights, honor, and interests. Nevertheless, senators inserted into each agreement a clause giving the Senate the right to veto arbitration of a dispute. President Theodore Roosevelt reacted sharply. He considered the Senate action to be a violation of the constitutional authority of the chief executive and refused to exchange ratifications. In 1908, however, he relented, authorizing Root to negotiate other agreements that reflected the Senate's wishes.

In 1910, President William Howard Taft decided to go further and seek agreements to arbitrate all disputes. Two such treaties in 1911 inevitably ran afoul of the Senate, which nullified his efforts and restricted the process in such a way that Taft abandoned his quest. In short, even before Woodrow Wilson became president, internationalists understood that the Senate would likely object to any meaningful proposal for American participation in a world organization.

This may explain why Wilson's secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, took a less controversial course by signing conciliation accords with many governments. Unlike arbitration agreements, these did not bind the signatories to the decisions of a third party. Bryan also introduced the "cooling-off" principle, whereby political leaders promised they would not resort to force while a case was pending. This concept was widely adopted after 1914.

Internationalists soon moved beyond their advocacy for an arbitration system and presented an even more important proposal. The world, they argued, needed a genuine court of justice. They viewed arbitration as limited because it contained no fixed principles that could be univer-

sally applied. With established laws and impartial judges, nations could submit disputes to a reliable and fair tribunal. With the U.S. Supreme Court as their (usually) unstated example, internationalists believed that an international system incorporating universally accepted rules (laws) might prompt governments to allow the court to hear even cases involving honor and independence.

The United States officially supported the goal of a court of justice at the Second Hague Conference, but the delegates had been unable to agree on a method of selecting judges. International lawyers and advocates of the evolutionary hypothesis continued to work for some type of judicial agency. The American Society of International Law, established in 1906, and the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes along with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, both formed in 1910, concentrated on this objective. Resolutions of peace congresses and other internationalist organizations reflected a popular desire for a judicial tribunal. President Taft's secretary of state, former corporate lawyer Philander C. Knox, proposed in 1909 that a maritime prize court discussed at the Second Hague Conference be reconstituted as an international court of justice. The proposal went nowhere. The fears of nationalists continued to be more influential than the hopes of the internationalists.

Nevertheless, proposals concerning an international court of justice inevitably revived interest in the old scheme of a periodic congress. Evolutionists viewed it as a vital next step. Even more significantly, advocates of an international court saw it as an important development because, they argued, some agency had to establish the rules (the international law) that would guide the judges. The First Hague Conference had stimulated demands for additional meetings, and the congress theme became increasingly popular after 1900. Bridgman began a successful petition campaign to obtain the endorsement of the Massachusetts legislature, while the American Peace Society embarked upon an extensive propaganda campaign to reach religious and civic bodies. One writer breathlessly called the periodic congress idea "the demand of the hour."

Such agitation prompted action that had a direct bearing upon calls for the Second Hague Conference. In 1904, representatives of the Interparliamentary Union, an association of legislators from congresses within nations, met at St. Louis, where they resolved to support the convening of a second Hague Conference. Under the leadership of U.S. Representative Richard Bartholdt of Missouri, they persuaded President Roosevelt to join them in calling on foreign chancellories to support the plan. The 1907 conference was the fruit of their labors.

Bartholdt had launched this project along with peace advocate Hayne Davis, and the two men proposed that "a regular Congress of Nations be created, to meet at stated periods, to discuss international questions and make recommendations to the governments." By April 1906 the nearly two hundred congressmen who had joined the Interparliamentary Union agreed to endorse Bartholdt and Davis's aims. The periodic congress proposal gained acceptance at The Hague in 1907 in the form of a resolution calling for further meetings. Internationalists hoped that a third session might convene in 1914 or 1915. The outbreak of war, however, frustrated their aims.

As the periodic congress idea gained in popularity, some planners began to focus on specifics, exploring, for instance, how an evolving organization would operate and the powers that it must have. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of these planners thought in terms of a federation modeled after that of the United States, with legislative, judicial, and executive agencies. Such a structure would allow nations to divide their sovereignty. They would allocate certain responsibilities to the central body while retaining control over those affairs most important to themselves, an arrangement that many internationalists hoped, or perhaps assumed, would mollify nationalistic members of the Senate. Hamilton Holt, managing editor of *The Independent* magazine, popularized this theme, with help from other prominent internationalists like Andrew Carnegie. The steel magnate repeatedly called for a "league of peace," a proposal that may well have inspired Theodore Roosevelt to float his own version of a league of peace in 1910.

The most ambitious undertaking in the years from 1910 to 1912 was what Holt and his coactivist, Oscar Crosby, called a World-Federation League. Its intricacy may have owed much to Crosby's background as an inventor and engineer. He and Holt had been energized by Roosevelt's brand of skeptical idealism. They called for the creation of a U.S. commission authorized to draft for Congress "articles of Federation" for the "maintenance of peace, through the establishment of a court that could decide any dispute between nations." This was revolutionary enough, but what especially distinguished their proposal was that the court would have the ability to enforce its

judgments by calling for the use of military force by members of the federation. The Holt-Crosby emphasis on legal procedures backed up by military force would become more common—and more controversial—during the next decade.

Although Congress failed to address their proposal, in 1910 it did unanimously pass a resolution sponsored by Representative William S. Bennet of New York. Perhaps the fact that the resolution passed unanimously signifies that it had little real importance, for it actually committed the United States to nothing that nationalists viewed as threatening the concept of sovereignty. What the resolution did do, however, was to call for a commission to explore the possibility of both arms reduction and the creation of an international naval force (composed of existing navies) that could police the oceans. In a sense, this may have been less radical than it appears. Former President Theodore Roosevelt had recently incorporated the policing idea into what historians call the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine as well as his league of peace proposal. Although his motives were no less nationalist than internationalist, he more or less legitimized the concept sufficiently to elicit congressional approval of Bennet's 1910 resolution.

President Taft, however, never acted. Despite pressure from pacifists and federationists, Taft—who would later contribute a great deal to the movement for a league of nations—kept his own counsel. Yet it is worth noting that Taft, whom historians generally view as much more conservative than either his predecessor or his successor, reflected the progressive emphasis on settling international disputes peacefully. Taft was the most legalistic president of the twentieth century, even more so than Woodrow Wilson. His commitment to the so-called conciliation treaties, along with his dedication to international law, provided additional foundation work for the flowering of internationalism later in the century.

ORGANIZATION FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT

A few internationalists of the pre-1914 period went beyond federal principles to advocate a world government. Sixty years later, this kind of thinking would fuel a backlash against internationalism. Not so before World War I, when the idea was too novel to inspire great fear. Journalist Raymond Bridgman called for an internationalist agency that would coin money, regulate trade, control patents and copyrights, and (again reflecting a powerful current in turn-of-the-century progressivism) even supervise global monopolies. He and his followers also favored the establishment of an international executive with considerable authority, including the authority to use force to maintain peace. Roosevelt incorporated this latter idea in his Nobel Peace Prize address; Holt occasionally flirted with the idea; and Bartholdt's suggestions to the Interparliamentary Union in 1905, no less than the Bennet resolution of 1910, embodied this principle. Andrew Carnegie, too, endorsed the need for an international police force, as did Lucia Ames Mead, a prominent Boston reformer and peace advocate. Publisher Edwin Ginn favored an army to maintain order, and Cyrus Street, an eccentric realtor from San Francisco, presented some extreme views along this vein. He published a small journal, called *The United Nations*, in which he noted the need for a government "with power to make, judge, and execute laws; and to provide for the final disposal of all their armies and navies." He meant by this that a United Nations would have the sole authority "to *enforce peace* and prevent war from *ever* occurring again" (italics in original). After 1919, of course, this would hardly seem so eccentric.

Representative James L. Slayden of Texas added another feature when he introduced House Joint Resolution 72 in April 1913. It called for all Western Hemisphere nations to unite in "the mutual guaranty of their sovereignty and territorial integrity." Although the resolution never got out of committee, it again points to the degree to which traditional isolationism—or, more accurately, the unilateralism expressed by such things as the Roosevelt Corollary—was subject to challenge.

In truth, such suggestions represented a minority opinion among those who favored the creation of an international organization prior to 1914. The plans for periodic congresses (inspired by the Congress System that emerged from the Vienna Conference of 1815), for a federal approach to order that clearly limited a single organization's powers, and for a court of justice appealed to many more Americans. Even the court idea, however, was complicated by competing legal visions. American delegates had proposed the formation of a court of justice at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. The court concept, however, stood in conflict with the arbitration ideal that emerged from both the First and Second Hague Conferences. The formation of

a Permanent Court of Arbitration appealed powerfully to some internationalists, but it contradicted the hopes of those, like legal scholar James Brown Scott, who hoped to see a court more committed to "adjudication" and less to arbitration. The differences between these concepts was not always clear, even among internationalists, but the former was usually viewed as more useful in legal disputes among nations, while the latter would presumably handle more "political" matters that involved the necessity for compromise.

While such debates monopolized the attention of lawyers, other internationalists gravitated toward more modest proposals. Historian George L. Beer advocated an English-speaking union, while Ellery C. Stowell, who taught law at Columbia University, believed that a general alignment of states along geographical lines would provide the basis of order. Stowell was among the first to use the term "internationalism," a concept that he viewed as binding America and its allies along both political and economic lines.

Cultural and racial considerations, too, came into play. The new Rhodes Scholarship program appealed to Americans—many of them imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt—who believed that the United States indeed should share the white man's burden. Internationalism and imperialism would part company in the United States after World War I, but there was yet no consensus about this in the prewar period, as the turn-of-the-century debate over the U.S. role in the Philippines had shown.

One thing, however, was becoming increasingly clear. The development of turbine-engine ocean liners and the telegraph had already compressed both time and space in ways that would profoundly influence the growth of internationalist thought. Since the end of the Civil War, Americans had participated in a growing number of meetings on an ever-widening variety of topics. "Functionalism," modern writers call this theme, as if to emphasize that cooperation regarding such functions has powered the growth of internationalism generally. Subjects as varied as communications, health and sanitation, weights and measures, patents, copyrights, currency, and agriculture provided the basis for international conferences. And not just conferences. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became an age of organizations such as the General Postal Union, founded in 1875, followed by a telegraphic union, a health organization, and many others. These bodies redefined the very context in which isolationism could survive and internationalism would thrive. Not only public officials, but private citizens, served as delegates to these organizations and attended these conferences. Such contacts engendered a growing awareness of global interdependence as the United States developed industrially and thrust outward economically and territorially.

The result was the development among some internationalists of a genuine sense of global community, promoting what is commonly called cultural internationalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Unlike the more typical internationalists who took the Darwinian system of sovereign states for granted and sought to tame interstate competition through legal restrictions and, occasionally, military cooperation to enforce the peace, the cultural internationalists approached their task in a very different frame of mind. They saw the process of unity advancing not through a political process involving institutions and agencies created by the nation-state, but through the relationships of people more or less transcending the state. They were precursors of those who, a century later, would describe the world as a global village, and they viewed international society as much more organic than the political and legal internationalists who emphasized individual rights rather than the rights of societies (whether national or international). If the political and legal internationalists tended to approach their task via the rule of law and military enforcement, the cultural internationalists more often appealed to common interests and a sense of common humanity.

WORLD WAR I

The First World War began in Europe in 1914, engulfing the United States nearly three years later. This was the war that Americans of a progressive generation had sought to avoid, isolationists by ignoring Europe, internationalists by erecting the machinery that might prevent a small dispute from becoming a larger conflict. At first, internationalists despaired. In 1915, however, the military carnage in Europe energized Americans who argued not that international cooperation was impossible, but that it had not been sufficiently tried. In short, they resolved to work harder, to construct peacekeeping machinery that might work much more effectively than the failed pre-1914 arbitration and conciliation treaties.

Although arbitration and conciliation had been discredited, few internationalists gave up on the quintessentially American faith in law. Led by former president Taft, many Americans joined what soon became the most important internationalist organization of the wartime years, the League to Enforce Peace. Such a league, argued its founders, would incorporate a judicial court to provide the basis for international stability. Formed in the spring of 1915, it aimed to prevent war, not to win a war once war broke out or to use force as a threat to prevent states from violating the peace in the first place. This point is important, because the League to Enforce Peace really had little inclination to enforce anything. Its program reflected the prewar faith in procedural machinery that could be used to resolve differences before they erupted in war. It would compel nations to submit their disputes to various agencies in order to guarantee that peaceful disputes did not turn violent. Sanctions, both economic and military, theoretically existed to compel a state (or states, as long as they were members of the organization) to resolve differences peacefully. Presumably, sanctions would be applied whenever a party to a dispute refused to follow prescribed procedures. But theory and practice were never reconciled, for the League to Enforce Peace recommended no use of force in the event that states rejected its recommendations or decisions. As one of its leaders, Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell, put it, no international organization could be effective once war erupted; it had to succeed in preventing war, not ending war.

Other internationalists agreed. Few would endorse the potential use of force by any international organization. The World's Court League, second only to the League to Enforce Peace as an internationalist organization with substantial national influence, called for a judicially centered body with no power to compel the submission of controversies or to uphold decisions. No power meant no effectiveness, but the noise of war ironically shrouded this reality in the context of World War I. The emphasis on judicial authority without enforcement provisions spoke to the aspirations of most Americans, who believed that it really made no sense to fight a war to prevent a war. Pacifists, of course, applauded such an approach. So did many lawyers who either neglected the need for enforcement to compel people (or states) to obey the law, or who were so enamored of the logic and sanctity of law that they ignored the fundamentally anarchic nature of the international system.

WILSON'S LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Despite the limitations of these plans, both organizations—the League to Enforce Peace and the World's Court League—campaigned vigorously to promote not only their projects but the more general idea of a league. Even the critics of international organization did not doubt that a vast majority of citizens found the league idea attractive by 1919. President Wilson incorporated it into the famous Fourteen Points address, his most important speech regarding war aims. At the Paris Peace Conference, he then insisted that the final peace treaty contain the League of Nations proposal. Nevertheless, Wilson had done little to clarify his thinking about a league during the war. He consciously and consistently rejected suggestions to spell out a peace plan before the summer of 1918. Only after the British presented their own plan and the fortunes of war turned decisively in favor of the Allies did the American president encourage more detailed thinking about the subject.

In part because he believed the British plan, authored mainly by Lord Phillimore, to be toothless, he increasingly emphasized the importance of both economic and military sanctions to compel states to maintain the peace. This approach not only differed from that of the British but substantially deviated from that of the League to Enforce Peace. Wilson not only became increasingly sympathetic to sanctions, but veered away from the League to Enforce Peace plan in a number of other ways. These included his insistence on a guarantee of territorial integrity, his emphasis on disarmament, and his stress on the binding and compulsory nature of arbitration. Oddly, the president, who had written some serious history, ignored the main lines of prewar American internationalist thought. By calling for an organization with considerable authority that emphasized elements of power politics rather than legal principles, he virtually guaranteed that his plan would encounter stiff opposition at home.

Americans bided their time while Wilson in Paris, together with a handful of colleagues from the larger states, hammered out the League of Nations Covenant behind closed doors. French skepticism about a league and British fear of too strong a league gave way before Wilson's influence. Moreover, the president's willingness to compromise on territorial, imperial, and financial issues was contingent on European willingness to approve his version of the Covenant. At the heart of that Covenant were four articles that, Wilson

had come to believe, would make war a thing of the past. Article 10 guaranteed the territorial and political independence of every member state. Article 11 mandated that any threat to the peace was of concern to every member of the organization and authorized the league to take "any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Article 15 established procedures to settle matters that could not be arbitrated or settled in court, and Article 16 provided the machinery for economic and military sanctions. For a nation schooled in isolationism and quite unprepared for the kind of commitments that Wilson had championed in Paris, the change in course was quite radical. Wilson gambled that the fear of another world war would persuade Americans to embrace his proposals. Nonetheless, by failing to prepare the public for such a radical change, and by ignoring the crassly political crosscurrents that the treaty fight unleashed, the president found himself on the defensive during the remainder of his term.

The story of the treaty fight of 1919–1920 has been recounted many times. Conventional interpretations emphasize the clash between isolationism and internationalism, and between the Democratic president and his chief Republican opponent, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Henry Cabot Lodge. Isolationism, of course, was an extension of nationalism, and the next two years would witness a real clash between internationalism and nationalism. Even former president Theodore Roosevelt would repudiate his internationalist leanings by damning the league as pro-German. "We are not internationalists," he said as he denounced the league, "we are American nationalists." His own hatred of Wilson was reflected in his indictment of the league. Substituting internationalism for nationalism meant, he argued, the rejection of patriotism. "The professional pacifist and the professional internationalist are equally undesirable citizens," said the still-popular ex-president.

This kind of demagoguery took its toll. Even though historians agree that most Americans favored a league of some kind, the public grew increasingly wary of a league that contained the kind of advance commitments regarding force embodied in Articles 10 and 16. To many Americans, fighting a war to prevent a war just did not make much sense, as the prewar internationalists in the World's Court League had claimed. Perhaps Wilson really believed that the threat of using force against an aggressor state that violated the League of Nations Covenant would suffice to guarantee the peace. The American public was less sure. The result was that the Senate debated not membership itself, but the kind of league the United States might join. The slim Republican majority in the Senate, and even some Democrats, sought to whittle away the obligations of membership. Wilson remained uncompromising. The president's supporters, therefore, failed to mobilize the two-thirds Senate majority needed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Sadly for Wilson, the first twenty-six articles of that treaty constituted the League Covenant.

INTERWAR ISOLATIONISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

The refusal of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, followed by the victory in the 1920 presidential election of Warren G. Harding, who had rejected the league, claiming to favor a mythical "association of nations," meant that the United States never joined the League of Nations. Neither would the Senate ratify a treaty to join the country to the Permanent Court of International Justice, organized in 1921 as an affiliated agency of the league. Did this in fact represent a repudiation of internationalism? Scholars are not of one mind. Almost surely the voting public in 1920 would have approved a somewhat scaled-down League of Nations that lacked the automatic territorial guarantee embodied in Article 10. And although the Harding administration refused even to answer mail from the League Secretariat in Geneva, there are few indicators that the public approved the administration's rigid rejection of international cooperation. Indeed, by 1923 the State Department had begun to soften its anti-league policy by accepting invitations to league-sponsored meetings and sending unofficial observers ("something between a guest and a spy," quipped one league proponent) to Geneva on a regular basis.

Another piece of evidence that many Americans remained sympathetic to internationalism was the Harding administration's disarmament and foreign policy. State Department support for hosting the Washington Naval Conference—held from November 1921 to February 1922—stemmed at least in part from the fear that, with the League of Nations a going concern, America might find itself more isolated than was desirable. Certainly many isolationists favored the naval

limitation treaty that emerged from the conference, but the treaty garnered overwhelming support among internationalists, both of the idealist variety and those who would later be called realists, like Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and future Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. The other agreements signed at Washington also spoke to the belief among internationalists that U.S. strategic and economic interests made isolationism obsolete. The Four-Power Pact guaranteeing the status quo in the western Pacific may not have contained enforcement provisions, but it did obligate the signatories to consult in the event of a threat to the peace. Internationalists likewise supported the Nine-Power Pact guaranteeing the "open door" and the status quo in China.

In short, the Harding administration forged a web of relationships that did not support overt intervention abroad but did contradict the fundamental basis of isolationism. These relationships were further supported by an economic policy that increasingly reflected the corporate side of American life. The post–Civil War Industrial Revolution tied American prosperity to a healthy global economy. The policymakers who promoted U.S. loans to China and Latin America were internationalists, not isolationists, as were their banker and industrialist friends. They may have differed among themselves over such issues as imperialism and even military intervention, but few still doubted that America needed to be involved in the global economy of the twentieth century. Some of these policymakers were themselves financiers and industrialists, like oil magnate Charles G. Dawes, who served as vice president during the Coolidge Administration (1925–1929), and banker Norman Davis, who served both Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt in various foreign policy posts. Their prominence gave substance to the belief that international cooperation had become an article of faith in post–World War I Washington.

No wonder, therefore, that even President Harding favored U.S. membership on the World Court, officially the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Advisory Committee of Jurists who met at The Hague in 1920 and drafted the court's statute included the influential Elihu Root, a Republican Wall Street lawyer who had served Theodore Roosevelt as secretary first in the War Department and then in the State Department. Root typified many of the Republican internationalists during the 1920s. He had misgivings about President Wilson's brand of enforcement internationalism, preferring the prewar legal approach that emphasized the importance of judicial processes and the codification of international law. His prestige, along with that of future World Court judges like Charles Evans Hughes and the legal scholar John Bassett Moore, helped to legitimize the court for most Americans. The unimaginative Calvin Coolidge, who succeeded Harding in the White House and has often (and too simplistically) been described as an isolationist, also called for membership on the court. So did every subsequent president and secretary of state during the interwar period. Enough isolationist opponents of the court remained in and out of Congress, however, to prevent ratification of court membership until after World War II. When the most important Senate vote on membership occurred in 1935, these isolationists capitalized on the insecurities generated by the Great Depression and the fear of an aggressive Germany and Japan to block ratification by a two-thirds vote. Americans favored international cooperation, but not to the extent of risking war. This may not have been full-blown internationalism, but neither was it isolationism.

It is important to remember that support for World Court membership during the interwar period did not always translate into support for league membership. Nevertheless, many internationalists continued their Wilsonian campaign into the early 1930s, believing (perhaps correctly) that the new organization could not succeed without U.S. participation. As with so much else regarding foreign policy between the wars, the results were mixed.

Pro-league spokesmen lobbied with some success for support in the political platforms of the two major parties, and they publicized the league's work in order to generate renewed interest. Hamilton Holt, former Supreme Court justice John H. Clarke, and Theodore Roosevelt's former attorney general, George W. Wickersham, founded in 1922 the most focused supportive organization, the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, later renamed the League of Nations Association. Women's and religious organizations, such as Jane Addams's Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, strongly endorsed the league, while pacifist groups and legal bodies supported World Court membership. The World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Society of International Law led the pro-Court parade.

Internationalist educational activity complemented these efforts. The establishment of organ-

izations like the Foreign Policy Association, with its many local chapters, publicized international affairs generally and cooperative international activity in and out of Geneva specifically. The Carnegie Endowment helped to sponsor international clubs in high schools, while a number of colleges and universities instituted major programs in international relations. A few, like Harvard, Princeton, and Johns Hopkins, founded graduate institutes to produce specialists who might find their way into the State Department or into teaching positions at other institutions.

Other organizations, too, warrant mention, including some that encouraged cultural internationalism. Of special importance was the establishment in 1919 of the Institute of International Education. The IIE promoted educational exchanges abroad for both students and teachers and, after World War II, administered the Fulbright scholarship program. It shared an assumption common among interwar internationalists: that familiarity with foreign cultures would promote understanding and therefore peace.

A few internationalist enthusiasts, such as the journalist Clarence Streit, who founded one of the more popular internationalist organizations, Federal Union, favored a plan to organize the world's democracies into a world federation to ensure peace. Streit's movement eventually included more than a quarter of a million Americans in local chapters and represented the most popular prointernationalist response before Pearl Harbor. Other internationalist organizations, like the Council on Foreign Relations, which first appeared in 1921, headed in a more traditional, or "realist," direction. Founded by former cabinet members Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson, the council capped its membership at about 550 prestigious individuals from government, business, journalism, and university life who met with domestic and foreign officials, hosted seminars on wide-ranging issues concerning foreign policy, and published the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*. The council's influence was much greater than its actual membership would suggest. The degree to which it closed its doors to the general public led many isolationists, both then and later, to see it as the center of an internationalist conspiracy to involve the United States in foreign entanglements or wars. Unlike Streit's organization, it remained committed to a very traditional model of state sovereignty, albeit one that rejected the assumptions undergirding American isolationism.

When by 1923 it was clear that the United States would not join the League of Nations, internationalists turned their attention to increasing American cooperation with the league and its agencies short of membership. But they also sought to influence American attitudes toward the outside world by creating a sense of collective "responsibility"—the word would soon achieve almost religious meaning—to support Covenant principles that advanced peace.

The first program succeeded reasonably well. By the mid-1920s the United States regularly participated in league commissions dealing with nonpolitical matters, notably health, social, and economic problems. It also cooperated in the disarmament area, though without much success. International cooperation, of course, was not pursued exclusively through the league or league-related agencies. Some Americans continued to work for pre-league internationalist objectives such as arbitration of interstate disputes and legal, not political, means to resolve problems. The arbitration ideal, discredited by World War I, bounced back among Americans with short memories and received additional support by the league itself with the establishment in 1927 of the Arbitration and Security Commission. Partly through the commission's efforts, Washington would eventually negotiate twenty-seven arbitration treaties between 1928 and 1931, though these treaties, as earlier, usually excepted consideration of such important interests as the Monroe Doctrine.

Efforts to further strengthen international law as a bulwark against disorder led the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1923 to establish and fund the Academy of International Law at The Hague. The Carnegie Endowment also funded efforts to continue the codification of international law, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. James Brown Scott, who founded and led the American Society of International Law, spearheaded this work. To the disappointment of Scott and his colleagues, little of it captured the public imagination as it had before World War I. At best, the limited agreements that resulted from these efforts allowed the United States to balance its economic interests and its legal ideals.

Those economic interests carried the U.S. government in both directions during the interwar period, sometimes at the same time. Internationalists applauded the involvement of Washington in forging the loan programs embod-

ied in the Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929) to stabilize the European economy. They were silenced, however, by the economic nationalism expressed in 1930 when President Herbert Hoover signed the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Act. Nor did the Democrats who joined the Roosevelt administration offer consistent support to the economic internationalists. When Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, an orthodox Wilsonian, attended the London Economic Conference of 1933 to forge a global solution to the economic crisis, the president undermined his efforts by siding with economic nationalists who opposed Hull. Yet the following year, Roosevelt gave his blessing to Hull's internationalist program for reciprocal tariff agreements to lower rates.

MANCHURIA AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

It was shortly before Franklin Roosevelt became president that Japan set in motion a series of challenges to the existing international order that eventually led to American involvement in World War II. These were the kind of affronts to the post–World War I treaties that the League of Nations had been created to prevent. For good or ill, American officials had shunned league consideration of such political controversies until the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1932. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, a staunch internationalist who believed powerfully in the sanctity of treaties, sent a delegate to the league council debates in October 1931 to consider Japan's violation of the Nine-Power Pact of 1922. Stimson's anger at Tokyo almost triggered a fundamental shift in Republican Party policy toward Geneva. The secretary, a proponent of what would soon be called collective security, gave serious consideration to embargoing American trade to Japan should the league invoke the sanctions authorized by the Covenant's Article 16. President Herbert Hoover demurred, however. He feared that economic sanctions would inevitably lead to military sanctions, which in his mind meant war. As a result, Stimson's initiatives, while heartening the battered internationalist movement at home, ultimately led nowhere.

Nor was the next president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, able to repair things. He had been a strong supporter of league membership when he ran for vice president in 1920. In 1932, however, he reversed his position, fearing that he might alienate isolationist progressives from the Midwest and West whose support he needed for the presidential nomination. Domestic political considerations overrode his internationalist instincts.

Nevertheless, by the time he became president in 1933, cooperation with Geneva concerning nonpolitical subjects had become so routine as to be hardly newsworthy. Internationalists had established extensive ties at Geneva. American citizens held league administrative posts and promoted both official and unofficial contact between Washington and Geneva. Arthur Sweetser, a Boston journalist who served in the league's Information Section, became the focus of such contacts. He worked closely with the Harvard law professor Manley Hudson, who established a study and research center at Geneva. Hudson even sought gifts from Americans to underwrite league programs, and those he obtained included a Rockefeller Foundation grant of $2 million to establish a library at the league's headquarters.

Until the late 1930s, however, little of this kind of activity made much difference. Even Roosevelt, privately sympathetic to international cooperation, remained publicly wary of pro-league enthusiasts who advocated outright membership or even just political cooperation with Geneva. Nevertheless, amid the indifference or even hostility of many depression-scarred Americans concerning international cooperation, a few well-known internationalists kept the faith. The historian James T. Shotwell became the leading advocate of the idea that the United States must reject doing business as usual with governments that broke treaties or defied the League Covenant. If this could not be done through league membership, then states should morally condemn violations of international law through such treaties as the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of policy. Similar was internationalist support for Secretary Stimson's 1932 nonrecognition doctrine, enunciated to deprive Japan of legal sanction for its occupation of Manchuria. Internationalists also applauded Roosevelt's support for the Neutrality Act of 1935 because it permitted the United States to establish economic sanctions parallel to potential league sanctions against an aggressor by prohibiting American trade in war-related materials. But like so much other activity during the Great Depression, these measures were not unambiguously internationalist. Isolationists, too, generally

supported them—indeed, it was Senator Gerald Nye, an isolationist, who initially proposed neutrality legislation—because neutrality posed so little risk to the United States. The result was a foreign policy that veered erratically between internationalism and isolationism, leading critics to claim, with some justification, that the Roosevelt administration had no foreign policy at all.

WAR IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

This ambiguity dissipated after the European phase of World War II began in September 1939, ushering in what eventually became the most internationalist phase of American foreign policy. Between 1939 and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the country was sharply divided between internationalist advocates of aid to America's European allies and isolationists who feared such aid would lead to an unwanted and unnecessary American involvement in the war. The internationalists were themselves divided between outright interventionists and those who, led by William Allen White and his Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, argued that sending military equipment and loans would make American participation in the war against Adolf Hitler unnecessary. All these internationalists called for the repeal or modification of neutrality legislation and other laws that hindered the free flow of materials to governments fighting the Axis Powers. By late 1941, Washington had lifted most restrictions against sending aid to Great Britain. Rejecting the charge of inconsistency, these same internationalists applauded the imposition of economic sanctions against Japan regarding oil and scrap iron.

The European war in 1939 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 seemed to confirm what internationalists had been saying for years about the need for an effective collective security organization. They also reinforced the argument in favor of American membership. Isolation, charged the internationalists, had not only failed but made world wars more rather than less likely. Even months before Pearl Harbor, 87 percent of Americans claimed they favored some kind of postwar organization. To most Americans, Hitler had made internationalism not only respectable but necessary.

The president of the League of Nations Association, James T. Shotwell, and his executive director, Clark M. Eichelberger, founded the somewhat pompously named Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, which cooperated with the State Department in formulating U.S. proposals for what eventually became the United Nations. (The League of Nations Association changed its name to the American Association for the United Nations in 1943.) Next in importance to the commission was the Federal Council of Churches to Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace, led by collective-security advocate and future secretary of state John Foster Dulles. Altogether, thirty-six private internationalist organizations joined this effort to create the UN, threatening to make the task chaotic.

The task of coordinating the planning for the UN fell mainly on an obscure State Department economist, Leo Pasvolsky, who headed the department's Division of Special Research (which had, at various times, other bland titles). No one worked more tirelessly or anonymously than he. At a time when American planning for the UN was hampered by rivalries between State Department officers, between Republicans and Democrats, and between congressional leaders and State Department officials, Pasvolsky managed to keep the project afloat. And because American officials had done much more planning than their counterparts in other countries, the final charter would reflect American thinking to a great extent.

The UN Charter was drafted primarily at three conferences: Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944), Yalta (February 1945), and the special UN conference at San Francisco (April to June 1945). Although the president had raised the issue of a postwar organization with the USSR's Joseph Stalin and Britain's Winston Churchill at various wartime conferences, the details—including the critical questions relating to membership and great power authority—were postponed until the latter stages of the war. A small group of officials, not the internationalist movement generally, resolved these matters, agreeing with Stalin's insistence that each of the great powers possess a permanent veto in the UN's Security Council. They also agreed that the Security Council, and not the larger General Assembly, would control the UN's enforcement machinery.

This time the president and his advisers, in contrast to President Wilson, did their political homework. They employed a broad spectrum of American internationalists to prepare the way for ratification of the UN Charter. Preceding the vote the administration launched the most ambitious

campaign to support a foreign policy objective of the entire twentieth century. It included parades, parties, lectures, and radio and school programs. UN supporters turned isolationism into a dirty word. Everyone, it seemed, had become an internationalist, which masked the real differences within the movement. Even many Republicans who had opposed League of Nations membership a quarter of a century earlier now promoted UN membership. Less than a month after the San Francisco Conference, the Senate ratified the UN Charter by 89 to 2.

The charter reflected much of the structure and many of the operational features of the League Covenant, including a basic reliance upon power politics and a response to crises only after a breach of the peace. Like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt believed that an alliance of nations, functioning through an organization, could best maintain stability (though Wilson thought more in terms of universality, Roosevelt more in terms of great power cooperation). The United Nations Charter called for states to sacrifice very little sovereignty. Even former American isolationists could call themselves internationalists, knowing that American interests were protected by the permanent veto.

UN SKEPTICS

Nevertheless, the nation had indeed shifted decisively toward a more internationalist position. Washington quickly and quietly joined UN-related agencies like the new International Court of Justice (which replaced the older Permanent Court of International Justice) and the International Labor Organization. (The United States had actually joined that organization in 1935, but only because ILO proponents emphasized its separation from the League of Nations itself.) Membership in both came with some of the usual nationalist protections, such as the Connally Amendment preventing the International Court from hearing cases that Congress considered within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the United States.

Not all Americans accepted the United Nations unquestioningly. A vocal isolationist remnant, led by Senator Robert Taft, challenged the new internationalist faith and its emphasis on sanctions and entanglement. A small but visible group of internationalists, too, raised concerns about the UN. They complained not that the UN had too much power, but that it had too little. Where isolationists and nationalists feared that the new organization would compromise American sovereignty, the internationalist critics mainly argued that the UN left its members with too much sovereignty. Many called for a world federation, more or less inspired by Clarence Streit's *Union Now* (1939). UN proponents may have stolen much of Streit's thunder, but his movement continued to promote the federation ideal, which emphasized the primacy of people rather than states. This became evident in 1958, when Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn published the most famous treatise on the subject of federalism, *World Peace Through World Law.* They proposed that the UN General Assembly become the foundation of the new system, with delegates elected by subject populations and not selected by sovereign governments. Law, not national interest, would be the driving force behind the federation, therefore ensuring the likelihood of permanent peace.

Considered utopian by most academic writers, this brand of internationalism never achieved real popularity. A diverse coalition of groups called Americans United for World Organization sought to mobilize support for this kind of federalism even before the end of the war, but internal disputes eventually rendered it impotent. In 1947 it merged with a few other federalist groups to form its better-known successor, United World Federalists. This organization, too, failed to dent the pro-UN consensus. In part, its timing was wrong. Federalism necessitated international cooperation, exactly the opposite of what occurred after 1947 as the Cold War became the dominant international reality. Ideological differences and military alliances rendered the federalists irrelevant.

COLD WAR

Ironically, the American love affair with the UN would mask some real changes to the organization. Not only did the Cold War make the federalists irrelevant, it stripped the Security Council of authority at the very moment that it most needed support. With the Soviet Union increasingly using its permanent veto to block enforcement action by the UN's American-led majority, the UN could not live up to its promise. Only in Korea during 1950, and then solely because a Soviet boycott of the Security Council left the USSR unable to exercise its veto, did the UN come close to addressing its original purpose. As a rule, the veto shifted the

UN to the periphery of world politics. Americans increasingly came to associate collective security not with the UN but with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed in 1949. But NATO was much closer to being a traditional military alliance than a universal collective security organization. As long as the UN would be hampered by the Soviet veto—which meant that so long as the UN would not serve as a convenient instrument of American foreign policy—Cold War internationalists like Dean Acheson, secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, would hold it in disdain.

The Great Depression, World War II, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War had discredited isolationism. But internationalists may have celebrated their victory too casually. If nearly everyone had become an internationalist, then the term was in danger of losing its meaning, which is exactly what happened during the next forty years. Indeed, many outspoken nationalists proclaimed themselves internationalists, promoting the projection of U.S. power throughout the world through the new system of alliances. Yes, they admitted, the world had shrunk. Economic interdependence and advances in communications and weaponry—including intercontinental bombers and missiles—made cooperation expedient. But it was anticommunism, not technology, that served as the glue holding their foreign policy worldview together, and anticommunism, as the McCarthy era proved, was often associated with xenophobia and unilateralism.

INTERNATIONALIST INCONSISTENCY

What did all this mean? Confusion, at least. Scholarly terms reflected the confusion: internationalism, interventionism, globalism, multilateralism, transnationalism, hegemonism. But some things are clear, including that for many members of the post–World War II generation of internationalists, U.S. involvement abroad, utilizing UN agencies or other institutions, lacked a commitment to equality that the pre–World War II internationalists had promoted. Prewar internationalists generally viewed internationalism as a way to create a warless world and a more just international society. Post–World War II internationalists proved more willing to ignore both. Justice played second fiddle to the national interest. Especially after 1970, as Third World countries became the UN majority, Washington rejected what it viewed as radical proposals to share the resources of the industrialized North with the developing and needy South. From 1972, when the State Department rejected Third World demands for a new international economic order, to 2000, when the Clinton administration ignored proposals to forgive the debts of sub-Saharan African nations, issues of economic justice have been greeted unsympathetically by official Washington.

Americans after World War II also proved more willing to entertain—and occasionally even promote—the use of military force, as they did in Korea and Vietnam, but also in less risky areas such as the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf (1991), and the former Yugoslavia (1999). Motives varied, ranging from anticommunism to regional hegemony to humanitarianism. So did the degree of international cooperation. In Korea, Cold War internationalists fought under a UN flag; during the Gulf War, under less formal UN authorization; in Yugoslavia, under NATO command. But in Latin America there was barely a pretense of cooperation. In fact, the Organization of American States formally condemned the U.S. intervention in Grenada.

The inconsistency concerning collective military activity also characterized the record of the United States in areas even more traditionally viewed as internationalist, such as support for international law and arms negotiations. Ever since the Hague Conferences, internationalist lawyers had promoted the creation of an international court to reduce the anarchy inherent in a system of sovereign states. They believed that the codification of international law would promote stability and peace, and that an international court would serve as a capstone of the legal system. Their dreams were partially fulfilled when, after both world wars, the victorious nations established international courts. But the court ideal never attained its promise, partly because of American policy. During the interwar period, Congress refused to ratify the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Nearly forty years after World War II, American support for its successor, the International Court of Justice, would be dramatically reversed when the Reagan administration in 1984 rejected the court's authority in a celebrated case brought against the United States by Nicaragua. To accentuate the retreat from internationalism, Washington then formally repudiated the court's compulsory jurisdiction in all cases involving U.S. interests unless specifically mandated by treaty. Nevertheless, inconsistency tri-

umphed here, too, as the United States joined with other countries at the end of the century to create the International Criminal Court with authority to try defendants charged with genocide and other violations of the law of war.

Arms negotiations offered another version of the same story. The development of atomic weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union during and after World War II dramatized the need for arms reduction and limitation. Internationalists helped to negotiate and ratify a number of agreements, most notably the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the bilateral accords negotiated with the Soviet Union during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s (SALT I, the 1972 ABM Treaty, the 1987 International Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START). In 1997 the Clinton administration, with some support from Republican nationalists, persuaded the Senate to ratify a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. But other treaties, including SALT II, signed by the Carter administration in 1979, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, and a 1997 treaty prohibiting the use of land mines, failed to win Senate approval, the latter two supported by more than one hundred governments. Indeed, in 2001 the administration of George W. Bush not only ended efforts to have the Senate ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, but to terminate the 1972 ABM Treaty despite strong objections from America's European allies.

The theme of inconsistency also applied to the subject of international economic cooperation. During the late stages of World War II, the United States had initiated efforts to create international financial institutions that would economically stabilize the postwar world and prevent another Great Depression. The most important such institutions emerging from the war were the World Bank, to provide bank-sponsored development loans, and the International Monetary Fund, to grant government loans to stabilize currencies.

The last half of the twentieth century also witnessed tariff reduction, long applauded by internationalists. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs dates back to 1947; the agreement involved numerous conferences held over decades. GATT addressed the hopes of Wilsonians, who continued to argue that economic nationalism was a powerful cause of war. But here, too, internationalists met increasing resistance at home. Labor unions, fearful of losing jobs to low-wage workers abroad, joined forces with (generally) small businesses fearing foreign competition, nationalists, environmentalists, and neoisolationists to pass measures like the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act undermining the free-trade aims of internationally oriented businesses and banks. For the most part, the legislative record from 1962 to 2001 favored the free traders. The North American Free Trade Agreement of 1993, membership for the United States and its trading partners (most controversially, China) in the World Trade Organization (GATT's successor), and the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations' support for the Free Trade for the Americas Treaty (not yet finalized in 2001) exemplify this trend.

Inconsistency also characterized international cooperation regarding the environment. Internationalists successfully promoted modest environmental reform, such as the creation of a UN Environment Program that emerged out of the 113-member UN Stockholm Conference of 1972, and two agreements (Vienna in 1985 and Montreal in 1987) limiting the release of ozone into the atmosphere. However, the Senate refused to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty negotiated between 1972 and 1982, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity negotiated at Rio de Janeiro, and the 1997 Kyoto Accords limiting carbon dioxide emissions negotiated at the UN Conference on Climate Change. Indeed, by the early twenty-first century, American environmentalists were themselves aligning in opposition to internationalism, fearing that looser environmental standards abroad would undermine environmental protections at home.

RETREAT

There is a larger issue here: the last third of the twentieth century witnessed a general deterioration of support for internationalism. The causes were many. They have included the upsurge of nationalism that accompanied the appearance of the evangelical religious right; disillusionment concerning foreign entanglements stemming from the American defeat in Vietnam; the decline of the industrial economy resulting from foreign competition in low-wage countries; the failure of the UN in highly publicized peacekeeping ventures (most importantly, Somalia and Bosnia during the early and mid-1990s); the increase in international terrorism; and the rise of anti-American policies at the UN (seen in programs like the New Interna-

tional Economic Order of 1972 and the New World Information and Communications Order of 1978). A former president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described the late twentieth century as "the twilight of internationalism."

He may have exaggerated the reaction against internationalism, but he was onto something important. Since 1994, the United States has sharply curtailed its support for UN peacekeeping missions. Facing criticism of U.S. peacekeeping activity in both Somalia and Bosnia, President William Jefferson Clinton sharply scaled down American support (including both military and financial support) for these missions. Some 74,000 peacekeeping troops from seventy-six countries served in 1994; by 2000 this number had shrunk to less than 20,000. Presidential Decision Directive 25, the most important State Department policy paper concerning peacekeeping since the Congo crisis of 1960, placed stringent criteria on peacekeeping, reversing calls for more U.S. involvement uttered just two years earlier by Bill Clinton as he campaigned for the presidency.

Nor was the disillusionment with internationalism confined to peacekeeping. After the 1970s it spread to the UN generally. During the mid-1980s, President Ronald Reagan began to withhold American dues to the UN, a process encouraged by Congress when it passed the 1983 Kassenbaum Amendment unilaterally cutting the American share of UN assessments. The growth of conservative nationalism during the 1990s intensified anti-UN sentiment, especially after the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1995. Dues and peacekeeping assessments went unpaid, threatening America with the loss of its vote. Congressional critics of the UN more or less blackmailed the Secretariat not only into bureaucratic reform (which was overdue), but into further reducing the percentage of revenues paid by the United States. Tellingly, few internationalist voices inside or outside Washington expressed strong objections.

Other important developments during the last third of the century also reflected the decline of internationalism. In 1977 the United States withdrew from the ILO for what turned into a three-year absence. A similar story was repeated at the International Atomic Energy Agency between 1981 and 1983. Washington withdrew from the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1984 and from the UN Industrial Development Organization in 1995. American officials may have rightly deplored the politicization of these agencies. Nevertheless, Washington's decisions to withdraw altogether symbolized the priority that Congress and the White House increasingly gave to national rather than international interests.

American internationalism, of course, ranges far beyond the subject of the UN. Regional organizations, most importantly the Organization of American States (OAS), which rests on three treaties ratified in 1947 and 1948, have also been a part of this story, but without the centrality or the visibility of the League of Nations or the UN. Indeed, Article 51 of the UN Charter sought to make room for regional collective defense, a matter that was central to some of the negotiations regarding the UN Charter during World War II. Moreover, American obligations under the OAS charter regarding nonintervention have occasionally clashed with U.S. Cold War objectives, a clash that led some Western Hemispheric countries to seek recourse at the UN. This was especially the case regarding crises in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1962), and Grenada (1983). During each episode U.S. officials gave short shrift to UN and OAS objections regarding American intervention.

Washington also gave little heed to OAS demands to highlight the principle of collective economic security, which many in Washington viewed as a regional variation of the New International Economic Order. Although U.S. policymakers have never been sympathetic to resource transfers from rich nations to poor (with the possible exception of technology transfers), some of the Latin American demands for wealth sharing contributed to Washington's willingness to negotiate the free trade agreements of the 1990s. This was an area in which internationalist sentiment coincided with what every presidential administration from Reagan to George W. Bush has viewed as U.S. economic interests.

CULTURAL INTERNATIONALISM

With the end of the Cold War, the subject of cultural internationalism returned to prominence as it had after World War I. Disillusionment with political internationalism has not yet affected the health of the Fulbright scholarship program, begun after World War II to promote among Americans knowledge of other cultures and to attract foreign scholars to the United States. Cultural, athletic, and scientific exchanges thrived

during the last third of the twentieth century. The degree to which Americans have taken up soccer, long considered a foreign sport, is a small sign of this, as is the internationalization of baseball, with American players in Japan and a great many Latin American players along with a growing number of Japanese players in the Major Leagues.

A similar story can be told about other sports, as with the internationalization of rock and roll and American films. More moviegoers saw *Schindler's List* (1993) and *Titanic* (1997) outside of the United States than inside. Michael Jordan T-shirts are worn by Asian teenagers who never saw a basketball game. The Internet, for good or ill, has connected people in different countries in ways that seemed unimaginable in 1990. This may not be exactly what the founders of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had in mind when they formed their organization in 1910. Neither is it likely to be what President George H. W. Bush meant when he called for a new world order in 1990. Nevertheless, it addresses the vitality of cultural internationalism even when disillusionment, pessimism, and cynicism have crippled the movement politically.

In short, the history of American internationalism has been the history of complexity and inconsistency. This remains as true at the beginning of the twenty-first century as it was one hundred years earlier.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alder, Selig. *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction.* New York, 1957. Covers internationalism while addressing isolationism.

Bartlett, Ruhl J. *The League to Enforce Peace.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944. Excellent on developments between 1914 and 1919.

Brinkley, Douglas, and Townsend Hoopes. *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* New Haven, Conn., 1997. Updates Robert Divine's well-known study.

Curti, Merle. *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936.* New York, 1936. A classic intellectual history.

Davis, Calvin D. *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1962. Describes the politics leading to the conference.

———. *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914.* Durham, N.C., 1975. Describes the politics leading to the conference.

Divine, Robert A. *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II.* New York, 1967. Somewhat dated but still very useful in tracing the United States's role in writing the UN Charter.

Dunne, Michael. *The United States and the World Court, 1920–1935.* New York, 1988. The very best work on the legal issue. Dunne also wrote a number of fine articles about American diplomacy and internationalism that appeared in the British journal *International Affairs* during the 1990s.

Gill, George. *The League of Nations from 1929 to 1946.* Garden City, N.Y., 1997. A companion volume to Ostrower's work on the 1920s.

Herman, Sondra R. *Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898–1921.* Stanford, Calif., 1969. Develops the position of the "community-minded" internationalists.

Hilderbrand, Robert C. *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990. Views the UN as a combination of Wilsonian idealism and Franklin Roosevelt's "Four Policeman" realism.

Hoffman, Stanley. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism." *Foreign Policy* 98 (Spring 1995). Indispensable in understanding end-of-the-century internationalism.

Hughes, Thomas L. "The Twilight of Internationalism." *Foreign Policy* 61 (winter 1985–1986): 25–48. Traces the reasons for the resurgence of nationalism.

Iriye, Akira. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order.* Baltimore, 1997. Provides an excellent overview of the nonpolitical side of internationalism from the perspective of a committed internationalist.

Johnson, Robert David, ed. *On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History.* Chicago, 1994. Contains essays that redefine the subject of internationalist thinking.

Josephson, Harold. *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America.* Rutherford, N.J., 1975. Offers insight into the most active proponent of an organized world.

Knock, Thomas J. *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order.* New York, 1992. A rousing and exceptionally insightful defense of Wilson as liberal idealist.

Kuehl, Warren F. *Hamilton Holt: Journalist, Internationalist, Educator.* Gainesville, Fla., 1960. The standard biography of a key internationalist.

———. *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920.* Nashville, Tenn., 1969. Provides the fullest account of early support for cooperation.

Kuehl, Warren F., and Lynne K. Dunne. *Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920–1939.* Kent, Ohio, 1997. Provides an overview of pro-league sentiment by individuals and organized groups.

Marchand, C. Roland. *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918.* Princeton, N.J., 1972. Sees internationalism emerging from the progressive movement generally.

Michalak, Stanley J. "The UN and the League." In Leon Gordenker, ed. *The United Nations in International Politics.* Princeton, N.J., 1971. Skillfully compares U.S. policy toward the League of Nations and the UN.

Ninkovich, Frank A. *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950.* New York, 1981. Offers insight into the American shift from isolationism to Cold War interventionism.

———. *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900.* Chicago, 1999. Provides a less idealistic view of Wilson than is traditional, comparing Wilson's "crisis internationalism" to the more benign variety.

Nordholt, Jan Willem Schulte. *Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace.* Berkeley, Calif., 1991. A very insightful and underrated biography that explores the nature of internationalism.

Ostrower, Gary B. *Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of Nations During the Early Thirties.* Lewisburg, Pa., 1979. Provides an in-depth view of American policy during the Manchurian crisis.

———. "The United States and the League of Nations, 1919–1939." In Zara S. Steiner, ed. *The League of Nations in Retrospect.* Berlin, New York, 1983. A concise overview of the U.S.–League of Nations story.

———. *The League of Nations: From 1919 to 1929.* Garden City, N.Y., 1996. Offers a general history of the league including its nonpolitical work.

———. *The United Nations and the United States: From 1940 to 1998.* New York, 1998. Emphasizing the inconsistency of American policy, this is the best single survey of the U.S.–UN relationship.

Patterson, David S. *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914.* Bloomington, Ind., 1976. Competently explores the internationalist perspective of peace workers.

Righter, Rosemary. *Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order.* New York, 1995. A superb study critical of U.S. policy at the UN.

Widenor, William C. *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy.* Berkeley, Calif., 1980. One of the best examinations of the isolationist-internationalist debates after World War I, viewing Lodge as motivated by principle, not political advantage.

Wittner, Lawrence S. *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–60.* New York, 1969. Contains the fullest presentation of post-1945 popular attitudes.

See also ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; GLOBALIZATION; IMPERIALISM; INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; ISOLATIONISM; WILSONIANISM.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Christopher C. Joyner

International law is the body of customs, principles, and rules recognized as effectively binding legal obligations by sovereign states and other international actors. International law stems from three main sources: treaties and international conventions, customs and customary usage, and the generally accepted principles of law and equity. Judicial decisions rendered by international tribunals and domestic courts are important elements of the lawmaking process of the international community. Resolutions of international organizations, the United Nations in particular, may also affect the growth of the so-called customary international law that is synonymous with general principles of international law. The present system of international legal rules is based on the premise of state sovereignty. It is within the discretion of each state to participate in the negotiation of, or to sign or ratify, any international treaty. Likewise, each member state of an international agency such as the United Nations is free to ratify any convention adopted by that agency.

American history confirms that the functions of international law and U.S. foreign policy are inextricably intertwined. The rules of modern international law are in great part products of negotiations in which U.S. diplomats played important roles, and U.S. foreign policy is in great part dependent on the rules of international law for its operation. The willingness of the U.S. government to employ international law as an instrument of foreign policy arises from the historical experience that shapes the political attitudes of the American people. Its vast size and abundant natural resources allowed the United States to grow into an economic power that rivaled its European peers. The United States was permitted to develop internally, in large measure without external distractions. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, save for the interruption of World War I, the United States remained mainly on the sidelines, contributing little to expanding or modernizing the rules of international intercourse. After World War II, however, the United States emerged as a global superpower. Coincident with this newfound responsibility, and with the onset of Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, the United States asserted greater prominence in shaping the direction of international law—a role that became more salient over time.

To appreciate how international legal rules function in the making and performance of U.S. foreign policy, it must be understood that both tangible and intangible factors impose constraints on policymakers. The essence of these constraints lies within the nature of the international system.

CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The international system imposes structural constraints on the ability of American decision makers to create legal rules favorable to U.S. national interests. The enduring feature of the international system is its decentralization. There are no central institutions to legislate standards or to ensure their enforcement. Nor does a common political culture exist in which to anchor an agreed-upon body of norms for governing the behavior of states. The upshot for U.S. foreign policy is a highly competitive international system in which there is constant expectation of violence and conflict and little expectation that either international law or appeals to normative principles will significantly influence the resolution of contentious issues.

A decentralized international system does not mean that U.S. foreign policy operates in a legal vacuum or under conditions of global anarchy. While there is no world government, and universally enforceable laws and common values are lacking, rules affecting the conduct of U.S. foreign policy do matter, and such rules lend greater pre-

dictability and more certainty to international transactions. These legal rules indicate the limits of permissible behavior, the norms for interstate conduct, and the ways and means of settling disputes. To the extent that the U.S. government subscribes to these legal rules, it becomes obligated to perform certain duties to those ends. That is, the United States as a sovereign, independent state is affected by legal principles contained in fundamental legal constructs. For its foreign policy to function the United States must be diplomatically recognized by other governments. In its foreign affairs, the government must accept and exercise certain rights and duties under international law, which are motivated by pragmatism and reciprocity. These rights and duties ensure that governments can deal with one another in a systematic, orderly fashion. The United States has the rights, inter alia, to recognize other states and to secure its national territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, by forcible self-defense if necessary. The United States also has corresponding obligations, key among which are not to intervene militarily into the affairs of other states, not to pollute the air, water, or land such that it causes transboundary harm, and to abide by international agreements made with other states or international actors. Although constrained by the world system, the United States is able to perform critical legal functions that ensure its survival as a legal entity in interstate relations.

A second structural constraint flows from the fact that the world system is a self-help system. The United States, like all governments, ultimately relies upon itself to accomplish foreign policy objectives. To do otherwise risks being manipulated by other governments. Similarly, the self-help principle impresses upon U.S. officials the need to bring policy goals and national resources into balance. International law strives to facilitate that. The pursuit of excessive goals, without adequate resources to attain them, can enervate a government and diminish its ability to respond effectively to future challenges. For the United States the tragedy of the Vietnam War remains a constant reminder of that truth.

A third structural constraint rests in the hierarchical character of the international system. The equality of states implicit in the legal principle of sovereignty is a political fiction. The notion of sovereignty dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the origins of modern states. As a political construct, the sovereignty principle affirms that no legal authority exists above the state except that which the government voluntarily accepts. The reality of twenty-first-century international relations is markedly different. Sovereignty remains more a matter of degree than an absolute condition. States are inherently unequal, and the resources they use to exercise power in their international dealings are distributed unequally around the world. As the lone superpower state in the early twenty-first century, the United States has access to more resources, possesses greater capabilities, and can exercise greater power than any other state. In this context international law defines permissible ways and means that the U.S. government may employ those resources and capabilities in its foreign relations.

Despite systemic constraints, an international society does exist. International legal rules do affect the structure of that society—its institutions, actors, and procedures for transnational activity; the assumptions on which the society was founded; the status, rights, responsibilities, and obligations of states within this society; and the various relations between those states. Through its foreign policy the United States maintains, establishes, changes, and terminates relationships with other international actors—all through international legal means. Although international law may be primitive, the United States employs it to formalize, regulate, and regularize interstate relationships. For the United States most of the time, its foreign policy is constructed in a way that preserves international order, so that government policymakers might pursue the best perceived course for U.S. national interests, both foreign and domestic. Such international order depends on a framework of agreed presumptions, customs, commitments, expectations, and sanctions that all states, including the United States, accept to regulate international society. International law furnishes the rules for relations between states, sets standards for the conduct of governments within this international system, and facilitates establishment of multilateral institutions toward these ends. In these regards the United States has become the chief state architect and purveyor of international legal rules in the twenty-first century.

LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES

Public attitudes in the United States toward the utility of international law have shifted with its

government's perceptions of how the United States best fits into the world scene. At the same time, government officials do not agree to international legal rules in a political void—domestic political considerations and national interests figure prominently, and often preeminently, in negotiating legal instruments. Historically, the propensity of U.S. government officials for creating legal rules was caught in the tension between two opposing policy approaches—isolationism and internationalism. Up until 1940 these approaches were more or less cyclical throughout American history. Since then the East-West ideological rivalry of the Cold War, escalating international economic interdependence, and ever-increasing technological globalization have combined to render the internationalist approach politically, commercially, and legally imperative for the United States.

Isolationism reflects the belief that the United States should avoid getting involved in the political affairs of other states. This rejection of foreign political involvement was not meant to imply that the United States should ignore the rest of the world. Indeed, diplomatic and commercial contacts were critical for the United States as it developed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In these respects, international legal rules and multilateral instruments assumed cardinal importance in rendering American foreign policy practical and effective. Instead, from the isolationist perspective, American national interests are best served by withdrawing from the rest of the world, or at least remaining detached from events elsewhere. In this regard, international legal rules play only a minimal role. Less international involvement abroad results in less interest in world affairs and fosters the perception that the United States has little need to be bound by international law.

Isolationism draws its inspiration from George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, in which he admonished Americans to "steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world." This tendency to avoid foreign involvement was fueled by the fact that, save for the War of 1812, the United States was never physically endangered by foreign military attack, and a sense of physical security from the threat of foreign intervention prevailed. Later, the horrors of the Civil War fostered a less militaristic attitude within the American political culture. When combined, these attitudes contributed to the isolationist impulse and a relative indifference to international legal concerns. Among the major isolationist foreign policy decisions that heavily impacted on principles of international law are the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the refusal to join the League of Nations (by the U.S. Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919), the neutrality laws of the 1930s, and the legacy of the Vietnam syndrome, that is, the reluctance to commit American troops abroad.

The internationalist perspective sees the protection and promotion of U.S. national interests through pursuit of a legally based, activist, global foreign policy. Internationalists argue that the United States cannot escape the world. Events in other places inevitably encroach upon U.S. interests, and policy rooted in the retreat from global involvement is self-defeating. Thus, the United States has a stake in the general nature of the international system, and its government must be willing to become actively involved in world affairs on a regular basis. To bolster this contention, internationalists point to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the rise of Hitler in Europe, the outbreak of World War II, and the expansion of communism in the war's aftermath. Hence, the United States must be involved in world affairs. To this end, international law provides proven conduits for integrating U.S. national interests into constructive foreign policy opportunities. American national interests are best served by remaining active internationally and by negotiating legal rules that promote foreign policy goals as they foster international order. Evidence that internationalism best serves U.S. national interests is seen in the preeminent place of the United States since 1945 in establishing the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and many other international organizations; in promoting the Marshall Plan and the Helsinki Human Rights Agreement; in U.S. involvement in armed conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and in vigorous support of a massive expansion of U.S. international trade relations. In all of these areas, the ways in which the United States employed international legal rules proved critical for implementing its foreign policy in ways acceptable to international society.

The war in Vietnam frayed American confidence about internationalism in general and the containment doctrine in particular. The tremendous human, financial, and political costs traumatized the American people, gave rise to a domestic antiwar movement, and undermined the faith of Americans in their government. More

than 58,000 American lives were lost, and four million Vietnamese on both sides were killed or injured. Over eleven years the war cost the United States approximately $150 billion to fight and lose. Consequently, since 1975 American attitudes have been ambivalent toward activist internationalism. On the one hand, the realization persists that as the world's only superpower, the United States retains a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. But, on the other hand, the American people are profoundly reluctant to support long-term commitments of American blood and treasure abroad to defend other states, especially those with little strategic value to the United States. American government officials therefore are wary about sending U.S. forces abroad and have done so only in selected cases. They are fully aware that a high political price can be incurred for American soldiers coming home in body bags—namely, defeat in the next general election.

Isolationism and internationalism have both shaped the course of American foreign policy and determined the relative degree of importance that international law has assumed in policy formulation. Both approaches are joined in the conviction that international law should be used to serve and protect the institutions and ideals of the American experience. The approaches differ, however, on how to achieve these national ambitions. Isolationism aims to insulate the American experience from the corruption of foreign influences and protect U.S. sovereignty from burdensome international commitments. The isolationist approach attributes little utility to international law, except insofar as it segregates the United States from extraterritorial commitments and facilitates the government's foreign relations to secure needed resources and sustain trade relations. Conversely, internationalism works to attain U.S. policy goals by promoting a more stable global environment for the United States, which opens the door to foreign opportunities to fulfill American political, economic, and legal interests. To these internationalist ends, international law assumes a more fundamental, more comprehensive place in U.S. foreign policy. International legal rules become channels for closer, more regularized international contact as well as regulatory standards that encourage such cooperation. Regardless of the approach taken, consideration of and regard for international legal rules remain important in the process and formulation of American foreign policy.

AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

American political culture determines how individual policymakers regard the place and authority of international law in U.S. foreign policy. Political culture, which embraces fundamental attitudes and practices of American society, draws from two main sources. One is historical experience. Americans are products of their past. The second is the national belief system, that is, the ideas and ideologies held by the American people. The relevance and status of international law in the making of U.S. foreign policy derive from the American people's self-image, their norms and values, and the ways in which American political culture influences their perceptions of international relations. This national outlook, which might be called the American ideology, inculcates an American style in world affairs and helps to explain why and how international legal rules are integrated into U.S. foreign policy actions.

Understanding the sets of beliefs that comprise the American ideology is critical for appreciating why, where, and how much legal considerations figure into the process and patterns of American foreign policymaking. This national ideology emanates from four sets of core American self-perceptions and values, namely, the predispositions toward exceptionalism, legalism, liberalism, and pragmatism. When evaluating how these elements of American political culture affect policymakers, one must remember that each element influences personal attitudes, though in various ways and to differing degrees. A person's attitudes toward some international event can invite struggle over the priority between these elements and engender conflicted feelings over which policy appears most appropriate for U.S. interests. Similarly, a person's strength of convictions toward these elements can change over time, relative to perceptions, circumstances, and particular events.

EXCEPTIONALISM

A principal set of core elements in the American ideology that affects feelings about international law's role in U.S. foreign policy originates from a sense of exceptionalism, often expressed as self-virtuosity. That is, Americans seem to be self-confident to the degree that they and their political culture are admired and thought special by the rest of the world. To early Americans the New

World was a gift from God, which settlers transformed out of wilderness into the most prosperous and advanced society in history. Traditional perceptions of history reinforce this conclusion: Americans conquered native, "uncivilized" peoples, survived a brutal civil war, moved westward and secured the continent, established a country founded on private, free-enterprise capitalism and democratic principles, rescued Europe from the evils of nazism in World War II, and saved the world from communist domination in the four decades thereafter. In the American mind, these profound accomplishments make the United States the envy of the world and correspondingly reinforce the sense of being uniquely special. Americans thus are prone to view the United States as having evolved into an exceptional country that is not merely different from, but actually superior to, all other states.

Exceptionalists admit that the United States has a certain moral responsibility for the fate of people living in other countries. As such, they advocate international activism and interventionism in a wide variety of global situations. They do not concede to any clear, universally accepted international code of foreign policy behavior. Their chief belief is that the United States should advance principally American values in its foreign policy.

Belief in American exceptionalism has sometimes bred U.S. unilateralism in foreign affairs. That is, integral to Americans' belief that their country's experience has produced the best social and political order in history is the predilection of the United States to act alone in addressing foreign concerns. This go-it-alone tendency in U.S. foreign policy represents the rejection of a balance-of-power approach for promoting national security in international relations. Given the geography and natural assets of the United States, national security was once largely assumed, making efforts at multilateral collaboration unnecessary. After World War II, the rise of the United States to superpower status exaggerated its self-perceived virtuosity in world affairs, which generated more acts of unilateralism in its foreign relations and international law attitudes.

Another facet of American self-virtuosity arises in the tendency to engage in messianism abroad. American foreign policy sometimes takes up crusadelike causes for ends that are perceived as just and noble. U.S. policymakers conclude that they must bring the benefits of American ideals and institutions to other, less fortunate, peoples. Such feelings blend the traits of the American self-image of political, moral, and ideological superiority to produce within the American political culture a tendency to engage in messianic campaigns. There emerges a missionary-like compulsion in U.S. foreign policy ambitions to recreate the world in the American image, to establish models of governance grounded in American values and democratic institutions, by force if necessary. Such attitudes can foster a sense of paternalism. More ominously, they breed resentment from other societies who see the United States as attempting to impose its cultural values and political lifestyle upon them. In the extreme, such a doctrine of internationalized manifest destiny can become the political rationalization for unlawful U.S. intervention. Witness, during the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. involvement in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1981–1984), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Serbia (Kosovo) (2000).

The clearest historical statement of American unilateralism remains the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This declaration by President James Monroe came in reaction to U.S. concern over the possibility of European interference into affairs of newly independent Latin American countries. The doctrine proclaimed that the United States would not tolerate European intervention into the Western Hemisphere, and, in return, the United States pledged not to interfere in European affairs. The Roosevelt Corollary, articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress on 6 December 1904, expanded the scope of the doctrine by making the United States the self-appointed policeman of the Western Hemisphere, thereby providing a unilateral justification for increased intervention into the affairs of Latin American countries.

Important to realize is that neither the Monroe Doctrine nor its Roosevelt Corollary drew validity from any U.S. legislative pronouncement, nor from any international treaty instrument. Nor was the reach of jurisdiction or application of either doctrine ever precisely defined by specific law or fiat. Indeed, both doctrines were applied historically on an ad hoc basis, in circumstances defined only by perceptions of U.S. policymakers, to explain the rationale for interventionist actions. From 1850 to 1935, both doctrines were held out as pillars of U.S. foreign policy and were invoked periodically to justify unilateral interventions taken in the name of defending the Ameri-

cas from European intrusions. For example, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, the United States intervened militarily on some sixty occasions in several small Caribbean and Central American states. In all these cases, little diplomatic consideration or formal concern was expressed by the U.S. government about the international legal implications of these interventions or the critical attitudes of other states.

Although largely repudiated with the rise of Pan Americanism during the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt during the 1930s, the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine persisted in modern times. Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in overthrowing the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and the Allende government in Chile in 1973, U.S. complicity in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and in blockading Cuba during the missile crisis in 1962, the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and the 1989 invasion of Panama attest to the continued influence of U.S. unilateralist behavior in the Western Hemisphere.

LEGALISM

Legalism—the tendency to profess legal grounds for U.S. foreign policies—is a second core belief underpinning the American ideology. The inclination to embrace legalism springs from rejection of the balance-of-power approach as the means for preserving U.S. national security and from the liberal assumptions that people are rational human beings who loathe war and prefer the peaceful settlement of disputes. In modern times U.S. foreign policy clearly contributed to the creation of a global system of institutions and legal rules that allow states to settle their disputes without resource to use of force. This legalism perspective is well embodied in active U.S. participation in international rule-making and in the multitude of contemporary international institutions that the United States has joined and in great part has been responsible for establishing. Paramount among these is the United Nations, which was envisaged through the political initiative of the United States at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and San Francisco in 1945. The United States was also the main architect for designing and negotiating the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund to reconstruct the post–World War II international economic order. From 1987 to 1994 the United States assumed the leading role in negotiating the World Trade Organization, which effectively rewrote the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in an effort to provide legal rules, inclusive of mandatory dispute settlement, for international commercial transactions. At the end of the twentieth century the United States assumed an intensely active internationalist role as it participated in more than one thousand intergovernmental organizations, most of which were conceived through U.S. political initiatives and were sustained with substantial U.S. financial support. In this regard it is critical to appreciate that nearly all of these international organizations were empowered to negotiate and create new legal rules, both for internal administration and as international regulations. As a global superpower with worldwide interests, the United States remained intimately involved in that norm-creating process through these global institutions.

For the United States, the rule-making facet of legalism rests in the critical legal principle of a government pledging its willingness to abide by international agreements to which it has voluntarily committed itself. This legal principle, known as *pacta sunt servanda* and drawn from the domestic practice of contract law, asserts that treaties made in good faith between governments are binding. While no meaningful police or judicial mechanisms are available to enforce international agreements, state practice clearly indicates that all governments, including the United States, overwhelmingly abide by their treaty obligations for two fundamental reasons: first, it is in their national interests to do so; second, abrogation of treaty commitments absent legitimate justification deprives a government of its political and legal credibility with the rest of the international community. The United States, like all states, honors its treaty obligations principally because those rules benefit American foreign policy interests. To spotlight this point, in 2001 the United States was party to more than five thousand international agreements, of which more than five hundred were prominent multilateral conventions. If treaty-based legal rules were nugatory for U.S. foreign policy, why pursue the painstaking political effort to negotiate, ratify, and consolidate such an impressive array of international instruments into legally binding obligations? The answer is plain: international legal agreements are not worthless. These rule-making documents well serve U.S. national interests, and upholding their obligations provides the United States with

greater constructive opportunities and legal latitude in its relations with other states.

Legalism places heavy burdens on U.S. foreign policy, especially when considerations are given to the use of military force internationally. By rejecting the power-politics approach, policymakers cannot assert national security self-interests as the only justification for engaging in armed conflict abroad. Instead, U.S. foreign policy actions may be dressed in legal principles to explain the bases for those decisions. Several examples demonstrate this pronounced tendency to justify the grounds for military action in legal terms, including resort to using the United Nations as an umbrella of legitimacy to prosecute the Korean War in 1950 and the Gulf War in 1991, citing a request by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States as partial legal justification for the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and use of NATO to sanction the lawfulness of U.S. action in Bosnia in 1994–1995 and in Kosovo in 2000.

The American resort to legalism contains a proclivity toward moralism. Moralistic assertions may be used to explain how international legal rules and institutions are integrated into U.S. foreign policy outcomes. This American sense of morality in its international relations rests on two presumptions. First, the belief persists that the conduct of states can be judged by moral standards. Second, there is the assumption that American morality supplies the universal standard for making those judgments. By definition, American foreign policy actions are presumed morally right and legally justifiable. Thus, when flawed policy initiatives occur, they are not attributed to "American" values that guide the policy action. Rather, such fallacies are rationalized as resulting from leadership deficiencies, information failures, bureaucratic miscommunications, or organizational lapses.

Americans often justify political goals and foreign policy actions in moral terms and evaluate outcomes of events through a prism of moralistic values. This occurs when the government seeks to explain to the American public why foreign assistance for some state might be necessary. Numerous examples of such cases can be found during the Cold War, as the United States often asserted moral principles to justify aid to prodemocratic governments aimed at suppressing communist insurgencies in Greece in 1947, Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, El Salvador in 1981–1984, and Grenada in 1983. One might also add the decision to send military and food aid during the widespread famine in Somalia in late 1992. U.S. participation in massive refugee relief efforts similarly rests on pillars of moral values, well illustrated in the tragedies that gripped Bosnia (1992–1994), Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1994), and Kosovo (2000).

Idealism, or the vision that advocates that international peace is desirable and possible, also remains salient as a theme in American legalism. American idealists believe that violence and conflict represent human failures that can be overcome through education. Idealists find clear, accepted moral values in international agreements such as the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are closely aware of moral claims by other governments and tend to advocate greater access for peoples in other countries to civil rights and liberties, health care, housing, and education. Idealists emphasize the importance of applying the principle of self-determination in U.S. foreign policy to peoples abroad and are more likely to advocate multilateral than unilateral action in world affairs. The integration of idealism with legalism's proclivity for establishing institutional structures served as the catalyst for the United States—through President Woodrow Wilson—to assume the leading role in establishing the League of Nations in 1919 and for supporting the United Nations in 1945. Idealism also fostered the rapid promotion and acceptability of human rights law in U.S. foreign policy programs and treaty commitments.

U.S. foreign policy at times assumes an approach of idealistic legalism to seek means of attaining international peace and cooperation. Such ambitions are seen in the nation's leadership in several disarmament conferences throughout the twentieth century, among them the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Washington Naval Conference of 1922, Geneva Conference of 1922, London Conferences of 1930 and 1935, and Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which sixty-two contracting parties, including the United States, renounced the use of war as an instrument of national policy.

Idealism furnishes the bedrock of international humanitarian law, which governs the use of armed force and the treatment of individuals during armed conflict. International humanitarian law is designed to reduce and limit suffering of individuals in war. It thus extends the principles and protections of human rights to the rules governing armed conflict. In substantial part, such international humanitarian law is the product of U.S. for-

eign policy. In 1907, the Second Hague Peace Conference adopted Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which remains the core legal statement on the law of land warfare. These regulations originated in the code of principles set out in 1863 by Francis Leiber, a U.S. physician during the American Civil War, to provide Union troops with rules of conduct on the battlefield. In reacting to the horrors of World War I, the United States in 1929 played a pivotal part in drafting two Geneva conventions that codified protections for prisoners of war and ameliorated conditions of sick and wounded soldiers in the field. The experiences of World War II reaffirmed the need to broaden the 1929 accords, and in 1949 in Geneva four major conventions were adopted that codified more comprehensibly legal rules for the protection of victims of war. Although drafted under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United States assumed the lead role in revising and developing these agreements, which dealt with the wounded and sick in the field and at sea, treatment of prisoners of war, and the protection of civilians. The four Geneva conventions of 1949 represent the most important codification of international humanitarian law protecting armed forces and civilian victims of armed conflict. As such they have been ratified by virtually every state in the world.

Idealism also underpins modern international criminal law, the main goal of which is to make accountable persons accused of committing atrocities and gross violations of human rights law. International criminal law descends substantially from American jurisprudential values and U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The trials in 1945 by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which prosecuted twenty-two German Nazi officials for committing acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the peace during World War II, were innovations of and productions by American lawyers. So, too, were the Tokyo War Crimes Trials during 1947–1948 that prosecuted Japanese war leaders and industrialists. In reaction to "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia during 1992–1993, the United States diplomatically steered the UN Security Council into the May 1993 establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). With U.S. diplomatic and financial support, this court emerged as a credible institution for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing persons accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against persons in the former Yugoslavia (mainly Bosnia). By 2001 the Hague Tribunal had publicly indicted one hundred persons for alleged atrocities, and nineteen had been convicted. Among those in custody and being tried was Slobodan Milosevic, former president of the Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1994 the United States again acted through the UN Security Council to create a special tribunal to try and prosecute persons accused of committing similar offenses in Rwanda. By 2001 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had indicted at least fifty-five persons, had fifty-one cases in progress, and found eight individuals guilty, including former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, the first head of state ever convicted of such crimes. The United States also actively participated in the 1998 Rome negotiations that produced the Convention for the International Criminal Court. Ironically, while this instrument was the product of considerable American jurisprudential influence, the U.S. government continued to have strong reservations about the convention text. In particular, American objections centered on the fact that no provision existed for the United States to veto in the Security Council a particular case coming before the court and the possibility that U.S. troops abroad might be made subject to the court's jurisdiction on trumped-up charges.

Idealistic traits in U.S. foreign policy have generated support within the American public for humanitarian military intervention in situations where gross human rights atrocities or flagrant acts of genocide are perpetrated. Led by the Clinton administration, from 24 March to 10 June 1999, NATO conducted an air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO aircraft flew more than 38,000 combat sorties against targets in Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro. Geostrategic and Realpolitik concerns clearly motivated the United States to act, especially the belief that ethnic conflict within Kosovo could destabilize the Balkans and inflame tensions between Greece and Turkey. Criticism was leveled at the Clinton administration for sketchy legal rationales proffered to justify NATO's military attacks, which caused severe collateral damage and civilian deaths. Nevertheless, strong evidence suggests that Serbian forces were undertaking a wide range of human rights and humanitarian law violations throughout Kosovo under the guise of "ethnic cleansing." An estimated six to ten thousand Kosovar Albanians were victims of mass murder, and more than 250,000 Kosovars were

displaced and forced to flee to Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The Clinton administration contended that a cardinal objective of NATO in its military action was to deter Belgrade from launching an all-out offensive against its own civilians. In this sense, the NATO bombing campaign took on the character of a humanitarian intervention, motivated by both moral and idealistic concerns. Strictly speaking, the lawfulness of U.S.–NATO action remains suspect because it was taken neither in self-defense to a military attack by Serbia nor legitimized by the approval of the UN Security Council. Still, it is reasonable to infer that the U.S.–NATO action may have saved thousands of Kosovar Albanian lives and might be considered an act of anticipatory humanitarian intervention.

LIBERALISM

A third critical ingredient in American ideology is a belief in the political and economic values associated with liberalism. Dominant as an American political philosophy, liberalism stipulates that the rights of the individual supersede rights of the government, and as such, the individual must be protected by law. Such notions, which are enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's Bill of Rights, proclaim the Lockean notions of protection of individual liberty, private property, and the rule of law.

Belief in principles of liberalism imbues Americans with antagonism toward authoritarian governments that suppress the civil and political rights of their citizens. This can be seen in Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination (1919); Jimmy Carter's human rights policy (1976–1980); the Clinton administration's efforts to restore democracy in Haiti and to use military force if necessary to overthrow the military junta (1994); and the anticommunist impulse, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, when communist governments were viewed as enslaving their populations under the control of a police state. Americans believe in individual rights and democratic principles, and the U.S. government often seeks to translate those beliefs into policies abroad.

During the 1990s these beliefs gave rise to the democratic peace theory, a notion of democratic idealism. Liberals argue that democratic states are less likely to wage war against each other, the fundamental proposition in the democratic peace theory. Democracies are more law-abiding and pacific because democratic norms and culture inhibit the leadership from taking actions that might precipitate war. Democratic leaders must listen to multiple voices that tend to restrain decision makers, and citizens of democracies share a certain kinship toward one other. All of these factors work together, the thinking goes, to diminish the possibilities of war. Promoting democracy fosters peace, political stability, and greater cooperation and collaboration in solving problems. Integrating this notion into its foreign policy, the Clinton administration successfully used economic and political incentives to promote democracy in Russia as well as states in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. By the beginning of the twenty-first century more states than ever before were nominally democracies.

Since revelations of the Holocaust in 1945, the protection of human rights has emerged as a major concern of international law. World attention to human rights has intensified because of television coverage of the horrors of gross violations, increasing efforts of nongovernmental organizations to promote concern for human rights abroad, and growing awareness that human rights violations are a major source of international instability. For the United States, the contemporary realm of human rights law flows directly from both the government's evolving experience in protecting the civil rights and liberties of its citizens and the goal of extending those protections to peoples everywhere. Many human rights norms are modeled after rights, liberties, and protections incorporated into U.S. constitutional law, American jurisprudence, and the national welfare system instituted during the mid-1930s under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Not surprisingly, the American people tend to support foreign policies that champion and enforce such human rights standards. To codify such standards, U.S. foreign policy has strived to create global human rights law through the adoption of prominent international legal agreements, to which most states have become lawfully obligated. As a consequence, the United States has assumed a leading role in promoting the negotiation and promulgation of human rights instruments. Yet a paradox persists here for U.S. foreign policy and international human rights law. On the one hand, the United States, more than any other government, is responsible for initiating, engineering, and bringing into force most of these agreements. On the other hand, the political concerns of some U.S. government officials that these treaties might

be used to interfere into domestic affairs have prompted partisan isolationist impulses that continue to preclude a number of them from being ratified into U.S. law. Even so, the United States can take credit for substantially contributing to the codification of global human rights law and became a contracting party to several core instruments: the 1948 Genocide Convention (132 contracting parties); the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (157 contracting parties); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (147 contracting parties); and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (124 contracting parties). Although actively participating in negotiations leading to their promulgation, at the turn of the century the United States remained outside legal obligations associated with a number of other important human rights treaties, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (137 contracting parties); the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (147 contracting parties); the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (101 contracting parties); the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (168 contracting parties); and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (191 contracting parties). Each of these treaties includes specific human rights protections that have generated ideological preferences in the U.S. Senate for isolationism, exceptionalism, and pragmatism—considerations that supersede that of codifying idealism and moralism into legal obligations binding American policy.

Even though democracy and respect for human rights have prominent stature as American political values, the application of such norms to U.S. foreign policy remains inconsistent. Throughout the Cold War years, a state's human rights record had little to do with whether it received foreign aid from the United States, which sought to aid anticommunist governments even if they were oppressive to their own people. Witness, for example, U.S. support for the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the shah in Iran, the Marcos government in the Philippines, and the white minority government in South Africa even during the Carter administration, the strongest proponent of a U.S. foreign policy grounded in human rights considerations.

There likewise persists among Americans a strong aversion to military intervention into another state's affairs even to install a democratic regime or to protect principles of human rights. Americans appear quick to champion human rights rhetorically, but they abhor taking action to implement or guarantee them for peoples in other states. This penchant is a legacy of the Vietnam War and the manifest disinclination to send troops abroad. American policymakers usually rule out U.S. military intervention undertaken to protect the human rights of peoples elsewhere because of the high political costs that casualties would produce at home for the administration. This so-called Vietnam syndrome explains in large part the readiness of the Clinton administration to quit Somalia abruptly in 1993 and its unwillingness to send U.S. troops to suppress gross genocidal atrocities being perpetrated in Bosnia during 1991–1994, Rwanda in 1994, and Sierra Leone in 1999. In the same vein, the Clinton administration downplayed human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China in favor of consistently supporting renewal of its most-favored-nation trade status, as well as in supporting the admission of China into the World Trade Organization. Clearly the strategic implications for the United States of a secure economic relationship with China overrode moralistic concerns that advocate stronger protection for human rights for its population.

As instilled in the American political culture, liberalism also assumes an economic dimension. This aspect takes the form of laissez-faire capitalism, which, like liberal democracy, concentrates on the free will of the individual. Key values earmarking the U.S. brand of capitalism turn on the profit motive, private property, and the free market as a means of guaranteeing rewards for persons who earn their way. Sustained U.S. commitment to capitalism during the Cold War years worked to define socialism under the former Soviet Union and its communist satellites as dysfunctional and menacing to the world economy. Pursuit of capitalism by the United States also coalesced with American economic and political supremacy after World War II to facilitate its ability to assert the leading role in constructing the postwar world economic order. Critical was the U.S. capacity for proposing and legally assembling core international treaties and institutions, which have continued to regulate international economic relations. Put tersely, the American conviction in the liberal values of capitalism bolsters the U.S. emphasis on international trade and commerce and generates pronounced impacts for the role that international law must perform in U.S. foreign policy.

LEGAL RULES FOR U.S. POLICY

The past informs the future. For American foreign policy in the twenty-first century, this realization is critical for assessing what role international legal rules play in making and carrying out U.S. policy objectives abroad. The future of U.S. foreign policy still turns on the costs and advantages of three persistent conflicting impulses: the choices between isolationism and internationalism, realism and idealism, and intervention and nonintervention. International legal issues and concerns lie at the heart of each debate, and American policymakers bear the burden of reconciling these divergent viewpoints in rapidly changing global circumstances. The challenges for American foreign policy are daunting, particularly given the economic, political, and military superpower roles in which the United States is cast. The threats to U.S. security are no less menacing, among them: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the degradation of the planet's environment through natural resource depletion; increased global warming, ozone depletion, and transnational pollution; pervasive poverty and overpopulation; terrorist violence; the rise of intrastate ethnic wars that produce genocidal atrocities and massive violations of human rights; accelerating forces of interdependence and globalization that make economic, technological, and electronic penetration of national borders increasingly facile; and the massive expansion in international commerce, which makes all states increasingly dependent on (and vulnerable to) others for needed goods and services.

The United States, despite its preponderant military, cultural, and economic power, cannot manage, much less mitigate, these global threats alone. Remedies lie in producing multilateral cooperation, collaboration, and commitment of mutual political wills among governments. The policy means for attaining these remedies come through active American diplomacy that strives to elaborate international legal strategies and agreements for meeting those ends. The conclusion is clear: international law is far from being an idealist pipe dream. International legal means are in fact realistic policy instruments that the United States must increasingly exercise if multilateral agreements are to be secured on common solutions and approaches for dealing with common global problems. In a world of intensifying interdependence and globalization, the United States needs international law to protect its fundamental national interests. Similarly, American foreign policy must be formulated in such a way that the United States accepts the norm of state responsibility to uphold its international legal obligations. To do otherwise is to ignore the lessons of U.S. diplomatic history and, more perturbing, to render the world an even more politically, economically, and ecologically complicated place in which to live.

The United States emerged as the world's economic superpower during the last half of the twentieth century. It did so by realizing that international trade with other states and foreign multinational corporations would be essential to its continued economic well-being and prosperity and by negotiating bilateral treaties of friendship, navigation, and commerce with nearly every state in the international community. In addition, the national economies of states devastated by World War II, especially those of Europe, had to be rebuilt. To this end the United States assumed the lead role as early as 1944 in proposing and negotiating the Bretton Woods agreement, which established a new monetary order and created the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) to advance and regulate the world economy. In late 1947 the United States successfully promoted negotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became effective on 1 January 1948. Initially signed by twenty-three countries accounting for four-fifths of world trade, this multilateral trade agreement prescribed fundamental principles to guide international commercial transactions among most states: free, nondiscriminatory trade; unconditional use of the most-favored-nation clause; reciprocity and mutual advantage in trade relations; reduction of tariffs; and elimination of protective barriers. These principles became the cornerstones of U.S. trade goals in the postwar economic order, and by 1993 the GATT had attracted 130 states as contracting parties.

From 1947 to 1993 the United States played the pivotal role in the GATT's multilateral trade conference negotiations (called "rounds"). The 1986–1994 Uruguay Round produced the most ambitious trade liberalization policies yet, and led to creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an institution proposed and strongly supported by the United States in its foreign economic policy. On 1 January 1995 the GATT was replaced by the WTO. Charged with monitoring and regulating international commerce, in 2001 the WTO had 142 members, accounting for 90 percent of world trade. The organization serves as a forum for administering trade agreements, conducting negotiations, and settling trade disputes; it also has the power to enforce provisions of the GATT and to assess trade penalties against countries that violate the accord. WTO rules, which cover commerce in goods, trade in services, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, and trade policy reviews, consist of sixty agreements that run thirty thousand pages in length. While critics might grumble about diminished sovereignty, U.S. foreign policy clearly benefits from the WTO's legal guarantees of nondiscriminatory free trade and the mandatory legal process created for settlement of disputes between member states. From 1995 through 2001 the United States brought fifty-seven complaints to the WTO and had to answer forty-nine complaints by other countries. In cases actually decided by the WTO litigation process, the United States prevailed sixteen times and lost sixteen times. In twenty-seven cases, disputes were resolved to U.S. satisfaction without litigation. Critical to appreciate is that the U.S. government complied with WTO juridical processes and its arbitral panels' rulings, irrespective of the outcome. In these dispute situations, U.S. foreign policy allocates greater import to the rule of law than to pragmatic self-interest or belief in the virtues of America's economic might.

The GATT and the WTO strengthen and make more stable the international trading system that has fostered unprecedented global economic growth since the 1950s. More than any other government, the United States has been the architect of that system. While the lawfulness of its foreign trade policy might be tested at times through multilateral institutions, the United States is willing to accept that price to preserve economic order and support for the liberal principles of international commerce. To this end, U.S. foreign policymakers cede preference to the long-term benefits of international legalism and liberalism over the costs that would be incurred by national exceptionalism and isolationism.

The regional dimension of U.S. economic policy exists in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force for the United States, Canada, and Mexico on 1 January 1994. The agreement, which exceeds two thousand pages, established schedules for reducing tariff and nontariff barriers in nearly all of twenty thousand product categories. NAFTA also expanded foreign investment opportunities and other financial transactions among the three states. While many uncertainties persist over the economic impacts of NAFTA, one obvious reality is the much freer flow of goods, services, and investments among the three member countries. Once again, U.S. foreign policy operates through agreed-upon international legal conduits to attain liberal economic goals of freer, nondiscriminatory trade relations with its neighbors. In a world of accelerating globalism and economic interdependence, the creation, implementation, and respect for international economic law becomes increasingly necessary for the United States.

U.S. foreign policy sometimes uses economic instruments as sanctions against other states. Throughout the Cold War, strategic embargoes were levied against trade with communist bloc countries in Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cambodia. With the end of the Cold War the United States continued to apply its own legislative sanctions against certain states, namely, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, and cooperated with the UN Security Council in imposing economic sanctions against a number of other governments. The U.S. economic embargo of Cuba reflected a policy steeped in liberal, ideologically messianic ambitions to install democracy in that country. At the same time, the sanctions stood as a symbol of U.S. unilateralism, driven by forces of self-virtuosity. A number of measures, including the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, applied sanctions against Cuba and foreign companies doing business with the Castro government. These sanctions represented the effort by the United States to link trade relations to the nature of the Cuban government in order to pressure the Cuban people to overthrow Castro in favor of democracy. But this policy was condemned by the UN General Assembly, Organization of American States, Canada, and several European governments. While the goal of turning Cuba into a democracy may have seemed admirable, the means used appeared counterproductive.

PRAGMATISM

The fourth core belief set in the American national ideology is pragmatism, that is, resort to an applied practical approach to foreign policy decisions. It stems from the realization that Americans built a country out of the wilderness, created their own government institutions, and achieved more economic and ideological success than any other people in modern history. American pragmatism thus resembles an engineering approach to foreign policy problem solving. U.S. involvement is often viewed as working to make things politically stable and morally right. The assumption is that right answers do exist for world problems, and the U.S. response contains those right answers. Complications arise in international relations when other governments do not perceive these problems in the same way as the United States. As a consequence, the preferred American approach in seeking solutions for law-related foreign policy issues is to deconstruct the problem, much as an engineer would use a blueprint to break tasks down into sub-problems. A mechanical solution is then devised for each legal component of a problem, while all the time keeping in mind the political implications. It bears mentioning that in this process one runs the risk of losing sight of the problem's larger legal context in order to protect perceived political interests inherent in each subproblem. When this occurs, the result can be the substitution of means for ends and the tendency to improvise solutions that are unlikely to lead to resolution of the greater problem.

Resort to pragmatism means that legal situations are dealt with on an individual basis, as opposed to long-term planning. Pragmatist policymakers tend to evaluate policies based on whether they solve the problem, rather than on what is legally permissible, ethically required, or even morally acceptable. In this regard, reliance on pragmatism invites U.S. decision makers to assert a strong realist approach in foreign policy. The theory of realism involves application of power politics to international relations. Realists are generally skeptical about human nature and are willing to accept that governments will inevitably act aggressively in their foreign policy. Hence, governments must pursue and protect their national interests, including use of force if deemed necessary. Realists advocate the prudent management of economic and military power. In sum, for U.S. foreign policy realists, the main objectives that the government should advance in its international relations are its military security and economic prosperity, that is, its national interests. Legal considerations are pushed aside, save insofar as they contribute to securing military security and economic objectives. Hence, when such realist tendencies occur, the likelihood arises that foreign policy decisions might compromise or circumvent international legal rules for the sake of obtaining perceived direct political gains. To attain greater short-term benefits for U.S. national interests, a strictly pragmatic approach might conclude that international legal commitments should be short-circuited or overridden. Unilateralist political ambitions are given higher value than multilateral legal obligations.

Resort to pragmatic foreign policies by the United States frequently occurs in situations involving the use of force abroad, which often produce fundamental conflicts with legalism, especially in terms of moral constraints and idealistic principles. When that occurs, historical experience suggests that pragmatism usually prevails. This can be seen in the American attitude toward policies of intervention abroad and government rationales devised to politically support those actions. To put this into legal perspective, international law holds that military intervention by one state into the territory of another state is flatly prohibited, except under four special circumstances: (1) if there is a treaty agreement permitting such intervention between the two states; (2) if the intervention comes at the genuine invitation of the legitimate government of a state; (3) if the intervention is undertaken as part of a collective security action involving an international organization; and, more controversially, (4) if the intervention is done for humanitarian purposes. Throughout most of its history, the United States chose not to rely on these legal justifications to substantiate the legitimacy of its intervention actions abroad.

Historically, the legal logic used by the United States to support foreign intervention is couched in the articulation of presidential doctrines. These policy proclamations, which significantly shape U.S. legal attitudes toward the permissibility of international intervention, are greatly influenced by pragmatic motivations but increasingly assume ideological traits irrespective of relevant legal considerations. The Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary were historically the most widely applied of these doctrines. The Cold War markedly affected U.S. policy attitudes and resurrected American willingness to engage in military intervention abroad. Consequently,

during the last half of the twentieth century the U.S. perception of aggression (that is, legally impermissible intervention) became framed in terms of evaluating and containing radical communist regimes throughout the Third World generally and the Western Hemisphere in particular. U.S. policymakers believed radical influence upon the domestic politics or governmental structure of a state produced regional instability and therefore plowed fertile ground for that country to become a victim of communist aggression. Concerns about the threat of communist expansion worldwide resurrected and reactivated the fundamental policy motive contained in the Monroe Doctrine—intervention for self-defense—and fostered its application through a number of post–World War II policy doctrines.

The first doctrine of the post–World War II era, the Truman Doctrine, was asserted in 1947 and committed the United States to a global policy aimed at stopping the spread of communism. The Truman Doctrine was designed specifically to send $400 million to help Greece and Turkey put down communist insurgencies that threatened those governments' stability. The lawfulness of this aid was not at issue, nor did the United States intervene militarily. The scope of U.S. anticommunist assistance was expanded in January 1957 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower formally asked Congress to authorize the use of armed force to assist any country that requested help against communist aggression. In March 1957, Congress ratified the Eisenhower Doctrine, which became the legal rationale for U.S. intervention into the Middle East, where radical nationalism had sharpened in the aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956. The Eisenhower Doctrine assumed Realpolitik policy objectives and affirmed U.S. determination to become the leading power in the region. The U.S. government invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine only twice, and in neither case was it in response to external aggression. In April 1957, Washington dispatched emergency aid to Jordan, which was threatened by an abortive coup. In January 1958, U.S. marines landed in Lebanon to support the Chamoun government, which was in the midst of a civil war. Importantly, in both cases, U.S. assistance had been formally invited by the legitimate government in power, making the action lawful notwithstanding the obvious Realpolitik ramifications.

The administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson produced a new intervention doctrine for U.S. foreign policy. The Johnson Doctrine derived from the episode in April 1965 when the United States sent 21,000 troops into the Dominican Republic to restore civil order on the pretext of preventing a "second Cuba" from emerging in the hemisphere. The principal legal rationale for the action was self-defense (more accurately, exaggerated national security concerns) against the perceived threat of communism being established in the Dominican Republic. Shortly thereafter, this doctrine was applied globally to shore up justification for U.S. military assistance to the government of South Vietnam in the face of the communist aggression of North Vietnam and China.

The Vietnam War imbroglio produced a new doctrine for U.S. foreign policy toward regions threatened by communist aggression. By the late 1960s, the enormous costs of the conflict in lives and dollars, coupled with the eruption of strong domestic antiwar sentiment, demonstrated to the Nixon administration the need to shift the American approach to military assistance. The new policy, articulated in 1969, aimed to transfer immediate self-defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese indigenous forces. While the United States would continue to bear responsibility for deterring nuclear and conventional war, the burden for deterring localized conflicts would shift to the countries involved. This so-called Nixon Doctrine was later broadened to encompass the entire globe. As with other American doctrines, considerations of international law were largely omitted from the policy calculus. The change in military assistance policy was not done in response to international criticisms of U.S. military intervention into Vietnam or the widely reported American violations of the laws of war. Rather it was done to counter domestic public discontent and to produce more opportunity for an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. These were actions motivated by pragmatism and Realpolitik, not for reasons of legalism or moral commitment.

The administration of President Jimmy Carter revived the expansion of U.S. military commitment to the Middle East. On 29 December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded and seized control of Afghanistan. The Carter administration reacted by withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, increasing aid to Pakistan, cutting off grain sales to the Soviet Union, and calling for a boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic Games in Moscow. More provocative was the president's proclamation in January 1980 that warned the Soviets to halt their expansion into the Middle East. In effect, Carter declared that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened the Persian

Gulf and Indian Ocean oil supply pipelines and asserted that the United States would act alone if necessary to protect Middle East oil from Soviet takeover. Thus, the Carter Doctrine identified the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf as a paramount strategic interest of the United States, to be defended with U.S. military force if necessary. In so doing, it broke with the Nixon Doctrine, which called for partnership in preference to the unilateral approach in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson doctrines. The United States in this case responded to an unlawful act of foreign intervention by asserting the strategic necessity—as opposed to the predicate of lawfulness—of military assistance to a victim state. Again, preeminence was given to motivations of American exceptionalism and pragmatism over normative elements found in policies of legalism, liberalism, and moralism.

Finally, during the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan articulated his own policy dictum to reinforce the central theme of halting the spread of communism. The Reagan administration expanded military and economic assistance to friendly Third World governments battling leftist insurgencies and actively supported guerrilla movements and other opposition forces in countries with leftist governments. This policy, which became known as the Reagan Doctrine, was applied with particular zeal in Latin America. Central to these efforts was supplying military and economic aid to the government of El Salvador in its civil war against the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and in organizing, funding, and training the contras, a guerrilla force of 15,000 who sought to overthrow the Marxist Sandinista government in neighboring Nicaragua. Support for such "freedom fighters" was also extended to Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia to assist those irregular forces in their struggles against totalitarian leftist regimes. In these ways the Reagan Doctrine can be viewed as a natural corollary of the Nixon Doctrine, albeit one whose permissibility under international law is seriously in question. Such assistance to rebel insurgents is generally viewed as unlawful intervention into the internal affairs of another state and is prohibited under international legal rules, irrespective of the ideological character of the ruling government.

Other U.S. policies highlight the salience of pragmatism over legalism. For example, even though the Reagan administration was adamant about not dealing with terrorists, in 1985 it agreed to sell weapons to Iran in the hope that this might persuade Islamic fundamentalists holding hostages in Lebanon to release them. Interestingly, the monies from the arms sales went to support of the contras in their war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. Similarly, the invasion of Grenada in 1983 (on the pretext of rescuing one thousand American medical students on the island) and the bombing of Libya in 1986 (on the pretext of acting in self-defense against Libya for its bombing of a West Berlin discotheque) further eroded the respect for law by the Reagan administration in its foreign policy. Although praised by Congress and the American pubic, these actions were widely condemned by the international community for their shaky legal underpinnings. Propelled by ideological concerns, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by American pragmatism, self-virtuosity, and unilateralism exercised at the expense of the legal, moral, and liberal considerations that embody the fundamental legal principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Throughout the Cold War years, presidential doctrines articulated policies in which international legal considerations were conspicuously omitted, as unilateralist ideology assumed paramount importance.

Since the end of the Cold War, pragmatism in U.S. foreign policy has remained ascendant over legal and moral considerations when issues of using armed force are involved. Even so moral, liberal, and legal considerations have been integrated more and more to explain and justify U.S. rationales for using armed force abroad. There has evolved the need to advocate normative arguments for American actions to foster greater international acceptance of the lawfulness of that policy.

For President George H. W. Bush, the invasion of Panama and the Gulf War were principal U.S. actions involving use of force. In December 1989, U.S. armed forces intervened militarily into Panama in Operation Just Cause. The Bush administration provided three pragmatic reasons, grounded in nationalist considerations, to justify the action: to keep the Panama Canal open; on grounds of self-defense, to protect the lives of U.S. citizens living there; and to apprehend the self-proclaimed "maximum leader," General Manuel Noriega, so that he could be put on trial for alleged violations of U.S. narcotics laws. One liberal objective was given in support of the action: to restore democracy in Panama. None of these directly relate to international law, and, in fact, a joint communiqué of reservations and under-

standings appended to the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 flatly renounces any right of the United States to intrude into the internal affairs of Panama. The legal rule of nonintervention into Panama was overridden for perceived pragmatic short-term objectives of U.S. policy interests, to protect the canal and to seize Noriega.

The Gulf War of 1991 was the first major military conflict involving U.S. intervention after the Cold War. Importantly, it came not as a unilateral U.S. response to Iraq's aggressive conquest of Kuwait in August 1990. Rather, American military action was taken as part of a collective responsibility, formally approved in seventeen resolutions by the UN Security Council in order to force Saddam Hussein's forces to quit their unlawful occupation of the Persian Gulf sheikdom. Sponsored by the United States, Security Council Resolution 678, adopted on 29 November 1990, asserted that unless Iraq unconditionally withdrew from Kuwait and released all foreigners by 15 January 1991, UN member states would be allowed to "use all necessary means to restore the international peace and security in the area." On 16 January, UN efforts to deal with Iraq culminated in a U.S.-led coalition of twenty-eight countries instigating an intense air attack against Iraq. On 23 February a massive ground assault was launched to eject Iraqi troops forcibly from Kuwait. Four days later the war ended.

While American motivations for prosecuting the war against Iraq were more strategic than moral—that is, to maintain secure access to oil resources in the Persian Gulf, to prevent Iraq from controlling nearly one-half of the world's known oil reserves, and to preclude Iraq from building up a military machine that included weapons of mass destruction—a strong case can be made for the lawfulness of its action. The United States might have acted unilaterally to oust Saddam Hussein, but it did not. Resort to the Security Council (and obtaining its concurrence) was essential for substantiating the legitimacy of the U.S. use of force. In this instance U.S. military intervention was implemented legitimately through multilateralism (through an international coalition) and attained the aims of moralism (to reverse aggression) as well as liberalism (to install greater respect for democracy and human rights) and legalism (to proceed through universally accepted UN procedures for dealing with aggressor states).

At the time, many analysts even agreed that the Gulf War served well the prospects for a "new world order." In the succeeding years, such an order did not come to pass, as violence between states became supplanted by the rise of violence between ethnic and tribal groups within states. To appreciate the tragedy of this point, one only has to think of the civil wars in Somalia (1992–1993), Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992–1995), Sierra Leone (1999–2000), Serbia-Kosovo (1999), and the Congo (2000–2001) that killed or displaced more than five million people over a decade.

Pragmatism affects U.S. foreign policy in several ways. It alleviates the requirement that American decision makers only make policy that is grounded in strict legal principles or ideological tenets. Policy is not wedded to philosophical or moral stricture. It can be decided with greater flexibility, based mainly on political perceptions as opposed to rigid normative considerations. Further, U.S. foreign policy tends to be reactive rather than proactive. In its international dealings the United States reacts to certain events as they occur rather than anticipating that they will occur. In this sense pragmatism contributes to the American tendency to prefer short-term national goals over long-term international solutions—an approach that invites inconsistency in foreign policy actions. Pragmatism can also blind policymakers to the more idealistic sides of liberalism, especially with regard to respect for human rights. One only has to recall that the United States has supported a number of governments that had egregious human rights records in the treatment of their own citizens, to wit, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, the shah in Iran, Duarte in El Salvador, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and the minority white government in South Africa.

One can similarly conclude that when vital interests are perceived to be at stake, U.S. officials sometimes bend legal rules to justify their policies rather than conform their actions strictly to the letter of the law. In 1998 the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles against Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's refusal to permit UN inspections of suspected chemical and biological weapons facilities. More missiles were fired in 1998 against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to those governments' alleged complicity in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. American claims that their actions were motivated by lawful considerations of self-defense are suspect, and the evidence of these govern-

ments' complicity is not well founded. More likely, these attacks were acts of military reprisal against those states, acts that are impermissible under the rules of modern international law.

On certain national security issues, international law provides the preferred practical recourse in U.S. foreign policy. Two critical areas of intense U.S. involvement stand out: the threat of transnational terrorism and the preclusive strategy of arms control. Regarding international terrorism, such violence has become a regular event in modern times, with Americans and their property frequent targets. Between 1981 and 2000 the number of terrorist attacks worldwide remained relatively consistent, with 9,170 incidents, including 422 attacks in 2000. While domestic terrorism—such as the bombs that seriously damaged the World Trade Center in 1993 and destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995—is a matter for American civil authorities, concern over transnational terrorism has escalated in U.S. foreign policy priorities. These worries not only pertain to conventional problems such as bombing and kidnapping but also to the possibility that terrorists might use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against a city in the United States.

Accordingly, the United States has assumed the leading role in establishing specific prohibitions against such violent acts through the negotiation of special international legal agreements. Chiefly toward this end, American negotiators, beginning in 1970, have proposed international legal instruments that stipulate not only the unlawful nature of terrorist acts but also the fundamental requirement for governments to prosecute persons who perpetrate such acts, or at least extradite accused offenders to those states who will. Outstanding among U.S.-inspired agreements to outlaw and prosecute criminal acts of transnational terrorism are the following instruments: the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (171 contracting states); the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (173 contracting states); the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (174 contracting states); the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (107 contracting states); the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (75 contracting states); the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (69 contracting states); the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (53 contracting states) and its protocol to suppress unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms on the continental shelf (49 contracting states); and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (67 contracting states). Importantly, though, the United States by 2001 had yet to become a contracting party to the 1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (24 contracting states) or the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (3 contracting states). Through these legal means, U.S. foreign policy sought to integrate the moral aspiration of protecting innocent people with a pragmatic approach that provides diplomatically available international channels for political cooperation and legal prosecution of persons accused of such offenses.

To regulate the use of force and weapons systems in interstate relations, U.S. foreign policy has assumed a highly pragmatic approach. The end goal of policy might appear idealistic (to promote international peace and national security through disarmament), but the means taken are clearly more realistic in their intent and application (to negotiate instruments for arms control guided by President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify"). The United States has thus employed diplomacy to create legal rules so as to promote greater order and stability in interstate relations, thereby contributing to its own national security. Nowhere is this strategy more apparent than in efforts to control the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction globally and, more particularly, in its bilateral relationship with the former Soviet Union, now Russia. To assist in curbing proliferation of various weapons, the United States was instrumental in drafting, negotiating, and promoting numerous international agreements.

Through negotiation of international legal instruments, the U.S. government has put limitations on the types and power of weapons permissible in national arsenals. What makes the U.S.-led negotiation of these agreements even more impressive is that many states have become legally obligated to most of them, simply because they realize these limitations best serve their national interests. The United States is party and legally obligated to all of the following: The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bans tests in the

atmosphere, outer space, and under water (124 contracting parties); the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits selling, giving, or receiving nuclear weapons (189 contracting states); the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, which bans placement of nuclear weapons in or under the deep seabed (99 contracting states); the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which bans the production and possession of biological weapons (143 contracting states); the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT I), which limits the number and types of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons; the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the pact between the United States and Soviet Union that sets limits on antiballistic missile testing and deployment; the 1976 Environmental Modification Convention, which bans modification of the environment as a form of warfare (66 contracting states); the 1979 SALT II Treaty, which limits the number and types of U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons; the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, which eliminates all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime, which limits transfer of missiles or missile technology (25 contracting states); the 1991 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (START I), which reduces strategic nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine; the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans possession of chemical weapons after the year 2005 (143 contracting states); and the 1993 START II agreement that reduces U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Notable exceptions cloud U.S. practice and highlight the force of pragmatic realism over multilateral legalism. The U.S. Senate in 1999 rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (77 contracting states), largely for reasons of partisan politics and to ensure that the ability to test nuclear weapons would be available to the United States so as to maintain nuclear parity with other states. Nor has the United States contracted to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (117 contracting states), because of the deterrent value of landmines for protecting U.S. troops in South Korea. Unilateral exceptionalism, ostensibly on pragmatic security grounds, reemerged in the presidency of George W. Bush. The Bush administration indicated that it would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia so that the United States may go forward with testing and deployment of a space-based missile system to protect America from an attack by a "rogue state" armed with nuclear missiles. Moreover, the Bush administration announced in 2001 that the United States opposed a UN treaty to limit the international sale of small arms, because the accord would constrain the legitimate weapons trade and infringe on the right of American citizens to bear arms. The fact that the United States is the leading exporter of such weapons, selling $1.2 billion of the estimated $6 billion worldwide total, seems a more pragmatic explanation of that policy decision.

Such international legal agreements demonstrate the American recourse to legalism, but they are steeped in motives of pragmatism and realism. A treaty in and of itself cannot prevent the use of any weapon by any party, no more than domestic laws can prevent a person from using a handgun to rob a bank or commit murder. Still, multilateral agreements articulate rules and norms that states are expected to follow in their conduct. If all contracting parties adhered to all these legal rules all of the time, the possibility of these weapons being used would be considerably reduced, and the prospects for obtaining international peace and security would be greatly enhanced. Once again, the motivations for U.S. foreign policy emerge as a national blend of realistic pragmatism and idealistic legalism, the success of which ultimately rests in the political will of the involved governments.

The blend of pragmatism with recourse to multilateral legalism is also well illustrated in issues concerning conservation of natural resources and protection of the biosphere. As the greatest industrial superpower in history, the United States consumes 35 percent of the world's energy resources and emits nearly 25 percent of the world's carbon dioxide. American economic consumption at home generates serious environmental repercussions abroad. Since 1960 the U.S. government, along with other states and international organizations, has grown more attuned to how burgeoning industrial output affects its own air, water, and land area, as well as how international legal agreements might best be fashioned to minimize the corrosive impacts of industrialization on the earth's environment beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. To these ends more than five hundred multilateral agreements have been concluded on conservation and protection of the biosphere, many done with vigorous U.S. participation in UN-sponsored conferences. The obligatory presumption underpinning these instruments is that governments and individuals must use the bio-

sphere responsibly, on the theory that it belongs to no one individually and to everyone collectively. These views are crystallized in multilateral agreements negotiated as legal regimes to govern national activities in global common areas, that is, in those spaces such as the oceans, Antarctica, and the atmosphere. Importantly, the United States is formally obligated to most of these legal regimes.

The legal status of the world's oceans has been a legal concern for four hundred years, though more recent attention has focused on how best to use them without causing pollution, resource depletion, or harm to living creatures. The first global effort to codify the oceans' legal status came in 1958 with the promulgation of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. The United States assumed the pivotal role in drafting these agreements. When advances in technology overwhelmed the relevance of these instruments, the United Nations in 1973 convened a complex, protracted series of negotiations to recodify ocean law. Again, the United States assumed the central role in these negotiations, which in 1982 produced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This framework convention seeks to regulate issues of offshore territorial jurisdiction, ownership of the continental shelf region, exploration and exploitation of living and nonliving resources in the ocean and on the deep seabed, as well as protection of the marine environment. The convention defines coastal zones, establishes an International Seabed Authority to regulate mining on the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and provides for sharing revenues derived from such operations.

For modern ocean law, the 1982 convention rules the waves for most nations. Yet the United States has remained resistant to becoming a party to this agreement, principally because of the deep seabed issue. The United States possesses the most advanced seabed mining technology and would contribute the most dues to the authority's operations, which would likely most benefit developing countries. On these grounds some U.S. senators argued vigorously during the 1980s against the treaty, although since the treaty entered into force in 1994, those objections have largely waned. In this respect the U.S. role in the modern law of the sea inculcates an ideological struggle in the American mind between the benefits of international legalism versus unilateral exceptionalism, as well as the virtues of economic liberalism versus international socialism. The irony is that, over the course of nearly a decade, the United States contributed more legal wherewithal and technical insights to the negotiation of this convention than any other government. In the end, the fundamental issue came down to that of sovereign self-interest versus international common interest, and in this case, sovereign self-interest appears to have won out.

Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy was essential for forging many other treaties that contributed to more orderly use of ocean space. Among these were the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, with its protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) and six annexes; the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, with its 1996 protocol; the 1966 Load Line Convention; the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention; and the 1972 International Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. In addition, the United States figured mightily in the negotiation of two other major ocean conservation documents, the 1993 UN Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas; and the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.

In the case of Antarctica, the United States remains key as the contributor to forming new rules for administering the legal regime there. The Treaty on Antarctica was largely an American inspiration and culminated on 1 December 1959 from a special negotiating conference of twelve states in Washington, D.C. The United States also emerged as the critical influence in producing three other agreements that comprise the modern Antarctic Treaty System. These are the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, which protects Antarctic seals from being harvested; the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, designed to conserve krill, fish, birds, and other marine life in the Southern Ocean; and the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on the Protection of the Antarctic Environment, which establishes the norms, rules, and procedures that Antarctic Treaty contracting parties must apply to their activities in the region. Each instrument was negotiated and entered into force with full U.S. concurrence, because protection of the environment and conservation of

Antarctic resources are perceived as best serving long-term U.S. national interests. In this regard, elements of pragmatism stand out in U.S. policy. But what also stands out is the important proclivity toward multilateral legalism that is idealistically intended to secure environmental protection and resource conservation in the region. For U.S. interests to be best protected, other governments concerned with Antarctic matters must be likewise legally bound. Only multilateral agreements, as opposed to exceptionalist, unilateral initiatives, can suitably attain that purpose.

A quartet of instruments comprises the regime for regulating the protection of the atmosphere by eliminating or stabilizing anthropogenic emissions of substances that threaten its environment. The first of these, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, was instigated and promoted mainly by the United States. This treaty aims to protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects of modification of the ozone layer. Its 1987 Montreal Protocol, which entered into force with strong support from the U.S. government, was negotiated to institute precautionary measures to control global emissions of substances that deplete the ozone layer. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a product of the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro, seeks to regulate the level of greenhouse gases contaminating the atmosphere in order to avoid creating climate changes that impede economic development worldwide. Its companion instrument, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, was negotiated as a means to implement the framework global warming convention. Even though U.S. industry is responsible for producing 25 percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, the administration of George W. Bush indicated in 2001 that it would not participate further in negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, mainly because the economic price paid by U.S. industry was considered unfairly too high, especially given that India and China were not participating and developing countries were exempt from the protocol's restrictive terms.

By 2001 the United States had not accepted the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to conserve and promote sustainable use of biodiversity resources. Although 180 other states had ratified this accord, the United States rejected it on grounds that it encourages "equitable sharing of benefits" arising out of the use of genetic resources and "appropriate" transfer of technology, while taking into account rights over such resources. The legal logic here supposes that, as the largest developer of biotechnology industries, the United States stands to lose most from these obligations. These costs are seen as not worth the price of legal agreement. Nor had the United States contracted to the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, ostensibly because critical terms in the agreement were left vague and open to interpretation. Rejection of the Basel Convention more likely came because U.S. industry is the world's largest exporter and importer of precious-metal wastes and scrap and would be severely affected by the accord's legal restrictions.

An attitude of exceptionalism for the world's largest consumer and greatest polluter cannot produce benefits for the planet's environment. To correct this, the United States has contracted to three important agreements: the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which seeks to protect certain species from overexploitation by a system of import-export permits; the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which aims to limit the discharge of air pollutants, especially sulfur dioxide, that cause distant damage in other states; and the 1992 UN Convention to Combat Desertification, which strives to halt spreading desert lands.

CONCLUSION

U.S. foreign relations depend on legal order, operate within a legal framework, and require legal principles and concepts that influence policy and limit choices. To be sure, the United States derives benefits from international legal rules and agreements with other states. Legal rules keep international society functional, contribute to economic order and political stability, and provide a basis for common ventures and mutual intercourse. Given that international law serves to limit the actions of all governments, it therefore enhances the security and independence of the United States in its dealings with other states. International legal rules establish common standards where they are deemed by states to be desirable and make more predictable what behavior to expect from states in their relations with each other. That is no less true for the United States in this age of globalization and increasing interdependence.

But international law also limits the freedom of the United States to act in its foreign affairs. The

United States is obligated to certain restraints, irrespective of what its government might like to do when the time comes to act. Political arrangements legitimized by formal agreements are more difficult to unravel or modify. The predictability of state behavior established by international law means that the United States is not free to be disorderly or promote changes on its own whim. To foster the security and independence of its own territory and limit the conduct of other governments, the United States must accept corresponding limitations on its own behavior. To secure the confidence accrued from law, the United States must consent to being restricted in its ability to frustrate the expectations of other states. U.S. foreign policy therefore evolves in tandem with how international legal rules are regarded. Each successive administration builds its foreign policy on the legal framework constructed by its predecessors. Since World War II, U.S. foreign policy has moved slowly but perceptibly away from pragmatic, nationalist principles toward a more legalist, international doctrine. With the end of the Cold War, this tendency has accelerated. In the early twenty-first century, U.S. foreign policy was moving toward more universal values, bound by increasing legal commitments in formal multilateral agreements.

For American foreign policy, international law is most effective in regulating the rapidly expanding range of functional relations between the United States and other international actors. Such functional interstate relations are considered to be "low politics" (trade, communications, rules of diplomacy) and are motivated by a combination of idealism, moralism, and pragmatism. National security issues, however, retain their critical importance as pragmatic considerations, though increasingly the tendency has been to negotiate arms control agreements whenever possible, as opposed to seeking a straightforward balance of power amongst military adversaries. For the United States the restraint of legal rules appears least effective when applied to "high politics," meaning its national security relations between sovereign states. Under these circumstances, realism and pragmatism are prone to fostering American unilateralism in foreign dealings. Yet the wide range of arms control agreements, environmental regulations, and rules for war negotiated through U.S. leadership suggests that recourse to international legal solutions to deal with "high politics" issues retains great sway for U.S. foreign policy as well.

The American experience demonstrates that international law best serves those who make it work over the long term. As the body of rules for the international relations game, international law provides the formal ways and means for communicating to U.S. policymakers the perceived international consensus on policy questions and legal issues. Thus, the United States employs international law in its foreign policy and contributes to its creation. This explains why, with few exceptions, the United States formally recognizes and agrees to respect fundamental rules and principles intended to guide its foreign policy behavior. For the preeminent actor in international relations at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it cannot be otherwise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938.* 8th ed. New York, 1997. Among the best treatments of U.S. diplomacy during the Cold War years and since.

Arend, Anthony C., and Robert J. Beck. *International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter.* London, 1993.

Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People.* 10th ed. New York, 1980. The best-written history of U.S. diplomacy.

Barkun, Michael. *Law Without Sanctions.* New Haven, Conn., 1968.

Brierly, James. *The Law of Nations.* 6th ed. Oxford, 1976.

Brownlie, Ian. *Principles of International Law.* 4th ed. Oxford, 1990.

Cingranelli, David Louis. *Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World.* New York, 1993.

Cohen, Stephen D. *The Making of United States International Economic Policy.* 5th ed. Westport, Conn. 2000. Definitive study of U.S. policymaking for trade agreements.

Devine, Donald J. *The Political Culture of the United States: The Influence of Member Values on Regime Maintenance.* Boston, 1972. Insights on political culture's impact on policymaking.

Falk, Richard A. *Law in an Emerging Village: A Post Westphalian Perspective.* Ardsley, N.Y., 1998.

Ferrell, Robert H. *American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century.* New York, 1988.

Forsythe, David P., ed. *The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward.* Lincoln, Neb., 2000.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, and Provocations*. New York, 1992. Useful reflections on the future of U.S. foreign policy.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1993.

Gruber, Lloyd. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton, N.J., 2000.

Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995): 511–533.

———. "Democracies and Intervention." *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (2001): 237–245.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "International Law and the Control of Force." In Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, eds. *The Relevance of International Law*. Garden City, N.Y., 1971.

Hsiung, James C. *Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations*. Boulder, Colo., 1997.

Jentleson, Bruce W. *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*. New York, 2000.

Jentleson, Bruce W., ed. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Reading and Cases*. New York, 2000.

Joyner, Christopher C. "The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion." *American Journal of International Law* 78 (1984): 131–144. Succinct treatment of intervention as U.S. policy.

———. "The United States and the Genocide Convention." *Indian Journal of International Law* 27 (1987): 441–482. Scrutiny of U.S. interests and legal concerns in the genocide treaty.

———. "International Law." In Peter Schraeder, ed. *Intervention into the 1990s*. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo., 1992.

———. "The United States and the New Law of the Sea." *Ocean Development and International Law* 27 (1996): 41–58. Examines U.S. criticisms of the 1982 ocean law convention.

———. "International Law and the Conduct of Foreign Policy." In Shirley Scott and Anthony Bergin, eds. *International Law and Australian Security*. Canberra, Australia, 1997.

———. "The Reality and Relevance of International Law in the Twenty-First Century." In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, eds. *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*. New York, 2001.

Joyner, Christopher C., and Anthony Clark Arend. "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention: An Emerging Legal Norm?" *Journal of Legal Studies* 10 (2000): 27–60. Examines international law and U.S. policy in Kosovo.

Joyner, Christopher C., and Michael Grimaldi. "The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 25 (1985): 621-689. A useful critique of the lawfulness of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.

Joyner, Christopher C., and Christopher Posteraro. "The United States and the International Criminal Court: Rethinking the Struggle between National Interests and International Justice." *Criminal Law Forum* 10 (1999): 359–385. Why the U.S. opposes the ICC.

Kegley, Charles W. "The Bush Administration and the Future of American Foreign Policy: Pragmaticism or Procrastination?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19 (1989): 717–731.

———. *How Nations Make Peace*. New York, 1999.

Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory A. Raymond. *Exorcizing the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium*. Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2002.

Kegley, Charles W., and Eugene Wittkopf. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. 5th ed. New York, 1996. One of the best texts on U.S. foreign policy.

———. *World Politics*. 8th ed. Boston, 2001. Leading academic text on international relations.

Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and War." *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 79–97.

Melanson, Richard A. *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton*. Armonk, N.Y., 2001.

Moore, Rebecca R. "Globalization and the Future of U.S. Human Rights Policy." *Washington Quarterly* 21 (1998):193–212.

Newsome, David C. *The Public Discussion of Foreign Policy*. Bloomington, Ind., 1996. Thoughtful treatment of public opinion and U.S. foreign policy.

Pangle, Thomas L., and Peter J. Ahrensdorf. *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace*. Lawrence, Kan., 1999.

Perkins, Dexter. *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine.* Boston, 1941. The authoritative history of the Monroe Doctrine.

———. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1962. A historian's history of U.S. foreign policymaking.

Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World.* Princeton, N.J., 1993. Excellent assessment of democratic peace theory.

Schlesinger, Arthur. "Foreign Policy and the American Character." *Foreign Affairs* 62 (1983): 1–16.

Slomanson, William R. *Fundamental Perspectives on International Law.* Belmont, Calif., 2000. Leading text on international law.

Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II.* 14th ed. Washington, D.C., 2000. Very useful historical account of U.S. foreign affairs since 1945.

Spero, Joan Edelman, and Jeffrey A. Hart. *The Politics of International Economic Relations.* 5th ed. New York, 1996. Authoritative text of international political economy.

Stoessinger, John G. *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy.* 2d ed. New York, 1985.

Wittkopf, Eugene R., and Christopher M. Jones, eds. *The Future of American Foreign Policy.* 3d ed. New York, 1999. Provocative essays on challenges for U.S. policy abroad.

See also DOCTRINES; ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; EXCEPTIONALISM; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; REALISM AND IDEALISM.

International Monetary Fund and World Bank

Francis J. Gavin

If the success of institutions were judged by the breadth and passion of their critics, then both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) would count among the most effective multilateral organizations in the world. Beginning in the late 1990s it became an annual ritual for tens of thousands of anti-globalization protesters to descend upon Washington, D.C., in late September to disrupt their annual meetings. But the left has had no monopoly on criticism of the IMF and World Bank. Republican U.S. congressmen and free-market economists have long derided both entities as misguided and even corrupt. Furthermore, these protests were nothing new: both the left and the right in the United States vehemently objected to the Bretton Woods agreements that created the IMF and World Bank near the end of World War II.

Do the arguments made against the Bretton Woods institutions, both now and in the past, have any merit? And why do these multilateral institutions, created for the noble goals of preventing international monetary turmoil and alleviating global poverty, incite such heated responses, both in the United States and abroad? Finally, are the IMF and World Bank simply tools of American foreign policy, as is often claimed? At first glance these criticisms are puzzling, especially since protesters have vastly overestimated the power and effect these institutions have had on the world economy. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed tremendous changes in all parts of the domestic and global economy, including in those areas that are the responsibility of the two Bretton Woods institutions: international monetary relations and economic development. But a strong case could be made that other forces—the Cold War, macroeconomic reform, technology, the massive increase in capital and trade flows—were far more crucial to unleashing and sustaining these changes than either the IMF or the World Bank.

In fact, in order to understand the influence and development of these organizations during their first few decades, it is more useful to talk about a "Bretton Woods system" rather than dissecting the specific institutional histories of the IMF and World Bank. The agencies themselves were both anemic and ineffective during their early years. For example, the World Bank was established in order to aid postwar European reconstruction but was quickly supplanted when the United States established the European Recovery Plan and the Marshall Plan. Only later did it embrace the mission of funding development, infrastructure, and anti-poverty programs in the underdeveloped countries of the world. The IMF was similarly pushed to the side during its early years, as bilateral negotiations, currency blocs (like those for sterling and the franc), or Marshall Plan institutions such as the European Payments Union drove postwar international monetary relations.

Still, while the IMF and World Bank were moribund for some time, and are not particularly influential in the early twenty-first century, the Bretton Woods agreements did set down certain "rules of the game" that, if not always enforced by the IMF and World Bank, certainly have animated much of the spirit of international economic activity since World War II. Furthermore, in spite of their weaknesses, it is important to remember that at the time of their inception, the idea of creating such multilateral economic institutions was truly revolutionary. The logic behind these organizations and their mission emerged from a powerful if sometimes flawed causal and historical logic. After the economic collapse of the 1930s and destructive war of the 1940s, the conventional wisdom held that unfettered capitalism was unstable, prone to crisis, and unfair in its international distribution of wealth. Just as the U.S. federal government intervened in the domestic economy through the New Deal to eliminate the extremes of market capitalism

while maintaining the benefits, so too were the newly formed global organizations formed to regulate, but not stifle, the global economy.

Depression and war had ushered in a profound shift in the relationship between governments, national economies, and the global economic order by the time representatives of forty-four nations met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. Before World War I, international monetary relations were not considered the province of national governments. Rarely did any entity intervene in foreign exchange markets, and when one did, it was nongovernmental banks such as the House of Morgan or the still private Bank of England. There were several attempts at monetary cooperation and collaboration among international private bankers during the late nineteenth century, but it was sporadic. And while the idea of providing aid to rebuild the devastated, war-torn economies had been considered after World War I, the notion of a permanent international bank to guide global efforts to increase living standards and eliminate global poverty was truly remarkable.

One criticism is, however, quite justified. Both the World Bank and especially the IMF have often been tools for U.S. foreign policy and foreign economic goals. Part of this has to do with the nature of constituent power within these organizations. Unlike the United Nations, where each state has an equal vote, representation within the Bretton Woods institutions is established by the size of the financial contribution. Since the United States is by far the largest contributor, it has the principal voice in determining the policies and procedures of both institutions. Furthermore, the United States is able to pressure many of the other large contributors, like Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, into following their policy preferences.

In fact, it is fair to say that America has dominated both of these institutions since their founding. To give just a few examples: in the 1940s, it was the United States bypassing these institutions through the Marshall Plan and regional aid schemes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States used the IMF to bail out sterling, the currency of its close ally Great Britain, and the World Bank to promote its modernization schemes. During the 1990s the relationship between the IMF and the Clinton administration's Treasury Department was downright incestuous, as both institutions forged the now controversial "Washington consensus" in its aid and economic reform packages. Rarely has either Bretton Woods institution pursued policies at odds with U.S. foreign policy goals.

THE IMF BRETTON WOODS MONETARY SYSTEM

The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 produced the most ambitious and far-reaching international economic agreement between sovereign states in history. By far the most important aspect of these arrangements were the articles that created the International Monetary Fund and established the rules for global monetary relations. American and British financial officials, led by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, hoped to establish a system that would maintain stable, fixed exchange rates, allow national currencies to be converted into an asset over which they had no issuing control (gold), and to provide an effective mechanism to adjust exchange rates in the hopefully rare event that a "fundamental" balance-of-payments disequilibrium emerged. In the event of nonfundamental deficits that normally arose in international transactions, the deficit country would pay with a reserve asset (gold or a key currency convertible into gold), or seek short-term financing from the International Monetary Fund, which would supply the currency needed. The IMF was also assigned the task of overseeing and enforcing these arrangements.

This IMF-guided system was much different from any previous international monetary system. It was not like a traditional gold standard, where the domestic money supply, and hence the domestic price level, was directly determined by the national gold stock. Under the gold standard, a balance-of-payments deficit would be paid for through the export of gold, resulting in a decrease in the domestic money base and a deflation of prices. The decreased purchasing power would lower that country's imports, and the increased international demand for that country's lower-priced goods would increase exports, naturally correcting the balance-of-payments deficit. Conversely, an influx of gold, by increasing the domestic monetary base and domestic prices, had the opposite effect of boosting imports and discouraging exports, thereby eliminating a payments surplus. According to standard market theory, any balance-of-payments disequilibrium would be adjusted more or less automatically, eliminating the need for government interference. But the cost of making payments balance could be

very high, and included deflation that caused widespread unemployment in deficit countries. In reality this system worked much better when capital flows from London, and to a lesser extent Paris, kept the system functioning smoothly.

The founders of the IMF explicitly rejected the gold standard as a model for future international monetary relations. White and especially Keynes believed that the interwar experience had demonstrated that a balance-of-payments adjustment process that relied on deflating the economy of a deficit country was draconian in an age when national governments promised full employment and a wide array of social spending. Decreasing the monetary base in a deficit country would lead to a fall in national income, unleashing unemployment and necessitating large cuts in government spending. To avoid such a politically unacceptable system, the Bretton Woods IMF regime allowed nations to import and export gold without penalty (that is, without having to change their domestic monetary base). If and when balance-of-payments deficits arose between countries, they would be corrected through short-term IMF financing and small, IMF-approved changes in the exchange rate. This points to an interesting fact about the Bretton Woods conference and agreement. Although Bretton Woods was hailed as the hallmark of international cooperation, in reality it provided national economic and political authorities an unprecedented amount of immunity from the international pressures of the global market. To a large degree, this was the policy preference of both the United States and Great Britain. Macroeconomic decisions were the sole province of national governments, which were quick to sacrifice measures that would bring about balance-of-payments equilibrium in order to achieve important domestic goals.

Because U.S. economic foreign policymakers worried that the existing gold stock was too small to sustain the growing demand for international liquidity, the Bretton Woods IMF regime was set up to be a two-tiered system in which certain key currencies—those convertible into gold, such as the dollar and (it was hoped) sterling—could be used in lieu of gold to settle international transactions. It was hoped that this would conserve the use of gold and dramatically increase the amount of liquidity available to finance international transactions. This meant that much of the world's reserve requirements would be supplied through the balance-of-payments deficits of the key currency economies. Why did the Bretton Woods planners allow such a thing? Keynes recognized that Great Britain would face postwar deficits, and he wanted a system that did not penalize sterling. Ironically the British economist also feared American surpluses and wanted to guarantee that the United States fulfilled international liquidity needs.

But it was unclear how large these deficits had to be to fulfill international reserve needs. If the key currency economies had no deficit, or too small a deficit, then the world would have to rely on gold alone to finance trade. Without key currency deficits, liquidity would dry up and international transactions disappear. But if the key currency country ran balance-of-payments deficits that were too large, the resulting inflation would test the value of the key currency and set off a large-scale conversion of the currency into gold. This would remove valuable liquidity from the system and set off a fierce competition for gold, with deflationary effects on the international economy. Capital controls, trade restrictions, and currency blocs might ensue. This made the meaning of British, and to a greater extent, American balance-of-payments deficits somewhat ambiguous. The system was designed to make deficits necessary, but it was never clear how large or how small a deficit was needed to supply liquidity without undermining confidence in the value of the dollar.

What were the larger motives of the founders of the IMF plan? U.S. and British foreign and economic policy goals were often at cross-purposes by 1944. It has often been noted how remarkable it was that Keynes and White, despite the vastly different economic priorities of the countries they represented, were able to come up with such an extraordinary compromise. Indeed, Keynes's original proposal envisioned a "currency union" in which countries would have had to pay a penalty on their surplus payment balances. Additionally debtor nations would have unrestricted and virtually unlimited access to the resources of the clearing fund without having to seek international approval or make domestic adjustments to correct payments disequilibria. Keynes's original plan had an enormous inflationary bias, and would have allowed Great Britain to tap the immense resources of the United States without having to go through the arduous and embarrassing process of asking for direct aid.

The IMF Bretton Woods system has often been portrayed as an attempt to move away from the vicious economic competition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ameri-

can policymakers were motivated, it has been suggested, "by a humanitarian desire to prevent the kind of financial stresses and economic dislocations that might lead to future wars." The noted policy analyst Judy Shelton summed up the conventional wisdom when she argued in 1994 that "Keynes and White were convinced that international economic cooperation would provide a new foundation of hope for a world all too prone to violence. 'If we can continue,' Keynes observed, 'this nightmare will be over. The brotherhood of man will have become more than a phrase.'"

Keynes's own writings call this interpretation into doubt. Not only would his blueprint protect Great Britain's planned full-employment policies from balance of payments pressures, it would also present a convenient and politically painless way to get money out of the United States in the guise of international banking and monetary reform:

> It would also be a mistake to invite of our own motion, direct financial assistance after the war from the United States to ourselves. Whether as a gift or a loan without interest or a gratuitous redistribution of gold reserves. The U.S. will consider that we have had our whack in the shape of lend lease and a generous settlement of consideration. . . . We in particular, in a distressed & ruined continent, will not bear the guise of the most suitable claimant for a dole . . . On the contrary. If we are to attract the interest and enthusiasm of the Americans, *we must come with an ambitious plan of an international complexion, suitable to serve the interests of others sides ourselves.* . . . It is not with our problems of ways and means that idealistic and internationally minded Americans will be particularly concerned.

While the Americans rejected the currency union plan as too radical, the British came up with a substitute in the scarce-currency clause for the IMF, which permitted extensive capital controls and trade discrimination against major surplus countries. Roy F. Harrod, a U.S. Treasury official and Keynes protégé, even suggested that the scarce currency not be discussed in public, for fear that the U.S. Congress might figure out its true implications. Keynes agreed, stating, "the monetary fund, in particular, has the great advantage that to the average Congressman it is extremely boring." But the heated debates in Congress over the IMF demonstrated that some Americans had a better understanding of the scarce-currency clause than Keynes assumed.

The controversial scarce-currency clause was eventually included as Article 7 in the IMF Bretton Woods agreement, but the Truman administration interpreted its provisions very narrowly. This angered many British policymakers, who in later years blamed many of Britain's economic woes on the Americans' narrow interpretation of the clause. During deliberations over whether or not to devalue sterling in 1949, the UK president of the Board of Trade bitterly lamented the American position:

> In particular, United States policy in the Fund has been directed . . . to making the "scarce currency" clause a dead letter. We thought originally that this clause might give some real protection against a dollar shortage; indeed, Lord Keynes's conviction that this was so was one of the main factors which led His Majesty's Government and Parliament to accept the Loan Agreement. Once the clause comes into operation, it gives wide freedom for discriminatory exchange and trade controls against the scarce currency; and then there is real pressure on the country concerned to play its full part in putting the scarcity right, e.g., by drastic action such as we want the United States to take to stimulate imports.

In the end, the British had little to complain about. By the late 1940s the Truman administration's foreign policy goal of promoting European reconstruction and eventual integration led the United States to permit extensive dollar discrimination while furnishing billions of dollars of aid through the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, to the surprise of many, the United States ran consistently large balance-of-payments deficits throughout the postwar period. The problem was not, as Keynes and White had feared, too little liquidity. The opposite was the case. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a growing sense that the flood of postwar dollars had become too large, and that measures had to be taken to choke off the persistent American balance-of-payments deficit.

A ROUGH START FOR BRETTON WOODS AND THE IMF

The Bretton Woods blueprint for exchange-rate stability, hard convertibility, and international cooperation through the International Monetary Fund proved untenable from the start. In 1947, buoyed by an enormous stabilization loan given by the United States after the cessation of lend-lease, Great Britain attempted to make sterling convertible into gold and dollars, as stipulated by the Bretton Woods agreement. This first real test

of the agreement proved a dismal failure. There was an immediate run on the pound, and within months Britain used the entire proceeds of the loan. Current account convertibility of sterling was suspended, and no other major currency would attempt anything approaching hard convertibility until the end of 1958. The failed attempt to make sterling fully convertible was a major reason the United States decided to circumvent both the IMF and World Bank to provide direct aid to Great Britain and western Europe through the Marshall Plan. The sterling crisis also persuaded the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to accept widespread trade discrimination and monetary controls aimed at the dollar and dollar goods, in clear violation of the terms of the IMF's rules and regulations. Some of the monetary restrictions were lifted in 1958, but much of the trade discrimination against American goods continued for decades.

The pretense of IMF-monitored exchange-rate stability was abandoned in 1949, when Great Britain undertook a massive devaluation of sterling in order to make its exports more competitive and to write down wartime debts. Great Britain did not seek the approval of the IMF or any of its major non-Commonwealth trading partners. It did secretly consult with a small, high-level group of Truman administration officials led by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The 1949 devaluation outraged officials from the IMF and the international community and threatened to undo the tentative movement toward European economic integration and the dismantling of worldwide trade and currency controls. The lesson learned by other nations was that there was no punishment for a unilateral devaluation if national interests warranted it. If one of the countries that helped design the IMF and the Bretton Woods system flouted its rules, how could other nations be expected to tow the line? The IMF was powerless to stop any transgression against its charter.

Perhaps the most shocking fact was that the International Monetary Fund, which was supposed to be both the source of liquidity for temporary payments imbalances and the enforcer of Keynes and White's international monetary rules, was almost entirely excluded from Great Britain's decision (which was made in close consultation with the Truman administration). In actuality, the IMF was emasculated in the 1940s and 1950s, with little authority or voice in international economics. Desperately needed liquidity was supplied to the world by direct American aid, through programs like the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the Military Assistance Program. In fact, signatories of the Marshall Plan were strictly forbidden from using the IMF to correct payments imbalances. The Marshall Plan actually created a separate monetary system for western Europe, the European Payments Union, which had its own rules that flouted both the spirit and the letter of IMF regulations. The EPU allowed only extremely limited intra-European convertibility and permitted discrimination against dollar transactions. It was only much later that the IMF became a player in world monetary relations, a period that began when the United States used the IMF as a vehicle to make an enormous loan for Great Britain after the Suez crisis in 1956–1957.

"Disequilibrium" characterized the postwar IMF monetary system throughout the so-called Bretton Woods period. During the early postwar period, there were large payments imbalances between the devastated economies of western Europe and the United States. Large European deficits were to be expected, but they were made worse by the fact that currency par values were often established in an arbitrary manner. Although the IMF was supposed to approve initial par values and any subsequent changes, in actuality each country could pretty much establish whatever rate it wished. If exchange rates had "floated" on foreign exchange markets after the war, they might have found a sustainable rate that would have closed the payments gap with the United States more quickly and efficiently. But after rates were set, changes came in dramatic and disruptive devaluations, the direction of which was always known in advance. Extensive trade and capital controls that discriminated against dollar goods were established instead. In order to fill the large payments gap, the United States provided enormous amounts of aid (in fact, initially Marshall Plan disbursements by the United States were determined by the payments deficit of individual European countries). The adjustment process during the postwar period was not automatic but had to be managed by governmental policy and controls. This made the Bretton Woods period different from the gold standard and the free exchange-rate period in one important respect: because the adjustment process could only be accomplished by government intervention and policy, the system was highly politicized.

THE FLAWS OF THE IMF BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM

Why did the Nixon administration finally pull the plug on the IMF Bretton Woods system on 15 August 1971, after two decades of monetary chaos and instability? In fact the decision was to a large degree inevitable. In its final form the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement that created the IMF was unworkable because it lacked a mechanism to adjust persistent payments imbalances between countries. Exchange-rate stability could only be maintained by providing ever-increasing amounts of "liquidity," a process that created enormous political difficulties and ultimately undermined confidence in the IMF system.

Why were the fixed exchange rates unstable? The IMF plan, unlike a pure gold standard, affirmed the primacy of domestic economic goals, which included the maintenance of full-employment economies over strict balance-of-payments concerns. But exchange-rate stability can only be sustained when there is comparable price stability between countries, a near impossibility. If prices change markedly because of inflation or deflation in a given domestic economy, then currency exchange rates must shift accordingly or else their initial par rates will quickly be rendered obsolete. When exchange rates are not changed to reflect price shifts, balance-of-payments deficits and surpluses quickly emerge. Such a situation would be especially problematic if the initial par values were already out of line, which was often the case under the IMF Bretton Woods system, because nations were given wide discretion to establish their own rates.

The ensuing balance-of-payments disequilibria were a constant source of monetary instability in the IMF Bretton Woods system. For example, if Great Britain's domestic economic goals produced a yearly inflation rate of 6 percent, and the United States pursued policies that resulted in 4 percent inflation, then the exchange rate would have to be adjusted if balance-of-payments disequilibrium was to be avoided. But this obviously contradicted the IMF's goal of exchange-rate stability, and without market-determined rates there was no easy mechanism to adjust the exchange rate without creating havoc. Deflating the domestic economy to bring the balance-of-payments into balance was not politically realistic or desirable after World War II. Furthermore, the IMF system actually rewarded speculators, who knew the direction of any revaluation and could simply put pressure on a vulnerable currency until a nation exhausted its reserves or its will defending the old exchange rate. Speculators made a fortune forcing the devaluation of sterling in 1949 and 1967. The only option to avoid damaging devaluations was capital and trade controls. Every major country, including the United States, had to install capital controls in one form or another during the early years of the IMF Bretton Woods system in order to maintain their exchange rate, despite the fact they were forbidden (except in extreme cases) by the IMF.

A second flaw, less well recognized but equally serious, was the method of providing "liquidity" in the IMF Bretton Woods system. Liquidity is simply another word used to describe reserve assets that are transferred from debtor to surplus countries to cover their payments gap. In order to offset a negative payments balance and maintain a fixed exchange rate, governments had to supply some universally accepted asset over which they had no issuing control to cover. Until 1914 this asset was, at least in theory, gold. Because the IMF Bretton Woods planners believed that there was not enough gold to supply world liquidity (reserve) needs, key currencies, such as the dollar and sterling, should be used to supplement or replace gold to settle international transactions.

The failure to make sterling fully convertible in 1947 meant that the dollar alone would serve the reserve asset, or "liquidity," function. As a result the dollar was demanded by foreign nations both as a reserve asset and to finance much of the world's trade. These factors, in conjunction with the economic recovery of Europe, helped produce a sizable American balance-of-payments deficit. But it was not like the payments deficit of any other nation. Some of these excess dollars were actually desired by the rest of the world, not to purchase American goods and services but for reserve and international settlement purposes. In other words, the dollar's unique role in world trade and reserve creation meant that a certain level of American balance-of-payments deficit was desirable and in fact necessary for the international economy. But how much of a payments deficit was needed to supply global liquidity was difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Initially most foreign central banks preferred to hold dollars because they earned interest and had lower transaction costs than gold. But as American dollar liabilities—created by the yearly payments deficits—increased, confidence in the gold convertibility of the dollar fell. After convertibility

was established by the major economies of western Europe at the end of 1958, central banks began to buy increasing amounts of gold from the United States with their excess dollars.

This brought up a larger question: how stable and cooperative could the IMF Bretton Woods system be if it only worked when the world's largest economy, the United States, ran yearly balance-of-payments deficits? Much has been made of the advantages and disadvantages this system conferred on the American economy. When foreign central banks held dollars for reserve and transaction purposes, it enabled American consumers to receive foreign goods and services without having to give anything other than a promise to pay in return. It was like automatic credit, or, if the reserves built up indefinitely, like getting things for almost nothing. This arrangement, which is the benefit of seigniorage, could be maintained as long as the dollar was "as good as gold," when holding dollars in the form of short-term interest-bearing securities was probably preferable to buying gold, which earned no interest income and had high transaction costs. The danger came when overseas holders of dollars worried that the dollar was not as good as gold or for noneconomic reasons preferred holding gold to dollars. This sentiment emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Under the IMF Bretton Woods system, overseas central bankers could turn in their excess dollars for gold at any time. But at some point the ratio of dollar liabilities to American gold would increase to a level that might cause a loss of foreign confidence in the dollar and a run to the U.S. Treasury gold window. American policymakers saw this as a threat to the economic well-being and foreign policy of the United States. The loss of American gold was also seen as a threat to the world economy, because it was believed that a worldwide preference for gold over dollars would decrease the amount of liquidity needed to finance and balance ever-expanding world trade. A mass conversion to gold would force the United States to suspend convertibility, which would wipe out the dollar's value as a reserve and transaction currency. It was feared that competition between central banks for scarce gold could subject the international economy to paralyzing deflation. Another fear was that the resulting collapse of liquidity would freeze world trade and investment, restoring the disastrous conditions that paralyzed the world during the 1930s and created depression and world war.

The IMF Bretton Woods monetary system did have certain disadvantages for the United States. The fact that overseas central bankers held dollars in their reserves meant that the United States could be pressured for political reasons by the countries within the IMF Bretton Woods system. While the United States accrued benefits from the system, its pledge to convert dollars into gold made it vulnerable in ways other countries were not, especially as the ratio of gold to dollars decreased over time. To some extent Great Britain ran a similar gold-exchange standard before 1914 with a very low gold to sterling ratio, but international monetary relations were far less politicized before World War I. If France held a large supply of dollars as reserves and wanted to express dissatisfaction with some aspect of American foreign or economic policy, it could convert those dollars into gold. Converting dollars into gold gave surplus countries an important source of political leverage. It was this scenario that caused President John F. Kennedy to exclaim that "the two things which scared him most were nuclear weapons and the payments deficit."

The IMF Bretton Woods system trapped reserve countries in another way. If a nonreserve country ran a persistent balance-of-payments deficit, it had the option of devaluing its currency to improve the terms of trade of its exports. The dollar was priced in terms of gold, so if it was devalued, other currencies could simply shift the value of their currencies so that no real devaluation could take place. The only true devaluation option that the United States had was to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The rest of the world would be left with a choice. Overseas central bankers could support the exchange rate of the dollar by using their own reserves to maintain their exchange rates with the dollar. Or they could "float" their currencies in all the foreign-exchange markets to determine their true value. Suspending dollar-gold convertibility was an option few American policymakers wanted to consider during the 1950s and 1960s. For their part, most European surplus countries dreaded either option.

Why was there such a fear—both in the United States and abroad—of abandoning the IMF Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates and moving to a market-determined, free-floating exchange-rate regime? It is hard to underestimate the powerful influence of the received wisdom concerning the history of monetary relations between the wars. In the postwar period it was a

widely held belief that the economic collapse of the 1930s was caused by a failure of international monetary cooperation. In the minds of most postwar economists and policymakers, capital flight, which had its roots in free-market speculation, had ruined the gold exchange standard, which destroyed international liquidity and froze international trade and financial transactions. The collapse of the rules of the game unleashed a vicious competition whereby countries pursued beggar-thy-neighbor policies of competitive devaluations and trade restrictions. To most, the culprit behind the international economic collapse was a free market out of control, fueled by pernicious speculators who had no concern for the larger implications of their greed-driven actions. This economic collapse unleashed autarky and eventually war. A market-driven international monetary system was no longer compatible with stability and international cooperation. Any situation that remotely looked like a repeat of the 1930s was to be avoided at all costs. IMF planners and Western policymakers determined that in the postwar world the market had to be tamed and national interest replaced with international cooperation that would be fostered by enlightened rules and institutions. Strangely, few seemed to understand how chaotic and inefficient the IMF Bretton Woods system eventually became. Massive American aid and constant intervention tended to obscure the system's failings. The intellectual framework that produced the IMF Bretton Woods blueprint, though deeply flawed, had a profound impact on the postwar planners in most Western countries, including the United States, and thrived well into the 1970s.

More than anything else, policymakers in America and western Europe were afraid of the unknown. While the system was inefficient and prone to crisis, monetary relations, no matter how strained, were far better than during the interwar period. Furthermore, Western monetary relations were interwoven into a complex fabric that included key political and military relationships, including U.S. troop commitments to West Germany and Japan. No one knew what would happen to this fabric if the IMF Bretton Woods system collapsed, and few were anxious to find out.

What eventually destroyed the original IMF Bretton Woods system was that it did not have an effective, consistent process to adjust payments imbalances between countries. In order to preserve or restore a balance in international payments, payments imbalances between a country and the rest of the world must be brought into equilibrium through an adjustment process. The adjustment process can take many different forms, depending upon the rules of the international monetary system in question. There are two monetary systems where the adjustment mechanism is automatic, at least in theory: a gold standard and a system of free exchange rates. The nineteenth-century gold standard eliminated payments deficits and surpluses automatically through changes in a country's aggregate demand brought about by importing or exporting gold. The present system of free exchange rates eliminates prospective payments imbalances through market-driven shifts in exchange rates. In both systems, payments imbalances are brought into equilibrium through processes that are largely automatic and independent of any governmental interference. The adjustment process in gold standard and free exchange rate regimes tends to be less politicized.

But this is not how payments imbalances were adjusted in the IMF Bretton Woods system. Instead, domestic economies were protected from demand fluctuations produced by gold or other reserve movements, and the system of fixed exchange rates prevented the market from determining the equilibrium price for a nation's currency. Since there were inevitably great differences among national monetary policies, some method was needed to adjust for the changes in the relative value of currencies produced by differential rates of inflation and savings. But exchange-rate variations were difficult because they unsettled foreign exchange markets, and it was impossible to get countries to agree to shifts because they feared the adverse effects on their terms of trade. Countries were equally reluctant to sacrifice full employment and social policy goals for balance-of-payments purposes. This left no effective means to close balance-of-payments gaps automatically. As the economist Robert Stern stated in 1973, "Since the functioning of the pegged rate system may appear to avoid rather than expedite adjustment, it might be more fitting to characterize this system . . . as the 'international disequilibrium system.'"

Consider the lengths to which the Kennedy and Johnson administrations went to settle America's balance-of-payments deficits in the early 1960s. After the Eisenhower administration went into a near panic over the loss of gold in the days immediately before and after the 1960 presidential election (Eisenhower even proposed using the more abundant uranium in place of gold to settle

America's payments deficit), the new Democratic administration made solving the problem one of its key foreign policy goals. A whole series of complicated formal and informal arrangements ensued—some through the IMF, others bilaterally, and still others with the so-called Group of Ten, or industrialized nations. But none of these American policies dealt with the crucial issue of creating a more effective adjustment mechanism.

The liquidity issue was much discussed both within and outside of the IMF during the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Liquidity, which was merely a euphemism for reserves, was the vehicle for financing balance-of-payments deficits in the Bretton Woods system. The greater and more persistent the imbalances, the more reserves, or liquidity, are needed to make the system work. In a system of fixed exchange rates that does not have an automatic adjustment mechanism, differential inflation and savings rates will quickly produce large imbalances between countries. Government leaders, unwilling to adjust exchange rates or alter domestic priorities for balance-of-payments purposes, clamored for more liquidity to finance balance-of-payments deficits. But it was rarely pointed out that this liquidity would be unnecessary if there was an efficient, effective, and automatic process for adjusting imbalances.

During the late 1950s and 1960s, when both policymakers and academics recognized that the international monetary system was flawed, hardly a proposal for reform was produced that did not emphasize the need for more liquidity. Suggestions ranged from increasing the country subscriptions to the IMF to inventing a whole new form of liquidity. The most dramatic American proposal came during the summer of 1965, when the Johnson administration's secretary of the treasury, Henry Fowler, called for a "new Bretton Woods conference" to create new liquidity. When the major western European nations eased capital controls and allowed for convertibility of their currencies into dollars, trade and capital flows increased dramatically. This made liquidity a more important issue: larger trade and capital flows increased the payments imbalances that inevitably arose in a fixed exchange-rate regime. More reserve assets were needed by national foreign exchange authorities to defend their exchange rate in the face of increasingly large and sophisticated currency markets. If controls were to be avoided (and they were not), countries would have to cooperate to manage disequilibrium. This would require agreements and institutional arrangements, such as the IMF, the General Agreement to Borrow, the swap arrangements, the Group of Ten, and the gold pool. But in the end, all of these reforms and ad hoc measures were merely Band-Aids to cover the deep structural flaws within the IMF Bretton Woods monetary system.

THE IMF AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF BRETTON WOODS

Despite the strenuous efforts of U.S. foreign policymakers, the IMF Bretton Woods system suffered a slow, painful death in the 1960s and early 1970s. Institutionally the IMF was at the center of many of the attempts to keep the system on life support. The organization's deposits, and ability to loan, were increased substantially in the 1960s. The IMF was also at the center of a series of proposals to reform and recast international monetary relations. The most interesting was the American proposal to supplant the dollar's reserve and liquidity role with an instrument called "Special Drawing Rights," or SDRs. The idea for the SDRs emerged from a 1963 G-10 study on the need for additional liquidity and was formally proposed by the United States in the summer of 1965. The French were vehemently against the SDR, or any instrument that increased the IMF's power, since they believed the organization was a vehicle for American hegemony. Tough and at times acrimonious negotiations finally produced an agreement that was signed in Rio de Janeiro in September 1967. The SDRs were hailed as a major accomplishment, a needed supplement to the IMF Bretton Woods system, but in fact they were never widely used.

Ironically the greatest beneficiary of the monetary disorder of the 1960s and 1970s might have been the IMF. Irrelevant during the late 1940s and 1950s, the organization became the focal point of efforts to fix a broken international monetary system. Increased capital and trade flows brought more balance of payments volatility, and the IMF was called upon repeatedly to bail countries out of foreign exchange crises. The British requested billions to stave off monetary crises in 1961, 1964, and 1966. None of this aid helped, as sterling was finally devalued in 1967, although unlike the 1949 devaluation, the IMF played a key role. Even the French were forced to ask the IMF for help to defend their currency after their currency collapsed in the wake of the May

CAPITAL MOBILITY

It is not widely recognized that the worldwide explosion of capital flows came only after the IMF–Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility collapsed in the early 1970s. By the late 1970s, many developed countries began to abandon the array of capital controls that had been necessary to maintain strict par values. Exchange-rate flexibility combined with deregulation of the financial markets, improved technology, and the development of innovative financial hedge instruments to protect against exchange-rate risks to encourage a massive increase in cross-border capital movements. Even more significantly, the direction of these flows changed, as more capital began to move to the developing economies around the world, particularly in East Asia and Latin America.

Has this revolution in capital mobility been a good thing for the world? Previously poor East Asian economies have become economic dynamos in record time, most of the former Soviet empire has joined the world trading system, and Europe has begun a once-unthinkable experiment of a single currency. Never in history has there been such breathtaking change in international monetary relations in so short a period of time.

There is no doubting the benefits that the international financial revolution has brought to the world. But there have also been troubling crises that deserve attention: the volatility of the dollar's exchange rate in the 1980s, the developing-country debt crisis that burdened Latin America and threatened the solvency of major Western banks, and the bumpy road to the European Monetary Union. But most monetary and financial crises are not simply the product of unfair speculation or herd behavior. There is almost always a real-world culprit, whether it is loose monetary policies, fiscal largesse, or insufficient supervision of domestic financial institutions. Fortunately, as the link between these macroeconomic and regulatory problems and monetary chaos are better understood, there should be far fewer destabilizing crises in the future.

1968 Paris street protests. The IMF also served as a convenient vehicle for U.S. foreign policy goals when direct aid was not politically feasible, especially in the case of the bailout of sterling.

The IMF's power and influence as an organization increased even more after the collapse of the global monetary rules it was assigned to oversee. Nixon ended dollar-gold convertibility at Camp David on 15 August 1971 without consulting the IMF. But every American attempt to restructure the system during the ensuing sixteen months did so with the IMF as the centerpiece organization. Any attempt to maintain the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system collapsed, however, after February 1973, when the United States and the world abandoned the short-lived Smithsonian agreement. The world returned to market-determined free exchange rates, the very system the IMF was established to prevent.

Economic malaise, in the form of international recession and a fourfold increase in oil prices, combined with exchange-rate volatility to spread balance-of-payments chaos worldwide. After Camp David the IMF's role, and even its customers, changed dramatically. After abandoning fixed exchange rates the large industrialized countries like Japan and the countries of western Europe were less concerned about balance-of-payments difficulties. Market-determined changes in cross exchange rates replaced the ineffective adjustment mechanism of the old IMF Bretton Woods system. Nor did these large countries need the liquidity provided by the IMF, unless they wanted to defend their exchange rates against the overwhelming forces of the market. But the countries of the developing world could not as easily ignore dramatic changes in their exchange rates, and the oil price surge left many unable to close their balance-of-payments gaps without outside help.

Thus in the 1970s the IMF acquired a new client—the developing world. The fund also had new subscribers—the states of the Middle East that had grown rich with profits from their oil. Countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had vast amounts of money, some of which went to increased subscriptions to international organizations like the IMF, and most of which was "recy-

cled" through American banks and invested in the underdeveloped world. This massive recycling was both a response to and the reason for the Third World debt crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s. The IMF increasingly found itself providing balance-of-payments financing to poorer countries hit hard by the energy price spikes of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s.

One of the most controversial aspects of the IMF's post–Bretton Woods lending program has been its requirement that funded countries undergo what is called "structural adjustment." Since IMF funding is meant to fill a balance-of-payments deficit, stabilize the foreign exchange rate, and avoid devaluation, the institution demands fundamental macroeconomic and institutional reforms to remove the causes of the payments imbalance. Stabilizing a currency and halting massive capital flows usually require policies that deflate the domestic economy, such as raising interest rates and slashing the size of the state's budget. Many critics contend that these measures hurt the weakest members of the affected society. The first programs cut are usually in much-needed social welfare, health care, and educational programs that help the poor. Higher interest rates deflate the economy and lead to increased unemployment. Furthermore, the poor do not have the option of transferring their assets and capital abroad, as the wealthy often do during currency crises in the underdeveloped world.

The harshness of the IMF's structural adjustment program—and U.S. policymakers' role in promoting these controversial plans—came into greater focus in the late twentieth century. Largely at the behest of the Clinton administration's Treasury Department, the massive IMF bailout of Mexico in 1995 required an economic reform plan that led to large layoffs and sharp downward pressure on workers' wages. Similar complaints have been voiced in East Asia, where Indonesia's efforts to calm a currency crisis through "structural readjustment" led to political turmoil, domestic unrest, and economic collapse. The IMF's reputation has been further damaged by the widespread misuse of its funds in Russia. Things got so bad that the IMF was publicly criticized by Joseph Stiglitz, the chief economist of its sister organization, the World Bank. Worse, the IMF was seen as a handmaiden for America's foreign policy goal of privatizing, reforming, and opening overseas markets. The sharp criticism forced the IMF to reassess all of its lending procedures and requirements, including its structural adjustment programs.

THE WORLD BANK AND ITS OFFSHOOTS

The World Bank, though far less influential than the IMF, has certainly been no less controversial since its opening in 1946. The bank has actually gone through fundamental changes since accepting its original agenda to promote the postwar recovery of Europe and Japan—its first loan was for $250 million to France in 1947. As it has added to its mandate, it spawned several new organizations to the original International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

In 1956 the bank established the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to provide subsidized loans and guarantees to poor, underdeveloped countries. The IFC provides long-term financing at near-market rates. The IFC provides $4 to $5 billion in new loans annually. The International Development Association (IDA) is perhaps the most controversial additional arm of the World Bank. The IDA was created in 1960 to provide money to countries too poor to borrow from the World Bank's primary institution, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. IDA loans carry no interest rate, are very long term (thirty-five to fifty years), a small yearly fee (.75 percent), and a ten-year grace period. The United States has been the largest contributor to the IDA, providing more than $20 billion between 1960 and 2000. The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in 1966 to promote increased private investment to the underdeveloped world. Similarly, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was created in 1988 to reduce the risk faced by private global investors in poor countries. In addition to providing advice, MIGA insures and guarantees up to 90 percent of a project's investment.

The bank gets its money from country contributions and its investments in financial markets. The membership has increased from the original 44 nations that met at Bretton Woods to 183 in 2001. The United States is by far the largest contributor, providing over $50 billion since 1944. Although its total share has decreased, the United States still provides more than 17 percent of total funds. Several bodies govern the bank, including a board of governors (with a member from each country), a twenty-five-member executive directorate (with the five largest donors—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain holding permanent seats), and a president, who is by tradition an American.

EXECUTIVE PERSONALITY AND THE WORLD BANK

Far more than the IMF, the World Bank's direction and policies have been established by the personality of the executive director. The director's authority came largely as the result of a power struggle in the bank's early years between the first president, Eugene Meyer, a seventy-year-old investment banker selected by the Truman administration, and the bank's management and executive board. This dispute over power sharing led to Meyer's resignation after only six months. The high-profile "wise man" John J. McCloy was brought in to succeed him and to place the tottering bank on a better footing. McCloy's first act was to get the bank's executive board to relinquish its activist position and allow the president to dictate the organization's policies and directions. Though McCloy only stayed two and a half years, he began the tradition of powerful American World Bank presidents who drove the multilateral organization's agenda.

The World Bank's original mission was to provide reconstruction loans to war-torn Europe and Japan. These loans were intended for basic infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, electrical plants, and the like. But the bank's lending policies were very conservative at first, and the recipients both demanded more funds and resisted the conditions attached to financing. The European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, soon eclipsed the World Bank. This U.S.-financed program provided far more money and attached fewer strings. During its first four years the World Bank provided only $500 million to western Europe, a figure dwarfed by the Marshall Plan and even by private American investment.

The World Bank's conservative lending policies continued under the long-term leadership of Eugene Black (1949–1962). While Black, a former president of Chase Manhattan Bank, enjoyed a solid reputation in the financial world, he was wary of moving too quickly away from the bank's original mandate. But by the late 1950s and 1960s the World Bank decided to escape its international irrelevance by reinventing itself. Western Europe and Japan were well on their way to a robust economic recovery that the World Bank had little to do with. The key event was the creation of the International Development Association in 1960. The IDA was established to make subsidized loans to poor countries that were credit risks and could not afford private commercial loans.

In order to borrow from the IDA a country must meet four criteria. It must be very poor (less than $800 per capita GNP in 2001). It must have sufficient political and economic stability to warrant financing over the long term. The country must have extremely difficult balance-of-payments problems, with little opportunity to earn the needed foreign exchange. Finally, its national policies must reflect a real commitment to development. These goals and policies reflected a new passion within the U.S. academic and foreign policy community for using foreign aid to promote "modernization" in the so-called Third World.

The IDA did not start out well. In fact a whole series of regional institutions were developed in order to fill the perceived void created by the World Bank's stingy loan practices. In 1958 the European Development Bank was created, largely for the benefit of francophone Africa. The European Investment Bank was established to finance infrastructure projects within the European Economic Community. In 1958 the Inter-American Development Bank was set up in Washington, D.C., to spur growth in Latin America. The African Development Bank was created in 1964, and the very successful Asian Development Bank began operations in 1966. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then the World Bank was successful indeed. But the proliferation of regional banks also signaled the failure of the Bretton Woods institution to fully embrace the enormous global development challenges that arose in the 1960s.

The World Bank began its real transformation under the controversial leadership of Robert S. McNamara (1968–1981). McNamara took over the bank after his resignation (or firing—he was never sure which) as President Lyndon B. Johnson's secretary of defense in 1968. McNamara became the father of a much-contested lending concept called "sustainable development." He dramatically increased the bank's lending portfolio, and by the time he left in 1981, lending had increased more than tenfold, from almost $900 million to $12 billion. McNamara succeeded in finally making the World Bank relevant to the global economy, particularly in the underdeveloped world. But he also left a legacy of continuing controversy that has fueled passionate anti–World Bank rhetoric from both the extreme left and right.

By the time McNamara had decided to leave the bank, there had been a sharp shift in orthodoxy within both the economics profession and policymaking community toward development

aid. The election of Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the United States signaled a move away from Keynesian demand management toward a more laissez-faire philosophy. This was bound to affect the bank. In fact, just as the last years of Jimmy Carter's presidency witnessed a defense buildup and a spate of economic deregulation that foreshadowed the Reagan years, so too did the final period of the McNamara presidency bring a sea shift in World Bank policies. By the end of the 1970s there was a growing dissatisfaction with the results and perceived lack of accountability in World Bank lending. This led the bank to institute its own "structural adjustment" policies in the hope of encouraging macroeconomic reform among countries receiving funding.

McNamara's successor, A. W. Claussen (1981–1986), faced mounting challenges: hostility from the new U.S. administration, a poorly performing portfolio, and increasing fears of a full-blown debt crisis in the developing world. Over time, Claussen replaced McNamara's more progressive staff members with neoclassical economists like Anne Krueger. Claussen maintained a far more low-key style that served the bank well during this period of transition. Claussen's successors Barber Conable (1986–1991) and Lewis Preston (1991–1995) did not fare as well. The World Bank was forced to suspend its lending to its largest (and in many ways most successful) client, the People's Republic of China, after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. This set a precedent of sorts for the bank, as it had scrupulously tried to stay out of "borrower politics." The Preston presidency faced growing questions about the bank's effectiveness, detailed below, which continued to plague Preston's successor, James Wolfensohn, who took over after Preston's untimely death in 1995.

WORLD BANK CRITICS ON THE RIGHT AND LEFT

The World Bank and its lending practices have come under increasing scrutiny. The critique from the right contends that the World Bank has shifted from being a "lender of last resort" to an international welfare organization. In doing so the World Bank has become, according to critics, bloated, incompetent, and even corrupt. Worse, the bank's lending policies often reward macroeconomic inefficiency in the underdeveloped world, allowing inefficient kleptocracies to avoid the types of fundamental reforms that would in the long run end poverty in their countries. These critics like to compare the fantastic growth in East Asia to the deplorable economic conditions of Africa. In 1950 the regions were alike—South Korea had a lower per capita GDP than Nigeria. But by pursuing macroeconomic reforms, high savings, investing in education and basic social services, and opening their economies to the global trading order, the "Pacific Tigers" have been able to lift themselves out of poverty and into wealth with very little help from the World Bank. Many countries in Africa, however, have relied primarily on multilateral assistance from organizations like the World Bank while avoiding fundamental macroeconomic reforms, with deplorable but predictable results.

Conservatives point out that the World Bank has lent more than $350 billion over a half-century, mostly to the underdeveloped world, with little to show for it. One study argued that of the sixty-six countries that received funding from the bank from 1975 to 2000, well over half were no better off than before, and twenty were actually worse off. The study pointed out that Niger received $637 million between 1965 and 1995, yet its per capita GNP had fallen, in real terms, more than 50 percent during that time. In the same period Singapore, which received one-seventh as much World Bank aid, had seen its per capita GNP increase by more than 6 percent a year.

The left has been no less harsh in its criticisms of the World Bank. They claim that World Bank loans privilege large infrastructure projects like building dams and electric plants over projects that would benefit the poor, such as education and basic health care. Worse, these projects often have wreaked havoc on the local environment. Forests, rivers, and fisheries have been devastated by World Bank–financed projects. Some projects even have led to the forced resettlement of indigenous communities. One estimate holds that more than two and a half million people have been displaced by projects made possible through World Bank loans.

Environmentalist and anti-globalization groups point to specific failed projects. The Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada River in India was expected to displace almost a quarter of a million people into squalid resettlement sites. The Polonoroeste Frontier Development scheme has led to large-scale deforestation in the Brazilian rain forest. In Thailand, the Pak Mun dam has destroyed the fisheries of the Mun River,

impoverishing thousands who had made their living fishing and forever altering the diet of the region.

In response to these accusations, the World Bank has attempted reforms, appointing its own inspection panel in 1993. But critics point out that the bank needs to be more responsive to outside forces and criticisms. The World Bank has never rejected a single project since 1944. The bank staff is very highly paid—the average compensation of a World Bank employee in 1994 was $134,000. The bank can't even properly manage the construction of its own headquarters: the 1993–1994 project came in almost $100 million over budget. Perhaps most damning, the bank's lax lending standards have led to a rapidly deteriorating loan portfolio.

CONCLUSION

The future of both Bretton Woods institutions remains uncertain. Both the IMF and World Bank escaped the efforts of the Republican U.S. Congress in the mid-1990s to sharply curtail and even eliminate both organizations. These agencies have been less successful in answering the charges from the left, as the IMF retains its demand for "structural adjustments" and the World Bank still favors funding for large, project-driven funding. While both the IMF and the World Bank have instituted some reforms, they have been unable to appease the concerns of outraged environmentalists, labor unionists, and nationalists and advocates of indigenous peoples in the developing world.

Still, as this essay has suggested, these two organizations are really the misguided target for the legitimate concerns people of all ideological stripes have had about the rapid pace of globalization in the past half century. It is likely this globalization would have occurred whether or not there had been a Bretton Woods conference, and it is all but certain it will continue in the future regardless of the policies pursued by the IMF and World Bank. While it is true that they have often been too driven by U.S. foreign policy concerns, in the end the influence of both institutions has been widely overstated. And despite their mistakes during the past half century, they have rarely been given credit for many of the little things they do well. For example, both institutions perform economic surveillance over most of the world's economy, a valuable task that no other international or private organization could perform with such skill. Both agencies also serve as a store of expert knowledge and wisdom for countries throughout the world that lack trained specialists. While neither the IMF nor the World Bank has met the lofty goals of their founders or wielded the nefarious influence charged by their critics, they have and should continue to play a small but important role in promoting prosperity and economic stability worldwide.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Argy, Victor. *The Postwar International Money Crisis: An Analysis.* London, 1981.

Aronson, Jonathan David. *Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System.* London and Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977.

Block, Fred L. *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present.* Berkeley, Calif., 1977.

Bordo, Michael D., and Barry Eichengreen, eds. *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform.* Chicago, 1993.

Brown, Brendan. *The Flight of International Capital: A Contemporary History.* London and New York, 1987.

Caincross, Alec, and Barry Eichengreen. *Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949, and 1967.* Oxford, 1983.

Calleo, David P. *The Imperious Economy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1982.

Cassis, Youssef. *Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880–1960.* Cambridge and New York, 1992.

Cohen, Benjamin J. *Organizing the World's Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations.* New York, 1977.

Cooper, Richard N. *The International Monetary System: Essays in World Economics.* Cambridge, Mass., 1987.

Corden, W. M. *Inflation, Exchange Rates and the World Economy: Lectures on International Monetary Economics.* 3d ed. Chicago, 1986.

De Grauwe, Paul. *International Money: Post-War Trends and Theories.* Oxford and New York, 1989.

De Vries, Margaret Garritsen. *The International Monetary Fund 1966–1971: The System Under Stress.* Vols. 1–2. Washington, D.C., 1976.

———. *Balance of Payments Adjustment 1945 to 1986: The IMF Experience.* Washington, D.C., 1987.

Dormael, Armand van. *Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System.* New York, 1978.

Eckes, Alfred E. *A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971.* Austin, Tex., 1975.

Eichengreen, Barry. *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939.* New York, 1992.

———. *International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century.* Washington, D.C., 1994.

Fischer, Stanley. "Stability and Exchange Rate Systems in a Monetarist Model of the Balance of Payments." In Robert Z. Aliber, ed. *The Political Economy of Monetary Reform.* London and Montclair, N.J., 1977.

Friedman, Milton. "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates." In his *Essays in Positive Economics.* Chicago, 1953.

———. *Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History.* New York, 1992.

Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz. *A Monetary History of the United States: 1867–1960.* Princeton, N.J., 1963.

Gallarotti, Giulio. *The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 1880–1914.* New York, 1995.

Gardner, Richard N. *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order.* New ed. New York, 1980.

Gavin, Francis J. "The Legends of Bretton Woods." *Orbis* (spring 1996).

Gilbert, Martin. *Quest for World Monetary Order: The Gold-Dollar System and Its Aftermath.* New York, 1980.

Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations.* Princeton, N.J., 1987.

Gowa, Joanne. *Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1983.

Hogan, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952.* Cambridge and New York, 1987.

Horsefield, J. Keith, ed. *The International Monetary Fund, 1945–1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation.* Washington, D.C, 1969.

Ikenberry, John G. "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement." *International Organizations* 46 (winter 1992).

James, Harold. *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods.* New York, 1996.

Johnson, H. G. "Theoretical Problems of the International Monetary System." In Richard N. Cooper, ed. *International Finance.* Baltimore, 1969.

Kaplan, Jacob J., and Günter Schleiminger. *The European Payments Union: Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s.* Oxford and New York, 1989.

Kapur, Devesh, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb. *The World Bank: Its First Half Century.* Washington, D.C., 1997.

Kelly, Janet. "International Monetary Systems and National Security." In Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds. *Economic Issues and National Security.* Lawrence, Kans., 1977.

Kenen, Peter B., Francesco Papadia, and Fabrizio Saccomanni, eds. *The International Monetary System.* Cambridge and New York, 1994.

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton, N.J., 1984.

Keynes, John M. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.* Vol. 25. Edited by Donald Moggridge. London and New York, 1980.

Kindleberger, Charles. *A Financial History of Western Europe.* 2d ed. Oxford and New York, 1993.

Kirshner, Jonathan. *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power.* Princeton, N.J., 1995.

Kunz, Diane. *Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy.* New York, 1997.

Maier, Charles. "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe." *American Historical Review* 86 (April 1981).

Mason, Edward, and Robert E. Asher. *The World Bank Since Bretton Woods.* Washington, D.C., 1973.

Meier, Gerald M. *The Problems of a World Monetary Order.* 2d ed. Oxford and New York, 1982.

Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951.* London and Berkeley, Calif., 1984.

Newton, Scott. "The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan." *Economic History Review* 37 (August 1984).

———. "The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British Policy Toward European Integration." *Review of International Studies* 11 (July 1985).

Odell, John S. *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change.* Princeton, N.J., 1982.

Pollard, Robert A. *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950.* New York, 1985.

Rueff, Jacques. *Balance of Payments: Proposals for Resolving the Most Pressing World Economic Problem of Our Time.* New York, 1967.

Salda, Anne C. M. *Historical Dictionary of the World Bank.* Lanham, Md., 1997.

Shelton, Judy. *Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to the Global Currency System.* New York, 1994.

Solomon, Robert. *The International Monetary System, 1945–1976: An Insider's View.* New York, 1977.

Stern, Robert M. *The Balance of Payments: Theory and Economic Policy.* Chicago, 1973.

Strange, Susan. *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline.* New York, 1971.

———. *International Economic Relations of the Western World: 1959–1971.* Vol. 2. London and New York, 1976.

Temin, Peter. *Lessons from the Great Depression.* Cambridge, Mass., 1989.

Tew, Brian. *The Evolution of the International Monetary System, 1945–1988.* 4th ed. London, 1988.

Triffin, Robert. *Gold and the Dollar Crisis.* New Haven, Conn., 1960.

Wee, Herman van der. *Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy During 1945–80.* New York, 1985.

See also BALANCE OF POWER; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; FOREIGN AID; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY.

International Organization

Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Klaus Larres

International organizations (IOs) serve as crucial forces of coordination and cooperation on many political, economic, social, military and cultural issues. Aside from the traditional domination of international politics by established or recently codified nation-states, IOs are important participants of the international system. The growth of transnational IOs was greatly facilitated by the rise of an increasing number of tenuous networks of nation-states in political, economic, and financial affairs in early modern Europe. They began to proliferate in the course of the nineteenth century. As will be seen, the United States first participated in the development of IOs in a relatively minor way in the first two decades after the Civil War and in a more important way when American statesmen attended the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907. For much of the twentieth century the United States remained a leading proponent of the formation and development of IOs. Washington was even instrumental in the creation of two of the most important IOs ever: the League of Nations founded in 1919 after World War I and the United Nations established in 1945 at the end of World War II.

The breakdown of the international system in the 1910s and late 1930s and the global bloodshed, devastation, and unsurpassed misery brought about by two world wars convinced the international community, led by the United States and Britain, of the urgency for the establishment of a new universal and cooperative order. In the course of World War II traditional American political isolationism was marginalized to a considerable degree. Beginning with the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and continuing with the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods conferences, the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the formation of many other international political and economic institutions, the pillars for a new multilateral order were created. The Cold War soon added another dimension to this, which led to the shelving of the dream of a new cooperative world order for more than four decades: the politics and culture of bipolar containment. Genuine multilateralism was sidelined during much of the second half of the twentieth century. Instead international institutions, in particular the General Assembly of the United Nations, were frequently exploited as a mere talking shop and a forum for ventilating hostile rhetoric.

From the mid-1970s, however, a cautious revival of multilateralism, in the form of the Helsinki process inaugurated in 1975, may even have contributed to hastening the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. The dangers of an ever-increasing nuclear arms race, as well as economic and financial globalization and, paradoxically, the simultaneous development of a politically and culturally ever more fragmented world, once again gave IOs a crucial role as a forum for consultation, mediation, and arbitration. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries not only globalization and fragmentation but also the influence of more sophisticated means of transportation and communication and the increasingly transnational character of military, political, and environmental conflicts posed entirely new challenges. Despite recurrent bouts of political isolationism, the United States—like most other countries—recognized the impossibility of addressing contemporary problems merely on a nation-state basis. After the end of the East-West conflict and the gradual realignment of eastern and western Europe, this led to the formation of a host of new international organizations and institutions. Yet in the post–Cold War era the policies of the United States toward international organizations remained ambiguous; a widespread revival of both isolationism and unilateralism could be observed. However, the unprecedented terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 had a fundamental impact on American political strategy. In the

immediate wake of the attack no one could say whether it would result in the abandonment of unilateralism, but many policy analysts believed that it might well lead to a much greater American reengagement with international organizations to fight global terrorism.

Intellectually the development of IOs was rooted in Immanuel Kant's eighteenth-century insight that only the "pacific federation" of liberal democratic, interdependent, and lawful republics could overcome the inherent anarchy of the international system, as described by Thomas Hobbes, and therefore the permanent danger of the outbreak of war. While Hobbes believed that a strong authoritarian state and the balance of power among the world's greatest powers could rectify this situation and provide lasting international security, Kant was not convinced. He was in favor of the establishment of peace-creating confederations and thus, in effect, of bringing about the interdependence of nation-states. Over time these insights developed into the contemporary conviction that interdependent democratic states will hardly ever embark on military action against one another. Democracy and cooperative multilateralism within (but also outside) international organizations were thus seen as the best vehicles for the creation of a more stable and peaceful world.

WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?

In general international organizations are based on multilateral treaties between at least two sovereign nation-states. The formation of an initially fairly loose bond among the participants is generally fortified by the development of more or less stringent institutional structures and organs to pursue certain more or less clearly defined common aims in the international arena. IOs can either have a global or a regional character, with the latter in general displaying a more centralized structure due to the limited number of regional state actors available. While many IOs are single-issue organizations, others focus their attention on a multitude of issues. IOs can either be open to new members or consist of a closed system. On occasion IOs are established for a certain duration as specified in their respective charters, but more often than not no time restriction is applied.

In some of the older literature IOs tend to be subdivided into political and apolitical organizations, the former referring to military and political alliances to further the power of their member states and the latter referring to organizations dealing with mere administrative and technical issues. However, in the last few decades of the twentieth century many of the allegedly technical and "apolitical" suborganizations of the United Nations (for example, the Atomic Energy Commission and the World Health Organization), as well as such wide-ranging entities as the International Olympic Committee, the International Monetary Fund, and even many large multinational corporations, developed into highly politicized organizations with a multitude of political aims. The differentiation between political and technical IOs is therefore unhelpful. It makes much more sense to differentiate between international governmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, NATO, the IMF, and the World Bank, to name some of the best-known ones, and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) like Amnesty International and the International Red Cross. Although estimates differ profoundly, at the turn of the twenty-first century at least five hundred IGOs and eleven thousand INGOs were in existence. They were organized in the Union of International Organizations (founded 1907), which is based in Brussels and publishes the annual *Yearbook of International Organizations*.

While INGOs help to clarify international rules and regulations that enable at least two societal actors (parties, issue groups, unions, associations, international businesses, and corporations) to cooperate in the coordination of certain specified transnational and cross-border issues, IGOs, with which this essay is mostly concerned, are based on the cooperation of nation-states. An IGO is usually based on a multilateral treaty of two or more sovereign nation-states for the pursuit of certain common aims in the international arena. It is helpful to differentiate between supranational or semi-supranational IGOs, like the European Union, or looser confederations of states and nonsupranational IGOs, like the United Nations and NATO. While the former limit the sovereignty of the participating nations to a lesser or greater degree, the latter normally do not infringe on the sovereignty of their member states; they therefore tend to have only a limited degree of influence over their members. Despite the equality of recognized nation-states in international law, in fact a hierarchy of power and influence exists even within nonsupranational IGOs. The UN Security Council, dominated by its five permanent members, as well as the IMF, the

World Bank, and many other IOs, are all dominated by the established great powers, not least on account of their political and military influence and capabilities as well as their financial and economic clout. With the exception of China and Russia, the influential powers of the early twenty-first century all come from the ranks of the West.

There are some institutionalized meetings and conferences that can easily be mistaken as IGOs. Among these are the increasingly controversial G7/G8 meetings of developed nations and the meetings of the World Trade Organization as well as summit meetings between heads of states and, for example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which played such an important role in overcoming the Cold War. In fact they are not IGOs; instead these loose organizational structures are only very temporary alliances of a hybrid nature. But they are increasingly important and, in addition to the IGOs and INGOs, must be characterized as a third—albeit no less ambiguous and still largely unexplored—actor in international diplomacy.

DEVELOPMENT OF IOS AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

International organizations began to appear during the nineteenth century in the predominantly European state system. A considerable number of separate and limited-purpose agencies had accumulated by the outbreak of World War I. The organization-creating tendency of this period was stimulated primarily by the interdependencies engendered by the Industrial Revolution. New forms of production and new methods of transport and communication created problems and opportunities that necessitated more elaborate and systematic responses than those traditionally associated with bilateral diplomacy. International organization was an outgrowth of the multilateral consultation that came into vogue. It was a short step, and sometimes an almost imperceptible one, from convening a meeting of the several or many states whose interests were involved in a given problem and whose cooperation was essential to solving it, to establishing permanent machinery for collecting information, preparing studies and proposals, arranging recurrent consultations, and administering schemes agreed upon by the participating states.

The nineteenth-century concern with the challenge of developing rational multilateral responses to the changes wrought by steam and electricity in the economic and social spheres did not exclude concern with either the perennial or the newly developing problems of the "higher" sphere of international relations: war and peace, politics and security, law and order. Indeed it was clear that changes in the former spheres contributed to difficulties in the latter, and it was hoped that organized collaboration in the first might contribute to improvement in the second. Awareness of the increasing complexity of international politics, anxiety about the problems of preventing and limiting war, concern about the orderly balancing of stability and change, and hope for the strengthening of international law combined to inspire the ideal of applying international organization to the politico-legal realm.

The effort to do this at the end of the Napoleonic wars had yielded meager results, but the idea of giving firm institutional shape to the Concert of Europe persisted and was supplemented during the nineteenth century by the ideal of developing judicial means for the resolution of international disputes. It remained for the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 to stimulate the hope, and for World War I to demonstrate the necessity, of extending the concept of international organization into the "higher" sphere of international relations. The League of Nations embodied that extension, represented an effort to provide a central focus for the varied organizational activities that had emerged in the preceding century, and accelerated the growth of the organizing process among states. The collapse of the League and the outbreak of World War II gave rise to the establishment of the United Nations and a network of affiliated organizations. It also gave impetus to the institution-building disposition of statesmen, not least on the European continent, that has produced scores of agencies of almost every conceivable size and concern. If the nineteenth century was the period of the beginning of the movement toward international organization, the twentieth century has been the era of its multiplication. In the post–Cold War world the landscape is dotted with international agencies: global and regional, single-purpose and multipurpose, technical and political, regulatory and promotional, consultative and operational, modest and ambitious. And the habit of creating new ones and maintaining old ones remains well established among statesmen. By any test of quantity and variety, international organization has become a major phenomenon in international politics.

The beginning of the trend toward international organization in the nineteenth century and the proliferation of that trend in the next substantially involved the United States. The well-known isolationist tradition of the United States and the fact that it rejected membership in the League of Nations but joined the United Nations at its creation should not be taken as evidence that America is a latecomer to international organization. On the contrary, American participation in the nineteenth-century organizing process was at least as active as might reasonably have been expected given the country's geographic remoteness from the European center of the movement and its modest standing among the powers. American initiative contributed to the formation of such multilateral agencies as the Universal Postal Union (1874) and, within the Western Hemisphere, the Pan American Union (1890). Although the determination of the dates of establishment of international organizations and of adherence by particular states is by no means an exact science, one can take it as approximately correct that by 1900 the United States was a member of ten international bodies, and that by the outbreak of World War I it participated in twenty-seven, as against twenty-eight for Great Britain and thirty-six for France.

This record would seem to substantiate Henry Reiff's assertion that "The United States . . . is a veteran, if not an inveterate, joiner of unions or leagues of nations," despite its failure to affiliate with the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. America's record of interest and involvement in international organization made it less surprising that President Woodrow Wilson took the lead in creating the League of Nations than that the United States refrained from joining it. The American rejection of the league, historically considered, was an aberration rather than a continuation of settled policy regarding international organization. Moreover, it did not presage a drastically altered policy. Although the United States never accepted membership, it gradually developed cooperative relationships with the league in many areas of activity and ultimately assumed a formal role in several of its component parts. In the final analysis the United States became a more active and more useful participant in the operation of the league than many of the states that were officially listed as members. In addition, between the world wars the United States continued to join organizations outside the league family to such an extent that by 1940 it held a greater number of organizational memberships than did Britain and France, the leading powers in the league. Following World War II the United States became the world's unchallenged leader in promoting and supporting the development of international organizations of every sort.

AMERICAN AMBIGUITY TOWARD IOS

The attitude of the United States toward international organization, however, has been very ambivalent. Presumably the United States has gone along with, and has sometimes displayed enthusiasm for, the organizing process for essentially the same reasons that have moved other states: it has recognized the practical necessity, in its own interest, of developing and participating in systematic arrangements for dealing with the complex problems of the modern world. It has also shared the ideal of creating a global mechanism better adapted to promoting and maintaining peace and human welfare. Even when it has been skeptical of the utility or importance of particular multilateral institutions, the United States, like most other states, has generally inclined to the view that it can ill afford to be unrepresented in their functioning or to give the appearance of being indifferent to the ideals they purport to serve.

America's limited and informal engagement in the operation of the League of Nations illustrated the first of these points. The United States could bring itself neither to join nor to abstain entirely from the League. Its enthusiastic adherence to the United Nations in 1945 can be interpreted as in part a symbolic act of repentance and reversal, a conscious repudiation of the American abandonment of the League. Moreover, already during World War II, American statesman had been very active in planning for the postwar world. Even though idealistic and quite unrealistic plans predominated—such as Franklin Roosevelt's strong advocacy of a "one world" system including something approaching a world government, the abolition of the balance-of-power concept and of geographical spheres of influence, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull's enthusiasm for uninhibited global free trade—this still compared favorably to the passivity of Britain, the nation that had hitherto dominated the international system. While the British hesitated to embark on any postwar planning exercises for

fear of undermining the war effort, Washington began planning for the postwar world before the country had even become a belligerent power. After Pearl Harbor, and once Hitler had declared war on the United States, it was unlikely that a return to the political isolationism of the interwar years would occur despite the continuation of a strong isolationist strand in American thinking.

Thus, America's joining the United Nations with New York as the new organization's headquarters and San Francisco as the venue for the ceremonial signing of the UN Charter was much more than a mere symbolic denial of indifference to the high ideals enunciated in the charter. It was, more positively, a declaration of resolve to accept a position of leadership in world affairs, an affirmation of the intention to play a role that this country had never before assumed in international relations. In this sense American ratification of the UN Charter was a unique act, a dramatization of an event of peculiar significance: the decision of the United States to transform its approach to world affairs. The country's subsequent role in the distribution of Marshall Plan aid to western Europe and, above all, its adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949, reaffirmed the same point and even strengthened it. After all, NATO membership carried more concrete obligations and more definite alliance commitments than did membership in the United Nations. Article 5 of the NATO treaty pledged all member states to regard an attack on a member state as an attack on itself. Although during the ratification process the U.S. Senate insisted that the last decision of how the United States would react to any such emergency had to be left to Congress, article 5 imposed a firm obligation of some form of assistance on NATO member states.

In most cases decisions by the United States to take part in international agencies can be assumed to be motivated in much the same way and can be assigned essentially the same meaning as such decisions by other states. Neither in the case of the United States nor in other instances does it make sense to regard acceptance or support of international organizations as in itself a demonstration of virtue comparable with the virtue sometimes attributed to the individual because he goes to church and pays his tithe. International agencies are not embodiments of a sacred cause but, rather, instruments of the purposes of their members, susceptible of use to promote both noble and ignoble causes. States join them for mixed reasons, and the mere act of affiliation typically provides no solid information about the constructiveness, willingness to cooperate, or the peacefulness of the intentions of the state concerned.

America's inhibitions and reservations concerning international organization are a blend of the typical and the peculiar. Despite the vogue of creating new international organizations since the 1990s and the strong trend toward economic and financial globalization, it is clear that all states maintain some measure of reluctance to become too encompassed, circumscribed, and absorbed by international bodies. It is perhaps unfair to accuse them of harboring the illogical desire to have their cake and eat it too, for in the relations between organization and sovereignty, just as in the relations between national society and individualism, the real question is not which to choose but how much of each to include in the package. In either the domestic or the international case, however, the perennial tension between control and autonomy remains, and it becomes especially acute when circumstances require reconsideration of the necessary and proper balance between them. The fact that states need and want international organizations does not eliminate their desire to retain as much as possible of the autonomy that the traditionally decentralized international system affords them. The tension between the desire for effective and useful international organization and the urge to continue to enjoy and exploit the freewheeling possibilities of a simpler era profoundly affects the behavior of states in creating, joining, and operating multilateral agencies. In the Western world both NATO and in particular the European Union are prime examples of this.

SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTONOMY

Although sovereignty may figure as an abstract concept with definable meaning in legal and political scholarship, in the real world of states and peoples it is a symbol and slogan no less powerful for its having indistinct and highly variable meaning. "Sovereigntyism" as a subjective phenomenon is a more important factor in international relations than sovereignty as an objective fact. Concern about sovereignty has pervaded America's policy with respect to international institutions from the earliest days to the present. While it has rarely prevented the joining of organizations, it has always affected American contri-

butions to their design and the style of participation in their functioning. The fear that organizational involvements might cut more deeply into national autonomy than originally intended or agreed has never been far beneath the surface of American politics.

American "sovereigntyism" was originally linked with isolationism, which was based upon the fact that the new state was substantially isolated from the European cockpit of world affairs; it was distant, separate, and different. Moreover, it was weak and vulnerable to exploitation in any intimate association with European powers. Fixation on sovereignty reflected the conviction that prudence required the fledgling state to go its own way, capitalizing upon its peculiar situation to maintain political distance between itself and the leading states of the day. Isolationist doctrine related to political and military embroilments, not to economic and commercial ties, and for that reason it did not significantly inhibit American participation in the public international unions that began to emerge in the nineteenth century.

It was when international organization turned political, with the formation of the League of Nations, that jealous regard for sovereignty, nurtured in the era of isolationism, came to the fore as an impediment to American involvement. President Wilson's leading contribution to the formulation of the covenant made the league largely an American enterprise, but it was nevertheless profoundly un-American in certain fundamental respects. The league promised or threatened to involve the United States deeply and systematically in the political and security problems of a world that was still fundamentally Europe-centered. The covenant prescribed commitments that seemed to restrict America's freedom to keep its distance, to stand aside. By this time the United States had lost its isolation and the cogency of much of the rationale for isolationism had faded. However, Americans continued to value the freedom to decide, unilaterally and ad hoc, whether, when, and how to become involved in the quarrels of other states. The right to be unpredictable constituted a major part of the substance of the American idea of sovereignty, and membership in the league was regarded as involving the drastic curtailment of that right.

Wilson lost his battle for American affiliation with the league not to nineteenth-century isolationists who believed that their country was safely encapsulated by the huge continent it had ruthlessly conquered and now inhabited without challenge but to proponents of the idea that the United States should continue its recently espoused auxiliary role in world affairs, the central feature of which was untrammeled discretion concerning engagement and disengagement. Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding, expressed this idea succinctly: "If our people are ever to decide upon war they will choose to decide according to our own national conscience at the time and in the constitutional manner without advance commitment, or the advice and consent of any other power." When the league actually dealt with political and military crises, the United States was sometimes willing and eager to take an active role, but it was never willing to accept an obligation to do so.

Sovereignty, interpreted as the retention of a free hand, continues to have a major impact upon American policy regarding international organization. World War II convinced most Americans that the advance and well-understood commitment of the United States to throw its weight onto the scales was essential to the preservation of world peace, and the United States made the shift from the policy of the free hand to the policy of commitment that it had rejected when Wilson proposed it. Nevertheless the urge to keep options open has not been displaced by recognition of the value of clear and credible commitments. The strength of that urge was demonstrated in American insistence upon having the power to veto substantive decisions in the UN Security Council. It could also be observed in the careful hedging of obligations under the various bilateral and multilateral security treaties concluded during the Cold War. The United States has wanted to put the world on notice as to its future strategy while retaining the possibility of deciding its policy ad hoc. It has wanted to enjoy the benefits of being committed without paying the price of losing the national freedom to choose its course of action.

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

The American conception of sovereignty has traditionally included another element: the right to national privacy, the capacity to fend off external intrusions into domestic affairs. This concern was rooted in the original American sense of separateness and differentiation from Europe. The New World had broken off from the Old World, and maintaining the sharpness of the break was

deemed essential to retaining the valued newness of the qualities of American political society. The isolationist tradition combined cautions against being drawn into European affairs and against Europe's poking into American affairs.

The latter concern is typically expressed with reference to international organization by the concept of domestic jurisdiction. Participation in multilateral agencies necessarily involves exposure as well as commitment; nothing can be done with the collaboration of, or for the benefit of, a member state without something being done to that state. American enthusiasm for international organization has always been qualified by fear of expanding the national vulnerability to external interference, a concern that was manifested in the drafting of both the League Covenant and the UN Charter by vigorous insistence upon provisions protecting domestic jurisdiction. The campaign that defeated American affiliation with the league concentrated as heavily upon what might be done to this country by and through the organization as upon what the United States might be required to do on behalf of the league. Similarly, misgivings about the United Nations and the specialized agencies have often expressed the belief that the United States has been, or the fear that it might be, improperly penetrated by foreign influences flowing through those institutional channels.

This concern for sovereignty, translated as domestic jurisdiction, is shared by all states. It has received peculiar emphasis in American policy for reasons that go beyond the attitudes that were initially associated with an isolated position and an isolationist doctrine. It seems probable that, perhaps until very recently, the United States never shared the keen need for international organization to serve its particular interests—as distinguished from its broader interest in a stable and peaceful world—that most other states have felt. As a big country, a continental state, the United States appeared not to require the relief of difficulties posed by cramped territorial area that many other states have been compelled to seek through international organizations. It did not fully share the need of European states, now matched by states on other continents with numerous national divisions, for mechanisms of coordination to facilitate interchange across state boundaries. In this respect the American situation was analogous to that of a great rural landowner, in contrast with that of residents in congested urban areas.

Throughout the twentieth century the United States perceived itself as a powerful, wealthy, and highly developed state, not dependent upon others for protection or for economic and technical assistance. This feeling of independence and omnipotence even increased at the end of the Cold War. Given these characteristics it is perhaps understandable that the United States tended to conceive of participation in international agencies as a matter more of giving than of receiving, and that it insisted upon limiting both what it gave and what it received. The United States could afford to resist having undesired things done to it by international organizations because it had little stake in having essential things done for it by those bodies. With regard to the impact of multilateral programs and activities upon and within national societies, the United States accepted the biblical proposition that it was more blessed to give than to receive. America, more than most other states, could plausibly consider its engagement in organized international activities as predominantly a means of contributing to the general welfare of the global body politic rather than as a means of acquiring particular benefits for itself. Perhaps for this reason Americans appeared especially prone to believe that international organizations were, or should be, expressions of collective idealism and altruism. The sudden awareness of the exposure of the hitherto invulnerable American continent to international terrorism, however, changed this attitude dramatically at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Another set of difficulties and inhibitions that affected American participation in international organization in the twentieth century might be said to derive from the reverse of the attitude toward national sovereignty discussed above. International organizations inevitably cut into the sovereignty of participating states in the sense that they require them to accept commitments—thereby restricting in some measure their freedom to decide what they will and will not do—and in the sense that states' domestic exposure to external impacts is enhanced, thereby diminishing their sense of national privacy. Yet the development of so-called international rogue states like Iraq and North Korea in the 1990s, and in particular the increasing vulnerability of the United States to international terrorism, led to a much greater sense of the inevitability of American involvement with the rest of the world. A wide spectrum of U.S. policymakers began to

embrace the idea that even the territory of such a vast and powerful and geographically protected country like the United States could not do without the support of the international community to safeguard its physical security.

DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

One should not conclude that the relationship between national sovereignty and international organization is in all respects a competitive one. International agencies are not engaged in a zero-sum game with states, a situation in which the weakening of the latter is the condition of the strengthening of the former. On the contrary, effective international organization requires the participation of broadly competent states—states that are able as well as willing to meet their obligations, that are capable of formulating responsible positions and reaching meaningful decisions, and that can manage their resources, people, and territories to the degree required for dependable cooperation in multilateral activities. States deficient in these respects are frequently pressed by involvement in international organization to remedy their deficiencies, and the agencies of the United Nations system have attempted to give attention to building up the capabilities of particularly deficient member states to increasing, rather than diminishing, the meaningfulness and effectiveness of their sovereignty.

America's engagement in international organizations has always been handicapped by limited possession of the kind of national sovereignty essential for effective and reliable participation. Its collaboration in multilateral enterprises has been restrained by reluctance to bend to pressure for strengthening the national capabilities in question. When Americans worry about the implications of membership in international bodies, they are at least as likely to exhibit concern about the enlargement as about the diminution of the sovereign competence of the U.S. government.

The essence of the matter is that the United States is a political society dedicated to the ideal of constitutional democracy, a state whose central government is designed to operate within a framework of limitations derived from the principles of democracy and constitutionalism. Democracy implies that government must be responsive to the majority will more than, and in case of conflict, instead of, the exigencies of the international situation, the rules or decisions or pressures of the organs of international agencies, or the obligations prescribed either by general international law or by treaties. The problem posed by the tension between international commitment to order and domestic commitment to democracy is a real one for the United States; and the more the country becomes involved in multilateral agencies and activities the more intense it becomes.

Unfortunately for international organizations, the democratic principle is not exhausted by the proposition that national commitment requires popular consent. Consent theory implies the right of a nation to change its mind and the obligation of a government to accept the implications of the withdrawal of popular consent. The international legal sanctity of national commitments is challenged by the democratic legitimacy of popularly inspired decisions to violate or repudiate such commitments. The government of the United States came face to face with this problem in the 1960s and 1970s, when the popular consensus that had supported the acceptance of commitments in the two preceding decades began to dissolve. So long as the United States undertakes to combine international responsibility with domestic democracy, its leaders will confront serious dilemmas, and uncertainty will prevail in international organizations as to what can be expected from the United States. Democracy coexists uncomfortably with international law and organization.

Constitutionalism, no less than democracy, creates difficulties for the United States as a participant in international agencies. The president's responsibility for the conduct of American foreign relations, including the management of American participation in international organizations, is not fully matched by his legal authority or his political power to exercise this responsibility. He must compete and cooperate with the Congress, which shares in the control of foreign policy. The division of powers associated with American federalism limits the capacity of the federal government to accept and carry out obligations, or to engage in cooperative arrangements, under the auspices of international bodies. The national commitments to preserve a significant degree of autonomy for the private sector of the economy, to maintain the freedom of a press that zealously guards the right to self-definition of its responsibility, and to respect individual rights enshrined in a written constitution and interpreted by an

independent judiciary, establish further limitations upon the capacity of those who speak and act officially for the United States to engage the country fully and reliably in the work of international organizations.

To say that the United States is a constitutional democracy is to say that the body politic has not conferred upon its central government the full powers, usually associated with the concept of sovereignty, that may be required for loyal and effective performance in foreign relations, including the country's effective performance in international organizations. To say that the American public is dedicated to the preservation of the system of constitutional democracy is to emphasize its reluctance to enlarge, or to countenance the enlargement of, governmental capacities relevant to involvement in multilateral enterprises, capacities to make and carry out commitments, to act decisively, and to exercise the degree of control over a variety of internal matters that may be entailed by acceptance of international schemes of regulation or cooperation.

There is a constitutional doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court opinion in *Missouri* v. *Holland* (1920), supporting the view that the valid acceptance of international obligations carries with it the enhancement of federal powers to the extent required for meeting those obligations. Moreover, early enthusiasm for membership in the United Nations was reflected in a widespread tendency to acquiesce in a broad interpretation of executive authority to act as might be required for effective collaboration with the organization. This acquiescence proved to be short-lived. In the 1950s the Bricker amendment campaign argued—at least according to President Eisenhower—in favor of curtailing presidential power and empowering Congress with the obligation to ratify all treaties negotiated by the executive. Yet the campaign revealed the high regard for the U.S. Constitution. The doctrine of *Missouri* v. *Holland* was more generally feared as a threat to the integrity of the American constitutional system than valued as a promise of the adaptability of that system to the requirements of the age of international organization. The formal constitutional renunciation of the doctrine was obviated by assurances that it would not be exploited. Less than two decades later there emerged a political mood dominated by insistence that the competence of the president to commit the country in international affairs should be significantly reduced. In 1973, in view of the lost war in Vietnam and the Watergate crisis, this led a Democratic Congress to pass the War Powers Act, which compelled the president to consult with Congress about sending American troops into combat abroad and required him to withdraw these troops within sixty days unless Congress gave its approval for a longer mission abroad.

Generally, however, it appeared that Americans were more concerned about preventing involvement in international organization from impinging upon the distribution of authority within their political system than about preventing the peculiarities of their domestic arrangements from handicapping the nation's performance in international organization. The dominance of this concern had a great deal to do with American rejection of the League of Nations. Acceptance of the United Nations clearly has not eliminated this element from the American attitude toward involvement in world affairs.

Nineteenth-century isolationist doctrine, with its emphasis upon aloofness from European political entanglements and intrigues, expressed not only a pragmatic judgment concerning the best way for the United States to survive in a dangerous world but also a moral aspiration, an ideal of national virtue defined as innocent abstention from the evils of power politics. This heritage of moral distaste for international politics colored early American thinking about international organization to promote world peace and order. Nineteenth-century Americans, ranging from spokesmen for the various peace societies that sprang up after 1815 to leaders in government, tended to conceive organization for peace in essentially apolitical terms, emphasizing legal formulas and arbitral or judicial settlement of disputes. World courts figured more prominently than diplomatic forums or international armies in favored formulations, and the ground was prepared for the perennial popularity of the "rule of law" in American internationalist thought. In particular the vision of the future did not include the involvement of the United States in the international political arena or the burdening of the United States with weighty political responsibilities. It certainly did not refer to the obligation to participate in military sanctions against disturbers of the peace. America was not to be contaminated by being dragged into power politics; rather, the world was to be purified by being persuaded to rise above politics, to the realm of law. Global salvation was to be achieved by formula and gadget, not by American commitment to share in the

hard, dangerous, and dirty work of an organized political system.

The scheme, set forth during World War I by the League to Enforce Peace and by similar organizations in Europe, then formulated in the League of Nations Covenant under the leadership of President Wilson, was not in accord with this American vision. Calling for an essentially political approach to world order supported ultimately by national obligation to engage in military sanctions, it violated the basic tenets of the traditional American creed. It offered a painful, not a painless, solution to the problem of order. The American peace movement had hoped for the appointment of a judge; it was confronted by the demand that the United States serve as a policeman. The league promised not reliance upon predictable legal process but involvement in the uncertainties of political and military activity. True, the new machinery included the World Court, and there was massive American support throughout the life of the league for membership in that body. The movement to join the court was ultimately frustrated, however, by the fear of involvement in the political league through adherence to its judicial annex. The American legalistic tradition demanded acceptance of a court, but it did not permit acceptance of that particular court.

IOS IN THE COLD WAR AND THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

During the Cold War the role of the United States in creating, supporting, and operating the United Nations reflected the official abandonment of preoccupation with legal system-building and of aversion to engagement in the political and military aspects of international affairs. Nevertheless the Cold War record contains numerous indications of the survival of these sentiments. The mood engendered by the Vietnam War was characterized by the revival of the tendency to conceive national virtue in terms of innocence rather than of responsibility. Fighting for peace, the central motif of the twentieth-century ideal of collective security, tended to be regarded not as paradoxical but as inconsistent at best and hypocritical at worst. Self-critical Americans are inclined to interpret the performance of the United States in the early years of the United Nations as a record of shameful manipulation and abuse of the organization, not of constructive leadership and loyal support.

The image of the responsible defender of international order was overshadowed by the image of the irresponsible adventurer and imperialist. In the eyes of self-pitying Americans, the national image was that of an overloaded and insufficiently appreciated bearer of international burdens. Those who put the matter as the abdication of a discredited tyrant and those who put it as the retirement of a weary servant were advocating the same thing: the diminution of the American role in world affairs. The appeal of this prescription was strengthened by the rise to dominance in the United Nations of political forces and factions that the United States could neither lead nor control; America's opportunity to exercise leadership declined as much as its inclination to do so.

Traditional American misgivings about involvement in international political organization was thus confirmed. Discounting the excesses of guilt and self-pity, it must nevertheless be concluded that participation in the United Nations entailed the disappointment of national hopes, the frustration of national efforts, and the dirtying of national hands. It required that the luxury of pure adherence to principle be sacrificed in favor of the more ambiguous and less satisfying morality of responsibility. The glamour of sharing in the formulation of a grand design gave way to the never-finished work of international housekeeping and the never-solved problem of managing the affairs of an almost unmanageable international system. It was not surprising that the United States failed to find this work inspiring or pleasant.

From the late 1960s to the 1980s—strongly influenced by the disastrous involvement in Vietnam, the country's subsequent severe economic problems, and, due to East-West détente, the diminishing Soviet threat—the shift from isolationism to international engagement that occurred during World War II was temporarily reversed. Instead attention was focused once more upon the dangers of overcommitment and the advantages of unilateralism. The pursuit of the national right to make foreign policy decisions unfettered by promises to, or participation by, other states was vigorously asserted by the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations. But widespread talk of "American decline" and the loss of will to preserve the standing of the United States as one of two superpowers proved premature. Instead the crisis situation brought about by the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf War of 1990–1991 to liberate Kuwait from the

Iraqi invasion saw impressive American leadership and the country's constructive reengagement with IOs like NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Above all, leading U.S. involvement in the "two-plus-four" negotiations (the two German states and the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France) for bringing about German unification within the NATO, European Union, and United Nations framework, along with constructive American engagement with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, did much to achieve a relatively peaceful and stable transition to the post–Cold War era.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse and disappearance of the Soviet Union in December 1991, with the United States remaining the only global superpower and by far the most powerful nation on earth, once again American suspicion of restrictive international commitments and American preference for unilateral activities increased dramatically. The symbolic significance of American membership in the United Nations and its many suborganizations was drastically reduced. Washington's reluctance to pay its full dues to the United Nations was indicative of the United States's ambiguous position toward its involvement and responsibilities in international affairs. While the American superpower was unwilling to pay its dues to the United Nations, the UN itself was in debt to some poor countries such as Bangladesh, owing it $15 million. Between 1994 and 1999 the United States built up a bill of $2.3 billion, arguing that it was asked to pay too much to the United Nations. By late 2001 Washington still owed a substantial amount to the world organization; it was committed to pay the outstanding amount of $582 million in 2001 and the remainder of $244 million in 2002. In 1999 and 2000, after passage of the Helms-Biden act, the United States paid some of the $1 billion it had promised to contribute belatedly to the UN coffers. In return the United States had asked for and obtained various UN reforms and the elimination of the rest of the American debt and a reduction of its future annual dues. (Instead of 25 percent, the United States would now finance only 22 percent of the UN's regular budget; it would also reduce its contributions for UN peacekeeping missions from 31 to 27 percent of the overall costs.) While the Senate accepted this, the repayment of the remaining debt was controversial among Republican leaders in the House of Representatives who wished to impose further conditions and asked for greater UN reforms. The attitude of the House of Representatives was partially also a reaction to the fact that the United States was voted off the UN Human Rights Commission in May 2001 by some UN members (including some of America's European allies) who were running out of patience with Washington's less than constructive role in the human rights body and the administration's general lack of support for the United Nations.

Washington's manifold policy of suspicion toward the United Nations, Franklin Roosevelt's harbinger of hope, must serve as just one example for the claim that an increasing concentration on domestic affairs and a neglect of American involvement in IOs was indeed the dominant feature of American policy in the 1990s. The few years of renewed international activism at the end of the Cold War—President George H. W. Bush's somewhat rash announcement of a "new world order" in 1990 and the occasional brief burst of peacemaking activities that characterized the foreign policy of the Clinton administration after 1993—must be regarded as exceptions rather than the rule. Senate majority leader and 1996 Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole's assessment in the mid-1990s reflected the deep and widespread American unease about IOs. Dole believed that frequently IOs either "reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or do not reflect American principles and ideas."

Yet as G. John Ikenberry wrote in 1996, while the bipolar order of the Cold War years came to an end in 1989–1991, the dense economic and political "web of multilateralist institutions" and thus the "world order created in the 1940s is still with us." Despite a tendency to focus on the domestic enjoyment of the prosperity and rising share values of the multiplying "dot com" companies of the Clinton years, the United States was unable and indeed unwilling to abdicate its global leadership. In fact globalization demanded the opposite, and the administration made sure that the United States would continue to dominate the World Bank and the increasingly important International Monetary Fund. The efforts the Clinton administration made for the full implementation and expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and for enabling China to become a member of the World Trade Organization, allowing it to enjoy most-favored-nation status, are further examples that indicate that the Clinton administration had no intention to revert to economic isolationism.

The same applied to the political sphere. The Clinton administration was careful to denounce any talk of a new isolationism in the post–Cold War world, including alleged American disinterest in Europe in favor of a Pacific-first policy. In fact, despite the administration's ambiguous if not outright negative attitude to the United Nations and the many petty trade wars with the European Union, the post–Cold War world at times saw a vigorous and often constructive reengagement of the United States in many parts of the world. However, this became frequently mixed with a strong dose of American unilateralism. Clinton called this "assertive multilateralism." For example, despite much international pressure, for largely domestic reasons the Clinton administration insisted on preventing a UN treaty controlling the trade in small arms. The administration's ambiguity toward the United Nations had disastrous consequences in the East Timor crisis of 1999–2000, when the lack of U.S. support induced a withdrawal of UN troops, which in turn led to the wholesale slaughter of many East Timorese people in the Indonesian civil war. Clinton's unsuccessful and unilateral bombing raids on buildings in Sudan and elsewhere in response to terrorist attacks on American diplomatic and military targets abroad also turned out to be ill-advised; they may well have contributed to inflaming even more hatred of the United States in the Islamic world.

Still, American peacemaking efforts in cooperation with IOs during the Clinton era often added a constructive element to the frequently chaotic and very violent developments in such embattled regions as the Middle East and the Balkans. It is unlikely that the successful NATO pursuit of the 1999 Kosovo war and the ousting and subsequent handover of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague in 2001 would have been achieved without strong American involvement. The Clinton administration's attempts to act as a neutral arbiter in the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland and in the reconciliation between South and North Korea were also relatively successful. This explained the regret voiced in many parts of the world of Clinton's departure in January 2001. Paradoxically, despite Clinton's contempt for the United Nations and his many other unilateral activities, the president's reputation as an international peacemaker far surpassed his embattled and scandal-ridden standing within the United States. Yet his years in office may well be primarily remembered for his administration's ability to maintain and increase America's prosperity and the achievement of a substantial budget surplus rather than for a farsighted foreign policy.

After the drama of the presidential election of 2000, which was only narrowly decided by the Supreme Court in December, it was not Vice President Al Gore but Texas governor George W. Bush who moved into the White House. The new president immediately surrounded himself with many right-wing and unilateralist if not isolationist advisers. Many of these people were very experienced policymakers who had already served under Bush's father in the early 1990s and even under Presidents Ford and Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet his administration did not appear to consist of a vigorous modernizing team prepared to tackle the international problems of globalization and fragmentation. In a 1999 article in *Foreign Affairs,* Condoleezza Rice, who became Bush's national security adviser in January 2001, tellingly talked at length about the importance of the pursuit of America's "national interest" but rather less about American international involvement and engagement in IOs. She wrote that a Republican administration would "proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interest of an illusory international community." Indeed, the Bush administration treated the United Nations with even greater disdain and suspicion than Clinton had done. During its first eight months in office the new administration walked out of five international treaties (and withdrew from the conference on racism in protest at anti-Israel passages in the draft communiqué in South Africa in early September 2001). Among the treaties the United States opposed were the Kyoto Protocol on climate change supported by much of the rest of the world and a treaty for the enforcement of the important Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. The administration also withheld support from the establishment of the World Court to be based in The Hague. Although Washington agreed with the principle of establishing such a court, it did not wish any of its nationals ever to appear before it. The Bush administration also threatened to abandon several other contractual pillars of the postwar world, notably the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty concluded between Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev to contain the nuclear arms race.

Above all, Bush's insistence on implementing a national missile defense (NMD) to protect

the United States (and perhaps its NATO allies) from nuclear attacks from rogue states like North Korea and Iraq caused great unease in the Western world. Not even Britain, traditionally America's closest ally, was able to show much enthusiasm for a missile plan that had not been tested successfully and would cost billions of dollars and resembled Reagan's ill-fated Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), a plan that had not been tested successfully and would cost billions of dollars. America's allies reasoned that not least for financial reasons the implementation of Bush's missile shield scheme would in all likelihood prevent the United States from giving equal attention to the development of other defensive and military schemes that deserved greater priority. Moreover, the Bush administration showed scant regard for international institutions like NATO by making clear that the missile shield decision had already been made. While America's allies would be consulted and informed and would hopefully participate in the project, any allied advice to abandon the project would not be heeded. Unilateralism was triumphing. Multilateralism and constructive open-minded engagement with IOs had been abandoned for good.

Or so it seemed. Then, in September 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred. This was not only a severe shock to the American people, who for so long had felt secure on a continent that was geographically very distant from most of the world's battlegrounds, it also shook the Bush administration to its core. Alexis de Tocqueville's statement in his famous *Democracy in America* (1835) that the United States was a nation without neighbors, securely enveloped in a huge continent and thus separate from the problems of the rest of the world, became out of date within a matter of hours. Despite its superpower status, and probably even because of it, it was recognized that America was no longer invulnerable. The *Economist* wrote presciently that the United States and the entire world realized that America was "not merely vulnerable to terrorism, but more vulnerable than others. It is the most open and technologically dependent country in the world, and its power attracts the hatred of enemies of freedom everywhere. The attacks have shattered the illusions of post-cold war peace and replaced them with an uncertain world of 'asymmetric threats.'"

The value of American reengagement with IOs was recognized in many quarters almost immediately. Suddenly the United States was not merely the provider of benefits to the international community but could also greatly benefit itself from a close cooperative engagement with IOs. Within a matter of days the Security Council of the United Nations had unanimously condemned the attack in the strongest terms and pledged its support to the American intention to embark on a prolonged war against international terrorism. The European Union and many other IOs followed suit. NATO went even further. For the first time in its history the North Atlantic Alliance invoked article 5 of its charter, which obliged each member to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" if a member state was attacked from abroad. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were interpreted as a military attack on a NATO member state, which obliged all NATO members to come to the common defense of NATO territory. This was unprecedented; above all, it demonstrated the value of IOs to the hitherto unilateral Bush administration.

While it was unlikely that the Bush administration would not resort to unilateralist activities in the fight against international terrorism, it was equally improbable that even a state as powerful as the United States could win this fight by itself. Engagement with international organizations like NATO and the United Nations and cooperative multilateralism appeared to be decisive. Thus the occasional bouts of American neo-isolationism that could frequently be observed in the 1990s were thought by many to be largely a thing of the past. This, however, would also depend on whether or not the unity of NATO and its member states could be upheld for a prolonged period of time. Quite understandably, both the American people and the Bush administration were sufficiently enraged by the appalling attacks that cost the lives of more than six thousand people and caused damage in excess of $30 billion to "go it alone" if Western and indeed international unity could not be preserved. While the danger existed that the attacks might have the opposite effect and induce America to withdraw from international engagement altogether, this is unlikely; after all even an entirely isolationist America would continue to be exposed to the threats posed by international terrorism. Multilateralist engagement with international organizations and acting in concert with its allies appeared to be the best chance of reestablishing a degree of national and international security. However, it was thought abroad, at least, that this could well take the form of the controversial American "assertive

multilateralism" that the world had to put up with during the Clinton years.

Still, after 11 September it appeared that unilateralism and isolationism were no longer regarded as viable political concepts. In view of the Bush administration's active engagement with the international community to fight the "war against international terrorism," the *Financial Times* concluded that multilateralism was "no longer a dirty word." Similarly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed the belief that the answer to the unprecedented challenge confronting the world was "not isolationism but the world coming together with America as a community." It was generally recognized that the world had to look beyond bombing Afghanistan, the country that hosted the terrorist network responsible for planning the attacks, and other military options. An American correspondent put it succinctly in a letter to the *International Herald Tribune* in early October 2001: "The Bush administration's unilateralism has been revealed as hollow. Rather than infringe our sovereignty, international institutions enhance our ability to perform the functions of national government, including the ability to fight international crime."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abi-Saab, Georges, ed. *The Concept of International Organization.* Paris, 1981.

Armstrong, David. *The Rise of International Organization: A Short History.* London, 1982.

Archer, Clive. *International Organizations.* 2d ed. London and New York, 1992.

Baratta, Joseph P., comp. *The United Nations System.* Oxford and New Brunswick, N.J., 1995.

Bennett, A. Leroy. *Historical Dictionary of the United Nations.* Lanham, Md., 1995.

———. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues.* 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1995.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Unvanquished: A U.S.–U.N. Saga.* London and New York, 1999.

Clark, Ian. *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century* New York, 1997.

Claude, Inis L., Jr. *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations.* 4th ed. New York, 1971.

Claude, Inis L., Jr., ed. *States and the Global System: Politics, Law, and Organization.* Basingstoke, U.K., and New York, 1988.

Diehl, Paul F., ed. *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World.* London and Boulder, Colo., 1997.

Feld, Werner J., and Robert S. Jordon. *International Institutions: A Comparative Approach.* 3d ed. Westport, Conn., 1994.

Finkelstein, Lawrence S., ed. *Politics in the United Nations System.* Durham, N.C., 1988.

Franck, Thomas M. *Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It.* New York, 1985.

Haas, Ernst B. *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization.* Stanford, Calif., 1964.

Iriye, Akira. "A Century of NGOs." *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 3 (summer 1999): 421–435.

Jacobson, Harold K. *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System.* 2d ed. New York, 1984.

Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst, eds. *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence.* Boston, 1990.

Krasner, Stephen D. *International Regimes.* London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1983.

Kratochwil, Friedrich, and Edward D. Mansfield, eds. *International Organization: A Reader.* New York, 1994.

Luck, Edward C. *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organizations, 1919–1999.* Washington, D.C., 1999.

Maynes, Charles William, and Richard S. Williamson, eds. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the United Nations System.* New York, 1996.

Moore, John Allphin, Jr., and Jerry Pubantz. *To Create a New World? American Presidents and the United Nations.* New York, 1999.

Osma'nczyk, Edmund Jan. *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements.* 2d ed. New York, 1990.

Ostrower, Gary B. *The United Nations and the United States.* New York, 1998.

Parsons, Anthony. *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions, 1946–1994.* London and New York, 1995.

Taylor, Paul. *International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and Global Process.* London and New York, 1993.

Taylor, Paul, and A. J. R. Groom, eds. *International Institutions at Work.* London and New York, 1988.

Union of International Associations. *Yearbook of International Organizations.* Brussels. Annual.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Leon Gordenker, eds. *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance.* Lon-

don and Boulder, Colo., 1996. A brief but useful compilation of essays on the role of NGOs.

Wells, Robert N., ed. *Peace by Pieces: United Nations Agencies and Their Roles.* Metuchen, N.J., 1991.

Williams, Douglas. *The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis.* New York, 1987.

See also COLLECTIVE SECURITY; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; SUMMIT CONFERENCES.

INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION

Doris A. Graber

Analysis of the intervention and nonintervention theories and practices of the United States requires examination of four distinct facets of the issue. They are the theory underlying the use of intervention in international relations, the policy doctrines proclaimed by the United States regarding intervention, the international law regarding the legality of intervention, and the actual practice of intervention adopted by the United States.

THE THEORY

The theory of intervention is based on the concept of state sovereignty, which was incorporated into the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War to prevent rulers from meddling in the affairs of their neighbors at the risk of provoking wars. Sovereignty of a state means that it is entitled to exercise absolute control over its territory and people and can choose to govern its realm as it chooses. In a world of sovereign states, where no overarching governmental unit exists, nobody has the right to interfere with the state's activities unless the interference has been explicitly authorized by the state. In other words, by virtue of its sovereignty, every state, no matter how small and weak or large and powerful, has the legal right to be free from intervention by other states.

The problem with this theory is that it is based on an unrealistic assumption: namely, that all states are completely independent actors who are not affected by what other states do and whose activities do not affect other states. Nonintervention is an impossibility for political units sharing the same world, particularly when they exist in close physical proximity. National borders, which demarcate the state's sphere of control, have become increasingly porous, especially in the modern age of surveillance satellites and the Internet. The fact that international law acknowledges that states have the right of self-defense to protect their sovereignty has always been an implicit acknowledgment that intrusions on state sovereignty should be expected.

THE POLICY DOCTRINES

Throughout modern history, the principle of nonintervention, tempered by the right of self-defense, has been cherished, especially by small and weak nations that lacked the strength to resist intrusions by stronger rivals. The United States, which started its political life as a small and weak nation, was no exception. Its vocal support of the principles of nonintervention—the nonintervention doctrine—has served three major purposes throughout the years, aside from its use as a guideline for policy. First, it was meant to deter European interventions directed against the United States and its neighbors. President George Washington, in his Farewell Address to the nation, repeated a mantra common to the Founders. The United States would not intervene in Europe's affairs in return for reciprocity by European powers. Accordingly, it would object to interventions by other powers because it considered nonintervention as the normal rule to be applied by the world community.

Second, the doctrine was intended to inform the American people that pressures on their government for a policy of intervention were likely to be rejected on principle, even when Americans were eager to help European colonies in Latin America to become independent states. Expectations were that repeated proclamations of the nonintervention policy would deter interventions that the country could ill afford to undertake.

Third, once the principle had become venerable and established as right and moral conduct, it became useful as a psychological tool of politics. Many undesirable international activities

could be readily condemned by labeling them as "intervention." Desired interventions could be excused by denying that they constituted interventions. Alternatively, the United States could claim that a particular intervention was within the scope of interventions permitted under the hallowed nonintervention doctrine. Putting policies within a framework of "moral" and "immoral" actions is particularly important for a democratic country where political leaders depend on the support of elected government officials and public opinion. It is easier to secure support when policies can be defended as moral principles, rather than as complex bargaining schemes or maneuvers in political power games.

All three purposes appeared to be particularly well served during the early years of the nation. It is therefore not surprising that American presidents, starting with George Washington, almost routinely advocated nonintervention. During the decades when the country was most vulnerable to foreign intervention and ill-equipped to intervene individually or collectively in faraway Europe, the doctrine was credited with keeping European powers from intervening in the affairs of the United States as a reward for American nonintervention in Europe's liberation struggles. The doctrine permitted American leaders to refuse most requests for political as well as humanitarian interventions. The successes claimed for the doctrine strengthened faith in its value.

At first, the doctrine was generally expressed in absolute terms to give it the strongest possible impact. This formulation was never viewed as a renunciation of the presumably inalienable right of every country to use intervention to protect its vital interests. Rather, the doctrine was avowed for its practical usefulness for American policy needs. That the nonintervention doctrine involved legal considerations under international law was not stressed until 1842, when Secretary of State Daniel Webster alluded to its grounding in the legal doctrine of sovereign rights.

Because the absolute formulation of the doctrine was literally interpreted by many people, it grew embarrassing when the United States engaged in numerous interventions in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, American statesmen reformulated the doctrine so that it would specify the exceptional conditions under which intervention would be permitted. The ebb and flow of efforts to spell out the limits of nonintervention, without abandoning the nonintervention doctrine as a general principle, constitute the major aspects of doctrinal developments over the ensuing decades.

President James Buchanan's inaugural address in 1857 is an early example of reformulation. He declared it to be the nation's policy never to interfere in the domestic concerns of other nations "unless this shall be imperatively required by the great law of self-preservation." He did not specify the occasions when the law of self-preservation might apply and the ways in which such occasions could be identified. Buchanan also contended that the nonintervention doctrine did not preclude the duty of preventive intervention. When, as happened in Mexico in 1859, a Western Hemisphere country was afflicted by internal unrest that spilled over its borders, it was the duty of the United States to intervene to stop the unrest and thereby prevent intervention by other powers. Congress did not accept this argument at that time. But when the argument was revived and amplified during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, it became an accepted clarification of the scope of the nonintervention doctrine.

Officially, a number of major clarifications were labeled corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, which had become an icon for the nonintervention principle. Linking interventionist policies to this icon served to maintain the aura that the nonintervention doctrine remained absolute. For example, the Olney Corollary of 1895 asserted the right of the United States to intervene in any conflict between an American and non-American power that endangered the security of the United States. Under the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the United States claimed an even broader right and duty to act as policeman of the Western Hemisphere. If any nation in the hemisphere permitted conditions on its territory that might invite intervention by another country, then it was incumbent on the United States to intervene to remedy these conditions and forestall intervention by others. The United States must assume this obligation because the Monroe Doctrine prevented other powers from exercising their right of intervention in troubled Western Hemisphere countries.

Many American political leaders were dissatisfied with the doctrinal and practical consequences of the Roosevelt Corollary. In an attempt to adhere more closely to the spirit of nonintervention, President William Howard Taft sought to control internal political affairs in other nations through economic, rather than military, pressures. Since the nonintervention doctrine did not prohibit intervention for the protection of nationals,

his administration encouraged American business interests to settle in potentially unstable neighboring countries. Presumably, they would help the country to stabilize its economy and prevent political turmoil. If the presence of American businesses failed to prevent unrest, the United States could then send protective missions as part of its right to protect its citizens abroad. In this manner it could control the politics of unstable countries without violating restraints commanded by the nonintervention doctrine.

During the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the nonintervention doctrine received yet another interpretation. Wilson's claim that the United States must discourage dictatorships or unconstitutional governments in Latin America by refusing to recognize them was accompanied by strong professions that such interventions accorded with the principles embodied in the established doctrine of nonintervention. Destruction of unpopular governments, Wilson argued, freed foreign nations from undue restraints on their sovereign right to opt for democratic rulers. Rather than serving as a tool for coercing these nations into unwanted action, intervention thus became a tool to enable their people to exercise their will. While Wilson expanded the scope of the right of intervention on one hand, he also laid the groundwork for subsequent contractions of the right. His stress on the sovereign rights of states to determine their own fates, regardless of size, led to a series of international agreements that proclaimed the nonintervention principle as a prescription of international law except for individual or collective self-defense. Such agreements became part of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1918) and later the United Nations Charter (1945).

Nations of the Western Hemisphere went even further than the rest of the international community. Through a series of agreements and declarations springing from successive inter-American conferences in the 1930s, Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, adopted a principle of absolute nonintervention by individual countries within the Western Hemisphere. Individual countries retained the right to protect the personal security of their citizens. Beyond that, only collective intervention by the combined forces of Western Hemisphere countries would remain lawful.

The United States was willing to bind itself to such absolute declarations of nonintervention because it believed that the collective intervention arrangements made in the Western Hemisphere and on the broader international scene provided a viable alternative to intervention by individual countries. At the same time, a series of presidential declarations emphasized more strongly than had been done in the early years that nonintervention pledges did not mean an abandonment of the right of self-defense when there was no effective collective action. Whenever possible, the United States also tried to conclude mutual defense and economic assistance treaties to provide a legal basis for coming to the aid of selected countries when counterintervention was needed to resist a communist takeover.

In addition, the United States explicitly asserted a right of counterintervention against illegal interventions by other powers. Protection from intervention was a privilege earned by deserving countries; it was not an absolute right. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, during the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, declared that the nonintervention principle applied only to nations that respected the rights of others. The United States, as a powerful member of the community of nations, had a right and duty to intervene in order to prevent or stop illegal interventions directed against countries that lacked the power or will to resist such interventions.

The dangers that would give rise to interventions were identified explicitly but broadly in the 1930s and 1940s. During that period, American political leaders believed that the efforts of the Axis powers to expand their control over Europe and Asia endangered peace and warranted intervention. American leaders sought—sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully—to have these concerns incorporated into multinational declarations to indicate that nonintervention pledges did not apply to power plays by the Axis powers. The idea that mutual nonintervention pledges by the United States and the Axis powers might be a better way to protect the United States was rejected by the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, communism was viewed as the main danger to the national integrity and security of the United States and the world. In the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed in 1947, the United States declared broadly that either unilateral or collective intervention was justified to protect any country in the world from falling under communist rule. The peace and security of the United States and the world were at stake. The Eisenhower Doctrine, proclaimed in 1957, pinpointed

some of the areas where intervention might be expected. Specifically, the political integrity of Middle Eastern nations was declared to be vital to world peace and American interests. If nations in the Middle East were threatened by overt armed aggression by communist forces, the United States would come to their aid if they requested help.

The 1970s saw a retrenchment in overt interventions against communist expansion. Accordingly, it seemed appropriate once more to redefine the scope of the nonintervention doctrine to conform to the prevailing official interpretation of the limits set by the policy. The Nixon Doctrine of 1970 expressed the principle that the United States did not consider it an obligation to protect other countries against communist intervention unless it had determined, in specific cases, that American security interests were involved. Even then, intervention was not the sole duty of the United States but was an obligation shared by all countries opposed to the overthrow of noncommunist governments by communist contenders. President Jimmy Carter deemed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 a major threat to the West's oil lifeline. He responded in 1980 with the Carter Doctrine, declaring with unusual specificity that attempts by any foreign power to gain control over the Persian Gulf region would be considered a threat to the vital interests of the United States. It would be repelled, using military force if necessary. Five years later, in 1985, President Ronald Reagan once more pledged support for a policy of unilateral armed intervention in Third World countries if this became necessary to overthrow Marxist-Leninist regimes. The policy was to be applied selectively anywhere in the world where people were fighting against communism. In practice, it was implemented mostly in Central America.

The Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan doctrines did not pinpoint the conditions that might trigger a specific intervention. However, high-level military leaders often laid out the policy in somewhat more detail. For instance, General Colin Powell, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the administration of George H. W. Bush (1989–1993), declared that military interventions should be undertaken only when a number of conditions were met. Most importantly, the political objectives of the intervention had to be clearly defined and the gains and risks and likely outcomes had to be adequately assessed. Based on these assessments, it should be clear that the objectives of the intervention could be reached through military means at a defensible cost. Finally, nonviolent alternative policies, if suitable, had been tried first and failed.

Many observers argued that the various and sundry doctrines and statements by military leaders should not be viewed as blueprints for action. Rather, like the previously proclaimed nonintervention principles, they were tailored primarily for psychological impact. They were intended to discourage intervention-minded leaders and to give moral support to nations fearing communist attacks. It was hoped that policy pronouncements would obviate the need for remedial action. If action became necessary, the pronouncements could be characterized as prior warnings that legitimized subsequent actions.

Thus, the nonintervention doctrine has ebbed and flowed in its more than 200-year history. It has gone from an absolute expression, tempered by the implicit exception that interventions for vital purposes were permissible, to an emphasis on a broad range of exceptions to the doctrine, which left it little more than an empty shell. Then it was reformulated in absolute terms, tempered by statements of exceptions stressing that collective or unilateral intervention would still be used by the United States to protect vital security interests. But the absolutism abated again in the wake of major international threats posed by upheavals in Europe and Asia and evidence that collective interventions were difficult to orchestrate.

By the early twenty-first century, the policy implications of the doctrine were that the United States, like all sovereign states, claimed the right to protect its security by all means within its power—including intervention—whenever its leaders believed that this security was seriously endangered. Despite American capacity to intervene freely in the politics of most small nations, however, intervention would be used sparingly, primarily when conditions existed that potentially threatened the security of the United States and its allies and when all other means to resolve the problems failed. The pledges of nonintervention made in the twentieth century indicated the areas where intervention was most likely to occur and the conditions most likely to provoke it. They served as a rough guide to the government in its choice of policy options.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Definition and General Rules As defined by international lawyers, intervention is unsolicited

interference by one state in the affairs of another; nonintervention is the avoidance of such interference. Intervention may be directed against a single state or factions within it, or it may involve interference with the interactions among a group of states. It may take the form of military action or economic or political pressures. These pressures force states to act in a manner prescribed or foreordained by the intervening state. Alternatively, the intervening state may use its own agents to carry out the policies that it desires. States yield because they fear military coercion or nonmilitary punitive actions or because they cannot stop the intervening state's agents or activities.

Although the elements of intervention can be readily outlined, they are hard to identify in specific political situations. Most relations among states contain elements of coercion whenever interacting parties feel constrained to make some concessions to each others' wishes. It is difficult to determine at what point pressure becomes coercive enough to be considered an intervention because consent was unwilling and therefore deemed void. For instance, when a country desperately needs economic aid from the United States or international agencies whose policies the U.S. controls, is it intervention to make aid contingent on privatizing that country's banking system? Normal intercourse among states merges almost imperceptibly into interventionist practices. In a community of nations that is comprised of states of varying powers and degrees of interdependence, nations lacking in economic and political resources are most likely to experience interventionist pressures. The world community has not yet agreed on the borderline between the right of the stronger power to insist on its terms, and the right of the weaker power to conduct its affairs free from coercion. At the other end of the spectrum of coercion, it has at times been difficult to determine when interventions become outright warfare.

A second problem arises from the interdependence of nations in the community of nations, which makes the complete independence envisaged by the concept of sovereignty a legal fiction, rather than a viable reality. In a community of interdependent nations, the domestic or foreign policies of state A frequently have a direct effect on the affairs of state B. When the United States closes its borders to Mexican farm laborers hired for seasonal work in the United States, the Mexican economy suffers. There is disagreement about whether intervention has taken place when the actions of A—and even inactions—seriously affect B but have not been primarily designed to affect B. If, as many international lawyers contend, intent to intervene is essential to establish the fact of intervention, the difficulty of proving intent seriously impedes accurate findings. For instance, the United States stopped the exportation of scrap metal to Japan prior to World War II, giving U.S. national defense needs as the reason. Japan claimed that the measure was intended to force a change in its military policies. It was difficult to prove at the time which claim was correct.

A third problem is tied to the question of responsibility of a state for the actions of its nationals. Citizens of country A, enraged about the treatment of religious minorities, revolutionaries, or foreign business establishments in country B, may openly or covertly interfere in the politics of country B to change policies that they think are offensive. It remains unsettled whether and under what circumstances their government becomes implicated by their activities. For example, Americans who were outraged by the racial policies of a South African government controlled by whites who were an ethnic minority pressured various American enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s to withdraw their investments from South Africa unless racial policies were changed. The withdrawals caused major economic dislocations and contributed to the ultimate fall of the minority government.

The problem of accurate identification of interventionist actions was of minor significance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, because most interventions by the major European powers in the affairs of weak states were then deemed permissible self-defense actions under international law. In fact, rulers in Europe considered intervention a moral duty to uphold their common culture and to protect the political status quo. When the status quo was threatened by the French Revolution, the major European powers pledged support of interventions that would uphold the existing balance of power and maintain established governments.

Numerous interventions took place for these causes. For example, Prussia, Austria, and Russia intervened in Spain, Naples, and Piedmont in 1820 to suppress revolution against the established governments. Similarly, from 1827 to 1832, during the Greek war of independence, Britain, France, and Russia repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of Greece and Turkey to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. Other interventions

were designed to protect religious groups and minorities, especially when they had ties to the intervening country. Despite high regard for the principle of state sovereignty, international law and practice in the nineteenth century sanctioned a broad right of intervention to protect the interests of nations strong enough to exercise this right to maintain the political status quo.

In the twentieth century, international developments changed the concept of unquestioned legality of all interventions, raising the problem of defining the nature of legal and illegal interventions. The decline of autocratic monarchies and the rise of democratically controlled nations in the wake of the French Revolution had weakened the idea of a community of nations jointly responsible for preserving the existing political landscape. Democratic and autocratic governments had little in common except the reciprocal fear that one was determined to destroy the other. They did not share the sense of kinship and personal moral obligation that had united the crowned heads of Europe. Nor did they agree about the most advantageous policies for Europe and the aims worthy of individual or collective intervention.

Fearing each other, European states wanted to make sure that they would be able to conduct their affairs unhindered by other nations. They therefore looked to the theory of state sovereignty and to claims of an inherent freedom of self-determination as foundations for legal restraints that would protect them from unbridled interventionism by other members of the international community. Gradually, the efforts of small nations, supported by larger countries opposed to interventions to sustain absolute governments in Europe, undermined the concept of an unlimited right of intervention. The notion of a duty of intervention to prevent politically harmful changes was replaced by the concept of a duty of nonintervention subject only to a small number of exceptions.

By the middle of the twentieth century, changing legal philosophies, buttressed by a number of specific resolutions and multilateral treaties, including the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) and the United Nations Charter (1945), had made it a general rule of international law that states may not interfere in matters customarily deemed to be the exclusive purview of another state. A state's internal affairs and its relations with third parties are inviolable. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter states that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

While nonintervention is the general rule, it is still limited by a right of intervention in cases where the current or imminent actions of one state endanger vital concerns of another state or of the community of nations. The clamor of small states for a total prohibition of all interventions has never been heeded. Accordingly, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter also provides that the nonintervention principle "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Under Chapter VII, states retain the right of coercive action, including the use of military force, to protect international peace and security.

In fact, there has been a partial swing back to the notion that intervention may be a duty to assure the right of people everywhere to be governed democratically and to be protected from violations of their basic rights as human beings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, laid out the scope of these rights. They include bans on genocide and war crimes. The declaration urges member nations to secure "universal and effective recognition and observance" of these rights. Subsequently, the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide spelled out in detail that actions such as killing members of national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, or harming them bodily or mentally, or preventing them from having children, constitutes genocide. The Nuremberg Tribunal, set up to try German war criminals after World War II, established the principle that political leaders and their minions are personally responsible for atrocities they commit as part of their official duties. In the 1990s, international criminal tribunals were set up to try individuals accused of crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The activities of these tribunals demonstrate that individual responsibility for crimes against humanity can be enforced to some degree under existing international laws. The 1998 Rome Statute for creating an International Criminal Court, which was signed by 120 countries within two years of its adoption, is further evidence that the world community concurs that human rights should be protected under international law.

In 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged UN members to devise and pursue more effective policies to stop egregious human rights violations. He acknowledged that

some nations might oppose humanitarian interventions as violations of state sovereignty. He countered this contention by arguing that the moral duty of the world community to stop human rights violations trumped an offending state's rights to sovereignty. In line with such widespread sentiments, which nonetheless lack the force of law, the United States has been criticized by political leaders at home and abroad for neglecting its "duty" to prevent or stop genocide, irrespective of its own interests. The issue arose in the Balkans, in Uganda, and in Indonesia when civil strife led to "ethnic cleansing" policies because ruling factions in these states or regions committed atrocities designed to kill or otherwise eliminate undesired minorities from their lands.

Application Problems The general rule that states may intervene in the affairs of other states to protect their own vital interests has been difficult to apply because there is no agreement on the definition of "vital interests." Are the interests that may be protected limited to matters of military security, or do they include major economic and social stakes? Must the danger be imminent or is there a right of preventive intervention? Is it a vital right to protect the property of one's citizens from physical harm in states where effective government has collapsed? Who determines that vital interests are endangered and that intervention is needed to protect them? What is an equitable balance between the safeguarding of vital interests of the intervening state and those of the state subject to intervention? If a state violates the human or political rights of individuals within its borders, or if its actions endanger international peace, do members of the international community have the duty to interfere to enforce the norms of the international community? May they intervene on behalf of established governments under attack by revolutionary forces within their own borders? The answers to these questions remain highly controversial.

These problems are further clouded by vociferous statements of political activists who invoke moral and ethical norms. They claim that interventions on behalf of "good" causes, as they define them, are legal and a moral duty, while interventions for "bad" causes are illegal, unethical, and immoral. Good causes range from aiding persecuted individuals to the duty to provide peoples with good governments to the obligation to stop civil wars or bring about the victory of the allegedly more virtuous side.

A second area of controversy concerns the means of intervention. There is substantial consensus that illegal intervention has occurred when a state dispatches armed forces to the territory of another. The Covenant of the League of Nations (1918), the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and the United Nations Charter (1945) are examples of international agreements outlawing such armed interventions. There is far less agreement about the legality of the vast array of nonmilitary pressures by which states can affect the affairs of other states. These include economic pressures, such as an offer or withdrawal of loans, trade, or aid, including military supplies; political pressures, such as granting recognition to an acceptable government to bolster its power, and withholding of recognition from an unacceptable government in hopes of toppling it; and psychological pressures, such as expressing support for one side in a revolution, denouncing the policies of another state, or excluding it from international meetings. There is a good deal of disagreement about which of such economic, political, and psychological pressures are legitimate exercises of a state's right to conduct its affairs with others as it pleases or undue interferences in the affairs of another state.

A third area of dispute involves the validity of consent to intervention. Many legal experts contend that intervention is legal if it is carried out pursuant to treaty rights or in response to an invitation by an incumbent government. Others dispute the legality of such interventions because treaties granting the right to intervention and requests for intervention frequently spring from duress or are initiated by unrepresentative governments eager to keep themselves in power. Whether these factors invalidate the consent expressed in the treaty or invitation is a controversial legal question. For example, when Colombia refused the request of President Theodore Roosevelt's administration to allow the United States to build a canal in Panama, then a part of Colombia, an uprising leading to Panama's independence was engineered with U.S. support. The pro-independence forces then requested U.S. aid in resisting Colombia's efforts to prevent the secession. The United States complied, ignoring Colombia's objections that the rebels lacked legitimacy and the right to request foreign aid. Once independent, Panama granted the United States the canal rights that its parent state had refused.

A related problem involves the right of collective intervention. For example, member states

of the United Nations have agreed in principle to collective interventions. Is this tantamount to automatic approval of interventions by the United Nations in a member country that has violated UN rules and demands? Can a nonmember of the United Nations validly argue that collective intervention directed against it is illegal because it has not given prior consent? For example, could Iraq contend that the UN coalition cobbled together by the Bush administration in 1990–1991 amounted to illegal intervention when Iraq claimed that its incursions into neighboring Kuwait were legitimate because part of the region legally belonged to Iraq? Moreover, Iraq claimed that the government of Kuwait was ruling the country against the objections of the Kuwaiti population.

The official position of the United States on legality and illegality of interventions has generally leaned toward a fairly broad construction of the right of intervention. Presidents and secretaries of state have argued since the end of World War I that international law permits states to retain the right to determine which of their national interests may be protected through intervention and the occasions when intervention is required. Likewise, the United States contends that states retain the right to intervene individually when collective intervention machinery fails to operate efficiently. At the same time, the United States has narrowed the scope of American interests defined as vital enough to justify protection through intervention. Examples of circumstances claimed as justifying intervention include the establishment of Soviet missile sites in Cuba in 1962 and aid to the corrupt but noncommunist government of Vietnam in the 1960s when communist forces attempted to wrest power from the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The determination of what constitutes legal intervention has been further complicated by the fact that it is deemed derogatory to charge a government with the practice of intervention. For many of the world's governments and people, interventions are policies pursued by international bullies and oppressors, while nonintervention is the hallmark of virtuous nations. These evaluative connotations tempt intervening governments to avoid the label of "intervention" even when their actions are lawful. Instead, they use deceptive names, such as "interposition" or "police action." Similarly, they may misrepresent illegal interventions as legal activities by using deceptive names or spurious legal justifications. The countries that are the targets of interventions may give the false taint of illegality to them by attaching the intervention label to them. Such misuses of political terms make it difficult to ascertain prevailing views within the community of nations on the precise nature of intervention and the criteria by which one can judge whether intervention has occurred and is legal or illegal.

THE PRACTICE OF INTERVENTION

If one were to draw a curve charting the number of American interventions over a 200-year span, it would begin at a fairly low point, reach a peak roughly at the center, then move sharply downward and rebound after World War II. The curve would show several lesser fluctuations during the years of ascent and descent. The major rationale for this ebb and flow of interventionism is the change in perceptions about the security of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has intervened in the affairs of other nations, or seriously considered intervening, primarily to prevent or foil anticipated attempts by powers on other continents to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere from which they might mount an attack on the United States. It has also intervened to maintain power balances among nations in Europe and Asia so that no single nation or combination of nations might become strong enough in these regions to launch an assault on the Western Hemisphere from abroad. Occasionally, the United States has also intervened to establish American strategic and economic bases abroad in order to protect its vital connecting routes to other parts of the world.

When challenges to hegemony were deemed minor, or when interventions were urged for goals not clearly involving the protection of hegemonic interests, the United States has generally shunned intervention. A major exception has been the policy of intervening on behalf of U.S. citizens abroad whenever their lives and property were threatened by political events in a weak foreign country. American statesmen have generally viewed the protective aspects of such actions as paramount and the interventionist aspects as strictly subordinate. Protective interventions, if limited to safeguard Americans, were ordinarily not counted in the record of interventions, at least not by American officials. Of course, the target country often viewed the matter differently.

Humanitarian interventions are another exception. They are viewed primarily as attempts

to help suffering human beings whose lives are endangered, rather than as attempts to challenge or interfere with the political situation in the states where these individuals happen to live. In fact, the United States has resisted protecting people from violation of many of their economic and social rights stipulated in human rights conventions, claiming that such interventions would constitute illegal interference.

The argument that infringements of state sovereignty to achieve humanitarian goals are nonpolitical becomes more difficult to sustain when humanitarian crises are precipitated by political events, as was true in the 1990s for starvation relief in Somalia or rescue of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo from annihilation. States where humanitarian interventions are taking place generally condemn them. They consider all actions taken by a foreign power on their soil against their expressed wishes as intervention, regardless of the motivation for the action. This is why intervening states, including the United States, often supplement the humanitarian argument by claiming that the action is also undertaken because their vital interests are at stake or because extreme human suffering brings instability that endangers international peace.

While protection of the security of the United States has been the major reason for considering interventions as policy options, additional concerns have influenced specific policy decisions. Foremost, particularly in the early years of the country, was the question of capability to intervene effectively. Intervention usually requires substantial military, economic, and political resources. When the United States lacked such resources or was already using them to their fullest extent, it could not spare them for interventions.

The balance between political gains and political disadvantages derived from the intervention is also important. Intervention by one state may spur counterintervention by another. It may alienate the government and people of the state against which it is undertaken. It may antagonize other members of the community of nations. The chances that it will accomplish the objectives for which it was undertaken may be slim. All these factors are weighed in determining whether a particular intervention is advisable.

Policies of intervention, like other foreign policies, also tend to become entangled with events on the domestic political scene. Political competition for the allocation of human and material resources for various goals may lead to strong opposition to spending resources for a particular intervention. In the years before the Civil War, many interventions were appraised within the context of the proslavery-antislavery dispute. Later, the intervention policy became entangled in the debate over the merits of imperialist expansion. Differences in the appraisal of individual situations also are important. Political leaders often disagreed about whether hegemonic interests were really involved in a particular situation and whether intervention was likely to produce the anticipated results. Considering the high economic and political stakes involved in most decisions to intervene or to abstain, heated debates have been the rule. Political partisanship has also played a part in opposing or supporting particular interventions even though the policy of intervention and nonintervention has never carried a party label. Periods of plentiful and of scarce interventions have been unrelated to the partisan orientation of the government.

Public opinion within the United States has also had a discernible impact on foreign policy choices. When the public mood leaned toward isolationism and concentration on domestic problems, interventions were chosen less frequently than when the public mood was expansionist or imbued with the idea that the United States, as a world power, must involve itself fully with external affairs. Such swings in public opinion have been common, often based on reactions to the success or failure of the most recent foreign policies and on the country's economic strength.

The history of U.S. intervention and nonintervention policies can be divided into four periods. The first, in which the stress on nonintervention was greatest, encompasses roughly the first century of the nation's existence. Then followed an interlude of unabashed interventionism during the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. This period ended with the Great Depression years of the 1930s. Third, there were the frustrating decades leading up to World War II, followed by the Cold War era of confrontation between communist and noncommunist power blocs. Hopes for meeting dangers to the national interest through collective interventions turned to dust in the Cold War era. Despite a desire to abandon unilateral interventions, the United States felt compelled to intervene repeatedly to safeguard its national security when American leaders deemed it endangered by the policies of authoritarian governments in various parts of the world. Finally,

the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era. Humanitarian interventions in ethnic conflicts and interventions to aid countries in creating democratic governments became fairly common interventionist activities, usually after prolonged and heated verbal battles in the halls of government.

The First Century During the first century of the nation's history, numerous interventions were undertaken to consolidate control over the American mainland and adjacent regions. Territories held by European countries or in danger of being taken over by a European country were acquired or kept from passing under the control of a European rival or changing hands from a weaker to a stronger European ruler. Several major interventions to acquire Spanish Florida and minor meddling in Texas and California are examples. However, while the country was still weak compared to strong European powers, and during the turmoil of the Civil War and Reconstruction, interventions were undertaken only if the outcome seemed highly promising and few dire consequences appeared in the offing. For instance, intervention to acquire Canada was ruled out because of fear that it might bring war with Britain. Diplomatic activities to acquire Cuba were kept short of intervention lest they embroil the country in war with Spain and its allies. Likewise, intervention to annex the Dominican Republic was scotched by Congress.

Intervention was also considered repeatedly during this period in order to keep European powers from intervening in the affairs of independent Western Hemisphere states. But few of these plans bore fruit. Internal weakness kept the United States from pursuing its policies through intervention on a number of occasions when, at a later period, it would have intervened. For example, the United States did not stop interventions by France in Mexico and Haiti to collect debts, nor did it halt incursions by Britain into Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Argentina. Verbal protests were made repeatedly. The United States objected to France's intervention in Mexico to support a monarchy, to Spain's intervention in Peru and annexation of the Dominican Republic, and to Britain's acquisition of parts of Honduras.

The United States also attempted to strengthen American influence in areas threatened by European intervention by expressing a strong interest in the fate of these regions. But the United States could do little more. Powerful influences in Congress and among the public opposed preventive interventions that various presidents had suggested to restore public order in Mexico and the Caribbean area or to overturn military dictatorships and thereby forestall corrective measures by European powers. The United States even kept largely aloof from the efforts of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere to free themselves from control by their mother countries.

Interventions by the United States in revolutions outside the Western Hemisphere were also kept to a minimum, although many revolutions were taking place in Europe to replace absolute monarchies with democratic governments. Two centuries later, the support of democratic factions and countries against absolute governments of a different sort would be deemed sound reason for intervention by the United States, but that time had not yet arrived.

The United States did intervene in China, Japan, and Korea to coerce them to grant trade privileges to American merchants, beginning with a government trade mission in 1844 headed by Commissioner Caleb Cushing. At the time, such missions were the usual practice when foreign nations wanted to trade with Asian countries. The eagerness of the United States to have its citizens participate in the spoils of trade in the Far East was explained as much by strategic as by economic considerations. American leaders feared that the European powers would divide the Far East, particularly China, into spheres of influence from which other powers would be excluded. Land bases in China would give them control over the shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean. The United States, unless it supported retention of control by the weak Asiatic powers or secured spheres of interest of its own, would be deprived of Pacific outposts to protect its access routes to Asia. The United States therefore pursued a two-pronged policy in the area: it protested against increased domination by European powers, and it intervened to acquire trade privileges for itself and to lay the foundations for ultimate acquisition of a number of naval bases in the Pacific.

The Imperial Period The heady philosophy of the interventionist phase of American foreign policy is epitomized by Secretary of State Richard Olney's claim in 1895 that the United States had become master of the American continent "practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers." Consequently, "its fiat is law upon the sub-

jects to which it confines its interposition." Within the next decade the United States would satisfy all its remaining territorial ambitions, largely through interventions and war with Spain. Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam came under its control, as well as Hawaii and Samoa. Nonetheless, even during this period, reluctance to intervene did not disappear entirely. For instance, President Grover Cleveland's administration resisted pleas for intervention in Cuba although intermittent civil strife on the island was deemed hazardous to American security.

From the standpoint of intervention policy, the most crucial territorial acquisition during this period was the Panama Canal Zone. It was acquired through interventionist policies that assured that the Panama region would break away successfully from Colombia and would grant ample concessions to the United States for construction and protection of an isthmian canal. The United States regarded the canal as a lifeline permitting its naval units to shuttle rapidly between the East and West coasts to guard against dangers emanating from Europe or Asia. To protect this vital route, the United States appointed itself policeman of the Western Hemisphere who must and did intervene frequently to restore political order in the small countries near the canal. American political leaders assumed that political unrest automatically spelled danger to the canal area, warranting intervention. No specific proof was required in a particular situation that an attack on the canal was imminent. In a number of Caribbean countries, the United States even secured treaty rights of automatic intervention in case of unrest. The most famous advance authorization for intervention was the Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution, which was in force for more than thirty years.

In areas farther from the canal, interventions were undertaken with more restraint. During this period, Mexico was a source of great concern to American policymakers because of constant internal turmoil, a succession of brutal dictatorial governments, and serious attacks on American citizens and their property in Mexico. The United States used a number of pressures, particularly economic sanctions and arms embargoes, to control turmoil in Mexico, but refrained from full-scale military intervention despite domestic pressures.

During the interventionist period the United States protested more strongly than ever before against European incursions into the affairs of the hemisphere. Boundary difficulties between Venezuela and Britain in the 1880s provide a good example. The United States intervened in the dispute, contending that it had a general right to interpose in any conflict in which the political or territorial integrity of an American state was threatened by a non-American power. It claimed that it could insist on arbitration and the enforcement of the arbitration award, even if one of the parties opposed the award.

By nonrecognition of an undesirable government, the United States also intervened repeatedly, although not consistently, to overthrow authoritarian regimes, particularly military dictatorships that had come to power in Latin America. Regimes that had ascended through unconstitutional means and represented authoritarian philosophies were deemed potential sources of instability. They might produce internal unrest, encouraging foreign intervention that would threaten the hegemonic interests of the United States. It was hoped that nonrecognition would make it so difficult for the unrecognized government to conduct its political and economic affairs that it would be weakened and overthrown by democratic forces. While potential danger to the security of the Western Hemisphere usually was the motivating force for nonrecognition, at times the policy was used on purely ideological grounds. Several instances occurred during the Woodrow Wilson administration because President Wilson was loathe to recognize governments that had come to power by force or ruled undemocratically.

Major challenges to the international balance of power continued in Asia during this period. European nations and Japan were establishing spheres of interest at the expense of China. More assiduously than before, the United States aimed to prevent this by means of an Open Door policy for China. This involved securing pledges by European nations and Japan to refrain from closing any part of China to access by other powers. The United States protested whenever other powers violated the policy, which it regarded as a guarantee of China's territorial integrity and independence. When protests failed, the United States did not usually attempt stronger pressures for fear that they might lead to war.

The United States did intervene in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) to prevent Russia and Japan from encroaching on China's sovereignty. Later it refused to recognize damaging concessions extorted by Japan from China in the vain hope that this would produce a policy

change on Japan's part. The United States also continued to engage in intervention designed to strengthen China economically and politically and to assure an American presence in the area to checkmate European power plays.

The peak of interventionism, if one judges by the frequency of interventions and the number of countries involved, was reached during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Besides numerous interventions in the Western Hemisphere and Asia, this phase included U.S. intervention in World War I on behalf of the anti-German coalition. Ultimately, intervention led to full-scale American participation in the war.

In the postwar years, the number of interventions declined. The weakness of European powers after World War I was one major factor. They no longer presented a real threat to the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. No European power was strong enough to assume control over Europe or the tottering Chinese empire. Another major factor was the realization that many goals that the United States had tried to accomplish in the course of interventions in the Western Hemisphere could not be achieved through intervention. For instance, it had been impossible to lay the groundwork for politically stable, economically sound, and democratically governed states in the Caribbean area, despite lengthy U.S. military interventions. Attempts to establish economic influence abroad and to use it for political purposes (known as dollar diplomacy) had also largely failed.

Lastly, interventions had aroused a great deal of opposition from other countries, particularly the nations of the Western Hemisphere, and from groups within the United States. The policy was attacked on legal, moral, and practical grounds as improper coercion of the weak by the strong for the selfish aims of the strong. Behind such charges lay a changing climate of world opinion that placed greater emphasis on the sovereign rights of small nations and condemned coercive diplomacy, particularly the use of military force, to achieve national objectives.

The Collective Security Phase The dominant feature of American intervention and nonintervention policies after the end of the openly interventionist years was the desire to make interventions—particularly those involving the use of military force—collective enterprises of the world community or regional groupings. Dangers to the vital interests of the international community that would justify protection through intervention were to be carefully defined in advance. The United States hoped that they would encompass all the circumstances that had hitherto tempted it into individual interventions. In addition, the United States expected to influence the policies of other countries through conditions attached to its economic and military aid policies. It did not consider such conditions interventionist. Rather, they were deemed the right of the donor to dictate the terms of a grant.

Unfortunately, the goals set for conditional aid policies were rarely achieved. The stipulated conditions often proved impossible to implement or failed to produce the desired results because of unstable internal conditions in the recipient nations. Fraud and corruption were major problems worldwide. In many cases, the conditions attached to the aid were flouted. Occasionally, the prospective recipient refused the aid because the conditions were deemed interventionist, destabilizing, or insulting.

The goals set for collective interventions fared somewhat better, but also fell short on many occasions. Prolonged negotiations over many years made it possible to organize a moderately effective collective intervention system in the Western Hemisphere. Spurred on by the United States and its supporters, the system was activated repeatedly to curb Axis and communist influence in Latin America. Strong objections by countries such as pro-Axis Argentina and Chile and pro-communist Cuba, Guatemala, and their supporters were overruled. But efforts to use the system failed frequently when the goal was to control major political problems endemic to Western Hemisphere countries.

On the wider international level, the League of Nations Covenant, and the United Nations Charter and interpretive resolutions thereafter, also contained provisions for collective intervention to protect the vital interests of members of the community of nations. But agreement could rarely be reached on the kinds of menaces to which this machinery should respond. Nations could not even agree during international gatherings or when faced with specific situations on what sets of circumstances should be considered threats to world peace.

The weaknesses of the collective intervention machinery encouraged the United States to continue to determine unilaterally whether its security was menaced by particular international developments. When protective interventions

seemed necessary, it would then try to initiate collective action. If this failed, or if the collective machinery could not be put into operation quickly and decisively enough to halt the danger, the United States claimed and continued to exercise a right of unilateral intervention.

Two major dangers, similar in nature, roused the United States to a large number of verbal, economic, political, and military interventions during this and the preceding period. The first was the attempt of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Europe, and later in the Far East as well, to destroy the balance of power in Europe and Asia and to establish their own hegemony. The United States first intervened in World War II in Europe and Asia by verbal attacks and warnings directed against the dictators. It tried to engender and support policies by neutral powers that would be harmful to the dictators' aims, and it gave economic and military aid to the dictators' enemies. Along with other countries in the Western Hemisphere, it interfered with the rights of belligerent powers to conduct hostilities on the high seas surrounding the Americas in a band 300 to 1,000 miles wide. To protect the hemisphere from Axis footholds, the territorial status of European possessions in the Americas was declared frozen in 1940. Inter-American machinery was established to administer the possessions of subjugated European countries. All of these verbal, political, and economic interventions failed to halt Axis advances. The United States then entered the war in 1941 in response to Axis war declarations and attacks on U.S. territories.

The victory of the Allied powers in World War II ended the menace to American security created by rightist totalitarian imperialism in Europe and Japanese empire building in Asia. New challenges to hemispheric safety soon arose from attempts by the Soviet Union and other communist powers to spread their ideology and political and even territorial control over a widening circle of countries in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world. American leaders believed that the United States had a legal right to intervene to halt communist advances because its own survival as a democratic country was deemed at stake. Every addition to the communist coalition diminished the potential of the United States to defend itself successfully against communist subversion and military aggression.

Interventions by the United States to halt or prevent the spread of communist control throughout the world explain most of its far-flung operations during the latter four-fifths of the twentieth century. In almost every case in which the United States had identified a situation as potential or actual communist intervention, it tried to work through collective action. These efforts failed frequently because other countries disagreed that communist intervention was imminent or because they feared the consequences of the spread of communism less. Moreover, struggles by national liberation movements to free their countries from foreign control or domestic tyranny and corruption had often become so entwined with insurgency by procommunist forces that it was hard to fight communism without destroying liberation and reform movements. When the United States intervened unilaterally, claiming to act in the name of collectively approved principles to maintain established governments in power, its reputation as a champion of popular, honest government often suffered serious damage at home and abroad.

The United States intervened to prevent the ascendancy of communist governments in Eastern Europe by means of a policy of nonrecognition and economic pressures. It tried to checkmate Soviet influence in places like Iran, Turkey, and Greece. It aided anticommunist nations in the Middle East, particularly the new state of Israel, as well as pro-Western Jordan and Lebanon in their struggles against covert and overt attacks by Soviet-supported Arab nations. The United States sent aid and rescue missions to assist anticommunist forces in the Congo and, to a lesser extent, Angola. It used a number of interventionist tactics to bring about black majority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Namibia, in hopes of preventing racial warfare in southern Africa that might provide a cover for further expansion of Soviet influence in the area. It also used such tactics to keep Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf at bay.

To strengthen noncommunist governments faced with strong domestic opposition from communist parties, and to support governments fighting against communist insurgents, the United States intervened in widely scattered parts of the globe, such as Central and Western Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. In the Far East, intervention was used to prevent the expansion of communist control over much of Southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and over South Korea. In Korea, the United States intervened unilaterally in 1950 until a United Nations force could take over. The

bulk of military power that was made available to the United Nations for collective intervention had to be furnished by the United States because other powers gave only verbal support. The Korean intervention and other interventions undertaken to stop the advances of communism made it clear that gains won on the battlefield could not be maintained without permanently stationing noncommunist military forces in areas coveted by communist powers.

The most protracted and costly intervention to halt the advance of communist-controlled forces occurred in Vietnam. There the United States and a number of its allies attempted to support noncommunist governments against attacks by procommunist forces eager to reunite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under a communist government. The fierce controversy over the legality and wisdom of the Vietnam intervention led to serious political cleavages within the United States and within the international community. Opponents of the intervention claimed that the situation involved a domestic struggle between procommunist and anticommunist Vietnamese that did not seriously involve U.S. security interests. Proponents disagreed and their views prevailed. The United States finally withdrew its military forces from Vietnam in 1973. Economic and military aid to the South Vietnamese government was discontinued in 1975. By that time, communist forces had assumed full control of the country and further resistance to the spread of communism in Southeast Asia appeared hopeless.

In many instances, it is easy to refute charges of illegal interventionism by the United States because American policymakers based their actions on treaty rights providing for joint defense against communist attacks or on requests for help by anticommunist governments in various nations. But, as indicated earlier, the moral and even legal validity of these arrangements is often challenged when the agreements were concluded under circumstances that made it practically impossible for one party to decline or when the moral authority of the government to agree to intervention is questionable. A more solid, legal defense for anticommunist interventions is the claim to a right of counterintervention. The United States acted in most instances in response to proved, presumed, or anticipated interventions by communist forces that were intervening around the world to guide politics to their advantage. It can be argued that, akin to the right of self-defense, there exists a right of preventive or curative counterintervention.

While it may seem at first glance that the United States missed no opportunity to intervene against the spread of communism, this was not the case. Many possibilities for intervention were bypassed because the threat of advancing communist influence was comparatively limited, because the costs of intervention, including likely counterinterventions, seemed too high, or because the United States realized that it could not muster sufficient strength in faraway places to engage in effective intervention.

A situation involving all three of these contingencies occurred on mainland China. The United States had initially given some aid to the forces of General Chiang Kai-shek to assist him in wresting control of North China from the communist forces in that country. When it became clear that only massive military involvement would save the Chinese mainland from communist control, U.S. policymakers in the period following World War II, in a highly contested policy judgment, decided against such a major commitment. But limited aid to Chiang Kai-shek, who had retreated to the island of Formosa, continued. Similarly, despite explicit declarations and implicit threats, interventions on behalf of noncommunist factions in Eastern European countries to help them shed communist control never materialized. Insurgents in East Germany in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 received no official help.

Nor did the United States intervene in most instances when left- or right-wing dictatorships came to power in Latin America in the period after World War II, or when governments expropriated the assets of large American businesses without adequate compensation. For example, it failed to intervene in Bolivia in 1952 when a coup d'état supported by Argentina's pro-fascist Juan Perón regime put a radical regime into power. It nationalized the tin mines that supplied tin to the United States and failed to compensate U.S. business interests for losses suffered through expropriations. Major exceptions to this hands-off policy occurred generally only in areas close to the American mainland and the access routes to the Panama Canal. For instance, the United States intervened to topple a left-wing anti-American government in Guatemala in 1954 by aiding exile forces attempting military invasion of their homeland.

The United States also helped to plan and execute an invasion by anti-Castro Cuban refugees in 1961 who wanted to overthrow the communist government of Premier Fidel Castro in Cuba. The

attack failed and the tactics of the United States were widely condemned as illegal. Few such charges were made a year later when the United States intervened in Cuban-Soviet relations by demanding removal of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. In the Cuban missile crisis, most Latin American states and most noncommunist members of the world community concurred that the security of the United States was sufficiently endangered by Soviet missiles ninety miles from its territory to justify intervention. Subsequently, the inter-American community acted jointly to exclude Cuba from the inter-American system and to embargo the shipment of arms and other goods to Cuba. This fell short of the collective break in diplomatic relations favored by the United States in response to Cuba's publicized plans to subvert other Latin American governments, if necessary by guerrilla violence and civil war. Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia had been singled out as primary targets. When the dominance of the United States over hemispheric relations declined in the 1970s, restrictions against Cuba were lifted one by one.

Another major intervention against a Latin American government was the attempt to forestall a leftist takeover in the Dominican Republic. More than 30,000 U.S. troops were dispatched in 1965 to stop fighting between forces that President Lyndon Johnson deemed procommunist and anticommunist. Ultimately, a right-wing regime prevailed. Although the United States managed to involve the inter-American collective intervention machinery, participation by the Organization of American States did little to erase the bitterness within the United States, Latin America, and other parts of the globe about the initial failure of the United States to abide by its pledge to abstain from unilateral military intervention. Many observers doubted that the Dominican situation had presented a sufficiently serious threat to the security of the United States to warrant major preventive measures.

After costly, often fruitless interventions had soured American policymakers on benefits to be reaped from intervention, a renewed retreat from overt interventionism began in 1969. It was hastened by a policy of détente and bargaining between the United States, the Soviet Union, and mainland China that helped to reduce the climate of mutual fear that had spawned interventions earlier. The ascent of communist-controlled or communist-influenced governments was no longer deemed an ipso facto threat to the security of the noncommunist world. The United States reduced its interventions and military commitments in Asia. It tried to lessen occasions for intervention in the Middle East by pacifying the area and resuming more normal relations with countries that had drawn their support from the Soviet Union. It also took a more aloof stance toward the tumultuous politics of Latin America. Moreover, to avoid the onus of charges of interventionism, a number of interventions were conducted as covert enterprises. The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, which contributed to the overthrow of the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile in 1973, are examples of the types of actions that were undertaken covertly to weaken governments and policies deemed hostile and dangerous to the United States.

However, increased reluctance to engage in interventions and decreased concern about the dangers posed by the ascendancy of Marxist governments in various parts of the world should not be construed as a complete retreat from the use of collective or unilateral intervention to protect the security of the United States from damage caused by attempts to spread communism. For instance, the United States invaded Grenada, a Caribbean island, in 1983 on the grounds that the Fidel Castro's communist government in nearby Cuba had designs on the island.

Overall, the more restrained approach to anticommunist interventionism was gradually counterbalanced by increased interventionism on behalf of humanitarian and civil rights causes. President Jimmy Carter, following policies reminiscent of the Woodrow Wilson presidency, proclaimed in 1977 that the United States would intervene on behalf of persecuted peoples anywhere in the world where states were denying human or civil rights to their citizens on account of race, religion, or political persuasion. Numerous such interventions took place. However, they were neither prompt nor consistent. In a haphazard pattern, influenced by a multiplicity of political and logistical factors, humanitarian interventions were carried out promptly or sluggishly in some situations but forgone in others involving equal or greater human catastrophes.

The Post–Cold War Decades During the Cold War era, most interventions could be defended as counterinterventions that were needed to implement the policy of containment designed to stop the spread of communism. Following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, different rationales came to the fore. The new potential dangers to U.S. interests came primarily from an

epidemic of violent internal conflicts and human rights violations in formerly communist nations and in developing countries throughout the globe. To justify intervention under these circumstances, U.S. presidents used three major rationales. Most commonly, presidents contended that these upheavals endangered world peace and security in general and hence the security of the United States. This argument served two purposes. It was useful in justifying collective interventions under the United Nations Charter and it weakened complaints by domestic critics in the United States, especially in the Senate, who denied that the country's national security was imperiled and therefore charged that the United States had no business undertaking these foreign interventions.

The second major rationale was the evolving consensus that humanitarian interventions are a moral duty as well as a requirement in the wake of the various human rights declarations. However, this argument has never been considered strong enough to silence influential critics of intervention. Hence, it is usually accompanied by claims that the human rights violations, besides endangering vulnerable populations, also constitute a threat to peace.

The final major rationale—also usually buttressed by individual or collective self-defense arguments—is the claim that the United States is a world power that must protect the world from major misbehavior by members of the international community. The argument was clearly articulated by President Bill Clinton in his Farewell Address to the nation in 2001. He declared that "America cannot and must not disengage itself from the world. If we want the world to embody our shared values, then we must assume shared responsibility." Clinton's plea resembles to a surprising extent the claims made by President Theodore Roosevelt a century earlier. The Roosevelt Corollary that pictured the United States as the world's policeman was never accepted by the rest of the international community. Its modern version is likely to be equally unpopular, especially among small nations that are the most likely targets of intervention.

The argument that international peace and security are endangered by political unrest in a foreign country was used by Clinton's predecessor, President George H. W. Bush, to displace General Manuel Noriega, who headed the government of Panama in 1990 when the country was in turmoil and there were rampant violations of the human rights of Noriega's enemies. Economic sanctions, such as freezing Panamanian assets in the United States and revoking Panama's most-favored-nation trade status, had failed to drive the general from office. As in so many other interventions, the brunt of the suffering produced by these economic sanctions was borne by the poorest segments of the population while the leaders of the country continued to prosper and lead lives of luxury.

On 17 December 1989, President Bush ordered Operation Just Cause to replace Noriega by military force. American troops landed on 20 December. The officially stated "just causes" for the intervention were protection of American lives and property in Panama at a time of internal political unrest, restoration of democracy, the security of the Panama Canal, and brutalities and illegal drug trafficking ascribed to Noriega and his cronies. It remains a matter of controversy whether these were the actual motives or merely cover-ups for more mundane political objectives of the Bush administration. Among other reasons, President Bush, like many of his predecessors and like his successor, President Clinton, may have felt that the "leader of the free world" could not risk his international image by allowing a tin-pot dictator in a tiny country to defy his demands.

The argument that internal domestic conditions in a small country threatened world peace seemed spurious to devotees of nonintervention in the United States and abroad. Accordingly, the Panama intervention led to charges of unlawful intervention by the United States. On 29 December 1989, the UN General Assembly condemned the intervention by a vote of 75 to 20 and demanded that the United States remove its troops from Panama. Likewise, the Organization of American States condemned the intervention unanimously, even though many members detested Noriega and his actions. In defense of its actions, the United States cited the self-defense provisions of the UN and OAS charters, without specifying in what way Panama constituted a major threat to U.S. security. U.S. representatives also argued that the survival of democratic nations was at stake and that all available peaceful means of displacing Noriega had been tried and failed. There was no solid proof for these claims or for the claim that American citizens or the Panama Canal were in imminent danger of suffering major harm. However, public opinion polls by the CBS television network indicated that most Panamanians approved of the intervention and were happy that it had led to the removal of Noriega from government power and from the country.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS, 19 JANUARY 2001

"Because the world is more connected every day in every way, America's security and prosperity require us to continue to lead in the world. At this remarkable moment in history, more people live in freedom than ever before. Our alliances are stronger than ever. People all around the world look to America to be a force for peace and prosperity, freedom and security. The global economy is giving more of our own people and millions around the world the chance to work and live and raise their families with dignity. But the forces of integration that have created these good opportunities also make us more subject to global forces of destruction, to terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trafficking, the spread of deadly weapons and disease, the degradation of the global environment. The expansion of trade hasn't fully closed the gap between those of us who live on the cutting edge of the global economy and the billions around the world who live on the knife's edge of survival. This global gap requires more than compassion. It requires action. Global poverty is a powder keg that could be ignited by our indifference.

"In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson warned of entangling alliances. But in our times, America cannot and must not disentangle itself from the world. If we want the world to embody our shared values, then we must assume a shared responsibility. If the wars of the twentieth century, especially the recent ones in Kosovo and Bosnia, have taught us anything, it is that we achieve our aims by defending our values and leading the forces of freedom and peace. We must embrace boldly and resolutely that duty to lead, to stand with our allies in word and deed, and to put a human face on the global economy so that expanded trade benefits all peoples in all nations, lifting lives and hopes all across the world."

A less political, and initially less controversial, intervention took place in Somalia in 1992. It began as a purely humanitarian venture to provide starvation relief and stop human rights abuses in that African country. No strategic, economic, or drug trafficking issues were involved, and Somalian leaders had not seized territory illegally. However, the country was in the throes of a civil war without an effective government in place. Proponents of the intervention argued therefore that it made no sense for foreign powers to ask anyone's permission to enter the country. The United Nations, with strong member support, had approved the mission after it had become impossible for relief agencies to function in the war-torn country. The United States then dispatched 37,000 troops to Somalia to keep food relief supplies out of the reach of the feuding warlords and distribute it to the starving population. The initial plans called for completing the mission within five months.

But, as often happens in unstable areas, the various UN forces involved in the mission, including the American contingents, soon became embroiled in the civil war, changing the nature of the venture in unforeseen and unplanned ways. It had become obvious that effective delivery of aid to the people required bringing about at least some semblance of political order. In the wake of political efforts to pacify the country—which turned out to be futile—Somali soldiers attacked the relief teams, inflicting heavy casualties. Eighteen U.S. soldiers were among the dead. After some hesitation, President Clinton withdrew U.S. forces in October 1993, in the wake of the killings. Pictures of the corpse of an American soldier dragged along the streets of Somalia's capital city had outraged the American public and led to angry recriminations in Congress about the wisdom of undertaking the mission.

The Somalia intervention, besides souring the U.S. government's taste for humanitarian interventions, gave rise to the belief that ample television coverage of human disasters throughout the world can arouse the anger and compassion of the American public. In turn, the public may then pressure the national government to intervene to stop human suffering. This putative phenomenon was dubbed "the CNN effect." As evidence that such an effect had spawned the initial intervention in Somalia, scholars pointed out that graphic pictures and reports about atrocities, starvation, and devastation in Somalia had been widely aired on CNN television. Pressure groups, so it was alleged, had then forced the government, against its better judgment, to airlift relief supplies and later send U.S. troops to Somalia. Other scholars denied this sequence of events and contended that relief plans

for Somalia antedated the CNN publicity by more than a year. They claimed that government officials, including members of Congress who had visited Somalia, had inspired the action.

It is impossible to prove that the pressure by government officials would have been sufficient to lead to the decision to intervene—and to withdraw when the bodies of dead soldiers were shown—if the decision had not been supported by media-induced public pressure. Hence, media buffs continue to believe that the CNN effect exists. They argue that graphic coverage of human suffering is an important determinant of whether or not a particular disaster will generate U.S. intervention. In general, public-opinion polls show that the American public supports purely humanitarian interventions by a substantial margin, especially if there are no American casualties. The same holds true when the public becomes convinced that the intervention seeks to subdue an aggressor eager to attack the United States, injure its vital interests, or damage its citizens. The public is far less supportive of interventions that seem designed to change another country's politics when there appears to be no immediate threat to vital U.S. interests.

Many interventions that involve important humanitarian concerns serve multiple purposes, of course. For example, the intervention in Haiti in 1994 combined humanitarian and democracy-building objectives with an exceptionally strong emphasis on restoring democracy to a country where a democratic election had been aborted. Because of Haiti's proximity to the U.S. mainland, large refugee flows into Florida were quite likely. Rumors suggested that more than 300,000 Haitians were eager to leave their country, most of them heading for the United States. Similarly, the 1989–1990 Panama intervention, besides stopping humanitarian outrages and supporting democracy in Panama, became a cog in U.S. efforts to stop the inflow of dangerous recreational drugs into the United States.

The policy of intervention to support democratic governments was originally part of the policy of containment of communism. If a country had a strong democratic government, presumably it would not succumb to an authoritarian ideology. After the Cold War ended, supporting or even creating democracies was viewed as an aid to international peace on the dubious assumption that democratic countries rarely go to war with other democratically governed states. Hence, the United States could argue that its intervention in Haiti was justified under the UN Charter to maintain world peace. The claim was bolstered by the fact that the United Nations had officially sanctioned the intervention.

As if to underline the importance of sponsoring the growth of democratic institutions worldwide, the U.S. State Department created a Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Affairs during the Clinton years. The bureau's mission was defined as promotion of democracy throughout the world and formulation of human rights policies, including those relating to labor issues. In addition, the Clinton administration, like several of its predecessors, used the granting or withholding of economic resources as a weapon in the fight to democratize the nations of the world.

It has always been easier to claim concerns about the security of the United States as reasons for intervention when the location of the trouble is close to America's shores. This is the U.S. "sphere of influence," designated as its prime concern and fief since the days of the Monroe Doctrine. Reluctance to become entangled in conflicts outside of the Western Hemisphere, especially when international organizations are available with authority to handle such situations, explains why the United States initially tried to avoid intervention in the civil strife in Bosnia that entailed major human rights violations. But the combined pull of a number of motives—humanitarian concerns, the importance of U.S. support for NATO involvement in the Balkan situation, and the desire to maintain U.S. influence in European affairs—finally persuaded the Clinton administration in 1995 to join its NATO partners in air strikes to try to end ground fighting in Bosnia.

Overall, when U.S. policymakers weigh the options in situations where intervention is under consideration in the post–Cold War world, several factors seem to weigh especially heavily in favor of becoming involved. They are the location of the trouble spot, the relative size and power of the country in question, the degree of defiance of U.S. requests displayed by the local rulers, and the chances of a successful outcome. Given these criteria, Western Hemisphere locations, especially if they are close to the United States, are most likely to elicit intervention, provided the country is small and headed by an arrogant, democracy-defying ruler, and provided the United States is ready and willing to commit sufficient resources to carry the intervention through to a successful conclusion.

Other important factors are the magnitude and viciousness of human rights violations, the

effectiveness of mass media in depicting them to large audiences, the impact of unrest on American citizens in the country in question, and the likelihood that an exodus of refugees will seek asylum in the United States or allied nations. While absence of most of these conditions explains why the United States abstained from intervention in numerous major human rights tragedies in the post–Cold War era, U.S. policies have not been entirely consistent. The complex international and domestic environment that surrounds foreign policy decisions has always made it impossible to predict specific political actions with certainty.

A number of the interventions mentioned thus far are examples of cooperation between the United Nations and the United States. When interventions have been undertaken under UN auspices, the organization has repeatedly encouraged one nation to take charge of a collective intervention enterprise. For example, it entrusted the United States with major responsibilities for the conduct of UN interventions in the Persian Gulf War, in Somalia, and in Haiti. In such cases, the leading country is expected to take control of the operation and to foot most of its expenses. Other UN members contribute personnel and material resources.

The Gulf War of 1991 is the best example of the United States working effectively with the United Nations to implement a policy that seemed in its own as well as in the collective interest. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, destabilizing the balance of power in the Middle East and threatening the uninterrupted flow of oil, the UN Security Council condemned the aggression and imposed economic sanctions. When these measures failed to persuade Hussein to withdraw his troops, President George H. W. Bush threatened U.S. military intervention. The U.S. position was legitimized and strengthened by a Security Council resolution that authorized "all necessary means," including the use of military force, to get Saddam out of Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm, which was launched in 1991 with full control by the U.S. military, thus became a UN operation supported by a coalition of twenty-seven nations. The drawback to the collaborative arrangement was that U.S. freedom of action in the military operations and the peace settlement that followed the brief span of hostilities was limited by political pressures to include coalition members in decision making and make concessions to their wishes.

Initially, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was bullish about the usefulness of interventions conducted within the UN framework. But the euphoria about collective action was short-lived. Disillusionment set in during subsequent crises in Somalia and Bosnia when disagreements between U.S. and UN policymakers hampered the United States in structuring and executing the missions. It was difficult, for example, to make threats of military intervention credible when the United States could not act without first securing UN approval.

Problems incurred in orchestrating interventions in the Balkans with the help of members of both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) were blamed for delaying subsequent U.S. intervention until after massive killing and ethnic cleansing had already occurred. Similarly, the failure of the Somalia intervention allegedly scotched all plans for intervention in the Rwanda genocides, which were the next major humanitarian crisis in Africa. Observers of U.S. diplomacy therefore believe that Americans have little patience with policies, especially when they involve military force, when these policies do not produce quick successes. Failed policies become a barrier to future action in the same vein. Like most generalizations, this is only partly true. The slogan "No More Vietnams" after the failed Vietnam War presumably precluded future military interventions but only for a while.

Still, in light of these policies of self-restraint whenever obstacles occur, it seems unlikely that the United States will make ample use of its proclaimed duty to act as the world's chief law enforcement power. This is especially true because the experiences of the Bush and Clinton administrations with a number of interventions have made it clear that interventions carry high personnel costs. Airpower alone, even if massively deployed, will not generally displace violent governments or end brutal civil wars. But fighting on the ground risks large numbers of casualties. Such losses are both humanly and politically extraordinarily painful. Many members of Congress are very unwilling to become mired in interventions and resist them with all of the means at their disposal. Their opposition, often via claims that the 1973 War Powers Act has been violated, is a potent political deterrent to interventions, especially when they seem problematic for other reasons as well. High on the list of deterrents is the difficulty of coordinating multinational ventures that involve widely diverse nations and public- as well as private-sector organizations.

Opponents of policies involving military intervention often recommend economic sanc-

tions as an alternative to constrain international troublemakers. Unfortunately, the occasions when such policies have worked are few. The breakdown of apartheid policies in South Africa is often cited as a most conspicuous success. However, even in that situation, it remains controversial what the precise influence of economic sanctions was, compared to other factors in the breakdown of apartheid. Unfortunately, failures of even prolonged sanctions are easier to demonstrate, such as the defiance of sanctions by Fidel Castro's Cuba and by the despotic rulers of Haiti, Panama, Somalia, and Bosnia, where interventions followed failed sanctions. Another galling example of the impotence of sanctions was the political survival and prospering of Iraq's Saddam Hussein in the face of massive sanctions imposed by the international community and maintained for more than a decade.

DOCTRINE VERSUS PRACTICE

How does this record of numerous American interventions over two hundred years of national history square with the claim that the United States has always upheld the principle of nonintervention? How does it accord with the frequent declarations that nonintervention is the official policy of the United States? The answers require putting intervention policies into the perspective of available options, and also discussing the role that political doctrines play in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Countries, like individuals, rarely act with total consistency. Champions of peace do go to war; a preference for free trade may yield to protectionism when circumstances make protectionism highly advantageous. One generally characterizes a country's policies by prevailing trends within the policy and within the international community. As discussed, in the case of American intervention policies, the large numbers of interventions are matched by an even larger number of occasions when the United States eschewed intervention, although it was a viable and potentially beneficial policy alternative. This was particularly true during the first century of the nation's existence when it first proclaimed that nonintervention would be its preferred policy. Whether it will again become true in the twenty-first century remains an open question in the wake of many disappointing results of intervention policies, the high costs of such ventures, and competing domestic claims on available national resources. One thing is clear however: choices of intervention and nonintervention in particular situations will always be controversial. Proponents will claim that they are necessary and legal while opponents will argue the reverse.

Throughout American history, whenever intervention was the preferred policy choice, it has always been pictured as a last, undesired option. Nonintervention has been hailed even when the country's practices were clearly interventions. One may call this hypocrisy and denounce it. Or one may recognize that the belief in a country's right to freedom and independence from outside interference runs strong. After all, that was the legacy left to Americans in 1796 when President George Washington warned that "History and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government." Therefore, "it must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves . . . in the ordinary vicissitudes of [other nations'] . . . politics."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, Michael E., ed. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996. Claims that deadly internal conflicts threaten dozens of countries and major regions around the world.

Brune, Lester H. *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998.* Claremont, Calif., 1998. Presents fairly detailed chronologies of events in these three interventions.

Bull, Hedley, ed. *Intervention in World Politics.* Oxford and New York, 1984. Based on a series of 1983 lectures at Oxford University about sovereignty and international relations and law.

Chayes, Antonia Handler, and Abram Chayes. *Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management.* The Hague and Boston, 1999. Offers a new strategy for the world community's handling of intervention into internal state conflicts.

Chopra, Jarat, and Thomas G. Weiss. "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention." *Ethics and International Affairs* 6 (1992).

Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst, eds. *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention.* Boulder, Colo., 1997. Deals with peacemaking problems, such as rebuilding the economy, and with the rela-

tionship between the military and nongovernmental organizations.

Franck, Thomas. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance." *American Journal of International Law* 86 (1992). Discusses an international trend toward considering democracy a legal right that entails international legal obligations.

Freedman, Lawrence, ed. *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases.* Oxford and New York, 1998. Argues for a reappraisal of the role of strategic coercion by drawing on the experiences of countries other than the United States.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. *The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order.* Princeton, N.J., 1993.

Frenderschub, Helmut. "Between Universalism and Collective Security: Authorisation for the Use of Force by the UN Security Council." *European Journal of International Law* 5 (1994).

Gilboa, Eytan. "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era." *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (1995–1996).

Goodpaster, Andrew J. *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Interventions.* New York, 1996. Analyzes the difficult problems encountered when interventions involve multiple governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Haass, Richard N. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post–Cold War World.* Washington, D.C., 1994. Discusses U.S. intervention in Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq and nonintervention in genocide activities in Central Africa.

Hippel, Karin von. *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post–Cold War World.* Cambridge and New York, 2000. Focuses on U.S. interventions that were followed by nation-building efforts in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

Hoffman, Stanley. "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention." *Survival* 37 (winter 1995–1996).

Joes, Anthony James, ed. *Saving Democracies: U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States.* Westport, Conn., 1999. Covers multiple interventions over much of the twentieth century.

Kanter, Arnold, and Linton F. Brooks, eds. *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post–Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses.* New York, 1994.

Lepgold, Joseph, and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics.* Albany, N.Y., 1998. Examines the prospects for collective management of international conflict in the post–Cold War.

Livingston, Steven, and Todd Eachus. "Humanitarian Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered." *Political Communication* 12 (1995): 413–429.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20 (summer 1995).

Maynes, Charles William. "Relearning Intervention." *Foreign Policy* (spring 1995).

Moore, John Norton. *Law and the Grenada Mission.* Charlottesville, Va., and Washington, D.C., 1984.

Murphy, Sean D. *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order.* Philadelphia, 1996. Analyzes the law as it applies to humanitarian interventions, especially when the United Nations becomes involved.

Pasic, Amir, and Thomas G. Weiss. "The Politics of Rescue: Yugoslavia's Wars and the Humanitarian Impulse." *Ethics and International Affairs* 11 (1997).

Robinson, William I. *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony.* Cambridge and New York, 1996. Provides a view of intervention policies from a less conventional perspective.

Sassen, Saskia. *Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization.* New York, 1996.

Weiss, Thomas G. *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises.* Lanham, Md., 1999.

Zartman, I. William, ed. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority.* Boulder, Colo., 1995. Case studies of problems in African states.

See also BLOCKADES; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONTAINMENT; COVERT OPERATIONS; DOCTRINES; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; IMPERIALISM; INTERNATIONAL LAW; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; OIL; PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD; RECOGNITION; REVOLUTION; THE VIETNAM WAR.

ISOLATIONISM

Manfred Jonas

The term "isolationism" has been used—most often in derogation—to designate the attitudes and policies of those Americans who have urged the continued adherence in the twentieth century to what they conceived to have been the key element of American foreign policy in the nineteenth century, that is, the avoidance of political and military commitments to or alliances with foreign powers, particularly those of Europe. It was most nearly applicable to American policy between the two world wars, especially after 1935, when the U.S. Congress attempted to insulate the country from an increasingly dangerous world situation through the enactment of so-called neutrality laws. Since World War II, efforts to limit or reduce the vastly increased American commitments abroad have sometimes been called neo-isolationism.

The term itself is of relatively recent origin. Its first known application to the foreign policies of the United States was by Edward Price Bell, the London correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*. In an article entitled "America and Peace" (*Nineteenth Century,* November 1922), Bell was critical of what he called the essentially negative attitude of the United States toward international cooperation, but noted that the country was nevertheless in the process of moving gradually "from isolation into partnership." Pointing out that the United States had, despite strong misgivings, ultimately declared war on Germany in 1917, he concluded: "Her isolationism, such as it was, discovered that the strain of a formidable advance against freedom was more than it could bear."

The word "isolationist" was listed for the first time in the 1901 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary,* although without any indication as to when or where it had been used in its political sense. Standard American dictionaries did not incorporate the word until 1922, and the 1933 supplement to the *Oxford English Dictionary* cites no political use of it before 21 April 1921, when it appeared in the *Glasgow Herald.* Mitford M. Matthews, in *A Dictionary of Americanisms on Historical Principles* (Chicago, 1951), makes a logical but erroneous inference from the listing in the 1901 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* (it remains unchanged in the current edition) and traces "isolationist" in a political sense to an article in the *Philadelphia Press* of 25 March 1899. This article, however, uses the word in a medical sense in connection with a smallpox epidemic in Laredo, Texas.

THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

The scholarly literature on isolationism began in 1924 with J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo's essay "The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation" (*Smith College Studies in History* 9). The term was not prominently used, however, until 1935, when Albert K. Weinberg offered a provocative interpretation of it in *Manifest Destiny.* World War II and its immediate aftermath, when the United States for the first time actively sought to assume the mantle of a major power, provided the major impetus for its serious study.

American policy during the interwar years, which frequently was described as isolationist, came then to be regarded as an anomalous one that required explanation and analysis. Isolation, it was argued, had generally been imposed on major powers only against their will, as in the case of France after the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) or of Great Britain in the 1890s. Although the speech by George Eulas Foster in the Canadian House of Commons on 16 January 1896 led to a flurry of oratory concerning Britain's "splendid isolation," it was clear that the term had been used ironically more often than not and that British policy had been designed to help the empire emerge from that apparently undesirable state. Voluntary isolation had been sought only by

some smaller nations, such as Switzerland, as a way to avoid falling victim to more powerful neighbors, and by culturally threatened ones, such as China and Japan, as a defense against Western incursions.

The United States was the only major Western industrialized nation that had apparently displayed a positive interest in some form of isolation, and that phenomenon attracted the attention of scholars in the late 1940s, and with increasing frequency in the two decades that followed. Ray Allen Billington sought to give isolationism a geographic base in his "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism" (*Political Science Quarterly,* March 1945); Henry Nash Smith examined its relationship to "the myth of the garden" (*Virgin Land,* 1950); Samuel Lubell exposed what he took to be its "ethnic and emotional roots" (*The Future of American Politics,* 1952); and Wayne S. Cole explained it as an expression of the "needs, desires, and value systems" of American agricultural society (*Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Policy,* 1962).

Extended analyses of isolationism were also published by Robert E. Osgood, who defined it as a form of "passive egoism" in his *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations* (1953); by Selig Adler, who stressed economic self-sufficiency, the illusion of security, and ethnic prejudices as causative factors (*The Isolationist Impulse,* 1957); by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., who explained isolationism as a policy designed to assure de facto independence after the American Revolution had been won (*Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy,* 1966); and by Manfred Jonas, whose *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941* (1966) analyzed the assumptions underlying the isolationist position prior to World War II and suggested that these indicated a survival of unilateralism bolstered by a fear of war. John Milton Cooper, Jr., sought to define isolationism as "a political position with programmatic and ideological dimensions" somewhat akin to a political movement (*The Vanity of Power,* 1969), and a host of other scholars—historians, political scientists, sociologists, and even psychologists—have investigated the subject from the perspective of their respective disciplines.

THE MYTH OF THE FOUNDERS

While controversy continues about the precise meaning of the term "isolationism" and about the relative importance of various factors that might explain the phenomenon, some areas of agreement emerged from the research. It became clear, for example, that isolationists of whatever stripe always regarded themselves as traditionalists with respect to American foreign policy and regularly invoked the Founders, particularly George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, in support of their position.

Washington was the father of the first American neutrality act (1794), which incorporated both the principle of his Proclamation of Neutrality (1793)—that the United States should pursue "a conduct friendly and impartial towards the Belligerent Powers"—and the subsequently developed Rules Governing Belligerents. The neutral stance of the United States was noteworthy primarily because of its obvious incompatibility with the French alliance that had been concluded despite strong misgivings in 1778. Since France chose not to invoke the alliance in the 1790s, American neutrality remained unchallenged, and could thus develop into a tradition that was reasserted, at least initially, with respect to every major international conflict up to World War II.

In his Farewell Address in 1796, Washington supplied the rationale for this policy and urged its continuance. He pointed out that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation," and advised his countrymen "to steer clear of permanent Alliances" and involvement "by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics and the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities." Less than five years later, Jefferson put substantially the same advice into even more enduring phraseology in his first inaugural address, where he insisted that American policy should continue to be based on the principle of "peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

Neither Washington nor Jefferson, however, regarded themselves as advocates of a policy of isolation and, indeed, that word had not yet migrated to the English language from the French at the time they expressed their views. Both men actually sought to increase American contacts with the outside world. Washington vigorously espoused the expansion of foreign trade and promoted a series of commercial agreements on the model of the one negotiated with Prussia in 1785. Jefferson, although he would, in moments of great frustration, have preferred the United States "to practise neither commerce nor navigation, but to

stand, with respect to Europe, precisely on the footing of China," clearly recognized after he had become president the necessity of fostering commerce and other forms of international intercourse. Indeed, he sent the U.S. marines to the shores of Tripoli to protect American commerce and acquired the whole Louisiana Territory from France in order to keep the mouth of the Mississippi open to the new nation's trade. Both presidents welcomed continued immigration and, Jefferson in particular, the influx of European ideas and culture.

The two did not even categorically rule out alliances. Washington indicated in his Farewell Address that the new nation might "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Jefferson advised President James Monroe in 1823 to accept Foreign Secretary George Canning's invitation to joint action with Great Britain against the threat posed to Latin America by the Holy Alliance. While reasserting that the "first and fundamental maxim [of the United States] should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe" and the second maxim, "never to suffer Europe to meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs," Jefferson nevertheless concluded that "the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours," and that if "we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it."

The basic aim of both Washington and Jefferson was to safeguard the independence of a new and weak nation by avoiding, whenever possible, involvement in the military and political affairs of the major powers while at the same time expanding trade and commerce as a means of fostering national development. But both men were fully aware that economic and political matters could not be separated as neatly as their phraseology suggested, and neither can be regarded in any meaningful way as an isolationist. Together with many of the other Founders, they merely followed the logic of the American Revolution and its consequences.

Thomas Paine had pointed out in *Common Sense* (1776) that one of the advantages of breaking the connection with Great Britain lay in the possibility of assuming a position of neutrality with respect to a Europe "too thickly planted with Kingdoms to be long at peace" and thus promoting and protecting trade with all nations even in wartime. John Adams urged the Continental Congress to enter only into treaties of commerce and "to lay it down, as a first principle and a maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire neutrality in all future European wars." Were the fledgling United States to do otherwise, Adams feared, "we should be little better than puppets, danced on the wires of the cabinets of Europe." The Congress that he addressed had earlier established a committee to draft a declaration of independence and, at the very same time, one to devise a model treaty for regulating relations with foreign nations. The model treaty, Adams declared, was to be only commercial and have neither political nor military clauses. Such a treaty proved impossible to conclude, however, and foreign aid was needed if independence were to become a reality. Less than six months after adopting the Declaration of Independence, therefore, Congress dispatched John Jay to Spain, Benjamin Franklin to France, and John Adams himself to Holland to seek both money and full-fledged alliances. Isolating the United States from the rest of the world was the last thing they had in mind.

The United States was involved almost from the beginning in the first world crisis after independence was achieved: the quarter century of wars spawned by the French Revolution. That was due in part to the fact that the new nation could not be indifferent to the outcome of these wars, and that Jefferson and the Republicans generally favored the cause of France, while Washington, Hamilton, and the Federalists favored Great Britain. Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 was not intended primarily to insulate the United States against foreign conflicts, but was rather an anti-French measure for evading America's obligations under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778 and thereby helping the British cause. Both Jefferson and James Madison denounced it on that account, particularly after the Washington administration negotiated a new treaty, this one with Great Britain, shortly thereafter. Alexander J. Dallas, the future secretary of the Treasury who would have been much happier to have the French alliance continue, in 1795 denounced the treaty that John Jay had negotiated in London as a scheme for "wantonly involving ourselves in the political intrigues and squabbles of the European nations."

After Napoleon came to power in France, Jefferson played a role in the ongoing struggles by buying Louisiana from the financially strapped emperor and by a series of manipulative trade measures including the Embargo Act of 1807

and the Nonintercourse Act of the following year. Over the protests of staunchly Federalist New England, the United States even went to war in 1812 with Great Britain and attempted to conquer Canada, thereby becoming in effect an ally of Napoleon. The *Boston Gazette* promptly lamented the shedding of American "blood for Bonaparte" and, after the French occupied Moscow, Czar Alexander I offered his services as mediator in the conflict between his British ally and the United States.

The nation was thus, in its early years, neither isolated nor isolationist. It consistently recognized its involvement with the world but sought to pursue its international interests unilaterally without making long-term commitments or entering formal alliances. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams correctly assured the assembled multitude on 4 July 1821 that the United States "does not go forth in search of monsters to destroy" because "by once enlisting under banners other than her own" it would become party to "all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition." But Adams had already served as minister to the Netherlands, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain and had been one of America's negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812. As secretary of state, he was to conclude formal treaties with Spain and Great Britain and to protect the newly independent states of Latin America with the Monroe Doctrine.

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The unilateralist foreign policy that Adams pursued—the actual legacy of the Founders—proved serviceable and was followed with reasonable consistency until the end of the nineteenth century. It was a policy peculiar to the United States not in its motivation but only in the circumstances that allowed it to work. Americans had deliberately shaken off their major tie with Europe during the Revolution and understandably had little interest in replacing it with other ties. Moreover, in 1776 Americans had acted partly out of a sense of uniqueness and of superiority to the Old World and its institutions, and they regarded it as essential to the success of the mission of the United States that its policies remain uncontaminated and free from foreign influence. The development of the traditional American foreign policy was thus coeval with the first flowering of an assertive American nationalism.

The freedom of action that the United States sought for itself during the nineteenth century is, however, the ideal of all nation-states. Alliances, however desirable or even necessary under certain circumstances, inevitably circumscribe that freedom, and the avoidance of alliances and the maintenance of neutrality in the quarrels of others are, therefore, a universally appealing policy.

For most nations, however, the policy is also self-defeating and dangerous, since it is often incompatible with the continuance and further development of commercial and cultural ties, largely rules out assistance from others when that may be necessary, and invites attack by stronger neighbors. For the United States in the early nineteenth century, as a country of little economic and no military importance, without strong neighbors, protected by wide expanses of ocean and the polar ice cap, and favored by a world balance of power that tended in most instances to safeguard its interest, the policy was not only appealing, however, but also practicable. Unallied and uncommitted, threatened neither by invasion nor loss of territory, and possessed of a vast, rich, and sparsely developed hinterland, the United States was able to act independently and at its own discretion in those cases in which events elsewhere in the world seemed to affect the nation's interests.

Over the course of the century, the United States was able to expand its trade and commercial relations to an extraordinary degree, absorbed European immigrants in unparalleled numbers, and engaged freely in the process of cultural exchange. Moreover, it quite consistently displayed strong interest in political and military matters outside its borders.

It encouraged the revolutions in Spain's American colonies and sought to protect their newly won independence with the Monroe Doctrine. It followed the Greek Revolution and the European revolutions of 1830 and 1848 with sympathetic interest, and treated at least one of their leaders, the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth, to a hero's welcome. It vied with the British for control of the Oregon Territory in the 1840s and tried to buy Cuba in the 1850s. It went to war with Mexico in order to acquire not only Texas but California as well, and was instrumental in bringing Japan, a truly isolated country, into contact with the world at large. At the close of the Civil War, it helped effect the withdrawal of French troops

from Mexico and acquired Alaska, its first noncontiguous territory, from Russia.

At the same time, the United States consistently sought to avoid "entanglements" by either acting alone or, when that proved impossible, refraining from action. Not only did it take part in the Napoleonic Wars without entering into an alliance with France, it never made certain the support of the British fleet by formal treaty even though that fleet was essential to the effectiveness of the Monroe Doctrine. Despite some strong sentiments to the contrary, the United States consistently refused to commit itself to active support of the European revolutionaries, and limited its treaty making during the entire nineteenth century to the settlement of specific disputes concerning boundaries, immigration, and fishing and sealing rights. The only treaty to carry even the suggestion of joint action with another power, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with Great Britain, which limited action by the United States with regard to the building of a trans-isthmian canal, has been called by the historian Thomas A. Bailey "the most persistently unpopular pact ever concluded by the United States."

By the middle of the nineteenth century, America's traditional policy had become so firmly established that it was above serious challenge. In rejecting, on 11 May 1863, an invitation to join with France, Great Britain, and Austria in an attempt to persuade Czar Alexander II to modify his designs on Poland, Secretary of State William H. Seward cited Washington's Farewell Address as the basis for his action, and applauded the hitherto successful resistance to "seductions from what, superficially viewed, seemed a course of isolation and indifference." It was the first known official use of the term "isolation" in connection with the traditional American policy, and it was used, of course, only to be rejected as inapplicable. "Our policy of nonintervention, straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations," concluded Seward, "has . . . become a traditional one, which could not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, amounting to manifest necessity."

TRYING THE ROLE OF WORLD POWER

As long as this policy was regarded as natural and obvious, it provided no basis for factional disputes and required, therefore, neither ideological nor programmatic definition nor a specific label. Isolationism emerged as a distinctive and definable political position only when the foreign policy consensus derived from the teachings of Washington and Jefferson began to break down, a development that found its basis in the conditions of the late nineteenth century but full expression only in the period of World War I.

By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually all of the circumstances that had made the traditional policy of the United States possible had either been greatly modified or disappeared altogether. With rapid industrialization and the opening of vast new lands to agriculture, the United States had become a serious factor in the world economy and was converting itself from an importer into an exporter of capital. The need for the protection of trade and investments, as well as the chauvinistic search for the sinews and symbols of power that infected all Western nations in these years, led the United States to follow the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who in his lectures at the newly established Naval War College—subsequently published as *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660–1783* (1890)—argued that great countries were built by great navies. Even as the United States thus embarked on the road to military power, advances in technology and communications continued to shrink the oceans and thereby to move the country from the periphery of power to a place closer to the center. And the nineteenth-century balance of power, which, for all the abuse that had been heaped on it by American statesmen, had served the nation well, was upset by the simultaneous rise to international prominence of two ambitious newcomers, Germany and Japan.

The United States responded to these changes with a more active foreign policy and greater international involvement. In 1884 it joined the International Red Cross and participated in the Berlin Conference that was intended to solve the problems in the Congo. Three years later, it hosted the first international conference of its own, the Washington Conference on Samoa, and in 1889 the first Pan-American Conference. These expanded international contacts soon led to further involvement. The Venezuela Crisis of 1895 was followed by the War with Spain, the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and the enunciation of the Open Door policy designed to assure equal international access to the markets of China. The United States sent delegates to the First International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899, and the

following year contributed 5,000 troops to an international expeditionary force that put down the Boxer Rebellion in China.

The pace of America's involvement with the world quickened during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who hugely enjoyed asserting America's growing power. In 1902, after Great Britain, Germany, and Italy had blockaded Venezuela and brought its dictator, Cipriano Castro, to his knees, he facilitated an arbitration of the dispute that protected America's long-standing interests in Latin America. In 1903 he encouraged rebellion in Colombia, promptly recognized the new country of Panama that emerged, and acquired territory from it on which to build a trans-isthmian canal. In 1904 his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine arrogated to the United States the exercise of an international police power in the Caribbean, and for the next twenty years U.S. marines landed periodically in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, and, on occasion, even Mexico. In 1905 he mediated the peace treaty between Russia and Japan that was concluded at a conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. For his efforts he became the first of three Americans who were to win the Nobel Peace Prize before 1920.

All of this activism in international affairs was deemed to be compatible with the foreign policy of the Founders, and the traditional American consensus therefore remained largely intact. Even the anti-imperialists at the turn of the century, while opposing the acquisition of colonies on the grounds that this would fundamentally change the character of the American Republic, made surprisingly little of the fact that it would inevitably lead to involvement in the great power rivalries against which President Washington had warned, and that the Open Door policy would have the same effect if attempts were made to enforce it. When the Senate ratified the Algeciras Agreement of 1906, an international compact dealing with the future of Morocco, and the Hague Convention of 1908 that established the rights of neutrals and of noncombatants—both clearly "entangling" in nature—it simply added the proviso that agreeing to them was "without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy."

Less than three months before the outbreak of World War I, Woodrow Wilson, who still insisted that "we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world," reasserted the traditional policy: "Those who are right, those who study their consciences in determining their policies, those who hold their honor higher than their advantages, do not need alliances." Consequently, the onset of hostilities in Europe produced the traditional American response: a declaration of neutrality and a reassertion of the policy of friendship with all and entanglements with none, which, as an editorial in the magazine *World's Work* put it, "was made for us by wise men a hundred years ago."

INTERVENTIONISM AND ISOLATIONISM

World War I nevertheless proved to be the first clear indicator that the United States, would, by virtue of its new power position, find it difficult, and perhaps also undesirable, to remain "unentangled." Since the conflict pitted many ideological friends and major trading partners of the United States against a group of European autocracies—most particularly after the March Revolution of 1917 in Russia—it proved extraordinarily difficult, even for the president himself, to heed Wilson's admonition to be "impartial in thought as well as in action." The wartime increase in trade flowed naturally into previously developed channels, and loans and credits largely followed the route of established business connections, thus not only favoring one set of belligerents and arousing the ire of the other but giving the United States a tangible stake in the outcome of the war.

Even aside from such specific considerations, the possibility that nations with political systems and economic aims different from those of the United States might dominate the world after the war could be ignored only with difficulty. For all of his original devotion to neutrality, Wilson himself was moved to his desire for a negotiated "peace without victory" at least in part because he found one of the other alternatives—the victory of the Central Powers—to be wholly incompatible with American interests. "The world," he was to say in his declaration of war, "must be made safe for democracy."

The situation of the United States during World War I brought respectability for the first time to the proposition that, given its changed world position, the United States might best protect its interests by more active cooperation with other nations, even through commitments and alliances not in keeping with the traditional policy. Wilson's espousal of such ideas led him to propose a League of Nations, which required full-

fledged American participation in a system of collective security. Others with similar views joined together in June 1915 to found the League to Enforce Peace, an American counterpart to the Netherlands-based Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable. Among the leaders of the new organization were former president William Howard Taft, President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard, and Hamilton Holt, the influential editor of the *Independent*.

This initial articulation of an approach to foreign policy that differed from the traditional one chiefly in its espousal of collective action as a necessary element in the defense of the national interest produced, in its turn, the defensive position generally called isolationism. In the context of the time, it amounted to an assertion, implicit or explicit, that changed world conditions had not made a departure from traditional policies either necessary or desirable and that entanglement in what continued to be regarded as the affairs of other nations was more dangerous to the United States than any conceivable result of continued noninvolvement. Among the early isolationists, in this sense, were Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, Senators William E. Borah of Idaho and George W. Norris of Nebraska, and the pacifist-intellectual Randolph S. Bourne. On a popular level, such sentiments found support in the Hearst press beginning in early 1917.

Although the occasion for this development of an isolationist position was the debate over American entry into World War I, the actual declaration of war did not prove to be the really divisive issue. If the United States entered the war on its own volition and in defense of its own interests, such a step did not necessarily violate traditional policy, particularly not if it fought, as it did, not in formal alliance with other nations, but simply as an "associated power." Accordingly, a number of confirmed isolationists in the Senate voted for war. Among these were not only Democrats like Charles S. Thomas of Colorado and Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma, who might be considered to have put partisanship ahead of conviction, but also Republicans Joseph I. France of Maryland, Hiram Johnson of California, and Borah.

Wilson soon realized, however, that any serious effort to make the world safe for democracy required that the United States enter into de facto alliance with the European powers, under whatever label, so that he himself would be able to exert the leadership necessary to the attainment of that objective. In his Fourteen Points address of 18 January 1918 he in effect supplied all of the Allies with a set of war aims that included the removal of economic barriers among nations, the adjustment of competing colonial claims, the freedom of the seas, and a "general association of nations" to secure "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Less than a year later, he went to Paris in an effort to have these objectives, especially the establishment of a League of Nations, incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles that ended the war.

America's entry into the League of Nations would have been an obvious violation of the traditional policy. The league was clearly an alliance, an open-ended commitment of the very sort against which the Founders had warned. Wilson in fact promoted U.S. participation in the international organization as "an entirely new course of action" made necessary by the fact that the isolation of the United States was at an end, "not because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our power we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind and after you have become a determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you want to or not."

The isolationists would have none of that. They generally agreed with the contention that isolation was no longer a realistic aim, if indeed it had ever been one, but took sharp issue with the proposed policy reversal. "We may set aside all this empty talk about isolation," Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, told his colleagues in 1919. "Nobody expects to isolate the United States or make it a hermit Nation, which is sheer absurdity." At the same time, however, he warned against the injury the United States would do itself by "meddling in all the differences which may arise among any portion or fragment of humankind" and urged continued adherence to "the policy of Washington and Hamilton, of Jefferson and Monroe, under which we have risen to our present greatness and prosperity." The Senate debate over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles sharpened and clarified the isolationist position. It turned entirely on the question of America's so-called meddling, and set the course of American foreign policy for the next two decades.

THE TRIUMPH OF ISOLATIONISM

The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate and the overwhelming popular ratification of that action in the election of 1920 can be regarded as a triumph of American isolationism. It was not, as has sometimes been argued, a return to an earlier policy. The world had changed too much to allow that. But it was a reassertion of that policy in the face of the first fundamental challenge it had ever faced. The isolationism of the 1920s was real, despite the continuing commercial expansion of the United States and despite the greater influence on world affairs that the country enjoyed. The traditional policy, which the isolationists thought they were preserving, had always, after all, emphasized trade and commerce even while shrinking from political commitments, and American influence and the desire for it had traditionally been a component of the "mission" of the United States.

Nevertheless, the American position during the 1920s was in some ways an ambiguous one. The experience of World War I had greatly increased the role of the United States as an economic, political, and even military factor in world affairs, and made some degree of coordination with other nations all the more crucial. At the same time, the war had served as an object lesson on the danger of international commitments. The success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was only the most threatening of the postwar events that persuaded most Americans that their intervention had clearly failed to make the world safe for democracy. It thus appeared to demonstrate the wisdom of the contention that meddling in the affairs of others was useless and self-defeating. The reflexive logic that this intervention had almost led to a total abandonment of the policy of the Founders only served as a further warning.

On the basis of such perceptions, the United States set out on an isolationist course that could best be described as one of cooperation without commitment. The United States, for the first time in its history, sharply curtailed immigration. It took the lead in negotiations on naval disarmament that would make war less likely and took pains to clarify the purely hortatory character of the Open Door policy. The Four-Power Treaty of 1921 changed any commitments the United States might once have assumed with respect to the openness or territorial integrity of China into a commitment, proposed by Senator Lodge, "to communicate . . . fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." Even then, the Senate ratified the treaty only after adding a further disclaimer: "The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of this treaty there is no

THE SWANSON RESOLUTION (1926)

Resolved (two thirds of the Senate present concurring), That the Senate advise and consent to the adherence on the part of the United States to . . . the Permanent Court of International Justice . . . subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution, namely:

1. That such adherence shall not be taken to involve any legal relation on the part of the United States to the League of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the United States under the Treaty of Versailles. . . .

4. That the United States may at any time withdraw its adherence to the said protocol and that the statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice adjoined to the protocol shall not be amended without the consent of the United States.

5. That the court shall not . . . without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest. . . .

Resolved further, That adherence to the said protocol and statute hereby approved shall not be so construed as to require the United States to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall adherence to the said protocol and statute be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.

— *From* Congressional Record *67 (1926): 2306* —

commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."

During these years the most heralded diplomatic achievement by the United States, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), was in its origins simply a way of gracefully denying France the security guarantees it had sought to obtain. Although generally regarded at the time as a positive contribution to the maintenance of world peace and order, it formally committed the United States to no action of any kind and was strongly supported by many of the most prominent isolationists, including the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Borah.

By the beginning of the 1930s, the United States was retreating from military intervention in Latin America by adopting the so-called Good Neighbor Policy, and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson reacted to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria with a unilateral action that threatened nothing more serious than nonrecognition. President Herbert Hoover restated the isolationist consensus in 1931. Although recognizing a greater interdependence among nations in the modern world, Hoover nonetheless distinguished between the path of the United States and that of other nations. "We should cooperate with the rest of the world;" he told his cabinet, "we should do so as long as that cooperation remains in the field of moral pressures. . . . But that is the limit." There were few dissenters.

ISOLATIONISM AT HIGH TIDE

During the remainder of the 1930s, America's isolationism was most clearly defined and most ardently defended, and it reigned triumphant until fatally undermined by the very world events that had helped to promote it. The isolationism of the 1930s emanated clearly from a world situation in which the totalitarian states—most notably Germany, Japan, and Italy—challenged the status quo and with it the power position and security of the United States. Traditional American foreign policy had always rested on the assumption that the United States was safe from attack and that American trade and ideas would continue to find acceptance regardless of developments elsewhere. As that assurance diminished, it seemed more important than ever before to try and seal off the United States from threats from abroad, especially the threat of war. It was not until the end of the decade that most Americans faced up to the question then raised rhetorically by the formerly isolationist *Progressive* of Madison, Wisconsin: "If Hitler defeats England and the British fleet is destroyed, what becomes of our splendid isolation, with Hitler on the Atlantic side and Japan and Russia on the Pacific side?"

Until that time, the Great Depression provided a new and for a time persuasive rationale for the isolationist position. Confronted by urgent domestic problems, the immediate impulse of the United States was to turn inward and to regard events outside its borders as distractions tending to impede the solution of problems at home. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, as a disciple of Woodrow Wilson was anything but an isolationist, spurned international cooperation to alleviate the crisis in favor of unilateral American action and, in effect, torpedoed the London Economic Conference in 1933.

The depression also deflated confidence in the strength of the United States and in its ability to influence events elsewhere. Faced with evidence that much was wrong at home, many Americans abandoned the traditional belief that their institutions should serve as a model for the rest of the world. Others reasoned that the economic crisis had so sapped the nation's strength that it would be futile to intervene in international affairs. Both lines of thought led to essentially isolationist conclusions. Finally, the depression increased popular distrust of bankers and businessmen and thus the willingness to sacrifice even trade and commerce, if necessary, to maintain political and military noninvolvement. Because the reputation of the American businessman reached its nadir in the 1930s, the attempt was made to resolve the increasingly apparent dichotomy between "commerce and honest friendship with all nations" and "entangling alliances with none" not by increasing American political involvement but by circumscribing the then suspect commercial contacts.

The high-water mark of American isolationism was therefore reached in the years from 1934 to 1937, in the depth of the Great Depression. Beginning with the Johnson Act, which in 1934 prohibited loans to countries in default on previous debts—only Finland could qualify for a loan under that provision—Congress took a series of actions designed to prohibit activities of the sort that were presumed to have involved the United States in World War I. The Senate established a committee headed by the isolationist Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota to investigate the American munitions

industry and its ties to European arms makers. In 1935, 1936, and 1937, by means of so-called neutrality acts, the United States banned loans and the export of arms and ammunition to countries at war, prohibited Americans from traveling on belligerent vessels, forbade the arming of American merchant ships trading with countries at war, and prohibited the sale on credit of war materials other than arms and ammunitions as well as transportation of such materials on U.S. vessels. A substantial majority of the members of Congress believed that such measures could insulate the country against increasingly threatening world events.

The rationale behind these acts provides us with the clearest expression of isolationist assumptions. Their purpose was simply to make possible in the twentieth century the stance first adopted by the United States in 1794. Although the recognition that legislation was necessary to achieve this implied an acknowledgment that the world had changed since the eighteenth century, it also suggested that the United States might accommodate itself to these changes and maintain its traditional position of neutrality by simply taking certain relatively minor precautions. This assumption required a continuing belief that the vital interests of the United States were not substantially affected by events elsewhere; that Europe still had a set of interests "which to us have none or a very remote relation"; and that the country had become involved in other international quarrels, particularly in World War I, for reasons having little to do with genuine national interest.

The last of these beliefs was given powerful support not only by the conclusions of the Nye Committee that the greed of America's "merchants of death" had led the nation into war in 1917, but also by the work of so-called revisionist historians who, at least since the appearance of Harry Elmer Barnes's *The Genesis of the World War* (1926), had been hammering away at the theme that the entry of the United States into the world war had been brought about, contrary to the true interests of the United States, by direct and indirect Allied pressure and by the machinations of bankers, brokers, and businessmen who had unwisely tied American prosperity to the cause of Great Britain and France. In the mid-1930s, Charles A. Beard and Charles C. Tansill were the most prominent of the historians who repeated this theme and alleged the existence of a "deadly parallel" to the situation twenty years before. Walter Millis repeated these arguments in his best-selling *Road to War* (1935).

The neutrality legislation of the 1930s clearly reflected the isolationist contention that the United States went to war in 1917, and might do so again, not because its interests were threatened, but merely because its activities, particularly those relating to trade, produced incidents that blurred judgment and inflamed passions. By prohibiting loans and the trade in arms, by keeping Americans off belligerent vessels, and by insisting that title to all war material had passed to the purchaser and that such material be carried only in non-American ships, the United States expected to avoid such incidents and thereby involvement in war.

ISOLATIONISM IN RETREAT

The isolationist's beliefs, however, no longer reflected the realities of the world situation. The United States had acquired a far greater stake in the international power balance and exerted far more influence on it than the isolationists were prepared to admit. Neutrality legislation did not reduce this influence but simply redirected it, not necessarily into desirable channels.

In general, the American policy gave aid and comfort to would-be aggressors since it offered tacit assurance that this country would not actively oppose their actions as long as they did not directly threaten the United States. More specifically, the neutrality legislation in effect aided the Fascist dictators—Italy's Benito Mussolini when applied to the Italo-Ethiopian War and Spain's Francisco Franco when applied to the Spanish Civil War. The legislation also tended, at least in the first of these cases, to undercut possible peacekeeping actions by the League of Nations.

Since even most isolationists agreed that the victories of the Italian and Spanish fascists were less desirable from the American viewpoint than were other possible outcomes, the wisdom of a policy that contributed to such a result came increasingly to be questioned. "In the long run," the Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas, a staunch isolationist and an original proponent of neutrality legislation, told President Roosevelt in December 1936, "it is not peace for the world, even for America which will be served by applying to the Spanish rebellion a general principle which should be asserted more rigorously than is yet the case in Congressional legislation concerning neutrality in international law." As a

socialist who supported the elected government of Spain and abhorred Franco, Thomas was caught in a dilemma that could not be resolved in isolationist terms.

The two events that destroyed the rationale for American isolationism altogether were the fall of France in June 1940 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of the following year. The defeat of France by a seemingly invincible Germany created a profound sense of insecurity in the United States. It raised fears not only of an Axis victory but also of a direct attack on this country in the event, now deemed possible, that the British fleet would either be destroyed or captured. The founding of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, the first influential interventionist organization, was a direct result of this fear, and the success of that organization produced the establishment of the America First Committee, the last stronghold of the embattled and soon outnumbered isolationists.

The attack on Pearl Harbor, in its turn, graphically demonstrated the vulnerability of American territory to foreign aggressors. Under these circumstances cooperation and even alliance with others to forestall further danger seemed dictated by prudence and common sense. "In my own mind," one of the most outspoken and influential of the congressional isolationists, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, confided in his diary some time after the event, "my convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist."

THE END OF AMERICA'S ISOLATIONISM

Vandenberg was essentially right. Both the traditional American foreign policy, based on the precepts of Washington and Jefferson, and isolationism, regarded by its proponents as an adaptation of that policy to the conditions of the twentieth century, had rested on the assumption that Europe's interests were sufficiently different from those of the United States and that the United States was sufficiently safe from attack to make political or military involvement with Europe unnecessary. If unnecessary, such involvement was undesirable by definition, since it could only limit the country's freedom of action and thereby its sovereignty without bringing any compensating benefits. Although these assumptions had been challenged by world events since the end of the nineteenth century, they had never before been clearly disproved. When the assumptions were disproved, the isolationist structure was no longer a viable one, and the United States moved rapidly not only into tacit alliance with Great Britain and into war as a formal ally of the anti-Axis powers but also very consciously into a commitment to collective security.

Even before World War II had ended, the world economy and the political structure of the new league of nations, the United Nations, would be laid out under American leadership at international conferences at the Bretton Woods resort in New Hampshire and the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington, D.C. The United States not only joined the United Nations without serious opposition, but also symbolized its change of course by welcoming that organization's headquarters to New York City.

What had been destroyed, of course, had only been the practicality of the isolationist position. Its emotional appeal remained largely intact, as it had in nations for whom isolationism had never been a realistic position. Isolationist rhetoric, therefore, continued to be used by some opponents of American postwar policies. In the debate over military aid to Europe, which began late in 1950, Joseph P. Kennedy, the isolationist former ambassador to Great Britain, spoke of "unwise commitments" in Berlin and Korea and scoffed at the idea that the United States had any interest in or responsibility for the defense of Western Europe. Herbert Hoover argued that the Americas were still "surrounded by a great moat," and referred once again to "the eternal malign forces of Europe" with which this country should have as little as possible to do. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, a leading prewar isolationist, minimized the danger that this country faced from the Soviet Union in terms virtually identical to those in which he had discussed the threat emanating from Nazi Germany.

Although some observers promptly labeled this outburst "the new isolationism," it bore little practical relation to true isolationism. Hoover, in fact, strongly favored an American commitment to the defense of a "Western Hemisphere Gibraltar," the outlying bastions of which were the British Isles, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and, possibly, Australia and New Zealand. Taft recognized that an effective international organization would give the best assurance of world peace and, therefore, of American peace, and stated flatly

that "nobody is an isolationist today." The whole discussion centered largely on the extent of American military and economic aid to other nations, and not on the necessity for such assistance. It turned on the question of how the cooperation among allies of the United States might best be secured, not how American alliances could be terminated most rapidly.

Isolationism was simply no longer viable in a world in which neutrality for the United States was impossible, if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union regarded the United States as its primary foe; in which the United States could clearly not be indifferent to wars in Europe or Asia that affected the world power balance; and in which the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles had eliminated the margin of safety that geography had once provided. In short, isolationism was made practically impossible when the United States emerged as the dominant world power in an unstable world. Just as "splendid isolation" had emotional appeal but dangerous practical implications for Great Britain at the close of the nineteenth century, so isolation in any form posed a threat to the position of the United States in the postwar world.

For a brief period, even the traces of the isolationist strain in American foreign policy seemed to disappear. The United States embraced its world leadership role at a time when it was, by a considerable margin, the strongest power on earth. It thus could expect to control whatever alliances it entered and saw no necessary conflict between such alliances and the traditional insistence on unilateral action. The refusal of the Soviet Union to recognize a Pax Americana did not shatter that expectation, but initially strengthened the belief that America's security required cooperation with and commitments to like-minded nations. In the Cold War that resulted, the United States laid claim, without having to consult anyone, to the leadership of what it chose to define as the free world. That leadership produced the Marshall Plan, a massive program to rebuild war-devastated Western Europe, in 1948 and, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a permanent formal, military alliance—its first in 171 years—with Canada and a group of ten Western European nations. It was manifested again the following year, when the United States was able to use the UN to muster an international force to serve under American command in Korea. A powerful United States controlling its allies fully met the test of unilateralism.

ISOLATIONISM RECONFIGURED?

Over time, however, American control of the UN and of its allies declined even as its worldwide commitments multiplied. As a result, U.S. foreign policy became both less effective and more costly, and domestic criticism of it increased. The Vietnam War, in particular, spawned critics who argued that there were limits to America's power and that, in consequence, the United States should withdraw from some of its more exposed positions and reduce its international commitments. These critics were often referred to as "neo-isolationists" and sometimes even applied that label to themselves. A leading scholar of American foreign policy, Robert W. Tucker, applauded their position in his book *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York, 1972).

Yet major spokesmen for this point of view, such as Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon, Ernest Gruening of Alaska, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, or George F. Kennan, who as a foreign service officer had been the first to advocate "containment" of the Soviet Union, were not isolationists in any meaningful sense. All favored increasing the role of the United Nations, the maintenance of key alliances, and new attempts to reach agreements with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. None suggested, even remotely, that the cure for current problems might be found in a return to the foreign policies of the 1920s or 1930s.

The Vietnam War, to be sure, had a traumatic effect on both American policymakers and the American public. It caused President Lyndon Johnson to withdraw as a candidate for reelection, assured the defeat of his vice-president, Hubert Humphrey, in the 1968 election, and produced major reassessments of American military and strategic policies. But the lessons that were drawn from the failure in Vietnam did not seriously question America's international commitments. They concentrated instead on the clearer and perhaps more limited definition of American goals, the avoidance, where possible, of no-win situations, and, above all, the avoidance of American casualties in future conflicts.

The internationalist consensus thus remained largely intact, and all subsequent presidents vigorously exercised their presumed prerogative of world leadership. Richard Nixon traveled to China in 1972 to definitively change that nation's relationship to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States. President Jimmy Carter tried

policies based on the ideas of the Trilateral Commission, a private group of American, Western European, and Japanese businessmen, and in 1979 negotiated a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in Maryland.

Ronald Reagan outdid even Woodrow Wilson in what Frank Ninkovich has defined as crisis internationalism (*The Wilsonian Century,* Chicago and London, 1999). "Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy" runs the so-called Reagan Doctrine he enunciated in his State of the Union message in 1985. "We must stand by all of our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent . . .—to defy Soviet-supported aggression." Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, launched the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 and brought a number of European and Middle Eastern allies into it. President Clinton, throughout the 1990s, played a direct role in conflicts throughout the world, from Ireland to Israel to Yugoslavia and even beyond.

Throughout these years, isolationism has, to be sure, remained in the area of public discourse. But it has remained there largely as a bogeyman. All presidents since Nixon have defended their policies by labeling their opponents isolationists, and they continue to do so. On 8 December 2000, President Clinton traveled to Kearney, Nebraska, for a foreign policy speech in which he warned his listeners against "isolationist sentiment," and at his confirmation hearing on 17 January 2001, incoming Secretary of State Colin L. Powell found it necessary to assure the Senate that under his guidance the United States would not become "an island of isolationism."

Political commentators continued to treat such allegations with great seriousness. The American Enterprise Institute as recently as 1996 found good cause to publish Joshua Muravchik's *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism,* and publications on both sides of the question abound. Yet isolationism is no longer a serious prescription for American policy. With the possible exceptions of the pseudo-populist industrialist Ross Perot, an independent candidate for president in 1992, and Patrick Buchanan, a disgruntled Republican who ran on the Reform Party ticket in 2000, no responsible leader has proposed withdrawal from NATO or the UN or urged the United States to go it alone in a world still considered dangerous, even after the end of the Cold War and the relative triumph of both democracy and free-market capitalism. Ironically, even Buchanan's *A Republic Not An Empire* (Washington, D.C., 1999) contains a section entitled "The Myth of American Isolationism."

The persistence of isolationism as a talking point half a century after its effective demise led some scholars, particularly in the field of security policy, to redefine the term, sometimes in quite sophisticated ways. Eric Nordlinger's *Isolationism Reconfigured* (Princeton, N.J., 1995), for example, sees isolationism essentially as the unilateralist component of the traditional American foreign policy that is wary of entangling alliances and, therefore, as a permanent counterweight to the traditional policy's internationalist component that has carried the day since World War II. In somewhat similar fashion, Frank Ninkovich has defined isolationism as the "normal internationalism" he attributes to the Founders. The Wilsonian counterpart to that which has dominated U.S. foreign policy for the past half century he calls "crisis internationalism."

Either redefinition does away with the need to explain isolationism or to account for its appearance, especially in the 1920s. For that reason, both lend themselves to the development of ingenious and highly persuasive analyses with substantial postmodernist appeal. They do so, however, by dealing scarcely, if at all, with the objective reality of that isolationism that was an important phase in the development of American foreign policy. That phase has now been superseded, and reentry into it seems no longer possible, even if a nostalgic longing for it survives.

Born of the universal aspiration for unrestricted national sovereignty and the peculiar relation of the United States to the rest of the world in the nineteenth century, isolationism was staunchly defended and raised to the level of dogma when world events in the twentieth century threatened America's traditional foreign policy consensus. In a shrinking world with an increasingly global economy and ever more deadly weapons that can be delivered anywhere, however, it is an untenable position for a country that has gone to great expense to develop and maintain a fully global military reach, dominates virtually every international institution or agency to which it belongs, and labors ceaselessly to remain the center of global finance and of world trade.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adler, Selig. *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction.* London and New York,

1957. The classic early work that regards economic self-sufficiency and the illusion of security, as well as some ethnic prejudices, as the causes of isolationism.

Clemens, Diane Shaver. *From Isolationism to Internationalism: The Case Study of American Occupation Planning for Post-War Germany, 1945–1946.* An exceptionally detailed examination of the definitive turning point.

Cole, Wayne S. *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941.* Madison, Wis., 1953. Still the only full-scale study of an isolationist organization.

———. *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1935–1945.* Lincoln, Neb., 1983. The isolationists' heyday and how they were outflanked by FDR.

Cooper, John Milton, Jr. *The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War, 1914–1917.* Westport, Conn., 1969. Defines isolationism as a political position with ideological dimensions.

Doenecke, Justus D. *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists and the Cold War.* Lewisburg, Pa., 1979. Traces the varied responses of the old isolationist to the new world created by World War II.

———. *Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941.* Lanham, Md., and Oxford, 2000. The most complete analysis of anti-interventionist assumptions and arguments prior to Pearl Harbor.

Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. "The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (1958). An interesting though unprovable psychological explanation for the persistence of American isolationism.

Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1840–1975.* Washington, D.C., 1983. The public opinion studies conducted by the State Department.

Graebner, Norman A. *The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950.* New York, 1956. A "realist" view of America's postwar role.

Guinsburg, Thomas N. *The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States from Versailles to Pearl Harbor.* New York, 1982. A full-scale study of the most clearly isolationist period in U.S. history.

Jonas, Manfred. *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, and Chicago, 1990. Analyzes the arguments and actions of the isolationists up to Pearl Harbor and concludes that their common denominator was unilateralism strengthened by the fear of war.

Kull, Steven. *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism.* Washington, D.C., 1999. Defends those looking to limit America's commitments against the charge of isolationism.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State.* Boston, 1997. Divides U.S. diplomatic history into "Old Testament" and "New Testament" phases and argues that foreign policy debates revolve around the differences between the two.

Muravchik, Joshua. *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism.* Washington, D.C., 1996. Argues that the United States must remain the fully committed leader of the free world.

Ninkovich, Frank. *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900.* Chicago and London, 1999. A brief analytical survey that does away with isolationism by defining American policy as a tug of war between the "normal" internationalism of the Founders and the "crisis" internationalism of Woodrow Wilson.

Nordlinger, Eric A. *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1995. Argues that isolationism is simply the unilateralist component of the traditional and relatively constant American foreign policy.

Osgood, Robert E. *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1953. A classic.

Powaski, Ronald E. *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism and Europe, 1901–1950.* New York, 1991. A straightforward account of how the "isolated" United States came in time to create the North Atlantic Treaty.

Rieselbach, Leroy N. *The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy.* Indianapolis, 1966. The most ambitious behavioral analysis of congressional isolationism.

Rossina, Daniela, ed. *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy.* Staffordshire, England, 1995. A collection of essays most of which offer a European view of the United States.

Russett, Bruce M. "Demography, Salience, and Isolationist Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24 (1960). Offers the most serious challenge to ethnic and geographical explanations for isolationism.

Smith, Glenn H. *Langer of North Dakota: A Study in Isolationism, 1940–1959*. New York, 1979. One of the few biographies of a leading isolationist senator.

Tucker, Robert W. *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* New York, 1972.

Weinberg, Albert K. "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolationism." *American Political Science Review* 34 (1940).The classic brief statement of what traditional American foreign policy was and what it was not.

Williams, William A. "The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s." *Science and Society* 18 (1954). Argues that the absence of genuine economic isolationism demonstrates the mythical nature of the entire concept.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NEUTRALITY; WILSONIANISM.

JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE

Terrence R. Guay

The words "foreign policy" and "foreign affairs" do not appear in the U.S. Constitution, and there is nothing in the document to suggest that the three branches of government should treat this policy area any differently than others. Yet with a few notable exceptions, the judiciary branch has played a limited role in foreign policy. The courts have preferred to refrain from influencing foreign policy, often regarding disputes between the executive and legislative branches in this area to be political, rather than legal, questions. Indeed, Article 3, Section 2 states that "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." This judicial deference is controversial, particularly among those who feel that foreign policy has no special claim to be treated differently than other policy areas.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The judiciary's traditional refusal to be drawn into foreign policy matters has its origins in the Constitution, which established responsibility for exercising foreign policy with the executive and the legislature. The president as commander in chief is responsible for conducting war, but Congress is empowered to declare war and raise and maintain military forces. The president may negotiate treaties, but the Senate must ratify them. Congress appropriates funds for the president to use for international diplomacy. While Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution extends judicial power to cases related to treaties, ambassadors, and the admiralty, and to controversies to which the United States is a party, there is no explicit constitutional role or responsibility for the judiciary in foreign affairs.

The lack of an enumerated constitutional power for the judiciary has not kept foreign policy questions out of the courts. The case of *Marbury* v. *Madison* (1803) established the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. This power has come to mean that the Court can determine whether legislative and executive branch actions are permitted within the powers outlined for these branches in the Constitution. Although the case details of *Marbury* were clearly domestic in nature, judicial review is applicable to all policy areas, including foreign policy.

Despite this power, the Supreme Court has often refused to review cases related to foreign affairs on the grounds that they are "political questions," which are solvable only by the political branches of government, Congress and the president. The Court first adopted this stance in *Foster & Elam* v. *Neilson* (1829), which involved an international dispute over title to part of the Louisiana Territory. In those cases it has heard, the Court generally has upheld exercise of the power in question—a power usually delegated by Congress to the president during a foreign affairs crisis.

Judicial abstention in questions involving foreign affairs is controversial. On the one hand, the Constitution provides no expressed powers for the judiciary in foreign affairs. The general foreign affairs powers distributed to the legislative and executive branches are clearly enumerated, although the specifics are vague and contradictory. Given the emotional nature of war, the absence of tools for the judiciary to apply its own foreign policy preferences, and its reliance on the executive to carry out a decision, deference is the only responsible approach for the courts to take. On the other hand is the argument that deference on political questions is an abdication of the judiciary's constitutional responsibilities. Article 3, Section 2 seems to bestow responsibility on the judiciary to review all cases under the laws and treaties of the United States. There is no exclusion

for foreign policy, and treaties certainly are elements of foreign affairs. There is little in the Constitution to suggest that the framers regarded foreign affairs as privileged and beyond the safeguards established by the separation of powers. Yet at various times the Court has ruled the following to be political questions: matters of sovereignty of either the United States or another country; boundaries and territorial authority; the determination of U.S. neutrality; the existence of peace and war; the length of a military occupation; the recognition of the independence or belligerency of a foreign state or government; the acknowledgment of diplomatic immunity; the status of aliens; and the validity or breach of a treaty. The doctrine of political questions, then, must be seen as a product of judicial self-restraint.

The other side of the self-restraint coin is a willingness to let stand legislation that increases the authority of the other two branches, especially the executive, to shape foreign affairs. The courts often have used the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8) to permit congressional actions. Sometimes known as the "elastic clause," the necessary and proper clause has been interpreted broadly by the courts, beginning with *McCulloch* v. *Maryland* (1819), to give considerable discretion to the ways that the federal government, and in particular Congress, utilizes its expressed powers. In *Missouri* v. *Holland* (1920), the Supreme Court ruled that the necessary and proper clause could justify the supremacy of international treaties. Upset that lower courts had ruled a congressional act to protect migratory birds from hunters unconstitutional as a violation of state sovereignty, the federal government negotiated a treaty with Canada to protect the birds. Following Senate ratification of the treaty, Congress passed another law prohibiting hunting of the birds, using compliance with the U.S.–Canada treaty as its justification. In affirming the constitutionality of the second law under the necessary and proper clause, the Court opened itself to the criticism that the excuse to implement legislation to comply with international treaties circumvented constitutional restrictions on federal government power, thereby expanding federal authority.

Judicial deference is controversial on other grounds. In *Harisiades* v. *Shaughnessy* (1952), the Supreme Court heard an appeal brought by an alien being deported because of his membership in the Communist Party earlier in his life. The opinion of the Court was that policy toward aliens is a component of foreign relations, and that such matters "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." The decision was contentious because it did not appear that the Court had considered how restraint in reviewing political questions related to national security and foreign policy conflicts with other constitutional values and civil liberties.

Another justification for deference is that courts are not equipped with the expertise to rule on complicated foreign policy issues or treaties based on international law. It may be more expedient for domestic judges to rely upon the views of the executive branch. However, even in foreign policy cases, attorneys provide the necessary information in their roles as advocates. While deference may be the norm in cases with a foreign policy dimension, the judiciary has weighed in with important opinions at critical times in the country's history. Many of these moments occurred while the country was at war.

WAR AND THE COURTS

While it is generally accepted that the Constitution grants war powers to the federal government, and the courts have never seriously questioned this, the source and division of war powers has been much disputed. Reasons for judicial acceptance of federal war powers include: that the power to declare war carries with it the power to conduct war (*McCulloch* v. *Maryland*); that the power to wage war derives from a country's sovereignty and is not dependent on the enumerated powers of the Constitution (*United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corporations,* 1936); and that the power to wage war comes from the expressed powers as well as the necessary and proper clause. With such acceptance of the federal government's central role in war (and foreign policy generally), the Supreme Court has been reluctant to place any limits on the powers Congress or the president devise to conduct it. The courts have declared some statutes created during wartime unconstitutional, but in nearly every case it has been done on grounds that the law abused a power other than war power, and the decision has been rendered only after combat has ceased.

It is perhaps surprising that Congress has declared war on only five occasions: the War of 1812; the Mexican War; the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. When U.S.

UNITED STATES V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORPORATION

The majority opinion in this Supreme Court case, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), upheld an embargo on arms destined for Paraguay and Bolivia, two nations at war. Justice George Sutherland's majority opinion included the following statements:

> It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first consider the differences between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs. That there are differences between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may not be doubted. The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. . . .
>
> It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality. . . .
>
> Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . .
>
> It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.

involvement in other international conflicts was challenged in the courts, the judiciary has ruled that declaration is not required. For example, in *Bas* v. *Tingy* (1800), the Supreme Court held that Congress need not declare full-scale war and could engage in a limited naval conflict with France. During the latter half of the twentieth century the United States engaged in numerous military conflicts without declaring war, the most controversial being the Vietnam War. Lower courts ruled that the absence of a formal declaration of war in Vietnam raised political questions not resolvable in the courts. The Supreme Court refused all appeals to review the lower court rulings, although not all its denials were unanimously agreed (for example, *Mora* v. *McNamara*, 1967).

The courts have also rebuffed state challenges to federal government war-related actions. In 1990 the Supreme Court upheld a law in which Congress eliminated the requirement that governors consent before their states' National Guard units are called up for deployment (*Perpich* v. *Department of Defense*, 1990). Specifically, Minnesota objected to National Guard units being sent to Honduras for joint exercises with that country's military. The issue was between states' control over the National Guard under the Constitution's militia clauses and congressional authority to provide trained forces. The unanimous decision in *Perpich* further strengthened the power of the federal government in military affairs.

While there has been little disagreement on the federal government's authority to go to war, the appropriate roles of Congress and the president have sparked considerable debate. Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution begins: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." This sentence has been the source of controversy between the three branches of government. Of particular concern are the circumstances under which the president can authorize the use of force abroad and how and whether Congress should be involved in making such decisions. The role of the judiciary in such matters seems crucial, but the courts have been unwilling participants in these debates.

While such abandonment of judicial review is questionable, there are a series of historical precedents to support the courts' approach. In 1795, Congress authorized the president to call out the militia of any state to quell resistance to the law. The Court sanctioned the president's discretion to determine when an emergency existed and subsequent calling of state militia. Several New England states challenged that law during the War of 1812, but the Supreme Court upheld the delegation of congressional authority as a limited power in *Martin* v. *Mott* (1827). In subsequent decades the Court and Congress regarded

the president's war power as primarily military in nature. The Supreme Court has never opposed the president's authority as commander in chief to deploy forces abroad. However, during most of the nineteenth century Congress provided the initiative in foreign policy. When presidents in peacetime sought expansionist policies that threatened war, Congress stopped them.

Supreme Court decisions during the Civil War played a central role in shaping the courts' approach to war powers. Congress was in recess when hostilities broke out, so President Abraham Lincoln declared a blockade of Confederate ports, issued a proclamation increasing the size of the army and navy, ordered new naval ships, and requested funds from the Treasury to cover military expenditures. When Congress returned it adopted a resolution that approved the president's actions. However, owners of vessels seized during the blockade and sold as prizes brought suit, arguing that no war had been declared between the North and the South. The Supreme Court ruled in the *Prize Cases* (1863) that President Lincoln's actions in the early weeks of the war were constitutional, because the threat to the nation justified the broadest range of authority in the commander in chief.

Despite a narrow 5–4 ruling, the *Prize Cases* bolstered the powers of the presidency and shaped the tendency of the judiciary to abstain from rulings that would curb war powers. The Supreme Court's decisions, which interpreted broadly the powers of the president as commander in chief, marked the beginning of expansionary presidential actions during war. The national emergency of civil war required that the executive be able to exercise powers that might not be permitted during peacetime. Thus, Lincoln's decisions to declare the existence of a rebellion, call out state militia to suppress it, blockade southern ports, increase the size of the army and navy, and spend federal money on the war effort were not rebuked by the courts. Even the Emancipation Proclamation was issued under Lincoln's authority as commander in chief. Only Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus in certain parts of the country earned a censure from the Supreme Court.

The world wars of the twentieth century provided opportunities for Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt to push the constitutional envelope. As the United States entered World War I in 1917, President Wilson sought and obtained from Congress broad delegations of power to prepare for war and to mobilize the country. He used these powers to manage the country's economy, creating war management and production boards (coordinated by the Council of National Defense) to coordinate production and supply. His actions included taking over mines and factories, fixing prices, taking over the transportation and communications networks, and managing the production and distribution of food. Because the president had obtained prior congressional approval for these actions, there were no legal challenges to Wilson's authority during the war.

In a novel interpretation of the economic turmoil of the 1930s, President Roosevelt equated the challenge of the Great Depression to war. He sought wide executive-branch powers to address the economic crisis, but the Supreme Court was reluctant to sanction such authority during peacetime. However, once the United States entered World War II, Roosevelt was on more solid footing. Congress again delegated vast federal powers to the president to help win the war, and Roosevelt created many new administrative agencies to aid in the effort. There were very few objections on constitutional grounds, largely because the three branches assumed that the use of war powers by Lincoln and Wilson applied to the current conflict. The Supreme Court never upheld challenges to the authority of wartime agencies or to the authority of the 101 government corporations created by Roosevelt to engage in production, insurance, transportation, banking, housing, and other lines of business designed to aid the war effort. The Court also upheld the power of the president to apply sanctions to individuals, labor unions, and industries that refused to comply with wartime guidelines. Even the case of the removal and relocation of Japanese Americans was considered by the Supreme Court, which ruled that, because Congress had ratified Roosevelt's executive order as an emergency war measure, this joint action was permitted.

The assertion of broad emergency powers by Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt obfuscated the constitutional separation between Congress's authority to declare war and the president's power to wage it. As long as Congress delegated authority to the president and appropriated funds (through its "power of the purse") to support such powers, the judiciary would interpret this as congressional sanction of the president's decision. The courts would not challenge this "fusion" of the two branches' warmaking powers.

The onset of the Cold War did not result in a curb in executive war powers. In 1950, President Harry Truman decided to commit U.S. forces to help South Korea without a declaration of war from Congress. He based the authority for his actions on the United Nations Security Council vote to condemn North Korea's invasion and urge member countries to assist South Korea. However, the Supreme Court ruled that President Truman went too far when he ordered the secretary of commerce to seize and operate most of the country's steel mills to prevent a nationwide strike of steelworkers. The president justified his actions by arguing that the strike would interrupt military production and cripple the war effort in Korea and by claiming authority as commander in chief. In *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company* v. *Sawyer* (1952), also known as the Steel Seizure Case, the Court agreed that the president had overstepped constitutional bounds, but it did not rule out the possibility that such seizures might be legal if done with the consent of Congress. Nonetheless, the Steel Seizure Case is significant as the strongest rebuke by the Court of unilateral presidential national security authority. The country was at war when Truman acted, and Congress had not expressly denied him the authority to act. It was extraordinary for the Court to find that the president lacked authority under those circumstances.

Thus, the Cold War environment did little to curb the gradual expansion of presidential authority during war. In 1955, Congress authorized President Dwight D. Eisenhower to use force if necessary to defend Taiwan if China attacked the island. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy obtained a joint congressional resolution authorizing him to use force if necessary to prevent the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. Two years later, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which empowered President Lyndon B. Johnson to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist in the defense of members of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. President Johnson relied on this resolution to wage the war in Vietnam instead of asking Congress to declare war on North Vietnam. Federal courts were asked repeatedly during the late 1960s and early 1970s to rule on the constitutionality of the war. The Supreme Court declined to hear such cases on the view that war was a political question. Although opponents of the war contended that U.S. involvement was unconstitutional because Congress had never declared war, the legislative body continued to appropriate funds for defense, thus implying support for Johnson's, and then Richard Nixon's, policies in Southeast Asia.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

While the commander in chief role of the president has stirred little debate in those instances when the United States was attacked by another country, the president's authority to send forces into hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or congressional authorization has generated much controversy. The tension reached a head during the latter years of the Vietnam War. Beginning in 1969, President Richard Nixon authorized secret bombing raids on neutral Cambodia without informing Congress. The following year he ordered U.S. forces on "search and destroy" missions in that country. In 1972 he directed the mining of North Vietnamese ports, which risked collisions with Russian and Chinese vessels, and one year later ordered the carpet-bombing of Hanoi. The president neither sought nor obtained explicit congressional approval for any of these policies, and he negotiated the 1973 Paris treaty ending the Vietnam War without congressional participation. Nixon defended his actions by arguing that the constitutional distinction between Congress's war power and the president's commander in chief role had become blurred.

For Congress, this was the last straw. The perception that presidents had assumed more authority to commit forces than the Constitution's framers had intended led Congress in 1973 to pass the War Powers Resolution (also known as the War Powers Act) over President Nixon's veto. The main purpose of the resolution was to assure that both the executive and legislative branches participate in decisions that might get the United States involved in war. Congress wanted to circumscribe the president's authority to use armed forces abroad without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to permit the president to respond to attack or other emergencies. Specifically, the War Powers Resolution requires the president to provide written notification to Congress of the introduction of U.S. armed forces into hostilities within forty-eight hours of such action. The president must explain the reasons forces were inserted in a hostile situation, the executive's

authority for doing so, and the scope and duration of the military action. In addition, the president is required to terminate the use of military forces after sixty days unless Congress has declared war, extended the period by law, or cannot meet the sixty-day deadline as a result of an armed attack on the United States. The sixty days can be extended for thirty days by the president if the safety of armed forces would be jeopardized by immediate removal. The president is also required to remove forces at any time if Congress so demands by concurrent resolutions (known as a legislative veto). In essence, most members of Congress supported the notion that the president, as commander in chief, is empowered by the Constitution to lead U.S. forces once the decision to wage war is made or an attack on the United States has commenced. What Congress sought with the War Powers Resolution was participation in the decision to commit armed forces at the beginning of hostilities.

Predictably, Nixon and all subsequent presidents contended that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional. In virtually every commitment of U.S. troops since 1973, including the Iran hostage rescue attempt (1980), military exercises in Honduras (1983), the participation of U.S. marines in a multinational force in Lebanon (1982–1983), invasion of Grenada (1983), bombing of Libya (1986), invasion of Panama (1989), humanitarian mission to Somalia (1992–1994), and bombing of Kosovo (1999), members of Congress complained that the president had not fully complied with the War Powers Resolution.

Critics of the resolution argue that Congress has always held the power to forbid or terminate military action by statute or refusal of appropriations, and that without the clear will to act the resolution is ineffective. The sixty-day termination requirement is a major reason why presidents do not report force deployments to Congress, thereby undermining the objective of the resolution. The imposition of a deadline, some critics contend, would signal a divided country to the enemy, which might then seek to prolong the conflict to at least sixty days, thereby forcing the president to either seek a congressional declaration of war or withdraw U.S. forces. Alternatively, the resolution could be seen as a blank check to commit troops anywhere and for any purpose, subject only to the time limitations, thereby defeating the intended goal of restricting the president's war-making ability. A more fundamental problem is defining presidential consultation of Congress. Does the War Powers Resolution require the president to seek congressional opinion prior to making a decision to commit armed forces, or simply to notify Congress after a decision to deploy troops has been made but before their actual introduction to the area of hostility? Such wide differences in interpretation of the War Powers Resolution would suggest a clear role for the judiciary.

Surprisingly, the courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. The first legal challenge to noncompliance with the resolution, *Crockett* v. *Reagan* (1982), was filed by eleven members of Congress who contended that President Ronald Reagan's decision to send military advisers to El Salvador must be reported to Congress. A district court ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question of whether U.S. forces in El Salvador were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation. The Supreme Court declined consideration of a later appeal. In *Lowry* v. *Reagan* (1987), the courts refused to decide whether President Reagan had failed to comply with the War Powers Resolution when he dispatched naval forces to the Persian Gulf. A suit was brought by 110 members of Congress, arguing that sending forces close to the Iran-Iraq war zone required congressional approval. The district court held that it was a political dispute to be dismissed "as a prudential matter under the political question doctrine."

An important question in the post–Cold War world is whether the War Powers Resolution applies to U.S. participation in United Nations military actions. During the 1990s the United Nations sent multinational forces to trouble spots around the world, usually for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. However, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United Nations contemplated and approved military force against Iraq. The United States took a leading role in this effort. Between August and December 1990, President George H. W. Bush deployed 350,000 troops to the Persian Gulf in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although the president sent reports to Congress describing the buildup, he did not seek the legislative body's approval. Forty-five Democratic members of Congress sought a judicial order enjoining the president from offensive military operations in connection with Operation Desert Shield unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress. However, a federal district court denied the injunction, holding that the controversy was not

ripe for judicial resolution because a majority of Congress had not sought relief and the executive branch had not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course of action (*Dellums* v. *Bush*, 1990). On the same day, another federal judge issued a decision in *Ange* v. *Bush* (1990), holding that the courts could not decide whether President Bush needed congressional permission to go to war because it was a political question.

Bush claimed that he did not need a congressional declaration of war to use military force against Iraq. However, to bolster political support for the commencement of hostilities with Iraq, and to obtain legislative legitimacy for the participation of U.S. troops in a multinational coalition, the president requested a congressional resolution supporting the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing member states to use "all necessary means" to restore peace to the region. The Senate (in a 52–47 vote) and House (302–131) passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, stating that it was intended to constitute authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Bush's action during the Gulf War was not unique. The deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti by Presidents Bush and William Jefferson Clinton did not fully comply with the War Powers Resolution either.

The main point here is that the courts have provided no guidance in how to interpret the War Powers Resolution, or in whether the resolution is constitutional at all. Only *Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha* (1983), which ruled unconstitutional a one-house legislative veto, has implications for the legality of the concurrent resolutions section of the War Powers Resolution. This is because a concurrent resolution is adopted by both legislative chambers but is not presented to the president for signature or veto. The larger question of the appropriate amount of congressional participation in presidential decisions to commit U.S. troops abroad, a question that the War Powers Resolution tried to address, remained unanswered by the judiciary.

THE COURTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

While war can be viewed as a specific component of foreign relations, foreign relations in general suffer from the same constitutional ambiguities as war. In addition to the president's commander in chief powers, the Constitution grants the president the power to make treaties and to receive and appoint ambassadors. Together, these grants of power are the source of the president's authority to conduct foreign policy. The Constitution's framers did not want the president to be as powerful as European monarchs in international matters, so Congress was given a voice too. While the president is free to negotiate treaties, they must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. Congress's only other constitutional authorizations over foreign policy derive from the powers mentioned earlier: the power to declare war, raise a military, and appropriate funds.

The judiciary has provided little guidance in more clearly demarcating executive and legislative branch powers in foreign policy, often invoking the political question doctrine. The result is that Court rulings either supported the actions of the political branches or refused to judge them. *Baker* v. *Carr* (1962) is the principle case outlining the Supreme Court's position on political questions. Although *Baker* v. *Carr* concerned the malapportionment of election districts in Tennessee, the Court's comments on political questions apply to domestic and foreign policy issues. Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan outlined the circumstances under which a case involved a political question and the obligation of federal courts to abstain from ruling. Among other instances, Justice Brennan opined that judicial abstention would be appropriate whenever a case raised foreign policy questions that "uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views." Despite this attempt at clarification, *Baker* v. *Carr* continued to confuse constitutional scholars and lower courts because the guidelines set forth by Justice Brennan did little to clarify the definition of political questions, the circumstances under which an issue is nonjusticiable, or the approach the courts should take when confronted by cases that appear political and nonjusticiable.

For several reasons, then—an explicit constitutional role for Congress confined to treaties, the exclusion of individual states from traditional foreign policy, and judicial deference to the political branches in such matters—the president and executive branch have been the principle beneficiaries of Court rulings in foreign policy matters. *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936) was a landmark case that confirmed the president's lead role in foreign affairs. In this case, Congress approved a joint resolution authorizing President Roosevelt to embargo arms shipments

to Paraguay and Bolivia, if doing so might contribute to ending the war. After Roosevelt declared an embargo in effect, *Curtiss-Wright* was subsequently convicted of selling weapons to Bolivia in violation of the embargo. The company challenged the constitutionality of the resolution, arguing that it was an improper delegation of congressional power to the president.

Given that the Court had already struck down major New Deal programs, there was some expectation that it would do the same with respect to arms embargoes. However, in his 7–1 majority opinion, Justice George Sutherland presented an original and controversial defense of presidential authority in foreign affairs. Sutherland argued that independence from Britain fused the thirteen original colonies into a sovereign nation. He also distinguished between internal (domestic policy) and external (foreign policy) powers of the federal government. Internal powers, he argued, lay with the individual states and are conferred upon the federal government by the Constitution. External powers, however, derive the sovereignty that all countries enjoy, and sovereignty was passed from Britain to the union of states upon independence. Since the powers of the United States to conduct its foreign relations do not derive from, nor are enumerated in, the Constitution, it is impossible to identify or infer them from constitutional language. As a result, the Court's view was that delegation of power to the president in foreign affairs was not to be judged by the same standards as delegation of power over domestic matters. Consequently, the "president alone has the power to speak as a representative of the nation."

Sutherland's opinion is open to criticism from several angles. If the federal government derives powers from sources other than the Constitution, neither the Constitution nor the courts provide guidance in the distribution of such powers between the branches. The implication that foreign affairs powers of the federal government are extra-constitutional goes beyond previous Court opinions that, less controversially, found foreign affairs powers to be vested in the federal government by the Constitution. Further, the notion that the federal government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not insinuated in the document itself, the records of the Constitutional Convention, the *Federalist Papers,* or contemporary debates. Sutherland's opinion is grounded in sovereignty, but it is also possible to interpret the Declaration of Independence as creating thirteen sovereign states, and many did conduct their own foreign relations until the Articles of Confederation. Sutherland's reliance on political philosophy and international law, rather than constitutional interpretation, as a basis for foreign policy powers is also controversial. Finally, drawing a clear distinction between foreign and domestic policy is becoming increasingly difficult to do, and an approach that derives different sources of power for each is bound to generate legal challenges. Sutherland's position holds up best if one takes the view that the Constitution is a document whose principle objective is to distribute power between the states and federal government, and among the branches of the federal government. Despite the criticisms, *Curtiss-Wright* is a landmark case in the broadening of federal and, in particular, presidential authority in foreign affairs.

Presidents have found additional means to increase their foreign policy powers. One is to use executive agreements, since they do not require Senate ratification but have been held by the Court to have the same legal status as treaties (*United States* v. *Pink,* 1942). Executive agreements are of two forms: those authorized by Congress and those made on presidential initiative. Authorized executive agreements have provided authority for presidents to negotiate the lowering of tariff barriers and trade agreements. The Lend-Lease Act (1941) granted President Roosevelt the power to enter into executive agreements that would provide war material to "any country deemed vital to the defense of the United States." Numerous executive agreements have been negotiated regarding the stationing of U.S. military forces in other countries. Executive agreements made on presidential initiative have often been obtained during international conflict, including the ending of the Spanish-American War and the deployment of troops during China's Boxer Rebellion. The Supreme Court, in *United States* v. *Belmont* (1937), upheld Roosevelt's use of an executive agreement to formalize his decision to recognize the Soviet Union, noting that it had the effect of a treaty and overruled conflicting state laws. Roosevelt used executive agreements extensively in the years leading up to World War II and to negotiate agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta conferences. President Lyndon Johnson made many secret agreements with Asian countries during the 1960s, and President Jimmy Carter used executive agreements that constituted the financial arrangement necessary to free Amer-

ican hostages in Iran. In *Dames & Moore* v. *Regan* (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that Presidents Carter and Reagan had acted consistently with emergency powers granted by statute to use executive agreements to suspend the financial claims of Americans against Iran, in return for the safe release of the hostages seized during the 1979 Iranian revolution.

While the treaty approval process is described in the Constitution and has raised few problems, the relationship between treaties, domestic laws, and the Constitution is less clear. One area of confusion was whether treaties were superior to national legislation. In *Foster & Elam* v. *Neilson* (1829), Chief Justice John Marshall distinguished between a self-executing treaty and a non-self-executing treaty. The former requires no legislation to put it into effect, while the latter does not take effect until implemented through legislation approved by the Congress and president. The superiority of a treaty or statute is determined by whichever is most recent. However, in the case of a non-self-executing treaty, congressional acts take precedence (Head Money Cases, 1884). In *Missouri* v. *Holland* (1920), the Court's ruling illustrated how treaties could increase the power of the federal government vis-à-vis the states. The Court upheld the national law protecting migratory birds on the grounds that it was necessary to carry the provisions of this non-self-executing treaty into effect.

The Court has also considered the termination of treaties. It has held that termination requires an act of Congress. If international obligations are violated as a result of the termination, the matter will need to be renegotiated with the international parties. However, the Court has also ruled that treaties may be terminated by agreement between the contracting parties, by treaty provisions, by congressional repeal, by the president, and by the president and Senate acting jointly. When President Carter decided to officially recognize the government of the People's Republic of China, he unilaterally terminated a mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan. The Supreme Court refused to hear a case brought by Senator Barry Goldwater and nineteen other senators (*Goldwater* v. *Carter,* 1979) asking the Court to require the president to first obtain congressional authorization.

It is clear that, for two centuries, the courts have played an important role in resolving foreign policy disputes between the executive and legislative branches. But this is only one of the two principle divisions of power established by the Constitution. The other principle is dividing power between the states and federal government. Along this division, too, the courts have been required to resolve disputes over foreign policy powers.

FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

It is widely believed that the Constitution's framers sought to place control of the new country's foreign relations in the hands of the federal government rather than the states. To ensure that the country spoke with one voice in international matters, the Constitution granted the federal courts power to hear all cases between a state or its citizens and a foreign state or its citizens, and all cases involving ambassadors, public ministers, or consuls. To the framers of the Constitution, foreign policy was first and foremost the arena for waging war and making treaties. However, they also understood that the federal government must have power over some economic issues like setting tariffs and duties and issuing currency, all of which affect international trade and investment. Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution lists the activities that states are prohibited from doing, most of which are related to foreign policy. However, the Tenth Amendment reserves powers not delegated to the federal government, or prohibited by the Constitution to the states, to the states or to the people.

The ambiguity of this notion of "dual federalism" has been a source of confusion from the start. The role of states in foreign policy was one of the first controversies addressed by the Court in the years following the writing of the Constitution. In *Penhallow* v. *Doane* (1795) and *Ware* v. *Hylton* (1796), the Supreme Court denied to the states any role in foreign policy matters, ruling that treaty-making power was not affected by the doctrine of dual federalism. It helped to minimize disputes in this area because, for most of the country's history, it was easy to distinguish between domestic and foreign matters. In the later years of the twentieth century, however, the lines blurred. This was particularly true in international economic matters. States and cities routinely sent trade missions abroad to help local firms export and to encourage foreign companies to invest locally. Local government forays into foreign policy accelerated in the 1980s. Many localities enacted boycott legislation to pressure South Africa to end apartheid. Others passed resolutions criticizing nuclear weapons, supporting a freeze in the arms race, and banning

nuclear testing. Some formed linkages with Nicaragua and, along with grassroots organizations, provided more humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan people than all the military aid Congress authorized for the contras, the anticommunist forces supported by the Reagan administration. Still others welcomed Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, established "sister city" relationships with communities in other countries (including the Soviet Union), and passed ordinances phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals.

Opponents of local government involvement in foreign policy proposed three arguments. The first was that U.S. foreign policy is most effective when the country speaks with one voice. The second was that foreign affairs, like all public policies, should be shaped democratically by all who would be affected. It would be unfair for some states and cities to make decisions that affect the entire country. The third proposition was that only the federal government has the expertise to make foreign policy. The president, through the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Departments of State and Defense, and other executive branch organizations, has far more resources and information (much of it secret or sensitive) than governors and mayors. These arguments were countered by the fact that U.S. foreign policy is rarely of one voice. Members of Congress, different departments within the executive branch, multinational corporations, and special interest groups have all expressed views at odds with the president or State Department. In addition, local government foreign policies may be viewed as an extension of the democratic process, since local governments concerned about an international issue can develop policies specific to their citizens' needs, as well as accountability, since there is no national security apparatus for local officials to hide behind. Finally, while the federal government may have access to more information in traditional foreign policy areas (like war and security), local governments are perhaps more knowledgeable in economic policy and have more tools at their disposal (such as tax and other incentives to attract foreign direct investment).

There have been few cases challenging local government foreign policies, and the Constitution helps to explain why. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states engaged in trade wars, pursued their own military campaigns, and carried out independent diplomacy. The Constitution's framers sought to correct this. First, it is broadly understood that the framers sought to place foreign policy firmly at the national level. Second, the Constitution clearly prohibits states from some foreign activities, including making treaties or engaging in war. Third, Article 6 of the Constitution provides that laws and treaties of the United States are "the supreme law of the land" and prevail (or preempt) state law. Fourth, states may not levy taxes or duties on imports or exports, or enact regulations that unduly inhibit interstate or foreign commerce. Consequently, until the late twentieth century there were relatively few foreign policies enacted by local government, and only a handful that posed a serious threat to the ability of the United States to speak with one voice in international relations.

An alternative reading of the Constitution suggests that the framers could have taken all foreign policy activities away from state and local governments but chose not to do so. Instead, they enumerated a small number of limitations on state power. In those instances when local government has become involved in foreign policy, the executive and legislative branches usually have done little to discourage such activity. During the Reagan administration, conservatives in the Justice Department were reluctant to file suit against municipal foreign policies because of their support for the principle of states' rights. Thus, local government foreign policies bring two constitutional principles, states' rights and a national-level foreign policy, into conflict.

Many of the local government activities of the 1980s and 1990s do not fall neatly into constitutional categories (like war, treaties, and duties). For example, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 made it clear that state and local divestment and antiapartheid legislation could remain in effect. In such cases, the judiciary resorted to other interpretations. In *Zschernig* v. *Miller* (1968), the Supreme Court ruled against Oregon. That state's government had enacted a law requiring reciprocal treatment of property inherited by a resident alien in Oregon and in the alien's home country. The Court announced that it would now strike down any municipal foreign policies having more than "some incidental or indirect effect" on U.S. foreign relations. The fact that such an effect could vary in importance over time creates an opening for the judiciary to increase its influence in foreign policy matters.

One increasingly popular type of nontraditional foreign policy of local governments is economic sanctions. In 1996, Massachusetts passed a

law that made it more difficult for companies with investments in Burma (Myanmar) to receive state procurement contracts. This "selective purchasing" law applied to U.S. and foreign companies and was challenged at two levels. The European Union and several Asian countries asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to determine whether the "Burma law" violated international trade rules. They felt that the law was yet another example of U.S. "extraterritoriality," that is, applying laws originating within the United States on parties operating beyond the country's borders. However, the claimants agreed to let the U.S. courts decide on the case before pressing for a WTO ruling. A group of companies formed the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and challenged the law within the federal court system in 1998 in *National Foreign Trade Council* v. *Baker.* The NFTC's argument rested on three points. The first was that the Constitution gives only the federal government the right to make foreign policy. The second was that the Massachusetts law violated the Constitution's commerce clause, which gives Congress exclusive powers over interstate commerce. The third was that a federal law prohibiting new investment by U.S. companies in Burma, but passed a few months after the Massachusetts law, preempted the state law.

Massachusetts supported its position with several arguments. First, the Constitution explicitly lists the activities in which states may not engage, but economic sanctions is not one of them. Second, because the Massachusetts law did not establish direct contact between the state and Burma, it was not a foreign policy question. Third, important state interests embodied in the First (freedom of speech) and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution permitted the law. Finally, since the foreign affairs doctrine is vague, the courts should leave to the legislative branch the issue of whether to invalidate the Massachusetts Burma law.

The fuzzy area of the constitutionality of state actions in the international realm was underlined by the ways in which federal courts ruled as this case made its way through the judicial system. A federal judge ruled that the Massachusetts law "unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs," since the objective of the legislation was to change Myanmar's domestic politics (specifically, to force the military junta to recognize the results of a 1990 election). The appeals court's 1999 ruling was much more sweeping, as it found the Burma law unconstitutional on all three grounds presented by the NFTC. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case (*Crosby* v. *National Foreign Trade Council,* 2000) and ruled against Massachusetts—but for yet a different reason. The Clinton administration avoided taking sides in this dispute, but revealed its support for the NFTC during the Supreme Court hearing. In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal statute banning investment in Burma (enacted shortly after the Massachusetts law) preempted the Massachusetts law on procurement. In other words, the law passed by Congress prevented states from having their own sanctions laws aimed at Burma. The Court has taken a similar approach in other cases, whereby it has nullified a state or local foreign policy because it contradicted a specific federal statute, treaty, executive agreement, or constitutional clause.

Unfortunately, the narrow ruling in the Massachusetts case left the door open for other state and local government actions in the foreign policy area. For example, it was not clear whether a state sanctions law is constitutional when no national law exists aimed at the same country. Nor did the ruling prohibit other measures, such as divestment by state pension funds of stock held in firms doing business in undesirable places. Most importantly, this case presented the courts with the opportunity to clearly demarcate the limits of states' actions in the foreign realm, but the Supreme Court was unwilling to make such a bold statement.

The conflicting constitutional principles that thus arose were difficult to resolve. One solution to controversies of this type was for the courts to treat local government involvement in foreign policy in the same way that they usually treat disputes over war powers. By holding that these are political questions, the courts could leave it to the legislative and executive branches to create laws permitting or barring various activities. For example, if Congress did not want states like Massachusetts enacting selective purchasing laws, it could pass a law prohibiting them from doing so. In this line of thinking, the courts should uphold all local government foreign policies, unless such activities are specifically barred by national legislation or the Constitution.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional law expert Louis Henkin summarized the judiciary's role in foreign affairs nicely when he wrote:

> Overall, the contribution of the courts to foreign policy and their impact on foreign relations are significant but not large. The Supreme Court in particular intervenes only infrequently and its foreign affairs cases are few and haphazard. The Court does not build and refine steadily case by case, it develops no expertise or experts; the Justices have no matured or clear philosophies; the precedents are flimsy and often reflect the spirit of another day. But though the courts have only a supporting part, it is indispensable and inevitable, and if their competence and equipment for making foreign policy are uncertain, they can be improved by stronger, continuing guidance by Congress and, perhaps, by the President.

In examining the power and practice of the judiciary in foreign affairs, one is struck by the potential power of this branch but the rare use of it in practice. In general, the judiciary has tended to regard foreign affairs as fundamentally different from other areas of power. In so doing, it has been more willing (either through actual rulings or the dismissal of cases as political questions) to permit the federal power under consideration, and to give the president the benefit of the doubt in disputes over executive and legislative branch authority. The blurring of the domestic and international, the increasing activism of state and local governments in foreign affairs, and the form and timing of U.S. military intervention abroad will be major factors in coming years that will determine whether the judiciary's restraint in foreign affairs continues.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt. *The Supreme Court and the Powers of the American Government.* Washington, D.C., 1997.

Bradley, Curtis A. "The Treaty Power and American Federalism." *Michigan Law Review* 97 (Nov. 1998): 390–461.

Dycus, Stephen, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen. *National Security Law.* Boston, 1997.

Franck, Thomas M. "Courts and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy* 83 (summer 1991): 66–86.

Gibson, Martha Liebler. "Managing Conflict: The Role of the Legislative Veto in American Foreign Policy." *Polity* 26 (spring 1994): 441–472.

Grimmett, Richard F. *The War Powers Resolution: Twenty-Two Years of Experience.* Washington, D.C., 1996.

Guay, Terrence R. "Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of Massachusetts' 'Burma Law.'" *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (fall 2000): 353–376.

Henkin, Louis. *Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution.* 2d ed. Oxford and New York, 1996.

Henkin, Louis, Michael J. Glennon, and William D. Rogers, eds. *Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution.* Ardsley-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1990.

Hicks, Bruce D. "Dueling Decisions: Contrasting Constitutional Vision of the United States President's Foreign Policy Role." *Policy Studies Journal* 24 (summer 1996): 245–258.

Koh, Harold H. "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs." *Yale Law Journal* 97 (1988): 1255–1342.

Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence, and Richard P. Longaker. *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief.* Expanded ed. Ithaca, N.Y., 1976.

Schmahmann, David, and James Finch. "The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 30 (March 1997): 175–207.

Shuman, Howard E., and Walter R. Thomas, eds. *The Constitution and National Security: A Bicentennial View.* Washington, D.C., 1990.

Shuman, Michael H. "Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies." *Foreign Policy* 86 (spring 1992): 158–177.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION

Richard W. Van Alstyne and Joseph M. Siracusa

Problems arising from unpaid debts owed by foreign governments to private bankers and, later, to international agencies, troubled American policymakers during the twentieth century. Initial concerns arose regarding the political motives of European governments who sought to employ their military forces to enforce repayment of financial debts incurred by South American and Central American countries. When its World War I allies stopped paying on wartime loans during the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. officials were faced with a series of unpleasant choices. To avoid this problem during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the lend-lease program that provided economic and military aid to America's allies yet left no substantial postwar debt.

During the Cold War years, the United States employed foreign aid packages that consisted largely of grants with occasional loans to aid its allies. Initially, the new International Monetary Fund and the World Bank provided developing countries with economic assistance; later, in the 1970s, commercial agents—individual banks and consortiums—extended loans to the same clients. This subsequent surge of credit resulted in greatly increasing Third World debt and, after 1981, increasing concern with possible defaults and debt rescheduling.

CARIBBEAN PROTECTORATES

In the early twentieth century, debt repayment emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy issue when dictatorships in several Caribbean republics—regimes that had managed to live on loans granted by European banking and speculative interests—demonstrated an incapacity or plain unwillingness to pay that brought threats of armed intervention from European powers. The classic instance was that of Venezuela, whose reckless behavior had aroused the anger and contempt of the great powers, including the United States. In 1902 the British and German governments, joined nominally by Italy, blockaded Venezuela and seized the country's customs, the revenues from which would then be utilized toward redemption of the debts. This method, which proved effective but also aroused American susceptibilities over the Monroe Doctrine (1823), soon brought from the administration of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) an important policy shift, namely, that the United States would henceforth be responsible for the behavior of the Latin American republics toward Europe. In due course, then, the United States assumed fiscal supervision over several Caribbean countries.

The principal recipients of American "protection" were Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti. The special relations of the United States to these republics were embodied in treaties, no two of which were exactly alike. To only one such state—the Republic of Panama—did the United States actually promise "protection," in the declaration that "the United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama." Other treaties, such as those with Cuba and Haiti, contained engagements on the part of the "protected" states not to impair their independence or cede any of their territory to a third party; and the same two treaties permitted intervention by the United States for the maintenance of independence or of orderly government. Since careless public finance was likely to lead to foreign intervention and possible loss of independence, a number of the treaties—those with Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic—contained restrictions upon, or gave the United States supervision over, financial policy.

American investments existed in all the countries of this Caribbean semicircle of protectorates. These no doubt benefited from the increased stability and financial responsibility

induced by governmental policy. In the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua that policy resulted in a transfer of the ownership of government obligations from European to American bankers. Yet in none of the five republics save Cuba were American financial interests especially large or important. The dominant motive was clearly political and strategic rather than economic. The acquisition of the Canal Zone and the building of the Panama Canal made the isthmian area a crucial concern in the American defense system.

CUBA AND THE PLATT AMENDMENT (1901)

The end of the war with Spain in 1898 left Cuba occupied by the armed forces of the United States but with the future status of the island not clearly defined. Spain had relinquished sovereignty over Cuba, and the United States had renounced any thought of annexing it. But that renunciation did not absolve the United States, in its own eyes, from responsibility for Cuba's future. President William McKinley remarked in his annual message of 5 December 1899 that the United States had assumed "a grave responsibility for the future good government of Cuba." The island, he continued, "must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength of its enduring welfare is to be assured."

What those ties were to be was defined by Elihu Root, McKinley's secretary of war. General Leonard Wood, America's military governor of Cuba, convoked a constitutional convention, which sat in Havana from November 1900 to February 1901. It completed a constitution for independent Cuba but failed to carry out a directive of the governor to provide for relations between the Cuban government and the government of the United States. Secretary Root outlined his concept of what those relations should be in a set of proposals that were introduced in the U.S. Senate by Senator Orville H. Platt of Connecticut and were known henceforth as the Platt Amendment. This was actually an amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of 2 March 1901; the amendment authorized the president to terminate the military occupation of Cuba as soon as a Cuban government was established under a constitution that provided, among other things, that Cuba should never permit any "foreign power" to gain a foothold in its territory or contract any debt beyond the capacity of its ordinary revenues to pay; and that Cuba should consent that the United States might intervene in its affairs for the preservation of Cuba's independence.

The new Cuban government was inaugurated on 20 May 1902. The Platt Amendment took its place as an annex to the Cuban constitution and was embodied in the permanent treaty of 1903 between Cuba and the United States. It remained in force until 1934, when all of the treaty except the naval base article was abrogated. Under that article the United States enjoyed the use of Guantánamo Bay, on the south coast near Santiago, as a naval station. Under Article 3 the United States exercised the right of intervention from time to time, notably in 1906–1909, following a breakdown of the Cuban government, but more frequently in subsequent years.

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Secretary Root spoke of the Platt Amendment as supplying a basis in international law for intervention by the United States under the Monroe Doctrine to protect the independence of Cuba. But with how much justice or logic could the United States enforce the Monroe Doctrine against European intervention in turbulent Western Hemisphere republics if it took no responsibility for the behavior of such republics or for the fulfillment of their obligations to Europe? The Platt Amendment, by restricting the debt-contracting power of Cuba and permitting the United States to intervene for the preservation of orderly government, hinted that the Monroe Doctrine involved certain policing responsibilities for the United States. That idea, though previously suggested from time to time, was now for the first time written into law. Need for such a principle was emphasized by events in Venezuela in 1902–1903.

In 1901, when the German and British governments were contemplating the use of force to collect debts from the Venezuelan dictator, Cipriano Castro, Theodore Roosevelt (then vice president) wrote to a German friend: "If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country spank it." In his first annual message as president a few months later he declared that the Monroe Doctrine gave no guarantee to any state in the Americas against punishment for misconduct, provided that punishment did not take the form of acquisition of territory. When, however, in the winter of 1902–1903, Germany

and Great Britain actually undertook to bring Castro to terms by a "pacific blockade," anti-German sentiment flared up in the United States, and Roosevelt became alarmed over the possibility that such a situation might produce a serious quarrel between the United States and some European power. The Venezuelan crisis was settled when Castro agreed to submit the question of his debts to arbitration, but no one knew when Venezuela or one of its neighbors might present a new invitation to coercion. It seemed to Roosevelt desirable to find a formula by which all excuses for European intervention in the New World might be removed.

The formula was announced by Roosevelt in 1904, first in May in a letter to Secretary Root, then, in almost identical language, in his annual message of 6 December 1904. As stated in the annual message:

> Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention of some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

THE DOMINICAN RECEIVERSHIP

The Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine—so called because it was assumed to follow as a necessary consequence of the doctrine—was to serve, whether expressly mentioned or not, as the theoretical basis for the subsequent establishment of protectorates in the Caribbean. The United States now assumed the role of international policeman—kindly to the law-abiding but apt to lay a stern hand upon little nations that fell into disorder or defaulted on their obligations, since disorder or default, if allowed to continue, might invite intervention from outside the hemisphere. The first application of the new doctrine was in the Dominican Republic.

The government of the Dominican Republic, or Santo Domingo, after that state won its independence from Haiti in 1844, had been a dictatorship generously tempered by revolution. Revolutions were costly, and by 1904 the Dominican debt had grown to a figure—some $32 million—which the national revenues, as administered by native collectors of taxes and customs, were incapable of servicing. The foreign debt was widely distributed. Portions of it were held in France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany. The largest single creditor, representing both American and British capital, was the U.S.-based San Domingo Improvement Company. From time to time, the Dominican government pledged the customs duties at various ports as security for its debts, and the pledges sometimes conflicted. Intervention by the United States on the company's behalf resulted, in 1903 and 1904, in the San Domingo Improvement Company being placed in charge of the collection of customs at Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi on the north coast. This action brought protests from the European creditors, who claimed that those same revenues had previously been pledged to them. An international scramble for control of the Dominican customhouses threatened, with the possible development of a situation resembling the one in Venezuela that had alarmed Roosevelt a scant two years earlier.

It was under these circumstances that Roosevelt formulated his famous corollary, which was without doubt intended as a forecast of coming events. With the encouragement of Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. minister to the Dominican Republic, President Morales invited the United States to take charge of the nation's customhouses and administer the collection of import duties for the purpose of satisfying the creditors of the republic and providing its government with revenue. An executive agreement to this effect was signed on 20 January 1905, but this attempt of Roosevelt to bypass the Senate excited so much criticism that Dawson was instructed to put the agreement into the form of a treaty, subject to ratification in the constitutional manner. The treaty was duly signed and its approval urged upon the Senate by President Roosevelt with reasoning based, like his corollary message, upon the Monroe Doctrine.

Democratic opposition prevented action upon the treaty, but the president, with characteristic determination, put the essence of the arrangement into effect by a new executive agreement, referred to as a modus vivendi, signed 1 April 1905. The Dominican government agreed to appoint as receiver of customs a citizen of the United States nominated by the U.S. president. As

in the proposed treaty, 45 percent of the receipts were to be turned over to the Dominican government; the remainder, less costs of collection, was to be deposited in a New York bank, to be apportioned among the creditors of the republic if the Senate approved the treaty, or returned to the Dominican government if the treaty was finally rejected.

The modus vivendi remained operative for more than two years. During that period the creditors of the Dominican government agreed to a downward adjustment of the debt from over $30 million to $17 million. A new $20 million bond issue was floated in the United States, and the proceeds were applied to the paying off of the adjusted debt and to the execution of needful public works on the island. In February 1907 a new treaty was signed, which the Senate promptly approved through the switch of a few Democratic votes to its support. The treaty, proclaimed 25 July 1907, perpetuated the arrangement under the modus vivendi, with minor modifications. A general receiver of Dominican customs, named by the president of the United States, was to have full control of the collection of customs duties until the $20 million bond issue was liquidated.

The Dominican receivership, under the modus vivendi and the subsequent treaty, produced results. For some four years after the conclusion of the treaty, the republic experienced the unaccustomed blessings of financial solvency and political stability. Then began a new series of revolutionary disturbances that led to a more drastic form of intervention by the United States.

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN NICARAGUA

The next Caribbean country to receive the "protection" of the United States was Nicaragua. Intervention in Nicaragua, initiated under President William H. Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox in 1912, was a prominent example of the so-called dollar diplomacy usually associated with that administration. Dollar diplomacy had a dual character. On one side, it was the use of diplomacy to advance and protect American business abroad; on the other side, it was the use of dollars abroad to promote the needs of American diplomacy. In the first sense, it was practiced by many an administration before Taft and since. The employment of American dollars to advance the political and strategic aims of diplomacy was a less familiar technique.

There was a hint of it in the Platt Amendment. It was plainly seen in the refunding of the debt and the instituting of the receivership in the Dominican Republic under Theodore Roosevelt. Invoking, as Roosevelt had done, the Monroe Doctrine as their justification, Taft and Knox made a similar arrangement with Nicaragua and sought unsuccessfully to do the same with Honduras and Guatemala.

The setting up of the Nicaraguan customs receivership came at the conclusion of some years of turmoil in Central America, largely the work of the Nicaraguan dictator, José Santos Zelaya. Having lent support to the ousting of Zelaya, Taft and Knox were anxious to bring peace and order to Central America by applying in Nicaragua the same remedy that had some success in the Dominican Republic. They found a cooperative leader in Nicaragua in the person of Adolfo Díaz, who succeeded Zelaya as president in 1911. A businessman who despised militarism and craved order and good government, Díaz was willing to compromise his country's independence by granting to the United States broad powers of intervention. In 1912, when he was faced with insurrection, the United States, at his request, sent 2,000 U.S. marines to Nicaragua, suppressed the rebellion, deported its leaders, and left a legation guard of one hundred marines that—until 1925—"stabilized" the Nicaraguan government under Díaz and his successors.

Secretary Knox's attempt, with the aid of Díaz, to set up a customs receivership in Nicaragua by treaty was blocked in the U.S. Senate, but a receivership was established nevertheless by agreement between Nicaragua, certain American banks, and the State Department. A mixed claims commission reduced claims against Nicaragua from $13.75 million to a mere $1.75 million. Another mixed commission was given limited control over Nicaragua's spending policy. The policy of Taft and Knox was continued by their successors, President Woodrow Wilson and his first secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan. To meet Nicaragua's urgent need for funds and at the same time to provide for the future canal needs of the United States, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, signed 5 August 1914 and approved nearly two years later, provided for a payment of $3 million to Nicaragua in return for the grant of certain concessions to the United States. These included the perpetual and exclusive right to construct a canal through Nicaragua and the right for ninety-nine years to establish

naval bases at either end of the route, in the Corn Islands in the Caribbean and on the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific.

The United States also succeeded, not by treaty but by informal agreement with Nicaragua and the bankers, in reducing and simplifying the Nicaraguan debt and in setting up a customs receivership that would see to it that a suitable portion of the national revenue was applied on the debt. Application of the Roosevelt Corollary, implemented by dollar diplomacy and the landing of a few marines, had made Nicaragua secure against any violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

WILSONIAN INTERVENTION

It is ironic that the treaty that consummated the success of dollar diplomacy in Nicaragua bore the name of William Jennings Bryan, for Bryan, out of office, had been a severe critic of dollar diplomacy. Other inconsistencies were to follow. The anti-imperialist Wilson administration (1913–1921), with first Bryan and later Robert Lansing as secretary of state, although promoting independence for the Philippines and self-government for Puerto Rico, imposed upon Haiti a protectorate treaty of unprecedented severity and set up a regime of pure force in the Dominican Republic.

There is perhaps less of a contradiction than at first appears between the new administration's policy in the Philippines and Puerto Rico and its policy toward the independent republics of the Caribbean. The Philippines and Puerto Rico, under American tutelage, had been learning the lessons of democracy and conducting orderly elections in which ballots, not bullets, determined the outcome. Perhaps a few years of American tutelage would suffice to complete the political education of the natives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, who hitherto had found the bullet a more congenial instrument than the ballot. At the very beginning of his administration, Wilson made it clear that he would frown upon revolutions in the neighboring republics. "I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men," he remarked with optimism to a British visitor.

Such remarks foreshadowed a new turn in American interventionist policy in which the promotion of democracy would take its place as an objective beside the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine and the protection of the economic and strategic interests of the United States. Unfortunately, although the new measures were effective in restoring order and preventing revolutions by force, they did little or nothing toward providing a substitute for revolutions in the form of free and fair elections.

HAITI

The republic of Haiti, unlike the Dominican Republic, its companion on the island of Hispaniola, had maintained its independence continuously since the time of Toussaint Louverture in the late eighteenth century. It had also been more successful than its neighbors in meeting the interest payments on its rather large foreign debt; but in the prevalence of corrupt tyranny complicated by frequent revolution, it surpassed the Dominican Republic. In the early twentieth century, corruption grew more flagrant and revolution more frequent, and bankruptcy, default, and the menace of European intervention loomed on the horizon.

Under these circumstances the United States began urging upon Haitian presidents measures designed to bring some order out of the chaos into which the country had fallen and to guard against European intervention. Bryan asked for the United States the right to appoint a customs receiver, as in Santo Domingo, and a financial adviser. He asked for the right to supervise Haitian elections and for a nonalienation pledge regarding Môle St. Nicolas, a potential naval base at the northwest corner of the island. Negotiations along these lines proceeded, but so kaleidoscopic were the changes in Haitian administrations that no results had been achieved by July 1915, when President Guillaume Sam, following the cold-blooded massacre of 170 political prisoners in the government jail, was pulled by an angry mob from his sanctuary in the French legation, thrown into the street, and assassinated. On the same afternoon (28 July), the USS *Washington*, flagship of Rear Admiral Caperton, dropped anchor in Port-au-Prince harbor, and before nightfall the U.S. marines occupied the town.

Exasperated at the long reign of anarchy in Haiti and at the failure of treaty negotiations, Washington was resolved to use the new crisis to enforce its demands upon the Haitian government. By taking control of the customhouses and impounding the revenue, and by the threat of continued military government if its wishes were not obeyed, the United States was able to dictate the choice of a president as successor to Guillaume Sam and to prevail upon the new president

and the National Assembly to accept a treaty embodying all the American demands.

The Treaty of 1915 with Haiti went further in establishing U.S. control and supervision than the Platt Amendment treaty with Cuba or the Dominican treaty of 1907 combined. It provided that the top officials should be appointed by the president of Haiti upon nomination by the president of the United States. Moreover, all Haitian governmental debts were to be classified, arranged, and serviced from funds collected by the general receiver, and Haiti was not to increase its debt without the consent of the United States, nor do anything to alienate any of its territory or impair its independence. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years, but a clause permitting its extension for another ten-year period upon either party's showing sufficient cause was invoked by the United States in 1917, thus prolonging to 1936 the prospective life of the treaty.

THE NAVY GOVERNS THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Until 1911, the customs receivership of 1905 and 1907 in the Dominican Republic worked admirably. Under the presidency of Ramón Cáceres (1906–1911), stable government and orderly finance had been the rule: constitutional reforms had been adopted, and surplus revenues had been applied to port improvements, highway and railroad construction, and education. Such a novel employment of the powers and resources of government was displeasing to many Dominican politicians, and on 19 November 1911, Cáceres fell victim to an assassin's bullet. At once the republic reverted to its seemingly normal condition of factional turmoil and civil war, and the necessities incident to the conducting and suppressing of revolutions resulted in the contraction of a large floating debt, contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1907 treaty with the United States.

Thus, the Wilson administration found in the Dominican Republic a situation as difficult as that in Haiti. Under a plan drafted by Wilson himself and accepted by the Dominican leaders, the United States supervised the 1914 elections. From the new leadership, the United States demanded a treaty providing for the appointment of a financial adviser with control over disbursements, for the extension of the authority of the general receiver to cover internal revenue as well as customs, and for the organization of a constabulary. These demands were rejected as violative of Dominican sovereignty, and in the spring of 1916 the situation went from bad to worse when the Dominican secretary of war, Desiderio Arias, launched a new revolution and seized the capital. On 15 May, U.S. marines landed in Santo Domingo and the country was soon placed under military government. This arrangement lasted six years.

ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

A consequence of World War I, the significance of which was little recognized save the wartime flow of gold across the Atlantic, was the sudden transformation of the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. Like other new countries, the United States hitherto had been consistently a borrower. Its canals, railroads, and industry had been built in large measure with capital borrowed in Europe, which it had been enabled to service by an excess of exports over imports. By the end of the century, the United States was also lending or investing money abroad, but in 1914 it was still on balance a debtor, owing Europe from $4.5 to $5 billion against $2.5 billion invested abroad, chiefly in Canada, Mexico, and Cuba.

Early in the war, large quantities of U.S. securities held abroad were sold in New York in order to finance purchases of American war materials by the Allied governments. By the fall of 1915, those governments found it necessary to float a bond issue of $500 million in the United States through the agency of J. P. Morgan and Company, and such borrowings continued until the United States entered the war (1917). The role of lender was then assumed by the U.S. government, which advanced to friendly governments more than $7 billion before the armistice of 11 November 1918, and $3.75 billion in subsequent months. Without counting interest, therefore, the U.S. government at the close of World War I was a creditor to its wartime associates to the extent of $10.35 billion. Although the war impoverished Europe, it brought great wealth to the United States and thereby created a large fund of surplus capital ready to seek investment abroad. By 1928 private investments in foreign lands totaled between $11.5 and $13.5 billion. Acceptance of the new creditor role should have entailed changes in policy, especially tariff policy, which American statesmanship proved incapable of making.

WORLD WAR I FOREIGN DEBT COMMISSION RATES

Country	*Principal*	*Rate of Interest*	*Percentage of Cancellation*
Austria	$ 24,614,885	—	70.5
Belgium	417,780,000	1.8	53.5
Czechoslovakia	115,000,000	3.3	25.7
Estonia	13,830,000	3.3	19.5
Finland	9,000,000	3.3	19.3
France	4,025,000,000	1.6	52.8
Great Britain	4,600,000,000	3.3	19.7
Greece	32,467,000	0.3	67.3
Hungary	1,939,000	3.3	19.6
Italy	2,042,000,000	0.4	75.4
Latvia	5,775,000	3.3	19.3
Lithuania	6,030,000	3.3	20.1
Poland	178,560,000	3.3	19.5
Romania	44,590,000	3.3	25.1
Yugoslavia	62,850,000	1.0	69.7
Total	$11,579,435,885		

SETTLING THE WAR DEBTS

The $10 billion advanced by the United States to friendly governments during and immediately after the war had unquestionably been regarded as loans by both lender and receivers. In the U.S. Congress, a few voices were raised in support of the thesis that the advances should be viewed simply as part of America's contribution to the war, as a means of enabling others to do what, for the moment, the United States could not do with its own army and navy. There were warnings, too, of the ill will that might result from an American effort to collect the debts from governments that the war left close to bankruptcy. But such pleas and warnings went almost unnoticed, and President Wilson and his advisers rebuffed all proposals for cancellation of the debts or for discussing them at the Paris Peace Conference.

In June 1921, President Warren G. Harding proposed that Congress empower the secretary of the Treasury to negotiate with the debtor governments adjustments of the war debts as to terms, interest rates, and dates of maturity. Congress responded by an act (9 February 1922) creating the World War Foreign Debt Commission, with the secretary of the Treasury as chairman and authorizing it to negotiate settlements on terms defined by the act. No portion of any debt might be canceled; the interest rate must not be less than 4.5 percent, nor the date of maturity later than 1947. The commission found no debtor government willing to settle on these difficult terms. The procedure it adopted, therefore, was to make with each debtor the best terms possible (taking into account in the later settlements "capacity to pay") and then to ask Congress in each case to approve the departure from the formula originally prescribed.

In this way, between May 1923 and May 1926, the World War Foreign Debt Commission negotiated settlements with thirteen governments. Settlements with Austria and Greece were later made by the Treasury Department. With the exception of Austria, which received special treatment, all the settlements provided for initial payments over sixty-two years. No part of the principal was canceled in practice, and the rates of interest were so adjusted downward that varying portions of the debts were actually forgiven. Comparing the total amounts to be paid under the settlements with the amounts that would have been paid at the interest rate of 4.5 percent originally prescribed by Congress, one finds effective cancellations ranging from 19.3 percent for Finland and 19.7 percent for Great Britain to 52.8 percent for

France and 75.4 percent for Italy. The amounts of the principal funded, the rates of interest to be paid, and the portions of the debts that were in effect canceled can be seen in the table.

THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM

Throughout the debt-settlement negotiations, the European debtor governments argued that payments on the debts should be dependent upon the collection of reparations from Germany. The United States refused consistently to recognize any relation between the two transactions. In American eyes, the Allied governments that had borrowed from the United States—had "hired the money," as President Calvin Coolidge put it—were under obligation to repay their borrowings regardless of what they might be able to collect from Germany. In actual fact, however, it was obvious that the ability of the Allied governments to pay their debts would be affected by their success or failure in collecting reparations, and it is for this reason the United States took a sympathetic attitude toward efforts to solve the reparations problem.

The peace conference had left to the Reparations Commission the determination of the amount to be paid by Germany. In May 1921 the commission set the figure at 132 billion marks, or approximately $33 billion. Germany accepted the figure under threat of occupation of additional German territory. Annual payments of a minimum of 2 billion marks were to begin at once, with later payments to be adjusted in the light of estimates of capacity to pay and evaluation of payments in kind already made.

Within just fifteen months of the settlement, Germany was in default on the required payments, whether willfully or through inability to meet the schedules. Over British objection (backed by that of the American observer), the Reparations Commission authorized occupation of the great German industrial area of the Ruhr Valley. French and Belgian armies carried out the mandate in January 1923 and held the Ruhr until September 1924. Germany met the occupation with passive resistance, and its economy suffered a prolonged and disastrous inflation. Reparations payments stopped entirely.

In the meantime, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had proposed that a committee of experts study Germany's capacity to pay and devise a plan to facilitate payments. Late in 1923, all the governments concerned agreed to the suggestion, and the Reparations Commission appointed two committees to study different aspects of the problem. One of the committees was headed by the Chicago banker Charles G. Dawes. The Dawes Plan, which went into effect on 1 September 1924, was admittedly a temporary expedient, providing a rising scale of reparations payments over a period in which it was hoped the German economic and monetary system could be restored to a healthy condition. Germany received an international loan of $200 million. It agreed to make reparations payments beginning at 1 billion gold marks the first year, rising to 2.5 billion in the fifth year and thereafter. Payments would be made in German currency to an agent general for reparations. Thereupon Germany's responsibility would cease. The problem of converting the marks into foreign currencies would be the responsibility of the Inter-Allied Transfer Committee. No attempt was made to reassess the total or to set a date for the termination of payments.

During the prosperous years 1924 to 1928 the Dawes Plan worked satisfactorily, and by the latter year, the time appeared ripe for an attempt at a final settlement. A new committee headed by another American, the New York financier Owen D. Young, proposed the Young Plan, which was agreed to by Germany and its creditors in January 1930. By the new arrangement, which was intended to make a final disposition of the reparations problem, Germany agreed to make thirty-seven annual payments averaging a little over $500 million, followed by twenty-two annual payments averaging slightly under $400 million. By the end of the fifty-nine years, Germany would have paid altogether about $9 billion of principal and $17 billion of interest—a drastic reduction from the $33 billion of principal at first demanded by the Reparations Commission. Furthermore, the Young Plan clearly recognized the relationship between reparations and war debts through a concurrent agreement (not participated in by the United States) that any scaling down of the debts would bring about a corresponding reduction in reparations. The annuities to be distributed under the plan were so proportioned as to cover the war debt payments to be made by the recipients. As long as Germany continued to pay the Young Plan annuities, the debtor governments would have the wherewithal to satisfy their creditors, of whom the chief was the United States. If general prosperity had continued, the plan would have been workable.

MAKING THE CONNECTION

None of the presidents from Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt or the high officials under them evinced any economic enlightenment on the subject. Herbert Hoover stuck to his rigid belief in the sanctity of contracts, and in October 1930 his secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, rejected the idea of a connection between the Allied war debts and German reparations. But by this time the Great Depression had entered its serious stage, and voices were being raised at home and abroad for a drastic reduction of the debts just as German reparations had been twice reduced. Senator Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky returned from a trip to Europe to announce publicly that the American tariff was a handicap—that there was no possibility that Britain could continue to pay, that "in every circle with which I came in contact, official and unofficial, there was a profound feeling bordering on despair and even bitterness." Europeans could not understand "our demand that they pay us what they owed us and buy the goods we send them while at the same time denying them the ability to do either by preventing them from selling anything to us." Barkley's reference was to the new Smoot-Hawley Act (June 1930), the effect of which was to reduce foreign trade to a trickle. President Hoover had brushed aside warnings of the evil consequences of the bill. Senator Reed Smoot, the principal author, had been a member of the World War Foreign Debt Funding Commission, but to his mind no "good American" would advocate cancellation of the debts or oppose his tariff bill.

The basic economic consequence of the war was to advance the United States to a position of supremacy. Despite the difficulties surrounding the war debt settlements, dollar loans poured from private American banks and investment syndicates on a vast scale, accelerating after 1924 but coming to an almost complete stop in 1930. European governments, municipalities, and private corporations sought and received these loans, paying high interest rates (in dollars) and meeting their war debt installments from the proceeds of these loans. Germany was a leading recipient of American loans and was thus able to pay reparations to the Allies, who in turn were able to pay their American creditors. The source of these extraordinary loans was the profits of American industry in the sale of its products both at home and abroad, and in the abundance of speculative capital-seeking outlets. An open door—or rather, open doors—appeared as if by magic to dazzle the American investor. Latin America, Australasia, Africa, and East Asia obtained dollar loans. The lending process was a continuation of the Open Door policy pursued in China: an attempt by means of loans to capture the world's markets, but without serious consideration as to how these loans were to be repaid. Actually interest was being paid out of principal, not out of returns on the investment. As secretary of commerce under Coolidge, Herbert Hoover encouraged loans of this type, particularly to South American countries. Criticism, scrutiny, and hints to the naive individual investor to exercise caution were alien to Hoover's peculiar laissez-faire cast of mind.

When the bubble burst in 1930, total U.S. private long-term foreign investments stood at $15.17 billion, triple the figure in 1919. Germany still routinely made payments on its reparations account, and at least some of the Allied governments were forwarding their installments to Washington. But the principal of the war debts (including the postwar loans) carried on the books of the U.S. Treasury stood at $11.64 billion, which was $120 million more than the total shown at the time the thirteen governments signed the settlement agreements. Supposing that all thirteen had continued to pay principal and interest through the entire sixty-two-year period, the grand total would have exceeded $22 billion. Meanwhile, the fascist dictatorship under Benito Mussolini had installed itself in Italy; and in Germany, the Nazis, now on the high road to power in that country, had promised to repudiate all further reparations payments. Bolshevik Russia had long ago repudiated czarist Russia's war debts.

By June 1931, Germany, the greatest of the world's debtors, was near collapse; and while continuing to maintain that debts and reparations were unconnected, Hoover, after assuring himself of sufficient congressional support, proposed a year's moratorium on all intergovernmental debts. Hoover was at last ready to admit that debt redemption on the part of any country depended upon its capacity to pay, although probably as a political gesture, he again declared his disapproval of cancellation. Hoover's opponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, declined to take a position but did not miss his opportunity to ridicule the Republicans for their absurd policy "of demanding payment and at the same time making payment impossible."

Meanwhile, the Lausanne Agreement (1932) between Germany and its creditors put an end, for

HITLER REPUDIATES THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND REPARATIONS

In a speech to the Reichstag on 17 May 1933, Adolf Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles because, in part, it had imposed such large reparations payments as to leave Germany in economic shambles.

"All the problems which are causing such unrest today lie in the deficiencies of the Treaty of Peace which did not succeed in solving in a clear and reasonable way the questions of the most decisive importance for the future. Neither national nor economic—to say nothing of legal—problems and demands of the nations were settled by this treaty in such a way as to stand the criticism of reason in the future. It is therefore natural that the idea of revision is not only one of the constant accompaniments of the effects of this treaty, but that it was actually foreseen as necessary by the authors of the Treaty and therefore given a legal foundation in the Treaty itself. . . .

"It is not wise to deprive a people of the economic resources necessary for its existence without taking into consideration the fact that the population dependent on them are bound to the soil and will have to be fed. The idea that the economic extermination of a nation of sixty-five millions would be of service to other nations is absurd. Any people inclined to follow such a line of thought would, under the law of cause and effect, soon experience that the doom which they were preparing for another nation would swiftly overtake them. The very idea of reparations and the way in which they were enforced will become a classic example in the history of the nations of how seriously international welfare can be damaged by hasty and unconsidered action.

"As a matter of fact, the policy of reparations could only be financed by German exports. To the same extent as Germany, for the sake of reparations, was regarded in the light of an international exporting concern, the export of the creditor nations was bound to suffer. The economic benefit accruing from the reparation payments could therefore never make good the damage which the system of reparations inflicted upon the individual economic systems.

"The attempt to prevent such a development by compensating for a limitation of German exports by the grant of credits, in order to render payments possible, was no less short-sighted and mistaken in the end. For the conversion of political debts into private obligations led to an interest service which was bound to have the same results. The worst feature, however, was that the development of internal economic life was artificially hindered and ruined. The struggle to gain the world markets by constant underselling led to excessive rationalization measures in the economic field.

"The millions of German unemployed are the final result of this development. If it was desired, however, to restrict reparation obligations to deliveries in kind, this must naturally cause equally serious damage to the internal production of the nations receiving them. For deliveries in kind to the amount involved are unthinkable without most seriously endangering the production of the individual nations.

"The Treaty of Versailles is to blame for having inaugurated a period in which financial calculations appear to destroy economic reason.

"Germany has faithfully fulfilled the obligations imposed upon her, in spite of their intrinsic lack of reason and the obviously suicidal consequences of this fulfillment.

"The international economic crisis is the indisputable proof of the correctness of this statement."

— From Norman H. Baynes, ed.
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler,
April 1922–August 1939. *Vol. 2.*
New York, 1969 —

all practical purposes, to reparations payments. Then Belgium, followed by France, defaulted. Britain and Italy managed to make partial payments through December 1932. It was at this time that Finland became conspicuous. "Sturdy little Finland" earned a high mark with the American public for meeting its semiannual installment of $166,538 punctually and in full. Britain offered a token payment in 1934 but, on being informed that this would not save it from the stigma of being a defaulter, decided to make no further gesture. Spurred by Senator Hiram Johnson, most vociferous among the diehards, Congress in April 1934 made certain there would be a stigma. It passed the Johnson Debt Default Act, which originally sought to close the door to any foreign govern-

ment in default on its debts. Although this is what Johnson intended to do in the bill, the act as passed applied only to World War I debts owed to the U.S. Treasury. As Harry Dexter White pointed out to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, this left open the door to public lending to Latin American states and others that defaulted on private debts only. And the act did not apply to Export-Import Bank loans, though members of Congress frowned on lending the bank's funds to governments in default on their private debt. The Johnson Act had no practical effect; no foreign nation offered to resume payments, and none of those at whom the act was pointed was in the market for further American credits.

LEND-LEASE

The reparations experience had a marked affect on the way in which the United States provided the bulk of its aid to nations fighting the Axis powers in World War II. Under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act (1941) and in lieu of credits and loans, the United States supplied to more than thirty-eight nations whatever goods were certified by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as "in the interests of national defense."

After reelection in 1940, the president received from Prime Minister Winston Churchill a long letter setting forth Great Britain's financial straits. That nation was scraping the bottom of the barrel to pay for goods already ordered and would need "ten times as much" for the extension of the war. Churchill hoped that Roosevelt would regard his letter "not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose." The problem, as Roosevelt saw it, was how to aid England in the common cause without incurring such a breeder of ill-will as the war debt problem after World War I. After brooding over the matter for days during a Caribbean cruise on the cruiser *Tuscaloosa,* he came up with the ingenious idea of lending goods instead of money. He wanted, as he told a press conference, to get away from that "silly, foolish old dollar sign," and he compared what he proposed to do to lending a garden hose to a neighbor to put out a fire that might otherwise spread to one's own house.

In his "fireside chat" radio broadcast on 29 December 1940, Roosevelt depicted the United States as the "arsenal of democracy," and in his message to Congress a few days later, he made official the proposal that resulted in the Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941. The act, the complete negation of traditional neutrality, empowered the president to make available to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States" any "defense article," any service, or any "defense information." "Defense articles" might be manufactured expressly for the government that was to receive them, or they might be taken from existing stocks in the possession of the United States. Launched on a modest scale, the lend-lease program eventually conveyed goods and services valued at more than $50 billion to the friends and allies of the United States in World War II, and it left in its wake no such exasperating war debt problem as that of the 1920s.

Against the $50 billion of lend-lease aid furnished by the United States, it received approximately $10 billion in so-called reverse lend-lease from its allies. After the war the United States negotiated settlement agreements with most of the recipients. In general, the agreements stipulated that lend-lease materials not used in the war should be returned or paid for, but the settlements were also shaped by the proviso written into the original lend-lease agreements, that final settlement terms should "be such as not to burden commerce but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations . . . and the betterment of worldwide economic relations." Within a decade of the war's end, settlement agreements totaling more than $1.5 billion had been negotiated, on which $477 million had been paid. The Soviet Union, which had received $11 billion, did not settle its account until 1990, in the glow of *glasnost* and the end of the Cold War, eager to qualify for U.S. credits.

UNILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: AID, GRANTS, AND LOANS

The first notice of a new American foreign economic policy that recognized aid as an integral part of its overall approach to the world came on 12 March 1947, when President Harry Truman went before Congress to ask for $400 million in military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey. Since 1945 the royal government of Greece had been struggling against communist forces within, aided by heavy infiltration from Greece's three northern neighbors, all satellites of the Soviet Union. Great Britain, which had been aiding both

Greece and Turkey, informed the United States in February 1947 that it was no longer able to do so. Truman promptly accepted the responsibility for the United States. In asking authority and funds to assist Greece and Turkey, he propounded a general principle that came to be called the Truman Doctrine: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

President Truman's proposal met a general favorable response in America, though some critics thought its scope was too broad. Congress acted after two months of debate. An act of 22 May 1947 authorized the expenditure of $100 million in military aid to Turkey and, for Greece, $300 million to be equally divided between military and economic assistance. The act also empowered the president to send military and civilian experts as advisers to Greece and Turkey. American aid thus begun and continued from year to year proved effective as a means of "containment" in that quarter. But the Truman administration moved quickly to assume broader responsibilities.

To Europe as a whole the danger from communism lay principally in the economic stagnation that had followed the war. Western Europe in the spring of 1947 was facing catastrophe after a severe winter. Food and fuel were in short supply, and foreign exchange would be exhausted by the end of the year. Large communist parties in France and Italy stood ready to profit from the impending economic collapse and human suffering.

The best protection against the spread of communism to western Europe would be economic recovery. On this reasoning, Secretary of State George Marshall, speaking at the Harvard commencement on 5 June 1947, offered American aid to such European nations as would agree to coordinate their efforts for recovery and present the United States with a program and specifications of their needs. Congress established the Economic Cooperation Administration to handle the program in April 1948 and at the end of June appropriated an initial $4 billion for the purpose. Thus was launched the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program, which was to continue for three years, cost the United States nearly $13 billion, and contribute to an impressive economic recovery in Europe.

The Marshall Plan was designed to aid in the recovery of nations with advanced economies that had been dislocated by the war. But communism was also a threat among the poverty-stricken masses in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the modern economy had made little or no progress. The containment of communism required measures to raise the standard of living in countries such as these. It was with this purpose in mind that Truman, in his Inaugural Address of 20 January 1949, proposed his "Point Four," or Technical Assistance program: "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." The Point Four program got under way in 1950 with a modest appropriation of $35 million. Authorized expenditures for the next three years nearly totaled $400 million.

To stimulate the flow of private capital that hopefully would supplement government-to-government loans and grants, the legislation creating the Marshall Plan also called for establishing the Investment Guaranty Program. Initially, the agency issued insurance contracts for investments in Europe against the possible inconvertibility of local currency; in 1950 the coverage was extended to loss through expropriation or confiscation. As a result of the Korean War, U.S. foreign aid programs shifted in emphasis in 1951 from economic to military aid, thus increasing the importance of private U.S. overseas investment. In that vein, the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 (amended in 1953) and 1954 expanded the focus to guarantees to certain friendly developing countries. After several mutations, including a stay in the Agency for International Development, the guaranty program in 1969 was reestablished as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and placed under the jurisdiction of the secretary of state. The program history over three decades appears to have been both a substantial inducement to private investment and, because of the fees charged, a profitable undertaking for the government.

MULTILATERAL FOREIGN LOANS

The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, also known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference and chaired by Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, ushered in a new era of international monetary cooperation. Designed to abolish the economic ills believed to be responsible for the Great Depression and World War II, it brought together delegates from most of the Allied

nations. From the conference came recommendations to establish a new international monetary system and to make international rules for an exchange-rate system, balance-of-payment adjustments, and supplies of reserve assets. The conference's proposals led forty-five nations to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945 and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank, in 1946. (Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite to membership in the World Bank. Traditionally, the managing director of the IMF is a European, whereas the president of the World Bank is an American.)

The IMF, the brainchild of Harry Dexter White, had as its chief purpose restoring exchange-rate stability in the countries that had been in the war and then to promote international monetary cooperation and the expansion of world trade. It was to provide short- to medium-term monetary assistance to member states experiencing balance-of-payments deficits and to prescribe methods by which recipient nations would be able to eliminate their deficit positions. The IMF has played a significant role in facilitating the growth of the world economy, but it has not been without its critics, who have argued that it imposes inflexible and onerous conditions on individual nations who are having difficulties in meeting their payments. They have charged that the IMF shows little consideration for differences in types of economies; that some of the stabilization programs offer no hope of permanent adjustment; and that the fund is often more interested in short-term, painful, quick-fix programs that do not address the fundamental problems. The latter complaint is bolstered by an examination of the fund's policies during the Yugoslavia crisis in the later 1980s and its failures in meeting the needs of the Haitian crisis of the 1990s. Additionally, critics have complained that the IMF is biased against socialism and favors the free-market approach. While this charge may be debated, it does appear that strategic and political concerns have led the United States to lobby the IMF for increased leniency in the rescheduling of debts for Latin American countries, especially Mexico.

The World Bank's purpose, after initially emphasizing the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, has been both to lend funds to nations at commercial rates and to provide technical assistance to facilitate economic development in its poorer member countries. Essentially, the World Bank was designed to complement the IMF's short-term focus with longer-term developmental goals. It would provide loans aimed at encouraging the development of new, productive resources in countries facing a deficit—especially those resources for which there were reliable foreign markets. The bank's charter stated that it was to promote foreign investment for development through loan guarantees; it was also to supplement private investment in projects it viewed appropriate when other sources of financing were lacking.

The World Bank obtained funds from four sources: capital subscriptions of its member countries, capital market borrowing, loan repayments, and retained earnings. In terms of its financial practices, the bank has had an excellent performance history in that it has earned a profit every year since 1948. In fiscal year 1991, it earned a net income of nearly $1.2 billion on loans in forty-two currencies of some $90 billion.

Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981, shifted its goals from concentrating on infrastructure to the alleviation of poverty—the meeting of basic human needs. His successor, A. W. Clausen, a former president of the Bank of America, changed the World Bank's focus in the early 1980s toward reducing the role of state in the economy and the possibilities of privatizing state-owned enterprises. By the end of the 1980s, the bank had shifted again and now began emphasizing the role of women in development and the idea of sustainable development and the environment.

As with the IMF, the World Bank has generated its share of criticism. There were complaints that the two were not coordinating their activities and in some instances actually weakened the fiscal basis of their debtor states. Also, critics have pointed out the bank's efforts to reduce the role of state in the economy—in the belief that it would produce greater efficiency and better economic performance—often did not address the root problems. But it was the bank's difficulties in dealing with debt crises, beginning in the early 1980s, that have prompted the most complaints.

THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISES

From the end of World War II to the 1973–1974 oil crisis, governments gave and loaned to other governments in various ways, but increasingly through international institutions. Defaults were rare. However, the oil crisis resulted in an increase in oil prices that led to the sudden availability of vast sums of "petrodollars" that banks desired to

lend, often unwisely, and developing countries eagerly accepted. For example, the bank-held debt of non–oil developing countries increased from $34.5 billion in 1975 to $98.6 billion in 1982, with U.S. banks holding 36.7 percent of the loans.

With the Polish debt crisis of 1981 and Mexican crisis in 1982, the lending stopped abruptly, and since 1982 capital has flowed back from debtors to creditors, impairing the future of developing nations. In the early stages of the crises, at least nine large U.S. banks would have become insolvent if all of their foreign governmental clients had defaulted on their loans. By 1985 the severity of the crisis had passed for the creditor nations; however, the crisis was not over for developing countries, still confronted with staggering debts, who saw their standards of living decline significantly and found little hope for future relief.

Since the early 1980s, the heavily indebted developing nations have been involved in extensive financial negotiations with their international creditors. In 1992 the IMF was managing arrangements with fifty-six countries, twenty-eight in Africa, but the total number of agreements involved in the extraordinarily complex negotiations was much larger. These multilateral debt rescheduling and adjustment undertakings involved widely disparate parties, often with contradictory objectives, which included international financial institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the creditor clubs in Paris and London), plus a number of transnational banks and official aid agencies of the major creditor nations. While most Latin American debtor countries had borrowed heavily from private, transnational banks, most of the African countries had loans from official bilateral and multilateral agencies. And the debt problem varied greatly. For some nations it was a question of short-term financial liquidity; for others it was more a matter of basic financial solvency. As a result of these negotiations, a global debt regime evolved with most developing countries undertaking substantial economic reforms, but it was not evident that these reforms, by themselves, would deal with the problems.

In 1982, Mexican credits accounted for 41 percent of the total combined capital of the nine largest U.S. banks, threatening their existence should Mexico default on its repayments. In August, when Mexico did not have the $2 billion needed to meet its repayment schedule, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker's staff arranged for $1 billion from the Commodity Credit Corporation to guarantee purchases of U.S. agricultural surpluses. The second billion came in a complicated package from the Department of Energy for future oil deliveries to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for which Mexico ended up paying roughly 30 percent interest. The Reagan administration also provided Brazil with $1.2 billion in additional loans to allow it to meet its repayment schedules. Two other U.S. allies, Turkey and the Philippines, both of which faced defaulting on their loans, benefited from reloan packages worked out with the United States and the IMF. The United States, aiming to rescue American banks from their overexposure, had put forward a number of plans—most notably Baker's plan (1989)—which sought to relend without incurring loan writeoffs.

The 1990s saw a continuation of international financial problems. When Mexico again needed financial assistance in 1994, President William Clinton arranged for loan guarantees amounting to some $25 billion despite considerable congressional resistence. In 1997 and 1998 currency speculators disrupted the financial systems of Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan, and eventually impacted the American economy. With U.S. support, the IMF was able to stabilize the situation.

By the end of the 1990s many people believed that the problems of the huge debt being carried by developing countries was threatening the survivability of the creditor nations. This concern was reflected in the popular protests against the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and the World Bank in Seattle, Washington (November 1999), Washington, D.C. (April 2000), and Prague, Czechoslovakia (September 2000). The protestors argued that the developed nations were draining the developing countries of the natural resources without adequate compensation and incurring an ecological debt. They contended that this debt should be used to pay the financial debts incurred by developing nations and owed to the IMF and World Bank.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the experiences of trying to collect World War I war debts had led to the employment of lend-lease in World War II and to a grant system during the Cold War. The United States no longer wanted its foreign policy mired in the business of debt collection or to have the issue of

debts cloud its relations with other nations. In 1953 the Point Four program was placed, with other forms of foreign aid, under the Foreign Operations Administration. The so-called foreign aid appropriated annually and intended for friendly nations included aid for economic development and military assistance—which often was the larger package—in the form of grants. While somewhat diminished, grants of economic aid and military support continued into the post–Cold War decades.

The loans and extension of credits by the IMF and World Bank, as well as American banks, gradually came to play a major role in providing loans to developing nations. Indeed, the amount of these loans had become so large and burdensome in the post–Cold War decades that by the end of the century a movement had developed which asked, with modest success, that the wealthier nations agree to "forgive" substantial portions of these obligations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aggarwal, Vinod K. *Debt Game: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling.* New York, 1996.

Biersteker, Thomas J., ed. *Dealing with Debt: International Financial Negotiations and Adjustment Bargaining.* Boulder, Colo., 1993. A most helpful introduction to the basic issues of the post-1980 debt crisis.

Bergmann, Carl. *The History of Reparations.* Boston and New York, 1927. Presents the German side of the reparations question.

Brennglass, Alan C. *The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: A Study in Political Risk.* New York, 1983. Reviews the use of government loan guarantees to private investors from 1948 to 1980s.

Carew, Anthony. *Labour Under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science.* Detroit, Mich., 1987.

Dobson, Alan P. *U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946.* London and Dover, N.H., 1986.

Dougherty, James J. *The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic Assistance to France and French Northwest Africa, 1940–1946.* Westport, Conn., 1978.

Eckes, Alfred E. *A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1947.* Austin, Tex., 1975. Standard account of the Bretton Woods system.

Eichengreen, Barry, and Peter H. Lindert, eds. *The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge, Mass., 1989. Very helpful in relating the various financial and debt crises to U.S. policy.

Feis, Herbert. *The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919–1932.* Baltimore, 1950.

———. *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1964. A thorough pragmatic and standard postwar analysis of Allied foreign aid and international politics.

Fossedal, Gregory A. *Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan and the Triumph of Democracy.* Stanford, Calif., 1993.

George, Susan. *The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All.* Boulder, Colo., 1992. A critical look at World Bank and IMF policies and the dangers of the huge Third World debt to developed nations.

Healy, David. *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1917.* Madison, Wis., 1963. A revisionist study of the rise of American official dominance of independent states of Central America and Greater Antilles.

Herring, George C. *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War.* New York, 1973. The starting point for the study of lend-lease.

Hogan, Michael. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952.* New York, 1987.

James, Harold. *The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936.* Oxford and New York, 1986.

Johannsson, Haraldur. *From Lend-Lease to Marshall Plan Aid: The Policy Implications of U.S. Assistance, 1941–1951.* Reykjavik, 1997.

Jones, Kenneth P. "Discord and Collaboration: Choosing an Agent General for Reparations." *Diplomatic History* 1 (1977): 118–139.

Kent, Bruce. *The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918–1932.* Oxford and New York, 1989. Argues that creditor governments understood Germany could not pay but prolonged the agony to stave off challenges from below.

Keynes, J. M. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.* New York, 1920. Argues that the reparations forced upon Germany were more than three times the capacity of that nation to pay.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy." *Journal of American History* 59 (1972): 585–601. Makes the case that

Republican Party leaders decided that debts should be collected for domestic reasons.

Martel, Leon. *Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War.* Boulder, Colo., 1979.

Miller, Morris. *Coping Is Not Enough! The International Debt Crisis and the Roles of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.* Homewood, Ill., 1986.

Massad, Carlos, ed. *The Debt Problem: Acute and Chronic Aspects.* New York, 1985.

Moulton, Harold G., and Leo Pasvolsky. *War Debts and World Prosperity.* Washington, D.C., 1932. The indispensable study of the subject.

Munro, Dana G. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921.* Westport, Conn., 1964. Contends that the United States intervened in the Caribbean to promote stability and progress in order to prevent imperialist European nations from intervening and thus threatening American security.

Nelson, Joan M. *Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1968. A brief but useful introduction to the rationale behind American foreign aid from the end of World War II to the late 1960s.

O'Leary, Michael K. *The Politics of American Foreign Aid.* New York, 1967. One of the first attempts at a comprehensive analysis of how foreign aid appropriations are made.

Perkins, Dexter. *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867–1907.* Gloucester, Mass., 1937. Classic multicultural examination of the subject.

Pisani, Sallie. *The CIA and the Marshall Plan.* Lawrence, Kans., 1991.

Rhodes, Benjamin D. "Reassessing 'Uncle Shylock': The United States and the French War Debt, 1917–1929." *Journal of American History* 55 (1969): 787–803.

———. "Herbert Hoover and the War Debts, 1919–33." *Prologue* 6 (1974): 130–144. Discusses that settlement of World War I debts revolved around the person of Herbert Hoover.

Schuker, Stephen A. *American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919–33: Implications for the Third World Debt Crisis.* Princeton, N.J., 1988.

Silverman, Dan P. *Reconstructing Europe after the Great War.* Cambridge, Mass., 1982. A persuasive account of events.

Siracusa, Joseph M. *Safe for Democracy: A History of America, 1914–1945.* Claremont, Calif., 1993. A good survey of the interwar period from an American perspective.

Siracusa, Joseph M., ed. *The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War, 1941–1947.* New York, 1976. Provides a good discussion of the background leading up to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923.* New York, 1980. Argues that French efforts to use reparations claims to shift costs of war and reconstruction to other countries were repeatedly rebuffed by the other major powers.

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941–1945.* New York, 1989.

Wertman, Patricia A. *Lend-Lease: An Historical Overview and Repayment Issues.* Washington, D.C., 1985.

Williams, Benjamin H. *Economic Foreign Policy of the United States.* New York, 1929. Perceptive and fair-minded contemporary account.

Wood, Robert E. *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy.* Berkeley, Calif., 1986.

Yielding, Thomas D. *United States Lend-Lease Policy in Latin America.* Denton, Tex., 1983.

See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; FOREIGN AID; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; OPEN DOOR POLICY; REPARATIONS; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS

Edward M. Bennett

Mandates and trusteeships have played an important role in the evolution of U.S. diplomacy and perceptions of the foreign policy process. After World War I, the mandate system was introduced at the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson, who believed that indigenous populations in the areas held under colonial rule should be brought either to independence or under benevolent tutorship of the powers holding sway over them. This was part of Wilson's dream to replace the monarchies with democratic republics. Very few new nations actually evolved from the mandate system, and it remained for the trusteeship council emergent from the United Nations structure after World War II to carry on what Wilson began. The mandate name was abandoned in favor of trusteeships in order not to have the stigma of the moribund League of Nations to carry in its baggage. By the end of the 1990s, the membership of the UN reached 187 nations due largely to the work of the trusteeship council's bringing them to nationhood.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES

President Woodrow Wilson presented the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations to the Paris Peace Conference on 14 February 1919. He explained to his colleagues that they would find incorporated in the document an old principle intended for more universal use and development—the reference was to mandates for former colonies. In this fashion the mandate system became a part of the new world that Wilson imagined would emerge from the deliberations in Paris. Mandates developed historically from the practice of great power supervision of areas subservient to the controlling power usually adjacent to that power's territory; acceptance of British, French, and American conceptions of the rule of law and colonial freedom and self-government; Edmund Burke's suggestion of the trusteeship principle in administering British colonies in the interest of the inhabitants, taken to heart and subsequently expanded by Parliament after the American Revolution; and the Concert of Europe concept, in which Prince Metternich of Austria attempted to create a conservative coalition to preserve stability and prevent revolutionary changes in Europe at the end of the Napoleonic wars, and its application to former Turkish and French holdings in Africa and the Near East. While the principle may have been old, Wilson's perception of it was new because he wished to universalize it.

Although the British and French delegations at Paris did not oppose the mandate system, they were not in the forefront of those demanding it. Nor were they particularly eager to accept Wilson's freewheeling interpretation of the general mandate system as applying to any and all former enemy colonies. The Japanese and Italian representatives were even less enthusiastic about mandates that might restrict their control of former German colonies. They preferred a division of territory. The Americans were insistent that former enemy colonies would not be treated as spoils of war. In a meeting of the Council of Ten on 28 January 1919, the mandatory principle was discussed. Vittorio Orlando of Italy asked how the former colonies should be divided, what provisions should be made for government, and what should be said about independence. Baron Shinken Makino of Japan asked whether mandates had been accepted, and Georges Clemenceau of France responded that the question was to be taken up later. Wilson would not permit the subject to be buried, so the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, presented a proposal for defining mandates on 30 January 1919, suggesting a division into three types—ultimately defined as A, B, and C mandates. Without citing specific locations, it is sufficient to observe

that most of Africa, part of the Middle East, and most of the Pacific island groups were considered to be in one of the categories: A—mandates quickly able to be prepared for independence; B—mandates needing tutelage for some time before being considered for independence; and C—mandates that probably would never be ready for independence.

Wilson's associates at Paris hoped for U.S. participation in the postwar enforcement of the Versailles settlement and did not feel they could strongly oppose him on the mandate issue. Many members of the conference sincerely believed that the mandate system might work, but that it had to draw on existing experience in the colonies and should not promise too much to peoples who could not in the foreseeable future be prepared for nationhood and full citizenship rights. Wilson agreed that in some cases this would be true, but he was less restrictive in the number of former colonies he would place in this category than were some of his colleagues.

There was a tendency at the peace conference to identify someone else's mandates as ready to be placed in the category reasonably close to independence with minimum preparation rather than one's own. Lloyd George, for example, saw most of the colonies being assigned to Great Britain and British Commonwealth nations as more suitable for either direct annexation or deferral. South-West Africa (Namibia), he argued, should be annexed to South Africa because it was not likely to proceed to independence; and South Africa would be better able to care for the people of South-West Africa under South African laws and tax structure. Papua might better be classed as an area that would never be self-governing, and therefore should be permanently assigned to Australia. He could visualize French mandates in northern Africa being prepared for independence. Clemenceau, however, was more inclined to see British mandates as nearing preparation for independence. In effect, then, the mandate system would only be as good as the determination of the powers in the league to carry it out.

Woodrow Wilson was the master planner for the mandate system, but the man responsible for laying out the detailed plans of the process was General Jan Christian Smuts of South Africa. The process began with Wilson's Fourteen Points, drawn up by the journalists Walter Lippmann and Frank Cobb under the general supervision of Colonel Edward House. They read through the president's statements of war aims and compacted them into the program that Wilson set forth in an address to Congress on 8 January 1918. Point 5 called for "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." It was made clear in the Council of Ten discussions at Paris, partly because of British fears concerning the Irish and Indian independence claims, that colonial questions would be restricted to colonies belonging to Germany or coming into being as a result of the war. In practical terms this meant that mandates applied only to the German African and Far Eastern holdings and the non-Turkish parts of the former Ottoman Empire.

Secret treaties signed before or during the war had divided these territories among the victorious powers except the United States, which was not a party to them. Wilson went to Paris determined to set aside these treaties and for that purpose had formulated Point 1 of the Fourteen Points, which called for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

General Smuts set to work to carry out the mandates charge embodied, at Wilson's insistence, in Article 22 of the League Covenant. The article made it clear that certain of the Turkish territories were ready for nationhood almost immediately, that central African peoples needed mandatory powers that would guarantee their human rights and political and moral tutelage, and that the open door to trade would apply in all mandates. It also determined that South-West Africa and certain of the Pacific islands, because of the sparseness of population, isolation, size, and other circumstances, could best be administered under the laws of the mandatory and as integral portions of its territory, with safeguards for the well-being of the inhabitants supervised by the Mandates Commission. The Permanent Mandates Commission, the later official title of the commission, was to receive annual reports from mandatory powers and complaints relative to the treatment of inhabitants. The reports and complaints were to be sent to the League Council for deliberation.

Wilson met his first defeat on the mandate issue when his allies refused to consider turning

mandates over to the administration of small neutral nations. The distribution followed the pattern of the secret treaties, with some other powers added to the list. Motives concerning the possession of mandates were mixed. Some Japanese saw mandates as preludes to annexation or as convenient means to establish secure military and market areas, while others saw them as symbolic of great power status and the promise of a stronger position in the future whether the system worked or not. The open door to trade and the defense of colonial peoples, plus democratization of the world, were the primary American objectives. British, French, and Belgian motives shaded to a greater or lesser degree along the lines of Japanese thinking. "Little England" advocates, who supported reduction in the size of the British Empire and a refocusing on trade expansion, were relieved to see the lessening of colonial responsibilities, while the imperial advocates were alarmed but convinced that the empire could hold together and peace could be secured while the United States participated in the peacekeeping system. France and Belgium were pleased to see the diminution of German power and could live with mandates if that were the result.

Japan proved a special case because it had emerged as a great power at a time when the main symbol of such status—empire—was on the decline. Japanese ambitions in China were set in the old imperial structure. During the war Japan secured a position as a major force in colonial exploitation of China as a result of the Twenty-one Demands presented to China, only to encounter demands for surrender of these privileges at the end of the war. Lloyd George and Clemenceau sided with Japan. This, combined with Japan's threat not to join the League of Nations, forced Wilson to accept the assignment of German rights in Shantung to the Japanese—but with a pledge to return the province to full Chinese sovereignty with only the former German economic privileges remaining to them; Japan was also given the right to establish a settlement at Tsingtao (Qingdao). Thus, Wilson's hopes for an anticolonial postwar structure were already on shaky ground.

Some scholars have argued that the Allies were not sincere in adopting the mandate process and intended to use it as a subterfuge for expanding colonial control. While in some instances this proved to be true, generally the mandates were administered in the interest of the people concerned and a large percentage of the Class A mandates were moved into independence. Most of these were in the former Ottoman Empire, such as Trans-Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. Wilson's charge to the peace conference in the plenary session of 14 February 1919 was only partially observed; but his expectations on mandates were more fulfilled than in most other areas of the Fourteen Points. Wilson told the conference members that they were "done with annexation of helpless peoples," and henceforth nations would consider it their responsibility to protect and promote the interests of people under their tutelage before their own interests. It would remain for the United Nations, not the League of Nations, to carry out this promise.

Often overlooked in judging Wilson's objectives are the underlying premise and promise that he undertook to deliver as a result of American participation in the war—making the world safe for democracy. Success meant the elimination of the monarchical and colonial systems. Wilson envisioned the states that were to emerge from the mandate system as democratic republics.

UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIPS

The United States entered the era following World War II with the same idea and again faced opposition from its allies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted in the Atlantic Charter to reestablish the framework for bringing the colonial peoples of the world to free government. The ramifications of this were not lost on British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who at one point, in a fit of pique, told Roosevelt that he did not become his majesty's first minister in order to preside over the disintegration of the British Empire. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, on the other hand, was ready with his own interpretation of what free government meant; it included only the right to be a communist state, insofar as the Soviet Union had the military power to ensure such determination of national sovereignty.

President Roosevelt, as a follower of President Wilson's view of dependent peoples, spoke frequently to the issue of independent states in his foreign policy pronouncements of the 1930s. He attempted to promote a new relationship away from the orientation of his predecessors in his Good Neighbor policy in Latin America. His focus was on the preservation and expansion of democracy, and, in the vein of Wilson's Fourteen Points, he set forth war aims in the Atlantic Charter and

his Four Freedoms speech. In the former, he persuaded his allies to agree to the principle of self-determination, and in the latter, he attempted to promote freedom of speech, religion, and from fear and want, which he related to his Atlantic Charter objectives. He irritated Churchill by his inclination to encourage the Indians by trying to contact Gandhi while the Indian leader was incarcerated and tried to establish rapport with such leaders in the Middle East as King Saud of Arabia. Also, he tried to convince the French and British to withdraw from their colonial holdings in the Far East.

The concept of trusteeship appeared first in discussions of the Big Three at Yalta in 1945 but was also discussed in general form in the Department of State during the war. It was agreed at Yalta that trusts would be set up under United Nations auspices, with decisions being made on the general procedure by the five powers having permanent seats on the Security Council. (Trusts were substituted for mandates in order not to have any carryover from the moribund League of Nations and because they were to have a broader definition.) Trusteeships would apply only to territories still under mandate in 1939, areas detached from the defeated enemies, or territories voluntarily placed under the system, with the specific geographic areas to be determined later.

John Foster Dulles represented the United States on the Fourth Committee at the twenty-seventh plenary meeting of the United Nations in 1945, which was charged with developing the trusteeship system. Dulles followed Wilson in his challenge to the colonial system, proclaiming that the committee was determined to assume the responsibility for boldly addressing the whole colonial problem, which involved hundreds of millions of people, not just the 15 million who might come under trusteeship. He presented a clarion call for the destruction of colonialism. The anticolonial thrust initiated by Dulles in the name of the committee became a part of the United Nations trusteeship system and continued over the next fifty-five years, implementing Wilson's dreams beyond his expectations and with results not imagined in his time. According to Alger Hiss, the State Department official who in 1948 would be accused of being part of a communist spy ring, there is considerable irony in the wholehearted support for the trusteeship system outlined by the United States at San Francisco. Hiss recalled that Churchill was skeptical of the operation and that Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius turned to Hiss and told him to explain it to Churchill. Hiss off the top of his head set forth the structure of the trusteeship system, and Churchill put his okay on it. Thus, Dulles adopted as gospel a plan put forth by Hiss, whom he later treated as a pariah. There emerged such a myriad of states in Africa, the Near East, and Asia, with differing national objectives and systems, as to boggle the minds of those who originated the mandate system and its objectives.

Chapter 4 of the report of the United Nations Preparatory Commission ordered the Fourth Committee to deal with trusteeships in the interest of the trust peoples. Accordingly, the committee outlined the rules and procedures, including creation of the Trusteeship Council. While this looked very good to the creators of the trust system, reservations appeared immediately, including objections from U.S. Army and Navy spokesmen, who urged outright annexation of the strategic Pacific islands taken from the Japanese. The president and the Department of State proposed a compromise based on the anticolonial position in Articles 82 and 83 of the charter. As primary sponsor of the trusteeships, the United States could scarcely reserve certain areas for annexation. Article 76 sets forth the provisions and restrictions applying to trustee powers and includes procedures leading to independence, representative government, and economic development. It was overridden at the San Francisco conference establishing the United Nations, however, by insertion of articles 82 and 83 of the charter. These articles provide that areas within trust territories might be set aside as "strategic areas" under the direct control of the trustee, which is answerable to the Security Council, where the veto power applies, instead of to the General Assembly, where it does not apply. In this fashion Micronesia—comprising the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islands, but not the Gilbert, Nauru, and Ocean islands administered by Australia and the United Kingdom—became the strategic area of the Pacific under U.S. supervision.

CONCLUSION

The trust principle seems to work more effectively for the objectives established in the Charter of the United Nations than did the mandate system under the League of Nations, because the Trusteeship Council is composed of those determined to carry it through and because it is under constant public scrutiny. Regular and voluminous

MICRONESIA: THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNANCE

By the mid-1970s, the complex process of negotiating the eventual end of the U.S.-supervised Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was well underway. The UN Trusteeship Council report in the July 1974 issue of the *UN Monthly Chronicle* noted the council's concern as discussions between the United States and the Micronesian congress continued to be oriented toward the choice of free association for six districts represented in the congress. The district comprising the northern Marianas engaged in separate negotiations concerning commonwealth status under United States sovereignty. Reported discussions between representatives of the Marshall Islands and the United States also disturbed the council, which wondered how they would affect the inhabitants of the Carolines. Micronesia's landmass was only about 700 square miles, comprising more than 2,000 islands in the three major archipelagoes and spanning some 3 million square miles of ocean. The northern Marianas's apparent movement toward becoming the first territory acquired by the United States since the purchase of the Virgin Islands in 1917 was considered by the Trusteeship Council to be a literal violation of the trust arrangement intended to keep Micronesia together as an integral unit.

Members of the Trusteeship Council insisted that the United States should not proceed with incorporation of the area unless satisfactory arrangements were made with the Micronesian congress. The congress agreed to separate discussions, and a commonwealth agreement was signed on Saipan in February 1975, climaxing two years of formal negotiations; it was then to go to the sixteen-member Marianas district legislature for approval. In June 1975 the agreement was submitted to a United Nations–administered plebiscite, which was overseen by a committee of the Trusteeship Council. The council reported that it was properly conducted and that the results, which favored joining the northern Mariana Islands to the United States by commonwealth status, represented the will of the people. The islands were to be self-governing, and when all steps were carried out to accomplish this, the Trusteeship Agreement would be terminated for the entire Trust Territory as well as for the northern Marianas.

In 1979 four districts (Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truk, and Yap, in the Carolines) established themselves as the new Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), while two other districts formed republics, the Marshall Islands (1979) and Palau (1981). In 1986 the United States declared that the Trust Territory was terminated, and though the Soviet Union blocked UN Security Council approval of this measure, it was approved by the UN Trusteeship Council. In 1994 Palau became, like the FSM and Marshall Islands, a self-governing sovereign state with the United States responsible for its defense.

reports from the Trusteeship Council had dwindled to pamphlet size by 1972. By 1975 the last two trust territories, Papua New Guinea and Micronesia, were determining their course toward independence or other disposition. In all, eleven trusteeships had originally been assigned to the council. The other nine had been Nauru, Ruanda-Urundi, French Cameroons, French Togoland, Italian Somaliland, Western Samoa, British Cameroons, British Togoland, and Tanganyika. From the trusteeships or released territories, ten nations had emerged in 1947, several in the 1950s, fourteen in 1960, and others later. Very often the result has not been satisfying, for the virulent nationalism exhibited by the new states has mirrored the worst traits of their older counterparts. Many celebrated nationhood by immediately sinking into anarchy or by trying to annex neighbors in wars of "liberation."

If success for the mandates and trusteeships is measured in terms of achieving independence, the trusteeship system obviously has been more successful. If it is measured in terms of achieving economic, political, and cultural development before nationhood, perhaps the more cautious approach of the mandate system has provided better results. In any case, the net result was that colonialism of the old order, with direct control of territory and people, and with no pretense of self-government, was dead by the end of 1975.

The objective of creating a nation-state system of democratic republics operating on a constitutional structure with governments of, by, and for the people—Woodrow Wilson's dream—is far

from achievement. The most orderly and stable transitions came in the states that emerged from territories formerly under British control, where the population was generally educated for self-rule. Trust territories where there was literally no preparation for self-rule and independence emerged with bloody struggles for power and unstable systems of government. In a considerable measure this result arose from the failure of mandate and trusteeship powers to take seriously their charge to use all deliberate speed to prepare the populations for independence. All too often, however, the period of preparation was too short; and in some instances the viability of the states created might be questioned in terms of their ability to become economically self-sufficient. For better or for worse, the states now exist, and the next problem for them is to learn some degree of tolerance for one another and to curb the excesses of nationalism thus far exhibited.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hall, H. Duncan. *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships*. London and Washington, D.C., 1948. The most comprehensive study of the background, origins, and development of the mandate system.

Leibowitz, Arnold H. *A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations*. Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1989. An overview of U.S. policy and results in the U.S. dependencies.

Mezerik, A. G., ed. *Colonialism and the United Nations*. New York, 1964. An academic study of the trust system in the general context of international relations or international organization.

Nevin, David. *The American Touch in Micronesia*. New York, 1977. Provides a perspective on the U.S. influence in the region.

Pomeroy, Earl S. *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia*. Stanford, Calif., 1951. An excellent account of the American concern for strategic position in the Pacific region; it treats the single exception to the general trust system.

Roff, Sue Rabbitt. *Overreaching in Paradise: United States Policy in Palau Since 1945*. Juneau, Alaska, 1991.

Russell, Ruth B., and Jeanne E. Muther. *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945*. Washington, D.C., 1958. Useful in tracing the background of the trusteeship principle.

Stuart, Peter C. *Isles of Empire: The United States and Its Overseas Possessions*. Lanham, Md., 1999. This is the most comprehensive analysis to date of U.S. policy relating to the trust territories and other dependencies.

Temperley, H. W. V. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. 6 vols. London, 1920–1924. Provides considerable insight on the discussions and development of the mandate question.

United Nations Department of Public Information. *Everyman's United Nations*. 8th ed. New York, 1968. Provides extensive information on the development and implementation of the trusteeship system.

United States Department of State. *The Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference*. 13 vols. Washington, D.C., 1942–1945. Gives the best information on Woodrow Wilson's perspective on mandates.

Upthegrove, Campbell L. *Empire by Mandate: A History of the Relations of Great Britain with the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations*. New York, 1954. The most comprehensive work tracing the British adjustment to the mandate concept and the British government's dealings with the Mandates Commission.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; IMPERIALISM; PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE; SELF-DETERMINATION; WILSONIANISM.

MILITARISM

William Kamman

Near the turn of the twentieth century, Secretary of War Elihu Root told a Chicago audience: "We are a peaceful, not a military people, but we are made of fighting fiber and whenever fighting is by hard necessity the business of the hour we always do it as becomes the children of great, warlike races." Theodore Roosevelt's admonition, "Speak softly and carry a big stick," says it more succinctly, and the great seal of the United States with an eagle clutching both an olive branch and thirteen arrows expresses the idea symbolically. The history of the United States offers many examples of the nation at peace and war, speaking softly while carrying a big stick. But does one characteristic dominate?

Although the nation's rise to imperial size and world power during the twentieth century may suggest military influence, historians do not agree among themselves. Samuel Flagg Bemis, a distinguished diplomatic historian, described manifest destiny as a popular conviction that the nation would expand peacefully and by republican example; it was not, in his view, predicated on militarism. During the expansionist period (excepting the Civil War), the army and navy were small and there was no conscription. Dexter Perkins, another distinguished historian of the same generation, would agree with this interpretation. The United States completed its continental domain, he said, with less violence than usually accompanies such expansion. Perkins believed that Americans have only reluctantly recognized the role of power in international affairs and that they desire a reduction of armaments compatible with national security. Undoubtedly influenced by Cold War events, particularly intervention in Vietnam, many writers have challenged such interpretations. Dissenters such as J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, saw a trend toward militarism in foreign policy arising after 1945, when extreme emphasis on defense and anticommunism led to a national security state with huge military budgets, increased executive power, and greater commitments abroad. Others maintain that militarism emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, when—according to historian Gabriel Kolko—Presidents William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson "scaled the objectives of American foreign policy to the capacity of American power to extend into the world." Still others discern imperialism broadly defined as a goal of American policy from the very beginning and suggest that recent military events are the logical culmination of trends over two centuries.

Militarism, like its frequent handmaiden, imperialism, is an avowedly distasteful phenomenon to Americans. The term can be broadly or narrowly defined and may be tailored to circumstances. Noah Webster defines militarism as predominance of the military class or prevalence of their ideals; the spirit that exalts military virtues and ideals; the policy of aggressive military preparedness. In his history of militarism, Alfred Vagts distinguished between militarism and the military way, the latter referring to the legitimate use of men and matériel to prepare for and fight a war decided on by the civilian powers of a state. Militarism does not necessarily seek war and therefore is not the opposite of pacifism; in its spirit, ideals, and values it pairs more precisely with civilianism.

Although most nations offer examples of militarism, the attitude is most often associated in the American mind with Prussia and Wilhelmian Germany. Expressions of militarism and policies reflecting it were clearly discernible in the Germany of that time. The writings of the historian Heinrich von Treitschke and of General Friedrich von Bernhardi seemed representative of a general view that war was natural and right; and Otto von Bismarck, called to lead the Prussian king's struggle for army reform without parliamentary inter-

ference, emphasized power at the expense of liberalism, once telling the parliamentary budget commission that iron and blood, not speeches and majority decisions, settled the great questions of the day. For a time the Prussian nobility regarded the army as their almost exclusive opportunity for power and rank and sought to discourage the rise of bourgeois elements in the officer corps. Loyalty was to their noble class for the maintenance of its privileges. With his swashbuckling manner, Kaiser Wilhelm II epitomized German militarism for Americans, and the 1914 invasion of Belgium—despite a treaty guaranteeing that nation's neutrality ("just a scrap of paper" and "necessity knows no law" said Berlin)—represented the immorality of German militarism and its refusal to accept any constraints.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the American experience, some of the traditional marks of militarism are lacking. There has been no aristocratic class, except perhaps in the antebellum South, which regarded military values highly and the army as a career preferable to business and civilian professions. There have been few challenges to civilian dominance over the military and little disagreement during most of American history about a small standing army. In the United States, any militarism must exist alongside democratic, liberal, civilian traditions and sometimes even have their support. Generally, this support has not been lacking when achievement of foreign policy goals (continental expansion, defense of the Monroe Doctrine, neutral rights, preservation of the European or world balance of power) has seemed to require military power. With that support the evidence of militarism in the United States increases as the nation accepts greater foreign policy commitments.

Late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American history shows few signs of militarism. Americans were not militaristic because there was no rationale for it. Yet these were not years of unbroken peace, for, as Root said, Americans were willing to fight when need was apparent. American fortune allowed war preparations after the crisis developed and permitted rapid demobilization when it was past, or as historian Daniel J. Boorstin, referring to the American Revolution and later American wars, said, "the end of the war and the end of the army were substantially . . . the same." Strong pressures for militarism in the United States came mainly after a long development of antimilitaristic sentiment.

American military efforts in the Revolution and the successful preservation of independence brought no changes in colonial antipathy (learned from the English cousins) to standing armies. A standing army was, for the revolutionary generation, dangerous to liberty and a tool for establishing intolerable despotisms. Americans believed that those who had arms and were disciplined in their use would dominate and that a standing army was inconsistent with free government. As noted by Bernard Bailyn in *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* such thoughts reflected the influence of earlier English writers and was dogma that prevailed with little dispute throughout nineteenth- and into twentieth-century American history. For colonists the British army might provide needed defense, but it should do so with few demands on colonial life or pocketbook. After 1763, when England kept several thousand troops in America, there was distrust in the colonies; on the eve of the Revolution, the Continental Congress memorialized the king with their grievances about the standing army in their midst and the commander in chief's assertion of authority over civil governments in America. In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders repeated these charges. Many Americans were convinced that the army was not needed and colonial wars of past years—referred to by the names of the British monarchs—were of little interest to them. This attitude reflects the isolation of the colonies and illustrates its effect on military thinking. Thomas Paine emphasized it when he urged separation from Britain. Britain fought for its own interests, he said, not for any attachment to Americans: "She did not protect us from our enemies on our account; but from her enemies on her own account." Independence would demonstrate America's isolation and lessen the need for a large professional military establishment.

More important in colonial experience was the armed citizen, the embattled farmer who was ready at a minute's notice to defend family and community. Most of the able free male inhabitants of an English settlement were armed because dispersed settlement made it necessary. They were accustomed to the rigors of hard life and were familiar with firearms. Although most of them served in the militia, the drills and reviews offered little instruction; the men were little inclined to military training or subordination. These plain citizens with arms were the military men; their

presence made civilian control over the army a reality well before adoption of a constitution in which that principle was firmly embedded. During the Revolution many of these armed men served in the Continental army, the militia, or in some irregular capacity. They have been variously described as ragged, dirty, sickly, and ill-disciplined, unused to service, impatient of command, and destitute of resources.

One foreign observer, however, believed the whole nation had much natural talent for war and military life. All descriptions were apt for the citizen soldiers for whom General George Washington sometimes despaired, but with favorable geography and foreign aid, without which success would have been difficult, they won. The victory amid political and economic confusion did not emphasize the military prowess of the Continental army or of the militiamen, and fortunately, too, for the civilian tradition, the man who commanded those victorious arms did not have the seeming messianic impulse of Napoleon, Charles de Gaulle, or Douglas MacArthur.

Washington reinforced civilian dominance at the time the nation was formed and precedents were set. He understood that the Revolution needed the support of public opinion as well as successful military efforts; he emphasized to his civilian soldiers their own interests (not those of some king) in the conflict; and he remained subordinate to Congress. At the end of the war, when soldiers were grumbling about back pay and unkept promises of future reward, Washington counseled patience and obedience. It was a time when politicians were scheming with discontented officers and there was imminent danger of military interference in political matters, but Washington's position prevailed. In June 1783, most of the army disbanded and the following December the Virginia planter-turned-general resigned his commission and went home. Never again in American history would the army be so close to open defiance of civilian authority. The disbanded troops met general public opposition to their demands for further pay; many received little or nothing. Civilian suspicion of military men was also revealed in public reaction to the Society of Cincinnati, a social and charitable organization of officers with membership passing through primogeniture. Opposition focused on the aristocratic trappings and possible military pressure on government. It was a natural civilian and democratic reaction from the likes of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and John Jay.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The colonial heritage, experience in the Revolution, and constitutional constraints influenced the military policy of the new nation. The Constitution firmly established civilian dominance, although it did not prohibit a standing army. The president was commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, including state militiamen called into the nation's service; Congress had the power to provide and support an army and navy but no appropriations for the army would be for more than two years; and Congress had the power to declare war. Under Congress's suspicious eye, the army remained small throughout the nineteenth century, except for bulges during the century's four major wars. Liberal sentiment—a heritage of the Enlightenment as accepted by Americans and passed on through the Declaration of Independence—emphasized tolerance, progress, and the individual; these traits allowed only restricted acceptance of military development, especially in the absence of any great threat and as American expansion moved apace with little opposition. Alexander Hamilton might call for substantial military preparations in 1797–1798 and support creation of a U.S. military academy (a proposal attacked as aristocratic and militaristic but nonetheless implemented in 1802), Secretary of War John C. Calhoun might in 1820 make a well-reasoned plea for the standing army against economy cuts, or Henry Clay might argue for greater defense in the face of an alleged European threat during the Latin American revolutions—but they failed to alter substantially the American mood for a small army. Diplomatic efforts of John Adams preserving peace in the late 1790s, or of Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams extending the nation's boundaries, or unilateral pronouncements such as the no-transfer resolution and the Monroe Doctrine all seemed to provide at little expense what Americans wanted.

When diplomacy faltered, the United States did turn to war. Some of these wars were aggressive, fought by a young, nationalistic, and expansionist people. In the case of the Mexican War, there was heavy opposition to the conflict, marked notably by Henry David Thoreau's call for civil disobedience, more a challenge to the extension of slavery than to the war itself. There were many other armed conflicts in nineteenth-century American history than students may remember, if they ignore the numerous army engagements with the Indians—estimated between 1,200 and

1,500—lasting until 1898. These conflicts with Native Americans have posed serious and complicated questions for interpreters of U.S. history. Wars and diplomatic negotiations with England, France, Spain, and Mexico established the country's continental boundaries by mid-nineteenth century, but relations with the native inhabitants of these lands remained ambiguous and problematic into the latter part of the century. These relations were clashes of culture besmirched with greed, maladministration, and corruption and based on force to overcome resistance. Reconciling the territorial desires of the country and its people with respect for Indian lands was in the end impossible. While some leaders of the new nation might want to advance the nation's perceived well-being without sacrificing its honor in treating with indigenous people, it was never, as the historian Francis Paul Prucha notes in his *Sword of the Republic* (1969), the intent of the U.S. government to halt the westward movement for all time.

There was bound to be conflict, and despite their hostility toward standing armies, the country's leaders established an army, although small, to resolve problems caused by the movement of Americans into frontier lands. U.S. policy was established by treaties and laws and generally administered by civilian agents at first from the War Department and later the Department of the Interior. The regular army, frequently supplemented by militia troops, was available to provide force when deemed necessary. Many officers and their men had contempt for Native Americans, and there was excessive violence in handling Indian affairs, including extensive bloody wars to remove tribes from their homes as in Florida (1835–1842, a result of government policy on removal) or in actions of militiamen, as in the Chivington massacre in Colorado (1864). Robert Wooster in *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903* (1988) remarks that a view of Indians as subhumans obstructing civilization's advance allowed officers to avoid moral misgivings in the face of brutal actions. Yet some officers such as General William Tecumseh Sherman, who supported strong action against Indians and did not view them as equals, understood their resistance.

The westward advance—imperialism under the name of manifest destiny, with army support—provides evidence of militarism, but there was little or no glorification of martial virtues or the martial spirit except as Hollywood might in later years portray it. Despite the army's role, there was a strong civilian influence on what was done. Sometimes when the army removed white invaders from Indian land or controlled trade with Indians there were complaints of military tyranny. Early legislation provided that persons apprehended for violating Indian territory would be subject to civil, not military, courts, and there were cases of civil actions brought against officers for performing such duties. There was also the belief among some army personnel that civilians frequently caused Indian problems, hoping to encourage military action. While fighting was an important part of the army's assignment in the West, it had a multipurpose role well beyond the use of force. Michael L. Tate in *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West* (1999) describes the army's major accomplishments in civilian-oriented tasks, including exploration and mapping, road and bridge building, agricultural experimentation, meteorological service, and a variety of services for persons going to and returning from the West.

Slavery provided the moral setting for the greatest threat to the Union and the most severe test of the civilian-military relationship in the nineteenth century. The occasion was a civil rather than a foreign war, and for that reason the internal threat seemed more imminent and restrictions on civil liberties more justified. President Abraham Lincoln was not happy about some measures taken nor the exuberance of some officers in carrying out regulations, but he thought preservation of the Union required adequate measures, even including suspending the writ of habeas corpus, detaining thousands of persons for disloyalty, sending hundreds of provost marshals into the country to oversee conscription and internal security, and using military officers and men in political campaigns to ensure election of administration supporters. Few people today would question Lincoln's motives, although his means are debatable. Yet national elections were not canceled (Lincoln defeated a general he had earlier removed from command), and the restrictions were not permanent although military governments were established in the South, some occupation troops remaining until 1877. Noteworthy, too, is the civilian control of the restrictive militaristic policies—a condition, according to some historians, not dissimilar to the civilian aspect of present-day militarism. In foreign relations, the Civil War demonstrated the nation's relative immunity to foreign dangers even at a time of great internal peril—what better argument to challenge calls for greater

military preparedness after the war? Also significant was Lincoln's broad interpretation of presidential powers during wartime, a legacy enlarged by future chief executives whose actions have fed much of the debate on militarism and imperialism in recent American history.

When the guns fell silent after Appomattox, more than a million men went home and the fleet of almost 700 ships declined to fewer than 200, many unseaworthy. Public attitude was the usual postwar aversion to things military, although the war had its heroes and the people elected General Ulysses S. Grant president as earlier they had chosen George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, and Zachary Taylor. Also, as after earlier wars, veterans' organizations developed to promote patriotism and economic self-interest and preserve wartime camaraderie. The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, as the Aztec Club after the Mexican War, was modeled on the Society of the Cincinnati and had little impact. The Grand Army of the Republic was of greater importance. Its influence was probably more effective on veterans' benefits and patriotic observance than its sometimes divided opinions on foreign and military policies. As the historian May Dearing has noted, the GAR was so busy with patriotic exercises, textbooks with a loyal Northern bias, and military instruction in schools (denounced by writers, peace groups, and some labor unions as militaristic) that it had little time for "jingoistic fulminations against other countries." Nonetheless, the patriotic exuberance may have encouraged public sentiment for war in 1898, and when war came the GAR leadership supported it and the territorial expansion that followed.

Still, old dogmas of civilian dominance over the military and a small army and navy prevailed, but there were changes affecting the economy and foreign policy that would alter the traditional civilian-military relationship over the next decades. In the thirty-five years following the war, the nation's population more than doubled; by the end of the century, American manufacturers had made the United States the world's industrial giant; American exports during the latter half of the 1890s exceeded a billion dollars annually. Few people could doubt America's claim to the status of a world power: there remained only the emulation of European imperialism to give formal recognition of that fact, and that came with the Spanish-American War of 1898. Whether America's fin de siècle imperialism was a great aberration, part of a search for markets, a continuation of earlier expansionism, an expression of manifest destiny, or simply a duplication of European practices, U.S. policy would not be the same again, and in the formulation of that foreign policy there were unmistakable signs of militaristic thinking.

As early as the 1840s, General Dennis Hart Mahan, father of the naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, had urged creation of a more effective regular army to carry America's influence to the world. Mahan believed that the United States was probably the least military of the civilized nations, "though not behind the foremost as a warlike one." "To be warlike," he went on, "does not render a nation formidable to its neighbors. They may dread to attack it, but have no apprehensions from its offensive demonstrations." The Mexican War had demonstrated the military potential of the United States, and, however slow Americans were in profiting from the lesson, the rest of the world recognized it. General Mahan's vision of military glory went far beyond defense of the nation to an extension of its power outside the continent. Despite Mahan's vision and the arguments of such generals as Emory Upton, who deplored civilian control over strictly military matters and overdependence on armed citizenry in war, there was little change in American opinion.

While the navy experienced the same reluctance to abandon traditional military policies and became embroiled in politics and spoils, it was free of some of the public's extreme suspicion of a standing army and benefited immensely from that apostle of navalism and imperialism, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and two of his sometimes overlooked contemporaries, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, founder of the Naval War College where Mahan expounded his ideas, and Benjamin Harrison's secretary of the navy, Benjamin F. Tracy, advocate of a battleship fleet. The naval building program also spawned lobbyists and vested interests in the industries providing the new matériel and equipment. Wanting to avoid overdependence on foreign suppliers, Congress in 1886 required navy shipbuilders to use only matériel of domestic manufacture. The following year the Bethlehem Iron Company agreed to supply the first American-made armor plate and in 1888 began production of the first steel propeller shafts for U.S. warships.

Like his father, Alfred T. Mahan had a vision of America's world position—a vision, perceived through study of British naval history, not con-

fined to defensive preparations. The younger Mahan's message emphasized sea power as a source of national greatness: the building of a battleship fleet to protect U.S. interests, if not to reach distant countries at least to keep clear the main approaches to America. The sea is a highway, he said, and ships providing access to the world's wealth and traveling on that highway must have secure ports and must, as far as possible, have "the protection of their country throughout the voyage." The United States with safe frontiers and plentiful internal resources might live off itself indefinitely in "our little corner" but, suggested Mahan with a tone more of warning than speculation, "should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn might have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all people, the sea. The canal—a great commercial path—would bring the great nations of Europe closer to our shores than ever before and it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications." He saw in Americans an instinct for commerce, preferably in their own ships, a possibility for colonies, and a need to control an isthmian canal. For him, war was sometimes necessary just as the policeman's work was necessary; through such organized force the world progressed.

As many Americans accepted Mahan's strategic proposals to give a historical validity to their imperialist, militarist policies, so many also adopted Charles Darwin's theory of biological development to lend scientific support for survival of the fittest in international relations. In his study of social Darwinism, the historian Richard Hofstadter remarked that although Americans did not have to wait for Darwin to justify racism, militarism, or imperialism—all present in American history before 1859—Darwinism was a convenient handle to explain their beliefs in Anglo-Saxon superiority, meaning pacific and belligerent expansion.

Few people typify the spirit of Mahan in the milieu of Darwinism as well as Theodore Roosevelt, a strong exponent of the "large policy" designed to make the United States a world power and possessor of colonies to provide bases and encourage trade. As a Rough Rider, public official, or historian, Roosevelt admired strength, pursued power, was sometimes a demagogue, sometimes chauvinistic, his ardent nationalism easily becoming militaristic. Roosevelt's call for a strenuous life revealed much that could be ominously dangerous: "We do not admire the man of timid peace. We admire the man who embodies victorious effort; the man who never wrongs his neighbor, who is prompt to help a friend, but who has those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life." He did not want to avoid war simply to save lives or money; the cause was what mattered. "If we," he said, "are to be a great people, we must strive in good faith to play a great part in the world. . . . The timid man, the lazy man, the man who distrusts his country, the overcivilized man, who has lost the great fighting, masterful virtues, the ignorant man of dull mind, whose soul is incapable of feeling the mighty lift that thrills 'stern men with empires in their brains'"—thus he characterized people unwilling to undertake the duties of empire by supporting an adequate army and navy. He urged Americans to read the *Congressional Record* to identify those opposed to appropriations for new ships, or the purchase of armor, or other military preparations. These men, Roosevelt declared, worked to bring disaster on the country; they had no share in the glory of Manila; "they did ill for the national honor." He feared the nation would become a weak giant like China. That tragedy could be avoided through a life of strenuous endeavor. Every man, woman, and child had duties: the man, to do man's work; the woman, to be homemaker and "fearless mother of many healthy children"; and the child, to be taught not to shirk difficulties. Roosevelt had little patience for the timidity of those who opposed empire or their canting about liberty and consent of the governed "in order to excuse themselves for their unwillingness to play the part of men." Not many Americans had Roosevelt's eloquence or his platform, but many shared his sentiments.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Nationalism, an effort to exert greater influence beyond the country's borders, and a willingness to threaten or use force, while not new in United States foreign policy, seemed more apparent as the country moved into the twentieth century. Several episodes of American foreign and military policy highlight this trend.

Deficiencies of the U.S. Army in the Spanish war necessitated a revamping of the military organization. Using European precedents, Secretary of War Elihu Root proposed several changes,

including creation of the Army War College and a general staff. Much opposition came from entrenched interests in the army and the state militias, but through compromise Root's proposals passed. America's participation in World War I was more effective because of these changes. For some people development of the general staff raised a specter of militarism. Walter Millis, a student of militarism, writing in 1958 commented on Root's contribution and mused that without it American participation in the Great War might not have occurred. "But Root, like all large figures," Millis said, "was only a reflection of his times. There were many other architects of the great disaster of militarism which was to supervene in 1914–18."

The new navy was begun under the administrations of James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur. In 1883, Congress approved four steel vessels, and the building program continued through subsequent administrations, especially the Mahan-influenced presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, when emphasis was on battleship construction. A major turn came after war broke out in Europe. Since Roosevelt's presidency, American naval policy had called for a navy second only to Great Britain. In 1915 policy proclaimed a navy second to none. The naval appropriations act of 1916 had no precedent for its naval construction plans. A strong opponent, House majority leader Claude Kitchin, argued futilely that approval would make the United States "the greatest military-naval Nation the world has ever seen." The act reveals an interesting dichotomy, showing the uneasy American attitude toward military measures by combining large appropriations for warships with a renunciation of armed aggression, and an endorsement, in principle, of disarmament. Wilson's support for a strong navy shows his realization of the interaction of military power and diplomacy. The navy would allow the United States to meet existing challenges and to perform the international tasks it expected after the war.

In Latin American policy and in implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, Americans showed a new assertiveness resulting, particularly in the twentieth century, in frequent military interventions, intervention to remain a standard response to political instability until the 1930s. In 1896, Secretary of State Richard Olney and President Grover Cleveland confronted the British with "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." A few years later, Theodore Roosevelt, fearful of European intervention (perhaps a German naval base in the debt-ridden Dominican Republic), accepted for the United States the role of international policeman in the Caribbean. From the Roosevelt Corollary, the Platt Amendment with Cuba, the responsibilities of dollar diplomacy, and the 1903 canal treaty with Panama, whose independence Roosevelt assured by timely naval maneuvers, there emerged a Caribbean foreign policy often characterized by the big stick. American troops and tutelage countered political and economic chaos. Clashes were bound to occur: in 1912, U.S. forces in the Caribbean for the first time went into battle to suppress revolutionaries, this time in Nicaragua. In ensuing years, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua experienced extensive interventions, often with violence and with a full-scale guerrilla war in Nicaragua in the 1920s and early 1930s. Guerrilla opposition was not new to Americans, who had faced it in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War.

If broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in areas near the Panama Canal and if growing interests in Far Eastern affairs born of the Open Door and the search for that vast Asian market cast the United States in a role of greater involvement calling for more reliance on military solutions, this was not accompanied by surrender of traditional attitudes toward military matters. Compromises were always necessary: even entering the war in 1917 was put in the perspective of fighting German militarism, of fighting a war to end war. While most Americans might applaud a combative nationalism that had Roosevelt proclaiming, "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead"—when Raisuli, a Moroccan bandit, abducted an alleged American citizen near Tangier—or while pacifist Jane Addams might lose much of her popularity during World War I and have her speeches considered dangerous, or while Eugene Debs might be sent to jail in 1918 for a speech condemning war, these and similar events were more a result of the exuberant patriotism of the times than a widespread tendency toward militarism. In the postwar years there is substantial evidence that Americans wished to return to policies less likely to involve force. Much of the opposition to the League of Nations came from those who thought Article X of the Covenant deprived Congress of a free hand in deciding on war. These men did not want to guarantee the "territorial integrity and existing political independence of

all members of the League," for that might lead to a war not in America's interest. The disarmament conferences and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy did not usher in a long era of peace, but they were symptomatic of peaceful desire. Weary of the Nicaraguan imbroglio, President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson concluded that marine interventions were too costly and should end. Revelations of war profiteering, exposés of the armament industry, and the revisionist historical literature on U.S. entry into the Great War brought disillusionment and a determination that it should not happen again. Presidential power in foreign policy was suspect, the neutrality laws of the 1930s tried to close all loopholes that might lead to war, and there were restraints on presidential flexibility in foreign policy. One proposal, the Ludlow Resolution (1935–1938), even indicated distrust of Congress on the matter of war by urging that declarations of war should be by national referendum. These questions became more pressing as world crises multiplied. During the debate on American foreign policy in the late 1930s and early 1940s, each side proclaimed its approach as the true road to peace while the opponent's was sure to involve the United States in war.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Among isolationists in the interwar period there was fear of militarism. The historian Charles A. Beard felt the military interests seeking a larger navy would, if left to themselves, "extend America's 'strategic frontiers' to the moon." If Americans rejected the policy encouraged by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, and Henry Cabot Lodge, and if by plan, will, and effort they provided "a high standard of life and security for the American people," using to the fullest the national resources, technical arts, and managerial skills in the United States, there would be no need for large military forces. Defense policy should be based on "security of life for the American people in their present geographical home"; the army and navy should not be huckstering and drumming agencies for profit seekers, promoters, and speculators or defenders of every dollar invested abroad. Guided by such a clarification of policy, Beard said, military authorities could make calculations adapted to clearly defined ends; until then they "will demand every gun and ship they can get." Beard saw military leaders committing themselves to a policy of trade promotion and defense all over the world. Sometimes, he believed, they took dangerous chances and then tried to convince the people that national interest or points of honor were at stake. As long as naval strategists demanded more ships, men, and financial support, by using "the kind of propaganda they have been employing," they were more a danger to American security than a guarantee of it.

Senators also frequently spoke out on these issues. Robert A. Taft also urged restraint on interventionist policies because he opposed war. He did not trust President Roosevelt; he thought there was little the United States could do about democracy abroad; and he felt war would expand the power of the federal government to the detriment of democracy at home. Not all isolationists would agree with this reasoning, especially since German and Japanese aims appeared more aggressive. Senator George Norris came to believe by the late 1930s that despite the dangers of militarism the United States must rearm.

The American Legion, an organization of veterans that emerged in the interwar period, also advocated programs of preparedness. The legion supported the idea of a naval disarmament conference in Washington in 1921–1922 but did not want to sacrifice an adequate navy for maintaining the position of the United States as a world power; nor did the legion want its support of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) outlawing war as an instrument of national policy to imply any support for reduction in the nation's military establishment. Whether the American Legion has influenced public opinion or merely reflected it is uncertain. In the great foreign policy debate before Pearl Harbor, the organization had its own divisions on internationalism and isolationism; and, as for many Americans, the legion's general anticommunist stance gave way before the realities of World War II, returned with the Cold War, and adjusted to détente and the post–Cold War years. The size and organization of the American Legion have made it a more powerful lobby than its first antecedent, the Society of the Cincinnati; but it has also had public suspicion and criticism, reflecting perhaps the American civilian's distrust of military influence.

The first four decades of the twentieth century witnessed no marked trend toward militarism in the United States. But more than ever before in the nation's history, Americans were

having to come to terms with world power, having to think about international relationships that had been far from their minds in earlier times. Many Americans believed that the old truths of civil-military relations were still valid, although they realized that some concessions were necessary for adequate defense in a world not free of war. The big question then and still today centers on how much is adequate. In the interwar years, the army was seldom above 200,000 men and most often below 150,000; there was rejection of conscription until 1940 and much debate on the advisability of compulsory Reserve Officers Training Corps in colleges. The navy also suffered postwar neglect, and many officers regretted naval weakness in the Pacific, where they considered Japan the enemy. A change came with Franklin D. Roosevelt's support of naval expansion and more jobs in the shipbuilding industry.

WORLD WAR II

A majority of Americans came to accept Roosevelt's policy of gradually increasing both aid to the Allies and military preparation at home. When war erupted most people were still unaware that the free security from which they had unknowingly benefited for so long was gone forever. Many Americans believed that when the war was over national life would return to the prewar style. As Samuel A. Stouffer and others note in their sociopsychological study *The American Soldier* (1949), there was little feeling of personal commitment to war after the early sense of national peril had disappeared. The war was simply a detour that must be taken before one could return to the main, or civilian, road. At war's end the soldier had no desire to reform the United States or the world; he was interested in himself and his family. Cessation of hostilities brought not-surprising demands for rapid release of fathers, sons, and husbands; by 1946 the number of men on active duty had fallen from over 12 million to little more than 3 million, which was reduced by half the following year. In his plans for the postwar world, Roosevelt had sensed the public mood and anticipated a small armed force. At Tehran, when Stalin suggested that Roosevelt's idea of four policemen to preserve world peace might require sending U.S. troops to Europe, Roosevelt envisaged the United States providing ships and planes while Britain and the Soviet Union provided the land armies. And at Yalta the president doubted if U.S support for future peace would include "maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe." Clearly, the United States accepted an international role and would not make the mistake of rejecting membership in the new world organization, but Americans expected to fit their participation into a familiar mold requiring only limited military effort. This paralleled Wilson's first hopes in 1917 that the American contribution to the war would come mainly from the navy and industrial production, and Roosevelt's hopes in 1940 and 1941 that nonbelligerency would prevent defeat of Germany's enemies while keeping the United States out of war. These hopes were lost in events.

Although most Americans during and immediately after the war thought mainly of returning to peacetime pursuits with little or no consideration of America's role in the world and what that role might require, there were military leaders pondering the country's future and how to protect its interests. Even shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, as noted by Michael S. Sherry in his *Preparing for the Next War,* General George Marshall was thinking about peace after the imminent war and the war to follow it. Despite this slight beginning, postwar planning did not become serious for more than a year, and even then the planners had to deal with many uncertainties including vaguely expressed plans from political leaders and lack of cooperation inherent in the rivalries among the army, navy, and virtually autonomous army air force. All aspired to a preeminent place in defending national interests perhaps challenged by Soviet expansion, a concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1942. Planning proposals that emerged included universal military training, unification of the services, and an independent and large air force, but unanimity was lacking except on the essential ability for rapid mobilization. A proposal for universal military training eventually received President Harry Truman's support but never passed Congress. The country relied on the draft until 1973 with a brief hiatus in 1947–1948. The National Security Act of 1947 provided for coordination of the armed services and an independent air force. Although the war ended without planning consensus, hurried efforts in the latter half of 1945 brought recommendations advocating a policy of deterrence and preventive war. Sherry points out that such recommendations contrasted with earlier practice—going from a passive to an active defense. There followed military budgets lower than those

of wartime but higher than prewar levels and continued large research-and-development funding, allowing soldiers and scientists to remain partners. All of this, Sherry believes, created an ideology of preparedness and Cold War mentality permitting militarist influence to permeate American society.

THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

With the destruction of western Europe and the decline of Great Britain as a balancer of European power, the door to American retreat in the face of any new totalitarian threat closed. The challenge seemed to come from the Soviet Union, and this challenge as perceived by Americans has largely determined American foreign and military policies since 1945. Wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union had always been a marriage of convenience, although some hoped the social, economic, and political differences could be smoothed over to allow a peaceful working relationship after the war. Disagreements over Poland and Germany soon revealed the incompatibility of American and Soviet postwar goals. By 1947 the Truman administration was convinced that the world was polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to protect itself the United States must preserve the balance of power against Soviet expansion. Truman came forth in broad rhetoric to tell the American people that the United States would support "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Not long after, the diplomat George F. Kennan in his "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* provided an analysis of Russian behavior and prescribed a response in the form of "a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." On these appraisals the U.S. government based its foreign and military policies and over the years perhaps went far beyond what Truman and Kennan had intended. In his *Memoirs,* Kennan regretted his failure to make clear that he was not talking about "containment by military means of a military threat" and his failure to "distinguish between various geographic areas." Later reference to containment to explain American involvement in Vietnam disturbed Kennan. Certain areas of the world were more important to the United States, he said, and the world situation had changed since 1947; there was no longer only one center of communist power.

Although the major change in American defense policy came with the Korean War (1950–1953), even before that conflict there was much of the temper of the war years. Despite rapid demobilization of U.S. forces after World War II, they were still larger than during any peacetime in American history; the military budget was many times the 1940 level; President Truman was pushing for universal military training; and the United States was heavily armed, with a monopoly on the atomic bomb.

Nonetheless, Truman was reluctant to raise defense spending above $15 billion, much to the concern of military leaders and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. On the eve of the Korean War, a committee of State and Defense Department officials described in a plan (NSC 68) the potentially rapid economic and military growth of the Soviet Union and emphasized the need for strength if there were to be any successful negotiations with the Soviet Union or any agreement on arms regulation. According to Paul Hammond, it was a program calling Americans to rise to the occasion by giving more effort and resources to prevent further deterioration of the strategic situation of the United States. The Korean War provided the impetus for the administration and public to accept the call: the national security budget shortly went above $40 billion and the number of military personnel on active duty more than doubled.

Events occurring and attitudes established during the five years after the end of World War II set a pattern for response to subsequent challenges to American foreign and military policies. Supporters argued that reliance on well-prepared armed forces supplied with the latest weaponry and stationed around the globe was a deterrent to war, while critics perceived it as an example of militarism little related to the defense needs of the United States and, as in Vietnam, sometimes disastrous.

Many conditions acceptable for achieving victory during World War II have been denounced as militarism in the postwar era. Believing that the war was essential for the achievement of legitimate national goals, most Americans accepted industrial mobilization, strong and sometimes secretive executive leadership, large armed forces, large military budgets, and the use of whatever weapons were available. From the beginning of the Cold War, however, there have been many dissenters who doubt any international danger and question the military

NSC 68

One of the important Cold War documents that rationalized the military buildup to meet the communist challenge was NSC 68, principally authored by Paul H. Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, sent to the president in April 1950, and referred to the National Security Council for comment. Influenced by the Berlin blockade, the communist victory in China, and the Soviet testing of an atomic weapon, the authors of NSC 68 composed a ringing, frightening call to rearm. Whether the strategies outlined in NSC 68 were proper and prudent for winning the Cold War or were excessive, too expensive, and a misinterpretation of Soviet intent, they are part of the general debate on the Cold War and the extent of militarism in American policy and life.

NSC 68 states that "the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." If there is "any substantial further extension of the area under domination of the Kremlin [it] would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." The authors described the military power of the Soviet Union and expressed belief that if a major war occurred in 1950 the Soviet Union would be capable of attacking selected targets in the United States with atomic bombs. To meet the Soviet threat the United States must possess superior overall power including military strength to guarantee national security and to conduct a policy of containment. The country should also produce and stockpile thermonuclear weapons. The rapid buildup would be costly but, "Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake."

and foreign policies designed to counter communist aggression.

Probably the most cited example of militarism in American life is the military-industrial complex—an alliance between the military establishment and the companies supplying weapons and matériel used by the armed forces. The relationship was not new during World War II, but huge postwar defense budgets and the great dependence of some companies on government orders brought lobbying activities to new heights and saw substantial increases in the number of former military men on corporation payrolls. Add to this intellectual, political, labor, and geographic interests in various research projects or companies whose operations represented thousands of jobs, and there emerges a vast constituency to influence defense decisions. Defense spending for research and development also has had great impact on the nation's universities. The historian Stuart W. Leslie has described how large contracts from the military have influenced academic scientific research and maintained or established new laboratories under university management. The science and engineering departments did the research, consulted, and trained the graduates for work that was in demand by the defense establishment with the result, as Leslie says, that the military was establishing the scientific priorities.

In his Farewell Address of 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against unwarranted influence from the industrial-military complex. Many critics of the complex disagree with much of American foreign and defense policy since 1945 and fail to see any challenge requiring a large military response. The sociologist C. Wright Mills saw a greater penetration of military men in the corporate economy, which seemingly had become a permanent war economy, while Gabriel Kolko argues that the military establishment is only an instrument of civilian business leaders who seek strategic and economic objectives. Many of the critics reveal the old animosity toward munitions makers who peddle their wares that soon become obsolete and necessitate a new round of even more sophisticated and destructive weapons. Modern weapons are many times greater than needed to destroy an enemy, but the nation's security is less than ever before. Failure to achieve international control over weapons, for which some critics blame America's lack of suitable initiative when it had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, continued the wasteful arms race

and increased chances for their use—an unthinkable event, or so it seemed until Herman Kahn's *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (1969).

Opponents of postwar policies frequently centered their attacks on the president and his almost exclusive direction of foreign policy and his broad use of powers as commander in chief. According to critics, presidents have exaggerated foreign dangers and secretly committed the United States to other countries, entangling the nation in war in violation of the Constitution. Broad use of executive power from Washington's declaration of neutrality, through James K. Polk's occupation of disputed territory, Lincoln's reinforcement of Fort Sumter, Franklin D. Roosevelt's destroyer-base deal, and Ronald Reagan's Iran-Contra deal appears often in American history. The American people and their historians generally praise and admire (at least in historical perspective) the strong, active executive, but the Vietnam War and Watergate revelations caused a reexamination of presidential use of power. Some writers who supported presidential prerogative but became disillusioned in the later years of the Vietnam War have been at pains to distinguish which presidents faced real emergencies and were justified in wielding their authority. The distinction is difficult.

Critics also note Defense Department influence in foreign policy decisions as another example of militarism. During the John F. Kennedy administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at first opposed a comprehensive test ban treaty because it might reduce American vigilance and finally gave support only with extensive safeguards. During the Cuban missile crisis, the Joint Chiefs advised an air strike against Cuba, and earlier they had seemed at least tacitly to support American participation in military operations against Fidel Castro. Often cited are the optimistic and frequently misleading military reports of progress in Vietnam, reports that suggested victory was within reach with a little more effort. Acceptance of the idea that only the military people had the facts made effective challenging of Pentagon estimates difficult even for the sometimes skeptical President Kennedy. According to reporter David Halberstam, Kennedy's failure to match his growing inner doubts with his public statements would have made his successor's task extremely difficult even if President Lyndon B. Johnson had been less accepting and admiring of his military advisers.

No one can deny the widespread emphasis on military preparedness, the evident abuse of power by agencies created to improve American defense, the questionable American presence in Southeast Asia, and myriad other examples of militarism in American life. Reluctance to maintain a large standing army has given way before international realities that no longer allow the United States the cheap security described by the historian C. Vann Woodward. There have been attempts to maintain civilian control, and the Korean War is a case in point. The controversy between Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur over limiting the conflict to the Korean peninsula ended in victory for the president. While the people might wildly welcome MacArthur home and while they might be bemused by the concept of a limited war, they wanted little of his plan to broaden the war; nor were there many ready to accept MacArthur's belief that military men owe primary allegiance to the country and the Constitution rather than those "who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch." General MacArthur won a brief, emotional victory—his New York ticker-tape parade bested Charles Lindbergh's almost two-to-one in paper tonnage—but it was General Eisenhower, with his promise to go to Korea to seek an early and honorable end to the war, who won the votes and became the soldier-hero president. His willingness to please the fiscally conservative Robert A. Taft wing of the Republican Party and his search for a strong military policy compatible with a sound, growing economy—a concern not new with Eisenhower—was no surrender to militaristic thinking. In fact, he feared that a prolonged military program might lead to a garrison state, and he wished "to keep our boys at our side instead of on a foreign shore," even though some American troops remained abroad. At times, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles engaged in militaristic rhetoric, but policy remained generally cautious, although "massive retaliation," "going to the brink," and "liberation" were added to the slogans "containment" and "aiding free peoples everywhere"—slogans that undoubtedly affected popular thinking and allowed people to accept policies or actions without serious consideration. Involvement in Vietnam, where these policies and actions merged and gradually escalated, had no willing hand or perceptive mind to limit it until the commitment was very large. It was a self-perpetuating and self-deluding conflict without clear purpose, entangled in personal and national pride. Yet popular sentiment and journalistic and historical accounts of the war reveal a lively anti-

militaristic feeling that challenged authority and induced eventual withdrawal.

For some Americans the end of the Vietnam War dispelled fears of militarism. Others suggested only abandonment of American economic expansionist goals as seen in the open door, or open world, policies would reverse conditions feeding militarism. For still others, greater congressional supervision of foreign and defense policies, limiting executive initiative, was needed.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union by the early 1990s understandably encouraged greater questioning of America's military and related policies that had been in place for over half a century. For many Americans the certainties posed by the fascist and communist threats were no longer present to bolster long-held assumptions. Ever since 1940 the United States had been preparing in varying degrees for one war or another. Was it not time now to enjoy a peace dividend? The question presumed that the new circumstances were strong arguments for change. There were reductions, but not to the extent that many critics hoped. By 1998 defense spending was 12 percent below the average level from 1976–1990. There was downsizing of military personnel, down to about 1.4 million in 1996. There were base closings, approximately seventy by 1998, but all proposals were strongly fought because of feared effects on local economies. Defense Department plans to cut military reservist positions ran into congressional roadblocks for similar reasons. These changes represented a halting, rather grudging trend. Michael Sherry, writing in the mid-1990s about America's "militarization," a more broadly defined and perhaps vaguer concept than the classic "militarism," believed that the main rationale for militarization disappeared with the Cold War and that America would probably drift away from its militarized past without a clear or formal indication that it was doing so.

While Americans like Sherry might approve the trend but prefer a more deliberate course, others worried that the country was becoming complacent in the face of future dangers. In 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen was concerned about a widening gap between America's civilian and military cultures and the possible effect on the well-being of the United States as well as the international community if the American people did not understand and support the military that helped to ensure global stability. The historians Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, in a study comparing the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century with England in the 1920s, suggest that as England was unwilling then to prepare properly for defense, the United States seventy-five years later might not be maintaining sufficient armed forces to pursue an active foreign policy aimed at preventing war. The Cold War and its end, they argue, disguised America's continuing interest as a world power in maintaining peace and stability in an increasingly fluid and still dangerous international community.

These views of America's military and diplomatic policies and the dangers they pose for its democratic nature and its security are speculative. Finally, any control of militarism rests with the people and their traditions. Democracy is not always reliable, for a warfare economy has many constituents and overzealous patriotism may lead to uncustomary actions. American tradition is firmly on the civilian side. Americans have not easily accepted the martial virtues emphasizing authority and subordination, and, at least in theory, they have accepted beliefs in freedom and the pursuit of happiness. Nonetheless, civilian supremacy as a basic tenet in America's civil-military tradition is not above challenge in the country's history, even in recent years. The Truman-MacArthur controversy, while often cited as a victory for civilian dominance, was possible because other prominent military leaders supported Truman, and, as noted by the historian Ernest May, Congress and the public sided with one set of military leaders instead of another. The military historian Russell F. Weigley has suggested that the principle of civilian control in civil-military relations may need reexamination. He cites post–Cold War examples involving General Colin L. Powell, who publicly questioned U.S. intervention in Bosnia while the George H. W. Bush administration was debating the use of armed force there and later was critical of president-elect Clinton's campaign proposal on admitting homosexuals to the military. Weigley also notes that General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, after retirement, was critical of aspects of Gulf War diplomacy. These examples followed the Vietnam War era when civil-military relations were strained by various policy constraints not to the liking of the military. Weigley concludes that the traditional civilian dominance may have an uncertain future. Obviously, tradition is not immune to erosion.

The historian Howard K. Beale believed that Theodore Roosevelt's more ominous predilections

were restrained by democratic tradition, respect for public opinion, fear of political defeat in elections, concern for the nation's well-being, acceptance of a cautious middle-of-the-road approach to problems, and a sense of the worth and dignity of the individual. These traits continue to have support from an American consensus. When American policy seems to veer too far from democratic traditions, opposition grows, particularly if there is no clear relation between policy and national security and, in the case of Vietnam, if there are continuing demands for men and matériel. Withdrawal from Vietnam did not alter the general trend of American foreign and defense policy, and the militarism that critics saw as part of it remained, but the end of the Cold War brought new, if still somewhat uncertain, directions.

Complicating the outlook may be the evolution of technology allowing development of more sophisticated and precise weaponry. Examples include use of cruise missiles or other "standoff" weapons destroying clearly defined targets without widespread damage and casualties while preserving no-fly zones over Iraq or intervening in Kosovo. Does such conflict, called "virtual war" by Michael Ignatieff in referring to Kosovo, mean that this type of violence becomes more acceptable to people reluctant to go to war? If American servicemen operate their weapons out of harm's way and there are no body bags shown on evening television or if society is not called upon to mobilize, will there be less attention paid to such military action?

Technological innovation in warmaking and attempts to restrict casualty lists as much as possible are not new. One reason expressed for use of the A-bomb was that it might obviate the need for an invasion of the Japanese home islands and the anticipated loss of American lives. What is new is the extensive television coverage since the Vietnam War and its effect on public opinion. American military leaders and politicians may be concerned not only about their own casualties but also about civilian casualties on the other side and appearing too aggressive, thus losing public support. Fighting a virtual war has many complications and unresolved political, military, and moral issues, as Michael Ignatieff describes in his book, and there is no reason to believe that the United States will retain exclusive control of the new weapons. In the face of rapid international political and technological changes, what remains for the United States is to strive to maintain the credibility of its arms in the context of its democratic traditions.

CONCLUSION

Militarism is not a precise term and its definition may depend on one's ideology or point of view, and one's judgment of it may be determined by its extent and form. Classic militarism, epitomized for most Americans by Wilhelmian Germany or pre-Hiroshima Japan, has few examples in the American past, but war and preparation for war influencing the country's society and having its support is increasingly apparent, particularly beginning in the last half of the twentieth century. This is not to say that the country has not engaged in war or military conflicts or that manifestations of militarism have not existed in earlier America. Nonetheless, general antipathy toward the military and a Congress keeping tight reins on military appropriations are readily apparent through the first century and more of U.S. history. In the beginning, the War Department (including naval affairs until 1798) had the secretary of war and one clerk and was considered in those early years, as recorded by Leonard D. White in his administrative history of the period, as a "difficult and unpopular department." A century later, although the size had changed, it was still unpopular with many people, including politicians and labor leaders like Samuel Gompers, who may have been remembering the Pullman Strike when he said, "Standing armies are always used to exercise tyranny over people."

While the early twentieth century may have begun to erode such views, it was World War II and the Cold War that brought significant changes to the country's diplomatic and military policies, symbolized by the great growth of the State and Defense Departments. The secretary of war and his clerk at the beginning of George Washington's administration grew by the beginning of the twenty-first century to about 90,000 civilian and military personnel occupying millions of square feet of office space in the Pentagon and numerous other federal and commercial buildings in the Washington, D.C., area. After World War II, Americans were willing to accept these changes because most of them no longer believed that isolationism was a viable choice for the United States, and many were convinced that there was a new totalitarian threat, similar in their minds to Hitler and Nazism. When events in Poland, Germany, Greece, China, and Korea seemed to confirm their fears, many Americans, perhaps influenced by Munich and the belief that appeasement was futile for stopping aggressors,

accepted containment, deterrence, and a buildup of armaments with an ample supply of nuclear weapons. Through these policies the Cold War came to permeate American society.

While militarism, or at least the preparation for war, was clearly evident during the Cold War, its justification, if not all of its aspects, remained a subject of debate. For critics who blamed the Cold War on the United States by failing to recognize the Soviet Union's security interests, Washington's military response was dangerous, wasteful, tragic, with a mindset that continued into the post–Cold War era. For those who believed the Soviet Union posed a real danger to this country and its friends, the preparation for war was correct and need not be regretted. The requirements for the future, with its changing political arrangements and new technologies, remained open for even more concern and debate as evidenced by proposals, which continued into the twenty-first century, for a missile defense shield.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Coffin, Tristram. *The Armed Society: Militarism in Modern America.* Baltimore, 1964. Recounts the growing military influence.

Donovan, James A. *Militarism, U.S.A.* New York, 1970. Suggests a cut in military manpower and reduction in defense appropriations as the best means for controlling militarism.

Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. *The Civilian and the Military.* New York, 1956. Notes the importance of antimilitarism in American history but sees the penetration of militarism through the technological implications of modern warfare and perpetual mobilization in the post-1945 world.

Gaddis, John Lewis, and Paul H. Nitze. "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered." *International Security* 4 (spring 1980): 164–176. Comments on NSC 68, one by a historian of the Cold War and the other by the document's principal author.

Gholz, Eugene. "The Curtiss-Wright Corporation and Cold War-Era Defense Procurement: A Challenge to Military-Industrial Complex Theory." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2 (winter 2000): 35–75. Questions whether the military-industrial complex protected its industrial components from going bankrupt by an examination of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation.

Hogan, Michael J. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954.* Cambridge and New York, 1998. Describes how America prepared to fight the Cold War and tried to preserve traditional values and institutions.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond.* New York, 2000. Looks at the NATO action in Kosovo as a virtual war where technology allowed it to be fought with no deaths on the American side and was thus less than fully real to the United States. The author attempts to explain "why nations that have never been more immune from the risks of waging war should remain so unwilling to run them" by his examination of the new technology and the morality governing its use.

Kagan, Donald, and Frederick W. Kagan. *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today.* New York, 2000. Fears that the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century was emulating England in the 1920s in defense policy.

Knoll, Erwin, and Judith Nies McFadden, eds. *American Militarism 1970.* New York, 1969. A dialogue among politicians and intellectuals who bemoan then current trends in military and foreign policies and doubt if they are defending the basic values of American society.

Kolko, Gabriel. *The Roots of American Foreign Policy.* Boston, 1969. Emphasizes that the growing military establishment is a result of political policy not its cause.

Lauterbach, Albert T. "Militarism in the Western World: A Comparative Study." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 5 (1944): 446–478.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. How the Truman administration coped with legacies of World War II and took steps to contain the Soviet Union but at costs higher than necessary.

Leslie, Stuart W. *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford.* New York, 1993. The influence of the Cold War on American scientific research.

May, Ernest R. "The U.S. Government, a Legacy of the Cold War." In Michael J. Hogan, ed. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implica-*

tions. Cambridge and New York, 1992. Does not look with regret at the militarization of American government during the Cold War but questions how this government structure will fare in the post–Cold War period.

Millis, Walter. *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History*. New York, 1958.

———. *American Military Thought*. Indianapolis, Ind., 1966. An anthology.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite*. New York, 1956. Sees a unity of the power elite based on the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organizations.

Perkins, Dexter. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*. Rev. ed. New York, 1968. Suggests that Americans on the whole have not been imperialistic and have not surrendered their essential liberties and democratic customs to demands of war.

Shaw, Martin. *Post Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Philadelphia, 1991. An examination of the concept of post-military society, bringing not necessarily the end of militarism but the possibility of peace, and, despite contradictions, a period when militarism is less dominant of society.

Sherry, Michael S. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–45*. New Haven, Conn., 1977. An examination of military planning to shape post–World War II policies and attitudes.

———. *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s*. New Haven, Conn., 1995. A history of militarization, "the process by which war and national security . . . shaped broad areas of national life."

Speier, Hans. "Militarism in the Eighteenth Century." *Social Research: An International Quarterly of Political and Social Science* 3 (1936): 304–336.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*. Princeton, N.J., 1969.

Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military*. Rev. ed. New York, 1959.

Weigley, Russell F. *Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall*. New York, 1962.

———. "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell." *Journal of Military History* 57, no. 5, special issue (1993): 27–58. Suggests that the principle of civil control of the military in the United States has an uncertain future.

Yarmolinsky, Adam. *The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society*. New York, 1971. Describes the influence of the military in nonmilitary areas.

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston, 1977. Development of U.S. policy influenced by what the author terms the Riga axioms and the Yalta axioms—one distrustful, the other cooperative.

See also CONTAINMENT; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; IMPERIALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; NATIONALISM; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PUBLIC OPINION.

The Military-Industrial Complex

James A. Huston

Probably no presidential farewell address since that of George Washington in 1796 has had a greater impact or more lasting quality than that of Dwight Eisenhower in 1961. Washington's is remembered mainly for his warnings against political factions and foreign alliances. Eisenhower's is remembered for his warning against the military-industrial complex. Coming from Eisenhower, who had risen through the military ranks and was assumed to be a "friend of big business," the words surprised listeners but also carried great weight. Apparently the term itself may be attributed to him.

In mid-December 1960, Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review,* had suggested the idea of a farewell address. Eisenhower turned to one of his special assistants, Malcolm Moos, a young political scientist from Johns Hopkins University, to draft the speech, and worked closely with him in preparing the text. The president's closest economic advisers were not aware of the contents of the speech until they heard it broadcast.

Speaking to the nation on radio and television on the evening of Tuesday, 17 January 1961, Eisenhower said the following about the military-industrial complex:

> Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.
>
> The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
>
> In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

At a press conference the next morning, Eisenhower expanded on the military-industrial complex theme. In response to one question he said:

> It is only a citizenry, an alert and informed citizenry, which can keep these abuses from coming about. And . . . some of this misuse of influence and power could come about unwittingly but just by the very nature of the thing, . . . almost every one of your magazines, no matter what they are advertising, has a picture of the Titan missile or the Atlas or solid fuel or other things, there is . . . almost an insidious penetration of our own minds that the only thing this country is engaged in is weaponry and missiles. And, I'll tell you we just can't afford to do that. The reason we have them is to protect the great values in which we believe, and they are far deeper even than our own lives and our own property.

Eisenhower's main concern was that military industries would exert an undue influence on government policy. Munitions makers were likely to encourage warlike policies in the interest of their own profits. Beyond that, Eisenhower saw a danger that individual companies might influence military strategy by their advocacy of their own weapon systems. Further, a great conglomerate of military industrial power might threaten individual liberty.

The main concern of others, like Seymour Melman, an industrial engineer and economist at Columbia University, has been that government policy, concentrating on the development and

maintenance of a big military industry, would have an unfortunate impact on the national economy.

Indeed, Eisenhower shared the concern about the economic cost of maintaining large armaments. In an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953, he had called for control and reduction of armaments. He said that if an unchecked armaments race continued, "the best that could be expected" would be:

> a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the people of this earth.
>
> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
>
> This world in arms . . . is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.
>
> The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than thirty cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of sixty thousand population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete highway.
>
> We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than eight thousand people. . . .
>
> This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

FORCES BEHIND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Historians have not yet devoted much study to the military-industrial complex. It has surfaced as a concept and concern only in very recent times. Moreover, well-developed bodies of theory and data are not readily available. The editors of the *Journal of International Affairs* have aptly summarized the situation:

> Of all the political ideas that gained popular currency in the 1960s, the military-industrial complex is the concept perhaps most gravely deformed by public mastication. The debate of 1968 and 1969 over the influence of the military establishment in the United States proved, with few exceptions, consistently unsatisfying. After all was said, the concept of the military-industrial complex remained muddled and its attendant questions of international and domestic political influence were still unanswered.

Political leaders reflected the confusion of the man in the street, of business leaders, industrial workers, farmers, college students, and activists for conflicting causes. All were caught up in a dilemma—that armaments cause wars, and that arms industries create prosperity. At the same time, nearly everyone agreed that some military forces were needed for national security, and these in turn depended upon some kind of military industry.

Here we can see the great dilemma of U.S. military-industrial policy: Can the security of the United States be better served, can the economy of the nation flourish more, and can the attending evils of arms manufacture be better reduced or avoided by government or by private manufacture of munitions? This was a question to which leaders gave their attention from the early days of the Republic.

The American military-industrial complex may be said to have had its origins with Alexander Hamilton and Eli Whitney. Those two men of genius were in the vanguard of a group of imaginative men who set the course for the national arms policy of the United States. Hamilton emphasized government manufacture of arms, though he recognized the need to develop a private arms industry as well if what he conceived to be the defense requirements of the country were to be met. Whitney was the entrepreneur par excellence who saw opportunities for profit in making arms for the government.

In 1783, Hamilton, a twenty-eight-year-old former lieutenant colonel, presented a report on a military peace establishment to the Continental Congress. In it he called for the establishment of "public manufactories of arms, powder, etc." and proposed the employment of troops in the national armories. This, he maintained, would be far more economical than the importation of arms from Europe. But Hamilton's concern for domestic arms manufacture went beyond the possible economies. He thought independence from foreign arms makers to be essential for national security.

In his celebrated "Report on Manufactures" in 1791, Hamilton offered a program whose central theme was the development of domestic industries for national security. Hamilton would encourage domestic arms production by a protective tariff and by an annual purchase of weapons as an incentive for continuous manufacture. Still,

in the long run, Hamilton looked to the desirability of government manufacture of all arms of war. His concern about the private manufacture of weapons was not that the private companies would become too powerful and would exert undue influence on national policy. It was that private companies could not be relied upon to provide the arms necessary for national security.

Eli Whitney of New Haven, Connecticut, desperately in need of capital, turned to the U.S. government with a fantastic proposal to manufacture 10,000 or 15,000 stand of arms at the very moment—when war with France threatened—that the government could not afford to turn down any halfway realistic proposal for making arms. As he followed the debates in Congress on proposed appropriations for arms procurement, Whitney decided that here was the best possible opportunity to get a government contract.

Whitney decided that the only practical way to produce 10,000 satisfactory muskets in the United States, where skilled armorers were few, was to reduce the complex steps of gunmaking to a series of more simple tasks, each of which could be done with less skilled hands, and to design machines that would duplicate some of the armorer's skill. For best results, it would be necessary to make parts precise enough to be interchangeable. This would permit the maximum division of labor and make it possible to accomplish repairs simply by replacing parts.

One of the most important contributions to the development of a domestic arms industry was the act of 1808 for arming the militia. By this time the national armories were making 5,000 to 10,000 muskets a year, but relatively few were being delivered by private makers under contracts of 1798, and, even though they were admitted duty free, almost none were coming in from Europe, where the Napoleonic wars were raging.

The act of 23 April 1808 provided for the appropriation of an annual sum of $200,000 for arms and military equipment for the militia of the United States, by either purchase or manufacture. The purveyor of public supplies, Tench Coxe, advertised in newspapers of the leading cities for bids for contracts to make muskets. Between 30 June and 9 November of that year, Coxe let contracts to nineteen firms for a total of 85,200 muskets. The contracts were for five years, with one-fifth of the total number, in most cases, due each year. However, the time schedules proved to be unrealistic and a number of the manufacturers unreliable.

Unique among the states, Virginia took upon itself the task of manufacturing arms for its militia independent of outside sources. Authorized in 1798, the Virginia Manufactory of Arms, occupying an impressive building along the James River in Richmond, turned out enough weapons between 1802 and 1821 to arm all the county militia—58,400 muskets, 2,100 rifles, 4,200 pistols, and 10,300 swords.

Soon a national arms system based upon two national armories and a group of dependable private firms was fairly well established. Beginning with the funds appropriated for the arming of the militia, the government gradually developed a policy of providing orders for the most promising establishments on a long-term basis. As to the advantages of public versus private manufacture of military arms, there was much to be said on both sides. In the earlier period there was strong sentiment in favor of depending solely on national armories. The national armories were readily available and less expensive, and they established price standards for private contractors. Private manufacturers seemed more likely to improve models, and to experiment with new materials and new methods. Both were needed for the best possible system of arms production.

Recognizing that the military-industrial complex does exist as a powerful, if informal, structure in American military and economic affairs, the following questions arise: How did it get that way? What are its consequences? What can be done about it?

The forces that have driven the development of the military-industrial complex include the following:

1. The national arms policy during the first half of the nineteenth century. The early decision to rely on production both in government facilities and by private firms for providing armaments set the stage. The policy of long-term contracts with private arms manufacturers planted the seeds for a permanent arms industry in peacetime.
2. Industrial expansion during the Civil War. The first industrial mobilization that approached total war created undreamed-of opportunities for profit and showed what might be done in arms production.
3. Industrial mobilization during World War I. This carried the opportunities a step higher, but the effects were only temporary, because no large-scale defense industry persisted

after the war, when the drives for disarmament and isolation amid cries against profiteering by "merchants of death" discouraged such activities.

4. World War II expansion. This was several notches higher than the mobilization for World War I and was when many firms got their start in military production, and then continued after the war under conditions far different from the post–World War I period.
5. Government-sponsored research and development on a large scale. This major development during World War II had important consequences in the years that followed. This has been one of the keys to the growth of the military-industrial complex.
6. Nuclear weapons. This was another legacy of World War II that overshadowed defense policies in the postwar world.
7. The Cold War. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union to security in Europe, and the perception of communism as a worldwide threat led to an armaments race in both nuclear and conventional forces that gave a certain permanence to defense industries. Broad programs of foreign military assistance became a part of this, and added to demand for military production.
8. Korea. The communist attack against South Korea called up further military-industrial efforts and gave credibility to the fears of the Cold War.
9. Vietnam. This conflict maintained the demand for military equipment at a high level over a long period of time.
10. The Gulf War. Just when there were growing demands for cuts in military expenditures to help reduce the national deficit, the crisis in the Persian Gulf served to renew requirements for production.
11. The policy of maintaining a "guns and butter" economy in the buildup for Korea, for Vietnam, for the Gulf War, and for the Cold War in general meant that if the unsettling impact of continuous conversion and reconversion on domestic industries was to be avoided, some measure of a military industry on a more or less permanent basis would have to be maintained.
12. The economic impact of defense industries on local economies, and the supposed stimulus of defense spending on the national economy. This brings pressure from local industrial leaders and from local labor unions and workers in general who are employed in defense plants, from local chambers of commerce and businesses that stand to benefit from providing consumer goods and services to defense workers and their families, and from members of Congress and other political leaders anxious to stimulate employment in their districts.

THE IMPACT OF A PERMANENT MILITARY INDUSTRY

With all these forces at work, what are the consequences spawned from the powerful military-industrial complex? Several unfortunate consequences emerge—an undue influence on military policy and strategy, a tendency to extravagance and waste in defense spending, a negative long-range impact on the economy, and a possible weakening of the country itself.

To what extent do the pressures of manufacturers worried about profits, communities worried about unemployment, and members of Congress and presidents worried about local or general business depression—and ultimately about votes in key states—influence our choice of weapon systems, and thus affect the military considerations in our national strategy? Do we build a new bomber or a new missile or a new aircraft carrier because our strategy requires it, or because some group demands it, and then develop a strategy to include it? There always is the prospect that elements of a powerful military-industrial complex will influence national policy and strategy in the interest of favoring certain weapon systems not simply on the basis of military advantage, but for the benefit of the companies making them, or for the armed service using them, or for the locale where they and subsidiary instruments are made.

Why else would General Dynamics take out a two-page, full-color advertisement in *Smithsonian* magazine to proclaim its F-16 Fighting Falcon "the finest fighter in the world" and to review its achievements in producing the B-24 bomber during World War II and the B-36 afterward? Why would the same company take a two-page, color ad in *National Review* to extol the virtues of its M-1 Abrams tank? Why does McDonnell Douglas present a television commercial to "sell" its F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft?

In the fifty years after the conclusion of World War II, three forces led to the maintenance of a military establishment of unprecedented pro-

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS, 1968

Contractor	*Headquarters*	*DOD Contracts FY 1968 (billions of dollars)*	*Main Projects*
General Dynamics	New York	$ 2.24	F-111 fighter-bomber, Polaris submarine
Lockheed Aircraft	California	1.87	C-141, C-5A transports, Polaris missile
General Electric	New York	1.49	jet engines, electronics
United Aircraft	Connecticut	1.32	jet engines, helicopters
McDonnell Douglas	Missouri	1.10	Phantom F-4, Douglas A-4 bomber
AT&T	New York	.78	Safeguard missile, antisubmarine projects
Boeing	Washington	.76	B-52, helicopters, Minuteman missile
Ling-Temco-Vought	Texas	.76	A-7 fighter, electronics, Lance missile
North American Rockwell	California	.67	avionics, submarine electronics
General Motors	Michigan	.63	gas-turbine aircraft engines, tanks, M-16 rifle

TOP TEN DEFENSE CONTRACTORS, 1999

Contractor	*DOD Contracts*
Lockheed Martin	$ 12.67 billion
Boeing	11.57
Raytheon	6.40
General Dynamics	4.56
Northrop Grumman	3.19
United Technologies	2.37
Litton Industries	2.10
General Electric	1.71
TRW	1.43
Textron	1.42

portions for the United States over such a length of time: the Cold War with the Soviet Union, involving an arms race throughout most of the period; the Korean War (1950–1953), and the Vietnam War (1964–1975). As the period ended (that is, as the Cold War at last appeared to have come to a close), a fourth situation assured continuation of military-industrial production—the deployment of forces and combat operations in the Persian Gulf region.

Military orders for goods and services went from $27.5 billion in 1964 to about $42.3 billion in 1969. The total defense budget for fiscal year 1969 was $79.788 billion, which amounted to 42.9 percent of the total federal budget, and between 9 and 10 percent of the gross national product (about the same percent as throughout the preceding decade). Defense funds went to every state, to 363 of the 435 congressional districts and to over 5,000 communities. Workers in

defense industries and in defense-related production in mining, agriculture, construction, and services comprised over 10 percent of the total labor force. The Defense Department itself employed as many civilians as the populations of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine combined.

Despite the lowering of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union—and between Eastern Europe and western Europe—in 1989 and 1990, the Pentagon in 1990 still was planning to put $100 billion into the improvement of the nuclear arsenal over the next ten years. This was in addition to the continuation of the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") research program. The SDI effort began in a television address to the nation by President Ronald Reagan on 23 March 1983. It was a call for a defense system that would protect the United States from enemy nuclear missiles. The specific objectives of the program were not clear. At first it was offered as a more or less total net to protect against all missiles. Then it was suggested as something that would be valuable against missiles from China, North Korea, or other countries. Then it was seen mainly as protection of American missile silos so that the capacity to retaliate against a first strike would be guaranteed. To say the least, it was controversial largely out of conviction on the part of many scientists that it never would work, and on account of the vast expense involved. By 1987 the funding for SDI research and development had reached about $6 billion a year. The Department of Defense in 1990 estimated that the annual outlay would rise to about $12.5 billion in 1997. In September 2000 President Bill Clinton announced that he would not proceed with an order to build the missile defense system. Incoming President George W. Bush announced that he would continue the program. The total cost was estimated at $60 billion.

In any case, "Star Wars" was the epitome of the kind of program best calculated to encourage the military-industrial complex. It involved the expenditure of billions of dollars a year for many years, with no end in sight. Its effects spread into many kinds of activities and into many parts of the country. Much of it was conducted in secrecy. There was no way that it could be criticized for being over budget or behind schedule. Even many scientists who remained skeptical about the possible effectiveness of such a scheme were willing to acquiesce, and even to participate in it, for they saw it as a significant source for research funds when other sources were drying up.

At the end of the 1980s, Department of Defense officials were becoming concerned, not about an expanding military-industrial complex, but about a decline in American industrial capacity for military production. In 1990 the share of the United States in the world machine-tool market was less than half of what it had been in 1980. In the first half of the 1980s, the rate of growth of productivity in the United States was 3.5 percent, compared to nearly 6.5 percent in Japan. Deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf region changed all the impetus for reduction. That exercise in 1990–1991 added an estimated $30 billion to defense expenditures.

An increasingly significant arm of the military-industrial complex was the research community—the universities and private think tanks that lived on defense contracts. About half of all the scientific research being carried on in the United States in fiscal year 1969 was related to the military. Some 195 educational institutions received defense contracts of $10,000 or more during the year. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, and Johns Hopkins were among the nation's top 100 defense contractors.

A MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL

Surely the greatest direct impact of the military-industrial complex on American foreign policy, and the greatest direct impact of American foreign policy on the military-industrial complex, has been in the transfer of arms among nations, programs of military assistance, cooperative production programs, arms sales abroad, and the rise of multinational corporations in arms and related industries.

One of the most serious charges leveled against the military-industrial complex is that it campaigns actively and effectively against arms control and disarmament, and exerts a controlling influence on the shaping of foreign policy. Those who traffic in military procurement have a vested interest in an unstable international environment. According to proponents of this view, the profits and power of the complex would decline catastrophically if real progress were made in limiting strategic nuclear weaponry and conventional weapon systems. For this reason, it is claimed, advocates of huge arms expenditures use all available means of shaping public attitudes and governmental behavior to perpetuate an illusion of

great international danger emanating particularly from the communist bloc of nations. Modern "merchants of death" are said to pursue their own interests in complete disregard of humanitarian considerations.

Juan Bosch, former president of the Dominican Republic, writes of what he calls "Pentagonism." No longer do advanced capitalist nations send out their military to conquer and exploit colonies. Foreign warfare or the threat of warfare provides "access to the generous economic resources being mobilized for industrial war production. What is being sought are profits where arms are manufactured, not where they are employed, and these profits are obtained in, and bring money in from, the place where the center of pentagonist power lies." In short, the domestic population is exploited now as colonies were in the past.

But the serious question remains: Do not countries that have no substantial arms industry have a right to obtain arms from outside sources in order to defend themselves? And is it not in the national security interest of the United States to have allies who are well armed and equipped for military action?

The opening rounds of the Cold War took place in the intercontinental crossroads of the Near East. Only there did Russian efforts fail to consolidate a system of "friendly" buffer states along the Soviet borders. Communist guerrillas in Greece had threatened to extend communist influence in the Balkans and to deliver to the Soviets another strategic area for possible domination of the eastern Mediterranean.

What had brought matters to a head so far as American policy was concerned was not a new and sudden communist attack, but the announcement by the British in February 1947 that they no longer would be able to continue the assistance they had been giving to Greece and Turkey. This might have opened the door to communist penetration. Actually, it set the stage for the policy of military aid that came to be known as mutual defense assistance.

Even as the North Atlantic Treaty was being discussed in early 1949, the implication was clear that American matériel assistance to the participating countries would be necessary if the new organization were to have any real effectiveness as a deterrent to aggression. But President Harry Truman waited until the day after he signed the instrument of ratification to follow it up with a formal request for military assistance. Calling for $1.45 billion, this proposal would consolidate in one act the existing programs for Greece and Turkey, Iran, Korea, the Philippines, and the Western Hemisphere, with a new program for North Atlantic Treaty countries. It envisaged three types of assistance: (1) direct transfer of American military equipment; (2) expert guidance in using the equipment and in production of equipment; and (3) dollar aid to increase direct military production in Europe. Ten weeks later Congress approved the program in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

In three years of war in Korea, allied forces other than those of the United States and the Republic of Korea never reached as much as 10 percent of the total troop strength. The United States provided half or more of the logistic support for these forces, but this amounted to a relatively insignificant fraction of the total supplies and services furnished by the United States and Korean forces. But the problems of coordination, negotiation, and accounting were as great as if troop contributions had been several times as large.

A truck rebuilding program in Japan grew to a large scale for the Korean War efforts. Civilian automotive experts sent by the Department of the Army began to arrive in Japan in December 1947 to set up the first production lines. The plan was to rebuild motor trucks on a mass production basis. Although Japan was the foremost industrial power of the East, much in American methods of mass production was foreign to many Japanese workers and supervisors. They were not used to the close tolerances and rigid inspections necessary for the complete interchangeability of parts that is the basis for mass production, and many of their work habits and customs seemed quaint when compared with American factory methods. A training program soon overcame most of those obstacles, and completely renovated trucks began to roll off the assembly lines in ever-increasing numbers.

Old trucks brought into the plants first went to the disassembly line, where they were completely broken down to the last nut and bolt. These parts were then sorted, cleaned, and sent to the various shops. Engines, transmissions, carburetors, and other major assemblies were rebuilt in separate plants. Various parts came together on the assembly line after the fashion of Detroit. The new trucks—built of old parts—then went through a tune-up shop, received a new coat of paint, and a thorough final inspection, and then entered the supply system. In 1951 vehicles were coming off

some assembly lines at the rate of one every four minutes. Some 30,000 Japanese were working on the project under the supervision of 50 ordnance officers, nearly 300 civilian experts from the Department of the Army, and about 500 enlisted men from the Ordnance Corps. Here, surely, was an indirect boost to the Japanese automobile industry, and perhaps a further thrust toward a "military-industrial complex international."

An aspect of the defense business that was becoming more significant, with a new twist and a different thrust, was the sale of arms and equipment abroad. The provision of military equipment to foreign countries around the world under the mutual defense assistance programs and other programs already has been mentioned, but there was more to it than that. Now there was a studied effort to persuade other governments to buy American military matériel.

As a part of military assistance to other countries, the United States at first emphasized cooperative production programs with certain of those countries. Undoubtedly, the cooperative production programs contributed significantly to European defense. But Europeans saw the whole effort as too much of a one-way street. The United States showed little inclination to accept European designs for cooperative production either in the United States or in other European countries, even when European designs were favored by those countries. According to one view expressed at the time, this situation was the natural result of American technological superiority and Yankee salesmanship. Another suggested that it was due at least in part to pressure by the U.S. government, which had been lobbied by its own defense industries.

Recognizing what was appearing to many to be the growth of an unhealthy situation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara suggested a "common market" in armaments within the NATO alliance. This would encourage trade among all the allies on the basis of economy and quality, including better opportunities for European nations to sell to the United States. The impediment to this scheme came not mainly from trade barriers but from government procurement policies. A serious blow to anything approaching the kind of "common market" that McNamara envisaged came in the fall of 1967 with a nationalistic restriction that Congress imposed on the Defense Appropriation Act. In this instance, the members of Congress who offered the restrictive amendment evidently were interested mainly in eliminating foreign competition for shipbuilding industries in their home districts. But the vote in support was so large that it seemed likely that other members might be seeking similar protection for other kinds of goods at a later time.

Another point of some criticism was in U.S. arms sales to developing countries that could ill afford them. In 1972 four nations—the United States (which accounted for one-third of the world's total weapons), the Soviet Union, Britain and France—were responsible for more than 90 percent of all exports of arms to ninety-one developing countries. Total exports of U.S. arms to foreign countries from 1945 to 1972 (whether in grants or in sales) amounted to approximately $60 billion. This was a significant addition to the orders of American defense industries—and a further impetus to expansion and consolidation of the military-industrial complex.

Some critics have suggested that American enthusiasm for the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was based less on concerns for national security than on the opening of new markets for the American arms industry. William Greider writes in *Fortress America* (1998) that an official of Lockheed Martin was on the ground in those three countries, and in other potential new member countries, even before the expansion agreements had been accepted. He was there to make a sales pitch for his company's fighter planes, air transports, communication satellites, radar, and other matériel. Not that there was any new threat to the security of those countries, but now they would be moving to replace their old Russian-made armaments with more modern and compatible items from the United States. With pressure sales from British and French concerns as well as American, something of an arms race was under way in Latin America and in Asia.

After dropping sharply from an all-time high of $81.5 billion in 1984 (in 1997 prices) to a low of $42.2 billion in 1994, international trade in arms took a sharp upturn. By 1997 it had risen by 26 percent from that low point, and by 23 percent just over the previous year, to $54.6 billion. Three regions—the Middle East, East Asia, and western Europe—accounted for 80 percent of that trade in 1997, but arms sales to South American countries were rising at a rate of 20 percent a year from 1992 to 1997.

During the 1995–1997 period, Saudi Arabia was the leading arms importer, with a total of $31.3 billion. Others in the top ten arms

importers were Taiwan, $12.5 billion; Japan, $6.8 billion; Egypt, $5.3 billion; Kuwait, $5 billion; Turkey, $4.9 billion; United Kingdom, $4.5 billion; South Korea, $4.2 billion; United States, $3.8 billion; United Arab Emirates, $3.8 billion. The United States was the main supplier of arms for eight of those countries (all except the Arab emirates, where France was the chief supplier).

The American share of world arms exports grew from 29 percent in 1987 to 58 percent in 1997. During that period, the Russian share of world arms exports declined from 37 percent to 4 percent; the British increased from 8 percent to 12, and the French from 4 percent to 11. In dollar amounts, world arms exports in 1995–1997 totaled $142 billion. The total for the United States during that period was $77.8 billion; for the United Kingdom, $18 billion; for France, $12 billion, and for Russia, $9.2 billion. In 1997 arms exports represented 4.6 percent of the total exports of the United States, 2.3 percent of the exports of the United Kingdom, 2 percent of the exports of France, and 2.6 percent of the exports of Russia.

While arms trade totals of North Korea were not high when compared with totals of other nations, it should be noted that in 1988, 32.3 percent of North Korea's total imports were in armaments, and 29.2 percent of its total exports were in armaments. By 1997 those figures had declined to 2.1 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The People's Republic of China's arms exports amounted to $1.1 billion in 1997, 0.6 percent of its total exports, and its arms imports were $142.2 million, 0.4 percent of its total.

A further complication on the international scene is the growth of domestic arms industries into international conglomerates and multinational corporations. When a great military aircraft manufacturer leaps national boundaries and takes in companies or builds plants in many countries, where does its loyalty lie? What control does its home country have over it? If a foreign branch builds planes or tanks or guns for a country that has become an adversary, how can the company be accused of trading with the enemy?

CONTROL OF THE COMPLEX

Granted that the national security of the United States requires a substantial military industry, a question remains: How can the unfortunate consequences of a powerful military-industrial complex—the kind of conglomerate of special economic and military interests against which Eisenhower warned—be alleviated? One measure might be that favored by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, that is, nationalization of the armaments industry.

Jan Christian Smuts, a distinguished South African soldier and statesman who served in the British war cabinet (and who sometimes is regarded with Woodrow Wilson as a cofounder of the League of Nations), in December 1916 circulated his draft of a constitution for a league of nations. Its paragraph 17 stated:

> That all factories for the production of direct weapons of war shall be nationalized and their production shall be subject to the inspection of the officers of the council; and the council shall be furnished periodically with returns of imports and exports of munitions of war into or from the territories of war into or from the territories of its members, and as far as possible into or from other countries.

Why, it can be asked, should a private company such as General Dynamics, most or all of whose business is with the government, be private? It has been shown that defense contractors often show less profit than comparable companies in civilian production, but with little or no risk, why should their profits be as great? Jacques Gansler estimated that in 1967 just four firms held 93 percent of the contracts for satellites, nuclear submarines, missile guidance systems, space boosters, aircraft fire-control systems, inertial navigation systems, jet aircraft engines, helicopters, and fighter, attack, transport, and tanker aircraft. This concentration became even more pronounced over the next twenty years. The number of military contractors and subcontractors of all types fell from 138,000 in 1982 to fewer than 40,000 in 1987.

Government ownership and operation would eliminate the need for any profit at all and reduce the pressures on the government for big defense spending for the benefit of a company. Of course, it would not eliminate this kind of pressure altogether. As we have seen, locales and political leaders apply pressure for defense orders in their areas whether the facility concerned is government or private, and subsidiary industries that benefit from defense production still would urge those expenditures that would benefit them indirectly.

There are those who contend that government industrial facilities would be less efficient and more costly than private concerns. That is not

necessarily true. The Springfield and Harpers Ferry armories were effective in producing high-quality rifles at lower cost than private factories; government navy yards have been effective in building ships (sometimes they were more costly because they paid higher wages and granted more paid holidays than private shipyards); the government's Philadelphia clothing factory has been effective; an army depot has been effective and far less costly than private contractors in overhauling tank engines.

In the development of ballistic missiles in the 1950s the army probably did as well in terms of cost and effectiveness at its Huntsville (Alabama) Redstone Arsenal as the air force did with its favored private contractors. In the end, the air force won out in that competition, some allege on account of politics, and thus gave a great boost to the private military industry of southern California.

Wartime still might require the conversion of civilian plants to military production. But that is a different matter. A thriving automobile factory has no real stake in converting to tanks or aircraft, and it would be reconverted to the civilian production when the immediate need had been met. Another approach might be to prohibit the export of armaments. This usually brings the rejoinder, "Well, if we did not sell arms to other countries, someone else would." The answer to that is, "So be it; at least we would not be putting advanced American weaponry into the hands of potential enemies."

A further step toward reducing undue influences of the military-industrial complex might be a more complete separation of government-sponsored research and development from those who have an immediate stake in the production of the items concerned. In any case, control must depend upon effective and sympathetic leadership at the top, in the White House and in the Pentagon.

CONCLUSION

An army that had resisted breech-loading rifles and cannon, automatic rifles, machine guns, motor trucks, and airplanes has now, since World War II, done a complete about-face. Now anything old is likely to be discarded. Certainly, improved weapons and equipment are desirable. But the military-industrial complex has betrayed an almost "Detroit mind-set" in developing new models every year or so. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the constant quest for novelty is due in part to the activities of researchers and industrialists anxious to maintain the flow of research and development dollars and anxious to keep production lines going. This was a major factor in keeping defense budgets high. When people looked forward to a "peace dividend"—funds that might be available for other purposes—after the pullout from Vietnam, they were disappointed to find that there was little of a peace dividend. All kinds of new weapon systems were waiting to eat it up.

A more serious consequence of a powerful military-industrial complex is the drain that a permanent defense industry on a large scale creates on the national economy. Many people accept the myth that a big defense industry brings prosperity. They point to the economic well-being of a community that is dependent on a local defense industry. They point out that it really was World War II that brought the United States completely out of the Great Depression. There is some truth, of course, to those contentions. Defense industries do provide an economic shot in the arm. But in the long run, and for the country as a whole, defense industries on a big scale can only be a drain on the actual or potential economic well-being and strength.

A healthy partnership between the military establishment and private industry was sought from the early days of the nation. In more recent years, this has been actively cultivated as demands for national security have required a greater industrial base. It has been in the interest of corporate profits and individual careers as well as in the interest of national defense. At times, there have been evidences of costly mismanagement and of collusion, conspiracy, and even fraud. But for the most part the growth of what has come to be known as the military-industrial complex has been benign. Gaining a kind of momentum of its own, it has grown to have unfortunate consequences in spite of itself.

The greatest military rival of the United States in the post–World War II period was the Soviet Union. It devoted a large share of its resources to military production (from 9 to 10 percent of gross national product). By 1990 its economy was in chaos. The greatest economic rival of the United States, Japan, devoted a small share of its resources to defense (less than 1 percent of GNP). Its economy was flourishing at a high level.

Related to the question of prosperity and economic well-being is the broader question of the long-range strength of the nation. Military expenditures, stimulated by the military-industrial complex to unnecessarily high levels over extended periods of time, actually can pose a threat to national security. This was the concern that Eisenhower expressed in his address of 16 April 1953 and in other speeches early in his presidential term. It was a concern that General Douglas MacArthur expressed during the same period: "In final analysis the mounting cost of preparation for war is in many ways as materially destructive as war itself."

The problem is to maintain a balance between overcommitment beyond capabilities of the armed forces and overextension of the military at the expense of the domestic economy. For example, after World War II, Great Britain was facing military commitments beyond its resources and had to call upon the United States to fill the gap. Arnold Toynbee wrote, on the other hand, that the ancient Assyrian Empire fell of its own military weight. And in the Peloponnesian War, the overextension of its military effort in the expedition to Sicily was the undoing of Athens.

In *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,* a provocative study published in 1987, Paul Kennedy warns that overextension in military commitments has been a critical factor in the decline of great powers over the past five centuries. He concludes:

> Yet the history of the past five hundred years of international rivalry demonstrates that military "security" alone is never enough. It may, over the shorter term, deter or defeat rival states (and that, for most political leaders and their publics, is perfectly satisfactory). But if, by such victories, the nation over-extends itself geographically and strategically; if, even at a less imperial level, it chooses to devote a large proportion of its total income to "protection," leaving less for "productive investment," it is likely to find its economic output slowing down, with dire implications for its long-term capacity to maintain both its citizens' consumption demands and its international position. . . .
>
> We therefore return to the conundrum which has exercised strategists and economists and political leaders from classical times onward. To be a Great Power—by definition, a state capable of holding its own against any other nation—demands a flourishing economic base. . . . Yet by going to war, or by devoting a large share of the nation's "manufacturing power" to expenditures upon "unproductive" armaments, one runs the risk of eroding the national economic base, especially vis-a-vis states which are concentrating a greater share of their income upon productive investment for long-term growth.

An irony of modern war is that to preserve victory, the victors must maintain a large military establishment. At the same time, they force a strict limitation of arms on the late enemies. This permits the latter to devote their resources to expand their economies, and then they forge ahead of the victors economically.

But a major development of the last half of the twentieth century was the spread of low-intensity conflict with the support of international trade in arms. As John Keegan put it in *A History of Warfare* (1993):

> The Western-style militarisation of the new independent states of Asia and Africa in the four decades after 1945 was as remarkable a phenomenon as it had been with the non-warrior populations of Europe in the nineteenth century. That it had many of the same doleful effects—overspending on arms, subordination of civilian to military values, superordination of self-chosen military elites and even resort to war—could be expected. It was equally to be expected that most of the hundred or so armies brought into being after decolonisation were of little objective military worth; Western "technology transfers," a euphemism for selfish arms sales by rich Western nations to poor ones that could rarely afford the outlay, did not entail the transfusion of culture which made advanced weapons so deadly in Western hands.

Yet, African rebels and irregulars and government forces came to inflict casualties upon each other in appalling numbers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Eisenhower.* New York, 1984.

Brendon, Piers. *Ike: The Life and Times of Dwight D. Eisenhower.* New York, 1986.

Bush, Vannevar. *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy.* New York, 1949.

Campbell, Levin H., Jr. *The Industry-Ordnance Team.* New York and London, 1946.

Carey, Omer L., ed. *The Military-Industrial Complex and United States Foreign Policy.* Pullman, Wash., 1969.

Caves, Richard E. *Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis.* 2d ed. Cambridge and New York, 1996.

Chinn, George M. *The Machine Gun.* 5 vols. Washington, D.C., 1951–1987. A broad treatment of the development of automatic weapons.

Clark, Victor S. "Manufacturing During the Civil War." *Military Historian and Economist* 3 (April 1918).

Clarkson, Grosvenor B. *Industrial America in the World War: The Strategy Behind the Line, 1917–1918.* Boston, 1923.

Clayton, James L. *The Economic Impact of the Cold War: Sources and Readings.* New York, 1970.

Coates, James, and Michael Kilian. *Heavy Losses: The Dangerous Decline of American Defense.* New York, 1985.

Connery, Robert H. *The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II.* Princeton, N.J., 1951.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate. *The Army Air Forces in World War II.* Vol. 6, *Men and Planes.* Chicago, 1954. Well-balanced official history.

Crowell, Benedict, and Robert Forrest Wilson. *How America Went to War.* New Haven, Conn., 1921. Detailed coverage of industrial development during World War I.

Danhoff, Clarence H. *Government Contracting and Technological Change.* Washington, D.C., 1968.

Deitchman, Seymour J. *Military Power and the Advance of Technology: General Purpose Military Forces for the 1980s and Beyond.* Boulder, Colo., 1983.

Deyrup, Felicia Johnson. *Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley: A Regional Study of the Economic Development of the Small Arms Industry, 1798–1870.* Northampton, Mass., 1948. A useful general survey of the early period.

Dickson, Thomas L., Jr. "Military-Industrial Complex." *Military Review* (December 1971): 29–35.

Doremus, Paul N., William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauley, and Simon Reich. *The Myth of the Global Corporation.* Princeton, N.J., 1998.

Duscha, Julius. *Arms, Money and Politics.* New York, 1965.

Eccles, Henry E. *Military Power in a Free Society.* Newport, R.I., 1979. By a former naval officer with a special interest in logistics.

Edwards, David V. *Arms Control in International Politics.* New York, 1969.

Fuller, Claud E. *The Whitney Firearms.* Huntington, W.Va., 1946.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. "How to Control the Military." *Harper's* (June 1969).

Greider, William. *Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace.* New York, 1998.

Herzog, Arthur. *The War-Peace Establishment.* New York, 1965.

Huston, James A. *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953.* Washington, D.C., 1966.

———. *One for All: NATO Strategy and Logistics Through the Formative Period, 1949–1969.* Newark, Del., and London, 1984.

———. *Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945–1953.* London, 1988.

———. *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War.* London, 1989.

———. *Logistics of Liberty: American Services of Supply in the Revolutionary War and After.* Newark, Del., 1991.

Kaufman, Richard F. *The War Profiteers.* Indianapolis, 1970.

Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare.* New York, 1993.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000.* New York, 1987. An impressive study in which the author holds that the decline of great powers can usually be attributed to an overextension of military power.

Korstinen, Paul A. C. "The Industrial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: The Inter-War Years." *Journal of American History* (March 1970): 819–839.

Lapp, Ralph Eugene. *The Weapons Culture.* New York, 1968. A critical study by a popular scientist.

Lens, Sidney. *The Military-Industrial Complex.* Philadelphia, 1970.

Melman, Seymour. *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War.* New York, 1970.

———. *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline.* New York, 1974.

Millis, Walter. *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History.* New York, 1956.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite.* London and New York, 1956.

Mirsky, Jeannette, and Allan Nevins. *The World of Eli Whitney.* New York, 1952. A study by two outstanding historians emphasizing Whitney's industrial development based on Whitney's papers.

Mytelka, Lynn Krieger. *Strategic Partnerships: States, Firms and International Competition.* Rutherford, N.J., 1991.

Olvey, Lee D., James R. Golden, and Robert C. Kelly. *The Economics of National Security.* Wayne, N.J., 1984.

Phillips, J. B. "Special Report: The Military-Industrial Complex." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (24 May 1968).

Proxmire, William. "The Pentagon vs. Free Enterprise." *Saturday Review* (31 January 1970). A critique by a critical senator from Wisconsin.

———. *Report from Wasteland: America's Military-Industrial Complex.* New York, 1970.

Smith, R. Elberton. *The Army and Economic Mobilization.* Washington, D.C., 1959.

Somers, Herman Miles. "Civil-Military Relations in Mutual Security." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 288 (July 1953): 27–35.

Sutton, John L., and Geoffrey Kemp. "Arms to Developing Countries." *Adelphi Papers* 28 (October 1966).

Thayer, George. *The War Business: The International Trade in Armaments.* New York, 1969.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967–1976.* Washington, D.C., 1978.

U.S. Bureau of the Budget. *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government.* Washington, D.C., 1946.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998.* Washington, D.C., 2000.

Van Creveld, Martin. *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present.* London and Washington, D.C., 1989.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE; FOREIGN AID; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY.

MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE

Justus D. Doenecke and Michael R. Adamson

From its inception, the United States has incorporated the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle into its trade policy. Until 1923 it adhered to its conditional form and thereafter to unconditional MFN treatment. Only with the passage of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), however, did Congress allow U.S. trade negotiators to use unconditional MFN treatment as an instrument of trade liberalization. That is, the MFN principle does not equate with free or freer trading environments. From 1778 until 1934, U.S. trade policy was explicitly protectionist. In this environment, the adoption by the State Department of unconditional MFN treatment did nothing to advance its program of trade liberalization. MFN treatment is an instrument of trade policy. Its use must be understood within the context of trade policy. In the United States, interest group pressures, the actions of policymakers, and the constraints and opportunities presented by the international political economy shaped policy over time.

MFN treatment means that policy discriminates among nationals and foreigners but treats all foreigners equally. National treatment extends the same privileges to foreigners and nationals alike. Equal treatment in general is known as nondiscrimination. As far as U.S. trade policy is concerned, two types of MFN treatment are relevant. Unconditional MFN treatment is provided gratuitously to nations eligible for MFN status. Under conditional MFN treatment, third parties must bargain and provide equal compensation in order to benefit from MFN status. Linked historically to MFN treatment in practice is the instrument of reciprocity. Reciprocity, or the exchange of trading privileges through bargaining, implies discrimination among trading partners. That is, benefits are not conferred freely.

The following example illustrates the difference between conditional and unconditional MFN treatment. Assume that the United States extends conditional MFN treatment to Germany, then signs a trade deal with Japan that provides for a reduced tariff on the import of Japanese televisions. Under conditional MFN, however, the United States will not allow German television imports at the new rate until German trade negotiators offer equivalent compensation. German trade negotiators may then offer, for instance, to accept imports of U.S. sewing machines at a lower rate. U.S. trade negotiators—since 1962, officials of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; before then, State Department officers—may accept the offer, if the increased value of American sewing machine exports to Germany balances the increased value of German television imports into America. If America were to extend unconditional MFN treatment to Germany, however, the latter would receive benefit of the U.S.–Japanese treaty without having to make any concessions.

As this illustration suggests, unconditional MFN treatment may constitute the means by which a multilateral trading regime is created from a series of bilateral agreements, since its use ensures that all eligible countries enjoy the benefits of past and future concessions. This has been the experience internationally during most of the post–World War II period. As discussed below, both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), incorporated unconditional MFN treatment into their charters.

MFN TREATMENT IN PRACTICE, 1776–1887: CONDITIONAL MFN WITHIN PROTECTIONISM

At the time of the American Revolution, Great Britain and continental Europe adhered to unconditional MFN treatment, which they had done since the seventeenth century. To maintain the political and economic independence of the

new American republic, the Founders focused on balancing internal economic development among industry, agriculture, and commerce. Once established, the national government aimed to develop the nation's resources and secure neutral rights internationally. Leaders of the early republic did not seek autarky (that is, national economic self-sufficiency and independence). Indeed, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, for example, leaned toward free trade. However, since they believed that free trade would threaten America's political viability, they sought access to overseas markets for U.S. commodities through both reciprocity and nondiscrimination. Ideally, they wanted the benefits of unconditional MFN treatment. But they were prepared to settle for equality of treatment with foreign nations. Moreover, they recognized that the great powers of Europe were unlikely to reciprocate on trade. Ultimately, they adhered to conditional MFN treatment to preserve the means to bargain for access to overseas markets, but this approach ensured that all trade treaties were bilateral, unique, and discriminatory.

In July 1776 the delegates to the Continental Congress were prepared to allow unrestricted imports into the U.S. market in order to gain diplomatic recognition and break Britain's hold on Atlantic trade. John Adams, assisted by Benjamin Franklin, drafted a model commercial agreement that was approved by the delegates. It instructed trade negotiators to obtain equal national treatment or unconditional MFN treatment to gain access to Europe's markets (and those of its colonies).

America's first trade treaty, the 1778 Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, secured neither equal national treatment nor unconditional MFN status for American goods. U.S. trade negotiators Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee settled for a conditional MFN clause (Article II).

Neither side wanted the treaty to benefit Britain; French negotiators feared the consequences of a possible U.S.–British political reconciliation. U.S. negotiators wanted Britain and other European countries to buy access to the U.S. market with reciprocal trading privileges to their home and colonial markets. French officials only offered access to its home market. In 1783, France reverted to unconditional treatment and tried to interpret Article II in this way. U.S. officials balked; they decided to use reciprocity to secure equality of treatment.

During the early national period, U.S. officials had little success in opening overseas markets to American goods. They concluded treaties with Sweden and the Netherlands, but only the latter offered MFN access to both its home and colonial markets. In 1784 U.S. negotiators initiated another round of trade talks, using the 1776 plan as a blueprint. They succeeded only in securing a pact with Prussia in 1785, which secured the conditional MFN treatment granted by France in the 1778 treaty. Officials such as John Jay and Elbridge Gerry became convinced that a strict reciprocity approach would best serve U.S. interests, at least until negotiators gained experience in trade matters and America gained in importance within the international economy.

Crucial aspects of U.S. trade policy hampered the use of either reciprocity or conditional MFN treatment in a manner that benefited American exporters. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Report on Manufactures provided the justification for a protective tariff system to enable America to establish its own manufacturing base as the basis for economic development. After the War of 1812, Congress took up the recommendations of Hamilton and James Madison's Treasury secretary, Albert Gallatin, and adopted the so-called American System sponsored by Senator Henry Clay: a nationalistic industrial policy based on high tariffs and support for domestic manufacturers. Until the Great Depression, many U.S. leaders, especially Whigs and Republicans, remained adamant that protectionism was the key to U.S. economic development, class harmony, and political independence.

Congress also subjected all imports to a uniform (single-schedule) tariff, leaving little room for officials to negotiate preferential bilateral agreements. Until Congress adopted a dual-schedule tariff in the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Act, there was little chance that trade negotiators could wield reciprocity, not to mention MFN treatment, to win concessions from trading partners. This limited policymakers in the executive branch to adjusting the level of tariffs: Democrats tended to lower tariffs to levels adequate to fund the budget, and Whigs and Republicans tended to raise tariffs to protect domestic producers from foreign competition.

Until the late nineteenth century, foreign markets were the concern only of commodity producers in the South and timber and fur exporters in the North. Hence, there was little interest-group pressure to persuade Congress to lower the

barriers that protected domestic industries and workers. Diplomacy served the economic and security interests of a developing country with a large domestic market and little disposition to global leadership.

State Department negotiators therefore sought equal access for American goods to the markets of European competitors by offering equal access in return. The administrations of Presidents John Tyler, James Polk, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan were especially interested in using reciprocity to pry open overseas markets. However, Congress generally refused to ratify the reciprocal pacts that State Department officials negotiated, fearing that the MFN clauses in earlier treaties might compel the United States to generalize proposed concessions. Opponents also recognized that the State Department paid inadequate attention to negotiating an equivalent exchange of concessions.

With others—Canada, Latin America, and Asia—U.S. trade officials sought special privileges and offered special concessions for raw materials and agricultural goods in the U.S. market. The expansionist Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan administrations were eager to experiment with new approaches. They sought either unilateral MFN treatment or one-sided agreements that assured the United States of MFN treatment. For example, treaties with China in 1844 and Japan in 1854 provided America with MFN access to both markets, but did not extend equality of treatment to the U.S. market for either China or Japan in return.

The United States held contracting parties to conditional MFN treatment even when commercial agreements contained ambiguous language or appeared to contradict each other. As Secretary of State John Jay put it in 1787, it would be inconsistent with "reason and equity," as well as with "the most obvious principles of justice and fair construction," to demand that the United States grant unconditional MFN treatment simply because a treaty—in this case the 1782 treaty with the Netherlands—failed to specify conditional MFN treatment. Just because "France purchases, at a great price, a privilege of the United States," the Netherlands cannot "immediately insist on having the like privileges without [paying] any price at all."

The use of conditional MFN treatment led to disputes with trading partners. For example, the so-called Convention of 1815 with Britain set the stage for a dispute with France over the Louisiana Purchase. The convention extended privileges to British ships in American harbors that French ships did not enjoy. In the absence of a specific MFN clause, France insisted that the United States adhere to the literal interpretation of the MFN clause. France claimed that it had given America an equivalent concession at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. Nonetheless, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams asserted that "the condition, though not expressed in the article, is inherent in the advantage claimed under it." Only when France reduced duties on wines in 1831—acceding to a request from Secretary of State Martin Van Buren—did the United States grant France the commercial privileges it sought.

MFN TREATMENT IN PRACTICE, 1887–1933: CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL MFN WITHIN PROTECTIONISM AND EXPORT EXPANSIONISM

Until 1887, the United States was a relatively passive and highly protectionist country within the international economy. U.S. trade policy was nonnegotiable and nondiscriminatory and characterized by high tariffs. By the late nineteenth century, this policy complicated efforts of export-oriented sectors that sought to gain access to foreign markets. From the late 1880s, U.S. administrations identified opportunities that the international economy offered these interest groups and attempted to facilitate the expansion of exports on the basis of reciprocity and conditional MFN treatment. But Congress, dominated by powerful Republican protectionists such as Senators Nelson Aldrich and Reed Smoot, remained opposed to trade liberalization on principle. Before World War I, U.S. administrations from Grover Cleveland to Woodrow Wilson focused on export expansion. This was possible because Britain adhered to free trade even as America and Germany challenged and surpassed it in economic productivity and output. That is, the United States could continue to enjoy the benefits of Britain's free-trade policy without compromising its own protectionist policy. Yet the United States had limited success in gaining access to major overseas markets. Indeed, after World War I, the United States and its trading partners raised barriers to trade, exacerbating the financial and commercial imbalances created by the war. Both reciprocity and MFN treatment—conditional or unconditional—proved to be poor

NELSON W. ALDRICH: ARDENT TRADE PROTECTIONIST

An influential Republican senator from 1881 until 1911, Nelson W. Aldrich (1841–1915) used his position on the Senate Finance Committee—which he chaired from 1899 to 1911—to maintain protection. Elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1878, Aldrich was selected in October 1881 to fill the Rhode Island seat vacated by the death of Senator Ambrose Burnside. As a member of the Finance Committee, Aldrich apprenticed under Justin Morrill of Vermont, who chaired the committee for twenty-two years, until 1898. An ardent defender of both the American System and Congress's authority over trade policy, Morrill opposed free trade, reciprocal trade agreements, and unconditional MFN treatment. When he assumed the chair of the Finance Committee, Aldrich remained steadfast to Morrill's views on trade.

Aldrich championed the position held by the Republican Party that economic nationalism promoted class harmony. By excluding competition from imports, so the argument went, a high tariff wall would promote the well-being not only of producers and workers but also of consumers. As Aldrich put it in the *Congressional Record* of 5 August 1909: "If we permit American industries to live by the imposition of protective duties, competition in this country will so affect prices that it will give the American consumer the best possible results." For Aldrich, the tariff was the price that overseas producers had to pay to enter the U.S. market. As such, protectionism placed the burden of generating revenue for the federal government on foreign producers and domestic consumers of imported "luxury" items.

Aldrich had a major hand in writing the McKinley (1890) and Dingley (1897) Acts, which allowed the executive branch to negotiate reciprocal trade treaties. However, he opposed the deals that administrations subsequently negotiated because they lacked equivalent exchanges of concessions. Wedded to the congressional committee system as the institutional basis for policymaking, Aldrich also fought the creation of a commission of experts to study the tariff "scientifically" and make policy recommendations. Committed to protecting the textile industries of his state, Aldrich obstructed the modest efforts of the Taft administration to reduce tariffs and sought to make what became the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Act as conservative a piece of trade legislation as possible.

instruments of trade liberalization as long as U.S. markets remained closed to competing goods from overseas.

As administrations and Congresses reaffirmed their commitment to Clay's American System in the immediate post–Civil War period, Europe followed Britain's lead toward trade liberalization. The 1860 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, also known as the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, between Britain and France epitomized the free trade–low tariff regime established across much of Europe by treaty and unconditional MFN treatment. The treaty was meant to eliminate all tariffs between Britain and France and induced them to initiate a round of bilateral tariff reduction treaties with other European nations. Almost all commercial treaties involving European nations thereafter included the MFN clause. With the entry of Germany into the European system in the late 1870s, however, Europe began to retreat from liberal trade. In 1878, under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany raised tariffs on agricultural products and sheltered so-called infant industries. France also retreated, giving up the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty in 1892 with its adoption of the Méline tariff, which raised average rates on dutiable items and implemented a dual minimum-maximum schedule. (The maximum rate constituted the conventional rate. The minimum rate could be extended to trading partners through negotiation.)

In 1887, President Grover Cleveland called for duty-free status on raw materials. He wanted to recast the tariff as an instrument of export expansion. The 1890 McKinley and 1894 Wilson-Gorman Acts supported this approach. Both laws maintained protectionism, but they also sanctioned the pursuit of special reciprocal relationships with Latin American countries through lower duties on selected raw materials. Their aim was to expand U.S. exports to the region at the expense of British and European traders.

By the late 1890s, American exporters faced the probability of losing access to European markets. Some European countries now attached conditions to their MFN clauses. Average European tariff levels remained far below those of the United States—in 1900 European minimum or conventional rates averaged 10 percent while U.S. tariffs on dutiable items averaged 30 percent (and America offered concessions only on noncompetitive goods). But these tariff levels were trending upward. The goal of expanding exports was clearly under threat. The administrations of Presidents William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft responded by differentiating among trading partners. They maintained the approach of expanding markets in Latin America and protecting the domestic market, but they now used bilateral reciprocity to counter European trade restrictions. Under section 4 of the 1897 Dingley Tariff Act, Congress extended the bilateral reciprocity provisions of the McKinley tariff beyond Latin America to "France, Germany, Belgium, and other European countries."

Because the single-schedule tariff and conditional MFN treatment remained features of U.S. trade policy, the efficacy of using reciprocity to maintain or expand access to European markets was limited. Indeed, U.S trade negotiators could not compete with free-trading Britain for favorable tariff treatment from continental Europe. With U.S. manufacturers able to compete against European producers, European governments showed their displeasure with U.S. trade policy by putting tariff arrangements on a temporary basis and discriminating against U.S. products.

The ambiguity of MFN treatment among trade treaties created the basis for increasing commercial frictions between the United States and its trading partners once the executive branch acquired the capacity to use reciprocity as an instrument for expanding exports. The most notable example was the degradation of U.S. trade relations with Germany, beginning in 1905, which almost exploded into a tariff war but was resolved in 1907.

Beginning in the late 1890s, the German government pointed to numerous trade pacts, including the 1828 U.S.–Prussia Commercial Treaty, as evidence that America accepted unconditional MFN treatment. The Germans were particularly critical of the special commercial benefits the United States accorded Switzerland in 1898, in response to the Swiss government's demand that the United States extend the same concessions granted France earlier in the year. Since an 1850 U.S.–Switzerland trade treaty explicitly provided for unconditional MFN treatment, the United States decided that "both justice and honor" required meeting the Swiss claims. When Germany claimed the same treatment, however, the United States renounced the MFN clauses in the 1850 treaty.

Germany renewed its protests when a 1902 reciprocity treaty with Cuba gave the latter an exclusive rate 20 percent below the rates provided for in the Dingley tariff. Germany argued that Cuba's sovereign status required the United States to grant it commensurate reductions. The administration of President Theodore Roosevelt cheekily advanced the theory that the 1901 Platt Amendment, which forbade Cuba from entering into foreign agreements contrary to U.S. interests, rendered Cuba part of the U.S. political system, akin to a European colony. The incredulous German government threatened to retaliate with tariff revisions that targeted U.S. exports. It did so to induce the U.S. government to adopt unconditional MFN status, as Europe understood it. But powerful Republicans in Congress, including Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon and Senate Finance Committee Chair Nelson Aldrich, refused to budge. A major trade war was averted only when the U.S. and German governments concluded an executive agreement regarding a possible customs agreement. It outlined the terms of an exchange of the German conventional rate on nearly all items in return for U.S. concessions along the lines of the 20 percent cuts provided for in section 4 of the Dingley tariff.

With the introduction of a statutory minimum-maximum tariff schedule in the 1909 Payne-Aldrich tariff, U.S. trade negotiators held that the minimum rates in effect constituted unconditional MFN treatment as Europeans practiced it. Although the executive branch did not renounce conditional MFN treatment, and therefore remained technically free to alter policy, State Department officials were determined to use the minimum-maximum provisions in the act to embed the nondiscrimination principles of the Open Door policy in trade policy. Trade liberalizers in the executive branch adopted this approach to gain access to overseas markets and to attract the support of agricultural and export manufacturing interests as allies in the battle for a more liberal trade policy.

The administrative features of the Payne-Aldrich Act, including its establishment of the

Tariff Board, also enabled trade agreements to be hammered out within the executive branch, independent of Congress and largely free from public scrutiny. Unfortunately for trade liberalizers, the system proved rigid in operation, because Congress successfully resisted lowering U.S. minimum rates to European levels. Conditional MFN also remained in place. The Wilson administration and the Democratic majority in Congress thus abandoned the dual-schedule tariff for unilateral rate reduction and a single schedule in the 1913 Underwood-Simmons Act. Nevertheless, the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Act contemplated and institutionalized ways of dealing with liberalizing trade that would be built upon by the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

After World War I, Republican Congresses and administrations rejected reciprocity altogether and reestablished protectionism. In this context, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes used the equality-of-treatment clause in section 317 of the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Act to put U.S. trade policy on an unconditional MFN footing. But this failed to increase international economic cooperation, since Congress also precluded any liberalization of the tariff in the act.

The third of President Wilson's Fourteen Points included a demand for "equality of trade conditions." He recognized that nations that expected to increase exports needed to open their own markets to imports. This was especially so for America, which, Wilson hoped, would demonstrate international political and economic leadership in the post–World War I era. In addition to reinstating protectionism, the Fordney-McCumber Act addressed the issue of access to overseas markets for U.S. exports. Officials in the State, Treasury, and Commerce departments sought flexible retaliatory authority to counter discrimination. After much wrangling, Congress authorized the president to retaliate unilaterally against foreign discrimination. In addition, it stipulated in section 317 that the Tariff Commission established in 1916 monitor discrimination and make recommendations to the president. The State Department interpreted section 317 to be in harmony with unconditional MFN treatment.

As part of a State Department policy review, William Culbertson, a member of the Tariff Commission, suggested using section 317 to negotiate a series of trade treaties to extend equality of treatment and implement unconditional MFN treatment as broadly as possible. Inclined intellectually to free trade and uninhibited flows of capital, and institutionally sensitive to allowing trade wars to disrupt political relationships, State Department economic advisers Stanley Hornbeck and Wallace McClure agreed that discrimination against U.S. goods should be monitored, but recommended against retaliation unless officials determined it to be absolutely necessary. The policy review elicited strong support for the unconditional MFN approach. State Department officials wanted to avoid the bargaining associated with conditional MFN treatment, and they viewed unconditional MFN treatment as a way of avoiding diplomatic conflict, promoting trade, and improving foreign relations, including the trade negotiation process. They pressed Secretary Hughes to initiate a new round of trade talks based on the unconditional MFN principle. Hughes sold President Warren Harding on the idea. Congress offered no opposition; most members at this time did not engage trade as an issue at the technical level. The administration went forward with the decision on unconditional MFN treatment in February 1923. Hughes announced it in a circular letter to overseas posts in August.

In justifying the decision in a note to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hughes argued that conditional MFN treatment was incapable of winning equality of treatment for U.S. exports, and that what might constitute equivalent compensation was "found to be difficult or impracticable." "Reciprocal commercial arrangements," Hughes averred, "were but temporary makeshifts; they caused constant negotiation and created uncertainty." In his August circular, Hughes explained why a new series of trade pacts had to be concluded: "The enlarged productive capacity of the United States developed during the World War has increased the need for assured equality of treatment in foreign markets."

From 1923 to 1930, the State Department negotiated trade treaties with forty-three countries; twenty-one of them contained unconditional MFN clauses. Nonetheless, in the context of the financial chaos and the payments imbalances created by world war and the postwar Versailles settlement, important markets such as Canada, Britain, France, and Germany increasingly shut their doors to U.S. exports.

U.S. trade negotiators had little to offer any country that accepted unconditional MFN treatment and equal treatment for U.S. exports. The Fordney-McCumber Act raised the average tariff on dutiable items some 38 percent and on all imports to an average of almost 14 percent. This

was lower than the average rate of the Dingley tariff. Yet the new tariff granted more protection than its 1897 predecessor, since Congress also instructed the executive branch to adjust duties by up to 50 percent to equalize production costs between home and foreign manufactured products. Moreover, the act redefined dumping to include any product imported at a price below the U.S. cost of production (rather than the producers' own costs). In addition, Congress allowed the president to strip MFN status from any country that discriminated against American products or dumped goods into the U.S. market. The tariff now effectively excluded all competing goods.

The punitive responses and the single-schedule tariff regime reestablished by the Fordney-McCumber Act hamstrung all State Department efforts to negotiate unconditional MFN clauses in trade agreements. Tariffs could be adjusted only to equalize production costs or punish others for uncooperative acts. Equalization applied to all nations regardless of their MFN status. Discrimination applied selectively to nations that lost MFN status for their treatment of U.S. goods. To make matters worse for trade liberalizers, Congress supplemented tariffs with selectively applied quotas: a form of protection totally at odds with the MFN principle.

U.S. trade policy under the Fordney-McCumber Act, together with congressional insistence that allies repay their war loans to the U.S. Treasury, undermined international efforts to stabilize and reconstruct the post–World War I international system. Rather than assume the mantle of global leadership as Britain's economic power waned, the Republican administrations of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover relied on private capital flows to ameliorate the payments imbalances created by war debts and reparations. These flows ultimately proved insufficient to overcome the foreign economic policy of these administrations.

In its ongoing search for a way to liberalize trade that Congress might find politically acceptable, the State Department began thinking in terms of an approach that involved both reciprocal bargaining and unconditional MFN treatment. During the Coolidge administration, economic adviser McClure suggested as much, saying that it might pave the way for bilateral negotiations with important trading partners. McClure, a friend of fellow Tennesseean Representative Cordell Hull, worked closely with the future secretary of state to develop what would become the reciprocal trade agreements program. Both McClure and Hull preferred lowering trade barriers through bargaining rather than unilaterally reducing tariffs, which was the approach employed by the Wilson administration in the Underwood tariff. However, congressional Democrats adhered to the Wilsonian approach until the election of Franklin Roosevelt.

Congress reinforced its commitment to protectionism with its passage of the debilitating Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930. The act produced additional international economic conflict. Trading partners retaliated to protect themselves from the loss of the U.S. market, worsening relations and reinforcing the effects of global depression. The defensive reactions of trading partners, Britain and Canada in particular, demonstrated that the U.S. economy could be injured by foreign reaction. Politicians and officials recognized that trade policy could no longer be treated as an independent domestic issue. Further, when Britain failed to restore its pre-1914 position of international economic leadership following its return to the gold standard in 1925, the idea that international economy stability required American leadership began to gain support in some circles. Above all, the Smoot-Hawley Act demonstrated that the costs of protectionism were too high, prompting a turn toward a more liberal approach in trade policy, one within which all trade instruments, including unconditional MFN treatment, could serve as tools to lower trade barriers.

MFN TREATMENT IN PRACTICE, 1934–1974: UNCONDITIONAL MFN AS ONE INSTRUMENT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION

The State Department under Cordell Hull moved forward with the trade liberalization program that it had championed since the nineteenth century. The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act marked the beginning of a successful U.S. effort to liberalize trade and create a multilateral regime of commercial cooperation. The most important aspects of the RTAA were institutional. Foremost, Congress ceded to the executive branch the power to set and manage the trade agenda. Members of Congress voted to do so partially in response to the fallout from the Smoot-Hawley Act and the persistence and depth of depression. They were also persuaded by executive branch promises to compensate producers that were harmed by subsequent trade deals.

The RTAA formed the basis for the post–World War II multilateral system that employed bilateral reciprocity to negotiate lower trade barriers and enforce fair trade norms, and used unconditional MFN treatment to spread the benefits of reciprocal bargaining. The State Department used the RTAA to promote international trade, rather than just U.S. exports, and its officials recognized that America had to lower its trade barriers. In the run-up to World War II, the State Department granted concessions on an unconditional MFN basis as part of an effort to build an alliance to counter German and Japanese aggression. The RTAA approach—equality of treatment, a negotiable tariff, and executive-branch authority to negotiate agreements that would be binding without congressional ratification—would become the framework for international cooperation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Many State Department officials were liberals in the nineteenth-century tradition. They linked trade discrimination to political conflict. As such, they believed in free trade, to which Britain adhered until 1932. At the same time, they appreciated the power that Congress retained over trade policy. Hull and his advisers therefore chose reciprocity as a way to both lower trade barriers and placate members of Congress who remained wedded to protection. Unconditional MFN treatment would be the tool to maximize the benefit of bilateral treaties.

After keeping trade off the agenda during his first year of office to concentrate on reviving and regulating the U.S. economy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed the RTAA to Congress, selling it as a domestic recovery measure. To placate wary members of Congress, the administration proposed no changes to the 1921 Anti-Dumping Act, retained the countervailing duty provisions in section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Act, and agreed to subject the act to reauthorization in three years. The RTAA also said nothing about dismantling protection. The State Department took it upon itself to use both reciprocity and unconditional MFN treatment—linked for the first time in U.S. trade policy—as tools of trade liberalization.

In the interests of trade liberalization and international security, State Department officials pressed for few concessions in the series of negotiations that occurred before and during World War II. This was especially the case with Europe. (In Latin America, U.S. officials threatened to refuse to negotiate reciprocal trade and to withhold Export-Import Bank credits and other financial assistance unless governments satisfied their demands to settle debts in default to U.S. bondholders, treat U.S. direct investment in a fair and equitable manner, and adopt political reforms.) Determined to reverse the ill effects of U.S. protectionism, U.S. trade negotiators offered concessions to Belgium, Britain, Switzerland, and others, while tolerating trade barriers, currency depreciation, and other actions that closed overseas markets to U.S. products.

The State Department also decided to extend unconditional MFN treatment to most third-party countries. Under the RTAA, it was unclear which countries should be eligible to receive such treatment. The department moved initially to extend concessions to countries that did not discriminate against U.S. exports. Since all of America's major trading partners continued to discriminate against U.S. products, however, the State Department deemed this approach to be impractical. It concluded that the administration should withhold benefits only when others' discrimination was flagrant. In its view, such a stance would improve relations among nations. It therefore singled out Nazi Germany for retaliatory action. In moving in this direction, the State Department departed from the bilateral approach to reciprocity for which Roosevelt campaigned in 1932 and that Congress intended in the RTAA. (Roosevelt, his "brain trust" advisers, and key cabinet officials such as Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. doubted that the reciprocal trade program could play the role that Hull designed for it in achieving either the security or economic goals of the administration's foreign policy. For Roosevelt, trade, like all matters of foreign economic policy, took a backseat to domestic issues.)

In terms of expanding U.S. trade, the reciprocal trade agreements concluded between 1934 and 1945 achieved limited results. But actual trade expansion was secondary to building international cooperation against the Axis threat. In arguing for extensions of the RTAA in 1937, 1940, 1943, and 1945, State Department officials were explicit about the national security role of the trade program. Moreover, the State Department became convinced that the institutional structure of the RTAA, linking reciprocity and unconditional MFN treatment, should serve as the basis for constructing a post–World War II multilateral trade regime.

Hence, the linkage between reciprocity and unconditional MFN treatment was translated into

the norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the view of State Department analysts, economic autarky and fascist aggression were bound together as causes of the world war. Thus, political cooperation was possible only if economic cooperation was established. During the war, State Department officials developed a blueprint for the structure of commercial cooperation in the postwar world. The lack of cooperation during the interwar period persuaded them that economic nationalism was the root of instability in the international system and degraded relations among nations. They resolved to make nondiscrimination in trade the basis for economic cooperation, which they believed was essential to an enduring postwar peace. The International Trade Organization (ITO) would monitor commercial relations on the basis of unconditional MFN treatment. But countries would also negotiate bilaterally to both open markets and preserve their recourse to measures to protect domestic producers and social welfare policies, as the RTAA prescribed.

In 1947 the administration of Harry Truman invited countries, including Russia, to Geneva, Switzerland, to negotiate a multilateral trade agreement; twenty-four nations accepted the invitation. Although the Soviet Union opted out of the process, twenty-three countries negotiated bilaterally on a product-by-product basis. The bilateral pacts became the multilateral GATT, since every signatory enjoyed unconditional MFN treatment. The nine countries that felt they could adhere to the demands of the treaty, accounting for 80 percent of world trade, implemented the GATT on 1 January 1948.

The State Department supported a more liberal approach to trade policy than the still-protectionist Congress and the other agencies of the executive branch, most of which were solidly "New Deal" in orientation. But it recognized political reality and retained the "fair" trade elements of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in its negotiations for the International Trade Organization (and the GATT, after Congress rejected the ITO over sovereignty issues). The elements of the New Deal that provided for state responsibility for economic growth and social welfare were not going to be repealed. The United States, Great Britain, and other participants wanted to retain flexibility on domestic economic policy even as they agreed to liberalize international trade. And given their expectations regarding America's position of leadership in the postwar order, U.S. architects of postwar trade policy concluded that it was America's responsibility to offer asymmetrical concessions in order to establish the trade regime in which they were interested. Thus, unconditional MFN treatment became the guiding principle of an emerging liberal regime that retained the safeguards, restrictions, and exemptions of "fair" trade. Parties to the GATT promised to consult each other when conflicts arose and to resolve differences through a dispute settlement procedure. Reciprocity would be used as an instrument of both freer and fairer trade.

The GATT governed international trade until the World Trade Organization was established on 1 January 1995. Beginning with the 1947 session in Geneva, the GATT promoted trade liberalization through a series of negotiating rounds. With the Kennedy Round (May 1964–January 1967), negotiators adopted—with some exceptions—a formula for across-the-board percentage cuts, doing away with bilateral negotiating. For this round and the 1947 Geneva parley, Congress authorized tariff reductions of up to 50 percent of existing rates. Both rounds reduced tariffs some 35 percent. In both rounds, the U.S. promptly provided concessions to its trading partners, even if, like western Europe in 1947 and Japan and many developing countries in 1964–1967, they lagged in reciprocating. From 1947 to 1967, six GATT rounds removed tariffs as a barrier to the U.S. market. In doing so, U.S. policymakers placed a higher priority on stabilizing the American-led anticommunist alliance and promoting the economic reconstruction of its allies than on shielding domestic producers from foreign competition.

MFN TREATMENT IN PRACTICE, 1974–2000: UNCONDITIONAL MFN UNDER SIEGE BUT PRESERVED

The GATT relied on discrimination and retaliation to enforce an open, multilateral trade regime. The coexistence of unconditional MFN treatment and reciprocity in the GATT gave rise to tensions among members, because disparities in liberalization among participants widened over time. Under unconditional MFN treatment, countries that lagged in opening their markets enjoyed the benefits of a free ride on the system. When the United States experienced economic downturn during the 1970s and 1980s, domestic interest groups called for redress from participants who seemed to be

unfairly "gaming" the GATT. The United States seemed to be suffering within a system in which its trade negotiators ceded more to their counterparts from increasingly competitive trading partners—Japan in particular—than they received. In response, Congress resumed the activist trade-policy role from which it had retreated in 1934. Members of Congress introduced a plethora of retaliatory bills that had the potential of compromising America's commitment to unconditional MFN treatment within the GATT framework. In most instances, the actions threatened by these so-called fair, or strategic, trade measures constituted interest group efforts to push policy in a nationalistic direction. But the administrations of Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton handled them in (often illiberal) ways that kept the United States committed to the GATT.

Transparency in trade relations constituted a key principle of the GATT. Trade barriers were to be converted into tariffs, which then were to be lowered through negotiation. This approach reached its point of diminishing returns with the Kennedy Round. Nontariff barriers, which included such things as countervailing duties, technical barriers, import licensing, voluntary export restraints, and local content rules, were becoming significant obstacles to trade. The United States still adhered to the principle of nondiscrimination, but the GATT commitment to transparency was being lost.

Congress insisted that President Richard Nixon's administration use reciprocity to defend U.S. producers when it authorized the so-called fast track negotiating process for the Tokyo Round (1973–1979). (Under fast track, Congress had to approve or reject a trade treaty. Its members could not amend it.) Most significantly, the Tokyo Round extended the GATT to cover nontariff barriers (NTBs). While tariff negotiations continued on the basis of unconditional MFN treatment, however, NTB bargaining proceeded on a conditional MFN basis. The Tokyo Round in practice did little to reduce these barriers or to equalize access among the American, European, and Japanese markets. U.S. consumers were soon benefiting from a flood of well-made Japanese autos and electronic consumer goods. Besieged U.S. industries, however, petitioned Congress for assistance.

The 1974 Trade Act provided the basis for relief. Section 201 of the act authorized tariffs, quotas, and other remedies to facilitate orderly adjustment to increased competition from abroad. If the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determined that imports were causing "serious injury, or threat thereof" to a petitioning industry, it could order up to five years of relief. As U.S. automakers and the United Auto Workers union discovered in 1980, however, ITC approval of import relief could not be counted upon. In such cases, interested parties appealed again to Congress for help. Congress proved willing to consider measures that violated the GATT to redress sectorial trade imbalances and compensate injured firms and dislocated workers. U.S. administrations used reciprocity to derail such efforts. In the case of the U.S.–Japan auto dispute, for example, the Reagan administration negotiated and secured a voluntary export restraint agreement in May 1981. This strategy kept U.S. trade policy within the GATT framework and thereby preserved the U.S. commitment overall to unconditional MFN treatment.

During the 1980s and 1990s, regional trade agreements posed another threat to the principle of nondiscrimination in U.S. trade policy. After the protracted Tokyo Round, the Reagan administration pursued regional free trade agreements even as it pushed for a new GATT round. The Bush and Clinton administrations did so as well, even after the Uruguay Round commenced in 1986. Advocates insisted that free trade agreements not only were compatible with multilateral trade liberalization, they actually promoted it, since the agreements addressed issues not handled successfully with the GATT framework (such as agriculture, services, investment, intellectual property rights, and various nontariff barriers). Nonetheless, free trade agreements with Israel in 1985 and Canada in 1987, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico in 1992, marked a digression in U.S. trade policy from unconditional MFN treatment. At the same time, the Clinton administration remained committed to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which was completed in 1994. One hundred and eleven countries signed the pact, which established the World Trade Organization as the successor organization to the GATT.

During this period, Congress also linked MFN treatment to human rights. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, championed by Senator Henry Jackson, prohibited granting MFN treatment or Export-Import Bank credits to any "non-market economy country"

that restricted emigration. Jackson was primarily concerned about the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. To achieve its broader aims of diplomacy, the Nixon administration wanted to extend MFN treatment and access to export credits to the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration was also interested in the emigration of Jews but preferred to accomplish it through quiet diplomacy. Administration officials believed that Jackson's amendment had some value in sending a signal to the Kremlin regarding America's concern for human rights. However, as National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger argued, the administration would likely lose any leverage it had on the emigration issue once the Jackson-Vanik Amendment became law. This proved to be the case. From 1972 to 1974, some 87,000 people emigrated from Russia. For the period 1975–1977, the figure fell to a little more than 44,000.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment also ensured that human rights became intertwined with the MFN debate on China, particularly after the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989. In this case, the Bush and Clinton administrations successfully "de-linked" MFN treatment from human rights. In 1999 the Clinton administration secured congressional approval of "permanent normal trade relations" with China.

From their first commercial agreement in 1979, the United States and the People's Republic of China conducted trade relations on the basis of unconditional MFN treatment. China was not a member of the GATT. MFN treatment for China was subject to annual renewal by the president, per the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and had to conform to various requirements stipulated by the 1974 Trade Act. Until the Chinese government cracked down on the student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, the renewal of MFN treatment for China was a pro forma affair. After the massacre, in which more than a thousand protestors and bystanders were killed by soldiers, members of the House and Senate sought to condition MFN status on China's performance on human rights. In 1990, the Bush administration gathered enough Republican support in the Senate to renew unconditional MFN treatment for China. But soon thereafter, members of Congress complicated the issue by demonstrating their willingness to condition MFN status for China not only on human rights but also on a range of strategic, political, and economic issues. To meet the concerns of Congress (and businesses interested in such matters as intellectual property rights and Chinese textile imports), both the Bush and Clinton administrations adopted a policy of "constructive engagement." They used diplomacy to address human rights and other issues. At the same time, they continued to renew MFN status for the purpose of expanding trade and developing investment opportunities for U.S. corporations.

The Clinton administration initially favored linking unconditional MFN treatment to China's human rights record, but President Clinton ultimately proved unwilling to sacrifice the China market. After a protracted battle with human rights groups and members of Congress, the administration succeeding in "de-coupling" human rights from its trade policy on China in 1994. Over the next five years, Clinton administration officials worked to bring China into the newly created World Trade Organization and to put unconditional MFN treatment for China on a permanent basis. This culminated in an agreement of 15 November 1999 to make China a full member of the WTO.

The United States remained committed to unconditional MFN treatment within the WTO framework. However, by the end of the 1990s, further liberalization of trade within the WTO had stalled. Congress revoked fast track bargaining authority from the executive branch after the Uruguay Round, and the Clinton administration did not put a high priority on regaining it. The administration also declined to take a leadership position on the expansion of NAFTA to Latin America, as the Chilean and other governments hoped. With the remarkable expansion of the U.S. economy during the late 1990s, demands by Congress and interest groups for retaliation became less strident. To be sure, trade disputes continued. However, outside of MFN status for China, trade retreated in importance relative to finance as the "high-visibility" foreign economic policy issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boudreau, Donald G. "Beyond Tiananmen Square: China and the MFN Debate." *World Affairs* 153 (spring 1993): 140–147.

Culbertson, W. S. "Commercial Treaties." In *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. New York, 1934. Puts MFN in broad historical context.

Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. *Opening America's Market: U.S. Trade Policy Since 1776*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995. A defense of protectionism in U.S trade policy.

———."U.S. Trade History." In *U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory, and the WTO*. Armonk, N.Y., 1999. An excellent overview of more than two hundred years of U.S. trade policy.

Goldstein, Judith. "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy." *International Organization* 42 (winter 1988): 179–217. Argues that state-based actor behavior is crucial to understanding U.S. trade policy.

Gordon, Wendell C. *International Trade: Goods, People, and Ideas*. New York, 1965. Contains examples of both conditional and unconditional MFN provisions in trade agreements.

Haggard, Stephan. "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934." *International Organization* 42 (winter 1988): 91–119. Focuses on the institutional changes in trade policy produced by the RTAA.

Hornbeck, Stanley K. *The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commercial Treaties*. Madison, Wis., 1910. A defense of conditional MFN treatment.

Lake, David A. *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1988. Argues that executive branch responses to the constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure shaped policy in conjunction with congressional responses to interest-group pressures.

League of Nations Committee on Experts for Progressive Codification of International Law. "Report on the Most-Favored-Nation Clause." *American Journal of International Law* 20, supplement (1928).

Milner, Helen V., and David B. Yoffie. "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands." *International Organization* 43 (spring 1989): 239–272.

Moore, John Bassett. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses." *Digest of International Law* 5 (1906).

Ratner, Sidney. *The Tariff in American History*. New York, 1972. Provides useful material on the reciprocal trade agreements of the 1930s and the GATT.

Rhodes, Carolyn. "Reciprocity in Trade: The Utility of a Bargaining Strategy." *International Organization* 43 (spring 1989): 273–299. Assesses the use of reciprocity to achieve trade liberalization within the GATT regime.

———. *Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1993. Argues that instruments of trade policy, such as reciprocity and unconditional MFN treatment, can be tools of liberalization or protectionism, depending on the overall direction of policy.

Schaefer, Donald D. A. "U.S. Foreign Policies of Presidents Bush and Clinton: The Influence of China's Most Favored Nation Status upon Human Rights Issues." *Social Science Journal* 35 (1998): 407–421.

Viner, Jacob. "The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties." *Journal of Political Economy* 32 (1924). A vigorous argument against the use of conditional MFN treatment in U.S. trade policy by a University of Chicago economics professor and adviser to the Treasury Department during the Roosevelt administration.

Wang, Yangmin. "The Politics of U.S.–China Economic Relations: MFN, Constructive Engagement, and the Trade Issue Proper." *Asian Survey* 33 (May 1993): 441–462.

Wolman, Paul. *Most Favored Nation: The Republican Revisionists and U.S. Tariff Policy, 1987–1912*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992.

See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; RECIPROCITY; TARIFF POLICY.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Burton I. Kaufman

The influence of multinational corporations on U.S. foreign policy is complex, but, generally speaking, they have not played a major role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. This may seem a surprising conclusion, because it is now widely recognized that for much of U.S. history, but especially for the period beginning at the end of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth century, there has been a strong correlation between U.S. foreign economic policy and U.S. foreign policy. Simply stated, historians and others have shown, rather convincingly, that economic expansion—the search for foreign markets for U.S. surplus agricultural and industrial production—has played a key role in American foreign policy, particularly after President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) enunciated his concept of a new world order predicated on classical liberal and capitalist principles.

In writing about the role of multinational corporations on U.S. foreign policy, however, the following points need to be made: (1) the first multinational corporations were not established until the latter part of the nineteenth century; (2) most of the first multinational corporations became "multinational" by reinvesting their foreign profits abroad, not by making investments overseas; (3) large businesses invested abroad where and when their executives thought profits were to be made, not because of foreign policy concerns, and, with some exceptions, because they did not unduly seek to influence the formulation of foreign policy; (4) while there were certainly loud calls for expanding markets overseas, even to the point of permitting businesses to engage in joint combinations otherwise prohibited by the nation's antitrust laws, those business leaders advocating such policies were generally from smaller or midsize businesses and/or represented regional interests; and (5) to the extent that there was collusion or collaboration between public policymakers and business leaders (as in the case of the oil industry), it was just as often government that sought to use the nation's industrial giants to achieve foreign policy objectives rather than the other way around.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are corporations whose home offices are in one country but have significant fixed investments in other countries. These investments might be in factories or warehouses, transportation or telecommunications, mining or agriculture. Businesses that merely maintain local or regional sales offices abroad are generally not thought of as multinational corporations.

Corporations invest abroad for a variety of reasons. Among them are to open new markets or to hold onto existing ones; to avoid tariffs or other trade restrictions; to tap new sources of raw materials and agricultural production; and to take advantage of cheap foreign labor. Although the history of American MNCs goes back to at least the mid-nineteenth century and a significant number of MNCs had been established by the turn of the twentieth century, their emergence as a key factor in international commerce is really a product of the post–World War II period.

Americans had, of course, been involved in world commerce ever since the founding of the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Colonial merchants often employed agents abroad (frequently family members) to promote their interests wherever they conducted significant commerce, most notably in London and the West Indies. Following the American Revolution and through much of the nineteenth century, they expanded their stakes abroad by opening branches that sometimes included fixed investments like warehouses. Some Americans even opened small businesses overseas or inherited existing businesses through loan defaults and bankruptcies.

Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, American businesses had not

made the types of direct investments abroad that would have classified them as multinational corporations. The reasons why were much the same as the reasons why even America's largest business enterprises sold mainly in local and regional markets. The United States lacked the transportation and communication facilities to allow businesses to operate on a national scale. American businesses also lacked the organizational structure and capital to compete nationally or internationally.

By the end of the nineteenth century all that had changed. With the establishment of transcontinental railroads and a network of branch lines that laced much of the nation together and a telegraph and telephone system that made nearly instantaneous communication possible, American business leaders could think in broad national terms. Other developments, including a single national currency and the expansion of capital markets, the mass production of consumer goods like food products and manufactured clothing, and major technological advances such as the manufacture of electrical generators, office equipment, and sewing machines, each requiring a specially trained sales force to sell and service them, made national expansion viable, even inevitable.

The same was true of the international marketplace. A dramatic increase in the speed of steamships plying the oceans between American and world ports, the completion in 1866 of the first transatlantic cable, the need or desire on the part of American business leaders to seek out new markets for increased U.S. industrial and agricultural production, and the need also to have reliable sources of raw materials and native agriculture, such as bananas from Central America, were only some of the supply-side forces driving U.S. economic expansion overseas after the Civil War. On the demand side were the attraction abroad of new U.S. industrial output and the importance of having a trained sales force able to explain and service the highly sophisticated technology that American manufacturers were producing.

EARLY MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The first American multinational corporation was I. M. Singer and Company (later changed to Singer Manufacturing Company), whose name became synonymous with the sewing machine. Established in 1851, Singer relied at first on independent foreign agents to sell its machines in Europe, even transferring to a French entrepreneur, Charles Callebaut, the rights to its French patent. Having successfully developed its own sales force and branches in the United States, however, and unhappy with the lack of control over these agents, some of whom even sold competing machines, the company decided to rely on its own salaried sales force and branch offices to market its product. By 1879 Singer was selling more machines abroad than at home and had branches in such distant places as India, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. In response to Europe's demand for its machines, moreover, it opened its first foreign factory in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1867. In 1883 it built a new modern plant outside Glasgow, where it consolidated the operations of the original factory and two others that had grown alongside it. It also built much smaller plants in Canada and Austria. By the end of the century other American corporations, including Westinghouse, General Electric, Western Electric, Eastman Kodak, and Standard Oil, often following Singer's experience abroad, had also opened plants or refineries in Europe.

Although talk was ripe at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries about gaining a larger American presence in the Far East and Latin America, most large American companies invested abroad where market success seemed most promising or where sources of raw materials could easily be developed; this meant primarily Canada, Mexico, and Europe. Canada was both a market for American exports and a source of such raw materials as gold, timber, and oil. As such it was the largest market for American investments, which totaled $618 million by 1914. In second place was Mexico, where Americans invested $587 million, mostly in mining and railroads but also increasingly in oil.

Europe was a primary market for U.S. industrial goods, including heavy industrial machinery, steam pumps, cash registers, electrical generators, reapers, and consumer goods, most of which were superior to European technology. American firms grew abroad largely by reinvesting their overseas earnings. In fact, by the turn of the twentieth century the United States had made such inroads into European markets that Europeans even talked and wrote about an "American invasion" of Europe, not dissimilar from American cries seventy-five years later against a Japanese "invasion" of the United States. By 1914, U.S. direct investment in Europe amounted to $573 million.

Worldwide, Americans invested $2.65 billion. Although this might not seem noteworthy by contemporary standards, it amounted to about 7 percent of the nation's gross national product or about the same percentage of the GNP as for the 1960s. On the eve of World War I, in other words, the United States had entered the still new world of multinational corporations, although that term was still unfamiliar and would remain so to most Americans for another half century.

WORLD WAR I AND ITS AFTERMATH

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 offered MNCs both danger and opportunity at the same time. On the one hand the belligerent powers had to be fed and equipped. Furthermore, the war opened to the United States the opportunity to move into markets in Latin America and the Far East hitherto dominated by Europe's two major industrial powers, the United Kingdom and Germany, each of which had to concentrate its attention on winning the war for its side. Furthermore, the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 afforded new opportunities for increased trade between ports along the East and Gulf coasts of the United States and the west coast of South America and the Far East. In the Mississippi Valley it also kindled plans among the region's business and financial leaders to redirect some of the nation's largely east-west commercial traffic to such Gulf ports as New Orleans, Mobile, and Galveston.

The war turned the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. Despite tremendous losses as a result of Germany's on-and-off submarine campaign, the United States supplied Britain and its allies with the goods and credits necessary to sustain the war effort before America's own entry into the war in 1917. The United States was even able to make substantial gains in Latin American markets at the expense of the European belligerents, more so, however, in mining and ore processing than in manufacturing.

After the war Washington passed two measures designed to strengthen the nation's position in foreign trade, especially in Latin America. The first of these was the Webb-Pomerene Act (1918), which exempted business combinations from the provisions of the antitrust laws. Congress approved the measure as a way to help small businessmen enter the foreign field by being allowed to form joint selling agencies engaged in business abroad. But the measure had also been pushed by larger business concerns interested in organizing more complex vertical combinations (that is, combinations performing more than one function in the chain of production, extending from the acquisition of raw materials through the manufacturing process and ending with the distribution and sale of the finished product). Although fewer than two hundred associations ever registered under the act, a number of supporters of the measure, including the Department of Commerce, continued to seek ways to strengthen it.

The second measure approved by Congress after the war was the Edge Act (1919), which provided for federal incorporation of long-term investment and short-term banking subsidiaries doing business abroad. Like the Webb-Pomerene Act, the measure was intended to encourage small banking firms to compete successfully against more established British firms and a few American financial institutions like the National City Bank, which had established foreign branches throughout Latin America, more in order to attract accounts at home than to make profits abroad. The Edge Act was also part of the government's program for meeting Europe's capital and banking needs and President Woodrow Wilson's larger program for economic expansion.

Also like the Webb-Pomerene Act, the Edge Act never lived up to its promise. In the two years after its passage only two corporations were established under its provisions. As late as 1956 there were only three Edge corporations. The simple fact was that, despite government encouragement to foreign investment and a brief flurry of activity in the two years immediately following the war's end, too much uncertainty about world economic conditions existed to sustain this level of effort.

EXPANSION: 1925–1930

Not until the mid-1920s, when the international economy seemed to stabilize, particularly in Europe, and the United States' own economy was booming, did U.S. corporations start to make substantial direct foreign investments. Encouraged by President Calvin Coolidge and his fellow Republican Herbert Hoover, first in his capacity as Coolidge's secretary of commerce and then as Coolidge's successor in the White House, the largest U.S. firms began to invest heavily in Europe, both in search of new markets and as a way of protecting themselves against trade barriers. Such

investments, usually in the form of foreign subsidiaries, branches, or joint ventures, also fitted well into the multidivisional, decentralized organizational structure begun at General Motors (GM) under the leadership of Alfred Sloan but adopted very quickly by other major industrial concerns.

Yet, as Sloan later wrote, the decision to invest overseas did not come easily, nor was it perceived as inevitable. GM's executives, for example, had to decide whether there was a market abroad for American cars and, if so, which models were likely to fare the best. They also had to determine whether to export entire cars from the United States, build plants to assemble imported parts, or engage in the entire manufacturing process overseas. If the latter, they then had to consider whether to buy existing plants or build their own. Invariably, these decisions involved such other considerations as the taxes and tariffs of host nations, the state of existing facilities and dealerships abroad, and the desire of foreign governments to protect jobs and national industries. In the case of General Motors, the corporation almost bought the French carmaker Citroën but decided against doing so, in large part because of the French government's opposition to an American takeover of what it considered a vital industry. GM did, however, buy the British firm Vauxhall Motors Ltd. and the German carmaker Opel. Even more important, it made a decision at the end of the 1920s to be an international manufacturer seeking markets wherever they existed and to build the industrial infrastructure necessary to penetrate and maintain them.

Although direct foreign investment as a percentage of the GNP remained about the same in the 1920s as it did at the turn of the century (about 7 percent), what made the 1920s different from earlier decades were where and what kinds of investment were being made. Investments in manufacturing, which had lagged behind mining and agriculture, now vaulted ahead of both. As it did so, direct investments in Europe almost doubled, from approximately $700 million in 1920 to about $1.35 billion by 1929; manufacturing and petroleum accounted for most of this increase. Significantly, much of the new investment came from firms that previously had not braved the waters of overseas markets. Businesses like Pet and Carnation Milk had well-established brand names at home on which they hoped to capitalize by joining together under the Webb-Pomerene Act to open new plants and factories in France, Holland, and Germany in the 1920s.

Almost as dramatic as the increase in direct investments in manufacturing abroad were those in petroleum, which increased from $604 million in 1919 to $1.34 billion by 1929. Although this included everything from the exploration of petroleum to its production, refining, and distribution, most of the increase was in exploration and production. Thanks to vast increases in the production of oil in Venezuela, American direct investments in petroleum in South America jumped from $113 million in 1919 to $512 million by 1929.

Even in the Middle East, which remained largely a British preserve, the United States made important inroads. Fearful of an oil shortage after the war and worried that the region might be shut to American interests, the United States pressured the European powers to give a group of American oil companies a 23 percent share of a consortium of British, French, and Dutch oil producers. Among these companies were Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Standard Oil of New York (now Mobil), which later bought out the other American firms. The consortium became the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), whose purpose was to explore and develop mineral rights in the former Ottoman Empire.

As a result of developments like these, total American investment in foreign petroleum increased from $604 million in 1919 to $1.34 billion dollars in 1929. By that year petroleum had become the second-largest sector in terms of American direct foreign investment, with mining ($1.23 billion) and agriculture ($986 million) falling to second and third places.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The Great Depression of the 1930s, beginning with the crash of the stock market in 1929, affected multinational corporations worldwide. As purchasing power overseas dried up, and as governments sought to protect existing markets by erecting high tariffs and other trade barriers, some U.S. corporations closed or sold factories and other foreign facilities and curtailed or stopped entirely making investments abroad.

At the same time, however, other American businesses sought to leapfrog obstacles to trade and protect existing markets by entering into business arrangements with foreign concerns, such as licensing and market-sharing agreements. With all the major world currencies having gone off the gold standard and become

nonconvertible (that is, not convertible into gold or other currencies like the American dollar or the British pound), most multinational corporations simply chose or were forced by host governments, as in the case of Nazi Germany, to reinvest their foreign profits.

In Latin America, American corporations also continued to invest, sometimes with assistance from Washington, in the development of resources, such as copper in Chile and Peru and lead and zinc in Argentina (although overall investments in South American mining dropped dramatically), and in public utilities including railroads. In the Middle East, American oil companies continued to challenge British oil hegemony by investing heavily in production facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Gulf Oil Company negotiated an oil concession from Kuwait. Standard Oil of California (Socal) established the Bahrain Oil Company and received a concession to look for oil in Saudi Arabia. Texas Oil Company (Texaco) acquired a half interest in the Bahrain Oil Company and in the California Arabian Oil Company (now Aramco) organized by Socal to develop its Arabian fields.

These same companies also entered into a number of agreements among themselves and with two British and Dutch companies, Anglo-Iranian Oil (now British Petroleum, or BP) and Royal Dutch Shell, to control the sale of crude oil and finished products to independent refiners and marketers. Of these agreements the most significant were the so-called "Red Line" and "As Is" agreements of 1928, which placed severe restrictions on where, with whom, and under what conditions the signatories could explore for oil and develop oil fields in the Middle East. Between 1928 and 1934 the As Is partners entered into three supplementary agreements to carry out these purposes. So successful were they that by 1939, seven oil corporations, five of which were American, monopolized the oil industry in the Middle East and controlled much of the world's other oil supplies.

More generally, multinational corporations were able to weather the depression of the 1930s reasonably well. Between 1929 and 1940 total direct foreign investment by American firms declined only slightly, dropping from about $7.53 billion in 1929 to $7 billion in 1940. In Europe they increased from $1.34 billion in 1929 to $1.42 billion in 1940, while in South America they stayed the same, at about $1.5 billion for both years. In Europe manufacturing remained dominant, edging up slightly from about $629 million in 1929 to about $639 million in 1940. The most significant increase occurred in the petroleum sector, rising from $239 million in 1929 to $306 million in 1940. In contrast, in South America public utilities jumped from $348 million to $506 million during these same years, while petroleum actually dropped from $512 million to $330 million and mining fell from $528 million to $330 million; by 1940, public utilities had become the leading sector for direct American foreign investment in South America.

WORLD WAR II

As one might expect, U.S. entry into World War II in 1941 disrupted the normal channels of American commerce, discouraging or making impossible direct investments overseas. Between 1940 and 1946 such investments grew only marginally, from $7.0 billion in 1940 to $7.2 billion in 1946. In that year they amounted to only 3.4 percent of the GNP, the lowest percentage in the century. What American investments made abroad during the war were largely in the Western Hemisphere. Although investments in Canada and Latin America grew from $4.9 billion in 1940 to $5.6 billion in 1946, investments in Europe declined from $1.4 billion in 1940 to $1 billion in 1946. In Africa and the Middle East they remained steady at about $200 million for each of these years, while in the rest of the world they declined from $500 million in 1940 to $400 million in 1946.

Most of these investments went to further the war effort. No commodity was more important in this regard than oil, on which the entire machinery of war depended. So urgent was the need for oil, in fact, that the War Department invested $134 million in the construction of a refinery and pipeline in Canada as part of a project (the Canol Project) to open a new oil field in the Canadian Northwest Territories. The project had little commercial utility, and after the war it was abandoned when none of the parties to the project showed any interest in continuing it.

In the Middle East, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who also served as petroleum administrator for the war and generally distrusted the oil industry, even tried to obtain government ownership of American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Opposition from oil interests and doubts even within the administration about a government takeover of private enterprise ultimately doomed Ickes's plans. An

FEDERAL POWER VERSUS THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONALS: THE OIL DILEMMA

A power with great wealth and influence, the oil industry has often been seen by historians as a sovereign entity capable of dictating the terms and conditions under which oil is produced and sold throughout the world. Although this view is still widely held, it was especially prominent during the energy crisis of the 1970s, when a slew of books was published highly critical of oil's alleged power over the public weal. Inter-industry correspondence and memoranda, first revealed in congressional hearings in the 1970s, seemed to substantiate this view. So did the outcome of an antitrust action that the Department of Justice brought in 1953 against the five major U.S. oil corporations—Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Gulf, Socony Mobil (Mobil), Standard Oil of California (Socal), and Texaco—and two alleged coconspirators, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Iranian Oil (now British Petroleum), charging them with maintaining monopolistic control of oil from the Middle East. The case was so sharply curtailed before it was settled in 1968 that it left the multinational giants' control of oil from the Middle East largely intact. For this reason it seemed to provide additional support to the argument that the multinational giants dictate federal policy.

There can be little doubt about the historic power of the oil industry to influence—and sometimes dictate—federal policy. If anything, however, the oil cartel case of 1953–1968 reveals that it was the federal government that used the oil corporations for foreign policy purposes rather than the other way around. In perhaps the darkest period of the Cold War, the oil cartel ensured a cheap supply of energy to western Europe and Japan. It also ensured a certain degree of stability in a troubled area of the world and was a way of limiting Soviet influence in the region, a matter of great concern to policymakers in Washington. Through tax policies that allowed the oil companies to offset increased royalties to host nations with decreases in taxes paid to the federal government, the oil companies also provided a useful conduit of financial aid to Arab producing nations without providing a cause of action on the part of the strong pro-Israeli forces on Capitol Hill.

Through the fifteen-year history of the oil cartel case, in fact, officials of the Department of Justice remained at loggerheads with the Department of State about pursuing the case, with antitrust officials in the Justice Department anxious to prosecute the defendants and the State Department opposing prosecution on the basis of national security and the national interest. In the end, the Department of State prevailed.

effort, on the other hand, by several American oil companies to gain an ownership stake in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company led to strong and ultimately successful opposition by the British, who objected to what they regarded as an attempt by Washington to lock them out of oil development in the Mideast, and by the Iranians, who wanted to delay until after the war any decision on its most vital resource.

During the war a number of major multinational corporations engaged in the production of strategic materials, such as oil and synthetic rubber, were accused in congressional hearings and on the floor of Congress of having conspired with the enemy before the war. In particular, the oil and petrochemical industries were charged with exchanging trade secrets in chemicals with the chemical giant I. G. Farben and other German firms deemed instruments of Nazi policy in return for trade secrets in oil refining. Civil and criminal actions were even brought against a number of these companies, the most notable being against Exxon, which in 1929 had signed an agreement with Farben recognizing its "preferred position" in chemicals in return for Farben's recognition of Exxon's "preferred position" in oil and natural gas. The two giant corporations also pledged close cooperation in their respective enterprises.

In 1942 the Justice Department brought a civil antitrust suit against Exxon, charging it with delaying the development of high-quality synthetic rubber because of its agreement with Farben, which prevented easy access to important data by other U.S. rubber companies. Although Exxon blamed the German government and not Farben for withholding the needed data, it entered

a plea of "no contest." As part of its plea bargain it also agreed to release all its rubber patents free during the war, with the royalty on these patents to be determined after the war ended.

POSTWAR INVESTMENT: 1945–1955

Despite wartime criticism of the foreign operations of some American firms, including their ties with Nazi firms before the war, and notwithstanding the economic uncertainties that were bound to accompany the war's end, a few of the largest U.S. corporations, often with considerable assets seized or destroyed during the war, began to plan for the postwar period. Among these was General Motors. As early as 1942 the company had set up a postwar planning policy group to estimate the likely shape of the world after the war and to make recommendations on GM's postwar policies abroad.

In 1943 the policy group reported the likelihood that relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union would deteriorate after the war. It also concluded that, except for Australia, General Motors should not buy plants and factories to make cars in any country that had not had facilities before the conflict. At the same time, though, it stated that after the war the United States would be in a stronger state politically and economically than it had been after World War I and that overseas operations would flourish in much of the world. The bottom line for GM, therefore, was to proceed with caution once the conflict ended but to stick to the policy it had enunciated in the 1920s—seeking out markets wherever they were available and building whatever facilities were needed to improve GM's market share.

Other MNCs, however, adopted more cautious positions. Significant investments were made in Canada and Latin America in the mining of iron, uranium, and other minerals that had been scarce during the war, but of all the major industries, only the oil industry, worried as it had been after World War I about a postwar oil shortage, invested heavily overseas after World War II. Between 1946 and 1954 the value of these investments grew from $1.4 billion to $5.27 billion.

Even then, the type of oil investments before and after the war differed significantly. Previously they had been largely market oriented, their purpose being mainly to eliminate market competition. After the war Exxon, BP, Shell, and Mobil shifted their emphasis from market control to control of supply. The companies found that the infrastructure called for by the Red Line and As Is agreements of 1928, with their elaborate system of local and national cartels and quotas, was inefficient and difficult to maintain; moreover, the Red Line agreement established geographical limits to oil exploration in the Middle East. Much more effective, they concluded, would be control of a few crucial petroleum sources in the Mideast.

The opening of new fields by Gulf, Texaco, and Socal also raised the possibility that the As Is structure might be undermined. Conversely, control of these fields would guarantee the dominance of all the majors for years to come. Therefore, while maintaining their hold over marketing, the companies became much more interested in the supply end of petroleum. Exxon and Mobil withdrew from the Iraq Petroleum Corporation, which would have prohibited them from investing in the Arabian Peninsula without their other IPC partners, and instead bought a 40 percent share of Aramco. Socal and Texaco were glad to have them as partners both for their infusion of capital in what was a still risky venture and for their vast marketing capacity. The multinational oil companies also established a system of long-term supply agreements and expanded the number of interlocking, jointly owned production companies. In effect, the era of formal oil cartels gave way in the postwar era to a system of long-term supply agreements and an expansion in the number of interlocking, jointly owned production companies.

For other industries, however, pent-up consumer demand at home, the scarcity of similar demand in war-ravaged Europe and elsewhere, the lack of convertible foreign currencies, the risks attendant upon overseas investments as illustrated by the experiences of two world wars, restrictions on remittances, and the fact that a new generation of chief executive officers with less of an entrepreneurial spirit and more of a concern with stability and predictability than many of their predecessors, all served to limit foreign investment in the years immediately after World War II. Although investments in manufacturing, for example, grew from $2.4 billion in 1946 to $5.71 billion in 1954, most of this increase was in the reinvestment of profits of existing corporations, either because host governments blocked repatriation of scarce currencies or for tax and other reasons not related directly to growing consumer demand. Investments in other industries such as public utilities

($1.3 billion in 1946 and $1.54 billion in 1954) scarcely grew at all.

In at least one respect, government policy discouraged overseas investment after the war, particularly in manufacturing. As never before, foreign economic policy became tied to foreign policy. As the Cold War hardened in the ten years following the war, Washington imposed severe restrictions on trade and investment within the communist bloc of nations. The Export Control Acts of 1948 and 1949, for example, placed licensing restrictions on trade and technical assistance deemed harmful to national security. During the Korean War (1950–1953) even tighter controls, extending to nonstrategic as well as strategic goods, were imposed on the People's Republic of China (Communist China).

It would be absurd to suggest that, absent these controls, American companies would have made substantial investments within the communist bloc. Nevertheless, the economic boycott of a vast region of the world contributed to the global economic uncertainty that normally inhibits direct foreign investment. According to the British, who were anxious to relax controls on the potentially rich markets of China, it also delayed its own economic recovery, another inhibitor to foreign investors.

That said, in the decade following the war the administrations of both Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower looked to the private sector to assist in the recovery of western Europe, both through increased trade and direct foreign investments. In fact, the $13 billion Marshall Plan, which became the engine of European recovery between 1948 and 1952, was predicated on a close working relationship between the public and private sectors. Similarly, Eisenhower intended to bring about world economic recovery through liberalized world commerce and private investment abroad rather than through foreign aid. Over the course of his two administrations (1953–1961), the president modified his policy of "trade not aid" to one of "trade and aid" and changed his focus from western Europe to the Third World, which he felt was most threatened by communist expansion. In particular he was concerned by what he termed a "Soviet economic offensive" in the Middle East, that is, Soviet loans and economic assistance to such countries as Egypt and Syria. But even then he intended that international commerce and direct foreign investments would play a major role in achieving global economic growth and prosperity.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK

As European recovery became increasingly apparent in the early 1950s and as the demand at home for consumer goods began to be satiated, U.S. corporations started to look once more at overseas markets. Problems still remained, such as a shortage of dollars (the so-called "dollar gap") and the lack of convertible foreign currencies needed to pay for essential goods from the United States and to remit foreign profits. But the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) began to make loans intended to spur foreign trade and economic development. Established in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, as part of a new international monetary system based on the dollar, these twin financial institutions had remained largely dormant and ineffective as instruments of a new economic order. The IMF's primary purpose was to stabilize exchange rates, mainly by setting par values and supporting them with short-term balance-of-payments loans. The World Bank was intended to serve as a reconstruction rather than a development bank.

In the years immediately following the end of World War II neither financial institution was able to achieve its objectives. Faced with a staggering imbalance of trade and a severe dollar shortage, the IMF husbanded its resources and acquiesced in the growing number of exchange restrictions that took place as nations sought to protect their exchange values from the pressures of the free market. As for the World Bank, the problems of reconstruction and the degree of international financial instability after the war were far greater than the architects of the Bretton Woods system had anticipated. Unable to meet Europe's reconstruction needs with its own limited resources, much less to promote economic development in the Third World, and seeking to win the confidence of the American investor in order to float its bonds on the American capital markets, the bank followed conservative lending policies. It made a few reconstruction loans, but after the inauguration of the Marshall Plan in 1948, it purposely subordinated its lending activities to the new aid program.

Beginning around 1950, however, the World Bank expanded its long-term lending program from a level of $350 million in 1950 to more than $750 million by 1958. By the fall of 1958 it had invested $3.8 billion in development projects in

forty-seven countries, mostly in the Third World. The IMF went through a more protracted transition than the World Bank, largely due to the fundamental disequilibria that existed in the international economy and the fact that the dollar was the only fully convertible currency. Not until the Suez crisis of 1956 did the fund, which had stopped all lending with the inauguration of the Marshall Plan, resume lending. That year it approved a standby credit of $738 million for England to pay for oil imported from the Western Hemisphere. By 1958 the fund had extended short-term loans of $3 billion to thirty-five countries.

In other ways as well, the government sought to spur direct foreign investments. For example, the United States negotiated tax treaties with a number of countries to prevent American businesses overseas from being taxed twice. It made investment guarantees to American firms venturing in western Europe. It increased the lending power of the Export-Import Bank, which had been established in 1934 to make short-term loans to American exporters but which over the years had made a number of long-term loans for development purposes.

THE OIL CARTEL CASE

Near the end of Truman's term in office the Justice Department instituted an antitrust suit against the multinational oil corporations operating in the Middle East. Both Truman and subsequently the Eisenhower administration sharply cut back the suit. The government charged the five major U.S. oil corporations—Exxon, Mobil, Socal, Texaco, and Gulf Oil—along with two alleged coconspirators, Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, with criminal violation of the nation's antitrust laws by having engaged in a worldwide combination to restrain and monopolize U.S. domestic and foreign commerce in crude oil and petroleum products. The suit sought relief through divestiture of the defendants' joint production, refining, pipeline, and marketing operations.

The oil cartel was one of a series of cases that the Justice Department brought against industries after the war believed to have collaborated with enemy powers before the conflict. In the short term, the cases were disruptive to a number of multinational corporations that had made major investments overseas before the war and may even have discouraged them from engaging in international business after the conflict; certainly this was the case with General Electric (GE), which had suffered losses during the war and had to fight a suit accusing it and its subsidiary, International General Electric, of having maintained a cartel in lamps and electric equipment. Eventually GE sold off a major part of its foreign holdings.

By the end of Truman's administration, however, the White House had begun to rethink its foreign antitrust policies. This was most apparent in the oil cartel case. In 1951 Iran nationalized British Petroleum's Iranian holdings. BP responded with a highly successful worldwide embargo of Iranian oil, which led to serious European oil shortages. For reasons of national security having to do with needing the same oil companies against which it had brought a criminal antitrust action to meet these shortages, President Truman had the criminal charges reduced to much less punitive civil actions. He did this over strong objections from Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission officials, who maintained that the agreement constituted a waiver of the antitrust laws as applied to the foreign cartel arrangements of the oil majors.

President Eisenhower believed that enforcement of the antitrust laws should not interfere with programs and policies deemed important or essential to the national interest, such as the promotion of trade and private investment overseas. Accordingly, he later ordered the oil cartel case confined strictly to firms headquartered in the United States and then pressured the Justice Department to grant a newly formed Iranian oil consortium (consisting of BP, Royal Dutch Shell, the five American majors, and a number of smaller independents) a waiver in the exploration and refining of Iranian oil. Since it was nearly impossible to prosecute the very actions it had encouraged and sanctioned on the grounds of national security, the antitrust case was now effectively reduced to just the marketing and price-fixing of oil. Although the case was to drag through the courts until 1968, its final outcome left intact the scaffolding of the cartel arrangements among the oil majors. The decrees obtained were limited to price-fixing and marketing arrangements only.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 1955–1990

By the middle of the 1950s the wave of antitrust suits by the Justice Department against major

industries with direct foreign investment had about run its course, although not all cases, such as the oil cartel case, had yet been settled. Furthermore, western Europe had largely recovered from the worst ravages of the war and in 1957 would form what became known as the Common Market. Great Britain, which would not be invited to join the Common Market, was moving toward full convertibility of the British pound. The "dollar gap," which had worsened because of the Korean War and European rearmament, was turning into a "dollar surplus" that would cause its own problems in the 1960s. Thanks largely to American spending in Japan as a result of the conflict in Korea, that country had also begun its long course toward becoming a major industrial power, one that twenty-five years later would make it the envy of much of the rest of the industrial world, including the United States. Following the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the end of the Korean War that same year, there was even a short lull in the Cold War, as Moscow's new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, made new peaceful overtures to the United States that would lead to the Geneva Conference of 1957 between Khrushchev and President Eisenhower and the so-called "spirit of Geneva."

By the middle of the 1950s, in other words, economic growth had reached a point, and the world political situation had stabilized to such a degree, that many of the largest U.S. corporations were looking again to invest abroad. The country's foreign aid programs, which increasingly tied foreign loans and economic assistance to the procurement of American goods and services, also helped stimulate direct foreign investment.

The result was an expansion of MNCs in the middle of the 1950s that has continued largely unabated. Between 1950 and 1965 alone, the leading U.S. corporations increased their manufacturing subsidiaries in Europe nearly fourfold. In Australia, General Motors made significant investments. Even during the war GM had decided to manufacture and sell cars in Australia, where it had earlier purchased plants and established distributorships for its automobiles. In 1948 it still only manufactured and sold 112 vehicles. By 1950 production was up, but only to 20,000 cars. By 1962, however, GM was manufacturing 133,000 automobiles with expansion to a capacity of 175,000 already under way.

As the industrialized world recovered from World War II and as the United States built plants and factories and other facilities abroad, the nation's balance of payments turned into a deficit and gold reserves declined sharply. When he took office President John F. Kennedy responded by curtailing government spending abroad and encouraging American exports. President Lyndon Johnson established a program of voluntary—later made mandatory—restraints on direct foreign investment. Nevertheless the deficit continued to grow, and instead of being hoarded as they had been during the war, dollars in Europe began to be sold in what became known as the Eurodollar market. The selling of American dollars for other currencies and the inability of the United States to regulate the Eurodollar market led in 1971 to President Richard Nixon's decision to float the currency against other world currencies rather than to keep the dollar pegged to a fixed gold price as it had done since the Bretton Woods system of 1944.

While these measures had some immediate impact, in the long term they failed to prevent overseas investments by American firms. There were too many ways, for example, for these corporations to get around voluntary or mandatory controls, such as by downstreaming capital investments to foreign subsidiaries and by borrowing on the Eurodollar market. Furthermore, the opportunities abroad, the uncertain future of the dollar, the attraction of cheap labor in Third World countries, the growing importance of foreign oil and other raw materials, and the perceived need to be close to foreign consumers all encouraged the migration of American capital overseas.

Interestingly, while Washington was trying to limit direct investments in the world's largest industrial nations, it actually sought to promote such investments in the Third World, which through the Vietnam War of the 1960s and early 1970s was viewed as a battleground in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1969 Congress approved the creation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the mission of which was to encourage private investment in less developed countries. To help build the infrastructure needed to attract private investors, the World Bank increased the number of soft loans (loans with below-market interest rates and generous repayment schedules) it made to less developed countries. Even the IMF got into the soft-loan business despite the fact that this had not been part of its original mission.

As American-owned MNCs continued to expand abroad they met increased foreign resistance and growing competition from foreign

rivals. The 1970s were a particularly troublesome decade for many of these enterprises, not so much in terms of competition as in overseas opposition to what many foreign nationals regarded as a form of rapacious American imperialism. Still operating in the poisonous world and domestic climate that was an outgrowth of twenty-five years of Cold War rhetoric and a highly unpopular war in Vietnam, MNCs were maligned as part of an American military-industrial establishment seeking world economic and political hegemony. Nor were these views limited to a radical left-wing fringe. Many respected national and international political officials, political theorists, international business leaders, and academics joined in the chorus against the MNCs. A spate of books appeared in the 1970s highlighting the world power of the multinational corporations and arguing that they had become states unto themselves beyond the control of any single nation.

A particular target, but certainly not the only one, of the critics was the oil industry. Drastic increases in energy prices resulted from huge consumer demand in the United States and the decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had been formed in 1960, to use oil as a political weapon following renewed war between the Arab states and Israel in 1973. This led to a depletion of oil supplies, and prices for gasoline more than doubled in the United States.

Even respected authorities on the oil industry portrayed the multinational oil firms as a sovereign entity with its own form of government and with sources of revenue and influence that allowed it to dictate pretty much the terms and conditions under which oil would be produced and sold in the world. Although this was an oversimplified version of the power of the oil companies to control the production and price of oil, it resonated with the American public. Secret inter-industry correspondence and memoranda, much of it highly damaging and much of it revealed for the first time in 1974 by the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, provided the basis for many of the charges made against the oil industry.

None of the charges made in the 1970s against the oil industry or, more generally, against multinational businesses prevented their further growth. In 1978 Congress passed legislation effectively deregulating most domestic commercial aviation, a process that had already been started by Alfred Kahn, head of the Civil Aeronautics Board. In the 1980s deregulation was expanded to include international aviation. By 1997 the United States had concluded agreements with twenty-four nations, thereby allowing U.S.-owned airlines to enter into operational and strategic alliances with foreign-owned airlines and in some cases even to partially own them. Deregulation of the telecommunications industry, concluding with the 1996 General Agreement on Trade in Services, allowed American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and other American corporations in the telecommunications industry to enter into similar arrangements with their foreign counterparts. Between 1960 and 1965 assets of U.S. banks abroad grew from $3.5 billion to $458 billion. Fast-food chains and retailers like McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, the Gap, and Nike opened thousands of outlets overseas. So did firms in such industries as chemicals and heavy machinery. As a result, in the 1990s sales abroad of U.S. subsidiaries were, on average, five times larger than all of U.S. exports.

Nor were direct foreign investments limited to American-headquartered firms as they had been for most of the postwar period prior to 1980. Businesses in South Korea, Taiwan, and most of western Europe competed against the United States for foreign markets and, indeed, for the U.S. market as well. As a result, between 1980 and 1995 the total amount of direct foreign investment grew more than six times to approximately $3.2 trillion. Between 1975 and 1992 the number of persons employed by multinational firms also increased from about 40 million to 73 million. In 1977 U.S.-based firms accounted for about 69 percent of the U.S. gross manufacturing output; by 1994 that figure had dropped to 57.6 percent. During these same years foreign-owned subsidiaries in the United States increased their market share of U.S. manufacturing from 3.4 percent to 13.2 percent. As of 1996 western Europe actually accounted for $1.59 trillion (about 50 percent) of the world's foreign direct investment, while North America accounted for $905 billion (about 28 percent). Of the remainder, other developed countries, most notably Japan, accounted for about $402 billion (12.7 percent), while the rest of the world accounted for just $286 billion (or approximately 9 percent).

A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE 1990S

With the development of a truly global economy by the 1990s, opinion with respect to the multi-

national corporations in home and host countries varied considerably. American multinationals have often been viewed abroad as purveyors of technology and business efficiencies and as bearers of products meeting an insatiable appetite for American goods. But a more negative image also developed. The growing competitiveness of the new world economy and a heightened emphasis on cost efficiencies, job reductions, retooling, and relocation led to complaints in home and host nations about declining market shares and lost jobs.

The transnational character of the multinationals proved irksome to the growing legion of laid-off workers and lower- and mid-level managers who felt most victimized by the new competition and the search for cheaper labor markets. Government officials sensed a loss of their sovereignty because of the ability of these corporations to move their operations, transactions, and profits upstream or downstream as their self-interests dictated. Transfers of technology were another issue pitting MNCs and host and home governments against one another, as they jockeyed to maintain or gain control of technological breakthroughs for reasons of national security and profits.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the fact that more and more of the world economy seemed to be dominated by a relatively few multinational giants also led to the ringing of alarm bells. (Estimates of U.S. multinational corporations in 2001 ranged around three thousand, but the numbers were declining because of a wave of corporate mergers.) Other problems creating tensions between MNCs, host governments, and home governments included jurisdictional disputes, cultural differences, nontariff barriers to trade, international agreements among the multinational corporations, and conflicting political agendas on such matters of principle as the environment, energy, human rights, accessibility to proper medical treatment and high-cost pharmaceuticals, sweatshops, and child labor laws.

CONCLUSION

Public opinion and government policy with respect to MNCs, in other words, conjure up the image of a fault line along the earth's crust, quiet for the moment but with pressures building below that could—will—divide the earth above. Despite the best-educated guesses, however, nobody really knows just when and under what circumstances this will happen or how severe the damage will be. Already odd alliances have been formed among the parties most affected by the growth of MNCs. One of these took place beginning in 1991 when free-trade advocates in the United States found themselves joined by the multinationals but strongly opposed by rank-and-file workers over the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was ratified in 1992 despite labor's objections. In 1994 the MNCs and free traders won a limited victory with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which since its founding has focused much of its attention on breaking down remaining restrictions on the expansion of MNCs worldwide. It has had only moderate success, however, because it lacks judicial authority, something the U.S. negotiators refused to give it because of congressional reservations about granting extensive powers to the new body.

In the late 1980s, free traders in Europe joined with European workers in successfully opposing the proposed merger of Honeywell International and General Electric on antitrust grounds. The United States and the European Union also entered in a trade war. They clashed over European restrictions on imports of American beef and bananas, and the U.S. steel industry accused European firms of dumping steel on American markets. European business and political leaders retaliated with charges that Washington unfairly subsidized U.S. exports and rejected its efforts to resolve trade disputes.

These claims and counterclaims suggest that, in a world becoming smaller each day, with corporate mergers across national boundaries becoming more common and a technological and information revolution unlike any in the past, calls will continue to grow about bringing the aspirations of private enterprise more in line with national needs. How that will happen or whether it is even possible remain unanswered questions. The failure of the United States and Europe to resolve their economic differences and a growing movement toward economic regionalism in East Asia, including mutual currency supports, cooperative exchange systems, and an East Asian free trade area, even suggest a worldwide backlash already under way against economic globalization. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine anything less than a highly integrated world economy or one without the glue of the multinational corporations that helped bring it about in the first place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnet, Richard J., and Ronald E. Müller. *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations*. New York, 1974. This indictment of multinational corporations argues that MNCs constitute a state within a state. Well-researched but not entirely persuasive.

Doremus, Paul N., et al. *The Myth of the Global Corporation*. Princeton, N.J., 1998. Persuasively argues against the widely held view that multinational enterprises are able to act autonomously in international economic matters.

Ferguson, Niall. *The House of Rothschild: The World's Banker, 1849–1999*. New York, 1999. The second of a two-volume history of one of the great international banking houses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

James, Harold. *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression*. Cambridge, Mass., 2001. Argues that, while there are parallels between today's situation and the end of the movement toward globalization following the Great Depression, one of the essential developments of the 1930s—economic nationalism tied to two of the major powers of the era, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—is not in evidence in the early twenty-first century.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. *World Class: Thriving Locally in the Global Economy*. New York, 1995. Points to the difficulty of multinational corporations blending in with the local communities of their host nations.

Kapstein, Ethan B. "Workers and the World Economy." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (May–June 1996): 16–37. Argues that the global economy, with its implicit promise of a better life for the working class, has not lived up to that promise primarily because the institutional structure established after World War II to support economic growth and development has forced many governments to follow stringent fiscal policies at labor's expense.

Kaufman, Burton I. *The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War*. Westport, Conn., 1978. A history in which the author argues that Washington used the oil companies to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Moran, Theodore H. *Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition*. Washington, D.C., 1998. Emphasizes the positive role that foreign direct investment can play in developing countries and those nations moving toward a free market economy.

Nathan, John. *Sony: The Private Life*. New York, 1999. Fascinating history of one of Japan's great success stories after World War II.

Rangan, Subramanian, and Robert Z. Lawrence. *A Prism on Globalization: Corporate Responses to the Dollar*. Washington, D.C., 1999. Argues that multinational corporations have worked to assure currency stability rather than the flexible rates characteristic of the 1980s because that is what their customers prefer.

Rodrick, Dani. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington, D.C., 1997. Argues that globalization, including the expansion of the multinationals, may indeed have gone too far and that governments need to be more sensitive to the domestic ramifications resulting from economic globalization.

Sampson, Anthony. *The Sovereign State of ITT*. New York, 1973. Maintains that, through ruthless and sometimes illicit practices, ITT, one of the largest conglomerates of the 1960s and 1970s, became a worldwide business empire that defied control by any sovereign nation.

———. *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped*. New York, 1975. Adopts the argument that multinational corporations have had excessive control over the formulation of American foreign policy, but an important study and a solid history.

Spar, Debora L. "The Spotlight and the Bottom Line." *Foreign Affairs* 77 (March–April, 1998): 7–12. Maintains that, instead of exploiting foreign workers with low wages and unsafe working conditions, multinational manufacturers of consumer goods have actually helped to promote human rights because of the impact of the public spotlight and human rights activism.

Vernon, Raymond. *Sovereignty at Bay*. New York, 1971. Classic study of multinational corporations that traces their growth and the challenge they pose for sovereign nations.

———. *In the Hurricane's Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises*. Cambridge, Mass., 1998. Maintains that multinationals are facing increasing efforts by host and home governments to regulate their

operations as a result of an increasingly hostile domestic environment.

Wilkins, Mira. *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business from the Colonial Era to 1914.* Cambridge, Mass., 1970. The first of a two-volume study; deeply researched and thorough and comprehensive in coverage.

———. *The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970.* Cambridge, Mass., 1974. The second volume of Wilkins's classic study and the place to start for any study on the subject.

Wolf, Martin. "Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?" *Foreign Affairs* 80 (January–February 2001): 178–190. Argues that nation-states will become stronger rather than weaker in the evolving international economy, and that further globalization will not be the destined result of market forces associated with the technological revolution but rather of conscious decision by nation-states to enhance their economic well-being.

See also ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY; OIL.

THE MUNICH ANALOGY

Joseph M. Siracusa

At the Munich Conference of 1938, France and England followed a policy of appeasement toward Adolf Hitler, choosing not to challenge him on his takeover of Czechoslovakia in the hope that German aggression toward neighboring states would stop there and that war in Europe could be averted. The failure of this appeasement approach in preventing the outbreak of World War II subsequently made the Munich agreement a metaphor for weakness in foreign policy, and the "lesson" of the Munich Conference has permeated the American political world ever since. The Munich analogy has not only been used consistently in American presidential and governmental rhetoric but has also affected foreign policy decisions at crucial moments in U.S. history. Presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush, from the 1940s to the 1980s, have used the example of Munich as a warning to the public about the inherent dangers of appeasing aggressors.

THE ROAD TO MUNICH

During the fateful year 1938, the Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler took the first two steps in his *Drang nach Osten,* or drive to the east, by annexing Austria and the predominantly German sections of Czechoslovakia. In order to win Italian support, Hitler had promised to respect Austrian independence and to refrain from interfering in the small republic's internal politics. At heart, though, he had never really abandoned his hope of uniting the land of his birth with his adopted fatherland, a feeling reciprocated by some Austrians. (Indeed, at the end of World War I, Austria asked to be united with Germany, but subsequently this was expressly forbidden in the Treaty of Versailles.) By early 1938 Hitler felt strong enough to cast his promises to the winds.

In February he summoned Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor, to a conference at Berchtesgaden, the führer's mountain retreat in the Bavarian Alps, and demanded the admission of prominent Austrian Nazis to the cabinet. Schuschnigg complied but called for an immediate plebiscite, which he felt certain would demonstrate popular opposition to union with Germany. The Nazis were apparently of the same opinion, for they at once demanded the resignation of Schuschnigg and a postponement of the plebiscite, threatening invasion by German troops as the alternative. Schuschnigg resigned on 11 March. His successor as chancellor, the Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart, immediately called in the Wehrmacht, allegedly to suppress disorders in Austria. On 12 March the German government proclaimed Austria to be a state of the German Reich, and two days later Hitler entered Vienna amid a great show of rejoicing. *Anschluss* was complete. France and Great Britain protested, but since neither had an interest sufficiently vital to go to war to prevent this action, no one raised a hand in resistance.

Hitler next turned to "rescue" what he termed the "tortured and oppressed" Germans of Czechoslovakia, in point of fact the most democratic state of Central Europe. Of Czechoslovakia's 14 million people, about 3.5 million were Germans. These lived for the most part in the Sudeten area that fringed the western end of the republic, facing German territory to the north, west, and south. The Sudeten Germans, comprising just one of numerous ethnic minorities in Czechoslovakia, had shown little dissatisfaction with their government until 1932, when the Nazi movement first gained some strength among them. From then until 1938, the Sudeten Nazis, led by Konrad Henlein, kept up a growing agitation, first for complete cultural and political autonomy within Czechoslovakia and finally for union with Nazi Germany.

The Czechoslovak government made a succession of compromise offers, but these were one by one rejected by Henlein, who consulted Hitler at

each step. By September 1938 it was evident that nothing less than cession of the Sudetenland to Germany would satisfy the führer. The Czechoslovak government did not propose to yield to dismemberment without putting up a fight. It had a relatively efficient army and a defensible frontier. It also had defensive alliances with France and Soviet Russia. If it were attacked by Germany, and if its allies fulfilled their solemn obligations, a general European war was certain. This would, in all probability, involve England also.

In an effort to find a peaceful settlement for the Sudeten problem, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain paid two visits to Hitler, at Berchtesgaden and at Godesberg, on the Rhine a few miles above Cologne. In the first (15 September 1938) Chamberlain ascertained that the führer would take nothing less than surrender of the Sudetenland to Germany. In the second, a week later, he submitted to Hitler a plan for the prompt and peaceful transfer to Germany of the areas of Czechoslovakia with populations more than 50 percent German, the fixing of the new frontier by an international commission, and an international guarantee of the independence of a Czechoslovakia shorn of these important segments of its territory and population. The Prague government agreed to these terms under combined and relentless British and French pressure.

To Chamberlain's consternation, Hitler rejected this proposal as too slow. Instead he demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Czech military and official civilian personnel from areas that he specified, with plebiscites to follow in other areas where the percentage of German population was doubtful. German troops, he warned, would occupy the specified areas on 1 October, whether or not Czechoslovakia accepted his ultimatum.

Czechoslovakia at once rejected this proposal and mobilized its army of 1.5 million men. France followed with partial mobilization, as did Belgium. France and Britain made it clear that they would assist Czechoslovakia if it were attacked, while Italy announced its intention of standing by its Axis partner. The threat of war was real.

AMERICA HAS A STAKE IN APPEASEMENT

At this point (27 September 1938) U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the picture. Urging Hitler to lay the controversy before an international conference, he added: "Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to all humanity."

Roosevelt also joined with Chamberlain and French Premier Édouard Daladier in a plea to the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to persuade Hitler to accept a peaceful settlement that would give him substantially all he asked for. Hitler yielded to the extent of agreeing to meet with Mussolini and the French and British leaders at Munich. There, on 29 September, Hitler and Mussolini and Chamberlain and Daladier agreed on a plan that the Czech government perforce accepted. It differed little from Hitler's ultimatum of a week before, merely allowing slightly more time for Czech withdrawal from the surrendered area. The American contribution to the crisis was confined to a message from Roosevelt reminding all the European powers concerned of their solemn obligation under the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) not to go to war with one another. The Soviet Union was not invited. In any case, it was assumed that war had been averted. Prime Minister Chamberlain told the people of England that he had brought back "peace with honour," adding, "I believe it is peace in our time."

Two Czechoslovak diplomats summoned to Munich were held overnight under Gestapo guard and confronted on the morning of 30 September with what the great powers had done. Prague was forced to give in to the pact's terms. Jan Masaryk, son of the founding father of the Czech Republic, warned Britain and France, "If you have sacrificed my nation to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you. But if not, gentlemen, God help your souls!"

The Wehrmacht was to be allowed to take over the German-speaking frontier area of Czechoslovakia during the first ten days of October with all the military installations it contained. What was left of the republic was to be placed under some kind of indeterminate guarantee, never enacted.

The Munich pact was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy over war, and Chamberlain returned home to a hero's welcome. Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin at the time of the conference, later wrote that "it was solely thanks to Mr. Chamberlain's courage and pertinacity that a futile and senseless war was averted." He wrote to his prime minister, saying, "Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having

saved their sons from the horrors of war." The *London Times* reported that "No conqueror returning from a victory on a battlefield has come home adorned with nobler laurels." Americans greeted the Munich settlement with profound relief that war had been avoided. Thus, the American government and people at this time obviously favored appeasement with Hitler as the alternative to war.

As Hitler violated his pledges and anti-Semitic outrages multiplied in Germany, Roosevelt publicly voiced disapproval. He recalled the American ambassador after the violent *Kristallnacht* ("night of broken glass" on 9–10 November 1938) in Germany, a wave of anti-Jewish riots and stringent repressive measures that followed the assassination of a German diplomat in Paris by a Jew.

Hitler fully reciprocated American dislike and recalled his ambassador. He viewed the United States as a racial mixture that could not even cope with the economic depression. The United States, with its political weakness and degenerate culture, he told his intimates in 1938, would prove no match for German will. The United States was too impotent to fight and would not go beyond meaningless moral gestures in international affairs. The German military shared his opinion. Using "racial arithmetic," Hitler concluded that the polyglot United States was held together only by the glue of 20 million superior Anglo-Saxons or 60 million of valuable racial stock, therefore Germany, with its larger population of Aryans, was far more powerful. America's neutrality laws in the 1930s merely strengthened his contempt.

The Munich settlement proved to be but the prelude to the complete extinction of Czechoslovakia as an independent nation. Hungary and Poland demanded and received slices of Czech territory where Magyars and Poles were numerous. As a result of the crisis, Hitler annexed to Germany more than 3 million Germans of the Sudeten region. Politically, Hitler's success broke the back of the "Little Entente"(the alliance system of smaller states that sought to preserve the central European status quo as established by the Versailles system), gutted the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, and made the Third Reich easily the dominant power in the continent.

Internal dissension between Czechs and Slovaks in March 1939 afforded Hitler the final pretext for taking control of the destinies of those two ethnic divisions of the former republic. Hitler summoned President Emil Hácha to Berlin and induced him to "place the fate of the Czech people . . . trustingly in the hands of the Führer," who presumably guaranteed "an autonomous development of its national life corresponding to its peculiarities." On 15 March, Bohemia and Moravia became a German protectorate, which was promptly occupied by German troops. The Czech army offered no resistance. The disappearance of Czechoslovakia demonstrated Hitler's readiness to extend his claims beyond "racial" areas and base them on the Reich's needs for *Lebensraum,* or "living area."

Hitler had declared at Munich: "This [Sudetenland] is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe." His absorption of Czechoslovakia had given the lie to that declaration, and by April 1939 he was pressing Poland for consent to annexation of the free city of Danzig and a sort of German corridor across the Polish corridor to give Germany freer access to East Prussia. By this time even Chamberlain had lost faith in Hitler's promises. He abruptly abandoned appeasement and, with France, gave guarantees of aid against aggression to Poland and later to Romania and to Greece, the latter threatened by Italy's occupation of Albania. Geography would make it difficult to implement these guarantees effectively, but they at least served notice on the Axis powers that further aggression against their small neighbors would mean war with the great western democracies.

On 1 September, German forces, led by mechanized divisions and supported by overwhelming airpower, invaded Poland. Two days later, making good their pledge, Great Britain and France declared war against Hitler's Germany. World War II had at last begun. Appeasement was finished.

THE MUNICH LEGACY

The very term "Munich" has since become synonymous with a typical example of dishonorable appeasement, that is, a situation when the vital interests of a nation are bartered away in return for minor concessions or none at all. Appeasement, according to this line of argument, may often result from national weakness or, worse, ignorance either from an inability to fight or a fundamental misconception of reality. In the case of Czechoslovakia, interests were literally given away without any concessions being extracted from Germany. This occurred because Great Britain and France were not militarily or economically prepared to fight another war, nor

were they psychologically prepared to fight for causes that, although just, did not affect them personally. Prime Minister Chamberlain summarized public opinion to Parliament prior to leaving for the Munich Conference, pointing out "how horrible, fantastic, incredible that we should be digging trenches . . . here because of a quarrel in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing." Furthermore, Chamberlain was motivated by a belief that by conceding to the demands of a minority people who wished to be reunited with their traditional nation, he would be able to avoid war and achieve "peace with honour."

The Munich agreement soon became the archetype of failure of will in the face of moral confrontation, turning firmness into an essential virtue in the conduct of foreign policy. Statesmen, for fear of being called "Munichеers," have since been encouraged to go to the brink of war in the hope that by adopting an inflexible position, the aggressor will be forced to go to retreat. This outlook has been pervasive in the American political world since World War II. As Telford Taylor points out in his seminal work *Munich: The Price of Peace* (p. xvi), "Munich has become a standard weapon in the dialectic of politics," but always in a pejorative sense.

AMERICA'S MUNICH GENERATION

It is impossible to understand American politics and diplomacy since Munich without understanding the intellectual world of those Americans who came to maturity in the interwar period. These were the same politicians, policymakers, and diplomats who had experienced the disillusionment of the Versailles system and the folly of isolationism. They had struggled through the Great Depression, which had reduced half of America's population to penury. They witnessed the rise of communism (with its forced collectivization and purges), fascism, and nazism. They recoiled from the West's abandonment of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938 under the aegis of appeasement and were dragged into the second world war of their lifetime, the death toll this time probably reaching 60 million, including 6 million murdered Jews.

They also perceived a shrinking world in which war and peace were judged indivisible—the hard lesson of Munich, learned on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The analogy shaped a generation of diplomacy. Moreover, modern warfare, with its awful weapons of death and destruction and the equally awful contemplation that they could be delivered anywhere with impunity, caused the majority of Americans to rethink past policies and their role in the world. The usually cautious American public placed its faith in the collective security of the fledgling United Nations. The fact that the UN would not or could not play this promised role produced the moment of truth: Would the United States play the keeper of the balance of power? The answer would prove to be yes, launching what W. W. Rostow once described as the "American Diplomatic Revolution."

In 1938 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been unwilling to involve America in another war, and so had done little to strengthen British and French resolve at the Munich Conference. When Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the United States reacted with shock and anger. The U.S. ambassador to Italy later recalled how he had expressed America's dissatisfaction with Germany's actions. He told the Italian minister for foreign affairs that "Hitler's performance had greatly shocked American public opinion and that . . . the brutal methods employed by Hitler in seizing Bohemia and Moravia by armed force had created a profound impression on the United States." Thus, when Hitler finished off Czechoslovakia, the United States lost all hope it had held of appeasement preventing war. The ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, wrote to the secretary of state describing the feeling there: "The invasion of Czechoslovakia ends definitely all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. . . . There is only regret that Hitler's action has ended the period when it was still possible to hope that constructive diplomatic action might maintain peace." It became clear that war was imminent and that the policy of appeasement had failed.

By the time war came to America, Roosevelt had fully learned the harsh lesson of appeasement. In his Christmas Eve "fireside chat" of 1943, he assured the public that while the allies stuck together "there will be no possibility of an aggressor nation arising to start another world war. . . . For too many years we lived on pious hopes that aggressor and warlike nations would learn and understand and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary peace. The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments of former years did not work." From this moment on, American presidents would time and again refer to Munich and the appeasement policies of the 1930s as the prime example of what to avoid in the future.

Munich was also an example of what had to be avoided during an election. During the 1944 presidential campaign, American journalists and politicians alike predicted that Roosevelt would lose many votes because of his presumably conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet Union. The Republican Party actually campaigned against the Roosevelt administration's "appeasement" policies, arguing for a tougher stance against the "communist threat." This trend continued throughout the decade, as shown by a March 1946 poll in which 71 percent of the public disapproved of the administration's policy toward Russia, while 60 percent considered their policies toward the Soviets as "too soft."

THE COLD WAR

After Roosevelt's death in April 1945, the incoming Truman administration was equally concerned with avoiding the experiences of the 1930s. President Harry S. Truman and his advisers believed that in order to avoid the mistakes of the previous decade, they had to resist the "totalitarian" Soviet Union before its appetite and power increased. In the postwar period this attitude emerged when the administration was faced with the issue of whether to share the secret of the atomic bomb with the Soviet Union or retain control for as long as possible. In arguing against sharing any knowledge with the Soviets, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal stated that "it seems doubtful that we should endeavor to buy their understanding and sympathy. We tried that once with Hitler. There are no returns on appeasement." The Munich analogy was invoked to emphasize the futility of treating as reasonable an immoral and irrational adversary.

Another instance in which the Munich analogy came into play was the debate over the control of the Turkish Straits in August 1946. The Soviet Union proposed a joint system of control and defense by a body composed of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers, instead of Turkey retaining complete control. This proposal was met with alarm by the U.S. State Department, which saw this as an example of what was to become known as the "domino theory." This situation reminded politicians of the tumbling European dominoes of the 1930s. With loss of control in one area of Asia, the Soviet Union might move into other areas, increasing its strength along the way, which would only mean that the United States would have to fight communism later and under less favorable conditions. The Soviet Union could only be checked by employing a policy of containment, the rough intellectual outlines of which had been developed by George F. Kennan during and immediately after the war. As interpreted by Paul H. Nitze, Kennan's successor as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, containment meant essentially a policy that sought to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system so that the Kremlin could be brought to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards. A key feature of containment envisaged the United States dealing with the Soviets from the position of strength. "In the concept of 'containment,'" noted Nitze, "the maintenance of a strong military posture is an ultimate guarantee of national security and as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of containment." To Nitze, there was no substitute for the maintenance of superior force: "Without superior aggregate military strength, in being ready and mobilizable, a policy of 'containment'—which is in effect a policy of calculated or gradual coercion—is no more than a bluff."

The "lesson" of Munich, therefore, was to encourage firmness at all costs, even the risk of war. "Containing" Joseph Stalin was at the heart of America's Cold War.

THE KOREAN WAR

The best example of the manner in which the Munich analogy came to grip the minds of Truman and his advisers was the decision of the president to intervene in Korea in 1950. This is striking because the U.S. government completely changed its policy toward Korea on the basis of parallels between this situation and that of the 1930s. Prior to North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, the United States had followed a policy of avoiding military engagement in the Korean Peninsula. This was mainly because American policymakers believed that Korea lay outside the "defense perimeter" of the United States and was relatively unimportant to its national security. Even at the beginning of June, American policy was to avoid sending military forces to Korea. This was the consistent position

AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT REMEMBERS

George F. Kennan was director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department from 1947 to 1949. In his book *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (1960), he wrote about the Munich agreement:

"Throughout that summer of 1938, the Nazi buildup against Czechoslovakia proceeded apace; and in September there occurred the celebrated Munich crisis which rocked Europe to its foundations. With the details of this crisis—Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Bad Godesberg, his later dramatic flight to Munich, his concession that Hitler should have the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia, the Czech capitulation, the fall and flight of the Czech government, the occupation by the Germans of a large part of Bohemia and Moravia, and the reduction of what was left of the Czechoslovak Republic to the condition of a defenseless dependency of Germany—with all this, we are familiar. European history knows no more tragic day than that of Munich. I remember it well; for I was in Prague at the time, and I shall never forget the sight of the people weeping in the streets as the news of what had occurred came in over the loud-speakers.

"The Munich agreement was a tragically misconceived and desperate act of appeasement at the cost of the Czechoslovak state, performed by Chamberlain and the French premier, Daladier, in the vain hope that it would satisfy Hitler's stormy ambition, and thus secure for Europe a peaceful future. We know today that it was unnecessary—unnecessary because the Czech defenses were very strong, and had the Czechs decided to fight they could have put up considerable resistance; even more unnecessary because the German generals, conscious of Germany's relative weakness at that moment, were actually prepared to attempt the removal of Hitler then and there, had he persisted in driving things to the point of war. It was the fact that the Western powers and the Czechoslovak government did yield at the last moment, and that Hitler once again achieved a bloodless triumph, which deprived the generals of any excuse for such a move. One sees again, as so often in the record of history, that it sometimes pays to stand up manfully to one's problems, even when no certain victory is in sight."

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one that was twice considered by the National Security Council and twice approved by the president. Furthermore, during his famous National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950, the secretary of state, Dean Acheson, made this position plain.

The North Korean invasion changed policy dramatically. This was primarily because President Truman perceived the invasion as analogous to the aggressive actions of Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s. Truman stated that when he first heard the news of the North Korean invasion his first thought was of the 1930s. He wrote:

> I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act, it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier. . . . If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on a second world war.

Not only the president equated North Korean actions with those of the Nazis. The *Washington Post*, *Baltimore Sun*, *New York Herald Tribune*, and *New York Times* all alluded to the appeasement of the 1930s in their editorials on Korea. In the House of Representatives, Democrat Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut asked, "What difference is there in the action of North Korea today and the actions which led to the Second World War? Talk about parallels!"

By classifying the Korean invasion as comparable to the aggressive actions of Hitler in the 1930s, Truman and his associates were led to the conclusion that in order to avoid the "appeasement" of the 1930s and Munich, they had to act to protect the lesser power from this aggression. Refusal to repel aggression would be nothing but appeasement. And appeasement, as history allegedly had shown, would ultimately lead to war.

The analogy with Munich would continue to be cited during the Korean War. Truman used it time and again to reassure the public of the continuing need for U.S. troops to be stationed in Korea. In December 1950, the first year of the war, Truman assured the country that "We will continue to take every honorable step we can to avoid general

war. . . . But we will not engage in appeasement. . . . The world learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement." Critics who charged that the government was not employing sufficient force to counter the threat in Korea also used the analogy. The specter of Munich overshadowed everything. For example, Republican Senator William F. Knowland criticized the government, stating, "Talk of seating the Reds in the UN is appeasement. Talk of establishing a neutral zone in Korea is appeasement. Waiting around for Mao Zedong to become Tito is appeasement."

In November 1950, Chinese "volunteers" entered the war and the Munich analogy began to take on the form of the argument that failure to wage total war was appeasement itself. General Douglas MacArthur, in charge of the United Nations forces in Korea, used this argument forcefully to criticize his own government as well as that of the British, taunting them with allegations of appeasement. When the British began to consider creating a demilitarized zone south of the Yalu River, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned MacArthur that his war objectives might be altered "in the interests of pursuing negotiations with the Chinese." MacArthur denounced this "widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by giving them a strip of Northern Korea." He once again used the Munich analogy to remind the U.S. government that its credibility would suffer unless it stood firm on this issue. "Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia and render untenable our position both politically and military." Even more inflammatory was MacArthur's statement following a remark by British Prime Minister Ernest Bevin that the "young" nation, America, needed sage advice, gained by experience, from Britain. MacArthur retorted that he "needed no lessons from the successors of Neville Chamberlain." MacArthur played the Munich analogy for all it was worth, and eventually he discovered the consequences of pushing the analogy too far: in April 1951, after months of sparring, Truman fired him.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The outbreak of the Korean War and the American reaction to it, more than any other single event, crystallized the Cold War mentality that had been more or less in a state of fluidity from 1945 to 1950. As part of this process, American understanding and appreciation of the realities and aspirations of Indochina were transformed. With the North Korean invasion across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, Indochina came to be seen mainly as an aspect of the larger problem of coping with the communist conquest of the Free World by the Soviets and Chinese. Or, as Truman put it: "We were seeing a pattern in Indo-China timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a challenge to the Western world . . . a challenge by the Communists alone, aimed at intensifying the smouldering and anti-foreign feeling among most Asian peoples."

The Cold War paradigm that portrayed the Indochina conflict as but a functional aspect of worldwide communist aggression was passed on intact to the Eisenhower administration. The Korean War, argued President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was "clearly part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pursuing in Indo-China." And, conversely, the working out of a settlement of the Korean War would presumably have a lasting impact on Indochina as well as on other nations in the region. In this way, then, the American fear of another Munich carried over into the Eisenhower administration.

In 1954 the administration feared that the Geneva Conference called to discuss the future of Korea and the division of Indochina would turn into "another Munich." An armistice had been signed in Korea the previous year, but new concerns had arisen over the eight-year war in Indochina between France and the French Union and the communist-led Viet Minh resistance movement. The conference was arranged by Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France and was also attended by countries with an interest in the issue, including the People's Republic of China.

The United States was exceptionally hostile to any negotiation with Beijing. The Americans, especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, described the talks as "phoney" and "unpalatable" because they represented the "psychology of appeasement." Dulles was obsessed with the seating arrangements at the conference and even refused to shake hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. Because Dulles equated Geneva with the Munich Conference he was determined to be firm whatever the outcome.

The United States has been roundly criticized for its behavior at the Geneva Conference. The delegation was so opposed to negotiations before the conference started that they even

attempted to sabotage efforts to reach any political settlement. As Richard H. Immerman observed:

> If by these actions it exacted some concessions from the Communists, they were limited and more than offset by the strains they placed on the western alliance. If by resisting compromise and dissociating the United States from the result officials managed to avoid the label "appeaser," they cost America countless hearts and minds, particularly those in the third world. Worst of all, by refusing to sanction the elections, Washington signaled the diplomacy—and international law—were not substitutes for force.

The American attitude was simply that any concession amounted to capitulation, for by this time the American political culture had come to equate all forms of negotiation with appeasement at Munich. The United States finally refused to sign the Geneva agreement, which divided Vietnam along the Seventeenth Parallel and promised elections in 1956 to unify the country under one government. When President Eisenhower returned from the conference, he gave the usual speech at the airport immediately upon his arrival. Although it was raining, Vice President Richard M. Nixon was adamant that Eisenhower should not carry an umbrella, lest the nation and the media be reminded of Neville Chamberlain and his famous umbrella.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The 1960s provided a classic situation in which the Munich analogy was called into play. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy pointedly used the analogy in his speech of 22 October 1962, when he announced that he would implement a quarantine on communist Cuba in response to the discovery that the Soviet Union had been placing offensive weapons there. Explaining his decision, the president reminded the nation that "the 1930s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war." The transcripts of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) show that the Munich analogy was extensively used in governmental discussions during the crisis. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which the president explained that he was leaning toward implementing a blockade rather than more aggressive military action, General Curtis LeMay exclaimed: "This blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don't see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich." The president was at a loss for words.

The lessons of Munich had particular meaning for Kennedy. His father, Joseph Kennedy, had been Roosevelt's ambassador to Britain at the time of the Munich Conference, and John Kennedy had been a twenty-one-year-old university student. The elder Kennedy had been a longtime supporter of Britain's policy of appeasement and continued to be throughout the war. John Kennedy, however, formed his own beliefs with the coming of World War II. He disagreed with appeasement so fervently that his honors thesis at Harvard was entitled "Appeasement at Munich." This was published after his graduation under the title *Why England Slept* (1940) and became a best-seller. The book argued that appeasement was a weak policy that the United States should avoid at all costs. One can therefore imagine the effect on Kennedy of being labeled a "Munichee."

This damaging term was also applied to Kennedy's ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, in the wake of the crisis. There had been a confrontation during talks before the crisis on what to do about the Soviet threat. Stevenson had suggested that the president "should consider offering to withdraw from the Guantánamo naval base as part of a plan to demilitarize, neutralize and guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba . . . [and offer] to remove the Jupiter [missiles in Turkey] in exchange for the Russian missiles from Cuba." Kennedy vehemently disagreed with these proposals, saying that this was not the right time for concessions that could divide the allies and sacrifice their interests.

Stevenson's suggestion met with a strong reaction from other members of ExCom, leading to the subsequent charge that Stevenson had "wanted a Munich." This accusation appeared in a postmortem article by the journalist Joseph Alsop, who attributed the statement to a "non-admiring official." It turned out that President Kennedy was actually the "non-admiring official" whose comments were used to discredit Stevenson. As a result, the article made Stevenson's arguments for trading the Turkish bases seem less rational than they really were. This charge of being a "Munichee" was especially damaging to Stevenson's political reputation. The irony, of course, was that the Jupiter missiles did play a secret role in resolving the crisis.

THE VIETNAM WAR

The Munich analogy was increasingly used by Washington to justify various actions during the Vietnam War. In 1954, when the French were nearing defeat in Vietnam, Eisenhower considered sending additional aid to supplement the economic aid already being supplied. In fact, by this stage, the United States was already funding three-quarters of the cost of the war but had not actually intervened militarily. Eisenhower considered this move and sought British support to use U.S. air and naval power in Indochina. In a letter to Winston Churchill, he used the Munich analogy in order to persuade the British to support American actions: "If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?"

That John F. Kennedy thought and acted upon the same assumptions can hardly be open to question. In his words:

> Viet-Nam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the Keystone of the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the red tide of Communism overflowed into Viet-Nam. . . . Moreover, the independence of Free Viet-Nam is crucial to the free world in fields other than military. Her economy is essential to the economy of all of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia—and indeed the world.

For these reasons, added Kennedy, "the fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy . . . depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation."

Under Kennedy, the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam increased steadily, reaching some 14,500 before the end of 1963. Technically, they were engaged only in transportation, training, and advice, but these activities invariably exposed them to combat. Few questioned why they were there.

It was not until the advent of the Johnson administration, however, that the Munich analogy came into its own. President Lyndon B. Johnson and his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, considered Munich to be the most important historical lesson of their time. Remembering Munich, they saw weakness overseas as leading to World War III. Johnson explained, "Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression." Rusk was equally attuned to the lessons of the 1930s, which he described as the realization that "aggression must be dealt with wherever it occurs and no matter what mask it may wear. . . . The rearmament of the Rhineland was regarded as regrettable but not worth a shooting war. Yet after that came Austria, and after Austria came Czechoslovakia. Then Poland. Then the Second World War."

This belief in the applicability of the Munich analogy to his situation led Johnson to increase troop levels, first to 300,000 and then to 500,000 by 1968. At a National Security Council meeting in July 1965 to discuss an increase in troops, an exchange occurred between Undersecretary of State George Ball, who was opposed to committing more men, and the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge rebutted Ball's arguments, explaining that "I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don't go in. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich?" No one present at the meeting questioned this statement. Even McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser who often criticized others for using inaccurate analogies, did not comment. The administration's policymakers were convinced of the appropriateness of the analogy to their own situation in Vietnam, and often reminded one another of this fact. Even former president Eisenhower resorted to the analogy in advising Johnson in 1965. He warned the president not to be convinced by Britain's arguments for negotiation. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, he said, "has not had experience with this kind of problem. We, however, have learned that Munichs win nothing."

Most important, the Johnson administration used the analogy to convince the public that its Southeast Asia policy was appropriate. A government film produced in 1965 entitled *Why Vietnam?* contained flickering images of Neville Chamberlain at Munich throughout the film. Further, when announcing his decision to send combat troops to Vietnam in March 1965, Johnson explained to the public: "Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed . . . bringing with it

perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we learned from the lessons of history."

In the same year, Johnson argued that defeat in South Vietnam "would encourage those who seek to conquer all free nations within their reach. . . . This is the dearest lesson of our time. From Munich until today we have learned that to yield to aggression brings only greater threats." Worse yet, a new wave of McCarthyism might pose rhetorical questions about how Vietnam was lost.

Similarly, Richard M. Nixon's policy of détente with the Soviet Union and China failed appreciably to alter the image of Vietnam as a vital test case and an aspect of a larger problem. "An American defeat in Viet-Nam," declared Nixon on 8 May 1972, in a message to the American people explaining his decision to mine the entrances to North Vietnamese ports, "would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world. . . . Small nations, armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will, in the Mid-East, in Europe and other areas."

No change was to be expected in the attitude of Gerald Ford's administration. In his formal and foredoomed request to Congress in early 1975 for continued military aid to South Vietnam (and Cambodia), President Ford reminded his recent colleagues that "U.S. unwillingness to provide adequate assistance to allies fighting for their lives would seriously affect our credibility as an ally." Saigon fell on 30 April. The collapse of South Vietnam together with the defeat of the pro-Western forces in Cambodia and subsequently in Laos marked the end of American influence in the area. For some, it came as no real surprise, for others, there were no words to explain it. The Munich analogy, in time, gave way to the "Vietnam syndrome," which led many Americans to question the wisdom of using military power at all.

REAGAN, BUSH, AND THE GULF WAR

President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy perspective was clearly the product of the past. Reagan's mental pictures of the world had been formed when the Nazi storm was gathering in Europe and Imperial Japan was on the march in China. He viewed the world through 1930s eyes, and he learned his generation's lesson that unwillingness to confront aggression invariably invited war. For him, the very word "appeasement" connoted surrender. President Reagan often invoked the image of Munich in order to belittle the critics of his Nicaraguan policies as "appeasers" of the Sandinistas. His administration had used Nicaraguan rebels, the contras, to pressure and ultimately cause the overthrow of the legitimate Sandinista regime. He was supported in this by the ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who argued in 1985 that the Munich analogy was appropriate in this case.

Reagan frequently made use of the Munich analogy during his presidency. In a March 1983 address before the Evangelist Society about the threat of Marxist-Leninism, he criticized the "historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. . . . We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s." He cautioned that "if history teaches us anything, it teaches that simpleminded or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly." In August 1983 he told the American Legion that "Neville Chamberlain thought of peace as a vague policy in the 1930s, and the result brought us closer to World War II. History teaches us that by being strong and resolute we can keep the peace." Throughout its eight years, the Reagan administration bargained from a position of strength, at great cost to the public purse, to prove its point.

President George H. W. Bush relied heavily upon the Munich analogy in his speeches during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, which ultimately led to the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Munich was the perfect example in this case, and Bush used it to argue that to forget the lessons of appeasement would be to betray the sacrifices made in World War II. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Bush invoked World War II to reinforce his message of intervention. The United States, he said, had to stand "where it always has—against aggression, against those who would use force to replace the rule of law." The Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein particularly was linked to Hitler, to reinforce the necessity of standing up to dictators. "Half a century ago, the world had the chance to stop a ruthless aggressor and missed it. I pledge to you: We will not make the same mistake again."

Possibly because the Vietnam syndrome had come to overshadow all foreign policy, Bush needed a historical analogy that would convince the American public that this was the fight worth fighting to the end. In doing so, Bush tried to avoid parallels between the Gulf crisis and Vietnam, which carried the stigma of a protracted and unwinnable involvement in a foreign war, by using Munich as the relevant analogy. When Bush announced that he was sending forces to Saudi Arabia, he reminded the country that "a half century ago our nation and the

world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should and could have been stopped. We're not about to make that mistake twice."

Bush invoked the Munich analogy to persuade other nations that the world would be even more dangerous if the United States were to refuse to fight, and also used it when he praised the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for condemning the Iraqi invasion. He said that this demonstrated "that nations which joined to fight aggression in the Second World War can work together to stop the aggressors of today." Consequently, the construction of a narrative in which Munich, not Vietnam, served as the perfect unifying symbol struck just the right chord.

CONCLUSION

Political leaders have used the Munich analogy to justify what they believe is critical foreign intervention and to remind the public of its obligations to defend liberty. They also have used it to divert attention away from thorny "public relations" problems such as the Vietnam War syndrome and even to discredit critics. In fact, the "lesson" of Munich has continued to be relevant even in the present, as each generation ostensibly seeks to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors. Just as the leaders of the 1930s learned much from World War I, post–World War II and Cold War leaders learned much from Munich: the consequences of futile good intentions. And while leaders of the twenty-first century may not fully comprehend the process whereby the Munich agreement became the prologue to the even greater tragedy of World War II, they do seem unlikely to dismiss it from their realm of political discourse. As Donald N. Lammers reminds us in *Explaining Munich*, "Taken one way or another, Munich has become the great 'object lesson' of our age."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abel, Elie. *The Missiles of October: The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*. London, 1966.

Beck, Robert J. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered." *International Security* 14 (1989): 161–191.

Cannon, Lou. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime*. New York, 1991.

Fry, Michael G., ed. *History, the White House, and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians*. London, 1991. Depicts historical knowledge as one of the basic intellectual resources used by statesmen habitually if unevenly.

Graebner, Norman A. *Roosevelt and the Search for a European Policy, 1937–1939*. Oxford, 1980. A realist critique of FDR's policies.

Henderson, Nevile. *Failure of a Mission: Berlin, 1937–1939*. London, 1940.

Immerman, Richard H. "The U.S. and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look." *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990): 51–74.

Kennan, George F. *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*. New York, 1962. An important American perspective.

Khong, Yuen Foong. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton, N.J., 1992. The best available introduction to the subject of analogizing history.

Kiewe, Amos. *The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric*. Westport, Conn., 1994.

Lammers, Donald N. *Explaining Munich: The Search for Motive in British Policy*. Stanford, Calif., 1966. Doubts that a desire to destroy Soviet Russia played a role in British calculations.

May, Ernest R. *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. New York, 1973. Argues that policymakers often use history badly.

May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikov. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, Mass., 1997.

Medhurst, Martin J., and H. W. Brands, eds. *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*. College Station, Tex., 2000. Writings by historians and communications scholars on Cold War discourse.

Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*. New York, 1986.

Noguères, Henri. *Munich or the Phoney Peace*. Translated from the French by Patrick O'Brien. London, 1963. Critical discussion of the French role at Munich.

Public Papers of President John F. Kennedy, 1962. Washington, D.C., 1964.

Robbins, Keith. *Munich 1938*. London, 1968. Argues that there are no great "lessons" to be learned from Munich.

Rostow, W. W. *The American Diplomatic Revolution*. Oxford, 1946.

Rystad, Göran. *Prisoners of the Past? The Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era*. Lund, 1982.

Shepardson, Donald E. "Munich Reconsidered." *Midwest Quarterly* 23 (1981): 78–102.

Siracusa, Joseph M. *Into the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of the Cold War.* Claremont, Calif., 1998. Argues that American Cold War politicians, policymakers, and diplomats were greatly influenced by the events of the interwar period.

Small, Melvin, and Otto Feinstein, eds. *Appeasing Fascism.* Lanham, Md., 1991.

Taylor, Andrew J., and John T. Rourke. "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process." *Journal of Politics* 57 (1995): 460–468. A useful survey.

Taylor, Telford. *Munich: The Price of Peace.* Garden City, N.Y., 1979. A defense of Chamberlain's appeasement policy.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939.* Washington, D.C., 1956.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. "Munich After 50 Years." *Foreign Affairs* 67 (1988): 165–178.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy.* London, 1966. Classic treatment of Munich, from a British perspective.

See also ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM.

Narcotics Policy

William O. Walker III

Efforts to control the production of and traffic in illicit drugs, commonly referred to as "the war on drugs," seem like a relatively recent phenomenon. The visibility of struggles since the late 1970s against drug organizations, or "cartels," based in the prosperous Colombian cities of Cali and Medellín did much to shape that perception. Narcotraffickers, as major figures in the South American drug business are called, were responsible for the influx of powdered cocaine, crack cocaine, and, increasingly since the late 1980s, heroin into the United States.

Public awareness of drug control as an aspect of U.S. foreign policy likely began with Operation Intercept in August 1969. U.S. officials designed Intercept as an intensive effort to curb the flow of marijuana and other drugs from Mexico into California. Within two years, as narcotics like heroin began entering the United States in unprecedented amounts from various points of origin, President Richard M. Nixon had declared a war on drugs, calling them a serious threat to the security of the nation.

The Colombian, Mexican, and other examples illustrate the fact that campaigns to control drugs have a history of their own, unknown though they may be. The impetus for international drug control, commencing at the beginning of the twentieth century, arose from concern among industrialized nations, most notably the United States, about the havoc that drugs could potentially wreak upon society. Alarmed at the incidence of opium smoking in their new colony in the Philippines, U.S. authorities acted to stamp out the practice among the overseas Chinese population. They discontinued Spain's contract system under which Chinese smokers had purchased opium from licensed dens. Surprisingly elimination of the Spanish system actually increased the availability of smoking opium in the islands and led as well to a greater incidence of usage by the Filipinos themselves.

The motivation behind opium prohibition was simultaneously moralistic and economic. In the eyes of reformers and U.S. officials, good Christians only consumed intoxicants like tobacco and alcohol if they consumed any such substances at all. The smoking of opium betokened spiritual degradation if not personal depravity. Moreover, colonials habituated to opium and opiates were deemed unproductive subjects who potentially could weaken a market economy. Drug usage therefore had no place in the American empire or, for that matter, in any colonial setting.

For nearly a century the United States clung to the idea of control at the source as the only possible path to effective drug control. Whether at international parleys or through bilateral and regional diplomatic efforts, U.S. officials steadfastly pursued this goal. At the same time, as this essay demonstrates, drug control did not, indeed could not, exist in a vacuum isolated from other foreign policy concerns. Ultimately this state of affairs meant that control at the source had to give way to competing, often more important, priorities. During World War II, for instance, drug policy reflected the exigencies of global war by encouraging the production of raw narcotic material should it be necessary for the medical needs of the Allies. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. drug control officials frequently subordinated their traditional objectives to larger security considerations. This practice all too often entailed countenancing involvement with illicit drugs by so-called security assets. In the 1990s, as the Cold War ended, efforts by the United States to promote comprehensive drug control abroad became indistinguishable from the very issues of governance and state stability. This was particularly true in the Andes, most notably in Colombia, and to a lesser extent in Mexico.

THE ORIGINS OF DRUG CONTROL

The United States was not the first imperial power to try to halt the consumption of proscribed substances. Spanish authorities in colonial Peru, for instance, reversed their early tolerance of coca chewing, known as *el coqueo,* as they sought to transform indigenous Inca culture and develop a productive workforce to serve Spain's material and spiritual interests. In the process there arose a debate, which continued well into the twentieth century, over whether to prohibit native cultivation and use of coca. Like coca, opium has a complex past that is intermingled with issues of culture and power. The grafting of opium onto the culture of China roughly coincides with the history of the Qing dynasty. Opium smoking, likely enjoyed first by Chinese in Jakarta, Indonesia, evolved out of the habit of tobacco smoking. By the time of the mid-nineteenth century Opium Wars, when the dynasty showed unmistakable signs of instability, opium addiction permeated Chinese society.

The persistence of *el coqueo* among the indigenous people of Peru and the prevalence of opium cultivation and smoking among the very poor in China coincided around 1900 with a wave of reform, or prohibitionist, sentiments in both countries. The War of the Pacific, in which Chile defeated both Peru and Bolivia, lasted from 1879 to 1883 and briefly devastated Peru. Andean Indians endured especially oppressive conditions in the war's aftermath. The prospect of political change and with it, a wide spectrum of social reforms, revitalized Peru after a revolution in 1895. Inevitably some reformers asked whether traditional Indian reliance on coca had a place in modern Peru. Around the same time in Asia, the Qing dynasty came under intense pressure from Confucian scholars and others to implement broad reforms as foreign powers vied with one another to obtain concessions and create spheres of influence. Destroying the opium business became a basic part of the reform agenda in China. Chang Chih-tung, a powerful scholar-official and advocate of reform, wrote, "The development of education is the best medicine to use for the suppression of opium."

DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES

The emergence of a drug culture, usually called a subculture, also occurred during an age of reform in the United States. The Progressive Era, as scholars have characterized the U.S. political scene, began around 1890 and persisted until just after 1920. The reform spirit of the time arose out of a felt need for order and stability amid waves of immigration, the promises and challenges of industrial consolidation, and recurring threats of recession. The historian Richard Hofstadter found that the reformers were responding to real conditions that needed to be addressed in a nation undergoing rapid urbanization. Perhaps more important, he also believed that they were engaged in a quest for meaning in their lives and, hence, were desirous of finding something akin to the sense of mission that had earlier inspired the Civil War generation. Social reform naturally became one of the causes they championed.

To be sure, Americans had inveighed against drink throughout their history, especially since the Jacksonian era. The influx of immigrants, many of whom drank as a matter of course, gave the temperance movement a new urgency in the late nineteenth century. Assimilation through acculturation became the standard by which reformers measured the success of their endeavors to transform immigrants into good Americans.

Moral and social reformers did not limit their evangelism to newcomers. They sought to curb, if not stop, excessive drinking among the male citizenry of the republic and tried to restrict, if not eliminate, the practice of prostitution. Ultimately they turned their attention to the use and abuse of opiates. In their striving to make the United States what is now inaccurately termed a "drug-free" nation, reformers created a deviant class within society. Before reformers singled out and stereotyped casual users and addicts as deviants, though, the educated and the well respected were more likely to use narcotics than members of the working class, who typically drank alcohol because of its comparatively low cost. The medical community, for instance, especially seemed to fall prey to opiate abuse. By the early 1900s researchers feared that middle-class women, young people with time on their hands, and hard-working, progressive professionals would succumb to the temptation of drugs.

The concern that educated whites would find drug use an exhilarating experience had some basis in fact. No less a social reformer than Jane Addams wrote in her account of life at Hull House that she and four classmates had experimented with opium while attending Rockford College. The data are not available to establish the extent of drug abuse or addiction during the Pro-

gressive Era; estimates range widely between one hundred thousand and one million persons. Usage, of course, often remained a secret known only to the user's doctor or druggist. Despite public impressions that addiction was rapidly increasing, consumption may actually have been in decline in the early 1900s. Consequently the reality of a serious drug problem at that time remains open to question.

Even before the inception of progressivism, some reformers in the United States, baffled by the intractability of addiction, associated the prevalence of drugs in America with a foreign presence. These reformers did not directly charge foreigners with causing America's problem with drugs. What they were alleging was rather more sinister. They contended that foreigners, often Asians, and other purveyors of drugs had managed to unlock the worst instincts of the American populace. That is, many Americans were predisposed to surrender themselves to the drug habit "based as it is," in the words of a Massachusetts physician, "upon a [human] craving no laws can eradicate."

It seems evident, therefore, that reformers in several drug producing or consuming countries around the world had a common objective in the early twentieth century: to save from themselves those people living in a culture of drugs. Drug reformers rarely asked whether their basic assumptions about the drug cultures within their societies were accurate. By failing to so inquire, they consigned those subcultures to the margins of society. The ready identification of involvement with drugs as characteristic of a dangerous culture enabled Washington to promote its style of drug control as a desperately needed international goal. In 1903 the governing Philippine Commission failed in its attempt to return to the Spanish contract system in the Philippines. Charles H. Brent, Episcopal bishop of the Philippines and a leading antidrug crusader, declared the entire opium enterprise from import to sale to consumption an unacceptable "social vice . . . a crime."

A report by the Philippine Opium Committee, set up in 1903 to study opium throughout East Asia, had recommended the creation of a government monopoly in the islands. Deriving revenue from opium, critics charged, would make the United States no different from Great Britain, which was still selling chests of Indian opium to the Chinese. Thus the U.S. Congress passed a law in 1905 mandating for the Philippines the total prohibition by 1 March 1908 of all commerce in opium except for governmental and medical purposes. As the law went into effect the opium business went underground, thereby creating not only an illegal drug subculture but also a chronic law enforcement problem.

The inability of law enforcement personnel in the Philippines to curtail the illicit trade in opium allowed the United States to propose a deceptively simple solution to the emerging global drug problem: control at the source. First at Shanghai in 1909 and thereafter at three meetings held at The Hague beginning in 1911, U.S. officials, notably with the help of Chinese reformers, called upon other major powers to control the production and manufacturing of narcotics. How such controls would come about could not easily be agreed upon. The British, for example, were reluctant to put a premature end to the declining Indian trade, and commercial interests in China did not want to surrender a lucrative source of revenue. Asian opium smokers living outside of China understandably feared the loss of accustomed access to their drug.

The Shanghai meeting constituted the opening skirmish in what some analysts have called a new Hundred Years' War: the campaigns to control drugs in the twentieth century. The U.S. delegation, led by Brent and Dr. Hamilton Wright, who was well known for his work in Asia on communicable diseases, knew that mobilizing an anti-opium alliance would be no easy task. The meeting accomplished little more, therefore, than the introduction of the issue of opium control. Great Britain, for its part, continued not unreasonably to doubt China's willingness and ability to prevent the spread of poppy production and opium smoking.

Shanghai did, however, set the stage for additional international meetings and gave Wright and other reformers a basis for insisting that the U.S. Congress pass domestic drug control legislation. Armed with the moral high ground for having put in place a program of strict prohibition in its Asian colony, the United States was determined to accept nothing less than the same from other regional imperial powers, namely the British, the French, and the Dutch. The realities of the economic importance of opium in East and Southeast Asia and the inception of the Great War impeded American plans. Other major nations in attendance at the Hague Opium Conference of 1911–1912 agreed only to take preliminary steps to bring the illicit trade in opium under control.

Meanwhile the United States moved toward passage of its first comprehensive drug control

law, the Harrison Act of 1914. During the first week of the Shanghai meeting the U.S. Congress had prohibited the importation of smoking opium. The limited and, for Wright, disappointing outcome of the meeting at Shanghai convinced him to intensify his efforts on behalf of federal regulation. Only when the United States had in place adequate federal antidrug legislation, he reasoned, could America legitimately ask other nations to follow its lead.

Fears based on race and class clinched the case for federal drug control. America's cultural majority perceived heroin, which was usually taken through subcutaneous injection, and cocaine, a drug reportedly favored by African Americans in the South, as substances that decent people shied away from. By definition those who consumed these drugs were exhibiting antisocial, deviant behavior. Since the American public feared the spread of addiction and its attendant dangerous and often criminal behavior, the advocates of federal control had virtually no trouble making their case.

With scant debate Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act in December 1914. President Woodrow Wilson soon signed it into law, and it took effect on 1 March 1915. This law, typical of the regulatory legislation of its time, promised to promote cultural homogeneity and social stability through the unlikely though quintessentially progressive device of revenue collection. Despite widespread popular support for prohibition, the Harrison law did not cut off access to narcotics any more than imperial edicts in Qing China had eliminated the practice of opium smoking.

THE TROUBLED 1920S AND 1930S

Ironically the domestic successes of drug reformers adversely affected U.S. efforts to promote a global antidrug strategy of control at the source. Expectations in America about how long it would take to put comprehensive controls into effect did not accord with the reality of the situation abroad. Any delay was unconscionable, in the view of some American observers, because the international drug problem had evidently become a grave one. "[S]muggling of narcotics in the United States," lamented Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon in 1921, "is on the increase to such an extent that the customs officers are unable to suppress the traffic to any appreciable extent." The secretary's assertion gave anecdotal credence to unfounded public perceptions about the severity of the drug situation.

The newly created Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (OAC) of the League of Nations took charge of supervising the obligations incurred by the states signatory to the Hague conventions. Private individuals and those government officials who favored strict drug control doubted whether member states as well as the league itself possessed the political will to enact strict drug control measures. An impasse between Washington and Geneva developed during the early 1920s and kept the United States from influencing the work of the OAC until early in the 1930s. The Department of State's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, the bureau responsible for implementing drug policy, had initially hoped to find some way of cooperating with the OAC. In that spirit Dr. Rupert Blue, formerly the U.S. assistant surgeon general, attended the fourth session of the OAC in January 1923. He made it clear in his remarks to the OAC that the United States held both producing and manufacturing states responsible for escalating international drug problems. In Blue's estimation the only recourse was to call for strict controls on production and manufacture. Representative Stephen G. Porter, chairman of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee, who was as adamant as Blue about what U.S. foreign drug policy should be, wrote Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that "an effective remedy [to drug problems] cannot be secured by compromise."

Porter quickly transformed Blue's skepticism about the OAC into outright hostility. In May 1923 at the fifth session of the OAC, Porter refused even to engage in debate about U.S. proposals for immediate, comprehensive controls on manufacturing. In defense of his position, which had caused much consternation at Geneva, he belligerently remarked: "If when I get back to America anybody says 'League of Nations' to me, he ought to say it conveniently near a hospital." Porter's bellicosity was in line with Department of State thinking. Secretary Hughes had made it clear that the nonmedical or nonscientific use of drugs was unacceptable and that global production of narcotics had to be controlled. In so doing, Hughes captured the essence of the dogmatic approach to drug control—control at the source—that the United States has pursued throughout the twentieth century. Hughes once observed: "Unrestricted production leads to uncontrollable consumption, especially when the product enters

international channels." This assessment of the roots of the drug problem in America resulted in February 1924 in a walkout, led by Porter, of the U.S. delegation from the second Geneva Opium Conference, which had been convened to discuss the manufacturing of narcotics. Other states in attendance would not accept without reservations an American-initiated proposal to bring a rapid cessation to the drug business.

Compounding matters, and making multilateral action against drugs difficult to achieve, was the willingness to hold foreigners responsible, if not accountable, for whatever problems impaired U.S. antidrug efforts. The substances that most captured the attention of U.S. officials in the 1920s were opiates and, to a much lesser extent, cocaine and marijuana. Opiate traffic, increasingly in the form of heroin instead of smoking opium, primarily originated in East Asia. Heroin, once believed by some in the medical community to be a cure for morphine addiction, had initially reached a wide audience as a medicine for coughs courtesy of the Bayer chemical company of Germany. A manufactured drug, heroin could be synthesized from morphine fairly easily; as a result, officials could not readily pinpoint the precise origin of the heroin found in the illicit trade.

In the early 1920s drug manufacturing was concentrated among European nations, the United States, and Japan. The U.S. Congress had tried to control the export of manufactured drugs in a section of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922 by requiring exporters of such drugs to possess a proper certificate from the importing country. Congress amended the act in 1924 to prohibit opium importation for the manufacture of heroin. This legislation was meant to serve as a model for other countries but did not prevent the diversion of heroin manufactured outside the United States into illegal international channels.

The reluctance of manufacturing states to accede to controls that would mean a loss of market share turned the attention of the U.S. government to the less economically advanced drug-producing nations. Perhaps surprisingly Washington did not redouble prior efforts to curb opium poppy growth in China. Nor did diplomats serving in the Andes pressure leaders in Peru or Bolivia, where *el coqueo* was an integral part of national culture, to force peasants to stop farming coca. The fall of China after 1915 into a decade of internal strife dominated by regional warlords made efforts to halt poppy growing impossible. Not surprisingly, opium played a vital role in China's economy during the warlord era. As for cocaine, many urban users switched to heroin as a cheaper drug of choice after scarcity and strict enforcement of state laws combined to drive up black-market prices for cocaine. Accordingly U.S. officials encouraged Andean nations to move toward gradual compliance with international agreements relating to coca production. More serious problems lay elsewhere.

It was almost by process of elimination, therefore, that Mexico emerged as the country where U.S. officials hoped to demonstrate that control at the source was possible. Turkey and Persia, as producers of vast quantities of raw opium for both the licit and illicit trade, would also have been suitable candidates for such an effort. Turkey, though, refused to comply with anti-opium agreements until 1932, which rendered diplomatic overtures from Washington useless. Persia, which by 1920 had replaced India in the opium trade with East Asia, depended heavily on opium-based revenue and had a deeply entrenched opium culture of its own, one that transcended class lines. As a result, implementation of international accords by either country was not feasible in the 1920s and early 1930s. Diplomatic efforts to force compliance would almost certainly have failed. Mexico therefore became the proving ground for control at the source.

Mexico's proximity to the United States had rarely served it well. Not only had Mexico lost in war territory that became the states of New Mexico, Arizona, and California, it had also experienced U.S. involvement and intervention in its revolution during the 1910s. On economic and political matters the United States had frequently treated Mexican sovereignty as subordinate to Washington's own national interests. So it would be, commencing in the 1920s, with the issue of drug control.

The United States disdained Mexican sovereignty for several reasons. In the first place many government authorities and private citizens looked upon Mexico's Indian heritage as evidence of an inferior race. To make matters worse in the eyes of their detractors, the people of Mexico were not just inferior; they were unpredictable, an unpardonable trait in the age of progressive reform. In other words, cultural cohesion and political order in Mexico seemed unimaginable to many North Americans. Critics had to look no farther than Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New

Mexico, in March 1916 for incontrovertible proof of this societal failing. Villa's men, rumor had it, steeled themselves for the raid by smoking marijuana; Villa himself reputedly neither smoked marijuana nor drank intoxicating beverages.

Marijuana seemed to be in plentiful supply along the vast open border between the two countries. U.S. officials concluded, not for the last time, that Mexican authorities lacked the political will to fight domestically produced drugs. With the creation of a black market for opiates in the United States following the enactment of the Harrison law, Mexico became an important transit country for illicit substances. Citizens of Yuma, Arizona, appealed in 1924 to the Department of State for help in dealing with the "unbridled vice and debauchery" they contended was plaguing the border region.

Moreover, corruption served to undermine Mexico's drug control efforts into the 1920s. In fact the matter was as much a question of the limits of federal authority as one of corruption, but U.S. critics of Mexico emphasized corruption wherever they seemed to find it. The State Department, predisposed to see corruption by Mexican officials who were believed to harbor Bolshevist sympathies, allowed a 1926 treaty with Mexico for the exchange of information about drugs to lapse after only one year of operation. U.S. consular officials in Ciudad Juárez had long doubted Mexico's good faith about drug control. When authorities in Mexico City dispatched a special agent to the Juárez–El Paso region in 1931, U.S. Consul William P. Blocker commented disdainfully, "The Mexican Government has at last decided to clean up the drug traffic on this section of the border."

That attitude and the coercive diplomacy to which it gave rise would often characterize U.S. antidrug diplomacy, particularly in the Americas, from the 1930s through the 1980s; it tended to ignore not only the historical but also the practical reasons limiting the prospects for control at the source. The blinders that U.S. bureaucrats wore as they endeavored to contend with illegal drug trafficking for more than fifty years made it hard for them to understand why their presumably unobjectionable goals were unattainable.

In contrast to their attitude toward Mexico, U.S. officials did not judge Bolivia, Persia, or China to be models worthy of emulation in the pursuit of control at the source. In the case of Bolivia, folk wisdom had maintained long before the modern era that without coca there would be no Bolivia. The movement toward coca prohibition that surfaced from time to time before 1900 in Peru had made few discernible inroads into Bolivia. For U.S. authorities to presume that they could alter the real economic and symbolic value of Bolivian coca was akin to cultural arrogance. Try they did, however, to influence public policy in Bolivia, although not as overtly as in Mexico. Conferees at the first Opium Conference at The Hague had agreed that drug control could never become a reality unless coca and cocaine were included among the substances being controlled. That determination meant that effective coca control must come to Bolivia. U.S. representatives in La Paz suggested to government officials there that cuts in coca production would indicate Bolivia's willingness to work with the international drug control movement. The effort got nowhere.

At Geneva in 1924 the Bolivian delegate, Arturo Pinto Escalier, said that his government found coca chewing to be "a perfectly innocuous activity." More to the point he identified how vital coca was to maintaining the integrity of Bolivian culture. It would, he had previously told the OAC, "be impossible for the Bolivian Government to contemplate restricting the production of coca leaves without seriously interfering with the needs and economic life of the working population, particularly in mining districts, as coca leaves constitute for them a source of energy which cannot be replaced." The United States would have to look elsewhere for control at the source.

The situation in Persia was also instructive for U.S. policy goals. Prior to the second Geneva Opium Conference, Moshar-ol-Molk, Persian minister for foreign affairs, declared that it would be difficult to establish an international anti-opium movement. The foremost obstacle was economic, even for those states fundamentally in agreement with the strict U.S. objectives. It was "impracticable suddenly to place a prohibition on [the opium business] without . . . the substitution of other products for the production of opium, and the adoption of an appropriate decision whereby the domestic consumption of opium could be gradually stopped."

Persia's request for a program of crop substitution did not catch U.S. officials off guard. Elizabeth Washburn Wright, the widow of Dr. Hamilton Wright, had examined firsthand the opium situation there and became an advocate of increased silk production as a replacement for opium. She made the case for economic diversification in informal conversations with the Depart-

ment of State and in her capacity as an assessor to the Opium Advisory Committee.

A former State Department economic adviser, Arthur C. Millspaugh, who headed the American Financial Mission to Persia from 1922 to 1927, also made the connection between Persia's economic stability and the status of the opium trade. In the course of reorganizing Persia's finances the American mission assumed the task of collecting opium revenues. Millspaugh soon realized that any precipitous change in the opium situation would probably result in economic chaos and political instability. At the urging of the mission Persia indicated its willingness as early as 1923 gradually to reduce dependence on opium, particularly if foreign assistance were forthcoming. No one should underestimate opium's importance, Millspaugh noted, because "irrespective of the revenue which is derived by the Government from it, opium-cultivation in Persia constitutes one of the important agricultural industries, and the only one which makes any substantial contribution to the export trade."

By mid-1926, however, the Persian government, on Millspaugh's advice, had withdrawn an official request for a U.S. loan to help finance the difficult transition from opium to other commodities. U.S. officials had let it be known that they did not want to set a precedent by underwriting such a momentous change. If American banks bailed out Persia's drug-reliant economy, would they do the same for Bolivia or China? What would be the limits of such a potentially open-ended commitment? Also, why would banks invest heavily in an agriculturally based economy like Persia's? Short-term profits were unlikely to flow from the agricultural sectors of the world economy in the 1920s. Nor did the United States, after its withdrawal from the Geneva Opium Conference in 1925, want to be even remotely associated with the work of the league. A league-sponsored commission of inquiry to Persia after the Geneva conference recommended consideration of a crop substitution program. Persia itself, having worked within the confines of Millspaugh's mission since 1922, was increasingly unwilling further to surrender its financial autonomy to foreign control. For the foreseeable future the substitution of other crops for opium remained out of the question in Persia.

As for China, well into the 1920s conditions there were so chaotic that there existed no realistic hope for implementation of controls on opium growing. Even before the death of Yuan Shikai in mid-1916 and the subsequent onset of the warlord period, opium production and consumption was spreading throughout China, as had been the case in the late nineteenth century. British Minister Sir John Jordan, believing that the situation would lead to a desperate quest by the government for a reliable source of revenue, termed a proposal to establish an opium monopoly "a retrograde step." Opium's hold on China precluded the chance for significant reform. To American officials, plans to create a government opium monopoly, which meant adopting and enforcing over time a program of gradual suppression, flew in the face of reason. By the mid-1920s U.S. authorities concluded that gradualism was merely a cover for continuation of the twin vices of opium production and consumption. Making matters worse for proponents of opium control was an apparently successful effort by Japanese nationals to dominate a burgeoning market in North China for illegal morphine.

U.S. appeals to Chinese authorities to control the situation where practicable fell on deaf ears. Having reasserted nominal Republican control of China with the success of the Northern Expedition in 1928, the government of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) thereafter strove to appease Washington while continuing to profit from the trade. Headquartered in Nanking, Kuomintang leaders managed, simply by announcing a policy of suppression, largely to place the blame on Japan for China's opium troubles, many of which were of its own making. This accomplishment was all the more remarkable because of the Kuomintang's intimate ties to the notorious Green Gang of Shanghai, a secret society that dominated the Chinese underworld and by 1930 controlled a great percentage of the illicit trade in smoking opium in South China. Its most notorious figure, Du Yuesheng, headed the local opium suppression bureau at various times. Few knowledgeable foreigners believed that opium suppression would come anytime soon to Shanghai and, hence, to South China.

Japanese adventurism rendered largely irrelevant the actual steps taken against opium by Nationalist China. Herbert L. May of the New York–based Foreign Policy Association remarked in 1926 that the Japanese "were manufacturing drugs on a large scale and the government [in Tokyo] was closing its eyes to what was going on." Like the regional militarists, or *tuchuns,* of China's warlord era, Japanese civilian and military officials in North China and Manchuria were

seeking to profit from the opium and morphine trade. The assassination in June 1928 of Zhang Zuolin helped to expose both Japan's expansionist ambitions in North China and beyond, as well as the role of its Kwantung Army in the opiate business there.

The League of Nations dispatched a Commission of Enquiry to East and Southeast Asia in September 1929 to investigate both opium traffic originating in China and the incidence of opium smoking among resident Chinese outside of China. The commissioners found that local opium cultures created more than a social problem; they created alternative, underground economies that helped to destabilize the political economy of the region. The commission, linking the opium business to the security of nations beyond Asia, predicted further trouble with opium unless China brought production under control. This concern was echoed by delegates and observers attending the Conference for the Suppression of Opium Smoking held at Bangkok in November 1931. The American observer, John Kenneth Caldwell of the Department of State, condemned the smuggling of opiates from East Asia, which he declared was a growing problem for the United States. Nanking's refusal to attend the Bangkok conference underlined the near stranglehold of opium on China.

China's unwillingness to participate at the Bangkok meeting derived in part, though, from the threat to its security posed by the seizure in September of Manchuria by Japan's Kwantung Army. Kuomintang leaders were persuaded that they would need all the resources they could muster, including those purchased by revenues from the opium trade, in order to contain Japan's advance into North China. In that sense the Mukden Incident, which precipitated the taking of Manchuria by Japan, allowed Chiang Kai-shek to continue to use opium revenues for his own political and economic purposes while at the same time blaming Japanese military forces for poisoning China with narcotics.

The United States, though suspicious of the Kuomintang's motives where opium suppression was concerned, increasingly supported China in its dispute with Japan over opium. The adoption of a tougher stand against Japan came with the appointment of Stuart J. Fuller to the position of narcotics chief in the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Fuller had served in the 1920s as a consular official in Tanjin where he observed the growth of Japanese involvement with the narcotics trade in North China. Fuller's antinarcotic zeal was matched by that of Harry J. Anslinger, a onetime State Department official who had become commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) with the creation of the bureau in 1930. Importantly, unlike their predecessors they were able to put aside tactical differences with the OAC and turn the League of Nation's efforts against drugs toward the larger American policy goals of drug control at the source and improved interdiction of the illicit narcotics traffic.

Under the obvious fiction of a suppression movement, opium production, consumption, and addiction worsened in Nationalist China. U.S. military attaché Colonel Joseph W. Stillwell succinctly summed up the situation when he observed, "Opium is the chief prop of all power in China, civil and military." U.S. reaction to conditions in China was remarkably muted. Fuller, U.S. ambassador Nelson T. Johnson, and Anslinger evidently believed that Chiang would turn against the traffic as soon as it was in his interest to do so. They therefore began to hold Japan to a stricter measure of accountability than China. Johnson wrote Fuller in March 1934 that the Japanese "have no moral scruples when it comes to opium or the use of the gun or the sword."

Even though Fuller actually did criticize China before the OAC in May 1936, he saved his strongest language for Japan. "Let us face facts," he intoned, "where Japanese influence advances in the Far East, what goes with it? Drug traffic." One year later, as tensions were mounting between China and Japan, he told the OAC that conditions in Japanese-occupied areas of North China were "appalling and beyond description." Yet neither in North China nor in Manchukuo were conditions quite what Fuller and other critics of Japan claimed them to be, either before or immediately after the inception of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. The reality of the situation scarcely mattered, however, to critics of Japanese expansion. To some observers the battle against drugs in North China was bigger than a mere defense of security. "Humanity," stated the *South China Morning Post,* "has come to rely heavily upon American aid in the war on drugs."

The characterization of American drug policy as a war on drugs precisely captured the spirit of what Fuller and Anslinger were trying to achieve in the 1930s through participation at OAC meetings and by means of bilateral diplomacy. In assessing the threat posed by drugs the

two Americans viewed traffickers and producers of drugs as criminals who, in their most heinous incarnation, were also mortal enemies of the state.

Anslinger later wrote about the use of opium as a weapon of war in occupied China: "The Japanese had coldly calculated its devastating value as forerunner to an advancing army; long before the steel missiles began to fly, opium pellets were sent as a vanguard of the military attack." The inception of general war in Europe in September 1939 served to intensify American efforts to expose Japanese dependence on opiates as a way of maintaining order in their budding empire on the mainland. When the Pacific War spread to include the United States after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics chief declared in January 1942: "We in the Treasury Department have been in a war against Japanese narcotics policy for more than ten years. . . . We have experienced Pearl Harbors many times in the past in the nature of dangerous drugs from Japan which were meant to poison the blood of the American people."

In slightly more than a decade narcotics had become inseparable from the security of Washington's closest ally in Asia, China, and were playing a significant role in the development of Japan's foreign policy. It scarcely mattered whether high-level Japanese officials in Tokyo actually countenanced a policy of using drugs as a weapon of war in China at any time in the 1930s; what was important was the perception, especially in Washington, that they were doing so. In sum the drug scene in East Asia in the 1930s announced the opening of an era in which antidrug policy would become an important, if not well known, aspect of the foreign policy of many nations.

Developments in Latin America during the 1930s also offered an indication of how drugs could undermine political stability and civic order and thereby have a deleterious effect upon a nation's security. Shipments of illicit narcotics from Europe to Central America, which presumably were destined for the United States, nearly destabilized the Honduran government in the mid-1930s. While urging Honduras to deal more forcefully with the situation, Fuller and Anslinger were unable to determine the accuracy of reports alleging the involvement of North Americans in the trade.

That U.S. officials endeavored to influence the drug control policies of other countries partly resulted from a decision made by the League of Nations and reflected a tactical departure by Washington from its former hostility toward league-sponsored antinarcotic activities. The 1931 Manufacturing Limitation Convention had urged all countries, at the behest of the United States, to create an independent drug control office. In fact, the league singled out the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as a bureaucratic model that others might profitably adopt. Honduras, however, had neither the will nor the resources to follow the U.S. example.

More than any other country in the 1930s and early 1940s, with the possible exception of China, Mexico tested the limits of U.S. drug foreign policy. Would the United States be able to replicate abroad, whether through persuasion or coercion, its own restrictive approach to drug control? One prominent official in Mexico, Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, did not believe that U.S. policy was worth emulating, a view essentially shared by domestic critics of Anslinger and the FBN. As a result of his dissent from Washington's supply-side philosophy, Salazar found himself the object of intense public and diplomatic pressures that proved impossible to resist. In August 1939 he was forced from office as head of the Federal Narcotics Service and was immediately replaced by an individual more inclined to follow the lead of the Department of State and the FBN. The change in personnel did not soon lead, however, to a noticeable improvement in the drug situation at the U.S.–Mexican border. That did not occur until World War II, when the two nations experienced limited success in controlling drugs. Even then progress seems to have reflected as much the decline in wartime demand for illicit drugs as a victory for control at the source.

ORIGINS OF THE DRUG-SECURITY NEXUS

The advent of global conflict in the late 1930s presented U.S. policymakers with an opportunity and a challenge. In the first place war in Europe and Asia slowed the world's illicit narcotics traffic, thus allowing Anslinger, Fuller, and George A. Morlock, who succeeded Fuller at the Department of State in 1941 upon Fuller's death, to strengthen U.S. influence over the global drug control movement by moving the operations of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body to the United States. By the end of the Second World War, U.S. officials were virtually setting the agenda of the Commis-

sion on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in the newly created United Nations. The commission essentially accepted U.S. antinarcotics objectives as its own well into the 1970s.

Anslinger and his colleagues did not easily meet the challenge posed by global war, which brought into question his conviction that he and other antidrug officials should be seen as prominent policymakers in Washington. Yet during both the immediate prewar years and the war itself, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the narcotics office in the Department of State helped to maintain the security of the West against the Axis powers. On the most basic level, the FBN commissioner was responsible for meeting Allied demands for medicinal drugs. He did so under a directive issued through the War Production Board by working with the Defense Supplies Corporation and the Board of Economic Warfare. So long as the primary opium-producing nations outside of China neither fell to Germany or Japan nor adopted a neutral position in the war, Anslinger's task was fairly straightforward.

In the Americas the FBN learned, however, that Argentina and Chile might be producing opiates for Germany. There existed some fear too that opium from Peru and Mexico could find its way to the Axis. In the case of Argentina, Anslinger threatened unspecified reprisals against one major firm, Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc., if the allegations were proven. In the case of Peru, its role in the Allied war effort was secured by the sale of cocaine for medicinal needs through the lend-lease program. And in what can be interpreted as an important foray into the world of intelligence, the U.S. government may have paid informants as much as $10,000 per year during the war for information about drug production in Mexico.

Moreover, the inexorable spread of Japanese influence into the fertile poppy-growing regions of Burma gave the Japanese government a major source of opium for its medical needs. Anslinger and other U.S. officials did manage to prevent a similar accretion of Japanese power and influence in the Near East in Iran and Turkey by engaging in a preemptive purchase of large quantities of opium from those two willing suppliers. Anslinger would subsequently have the occasion in the early Cold War to reward the Iranian government for its wartime loyalty, if that is an apt description, to the Allied cause by not pressing the young shah on Iran's vast production of illicit opium, much of which found its way onto the black market in Indochina. Such diplomatic largess was repaid following the shah's ascension to the peacock throne in the wake of the coup of 1953 against Mohammad Mossaddeq's regime, when Iran became a reliable ally at the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs in the global struggle against drugs.

Providing the Allies with reliable sources of narcotics during the war and overseeing the maintenance of the global antiopium apparatus were not, however, the most important actions Anslinger undertook to guarantee the relevance of his bureau to U.S. global security interests. He avidly interpreted President Franklin D. Roosevelt's vague anticolonial sentiments regarding Southeast Asia as a clarion call to eliminate opium smoking from the former colonial possessions of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Anslinger and officials in the State Department warned that continued opium smoking would render former colonies more susceptible to internal decay and, as a result, to either revolution or foreign subversion.

In the immediate aftermath of the war Anslinger was not so preoccupied with the FBN's role in the national security state that he ignored the opportunity to advance his country's supply-side agenda at the United Nations. Two examples demonstrate his remarkable attention to virtually all drug-related matters and at the same time reveal his apparent inability to learn from past experience about the limits of policies based upon the elusive goal of control at the source.

The end of the war witnessed both a gradual rise in drug use and addiction in the United States and the revival of an active, illicit drug trade from Mexico. Not satisfied with the dilatory response of the Mexican government to diplomatic overtures, Anslinger took Mexico to task in 1947 at the second meeting of the CND for what he saw as unacceptable laxity in its antidrug activity. The public rebuke evidently had the desired effect because officials in Mexico City soon promised to strengthen their antidrug efforts at home and became more actively involved in the work of the CND.

U.S. drug control authorities also feared that prosperity after the war might stimulate the international cocaine trade, which had substantially declined in volume even before the onset of the Great Depression. Hoping to prevent a recurrence they supported sending a mission to Bolivia and Peru, the purpose of which was to evaluate the place of coca in modern Andean society. Wartime developments led U.S. officials to believe that Peru might be willing to consider strictly control-

ling coca leaf production, but that hope proved premature. The Commission of Inquiry on the Coca Leaf recalled the integral place of coca in the Andes and concluded that only either improved socioeconomic conditions in producing regions or stronger government action, meaning political will, could bring about the desired results. Important for present purposes is that nothing about the commission's findings, however negative in tone, persuaded U.S. officials to question their belief that Andean authorities were more or less favorably disposed toward a U.S.-style coca control program. The basic assumption that control at the source was a matter of time in the Andes would not be seriously challenged until the 1960s and after.

Instances like those involving Mexico and Bolivia and Peru were not unimportant to U.S. officials in the early Cold War, but they do not adequately show the intersection of security policy and drug control activities. It was in Asia that such a nexus was most readily discernible. FBN and State Department officials alleged that communists in China, like the Japanese before them, were prepared to ply their enemies with opium in order to suit their ideological ends. With the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1949 and its subsequent exclusion of Western influence from China, Anslinger's allegations about drug-related subversion of the West and Japan from Beijing could not be disproved. But having an adversary that was presumably willing to use narcotics as a weapon of war appeared to support the FBN chief's traditional supply-side strategy. The Chinese communists had learned a vital lesson, however, by observing the actions of imperial Japan as it sought to subjugate China in the late 1930s: a people drugged with opium do not make good subjects.

Communist China's centrality to the issue of drugs and security policy in the early Cold War merits elaboration. Traffic in heroin destined for Western markets resumed as World War II came to an end. Despite indications that the source of opium came partially from those areas of China controlled by the Kuomintang, Anslinger and the State Department were reluctant to blame their Chinese friends for the reappearance of the trade. For some months before the communists seized power and for some years thereafter, policymakers in Washington blamed Mao Zedong's forces for orchestrating the world heroin business. The less Western observers had access to China and its remote opium-growing regions, the stronger the allegations were against the communists. Occasional doubters, whether in London or Washington, were drowned out by the mass of unverifiable information emanating from the FBN and Foggy Bottom. The CND became an important vehicle for disseminating Anslinger's anti-China message.

It is hard not to conclude that a campaign of intentional disinformation was taking place. Available evidence indicates that to an extremely limited extent some communists did seek to exchange opiates for hard currency. There is no reliable indication, however, of a plan on the part of the Chinese Communist Party to demoralize the West with heroin. Instead it seems more likely that the head of the FBN, in making his allegations against the communists, actually was collaborating in the effort to hide covert operations against the Beijing government by Kuomintang forces operating out of the Golden Triangle, the heart of opium production and traffic in Asia. The objectives of U.S. security policy toward China, although in theory separate from drug control policy, had taken precedence over the pursuit of control at the source, which in the early 1950s was seen by some officials in Washington as an obstacle to the containment of communism.

In Thailand the logic of Cold War policy fashioned dubious linkages with unscrupulous leaders like General Phao Sriyanon, whose personal and political fortunes derived from and depended upon the trade in opium. Throughout Indochina numerous participants in the opium trade, whether in the hills or the cities, offered their allegiance to the United States and its allies in Saigon. In return their reliance upon opium as a source of income remained undisturbed and probably increased. The export trade in heroin from Southeast Asia grew rapidly. And in Indochina the appearance of U.S. advisers in the 1950s and combat forces a decade later sparked a resurgence of the regional drug trade. Thus the 1953 UN Opium Conference, which on paper adopted a spectrum of controls on opium, was an exercise in futility where Southeast Asia was concerned. Rising levels of drug usage and addiction in the West by 1960 and after resulted to some extent from a countenancing of the drug trade in the name of national security.

The convergence of narcotics policy and security interests in the early Cold War made drugs available to untold numbers of Americans. Another important long-term legacy of the drug and security policy nexus from the 1950s onward was the willingness of authorities to ignore the

drug-related activities of Central Intelligence Agency assets such as the contras in Nicaragua, General Manuel Noriega in Panama, spymaster Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru, and others, until those assets became expendable. A drug policy bureaucracy that set aside its own primary goals in the name of security was virtually abandoning the right to define its own mission. Objectively, illicit drug trafficking constituted a serious foreign policy problem for the United States, not a dire threat to the nation. Yet the historical efforts of Anslinger and others to propagate a supply-side strategy as the only acceptable road to drug control rendered drug policy hostage to other, more important foreign and security policy interests. In this way the linkage between drugs and security was cemented. To perpetuate the influence of the FBN, drug control authorities accepted a subordinate place at the policymaking table.

In the 1960s several important developments marked U.S. drug control policy. As if in testimony to Harry Anslinger's tenure as narcotics commissioner, which came to a close in 1962, nations from around the world signed and ultimately ratified the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, thereby placing under one instrument nearly all international antidrug accords. A consensus, more symbolic than real, had been reached favoring a supply-side approach to drug control. The practical effect for Washington of the convention was to place increasing emphasis upon bilateral relations. In that process frustration became the order of the day: drugs from Southeast Asia continued to reach consumers in the West. Latin America became an even greater source for cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Demand for drugs by recreational consumers and chronic users seemed to rise exponentially. Organizational changes did little to reduce demand; without Anslinger the FBN, mired in scandal, became in 1968 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). But the BNDD had no leader with Anslinger's stature to dominate the policymaking process.

Chaos, however, did not necessarily come to characterize U.S. drug policy. The 1960s had begun with an appeal from Mexico to the Eisenhower administration for antidrug help. By 1964 the Agency for International Development (AID) in the State Department had devised a program that previewed the future direction of U.S. antidrug assistance programs. Included in the aid package were funds for both crop eradication and weapons to combat the illicit traffic out of Mexico. Throughout Lyndon Johnson's presidency U.S. authorities tried but were unable to formalize trans-border antidrug operations with Mexico.

In the Andes an Inter-American Consultative Group on Coca Leaf Problems met at Lima in 1964 but achieved little. Bolivia refused even to sign the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs until 1975, and Peru, although a signatory power, declared that reducing its coca crop could not be considered for perhaps twenty-five years. Complicating the already sensitive relations between Washington and Lima was the creation of a national coca monopoly in 1969.

Notwithstanding these several setbacks in the cause of drug control, the earlier linkage of drugs and security offered a new way to promote drug control. A variant of supply-side tactics, the road to drug control would increasingly emphasize law enforcement as part of a general foreign aid package. U.S. policymakers in the 1960s worried that the "revolution of rising expectations" in the Third World, which encompassed important drug-producing countries, could not easily be controlled. They nevertheless sought to do so by tying together development and security assistance as provided to local law enforcement programs by AID, part of which was intended to be used for narcotics control. It is not clear from available evidence whether the drug control performance of producer states improved, but that outcome is doubtful given the frequent additional funding that Washington made available for drug control in the 1970s and after. Drug control, therefore, had all but disappeared by the late 1960s as an autonomous foreign policy issue. Starting in 1969 the association between drugs and security would grow closer still.

THE LIMITS OF DRUG CONTROL

The more U.S. drug officials equated their activities with security policy, the more diversified became policy objectives. The event that brought about this diversification was Operation Intercept at the Mexican border. In subjecting all traffic at the border to great delays in order to restrict the flow of drugs north from Mexico, the administration of President Richard M. Nixon did two things. First, it made drug interdiction as important as control at the source. Second, and more significant, it served notice that drug production and trafficking threatened U.S. security and was evidence of a lack of political will by the country

of origin in the fight against drugs. Since Intercept, U.S. policymakers in the executive branch and Congress have assumed the existence of an adversarial relationship with most producer and trafficking states.

In a major exception to this general rule, Turkey and the United States worked out an arrangement in 1972 that persuaded the Turkish government briefly to halt state-regulated production of opium poppies. Large amounts of Turkish opium had found its way into the heroin trade destined for western Europe and the United States. In severing what was termed the "French Connection," the Nixon administration temporarily muted congressional and public criticism of federal drug policy without disturbing the linkage between drug control and security policy.

Despite the administration's success with Turkey, congressional committees took an increasing interest in the course of U.S. drug policy and strategy. As early as 1971 the House Foreign Affairs Committee expressed concerns about the extent of abuse of Southeast Asian heroin by servicemen returning from Indochina. One committee report, in line with traditional U.S. policy, held that "the problem must be attacked at the source." What differed was the manner of attack that Congress had under consideration: a preemptive buy of the Southeast Asian heroin supply. Officials in the executive branch summarily rejected such a proposal at least twice by mid-decade. Even without knowing the costs of annual preemptive buys, the idea found scant favor in the White House or among drug control officials because it threatened to raise drug control as an issue on its own merits, which might undermine the favored drug-security relationship.

As the assault on executive policymaking prerogatives was being defeated on one front, the drug-security nexus was being reinforced on another. The patience of the United States for the apparent inability of Latin American states to control production and trafficking was wearing thin. In the process, the pre-1969 diplomacy of persuasion inexorably gave way to the politics of pressure and coercion. Following Operation Intercept both the United States and Mexico had endeavored to put the best possible face on a contentious situation by hastily devising what they termed "Operation Cooperation." Soon thereafter authorities in Mexico City initiated La Campaña Permanente, in which Mexican resources and assistance from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), one of the successor agencies to the FBN, were used to curtail opium poppy growth and heroin production.

So far as can be ascertained, Mexico's drug control record in the late 1970s was a relatively good one. But as the United States and Mexico tried to find common ground against drugs, political developments in Washington made that task more difficult. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control came into existence in 1976. Headed by activist congressmen who were dedicated to crop eradication and wanted to militarize the antidrug fight, the committee looked beyond recurring promises and began to assess performance in Latin America's drug control record. Mexico naturally caught the eye of drug control proponents in the United States. It is clear that President Jose López Portillo had in his government officials who were profiting from drug production and trafficking. What López Portillo knew about that situation remains unclear; in any event, by the time Ronald Reagan's presidency began in January 1981 members of Congress and some administration officials, although few then in DEA headquarters, were doubting Mexico's good faith regarding drug control. Ironically Mexicans had their own doubts about the U.S. antidrug commitment because of strict legal prohibitions against the spraying of paraquat on domestic marijuana. The inequality of power in U.S.–Mexican relations made that concern irrelevant in the bilateral relationship.

Mexico, of course, was not the only country subjected to close scrutiny by the United States. Colombia called attention to itself when it considered a plan to legalize and tax the marijuana trade and also after the boom in the cocaine industry became apparent. Peru and Bolivia were heavily criticized in Washington for failure to enforce the coca controls envisioned by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Bolivia especially fell out of favor with Washington during and after the year-long hold on power by General Luis García Meza as a result of what has been accurately termed a "cocaine coup." To U.S. authorities Bolivia seemed little more than a nation in thrall to the coca leaf and hence cocaine. Throughout the Andes the so-called kings of cocaine were in the process of constructing a powerful, albeit decentralized narco-empire.

Viewed from the perspective of official Washington it is not surprising that pressure instead of persuasion increasingly characterized U.S. drug policy by the 1980s. The United States consciously set out to transform drug control

policies and operations in Latin America at that time. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, more than any other congressional committee, resolved to hold to account Latin Americans, and the Reagan administration as well, for the integrity of antidrug activities. With no specific mandate except for the presumed interests and fears of an ill-defined public constituency, the committee held hearings, conducted study missions, and released reports about the status of drug control in the Western Hemisphere.

Not only did the committee rally support in Congress during the 1980s for a foreign policy calling for a comprehensive eradication of crops in the Andes and in Mexico, it also demanded a dramatic improvement in the rate of drug interdiction, thereby criticizing the antidrug efforts of the Reagan administration. Committee leaders encouraged militarization of the war on drugs over the vocal opposition of Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Department of Defense. By the end of the decade, though, it seemed as if selective low-intensity warfare had taken its place, next to control at the source and interdiction, as another basic component of U.S. antidrug strategy. Low-intensity conflict as a fundamental aspect of U.S. strategy would come to the fore after the drug summit held at Cartagena, Colombia, in February 1990, with U.S. assistance to Peru and Colombia increasingly emphasizing law enforcement assistance and military aid against drug production and trafficking. It would continue throughout the 1990s and ultimately metamorphose into Plan Colombia at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Also desirous of pressuring Latin American leaders to do more to control drugs were the three agencies most responsible for drug law enforcement: the DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard. DEA agents had operated abroad at the invitation of host governments since the agency's creation in 1973. In the strictest sense their mission was to gather information and assist in the training of local antidrug forces, such as the mobile units created in the early 1980s in Bolivia and Peru. Nowhere was the DEA presence more controversial than in Mexico, where in early 1985 the agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and his Mexican pilot were abducted, tortured, and killed. The case remained unsettled to the satisfaction of the DEA for some time, despite the arrest and successful prosecution of many of those allegedly responsible for the crime.

Demonstrating how negatively the Camarena case affected U.S.–Mexican relations was the national-interest certification accorded Mexico in 1988. Several years earlier Congress had passed a law requiring the White House to "certify" whether drug producing and trafficking nations were complying fully with U.S. drug policy objectives. Failure to do so could result in the suspension, and possibly termination, of various kinds of foreign assistance. In 1988, in order to lessen congressional pressure on the administration to name Mexico as a country lacking the political will to attack drugs and to express displeasure with Mexico about the Camarena incident, the White House accorded Mexico less than full certification.

Whether or not that was the case, narcotics foreign policy became highly politicized under Ronald Reagan. Fidel Castro's Cuba and the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua were charged with sponsoring the transport of drugs, especially cocaine, to the United States. At the same time, the Reagan administration largely ignored drug trafficking by anti-Castro Cubans and the Nicaraguan contras. The administration's readiness to portray the situation so greatly at odds with reality had historical precedent, as we have seen, in Anslinger's allegations about Communist China's involvement with the opiate trade.

Pressure for Latin America to adopt U.S.-style drug control programs can also be seen in the handling of economic development programs funded by the Agency for International Development. So limited was U.S. and international help for crop substitution and alternative development strategies that few farmers in Bolivia or Peru, the countries where this assistance was needed most, could have been expected to turn away from coca for another crop no matter how volatile the market price of coca leaves. The point is not that Bolivians or Peruvians were demanding absolute dollar-for-dollar income replacement; they were not. Rather, coca farmers, as well as processors and small-time traffickers, sought a reliable source of income if they were going to ignore the market forces that made coca an attractive economic choice. As structured in the 1980s and early 1990s, though, the development strategies devised in the United States failed to address the basic concerns of thousands of South Americans participating in the coca-cocaine business.

Indeed, aid programs were closely linked to effective crop destruction and hence were tied as well to presidential certification. The Agency for International Development never had the financial

means, let alone the disposition, to address any but the most visible symptoms of this vicious cycle. When viewed in that light President George H. W. Bush's promises at Cartagena about development assistance for the Andes, as one component of the Andean Strategy announced in September 1989, seems somewhat disingenuous. U.S. drug policy toward Latin America was relying on pressure rather than diplomacy and persuasion in two other important respects. On 8 April 1986 President Reagan issued a national security decision directive to the effect that drug production and trafficking constituted a grave threat to the security of the hemisphere. Hence those nations under attack by the drug lords, especially in the Andes, ought to defend themselves individually or in concert. In practice this meant a greater emphasis on control at the source and a relentless effort in source countries to interdict illegal drugs. The United States would provide advice, training, and equipment, although the drug war would be waged first in South America and second in its surrounding international waters.

This strategy largely ignored competing security objectives that tended to compromise antidrug objectives. Panama's Noriega, for example, was arguably the Reagan administration's most vital security asset in Central America despite his well-deserved reputation for double-dealing. Noriega was deemed indispensable to the administration and remained so as long as William Casey headed the CIA. Also, the administration chose to overlook the involvement of several Honduran military officials in the drug trade because Honduras served as a sanctuary for the contras. Such contradictions in security priorities were not lost on those nations, notably Colombia, that were on the front line of the drug war.

U.S. pressure against producer, processing, and transit countries accompanied the militarization of drug strategy. Going far beyond an upgrading of the mission of the Coast Guard, the United States virtually insisted that the battle be taken to source countries. To be sure, aid for military operations came after being requested by Latin American governments. Yet it is worth asking how much of a choice Bolivia had in March of 1986 when Operation Blast Furnace was being proposed. So long as Colombia sought U.S. assistance, it had few viable options other than armed confrontation with the Medellín cartel after the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán in August 1989. The Bush White House viewed the response to the killing as a test of the will of the government of Virgilio Barco Vargas. (Indeed, when Barco's successor, César Gaviria, sought to craft a Colombian response to the violence of the Medellín and Cali cartels, Bob Martinez, head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, proclaimed that Colombia was on trial before the world.)

Unwillingness abroad to strike directly at illicit production and trafficking would have jeopardized U.S. aid programs. With this implicit threat at the ready, the United States—in early 1987, more than two years before the Galán murder—had fashioned a more extensive antidrug strategy for the Andes, Operation Snowcap. But Snowcap, slow in getting underway, soon ran into difficulty, especially in Peru where the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) controlled coca-growing areas in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Proposals to dispatch U.S. special forces into the Andes were too controversial for Lima to accept openly, but by mid-1991 President Alberto K. Fujimori had agreed to their limited use.

The evolution of a more coercive antidrug strategy in the 1990s inevitably led to greater expectations about Latin American performance in Washington. Controlling drugs moved into the highest rank of foreign policy priorities, at least rhetorically, as the Cold War ended. Yet neither crop eradication nor drug interdiction, despite several spectacular, singular achievements, significantly reduced the flow of drugs in the Americas until after mid-decade.

Policymakers had long argued that an activist drug control strategy abroad would help to control consumption at home. Not until Congress passed the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act would they seriously begin to address the issue of demand, and they did so thereafter largely as an aspect of law enforcement. Demand reduction strategies primarily existed as a by-product of other goals. In effect authorities were betting that widespread craving for popular drugs, notably cocaine, would eventually decline. What they assumed, however, to be a cyclical theory of demand in reality resembled a spiral model, that is, one with absolute usage steadily increasing.

Drug control strategy was also intended to deter newcomers from entering the business at all stages, from production to sale on the street. A tougher approach in the Chapare of Bolivia, in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru, or even in the cays of the Caribbean would produce the desired result of lowering drug availability and consumption on the streets of New York, for example. Likewise a

strategy that emphasized strict and certain law enforcement might compel lesser players to get out of the game. Had policymakers paid closer attention to what they read in the analyses of Peter Reuter and his colleagues at the Rand Corporation, they would not have been so sanguine about the prospects for success of such a strategy. The risk factor for entrepreneurs entering the drug business was statistically insignificant, whereas the rewards were sufficient to sustain the promise of unaccustomed wealth.

Also anticipated as a result of drug strategy in the 1980s, particularly after Reagan issued his national security directive, was the apprehension of major traffickers. A number of seizures of important figures did take place, especially in Mexico and Gaviria's Colombia, but they did not appreciably affect the structure or functioning of the drug trade out of South America or Mexico, let alone within the United States. (Likewise, the heroin trade out of Southeast Asia scarcely depended upon the continued participation of its two most notorious leaders of the late twentieth century, Lo Hsing-han and Khun Sa, each of whom at one time or another swore off further involvement with opium.)

One outcome of the focus on major traffickers in Latin America would be a reduction in money laundering. The seizure of Noriega and the arrest of top officials of several major banks by the mid-1990s held out the promise of greater success over time, yet that hope was leavened by the realization that the laundering of money remained a serious problem in Panama, a nation whose government owed its very existence to the United States.

Another expected result of the battle against drugs was an increase in the price of drugs so that the economic incentive to consume them would decline. Again, U.S. strategists would do well to heed the analyses prepared at the Rand Corporation. For street prices appreciably to rise, the rate of interdiction would have to be far greater than it has ever been. Even if as much as 30 percent of illegal cocaine is seized, and few experts claim that seizures come close to that figure, the available supply would probably keep prices down and profits for traffickers acceptably high. Not even the vigorous pursuit of the longtime strategy of interdiction presents a serious threat to the major trafficking networks.

As the Cold War waned, policymakers looked to the war on drugs to provide U.S. forces with a contemporary military mission, however limited. After the Department of Defense under Secretary Dick Cheney overcame its reluctance to get involved in the drug war in Latin America and the Caribbean, commitments in the form of advice, training, and limited operations proliferated on a unilateral and bilateral basis. Yet the war remained a low-intensity conflict for both practical political and diplomatic reasons. As a result the drug war was deemed a losing budgetary and doctrinal proposition for the U.S. military and evoked demands for little more than a minimal expenditure of resources. Until the late 1990s it remained unclear what the mission for U.S. forces would be.

The unanticipated consequences of the Reagan-Bush drug war in Latin America were no more salutary. Inter-American relations were strained by the politics of pressure, which would decisively turn to coercion particularly toward Colombia after Ernesto Samper took office as president in 1994. Earlier, palpable tension at the San Antonio drug summit in February 1992, dubbed Cartagena 2, challenged the facade of a common front against drugs. The militarization of antidrug strategy and the process of certification, both of which arguably constituted an implicit denial of the sovereignty of producer, processing, and trafficking nations, placed the United States in the position of dictating a major aspect of regional relations. At the least, certification was demeaning to producer nations in that it assumed a lack of willingness to take action against drugs. The process of certification was something of a throwback to the 1920s and early 1930s in assuming that the drug issue existed apart from other vital issues such as the suppression of radical insurgencies.

It seemed too that defining the drug business as a threat to national security contributed to the realization of that very condition in the Andes. The institutional integrity of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru was weaker in the early 1990s than before. Perhaps the economic troubles confronting those countries would have undermined national political and social institutions even without the compounding factor of the illicit drug business. Yet pressure from Washington to wage war against drugs in the name of national security made the governing process more difficult.

The Clinton administration continued to prod the three Andean nations as well as Mexico to act more vigorously to attack drug production and trafficking. Nevertheless, during President Bill Clinton's first term in office, the fiery rhetoric of the recent pas was missing. This approach to drug diplomacy reflected the reduced priority the

White House was giving to drug control as a foreign policy objective.

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Beginning in the mid-1990s there were a number of positive developments in the war on drugs. DEA agents were advising their counterparts around the world; even China and Vietnam turned to the United States for assistance. The defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Peru, combined with a disease that severely damaged the nation's coca crop, drove the drug business out of the Upper Huallaga Valley until late in 2000. The Bolivian government of Hugo Banzer adopted a policy of "zero tolerance" toward coca growing outside of government-approved areas. An uneasy peace existed between growers' unions and the government as alternative development projects failed to provide sufficient income for former coca farmers. Also at the turn of the new century, Iran was cracking down on the opium business; and aid in the form of $43 million in spring 2001 persuaded the Taliban in Afghanistan to go after the heroin trade. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September, however, the price for heroin from Afghanistan plummeted. U.S. and international drug control officials believed that the Taliban was dumping large stockpiles of heroin to pay for weapons in the event of conflict as the United States sought to capture or kill the reputed leader of the terrorist network, Osama bin Laden, whose headquarters were located in Afghanistan.

Serious challenges nevertheless remained for U.S. drug control officials, especially in the Caribbean and Mexico. Mexican authorities at all levels remained susceptible to bribery and threats from that nation's major drug organizations even as cartel leaders were arrested and faced the prospect of extradition to the United States to face trial for their activities. During a visit to Washington in late summer 2001 President Vicente Fox pledged to cooperate closely with the administration of George W. Bush on common problems related to drugs. Whether that effort would be enough to lessen the expanding role of the drug business in Mexican politics, particularly at the state level, remained to be seen.

Illicit drugs from Latin America that were not transported to the United States from Mexico often came through Caribbean nations where authorities were unable, and in some instances unwilling, to handle a problem as complex as the one posed by drugs. The result was a greater presence of U.S. law enforcement personnel as advisers. Even Cuba began to share information with Washington about drug trafficking. Nothing happened in either Mexico or the Caribbean to suggest that drug control would soon disappear as a major foreign policy issue in the region.

However serious a challenge drugs posed to governance elsewhere, that threat paled in comparison to drug-related problems in Colombia. By 2002 foreign assistance to Colombia as part of Plan Colombia, a multiyear effort by the government of President Andres Pastrana to wipe out the drug business and defeat his nation's guerrilla insurgencies, made Colombia the third-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid behind Israel and Egypt. Indications of progress by Bogotá against drugs in the early and mid-1990s proved illusory. Neither the destruction of the Medellín and Cali cartels nor the death or incarceration or extradition to the United States of cartel leaders slowed the traffic in cocaine and crack, heroin, and (to a lesser extent) marijuana out of Colombia. Indeed, antidrug assistance served to embroil the United States more deeply than anticipated in the Colombian crisis. The government in Bogotá controlled barely 60 percent of the national territory. How U.S. aid could affect that perilous situation remained anyone's guess. The leftist insurgency had begun in the mid-1960s and showed little sign of abating, all the more so because rebel forces increasingly relied upon income from drugs to fund their activities. Negotiations between the government and rebels had created a safe zone, dubbed "Narcolandia." Should a settlement eventuate, there was no way of predicting its durability.

What had begun a hundred years earlier as an effort by the United States to promote social reform abroad was closely linked in the twenty-first century with matters of governance and national identity. Foreign lands continued to supply the United States with illicit substances; in so doing they met rather than created a demand for drugs, though U.S. leaders did not publicly admit that reality until the early 1990s. The more that supplier and transit nations accepted U.S. antidrug strategy, and declared drugs to constitute a security threat, the more difficult for them became the process of governing. Attention to demand alone, long advocated by some producer states, could not overcome the multifaceted problems posed by drugs. For better or worse drug control had become an important, sometimes crucial, facet of American foreign policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bertram, Eva, et al. *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial.* Berkeley, Calif., 1996. Critical overview of the proscriptive, punitive nature of U.S. domestic and foreign drug policies.

Courtwright, David T. *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World.* Cambridge, Mass., 2001. Outstanding assessment of the role of licit and illicit drugs in modern history.

Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd. *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege.* University Park, Pa., 1997. Survey of the implications of the war on drugs in the Caribbean region.

Kwitny, Jonathan. *The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the CIA.* New York, 1987. A skilled reporter's investigation of the links between illegal drugs and U.S. security interests in the 1970s and 1980s.

Lamour, Catherine, and Michel R. Lamberti. *The International Connection: Opium from Growers to Pushers.* Translated by Peter and Betty Ross. New York, 1974. Important book about the international dimensions of the modern commerce in illegal drugs.

McAllister, William B. *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History.* London and New York, 2000. The finest scholarly survey on the subject.

McCoy, Alfred W. *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade.* Brooklyn, N.Y., 1991. Updated, classic account of the post-1945 nexus of drugs and security policy throughout Asia.

Meyer, Kathryn, and Terry Parssinen. *Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade.* Lanham, Md., 1998.

Morgan, H. Wayne. *Drugs in America: A Social History, 1800–1980.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1981.

Musto, David F. *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control.* Expanded ed. New York, 1987. Best account of the origins and history of illegal drugs in the United States.

Powis, Robert E. *The Money Launderers: Lessons from the Drug Wars, How Billions of Illegal Dollars Are Washed Through Banks and Businesses.* Chicago, 1992.

Riley, Kevin Jack. *Snow Job?: The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1996. Skeptical look at recent U.S. and international efforts to combat cocaine.

Scott, Peter Dale, and Jonathan Marshall. *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America.* Updated ed. Berkeley, Calif., 1998. Riveting account of the convergence of drugs and U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s.

Stares, Paul B. *Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World.* Washington, D.C., 1996. Cautionary account about the limits of drug control.

Taylor, Arnold. *American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900–1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform.* Durham, N.C., 1969. A pathbreaking study of international drug control.

Tokatlian, Juan. *Globalización, Narcotráfico y Violencia: Siete Ensayos sobre Colombia.* Buenos Aires, 2000. An impassioned inquiry into the effect of drugs on Colombia late in the twentieth century.

Walker, William O., III. *Drug Control in the Americas.* Rev. ed. Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1989. Leading account of drug control as an issue in the Western Hemisphere.

———. *Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991. International history of the drug problem in East Asia.

See also INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; PAN-AMERICANISM.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

H. W. Brands

No concept in the history of American foreign policy has been more contentious than the "national interest." Both words in the phrase are troublesome. "National" implies something the entire nation can rally around; hence, the phrase often serves as a summons to patriotism. To oppose, or even question, the national interest pushes the opponent or questioner perilously close to sedition or treason. As for "interest," few terms are more elastic. The inhabitants of any country would have to be dull indeed not to be "interested" in much that goes on in the world; the inhabitants of a powerful, ambitious country like the United States can expand interests almost ad infinitum. Complicating the matter further is the fact that definitions do not necessarily the national interest make. What actually *is* the national interest is for history to determine. And even history does not always get it right.

For every country, national interest starts with safety of the national territory; for Americans, the arguing started just past that irreducible minimum. And it started early.

WHAT WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON (EVENTUALLY) AGREED ON

Quarrels over the national interest commenced with America's birth as an independent nation. Nearly everyone in the Continental Congress, and everyone not a Loyalist, agreed on the advisability of an alliance with France and cheered when that alliance was obtained in 1778. But no sooner had the French held up their end of the bargain—by cornering Cornwallis at Yorktown—than Americans began to squabble about how far beyond victory attachment to France ought to extend. Benjamin Franklin, the senior American commissioner in Paris, counseled continued closeness, both from gratitude for services already rendered and in expectation of additional French aid. Franklin doubtless was influenced by the adulation he received in Paris (a staged meeting between Franklin and Voltaire set the philosophes swooning), but, personal popularity aside, he believed the infant United States would need French help to avoid being sucked back into Britain's orbit. Franklin's fellow commissioners, John Adams and John Jay, were more inclined to doubt French bona fides and less inclined to fear the attraction of America's late colonial master. (Adams in addition suffered from excruciating envy of Franklin, and his Puritan mores were scandalized by Franklin's liaisons with the ladies of Paris.) As it happened, the tension between the two conceptions of the infant national interest produced a peace treaty that preserved the alliance with France while extracting important concessions from Britain.

Unfortunately, the concessions proved to be more impressive on paper than on the ground—particularly the ground of the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes. The British refused to evacuate forts in the region and defied the Americans to do anything to oust them. (The rationale for their continued occupation was the failure of the American government to honor pledges regarding debts and Loyalists, but their reason was simply that they could, and that influential groups in Britain defined Britain's national interest as holding what Britain had.) Thomas Jefferson, who had inherited Franklin's Francophilia along with Franklin's diplomatic post in Paris, and who carried this attitude to his position as President George Washington's secretary of state, found the British intransigence insufferable. The group that grew up around Jefferson—the nascent Republican Party—agitated to punish perfidious Albion.

Their cause was complicated by the outbreak of the French Revolution, and the onset of the wars provoked by that pregnant event. For most of a century, the American colonies had been caught in the crossfire between Britain and France; the

most recent installment of this modern Hundred Years' War had sprung the colonies free from Britain's grasp. But freedom did not preserve them when the crossfire resumed in 1792. The question that then faced Americans was: With which side did the American national interest lie?

Jefferson and the Republicans answered the question one way—France's way. The Jeffersonians did not necessarily forgive French violations of American neutrality (centering on seizure of American ships), but they felt more threatened by Britain's infractions, which now also included seizure of ships. The more fervent among them would have repaid French help in the war of the American Revolution with American help in this war of the French Revolution; yet even those who stopped short of wanting to honor the alliance to the letter conceived a kinship with the new republic on the Atlantic's eastern shore. In this view (and in a pattern that would persist for two centuries in American politics), the national interest at home and the national interest abroad were intimately entwined. Domestic republicanism dictated support for foreign republicanism.

Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists demonstrated a similarly married definition of the national interests at home and abroad. Hamilton was no great fan of American republicanism, having argued at the Constitutional Convention for a monarchy; not surprisingly, he held no candle for French republicanism. On the contrary, he admired the energetic executive of the British government (which he did his best to imitate as Washington's Treasury secretary and most trusted adviser), and he judged that America's future lay in close ties to Britain's governing and merchandising classes.

The national interest was whipsawed between the Republican and Federalist views for two decades. The Federalists (under Washington) negotiated and ratified the easy-on-Britain Jay's Treaty and (under John Adams) fought an undeclared naval war against France. During this conflict, the Federalists succeeded in outlawing—by the Sedition Act—their opponents' definition of the national interest. The Republicans (under James Madison) fought a formal war against Britain. The Republicans' war—of 1812—was a fiasco for the United States, with the burning of Washington City being but the most egregious example of America's inability to defend itself.

Yet the conflict had the salutary effect of ending the first phase of the debate over the national interest. Americans had learned something from their long ordeal. The Bonapartist turn of events in France cured the Jeffersonians of their revolutionary romanticism, while the Hamiltonians (who lost their champion in the infamous duel with Aaron Burr) were disabused of their Anglophilia by British impressment of American seamen. Both sides settled on the wisdom of staying out of other countries' wars. George Washington had urged eschewing "permanent alliances"; Thomas Jefferson denounced "entangling alliances." Permanent or entangling, alliances seemed unwise, and a strong majority of Americans concurred in keeping clear of them. No definition of the national interest would persist longer or sustain more general acceptance than this idea that other people's quarrels were for other people to settle. God in his wisdom had put an ocean between Europe and America; Americans in their wisdom had crossed it. Most saw no reason to cross back.

EXPANSIONISTS ALL

One reason Americans did not go back east was that they were too busy going farther west. The end of Europe's wars freed Americans to concentrate on what they and their ancestors had been doing since the start of the seventeenth century: claiming new territory and dispossessing the aboriginal inhabitants. Independent America inherited from imperial England the general idea that Indians had no rights worth respecting; Indian lands might be claimed and parceled out, subject only to the ability of the claimants to drive the Indians off. This attitude was not quite universal; a few English and Americans spoke up for the Indians. But between the more common view of Indians as beneath respect, and the ravages of introduced diseases upon the aboriginal populations, Americans expanded west almost as though the Indians were not there.

The Treaty of Paris of 1783 confirmed American title to the lands lying east of the Mississippi. (Confirmed title against European claimants, that is. No Indians sat at the Paris negotiations, and none were asked to approve the treaty.) The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 doubled the American national domain again, pushing the western boundary to the crest of the Rocky Mountains. Diplomatic and extra-diplomatic machinations brought Florida into the American fold.

Nearly all Americans approved this heady expansion. Federalists poked fun at Jefferson,

who had to abandon his strict constructionism lest Napoleon change his mind about Louisiana; and General Andrew Jackson incurred criticism for hanging one British trader and shooting another in Florida. But on the whole, more land was conceived to be in the obvious national interest.

There was something else behind the pro-expansionist feeling. Since Puritan times, many Americans believed their country was unique: the site of the terrestrial working-out of the will of God (either the Christian God of the Puritans or the natural God of Jefferson and Madison). The expansion of America, in this view, signified the extension of providential designs, with benefits not merely for America but for humanity at large. Other nations have defined their national interests to include people beyond their borders, but none have done so more vigorously or consistently than the United States.

The identification of the American national interest with the interest of humanity reached an early apex during the 1840s, in the era of "manifest destiny." The annexation of Texas, the conquest of California and New Mexico, and the acquisition of Oregon seemed to most Americans a convenient collaboration between God and the United States. To be sure, the war with Mexico occasioned complaint among northern Whigs, but their complaint had less to do with the extension of American authority than with a fear that the territory acquired in the war would strengthen the institution of southern slavery.

In fact, slavery never sank roots in the trans-Texas southwest. Yet difficulties in organizing governments for the Mexican cession did reopen the slavery debate and led, via "bleeding Kansas" and the Dred Scott decision, to the Civil War. The bitter sectional ordeal took the smugness out of the manifest destinarians and the wind out of the sails of territorial expansion. The generation that came of age with the Compromise of 1850 and remained in power until the Compromise of 1877 had trouble enough holding together the territory America already owned; it had little energy or inclination to acquire more. Secretary of State William Seward got Congress to purchase Alaska in 1867, but only because Russia's sale price made it a bargain the legislators could not refuse (especially when the price included generous kickbacks to the legislators themselves). Ulysses Grant tried to annex Santo Domingo, but the Senate said no.

A DEMOCRATIC EMPIRE?

By the end of Reconstruction, the Industrial Revolution in America was under full steam. And as the country redefined itself—from rural and agricultural to urban and industrial—it similarly redefined its national interest. Or tried to. Many Americans interpreted the shift from agriculture to industry as indicating that territory per se no longer mattered; America's expansionist impulses —which none denied still existed—should look to markets rather than land. Yet others contended that land still counted. They observed the overseas empires of the other great powers and judged that American greatness would be measured by the same material yardstick. Moreover, enough of the spirit of manifest destiny survived the Civil War (the Union victory did wonders for the self-confidence of the winners) to support a sense that American institutions and values could revivify a weary and corrupted world.

After fighting broke out in Cuba in 1895 between Cuban nationalists and Spanish loyalists, Americans sided with the nationalists: first sentimentally, then politically, and finally militarily. The American war party—led by Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge and journalists Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst—included individuals who dreamed of an American empire akin to the empires of Britain, France, and Germany. But what won William McKinley his war declaration against Spain in April 1898 was a feeling that America had an obligation to prevent atrocities in its own backyard. (It was during the 1890s that the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, asserting American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, achieved the status of an enforceable national interest.) When congressional skeptics of the McKinley administration's motives, led by Henry Teller, attached to the war resolution an amendment forswearing American ownership of Cuba, the amendment sailed through the Senate without debate.

But wars have a way of altering reality, and after American forces captured Manila, the urge to empire took a different tack. McKinley negotiated a treaty with Spain granting Cuba independence but transferring the Philippines to the United States. The president claimed that Providence told him his country had an obligation to uplift and Christianize the Filipinos. (Obviously, it was a Protestant Providence, as most Filipinos were already Christians—but Roman Catholics.)

When McKinley laid the treaty before the Senate for ratification, the country witnessed one of the most distilled debates in American history on the nature of the national interest. The imperialists asserted that annexation of the Philippines would benefit the United States economically (by providing a stepping-stone to the markets of Asia), diplomatically (by anteing America into the imperial sweepstakes that dominated international affairs), and militarily (by providing naval bases and coaling stations for the U.S. fleet). Beyond this, American control of the Philippines would advance the interests of world civilization. "It is elemental," Albert Beveridge told his Senate colleagues. "It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. . . . He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth."

The anti-imperialists construed the national interest quite differently. A radical few denied that God had any special plan for America, but others simply held that American exceptionalism worked better by example than by force. Indeed, to ape the European imperialists would undermine all that made America unique and worth emulating. Carl Schurz, a refugee republican from Prussia after the failed revolution of 1848 there, and a Lincoln Republican in the American Civil War, predicted that annexation would embroil the United States in an imperial conflict like those that ate the blood and treasure of the other imperial powers. "The Filipinos fought against Spain for their freedom and independence, and unless they abandon their recently proclaimed purpose for their freedom and independence, they will fight us," Schurz said. The imperial road would lead his adopted country into dire peril. "The character and future of the Republic and the welfare of its people now living and yet to be born are in unprecedented jeopardy."

The imperialists won the battle but lost the war. Even as the Senate (narrowly) accepted McKinley's treaty, Filipino nationalists launched the war of independence Schurz predicted. The American war in the Philippines was the long, dirty antithesis of the short, clean American war in Cuba. Americans committed (and suffered) atrocities like those they had castigated Spain for committing against Cuba; the whole experience soured the American people on empire. By the time U.S. forces finally suppressed the Philippine insurgency, Americans had discovered that their national interest did not include empire. They needed another four decades to divest themselves of the Philippines (Puerto Rico, which did not want to be divested, remained American), but they were never tempted to repeat the imperial experiment.

A SIGH FOR VERSAILLES

Reinforcing Americans' reluctance to engage in entanglements abroad was the suicidal behavior of the European imperialists, who locked themselves in a death struggle starting in 1914. For the first year of the Great War, Americans once again congratulated themselves and their forebears for having left that benighted continent; by consensus the national interest indicated adhering to the advice of Washington and Jefferson about eschewing alliances.

But the twentieth century was not the eighteenth or early nineteenth. American commercial and financial interests had grown tremendously, making the United States more dependent than ever on foreign markets. American merchants demanded the right to trade with the belligerents; American bankers insisted on being able to lend in London and Paris and Berlin. Woodrow Wilson wanted to keep clear of the conflict and tried for a time to rally his compatriots to neutral thinking as well as a neutral policy. But he could not resist the calls for belligerent trade and belligerent loans, and before long the tentacles of capitalism began to draw the United States into the war. Because the British had a better fleet than the Germans, most American trade, and the financing that funded the trade, flowed to Britain and France, making the United States a de facto member of the Allied powers by 1916. Germany recognized the situation, and in early 1917 declared war on American shipping. Wilson responded with a request for a formal war declaration, which Congress granted.

At the time, few in Congress or outside it questioned that the American national interest required defending American vessels and American nationals against German attack. Some, however, did question whether U.S. participation in the war required putting U.S. troops on the ground in Europe. "Good Lord! You're not going to send soldiers over there, are you?" queried a shocked senator of a War Department spokesman.

The War Department did send the troops, which helped break the back of Germany's desperate final offensive.

But what else they accomplished was open to doubt. The British and French knew what *they* were fighting for (although the rest of the world did not until Lenin leaked the secret treaties that spelled out the Allies' imperialistic war aims). The Americans were far less sure of their own purposes, not least because Wilson had waffled all over the landscape of politics and diplomacy. At various times he talked of being too proud to fight, then of achieving peace without victory, then of making the world safe for democracy. His Fourteen Points seemed rather many, with some too vague and others too specific. In any case, the British and French demonstrated at the postwar peace conference that they would have nothing to do with Wilson's airy abstractions. Germany had lost, and Germany would pay—in treasure, territory, colonies, and markets. Wilson could have his precious League of Nations, the proto–world government he hoped would prevent another such war. But he would have to make of it what he could.

Which turned out to be nothing at all. Even more than Wilson, Americans were confused as to why they entered the war. The only national interest that seemed directly threatened was the right to trade with belligerents. But the British violated America's neutral rights as consistently, if less egregiously, than the Germans (who, short on surface ships, had to resort to U-boat torpedoes to enforce a blockade). Was there an American national interest in preventing another European war? On this point, as on any other meaningful topic touching the national interest, the answer turned on the cost. Of course, it would be to America's benefit for Europe to remain at peace, but would the benefit outweigh the cost of an indefinite commitment to enforce the mandates of this new League of Nations? Did Americans wish to play policemen to the world?

The Senate said no in twice rejecting the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson summoned a simple majority for the treaty, but not the two-thirds supermajority ratification required. Under the rules specified by the Constitution, the Senate declared that membership in the League of Nations was not in the American national interest. Whether it really was not in the national interest, time would tell.

WILSON WITHOUT THE PREACHING

And not much time, at that. Calvin Coolidge may not have spoken for all Americans when he proclaimed that the business of America was business, but he spoke for those who counted during the Republican decade after the war. Disillusionment with the war's outcome—millions killed, including 60,000 Americans, to little positive effect observable from across the Atlantic—reinforced the feeling that Washington and Jefferson had been right. Foreign entanglements were a fool's game. There was still American engagement abroad, but it was chiefly the engagement of private, corporate interests, backed at times by federal officials (including the bright new star of the Republicans, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover) yet rarely rising to the level of a widely supported national interest.

If anything, the national interest seemed to point in precisely the opposite direction. During the latter half of the 1920s, the authors Harry Elmer Barnes, C. Hartley Grattan, and others attacked American participation in the late war as the work of private interests—chiefly financial and mercantile—parading as the national interest. During the 1930s this attitude enveloped Capitol Hill, where an investigative committee headed by Senator Gerald Nye laid blame for America's feckless involvement in the war at the feet of the "merchants of death." The Nye committee provided ammunition to congressional isolationists, who legislated neutrality for the United States in the event of another war. Yet this was a different neutrality from that which had defined much of the national interest from the 1790s to the 1910s. Where America's historic neutrality had been actively defended, twice by war (in 1812 and 1917), the legislated neutrality of the 1930s would be preserved by abandoning American neutral rights. The Neutrality Act of 1937, for example, forbade the sale of munitions to belligerents (no more "merchants of death"), outlawed loans to belligerents (no more lopsided lending) and barred American travel on belligerent ships (no more *Lusitanias*—or at least no more American deaths on such ships). The neutrality law also allowed the president to insist that trade in goods other than munitions be conducted on a cash-and-carry basis, with the purchasers taking responsibility for the cargoes before they left U.S. shores (no more American ships showing up in the crosshairs of belligerent periscopes).

THE INTELLECTUAL—AND LIGHTNING ROD—OF THE ISOLATIONISTS

Charles A. Beard (1874–1948) was no stranger to controversy. His iconoclastic 1913 *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* cast doubt on the disinterest of the Founders, and during World War I he quit Columbia University in protest over the firing of a colleague. In the 1920s, he carved a niche as a critic on the left of the policies of the Republican administrations. Franklin Roosevelt initially mollified him somewhat, but Beard was always more comfortable in opposition than in agreement, and he soon discovered grounds for criticizing the Democratic president. In *The Idea of National Interest* and elsewhere, Beard attacked Roosevelt for building more ships and otherwise laying the basis for intervention in Europe and Asia. To Beard, foreign intervention was something that benefited not the American people generally but only the rich and well-connected—the same groups he criticized in *Economic Interpretation.*

Beard's writings abetted the isolationism of the 1930s, yet where much isolationist thinking was more emotional than rational, Beard offered a carefully reasoned theory of nonintervention, based on a challenge to received wisdom regarding foreign markets. Beard acknowledged that nonintervention would require abandoning some foreign markets, and he conceded this would have a negative direct effect on American incomes. But he countered that much, perhaps all, of this loss would be recouped in savings on weapons not required and wars not fought. And even if it were not recouped, there was more to life, and to the national interest, than money. "National interest involves stability and standard of life deliberately adjusted to each other in a long time perspective," he explained.

Beard applauded the neutrality laws but did not think they would hold. "We're blundering into war," he predicted in 1938. When war did come, Beard suspended his attacks on Roosevelt, but he rejected the administration's high rhetoric and its enthusiasm regarding America's partners. "I refuse to take the world-saving business at face value and think that Churchill and Stalin are less concerned with world saving than with saving the British empire and building a new and bigger Russian empire."

For his forthrightness, Beard fell under intellectual obloquy. Erstwhile allies criticized him for failing to condemn Hitler and the Japanese with sufficient vigor. But he did not waver. "History to come will pass judgment on them and me," he said.

Americans might have quibbled over the details of the neutrality laws, but by all evidence they supported the general idea. Twenty years after the fact, American involvement in World War I seemed an exercise in fatuity, the likes of which should be avoided at nearly all cost.

Yet no sooner had they reached this consensus than events began to erode it. In appallingly short order, Italy brutalized Ethiopia, Japan raped China, and Germany severed Czechoslovakia. Many Americans thought it would be impossible to retain the country's self-respect without taking action against the organized violence abroad. Others concluded that if the violence was not stopped now, it would inevitably engulf the United States, as it had in World War I. But still others came to the opposite conclusion: to them, the muggings abroad underscored the necessity of neutrality. If the world insisted on going to hell, let it do so, but do not let it take America down with it.

The outbreak of the second great European war of the twentieth century, in September 1939, polarized American opinion further. A group calling itself America First wanted to widen the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and keep American boys securely at home. Mere discussion of U.S. intervention, the America Firsters said, discouraged Britain and France from doing for themselves what needed to be done. An opposing group, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, advocated a forthright policy of supporting those countries opposing Nazi Germany. With luck, such support might stop short of American belligerence, but that ultimate step could not be ruled out—nor should it be, lest Adolf Hitler take heart from American aloofness.

This latest round of the debate over the national interest continued for two years, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. As even the narrowest definition demanded defending American territory, by transgressing U.S. borders the

Japanese guaranteed American belligerence. Had Hitler not gratuitously declared war on the United States while the waters of Hawaii were still stained with American blood, debate doubtless would have continued regarding whether the national interest required fighting Germany. But in the event, Americans entered both wars—in the Pacific and in Europe—united in defining the national interest as requiring the defeat of the Axis. Woodrow Wilson might have been wrong about some things, but he now seemed right about America's inability to insulate itself from a world at war.

ENTER IDEOLOGY

Defining national interest during war is easy: to defeat the enemy. Things get harder after the war. Wilson discovered this; so did Harry Truman. In each case the trouble was with the Allies, who during war agreed on the primacy of victory but after victory had their own national interests to pursue.

The interests of the Soviet Union after World War II entailed control of its East European neighbors. This was not what the United States had been fighting for, and in denying democracy and self-determination, it constituted an affront to American principles. Whether it constituted a challenge to the American national interest was a separate question. Franklin Roosevelt gave signs of thinking it did not, at least not seriously; Harry Truman, upon succeeding Roosevelt, thought it did.

More precisely, what Truman and his Cold War cabinet considered the challenge to the national interest was the aggressive expansionism they perceived to be inherent in Soviet communist ideology, and which was currently manifested in the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Had Truman and his advisers been convinced the Kremlin had no designs west of the Elbe River, they would have slept more soundly and planned less ambitiously for the future of Western Europe; but instead they chose to interpret trouble in Iran, Greece, and Turkey as leading indicators of trouble farther west. In the March 1947 speech that unveiled the Truman Doctrine, the president described the world as divided between "alternative ways of life," with the communist way attempting to subvert and destroy the democratic way. By Truman's reasoning, the fate of America hung on the fate of Greece and the other countries under threat; it followed that the American national interest required defending Greece and those other countries.

Congress, and apparently the American people, endorsed Truman's definition of the national interest. Truman got the $400 million he requested for Greece and Turkey. Then he got the several billions he requested for aid to Europe. He got the Senate to accept the North Atlantic Treaty, committing the United States to the defense of Western Europe. And although he did not ask for a formal declaration of war, he got the Congress to underwrite his decision to defend South Korea against North Korea when war broke out on that divided peninsula in 1950.

Never in American history had the national interest been redefined so radically and swiftly. Scarcely a decade before, Congress had forsworn the use of force even to defend American ships and citizens against direct attack. Now, the United States was pledged to defend half the world and was actively fighting in a small and intrinsically unimportant country half a world away.

Why the change? Two reasons. First, although World War I had suggested that any major European conflict would eventually embroil the United States, Americans required World War II for the lesson to stick. In the twentieth century, American peacetime connections to Europe—business and financial connections primarily, but also cultural and social connections—were so deep and pervasive that Europe's troubles became America's troubles, and Europe's wars became America's wars. The Cold War commitment to Europe—through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially—represented an effort to keep America out of war by keeping Europe out of war.

The second reason for the radical redefining of the national interest was simply that Americans *could*. Had the United States been Luxembourg, Americans never would have dreamed of underwriting European reconstruction or defending South Korea. But after 1945 the United States was the richest, most powerful country in the history of the world. Rich people buy insurance policies the poor decline, both because the rich have more to insure and because they can afford the premiums. The ambitious policies undertaken by the Truman administration represented a form of insurance—a way of keeping Americans richer and more powerful than anyone else.

NATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL INSECURITY

But as any savvy insurance agent discovers, there is no end to what might be insured. Buying a house? Insure the house, of course, but also ensure the mortgage payments. Taking a vacation? Insure against bad weather.

Likewise for the United States during the Cold War. America's assorted alliance systems—NATO, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), the Rio Pact, ANZUS (the Pacific Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States)—insured not primarily against attacks on the United States but against attacks on countries related, in one way or another, to American security. Pakistan offered electronic listening posts and launchpads for spy planes. Australia pledged troops to the defense of the Middle East, whose oil then meant little to America directly (the United States still exported oil) but meant much to Western Europe. South Vietnam mattered psychologically: if that wobbling domino fell, it would unsettle the neighbors and might ultimately ruin the neighborhood.

This would be bad for American business, which had a bottom-line interest in preserving as much of the world as possible for market penetration. It would also be bad for American morale. Since Plymouth Rock and the "city on the hill" John Winthrop had promised next door at Boston, Americans had always considered themselves the wave of the future. Two communist revolutions in the twentieth century—in Russia and in China—cast serious doubt on this presumption. Additional advances by the communists could only unnerve Americans further.

During the Cold War, the term "national security" often supplanted "national interest" in American political parlance. And security connoted not simply physical security—the ability to fend off foreign attack—but also psychological security. In no other way can the hysteria that gripped the United States during the McCarthy era be explained. Indeed, by most measures the United States was more secure than it had ever been. Its power—military, economic, political—compared to its closest rivals had never been greater. Americans, however, often acted as though they were in greater danger than ever. Red screenwriters and pink professors apparently lurked in every studio and on every campus, ready to deliver America to communist tyranny; accordingly, Congress and the courts mobilized to identify and silence them. Nationalism in Iran and land reform in Guatemala aimed a dagger at America's heart; the Eisenhower administration sent secret warriors to overthrow the offending regimes.

Although much of the danger existed only in American heads (and on the agendas of those elected officials, bureaucrats, arms makers, and others who had profit and career incentives to magnify the communist threat), it was not entirely fabricated. In 1949 the Soviet Union broke the U.S. nuclear monopoly; by the mid-1950s, the Soviet air force possessed hydrogen bombs and long-range bombers; and by the early 1960s, Moscow's strategic rocket forces could deliver the big bombs across oceans and over the pole. For centuries, other countries had lived with the threat of imminent physical attack, but until now the twin moats of the Atlantic and Pacific had protected the United States and allowed Americans the luxury of time in organizing armies when war did come. The nuclear revolution in military technology erased the oceans and collapsed time; with luck, Americans might now get twenty minutes' warning of Soviet attack. By definition, paranoia is unreasonable, but it is not always unexplainable. If the American definition of national security exhibited a certain paranoia during the Cold War—and it did—the country's unaccustomed vulnerability to sudden and potentially annihilating attack was as good an explanation as any.

NO MORE VIETNAMS

Even for rich folks, insurance premiums can be a burden. The insurance Americans purchased for Southeast Asia eventually broke the bank—or at least the willingness of Americans to continue to pay.

In one sense Vietnam was inevitable. By the 1960s the American national interest was being defined so globally that hardly a sparrow could fall anywhere on earth without the U.S. government wanting to know why, to know whether the sparrow had jumped or been pushed, and, if pushed, to know whether the pusher wore scarlet plumage. Somewhere or other, sooner or later, the United States was bound to find itself defending a regime so weak, corrupt, or unpopular—especially since the chief criterion for American support was opposition to communism, rather than the positive embrace of democracy—as to be

indefensible at any reasonable cost. The country where this occurred happened to be Vietnam, but it might have been Cuba (actually, it *was* Cuba also, but Fidel Castro worked too fast and cleverly for the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations) or Iraq (Iraq likewise, but again the revolution succeeded before the United States reacted) or the Philippines (which similarly faced a leftist insurgency but managed to hold on).

Beyond its own problems, South Vietnam revealed something fundamental about the Cold War definition of the American national interest. As the world's only full-service superpower (the Soviet Union possessed a first-rate military but its strength in other areas was vastly overrated, as time revealed), the United States was more or less free to define its national interest however it chose. But having once agreed upon a definition, Americans were constrained to defend that definition lest they lose face with friends and enemies. Credibility counted when American commitments outran American capabilities. By no stretch of anyone's imagination could the United States have defended simultaneously all the regimes it was pledged by the 1960s to defend; its resolve and success anywhere had implications for its prospects everywhere.

That was why Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon went to such lengths to prevent the communist conquest of South Vietnam, and why Americans took failure there so hard. They might reasonably have accounted Vietnam simply as someplace where local conditions could not support an incompetent regime; if the American approach to Vietnam had actually (rather than metaphorically) been an insurance policy, Vietnam would have been written off and Americans would have gone about their business.

But Vietnam was not merely business—certainly not to the families and friends of the 60,000 service men and women who lost their lives there. Americans had indulged the illusion they could secure half the planet against revolution. In their post-Vietnam disillusionment, many Americans wondered whether they could secure any of the planet against revolution, or whether they ought to try. "For too many years," explained Jimmy Carter, the first president elected after Vietnam, "we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam being the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through its failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values."

Carter was certainly speaking for his own administration, but how many other Americans his "we" comprised was problematic. The reflexively anticommunist definition of the American national interest—the definition that had enjoyed consensus support since the early Cold War—had indeed been discredited in Vietnam, but a credible replacement had yet to appear. Nixon's candidate, détente, based on the provocative notion that capitalism and communism—even Chinese communism—could coexist, had spawned an entire school of opposition, called neoconservatism. Carter's human rights–based approach appealed to those appalled by the dirty linen that kept tumbling out of the Cold War hamper, but struck others as naively woolly-minded.

The only thing nearly all Americans could agree on was that the national interest dictated avoiding anything that looked or smelled like another Vietnam. Liberals interpreted this to mean not sending troops to prop up ugly autocracies abroad. Neoconservatives interpreted it to mean not sending troops unless the U.S. government and the American people were willing to follow through to victory. With the blades of the last helicopters from Saigon still whomp-whomping in American ears, the liberal and neoconservative conditions amounted to the same thing.

LONELY AT THE TOP

The neoconservatives helped Ronald Reagan win the White House in 1980, and they strove, shortly thereafter, to forge a new consensus around the old verities of the Cold War. Their man mouthed the right words, calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and summoning America to "stand tall" again. He dispatched troops to Grenada to loosen what he called "the tightening grip of the totalitarian left" there, and he added the Reagan Doctrine to the list that had started with Monroe, continued through Truman, and made lesser stops at Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter. In its own way, the Reagan Doctrine was more ambitious than its predecessors, which were essentially negative in concept and formulation (that is, aimed to prevent—respectively—European expansion in the Americas, communist subversion, destabilization of the Middle East, another Cuba, another Vietnam, and a Soviet takeover of

the Persian Gulf). The Reagan Doctrine advocated something positive: the replacement by rightists of leftist Third World regimes, notably in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. Above and beyond all this, the Reagan administration embarked on a big defense buildup, including the first steps toward what Reagan's partisans respectfully called the Strategic Defense Initiative and others derisively, or merely conveniently, called "Star Wars."

Although the American people cheered Reagan's speeches (which made all but hardened skeptics feel warm and fuzzy), supported his defense buildup (which provided welcome jobs during a nasty first-term recession), and reelected him by a large margin (over a candidate, Walter Mondale, who imprudently promised to raise taxes), they never cottoned to the neoconservative definition of the national interest. In the case of Nicaragua, the Congress explicitly cut off funding for Reagan's covert war against the Sandinista government. (Administration operatives would not take no for an answer and circumvented the congressional ban by the methods that produced the Iran-Contra scandal.)

Americans were much happier at a turn of events that started in Moscow in 1985 and gradually, then rapidly, redefined the politics of Europe. Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's plan to revitalize Soviet socialism required a respite with the West and led to the first important arms reduction agreements since the start of the Cold War. More important, Gorbachev's reforms required the Soviet client states of Eastern Europe to initiate reforms of their own, which led, in rapid-fire succession during the second half of 1989, to the dismantling of East European communism. By then, the anticommunist momentum was overwhelming, and before dissipating at the end of 1991 it swept aside Gorbachev and the Soviet Union itself.

The end of the Cold War was dazzling—and disorienting. Although the definition of the American national interest had shifted during the four decades since the start of the Cold War, with a particular break at Vietnam, it had always included the Soviet Union as a fundamental reference point. Now that reference point was gone, and Americans struggled to find a new one. Defense of the American homeland remained the sine qua non of the national interest, but nothing and no one offered a credible, or even conceivable, challenge on that count. (Terrorists, the new staple of Tom Clancy and other writers of thrillers, might blow up a building here or there, but such activity fell into the category of crime rather than war.) Defense of the U.S. economy could still arouse the American people: when Saddam Hussein seized the oil of Kuwait and threatened the wells of Saudi Arabia, President George H. W. Bush was able to marshal support behind an effort to protect what his secretary of state, James Baker, summarized in a word: "jobs." But military force was a blunt instrument for economic diplomacy; more appropriate were the North American Free Trade Agreement and the accords that moved China toward membership in the World Trade Organization. Even these noncoercive measures, however, enlisted far from unanimous support. Despite the unprecedented prosperity of the decade after the Cold War, many Americans registered real skepticism of the general phenomenon of globalization.

The hardest question for Americans during the 1990s was whether the American national interest included the defense of human rights overseas. Did the national interest require, or even suggest, dispatching troops to Bosnia to stop the "ethnic cleansing" there? To Somalia to deliver food to starving children and restore order where government had vanished? To Haiti to reinstall a president democratically elected but driven from office? To Rwanda to prevent the massacre of a half million men, women, and children on the wrong side of a murderous tribal conflict? To Serbia to secure self-determination for the Kosovo Albanians?

Beyond the basics of human rights, what about the promotion of democracy? Since the French Revolution, Americans had applauded the installation of governments responsible to the governed; but was this something worth making a fuss, or a fight, over? Should economic aid to the former Soviet republics be conditioned on elections and the rule of law? Should China be pressured to allow dissent and competitive politics?

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Americans had reached no consensus on these issues. No single definition of the national interest commanded the support of any substantial majority. The concept was still invoked: the administration of George W. Bush entered office in 2001 promising a foreign policy based on the "national interest" (rather, the new Bush men and women implied, than on the squishier standards of the outgoing Clinton administration). But they offered few specifics as to what their definition of the national interest entailed. Perhaps when they did, it would rally their compatriots behind a sin-

gle, stirring vision. More likely, given the experience of two centuries of American history, it would simply spark more debate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnes, Harry Elmer. *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt.* New York, 1926, 1929, 1970.

Beard, Charles Austin, and G. H. E. Smith. *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1934.

Beisner, Robert L. *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900.* New York, 1968. The debate about the Philippines and empire.

Brands, H. W. *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War.* New York, 1993. What we thought, why we fought.

———. *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy.* New York, 1998.

———. "The Idea of the National Interest." *Diplomatic History* 23 (1999): 239–261. Reprinted in Michael J. Hogan, ed. *Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century."* New York, 1999. Concentrates on the twentieth century.

Brands, H. W., ed. *The Use of Force After the Cold War.* College Station, Tex., 2000. For and against.

Cole, Wayne S. *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941.* Madison, Wis., 1953.

Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs.* New York, 1983.

Divine, Robert A. *The Illusion of Neutrality.* New York, 1962. Where the isolationists went wrong.

Ehrman, John. *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994.* New Haven, Conn., 1995.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961. What Hamilton thought and Washington said.

Graebner, Norman A., ed. *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1964.

Grattan, C. Hartley. *Why We Fought.* New York, 1929.

Haass, Richard N. *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War.* New York, 1997.

Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987.

Jonas, Manfred. *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, and Chicago, 1990.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *Jefferson and France: An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas.* New Haven, Conn., 1967. The roots of Republican foreign policy.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776.* Boston, 1997.

Merk, Frederick, and Louis Bannister Merk. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History; A Reinterpretation.* New York, 1963. A response to Albert K. Weinberg's *Manifest Destiny.*

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* New York, 1948, 6th ed., New York, 1985. The bible of Cold War realism.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1994.

Weinberg, Albert K. *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History.* Baltimore, 1935. A classic.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Rev. ed. New York, 1962. By the father of Cold War revisionism.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; DOCTRINES; IMPERIALISM; NEUTRALITY; OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION; PUBLIC OPINION; WILSONIANISM.

NATIONALISM

Lawrence S. Kaplan

Nationalism suffers from confusion both over the meaning of the term and over its role in the modern world. Its antecedents may be found in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the rise of the nation-state under dynastic rule, but its ideology and vitality are no older than the late eighteenth century, the period of the American and French revolutions. Nationalism represents a political creed in which the people offer their supreme allegiance to a nation-state. It underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes a nation's assertions of authority over the lives of its inhabitants.

DEFINING "AMERICAN" NATIONALISM

The earliest manifestation of nationalism, as opposed to mere patriotic impulses, was the rejection of an ancien régime and the transfer of sovereignty from monarch to people. There is in this event a note of liberation of the nation from oppression, either internal or external. As Hans Kohn pointed out in 1957, "Nationalism is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding." In the words of Carlton Hayes, it is a state of mind, "a modern emotional fusion of two very old phenomena; nationality and patriotism." If freedom to realize one's individual potential can be realized only in the nation-state, then nationalism becomes the antithesis of tyranny and oppression.

But this is not necessarily the totality of the nationalist experience. When the nation demands the supreme loyalty of its citizens, the freedom of the individual may be sacrificed to the welfare of the state. In this elevation of the state there is the concomitant denigration of the outsider and the temptation to advance the nation at the expense of other nations. As nationalism evolved in the nineteenth century, it assumed the ugly forms of imperialism, racism, and totalitarianism; it helped to stimulate world wars in the twentieth century.

It is these pejorative qualities that have led some American critics of nationalism to separate the American experience from the nationalism of Europe. Paul Nagel, an intellectual historian at the University of Missouri, refused even to use the term in dealing with American nationality. For him, "'Nationalism' regularly has implied a doctrine or a specific form of consciousness conveying superiority or prestige." Such glorification of country, he felt, should not be part of American loyalties because of the essentially different view of their land and themselves that distinguished Americans from other nationalities. Despite disquieting links between manifest destiny and European imperialism, most American critics find a qualitative difference in American nationalism.

One of the fundaments of nationalism is the sense of folk, of a kinship derived from a common ancestry. Where this bond is lacking or is of secondary importance, a common religion serves as a unifying force. Usually a people united in race or religion also have a clearly defined territory with which they are identified, either in the present or in the past. None of these attributes fits American history. Although England was the primary supplier of settlers, colonial Americans were also fully conscious of their Scottish and German roots at the time of the Revolution. An attenuated Calvinist heritage was as close to common religion as could be found in the eighteenth century, and this was vitiated by the fact that where there were established churches, they were more likely to be Anglican than Calvinist. It was a secularized religious spirit that was found in America. A specific territorial claim evoking national emotions was lacking among a people for whom territorial concerns were equated with an expanding frontier. America was more an idea than a geographical entity.

The "invention of America," as the Mexican historian Edmundo O'Gorman has happily phrased it, marks a major departure from the experience of more organically developed nations. The mythic

roots of Italian or Japanese peoples are nourished by a prehistory that tells of special strengths an Aeneas brought to Rome from Troy and special considerations conferred on Japan by virtue of divine descent. It is difficult to locate these qualities in a nation whose beginnings followed the invention of the printing press in western Europe by little more than a generation. The words and deeds of founders could be checked and countered, just as John Smith's tales about Virginia were examined by contemporaries who kept modern records.

Granted that every nation is a mixture of races with synoptic religious values, America is one of the very few nations the distinguishing features of which may be traced directly to the needs of other peoples at a particular period. The courage to embark on an American adventure, as well as the knowledge and skills necessary to discover and settle the New World, stemmed from a Renaissance belief in the capacity of man to achieve a new life. Such a conception was beyond the grasp of the medieval mind. The Reformation's pursuit of individual salvation outside the claims of established religions provided a moral imperative to much of the colonizing experience. Boston became a new Jerusalem when older Zions in Rome, London, and even Geneva had failed. Above all, the potential existence of vast quantities of precious metals in the New World gave a powerful impetus to the discovery and exploitation of American resources. The road to a transformation of life in a secular world, opened by the information of the Crusaders about the Levant and the Orient, led to Europe's colonizing of the Western Hemisphere. American nationalism was touched by all these forces.

The first problem, then, in defining American nationalism is to identify it. An automatic expression of nationalism did not accompany the establishment of the United States. The emotions of the American Revolution were attached to state rather than to nation, and the search for a substitute for a historic memory or a common church or a unifying ruling elite required forty years before it could bind the loyalties of Americans. It was an issue that absorbed the energies of the founders of the new republic and achieved a tentative resolution only after the War of 1812. By that time, the focus of nationalist sentiment was on the special conditions of liberty protected by a new and superior government that had no counterpart elsewhere.

The development of a national identity proceeded throughout the nineteenth century, and continued to be a preoccupation of Americans in the twentieth century. The effort to find suitable symbols to display loyalty was a lengthy process. As late as the Civil War there was more than one design of the national flag. It was not until 1942 that the ritual for its display on buildings or on platforms was completed, and the pledge of allegiance was made obligatory in many schools only a generation earlier. The insertion of "under God" in the pledge of allegiance was a product of the pieties of the post–World War II era. Even the national anthem, "The Star-Spangled Banner," was not so designated until 1931. The insecurity over identification of nationalism is equally apparent in the sensitivity over the meanings of "Americanism" and "un-Americanism."

A second, and overlapping, element in nationalism is the peculiar relationship between state and federal governments. The question had its roots in the making of the Constitution, as did the term "federal" used by its framers. It was a euphemism designed to secure support for a new basic law that implied the supremacy of a strong central government. An open affirmation of this purpose in 1787 would have meant the failure of the Constitutional Convention in a country where primary loyalties still belonged to the states and where the word "federal" suggested a fair sharing of power. The struggle between state and nation, begun with the failure of a genuine federal system under the Confederation, was a persistent theme in American life for three-quarters of a century. Although it was present in the Jeffersonian challenge to Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s and in Federalist disaffection from the Jeffersonian conflict with England in the next decade and a half, its dominance over American life coincided with southern sectionalism, culminating in the Civil War. That conflict ended not only in the triumph of the North but also in the vesting of new mystical powers in the Union and the Constitution. Nationalism after 1865 would always be equated with a nation, "one and indivisible," with the "unum" in "e pluribus unum" superior to the "pluribus."

A third strand in American nationalism, which is also as old as the Republic, is the special destiny of America. The hand of Providence as well as of man is involved. If America is a "new world," its rise must have a divine meaning; and that meaning was always translated into some form of sharing the blessings of liberty with less-favored peoples. The religious quality inherent in the image of a "chosen people" was enhanced by

the secular opportunities open to Americans. Vast, empty, rich lands held insecurely by European imperialists seemed manifestly destined for American occupation. Movement into Texas and California was a fulfillment of a destiny not only to occupy the entire continent but also to help the rest of humanity see how that occupation would spread the principles of free speech, free religion, self-government, and boundless economic opportunities that were denied to the Old World. Here was a sense of mission that sharpened in clashes with Britain or with Spain, but it was a mission that was susceptible to foreign influence. The unique character of a civilization serving as a beacon to others, a model to be copied, could be (and was) compromised by the change in status from a small, vulnerable republic to a continental empire with overseas ambitions. The altruism of an earlier time was thoroughly mixed, at the end of the nineteenth century, with prevailing influences of social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxon racism.

Most of the elements making up America's self-image of a divinely favored nation still survive, even though the trauma of a great economic depression in the 1930s, the burdens of world governance in the 1950s, and increasing doubts over social injustice and corruption at home and exploitation abroad have had disillusioning effects upon the meaning of the American mission. Yet with all these doubts, the connection between God's special favor and the American way of life remains part of nationalism. And, for all its flaws, the virtues associated with the record of American nationalism suggest distinctive qualities not found in other national experiences.

CONSTRUCTING AN AMERICAN IDENTITY

The most difficult period to identify in the evolution of nationalism is the time of its inception. The very name of America came comparatively late into the consciousness of the British colonies, and the first awareness of a separate destiny is a matter of continuing speculation. Boyd Shafer found an incipient national loyalty appearing as far back as 1740, during King George's War. Paul Varg of Michigan State University settled on 1759, Britain's annus mirabilis in the war with France. Richard Merritt, a Yale political scientist, employed quantitative techniques to determine that 1770 was the year when key colonial newspapers cited "America" more frequently than "British colonies" in their columns. Although by the middle of the eighteenth century it was obvious that Americans were becoming something more than transplanted Englishmen, many future revolutionaries were quick to proclaim their British affiliations as the mother country triumphed over France in the French and Indian War. There was genuine pride in membership in a great British empire. As late as 1775, the poet Philip Freneau was convinced that Britain could and should "rule our hearts again," if only the rights of the American part of the empire were respected.

After the Revolution had shattered that empire, no automatic transfer of loyalty from London to the Confederation, with its seat in Philadelphia, took place. To a New Englander or a Georgian, Philadelphia was as distant as London. The differences between North and South, tidewater and piedmont, were potentially as deep as differences between Americans and Englishmen. Culture as well as geography distinguished the Bostonian from the Virginian, and the tidewater Virginian from the Scottish frontiersman of the Blue Ridge. Some of the most fundamental characteristics of the American way of life—freedom from arbitrary government and freedom of speech and religion—were Virginian or Pennsylvanian as well as American. The America of 1776 could have remained as much an abstraction as Europe was then and now. The experience of Latin American revolutions a generation later could have been that of the former British colonies.

The vulnerability of a young republic in a world of hostile monarchies provided a major incentive for the cultivation of an American identity. The strength of nationalism was an inspiration to American statesmen aware of the temptations that quarreling American states offered to Europeans awaiting the demise of the American experiment. An anxious neighbor like Spain to the west and south, and an angry neighbor like Britain to the north, looked forward to exploiting the divisions among the former colonies. Even the ally France observed American weakness with complacence, knowing that it would bind Americans to their French patron.

The anticipated failure of the republican regime made success all the more important to the Founders, and this success depended on a strong pride in their achievements. Richard Morris pointed out that an ideology of nationalism could be built on what Europeans regarded as intolerable infirmities: the spectacle of a free people governing themselves under conditions of lib-

erty no other people enjoyed, and managing their affairs in such a way as to be an inspiration to the less fortunate. As Thomas Paine phrased it in his *Crisis,* the United States would be in a position "to make a world happy, to teach mankind the art of being so—to exhibit on the theatre of the universe a character hitherto unknown, and to have, as it were, a new creation intrusted to our hands."

There was an important distinction, however, between pronouncing American superiority on such grounds and building a foundation to support it. Poets, playwrights, and even lexicographers were as sensitive to the importance of building institutions to sustain American achievements as were the diplomats and statesmen. Noah Webster's labors on a dictionary were intended to establish an American language distinct from the English of the mother country. At one and the same time his dictionary would proclaim the differences between the two nations and provide a standard that could be used to deepen those differences in the future. His work was a success, but not quite on the terms he had set. The American language was only partially freed from its inferiority complexes.

Other intellectuals of this period harked back to classical antiquity to assert the American distinctiveness. The American republic was to be accepted, not as a replication of any contemporary European nation but as an improved reincarnation of ancient Greece and Rome. From language to architecture to political imagery, the classical period was invoked. If Rome had its *Aeneid* to glorify its origins, the Connecticut poet Joel Barlow was willing to offer his country *The Columbiad,* which attested to

> A work so vast a second world required,
> By oceans bourn'd, from elder states retired;
> Where, uncontaminated, unconfined,
> Free contemplation might expand the mind,
> To form, fix, prove the well-adjusted plan
> And base and build the commonwealth of man.

Whatever its poetic merits, *The Columbiad* claimed a new world to be even more superior to the Old World than Rome was to its rivals. But, like Rome, the United States was prepared to grant to mankind something better in human relations than it had ever witnessed before.

This language was the stuff of nationalism. It was also braggadocio, inviting the mockery of enemies and condescending friends. If, as Europe observed, America was no Rome, certainly Barlow and Freneau were neither Virgils nor Homers. America's pretensions were fair game for Europeans of all stripes. It was the American abroad whose national sensibilities were most exposed. John Adams, minister to Great Britain under the Confederation, was never more the American than when he was snubbed at the Court of St. James's. Even in France, which came to the aid of the United States in war, Thomas Jefferson, Adams's counterpart at the Bourbon court, was a victim of many of the slights suffered by Adams, although French motives were less hostile.

That America was unlike other nations was not the question. It was the nature of the differences that distressed diplomats in Europe. French enthusiasts of America were frequently as negative as open adversaries were. The idealization of Americans as Rousseau's "noble savages" stirred European sympathies for the United States, but the European emphasis upon savagery over nobility stirred resentment among Americans. One of Jefferson's more emotional moments in Europe was his encounter with the pejorative opinions of French intellectuals concerning the American character. His *Notes on the State of Virginia* was a response to those Europeans who shared the views of the naturalist Georges Buffon that animal life in America was inferior in size and strength to that of the Old World. Jefferson's response went beyond a literary effort; Buffon received skins and skeletons of American animals sent to France at Jefferson's behest to prove the equality, if not the superiority, of life in the New World. Even more galling was the charge of the philosophe Abbé Guillaume Raynal that human life degenerated on the American continent. This observation contained aspersions on American virility as well as on American genius. Jefferson countered this assault with a spirited presentation of Indian virtues. He labored valiantly, but under obvious handicaps, in pointing out poets and artists, mathematicians and scientists, to match the products of Europe. Benjamin Franklin and David Rittenhouse were not the equals of Galileo and Newton.

The vigor of American ripostes to perceived insults to their nationality inspired more derision than respect among Europeans of this period. None was more devastating than the Reverend Sydney Smith, a Yorkshire wit who reacted to American claims to being "the greatest, the most enlightened, the most moral people upon earth" by asking rhetorically, "In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an American play? or looks at an American picture or statue?" So much for the pretensions of American nationalism. A sense of inferiority in

relation to older civilizations seemed to have given rise to a hyperbolic style of self-defense that invited ridicule.

But Smith's famous article in the *Edinburgh Review,* which appeared in 1820, would have been more deflating had it appeared a generation earlier, when Barlow and Freneau were poetizing. Between 1783 and 1815 national pride expanded enormously to encompass a much larger company than a few diplomats abroad and the Hartford Wits at home. The nation, having acquired an inland empire and having faced down Britain in war, again shared its exhilaration. The very newness and freedoms of an empty land lacking oppressive government or a cultivated aristocracy, which Europeans translated as barbaric and uncultured, were the reasons for American superiority.

The Revolution had not stimulated nationalism among most Americans in the immediate postwar years. National attention was on the disarray—economic and political—that separation from Britain had brought. There was little occasion for self-congratulation. Such loyalty to country as was visible in this period was to the patriarchal figure of George Washington, and even this symbol did not emerge untarnished from the political debates. In the absence of a court, and even of a flag, Washington's services as the unifying father of his country were vital for the rallying of national sentiment. He was the Cincinnatus of America who sacrificed himself to perform services no one else could provide, and then retired rather than retain power. His was a vital function for the growth of nationalism, and yet it was incomplete. He found himself enmeshed, and ultimately damaged, by political controversy in the last years of his presidency. The Fourth of July, Independence Day, was a supplementary unifier, as toasts were drunk and cannons fired in honor of the Declaration of Independence. But as exciting as the celebrations may have been, they were as much a victory over the British by Pennsylvanians or New Yorkers as a victory by Americans.

The wave of nationalism that failed to rise in the 1780s and 1790s finally broke over America in the second war with Britain. The Francophilia that had briefly prevailed among Jeffersonians had dissipated in the disillusionment over the policies of the French Republic and in recognition of the dangers of Napoleonic imperialism. Federalist failure to exploit Francophobia fully during the Quasi-War with France in 1798–1800 reflects a deficiency in the quality of nationalism as much as it does the political power of the Jeffersonian opposition. Anglophilia, more enduring among Federalists of the Northeast, ended more gradually. For those who could not forsake British ties for reasons of custom or conviction or commerce, the consequence was isolation from most of their countrymen and, ultimately, extinction of the Federalist Party as a political entity. The majority of that party joined Republicans in a nationalism influenced by the trans-Appalachian and trans-Mississippi West. Federalists had exerted minuscule influence in 1783, and the Republican Party did not come into being until the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.

During the War of 1812, Jonathan Russell, a businessman-politician, was inspired by the *Constitution*'s victory over the British frigate *Guerrière* to burst out in a paean of praise of its commander, Isaac Hull. The event elevated Hull to Washingtonian heights:

> Yes! deathless, oh Hull, shall thy fame live
> in story
> And cheer, in the battle, our sons on the wave—
> Through ages unborn shall the beams of
> thy glory,
> Unclouded, illumine the march of the brave.

If such a minor figure as Hull could evoke such emotion from such an unlikely source, it is understandable that the common soldier, who was ignored after the Revolutionary War, would also receive attention. Congress finally granted pensions for revolutionary war service in 1818. American identity was no longer a problem on 4 July 1826, when the two great builders of nationalism and independence, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, died within hours of each other on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence they both helped to write. A generation earlier, when Washington died, the apotheosis of the first president was still a tribute to a single man, no matter how significant the deification was in the fashioning of national unity. On Independence Day of 1826, the passing of the second and third presidents of the United States was the occasion for the nation's apotheosis of itself.

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION AND THE "YOUNG AMERICA" SPIRIT

For nationalism to flourish, it was obvious that the United States had to prove its experiment successful. The War of 1812 was one proving ground. More significant than a diplomatic success against

Britain was the spectacular rise in the national economy, sparked by population increase, territorial acquisitions, and technological changes in transportation and industry. Speaking of the period after the Treaty of Ghent, Henry Adams observed, "The continent lay before them, like an uncovered ore-bed. They could see and they even could calculate with reasonable accuracy the wealth it could be made to yield." The steady accumulation of power to the central government at the expense of the states was equated with the growth of America. Nationalism implied the denigration of sectionalism and states' rights.

The conflict between central and local governments that accompanied the rise of nationalism was not surprising. The European nation-states experienced the assertion of central power by means of powerful monarchs overcoming the separatism of feudal nobles. What distinguished the American experience from others was the special nature of the central authority; it was not personified by a president, not even George Washington. The mystical conception of a constitution blessing a union permitted the cherished American liberties to flourish.

The argument for centralizing government during the Confederation had been fought on the assumption that no other government could perform that function. States' rights might rally libertarians worried about the tyranny of rule from afar, but the veterans of the revolutionary war returning to their farms and villages were more concerned about economic depression and foreclosures on their properties than with the potential evils of a distant national government. Had there been a stronger central authority in the Confederation, revolutionary war heroes of the order of Ethan Allen, who proposed attaching Vermont to Canada, and George Rogers Clark, who considered a Spanish connection to secure Kentuckians' access to the Gulf of Mexico, would have been less tempted to join with the former British enemy and the hostile Spanish neighbor. Where the states individually or collectively as the Confederation had failed to respond to Indian or European threats in the West, the Union drove the Indians out of the Northwest, saved the nation from the British in 1812–1815, and wrested Florida from the Spanish in 1819. As the western territories entered the Union their loyalties were to the nation that welcomed them rather than to any pristine colonial commonwealth. Unlike the original thirteen states, they had been created by acts of the federal Congress.

Still, the centrifugal forces that had always been a part of the American experience had not disappeared. Such "good feeling" as existed after 1815 did not have its premise in the end of sectionalism or even states' consciousness; rather, the "American system" of Henry Clay was built on a common hostility to British economic power that would help to mesh the economies of the North, the West, and the South. If there was temporary harmony at this time, it was largely because each section had unrealistic expectations of special advantage from congressional support of tariffs or of internal improvements.

The slave-oriented South found the Union ultimately a threat both to its economy and to its society, and in the Civil War provided the greatest challenge the Union had to surmount in the nation's history. The war was considered by some as a struggle between two competing nationalisms. In the years preceding this conflict, the Union became the most vital national symbol to the North. Southern challenges on constitutional grounds became increasingly insufferable. The South's interpretations signified more than just a peculiar gloss of the Constitution; the North regarded them as a rending of the instrument of America's sovereignty and the consequent extinction of the American nation. While loyalty to a section greater than loyalty to the nation could be considered patriotism, by 1860 the majority of the country was convinced that an effective American sovereignty could be expressed only in a unified nation.

A generation earlier, Alexis de Tocqueville, that astute French visitor, wrote, "The Union is an ideal nation that exists, so to speak, only in the mind." It also existed in the heart. The passions over slavery converted it into something more than a means of achieving effective government. The Union became an object of reverence, the indispensable foundation of national values.

Daniel Webster attempted to exploit this sentiment to deflect sectional rivalry into the popular channel of xenophobia. In a direct insult to Austria in 1849, President Zachary Taylor promised recognition to Hungary if its revolution succeeded, and then, after its failure, his successor Millard Fillmore gave its leader a tumultuous welcome to America in 1852. Secretary of State Webster not only rejected Austria's subsequent protest but went out of his way to taunt its minister to the United States, Chevalier J. G. Hülsemann. He lectured the Austrian on Hungary's good sense in imitating the American Revolution. Should the

Austrians have any objection, they must reckon with the fact that "the power of this republic, at the present moment, is spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface."

This well-publicized letter struck just the chord Webster hoped to reach in Americans. The appeal to chauvinism with hyperbolic rhetoric performed an important function in 1850. It united North and South in opposition to Europe. But the forces of disunion that Webster had hoped to dissipate were stronger than those of nationalism. In even greater desperation a decade later, Secretary of State William H. Seward tried to divert the country from war by urging President Abraham Lincoln to turn over the executive powers to him so that he could save the Union by initiating war against France or Spain, or all of Europe. The president rejected the proposal, but unrealistic as it may have been in 1861 and fantastic as it has sounded to later generations, the spirit behind the plan was the same one that had propelled the American system of Henry Clay, the Mexican War maneuvers of President James K. Polk, and Daniel Webster's note to Hülsemann. Antagonism to the Old World was a staple of American nationalism, especially in times of crisis.

The traumas of sectional conflict resulted in the removal of the constitutional question from nationalism. The Union had triumphed and with it sentiments of nationalism. The sobriety with which nationalism was expressed in the middle years of the century yielded to a reassertion of the older boisterous spirits. The end of war witnessed a period of even more rapid growth in population, wealth, and power than had been seen fifty years earlier, after the Treaty of Ghent. It also revived—in exaggerated ways before the century was over—the idea of mission that had been implicit in the American self-image from the beginning: the notion that God had given America a special portion of blessings, and with it a mission to share them with less-favored peoples.

Prior to the Civil War the most vocal articulation of the American mission had accompanied crises with Spain or Britain or France over their possessions in North America. They all violated a divine plan. While the idea of providential occupation of the West antedated the annexation of Texas and the demands for Oregon—and, indeed, may be found in Jeffersonian ruminations in the 1780s—it was John L. O'Sullivan, editor of the *Democratic Review,* who in 1845 specifically charged foreign hostility and jealousy with "limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." Texas, California, and Oregon—and even Upper Canada—were equated with empty land awaiting the arrival of Americans to bring it under proper cultivation.

Americans did not regard these views or the actions that followed from them as analogous to European imperialism; they were simply the natural spread of free peoples and free institutions into unoccupied space wrongly claimed by others. Although such assertions might have sounded hypocritical to hostile observers, even opponents of the Mexican War could concede that the mission to spread liberty bore marks of idealism. Frederick Merk found in expansionism a spirit that was "idealistic, self-denying, hopeful for divine favor for national aspirations, though not sure of it." So if manifest destiny was connected with the grasping for land, it was also linked to the land's improvement by peopling it with what Americans of the period considered to be a better society than could have been achieved under its original proprietors. In the midst of the Mexican War, former secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin defined the American mission as a great experiment in which "a representative democratic republic" had a chance to try out its ideals on a large scale. "If it failed, the last hope of the friends of mankind was lost, or indefinitely postponed; and the eyes of the world were turned towards you. Whenever real or pretended apprehension of the imminent danger of trusting people at large with power were expressed, the answer was 'Look at America.'"

In this spirit the migration of Americans to Texas or California or Oregon signified not exploitation of native peoples, or governance over unwilling subjects, but the sharing of liberties over a wider area. The growing United States had spilled its surplus population into neighboring territories that were relatively empty. When those territories were sufficiently populous, they would enter the Union, ultimately as full and equal partners of the older states. If there was conflict within the United States over their admission, this was a function of the slavery quarrels, not of a desire for imperialist control on the part of the nation.

But it was difficult to deny that the partial dismemberment of Mexico compromised the missionary spirit behind manifest destiny. The opposition of such distinguished figures as John

Quincy Adams, an authentic expansionist, and the poet James Russell Lowell helped to arouse a sense of guilt over a war that many abolitionists regarded as an act of aggression by southern slavery interests. That Mexican and Indian populations, no matter how scattered, lived in California or New Mexico gave a taste of imperialism to the fruits of American nationalism. Was manifest destiny, then, merely a mask for American conquest of a weak neighbor?

Although a repugnant element can never be expunged from nationalism, extenuating factors refine the annexation of Texas and even the ensuing war with Mexico. Manifest destiny was more than an instrument of southern interests; the pull of California had attracted New England mercantile ambitions as well. More important, it was a national rather than a sectional impulse, with a powerful England, as in the case of the Oregon quarrel, a major antagonist in 1844. The hope was that the two Canadas would sue for admission to the new and enlarged Union. O'Sullivan speculated that Canada, as easily as California, could be the next "customer."

Arrogant and self-serving as this language sounded in press, pulpit, and schools, its users could unreservedly contrast the freedom of religion and self-government in the territories under American control with the repression of a state church in Mexico and the limitations of political freedom in Canada. When the demands for annexation threatened to get out of hand, as in the pressure for the absorption of all Mexico, opponents stopped the threat effectively. Partisan fears of Mexico parceled into slave states may have been a powerful incentive for opposition, but they were fueled as well by the unpalatable prospect of governing an unassimilable population that would not participate in the American political process.

Although controversy continues to swirl about the purity of American motives in continental expansion, it does not apply to the display of nationalism in this period. It was genuine and widespread. If any emotion could have overcome the deep divisions within the Union in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was pride in American institutions and in the nation's power to proclaim them to the world. Had it not been for the slavery issue, Thomas Bailey of Stanford University speculated, "Americans would not only have swaggered more in the subsequent years but would have grasped more territories." As it was, the Young America spirit that flourished in the wake of the Mexican War expressed itself in provocations against Europe. The Revolution of 1848 was a suitable occasion for its display. George Bancroft, historian and diplomat, from his post in London expressed America's approval of the revolutions: "Can we show ourselves lukewarm, while the Old World is shaking off its chains and emancipating and enthroning the masses?"

THE AMERICAN MISSION ABROAD: IMPERIALISM AND EMPIRE

Changes that occurred later in the century provided a different gloss both to the idea of manifest destiny and to the meaning of mission. The new "manifest destiny" of the 1890s involved acquisition and control of an overseas empire. Although the older xenophobia and the civilizing mission remained, they were more strident in their tone and also more derivative of the European experience. The distinctions between European and American imperialism appeared to blur at the turn of the century. It was not that the popular nature of nationalism had altered significantly. The beer-garden simplicity with which the flag was venerated in the 1890s and the gusto with which the Spanish were rebuked for their behavior in Cuba linked Theodore Roosevelt to Davy Crockett. Finley Peter Dunne, the leading press satirist at the time of America's rise to world power, put words into the mouth of his Mr. Dooley that would have been as fitting half a century before: "'We're a great people,' said Mr. Hennessy earnestly. 'We are,' said Mr. Dooley. 'We are that. An' th' best iv it is, we know that we are.'"

What was different was a respectful interest in European imperialism and a wish by many American leaders to imitate it. As the burgeoning American economy produced enormous wealth, the instant oil, meat-packing, and rail barons sought marriage alliances with the Old World and pursued culture by bringing the French Middle Ages or Tudor England architecturally to their Rhode Island estates or New York City palaces. But they were conscious that they still lacked a sense of ideological security that European aristocrats possessed as a birthright. The spirit of Teutonic, and especially Anglo-Saxon, solidarity filled some of the needs of an insecure upper class. Although England may have remained a commercial and political rival, there was a surge of appreciation for the kinship of the two peoples that would account for the greatness of both.

The scholar-diplomats George Bancroft and John Lothrop Motley had commented earlier on the role that racial stock had in assuring a nation's greatness. Both had been students in Germany. Granting his distaste for some aspects of Prussian militarism, Bancroft claimed that it would be the instrument to win "more rapidly liberty in Europe than all that the Kossuths, Garibaldis, and Mazzinis could effect in half a century." Motley celebrated Teutonic virtues by noting that Holland's struggle with Spain in the sixteenth century "must have particular interest, for it is a portion of the records of the Anglo-Saxon race—essentially the same, whether in Friesland, England, or Massachusetts." Another diplomat, James Russell Lowell, more poet than scholar, brought the good news to England that "the duty which has been laid upon the English-speaking races, so far as we can discover, has been to carry over the great lessons of liberty combined with order. That is the great secret of civilization." In a major disquisition on democracy in 1884, Lowell had spoken of the problems that Americans encountered with the irresponsible masses in the large cities that were composed of peoples of inferior stock. America's success in overcoming these obstacles to become a great democracy could be traced to the fact that "the acorn from which it sprang was ripened on the British oak."

The only trouble with these perorations was the implication of a junior partnership for America in the racial connection. This became increasingly unacceptable to nationalists. A colonial relationship with even the best of the Old World did not fit America's self-image by the time the nineteenth century ended. America would be superior to Britain even in racism. Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana pointed out to the Senate that "God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. . . . And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the redemption of the world."

For those who might not heed a divine appeal, the mandate of social Darwinism brought the same message. The transfer of Darwinian principles from a struggle among species for survival to a competition among nations moved the naturalist's theory of evolution from biology to sociology and international relations almost from the moment of its conception. Presumably the laws of nature justified power in the hands of the fittest; and in the late nineteenth century the arena for the display of national superiority lay in carving out colonial empires in Asia and Africa. For the United States to stand by and remove itself from this competition would be an admission of inferiority. Since the American continent was filled, expansion would have to take place overseas. The alternative would be both a sapping of national strength and increasing advantage to European competitors in the Darwinian struggle for greatness.

The naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, more than any other figure, tied together the strains of racial pride and Darwinian sanctions with the economic significance of the acquisition of colonies. Such an undertaking would solve the problems of surplus goods flowing from what appeared, after the Panic of 1893, to be an overdeveloped economic plant. It would also satisfy the defense needs of the nation, through a navy protecting routes to new colonies. Lastly, it would address the imperative of carrying the blessings of American civilization abroad.

Indeed, the American mission was ultimately the most important rationalization for imperial control. The Reverend Josiah Strong, secretary of the Evangelical Alliance and a powerful publicist for expansion, exhorted Americans to respect their sacred trust by bestowing their privileges upon other sectors of humanity. After all, "they are not proprietors, apportioning their own, but simply *trustees* or managers of God's property. . . . Our plea is not America for America's sake," he wrote in *Our Country* (1885), "but America for the world's sake." It is this eleemosynary spirit that gave meaning to President William McKinley's reluctance to leave the Philippines under Spanish control or under its own governance. In confessing his agony over the decision to annex the islands, he finally realized, "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died."

The gulf between McKinley's understanding of America's mission and those of the French, British, Germans, and Russians was not as wide as the gulf between McKinley's or Theodore Roosevelt's conception of mission and that of Jefferson or John Quincy Adams. The Monroe Doctrine had made it clear that America was to serve as a model for others to emulate, but not as an instrument to involve itself in the afflictions of the less fortunate. America's own system could only be corrupted by such involvement. So Adams con-

cluded when he counseled President James Monroe not to intervene against Turkey on behalf of the admired Greek revolutionaries. But by the end of the century the combination of racial pretensions, Darwinian impulses, and putative economic imperatives had broken one great barrier of isolationism. They affected more than the special interests of navalists, businessmen, or missionaries. Even so sensitive a scholar as Frederick Jackson Turner found virtue in overseas expansion. He "rowed with the tide of the new nationalism," Ralph Gabriel noted in his *Course of American Democratic Thought,* at least for a while, as he pondered the effect of the passing of the frontier upon American democracy. It was hoped that settlement of Hawaii and the Philippines could have the same beneficial results for democracy as the settlement of Ohio and Iowa had in the past.

For Turner and for most Americans, the new manifest destiny was a mistake, an aberration of American tradition. In the wake of Filipino resistance to American occupation in 1899, William Jennings Bryan observed, "'Destiny' was not as manifest as it was a few weeks ago." Most American leaders were slower to realize this than Bryan had been. The tide of empire finally receded, but not before it had left a permanent imprint on the fabric of American nationalism, or at least had deepened indentations that had always been there. The country came to recognize the incompatibility between the governance of Iowa and the governance of the Philippines; the former was based on self-government and eventual statehood, the latter, on imperial control over unassimilable peoples. The result was the gradual disengagement from the imperial plans of 1900, and ultimate independence for those islands.

NATIVISM AND "AMERICANIZATION"

If nationalism in the twentieth century recoiled from the problems of assimilation abroad, it could not avoid those problems at home. The rise of Anglo-Saxon racism coincided with massive emigration from non–Anglo-Saxon eastern and southern Europe, which raised questions about the dilution not only of the race but also of the institutions of America. Not all the nativist reactions were hostile. Some were patronizing and even melioristic. The Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic societies recognized their duty to "Americanize" the foreigner, to teach him proper speech and manners as well as values. The public school would be the instrument, according to Josiah Strong, by which "the strange and dissimilar races which come to us are, in one generation, assimilated and made Americans." American Catholic and Jewish historical societies, accepting the importance of Americanization, were organized in the 1880s and 1890s to show the nation their own ties with the American past. Their objective was to justify themselves as Americans, different in background but sharing in the creation of a new people. The constitution of the American Irish Historical Society expressed the hope that "in the days to come, that lie in the womb of the future, when all the various elements that have gone and are going to make the republic great, are united in the American,—the man who in his person will represent the bravest elements of all the old races of earth,—we declare that the deeds and accomplishment of our element shall be written in the book of the new race, telling what we did and no more; giving us our rightful place by the side of the others."

Such modesty of aspiration on the part of an immigrant group and such generous impulses on the part of the patronizing older stock were balanced by less edifying side effects of the racist component in nationalism. Ethnic and religious communities vied with each other in claiming credit for contributions to the national history or character, while the Anglo-Saxon elite, under the impact of war and depression in the twentieth century, blamed immigrants for the nation's troubles. War inevitably stokes nationalist passions, and World War I was no exception. The case then was not simply undifferentiated immigrants. German-Americans were identified as enemies with dangerous attachments to the ancestral country. Such manifestations of nationalism at its worst were seen in the banning of Beethoven, the conversion of sauerkraut into liberty cabbage, and the removal of German language instruction from schools. The vehement denunciation of the "hyphenated" American by Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt during the war assumed that hyphenation applied to the Irish and Germans, not to the British. The latter's heritage was indistinguishable from the Americans' in 1917.

The revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, with its particularly ugly brand of national exclusiveness, was another manifestation of the Anglo-Saxon tradition translated into a self-conscious white Protestant ascendancy. Immigration restriction rather than immigrant amelioration was a consequence of this mood in the period of

disillusionment that followed World War I. It is ironic that a generation later, in the aftermath of another world war, the followers of Senator Joseph McCarthy, many of them from ethnic backgrounds that could not meet the test of Americanism in the past, led a nationalist assault on the loyalty of the older elite.

In the struggle with Soviet communism after World War II, McCarthy's unprincipled attacks on putative American communists numbered among their victims not merely the principles of civil liberties but also the American eastern "establishment," mostly Anglo-Saxon, which was accused of negligence and worse in the struggle of the nation against external enemies. The emotions of the time evoked the xenophobia of earlier crises, except that the "American" embraced a wider constituency. Nonetheless, the nationalism that was demonstrated in the 1950s, as much as in the 1920s or in the 1890s, was a narrow and self-centered view of the nation's interests.

AMERICANIZING THE WORLD

Despite the many xenophobic impulses released in the name of nationalism, the missionary elements did not disappear in the twentieth century. The retreat from moral uplifting of the natives of the Caribbean or East Asia was short-lived and replaced by an attempt to uplift the entire world, not merely those regions under American governance. In both world wars American democracy became the exemplar for the world. Although Woodrow Wilson won a reputation as a supreme internationalist, seeking a new world order that would end national rivalries, his new order would be on American terms. His conception of the American mission was to disseminate those progressive values, both economic and political, that would serve America's own interests in the world. It was nothing less than the remaking of the world according to an American pattern. Wilson himself rejected a narrow distinction between nationalism and internationalism. "The greatest nationalist," he claimed, "is the man who wants his nation to be the greatest nation, and the greatest nation is the nation which penetrates to the heart of its duty and mission among the nations of the world."

In this context the mission of World War II and the Cold War was a continuation of the Wilsonian worldview. The United Nations would replicate the League of Nations by serving to help America fulfill its duty to humanity. Both the goals and the methods were clearly outlined. Nations would be freed from fear of conquest, with American military power protecting them from Nazis or communists; they would be freed from want by the application of American technology to their economies; they would be freed from ignorance by American learning spread through a Fulbright scholarship program or a Peace Corps. These were the benign purposes of the Marshall Plan and Point Four. They reflected an idealism embodied in President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in 1961. The language in which they were expressed lacked the overt racial biases and self-satisfied smugness that had characterized many early missionary activities. The publisher Henry Luce anticipated an "American century," in which the United States would serve "as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, . . . as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and . . . as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice."

In 1967, Ronald Steel claimed that Luce's American century was in fact a Pax Americana, with very few distinctions between its dictates and those of Rome's imperialism. Whether America willed it or not, it built a world empire to serve its own economic needs; it elevated communism into a monster out of all proportion to the threat presented; it arbitrarily divided the world into Manichaean spheres of good and evil; and, in the name of altruism, it helped to turn parts of Southeast Asia into a wasteland. As Americans reflected with disillusion upon the exaggerated promises of the Truman Doctrine, undertaken in the afterglow of successes in World War II when the United States sought to extend its system throughout the world, they discovered flaws in even the most altruistic postures. Nationalism was a cover for the erosion of civil liberties identified with McCarthyism, for the corruption of government by the accretion of enormous power in the hands of the executive, and for the corresponding diminution of power in the Congress. While the crudities of American imperialism of the Theodore Roosevelt era may have been smoothed, the brutalization of the American character stemming from the anticommunist campaigns in Asia and Latin America was even more distressing.

The result in the post-Vietnam era was a decline in the nationalist spirit. The conscious abuse of the flag by many of the younger generation was a symbolic act of revenge upon a nation

that, in the name of liberty, sought conquest of the world for selfish reasons. The very idea of an American mission was called into question, not simply the matter of its betrayal. The result was a retreat by both conservatives and liberals into a neoisolationist stance in the 1970s. Conservatives would turn America's attention back to its own problems, rather than waste resources on an ungrateful world. Liberals urged a less grandiose vision for America's role in the world, blaming American arrogance for troubling the peace of the world.

Both sentiments were present in American society in the last years of the twentieth century. But they were subsumed under a triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War and implosion of the Soviet empire. President Ronald Reagan's vision of American power seemed to have been realized. Democratic capitalism was to be the model for the world. The striking victory over Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 marked the nation as the world's sole superpower. That the American way of life was the ideal toward which all peoples strove—and most did envy—sparked a nationalist pride that almost effaced the memory of failure in Vietnam. But doubts about the reality of American dominance of a fractious world dimmed the optimism of those who saw the "end of history" in the demise of capitalism. The world at the turn of the twenty-first century was in as much turmoil as it had been when the Soviet Union was the nation's powerful adversary. The shortcomings of American society were also as much—or more—in evidence as in the past, as hitherto quiet minority voices were heard. David Waldstreicher in 1997 observed that Native Americans and African Americans had no reason to celebrate the national fetes that accompanied Independence Day. Nationalism seemed to many Americans to have been tainted by the realities of the nation's history. For Walter A. McDougall, hubris inhered in the familiar temptation to reform the world in the American image. There were limits not only to national virtues but also to national power.

But there is nothing unique about the present mixed emotions about American nationalism. Indeed, skepticism about nationalism is endemic in the American system. Although nationalism is dependent upon an allegiance above all others, the nature of American pluralism militates against a monistic devotion. The nation must compete for public attention. For all its flaws in the past and the present, the special qualities associated with American nationalism—an open society, a mobile society, and above all a society divinely favored—will remain a force in America as long as the nation-state system of governance prevails among the peoples of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality.* Cambridge, Mass., 1953. Employs the techniques of the social sciences to examine nationalism.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *Essays on Nationalism.* New York, 1926. A collection of writings by the founder of American studies in nationalism.

Kohn, Hans. *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay.* 2d ed. New York, 1980. Particularly useful for its insights on the American character and its relationships to nationalism.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1963. Presents an economic explanation of the growth of nationalism.

Levin, N. Gordon, Jr. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution.* New York, 1968. Links American nationalism with Wilsonian internationalism.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776.* Boston, 1997. Warns of the dangers that nationalist pride may bring if America overextends its reach in the world.

May, Ernest R. *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay.* New York, 1968. Offers speculations on reasons why nationalism developed into imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century.

Merk, Frederick. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation.* New York, 1963. Gives a favorable view of manifest destiny as a link between nationalism and American ideals.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* New York, 1990. Reflects the pride that American leadership conveys.

Shafer, Boyd C. *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths.* New York, 1972. Summation of the many approaches to nationalism.

Steel, Ronald. *Pax Americana.* Rev. ed. New York, 1970. Treats nationalism and the Cold War.

Stephanson, Anders. *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right.* New York, 1995.

Van Alstyne, Richard W. *Genesis of American Nationalism*. Waltham, Mass., 1970. An examination of nationalism in the early republic.

Waldstreicher, David. *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820*. Chapel Hill, 1997. Emphasizes flaws in the foundations of American nationalism.

Weinberg, Albert Katz. *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*. Baltimore, 1935. A major revisionist statement on nineteenth-century nationalism as expressed in manifest destiny.

Zelinsky, Wilbur. *Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988. Finds American nationalism evolving from shared national values to events glorifying the nation-state itself.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; IMMIGRATION; IMPERIALISM; NATIVISM; RELIGION; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

National Security Council

Anna Kasten Nelson

The National Security Council (NSC) has been a ubiquitous presence in the world of foreign policy since its creation in 1947. In light of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, policymakers felt that the diplomacy of the State Department was no longer adequate to contain the USSR. The NSC was created specifically to coordinate the various strands of national security policy among the agencies then operating under the rubric of national security. Originally, it was centered around a council dominated by the military services and the State Department and was a paper-driven organization that mostly discussed papers prepared by staff. Both President Harry Truman and President Dwight D. Eisenhower enhanced the role of the council while relying upon interdepartmental staffs for information and analysis. John F. Kennedy chose to use the NSC quite differently. He rarely called the council together, relying instead on the newly appointed national security adviser and his staff. Lyndon B. Johnson followed suit and even enhanced the role of the national security adviser and his staff while calling together the council only for its public relations value. By the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, the NSC had become the national security adviser and his staff, although the original term continued to be used to describe the effort of the president to integrate national security policy. The story of the NSC, therefore, is the story of the evolution of the organization established in 1947.

ORIGINS

For more than 150 years, presidents of the United States conducted foreign policy with the advice of a secretary of state; a small, select group of foreign service officers; and, perhaps, a personal adviser. As he directed American foreign policy during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued this tradition through his very personal diplomacy and his reliance on friends and advisers who had served him so well during the era of the Great Depression and the New Deal. The frustrating process of resolving complex problems of strategy and diplomacy within the unstructured and chaotic Roosevelt administration led a number of wartime leaders to search for a new institutional arrangement to fulfill the postwar obligations of a world power.

Concern also centered on the elevation to the presidency after the death of Roosevelt in 1945 of the untested Harry Truman. Worried about the growing tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, many members of Roosevelt's cabinet, including Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, assumed that the former senator from Missouri would need help from a formal council of advisers to provide the leadership necessary in the postwar period. Forrestal and his supporters began the search for a new institutional arrangement to advise the new president and provide coordination between the various military services, the State Department, and other agencies concerned with foreign affairs.

The opportunity for change unexpectedly arose when President Truman first proposed the unification of the military services, a proposal influenced by General George C. Marshall and his own experience in the Senate as chairman of a committee to investigate the national defense program. The fragmentation that had developed during World War II was now exacerbated by the development of airpower and the creation of three separate air forces, one for each service. Truman first proposed unification in December 1945 in a special message to Congress. The proposal met with hostility and protest. It was studied, debated, attacked, and revised for the next year and a half. With the support of Marshall, the army backed the plan for unification, but James Forrestal and the navy, supported by a coterie of congressional members, were adamantly opposed. The navy

wanted to ensure the maintenance of its own air force and, furthermore, Forrestal was opposed to any system that would deprive the navy secretary of a seat in the cabinet and direct access to the president.

But Forrestal was also eager for the military services to be an integral part of foreign policy. He began to seek an alternative to the plan for unification, one that would integrate the decision making of the military services and the State Department without also jeopardizing the position of the navy. He called upon an old friend and former business associate, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to study and recommend an organizational system that would preserve the nation's security. The National Security Council emerged out of Eberstadt's recommendations. Eberstadt's plan emphasized coordination more than unity. The military establishment would remain decentralized but would be surrounded by several coordinating groups, the most important of which was the prototype of a coordinating body chaired by the president and composed of representatives from the State, War, and Navy Departments. Under this plan, the navy, and Forrestal, would continue to have a voice in policy.

Truman's advisers, including General Marshall, were suspicious of any congressionally imposed group that would usurp the president's power to conduct foreign policy and fulfill his duty as commander in chief. When Truman sent his proposal to Congress, a national security council was missing, made unnecessary in his view by the organization of a National Military Establishment with a unified armed services and a single secretary of defense. The navy rallied its supporters in Congress, and it appeared that after eighteen months of negotiations, unification would be defeated. Finally, to stave off defeat and achieve his goal of a unified armed services, Truman agreed to the idea of an advisory council. Meanwhile, his staff members were working on a revised draft of the original proposal. By the time they finished changing a word here and a phrase there, the precisely defined council with an executive director confirmed by the Senate had become a group purely advisory in nature, with no authoritative, statutory functions and a staff appointed at the sole discretion of the president.

Few, if any, members of Congress recognized the ramifications of the proposed National Security Council. Since it was part of the unification act, the legislation did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but went instead to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was concerned only with the future of the military services and gave little time to the other agencies created by the measure. The ambiguous language describing the council and its responsibilities meant that some inclusion of advice from the military services in the formation of national security policy would be considered by the president. Otherwise, the law provided little guidance to presidents and their advisers.

THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER YEARS

The National Security Act of 1947 established four new coordinating agencies: the National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the short-lived National Security Resources Board (NSRB); and the National Security Council. The statutory members of the NSC were the president; the secretaries of defense and state; the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force; and the chairman of the NSRB. Forrestal's attempt to gain the ear of the president had resulted in a membership distinctly weighted toward the military. After Forrestal was replaced, amendments to the act in 1949 eliminated the three civilian secretaries of army, navy, and air force and added the vice president to the council.

Since 1949 these four—the secretaries of state and defense, the president, and vice president—have been the core of an ever-changing set of presidential advisers. Virtually from the NSC's inception, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have participated in its meetings as "advisers." Often presidents, beginning with Truman, have added the secretary of the Treasury or the director of the Bureau of the Budget (later the Office of Management and Budget) to the mix.

The ambiguity that made for successful compromise provided little guidance for actually organizing the NSC. The statute provides a council "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." To do this, the Council is to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power." The council has no statutory function and operates with a staff appointed at the discretion of the president. The NSC is also unique in its relation to Congress. Unlike other

executive agencies created by Congress, it has no obligation to report to the legislative branch. With such a vague mandate, initial decisions concerning the NSC's structure seemed particularly important. Members of the defense group envisioned the council as part of the military establishment. It should be housed with the military, they argued, and, more importantly, the president should appoint the secretary of defense to preside over meetings in his absence. In other words, the secretary of defense rather than the secretary of state would be the principal adviser to the president on matters involving national security. Encouraged by his staff, however, Truman housed the NSC in the Executive Office Building. Furthermore, his trust in Marshall guaranteed that the secretary of state or his deputy, Robert Lovett, would sit in the chair of the presiding officer. The State Department was the key player in U.S. national security policy.

All of the NSC members agreed, for varying reasons, that the president should attend NSC meetings as seldom as possible, and Truman shared that view. But there is nothing in the legislation that indicates a president has an obligation to be present. Some supporters of the NSC felt that the presence of the president would inhibit the necessary frank exchange of views, but few presidents, including Truman, shared that opinion. The Berlin blockade brought Truman to some meetings in 1948, but it was not until the Korean War that he began to value the NSC process and depend upon NSC meetings. As Forrestal had foreseen, the very structure of the NSC made it useful as a warmaking body. It was a mechanism for bringing together the views of the diplomats, military officers, intelligence analysts, and economic prognosticators.

The war also brought home the fact that Truman's NSC system needed some repair. As a reaction to both the fall of the Chinese Nationalists and the detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, a review of U.S. policy was begun in early 1950 that would ultimately result in NSC 68, the consummate Cold War paper. At the same time, the president mandated a review of the NSC process. But while NSC 68 was a milestone in the conduct of American foreign relations, the NSC procedural study made very little impact. The basic problem rested with Truman's reluctance to have a national security assistant. By 1950 the NSC executive-secretary had returned to private life and the president's valuable assistant, Clark Clifford, had joined a law firm. As Truman faced war in Korea and dissension at home, there was no one to coordinate policy or mediate disagreements among the various members of the NSC.

Since the end of the Truman administration, the NSC has gone through many incarnations. Each presidential candidate has heaped criticism on the system used by his predecessor and promised reform. Each president has then largely restructured the process of making national security policy. The ambiguity inherent in the creation of the NSC has allowed presidents to impose their own system on what was given to them by Congress. Because of its legislative base in the National Security Act of 1947, no president can abolish it, but several presidents, among them John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, irreparably changed it. Others, such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, reached beyond the 1947 act by stretching and manipulating the NSC for their own purposes. After more than forty years and ten presidents, several stages in the evolution of the national security process have emerged.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower came closer to implementing the NSC as it was originally conceived than any of the presidents who followed him. As he campaigned for the presidency, Eisenhower criticized what he referred to as Truman's "shadow agency." The battles of the Cold War required a stronger national security process and a revitalized NSC, he argued. Eisenhower saw the NSC as the premier coordinating agency for protecting American security. In addition, he answered the complaints against Truman by appointing a national security assistant to be the chief facilitator of a coordinated policy. But Eisenhower, like Truman, did not believe in providing the NSC with a policymaking staff in the White House. The agency had a secretariat run by an assistant, but staff work continued to be done in the various departments and agencies.

After his election, Eisenhower restructured and strengthened the NSC system by dividing the NSC process into three parts. The first of these involved the writing of the policy papers that were examined and critiqued by the council. Every agency represented on the council, plus the secretary of the Treasury and the heads of the JCS and CIA, were to choose someone on the assistant secretary level to be a member of the interdepartmental Planning Board, the substitute for the former NSC senior staff of President Truman. This group wrote the papers presented to the council and tried to resolve disagreements over policy between agencies. Each week the formal NSC meetings

considered the papers, generally sent them back again, and finally approved the revised version.

Summaries of the meetings between Eisenhower and the members of the council, the second part of the process, often reveal freewheeling discussions dominated by the secretaries of state and Treasury. Few of these discussions, however, were about immediate policy matters. The council never discussed the decision to disallow funding to Egypt for the Aswan Dam, for example. Many meetings were devoted to the annual budget that the president presented to Congress. This is not a surprise, since budgets make policy. Other meetings were largely devoted to long-term or general policy issues.

Nevertheless, Eisenhower rarely missed an NSC meeting. In fact, the NSC took an inordinate amount of his time, since he would get together before the meetings with his national security adviser to go over the agenda and often had smaller meetings in the Oval Office at the conclusion of the meetings. The former army general was a man who believed in both an orderly process and planning.

The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was the third part of the Eisenhower national security process. Basically an interdepartmental group of deputies or assistant secretaries, the members met each week to make sure that policy decisions were coordinated and carried out. Although their task seemed straightforward, the OCB was also designed to make sure that CIA covert actions did not operate at cross-purposes with the other policy positions.

Eisenhower regarded his remade NSC as an important policy tool. Gathering together the NSC members, their numerous deputies and assistants, and the ancillary groups from the CIA and JCS, Eisenhower used the NSC as a device to keep political appointees and civil servants informed and committed to the final decisions. Everyone would have a stake in the policy if they had participated in writing the original paper and observed the discussions of the council meetings. The Eisenhower era was marked by this extensive set of meetings and the many policy papers they produced. By the president's second term, however, the designated agency representatives dreaded their participation in the NSC Planning Board meetings, and the council meetings began to sound stale. Disagreements over words and phrases replaced those of substance.

Although the work of the NSC was top secret, Eisenhower and his national security adviser were eager to talk about the orderly process behind the policies. They gained that opportunity when the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations held hearings in the first six months of 1960. The committee was chaired by Senator Henry Jackson, a Democrat from Washington State, and was an effort both to discredit the administration before the presidential election and to serve as a vehicle for Jackson to enter the world of national security policy. Regardless of the motivations, it provided one of the rare glimpses into national security policymaking.

Witnesses were called from both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Those from the Truman administration were uniformly critical of the NSC, while Eisenhower's national security advisers not only defended their process but indicated that the NSC played a central role in making foreign policy. The NSC was, in the words of national security assistant Robert Cutler, the "top of policy hill." The impression that emerged from the subcommittee hearings was that of a passive president beholden to a paper-driven, ponderous, bureaucratic process The emphasis in these hearings on Eisenhower's extraordinary use of the council proved very damaging to him as well as to the NSC.

Eisenhower and his advisers were eager to promulgate the view that the general was a man who relied on planning procedures and the advice of NSC members rather than making policy precipitously in response to crisis. His was an orderly system that he urged his successor to follow. Unfortunately, Eisenhower's efforts to promote his NSC system failed to explain fully its value to him. Neither Eisenhower nor any other president ever made policy within the NSC structure. Policy was made in the Oval Office. Eisenhower used the complicated NSC structure to encourage a sense of participation on the part of the policymakers. Council meetings informed those at the deputy and assistant secretary level and promoted a sense of loyalty. But policy was not formulated there. Neither the Jackson subcommittee nor the incoming administration understood the duality of policymaking represented by the NSC and the Oval Office.

Ironically, Eisenhower's use of the NSC appears consistent with the original view of its creators. The NSC was a mix of State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence representatives with other participants joining the group for special projects. It was created to advise the president and met at designated intervals. There are various indications that Eisenhower was thinking

about a more streamlined system by the end of his second term, but he made no changes. Although the policymaking process in the Eisenhower administration is generally given high marks, no president since Eisenhower has scheduled as many NSC meetings or participated in them as fully and as often.

THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS

President John F. Kennedy completely dismantled the highly organized institutional NSC system, establishing arrangements more amenable to his governing style and, it would appear, to succeeding presidents. Whereas Eisenhower took his experiences as an army commander into the White House, Kennedy emerged from the much more freewheeling structure characteristic of a U.S. senator's office. Critical of Eisenhower's cautious diplomacy and reluctance to increase military budgets, Kennedy was convinced that the stolid, paper-based structure of the NSC system described in the Jackson hearings was responsible for what Kennedy perceived as the timid foreign policy that marked Eisenhower's national security policy. Both the Planning Board and OCB disappeared. The statutory council remained, but was rarely used. Yet, under Truman and Eisenhower the council was the heart of the NSC. It was here that the presidents gathered the opinions of all their advisers representing every facet of national security policy. The council was the mechanism for the widespread input of advice. After Kennedy, the NSC meant the adviser not the council.

Kennedy chose to follow the recommendation of the Jackson subcommittee and initially used the NSC as a more intimate forum for discussions with only his principal advisers. But one of his first decisions irrevocably changed the national security policymaking system. He appointed McGeorge Bundy as a national security adviser (as opposed to an assistant). Bundy, who expanded the role of facilitator and added the role of personal adviser, chose a small policy staff of a half-dozen people to work with him. For the first time, the White House had an independent national security policy staff, a step that reflected Kennedy's scorn for the bureaucratic State Department.

With fewer council meetings and more staff work, the NSC also became less of a planning group and more of an action group concerned with the events or crisis of the moment. Eisenhower administration veterans pointed out that under their system a Bay of Pigs could never have happened, since the idea would have been vetted by desk officers in the State Department, military representatives, and intelligence officials plus discussion in NSC meetings. Of course, they exaggerated the effect of the NSC system on policy. Bad policy can rarely be improved with good process and Eisenhower, for all of his dependence on procedure, began the training of the Bay of Pigs exile army. After the Cuban fiasco, Bundy and his staff were moved into offices closer to the president and the role of White House staff was strengthened by Kennedy's belief that the CIA and the JCS had misled him.

As Kennedy's national security adviser, Bundy was hardly the anonymous staffer, but he was rarely quoted in major newspapers or featured on television. He took seriously his role as presidential adviser and provided the president with staggering amounts of information, sending him home each night and weekend with reports, articles, and books to read. Kennedy rarely attended a formal meeting of the council, relying instead on smaller meetings in the Oval Office. An executive committee, or special committee, for example, was formed to manage U.S. operations in Cuba. The ExCom gained fame because of its successful work in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Beginning slowly in 1961, the NSC was transformed. Aided by a White House staff, the national security adviser personally presented to the president the range of views and options that had been the function of the council during the Eisenhower administration. President Kennedy called NSC meetings for purposes of public relations. He preferred to work with the White House adviser and for the most part abandoned larger meetings. After 1961, presidents accepted the basic assumption that a White House staff and national security adviser were preferable to the unwieldy NSC meetings staffed by every department concerned with national security.

When President Kennedy was assassinated, Lyndon Johnson inherited his advisers and his reliance on the White House national security staff. Throughout his political career, Johnson had concentrated on domestic policy issues. Perhaps his insecurity in the face of the new burdens he faced accounts for his return to the practice of meeting with the National Security Council during the first year of his administration. He soon abandoned it, modifying the more informal style of Kennedy to suit his needs. Bundy continued to bring detailed information to the new president

and worked to integrate policy, functions that had once been a product of the NSC system. The NSC staff remained small. Bundy had three assistants: one was detailed from the CIA, a second from the Defense Department, and a third from the Office of Science and Technology. Another staff member was an expert on foreign economic policy. The executive secretary, Bromley Smith, completed the staff. Traditionally, the persons holding the positions of executive secretary and his assistants changed with presidential administrations and the concomitant arrival of new national security advisers. But Smith was an exception and stayed on under Johnson. He was especially valuable because he had experience as an NSC staffer under both Eisenhower and Kennedy and could provide some institutional memory. He was an essential participant in the procedural work of these administrations. For example, he was responsible for the "situation room," a top secret center of communication; conferred with Bundy on agenda items for meetings; and often sat in for Bundy when he was out of town.

Despite Bundy's emphasis on process, in the Johnson White House he was regarded as an adviser as well as a facilitator. Johnson's decision to send Bundy on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam illustrates the way in which the line between the two functions began to disintegrate. Finally, Bundy and his successor, Walt W. Rostow, assumed a third role, that of presidential spokesman. As the Vietnam War hit the headlines, McGeorge Bundy became a media "star."

Bundy resigned his position in December 1965 and during the following March, Johnson chose Walt W. Rostow to replace him. Rostow, who was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff at the time of the Kennedy assassination, was a man of strong opinions who was not shy in expressing them. When others in the White House began questioning Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War, Rostow stood firmly behind the president.

After convening twenty-five NSC meetings, Johnson began replacing them with small "Tuesday lunches" attended by the secretaries of state and defense, the national security adviser, the director of the CIA, and the head of the JCS. Others were invited when issues called for additional participants. Given the amount of staff work required, these lunches combined the attributes of mini–NSC meetings and Oval Office policymaking sessions. Rather than diminish Rostow's role as national security adviser, the Tuesday lunches enhanced his position. Before each meeting Rostow discussed the agenda with participants and assembled the necessary documents, including a background paper. This was the task of a facilitator, but as Rostow readily admitted, he often added his own views. This further blurred the demarcation between facilitator and adviser. Lyndon Johnson's last years in office were dominated completely by the Vietnam War. Regardless of who attended any given Tuesday lunch, the primary topic remained the same. The president listened to friends and former colleagues in the Senate who urged him to bring the conflict to an end. Abject surrender in whatever form, however, was anathema to this proud Texan, and so he chose to act on the advice of the loyal supporters with whom he lunched each week, thus isolating the political leadership in the agencies. When the loyal members of his cabinet introduced a dose of reality and finally convinced him it was a war he could not win, the weary Johnson declined another term as president.

THE NIXON, FORD, AND CARTER YEARS

Richard Nixon promised to restore the National Security Council and blamed many of the unsuccessful foreign policies of Kennedy and Johnson on its abandonment. Nixon entered the presidency with very specific views on organizing the national security apparatus that were based on his experience in the Eisenhower administration. Soon after his election, he handed the task of reorganizing the NSC system to his national security assistant, Henry Kissinger. Although touting the changes as a return to the Eisenhower model, Nixon displayed neither trust nor regard for officials in the State Department. Seeking complete White House control of national security, he carefully chose a secretary of state, William P. Rogers, who had little foreign policy experience. Nixon's personality was so different than Eisenhower's that whereas the national security machinery was in the Eisenhower style, actual policymaking was quite different.

The NSC structure encompassed a number of interdepartmental groups representing the senior officers of an agency. Even when council meetings were in abeyance, as in the Johnson administration, these groups existed to assure presidents that they were hearing from every agency on a particular issue. During the 1960s the State Department representative had chaired each

DIALOGUE WITH MAO

On 21 February 1972, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, met in China with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Prime Minister Chou En-lai. The following are excerpts from a memorandum of that conversation.

Chairman Mao: (looking at Dr. Kissinger) He is a doctor of philosophy?

President Nixon: He is a doctor of brains.

Chairman Mao: What about asking him to be the main speaker?

President Nixon: He is an expert in philosophy.

Dr. Kissinger: I used to assign the chairman's collective [sic] writings to my classes at Harvard. . . .

Chairman Mao: [Nixon and Mao] must not monopolize the whole show. It won't do if we don't let Dr. Kissinger have a say. You have been famous about your trips to China.

Dr. Kissinger: It was the president who set the direction and worked out the plan.

President Nixon: He is a very wise assistant to say it that way. (Mao and Chou laugh.)

President Nixon: When the chairman says he voted for me, he voted for the lesser of two evils.

Chairman Mao: I like rightists. People say you are rightists, that the Republican Party is to the right. . . . I am comparatively happy when these people on the right come into power.

President Nixon: I think the important thing to note is that in America, at least at this time, those on the right can do what those on the left talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: There is another point, Mr. President. Those on the left are pro-Soviet and would not encourage a move toward the People's Republic, and in fact criticize you on those grounds.

of these groups. The newly organized Nixon NSC expanded these interdepartmental policy committees and added approximately 120 people to the NSC system. The principal committee was the Senior Review Group, which bore a slight resemblance to the Eisenhower NSC Planning Board. This group was on the assistant secretary level, but with Nixon's support, Kissinger came to dominate that group as well as other groups that he chaired. The president was sending a clear signal that the White House would control the agenda.

Despite Nixon's campaign oratory about restoring the Eisenhower model, this control was one among several of the profound differences between the Eisenhower NSC and the Nixon system. Quite apart from personalities, the major difference between the Eisenhower and Nixon systems was the position of the State Department within the policy process. Eisenhower's principal and trusted adviser was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whereas Nixon's choice for secretary of state was the inexperienced Rogers, a clear indication that the State Department would be at the periphery of the policymaking process. Nixon's national security assistant, Kissinger, shared his desire to bypass the State Department and conduct foreign policy from the White House. The NSC staff grew accordingly and a third model for the NSC system emerged: the NSC as a small State Department under the control of the president and national security adviser. A flow of paper representing the requests of the NSC for agency input continued to move, but, in contrast with previous years, the requests did not seem to matter. Agency personnel suspected that the process of making them was designed to keep them occupied while Kissinger and Nixon made policy.

As in the previous administration, frequent official NSC meetings were held early in the Nixon presidency, but the thirty-seven meetings in 1969 diminished to twenty-one in 1970 and only ten in the first two-thirds of 1971. As the NSC moved away from formal meetings, the committee system stepped into the vacuum and gained importance. While the Nixon White House tapes show an overbearing president with little respect for his national security adviser and an almost subservient Kissinger, in fact the two men were in agreement on both policy priorities and the manner in which to implement them.

Both were intent on controlling and conducting foreign policy and both were convinced of the need for secrecy.

The Nixon and post-Nixon NSC arrangements illustrate the difficulty of separating policy, process, and personality. Henry Kissinger exemplifies this problem. First as national security assistant and then as secretary of state, he insisted on full control of people and ideas. He used the diffuse NSC interdepartmental process to better accomplish his goals and bent it to his needs. Given his belief in secrecy, Kissinger often did not tell his staff what he was doing.

The results of the Nixon-Kissinger approach were mixed. They turned China policy around but failed to end the war in Vietnam. Kissinger personally began lengthy and open negotiations in the Middle East, while Nixon directed the secret intervention in Chile that resulted in the seventeen-year dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. Kissinger and Nixon basically took advantage of the NSC mechanism to achieve their goals, making it their handmaiden. Meanwhile, Nixon ignored Secretary of State Rogers, a pliant individual who did not try to impose his own views or those of his department. When he resigned and Kissinger took over at State, any potential conflict between the secretary and national security adviser was laid to rest.

When President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon, he reestablished some equilibrium between the State Department and White House. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft assumed a low profile and moved to establish better relations between the State Department and the White House.

In the tradition of his predecessors, President Jimmy Carter quickly reorganized the NSC staff and stated the intention of placing more responsibility on the departments and agencies. The numerous committees of the Nixon-Ford White House were combined into two subordinate committees, the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee. However, Carter appointed as his national security adviser a man every bit as strong willed and as opinionated as Henry Kissinger. Zbigniew Brzezinski reorganized the staff to eliminate most of the vestiges of the Kissinger years. Rather than function as a mini–State Department, his staff was to carry through the usual coordination of policy and serve as a kind of think tank for the president. Aware of the tendency of his predecessors to overshadow the secretary of state, he also assured the president, press, and public that he would cooperate with the secretaries of state and defense. The prospects for harmony seemed good, as Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had served as cochairs of the Council on Foreign Relations while Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had worked with Brzezinski on the Trilateral Commission, a group to increase cooperation between the United States, western Europe, and Japan. The climate of cooperation promised smooth working relationships. Recognizing earlier problems between the NSC and the secretaries of state and defense, Carter asked for an internal study on integrating policy six months after taking office. The report, prepared by Philip Odeen, emphasized process and organization rather than personalities. In the long run, however, Carter's policy process was influenced far more by personalities than procedure.

It did not take long for Brzezinski, a dynamic man with wide-ranging interests, to become the predominant foreign policy spokesman of the Carter administration. Despite earlier plans, Carter's policy process was among the most centralized in the post–World War II era, with Brzezinski as the fulcrum. Like those of Kennedy and Johnson, it evolved into an informal structure, this time revolving around a Friday morning breakfast between Brzezinski, Vance, and Brown. Unfortunately, each man often emerged with a different interpretation of the discussion. The rivalry between the national security adviser and the secretary of state that had existed in the Nixon years took on a different cast under Carter when it became clear that Brzezinski's views on American foreign policy were quite different from those of Secretary Vance. Brzezinski, for example, sounded the death knell for détente on 28 May 1978, when he strongly attacked Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. On 14 June, however, Vance made it clear that the White House approved of his plan to send an American diplomat to Angola for talks with the government there. Brzezinski also made it clear that negotiations over the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were linked to Russian meddling in Africa and its support for African revolutionaries. A more conciliatory Vance dismissed the notion of linkage between the two issues. The secretary of state also assured the House International Relations Committee that he was the only one who spoke for the president.

It was Brzezinski, however, who saw Carter several times each day and served as the liaison between the cabinet secretaries and the president.

He prepared summaries and reports of meetings and discussions held under the national security tent between the principal participants of policy meetings and did not hesitate to give his opinion or express his disagreement with Secretary Vance or Secretary of Defense Brown.

Carter, a former governor of Georgia, had very little foreign policy experience. His personal goals included improving human rights, curtailing the military, and reaching out to the Third World in Africa and Latin America. Brzezinski, on the other hand, concentrated on such traditional Cold War problems as outsmarting the Soviets and encouraging the Chinese to look to the United States to the detriment of the USSR. Carter had success in accomplishing his own goals, but as international tensions unfolded, particularly the Soviet war in Afghanistan, he was pulled between the views of Vance and Brzezinski. By the time Secretary Vance resigned in 1980, Carter had accepted the views of his national security adviser and sounded like another cold warrior. Meanwhile, foreign policy lost its coherency as the administration spoke with two voices instead of one.

To observers, the disarray in the Carter administration seemed to be one more example of a national security system out of control. The publicity generated by Brzezinski drew attention to the organization of national security in the White House and the fate of the NSC itself. Although Brzezenski's staff never reached the size of the Kissinger staff of about two hundred (of whom fifty were professionals), it was a large staff of about one hundred (of whom thirty were professionals) and, like Kissinger's staff, it was a policy staff. Meanwhile, the NSC atrophied. Only ten NSC meetings were held while Brzezenski was the national security adviser. Even the Nixon and Ford administrations had held 125 meetings in their eight years in office.

In April 1980 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the first time, under its chairman, Frank Church, held hearings on legislation requiring Senate confirmation of all national security advisers. Two powerful national security advisers had become major policymakers yet were free from confirmation proceedings and were not required to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee. The effort to require accountability on the part of the national security adviser was ultimately unsuccessful. A consensus existed that presidents should be allowed to pick their own advisers and organize their administrations according to their own views and personalities. But the attempt did highlight the duality of foreign policymaking within the White House.

THE REAGAN, BUSH, AND CLINTON YEARS

President Ronald Reagan began his administration by reversing a trend and appointing a low-key national security assistant who would return to the pre-Kissinger model. Unfortunately, in an aberration from the designated use of the NSC, Reagan also used the national security system as an operating agency, with far-reaching results. Unfamiliar with and initially uninterested in national security affairs, Reagan, who had no trouble working with a triumvirate of domestic advisers, seemed unable to find the right national security person with whom to work. As a result, he had a record six national security advisers. Richard Allen, the first, was the only one since the origins of the NSC who did not have direct access to the president. Allen answered to Edwin Meese, a former Reagan associate who was now White House general counsel. He failed to gain the confidence of Meese and, despite his low profile, Allen immediately had turf battles with the intrepid secretary of state, Alexander Haig. Allen left office within a year and was followed by William Clark. Clark had no experience or background in national security policy but was close to Reagan, having served as his executive secretary when Reagan was governor of California. Someone who knew the president seemed more likely to be a successful assistant for national security. Clark was familiar with the president's work habits, goals, and governing style. He had complete access to the Oval Office, meanwhile building a strong staff of sixty-one to compensate for his own weakness. He could offer little in the way of substance, however, and resigned in 1983.

Meanwhile, the world had not waited for Reagan to find his way. Iranians, after overthrowing the shah, storming the American embassy, and taking American hostages, finally released the Americans on January 20, 1981, the day of Reagan's inauguration, but became an important anti-American and anti-Western force in the Middle East. In Central America, Reagan faced a revolutionary, left-wing government in Nicaragua. President Carter had not condoned or encouraged this new government but had chosen to accept it. Reagan and his advisers, on the other hand, saw the new Nicaraguan rulers, the Sandinistas, as part-

ners in the Havana-Moscow nexus. Reagan assumed that Nicaragua, like Cuba, would try to export its revolution throughout Latin America. Therefore, Nicaragua was seen as a danger to U.S. interests, and so the administration began to support the military opposition to the Sandinistas, those known as contras.

Congress tied the hands of the president when it prohibited the use of funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Reagan, however, was determined to rid Nicaragua of the Sandinistas and sought a different way to reach the contras. He turned to the one group outside the purview of Congress, the national security adviser and his staff. From 1983 to 1986, national security advisers Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, who followed McFarlane in 1985, were the chief architects of the disastrous Iran-contra policy. With the help of national security staff assistants who scorned the constitutional issues involved, they devised a plan to send arms to Iran for its war against Iraq. The payment for the arms was then sent to the Nicaraguan contras.

For the first and only time in its history, the NSC became an operational agency. National security adviser McFarlane made secret trips to the Middle East while U.S. marine lieutenant colonel Oliver North, a staff assistant, coordinated the activities against the contras. Trading arms for money, the essence of what became the Iran-Contra scandal, was soon discovered and investigated, discrediting both the president and the participants. The fifth national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, a respected and experienced veteran of the Defense Department, was then called in to clean house. Finally, in 1987 General Colin Powell stepped into the position.

The Reagan interlude illustrates the failure of the NSC system when a president fails to exert leadership within the policy process. Created for battle in the Cold War, no president between Truman and Reagan entered office without a strong commitment to developing a policy process that could cope with the problems presented by the global interests of the Cold War. These presidents, cognizant of the problems posed by international responsibilities, also brought into the White House men and women who could implement their policies. As a result, the glaring deficiencies of the original 1947 legislation were invisible. The act provided the NSC with an ambiguous mandate that ignored the necessity for an adviser and staff as key participants in the making of national security policy.

Taking a cue from President Carter, Reagan included his vice president, George H. W. Bush, in many of the important national security decisions of his administration. As president, Bush—who had been ambassador to the United Nations, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the American representative to China—reorganized the national security process, as had previous chief executives. His national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Scowcroft's deputy, Robert Gates, were at the center of the national security process, chairing the top panels of the senior officers in all the national security agencies and thus setting the agendas.

President Bush continued the use of the Principals Committee, which had been established in 1987 by Reagan. This committee was virtually the original NSC with the addition of the secretary of the Treasury, the chief of staff to the president, and the national security adviser. As was true of the NSC, the chairman of the JCS and the director of the CIA also attended, while others were invited as needed. Both Truman and Eisenhower would have recognized this group, although neither would have acquiesced to any committee of principals that did not include the president, the ultimate "principal." Instead, National Security Presidential Directive-1 noted that both President Bush and his vice president could attend any and all meetings.

Bush, like his predecessors, did not rely upon this system for making foreign policy. He valued secrecy and loyalty and relied on an unusually small set of advisers who shared similar worldviews. Bush's mini-NSC was composed of Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State James Baker, who met with the president in the Oval Office. They were occasionally joined by the General Colin L. Powell, now chairman of the JCS, and Gates after his appointment as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1991. The fact that the Bush administration did not use the NSC did not diminish the role of the national security adviser. In 1991, for example, the president sent Scowcroft to the Middle East and China, not Secretary of State Baker.

Predictably, President William Clinton changed the national security process, this time by adding a broad economic element to the National Security Council. The secretary of the Treasury and the chief of the new White House Economic Council were added to the NSC as well as the ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K.

Albright. The Principals Committee and Deputies Committee were both retained. As usual, there were discussions in the media about relationships between national security principals, in this case Secretary of State Warren Christopher; Defense Secretary Les Aspin; and the national security adviser, Anthony Lake. But the perception of problems within the Clinton administration were partly a product of a disorganized White House and the president's initial lack of interest.

By Clinton's second term, a succession of crises had brought Clinton into the heart of foreign policy and the administration began to change. All the original players, Christopher, Aspin, and Lake, left the administration. Samuel R. Berger, Lake's deputy, became the national security adviser and Albright became the first woman to serve as secretary of state. Albright was a more colorful secretary, but, like Christopher, she apparently was relegated to traditional diplomatic tasks. She never seemed totally without influence, but the heart of the policy process remained within the gates of the White House. National security policy was again dominated by the president's staff, in particular by Sandy Berger, whose office was just steps away from the president's and for whom the president's door was always open.

When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, he quickly nominated a strong and experienced secretary of state, General Colin Powell, and moved on to nominate an equally experienced secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Under the Bush plan, the national security adviser would return to the position of facilitator, bringing information to the president and acting as a liaison officer bridging the gap between the State and Defense Departments.

CONCLUSION

No president has ever made national security policy in the National Security Council. The NSC was not created as a policymaking body but as an advisory body to the president. The Cold War brought into the policy process various agencies and groups whose views were important but rarely coordinated. Foreign policy was no longer just in the hands of the State Department. The Defense Department and the JCS, joined by the CIA and the Treasury Department, were all players on the field of U.S. global power.

Therefore, even when presidents avoided the formal structure created early in the Cold War, they found it necessary to find a substitute. Interdepartmental committees and the Committee of Principals were all created to fill this role.

The turning point in the history of the NSC came in 1961 with the election of John F. Kennedy. When Kennedy brought into the White House a national security adviser with a staff, he began an inexorable move toward a completely new process. Even though it continued to meet sporadically, after 1961 the NSC was nothing more than the president's adviser and his staff, which soon evolved into just the president's staff.

Personality has been more important to the policy process than structure. That each president uses the NSC differently is part of the received wisdom about the policy process. Every president uses the NSC differently in order to differentiate himself from his predecessor as campaign promises for new policies are subsequently translated into new processes.

Since it was created by an act of Congress, no president can abolish the NSC. For the most part, however, it has evolved beyond recognition. The interdepartmental and ad hoc committees that form the crux of agency participation bear only a slight resemblance to Truman's senior staff or Eisenhower's Planning Board, and the dominant role of the national security adviser has changed the equation since the time when chairmen set the agenda.

The effect on policy is difficult to gauge. The danger faced by most presidents has been the tendency to rely on a few loyal advisers. If they do not participate in NSC meetings or the meetings of "principals," presidents become isolated. They do not have a forum for contrary views and are remote from those who must defend and implement their policies. Nixon and Kissinger may be prime examples of this isolation, but presidents such as Johnson and George H. W. Bush also preferred selective advice.

The NSC of the 1947 statute is probably dead and certainly obsolete. The end of the Cold War and the American position as the strongest global power probably requires a different kind of national security organization in order for the president to be truly advised in this new century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Destler, I. M. *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.* Princeton, N.J., 1974.

Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson. *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council*. Pacific Grove, Calif., 1988.

Nelson, Anna Kasten. "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council." *Journal of American History* 72 (September 1985): 360–378.

———. "The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council." In Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds. *Eisenhower, A Centenary Assessment*. Baton Rouge, La., 1995.

Prados, John. *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*. New York, 1991.

See also DECISION MAKING; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

NATIVISM

Geoffrey S. Smith

Nativism is a construct scholars employ to explain hostility and intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its imputed foreign connections. Appearing in three basic forms in American history, nativism was first characterized by antagonism toward Catholics during colonial and early national eras. Anti-Catholicism peaked from the 1830s through the 1850s, concomitant with the growing debate over slavery. This variant reflected themes popular since the Protestant Reformation, stimulated by American fears of French, Spanish, and papal threats in the New World. After the Civil War, anti-Catholic nativism became more secular, mirroring complex economic, cultural, and social upheavals and—most notably—an inchoate sense of nostalgia for a "purer" republic.

A second form of nativism, manifest in the dread of alien radicalism, emerged during the 1790s when the wars of the French Revolution embroiled the United States and threatened the republican experiment. A third manifestation of nativism, sometimes overlapping with anti-Catholicism and antiradicalism, developed during the 1840s as citizens celebrated their "manifest destiny" to bring the benefits of democracy and republican government to the Pacific. Girded by "scientific" analyses that touted Anglo-Saxon superiority against other peoples, racial nativism became crucial in the debate over imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century, underlay the incarceration of the Japanese-American minority during World War II, and remains today an important touchstone in ongoing arguments about multiculturalism, immigration, and trade.

Scholars analyze nativism in several ways. One approach, exemplified in John Higham's unsurpassed *Strangers in the Land* (1963), stresses actual, face-to-face conflicts and tensions between early settlers and subsequent arrivals. Higham underscores immigrant battles for social, political, and especially economic advancement in an individualist and competitive culture. He explores the organized nativist movements between 1860 and 1925 that resisted these newcomers, and he assesses skillfully both reality and hyperbole within nativist stereotypes, all the while focusing on the all-important sociocultural settings in which nativism has waxed and waned.

Other historians and social scientists, reflecting the long-dominant primacy of the liberal consensus (from the 1930s to the 1970s), accentuate both ideological and psychological functions of nativism as clues to understanding tensions and fault lines within national culture. Here Richard Hofstadter and David Brion Davis look to a broader definition of the term, describing nativism as a state of mind of native-born and naturalized citizens seeking to define their own Americanness by condemning real and alleged alien challenges to national values and institutions. For these historians, nativism signifies the ideology of persecuting groups, invariably bigoted, while targeted minorities emerge generally as victims.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, cultural and social historians focused more critically upon contests for power, assessing minorities more empathetically, "from the bottom up," often attacking traditional political elites. The Vietnam War, Watergate, black and feminist drives for equality, and growing concern by many at colossal inequities in wealth and shrinking opportunity, all interact with an increasingly multicultural society and tarnished political system to undercut the very idea of legitimacy. Scholars who embrace cultural studies—much influenced by such French theorists as Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault—explain battles for power and prestige between newcomers and nativist defenders of the old order by deconstructing such categories as economics, race and ethnicity, and gender and sexuality. Assessing these categories may not only allow new clarity in com-

prehending power relationships embedded in given contexts ("texts"), but the careful reading of evidence ("discourse") may also afford scholars a better sense of their own relationship to their realm of inquiry, indicate how the notion of "historical objectivity" invariably conveys values and requirements of dominant cultures, and supply the chance to make connections within, and between, governing and contending, often complicit, cultural paradigms. Cultural studies at its best respects history as fluid and uncontrollable (even by elites), and considers questions of cause-and-effect less important than understanding ways in which parts of the historical past (and theories like Antonio Gramsci's hegemony and complicity) fit together.

Although emerging mainly as varied forms of domestic intolerance, nativism has affected, and been affected by, United States foreign policy. On one hand, animosity toward immigrants and fear of alien influence have diverted attention from real national problems and their sources and solutions. Conversely, nativist stereotypes and images have impeded the efficient formulation and implementation of foreign policies. On several occasions, meanwhile, nativist endeavors to legitimize parochial agendas by identifying them with the nation's interests have generated crises involving the federal government. Withal, by encouraging disdain for the European concept of power politics, nativism has strengthened the nation's self-image of innocence and exceptionalism in a decadent world. Hence, the study of nativist ethnocentrism and xenophobia provides clues to aid historians in clarifying the interplay between domestic issues and foreign relations. These clues help to explain the persistence of moralism and rigidity in American diplomacy and the presence of emotionalism as an important problem for national self-interest.

Yet with the exception of the federal immigration acts of 1921 and 1924, optimistic tendencies have generally kept nativism from becoming national policy. In several cases, however, nativists achieved power sufficient to affect the nation's course. The Alien and Sedition Laws (1798) sought to stifle Jeffersonian opposition to Federalist foreign policy during the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800). But when President John Adams negotiated for peace (perhaps his most courageous accomplishment), the legislation backfired, split the Federalist Party, and helped Thomas Jefferson become elected president in 1800. During the 1850s, the Know-Nothing (or American) Party hastened disintegration of national politics when its crusade against Irish-Catholic immigrants offered citizens a choice to avoid confronting slavery, the greatest sectional crisis the nation had known. In the late nineteenth century, nativism intensified many social and economic difficulties wrought by the dislocating forces of industrialism, urbanization, and unprecedented immigration from lands nativists deemed benighted. As long as the economy remained robust, ample room existed for newcomers. But when the economy turned sour, as it did cyclically between 1870 and 1914, nativists looked more for the easy explanation—the new immigrants, of course—than they did shortcomings of the capitalist system.

The only nation that was "born in perfection and aspired to progress" (to use Hofstadter's felicitous phrase), the United States also confronted war in the twentieth century in ways that focused attention on the enemy within, the Trojan Horse that would undermine the peaceable kingdom. The United States went to war not to "muddle through" or merely win, like the British, but for moral reasons befitting its exalted (and self-anointed) global status. Messianic prophecies demand total obeisance and World War I unleashed an unprecedented campaign of repression against German Americans, foreign- and native-born Bolsheviks, socialists, anarchists, and pacifists. Wartime intolerance did not cease with the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, the Red Scare after World War I attested not only to problems attending the failure to make the world safe for democracy, demobilization, and the emergence of the Bolshevik adversary in the Soviet Union, but also to the desire, continuing into the 1920s, to purge the nation of all cultures that did not embrace traditional Anglo-Saxon Protestant virtues. This failed effort at national purification influenced attitudes toward international cooperation, immigration, the World Court, and the Soviet Union. A similar reaction, christened "McCarthyism" after its most renowned practitioner, Senator Joseph McCarthy, exploded after World War II, and the controversy over Watergate in the early 1970s revealed a similar cleansing dynamic, albeit in inverted form, which eventually consumed the presidency of Richard M. Nixon.

EARLY FORMS OF NATIVISM

Anglo-American nativism arrived in America with the first settlers. Imbued with ideas of founding a

city on a hill in the Massachusetts Bay Colony to honor God and redeem the Church of England, and harboring in Virginia a sense of commercial destiny built on racial dominion over blacks and First Nations, colonial Americans from England also nursed resentment against other white ethnicities—Irish, Dutch, German, French, and Spanish, for example, depending upon region and issues. Occasionally, as during the ethnoracial French and Indian War (1754–1763), nativist feelings burst forth. In Pennsylvania, English colonists followed Benjamin Franklin's lead in questioning local German loyalty to the crown.

After independence, the new multicultural nation faced the need to define its identity. Although the Frenchman Hector St. John de Crevecour spoke of the American as a "new" man, the Anglo-American connection died hard, if at all. With unity a key requirement for survival in a world of despotism and monarchy, many citizens expressed hostility toward European immigration—even as the new Republic became increasingly multiracial and multiethnic. This animus was understandable. Diversity heralded faction, as dangerous to a republic as the concentration of centralized power. Thomas Jefferson warned that immigrants might "warp and bias" the path of the nation and jeopardize "the freest principles of the English Constitution, with others derived from natural right and natural reason." Indeed, the American alliance with France—crucial to independence—became an albatross during the next fifteen years. The French Revolution, ironically styled in part on its American predecessor, terrified Federalist Party leaders.

The first organized expression of antiradical nativism came in 1798, when Federalist hostility exploded against both France and Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans. Influenced by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, whose Francophobia knew no bounds, President George Washington rejected any diplomacy that might offend Britain, at war against France since shortly after the revolution. Washington's diplomacy, therefore, aided Britain and opened a gap between Hamilton and Secretary of State Jefferson, a partisan of France. The fear of immigrants as a source of faction and corruption affected both emerging political parties in the new nation. The bipartisan Naturalization Act of 1795 required aliens to renounce earlier allegiances and disavow titles of nobility. But the more extreme Federalists—men and women of orthodox social, cultural, and religious attitudes united by their pessimistic view of human nature and aristocratic demeanor—worried lest incoming French émigrés, United Irishmen, and British radicals sow sedition and "Jacobinism" among the populace.

In fact, France did meddle in American politics, seeking to defeat Jay's Treaty in 1794 and to influence the election of 1796 in Jefferson's favor. The attachment of many immigrants to Jefferson alarmed Federalists. Democratic-Republican societies in New York and eastern Pennsylvania included recent Irish and Scots-Irish arrivals. These groups participated in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, led opposition to Jay's Treaty, and hence appeared connected to the intrigue of French agents like Joseph Fauchet and Pierre A. Adet. President Washington warned of this connection in his Farewell Address in 1796, but seemingly to no avail. By 1798 Federalists recalled that factionalism helped wreck the Articles of Confederation and now made the Republic vulnerable to external enemies.

The infamous XYZ affair and subsequent undeclared naval war with France presented Federalists the chance to use their control of foreign policy, in Federalist politician Theodore Sedgwick's words, "a glorious opportunity to destroy faction." Divisive issues having stimulated the lust for power in Federalists and Democratic-Republicans alike, politics now mirrored "a complete distrust of the motives and integrity, the honesty and intentions of one's political opponents." Consequently, Federalist stalwarts, moving "to crush internal opposition in the name of national security," moved to create an army and navy, to construct arsenals, and to abrogate the treaties of alliance and of amity and commerce of 1778. The more moderate wing of the party supported President John Adams's decision to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but "high" Federalists became increasingly ambitious. Given reports of a pending French invasion, the hawks demanded that Adams declare war. Although the president resisted their demand, he did link his political opponents with France and hence added his voice to an outburst of nativism that momentarily diverted the Federalists from serving the national interest.

The Quasi-War generated widespread fear within Federalist circles that French spies and their internal collaborators threatened national security. Representative Harrison Gray Otis denounced "wild Irishmen" and "the turbulent and disorderly of all parts of the world" who came to the United States "with a view to disturb our

own tranquility after having succeeded in the overthrow of their own governments." David Tappan, Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard, warned graduating seniors against infidels and impending world revolution. Congregationalist minister Jedidiah Morse called attention to the machinations of the "Bavarian Illuminati," a cabal of radical atheists who already had infiltrated American churches and schools.

The Alien and Sedition Laws, as they became known, sought to root out such subversion, and in the process destroy the Democratic-Republican opposition, slow immigrant participation in political life, and compel support for Federalist measures. These laws increased the period of residency required for citizenship, empowered the president to expel aliens suspected of activities deemed "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States," and provided penalties for citizens who engaged in rioting, unlawful assembly, or impeding the operation of the government. The Sedition Act did not weigh exclusively against immigrants. Premised on the assumption that war would be declared, the Sedition Law aimed to gag political criticism and would expire on the last day of Adams's term. The law, rooted in the seventeenth-century British concept of seditious libel, also reflected the Federalist view that government was the master, not servant, of the people. Any critique of government was dangerous because it subverted the dignity and authority of rulers. Politics was not a popular right; it belonged "to the few, the rich, and the well-born."

Certain that Democratic-Republicans stood poised to undermine the Constitution and overturn the government, Federalist judges turned their fire on Jeffersonian editors and publicists. With stacked courts presuming guilt unless defendants proved their innocence, published criticism of elected officials became synonymous with conviction. As Jeffersonians resolutely opposed Adams's call for an accelerated defense program, they encountered the heavy hand of Federalist patriotism, which included indictment of *Philadelphia Aurora* editor William Duane and the incarcerations of Scots publicist James T. Callender, the Irish-born Vermont congressman Matthew Lyon, and Pennsylvania editor Thomas Cooper.

John Adams withstood the war cry emanating from Federalist hawks and courageously dispatched William Vans Murray, the American minister at The Hague, to France, where he signed the Treaty of Mortefontaine (1800) ending the naval conflict and abrogating the "entangling" Franco-American treaties of 1778. In the interim, as the "Black Cockade fever" raged and Federalists sought to extirpate Illuminati and other subversives, Jeffersonians mounted an effective counterattack, organizing politically and continuing to attack Adams. Jefferson and James Madison drafted the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, respectively, condemning the administration's violation of individual and states' rights, and the malevolence felt by many immigrant groups toward the Federalist Party became implacable. In the election of 1800, Jefferson narrowly triumphed—a victory in which Scots-Irish and Irish, Pennsylvania Germans, and New York French played a role.

The election of 1800 signified the political arrival of America's immigrants, heralded the nation's multiethnic future, and underscored the importance of public opinion—the people's right "to think freely and to speak and write what they think." With the Federalist Party in eclipse—an unintended consequence of the nativist outburst of 1798—nativism remained a potent force in New England. During the War of 1812 delegates to the Hartford Convention (1814–1815) threatened secession after denouncing the impact of the war upon their section's economy, declaring that European monarchs were "dumping" paupers on American shores, and proposing a constitutional amendment that would exclude naturalized citizens from holding civil office or serving in Congress.

THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

Federalists attempted to safeguard the new nation (and their own political fortunes) against revolution by muzzling dissent and seeking to bar immigrant radicals and alien poor. These campaigns continued in the three decades before the Civil War—an era of unsettling change, disorder, and—for many Americans—uncertainty and anxiety. Jacksonian America featured the convergence of modernizing transportation and market revolutions, the emergence of liberal capitalism and government bureaucracy, as well as the concomitant growth of slavery and sectionalism and the dispossession of most Indian tribes east of the Mississippi River.

During this era, nativism became more complex, drawing its inspiration from a variety of

sources. Antebellum xenophobes expressed the need for consensus at a juncture when constant and bewildering change appeared to threaten "the old landmarks of Christendom and the glorious common law of the Founding Fathers." A lack of institutional authority and standards strengthened the drive for common ideological unity. The very diversity of this period—with its myriad religious groups, faddist sects, and voluntary organizations—implied divisiveness and stimulated anxiety about the nation's future and tensions between individualism and community in a modernizing polity. Nativists took up the battle against autonomous groups combining secrecy with a demand for total loyalty. Such organizations as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the Masonic Order, and the Roman Catholic Church troubled native-born and Protestant Americans as the antithesis of the egalitarian ideals of Jacksonian Democracy. In this era of "Pax Britannica," nativism provided worried Americans a series of contrived threats—moral equivalents of war—with which to rebuff autocratic adversaries and thus bolster the legitimacy and authority of republican institutions.

Anti-Catholicism during the Jacksonian era transferred the battle for democracy from the level of intellectual combat in the national arena to parochial politics and mob violence "where every son of liberty could strike his blow for righteousness." The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, concluded between John Quincy Adams and the Spanish minister Luis de Onís, struck such a symbolic blow. This "transcontinental treaty" extended American claims to the Pacific and thus "liberated" a vast expanse from a Catholic state. Four years later President James Monroe warned the European Quadruple Alliance not to intervene in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American republics. Monroe's "doctrine" was, of course, upheld by British sea power. Yet not a few Americans held to the belief that Europe's despots might attempt to reassert their power in the Western Hemisphere.

Such was the message of the artist and inventor Samuel F. B. Morse, who in 1834 warned of a Catholic plot to undermine the Republic. Echoing his father, Jedidiah Morse, in decrying the apathy of most Americans, Morse's *Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United States* declared that the European Leopold Association, currently assisting American bishops in the Mississippi Valley, was in fact an entering wedge through which Prince Metternich of Austria and Czar Nicholas I of Russia would seize control. A year later fellow New Englander Lyman Beecher published *A Plea for the West*. A prominent minister who became president of Lane Theological Seminary in Cincinnati (with St. Louis, a stronghold of Catholicism), Beecher grasped the significance of American know-how for westward, ultimately global expansion and evangelicalization. Beecher hated demon rum, dueling, religious complacency, Unitarians, and Catholics. Unless Americans accepted God's challenge and transacted their extraordinary destiny, they could expect dreadful retribution. Either Protestant faithful would evangelize the west and the world, or the area would be captured by an institution that destroyed freedom of thought, cloaked its true atheism behind specious symbols of religiosity, generated revolution wherever it appeared, and knew no limit in its quest for riches and power. If Catholicism were not halted, Beecher averred, the republican experiment would expire in a wasteland of ignorance and infidelity.

The idea of America as a contingent experiment verging on the most abject failure provides a recurrent theme in nativist literature, linking congregationalist ministers in Federalist New England, to avatars of 1840s revivalism like Beecher, and to twentieth-century fundamentalists like Billy James Hargis and Jerry Falwell. Beecher no doubt spoke for traditional congregationalist clergy seeking to redress its loss of established power by spreading New England Protestantism westward. But the expansionist connotation of his message was clear, and alongside the influx of Irish and other Catholic immigrants, it generated concern among those unsettled by cultural change.

The immigration of the 1830s and 1840s indicated to nativists that Europe's leaders might not be able to launch navies across the Atlantic, but they could send their illiterate, destitute, and criminal elements. Perhaps because the economy recovered well from the Panic of 1837, and Europe seemed far away, anti-Catholicism did not become a staple of the Mexican War (1846–1848). That it did not underscores the marginal relationship between nativism and foreign policy at this juncture. Although observers on both sides of the debate on the war disparaged the imputed racial inferiority of the Mexican adversary, Protestant nativists never succeeded in making the conflict a religious jihad. Some southern denominations—moved by the racialism that girded slavery—did warn that the "yoke

of papal oppression would be placed upon every state of the Republic" unless Mexico was crushed. But the absence of a unified anti-Catholic base was clear in the strength of other Protestant enemies, especially in northern states—including the "peculiar institution" of slavery, war generally, and the Mexican War in particular. Indeed, not a few northern Protestants scorned the threat posed by an aggressive slave-power conspiracy to extend its dominion into the western territories. Human bondage—here and now—proved more compelling than human bondage allegedly engineered by the Vatican.

More important, the cultural and social change that so alarmed Morse and Beecher had diluted Protestantism, secularized it, and stretched its basic tenets. Hence, most Americans rebuffed attempts to link Mexico with the Catholic menace. Midwestern Protestants generally held few uncertainties about the nation's future and the durability of their civilization. Mexican culture was primitive and impotent, and Mexican armies posed no threat to national safety. The historic Catholic culture of the Mississippi Valley would not halt American expansion to the Pacific.

Nevertheless, tales of Catholic atrocities persisted through the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, stimulating nativist imaginations (a form of ultra-Protestant pornography) and in urban and urbanizing venues making life difficult for Irish immigrants. The *Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk* (1836), which detailed lustful priests, compliant nuns, and strangled babies born of unholy wedlock, was the best known of this apocryphal confessional literature, and sold more than 130,000 copies over the next twenty years (earning the sobriquet, eventually, as the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the anti-Catholic crusade). For their part, Irish immigrant supporters of the Young Ireland movement spoke out in their new country against English rule and incurred violent reactions in Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Boston, among other cities. Anti-Catholic hostility centered upon such issues as the alleged role of immigrants in urban political corruption, trusteeship, the correct version of the Bible to be used in public schools, and rivalry in labor markets. In the late 1840s more than a million immigrants—expelled by famine—arrived in America "with hatred in their hearts for the British." The new arrivals made it necessary for politicians to heed their interests, thereby transforming urban politics in several venues.

Anti-Catholicism affected but was not coeval with antebellum nativism. Xenophobes also condemned non-Catholic immigrants and native Americans whose sociopolitical affiliations or religious tenets challenged local power structures or dominant cultural ideals. In addition, numerous immigrant groups—including Scots-Irish Presbyterians in Philadelphia and German radicals in the Ohio Valley—joined the Protestant crusade, as did many native-born Catholics. Bishop John J. Hughes of New York took the lead in denouncing the radicalism of Hungarian patriot Lajos Kossuth, while Boston Irish Catholics denounced German "48ers" as "red" republicans, anarchists and despoilers of the Sabbath. In fact, between 1846 and 1855 more than a million Germans came to the United States, leaving behind revolution and potato famine, and becoming politically active in their new home. This activism, though not unified, unsettled nativists.

The arrival of three visitors in the early 1850s connected nativism with foreign relations and domestic politics more closely than any episode since the 1790s. Hungarian nationalist Lajos Kossuth fled Europe after leading a failed uprising against Austria in 1848. Attacking New York's Bishop Hughes as an agent of Habsburg despotism and warning of a Vatican conspiracy to rule the world, Kossuth sought to enlist mercenaries to return to renew Hungary's battle for independence. Kossuth captured the imagination of Americans until most realized that he might upset the delicate balance between the means and ends of foreign policy. Democratic leaders who might have aided him did not embrace his cause. And by 1852, the Whig Party had sundered along sectional lines as a result of the slavery controversy. Hence, Kossuth failed to enlist political support and had to settle for leaving behind, in the words of historian Thomas A. Bailey, "Kossuth beards, Kossuth hats, Kossuth overcoats, Kossuth cigars, the Kossuth grippe, and Kossuth County, Iowa."

The arrivals of "Father" Alessandro Gavazzi and Monsignor Gaetano Bedini early in 1853 for a time appeared to transfer the battle for Italian unification to the United States. Gavazzi was an apostate monk who took part in the rebellion of 1848, while Bedini, representing the pope on his American visit, resolutely opposed Italian unification. Gavazzi's nationalistic denunciation of Bedini for leading papal forces at the Battle of Bologna converted what had been a pleasant visit for the papal nuncio into an ordeal, as hostile crowds greeted his every appearance.

The fear of immigrants assumed political meaning during the 1850s as the slavery question slowly immobilized both parties. In 1854 the secret Order of the Star Spangled Banner transformed itself into the American Party, or "Know-Nothing" Party (as New York newspaper editor Horace Greeley dubbed them), because members claimed to know nothing about the organization. Party faithful claimed to endorse the asylum ideal—they would welcome all immigrants, except paupers and criminals—as long as the newcomers promised to abstain from politics. The initial strength and subsequent weakness of the Know-Nothings lay in their promise of an issue, the danger of immigration, that skirted the slavery dispute. Nativism in this instance was less an end in itself than a means to achieve national unity amid growing sectional crisis.

Despite its nationalist gloss, the Know-Nothings were defined mainly by sectional and local conflict. Southern Know-Nothings focused their attention primarily on the tendency of most immigrants to settle in, and augment the political clout of, northern states. Conversely, New England Know-Nothings were often reformers, and most detested slavery. This contradiction undercut the American Party, which survived only as long as the Republic avoided commitment on the slavery question. Ironically, Know-Nothing nativism served to toughen immigrant resolve and cohesion. Abraham Lincoln wooed the German vote in 1860 by seeking to learn the language, reading a German-language newspaper, and naming immigrant Germans to his cabinet.

Know-Nothing nativism also toughened the resolve of Irish Americans who, though caricatured unmercifully, began to win the battle for urban America against lower-class Protestants. Indeed, by the end of the century, the Irish would join nativists in defending the United States against the "new" immigration from southern and eastern Europe.

Yet by the end of the Civil War, nativists could show no federal legislation restricting the immigration. American religious tolerance survived the socioeconomic turmoil and mob violence of the 1830s and 1840s, the Mexican War, and the Know-Nothing movement. Until the 1880s, in fact, confidence in the nation's power to assimilate newcomers checked nativism in most regions. Even the radical Irish Fenians, who used American soil to harass British North America after the Civil War—including an "invasion" of Ontario launched from Saint Albans, Vermont, in May 1870—fell far short of involving the United States and Britain in a war to free Ireland. In short, the "free security" of the Republic, afforded by the Atlantic and Pacific and weak neighbors to the north and south, combined with a hardy strain of Anglophobia to undermine resentment against Irish immigrants. The alchemy of the melting pot, which held that Americans had only to wait a generation or two to see immigrants assimilated, dominated the national mood. Immigrants had much to offer. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, Americans were "the Romans of the modern world, the great assimilating people."

IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND MORE NEWCOMERS

Until the 1880s it appeared that even the Sinophobia that flared in California in the 1850s would dissipate. Chinese laborers had proved essential in constructing the Union Pacific Railroad as it passed through the Sierra Nevada. The Fourteenth Amendment shielded the Chinese, as it did African Americans, while the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 mollified nativists by allowing Chinese who entered to provide inexpensive labor, but prevented them from becoming citizens. Economic troubles and social unrest, however, laid the basis for the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which proscribed immigration for a decade and marked a key change in the federal government's laissez-faire policy. The Chinese Exclusion Act codified the idea of a Yellow Peril and denied that Asians were assimilable. This legislation had a clear racial basis and hence also influenced attitudes toward the "new" southern and eastern European immigration. The historian Roger Daniels credits the law as providing "the hinge on which all American immigration policy turned." The legislation—renewed and amplified in 1884, 1888, and 1892—also influenced similar laws in Australia, Canada, and other English-speaking countries. As one senator told President Rutherford B. Hayes, they were "a cold pebble in the public stomach which cannot be digested."

The Exclusion Act and its amendments mortified China's government, which ironically practiced its own policy of ethnoracial exclusion against outsiders until Western powers in the 1840s and 1850s compelled the Chinese to treat whites as equals. China protested often against this inequality, but to no avail. With depression

and social unrest increasing, Sinophobia swept the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountains during the 1880s. In 1885, after a local water company in Tacoma, Washington, hired Chinese to lay pipe despite high white unemployment, a riot razed Chinatown and drove Chinese residents from the city. The incident, which locals deemed a "glorious victory," resulted in China receiving from the United States an indemnity of $10,000. A year later a similar workingmen's riot in Seattle forced most of the Chinese from the city and compelled President Grover Cleveland to mobilize military force to restore order. A systematic series of arrests occurred in San Francisco and Los Angeles in 1893, and by October sixty-four Asians were in prison pending the outcome of their appeals to avoid deportation. In 1894 these difficulties were settled after Li Hung-chang informed William Bowman, the American counsel at Tientsin, that Sino-American relations were near the breaking point. Then war with Japan intervened to weaken China's position, and the Gresham-Yang Treaty of 1894 succeeded in placing exclusion and registration laws passed since 1882 on a proper treaty basis.

Resistance to newcomers who were "not like us" burgeoned between 1890 and 1920. No equivalent period in American history can match the twenty million immigrants who came to the United States. Here was the stuff of a colossal saga—given added significance by the sight of the Statue of Liberty, dedicated in October 1886 in New York's harbor, near Ellis Island, the arrival point for most immigrants. The Statue of Liberty inspired millions of newcomers, and Emma Lazarus's poem inscribed at its base promised a better tomorrow:

> Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
> Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
> I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

If the newcomers' contribution was to provide fodder for the unprecedented economic growth of this era, economic difficulties and accompanying social strife undercut the positive view of immigration many citizens held. Businessmen and reformers joined labor leaders and workingmen in arguing that immigrant gifts paled before their role in promoting domestic discord. By stressing the European origins of class conflict, critics of the American urban-industrial scene like Edwin L. Godkin, Jacob Riis, Richard T. Ely, and Josiah Strong warned of the radical portent of this immigration. Missing the deep conservatism of the great majority of newcomers from southeastern Europe, they also failed to see that new urban governments lacked requisite administrative experience to deal with their problems. According to reformers, the new immigrants were the problem, settling in cities and corrupting politics. National immunity from the ills of Europe seemed to have expired, and the melting pot seemed more a pressure cooker.

This perception gained strength as Americans sought to make sense of the intense labor-management strife of the era. The Chicago Haymarket Riot in May 1886 ushered in a decade of industrial strife and catalyzed in American minds a dread of foreign conspirators. Fearful adversaries of "long-haired, wild-eyed, bad smelling, atheistic, reckless, foreign wretches" did not distinguish between Marxists and anarchists. Indeed, patriotic citizens parceled together all varieties of immigrant radicalism and left the package in front of the house of labor.

Fears of national decay heightened after the panic of 1893 and ensuing depression. An angry agrarian crusade attacked capitalism and international finance with a cataclysmic rhetoric not designed to reassure jittery easterners. Labor discontent reached bloody pinnacles during the Homestead and Pullman strikes. As time seemed to run out, portending the end of opportunity, geography seemed to conspire. As the historian Frederick Jackson Turner told the American Historical Association in 1893, the era of the frontier—the dynamic font of individualism, liberty, and democracy—had ended. Americans would have to find something new to supplant the source of those characteristics that made the nation great.

As the center seemed incapable of holding, an assemblage of New England Brahmins—graduates of Harvard—formed the Immigration Restriction League. The league championed Anglo-Saxonism and embraced a nostalgic view of the region's homogeneous past. They pored over the works of John Fiske and John W. Burgess, who applied precepts of social Darwinism to history and politics. Cheering the Foran Act of 1885, which had prohibited European contract labor, the restrictionists gathered behind Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and developed a series of literacy tests as the best way to halt immigration. While the House passed a literacy bill five times between 1895 and 1917 (with Senate support

after the first failure), presidents as distinct as Grover Cleveland, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson vetoed the legislation. Only in 1917 did Congress prevail over the veto.

In a society that questioned its ability to resolve conflicts, citizens looked for evidence of the republic's virility. The Reverend Josiah Strong expressed this anxiety in *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (1885), which excoriated the communal disruption wrought by excessive materialism. This development threatened America's traditional Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture in its quest to evangelize the world. As Lyman Beecher had a half-century earlier, Strong anticipated a "righteous empire" of Protestantism expanding and spreading the American way throughout the world. Not surprisingly in an era that witnessed the final relegation of America's Indians to reservations and penury and southern African Americans to Jim Crow, *Our Country* and other of Strong's writings embraced the racialist thesis that civilization would reach its zenith when Anglo-Saxons extinguished less vigorous peoples and secured international hegemony. Domestic corruption jeopardized this divine mission, made all the more imperative by the impending "final competition of races, for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled."

Strong advocated the mission of the United States rather than its manifest destiny. Just as Protestant Christianity would remedy domestic ills—socialism, intemperance, and the Mormon and Catholic threats—so too would Anglo-Saxon torchbearers of Protestantism carry their message to the far corners of the earth—not on the end of a sword, but through the persuasive power of example.

Pressure engendered by various domestic crises during the 1890s stimulated chauvinists and nativists alike. Richard Hofstadter's concept of a "psychic crisis" does not explain the William McKinley administration's decision for war against Spain in 1898, but by underlining the close relationship between the domestic distress of the 1890s, nativism, and the new bellicosity in American diplomacy, the construct suggests why Americans were eager for foreign adventure. During the decade the United States went to the brink of war with Italy, Chile, and Great Britain over issues peripheral to the national interest. Nativism served as a catalyst for these episodes, demonstrating its function to unify a divided nation by focusing on foreign problems and threats. In 1891 a New Orleans mob lynched eleven Italians and Italian Americans immediately after they were acquitted of the charge of murdering the city's police chief. The episode did nothing for Italian-American relations, especially when Theodore Roosevelt deemed it "a rather good thing." After Italy demanded compensation for the families of the deceased and Washington demurred, Italy cut full diplomatic relations. War talk flared among jingoists and one Georgian promised to muster a company of soldiers "to invade Rome, disperse the Mafia, and plant the stars and stripes on the dome of St. Peter's." As immigration restrictionists disparaged Italians and other southeastern Europeans and big-navy men called for an ambitious building program, President Benjamin Harrison chose the statesmanlike course and apologized to Italy. The war scare passed. But many journals observed that in the face of the threat national unity replaced sectional bickering.

A NEW CENTURY OF IMMIGRANTS

Nativism diminished at the beginning of the twentieth century. A robust national economy shielded newcomers, even as the assassination of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz, an American-born radical, led Congress in 1903 to bar "anarchists or persons who believe or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States . . . or the assassination of public officials." The nation's immigration bureaucracy grew quickly after 1900, boasting more than 1,200 workers by 1906. A year later Congress established the Immigration Commission, which in 1911 issued a huge report that popularized the distinction between the "old" and "new" immigration. The former was salutary, the latter baneful. The Immigration Commission also searched for illness at Ellis Island and on the West Coast, as bacterial and viral outbreaks—long associated with specific immigrant groups—became a means to distinguish "healthy" Americans from sickly aliens. In 1793, Philadelphians deemed an outbreak of yellow fever "Palatine Fever," to indicate German immigrant responsibility for the outbreak; in 1832 nativists attributed a cholera epidemic on the eastern seaboard to Irish-Catholic immigrants; and in 1900 the Chinese in San Francisco took the blame for an outbreak of bubonic plague. By 1907, in addition to anarchists, immigration undesirables excluded from American shores included paupers, polyga-

mists, lepers, beggars, prostitutes, epileptics, victims of tuberculosis, those suspected of "moral turpitude," and imbeciles. Clearly the stigma of disease served to marginalize immigrants culturally and to remove them—indeed, often by quarantine—from society's mainstream. Only by embracing the consumer culture of personal cleanliness could newcomers exhibit patriotism and become American.

Nativism did flare in San Francisco in 1906, when the school board ordered the exclusion of Japanese children from that city's public schools. Regional prejudice quickly threatened to overturn President Theodore Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy. Long a bastion of racialism, California assumed its anti-Japanese stance naturally. The Japanese and Korean Exclusion League appeared in 1905, as Japan and Russia waged war in East Asia, and repeated charges made earlier against the Chinese, warning that the Japanese jeopardized not only the standard of living but also the primacy of the white race. Many nativists, including the novelist Jack London and publisher William Randolph Hearst, excoriated the Yellow Peril. Not only had Japan's strong showing in war against Russia made it a world power, but now its position of strength in the Far East threatened the self-image of the United States as a superior, Anglo-Saxon nation. Ironically, Japan itself had a long history of institutionalized xenophobia, but now showed concern over its international status. Tokyo protested this exclusion, which placed Washington in the awkward position of convincing Californians of their obligation to the Union, while at the same time seeking to secure equal treatment for citizens of a foreign power. Concerned at Japan's new strength in Asia and upset by riots in Tokyo protesting the Treaty of Portsmouth, which he helped negotiate, President Theodore Roosevelt moved to restore cordial relations with Tokyo.

His own racism notwithstanding, Roosevelt withstood opposition from the Pacific coast and Rocky Mountain regions—and from southern advocates of Jim Crow and states' rights. He warned that he would employ military force, if necessary, and sent a personal representative to San Francisco. Mayor Eugene Schmitz soon revoked the segregation order, and Roosevelt promised to work to place Japanese immigration on a treaty basis. The president also dispatched the navy's Pacific Fleet on a dramatic global voyage—after informing Tokyo not to view the move as an unfriendly act.

Roosevelt and the Japanese exchanged several diplomatic notes, which became the basis in 1907 for the so-called "Gentleman's Agreement," an executive agreement that restricted passage of Japanese laborers from Hawaii and Japan to the United States unless they had "already been in America." The arrangement, shifting Japanese migration to the United States from basically male to female, quieted but did not halt anti-Japanese agitation. Foreign-born Japanese (*Issei*) remained "aliens ineligible to citizenship," while second-generation citizens (*Nisei*) found the Fourteenth Amendment a poor guarantee of the rights of citizenship against discriminatory law and custom. After leaving office, Roosevelt himself concluded that cultural and economic conflict was inevitable in relations between Americans and Asians.

Nativism reached its apogee during and directly after World War I. Just prior to American intervention in the conflict, congressional restrictionists overcame President Woodrow Wilson's veto and passed the major recommendation the Dillingham Commission made six years earlier. The Immigration Act of 1917 barred illiterate adult immigrants; set a head tax of eight dollars per person; and excluded vagrants, alcoholics, advocates of violent revolution, and "psychopathic inferiors." Passage of a literacy test and the establishment of a barred zone in the southwest Pacific—which closed the gates to Asians not already banned by the Chinese Exclusion Act and Gentleman's Agreement—indicated that the Great War heralded a more sinister era in the history of American nativism.

WORLD WAR I AND THE 1920S

With the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914, the geographical and political isolation—that placed foreign policy above controversy, rendered immigrant attitudes nonpolitical, facilitated assimilation, and shielded the melting pot—quickly dissipated. Foreigners who earlier solicited American support—like Edmond Genet and Lajos Kossuth—annoyed nativists, but did not change American noninterventionism. Even the wars with Mexico and Spain underlined unity. But now Europe seemed much closer. President Wilson's assurance that the United States would not intervene notwithstanding, nativism as a force for patriotism and national unity stressed conformity—targeting German Americans and political radicals. Divisive themes, like

anti-Catholicism and Teutonic racism, disappeared from the nativist lexicon.

Nativism in World War I had much in common with xenophobia during the Quasi-War. The chief assertion of American nationalism, termed "100 percent Americanism" after U.S. intervention, attested to the realization of cultural and social diversity amidst crisis. First- and second-generation immigrants comprised one-third of America's population—a point made more problematic by the loss of confidence by Progressive reformers. Hence, the preparedness campaign during the period of neutrality (1914–1917) focused primarily on German immigrants. Well-organized, prosperous, and self-consciously retaining old-world customs, German Americans mobilized following the outbreak of war to block munitions shipments to belligerents and counter sensational "Hun" propaganda stories emanating from London. In January 1915 the German-American Alliance met in New York, demonstrating a great show of unity—and outraging American nativists.

This gathering coincided with Germany's announcement of submarine warfare against Britain and with German attempts to bomb American vessels and munitions plants. Soon politicians and editors condemned the apparent conspiracy, decrying "hyphenate" Americans (but never Anglo-Americans, the antiwar activist Randolph Bourne pointed out) and heeding former President Roosevelt's point that any apostasy from total allegiance smacked of "moral treason." "America for the Americans!" he thundered. "Our bitter experience should teach us for a generation . . . to crush under our heel every movement that smacks in the smallest degree of playing the German game." President Wilson's counsel at the outset that Americans "be neutral in thought as well as in deed" quickly went by the board as citizens chose sides and sought to profit from the conflict by selling matériel and munitions to the belligerents. Britain, of course, held the advantage there.

As American neutrality became increasingly pro-British, radicals and dissenters joined German immigrants as surrogate enemies for patriotic citizens. Men like Henry Cabot Lodge and Augustus Gardner, wealthy New England Brahmins, moved easily from attacking new immigrants and labor unions to alerting citizens about the dangers posed by pacifists and German Americans. Citizens organizations like the National Security League and American Defense Society competed to strengthen the military and impose unity in all areas of life. German submarine warfare and propaganda played into the hands of these grassroots patriots, whose distrust of immigrants was shared increasingly by the Wilson administration. Although the German-American Alliance forbade political activity, state and local immigrant groups continued to lobby, no doubt exacerbating the bitter feelings that peaked during the 1916 election campaign. Denouncing "that small alien element among us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States," Wilson and the Democratic Party portrayed Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes—who refused to get involved with the hyphenate issue—as "a dupe of the Kaiser in pro-British areas, and as a Roosevelt-dominated jingo spoiling for war with Germany in areas with a large Teutonic population." The president played both sides of the nativist coin.

The mailed fist of patriotism fell even harder on German Americans once the United States entered the war. Ironically, as the Republic moved to make the world safe for democracy, American-style, patriots nearly tore up the Bill of Rights. Ethnic fidelity now became a sine qua non of foreign policy, even more so with the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. German culture came under attack on all fronts, with hamburgers, sauerkraut, Beethoven, and German language instruction disappearing. The Department of Justice gave vigilante groups like the American Protective League carte blanche to ferret spies and saboteurs from the German-socialist-pacifist–International Workers of the World–trade unionist monolith. In Collinsville, Illinois, an area previously scarred by racial and labor-management violence, Robert Paul Praeger was lynched in April 1918. Praeger was a socialist and a radical, and his death drew little support for civil liberties. Indeed, most observers considered Praeger's hanging evidence of the inadequacy of federal legislation to suppress sedition. The *New Republic* called this argument "a species of sickening cant," but editors and politicians who disdained vigilante justice praised passage of the Sedition Act of 1918.

Nativism did not diminish with the end of the war. Indeed, the martial psychology of 1917–1918 intensified in the face of postwar domestic dislocations, the apparent menace posed by the Bolsheviks, and, most important, the sudden loss of unity and purpose fostered by war. "War is the health of the state," Randolph Bourne averred cynically, but with peace American

democracy suffered anew. The Red Scare of 1919–1920 reflected anxiety at the racial violence, inflation, and economic recession attending demobilization and reconversion, as well as the appearance of new American communist parties, directed by the Moscow Comintern, and significant immigrant presence in the violent steel and textile strikes of 1919. Led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and "sustained by large numbers of business and political leaders, corporations and interest groups, several agencies of government, superpatriotic societies, and the press," federal agents targeted as security threats anarchists, communists, radical labor groups, and other citizens who had opposed the war.

The Bolshevik threat affected debate on the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Republicans and Democrats alike denounced as misguided Wilson's messianic prophecy to remake the world in the Republic's image and pointed out that Americans could never trust Old World statesmen. "Men had died," the poet Ezra Pound wrote, "for an old bitch gone in the teeth, a botched civilization." Hence, when Wilson argued that the new League of Nations would stem the Bolshevik threat, Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler retorted that the Versailles Treaty was "unpatriotic and un-American," an example of "subtle, half-conscious socialism." American fears peaked on 2 June 1919, when a dynamite explosion rocked Palmer's home on K Street in Washington (and blew up the perpetrator), and bombs exploded at the homes of leading citizens in eight other cities. An erstwhile Quaker with political ambitions, Palmer set out to destroy the "reds" and capture the Democratic nomination for president in 1920. He created a General Intelligence Division, led by J. Edgar Hoover, which soon amassed more than 200,000 cards detailing the character of radical organizations and publications and the case histories of more than 60,000 "dangerous radicals."

Incapacitated by a stroke, Wilson could not restrain Palmer, whose crusade soon left its mark. Within months the Palmer raids, strengthened by support from the newly formed American Legion, led to the deportation of 249 Russian immigrants whose Bolshevism was more imagined than real. The Lusk Committee in New York expelled five socialist delegates from the state legislature; business leaders fostered scare propaganda to deflect labor grievances; California prohibited Japanese from owning land; an Illinois mob turned on Italian settlers, beating them and razing their homes; and one patriot charged that Albert Einstein's theory of relativity had Bolshevik origins. Most Americans, one cynic noted, could not distinguish between Bolshevism and rheumatism, but no matter. The Soviets would provide a whipping boy for nativist patriots for the next seventy years.

When domestic conditions improved in 1920, the Red Scare collapsed—but not before Palmer himself became a victim of the episode. His presidential hopes evaporated along with the crisis. Nonetheless, World War I and the Red Scare cast a long shadow into the 1920s and beyond. Soviet-American relations were poisoned from the beginning by judgments and actions conditioned by wartime and postwar xenophobia. Bipartisan disillusionment with the politics of Europe contributed to the economic protectionism of the 1920s and also influenced the refusal of the United States to join the World Court. The linking of radicalism with disloyalty tarnished the labor movement for more than a decade. In Massachusetts, two Italian anarchists were executed after a trial that arrayed the values of the Brahmin establishment against alien radicalism. Liberals may have been outraged and transformed the defendants into martyrs after their death, but presiding Judge Webster Thayer's censure of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti as "anarchist bastards" epitomized the feelings toward southeastern Europe and radical politics held by most Americans.

Most important, the Red Scare gave the Immigration Restriction League "evidence" to show that the melting pot threatened American society and culture. The early 1920s witnessed the full flowering of Anglo-Saxon racism, part of the nostalgic drive toward Protestant Anglo-conformity that gave the decade its ambiguous cultural tone. The "roaring twenties" clashed with an "anxious twenties," in which sober citizens questioned the multicultural, interdependent, consumer-oriented future and hearkened toward a simpler past. The notion that a person's genes determined one's destiny found expression in university quotas and employment restrictions against Jews, the writings of Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, the popularity of IQ tests and eugenics, and the renewal of congressional debate on immigration. Led by Albert Johnson of Washington, long an enemy of local Wobblies, congressional restrictionists overrode President Wilson's veto in early 1921 and passed legislation limiting immigration based upon nationality: the number of immigrants per year from one country could

not surpass 3 percent of the total of that nationality resident in the United States in 1910. Three years later the Johnson-Reed Act closed the door to "inferior" peoples. Quotas would now reflect resident populations of 1890; after 1927 immigration would be limited to 150,000 persons annually, and Asians would be excluded. Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover agreed, suggesting "biological and cultural grounds why there should be no mixture of Oriental and Caucasian blood." President Calvin Coolidge did not mince words. He noted in signing the bill that "America must be kept American."

If the Red Scare prevented Americans from adapting to postwar realities, it was not surprising that during the decade after the conflict many citizens wrestled with fundamental social tensions by seeking to revive the attitudes and values of an earlier era. Nativist defenders of an idealized *Gemeinschaft* ("community") culture sought to halt the intrusion of modernity. What historian John Higham called the tribal twenties exhibited a retrospective idealism, at once parochial and nationalistic, at war with urbanism, secularism, and ethnic diversity. This cultural strain drove a significant part of the populace to embrace Anglo conformity as its rejoinder to the challenges posed by modern urban-industrial America—not least its liberated women, hot films, and jazz. In the 1920 census, for the first time in the nation's history, urban residents outnumbered their rural cousins—and there would be no restoration of a preindustrial epoch. Henry Ford epitomized the cultural problem of Americans enjoying the fruits of mass production and postwar technological prowess and lamenting the sociocultural consequences of change. The father of mass production—his assembly line devastated traditional skills and his Model T automobile revolutionized travel (and also provided a bedroom on wheels and means to escape small-town surveillance)—Ford became the most notorious anti-Semite of the interwar era. A scion of the rural Midwest, he organized a "peace ship" in 1915 to halt the European war. Initially supporting Wilson's League of Nations and dunning intolerant patriots during the Red Scare, Ford met frustration at every turn.

Disillusionment and economic problems in 1920 led to Ford's espousal of an ideological anti-Semitism that ultimately caught the attention of Adolf Hitler and his Nazis. In the pages of his *Dearborn Independent,* he came to blame just about every modern problem (and personal peeve) on the Jews. The short list included gamblers, booze and cigarettes, immigrants, Bolsheviks, bankers, and unions, but the underlying peril was a sinister Jewish cabal seeking to dominate the world. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* a czarist forgery in Russia in 1891, provided Ford documentation for his facile explanation of dismaying cultural trends and a dramatic symbol of the danger posed by international political cooperation.

Similar malice toward immigrants and internationalism colored the discourse of the Ku Klux Klan, reborn in 1915 and peaking eight years later with 2.3 million members. The soul of the organization, splintered into groups reflecting regional nativist animosities (against blacks in the South, Asians in the West, Catholics in the Midwest, and Jews in the Northeast), lay in America's urbanizing towns and villages—under siege from modernism, however defined. These were the same venues that gave Henry Ford his major support. Although Klan rhetoric primarily targeted these minorities, actual violence generally fell upon white, Anglo-Saxon apostates who strayed from traditional Protestant moral codes. Bootleggers, feckless husbands, and cheating wives comprised major targets for the Klan, which also prospered in urban centers in the Midwest and Southwest, reflecting demographic change wrought by World War I. Imperial Wizard Hiram W. Evans led the Klan in its "fight for Americanism," which included, among other items, support for Prohibition, immigration restriction, anti-evolution laws, and family values.

The 1920s included numerous examples of rural-minded, defensive imperialism. Yet as tribal nativists moved to prevent command of the nation's destiny from passing from Main Street to the metropolis, they affirmed the material benefits of the modernity they so grimly denounced. This contradiction mirrored a similar ambivalence in American foreign relations during the 1920s and 1930s. On one hand, Washington rejected political commitments like the League of Nations and the World Court. On the other, as William Appleman Williams and Emily Rosenberg demonstrate, apart from its protectionist tariffs, the United States proved adept internationally in economic and cultural realms, particularly in its search for markets and influence in Europe, China, Latin America, and the Middle East. Being in the world, but not of it, hearkened back to the original reason why English Puritans settled in the New World in the

early seventeenth century. Now, however, this quest for what Warren I. Cohen deemed "an empire without tears" confirmed the superior morality of Americans, but did not prepare them for constructive global action in case of crisis.

Nevertheless, nativism as an organized movement triumphed with passage of the National Origins Act of 1924. The law produced a sharp decrease in the volume of European and Asian newcomers and hastened the Americanization of newcomers already present in the United States. The Great Depression that began in 1929 also advanced the assimilation process, for economic difficulties blurred cultural distinctions between ethnic groups as it sharpened class feelings in the working population. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal also diminished the power of immigrant cultural and social groups by making immigrants and natives alike look to government for relief. Developments in mass communication—documentary films, Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats and radio itself, Works Progress Administration guidebooks and chronicles—also subjected Americans to unprecedented common experience. Finally, nativist attempts to cleanse the body politic of alien growth in fact shielded minorities by sharply restricting fields open to them. With the advent of economic catastrophe in 1929, Americans directed their bitterness at the establishment—white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant.

Even before the depression, social scientists initiated what John Higham termed a "massive assault on racial thinking and ethnocentrism." American loathing of Nazism during the late 1930s and World War II strengthened this trend and helped prevent the sort of vicious nativism that appeared after 1916. The German-American community also remembered the indignities it encountered, and after a bitter debate on intervention in the European War, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor served further to unify the nation. Hence, American anti-German hatred focused not upon German immigrants and their offspring, but upon Hitler, his political hierarchy, and the Nazi doctrine of Aryan supremacy. Official policy made this distinction until the end of the war. Not surprisingly, then, anti-Catholicism and racial nativism became less important, remaining powerful only among dyed-in-the-wool Roosevelt haters.

Indeed, from the 1930s on persons who advocated old-fashioned 100 percent Americanism risked identification with European anti-Semitism and fascism. The Great Depression gave several mass leaders a name and national following. The most famous, Huey Long of Louisiana, was assassinated in 1935, after he helped defeat Washington's attempt to join the World Court. The others included Father Charles E. Coughlin, the radio priest from Royal Oak, Michigan; the spiritualist William Dudley Pelley, founder of the Silver Shirt Legion; and Fritz Kuhn, leader of the German-American Bund. These men exhibited a curiously inverted form of nativism. Father Coughlin (borrowing from Henry Ford and earlier populists and anticipating the strategy and tactics of Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin) denounced treason within government circles, fingering President Herbert Hoover, Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon, government bureaucrats, and ultimately the entire Roosevelt administration. Here were the real "aliens," agents of a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy that threatened the Republic.

WORLD WAR II AND THE EFFECTS ON NATIVISM

This charge allowed traditional targets of nativists to turn the tables on their historic adversary—the Anglo establishment. As Justus Doenecke notes, disdain for Britain and things British unified a heterogeneous group of Americans who opposed aid to Britain between 1939 and 1941. Coughlin and several other mass leaders, however, copied Hitler's anti-Semitism and anticommunism. This strategy, combined with their accusation that members of the legitimate political order were the real aliens in the United States, backfired by decade's end. Their thesis that a cabal of Anglophiles, Democratic politicians, international bankers, and Jews controlled the government gave the Roosevelt administration evidence to proclaim the existence of an internal fascist movement, to link this threat with respectable noninterventionists attempting to prevent American entrance into the war, and to strengthen presidential power over foreign affairs. In September 1941, when famed flier Charles A. Lindbergh blamed the Jews, along with Britain and Roosevelt for the nation's march toward war, he closed the circle—nativism was now perceived as un-American, and nonintervention-ists as minions of Hitler.

Yet if World War II did not approach the first in its violation of civil liberties, the second remains far from the "good war" portrayed in

much historiography. Indeed, the racial character of the conflict figured prominently on both sides of the Pacific and revealed anew that the Republic was, in Richard Polenberg's term, "one nation, divisible." The war underlined anew the appalling treatment accorded African Americans, yet also led at long last to the postwar integration of the armed forces. The most flagrant blot on wartime civil liberties came with the incarceration of 126,000 Japanese Americans—ripped from their homes on the West Coast and transferred to "relocation" camps in the western interior. This diaspora came shortly after Pearl Harbor, when the federal government embraced the Pacific coast obsession with the Yellow Peril and accepted Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt's doctrine of "military necessity." Contrary to DeWitt's argument and popular belief, the Japanese Americans were not spies and saboteurs but a hard-working and prosperous people whose virtues did justice to Horatio Alger.

This mass relocation marked a new chapter in the history of American nativism. The Japanese Americans, who gained an official apology and partial redress in 1988 for their tribulations, were not tarred and feathered or forced to kiss the flag. For the first time, the federal government efficiently rounded them up and shipped them off to concentration camps, where—having lost their property, their jobs, and their civil and legal rights—they sat out the war behind barbed wire. The threat of Japanese-American betrayal, which girded relocation, drew support from President Roosevelt in Executive Order 9066, secured approval from Congress, and was upheld by the Supreme Court. The incarceration had unintended consequences as Japanese Americans moved eastward, and shifted their occupational emphasis from agriculture to business and the professions.

Nativism declined in importance after 1945, reflecting eroded foundations of ethnic group loyalty and changes in the basic structure of society after 1945. Religious affiliation supplanted ethnic origin as the basic means of achieving self-identity and promoting group loyalty. The memory of the Holocaust—and of the tardiness of the United States and other Allies in dealing with it—contributed in 1948 to passage of the Displaced Persons Act, which opened the gates to 400,000 Europeans. Moreover, the onset of the Cold War enabled immigrants and refugees from central and eastern Europe to move within the national consensus. Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles could be as good—or better—Americans than the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment, especially the perjured traitor, Alger Hiss, and his key character witness, Dean Acheson. In its ire against Anglophiles and intellectuals, McCarthyism both reflected and intensified the patriotism of these anticommunist Europeans.

NATIVISM'S DEATH KNELL?

In 1965, as President Lyndon Johnson sought to achieve a Great Society at home and in Southeast Asia, Congress passed an epochal immigration act that appeared to signal the death knell of nativism. Reflecting the nation's growing commitment to confronting racism, this law replaced the discriminatory national origins quotas of 1924 with an agenda based on family preference. The law exempted close relatives of persons already in the United States and limited newcomers from the Eastern Hemisphere to 170,000 persons annually and from the Western Hemisphere to 120,000 annually. Although Congress expected most immigrants to come from Europe, an upswing in Europe's economy, deteriorating conditions in Latin America, and the agonizing war in Southeast Asia produced a different outcome. In fact, the tide of immigration and refugees in 1976–1986 ranked the newcomers, in descending order of numbers: Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, Nationalist China (Taiwan), and Cuba. Never had the nation been more multicultural.

Nativism did not disappear, however, and in the last quarter of the twentieth century antiforeign sentiment erupted during periods of economic duress, especially in areas in which these groups settled and in contexts where political candidates like Pat Buchanan courted voters with antiforeign themes. Residents of the postindustrial rust belt seemed most sensitive to antiforeign ideas, which often emerged with antigovernment tones. For example, the downturn in the American automotive market negatively affected Asian Americans. The Ku Klux Klan and other survivalist and hate groups still sputtered along, erupting occasionally, as an unhappy underside of multicultural reality. Defenders of an older America denounced nonwhite newcomers, as their predecessors dunned immigrants in the 1840s, 1890s, and 1920s. But the nostalgic nativism at the beginning of the twenty-first century—never more than a minority position—did not hide the point that newcomers since the 1970s had often done the

kinds of work that native-born Americans choose not to do. In this way newcomers continued to reap the promise of what was still the most powerful force on earth—the American dream. The terrorist plane crash into the Pentagon and the destruction of the New York World Trade Center towers on 11 September 2001, however, heralded a new chapter in nativism. Americans of Middle Eastern descent now faced uncertainty as the Republic gathered its resources to meet a new kind of threat to its national security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archdeacon, Thomas J. *Becoming American: An Ethnic History.* New York, 1983. A good place to start on the history of American immigration.

Bennett, David H. *The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History.* Rev. ed. New York, 1995. Provides a fine scholarly overview and interpretation of nativism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Bodnar, John. *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America.* Bloomington, Ind., 1985. Another good reference for the history of immigration.

Daniels, Roger. *Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890–1924.* Chicago, 1997. Integrates American reactions to the new immigration with policies toward African Americans, Native Americans, and other minorities. Daniels stands alone as the historian of Japanese-American relocation and redress.

Daniels, Roger, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H. L. Kitano, eds. *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress.* Rev. ed. Seattle, 1991. A superior overview.

Davis, David Brion, ed. *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1970. Features a discourse and rhetoric of nativist countersubversion, including a sensitive reading of the author's construct of the paranoid style.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992. Focuses on the rise, place, and slow decline in power of the Anglo-American majority and argues that historians often minimize the importance of British immigrants and their role in fomenting nativism against other groups. A good starting place for those wishing to further assess nativism's place in the context of foreign relations; it also has the advantage of assessing the development of racism as an integral part of the American establishment.

Doenecke, Justus D. *Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941.* Lanham, Md., 2000. Presents a thoughtful assessment of nativist themes in American noninterventionism before World War II.

Dower, John W. *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.* New York, 1986. Portrays racism on both sides of the Pacific.

Dumenil, Lynn. *The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s.* New York, 1995. Dumenil offers measured assessments of the wrenching cultural change of that era and regressive American reactions. Her treatment of the Klan is particularly insightful.

Higham, John. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925.* New York, 1963. One of those few books that just gets better with time.

———. *Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America.* Rev. ed. Baltimore, 1984. Offers second thoughts equally significant.

Hofstadter, Richard. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays.* New York, 1965. Classic and problematic statement of liberal distaste for McCarthyism and the political right.

Kazin, Michael. *The Populist Persuasion: An American History.* New York, 1995. An empathic qualification of critiques of the populist skein in American history.

Knobel, Dale T. *America for the Americans: The Nativist Movement in the United States.* New York, 1996. Skillfully links nineteenth- and twentieth-century nativist themes.

Kovel, Joel. *Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America.* New York, 1994. The Red Scare receives significant analysis in this work.

Kraut, Alan M. *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace."* New York, 1994. Explores in a pathbreaking manner the virulent association in the popular mind between epidemics and immigrants.

Levin, Murray B. *Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression.* New York, 1971.

Murray, Robert K. *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920.* Minneapolis, 1955. Still pertinent reading.

Perea, Juan F., ed. *Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States.* New York, 1997. Contains essays suggestive of recent themes in nativism and its postmodern meanings.

Ribuffo, Leo P. *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War.* Philadelphia, 1983. Presents perhaps the most skillful synthesis of nativist theory, historiography, domestic culture and foreign relations.

Smith, Geoffrey S. *To Save a Nation: American Extremism, The New Deal, and the Coming of World War II.* Rev. ed. Chicago, 1992. Links the activities of the nativist mass leaders of the 1930s to political and diplomatic developments before Pearl Harbor.

See also ASYLUM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; IMMIGRATION; IMPERIALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; NATIONALISM; RACE AND ETHNICITY; RELIGION.

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

William R. Braisted

The history of American naval diplomacy may be divided into three periods that correspond to technical developments in naval warfare and with the changing situation of the United States in world affairs. During the first century of the nation's history, when the United States enjoyed considerable security provided by the oceans separating it from Europe and Asia, its naval forces were largely directed toward protecting American merchants, missionaries, and government officials in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This involved showing the flag to induce non-European peoples to treat Americans according to European and American conceptions of civilized practice. During the period from 1890 to 1945, the diplomatic role of the navy was revolutionized by the emergence of the United States as one of the great naval powers. To its earlier responsibilities of police and protection, the "new navy" of steam and steel added the strategic objective of defending the Western Hemisphere and a good part of the Pacific against intrusion by the European powers and Japan. After 1945 the navy joined with the air and land arms to provide the element of force behind American global diplomacy when the great military powers were reduced initially to two and finally to one, the United States.

THE FIRST PERIOD: 1790–1890

To protect Americans as they moved across the seas during the early days of the Republic, the navy eventually followed the example of the British Royal Navy by establishing ships on distant stations in the Mediterranean, the Far East, the Caribbean, the southern Atlantic, the Pacific, and Africa. The ships on each station, rarely more than three to six, were too few to meet all the calls from ministers, consuls, and citizens for a show of force. Only on exceptional occasions did the navy organize a squadron for impressive display, such as the Japan expedition of 1853–1854. The station commanders were both itinerant diplomats and administrative officers who kept their ships moving individually from port to port, reported on conditions in their areas, and watched over enlistments, supplies, and ships' fitness. Before the rank of rear admiral was introduced during the Civil War, they usually were accorded the courtesy rank of commodore.

Since the Navy Department was unable to undertake detailed direction of the distant stations before the advent of electrical communications, the station commanders enjoyed broad discretion within their domains. Their instructions were generally to protect American commerce and to heed the appeals from Americans to the best of their ability. Only rarely was a navy man placed under direction of a State Department official. Indeed, in a day when American consuls were commonly merchants—and even foreigners—and when ministers were usually political appointees, naval officers were often the most reliable officials serving the United States abroad. In contrast with the independence of naval men overseas, the Navy Department in Washington was under pressure to follow the State Department's wishes. Introduction of cable and radio by the time of World War I ended most of the autonomy enjoyed by flag officers abroad.

The Mediterranean The roots of the distant-stations policy extend to the late eighteenth century, when Americans sailing to the Mediterranean were overhauled by corsairs from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. The Barbary pirates assumed that non-Muslims were subject to capture and enslavement unless they were protected by treaties involving tribute payments. In response to Algerine depredations, Congress resorted to naval diplomacy in 1794 by voting to construct six frigates for a navy. Within three years, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli had agreed to call off their corsairs in return for monetary considerations. There-

after, however, the navy was diverted from chastising North African potentates by the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800) and by differences with Great Britain that culminated in the War of 1812.

Once peace with Britain was restored in 1815, Congress voted for further war against the Algerine corsairs, and Commodore Stephen Decatur quickly forced a treaty on Algiers that ended tribute payments. Decatur's decisive action halted Barbary depredations, and the Navy Department provided against further outbreaks by establishing a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. Before 1845 its ships were based at Port Mahon, Minorca.

The navy's cruising range in the Mediterranean extended eastward to Turkey, where in 1800 the frigate *George Washington* (captained by William Bainbridge) was the first American warship to call at Constantinople. After the destruction of the Turkish-Egyptian fleet at Navarino during the Greek War of Independence (1827), the Sublime Porte in 1830 finally signed a treaty of commerce with Captain James Biddle and two American commissioners that included a "separate and secret" article providing for American assistance in rebuilding the Turkish navy. Although the Senate rejected the article, President Andrew Jackson overrode the Senate's veto by sending Commodore David Porter, the first resident American representative, to Turkey with instructions to help the Turkish navy.

The Mediterranean Squadron was also a symbol of American sympathy for the liberal movements in Christian Europe. After the revolutions of 1848, American and European liberals rejoiced when the steam frigate *Mississippi* conveyed the Hungarian hero Lajos Kossuth and fifty other refugees safely to freedom. The squadron, like other distant stations, was practically disbanded during the Civil War. After it was revived in 1865 as the European Squadron, with expanded area, it provided amiable social billets for naval officers as they watched the Mediterranean and Africa fall under an order dominated by Europe.

Asia Although the American China trade dated from the sailing of the *Empress of China* from New York for Canton in 1784, the East India Squadron gradually took shape only during some nine cruises to Asia between 1800 and 1839, six by single ships and three in pairs. Initially, the navy dispatched ships to the East Indies to protect American merchantmen on the high seas and to transport public officials such as Edmund Roberts, who negotiated treaties with Siam and Muscat in 1833. In the conflicts between China and the West that destroyed the traditional Chinese tribute system in East Asian relations, it was the diplomatic mission of the U.S. Navy to support the claims by Americans to the various rights that Britain, and later France, gained for their nationals by war. During the first Opium War between China and Britain (1839–1842), Commodore Lawrence Kearney on the frigate *Constitution* won from the governor-general at Canton what amounted to a promise of most-favored-nation treatment for Americans in China. This principle, anticipating the U.S. Open Door policy toward China, was written into the Treaty of Wanghia (1844) secured by Caleb Cushing with support from the East India Squadron. Once China was opened under the "unequal treaties," the American navy's ships on the renamed Asiatic Station, including the famed Yangtze Patrol, were important props for the vast system of interlocking foreign treaty rights, including extraterritoriality, that Chinese nationalists bitterly resented.

The most spectacular demonstration of American naval diplomacy in the nineteenth century was the expedition led by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry to reopen Japan after two centuries of seclusion. Planning his expedition to impress the Japanese with the wealth and power of the United States, Perry first moved up Edo (Tokyo) Bay in July 1853 with a squadron of two steam frigates towing two sloops to present letters from President Millard Fillmore and himself urging the Japanese to modify their closed-country policy. Returning seven months later with a more impressive squadron, he induced the decrepit Tokugawa shogunate to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa, which met American demands for limited intercourse. Quite unwittingly, Perry proved to be the catalyst that unleashed a furious struggle within Japan, which led within fifteen years to the full reopening of the country, the overthrow of the Tokugawa, and the great changes of the Meiji Restoration.

To Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt fell the honor of opening the hermit kingdom of Korea to Americans. Korea was historically a Chinese tributary without desire for other intercourse. The expansionist Shufeldt embarked in 1878 on a much-publicized cruise to the Far East on the USS *Ticonderoga,* during which he mediated differences between Liberia and its neighbors, investigated sites for coaling stations in Africa, negotiated with the rulers of Madagascar and Johanna (Anjouan), and introduced the U.S. Navy to the Persian Gulf.

Shufeldt's ultimate objective was to open Korea, which he sought unsuccessfully to do through the good offices of Japan. On a return trip to the Far East, he finally negotiated a Korean treaty with China's leading scholar-official, Li Hung-chang, which the Koreans signed in 1882. Although the treaty established relations between the United States and Korea, it also proved to be a further blow to the Chinese tribute system without winning secure independence for Korea.

The Americas The U.S. Navy established stations embracing waters of the Americas where, in addition to showing the flag in support of trade, it watched for alien intrusions into the hemisphere and occasionally intervened in its troubled lands. The West Indies Station, created in 1821 to run down pirates infesting the area, was expanded to form the Home Station in 1841 (the North Atlantic Station after 1865), when strained relations with Great Britain reminded the navy that American coastal shipping was defenseless against raids from overseas. The navy operated its ships in the Caribbean throughout the nineteenth century in the presence of the more powerful British navy. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, proclaiming the American continent closed to further colonization, was initially rendered effective by tacit support from the Royal Navy. By the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, the United States won from Great Britain the right to participate on equal terms with the latter in building an isthmian canal at a time when the U.S. Navy was not yet dominant in the Caribbean.

South of the Caribbean was the Brazil Station, established in 1826 primarily to extend protection to Americans in feuding Brazil, Argentina, and the states of the Rio de la Plata. Usually numbering from two to six ships except during a crisis with Paraguay in 1858, the Brazil Station after 1843 included some 17 million square miles north from Cape Horn to the Amazon, eastward to Cape Negro, and then south along the African coast to the Cape of Good Hope. The station was reconstituted after the Civil War as the South Atlantic Station.

Largest and probably least well defined of the stations was the Pacific Station, dating from 1818. During the early years, the few ships on station tended to cruise between Callao, Peru, and Valparaiso, Chile, with occasional runs to Panama and to the Pacific islands: the Marquesas, Tahiti, Hawaii, and others. After the cession of California by Mexico in 1848, the focus of the station shifted northward, with San Francisco serving as home port. Although it was involved in spectacular crises with Chile in 1891, when Chilean sailors clashed with sailors from the USS *Baltimore* at Valparaiso, and with Germany over Samoa in 1889 and 1899, after the Civil War the navy's primary concern on the Pacific Station was the fate of the Hawaiian Islands. It habitually kept a ship at Honolulu, gave moral support to white planters against the native monarchy, acquired naval base rights at Pearl Harbor in 1887, and provided protective cover for the movement that led to American annexation of the islands in 1898.

Africa Most lonely of the distant stations was the African Station, created in 1843 after the United States agreed in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) to cooperate with Britain in suppressing the slave trade. Whereas the Royal Navy seized 594 ships suspected of slave running between 1840 and 1848, the few American ships on station captured but nineteen suspected runners between 1843 and 1857. Moreover, since before the Civil War the United States denied British warships even a limited right to visit American merchantmen, the illicit trade found shelter under the American flag.

THE SECOND PERIOD: 1890–1945

The "old navy" of wooden ships distributed to distant stations gave way in the late nineteenth century to the "new navy" of steel that operated in a world of great powers competing for empire. Men of the new navy strove to build fleets sufficiently powerful to guarantee the United States control of the sea within an American sphere that eventually embraced most of the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific. The period from about 1890 to 1945 also embraced the navy's battleship age, during which most American naval men and many civilians looked to a fleet of battleships (capital ships) as the key instrument for assuring the hegemony of the United States within its sphere and for promoting American diplomacy. From the appearance of his first major volume on sea power in 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan was preeminently the American naval writer who conceptualized a theory of sea power for the battleship age. Mahan was an economic determinist who held that national power derives from the flow of commerce through key maritime arteries protected by naval power. In emulation of the

British Empire, Mahan and his disciples conceived of an American naval line of empire protected by battle fleets and extending from the western Atlantic through the Caribbean and an isthmian canal to the Pacific and west.

Conspicuously absent during the battleship age was formal institutional provision for integrating American naval and diplomatic policies. President Theodore Roosevelt might himself serve as a one-man National Security Council, but the Navy Department and the State Department tended to plot their own courses with a minimum of exchange. Important for developing the naval officers' appreciation of their role in the world were such institutions as the Office of Naval Intelligence (1882), the Naval War College (1884), and the General Board (1900). Under the presidency of Admiral George Dewey, the General Board advised the secretary of the navy on a wide range of policies that touched foreign relations. The board's influence, however, gradually declined after the establishment in 1916 of the Office of Naval Operations, the navy's approach to a naval general staff. A step toward improved cooperation with the army was the creation in 1903 of the Joint Army and Navy Board, the often-ineffectual predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dewey's May Day victory at the outset of the Spanish-American War (1898) was perhaps inadvertently the navy's most significant act that contributed to American political commitment in the western Pacific. By the peace with Spain, the United States gained possession of the key positions of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, as well as control over Cuba. These island territories, together with Hawaii, Samoa, and the Panama Canal Zone (acquired in 1898, 1899, and 1903, respectively), included the prime sites for overseas bases that naval men wanted to support their imperial strategy up to World War II.

After the Spanish-American War, the navy followed a modified distant-stations policy in the Americas and the Far East while assembling its battle forces in the Atlantic and on the Asiatic Station. Although American naval men feared German aggression in the Caribbean, "the American Mediterranean," they also wanted a fleet in the Far East to support the Open Door in China. In 1906, however, all U.S. battleships were concentrated in a single battle fleet in the Atlantic, the area of the nation's greatest interests and of its vulnerability to German attack. It became a naval axiom that until the opening of the Panama Canal, the battleship fleet should be concentrated in one ocean so that its divided squadrons could not be defeated separately.

Spanish-American War to the 1920s From 1898 to World War I, the navy's Atlantic and Caribbean policies were to build a fortified isthmian canal under exclusive American control, to acquire bases for the canal's protection, and to deny the Western Hemisphere to outside aggressors. By the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, Britain released the United States to construct a wholly American canal without restriction as to fortifications. When Colombia failed to reach quick agreement on terms for a canal in its Panama territory, the navy in 1903 afforded cover for a revolt in the isthmus. Within fifteen days a new government of independent Panama accorded the United States a ten-mile-wide canal zone in perpetuity. For Caribbean bases, the General Board by 1903 had settled on two sites: Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, close to the Windward Passage, and a lesser base farther east, probably the island of Culebra, off Puerto Rico. While determined to prevent non-American nations from acquiring bases in the region, the board wanted the United States to take no more than the navy could defend. The navy and the marines also intervened in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in the Caribbean in support of the roles of debt collector and policeman that the United States assumed under the Platt Amendment relating to Cuba (1901) and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), in order to obviate interference by others. During the British and German blockade of Venezuela (1902), the United States concentrated in the Caribbean, under Admiral Dewey's command, the most powerful fleet ever assembled for maneuvers, another potent reminder that other nations must keep out.

In the Far East after 1898, American naval men initially conceived of the United States as one of a half-dozen naval powers competing in China. Their planning assumed that the maritime nations (Britain, the United States, and Japan) were committed to the Open Door in China, in opposition to the continental powers (Russia, France, and Germany). In addition to a main fleet base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, the General Board wanted an advanced base on the China coast, within easy steaming range of the European bases in northern Asiatic waters.

After Japan's triumph in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the American navy's outlook in the Pacific changed radically as Japan moved from

the position of sure friend to that of possible enemy. When Theodore Roosevelt ordered sixteen battleships of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific on the first lap of their spectacular world cruise in 1907, he was testing the navy's capacity to concentrate its power in the Pacific and reminding Japan and the world that the Pacific was an area of American naval responsibility. The navy also decided, in 1908–1909, to build its first major overseas Pacific base at Pearl Harbor rather than at Subic Bay, because the army insisted that it would be unable to hold the Philippine base against Japanese attack until the arrival of the battle fleet from the Atlantic. The navy's most important war plans on the eve of World War I were its Black Plan for defense of the Western Hemisphere against Germany and its Orange Plan for a war against Japan, precipitated by the immigration question or by Japanese aggression into China or the Philippines. Although the United States had no formal agreement with Britain, still the world's greatest naval power, there emerged before World War I a wholly informal system of naval power in which Britain built to contain the German navy while the United States strove for naval equality with Germany and decisive superiority over Britain's east Asian ally, Japan.

The ascent of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency in 1913 brought to the White House a leader determined to preserve civilian control over the conduct of foreign affairs but willing to employ the navy in war and diplomacy with utmost vigor. After the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Wilson administration was involved in acrimonious debates with Britain and Germany in defense of the cherished American principle of freedom of the seas. The tension of the war also moved the president to support the Naval Act of 1916, directed toward a navy second to none through the construction of ten battleships and six battle cruisers. This program would provide the United States with a powerful voice in diplomacy, whatever the outcome of the war.

Upon American entry into the war, the navy joined the Allies in a coalition wholly unpremeditated in its Black Plan and Orange Plan or its building programs. Conservatives in the navy, especially on the General Board, were reluctant to halt construction of capital ships so that American shipbuilding facilities could be devoted to building desperately needed antisubmarine and merchant craft. In addition to fearing that the United States might face greatly strengthened German and Japanese navies should the allies suffer defeat, these naval conservatives apparently were uncertain what policies Britain might adopt should the allies triumph too completely. It was to allay such anxieties, and thus to promote full U.S. naval participation in the war, that President Wilson's intimate adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, unsuccessfully sought from Britain an option on five British capital ships to meet postwar contingencies. The Navy Department finally halted its capital ship program in order to provide ways for submarine destroyers, and it reached an accord with the Japanese whereby the Imperial Japanese Navy watched the Pacific while the U.S. Navy concentrated on war in the Atlantic.

The allies' naval jealousies, subdued during the war, surfaced during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. British leaders saw President Wilson's call for freedom of the seas as a threat to the British Empire, and they strove unsuccessfully to prevent a resumption of building of American capital ships that might relegate the Royal Navy to second place. The naval advisers to the American delegation, on the other hand, opposed any division of the German navy likely to perpetuate British naval supremacy. For the American navy, however, the most significant act by the peace conference was its decision to award Germany's Pacific islands north of the equator to Japan as unfortified mandates of the League of Nations. Unfortified in Japanese hands, the islands would be open to a superior American fleet in a campaign against Japan. At the close of the war, U.S. naval representatives were prominent in the allied interventions in Russia and at Constantinople during the resurgence of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal.

The 1920s Britain, the United States, and Japan emerged from World War I as the three great naval powers. Whereas American naval authorities watched for any new evidence that Britain might attempt to retain its naval supremacy, they held as an article of faith that any new naval construction by Britain's ally Japan was directed against the United States. The General Board stated in 1921 that the United States should maintain a navy equal to the British and twice the Japanese. If the Anglo-Japanese alliance remained, however, the board wanted a navy equal to the combined British and Japanese navies. While the navy stationed the most powerful battle forces in the United States Fleet in the Pacific to guard against Orange (Japan), the estimates of naval war planners from 1919 to 1931 also dealt with possible wars against Red (Britain) or against a Red-Orange (Anglo-Japanese) coalition.

In 1921 civilian leaders in the United States, Britain, and Japan were united in their desire to avoid a ruinous naval race and to settle numerous Pacific questions unresolved by the Paris Peace Conference. At the nine-power Washington Conference called by the United States in 1921 to consider these issues, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes proposed a naval holiday and a limitation on the American, British, and Japanese navies at just half the levels recommended by the General Board. Hughes's plan was incorporated in the Five-Power Naval Treaty, which limited capital ships and aircraft carriers allowed the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy at a ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. At Japan's insistence, the three great naval powers also undertook, in article XIX of the treaty, to refrain from building new bases and fortifications from which their fleets could menace each other's vital territories in the Pacific. The United States thus abandoned new naval shore construction west of Hawaii, such as the proposed base on Guam that could serve the fleet in operations against Japan. The Washington naval agreements were part of a package settlement that included the Four-Power Treaty to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China, and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The statesmen at Washington sought a new naval order that would provide security for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire from the United Kingdom to Singapore, and Japan in the western Pacific. The Five-Power Naval Treaty, however, failed to limit lesser naval categories: cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The three-power Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 broke down when British and American naval men were unable to agree on cruisers. Japan and Britain, meanwhile, built ships in the unrestricted classes more rapidly than did the United States; and Japanese naval men at the London Naval Conference of 1930 demanded a 10:10:7 ratio rather than a 10:10:6 (5:5:3) ratio in cruisers. As at Washington, the delegations at London overrode vigorous opposition from their services; and the resulting naval treaty in theory preserved the 10:10:6 ratio in heavy cruisers but in substance promised Japan higher ratios in the lesser classes through the life of the naval treaties (1936). The bitterness provoked in the Japanese navy contributed significantly to the collapse of naval limitation after 1931.

The 1930s The Washington naval system crumbled after Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931–1932. While the American and British governments were unprepared to halt Japan by force, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson looked to the navy to deter Japanese aggression. After Japanese naval forces landed at Shanghai in 1932, Stimson publicly warned that since the Washington agreements were interdependent, a violation of a political accord, such as the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China, would nullify other Washington agreements, such as the American promise to desist from building bases in the western Pacific. The U.S. Fleet was concentrated for maneuvers off Hawaii in 1932, and Stimson induced President Herbert Hoover thereafter to retain the entire fleet in the Pacific as a warning to Japan.

Stimson's gestures proved futile. The ratio of American and Japanese naval strength in the early 1930s probably approximated 10:8, rather than 10:6, and the "fleet faction" in the Japanese navy forced the Tokyo government in 1934 to seek a common upper limit (naval parity) with the United States and Britain. The intransigent Japanese stand drove the Americans and the British to unite in defense of the 10:10:6 ratio at the preliminary and main London Naval Conferences called in 1934 and 1935 to review the naval treaties. The Japanese left the second conference, and effective naval limitation ended with the expiration of the treaties in 1936.

During the London conferences, British and U.S. naval officers established cordial relations that paved the way for increasing intimacy between their services as they faced the rising threats from Germany and Italy in Europe and from Japan after the outbreak of the China incident in 1937. Only days after Japanese aircraft sank the USS *Panay* in December 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent the navy's war plans director to London for consultations with the Admiralty during which a plan was drawn for possible joint action against Japan by an American fleet operating from Hawaii and a British fleet based in Singapore. This scheme was modified in 1939, when Britain was prevented by the Axis menace in Europe from undertaking powerful action against Japan. Admiral William D. Leahy, American chief of naval operations, then volunteered that, should a war break out in Europe to which the United States was not a party, the U.S. Fleet would assemble at Pearl Harbor to deter Japan. Should the United States be associated with Britain in war against the Axis and Japan, Leahy expected the American navy to care for the Pacific while the British navy would be responsi-

ble for the Atlantic. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, the Joint Army and Navy Board had already begun work on five Rainbow Plans for war situations involving the United States and the European democracies against the Axis powers and Japan.

World War II After the fall of France in June 1940, the U.S. Navy was party to a succession of measures short of war to prevent the collapse of Britain, to prepare for war in two oceans either alone or in association with the British Empire, to deter Japan in the Pacific, and to enlist Canada and the Latin American states in Western Hemisphere defense. In September 1940, Britain and the United States concluded an arrangement by which Britain granted the United States bases in British possessions in the western Atlantic in return for fifty American destroyers to be used against German submarines. This limited American naval assistance to Britain swelled in 1941, after Congress approved the lend-lease bill, American navy yards were open to British warships for repair, and the navy began patrolling the western Atlantic against German submarines.

In August 1940 representatives from the Navy Department and the Admiralty entered into urgent consultations on how the navy could best help in the war. After Japan, Germany, and Italy concluded the Berlin Pact in September 1940, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, prepared his famous Plan Dog memorandum for a two-ocean war in which British and U.S. forces would seek victory over the Axis in the Atlantic before turning to defeat Japan in the Pacific. This memorandum was the basis for the detailed ABC-1 Plan, drawn up during Anglo-American staff talks at Washington in February and March 1941. In line with this plan, the United States shifted about one-third of its battleships to the Atlantic in order to release British units for service in the Far East.

It was with gravely weakened naval forces in the Pacific that the Roosevelt administration in July 1941 finally turned to halt Japanese aggression by enlisting Britain and the Netherlands to freeze Japanese assets under their control, thereby terminating Japanese trade with the world outside East Asia. The United States and its associates thus sought to bring Japan to terms by cutting off the flow of oil and other materials vital to the Japanese economy through a distant blockade supported by naval forces divided and inferior to those of the Japanese. Facing the immobilization of their forces as their supplies ran out, Japanese leaders, including those of the Japanese navy, opted for war that closed the battleship age.

During the immediate prewar and war years, Franklin Roosevelt, as had his cousin Theodore, drew the integration of naval and diplomatic policies into his own hands. The State-War-Navy Liaison Committee established in 1938 was largely confined to Latin American affairs and lesser matters. After the president moved the Joint Army and Navy Board into the new executive offices in 1939, the military chiefs increasingly participated in foreign affairs without necessary reference to their service secretaries or even the State Department. Indeed, during World War II, the State Department repeatedly bowed to service interests; naval officers and other military men negotiated directly with foreign governments; and the military chiefs accompanied the president to summit meetings to which the secretary of state was not invited. It was only a year before the war's end that the State Department was restored somewhat to decision making in foreign affairs with the establishment of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to prepare for peace. In 1942 the chief of naval operations joined with American army and air force chiefs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provided institutional partners for the British chiefs in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who determined war strategy under the watchful eyes of President Roosevelt and of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Cooperation with the British in coalition war was important preparation for naval men when they turned to work for what amounted to a coalition peace.

1945–1975

The thirty years following the end of World War II in 1945 witnessed political, institutional, and technological changes that revolutionized the navy's role in diplomacy. In 1945 American naval officers had not yet devised a strategy geared to the atomic bomb, to a divided world in which the United States was for a time without a naval rival, and to the passing of battleship fleets as a measure of naval and national power. Insofar as they had speculated on the postwar world, they tended to assume a return to a division of responsibility in which the U.S. Navy would dominate the western Atlantic and the Pacific while the British navy would remain supreme in Eastern Hemisphere waters: the eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean,

and the Indian Ocean. The navy's one clear objective during the war was to secure the Pacific islands that Japan had held since World War I as League of Nations mandates. The navy was soon confronted, however, by the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Chinese communist victory on the Asian mainland in 1949, and the steady retreat by Britain to Europe that left the United States increasingly alone to deal with the supposed global menace of the Soviet Union and its allies. Moreover, whereas the navy had been the strong arm of American diplomacy through most of the nation's history, the air force emerged at the dawn of the atomic age to claim for the bombers of its Strategic Air Command the preponderant responsibility for deterring war.

The period from 1945 to 1950 was a critical one for the navy, during which the service sought meaningful roles in response to claims made by the air force in the course of the movement to organize a single Defense Department. The navy survived the unification struggle as one part of the new national security structure in which the State Department and the Defense Department were institutional equals. Under the National Defense Act of 1947 and amendments of 1949, the chief of naval operations became but one of five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman conveys the chiefs' collective advice to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. When the service secretaries lost their cabinet rank in 1949, the navy was denied separate representation on the National Security Council, the key institution responsible for integrating diplomacy and defense into national security policies. The civilian secretary of defense thereafter represented all the services in the council: the army, the navy, the air force, and, after 1978, the marines. Nevertheless, naval officers after 1945 served in unprecedented numbers in politico-military bodies concerned with foreign affairs.

While the navy thus lost its proud position as the leading force behind American diplomacy, it fought for programs of balanced defense against the claims by the air force that the threat of massive retaliation by the Strategic Air Command constituted the most effective deterrent to Soviet aggression. The navy's arguments for a variety of weapons were fully vindicated after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 demonstrated the effectiveness of carrier-based air and other capabilities in a limited war unsuited to massive retaliation with atomic bombs. This was a war provoked by an attack by communist North Korea on noncommunist South Korea. It was a war fought by Americans, Koreans, and allied forces under the auspices of the United Nations without a formal declaration of war. It also halted the spread of communism in Northeast Asia. The glamour of massive retaliation faded still more as the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic device in 1949, achieved a thermonuclear explosion five years later, fired the first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957, and launched the first artificial satellite (*Sputnik*) two months later.

To support friends and allies as well as to deter the Soviet Union, naval planners developed a transoceanic naval strategy to project the navy's power over the land and to keep the sea-lanes open. The fleets of the transoceanic navy, like the task forces of World War II, were commonly mixed forces that included two or three carriers, an amphibious marine force, and antisubmarine units. Most spectacular for display were the supercarriers, numbering fifteen in the 1960s and ranging up to 100,000 tons, whose versatile weapons could deal with local outbreaks or convey nuclear destruction to the heart of the Eurasian landmass. Responding to the Soviet Union's missile capability, the navy after 1960 also completed forty-one nuclear-powered submarines armed with Polaris and improved long-range Poseidon and Trident missiles carrying atomic warheads. The navy claimed that its mobile, seaborne forces were far more secure against Soviet attack than the land-based bombers and missiles of the air force.

Together with the army and air force, the transoceanic navy provided the American commitment of force to the multilateral regional pacts, bilateral alliances, and other arrangements through which the United States sought to organize the nations of the free world. Since western Europe seemed the most vital area to save from Soviet domination, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, assumed prime importance in American strategic planning. Through NATO the navy sought to expand its earlier "special relationship" with the British navy into a multilateral association in which the American navy provided important leadership and the largest commitment of naval force to retain control of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The NATO supreme commander for the Atlantic is the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, based with his NATO staff at Norfolk, Virginia. The NATO powers preserve independent control of their most important naval forces, from which

they contribute elements for NATO maneuvers and for a small standing force. In the Far East, when concluding peace with Japan in 1951, the United States also signed with Japan a mutual defense pact, which assured a base of operations in the western Pacific. Unlike the navies of Europe, however, the Japanese Defense Force was committed strictly to the defense of Japan.

The most visible American naval contribution to European security was the Sixth Fleet, established in the Mediterranean since 1948. In addition to its earlier role as a major segment in the maritime artery between Europe and Asia, the Mediterranean gained significance after 1945 as a deep inlet into which the United States could move naval power 2,000 miles eastward from the Atlantic, to within striking distance of the Russian homeland. It was also a sea from which the navy could support friends and allies on NATO's southern flank and in the Middle East, as well as a moat separating Europe from Africa. The United States first restored a naval presence in the Mediterranean in 1946–1947, when the Soviet Union pressed Turkey to open the Dardanelles to free movement by Soviet ships and when President Harry Truman extended assistance to Greece under the Truman Doctrine. The Sixth Fleet has commonly numbered more than fifty ships, including two supercarriers organized to meet the needs of a transoceanic navy. Its position in the Mediterranean became increasingly lonely, however, with the withdrawal of British naval power after the Suez Crisis of 1956, the spectacular buildup of Soviet naval forces in the 1960s, and the growing hostility among the Arab states that looked for Soviet aid to counter American support of Israel. In 1958, the Sixth Fleet, in response to a request from the president of Lebanon, landed a force in Beirut, which seemed to be threatened by domestic insurgency and foreign invasion.

The Seventh Fleet became the navy's Far East counterpart to the Sixth Fleet. At the close of World War II, the navy and the marines helped the Chinese Nationalists receive the Japanese surrender in eastern China, but U.S. forces withdrew from the Chinese mainland in advance of the communist victory in 1949. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, voicing recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined an American defense perimeter in the western Pacific, extending from Alaska through Japan, for whose defense the Seventh Fleet would assume major responsibility. Acheson's omission of Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia suggested that the United States was disengaging from the Asian mainland. American participation in the Korean War in 1950, however, demonstrated that the U.S. government would employ its naval and other forces to counter aggression on the mainland that threatened a key area on the American defense perimeter such as Japan, which after 1949 replaced China as the most important U.S. partner in East Asia.

The Korean War also brought the first public American commitment to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, when President Truman in 1950 ordered the Seventh Fleet to interpose its power between Taiwan and the mainland, to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, and to prevent the Chinese communists and the nationalists from attacking each other across the strait. After the United States and the Chinese Nationalists signed a mutual defense treaty in 1954, the Seventh Fleet provided massive cover in 1954 for the Nationalist evacuation from the Tachen Islands and again in 1958 for Nationalist logistic operations to sustain their garrisons defending the islands of Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese communist bombardments. During the relatively placid year of 1961, the Seventh Fleet included some 125 ships and 650 aircraft based at Subic Bay, Okinawa, and Japan. When formal relations were established with the communist government in Peking in 1979, relations between Taiwan and the United States were maintained quietly on an extradiplomatic basis. The United States provided Taiwan with arms and ships, and the Seventh Fleet remained an important presence in the western Pacific. South of Taiwan lay a former colony and ally, the Philippine Islands, where the United States retained its important naval base at Subic Bay until all American naval and military facilities were returned to the Philippines in 1992.

Although the Seventh Fleet's commitments to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization under the Manila Treaty of 1954 were unclear, the United States in 1962 landed marines in Thailand to deter communist infiltration from neighboring Laos. The fleet also fought in the Vietnam War after Congress, in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964), authorized the president to employ American armed forces in defense of freedom in southeast Asia. With the winding down of the war after 1969, the Seventh Fleet resumed its station in defense of a western Pacific perimeter.

Between the normal cruising ranges of the Sixth Fleet and the Seventh Fleet, the Indian Ocean area, including the oil-rich Persian Gulf, remained free of a significant American naval presence after

1945. Responding to growing Soviet naval forces in the ocean during the 1960s, however, the navy occasionally dispatched units from the Seventh Fleet to show the flag and to participate in Central Treaty Organization maneuvers. After 1966 the navy also joined with Britain to construct a communications station, landing fields, and other amenities on the British island of Diego Garcia.

Three decades after World War II, the navy was again adjusting to major world changes as the Cold War confrontations gave way to bitter rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese communist camps, détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and accommodations between Washington and Peking. Even as the United States and the Soviet Union moved to limit their atomic arsenals, including their seaborne missile forces, through accords at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, however, American naval men watched the emergence of the Soviet navy as a contender on the high seas and the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. The modest easing of tensions between the United States and the communist world, therefore, was followed by no lowering of the American naval guard. Indeed, the thaw in the Cold War was overshadowed in many areas of the world by the emergence of strong regional sentiment hostile to the United States and to any American naval presence. While the navy still strove to provide global force sufficient to honor security arrangements negotiated two decades earlier, when conditions were very different, it was increasingly regarded in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and even Europe as an agent of outside interference rather than as a protection.

The navy's responsibility during the Cold War, however, was not confined to the Old World. In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro, after winning power in Cuba, threatened to export communism to his Latin American neighbors. President John F. Kennedy in 1961 inherited from the Eisenhower administration a Central Intelligence Agency project to support an invasion of Cuba by Cuban refugees. The consequence was the so-called Bay of Pigs incident, which was a humiliating failure, at least in part because the administration was unwilling to provide the refugees with necessary naval and air support. This was followed the next year by discovery that the Soviet Union had built in Cuba some forty-two launching pads for intermediate ballistic missiles with striking range of more than 1,000 miles. President Kennedy immediately responded by ordering the navy to establish a blockade of Cuba, described as a "quarantine," to halt arms shipments to Cuba and demanding that the Russians withdraw all missiles from the island. It seemed that nuclear war was at hand, but the Russians bowed to the president's demand in return for a promise to withdraw American missiles from Turkey.

Close on the heels of the Cuban missile crisis came war in Vietnam. There, following the withdrawal of the French from their former colony, the Americans became increasingly concerned that noncommunist South Vietnam would fall to communist North Vietnam. When President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, U.S. "military advisers" numbered 16,700. Large-scale U.S. intervention was sparked the following year by a clash between the American destroyer *Maddox* and several North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. The U.S. Congress forthwith adopted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take "all necessary measures to repel armed attacks against the armed forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The Vietnam War was an undeclared war fought without United Nations support and subject to increasing public criticism in the United States and abroad. It was also a war limited by American unwillingness to provoke serious intervention by China or the Soviet Union. Task Force 77, composed of carrier forces attached to Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf and Dixie Station off South Vietnam, sent strikes against North Vietnam and supported ground forces in the south. Search patrols along the southern coast sought to interrupt movement of supplies from the north to insurgent Vietcong in the south, and numerous small boats of a "brown water" patrol moved through the Mekong Delta and along other inland waters to apprehend the Vietcong. The Vietcong Tet Offensive in 1968, although itself a failure, was followed a year later by President Richard Nixon's decision to "Vietnamize" the war. The last Americans and numerous Vietnamese refugees were airlifted out of Saigon in 1975, thereby ending perhaps the most humiliating war in American history.

In 1970, when Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was called from Vietnam to Washington to serve as the youngest chief of naval operations in history, the navy was in poor shape to meet the possible challenges ahead. The nation's resources had been expended on the Vietnam War, while the Soviet navy, under the leadership of Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, had been expanded to establish awesome capacity to operate in multiple seas.

Moreover, three years earlier, Britain had abandoned its imperial responsibilities east of Suez. To meet this situation, Zumwalt proposed a "high-low mix" by which the navy would build large numbers of less expensive "low" ships to assure "sea control" of areas where expensive "high" ships were unnecessary or would be in danger. For instance, he proposed to build a patrol frigate, half the cost and size of a destroyer, and a 17,000-ton sea control ship that would be far less expensive than the 100,000-ton supercarriers. His proposals were vigorously opposed by Admiral Hyman Rickover, the promoter of nuclear submarines and other high-tech ships, and Zumwalt's sea control ship was eventually rejected by Congress. The navy may also have suffered from the diversions that attended the resignation of President Nixon following the Watergate scandal. The decade ended with the embarrassing capture of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, by Islamic radicals and the Soviet naval ships operating out of Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam.

1975–2000

The outlook for the navy and naval diplomacy improved with the arrival of President Ronald Reagan's energetic young secretary of the navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who with forceful chiefs of naval operations (Admirals Thomas Hayward and James Watkins) pressed for an aggressive "maritime strategy" supported by a 600-ship navy composed of fifteen supercarriers, four battleships called back into service, 100 attack submarines, a powerful marine amphibious force, and numerous lesser craft. The program would increase by 20 percent the navy's combat ships over those in 1980. This aggressive strategy, however, did not rule out lesser actions to keep the Third World in proper order, such as the capture of the small island of Grenada (1983), a disastrous landing in Lebanon that ended with the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut (1982–1983), clearing mines from the Red Sea, protecting Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, denying with naval air Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's attempt to close the Gulf of Sidra (1986), the capture of Panamanian strongman General Manuel A. Noriega on charges of drug trafficking, and much more.

The decade of the 1990s was as revolutionary for the navy and naval diplomacy as had been the 1890s following the publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power on History* and the shift of the navy from wood and sail to steel and steam. The 1990s opened with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the freeing of the nations of Eastern Europe to join the Western powers, and the disappearance of the Soviet navy as a serious challenge to the U.S. Navy on the high seas. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, this left the United States claiming to be the sole superpower, NATO deprived of much of its original reason for being, and the navy in need of either a greatly revised strategy or a wholly new strategy. All this and more can be summed up by the statement that the Cold War had ended. It ended as the navy was adding such high-tech innovations as the Aegis air defense system, new Ticonderoga-class cruisers that carry long-range Tomahawk missiles, Ohio-class submarines mounting improved Trident missiles, and much more.

The navy's new strategy substituted "power from the sea" for the older "control of the sea" or "sea control." Since the majority of the world's population lives within fifty miles of the sea, the navy developed a littoral mission by which it would mount "power from the sea" to control the world's coasts as well as dispatch terrible destruction deep into the interior. The new strategy assumed that the oceans were safe and that the navy, by attacking the land "from the sea" would prepare for unopposed amphibious landings by the marines and the army.

The new era opened in early 1991 with the outbreak of the Gulf War in which Iraq attempted to annex the neighboring Persian Gulf state of Kuwait, a move that threatened the stability of the strategically vital, oil-producing region of the Middle East. Like the Korean War, the Gulf War sparked a United Nations response in which the United States provided by far the largest land and sea forces. At the height of the conflict, 130 American naval ships were joined by 50 allied ships in a multinational naval force. The marines contributed 92,000 officers and service personnel, the largest marine operation in history. The United States initially reacted by concentrating six supercarriers in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and enough marines to afford protection for Saudi Arabia until the arrival of reinforcements, largely army, to turn the tide and drive the Iraqis from Kuwait. The navy and the marines also assembled an amphibious force in the gulf to prevent the Iraqis from evacuating Kuwait and joining the main battle of Operation Desert Storm. After the war the navy provided forces to enforce UN punitive sanctions against Iraq.

The vital importance of this region that holds 70 percent of the world's oil reserves was reorganized in 1994 by the establishment of a new Fifth Fleet whose water areas included the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Gulf. The Fifth Fleet was subject to the Central Command, located in Tampa, Florida, whose theater of operations extended inland to Central Asia. The fleet in January 2001 comprised seventeen ships, including a carrier group, and 7,700 marines with support facilities at Bahrain within the Persian Gulf and at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The bombing of the destroyer *Cole* in Yemen in 2000 was a very sharp reminder of the religious, drug, and other terrorist groups that the navy works with others to oppose.

By far the most powerful of the American fleets on distant stations at the turn of the twenty-first century was the Seventh Fleet, whose area embraced the western Pacific, especially East Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Notwithstanding the practical disappearance of Russian naval power, the Seventh Fleet in 2001 numbered fifty-one ships, including two carriers, and 29,000 sailors and marines mostly operating out of Japanese home ports. China was probably the most unpredictable major power in the area, and the troubled relations between China and Taiwan remained potentially dangerous. The Seventh Fleet lost important shore support with the return of the Subic Bay naval base to the Philippines and British restoration of Hong Kong to China. Numerous exchanges between the American and Chinese high commands to promote understanding were seriously jeopardized by Chinese outrage following the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo. A port call by the U.S. cruiser *Chancellorsville* at Tsingtao in August 2000 brought public expressions from both sides that seemed to be evidence of a desire to return to stability.

With the passing of the Soviet Union, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean lost one of its principal justifications. Its ships in January 2001 were down to fifteen, with no carrier representation. The eastern Mediterranean in particular included a number of potential trouble spots within the range of the navy's littoral strategy. Among these was the disintegrating Yugoslav state, which was a NATO concern, and therefore an American one. The ethnic feuds climaxed in the Kosovo war of 1999, during which American carrier air provided perhaps 50 percent of the guidance and support missions for the air force.

From 1794, when Congress voted for the construction of the first six frigates, the United States Navy was a prime support for American diplomacy as the nation's interests changed and expanded. During the nineteenth century, the navy was employed principally to show the flag on distant stations where pirates and potentates were not always respectful toward American missionaries and merchants. After 1890, as the United States came to claim the rank of a great power, the navy concentrated on building fleets to dominate the western Atlantic and the Pacific. The battleship age ended with World War II, from which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union emerged as victors. After 1945, as the British Empire gradually came to an end, the U.S. Navy's role in the Cold War was dictated by the American determination to halt the spread of Soviet power and communism. The demise of the Soviet Union left the United States and the navy committed to helping in the solution of regional problems throughout the world. The United States, as in the nineteenth century, continued to follow a sort of distant-stations policy. Although Americans would deny that they aimed to form an American empire, American power inevitably provoked such protesting acts at the end of the twentieth century as the attack on the USS *Cole* off Yemen, the demands of Okinawans that U.S. forces withdraw, and New Zealand's quest for a nuclear-free South Pacific.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albion, Robert G. "Distant Stations." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 80 (1954). The most useful brief survey of the distant-stations policy.

Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990.* Stanford, Calif., 1994. A fine general survey with much material on naval diplomacy.

Braisted, William Reynolds. *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909.* Austin, Tex., 1958.

———. *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922.* Austin, Tex., 1972. This and the previous volume are concerned chiefly with the navy's relation to American diplomacy in eastern Asia from the Spanish-American War through the Washington Conference.

Buckley, Thomas H. *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1970. A monograph on the major naval conference following World War I.

Challener, Richard D. *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914.* Princeton, N.J., 1973. A magnificently documented study of the relation of both the army and the navy to American diplomacy from the Spanish-American War to World War I.

Davis, Vincent. *The Admirals' Lobby.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967. Deals with institutions, planning, and politics of the navy during the twentieth century.

Field, James A., Jr. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969. Includes the best treatment of the navy in the Mediterranean during the distant-stations era.

Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War.* Annapolis, Md., 2000. A fine survey of the Cold War by a distinguished writer on naval matters.

George, James L. *The U.S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1980s.* Boulder, Colo., 1985. A collection of essays dealing with the navy during the Reagan presidency.

Hagan, Kenneth J. *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889.* Westport, Conn., 1973. Concerns Commodore Shufeldt's cruise on the USS *Ticonderoga.*

———. *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power.* New York, 1991. A fine survey with much material on naval diplomacy.

Howarth, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991.* London, 1991. A useful survey that places the navy in world affairs.

Johnson, Robert Erwin. *Thence Round Cape Horn: The Story of United States Naval Forces on Pacific Station, 1818–1923.* Annapolis, Md., 1963. The best survey of the first century of American naval diplomacy in the eastern Pacific.

O'Connor, Raymond Gish. *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930.* Lawrence, Kans., 1962. The most complete study of the conference, based on American archival materials.

Paullin, Charles Oscar. *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778–1883.* Baltimore, 1922. A pioneer work that has never been completely replaced.

Pelz, Stephen E. *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II.* Cambridge, Mass., 1974. Views the naval approach to Pearl Harbor through British, American, and Japanese sources.

Pokrant, Marvin. *Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did.* Westport, Conn., 1999. A view of the navy in the Gulf War.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918.* Princeton, N.J., 1946.

———. *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922.* Princeton, N.J., 1946. This work and *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918* are the classic surveys of the navy's history through the Washington Conference, including illuminating comments on naval diplomacy.

Sweetman, Jack. *American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775–Present.* 2d ed. Annapolis, Md., 1991. Strictly a chronology of events without interpretation.

Trask, David F. *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918.* Columbia, Mo., 1972. A superb multiarchival study of Anglo-American naval cooperation during World War I.

Tuleja, Thaddeus V. *Statesmen and Admirals: Quest for a Far Eastern Policy.* New York, 1963. A survey of the navy in the Far East from 1931 to 1941.

Walworth, Arthur. *Black Ships off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition.* New York, 1946. A good-humored account of the navy's most important diplomatic venture in the nineteenth century.

Wheeler, Gerald E. *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931.* Columbia, Mo., 1963. The standard study of the navy in eastern Asia during the decade before the Manchurian incident.

Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. *On Watch: A Memoir.* New York, 1976. A rewarding memoir by one of the most gifted American admirals of the Cold War years.

See also BLOCKADES; THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; EXTRATERRITORIALITY; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; IMPERIALISM; PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

NEUTRALISM

T. Michael Ruddy

The term "neutralism" is not new to the lexicon of international relations, but in the Cold War world, divided into two competing blocs, this word assumed new meaning. For its first century and a half as a nation, the United States, under the guise of isolationism, practiced its own form of neutralism, shunning political and military involvement with the European powers and invoking its neutrality according to international law in wartime. The appeal of neutrality persisted into the 1930s, as the United States anticipated possible involvement in World War II. But those were different times. There was no Cold War, and the United States was not a superpower. While America's earlier neutralism bore a resemblance to the Cold War variety, some important distinctions set the two apart.

The Cold War, defined not only in terms of a political rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union but also in terms of a conflict between Soviet communism and Western democratic capitalism, provided the context for this new form of neutralism. This ideological rivalry dated to the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution, but during World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union put aside their ideological differences and joined in a common cause to defeat Hitler. In the aftermath of that conflict, the animosity soon resurfaced as disputes over the postwar settlement escalated. The two powers ultimately abandoned cooperation and turned to consolidating control within their respective spheres. By 1947, containment defined America's postwar policy toward the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), an alliance intended to thwart Soviet aggression, institutionalized this containment and defined the western bloc. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was consolidating its control over the eastern bloc.

Not all European states, however, presumed that their national interests would be served by associating with this alliance system. Sweden, situated on Europe's strategically important northern flank, and Austria, bordering the Soviet bloc, are notable examples. To them, neutralism had a definite appeal. Their decision to assume an independent position created complications for U.S. foreign relations. Policymakers in Washington particularly worried that neutralism might tempt America's allies and erode the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance.

Compounding their apprehension were developments in the Third World. As the former European colonial empires slowly crumbled, many newly independent states opted for nonalignment, often with the intention of exploiting the Soviet-American rivalry to secure economic assistance from both sides. The 1955 gathering of twenty-nine nonaligned nations at Bandung, Indonesia, combined with a concerted effort by the Soviet Union to curry favor with these states, underlined the necessity for the United States to follow a well-considered approach to neutralism.

In the years after World War II, an understanding of the causes, intentions, and goals of neutralism slowly evolved within policymaking circles that would guide America's relationship with these states. The administration of President Harry Truman initially resisted neutralism, considering it a hindrance to western security. Only reluctantly, after officials realized that the neutrals would not be dissuaded from their chosen course, did Washington begin to pursue an accommodation with neutralism. The administration of President Dwight Eisenhower, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, grasped the advantages and drawbacks of this third force and endeavored to implement a policy toward neutralism that would benefit Western interests. But often Cold War considerations intruded to muddle relations with the neutrals, particularly in the Third World. Despite the more sophisticated worldview of President John F. Kennedy and his advisers, and their appreciation of the unique circum-

stances faced by the Third World, in practice they deviated little from the approach of their predecessors. The framework for the U.S.-neutral relationship that would survive through the Cold War was in place by the 1960s.

U.S. policy toward neutralism met with mixed results. In western Europe, the neutral states, despite their aversion to alliances, shared a common political, social, and economic heritage with the United States and its European allies. U.S. policy thus successfully fostered a relationship that to a great extent accommodated neutral interests while furthering America's Cold War goals. In the case of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia's adoption of neutralism offered an opportunity to weaken Soviet control within its own orbit. But contrary to the hopes of policymakers, neutralism did not spread further in the Soviet bloc. Finally, Washington often misunderstood the forces of nationalism in the Third World. America's ties to many of the former colonial powers created friction with the newly independent states and opened opportunities for the Soviet Union. The United States encouraged neutralism when it fit American interests, but opposed it when it went counter to these interests. Often, this opposition was counterproductive. It antagonized Third World nationalism and drove these states closer to the Soviet Union.

By the time the expanding conflict in Vietnam consumed America's attention in the mid-1960s, neutralism had established itself as a force to be reckoned with. As Washington struggled to extricate itself from that costly Asian war and then as it tried to reduce Cold War tensions through a détente policy, the neutrals had to be factored into the equation. The neutrals exerted an important influence, often serving as political or diplomatic bridges between the competing Cold War blocs. They recognized that it was in their interest to work toward a solution to the Cold War.

DEFINING COLD WAR NEUTRALISM

At a June 1956 news conference, when the topic of neutralism came up, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded by noting that for 150 years the United States itself had been neutral. He then declared that "neutral" now meant avoiding any attachment to military alliances, and that "this [did] not necessarily mean . . . neutral as between right and wrong or between decay and decency." In equating America's past tradition with the neutral stance of 1956, the president exhibited a sympathy and understanding of this "third force" not always associated with his administration. The 150-year commitment to which he referred evoked two distinct but interrelated facets of how the United States defined its neutrality in the past—first, the legal status of a neutral state in time of war, and, second, the response to George Washington's admonition in his Farewell Address to "avoid entangling alliances." The traditional legal concept of neutrality, which had evolved in international law during the past century through treaty, court cases, and precedent, was codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907. These conventions recognized the legal status of a nonbelligerent state in time of war and prescribed the rights and obligations of a nation in its relations with belligerent states. During its formative years, the United States adhered to—indeed, became a champion of—these principles of neutrality. The principles of freedom of the seas and the right to trade with belligerents in time of war appealed to a fledgling nation focused on establishing its economic stability, which was so important to ensuring its viability as a nation. Even as the United States was becoming a major power in the twentieth century, it was hesitant to abandon neutrality. For three years before its 1917 entry into World War I, President Woodrow Wilson asserted America's neutral rights. And during the 1930s, encouraged particularly by a Congress and a public intent upon staying out of another conflict emerging in Europe, once again the United States declared its neutrality until events inexorably brought the country into the conflict at the end of 1941.

Besides this neutrality defined by international law, Eisenhower in his remarks also referred to another aspect of America's earlier policies that was more akin to postwar neutralism. In 1796, President George Washington in his Farewell Address warned Americans to avoid entangling alliances. At the time, war threatened to engulf Europe. The United States, which had signed an alliance with France in 1778, feared being drawn into a European conflict that did not serve its national interests. It abrogated that treaty by 1800, and for a century and a half thereafter assiduously avoided political and military entanglements with Europe.

In international affairs, America entered a period of what many historians describe as isolationism. In effect, the United States assumed a

neutralist position. Yet this neutralism was not a total rejection of international involvement. The United States pursued opportunities for trade, protected in time of conflict by the neutral rights supposedly guaranteed by international law, and the independence its neutral position afforded, provided opportunities to exploit the rivalry among the European powers to America's benefit.

America's status changed dramatically after World War II. As a major power, it could not return to its former neutral position. In fact, it now confronted a neutralism, first in Europe and then in the Third World, that exhibited many of the characteristics of the neutralism it had practiced for so many years.

After World War II, the legally defined neutrality in wartime was irrelevant in the new environment of the Cold War. The more traditional European neutrals, such as Switzerland and Sweden, had used this neutrality as a basis for their status. But like earlier U.S. neutralism, this new neutralism was more political than legal. In most cases, nations that espoused neutralism did so freely. In a few notable cases, however, external pressure influenced their choice. All neutrals refused to commit to alliances and distanced themselves from the power blocs dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. As Peter Lyon notes in his study *Neutralism*, "By neutrality is meant non-involvement in war, while by neutralism is meant non-involvement in *the* Cold War." Neutralism was a state of mind shared by a segment of Europe's and the world's population. Neutral sentiment existed in nations allied with the United States as well as in the neutral states themselves. As was the case with the United States during its early history, neutralist states determined that their national interest would best be served by not choosing sides in the great power conflict.

But Cold War neutralism, unlike that of the United States in the nineteenth century, was not isolationist. It was what political scientists call positive neutralism. Neutral states consciously exercised their status as a third force between the power blocs to further their national interests. Like the United States in the nineteenth century, this included promoting their economic and commercial cause. But positive neutralism went further. Through political involvement, especially in international organizations, neutrals exerted an influence on international affairs. They played a role as bridge-builders to span the gap between the Cold War rivals.

Neutralism presented an appealing option for those who had misgivings about subordinating their nation's sovereignty to the policies of the United States or the Soviet Union. Concern that the North Atlantic Treaty might just lead to such an eventuality at times fueled an attraction to neutralism even among some of America's traditionally closest allies. As late as 1948, political factions in Great Britain considered pursuing a "third way," which they defined as a bloc of western European states and their former colonies that would assume an independent position between the United States and the Soviet Union, to reduce British dependence on the United States. The term "neutralism" itself first came into vogue in the late 1940s in France, where it signified a state of mind that questioned whether French national interests would be served by subordinating French independence to American leadership.

The desire for U.S. economic assistance and a growing apprehension about the Soviet political and military threat ultimately trumped neutralism's appeal in Britain and France. But some of Europe's smaller states did embrace neutralism. Each of these states constructed its own distinct style of neutralism, defined in terms that served its own national interests. Switzerland and Sweden had a long tradition of neutrality that they had maintained throughout World War II and firmly guarded in the Cold War. Finland and Austria to differing degrees represented neutralism coerced. Finland, defeated and forced to deal with its victorious Soviet neighbor, tried to preserve as much of its independence as possible by signing the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which bound it to resist any attack on the Soviet Union. Austria, like Germany occupied by the Allies after World War II, accepted the status of neutrality as a prerequisite for the 1955 Austrian State Treaty that ended the occupation of its territory and restored its autonomy.

The Soviet bloc was not immune to the appeal of neutralism. Josip Broz Tito established a communist regime in Yugoslavia, but bristled at Stalinist interference in the internal affairs of his country. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Tito charted a course independent of both blocs.

As neutralism took root in Europe, the dissolution of Europe's colonial empires in Africa and Asia gave rise to newly independent nations, many of which adopted a policy of nonalignment. In certain respects, nonalignment was synonymous with neutralism, for the nonaligned states

eschewed commitments to either of the global power centers. But not all members of the nonaligned movement took a neutral position vis-à-vis the two blocs. Many of the twenty-nine states that attended the first meeting of the nonaligned at Bandung in 1955 tilted to one side or the other. B. K. Shrivastava, in a 1982 article titled "The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement," identified three categories of nonaligned states that had become clearly delineated by 1970: the extremists, consisting largely of Marxist and pro-Soviet countries; the conservative friends of the United States and the West; and the moderates, who wanted to maintain their distance from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Moderates, such as India and Egypt, wary both of the Soviet Union and of Western capitalist powers, their former colonial overlords, represented the true neutrals of the Third World.

As neutralism established itself in Europe and spread to Asia and Africa, U.S. policymakers had to decide whether to oppose or to pursue accommodation with that movement. Certain aspects of this phenomenon, from their viewpoint, were clearly contrary to American interests, especially the tendency for neutralism to impede the establishment of a unified opposition to Soviet advances. But neutrals, in their distrust of Soviet doctrine, also offered opportunities.

U.S. POLICY AND WESTERN EUROPEAN NEUTRALISM

After World War II, the Truman administration faced a deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and a Europe in dire economic straits that made it vulnerable to communist blandishments and powerless to resist potential Soviet aggression. In central Europe, the failure to establish a cooperative framework for the occupation of Germany was leading to a permanently divided German state. When the United States responded to these developments with a containment policy, it soon became clear that neutralism had the potential to undermine the unity of purpose the Truman administration deemed necessary to repel Soviet advances.

West Germany was a key factor in American policymakers' response to neutralism. With the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949 in the wake of the Berlin airlift, West Germany quickly emerged as an important component of the western European alliance, and a divided Germany became an accepted part of the Cold War landscape. To many Germans intent upon reuniting their country, however, neutralism often surfaced as a means of accomplishing this reunification. Through the years, this solution even had prominent advocates in the United States. The noted American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, in his 1957 Reith Lectures over the BBC, called for the superpowers to disengage from Germany, which would be united and demilitarized. Throughout the Cold War, Washington consistently resisted such solutions, fearing that this would weaken Western resolve to resist the Soviet threat.

The traditional neutrals, Switzerland and Sweden, along with Finland, were particular obstacles to Western solidarity. Neutrals were more than willing to participate in postwar economic programs such as the Marshall Plan. (Finland was the notable exception. As it tried to construct a relationship with its Soviet neighbor that would preserve its national autonomy, Helsinki opted against participation so as not to antagonize the Kremlin.) Economic ties were as far as they would go, however. Political and military bonds were out of the question.

The Truman administration initially viewed neutralism with suspicion and even hostility. The advice that Secretary of State George Marshall offered to the president on the occasion of a 1948 visit by the crown prince of Sweden was typical. Marshall argued that Sweden's adherence to neutrality had "been more benefit to the Soviet Union than to the Western countries" and urged Truman to "avoid any expression of approval of the neutrality policy," since such a policy that "reveal[ed] a division among the free nations of the world [could] only serve to invite aggression."

Gradually, however, officials grudgingly conceded that it was futile to try to dissuade these neutrals and that neutralism had to be accommodated for the foreseeable future. They thus concentrated on finding a way at least indirectly to turn neutralism to the West's benefit. Washington curtailed efforts to pressure neutrals to choose between the two competing camps and moved toward a consistent, pragmatic plan to bind Europe's neutrals closer to the West, thus strengthening rather than weakening the emerging collective security.

The Eisenhower administration, despite its more confrontational public stance and expressions of intolerance for neutralism—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called neutrality "obso-

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND NEUTRALISM

In the mid-1950s, Eisenhower administration public pronouncements on the issue of neutralism sometimes gave conflicting signals. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the administration's principal foreign policy spokesman, was consistently critical. In October 1955, speaking before an American Legion convention in Miami, he stubbornly declared that "except under very exceptional circumstances, neutrality today is an immoral and shortsighted conception." But several months later, at a June 1956 news conference, President Eisenhower took a more tolerant position. He observed that for 150 years the United States had been neutral, that in 1956 neutrality meant avoiding attachment to military alliances, and that "this does not necessarily mean . . . neutral as between right and wrong or between decay and decency." He concluded his appraisal by referring the reporters to a speech Dulles was scheduled to give the following week at Iowa State University. There, however, Dulles did not revise his assessment of neutralism but rather reiterated his intolerant stance. Dulles's hostility has been explained in different ways. It may have reflected his personal belief that there was a stark contrast between communism and democracy, and that, therefore, to take a neutral position was tantamount to choosing the former. H. W. Brands, in *The Specter of Neutralism*, offered another explanation, politics: "The secretary's sermonizing was designed to please conservatives, Republicans for the most part, who distrusted neutralists and continually threatened to block administration initiatives toward countries of the Third World." But what about Eisenhower's contrasting expression of tolerance for neutralism? The answer may lie in the behind-the-scenes deliberations of the administration. The National Security Council, responding to Nikita Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" campaign, was reexamining neutralism and all of its ramifications in order to construct a coherent policy toward these neutral states.

lete," "immoral," and "shortsighted"—continued and in fact institutionalized this trend. Dulles's public statements obscured an underlying realism in the administration's approach, a realism that was willing to accommodate the neutral cause if it served U.S. interests.

By the mid-1950s, a number of factors had moved neutralism to a higher priority for policymakers. Nikita Khrushchev, successor to Joseph Stalin, in 1955 proclaimed a drive for "peaceful coexistence" and backed his words with action—the return in 1956 of the port of Porkkala, which had been seized at the end of World War II, to Finland; his decision to support a neutralized Austria in return for a treaty ending its occupation; and efforts to mend relations with Yugoslavia. The United States doubted Khrushchev's sincerity and suspected that he was simply maneuvering to divide the West by encouraging neutralism. Khrushchev's actions, combined with his interest in a unified and neutralized Germany, raised some concern that the Kremlin was seeking a neutralized zone across central Europe—including Austria, Germany, and Yugoslavia—that would weaken the Western defense system. As these events unfolded in Europe, the Bandung Conference highlighted the expanding appeal of neutralism worldwide, a potential advantage for the Soviet Union.

In response to these developments, the National Security Council in 1955 asked the State Department to prepare an assessment of neutralism worldwide to aid the White House in developing an informed approach to this third force. This pivotal study established a framework for America's approach to neutralism through much of the remainder of the Cold War. For Europe, its analysis and conclusions led to a pragmatic and measured relationship with the neutral states.

The study began by making a distinction between *neutrality*, a government policy or a nation's status in foreign relations, and *neutralism*, described as "an attitude or psychological tendency." It went on to distinguish between what it called "classical" neutralism, which had always entailed a determination not to take sides in international rivalries, and a new "quasi-neutralism," a "hodge-podge of attitudes and tendencies which . . . involve[d] a disinclination to cooperate with U.S. objectives in the Cold War and in a possible

hot war." Even though this new neutralism eschewed commitments to both the Soviet Union and the United States, it was more threatening to the West's interests. Soviet strategy could exploit it.

The report proceeded to list several explanations for the appeal of this new neutralist sentiment in Europe: fear of nuclear war, nationalism, negative reactions to U.S. leadership, a desire to achieve security without responsibility, pacifism, pursuit of special interests, and economic motivations. It further emphasized that this new neutralism, more than the legal government policy of neutrality or even the neutralist position some European states assumed in the Cold War, was what threatened American interests most. A government's declaring itself to be neutral, the study stressed, did not automatically mean that nation was infected with that troublesome neutralism.

This cautionary insight was fundamental to the evolution of America's relations with the neutral states. From the U.S. perspective, the litmus test for beneficial neutrality was a strong ideological identification with the West, demonstration of "solid resistance to Communist blandishments," and maintenance of a strong national defense establishment. The key neutrals in Europe fulfilled these criteria. Each for its own reasons had adopted a neutral position, but this did not necessarily translate to that damaging neutralism that threatened to undermine relations with the West. Indeed, the State Department study identified neutralist sentiment as stronger among some of America's allies than among the neutral states. These insights led the United States to understand the distinct interests and positions of the individual states.

Switzerland Switzerland, the purest of the neutrals, dated its neutrality to the sixteenth century. Its status was reinforced in the early nineteenth century by provisions of the Congress of Vienna, and it carefully maintained its neutral stance throughout World War II. After the war, Switzerland even eschewed membership in the United Nations because it determined that membership in this international organization might compromise its neutrality. Despite Switzerland's stubborn refusal to cooperate, U.S. officials took solace in the fact that Switzerland practiced an armed neutrality. There was no doubt that it would defend its territory in time of conflict. Bordered by France and Italy, Switzerland, of the four major European neutral states, was of least concern to the United States.

Sweden Sweden dated its neutrality to the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century and maintained this status throughout World War II. After the war, it defined its position to be neutral in war and nonaligned in peacetime. When the United States began planning for the security for Europe, Sweden presented a particular problem. As a significant military force on Europe's northern flank, it was important to continental defense. U.S. officials understood the advantages of convincing Sweden to participate in Western defense arrangements. But as Washington negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty, Stockholm, rather than cooperating, attempted to exclude the Cold War from the Nordic region by proposing a league of armed neutrality, a Nordic Union, with its Scandinavian neighbors, Denmark and Norway. This scheme ultimately failed, and Denmark and Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Sweden continued to refuse to associate itself with the Western military alliance.

Sweden's actions caused some tension with the United States, but relations improved by the early 1950s. A 1952 National Security Council policy paper on Scandinavia and Finland (NSC 121) admitted that in the near future the United States would have to accept Sweden's determination to avoid military alliances and calculate the best means to increase Sweden's contribution to Western defense. Subsequently, Sweden became an important centerpiece of a "Nordic Balance" that secured the North Atlantic alliance's northern flank. Its neutrality, furthermore, contributed to Finland's success in maintaining its neutral position.

Finland In contrast to these established neutrals, the United States confronted in Finland's situation a neutrality created out of necessity. Precariously situated on the border of the Soviet Union, the Helsinki government struggled to preserve its independence by building a relationship premised on the belief that the Kremlin's interest in Finland was strategic, not ideological. After signing a punitive peace treaty in 1947 that imposed devastating reparations and took away 11 percent of its territory, Finland agreed to a ten-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948 that required it to resist any attack on the Soviet Union through Finnish territory by Germany or any nation allied with Germany, to consult with the Soviet Union on an

appropriate response in the event of attack, and to refrain from joining any alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. Finland subsequently tried to interpret and apply this pact in such a way that it could move more to a neutral position between the two blocs. Washington ultimately appreciated that Finland lacked alternatives to its chosen course, and was careful not to disrupt the delicate balance.

At times during the Eisenhower years, as Finland's economic situation improved and its independence became more secure, Washington considered the possibility that the solution crafted by Finland might serve as a model for other states bordering the Soviet Union. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the 1955 Geneva summit meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower suggested to Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin that Finland exemplified the relationship that might be acceptable to the United States for the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe. A 1959 National Security Council report titled "U.S. Policy Toward Finland" (NSC 5914/1) mirrored this suggestion when it asserted that "If Finland is able to preserve its present neutral status . . . it could serve as an example of what the United States might like to see achieved by the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe."

This appreciation of the benefits of Finnish neutralism for American foreign policy goals contrasted with later scathing assessments of the Finnish example. In a 1977 article titled "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization," the scholar Walter Laqueur coined the term "Finlandization," which from his perspective bore the negative connotation of a country willing to sacrifice its sovereignty for the sake of preserving felicitous relations with the Soviet Union. Laqueur feared that other European states might succumb to the temptation to follow Finland's example. Yet here, years before Laqueur's criticism, Dulles was offering the Finnish style of neutralism as a means of diminishing rather than enhancing Soviet control in its own sphere. Even if the Finnish situation was in no way analogous to that of the satellite states in Eastern Europe, the mere presence of this small nation resisting Soviet domination was useful as a propaganda tool for the United States.

Austria In 1955 neutral representation in western Europe expanded further as Austria joined this "third force." Austria, occupied by the Allies after the war's end, suffered through occupation and protracted treaty negotiations as the Cold War rift widened. By late 1953, Austrian officials were ready to accept neutralization as the price for regaining sovereignty. Soviet negotiators endorsed this solution at the foreign ministers' conference at Berlin in 1954, but the proposal was tabled, the victim of the continuing dispute over the status of Germany, because the neutralization of Austria could be linked to a similar solution for Germany. This was particularly unacceptable to the United States. Although Washington was willing to respect Austria's decision if it chose neutrality, Dulles articulated Washington's misgivings when he asserted that it was one thing for a nation to choose neutrality and another to have neutrality forcibly imposed. Under such circumstances, a nation could not be truly independent and sovereign.

West Germany's incorporation into NATO in 1955 removed this obstacle to a neutralized Austria. (The Soviet Union responded to West Germany's new status with the Warsaw Pact, which further solidified its control of the eastern bloc.) Austrian officials traveled to Moscow and negotiated the terms of the State Treaty of May 1955, agreeing that Austria would join no military alliances, would permit no military bases on its territory, and would practice a form of neutrality along the lines of the Swiss model. France and Britain endorsed this arrangement; the United States reluctantly agreed.

Economic and Military Assistance Each of these states traversed a different path to neutralism, and each defined its neutralism in its own distinct terms. Nevertheless, all shared an affinity with western values. This reassured U.S. officials, who employed several tactics to strengthen these ties. Economic measures figured prominently in American plans. European integration, furthermore, provided a vehicle to tie the neutrals to the West. Finally, in response to Sweden's efforts to improve its military capabilities and shore up its defensive position, covert military arrangements developed between Sweden and the United States and its NATO allies.

Economic assistance in the form of trade, loans, and credits was a particularly useful method of fostering a beneficial relationship. But economic assistance was not unrestricted; it had to address the West's Cold War interests. Switzerland and Sweden were economically sound and had healthy trade relations with the West. The United States continued to encourage this trade, but it feared the possible transfer of strategically important materials and technology by these neutrals to the Soviet bloc. In 1949, the United States and its allies had

reached an agreement to restrict the transfer of strategic goods. In ongoing negotiations parallel with the establishment of the Marshall Plan, U.S. officials pressured both Switzerland and Sweden to adhere to these export controls. Both countries, reluctant to compromise their neutral status, nevertheless by 1951 informally agreed to adhere to parts of the export controls. Reflecting Sweden's strategic importance in the Nordic region, its adherence to these controls led the United States in 1952 to begin to allow Sweden to purchase selected military equipment and supplies. This made Sweden eligible for military equipment otherwise restricted to America's allies. The United States went even further in 1956 when it agreed to share some nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

U.S. aid to Austria between 1945 and 1955, prior to the restoration of its sovereignty, amounted to an estimated $1.25 billion. Assistance continued after the State Treaty was signed in order to strengthen Austria's armed neutrality. In relations with Finland, Washington assiduously pursued an essentially hands-off political posture, intended to minimize antagonizing the Soviet Union, combined with measured economic assistance to strengthen the Finnish economy and orient it more firmly toward the west. This assistance included the sale of surplus agricultural goods as well as loans, the latter conflicting with the 1951 Battle Act, which prohibited loans to nations exporting strategic goods to the communist bloc. In the late 1950s, Eisenhower cited overriding foreign policy considerations to bypass Battle Act restrictions and ensure millions of dollars in loans to Finland. As a result, by the late 1950s, Finnish exports to and imports from the east bloc declined in relation to exports to and imports from the West.

In tandem with these economic measures, the United States exploited the steady evolution toward European integration to draw the neutrals further from the Soviet orbit, so as to reinforce rather than weaken the Western security system. Aside from any benefit integration could provide for its neutral policy, the United States recognized the value of a more tightly integrated Europe, both economically and politically. It therefore consistently encouraged Europe's movement toward cooperation, beginning with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established in 1948 to coordinate Marshall Plan aid; proceeding to the European Coal and Steel Community and then the European Economic Community (EEC), which portended the possibility of a truly effective union; and refusing to rebuff the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a tariff union created by states excluded from the EEC. Despite its interest in integration with truly effective supranational authority, the United States continued to encourage institutions like the OEEC and EFTA, which lacked that desired supranational authority, in part because these organizations provided a niche for the neutrals in the Western system. The OEEC included Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria. And when the EFTA was negotiated in 1958, U.S. officials hesitated to repudiate it, largely because it offered a haven for these three neutrals. Also, as Finland became more secure in its relationship with the Soviet Union, it began negotiations in 1959 that culminated in associate membership in this customs union in 1961.

In addition to these efforts aimed at all the neutrals, the United States and its NATO allies engaged Sweden in a covert military relationship that theoretically contradicted that nation's nonaligned posture. Soon after the promulgation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden began to meet with Denmark and Norway to coordinate military cooperation and planning. These secret meetings eventually expanded to include the United States and Great Britain, and led to other areas of cooperation. Sweden in effect became an unofficial member of the Western alliance system.

The Kennedy Years John F. Kennedy was the willing heir to this relationship with Europe's neutrals. Mirroring the findings of the 1955 neutralism study, a State Department study released in 1961 admitted that there were many variants of neutralism arising from "unique, indigenous conditions." The new administration was reassured by the fact that the European neutrals were stable nations that had proved impervious to communist influence, so Washington was content to let these favorable trends mature.

Illustrative of Kennedy's approach was his response to a visit to Washington in the fall of 1961 by Finland's President Urho Kekkonen and the subsequent "note crisis" provoked by Moscow. Finland's effort to associate with EFTA was only one of a series of cautious steps that nation had taken since 1955 to carefully establish its independence from Soviet control. On his visit to Washington, Kekkonen met with Kennedy and received a public endorsement for his country's neutral course. Soon thereafter, alarmed by Finland's expanding outreach to the West, Khrushchev sent an official note to Helsinki invoking the con-

sultation clause of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, a move that potentially threatened Finland's sovereignty. Although concerned about this development, Washington reacted cautiously. Bowing to Finnish wishes, Washington remained in the background and avoided escalating this incident into a Cold War confrontation. The U.S. ambassador to Finland privately reassured the Finns of America's support, then bowed to Helsinki's wish to address the crisis in its own way. After a visit to the Soviet Union, Kekkonen succeeded in defusing the crisis with Finland's independence still intact.

Britain and the EEC Despite this appreciation of neutralism, however, when neutral interests conflicted with more pressing priorities of America's Cold War policies, neutrals were the losers. A case in point was the U.S. response to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's announcement in the spring of 1961 that Great Britain intended to apply for EEC membership. Washington encouraged Macmillan because Britain was an important force in European economic and political affairs, and would provide an Atlantic link between the European Union and the United States. But to the dismay of American officials, Macmillan also pressed for membership, either full or associate, for Britain's fellow EFTA members, including the neutrals Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden (as well as associated Finland). Although Macmillan's proposal potentially would have drawn the neutrals closer to western Europe, Washington opposed his plan because these neutrals were unwilling to accept the full political commitments required of EEC members. Their participation, therefore, would erode the supranational authority necessary for a strong union. Washington encouraged Britain's application, but pressed London to postpone its efforts on behalf of fellow EFTA members. This decision was not encouraging for the U.S.-neutrals relationship. The issue ultimately became moot when the EEC, led by France, rejected Britain's application in January 1963. Nevertheless, these events illustrated the limits of America's willingness to accommodate the interests of these neutrals.

NEUTRALISM BEYOND WESTERN EUROPE

The pragmatism evident in western Europe extended as well to U.S. policy toward neutralism worldwide, but with mixed results. In *The Specter of Neutralism,* an important study of America's early postwar relations with Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt, H. W. Brands concluded that actual American policy during the Truman and Eisenhower years, as distinct from public rhetoric, "demonstrated a pragmatic ability to deal with neutralism on its own merits. If the neutralist actions of a particular country worked to the advantage of the United States, that country deserved, and usually received, American support. If a neutralist challenged American interests, opposition was the rule." The American advantages and interests to which Brands referred were inevitably defined by the geopolitical rivalry with communism and often lacked a sophisticated understanding of the interests of the Third World states.

Although Brands's study was restricted to the Truman-Eisenhower period, his insight could for the most part extend to the Kennedy years as well. Kennedy administration pragmatism was informed by a more sophisticated understanding of Third World issues, yet Cold War interests still prevailed and affected American tolerance for neutrals. Washington offered economic assistance and encouraged social reform as means to guide these states toward democracy and, it hoped, to counter the allure of communism. Policymakers were committed to resisting Soviet influence and preferred that these countries commit to the West, but when necessary, they were willing to use neutralism as an alternative to communist expansion. Notable in this regard were the Southeast Asia states of Cambodia and Laos. In the late 1950s, as the United States slowly increased its involvement in that area of the world, these two nations, recently independent from French control, embraced neutralism in an ultimately futile attempt to keep out of the emerging conflict. While the United States preferred a Laos and Cambodia committed to the anticommunist cause, it grudgingly accepted their neutralism. Kennedy, furthermore, during his 1961 Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev supported the neutralization of Laos.

From the end of World War II to the 1960s, neutralism brought opportunities and challenges outside western Europe. In the Soviet bloc, the United States encouraged Yugoslavia's neutralism, even in the face of congressional opposition, because this was a chance to discreetly undermine Soviet dominance. The flowering of neutralism in the Third World dictated that the United States adapt its policies, which it did with varying

degrees of success, as relations with the key neutrals, India and Egypt, illustrate. In South Asia, a region on the periphery of American interests, India, the quintessential Third World neutral, vexed policymakers. Resistant to U.S. efforts to draw it into entanglements with the West, India stubbornly followed a truly independent course. But while south Asia was not critical to U.S. security interests, the Middle East with its oil and strategic geographic position was. Here, U.S.–Egyptian relations proved particularly trying.

Yugoslavia John Gaddis, in *The Long Peace,* a retrospective look at four decades of the Cold War, argues that from as early as the middle of 1947, the United States had pursued a "multifaceted strategy aimed at driving a wedge between Moscow and its ideological allies throughout the world." Nowhere was this wedge strategy more evident than in relations with Yugoslavia. After World War II, Josip Broz Tito had imposed a Marxist regime. But, although committed to building a communist regime internally, he chafed under Stalin's attempts to impose tighter control over the eastern bloc. Stalin could not tolerate Tito's separate road to communism because Tito's neutralism conflicted with Soviet domination of the communist movement. Their dispute culminated with Stalin labeling Tito a deviationist and expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948. Without abandoning his commitment to communism, Tito then adopted nonalignment to address his nation's best interests.

The break left Yugoslavia desperate for economic assistance. The United States, quick to recognize the opportunity Tito's defection offered, stepped in to fill the vacuum left by his former Soviet benefactor. U.S. officials anticipated that, if successful, Tito's independent brand of communism might spread not only in Eastern Europe but also among communist states elsewhere, perhaps even China. Of added benefit was Yugoslavia's military strength. Tito commanded a force of thirty divisions that could potentially be turned against the Soviet Union in case of attack. In pursuit of these ends, the Truman administration adopted a low-key public approach, both to divert congressional opposition to support of a communist regime and to avoid the impression that the United States was responsible for Tito's defection, thus lending credence to Stalin's charges that Tito was selling out to the West. The United States extended aid and credits, including a $20 million loan from the Export-Import Bank, and lifted trade restrictions on many items, including some munitions. In the aftermath of North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, Washington offered further military assistance through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

As its defection became more permanent, Yugoslavia also figured in plans for the military containment of the Soviet Union. In February 1953, negotiations between Yugoslavia and Greece and Turkey, endorsed by the United States, resulted in the Balkan Pact, a friendship treaty providing for consultation and coordination of defense planning. Within a year, this pact evolved into a military alliance. The agreement enhanced Tito's international standing, but it never fulfilled expectations of closer collaboration with the West. For Tito, carefully guarding his nonaligned position, never abandoned the option of resuming relations with the Soviet Union. Following Stalin's death, formal relations were restored in 1955, after Khrushchev recognized Yugoslavia's independent road to communism. In that same year, Tito enhanced his neutral credentials by joining India and Egypt as a principal sponsor of the Bandung Conference. Despite Tito's machinations, the Eisenhower administration continued America's cautious support for Yugoslavia throughout the 1950s, seeing his independence as a beneficial break in the monolithic control that the Soviet Union exerted over the eastern bloc.

The Kennedy administration likewise willingly accepted Yugoslavia's neutralism as an alternative to Soviet influence. It tolerated Tito's independent initiatives even when they challenged Western interests. In September 1961, for example, Tito hosted a conference of nonaligned states in Belgrade. There, he played a leading role in pressing the nonaligned agenda that promoted, among other things, peaceful coexistence and condemnation of colonialism. His tilt toward the Soviet Union on certain issues addressed at this meeting irritated U.S. officials, especially when he failed to condemn the recent Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing, but blamed the capitalist bloc for the recent crisis in Germany surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall. But Washington still pursued amicable relations.

The Third World If the advantages of a neutral heretic in the Soviet bloc seemed obvious and led to a straightforward policy, appropriately addressing nonalignment among the former European colonies proved more problematic. The 1955 neutralism study commissioned by Eisenhower's

National Security Council had also examined the phenomenon of neutralism in the Near East and Far East. Like European neutrals, Third World neutrals wanted to remain independent of the competing power blocs. But the study stressed that in the developing world anticolonialism and nationalism were closely intertwined with neutralism, creating a more complex set of circumstances. Furthermore, these newly independent nations had little international experience and had very little power in international relations. However pragmatic and insightful these observations were, in application U.S. policy was less effective in the Third World. Cold War concerns often gave priority to global considerations, which tended to obfuscate officials' interpretations of the motives and actions taken by these nonaligned neutrals. Strained relations often resulted.

World War II hastened the demise of the former colonial empires. During the war, the U.S. government had signaled some sympathy for the plight of these colonies. The Atlantic Charter (1941), a statement of wartime aims signed by President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, had called for self-determination of all people, a reference in part to peoples under colonial rule. But political developments after the war soon complicated America's relationship with these former colonial possessions. As one former colony after another achieved independence, the United States was distracted by events in Europe. By the time the communist victory in China and, more significantly, the outbreak of the Korean War finally compelled America to turn its attention to the Third World, it encountered a rising tide of nationalism, resentful of years of colonial domination and determined to establish an independent position. Marxism appealed to many Third World nationalists, and the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China competed for influence. On one level, Khrushchev's call for "peaceful coexistence" was a blatant attempt to associate the Soviet Union with the cause of these newly independent states. The United States thus found itself in an awkward position. Not only were the former colonial powers some of its most valued European allies, but communism's appeal in the Third World aroused fears of the expansion of Soviet influence. The two prominent Third World neutrals, India and Egypt, illustrate the problems the United States faced in forging a successful relationship under these circumstances.

After India achieved independence in 1947, its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, crafted a foreign policy designed to steer clear of military involvements and to maintain an independent role in international affairs. Nehru's India was a democratic state that adopted the Marxist model of economic reform, thereby triggering suspicion among some policymakers. In contrast to Washington's global perspective, Nehru's outlook was decidedly regional. Given India's desperate economic state, his first priority was to improve the lot of his people. To accomplish this, he was open to economic assistance regardless of whether it came from the East or the West.

The Truman administration from the start encouraged India's effort to establish itself as a viable independent state. As Dennis Merrill notes in *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963,* "United States policy toward India abounded with contradictions." But, according to Merrill, it was guided by several goals: to prevent India from succumbing to communism and the increasing influence of the Soviet Union; to draw India into the Western alliance, tap its raw materials, and make it a reliable military ally; and to make India a model for noncommunist development in the Third World and an Asian "counterweight" to the People's Republic of China.

India, which from the beginning not only espoused neutralism but also acted in a neutral fashion, confounded American officials. Nehru's criticism of American policies, including Washington's refusal to recognize Communist China and its support for what he characterized as French aggression in Indochina, created friction. When the Korean War broke out, India supported early UN resolutions condemning the invasion and sanctioning UN actions to repulse the North Korean forces, at the same time that it strove to mediate an end to the conflict. By the latter stages of the war, the United States found it convenient to use Indian diplomats as a conduit to convey its positions to the Soviet Union. After the armistice was signed, India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee.

India's marginal importance to America's global strategy partially explained both America's measured response to its nonalignment policies even when they were detrimental to U.S. interests, and also why economic assistance to this poor country was slow in coming. But once it began, it steadily expanded during the Eisenhower years and reached its zenith during the Kennedy administration, peaking in 1962 at $465.5 million.

Good relations engendered by this aid, however, were often negated by the incompatibility of Washington's global goals with India's more regional interests. Nowhere was this more evident than in New Delhi's reaction to U.S. relations with Pakistan, a Muslim state established in 1947, at the time of India's independence, and a state engaged in an ongoing conflict with India over control of the state of Kashmir. In contrast to India's neutralism, Pakistan became a willing participant in America's containment efforts, which led the Eisenhower administration to view Pakistan as a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East and as a potential bridge to Muslim populations there. In 1954, Washington concluded a mutual defense assistance agreement with Pakistan. Soon thereafter, Pakistan became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. (Washington had previously tried to persuade India to join, but was rebuffed.) Then, in 1955, Pakistan joined NATO members Turkey and Great Britain in the Baghdad Pact (in 1959 renamed the Central Treaty Organization). While these maneuvers served America's global interests, they strained relations with India. Nehru not only was wary of bringing the Cold War rivalry to the Asian continent, but he feared the advantage American military assistance gave to his regional foe.

The Kennedy administration, more sensitive to India's interests, appointed the prominent economist and confidant of the president, John Kenneth Galbraith, as ambassador in 1961, signaling an interest in improving relations. Galbraith promoted expanded assistance to India and counseled acceptance of its nonaligned foreign policy. When the People's Republic of China attacked India in 1962 over disputed border areas, the United States provided India with necessary military aid. The United States now saw India as a counterweight to the growing influence of Communist China in that area of the world. India accepted U.S. assistance, but still resisted any commitment that would draw it into the Cold War. Washington continued to pursue improved relations, but India never achieved priority status.

In contrast to India, Egypt, located in the Middle East, a region rich in oil and strategically situated in the eastern Mediterranean, became a serious concern for American policy. Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to power in 1954, two years after a military coup had deposed King Farouk. Nasser rapidly established himself as a leader of the nonaligned movement and became a hero to the cause of Arab nationalism. Prior to the early 1950s, the Middle East seemed safely in the Western camp. And for a time after the coup, U.S. relations with Egypt were cordial. Washington promoted an Anglo-Egyptian base treaty that ended British occupation of the Suez Canal zone and expressed willingness to provide Cairo with both economic and military aid. But relations gradually deteriorated. U.S. commitments to Israel and its determination to deter the advance of Soviet influence in the region proved increasingly incompatible with the course Nasser chose to follow.

Nasser, whose country for years had endured British rule, adopted a form of neutralism intent on preventing domination by both the West and the Soviet Union. He resisted Western influence and rebuffed U.S. attempts to get Egypt to join a Middle East Defense Organization, an effort to expand the Western alliance system into the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, while he willingly cooperated with the Soviet Union when it served his purposes, he guarded against letting this cooperation turn to subservience. To Nasser and fellow Arab neutralists, opposition to the State of Israel was part and parcel of this policy. They opposed Zionism not only because Israel occupied Arab lands, but also because the former imperial powers supported Zionism. They saw Zionism as a tool of Western imperialism.

The neutral Nasser, like Nehru, willingly accepted aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. He recognized that the West was a more reliable source of aid, but he was wary of any assistance that threatened his independence of action. Thus, his independent neutralism increasingly ran counter to American interests. Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955, so Washington turned to Iraq, long one of Egypt's adversaries. Later, when Nasser requested military supplies after some serious border skirmishes with the Israelis in the Gaza Strip, Washington rejected his request. In response, Nasser turned to Czechoslovakia for arms, evoking vehement objections from Washington. While his actions were consistent with his neutral strategy, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned him for opening opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Dulles's handling of the Aswan Dam project antagonized Nasser even further. In 1955, the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank offered a financial package to fund this ambitious project intended to provide irrigation and other benefits for Egypt's economic improvement. However, Dulles made this offer contingent on Egypt's abandoning closer ties with the Soviet Union.

When Nasser continued to negotiate with the Kremlin for a better offer to build the dam, refused to rescind his arms deal with Czechoslovakia, and then extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China in 1956, Dulles rescinded his offer, prompting Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in order to use the fees collected to finance the dam.

Dulles created a self-fulfilling prophecy. The United States worried that neutralism provided opportunities for the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Washington's response to Nasser's neutralism resulted in the spread of Soviet influence and damaged American prestige. In October 1956, when Israel invaded Egypt, and Britain and France in a coordinated move occupied the Suez Canal under the pretext of protecting it, the United States found itself at odds with its major allies in Europe. The United States was forced to join with the Soviet Union in calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt.

Washington added to the damage by suspending aid to Egypt and freezing Egyptian assets. U.S. officials could not shake the fear that Nasser was a pawn of the Soviet Union. The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, which assured American support for Middle Eastern nations threatened by external aggression, was intended to contain the spread of Soviet communism. But Arab allies of Nasser interpreted it as an attempt to contain his nationalist movement. In 1958, Nasser accepted Soviet aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam and welcomed Soviet advisers, who remained in Egypt until Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, expelled them in 1972.

Beginning in 1959, relations improved as Eisenhower once more made Egypt eligible for food aid. By 1960, the United States provided two-thirds of Egypt's grain imports. And in October 1962, the Kennedy administration reached a $432 million aid deal with Egypt. But these steps could not totally mend the damage done to U.S. prestige by the events of the mid-1950s. Uneasy relations with Nasser continued, especially after he signed another arms agreement with the Soviet Union in June 1963.

THE UNITED NATIONS, VIETNAM, AND DÉTENTE

By the mid-1960s, Cold War neutralism had matured as a distinct force in international affairs. As the Vietnam conflict monopolized America's attention, neutral states both in Europe and in the Third World became more assertive and outspoken. The two blocs that defined the Cold War ever so slowly succumbed to a new international order. The appeal of neutralism threatened to challenge America's control over the western bloc at the same time that the Soviet Union met with only limited success in wooing the neutrals. Harto Hakovirta, in an article titled "The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality in Western Europe," observed that "at the height of the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s, a tendency toward absolute alliance was dominant; but, starting roughly in 1963, the direction seemed to reverse itself. Cold-war structures began to crumble, and the United States gradually lost control over its West European partners."

The United Nations provided a major forum for neutrals to voice their concerns. The composition of that organization changed significantly in the years after the end of World War II as its membership expanded to include newly independent Asian and African states, many of which embraced nonalignment. In 1964, these states formed a caucus, the Group of Seventy-seven (the number of members would increase in subsequent years), that, constituting a two-thirds majority, could effectively control the General Assembly. Although these new states resisted Soviet efforts to assume a role of leadership, they could often count on Soviet support. In contrast to the immediate postwar years, the United States no longer dominated the United Nations, and faced criticism and opposition from the membership.

Neutrals in the United Nations became increasingly outspoken on many issues—the need to reduce Cold War tensions, colonialism, and, importantly, nuclear proliferation. As early as 1961, neutrals took up the cause of nuclear disarmament. In that year, Swedish Foreign Minister Bo Östen Unden, addressing the General Assembly, called upon the nonnuclear members to band together to pressure the nuclear powers to reduce their armaments. Later, in a noteworthy success in the crusade to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, neutral states played a role in the promulgation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The terms of this treaty, after initially being negotiated by the Soviet Union and the United States, were revised and then submitted to the UN General Assembly by an eighteen-nation disarmament committee. In addition to five representatives each from the Western and Eastern blocs, eight neutral states were represented on this committee.

While the United States welcomed support for attempts to curtail the arms race, on some issues its interests were pitted against the neutral position. America's strong support for Israel and its intervention in Vietnam are prominent examples. Vietnam particularly exposed the United States to charges of being an imperialist power bent on pursuing its own ends, with no consideration for the Third World countries trying to overcome their years under colonialism. As opposition to American involvement grew, Sweden and India stood out among critics of that war.

By words and deeds, Sweden made its opposition known. In 1966, citing its commitment to freedom of speech and assembly, the Swedish government ignored Washington's protests and permitted the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, made up of a long list of prominent critics of American policy, to meet in Stockholm. Sweden also granted asylum to draft dodgers and military deserters. The numbers seeking safe haven grew significantly in the late 1960s. Prime Minister Olof Palme further strained U.S.–Swedish relations when in December 1972 he likened the massive Christmas bombing of North Vietnam to past Nazi atrocities. Most damaging to U.S.–Swedish relations, in 1969 Sweden became the first Western nation to extend full diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon both threatened, but did not follow through on, economic sanctions.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India incurred the wrath of the Johnson administration in 1966 when she publicly condemned U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, prompting Washington to postpone needed agricultural aid to her country. This, combined with the continued U.S. support for Pakistan, put a real strain on U.S.–Indian relations.

In Europe, the United States feared a weakening of the Western alliance and a drift toward neutralism among its allies. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States, chastened by the possibility of nuclear annihilation, gradually adopted détente to reduce tensions with the Soviet bloc. Beginning in 1969, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser (and later secretary of state), Henry Kissinger, made détente the cornerstone of their foreign policy. As their efforts probed the possibility that the divide between the two superpowers might be narrowed, Willy Brandt, foreign minister of West Germany from 1966 to 1969 and chancellor from 1969 to 1974, pursued his own form of détente, *Ostpolitik*, an independent effort by West Germany to resolve the differences with East Germany and the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1972, his diplomatic efforts led to treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union, and ultimately normalization of relations with East Germany.

Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in many respects coincided with Nixon's quest to improve relations with the Soviet Union. But Kissinger feared that *Ostpolitik* represented a drift toward neutralism and the possible resurgence of German nationalism. He worried that it might create fissures in the Western alliance, give the advantage to the Soviet Union, and consequently hinder the détente at the superpower level that he and Nixon were so intent upon pursuing. While the United States could not oppose *Ostpolitik*, its support for these initiatives was lukewarm.

As détente changed the dynamics of the Cold War, neutral states in Europe willingly assumed a role as bridge-builders between the competing blocs. They helped facilitate the resolution of Cold War disputes. Beginning in 1969, Helsinki and Vienna provided the settings for arms control negotiations that resulted in the first Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty in 1972. More significant, Finland played a prominent role in encouraging negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975). Jussi Hanhimäki, in his study *Scandinavia and the United States: An Insecure Friendship*, characterized the role of Finland, along with its Scandinavian neighbors including Sweden, as that of "midwives, providing the services and the medium needed for the conclusion of the agreements." He conceded that the agreements would not have come about without Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, Nixon's efforts at détente, and the Soviet desire for recognition of the postwar borders. But with its commitment to bridge-building, neutral Finland was a valuable vehicle for fostering and moving these negotiations forward.

By the 1980s, great strides had been made in narrowing the chasm created by the Cold War. Although this trend would experience setbacks during the early years of Ronald Reagan's presidency, when Reagan returned to confrontational politics of the earlier Cold War, and although consequently the U.S.-neutral relationship would decline, with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union, the momentum spawned by détente resumed in the late 1980s. Likewise, the interest of neutrals in reducing nuclear armaments and easing East-West tensions increasingly

coincided with Reagan administration policy. Washington welcomed neutral support. Through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other means, neutrals worked to maintain the momentum of improving relations between the two superpowers. Just as the neutrals had played a role in the events of the era of détente, so as bridge builders they served America's policy interests and facilitated the exchanges leading to the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, neutralism effectively became an anachronism. Nevertheless, for nearly five decades, it was a third force that American policy had with varying degrees of success addressed in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. U.S. policy that became established during the first two decades of the Cold War for the most part successfully steered a course that, with relatively few exceptions, preserved a good relationship with Europe's neutrals—if not promoting, at least not hindering—America's Cold War goals. This success to a large extent was attributable to the fact that Europe's neutrals shared political, economic, and cultural values and interests with the United States. Relations with Third World neutrals were more troublesome. Anticolonial feelings and the growing tide of nationalism that U.S. policymakers often misunderstood and resisted, strained relationships and opened opportunities for the Soviet Union. Cold War perspectives and global concerns regularly obfuscated policymakers' appreciation of the Third World neutral position, and the Soviet Union often stepped in to exploit the situation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 32 (1965). Entire volume devoted to articles on various aspects of neutralism.

Brands, H. W. "Redefining the Cold War: American Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1948–1960." *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987): 41–53.

———. *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960.* New York, 1989. Essential work examining the origins of U.S. policy through case studies of three Third World nations.

———. *India and the United States: The Cold Peace.* Boston, 1990.

Brecher, Michael. "Neutralism: An Analysis." *International Journal* 17 (1961–1962): 224–236.

Deák, Francis. "Neutrality Revisited." In Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin, and Oliver Lissitzyn, eds. *Transnational Law in a Changing Society.* New York, 1972.

Gabriel, Jürg Martin. *The American Conception of Neutrality After 1941.* New York, 1988.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War.* New York and Oxford, 1987.

Gehler, Michael, and Rolf Steininger, eds. *The Neutrals and the European Integration, 1945–1995.* Vienna, 2000.

Hahn, Peter L. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991.

Hakovirta, Harto. "The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality in Western Europe." *World Politics* 35 (1983): 563–585.

———. *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality.* New York and Oxford, 1988.

Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "The First Line of Defence or a Springboard for Disintegration? European Neutrals in American Foreign Policy, 1945–61." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 7 (1996): 378-403. A valuable synthesis of U.S. policy toward Europe's neutrals.

———. *Scandinavia and the United States: An Insecure Friendship.* New York, 1997.

Hess, Gary R. "Accommodation and Discord: The United States, India, and the Third World." *Diplomatic History* 16 (1992): 1–22.

Karsh, Efraim. *Neutrality and the Small States.* London, 1988.

Kissinger, Henry. *The White House Years.* Boston and Toronto, 1979.

Krüzel, Joseph, and Michael H. Haltzel, eds. *Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned Countries.* Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, U.K., 1989.

Laqueur, Walter. "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization." *Commentary* 64 (1977): 37–41.

Lees, Lorraine. *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War.* University Park, Pa., 1997.

Logevall, Fredrik. "The Swedish-American Conflict over Vietnam." *Diplomatic History* 17 (1993): 421–445.

Lyon, Peter. "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism." *Review of Politics* 22 (1960): 255–265. A brief synthesis of the theory and meaning of neutralism.

———. *Neutralism.* Leicester, U.K., 1963. A useful work defining neutralism and its roots.

Maurer, Pierre. "The United States-Yugoslav Relations: A Marriage of Convenience." *Studia Diplomatica* (1985): 429–451.

McMahon, Robert J. *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*. New York, 1994.

Merrill, Dennis. *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990.

Papacosma, S. Victor, and Mark R. Rubin, eds. *Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact*. Wilmington, Del., 1989.

Shrivastava, B. K. "The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement." In K. P. Misra, ed. *Non-Alignment Frontiers and Dynamics*. New Delhi, 1982.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; FOREIGN AID; ISOLATIONISM; NEUTRALITY.

NEUTRALITY

Thom M. Armstrong

The term "neutrality" is generally used to designate the legal status under international law of a sovereign state that seeks to avoid involvement in an armed conflict between belligerent states, protect its rights, and exercise its responsibilities as a neutral. Consequently, a neutral state under international law or practice asserts that it has the right to remain at peace and prohibit sovereign acts by belligerents within its jurisdiction, and also a responsibility to treat belligerents impartially. Customary international law, treaties, and relevant domestic legislation confirm such rights and responsibilities. A nation's sovereignty extends to its territory, its ships on the high seas, and the air space above its territory. These principles were, for the most part, reconfirmed in the late twentieth century by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) from 1972 to 1982. After reviewing the entire historical body of law related to maritime issues, the conference produced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Among other things, the convention established the breadth of territorial seas and economic zones and guaranteed traditional rights of navigation on the high seas as well as overflight.

Neutral states may engage in all legal international intercourse; therefore, neutrality is not synonymous with isolation, nor should it be confused with neutralism or nonalignment, terms that refer to peacetime foreign policies of nations desiring to remain detached from conflicting interests of other nations or power groups. This concept of neutrality has its origins in western Europe after the rise of independent states following the Peace of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty Years' War in 1648.

Respect for, and acceptance of, neutrality as having any bearing in international law or practice developed slowly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the time, Europe was in a state of anarchy and neutrals' rights were limited to what was acceptable to belligerents. The little advancement that did occur was largely the result of rivalry among states for trade and territory in the New World. Spain and Portugal's attempts to divide the New World between themselves, establish a monopoly of trade and colonization there, and close the seas to other nations was soon challenged by early writers on international law. In 1608 Hugo Grotius advanced the doctrine that since the seas could not be occupied, they could not become the property of any person or nation. Like the air, the seas were therefore the common property of all men. Although Spain and Portugal accepted this doctrine somewhat begrudgingly, it was firmly established by the end of the seventeenth century, and the notion of neutrality started to evolve among nations.

In general, restraints on trade revolved around the laws of blockade, the definition of contraband of war, the principle that free ships make free goods, and the right of neutrals to trade between the ports of belligerents. In all of these situations, the restraints on neutrals resulted from the obvious desire of belligerents to prevent their enemies from receiving war materials or other goods that may be needed in war. The law of blockade was an outgrowth of the law of siege in land warfare. Governments acknowledged the practice that a city or a place effectively besieged could be legally cut off from all outside help. When this principle was applied to ports, a blockade had to be effective in order for it to be legal; however, it was difficult, particularly during the age of sail, to seal a port completely. No precise definition of effectiveness was ever found, although an attempt was made in some commercial treaties to establish that a blockaded port had to be sufficiently guarded so as to render a ship "in imminent danger of capture" if it attempted to run the blockade.

The laws governing contraband of war have a long history. Under a late medieval code, *Conso-*

lato del Mare, all goods destined for an enemy, in belligerent or other ships, were subject to seizure. Early in the seventeenth century, commercial treaties started to distinguish between contraband and noncontraband. The earliest example of this was the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Southampton in 1625. Ordinarily, such treaties contained lists of goods under both categories, but uniformity in such lists was difficult, except that obvious materials of war were always considered contraband. The idea that free ships make free goods was associated with the issue of contraband. In essence, the concept meant that a ship's nationality determined the status of its cargo, and that enemy goods on a neutral ship, excepting contraband, would not be subject to capture on the high seas.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By the time of the American Revolution, a considerable body of customary law existed relative to the rights of neutrals, derived from European commercial treaties and the writings of jurists. Although the law was quite nebulous because it lacked uniformity in practice or means of enforcement, it nonetheless provided a basis for American policy.

A basic tenet of early American foreign policy was to remain free from European conflicts. Known as the Doctrine of the Two Spheres, the Massachusetts Bay Colony had indirectly asserted it in 1644. There were two aspects to this doctrine. One was that a European nation might restrict the trade of its colonials to the mother country although allowing trade between its metropolitan citizens and other metropolitan areas. The other was that wars in Europe between colonial powers would not extend to their colonials and, conversely, those conflicts between their colonies would not spread to Europe. The doctrine failed, for all practical purposes, under the pressures of colonial wars, but the Doctrine of the Two Spheres (the belief that the United States' destiny could be separate from Europe's) was advanced in the Continental Congress's debates over the question of independence. Clearly, this argument is evident in Thomas Paine's influential pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776) Americans saw themselves as victims of British mercantile policy. As long as the colonies were linked to the mother country, they would be drawn inevitably into Britain's wars, ones in which the colonies had no real interest. If they had been allowed to trade freely without restrictions, they would have flourished.

In June 1776 the Continental Congress appointed a committee to draft a declaration of independence and one to develop a plan of government, while also appointing a third committee, chaired by John Adams, to pen a model treaty for the conduct of foreign relations. The committee that worked on the model treaty studied the commercial treaties of Europe and drew from them the provisions on neutral rights that were most likely to be accepted by European nations in commercial relations with the United States.

The Model Treaty of 1776 represented a liberal interpretation of neutral rights. The list of contraband was restricted and short. The treaty called for free trade between countries at war and acceptance of the principle that free ships make free goods. The subsequent treaty of amity and commerce with France, a companion to the treaty of alliance of 1778, contained provisions that Americans had espoused in the model treaty. The United States then sought to make similar treaties with other European nations. When Catherine the Great of Russia issued a declaration of the rights of neutrals in 1780 and called for the formation of the Armed Neutrality to enforce those rights, Americans were optimistic. Although in principle Spain, Holland, and other neutral nations accepted the tenets of the declaration, Holland was the only other country with whom the United States signed a formal treaty during the Revolutionary War. Following the end of the war, the United States signed treaties of amity and commerce with Sweden in 1783, Prussia in 1785, and Morocco in 1787.

Although the United States signed commercial treaties with several nations following the Treaty of Paris (1783), it did not succeed in concluding similar treaties with Britain or Spain, two major maritime powers. Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, Britain had recognized the independence of the United States, even though she treated the fledgling nation with disdain and did not even fully respect the commercial provisions of the treaty to which she had agreed. Although subjected at times to inconveniences, annoyances, and insults, American trade with Great Britain was nonetheless lucrative. No serious problems arose until the outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1793. The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon would seriously threaten America's ability to remain neutral, although the United States sought measures to ensure against becoming involved militarily while at the same time promoting its commercial interests.

The American desire to remain free from European affairs and to stay neutral in European wars was associated with the goal of protecting American neutral rights. One of the reasons for the establishment of a stronger central government under the Constitution of 1787 was a desire to retaliate against British restrictions on American trade. This desire increased as Britain seized enemy goods on American ships and impressed sailors, alleged to be British citizens, serving on American merchant and naval vessels. Both practices violated the principle that free ships make free goods, that a nation's sovereignty applied also to its ships on the high seas. The official nationality of an impressed seaman was irrelevant. The fact that Congress would most likely retaliate against high-handed British measures in defense of national honor alarmed many who felt that the United States might be drawn into the war on the side of revolutionary France.

The American position during the French revolutionary wars was complicated by the fact that the United States had treaties of commerce and alliance with France dating back to 1778. In a technical sense, these treaties violated the Doctrine of the Two Spheres, as well as the principle of impartial treatment of a neutral toward a belligerent. However, the treaties had been consummated during the desperate days of the American Revolution, when doctrine was expendable if necessary to gain alliances that might help secure independence from Great Britain. Under the treaty of alliance, the United States guaranteed to France its territories in America, a provision that the French might invoke if their possessions were attacked. Under the treaty of commerce, the United States would allow French warships and privateers to enter American ports and sell their prizes, something denied to France's enemies. From the French perspective, this enabled them to outfit privateers in American ports. Concerned that the terms of the French alliance might drag the fledgling republic into the European conflagration, President George Washington, with the encouragement of his anti-French secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, sought to pursue a neutral course. This was much to the chagrin of the president's pro-French and anti-British secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson. On 22 April 1793 the president issued his Neutrality Proclamation. In doing so, Washington advised that the United States should "with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." Although the federal courts already had jurisdiction under an act of 24 September 1789 to deal with cases involving international law, Congress nonetheless passed the Neutrality Act of 5 June 1794, giving the courts additional authority.

A test of the terms of the Franco-American treaties came in 1793, when "Citizen" Edmond Genêt, minister to the United States of the French Girondin revolutionary government, arrived in the country in April and was warmly received by the American people. Genêt's activities, however, soon caused the Washington administration considerable consternation. The terms of the 1778 treaty with France, Genêt argued, allowed for the outfitting of French privateers in American ports in order to prey upon British merchant ships. Having arrived in the United States with little money, Genêt also had been instructed to prevail upon the Washington administration for repayment of the American revolutionary war debt owed to France. This money would be used in recruiting American sailors and in funding privateering operations against British shipping. Washington and Hamilton both opposed payment and viewed the outfitting of French privateers as a violation of American neutrality. Even Jefferson, while sympathetic to the French, believed that the United States had to prohibit them from using American ports for hostile purposes.

Ultimately, Genêt's activities convinced Washington to request his recall, and in February 1794 Genêt's successor, Joseph Fauchet, arrived in Philadelphia. A change in the French government that brought the Jacobins into power caused Genêt, who would probably have been executed upon his return to France, to request political asylum from Washington, who granted it. Washington's demand for Genêt's recall had prompted the French government to ask for the corresponding recall of the American minister to France, Gouverneur Morris, whose involvement in French politics had irritated the French revolutionary government. Washington had sent U.S. Supreme Court chief justice John Jay on a special mission to England, causing the French to fear an Anglo-American rapprochement in spite of the 1778 Franco-American treaty. In an attempt to allay French fears and suspicions, Washington appointed James Monroe of Virginia, a well-known pro-French Jeffersonian, to replace Morris as American minister to France.

In seeking to reduce tensions between the United States and Great Britain, Jay's mission to London secured a treaty of commerce and naviga-

tion. Jay's Treaty of 19 November 1794 was, in some ways, more remarkable for what it did not contain than what it included. For the first time, Great Britain had signed a commercial treaty, though limited in scope, with an independent United States. Most lacking in the treaty, however, was any reference to the British practice of impressing American seamen. On the principle that free ships make free goods, Jay conceded an important neutral point. When terms of the treaty leaked out, Americans, especially Jeffersonian Republicans, denounced it. To many, including the French, the treaty was viewed as a betrayal of the French alliance and a pro-British move by a Federalist administration. In response, the French renewed their seizure of American merchant vessels, intervened in American politics, and laid the groundwork for the reestablishment of a French empire in North America. Despite the treaty's limitations, and with mixed feelings, President Washington signed it. One of the indirect consequences of the treaty was a new settlement with Spain in the form of Pinckney's Treaty of October 1795. Fearing that Jay's Treaty foreshadowed an Anglo-American alliance that would threaten Spanish territories in North America, Spain acquiesced to most American demands. It agreed to a narrowed list of contraband, the right to trade with belligerents except under conditions of an effective blockade, and acceptance of the principle that free ships make free goods.

Jay's Treaty not only had a significant impact on American foreign relations; it was also important to American domestic politics. Reaction to the treaty contributed to the development of formal political parties in the United States: Republicans, who were basically pro-French, and Federalists, who were basically pro-British. When details of Jay's Treaty became known to the French, they were convinced that the Federalist administration was pro-British and was repudiating its obligations to its revolutionary war ally. On 2 July 1796 the French government announced that it would treat neutral powers the way the British treated them; namely, France would renew its seizure of American merchant vessels. When Republican James Monroe, who had replaced Gouverneur Morris as minister to France, suggested that Federalists like Washington and Adams would be thrown out of office in the election of 1796, the president recalled him. The Directory, the new French government, determined that it would not receive another American minister plenipotentiary until its grievances had been resolved.

Efforts to resolve the issues between the two countries produced the notorious XYZ Affair, in which French officials sought to bribe an American delegation for the mere privilege of meeting with them. In response to this perceived insult Congress, during the summer of 1798, declared all treaties with France abrogated. President John Adams, who had succeeded George Washington, was authorized to employ the navy to protect American merchant ships from French spoliation in the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, American merchant vessels were authorized to arm themselves for defensive purposes and to seize French armed vessels if attacked. On 2 March 1799, Congress created the Department of the Navy.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The so-called Quasi-War with France lasted until 1801. President Adams wisely took advantage of a change in the French government and negotiated the Convention of 1800, destroying his chances at reelection in 1796. Many Federalists, including Hamilton, who sought a war with France and an Anglo-American rapprochement, felt betrayed by Adams. The convention abrogated the 1778 alliance with France, but retained the commercial provisions and liberal definition of neutral rights characteristic of the earlier commercial treaty. This agreement, together with the Peace of Amiens (1802) that temporarily ended the European war, enabled the United States to pursue a course independent of the European conflict while at the same time maintaining its neutral rights. Under the provisions of the Convention of 1800, the interdiction on American trade pertaining to all countries except Great Britain and France was removed, and the president was authorized to permit trade with the two great powers if they should cease violating the neutral trade of the United States. However, with the resumption of war between Great Britain and France, and its expansion by 1805 with the formation of the Third Coalition against Napoleon, each side sought to gain advantage by shutting off the other's trade. In this deadly duel between the leading belligerents, neutral rights were once again neither recognized or respected.

In 1805, in the case of the *Essex,* a British admiralty court ruled that the practice by which American ships carried goods from French colonies to France, with only a brief stop in an American port, did not constitute a broken voy-

age but, in reality, was a continuous voyage. Thus, French goods were not neutralized and were therefore subject to seizure. Consequently, Britain passed a series of orders in council designed to impose a blockade of all ports controlled by France, thereby forcing American vessels to go first to Great Britain, pay fees, and allow their goods to be subject to search and seizure. France retaliated with its Berlin and Milan Decrees, placing an embargo on all trade with Britain, and ordering the seizure of all ships that had paid the fees demanded by the Orders in Council, arguing that neutral vessels which did so were no longer neutral but British, and thus liable to seizure. Subsequent decrees also allowed for the arrest of American ships in ports controlled by France and the confiscation of their cargoes. These and subsequent acts and other retaliatory measures by both belligerents, although primarily directed toward each other, nonetheless violated American rights and severely threatened American trade with Europe and its colonies. Lacking effective military and naval power to protect its shipping, the United States attempted through negotiations with Britain, and peaceable economic coercion directed at both Britain and France, to force both belligerents to respect American neutral rights. The Monroe-Pinkney Treaty (1806) with Britain failed to achieve guarantees for American neutral rights. In fact, so unsatisfactory was the treaty that President Thomas Jefferson refused even to submit it to the Senate for ratification.

Calculating that American trade was essential to the British, and to a lesser extent to the French, the United States employed coercive measures, beginning with the Non-Importation Act of 1806. This measure prohibited certain British manufactures from being exported to the United States. In 1807 Jefferson imposed the Embargo Act, a measure that prohibited American ships from leaving American ports. Although many American merchant vessels failed to adhere to the embargo, particularly as time elapsed and it failed to achieve its objectives, the embargo still severely restricted American trade, caused a depression, and produced intense political and sectional feelings in the country. In 1809 British minister David Erskine negotiated the Erskine Agreement with the United States, and President Madison prematurely lifted the embargo. When the treaty reached England, it was repudiated by the British government and Madison, somewhat humiliated, was forced to reimpose the embargo.

In 1809, under severe economic and political pressures, the Madison administration replaced the Embargo and the Non-Importation Act with a watered-down version of the embargo known as the Non-Intercourse Act. This measure opened trade to the world, except for Britain, France, and their possessions. In 1810 the Non-Intercourse Act was replaced by Macon's Bill No. 2, which reopened trade with even Britain and France, but stipulated that if one belligerent rescinded its restrictive measures, the United States would then impose nonintercourse against the other. When Napoleon's government implied that it was rescinding the Continental Decrees against American commerce, Madison jumped at the promise on face value when, in reality, France continued to seize American ships and cargoes. As Britain refused to rescind its orders in council when evidence confirmed that France had not actually stopped violating American neutral rights, Madison issued a proclamation, backed by the Non-Importation Act of 1811, prohibiting British goods from being imported into the United States.

Although the United States resented both Great Britain and France, the issues with the British were more long-standing and had greater impact. Many factors contributed to the War of 1812 with Britain, but certainly violation of American neutral rights, impressment of American seamen, and defense of national honor were major contributing factors. The war ended with neither belligerent achieving its expressed purposes. However, the establishment of peace and the conclusion of an Anglo-American treaty of commerce, as well as an agreement to limit naval armaments on the Great Lakes and to settle boundary and fisheries disputes, launched a new relationship between the two nations. After the Treaty of Ghent of 1814, which ended the war with Britain, and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, there were no major maritime wars for the rest of the century. Thus ended an epoch in the American struggle for neutral rights.

A new phase in the American policy of neutrality was brought about by revolutions in the colonies of Spanish America. Officially, the United States did not play a role in these revolutions and was not particularly concerned about them until such time as any had established permanent governments and therefore warranted recognition as independent states. However, when it looked like one or more European powers might assist Spain in restoring its American empire, President James

Monroe in 1823 issued a message to Congress, largely written by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, that came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. In essence, Monroe's message was a reaffirmation of the Doctrine of the Two Spheres. It also announced that while the United States would refrain from involvement in European affairs, it opposed any further European colonization of the Western Hemisphere, an extension of Europe's political systems to American states, or efforts to interfere in their internal affairs. Although Congress did not confirm the Monroe Doctrine and there was no occasion that developed immediately to test it, it became a cornerstone of American foreign policy and a justification for future acts that attempted to establish U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere in the decades to follow.

From 1823 until the American Civil War, the United States had no serious problems regarding neutrality. It officially maintained a neutral position during the Texas War for Independence (1835–1836) and the Canadian Uprising of 1837. During the Mexican War (1846–1848) the United States was able to establish an effective, and therefore legal, blockade of Mexican ports. When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, Britain and France agreed to a set of principles that were later codified and proclaimed by the leading European nations as the Declaration of Paris of 1856. This declaration acknowledged the long-standing American position that free ships make free goods, and that a blockade must be effective to be legal. It also contained the principles that noncontraband goods on enemy ships should be free from capture and that privateers should not be commissioned. As the United States was unwilling to surrender its right to commission privateers, and as it hoped to secure an additional agreement that all private property except contraband would be free, it failed to endorse the declaration. Ironically, after the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, the United States agreed to adhere to the declaration if its provisions were applied to the Confederacy. This offer was rejected by such nations as Britain and France.

The beginning of the Civil War saw the United States in an anomalous situation regarding its position on neutrality. War was not declared against the Confederacy, nor was belligerent status accorded it. Rather, the administration of Abraham Lincoln considered Union military operations to be a police action against rebellious citizens. Given this view, when Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Confederate ports on 19 April 1861, it was a domestic action and did not have to be effective in order to be legal. However, when Britain declared neutrality on 13 May 1861, it in effect granted the Confederacy belligerent status that, among other things, meant Britain would consider a blockade of Confederate ports subject to the usual rules of international law. Since the United States did not have sufficient naval power to make the blockade effective until later in the war, the Confederate government, while also pursuing diplomatic recognition, hoped that European nations would challenge the blockade's legality. This did not occur, however, largely because Great Britain concluded that its long-term interests would be best served by accepting the Union interpretation of a blockade's effectiveness. Before the end of the war, Confederate trade with Europe was almost completely stifled because of superior Union naval strength and the capture of major Confederate ports.

In addition to its position on blockade, the United States adopted the doctrine of continuous voyage, a principle taken from British prize law: a ship carrying contraband goods for a belligerent could be captured on the high seas in voyage from a neutral port to another neutral port whenever such a port was only a way station and not the ultimate destination of the cargo. The adoption and use of this doctrine by the United States established a precedent in American policy that was useful to Britain and the Allies in their conflict with the Central Powers when the United States was still a neutral state prior to its entry into World War I.

One incident occurred during the Civil War that caused the British to assert their rights as a neutral. This was the *Trent* affair of 8 November 1861, when an American naval vessel on the high seas stopped a British mail steamer, the *Trent*. On board were two Confederate diplomats on their way to England. The ship was boarded and the two diplomats were arrested and sent to prison in Boston. News of this violation of British neutral rights produced an immediate response from the British government, which demanded the release of the Confederates and an apology. For a short time there was even talk of war as the British undertook preparations. On the American side, with no desire for war with Britain given its preoccupation with the challenges of civil war, Secretary of State William H. Seward acquiesced to British demands and conflict was averted.

Aside from the *Trent* affair, the most significant conflict over neutral rights and duties during the Civil War was the construction and outfitting of warships (designed to be commerce raiders). This was significant primarily in relations between the United States and Britain, whose laws permitted—as did international law—the sale of merchant ships to belligerents, but prohibited the sale of warships. The Confederacy sought to circumvent this prohibition by having vessels built ostensibly as merchant ships, but constructed in such a way so as to be easily converted into warships at sea or in a Confederate port. The most notorious case, albeit not the only one, was the Confederate cruiser *Alabama*. The United States contended that Great Britain had failed to live up to its obligations as a neutral by allowing the *Alabama* to leave British waters. The British government asserted that the *Alabama* was a merchant vessel until it was significantly altered and equipped with naval armament in a Confederate port. This controversy continued throughout the Civil War, and was not resolved until the Treaty of Washington in 1871. In addition to the United States being awarded $15.5 million by an international tribunal, the significance of the treaty was in the concession by Great Britain that a neutral had an obligation to use "due diligence" in preventing a ship from being built "in whole or in part" as a warship for a belligerent. Although only signatories were bound by the treaty, the principle was subsequently incorporated in a convention on the rights and duties of neutrals at the Second Hague Conference (1907), the difference being that the imprecise rule of "due diligence" was changed to the obligation of a neutral to use the "means at its disposal."

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

During the years between the American Civil War and the outbreak of World War I, the United States experienced no serious problems connected with its own neutral rights. While promoting its strategic interests, the United States failed in one situation to adhere strictly to its obligations as a neutral nation and to live up to its treaty obligations. During the Panamanian Revolution of 1903, the United States departed from its neutral position by preventing the landing in Panama of Colombian troops attempting to suppress the revolution. In the same action, the United States violated its treaty obligations with Colombia in a 1846 treaty that pledged the United States to guarantee the "rights of sovereignty and property" of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama. In 1921 the United States compensated Colombia for its loss of Panama.

At the Second Hague Conference, the United States sought to secure an agreement on the rights and duties of neutrals that included the principle that had been advocated by the United States since 1784: that noncontraband neutral private property was exempt from capture. Although the conference adopted a convention on neutral rights, so many significant issues remained unresolved, such as the one of private property, that a separate meeting of the major maritime powers was organized to consider those issues. They met in London in 1908, and the following year issued the Declaration of London. The declaration provided for the most extensive and, as far as neutrals were concerned, the most liberal rules governing neutral trade that had ever been achieved. Although they did not prohibit the capture of private property, they did enumerate an extensive list of free goods and limited the principle of continuous voyage to absolute contraband. Universal acceptance of the declaration would have benefited neutral trade with belligerents, and it would have assisted those belligerents who would have profited from such trade. However, it would have restricted other belligerents in the exercise of rights previously recognized under generally acceptable rules of international law. Consequently, Britain rejected the Declaration of London, and as universal ratification was not achieved, the United States did not ratify the treaty, although the Senate had consented to it.

When World War I began the United States, under President Woodrow Wilson, issued a declaration of neutrality on 4 August 1914. Issues concerning American neutral rights arose most seriously with Britain and Germany. The British did not establish a traditional close blockade of German ports. Rather, it gradually expanded the contraband list to include goods that could be used to manufacture war materials and those that would be of significant value to the German war effort. The British also made extensive use of the doctrine of continuous voyage. The United States protested British maritime practices; however, Britain possessed a basis in international law for its policies. No precise lists of contraband had ever been universally accepted. The idea that some materials on a free list might become contraband had been a feature of treaties since the

seventeenth century. During the American Civil War, the United States had added naval stores and "articles of like character with those specifically enumerated" to the contraband list. The doctrine of continuous voyage was also firmly based in international practice and had been sanctioned by the United States during the Civil War. Even under the Declaration of London (1909), in which the principle of continuous voyage was limited to absolute contraband, the legal extension of such contraband was admitted. Although the United States might have protested the extremes to which Britain carried its maritime policies, it had no solid basis in international law to deny their validity, nor did it grant to the Allies rights prohibited to the Central Powers. General American sympathy for the Allied cause, plus ties of culture and economics, precluded the United States from forcefully defending its neutral rights, or engaging in retaliation as it had during the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, Germany's reliance upon the submarine, which caused not only property damage but also the loss of lives, came for most Americans to overshadow any actions by Great Britain.

The conflict between the United States and Germany stemmed largely from German insistence upon the use of unrestricted submarine warfare. The United States did not oppose a German blockade of Allied ports if the blockade were proclaimed and effective, nor did it deny the right of Germany to stop neutral ships on the high seas and to seize both the cargo and the ship if it carried contraband. In an attempt to break the tightening of the British blockade and deny the British supplies from across the Atlantic, Germany—in a proclamation of 4 February 1915—declared a war zone in the waters around Britain, including the English Channel. Germany threatened to sink all merchant vessels, including neutrals, without warning or providing for the safety of passengers and crew. The United States replied on 10 March 1915 that if American ships were so destroyed or American lives lost, this would be "an indefensible violation of neutral rights" and that it would "take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property."

Although early attacks on American ships prompted protests from the United States, it was not until the sinking of the British liner *Lusitania* on 7 May 1915, with the loss of 1,198 lives, including 128 Americans, that the American government vehemently protested. In the first *Lusitania* note from the Wilson government to Germany, the United States insisted that German submarines stop firing on merchant vessels. In a second *Lusitania* note, the United States threatened direct action if Germany did not stop its unrestricted use of the submarine against merchant vessels. In a conciliatory reply and an offer for compensation, Germany sought to defuse the situation with the United States. However, on 19 August 1915 the British liner *Arabic* was sunk, claiming two Americans. To stave off possible American retaliation, Germany issued the so-called *Arabic* Pledge, a promise that submarines would not attack passenger ships without providing warning and making provisions to rescue passengers and crews. In March 1916 a German submarine torpedoed the French liner *Sussex,* resulting in the injury of two Americans. From the American perspective, this appeared to be a violation of the *Arabic* Pledge and Wilson threatened to break off diplomatic relations. The German government once again tried to assuage the Americans by reaffirming the *Arabic* Pledge.

Germany had failed to achieve military victory by the summer of 1916. With serious political and social problems developing at home, and the German high command concerned about the will of the German people to continue the war, a last major all-out offensive on the western front was planned for the spring of 1917. In a desperate gamble designed to deprive the Allies of vital foodstuffs and materials, the German government resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917, fully aware that this was likely to bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. Following the sinking of several U.S. ships by German submarines in March, the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Several factors contributed to American entry into the war, but preservation of neutral rights was a key one.

By the end of World War I, President Wilson had determined that in the interests of humanity, as well as national security, a new approach to world peace was necessary. He was able to convince most of the major statesmen in the world to accept this need and the Covenant of the League of Nations was the outcome. The signatories to the covenant agreed "to preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." If a member of the league resorted to war in disregard of its obligations under the covenant, then members of the league would prohibit all

trade and financial relations with the covenant-violating state. Furthermore, nonmembers of the league would also be required to abide by these sanctions. Thus, the traditional rights of neutrals to trade with belligerents would be prohibited. However, when Japan violated the Covenant in 1931 by invading Manchuria, and Italy followed in 1935 with its invasion of Abyssinia, the league failed to impose sanctions at all in the first case, and only partially and ineffectively in the second. The league system of collective security collapsed. The extent to which American refusal to join the league contributed to the failure of the League of Nations failure is debatable.

In the twenty years after World War I, the United States rejected the League of Nations, pursued nationalistic economic policies, promoted naval arms limitations, and signed feeble and useless pacts, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the London Naval Treaties of 1930 and 1936. At the same time it focused overwhelmingly on domestic affairs and displayed apparent indifference to the moral and political disintegration of world order. When the specter of another world war arose, the nation naively sought to isolate itself from world affairs and pursued safety in the abandonment of its once-cherished neutral rights, for which it had fought two foreign wars. American neutrality had never meant simply noninvolvement in world affairs. Rather, it meant the determination to support the rights of its people under rules of international law that, in turn, would contribute to the civilized conduct of nations.

This reversal of America's traditional policy was accomplished through a series of congressional neutrality acts commencing in 1935 and reaching their most comprehensive form in the Neutrality Act of 1937. Believing that American insistence upon its historical defense of neutral rights, along with the greed of bankers and arms merchants, had helped to suck the United States into World War I, Congress passed legislation that in essence repudiated traditional American views of neutral rights. Under these acts, if the president determined that a "state of war" existed among two or more foreign states, American citizens were prohibited from exporting arms, munitions, or implements of war to belligerents or to neutrals for transshipment to belligerents, or to a state where civil strife existed. The selling of securities or making of loans was prohibited, as was travel by American citizens on belligerent ships. American merchant vessels were not to be armed, and they were prohibited from carrying materials of war. Nonprohibited goods could be sold to belligerents, provided the title to them was transferred before being transported abroad. By renouncing its historical interpretation of neutral rights, so the thinking went, the United States could hope to escape being drawn into another foreign war.

Commensurate with this "new neutrality" policy, the United States moved to strengthen relations with Latin American nations. The Neutrality Act of 1937 specifically exempted Latin American states from its application in case of war between one or more of them and a non-American state. In a series of conferences between the United States and Latin America, beginning at Buenos Aires in 1936, the American republics agreed to preserve their neutrality and to act in concert in the event of any threat to their safety or independence. However, when war broke out in Europe and the United States began to alter its neutrality policies, it acted independently of its Latin American neighbors. During World War II some Latin American states that remained neutral referred to their status as "nonbelligerency," a term without precise meaning in international law, but in reality an extension of commercial rights to the United States not accorded to other belligerents.

The "new neutrality" policy failed for many reasons. In actuality, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt the United States was not about to stand idly by and let the world be dominated by the aggressors who had signed the Tripartite Pact. Presidential acts as well as congressional measures eroded the new policy. President Roosevelt refused to recognize that a state of war existed between Japan and China, or between Russia and Finland. In the destroyers-for-bases deal of 1940, he sold or traded World War I–vintage warships to Great Britain, and extended the Monroe Doctrine to include the mid-Atlantic. In 1939 Congress repealed the arms embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1937, cut trade with Japan, and passed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, which in effect made the United States an unofficial ally of the nations opposing the Axis. By the end of October 1941, a virtual state of war existed between Germany and the United States, with President Roosevelt convinced that formal war would break out over some incident in the Atlantic between the two countries. However, as Japan was bent upon establishing its "greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere," Roosevelt—in an effort to pressure the

Japanese to relinquish their conquests in China and Southeast Asia—ultimately cut off all exports to Japan. Convinced that the United States meant to strangle Japan, its government in 1941 undertook plans to attack and, if possible, destroy the American Pacific fleet. When the attack on Pearl Harbor came on 7 December 1941, followed in quick succession with an American declaration of war on the Japanese Empire and German and Italian declarations of war on the United States, history witnessed the end of the United States as a neutral nation, at least in a traditional sense.

Prior to the formal conclusion of World War II, the United States reversed its traditional policy for the second time since 1920 by playing the leading role in establishing the United Nations. While the Charter of the United Nations differed significantly from the Covenant of the League of Nations, its impact on the concept of neutrality was basically the same. The Security Council of the United Nations was assigned the primary responsibility for world peace and for taking action against a state deemed to have threatened the peace of the world. Such action could be in the form of economic sanctions, which have had the effect of eroding the historical rights of neutrals.

Because of the preeminent political, economic, and military position of the United States in world affairs since the end of World War II, the nation was involved in numerous armed conflicts, some of which, like Vietnam, were protracted, even though war was never declared. The United States intervened, covertly and overtly, throughout the world where it felt its interests, or its vision of a desirable world order, was threatened, with little regard to concepts of neutral rights. In other situations, such as in the Korean War or the Persian Gulf War, the United States operated under the umbrella of the United Nations. Neutrality, a cornerstone of American foreign policy since before the establishment of the republic, was no longer relevant. Although there were some in the United States who hoped the country could once again return to an independent, neutral position in the world, President Harry S. Truman and other policymakers pursued international economic and military policies that were essential for the promotion of international trade, expansion of democratic ideals, prevention of another postwar depression, and stopping the spread of communism.

The wartime conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, followed by a series of Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings, were characterized by mutual suspicion and mistrust, and foreshadowed the rivalry that would come to be called the Cold War. Although the Western powers were already skeptical of Soviet intentions in territories they had liberated in Eastern Europe, the issue over Iran gave cause for Western alarm. In late 1945 a communist-orchestrated revolution broke out in the oil-rich region of Azerbaijan in northern Iran, particularly when the Soviets sent troops and arms to assist the revolutionaries. In addition, the Soviets failed to pull out of Iran in March 1946, as they had agreed previously. Although the Soviets withdrew in May after receiving minor concessions from Iran, their actions in the Near East, commensurate with increasing tensions in Eastern Europe, helped convince Truman that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin meant no good. Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in March 1946, a United States decision against a loan to the Soviets, the termination of German reparations to the USSR from the American occupation zone in Germany, American promotion of the Baruch Plan to control atomic weapons testing and development, and other issues concerning Germany heightened the feelings of mistrust between the Western powers and the Soviets.

The United States was anything but neutral in the Greek civil war and was extremely concerned about Soviet pressure on Turkey. If successful there, the Soviets would gain access to the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the oil-rich Middle East. Western Europe would most likely collapse and the British Mediterranean barrier to Soviet expansion and influence would be breached if Greece and Turkey fell.

Fighting had broken out in Greece in December 1944 between rightists, who tended to support the return of the monarchist government in exile, and communists. Under the terms of an uneasy truce reached at Varkiza in February 1946, an election was to be held to determine the form of government, and then another election was to take place for a constituent assembly. However, in the days before the election the conservative government repressed the opposition to the monarchy. By the time the election was to occur in March, both the British and the Americans had reneged on the procedures agreed to at Varkiza. Although a general election and plebiscite were held, the communists boycotted them. The results seemingly indicated support for the return of the king. These actions set off a civil war that was largely internal in origin. Many Americans, however, assumed it was Soviet coordinated, and by the spring of 1947 the situation seemed critical.

The gravity of the Greek situation, coinciding as it did with Soviet demands on Turkey and the notification by Britain in the fall of 1947 that it could no longer afford to maintain its commitments to Greece and Turkey, compelled President Truman to act. The result was what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the provisions of which were enumerated before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. In addressing Congress, Truman stated "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Truman Doctrine, although initially directed at Greece and Turkey, had as its primary goal the "containment" of communism. The Truman Doctrine represented a watershed in American history. This policy it represented became the justification for American intervention, covertly and overtly, in the internal affairs of nations throughout the world, and it formed the basis for the establishment of regional security treaties that were directed against the Soviet Union and its perceived allies. The United States sought to contain communism in Europe through such measures as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the formation of NATO, and virtually every other part of the world witnessed American interventions calculated to stop communism's spread.

In Asia the United States' major concern was China. As World War II came to an end, civil war in China between the nationalist armies under Chiang Kai-shek, and the communists under Mao Zedong, resumed. Each side hoped to secure territory and supplies by accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in China and Manchuria. Although outwardly encouraging talks between the two rival factions, the United States nonetheless moved its troops and transported nationalist soldiers into key eastern and northern Chinese cities in order to accept the Japanese surrender. In northern China and Manchuria, fighting broke out between the two groups. The communists were assisted by the Soviets in Manchuria, and the nationalists were assisted by the Americans. Although American lend-lease assistance to its other allies had ended, it was continued in the case of China. In January 1946 it seemed that there was a glimmer of hope when President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China as a special envoy to get the two sides to talk. The truce, however, proved illusory as each side maneuvered to gain the upper hand. The resulting civil war was one of the most bitter and devastating in modern history. In the end, Chiang Kai-shek could not command the same level of popular support as Mao and the communists proclaimed victory in October 1949, with Chiang fleeing to Taiwan. The "loss" of China subjected the Truman administration to severe political criticism for not doing enough for China. In the final analysis, short of an all-out effort to support the Nationalists, nothing could have been done to prevent their defeat. Also, for Truman the most important foreign policy priority was shoring up Europe against Soviet threats. The thirty-year treaty of alliance negotiated by Mao and the Soviet Union in 1950 was further evidence to many Americans that worldwide communism was being orchestrated by the Soviets. As far as China was concerned, American efforts to contain communism had failed.

For the United States, intervention in Asian affairs would prove extremely frustrating. Under the umbrella of the United Nations, the Cold War suddenly became a hot war with the eruption of the Korean conflict in 1950, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century the peace between North and South Korea remained precarious. In Vietnam, the United States—influenced by the domino theory and convinced of its ability to impose an outcome because of its superior strength—foolishly involved itself in what was essentially a civil war in Vietnam. For two decades the United States was caught up in a quagmire that, in the end, witnessed consolidation of the country by the communists. What the United States had tried so hard to prevent came about anyway.

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States did not hesitate to intervene in the internal affairs of governments closer to its borders than those of Asia, Europe, the Middle East, or Africa. In countries such as Nicaragua, the United States supported right-wing dictators including General Anastasio Somoza. In Chile the Central Intelligence Agency played a significant role in a coup that saw the overthrow and subsequent death of the popularly elected Marxist president Salvador Allende, who was succeeded by the anticommunist and repressive General Augusto Pinochet. The United States openly intervened in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and other countries because of the belief that American interests were greatly threatened by governments that included communists or suspected communists. However, the stakes were never so high as they were in Cuba, first with the Bay of Pigs inva-

sion in 1961, then with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which saw the world come to the brink of nuclear war as the Americans and Soviets stared down each other.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, the United States did not hesitate to continue intervening in the internal affairs of numerous nations around the word. However, there have been occasions where it sought to maintain the outward appearance of neutrality, particularly in the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). This war threatened to drag in other nations in a geopolitically sensitive part of the world. Passage through the Persian Gulf was threatened, which in turn posed a serious threat to oil interests. While the Soviet Union shrewdly tried to cater to both sides, the United States claimed it was neutral in the conflict. Clearly there was no love lost with Iran, what with the Iran hostage crisis still fresh in Americans' minds, and relations with Iraq had only recently improved after the State Department removed Iraq from the official list of nations that sanctioned terrorism. Although publicly opposed to arms sales to Iraq, the United States nonetheless sent a large quantity of arms and supplies to Iraq's ruler, Saddam Hussein. As the administration of President Ronald Reagan became more involved in the Middle East, its preference for Iraq over Iran became evident. Ironically, in the subsequent Gulf War of 1991, the United States under President George H. W. Bush put together a United Nations coalition of forty-eight countries against Hussein.

It may be premature to suggest that the concept of neutrality has come full circle since the Treaty of Westphalia and that the historical rights of neutrals under international law no longer exist. Conceivably, a war could take place in which the United Nations would not interfere and belligerents and neutrals would assert their traditional rights. However, given the realities of the modern world, particularly since the end of World War II, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this does not seem to be a likely prospect. In the years since 1941, the traditional concept of American neutrality seems to have been irreversibly transformed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bernath, Stuart L. *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy.* Berkeley, Calif., 1970. A superb monograph that examines the doctrine of continuous voyage.

Borchard, Edwin M., and William P. Lange. *Neutrality for the United States.* 2d ed. New Haven, Conn., 1940. Focuses on the issues involving American neutrality during the 1930s.

Bowman, Albert Hall. *The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy During the Federalist Era.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1974. An excellent account of the early problems with France, particularly from the French perspective.

Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945.* New York, 1979. In this comprehensive account of Roosevelt's diplomacy, the president fares well given the constraints under which he operated.

DeConde, Alexander. *Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy Under George Washington.* Durham, N.C., 1958. One of the standard works on politics and diplomacy during the Washington administration, it examines European-American conflicts over neutrality.

———. *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801.* New York, 1966. The most authoritative work on the subject.

Devlin, Patrick. *Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality.* New York, 1975. Considerable attention is given to the legal problems of neutrality.

Divine, Robert A. *The Illusion of Neutrality.* Chicago, 1962. A scholarly survey of the origins and consequences of the Neutrality Acts of 1935 to 1939.

Drummond, Donald F. *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937–1941.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1955. A good overview of the history of American neutrality, with an emphasis on the forces and events that transformed American policy between 1937 and 1941.

Fenwick, Charles G. *International Law.* 4th ed. New York, 1965. A good general survey of the principles of international law.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961.

Horsman, Reginald. *The Causes of the War of 1812.* Philadelphia, 1962.

Jessup, Philip C., et al. *Neutrality: Its History, Economics, and Law.* 4 vols. New York, 1936. The most authoritative and detailed study on the history of neutrality up to its publication date.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson.* 5 vols. Princeton, N.J., 1947–1965. The most comprehensive study of Woodrow Wilson, whose neutrality policies are explored in volumes 3 through 5.

May, Ernest R. *The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917.* 2d ed. Chicago, 1966.

Meecham, J. Lloyd. *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960.* Austin, Tex., 1961. Includes accounts of American efforts to secure a unified neutrality policy and hemispheric security with Latin America prior to and during World War II.

Ørvik, Nils. *The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–1941.* Oslo, Norway, 1953.

Pares, Richard. *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763.* Oxford, 1938. Although an older work, it has relevance for understanding eighteenth-century maritime law.

Perkins, Bradford. *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812.* Berkeley, Calif., 1961. A fine study of Anglo-American conflicts that led to the War of 1812.

———. *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823.* Berkeley, Calif., 1964. Examines the Anglo-American conflict over neutral rights.

Porter, David L. *The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939–1940.* Columbia, Mo., and London, 1979. Examines the role of Congress in enacting neutrality revision.

Savelle, Max. *The Origins of American Diplomacy: The International History of Angloamerica, 1492–1763.* New York, 1967. The most detailed examination of European treaties and agreements that helped shape early American foreign policy relative to the Doctrine of the Two Spheres.

Trefousse, Hans J. *Germany and American Neutrality, 1939–1941.* New York, 1951. A study of the German response to American neutrality policies prior to U.S. entry into World War II.

See also ARMED NEUTRALITIES; BLOCKADE; CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY; THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM; DOCTRINES; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; NAVAL DIPLOMACY; TREATIES.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Klaus Larres

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C. On behalf of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Dean Acheson, secretary of state throughout President Harry S. Truman's second term. The founding members of the Atlantic alliance consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Italy. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on 21 July 1949 by a vote of 82 to 13; it entered into force on 14 August 1949. By joining the North Atlantic pact, the Truman administration turned its back on the many voices in the American political establishment and the country at large that favored a return to the political isolationism of the interwar years. After all, isolationists were able to go as far back as George Washington's Farewell Address, in which he admonished his fellow Americans to beware of the Europeans and "to have with them as little political connection as possible." But U.S. membership in the United Nations in 1945 had indicated that the country intended to stay involved in international political affairs. Subsequently, the 1947–1948 Marshall Plan made clear that the United States felt it was in its national interest to use its massive economic and financial resources to help in the reconstruction of Europe. This, it was hoped, would stabilize the old continent, prevent it from becoming once again a hotbed of nationalist fervor and civil war and, not least, make it immune to the forces of international communism. But even after the European Recovery Program (ERP) had been announced, it was still a major step to enter into a close military association. By committing the United States to NATO and thus to a formal and long-lasting entangling military alliance in peacetime, the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 marked, as Lawrence Kaplan put it, a "radical transformation in American foreign policy."

It is unlikely that this almost revolutionary development in U.S. political thinking would have come about without the Cold War and the global ideological and political power struggle with the Soviet Union. With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty the United States indicated its willingness—after much prodding by the United Kingdom and other leading European nations—to accede to the role of protector of western Europe. The Truman administration clearly hoped that with the help of both the Marshall Plan and NATO, U.S. influence, and indeed its example, would help the countries of the old continent to integrate their political and above all economic and military systems in a peaceful and stabilizing way. It was expected that eventually a united and federally organized Europe would evolve in a manner similar to the development of the United States 150 years previously.

One should not credit the leading U.S. politicians of the day and organs like the State Department's Policy Planning Staff too much with a visionary long-term strategy: much came about by default and by means of ad hoc reactions to unexpected developments. Still, quite a few elements of a coherent and well-considered strategy can be detected in American foreign policy after World War II. Much thought was for example dedicated to the perennial German question. It was hoped that the unification of the European continent would defuse the German problem by incorporating this large and potentially still powerful and economically important country into a peaceful and fully integrated European system.

In view of the perceived military threat from the Soviet Union and the weakness of the Western world in terms of conventional warfare capabilities, America's unrivaled nuclear security umbrella was initially gladly accepted by all members. In fact, possession of the atomic bomb and Washington's apparent willingness to use this weapon if necessary in response to an attack on any NATO member was the basis for Washington's hegemonic position in the Atlantic alliance. NATO

allowed the United States to carve out a clear sphere of interest for itself. Washington's overwhelming military and also economic and political strength as well as its supremacy within NATO and the Western alliance enabled the United States to form what in the 1960s came to be called bluntly "the American Empire." In the 1970s and 1980s, when Europe's important role in the early Cold War and the creation of NATO was belatedly recognized, many historians began to refer to Washington's dominance somewhat more benevolently as an "empire by invitation." Yet the existence of American hegemony was disputed by very few European observers. Americans, however, often tended to regard their country's superiority in the Western alliance as the realization of Thomas Jefferson's well-meaning "empire of liberty." While to some extent Washington's role as a benign but still vastly powerful and at times quite autocratic leader rested on its economic strength and its political influence, primarily it was American dominance of NATO that furnished it with formidable global importance.

This explains why both the Bush and the Clinton administrations strongly objected to any thoughts of abandoning NATO after the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. The largely unchallenged American dominance of NATO was the most important and most powerful tool at the disposal of the United States to maintain its influence in Europe and beyond. More than a decade later this was still the case. In view of the increasingly frequent economic and trade as well as political and strategic disagreements in transatlantic relations in the early twenty-first century, Washington's efforts to bolster NATO and turn it into one of its main pillars of influence in the contemporary world was hardly surprising. NATO still provided the United States with a crucial instrument of global leadership. Moreover, in the aftermath of the entirely unexpected terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., in September 2001, NATO would also serve as the instrument that was able to provide the United States with crucial military and logistic help and indeed much needed political and moral support in the war against international terrorism.

CREATION OF NATO

The establishment of NATO in April 1949 rested upon a European and in particular a British initiative. As John Lewis Gaddis has written, it was "as explicit an invitation as has ever been extended from smaller powers to a great power to construct an empire and include them within it." However, in the circumstances of the times, considerations about American empire building and American dominance played a rather minor role. The Europeans were looking for military protection and economic and military aid to ensure their survival as democratic states. Some American observers have therefore concluded that the western Europeans deviously "entrapped" the United States. This is unjustified. The American political establishment of the time—both the Democratic administration and, until the election of 1948, the Republican leadership of Congress—realized very well that putting a stop to Soviet expansionist encroachments and maintaining democratic states with a liberal economic order on the European continent were very much in the national interest of the United States.

Yet, admittedly, without strenuous European attempts to persuade the Truman administration to come to the rescue of the European nation-states, American involvement might never have come about. What proved to be decisive for American support in both the economic and military sphere was evidence of European willingness to help themselves. This was Washington's condition for providing financial aid under the Marshall Plan and joining the European nations in talks about setting up a North Atlantic defensive alliance.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, American policymakers, and in particular Secretary of State James Byrnes, were hopeful that some kind of modus vivendi could be found with Stalin's Soviet Union. Yet, this soon proved to be impossible. In March 1946, in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill spoke of the iron curtain that was descending "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic." A month before this well-publicized event, the U.S. diplomat George Kennan had already sent his influential Long Telegram from the Moscow embassy to Washington warning about Soviet expansionist intentions. As a result of these efforts, in the course of 1946 the foreign policy elite in Washington and American public opinion were becoming rather critical of Stalin's activities. It was a slow process, however, and the turning point only came in 1947. The tightening of Moscow's grip on the states of Eastern Europe, frequent difficulties with Moscow's ambitions in Turkey, Greece, and else-

where, and increasingly tense East-West relations in occupied Germany made many contemporaries slowly aware of the apparently irreconcilable nature of Soviet and Western political aims. Of great importance was the ever more apparent economic weakness of Britain and the unsustainable nature of the country's long-standing imperial role. Crucially significant also was the state of near starvation and the considerable political and economic instability of much of western Europe. This propelled the United States into action.

In the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947, the United States declared that it would respond to the British request to assume responsibility for the support of the anticommunist forces in Greece and Turkey. Moreover, much less to Britain's liking, Truman also promised American support for the worldwide fight against international communism. Three months later, Secretary of State George Marshall, Acheson's predecessor, announced the European Recovery Program (ERP) in his speech at Harvard University on 5 June. The Marshall Plan was meant to provide economic assistance to the states of western Europe to enable them to withstand the onslaught of communist fifth columns. Otherwise communism's ideological temptations might well have held a tremendous attraction for the peoples of Europe who lacked food, housing, and heating fuel.

It was Washington's intention to stabilize and reconstruct the continent with the help of generous economic and financial aid. American policymakers recognized that only a united western Europe at peace with itself would be able to create a common front against the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union. Only such a Europe would ensure the reconciliation of Germany with the countries of the Western world while avoiding tendencies toward neutralism and defeatism. Underlying America's postwar vision was the assumption that only a fully integrated, stable, and economically viable Europe would develop into a peaceful and democratic continent. The lessons from America's own past as well as the country's federalist structure were to serve as the model to achieve a single European market. This would prevent economic nationalism, lead to European prosperity, and form a truly free and multilateral transatlantic economic system.

It also was expected that in due course this strategy would have the advantage of making unnecessary the continuation of American economic aid to western Europe. Active American governmental support and interference were always regarded as temporary. It was hoped that European reconstruction would close the dollar gap, permit the convertibility of European currencies, allow the Europeans to export to the United States, and, not least, create a huge market for U.S. exporters. The latter would be important in avoiding the predicted domestic American recession. Washington therefore stipulated that most of the goods purchased with Marshall Plan aid had to be bought in the United States.

In his speech at Harvard, Marshall had spelled out that while the United States would give generous economic aid, the initiative for proposals on how best to make use of this aid for reconstruction and economic revival had to come from the Europeans themselves. British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin realized this; he regarded Marshall's offer as "a life-line to sinking men" to avert "the looming shadow of catastrophe" over western Europe. Together with his French counterpart Georges Bidault, he organized an international conference in Paris in June and July 1947. The conference led to the formation of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation and to the acceptance of decisive American economic and political involvement in the internal affairs of the countries of western Europe. Eventually, in April 1948, the European Recovery Program was set up and a new European Payments Union and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were established. The latter was the organ responsible for the distribution of Marshall Plan aid to sixteen European nations and the western zones of Germany. Due to European disagreements and contrary to its original intention, Washington decided to become a direct participant in the running of the OEEC.

The Soviet Union, however, declined to accept the liberal-capitalist economic conditions Washington imposed as a precondition for participation in the ERP. Moreover, Moscow prevented Eastern European states like Poland and Czechoslovakia from accepting U.S. aid. According to some historians, the Soviet Union's self-exclusion may well have been a result secretly hoped for in Washington, as the United States had no interest in using American taxpayers' money to support the economic reconstruction of the communist world. Be this as it may, the nonparticipation of Eastern Europe meant that the Marshall Plan and the OEEC contributed to the widening of the economic, ideological, and political gulf in postwar Europe.

Although Marshall's speech was received with a great deal of hope in Europe, throughout

1947 and most of 1948 fear of a military invasion from the East stalked the western part of the continent. The spirit of the times was characterized by despondency and fatalism. Not only were Greece, France, and Italy, with their large communist parties, on the brink of civil war, but East-West relations in Germany, with the eastern zone firmly controlled by Stalin's lieutenants, were becoming ever icier. Questions such as reparations, four-power control of Germany's industrial heartland (the Ruhr Valley), and the desirability of the reestablishment of a central and united state were among the most contested.

It was the collapse of the London foreign ministers conference in December 1947 over disagreements regarding the future of Germany and the February 1948 communist coup and subsequent purges in Czechoslovakia that were decisive. These moved the United States toward participation in an Atlantic defense organization. In early 1948 both Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault impressed on American leaders the urgency of the situation. Ever since he had become British foreign secretary in July 1945, it had been Bevin's primary aim to persuade the United States to remain committed to the security and well-being of the European continent. But in the absence of a lasting U.S. commitment to Europe, Bevin, in response to a French initiative, had signed the Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March 1947. It established an Anglo-French bilateral military alliance with an anticipated duration of fifty years; the formal aim of the treaty was the prevention of renewed German militarism. Yet for both Britain and France the Dunkirk treaty represented merely a second-best solution as it did not involve the United States.

Shortly after the collapse of the foreign ministers conference, Bevin explained his idea of a Western union to Marshall and Bidault, who both heartily endorsed a new political and defensive agreement among Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. Bevin insisted, however, on the need for American assistance and participation in a loose and flexible "spiritual federation of the West." He told Marshall that the "salvation of the West depends on the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the [British] Dominions." During an impressive speech in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948, Bevin officially proposed the establishment of a western European union; he did not hesitate to spell out that such a treaty would be directed against the threat posed to western Europe by the Soviet Union. The impact of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February and increasing Soviet intransigence over Berlin, which by June had led to the Berlin blockade crisis, confirmed the importance of Bevin's pronouncements.

On 17 March 1948 a treaty for European economic, political, cultural, and military cooperation with a duration of fifty years was signed in Brussels. Participants of this multilateral treaty, the anti-German tone of which was much milder than that of the Dunkirk treaty, were Britain, France, and the three Benelux countries. Unlike the Dunkirk treaty arrangements, the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) could be enlarged to include other members. The values of self-help and cooperation were emphasized in the treaty to impress the United States and, indeed, President Truman warmly welcomed the new organization. Nevertheless, the United States still needed to be persuaded to accept a European security commitment. Truman's enthusiastic welcome of the BTO and his unusual decision to maintain conscription in time of peace were hopeful signs.

Almost immediately after the Brussels treaty was concluded, top-secret Pentagon talks between Britain and the United States and Canada about the setting up of a North Atlantic defense organization took place. It is unlikely that these talks would have taken place without the prior formation of the BTO. However, the establishment of transatlantic military cooperation was still viewed in terms of cooperation between the BTO and the United States; neither American membership in the BTO nor the creation of a new treaty organization was yet envisaged.

Shortly after the Pentagon talks, from July 1948 to March 1949 the BTO and the United States and Canada entered into drawn-out negotiations for the establishment of some sort of Atlantic security organization. The aim of the talks was the achievement of a unanimous decision rather than merely a majority vote. Still, the Truman administration remained cautious. As Lawrence Kaplan has explained, opposition to the establishment of a joint American-European military alliance came from three major camps in the United States.

First, there was the still formidable opposition from isolationists who suspected that America was being asked to pull the European chestnuts out of the fire. These largely emotional and psychological pressures were difficult to satisfy. The administration, and in particular Secre-

tary Acheson, embarked on a major effort of persuasion to win over as many isolationists in Congress as possible by, for example, emphasizing the harmony of interests between the UN Charter and the NATO treaty. But due to congressional pressure, and much to the dislike of the Europeans, Article 5 of the North Atlantic charter, in which an attack on one member was regarded as an attack on all and would lead to a joint war effort, had to be expressed much more vaguely than originally anticipated. Thus, not the Soviet Union or any other potential enemy but the U.S. Congress would in fact decide whether or not the United States would become involved in a war. Essentially, this was the result of the Vandenberg Resolution passed by the Senate in early June 1948. On the whole, however, the compromise achieved by Arthur Vandenberg, the influential Republican senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, only slightly diluted the North Atlantic Treaty. However, when article 5 was invoked for the very first time after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, it occurred in an entirely unforeseen way and for a totally unexpected reason. During the Cold War it had always been expected that the United States would have to come to the aid of European countries to defend them against a Soviet invasion. But in September 2001, article 5 was invoked by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the North Atlantic Council on the request of the U.S. administration to obtain NATO's political and military support in the fight against international terrorism.

Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. military in general were more than doubtful whether the country had the resources to build up a transatlantic military alliance. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs feared that the resources Congress would be able to make available to the American military services would be greatly reduced if Washington decided to rearm the Europeans. Whether or not European rearmament went ahead, in view of Stalin's conventional superiority, the West would be helpless if faced with a Soviet invasion of Europe. Eventually, however, the Joint Chiefs realized that the proposed Mutual Defense Assistance Program would actually enable them to enlarge and modernize the equipment available to the army, navy, and air force. Moreover, the administration's willingness to listen to the military and to agree to rule out the right of any of the future NATO members to automatic military assistance greatly pleased the Joint Chiefs. Instead, bilateral agreements with each member were made the precondition for offering U.S. military aid to western Europe.

Thirdly, supporters of the United Nations and Roosevelt's "one world" concept feared that an "entangling alliance" would revive the despised and dangerous balance-of-power concept of pre–World War II days. Although they recognized that the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council made any use of the United Nations for Western defense purposes difficult, if not impossible, the envisaged alliance appeared to ignore the United Nations altogether. This was a poor precedent that might well threaten to undermine the United Nations fatally. The Truman administration therefore invoked the UN Charter as much as possible in the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty, although they realized, as Kaplan writes, "that there was a basic incompatibility between the treaty and the charter." During the strenuous efforts to sell the North Atlantic Treaty to the country, the administration pretended that NATO was a regional organization of the United Nations (chapter 8, article 53). Wisely, however, no reference to this effect was included in the text of the treaty. After all, regional organizations were obliged to report to the UN Security Council, which would have given Moscow an unacceptable element of influence on NATO.

During the many months of negotiations between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the United States and Canada many other issues became controversial. For example, the question of whether the new organization should be only a strategic or also a political alliance was contentious. In the end, and largely on the insistence of Canada, the envisaged organization was also given a political and ideological role rather than a mere military function. Thus, article 2 emphasized the necessity of economic and social cooperation between the member states, and article 8 stated that no member state should enter into any obligations that conflicted with NATO—in other words, no member state was allowed to go communist. Also, the role of Germany, and how to restrain and integrate Germany into the Western world, was extensively and successfully discussed. At the London conference in the spring of 1948, the three Western allies were therefore able to agree on the radical step of setting up a separate West German state.

Of particular importance were questions of NATO membership, coverage, and duration. Eventually it was decided that there should be no

different categories of membership; countries were either participants or not. For strategic and political reasons it was decided to interpret the term "North Atlantic" loosely. For example, the Algerian departments of France were accepted as being covered by NATO, and countries such as Italy and Portugal (and later Greece and Turkey) were of such strategic importance that they needed to become involved. This meant for example that Antonio Salazar's Portugal, which was hardly a democratic country, was allowed to join. Yet, Spain only became a member in 1982, after the death of fascist dictator Francisco Franco. For largely strategic reasons, Portugal (including the Portuguese Azores) and Italy as well as Norway, Denmark (including Danish Greenland), and Iceland were allowed to accede to NATO in April 1949. They had not participated in the negotiations between the BTO, the United States, and Canada.

By September–October 1948 it had become clear that a new unified alliance would be created rather than a defensive agreement between the Brussels Treaty Organization and a North American organization, as had been envisaged in the Pentagon talks. Most importantly, at around the same time it became obvious that the United States would be a definite member of the new North Atlantic alliance. While the Europeans expected above all to benefit from NATO by means of American protection and military aid, Washington hoped that the existence of NATO would convince the Soviet Union to restrain its expansionist ambitions. Not least the United States expected that due to American participation, the North Atlantic alliance would help to overcome the outdated balance-of-power concept that had dominated European politics for centuries. NATO was therefore meant to contribute decisively to the establishment of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous continent.

NATO CONSTRUCTION AND REARMAMENT

After the establishment of the North Atlantic alliance in 1949, almost immediately two important organs for the running of NATO were set up under article 9 of the treaty: the North Atlantic Council and the Defense Committee. The first council meeting in September 1949 in Washington and the subsequent meetings in late 1949 and early 1950 decided that for the time being the organizational structure of the Brussels Treaty Organization was to be adopted for NATO's use. In addition, the establishment of a united command with a supreme commander and Council of Deputies was also agreed upon. The most important NATO institutions for the next few years were the five regional planning groups (including the Western European Regional Planning Group consisting of the five BTO nations); the Military Committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of the member states with a standing group based in the Pentagon; and a general three-nation standing group of NATO's most crucial members, the United States, Britain, and France. Thus by 1950 a relatively well-integrated alliance structure was taking shape.

It was much more difficult, however, to design a strategic and military concept that would turn NATO from a paper tiger into a real collaborative transatlantic alliance. NATO's first strategic concept was adopted in January 1950, with the United States being mostly responsible for strategic bombing issues, the United Kingdom for naval warfare matters, and the continental Europeans for tactical air warfare issues and the provision of ground troops. However, differences soon surfaced regarding American ideas about the defense of Europe. During the first few years of NATO the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were so pessimistic about the availability of Western military resources that the American defense plans for Europe essentially consisted of the withdrawal of U.S. troops to the Pyrenees and Britain. It was hoped that it might be possible to reconquer the continent at a later stage. Not surprisingly, the Europeans were less than impressed; they insisted on a defense of Europe at the Rhine or ideally at the Elbe. Thus, in May 1950 the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) that took European sensitivities into account was agreed upon. Still, the plan was based largely on the optimistic prognosis that more than ninety divisions and eight thousand planes would be available by 1954. This was highly unrealistic but NATO essentially believed that no Soviet invasion was to be expected in the foreseeable future (1954 was regarded as the danger year). Further, it was assumed that the American atomic monopoly would provide immunity from attack, whatever the availability and readiness of Western conventional forces on the continent. There was great fear that any strenuous rearmament effort by the Europeans would irreparably damage the economic and social reconstruction of the continent.

The explosion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in August 1949 undermined this

confident belief in the American atomic umbrella. After all, the Western alliance had expected that Moscow would not be able to develop atomic weapons for a considerable number of years. Yet, much to the consternation of politicians in Washington, by mid-September firm scientific evidence was available that a Soviet explosion had indeed taken place. Britain was only able to embark on its first atomic test explosion in 1952, and it took France until 1960 to develop an atomic device. Although it was considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able to rival Washington's growing atomic arsenal for a significant period of time, the Truman administration decided to go ahead with the building of a hydrogen bomb.

In the course of 1950 the U.S. government began to doubt whether the resources allocated to the defense of the Western world were sufficient. The result was the controversial document NSC 68, which reflected the increasing militarization of the Cold War. Subsequently, Washington's belief in the necessity of making more radical efforts to rearm the countries of western Europe (including the new West German state) and to expand and modernize America's conventional and nuclear forces was strengthened by the outbreak of war in Korea, which was regarded as another Western failure in Asia after the loss of China to the communists in 1949. In June 1950 communist North Korean forces invaded South Korea, the American protectorate. Parallels were drawn with the precarious position of divided Germany in Europe. It was clear that the envisaged MTDP program was grossly inadequate. Under the impact of the Korean War the huge American and allied rearmament program called for by NSC 68 was signed into law by President Truman. In addition, and despite strong French opposition during the Western head of government conference in September 1950 in Washington, the United States firmly insisted on the rearmament of the new West German state. West German forces as well as the territory of West Germany were needed for the forward defense of the European continent.

Eventually, a compromise was achieved by means of the Pleven Plan, which was based on the recently conceived European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for the integration of the French and German coal and steel industries. Both plans were the brainchild of the influential French businessman and civil servant Jean Monnet. Instead of an independent German army, navy, air force, and general staff, French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed the creation of a multinational European army under the umbrella of a European Defense Community (EDC), which, as Acheson expressed it, would be closely "interlocked" with (and presumably subordinate to) NATO. Approximately ten German divisions would be integrated with other countries' forces at the regimental level to form mixed European divisions that would remain under the command of non-German EDC member states. To make the difficult task of rearming the Germans more palatable to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who would face enormous domestic opposition, he was offered sovereignty for the Federal Republic as a reward. The EDC solution also envisaged the establishment of a European minister of defense, an assembly, and a council of ministers as well as a common defense budget. The persuasive skills of NATO's first allied supreme commander and World War II hero Dwight D. Eisenhower helped to convince the Truman administration that the EDC project was a sensible way of obtaining West German rearmament without antagonizing the other European countries too much. Fears of the reestablishment of Hitler's Wehrmacht were still widespread. Consequently, Washington regarded the realization of the EDC as of vital importance. It was believed that the European army would cement the Western alliance and lead to the establishment of lasting Franco-German friendship, thus strengthening NATO's coherence and preventing future European civil wars.

Although the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952, ratification was a difficult affair. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who succeeded Truman and Acheson in January 1953, were unable to pressure Paris into ratifying the treaty. Ultimately, in the absence of Britain, which was prepared to cooperate with the EDC but not to join it, fear of German dominance of the EDC led the French parliament not to go ahead with the ratification of the EDC treaty in late August 1954. With the exception of the outbreak of the Korean War, this was the most severe crisis of the Atlantic alliance to date. NATO was thrown into turmoil. Washington was particularly shocked. After all, the U.S. administration had hoped that the establishment of the EDC might enable Washington to reduce both its financial and troop commitments to Europe. Instead, the rearmament and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the European integration process and the coherence and military buildup of NATO, had to be reconsidered from scratch.

The British managed to come to the rescue. During two rapidly convened conferences in London and Paris in September and October 1954, and by way of an earlier whirlwind journey through the European capitals, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was able to convince his partners to agree to West German membership in NATO on a nondiscriminatory basis. Eventually, French agreement was won after the negotiation of Bonn's prior admission to the Western European Union (WEU). This was the renamed Brussels Treaty Organization of 1948. By way of West German WEU membership, France and the other member states were to receive a veto over the rearmament and arms procurement activities of the Federal Republic. Eden had also announced during the London conference that despite British sovereignty concerns, his country would not withdraw its Rhine army and tactical air force based in West Germany without the agreement of its WEU partners. As long as U.S. troops remained on the continent, the British would also be prepared to make a European commitment. The "great debate" of 1951 in Washington between the administration and isolationists in Congress about further troop commitments in Europe had already resulted in the dispatch of four additional American divisions to Europe.

Thus, the WEU solution to control German rearmament and London and Washington's commitment to continue deploying troops on the European continent were decisive in persuading France to cease its opposition to West German membership in NATO. Both German rearmament and the unity of the Western alliance had been preserved. Yet the WEU never developed a life of its own. It is fair to say that the development of a European defense identity and a European pillar of NATO—as had been envisaged with the explicit agreement of the United States by means of the EDC—therefore did not commence before the 1980s and 1990s. With the exception of France and despite the occasional crisis in transatlantic security relations, throughout most of the Cold War the western Europeans placidly accepted American predominance in NATO and thus the buildup of the American empire. While Britain believed it could rely on the "special relationship" with the United States to maintain its influence, the West Germans, at the front line of the Cold War, felt too dependent on the American security umbrella to oppose this strongly. Only the French were prepared to challenge American hegemony in Europe.

At the Lisbon North Atlantic Council conference in February 1952, agreement had been reached on a substantial military and political reorganization of NATO. That structure was largely still in place in the early twenty-first century. With regard to the military organization of the alliance, most of the regional planning groups were abolished. Instead, the standing group of the Military Committee would oversee SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), commanded by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe). An Atlantic command (Supreme Allied Command Atlantic, SACLANT) and an English Channel command were established on the same level of responsibility, which included planning issues. SHAPE, which was essentially modeled on the Brussels Treaty Organization headquarters near Paris and took over many of its administrative units, was clearly the most important command. It was subdivided into four geographical commands: Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Mediterranean. While the supreme commanders for Europe and the Atlantic were Americans, the Channel Command was headed by a Briton; all the command posts reported directly to the standing group in Washington. Unlike the failed European Defense Community, in NATO the vast majority of troops were national forces; NATO only mixed nationalities at the various command headquarters.

The Lisbon conference also approved a new political structure. A civilian secretary general (who would always be a European) was to be appointed. The secretary general was to be responsible to the Council of Ministers and in charge of an international secretariat that had responsibility for financial and economic planning and for military production issues. The Council of Deputies was to be replaced by permanent representatives at the ambassadorial level who assumed responsibility when the Council of Ministers was not sitting; their meetings would be chaired by the secretary general. Moreover, despite British protests it was decided to move NATO headquarters from London to outside Paris where it would be closer to SHAPE.

The conference also approved the first enlargement of NATO, which led to the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952. Both countries were of great strategic importance to NATO's southern rim and contributed more than twenty-five valuable divisions. The western Europeans reiterated their willingness to make huge rearmament efforts in the conventional field so that

ninety-six well-equipped divisions (including the West German contingents) would be available by 1954. However, economic and financial realities in western Europe would prevent the achievement of these ambitious and quite unrealistic military goals. With respect to domestic opinion and the obvious limits on the tax burden that could be imposed, no country was willing to adhere to the Lisbon goals.

Still, by 1955 NATO had already expanded its membership twice, had become a much more integrated military alliance with a clear political dimension, and had also seriously attempted to tackle its military weakness. However, it was still in no position to rival the forces at the disposal of the Soviet Union.

CONSOLIDATION

After the Austrian peace treaty in April and the admission of West Germany to NATO in May 1955, the Geneva Four-Power Summit in July inaugurated the first thaw in East-West relations. Although neither the summit conference nor the subsequent Geneva foreign ministers' conference managed to solve any of the many outstanding Cold War problems, the two meetings led to a more relaxed international climate. It appeared to be possible to contain the Cold War in Europe peacefully and agree to disagree, something that was soon called "peaceful coexistence."

Although East-West relations deteriorated temporarily when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in late 1956, the almost simultaneous Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt to reverse nationalization of the Suez Canal shook the Western alliance to its foundations. American anger at not having been consulted and Washington's fear that the British-French action would open the doors of the Middle East to the Soviet Union (as it did) led to the first occasion when the United States and the Soviet Union sided against two western European countries. An American-inspired run on the pound sterling and the effective imposition of an oil embargo on Britain by President Eisenhower had the desired result. Britain gave notice to the French that they would have to withdraw from Egypt, an action that caused a great deal of anti-British resentment in Paris. The Suez crisis made it clear that Britain and France, who still retained a good deal of global influence, were not able to embark on independent international action without the approval and support of the United States. Thus the crisis symbolized the decline of western Europe to the status of a mere satellite continent.

After the Suez crisis American preponderance within the Western alliance, both in its political and strategic dimension, could no longer be doubted. The Europeans increasingly became reactive members who criticized and complained while most constructive initiatives originated in Washington. This was evident during the long Berlin crisis of 1958–1963, which led to a quite unexpected escalation of the Cold War and to the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The Berlin crisis and in particular the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis brought the world close to nuclear war. The August 1963 limited test ban treaty between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and any other state that wished to join was one of the lessons drawn from the missile crisis. Another was the installation of a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow.

Despite the increasing Cold War marginalization of Europe in the second half of the 1950s and during the 1960s, European alliance members played a subordinate but still significant role with regard to the development of NATO's strategic concepts. However, most initiatives came from the United States. Shortly after taking office the Eisenhower administration realized that the conventional force goals as agreed at Lisbon would either remain unrealistic or, if implemented, would undermine American and European economic competitiveness and social well-being. Thus, Washington invented vague concepts with names such as "long haul," "massive retaliation," and "new look," which would obscure the fact that the alliance was unable to develop as quickly and as intensively as originally envisaged.

Although the European alliance members were very critical of the increased reliance on nuclear containment, there was very little they could do. While always prepared to criticize American proposals, NATO's European members were not prepared to put more of their own scarce resources into developing their conventional forces. The only concept they partially agreed with was the "long haul" idea, which essentially consisted of the insight that the frantic rearmament efforts of the Korean War and Lisbon conference era could not be sustained for financial and psychological reasons; the plan was therefore to be stretched out over a longer period of time. However, "massive retaliation" and the "new look," as first outlined in NSC document 162/2 in

late 1953, were very different matters. Because the envisaged conventional rearmament goals were unrealistic and because the production of atomic weapons appeared to be a lot cheaper than conventional warfare methods, the Eisenhower administration intended to focus NATO's strategy on nuclear containment. U.S. officials argued that fear of an American atomic response would prevent any Soviet attack on the countries of the Western alliance. Moreover, getting "greater bang for the buck," as Eisenhower's secretary of defense expressed it, would ensure the maintenance of healthy Western economies and budgets.

The increasing reliance on nuclear diplomacy meant that NATO would have no choice but to respond with atomic weapons if, for example, the Soviet Union invaded West Germany. NATO was all but incapable of retaliating to a communist attack with conventional weapons. Instead it would rely on the so-called "trip-wire" idea: once the Soviet Union attacked Europe and the U.S. soldiers stationed there, Washington's Strategic Air Command would be activated. The implications of such a scenario were most disconcerting for the West Germans and their European neighbors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Radford's 1956 suggestion, as leaked to the *New York Times,* that the United States needed to reduce U.S. troops in Europe to two million by the withdrawal of 800,000 soldiers from the continent, gave rise to great concern. Moreover, the greater the arsenal of intercontinental nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Soviet Union, the larger the question mark in the minds of European leaders about whether or not Washington would be prepared to run the risk of inviting a Soviet attack on American territory by coming to the aid of Europe.

This became a realistic concern in 1957, when Moscow sent *Sputnik,* the first space satellite, into orbit and also managed to launch the first intercontinental ballistic missile. American cities, and not merely European ones, could now be reached by Soviet nuclear bombs. Soon politicians were talking about a "missile gap" to the detriment of the West; this dominated the U.S. election campaign of 1960, although it soon became known that Nikita Khrushchev had been vastly exaggerating the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities. Still, *Sputnik* contributed to the fact that the U.S. government was more than ever in favor of "burden sharing" within the alliance. While the United States would be responsible for enhanced nuclear containment, Washington expected the western Europeans to provide for the cost-intensive conventional means of defending the European continent from any Soviet invasion. However, much to the irritation of the United States, the Europeans were both unwilling and economically unable to dedicate the expected resources to the defense of the Western alliance.

American politicians also became increasingly uneasy about the military implications of "massive retaliation." In the last few years of the Eisenhower administration and in particular with the advent of the Kennedy administration in January 1961, U.S. officials considered plans for replacing this doctrine with a new NATO strategy. Initially, they developed the concept of a shield force, which would include troops equipped with tactical nuclear weapons as well as conventional arms. The administration attempted to persuade Congress that nuclear sharing with the NATO allies, in particular with Britain, was essential for maintaining NATO's credibility. In 1958 this resulted in the repeal of the 1946 McMahon Act, which had forbidden the sharing of nuclear secrets with either friend or foe. In late 1962 it also helped British prime minister Harold Macmillan argue his case with President Kennedy that the canceled Skybolt missile be replaced with American Polaris missiles that the British could equip with their own nuclear warheads. The French were offered a similar deal but turned it down. Under President Charles de Gaulle, France would later insist on military independence.

A new strategic concept, "flexible response," was eventually adopted in 1967. It was meant to allow NATO to respond to an invasion by the Soviet Union with a range of escalating options: use of conventional weapons, use of small tactical atomic weapons, and only finally initiation of a full-scale nuclear war. But this also was a controversial concept. The European NATO allies generally feared that a Soviet and eastern European attack at multiple locations and by multiple means would still give the Western alliance no option but to embark on escalating the conflict into a nuclear counterattack. Moreover, the question remained: Who would decide the use of nuclear weapons by NATO and would the European members be able to influence Washington's decision? As Ian Thomas has recognized, the issues were "command and control" of NATO's nuclear forces. A compromise solution had already been found with the so-called dual key arrangements for the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the host nations had to give their

agreement to the use of these weapons. However, Britain and other European nations were concerned about whether in a sudden emergency the United States would wait for the agreement of the Europeans. After all, despite the looming threat of a global nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, the Americans had not bothered to consult with the Europeans; even the British had hardly been informed. Thus, the anxieties of the Europeans that they might be dragged into a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union against their will dominated the early to mid-1960s.

American ideas about the establishment of a multilateral force (MLF), put forth in early 1963, were a reaction to this. Although originally developed during the Eisenhower years, the Kennedy administration argued that the MLF would lead to greater alliance cooperation and transatlantic military transparency. It would create an integrated nuclear force similar to the existing integrated conventional forces and thus increase NATO military efficiency. Washington also hoped to integrate British and French nuclear forces into the MLF and thereby defuse the discussion about the creation of German-owned nuclear forces and Germany's participation in nuclear decision making.

The MLF was to consist of twenty-five ships, to be jointly owned, financed, controlled, and manned by the entire alliance; each ship would be equipped with eight Polaris missiles. In military circles it was technologically and organizationally a very controversial concept, and many experts doubted its military usefulness. However, the Kennedy administration appeared to believe that the MLF could be used to overcome the deep dissatisfaction within the alliance with regard to NATO's nuclear strategy. It would continue full American control over the deployment and use of nuclear weapons while giving the Europeans the impression that they were participating in nuclear decision making. At the same time, the MLF concept had the advantage of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons within the alliance. Despite strong German support for the MLF (and strong French and British opposition; London even proposed its own equally flawed Atlantic Nuclear Force concept), by 1965 the Johnson administration had withdrawn the idea. Instead, Washington was now in favor of creating a nuclear planning group within NATO.

By then France's increasing uneasiness about American dominance of and strategy for the alliance was rapidly posing a severe threat to the unity and coherence of NATO. Paris doubted the U.S. commitment to nuclear deterrence if America's own national interest (that is, U.S. territory) was not threatened. Moreover, many in France argued that multilateral nuclear deterrence would contribute to the prevention of nuclear war. Thus, for French nuclear strategy the existence of NATO was counterproductive and not necessary at all. In addition, De Gaulle viewed American predominance in NATO and talk of an Atlantic community with ever greater suspicion. Not without justification he believed that Washington intended to prevent the development of independent nuclear forces within NATO and to keep individual alliance members as subordinate as possible.

In early March 1966 President Lyndon Johnson was informed that France would leave NATO's Integrated Military Command (IMC) and that all NATO forces and NATO headquarters had to depart France by April 1967. This led to another severe crisis within NATO, yet by late 1967 the alliance had resettled in Brussels, and no lasting damage to the unity of the remaining NATO IMC members had occurred.

NATO AND DÉTENTE

After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, East-West détente was widely seen as the only option to ensure the world's long-term survival. Washington became increasingly interested in East-West détente and pushed NATO in the same direction. As early as May 1964, President Johnson had spoken of the need for "building bridges," and in October 1966 he advanced the idea of "peaceful engagement" with the countries of the Eastern bloc. The Harmel Report, approved by NATO member states in December 1967, spoke explicitly of the Western aim "to further a détente in East-West relations." However, it was made clear that any détente would have to be based on NATO's and the West's cherished policy of strength. During the NATO Council of Ministers meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, all NATO members emphasized their willingness to embark upon East-West negotiations regarding troop reductions in Europe. In fact, Washington hoped that NATO would become one of the instruments driving détente; in an era of lessening threat perception it would help to give the Atlantic alliance a new sense of purpose. It would also discourage the European allies from pursuing bilateral policies of détente, as for example the French and especially the West Germans were doing.

Washington's readiness in the late 1960s and early 1970s to use NATO as a vehicle for embarking upon détente with the Soviet Union, thus giving in to European calls for a relaxation of the Cold War, was strongly influenced by American economic and financial problems. Some commentators began speaking of relative American decline and the end of the American century. This was symbolized by Richard Nixon's termination in 1971 of the 1944 Bretton Woods economic system by his sudden suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold, which resulted in the free floating of international currencies and an effective devaluation of the dollar. Simultaneously, the president imposed a 10 percent protective tariff on imported goods. These measures were solely dictated by domestic economic requirements in the United States, and any negative economic consequences for its European allies were disregarded. America's problems were largely due to the costs of the Vietnam War, the lingering burden of financing the domestic Great Society programs of the 1960s, and the relative overvaluation of the dollar, which helped European and Japanese exports. The European Community's imposition of quotas, exchange controls, and import licenses on goods from outside the community as well as its protectionist common agricultural policy (CAP), inaugurated in 1966 also, contributed to America's ever-larger budget deficit. The United States had not only accumulated a considerable balance-of-payments deficit, but from 1971 it also had a considerable trade deficit as well as inflationary problems, rising unemployment, and almost stagnant wages; further, the position of the dollar, the world's leading reserve currency, was weakening. Transatlantic relations were becoming increasingly difficult, and this included relations within NATO.

America's relative economic and financial decline, in combination with global détente and the accompanying perception that the military threat from the Warsaw Pact was receding, decisively contributed to undermining the Nixon administration's commitment to the European continent and, to some extent, to NATO. Congress had also grown increasingly skeptical about the benefits of America's involvement in Europe. During the 1970s, Senator Mike Mansfield introduced eight amendments for U.S. troop reductions in Europe. Within the administration, it was the national security adviser Henry Kissinger, a keen student of nineteenth-century European power politics, who insisted on basing America's relations with its western European allies on a purely bilateral nation-state basis within the Atlantic framework. Establishing a united and federal Europe, as the creators of NATO originally had envisaged, was now seen as counterproductive for Washington's hegemony in the Western world. In Kissinger's realist worldview, it was unlikely that "Europe would unite in order to share *our* burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views." Kissinger even recognized that once "Europe had grown economically strong and politically united, Atlantic cooperation could not be an American enterprise in which consultations elaborated primarily American designs."

However, as far as public rhetoric was concerned, the Nixon administration continued speaking out in favor of a united federal Europe with a large single market, fully integrated into the Atlantic system. It was still assumed in Washington that a united Europe would share "the burdens and obligations of world leadership" with the United States. In particular, the Nixon White House favored the envisaged expansion of the European Community. It hoped that Britain's entry and the revival of the Anglo-American "special relationship" would lead to an improvement in transatlantic relations and within NATO. Yet on the whole Nixon and Kissinger were not prepared to accept the growing maturity of Europe and the realities of a more pluralistic and interdependent world. The Nixon administration still expected a largely docile Europe. As far as East-West relations and the NATO alliance were concerned, Washington certainly wished to be in full control. *Ostpolitik*, West Germany's fairly independent variant of détente, was therefore only grudgingly accepted by the U.S. administration. Nixon and Kissinger disliked the independence and confidence with which the West Germans proceeded with *Ostpolitik* and competed with Washington's own strategy of superpower détente.

By 1973 Kissinger realized that transatlantic relations were in urgent need of revision and repair. To the anger of the European Community countries who had not been consulted, he grandly announced the "Year of Europe." The Nixon administration had been largely occupied with the Vietnam War and the development of détente with China and the Soviet Union during its first years in office, and the "Year of Europe" was Kissinger's attempt to improve U.S.–EC relations inside and outside NATO while safeguarding Washington's leadership role. Kissinger proposed

a new Atlantic Charter and did not hesitate to emphasize that the United States had global responsibilities while the EC countries only had to deal with regional problems. Moreover, he insisted on a greater degree of military burden-sharing, arguing that only Europe's economic contribution would guarantee the continued functioning of America's security umbrella. The so-called Nixon Doctrine of 1970 had emphasized that America's allies ought to assume more of the burden of defending themselves.

The linkage between economic and security concerns led to severe difficulties between Washington and the western Europeans. Kissinger, however, managed to persuade the Europeans to agree to a clause in the new Atlantic Declaration, signed in June 1974, stating that Washington should be consulted before the EC countries arrived at important decisions that impacted on transatlantic issues. Thus, American ideas of the nature of the transatlantic relationship had largely won the day. In practice, however, allied relations remained tense. Severe friction occurred during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 when Washington wholeheartedly backed Israel and many European countries hesitated to do so. The European Community was much more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States, and many countries (like France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany) had strong economic links with the Arab countries in the region. Thus the war and the energy question were closely connected with both security and economic prosperity.

American-European differences with respect to the Year of Europe and the Yom Kippur War pushed the European Community into developing more sophisticated processes of cooperation, not least in order to resist pressure to fall in line with American wishes. The 1973 Declaration on European Identity was influential in gradually leading to a tentative common European foreign policy. It encouraged EC members to use the instrument of European Political Cooperation (EPC), created in 1970, to ensure that foreign policy positions would be coordinated among all EC countries. In 1968 the informal Eurogroup of EC defense ministers had been founded to discuss European defense cooperation. In late 1970 this led to the launch of the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) to build up NATO's infrastructure and national European forces. But as some authors have argued, this may have been less a demonstration of European independence in defense matters than an attempt to impress the United States with Europeans' willingness to help themselves. Thus, most authors view the 1970s as a "dark age" for both transatlantic relations and European integration. The two oil crises and the accompanying economic recession (best characterized by the term "stagflation"), as well as the expansion of the European Community from six to nine countries with the addition of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark on 1 January 1973, caused a severe, long-lasting crisis of adaptation within Europe.

It certainly weakened the ability of the European member states of NATO to embark on any decisive initiatives to reform the problem-ridden alliance. However, "the disarray of Europe" worked to the benefit of the United States. Washington was able to insist on the importance of the Atlantic framework and regain, as Alfred Grosser says, "its position as the leading power among the partners who were unified only when under its direction." Still, under Nixon and Kissinger an important reevaluation of U.S.–EC relations inside and outside NATO had taken place. Washington had begun to look after its own economic and political interests much more than before. It was no longer prepared to accept unilateral disadvantages in the hope of obtaining vaguely defined benefits in the long run. But it was still not prepared to accept western European emancipation from American tutelage.

The rising tide of Eurocommunism in southern Europe (particularly in Italy, France, and Spain) worried the United States much more than it did the Europeans. Despite the Eurocommunists' independence from Moscow and their ambition to democratize their party structures, Washington feared that NATO might not survive the international developments of the 1970s. Greece withdrew from NATO in August 1974 in view of the West's ambiguous attitude toward the Turkish invasion of Cyprus after the Greek-inspired coup. The ruling military regime in Athens had hoped to unite the island with Greece and thus improve their plummeting domestic popularity.

From the mid- to late 1970s the western and eastern Europeans cautiously began to diverge from the policies pursued by their masters in Moscow and Washington. With hindsight it seems that the European nations became gradually aware again of their common European identity and their shared interests in world affairs. In fact, the greater the respective difficulties with Washington and Moscow appeared, the more

united the European countries became. Serious problems in superpower cooperation in the mid-1970s—for example, the prolonged MBFR arms control talks regarding conventional armaments in Geneva and Vienna beginning in 1972 and the SALT II negotiations during the Carter administration—as well as the strengthening of the American neoconservative movement in the 1970s appeared to foreshadow a new hostile phase in the Cold War. European public opinion and many western European politicians refused to go along with this. Yet European politicians also felt the need to ensure that the United States remained committed to Europe. They were torn between opposition to a policy of renewed East-West tension and the awareness that the American security umbrella was still vital for the protection of the European continent.

TENSION, DÉTENTE, AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Détente climaxed in the first half of the 1970s. Nixon's visits to Moscow and Beijing, the Berlin Treaty of 1971–1972, the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two German states, and the Helsinki Accord of 1975 appeared to prove the vitality of East-West détente. But there was increasing domestic American opposition to détente; the growing number of neoconservatives were firmly opposed, for example, to the Helsinki conference. Many on the right of the political spectrum in the United States viewed Western acceptance of the postwar borders in Europe by means of the Helsinki Final Act as a substantial defeat of the West. Soviet ratification of the human rights accord, an element that may well have contributed to the unraveling of the Soviet empire a decade later, was seen as unimportant.

When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he embarked on a human rights crusade. He viewed NATO as more than just a military and political alliance; to him NATO ought to contribute to a more humane development of international politics and create a more just world. This antagonized the Soviet Union and led to much increased tension in East-West relations. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, détente was all but over. Carter turned into a full-blown cold warrior, not least in order to increase his chances for reelection in 1980. The U.S. government boycotted the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980 and the president refused to let the SALT II Treaty proceed for ratification in the Senate (where it probably would have been defeated).

However, in 1977 Carter made three important proposals that were accepted by NATO at the North Atlantic Council meeting in May 1978 and indicated the alliance's enduring mistrust of Moscow. The first proposal argued that Western policy should continue to be based on the Harmel Report: détente had to be pursued on the basis of strength. The second proposal referred to the standardization of military equipment and to the necessity of making further progress with integrating NATO at the operational level. The third proposal, which developed into the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), indicated that détente had not overcome the arms race. In view of continued Soviet expansion of its offensive capabilities, NATO's defenses also needed to be strengthened, particularly in the area of conventional weapons. NATO's long-term nuclear needs were to be discussed by the Nuclear Planning Group. Although most European countries wholeheartedly approved of the LTDP, the renewed outbreak of Cold War tension after the Afghanistan invasion worried the Europeans. The simultaneous continuation of détente in Europe became a serious problem for the coherence of NATO and America's dominant position within the alliance.

Soon the belief, widespread in the United States, that the Soviet Union was in fact attempting to obtain military and nuclear superiority under the guise of arms control agreements also began to worry a number of European NATO countries such as West Germany and Britain. It eventually led to NATO's "dual track" rearmament decision of December 1979. The dual track strategy consisted of the attempt to negotiate with Moscow for the reduction or even elimination of the Kremlin's intermediate-range SS-20 missiles, which were targeted at western Europe, by 1983. If this should prove impossible, as was in fact the case, equivalent U.S. weapons (464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing missiles) would be deployed in western European countries: the Pershings in West Germany and the cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, Italy, Holland, and Belgium. Among the European peoples this decision was severely criticized. In Bonn it contributed to the downfall of the Helmut Schmidt government and its replacement by the center-right government of Helmut Kohl in 1982. It also caused many domestic upheavals in France and Italy and led to the rapid development of a European-wide peace movement. The latter largely benefited the new

left-leaning, pacifist, and environmental Green parties across western Europe, which were particularly strong in West Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. After all, while European countries had to agree to the deployment of the new nuclear missiles in their countries, negotiations with the Soviet Union, if they were to take place, would be a bilateral affair between Moscow and Washington. It would exclude the Europeans—including the United Kingdom and France, whose nuclear weapons might also be affected by any negotiated solution—from having any input.

By the early 1980s America's political elite was increasingly dominated by anticommunist ideology, which eventually culminated in the election of President Ronald Reagan in late 1980. Reagan did not hesitate to go back to the days of intensive Cold War first experienced in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, Washington habitually failed to consult or even inform its European allies.

When Ronald Reagan entered the White House he was intent on reimposing America's leadership on transatlantic relations. The European Community's much stronger economic position and greater political confidence as well as the era of détente with the Soviet Union were simply ignored by Reagan as if these developments had never taken place. Thus, under Reagan, even more so than under Carter, economic as well as security issues and severely differing perceptions regarding the East-West conflict affected the transatlantic alliance. Reagan went on the offensive to implement NATO's "dual track" decision and undermine the European peace movements by attempting to sell the alliance as a harbinger of peace. At the same time, the reassertion of America's leadership of NATO and the concurrent attempt to increase America's global prestige were at the heart of Reagan's foreign policy. Reagan also did not hesitate to employ anticommunist rhetoric. Much to the despair of the European NATO allies, Reagan did not appear to be interested in rescuing what was left of East-West détente. Among European leaders only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supported Reagan's hard-line approach.

Reagan, like Thatcher, was not interested in supporting the creation of a supranational Europe. In fact, his new policy of strength toward Moscow precluded a reassessment of Washington's relations with its allies. With regard to Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union, however, it is useful to differentiate between his first and second terms in office; from 1984 to 1985 the president embarked upon a less hard-line approach toward the USSR. Although this helped to improve Washington's relations with its allies to a considerable degree, Reagan still expected the Europeans to follow America's hegemonic lead without questioning any of its policies. Thus, in terms of transatlantic relations, a deliberate policy of arrogant rather than benign neglect can be observed throughout Reagan's terms in office. Early in his presidency, for example, the administration talked casually of developing capabilities for fighting nuclear war and the possibility of entering into tactical nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union. Such exchanges would of course have taken place over European territory, destroying much of the continent in the process. The same apparent willingness to distance himself from European security concerns appeared to apply to the president's enthusiasm regarding the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). If this project ever were to come to fruition it purportedly would make the United States immune to nuclear attacks by the Soviet Union, while in all likelihood such protection would not be available to the Europeans.

Reagan's negotiations with Soviet secretary general Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986 almost led to the elimination of all ballistic missiles in East and West and the tabling of plans for the eradication of all nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Although such a development would have dramatically affected the future of the European continent, the president never consulted the Europeans but drew the lesson that only a united NATO front would convince the Soviets to make concessions. The same unilateral approach was applied when Gorbachev surprised Western leaders by accepting the United States' "zero-zero" INF proposal in December 1987, which foresaw the removal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe. Reagan's 1988 proposal to modernize NATO's short-range nuclear Lance missiles in Europe to counter Moscow's still existing conventional strength in Europe also occurred without much consultation with America's NATO allies.

The Reagan administration's disinterest in consulting the Europeans can also be observed with respect to economic issues. The European Community's, and in particular West Germany and France's, increasing trade with East Germany, the Soviet Union, the developing world, and certain Arab nations was viewed with a combination of suspicion and envy in Washington. Reagan

attempted to restrain the competition of the EC countries, and he did not hesitate to explain the rationale of American trade policy with the help of NATO and transatlantic security arguments, which usually resulted in the development of severe economic conflicts. Such crises emerged, for example, in connection with the proposed European gas pipeline deal with Moscow. Reagan's controversial trade sanctions on the Soviet Union in the wake of the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981 ensured that transatlantic relations deteriorated further.

As usual, the European Community was ready to compromise as far as security and political issues were concerned, fully realizing that reasonable transatlantic relations and a functioning NATO alliance were still the indispensable pillars of the Cold War world. From November 1983, after the negotiations with Moscow within NATO's dual track framework had failed, most EC countries went along with the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in the face of very hostile peace movements in many countries. Indeed, the deployment of the missiles even reassured some European governments that the Reagan administration did not intend to "decouple" from the European continent. Eventually the EC countries compromised over SDI and agreed to the imposition of sanctions (though largely symbolic ones) on Moscow after the Polish crisis of late 1981.

With regard to important economic issues the European Community was much less disposed to compromise. Regarding the envisaged gas pipeline to Moscow, the EC countries were adamant in their refusal to be browbeaten by the American attempt to undermine the deal; for example, they forbade the employment of American companies and technology in the construction of the pipeline. Reagan's attempts to impose what in effect amounted to extraterritorial sanctions on European companies who were willing to participate led to an outcry. Eventually Reagan had no option but to quietly give in.

Overall, Reagan's economic and financial policies showed yet again that the European Community was helpless in the face of unilateral American policies, forced to react to decisions that had been taken in Washington. Thus, as John Peterson has argued, "the precarious dependence of European economies on decisions taken by a fundamentally unsympathetic U.S. administration pushed the EC countries towards closer co-operation." The European Community under commission president Jacques Delors began developing plans for a Single European Market (SEM) to liberate itself from overwhelming American influence on western Europe's economic and financial fate. It intended to develop a fully free and integrated internal European market by 1992 and to design a common European currency system for implementation shortly thereafter. The French-led, though rather short-lived, revival of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1984 helped to contribute to the development of new ideas for creating a genuine common European foreign and defense policy, as later articulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. In 1988 a Franco-German brigade was founded. This was expanded to corps level three years later; it had the dual purpose of making sure that Germany would remain committed to European integration and of strengthening Europe's military capacities. America's economic and financial predicament, made worse by a rapid decline of the dollar's value in the second half of the 1980s, seemed to indicate the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe for financial reasons. The unilateral actions of Gorbachev regarding the reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments and the winding down of the Cold War also appeared to make this a distinct possibility for political reasons.

The Reagan administration viewed these moves toward an economically and politically more integrated and independent Europe with great suspicion. Despite its own protectionist and discriminatory trade policies, it did not hesitate to speak of a "Fortress Europe" and was deeply disturbed by European protectionist measures. By the end of the Reagan years it appeared that not much was left of America's vision for the European continent as it had been developed in the late 1940s and 1950s. The Reagan administration certainly had not been willing to deal constructively with the attempt of its European allies to emancipate themselves a little from American preponderance.

NATO AND THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

By the late 1980s it became clear that the Cold War was about to end. In April 1988 Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan. In December, speaking before the UN General Assembly, he offered to withdraw half a million troops and thousands of tanks from eastern Europe, which subsequently he did. Gor-

bachev's wide-reaching proposals—his domestic reform policy, his suggestion for a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) and a ban on chemical weapons as well as his agreement to the INF treaty—turned him into an immensely popular person in western Europe. NATO leaders were confused and feared for the relevance of the Western alliance. The North Atlantic Council summit in Brussels in May 1989, NATO's fortieth anniversary, therefore reiterated the common values and interests among all NATO members and announced a "Design for Cooperation."

One of the alliance's earliest tasks had been the reconciliation of France and Germany, and now NATO was meant to become the forum for overcoming the division of Europe, creating a free and united Europe, and integrating the eastern Europeans under a common European roof. Under American leadership this was NATO's counteroffensive to Gorbachev's talk about overcoming the Cold War by creating a common European house. This conception appealed to the Europeans and worried the United States. After all, it seemed to indicate that Washington's participation in a new post–Cold War framework for Europe was not really required. In more practical terms, the Brussels summit also envisaged the creation of a European security identity and the strengthening of transatlantic ties. Thus, NATO intended to remain relevant for the dialogue within the Western alliance. In view of Soviet disarmament moves, the modernization of the Lance missiles was postponed to 1992 and ultimately shelved. NATO also made proposals for the radical scaling down of conventional and short-range missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. President George H. W. Bush believed that the alliance should go "beyond containment."

Thanks in considerable part to Bush, Western triumphalism was avoided when the Berlin Wall was breached in November 1989. It was also Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, who attempted to support Gorbachev and his increasingly beleaguered position in Russian domestic politics. In close cooperation with West German Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Washington skillfully used the "two-plus-four" talks in 1990 and subtle diplomacy with Gorbachev to ensure that a unified Germany would remain a member of NATO. This was also the desire, if not the condition, of Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand, who both had initially attempted to prevent unification. By the time of German unification in October 1990 the issue had been resolved. The newly united state was both a member of NATO and the European Community, and a compromise had been reached for the position of East Germany. Until the last Russian troops had left the former German Democratic Republic by the summer of 1994, no NATO troops were to be based there. Large amounts of money went to the former Soviet Union to pay for the rehousing of the soldiers as the Russian government claimed officially. The all-German army was to be reduced to 350,000 (the old West German army consisted of just under 500,000 troops).

During NATO's first two post–Cold War summits, in London in May 1990 and in Rome in November 1991, the alliance attempted to devise a new strategic concept and ensure that NATO would be relevant after the East-West conflict had come to an end. It was emphasized that NATO's role was based on mutual values and trust and was meant to improve peace and cooperation. During the Cold War, NATO still did not exclude a nuclear first strike if necessary. Now the importance of nuclear weapons was scaled down. The alliance announced the elimination of all short-range nuclear forces. Henceforth NATO would focus on a more flexible approach to crisis management at a much lower level; during the London summit the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) was created. It was recognized that NATO would no longer have to concentrate on repulsing a sweeping Soviet invasion of the European mainland but would have to focus on much lower-scale emergency situations. Thus, a wider role for NATO was found that would ensure that the alliance remained relevant for the crises of the post–Cold War world.

This new and already fairly open-ended conception was expanded further at the Rome summit. NATO expressed the desire to be at the center of all major European institutions—the European Community, the Western European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe—to ensure transatlantic unity as well as intra-European cooperation. The alliance also expressed the opinion that it felt responsible for the security of the eastern part of the continent, its former enemies. Thus by late 1991, NATO had turned itself into a global crisis management instrument for the post–Cold War era. At the same time, it continued emphasizing its key role for solving conflicts among NATO members and with regard to transatlantic relations in a wider sense.

Perhaps one of the most important decisions at the Rome summit was the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was a forum of consultation of the defense and foreign ministers of the eastern European states, including the Soviet successor states. It would enable them to participate in strategic planning, disarmament, and crisis management discussions with the alliance. With the help of the NACC, NATO also believed that it was called upon to contribute to the democratization processes in eastern Europe. The January 1994 "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) concept built on the NACC. While the former Warsaw Pact countries were not (yet) allowed to join NATO, the vague and wide-ranging Partnership for Peace as well as the 1997 political cooperation agreement were clearly regarded as stepping stones to NATO membership for many eastern European countries, though not for Russia. Indeed, the April 1999 admission of the former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was greatly resented in Moscow. The intention to grant NATO membership to former parts of the Soviet Union like the Baltic states, Russia's so-called "near abroad," was perceived as even more humiliating and a severe potential threat to Russia's national security. While attempting to placate Russia as much as possible, however, NATO was unwilling to give Moscow an effective veto over its enlargement process.

The decisive event that convinced the world that NATO was still relevant to the post–Cold War era was the Gulf War of 1991. NATO itself was not a participant in the war, caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but U.S., British, and French contingents drew on NATO operational resources. In view of the failure of western European countries to provide an effective and united response to the crisis, the successful reversal of the conquest of Kuwait appeared to justify NATO's military and political crisis management techniques. It also meant that NATO members, and the Western public, became gradually used to the out-of-area activities of the alliance.

In response to the dire European performance during the Gulf War, at the Maastricht summit in late 1991 the EC countries decided to further develop the Western European Union in order to build up a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In early 1992 the Eurocorps (initially called the Franco-German corps) was meant to be the core of a new European army. This awakened American anxieties about whether or not the European Union was in the process of building up a serious rival to NATO. It also appeared to challenge the long-term future of America's engagement on the European continent. However, it was soon revealed that this was not the case. The European role in the wars in the former Yugoslavia was frequently characterized by military incompetence and political disunity, as well as financial and political unwillingness to assume a more prominent role in the Balkans. Thus, NATO's activities in the former Yugoslavia relied on American resources. Initially, NATO's performance (in the form of the Implementation Force, IFOR) was less than impressive during the wars of succession in Yugoslavia that began in 1991. In the war in Bosnia it was characterized by much hesitation and exaggerated caution. But in 1995–1996 the alliance embarked on its largest military operation ever and excelled in its effective cooperation. The Dayton Peace Agreement of November–December 1995 was largely due to NATO's belated but ultimately successful bombing campaign against the Serbs. NATO, it appeared, was still greatly relevant. In the absence of any united European military effort and an effective United Nations, NATO was indeed the only organization available to achieve such a task. Moreover, it was the United States that had contributed overwhelmingly to the alliance's military effort and provided it with forceful leadership.

This was also the case in the Kosovo war of 1999. After a hesitant and often ill-conceived strategy to oppose Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of the Serbian province, only the employment of NATO's (and Washington's) overwhelming resources and a forceful American-led bombing campaign seemed to impress the Serbian leader. But it may well have been the threat to employ ground troops, which the Europeans had been pressing for against strong opposition by the Clinton administration, that convinced Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. However, NATO's bombing campaign led to the deterioration of relations with Russia and China, and even NATO countries like Greece were less than impressed by NATO's activities in the Kosovo war, which had not been sanctioned by the United Nations.

NATO's involvement in the wars in the Balkans at the turn of the century and the alliance's careful crisis management and disarmament role in Macedonia in 2001 decisively contributed to NATO's new confidence and rediscovered sense of importance. While NATO

took the credit for the defeat of Serbia in Kosovo, the poor performance of the European NATO allies catapulted France, the United Kingdom, and other countries into making renewed efforts to build up a European military force. By late 2001 these efforts, though not the intention, had largely petered out. The economic difficulties of the global recession of 2001 and a persistent high rate of unemployment in Europe were welcome excuses for not dedicating an increased share of the national budgets to build up military resources and capabilities. Washington resented this but did appreciate that a European rival to NATO was no longer on the horizon. Even the right-wing administration of George W. Bush had no intention of returning to isolationism and leaving the European continent. In fact, in 2001, as in 1949, NATO was still the most important American instrument for maintaining Washington's involvement in European affairs. This in turn contributed significantly to the ability of the United States to continue playing such a dominant global role.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was widespread perception among both Western politicians and Western public opinion that NATO was still of great relevance. While in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War and German unification many critical voices could be heard that questioned the necessity of NATO's further existence once the Soviet threat had disappeared, in the course of the 1990s this strand of thinking lost support. NATO's on-the-whole not unsuccessful peacemaking activities in the former Yugoslavia decisively contributed to this. In view of an ineffective and divided United Nations, it was increasingly NATO that was seen as a factor of stability in the post–Cold War world. Although the presence of American NATO troops on the European continent was regarded as much less crucial after the disappearance of the Soviet Union than during the Cold War, on the whole, both Washington and the various European countries still viewed them as a constructive force for good. They still gave the United States an important political and military voice in intra-European squabbles and contributed an element of psychological security to latent French fears about the rise of a too powerful Germany. For the United States, its troops in Europe made global military activities in the Balkans and elsewhere logistically easier. But perhaps most important, they provided Washington with a crucial, albeit expensive, symbol of its global reach and world-wide power and influence. Perhaps surprisingly, most European countries were keen on the continuation of America's military presence in Europe. By the early years of the twenty-first century, the Western public's hostility to NATO, which could be frequently observed during the Cold War, had almost disappeared, and most eastern European nations were keen on joining NATO as soon as possible. Even Russia indicated that it would like to become a member. While this posed the question of whether NATO would make itself redundant once most of Europe had joined the alliance, this was not the way it was viewed in Brussels or indeed in Washington and most European capitals. NATO, it was argued, was the primary factor of stability in the post–Cold War world. The alliance appeared to be here to stay for a significant period of time.

Yet NATO was also faced with a great number of new challenges. There were increasingly heated transatlantic difficulties in political, military, and, perhaps most importantly, economic and trade areas. NATO's crisis management capability was persistently challenged by the enduring civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The enlargement of the alliance posed further serious problems, antagonizing Russia and also the countries who would be left outside. Increasing the number of NATO members also complicated organizational, operational, and indeed financial dimensions of NATO. George W. Bush's declaration to develop a missile defense shield to protect the United States (and perhaps its allies) from nuclear attacks by so-called rogue states, a scheme similar to Reagan's ultimately unrealistic SDI program, exposed great rifts within NATO. Most European NATO members strongly opposed Bush's scheme; it was regarded as technologically untested and prohibitively expensive. The missile defense scheme also appeared to be politically destabilizing as it threatened to undermine relations with countries such as Russia and China and to lead to a new arms race. The terrorist attack on America's financial and political centers in New York and Washington, D.C., in September 2001 demonstrated however that unprecedented terrorist attacks that could not be prevented by even the most sophisticated antimissile scheme were to be feared more than attacks from foreign states. It threatened to undermine relations with countries such as Russia and China and to lead to a new arms race.

Despite these problems, it was thought that for the foreseeable future reasonable transatlantic

relations would be maintained. In all likelihood European Union member states would reluctantly agree to continue accepting American predominance within NATO. Ultimately, however, the latter will be influenced by American flexibility and willingness to enter into a constructive dialogue with its allies. During the Cold War, American unilateralism always caused great resentment and proved damaging to the alliance. In the post–Cold War world Washington's European NATO allies were even more unlikely than before to accept this. Yet, American unilateralism may well have been profoundly undermined by the terrorist bombing of American cities in September 2001. Asking for the invocation of article 5 of the NATO treaty was an indication that the Bush administration hoped to fight the war against terrorism with the help of multilateralism and close cooperation with the NATO allies. While the United States will still, and quite justifiably in view of its powerful military and economic potential, demand a clear leadership role, it can be expected that this new kind of war can only be successfully fought with the help of a common cooperative effort.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnett, Richard J. *The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, Makers of the Postwar World.* New York, 1983.

Baylis, John. *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949.* Basingstoke, U.K., 1992.

Calleo, David. *The Atlantic Fantasy: The U.S., NATO, and Europe.* Baltimore, 1970.

Cornish, Paul. *Partnership in Crisis: The U.S., Europe, and the Fall and Rise of NATO.* London, 1997.

Di Nolfo, Ennio, ed. *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Appraisal.* Berlin, 1991. Essays published on the occasion of NATO's fortieth anniversary in 1989.

Duffield, John S. *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture.* Stanford, Calif., 1995. See for the development of NATO's conventional and nuclear strategies.

Gregory, Shaun. *Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response.* Basingstoke, U.K., 1996.

Heller, Francis H., and John R. Gillingham, eds. *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe.* New York, 1992.

Heuser, Beatrice. *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000.* Basingstoke, U.K., 1997.

Ireland, Timothy P. *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.* London, 1981.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years.* Lexington, Ky., 1984.

———. *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance.* Updated ed. New York and Toronto, 1994.

———. *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years.* Westport, Conn., 1999. A useful collection of the author's journal articles on NATO.

Kaplan, Lawrence S., ed. *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance.* Kent, Ohio, 1991. The very different views of American historians on NATO.

Martin, Pierre, and Mark R. Brundy, eds. *Alliance Politics: Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* Basingstoke, U.K., 2001.

Mattox, Gale A., and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds. *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates.* Boulder, Colo., 2001.

Menon, Anand. *France, NATO, and the Limits of Independence, 1981–1997: The Politics of Ambivalence.* Basingstoke, U.K., and New York, 2000. Covers France's ambiguous attitude toward U.S. domination of NATO.

Norton, Augustus R., comp. *NATO: A Bibliography and Resource Guide.* New York and London, 1985.

Osgood, Robert E. *NATO: The Entangling Alliance.* Chicago, 1962. One of the first and a still useful scholarly books dealing with the creation of NATO.

Sandler, Todd M., and Keith Hartely. *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and Into the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge and New York, 1999.

Schmidt, Gustav, ed. *A History of NATO.* New York, 2001. One of the best overviews of the history of NATO by a plethora of experts, based on conferences held on NATO's fiftieth anniversary in 1999.

Schwartz, David N. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas.* Washington, D.C., 1983. See for the development of NATO's conventional and nuclear strategies.

Smith, Mark. *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance.* Basingstoke, U.K., 2000.

Thomas, Ian Q. R. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination.* Lanham, Md.,

1997. A highly interest approach to the history of NATO with a focus on the organization's political culture and its political dimensions and goals.

Williams, Geoffrey Lee, and Barkley Jared Jones. *NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the Twenty-First Century: The Twenty-Year Crisis.* Basingstoke, U.K., 2001.

Yost, David S. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International Security.* Washington, D.C., 1998.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONTAINMENT; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; SUMMIT CONFERENCES.

Nuclear Strategy and Diplomacy

Kenneth J. Hagan and Elizabeth Skinner

On 6 August 1945 a single atomic bomb (A-bomb) dropped from an American B-29 bomber, named *Enola Gay* after the pilot's mother, leveled the Japanese city of Hiroshima and killed well over 80,000 residents. Three days later a second bomb smashed Nagasaki, exterminating 60,000 inhabitants. Emperor Hirohito forced the Supreme War Council to allow the government to sue for peace. Although World War II ended in the convulsive birth of the atomic age, the fiery climax failed to validate the putative war-winning efficacy of "strategic bombing." On 8 August the Soviet Union had broken its neutrality in the Pacific and declared war against Japan. News that the Red Army was sweeping across Manchuria caused greater alarm in official Japan than the latest episodes in a relentless American aerial campaign that in previous months included the fire-bombing of Japanese cities at the cost of more than 300,000 lives.

President Harry S. Truman justified history's first use of an atomic weapon on the grounds of military necessity. By the middle of 1945 the United States had dismembered Japan's overseas empire, blockaded its home islands, and razed a total of 178 square miles in sixty-six cities targeted with incendiary bombs. Still, Japan had refused to meet the long-standing American demand for unconditional surrender, a stipulation reiterated in July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference of Allied chiefs of state. Thus, short of some deus ex machina, an American invasion of Japan proper seemed inescapable. Its advocates, the strategic planners of the U.S. Army, recognized that fatalistic and suicidal Japanese resistance would "make the invasion of their homeland a horrendously costly endeavor." The disputed estimates of potential U.S. Army and Marine Corps casualties have ranged from the tens of thousands to more than 500,000. These figures do not reflect the inevitably heavy naval losses to kamikaze and midget submarine suicide attacks. Truman understandably chose to seek a cheaper victory through the shock of atomic bombing.

Devastating though it was to Japan, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had more significance for the future than for ending World War II. By 1945 twentieth-century warfare had witnessed the introduction of several revolutionary weapons systems characterized by horrifying destructiveness—the machine gun, the tank, the strategic bomber, and the submarine—but none of these remotely approached the nuclear bomb in transforming strategy and diplomacy. In the nuclear age, for the first time in history, armies and navies were no longer the principal objects at immediate risk in warfare. With their soldiers untouched and still waiting to engage the enemy, nations now could be obliterated in their entirety—populations, cities, societies. In his magisterial book *The American Way of War* (1973), Russell Weigley observed, "A strong strategy of annihilation could now be so complete that the use of . . . atomic weapons could no longer serve 'for the object of war,' unless the object of war was to transform the enemy's country into a desert." After August 1945, it therefore became the prime objective of the statesmen of the great powers to repudiate Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is merely "a continuation of policy by other means." The "other means" no longer could include the unlimited warfare symbolized by the American Civil War and the eastern front of World War II.

Despite fundamentally opposed political philosophies and almost universal pessimistic expectation, the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union grimly and steadfastly refrained from using the ultimate weapons in their arsenals during the half century between Hiroshima and the sociopolitical implosion of the USSR in 1991. Time and again, Soviet and American heads of state substituted statecraft for warfare as they patched together agreements aimed at curtailing

HIROSHIMA: A MILITARY TARGET

"The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in the first instance to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians."

— President Harry S. Truman, 9 August 1945 —

the enlargement of one another's stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Time and again, after seeming to establish a numerical ceiling, one or the other superpower—but usually the United States—would make an "end run" around the existing agreements with a technological breakthrough in delivery vehicles or nuclear warheads. Then the game began again. Amid mutual recriminations, Soviet and American negotiators stitched together another diplomatic limit governing the nature and quantity of weapons in their arsenals. The number grew to uncountable thousands, but not one nuclear weapon was ever actually launched at the opponent and detonated in anger.

The noted Cold War historian John L. Gaddis has described the Soviet-American era of nuclear restraint as "The Long Peace," and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has suggested that "nukes" be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Gaddis falls somewhat short of the mark, and Schlesinger seems facetious, but each was trying to encapsulate the magnitude of a phenomenal achievement, one without precedent and probably without sequel. The sobering reality is that in the 1990s nuclear strategy and diplomacy entered a new epoch, one in which the inexorable proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction" among second- and third-tier states posed unforeseen and highly complex challenges to the major powers' desire to avoid actual use of such weapons in combat.

THE FUTILE STRATEGY OF ATOMIC MONOPOLY

Historians today agree that ending World War II dominated the president's thinking in the summer of 1945. However, for many years "revisionists" contended that Truman's desire to practice what the scholar Gar Alperovitz aptly called "atomic diplomacy" strongly affected his decision to authorize the nuclear attack on Japan. According to this thesis, Truman sought to influence Soviet policy by dramatically proving that the United States possessed an unprecedentedly destructive weapon that American leaders were willing to use against an enemy. With one awesome stroke Truman could show his mettle as a tough warrior, end the war, depreciate the Soviet Union's claim to share in the occupation of Japan, and discourage Soviet communism's expansion into Europe and Asia. Overstated though it was, the Alperovitz thesis described one very real rationale for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan, and Truman certainly anticipated that a great geopolitical advantage would accrue to the United States from its atomic monopoly. What he did not foresee was the vehement reaction of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, who interpreted the atomic bombing as an anti-Soviet action disruptive to the postwar balance of power. No matter how unrealistic it was in the first place, any lingering hope of Soviet-American harmony in the early postwar world was doomed on 6 August 1945.

In a radio address delivered the day Nagasaki was bombed, President Truman elaborated the fundamental tenet of his postwar nuclear policy. Because the atomic bomb "is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world," he warned, "Great Britain and the United States, who have the secret of its production, do not intend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction." It soon became obvious that in the minds of American policymakers, "control" connoted some kind of global inspection system.

At first, prospects for negotiating the international regulation of atomic weapons appeared deceptively bright. In December 1945 the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow. They jointly proposed the creation of an atomic energy commission responsible to the United Nations Security Council, where a veto precluded any action abhorrent to one of the five permanent members. The guidelines for the proposed commission also included the inspections demanded by President Truman.

On 24 January 1946 the General Assembly voted unanimously to form the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) precisely as envisioned by the three foreign ministers. In June the commis-

sion met to forge the machinery for controlling atomic weapons. The American delegate, Bernard Baruch, immediately derailed the negotiations by introducing the concept of an International Atomic Development Authority that would operate independently of the Security Council. This autonomous body would have the power to punish, possibly by atomic attack, any nation that violated its pledge not to construct nuclear weapons. In a single sentence that broke the Moscow agreement, Baruch tersely explained the American rejection of the Security Council as the ultimate punitive agency of the United Nations: "There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes."

Baruch's astringent tone reflected the views of a president increasingly worried by the deterioration of American relations with the Soviet Union. During the spring of 1946 the Soviet Union and the United States had failed to agree about the admission of Soviet satellite states to the United Nations, the composition of the Security Council's military arm, and the future of Germany. Moreover, Truman was upset by Soviet penetration of Iran and Manchuria, the latter an area of historic interest to the United States. According to the official historians of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the president recalled the Manchurian crisis of 1931 and 1932, reasoning that if Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson had been able to threaten the use of force at that time, World War II would have been avoided. For all of these reasons, Truman decided that the veto rendered the Security Council impotent against any transgression by the Soviet Union.

By the middle of 1946 the Soviet Union had also shifted its position on the international regulation of nuclear weapons. Five days after Baruch spoke, the Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, addressed the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Ignoring the American's remarks, Gromyko proposed a multilateral treaty binding the signatories to destroy "all stocks of atomic weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition" within three months. The Russian made no provision for inspections to ensure compliance, thus rendering his proposal utterly unacceptable to an American president who refused to "throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us."

Truman was not the only senior American to favor the threatening metaphor of a gun. In September 1945, at a reception held during a London meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Soviet Union, and England, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes chided Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, "If you don't cut all this stalling and let us get down to work, I am going to pull an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it." This crude sortie into atomic diplomacy led to what the historian Gregg Herkin has described as Molotov's "reverse atomic psychology." The durable old Bolshevik made several dismissive jokes of his own, the import of which was to let the United States know that Byrnes "could not use the threat of the bomb to gain political concessions from the Soviet Union."

As hope for the international control of atomic weapons waned at the United Nations, the Truman administration began to shape a coherent nationalistic nuclear policy. The domestic political impediments were formidable. Congress was demanding sharply reduced postwar military expenditures and rapid demobilization of all branches of the armed forces. The army, for example, shrank from more than eight million men to fewer than two million in nine months. In this postwar environment, Truman won approval only for establishment of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in March 1946 and a test of the effectiveness of atomic weapons against ships at Bikini atoll later in the year.

Watchful waiting characterized American foreign policy immediately after the failure of the Baruch plan. Then, beginning in February 1947, a series of crises swept the noncommunist world. Britain's announcement of its inability to continue to sustain anticommunist forces in Greece and Turkey elicited an immediate promise of aid from President Truman, the first formal step toward the policy of containment. For sixteen months international tension mounted; in June 1948 it reached a peak with a Soviet blockade of land routes to West Berlin.

American nuclear diplomacy during that year and a half focused more directly on Great Britain than on the Soviet Union. In highly secret wartime agreements, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, with the approval of the Belgian government-in-exile, had apportioned the rich Belgian Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo) uranium ore reserves to Britain and the United States on an equal basis. At Quebec, in 1943, they also had agreed that neither nation would use atomic weapons in war without the consent of the other. By mid-1947 policymakers in Washington viewed

these two agreements as detrimental to the United States. In order to enlarge its nuclear arsenal, the United States needed more than half of the annual supply of the Congo's ore. To exercise full control over its own foreign and military policies, Washington had to eliminate London's voice in the use of atomic weapons. Britain finally agreed to these American demands in December 1947, receiving in exchange the promise of technical aid in the search for peaceful uses for atomic energy.

The military facet of Anglo-American nuclear interdependence manifested itself in the early weeks of the Berlin blockade (June 1948–May 1949), when the British permitted the newly autonomous U.S. Air Force to deploy to England three squadrons of B-29 bombers, which may have been modified to carry atomic bombs. This deployment was the first forward staging of American strategic airpower since World War II. It complemented the growing emphasis on military aviation within the United States, as evidenced by appointment of the aggressive General Curtis E. LeMay to head SAC, accelerated development of long-range atomic bombers, and agitation in Congress and the new Department of Defense for a seventy-combat-group air force. The American search for overseas air bases to encircle the Soviet Union and threaten it with nuclear attack began in earnest with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

In August 1949 the Soviet Union successfully detonated an atomic bomb, ending the American nuclear monopoly fifteen years earlier than anticipated by Washington. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and members of the powerful Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy pleaded with President Truman to counter the Soviet technological surge by building a hydrogen bomb. The outgoing chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), David Lilienthal, openly expressed the fear of such scientists as J. Robert Oppenheimer that it was morally wrong for the United States to base its foreign policy on "a weapon of genocide." But other equally prominent scientists, notably the nuclear physicists Ernest O. Lawrence and Edward Teller, argued the Soviet Union would surely try to outflank the American preponderance in fission weapons by developing a fusion weapon, or H-bomb, as quickly as possible. The only way for the United States to retain overall predominance in nuclear weapons technology was through creation of the hydrogen bomb, which Truman ordered in January 1950. He simultaneously directed a thoroughgoing reassessment of American foreign and military policy by the State Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council (NSC). By April, Paul Nitze of the State Department had written NSC 68, a blueprint for the future that Truman approved in September.

NSC 68 was a stark document whose authors attributed to Moscow a "fundamental design" of completely subverting or forcibly destroying the governments and societies of the non-Soviet world and replacing them with "an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin." Only the United States had the potential to thwart Russian expansionism and ultimately "foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system." But successful containment would require that America increase its own political, economic, and military power and aid its allies in strengthening themselves. To ensure maximum American strength, NSC 68 discouraged seeking a negotiated control of atomic energy because agreement "would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union." Looking ahead to 1954, when the Soviet Union presumably would possess a substantial atomic stockpile of its own, NSC 68 postulated a time of maximum danger during which the Soviet Union could lay waste the British Isles, destroy the communications centers of western Europe, or devastate "certain vital centers of the United States and Canada."

This suspicious and bellicose attitude permeated the highest levels of the executive branch when the advent of the Korean War in June 1950 loosened congressional constraints on massive military expenditures. President Truman immediately sought and obtained supplemental appropriations for the defense budget. By 1952 he had nearly quadrupled annual military spending, which had averaged about $15 billion since 1946. Although the president allocated a great deal of the hugely expanded sum to Korea and the buildup of conventional forces for NATO, the increase also made possible an exponential enlargement of the American capacity to wage nuclear war.

Truman moved on several fronts. First, he accelerated production of a hydrogen bomb. In theory, H-bombs can have unlimited explosive power, and their deadly radiation effects vastly exceed those of atomic, or fission, bombs such as those unleashed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Atomic Energy Commission successfully tested a

fusion device on 1 November 1952. A viable hydrogen bomb was added to the American stockpile in 1956, a year after the Soviets had developed their own practicable H-bomb. The second most important item on President Truman's atomic agenda was multiplication of fission weapons. Discovery of rich uranium deposits in the American Southwest and construction of several plutonium-producing reactors contributed to this atomic proliferation, but the big breakthrough in sources came with the determination in 1951 that the amount of fissionable material required for a bomb could be cut in half by surrounding the nuclear core with a neutron shield. The new abundance of fissionable substances permitted a third advance, the creation of "tactical" nuclear weapons. General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had publicly advocated this step in October 1949. Speaking as a soldier challenging the congressional popularity of the Strategic Air Command, Bradley argued that wars were won on battlefields, not by destruction of cities and factories. If Soviet armies massed to invade western Europe, tactical nuclear weapons could devastate them. Only in that manner could the thin divisions of NATO defeat a numerically superior foe.

Bradley won the endorsement of key nuclear physicists and congressmen. By the fall of 1951, Representative Henry Jackson of Washington State, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, was urging an annual expenditure of between $6 and $10 billion for tactical nuclear weapons. Under this pressure, the Atomic Energy Commission moved energetically. In March 1953 it exploded a fifteen-kiloton device amid simulated battlefield conditions. Two months earlier, at President Dwight D. Eisenhower's inaugural parade, the army had displayed a cannon capable of firing nuclear projectiles.

The Truman administration and Congress created many highly sophisticated delivery systems for new weapons. The very high-altitude, all-jet B-52 Stratofortress bomber with a range of 7,000 miles was beginning to take shape as the principal strategic aircraft of the future. As a stopgap measure, to replace the piston-driven B-29 strategic bomber of World War II, Truman acquired bases from America's allies for the intermediate-range, six-jet-engine Boeing B-47. Congress allotted funds for the first aircraft carrier capable of launching jet-powered nuclear bombers, the Forrestal-class supercarrier with a flight deck nearly 1,000 feet long. The Atomic Energy Commission and Westinghouse designed a reactor to fuel some of the new aircraft carriers, but nuclear propulsion of submarines had the navy's highest priority thanks to the unrelenting vigor of one naval officer, Hyman G. Rickover. In June 1952 the keel was laid for a nuclear-propelled prototype, the USS *Nautilus* (SSN-571). It would signal "underway on nuclear power" on 17 January 1955.

At a rapid pace, the U.S. Navy fashioned and deployed two distinct types of nuclear-fueled submarines. The "attack boat," or SSN, came first. It was intended for the classic submarine role of striking ships or other submarines with torpedoes. Five years after Truman left office, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh E. Burke prodded Congress to fund the first nuclear-driven, ballistic-missile-launching submarine (SSBN). Armed with ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range—first Polaris (1,200 nautical miles), later Poseidon (2,500 nm), finally Trident (4,000 nm)—this truly revolutionary weapons system aimed warheads at cities and other targets deep inland. It guaranteed the navy a permanent place in the strategic or nuclear "triad" of weaponry intended to deter Soviet attacks on the United States, or to launch a devastating retaliatory strike if deterrence failed.

Truman did not intend these weapons for limited war, but of necessity he had to consider the employment of atomic weaponry in the darkest days of the Korean War. On 30 November 1950, as Chinese troops swept General Douglas MacArthur's vastly outnumbered soldiers and marines south from the Yalu River, the president held a press conference. In answering a question about possibly dropping the atomic bomb on North Korea or China, he said, "There has always been active consideration of its use." He immediately added, "I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing to do with this military aggression." But the doomsday alarm had been sounded. John Hersey, author of the widely read book *Hiroshima,* wrote, "There were glaring headlines in Paris. . . . Big headlines in Finland gave the impression that MacArthur had already received the go-ahead. In Vienna, the story had the lead in all the morning papers except the Soviet army sheet."

A thoroughly aroused House of Commons dispatched Prime Minister Clement Attlee to Washington to determine exactly what Truman was contemplating. At an extended series of high-

level meetings in early December, the president attempted to mollify the Briton with the prayer that "world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb." But he would not categorically rule out use of the bomb if the UN position deteriorated radically and MacArthur was in danger of being driven off the Korean peninsula. As it was, the UN forces stemmed the tide and the front was gradually stabilized roughly along the thirty-eighth parallel of north latitude, the original dividing line between North and South Korea.

General MacArthur has been popularly condemned for advocating the use of atomic weapons, as indeed he did. In December 1952 he told his former protégé, president-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, "I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs." But contemplation of a nuclear war in Korea was widespread in Washington between 1950 and 1953. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fantasized about implanting a cordon sanitaire north of the Yalu River with cobalt 60, a highly radioactive residue derived from reprocessed plutonium. Always eager to be involved in a bombing campaign, General Curtis LeMay, head of SAC, thought his airmen were well qualified to drop nuclear bombs because of their "intimate knowledge" of atomic weaponry. He almost got his chance. According to the historian Stanley Sandler, B-36s armed with nuclear weapons were deployed to Okinawa in June 1952 to induce the Chinese to sign an armistice. Across town from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Representative Albert Gore, Sr., a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, believed radiating a large strip of the Chinese-Korean border was "morally justifiable" since Korea had become "a meat grinder of American manhood." In the supercharged atmosphere of early Cold War Washington, there was abundant domestic support for a nuclear war in Korea. The "buck" stopped with the president, as Harry Truman said it always did.

The American commander in chief refrained from authorizing atomic warfare against Korea or China partly out of belief that the Korean War was a Soviet feint and that the real communist attack would come in Europe, in which case the United States would need all of its nearly 300 atomic warheads. Moreover, by using atomic weapons the United States could spark North Korean retaliation against Pusan or other South Korean cities with Soviet-supplied atomic bombs. British disapproval and the racist implications of again employing the ultimate weapon against an Asian people contributed to Truman's restraint. Atomic diplomacy also helped stay his hand. In the opinion of one veteran of the Korean War, the historian Stanley Weintraub, Truman realized that if the bomb were used in Korea without producing "decisive results, it would lose credibility as a Cold War deterrent." The president therefore accepted a stalemate in conventional warfare in Korea while simultaneously fathering what Atomic Energy Commission chairman Gordon Dean described in September 1952 as "a complete 'family' of atomic weapons, for use not only by strategic bombers, but also by ground support aircraft, armies, and navies."

A STRATEGY OF OVERKILL

Dwight D. Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman in January 1953, warmly embraced this monstrous "family." The new Republican president's conservative economic advisers demanded a balanced budget, and reduction of swollen defense expenditures was an obvious step in that direction. Complementing this fiscal orthodoxy was Eisenhower's conviction that Soviet leaders hoped their military challenge would force the United States into what he called "an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. . . . Communist guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target." He abandoned NSC 68's conception of a time of maximum danger and began planning a less costly strategy for the "long haul." Throughout his two terms (1953–1961), Eisenhower limited annual defense spending to about $40 billion. He sought to deter communist aggression with an array of nuclear weapons rather than a large army. His strategic mainstay was SAC, supplemented by the navy's carrier-based atomic bombers and its new fleet of submarines (SSBNs) armed with the Polaris ballistic missile. By the late 1950s, SAC was flying 1,500 intermediate-range B-47 jet bombers from domestic and foreign air bases, and the intercontinental B-52 heavy bomber became operational, the first of a final total of 500. If deterrence or tactical nuclear weapons failed to prevent a Red Army sweep through western Europe—or if the Soviet air force dropped nuclear bombs on the United States—Eisenhower would employ his strategic airpower to destroy Soviet Russia.

Until 1957, when the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological sophistication by launching the *Sputnik* satellite and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of about

3,500 nautical miles, American policymakers generally considered a Soviet ground attack upon western Europe the most likely form of overt aggression. To cope with a Red Army advance in Europe, or a communist military offensive anywhere else, the Eisenhower administration adopted an asymmetrical strategy. On 12 January 1954, in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that to meet communist aggression the United States would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." This public pronouncement of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" capped an intensive high-level review of American strategy begun the previous May. As early as October 1953, Eisenhower had approved NSC 162/2, a paper attempting to reconcile deterrence with reduced defense spending. The solution, labeled the "New Look," was to equip U.S. troops in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons whose destructiveness would permit him to reduce "the big, expensive army he had inherited from Truman."

To preclude bankrupting the U.S. economy with military spending, Eisenhower planned to shrink the army from twenty to fourteen combat divisions by mid-1957. He would arm this leaner army with atomic artillery and short-range, air-breathing missiles carrying nuclear warheads. In February 1954 he induced Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act to permit divulging information about operational characteristics of American nuclear weapons to NATO allies. By December 1954 he had persuaded NATO strategists to assume that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in any future conflict with the Red Army. American General Lauris Norstad, NATO's supreme commander, succinctly summarized the new strategy in January 1956. The threat to use tactical nuclear weapons would "link the lowest and highest levels of violence and reinforce the credibility of the Western deterrent."

Although the rhetoric of massive retaliation usually did not discriminate between geographic areas, Eisenhower did have a different plan to meet aggression beyond Europe and the Western Hemisphere. If a noncommunist Asian nation were attacked, he intended to place the primary burden of defense upon that country's ground troops. The U.S. Navy's fiercely mobile aircraft carriers could be rushed into the arena, and in extreme cases the marines might be landed for finite periods. Nuclear airpower conceivably might be brought to bear, but only selectively. As Secretary of State Dulles said in a news conference on 18 July 1956, "In the case of a brush-fire war, we need not drop atomic bombs over vast populated areas." It might suffice merely to vaporize key military and industrial installations.

MASSIVE RETALIATION

"Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. . . .

"The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."

— Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 12 January 1954 —

Abstract bombast about massive retaliation notwithstanding, in only three instances did Eisenhower actually warn other governments that the United States was prepared to launch a nuclear attack if its demands were not met. In April 1953 the Korean armistice talks between the communist Chinese and Americans had bogged down over the question of exchanging prisoners of war. At Dulles's behest, neutral India cautioned China that if peace did not come soon, the United States would resort to nuclear warfare. The two sides quickly agreed on international supervision of the repatriation of captured troops. Shortly thereafter, as the French position in Indochina disintegrated, Washington warned Beijing that direct military intervention in support of the communist Vietminh would be met with an American atomic attack on China. Finally, on 20 March 1955, as the communist Chinese bombarded the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles publicly speculated about possible American use of "new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers." This foolhardy boast sent shiv-

ers around the world, especially throughout Asia, where national leaders recalled ruefully that the only atomic bombs dropped so far had fallen on an Asian people. Eisenhower, who was privately determined to defend the islands with nuclear weapons if necessary, gradually realized that he could not rattle the nuclear sword without arousing global apprehension. According to the scholar Gordon H. Chang, communist China's conciliation had contributed significantly to ending the crisis, but at the cost of Beijing's realization that it would have to build a nuclear force to counter modern-day American gunboat diplomacy in the western Pacific.

The Soviets at the same time were providing additional stimulus for American reconsideration of the doctrine of limited nuclear warfare. They had detonated a hydrogen device in August 1953, unveiled the intercontinental turboprop Bear bomber (Tu-95) in 1954, and displayed the all-jet, long-range Bison bomber (M-4) in 1955. That year they also added a functional hydrogen bomb to their arsenal. Eisenhower's response was to build an extensive radar network and multiply the air force's interceptor wings. But the successful Soviet test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the summer of 1957, coupled with the October *Sputnik* satellite launch, made these defenses prematurely obsolescent. The United States suddenly was exposed to a potential Soviet thermonuclear delivery system against which existing countermeasures were powerless. For the first time, all-out nuclear war would inevitably entail widespread death and destruction within the United States. Since it was impossible to ensure that escalation could be avoided once nuclear weapons of any sort were used anywhere in the world, the threat to use them thereafter must be restricted to crises involving areas absolutely essential to the United States: noncommunist Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

The stage was set for a policy of containment resting on conventional forces that the next president would adopt under the slogan of "flexible response." But Eisenhower's reluctance to spend large sums on defense prevented him from rebuilding or enlarging the army. For the same reasons of fiscal prudence, he also steadfastly resisted public and congressional pressure to disperse SAC aircraft more widely, to begin a crash program of ballistic missile development, or to spend tens of billions of dollars on fallout shelters. In August 1958, when the Department of Defense and some scientists warned him that discontinuation of nuclear testing would endanger further evolution of American tactical nuclear weapons, Eisenhower overrode their objections and announced a moratorium on atmospheric testing.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

"The National Military Program of Flexible Response should contain at the outset an unqualified renunciation of reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation. It should be made clear that the United States will prepare itself to respond anywhere, any time, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation."

— *General Maxwell D. Taylor,*
The Uncertain Trumpet,
New York, 1960 —

The sophistication of American aviation technology made restraint possible. Beginning in August 1955, the United States regularly flew extremely high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union. Dubbed U-2s, these glider-like jets soared above the reach of Soviet air defenses. They returned with photographs proving that the Soviet Union had not built a massive offensive nuclear striking force, despite the technological capacity to do so. The sluggishness of Soviet production permitted Eisenhower to proceed at a measured pace with deployment of ICBMs and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), including the submarine-launched Polaris. Eisenhower also could accurately describe Democratic presidential candidate John Kennedy's alleged "missile gap" as a "fiction." What Eisenhower could not do was win Soviet acquiescence to any form of inspections. Negotiations in the United Nations for the limitation of nuclear armaments therefore remained deadlocked throughout his presidency.

AT THE GATES OF ARMAGEDDON

President John F. Kennedy may have been perpetrating what one observer called a "pure election fraud," but it is more likely that as a candidate he decried the fictitious and nonexistent missile gap because he agreed with the militant representatives

and senators in the Democratic Party who disliked Eisenhower's tightly controlled defense spending. In any event, upon becoming president in January 1961, Kennedy admitted that a gap in nuclear weapons indeed existed, but it was favorable to the United States. At that time the United States possessed at least 200 operational strategic missiles of varying range, while the Soviet Union probably had no more than sixteen. Despite this substantial nuclear advantage in missiles alone, in February 1961 Kennedy requested congressional permission to strengthen America's deterrent forces by accelerating the acquisition of second-generation, solid-propellant, land-based ICBMs and nuclear-powered submarines armed with longer-range Polaris ballistic missiles. In a clear reversal of Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism, Kennedy decided to "develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings."

The new president also reversed his predecessor by enlarging the nonnuclear, or conventional, forces of the United States. In the summer of 1961, Kennedy seized on Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's bellicosity about the American presence in Berlin to extract from Congress a $3.2 billion supplement to the defense budget. With these funds he increased the armed services by 300,000 men and sent 40,000 more troops to Europe. This deployment underscored Kennedy's commitment to "flexible response," a strategy resting largely on nonnuclear weaponry. He refined the electronic "fail-safe" devices designed to prevent accidental firing of tactical nuclear weapons, discouraged planning that envisioned the use of such weapons, and retarded their technological evolution. These restrictions hampered NATO, which remained numerically inferior to the Red Army, by denying to the alliance the equalizing potential of clean and extremely low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, massive retaliation remained the only real deterrent to a Soviet military thrust into western Europe; and as the Soviets enhanced their ability to devastate the United States in any strategic nuclear exchange, the ghoulish doctrine became increasingly less reassuring to the NATO countries and less credible to the Soviet Union.

One reason for the Soviet nuclear buildup of the 1960s was the ambiguity of American strategy. From the beginning of the Kennedy presidency, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara insisted on maintaining clear strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. With Kennedy's concurrence, McNamara increased the number of American ICBMs from about 200 to 1,000, completed the construction of forty-one submarines carrying 656 Polaris missile launchers, oversaw the development of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), and kept a large percentage of SAC B-52s in a constant state of alert. Some of these measures, notably the conversion to MIRVs, came late in the decade, but the trend was apparent in 1961. Equally obvious was the possibility that a huge increase in the American stockpile would create a "first strike" capability with which the United States could preemptively attack and destroy the Russian nuclear striking force, thus making Soviet retaliation largely ineffective if not altogether impossible. The Soviets had lived with fears of an American nuclear bombing offensive since 1945, but nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles were virtually impossible to intercept. Kennedy's multiplication of those weapons thus deepened old apprehensions. As if to allay suspicion, on 26 March 1961 the president promised, "Our arms will never be used to strike the first blow in any attack."

Despite Kennedy's reassurance that the United States would not strike first, Khrushchev announced in August 1961 that he was breaking the three-year-old moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Worried by the dangers of radioactive fallout, Kennedy at first resorted to underground testing. In April 1962 he resumed atmospheric testing in order to evaluate sophisticated new warheads and to prevent the Soviet Union from scoring a technological breakthrough that would eliminate the American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev then sought a cheap and quick adjustment to the strategic imbalance by placing 900-mile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba. He also hoped to enhance his fading image as a supporter of overseas communist regimes, especially Fidel Castro's Cuban dictatorship, thereby answering hard-liners in Moscow and Beijing who deplored his efforts to ease tensions with the West. In this manner, reinvigoration of the strategic arms race in 1961 led to the Cold War's most dangerous nuclear war scare.

On 14 October 1962, American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Cuban missile sites while they were still under construction. For one week the Kennedy administration debated its response, finally settling upon a naval "quarantine" of further shipments of offensive missiles. As he announced his decision to the world on 22 October, President Kennedy also

warned that if ballistic missiles were launched from Cuba against any country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States would counter with a "full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." While massing troops in Florida for a possible invasion of Cuba, the president insisted that the Soviet Union remove the missiles already on the island. The face-off lasted for another week and was highlighted by an intense debate among the president's most senior advisers over whether to offer a contingent palliative to the Soviet Union: removal of the fifteen American Jupiter IRBMs based in Turkey. Obsolete by the time they became operational in 1962, the Jupiters already "were supposed to be replaced by submarine-launched Polaris missiles." Moscow nonetheless found their presence on the southern Soviet border extremely provocative and destabilizing. Evan Thomas, a meticulous student of the administration, sums up the situation: "President Kennedy was not inalterably opposed to swapping the Jupiters, but he thought it would be foolish to publicly offer right away to trade them." His brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, therefore privately assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that once the Cuban crisis passed, the American missiles would be withdrawn. For the rest of his life, Robert Kennedy feared the political repercussions of his intervention. Dobrynin claimed Robert Kennedy told him that "some day—who knows?—he might run for president, and his prospects could be damaged if this secret deal about the missiles in Turkey were to come out." The dour Robert was as much a political animal as was his glamorous brother.

Khrushchev capitulated and removed the Soviet missiles from Cuba because he feared losing control of the situation. Castro was beseeching the Soviet leader to launch a nuclear attack to stave off an American invasion of Cuba. In Washington, President Kennedy was under equally extreme pressure to take military action. A post-crisis outburst by the air force chief of staff expressed the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Curtis LeMay, who had masterminded the firebombing of Japan and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, shouted at the president: "We lost! We ought to just go in there today and knock 'em off." The president knew better. He had risked Armageddon because he regarded the Russian MRBMs as an unacceptable challenge to American strategic superiority and an immediate danger to the nation's security. The missiles were gone; he had achieved his strategic goal, and not incidentally thwarted Republican critics in a congressional election year. Most Americans probably agreed with him in 1962, but with the passage of time the ultimate gamble seems increasingly less defensible. "In retrospect," the strategic analyst Norman Friedman concluded soon after the Cold War ended, "it is difficult to understand why Soviet weapons in Cuba were worth a global war."

The Cuban missile crisis reverberated throughout the 1960s. The continental European members of NATO were shaken by the unilateral way in which the United States went to the brink of nuclear conflagration without consulting its allies. French President Charles de Gaulle reaffirmed his determination to reduce European economic and military dependence upon the United States. In January 1963 he vetoed British entry into the Common Market on the grounds that British membership would make the association "appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American domination and direction." Simultaneously he rejected Kennedy's plan for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) as a transparent scheme to give the impression of multinational authority while in fact preserving the American veto over NATO's nuclear strategy. To end France's subservience to the United States, De Gaulle gradually immunized his military units from unquestioning subordination to the NATO command, and he ordered the removal of the alliance's headquarters from French soil as of April 1967. To document great power status in the nuclear age, he forged a French atomic striking force, the *force de frappe*. Britain at the same time was building its own strategic nuclear arsenal, but because of the special Anglo-American relationship it faced far fewer developmental obstacles. Kennedy simply provided the Royal Navy with Polaris missiles.

The impact of the missile crisis on Soviet-American relations was tragically paradoxical. On the one hand, the humiliating Soviet retreat strengthened the militants in the Kremlin who favored increased defense expenditures. They resolved that in the future the Soviet Union would deal with the United States as a nuclear equal. On the other hand, leaders in both countries were chastened by having faced nuclear annihilation. They installed a Teletype link, or "hot line," between the White House and the Kremlin to minimize misunderstanding during acute crises. Even in the midst of capitulating, on 29 October 1962, Khrushchev set the tone for further accommodation: "We should like to continue the

exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension." For some months Kennedy hesitated. Then, on 10 June 1963, in a speech at American University he made a passionate appeal for peace as "the necessary rational end of rational men." Coupled with various Anglo-American diplomatic initiatives, Kennedy's speech broke the impasse in superpower negotiations. Within weeks Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited testing nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, or under water. The treaty fell short of Kennedy's original goal for a comprehensive test ban that would have preserved American technological superiority by slowing or preventing improvements to the Soviet arsenal. Nevertheless, the U.S. arms control and disarmament director, William C. Foster, reminded Congress that half a loaf was better than none. With the limited test ban, he said, "improvements in yield-to-weight ratios would come more slowly through laboratory work alone. Some weapons effects phenomena would remain unsettled or undiscovered by both sides. . . . In general, our present nuclear advantages would last for a considerably longer period." In September the Senate ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty by a vote of 80 to 19.

A MAD, MAD WORLD

Two months after Senate ratification of the treaty, on 22 November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. The unspeakable tragedy abruptly ended any possibility of subsequent nuclear weapons agreements between himself and Khrushchev. The new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, was focused foremost on ramming through Congress the domestic reforms he advertised as the "Great Society." For continuity and simplicity he kept Kennedy's foreign policy and national security advisers in place, including Secretary of Defense McNamara.

McNamara continued to espouse a variant of the old Dulles doctrine of deterring a Soviet attack through the threat of massive retaliation, a strategic premise not wholly shared by Moscow's leaders. As the secretary of defense explained in his "posture statement" of January 1964, the United States was building a nuclear force of such superiority that it could "ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, communist China, and the communist satellites as national societies." In addition, it could "destroy their war making capability so as to limit . . . damage to this country and its allies." The inconsistency of this statement is patent: there can be no need to destroy an enemy's nuclear arsenal if its entire nation has already been obliterated. But underlying what appeared to be a logical lapse was the dawning and extremely reluctant acknowledgment in Washington of the "difficulties of appreciably limiting damage to the United States and its allies." By 1964, as the strategic historian John Newhouse observed, "the recognition that the United States was in the autumn of its strategic supremacy had set in." The immediate upshot was an unresolved debate about whether nuclear missiles should be "counter-force" weapons targeted only against the Soviet Union's ICBMs and other military assets, or "counter-value" weapons targeted against major Soviet industrial centers and their populations.

A counter-force strategy was preferable for reasons of humanity if nothing else, but the possibility of a counter-value assault by a desperate nuclear power could never be altogether ruled out. The counter-value strategy enjoyed disconcertingly wide theoretical appeal. It lay firmly in the mainstream of the "strategic bombing" doctrines of the Italian theorist Guilio Douhet, who wrote approvingly in 1921, "A complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air." The army general William "Billy" Mitchell adapted Douhet to the American experience in the 1920s and 1930s, and in World War II the U.S. Army Air Forces had adopted these draconian concepts of annihilating the enemy and its urban-industrial infrastructure. The theories had helped to rationalize the decision to drop the first atomic bombs on Japan in 1945.

In this confused environment, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to design nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could withstand a nuclear first strike and mount a crushing retaliatory strike. The United States led in deployment of such innovative systems as hardened silos, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) of ever-increasing range, new generations of heavy bombers, and MIRVs (a MIRV consisted of several relatively small but highly accurate warheads atop a single ICBM, each destined for an independently preprogrammed target). Toward the end of the decade the ability to

cripple the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a gargantuan strike seemed to be coming within America's reach. By 1968 the United States had deployed 1,054 ICBMs to the Soviets' 858, and the U.S. lead in the other indices of nuclear superiority was equally daunting.

Owing to this preponderance and to the enormous fiscal drain that the Vietnam War levied on defense resources, the pace of the United States buildup of strategic weapons actually began to level off at the height of the arms race in 1965. At the same time, the Soviet Union initiated a massive expansion of its strategic forces in an attempt to achieve parity with the United States. Finally conceding that the goal of limiting damage in a nuclear exchange had become unattainable, strategists in Washington began to use the term "assured destruction" in describing the standoff between the two nuclear powers. McNamara himself became convinced that neither further arms buildups nor the visionary antiballistic missile defense system (ABM) could guarantee Americans the security they craved. He began to search for a new formula for strategic stability. The answer was found in a 1946 book entitled *The Absolute Weapon,* in which America's preeminent strategist, Bernard Brodie, argued for nuclear equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. "Neither we nor the Russians," Brodie and his coauthors presciently wrote, "can expect to feel even reasonably safe unless an atomic attack by one were certain to unleash a devastating atomic counterattack by the other." McNamara now adopted this proposition, and it became enshrined in a telling acronym unfairly ascribed to him: MAD, for "mutual assured destruction." The converted secretary made it his mission to proselytize the American and Soviet leadership.

In 1967, U.S. leaders discovered that the Soviet Union was deploying a protective ABM system around Moscow. McNamara anxiously sought to avoid a reactionary massive increase in America's offensive nuclear forces. He persuaded President Johnson to bring up ABM defenses at the summit meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in June 1967 at Glassboro, New Jersey. When Johnson was unable to convince Kosygin that antiballistic missile defenses would only trigger an offensive nuclear arms race, McNamara tried to explain the administration's reasoning to the prime minister. The secretary of defense described at length the action-reaction dynamic he foresaw if the Soviet Union persisted in deploying antimissile shields, and he insisted that the only way to prevent an endless arms race was to limit or even eliminate these embryonic protective systems. This reasoning infuriated Kosygin, who found the idea of abandoning defensive weapons in favor of offensive weapons to be irresponsible and immoral. His premises differed fundamentally from McNamara's. Like other Soviet leaders, Kosygin based his thinking on the cruel lessons of World War II, during which the Soviet Union suffered cataclysmic devastation at the hands of Hitler's invading armies. The imperative "never again" informed all Soviet military planning. For Kosygin, McNamara's proposal to abandon missile defenses was a direct invitation to a reprise of national disaster. Kerry Kartchner, an American disarmament negotiator, observed critically, "there is little evidence that McNamara took actual Soviet strategic thinking about nuclear weapons into account, either in determining what was required to deter Soviet leaders, or how the Soviet Union might react to American deployment of ABMs." McNamara also appeared hypocritical, because as spokesman for the Johnson administration he had testified before Congress in favor of a limited Sentinel ABM system intended to protect cities and ICBM silos from destruction in a Soviet nuclear attack.

By late 1967, McNamara's days in power were nearing their end. He and others within the Johnson administration were belatedly realizing that the parasitical war in Vietnam was unwinnable, and they soon faced incontrovertible evidence that their strategy for waging limited war had failed. The communist Vietnamese Tet offensive of January 1968 broke America's will to fight and precipitated McNamara's resignation as secretary of defense. It also induced Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from the presidential race. In November, Republican Richard M. Nixon was elected president. He inherited only one undeniably positive nuclear policy achievement from the Johnson administration: the multilateral Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed by the Soviet Union and more than fifty other nations in 1968 and ratified by the United States in 1969.

The Nonproliferation Treaty set up a two-tiered "regime" that divided the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. The United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, and China were designated "nuclear weapons states" by virtue of the fact that they had tested nuclear weapons before 1968. All other parties to the treaty, offi-

cially designated as "non-nuclear weapon states," joined with the understanding that they would not seek to import or develop nuclear technology or materials for military purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had been founded by the United Nations in 1957, was given the task of verifying treaty compliance through an elaborate inventory procedure including on-site inspections at regular intervals. The five so-called weapons states were exempt from all such controls, but they were expected to honor the regime out of self-interest. Even so, France and China were dissatisfied and did not ratify the accord until 1992.

During the treaty negotiations, India led the nonaligned states in opposing the treaty's codification of elite status for the weapons states. The principal sop that the five nuclear-armed signatories conceded to the nonnuclear weapons states was the provision to share nonweapon nuclear technology "in good faith." New Delhi strongly objected to the absence of a provision for the enforcement of this obligation. In the end, several important countries, including India, Pakistan, and Israel, refused to sign the treaty; they remained beyond negotiated global nuclear controls. Such a treaty was a thin reed of hope for nonproliferation, as Richard Nixon well knew.

A COOPERATIVE BALANCE OF TERROR

Unscrupulous and devious in many ways, President Nixon was the consummate realist in foreign policy, especially when guided and prodded by his national security affairs adviser, the German émigré and former Harvard professor Henry A. Kissinger. Upon learning that the Soviets were rapidly approaching nuclear parity with the United States, the new president sensibly abandoned the quixotic search for American superiority in nuclear weapons systems and accepted the concept of parity or "sufficiency." He simultaneously made the decision to expand ABM defenses in the name of damage limitation, citing not only the danger from the Soviet Union but also from the People's Republic of China, which recently had joined the special weapons club by testing and deploying a nuclear weapon. Unlike Sentinel, however, the new Nixon Safeguard system was designed exclusively to protect Minuteman ICBM silos. The administration made public its decision that, in light of the Soviet Union's burgeoning offensive nuclear capability, limiting damage to civilian targets no longer was possible. The United States could only hope to preserve a retaliatory capability, the existence of which would deter an opponent from striking first. To further underscore his tough-mindedness and enhance the American retaliatory arsenal, Nixon installed more MIRVs on U.S. ICBMs.

Considering himself to be in a position of diplomatic strength, President Nixon entered into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations with the Soviet Union in November 1969. The Soviets, for their part, were now willing to negotiate because they were drawing abreast of the United States in numbers of ICBMs, if not in MIRVed warheads. A rough de facto nuclear parity had been achieved, and each side sought to freeze it in order to avoid the astronomical expense of building elaborate ABM systems, which existing technology could not make fully effective. The cost of the Vietnam War was driving American fiscal prudence; the chronic inefficiency of the Soviet economy was inspiring Moscow's circumspection. The two sides, however, were unable to reach any agreement and the SALT I discussions dragged on until the spring of 1972.

Fruition came at a summit in Moscow on 26 May 1972, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed by treaty to curtail deployment of ABMs. Delegates of the two superpowers also initialed a five-year interim agreement freezing offensive strategic nuclear weapons systems at their existing levels. In essence, the United States conceded to the Soviet Union an advantage in large missiles with horrifically destructive warheads, and the Soviet Union yielded to the United States the countervailing advantage in MIRVs. "What are 3,000 MIRVs among friends?" Henry Kissinger joked, but he later regretted that he had not pondered "the implications of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully."

The ABM Treaty likewise failed to prohibit further development of new delivery systems, such as the supersonic intercontinental B-1 bomber to replace the B-52, longer-range Trident SLBMs to replace the Polaris-Poseidon system, and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Maintenance of nuclear parity at the 1972 level, therefore, gave the United States the chance to capitalize on its technological supremacy to make an end run on the Soviets. With characteristic insight and cynicism, Kissinger quipped, "The way to use this freeze is for us to catch up." The Senate showed its appreciation for the advantages of the ABM

Treaty by approving it with an overwhelming vote: 88 to 2. A joint congressional resolution endorsed the five-year moratorium on development of new offensive strategic nuclear weapons.

Nixon's acceptance of atomic equality did not deter him from relying on nuclear weapons in his conduct of foreign and military policy. For example, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, he authorized a full alert of American strategic forces to forestall intervention by Soviet airborne troops. Similarly, as he progressively reduced the size of the U.S. Army, he permitted his advisers to revive plans for using tactical, or battlefield, nuclear weapons. In January 1971, when speaking about the American defense posture from 1972 through 1976, Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird said: "For those levels in the deterrent spectrum below general nuclear war, the forces to deter Soviet and Chinese adventures clearly must have an adequate war-fighting capability, both in limited nuclear and conventional options."

Hoping to capitalize on the success of the ABM Treaty, Nixon ordered new negotiations with the Soviet Union. SALT II opened with promise in November 1972 but soon foundered for several reasons: the scandal of the Watergate burglary and the forced resignation of Nixon in August 1974, Soviet-American disagreements over technical issues, and the objections of militants like Senator Henry Jackson who cried for the restoration of nuclear superiority.

THE LIMITS OF DÉTENTE

The new president, Republican Gerald R. Ford, initially retained Kissinger as both secretary of state and national security affairs adviser, but the old diplomatic wizardry had dissipated. The secretary of state and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met frequently and maneuvered endlessly for an advantage in arms control negotiations, warily proposing to limit weapons in which the other side had superiority while protecting their own favorites. In the interminable horse-trading, the United States claimed that the supersonic Soviet Backfire bomber (Tu-26) should be included in any new limitations agreements; the Soviets demanded inclusion of American nuclear-armed, ground-hugging, nonballistic cruise missiles. Technological strides kept raising the ante: the Soviet Union was perfecting the triple-MIRVed SS-20 IRBM, a terrifying threat to NATO; the United States was readying highly accurate Pershing IRBMs for NATO deployment and completing the Trident SSBN, with ballistic missiles that had a range of 4,000 nautical miles. Since neither side would yield, the dimming hopes for SALT II were bequeathed to the new Democratic administration of James Earl Carter in January 1977. When Carter took office, the U.S. nuclear inventory stood at 8,500 nuclear warheads in comparison with 5,700 in 1972, and the Soviet count had nearly doubled in the same period. If moderation of the nuclear balance of terror was the benchmark, the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente had failed miserably.

President Jimmy Carter thought détente was worse than a failure. He believed U.S. strategic potency actually had diminished under Republicans Nixon and Ford: "We've been outtraded in almost every instance." The Naval Academy graduate and former nuclear submariner was perpetually torn between the "mailed fist" of his hawkish national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the "dove's coo" of his temperate and cautious secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance. The president played off China against the Soviet Union, lectured Moscow on its policy toward Jews and dissident intellectuals, and at the same time tried to reignite the stalled SALT II talks. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin lamented, "President Carter continued to attack us in public, in public, in public. Always in public."

Two months after Carter's inauguration, Secretary of State Vance flew to Moscow with a proposal to revive the SALT process by radically reducing the number of deployed ICBMs, not surprisingly the nuclear category in which the Soviets held the lead. Initially rebuffed, Vance persevered until Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty at a summit meeting in Vienna in June 1979. For the first time, each superpower accepted numerical equality with the other in total nuclear delivery vehicles. The total number of MIRVed launchers for each side was set at 1,200, and the quantity of MIRVs per missile was also fixed. Moscow and Washington promised to allow on-site verification of compliance by representatives from the other side, an unprecedented step forward. Excluded from the agreement were several new high-technology weapons systems: the American MX ("missile experimental"), an improved ICBM that could deliver ten MIRVs to targets 7,000 miles distant from the launch site; the Trident-II SLBM with MIRVed ballistic missiles almost twice the weight of their predecessors; the nonballistic, nuclear-armed cruise missile; and the

supersonic Soviet Backfire bomber with a threatening range of 5,500 miles.

This qualified success fell victim to domestic critics and to Soviet-American disputes over hegemony throughout the world. Paul Nitze, the bellicose author of NSC 68, protested against SALT II. He said it was "time for the United States to stand up and not be a patsy." Senator Henry Jackson, always a patron of the arms industry and an intransigent foe of conciliation, complained that SALT II sanctified an imbalance in which the Soviet Union could destroy American land-based nuclear retaliatory forces in a preemptive first strike. In contrast, doves faulted the treaty because it was not comprehensive enough.

The objectors might have scuttled the pact regardless of international affairs, but in the fall of 1979 they were aided immeasurably by Carter's accusation that the Soviets were infiltrating a combat brigade into Cuba. The president vainly attempted to placate his critics and to warn the Soviets. He proclaimed a five-year military expansion program focused on European-based intermediate and cruise missiles, and his personal rage at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of that year led him to withdraw SALT II from the Senate. Discredited by a wide variety of foreign policy failures, most notably the Iranian hostage crisis (1979–1981), Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan, a charismatic movie actor and former governor of California.

TAMING THE EVIL EMPIRE

Pledging to "make America great again," President Reagan carried enough Republican candidates on his popular coattails to win control of the Senate for his party. Reelected by a landslide vote in 1984, he was superbly well positioned to maintain a contentious posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which he denounced with ideological fervor as an "evil empire." He and a kaleidoscopically shifting cast of senior advisers perceived a mortal U.S. disadvantage in strategic armament. The deficit arose primarily from the Soviet Union's greater aggregate "throw-weight," that is, the sheer tonnage of destructive power its missiles could deliver to targets in the United States and NATO countries. This simplistic measure of relative capability was used by the Reagan administration to warn of a "window of vulnerability" through which the United States could be devastated by a preemptive Soviet first strike.

To redress the Soviet Union's ostensible "margin of superiority," Reagan instructed the Pentagon to disregard budgetary restrictions and request whatever weapons it wanted. He goaded Congress to fund accelerated development and deployment of the B-1 bomber, the neutron bomb, the B-2 "stealth bomber," the Trident-II SLBM, the MX and cruise missiles, and mobile Minuteman ICBM launching sites. Thus fortified, President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. "Cap" Weinberger undertook arms-reduction talks with the Soviet Union. The Reagan cohort would extort Soviet concessions by using the revived arms race to strain the creaking Soviet economy.

The Reagan administration soon was managing several approaches to strategic security in the wake of the inherited SALT II failure: a rapid buildup of strategic and conventional capabilities; negotiations in 1981 to limit intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); the opening of talks on a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1982; and research into space-based antiballistic missile defenses. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced in March 1983 and derisively dubbed "Star Wars" by its opponents after the hit science-fiction movie, was an ambitious scheme to put laser-firing satellites into low orbit around the earth. These "killer satellites," assisted by a complex system of ground-based tracking radars, would intercept and destroy ICBMs at the height of their trajectory outside the earth's atmosphere. The program was projected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars, and it relied on future development of problematical new technologies. Domestic opposition based on cost, feasibility, and SDI's contravention of the ABM Treaty remained strong throughout Reagan's presidency.

In 1981, Reagan had suggested a "zero sum" option for tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union promptly rejected. The president promised that NATO would refrain from deploying any American cruise missiles if the Soviet Union eliminated the ballistic missiles it had aimed at western Europe, including existing systems that had never been on the negotiating table before. This suggestion that the Soviet Union scrap extant missiles to preclude American deployment of systems that as yet were in the planning stage dumbfounded Soviet leaders. In November 1983 they broke off the INF discussions.

The U.S. arms buildup continued during a two-year hiatus in negotiations, as did NATO's planning for deployment of intermediate-range

THE EVIL EMPIRE

"So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil."

— Remarks by President Ronald Reagan, 8 March 1983, at the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida —

nuclear weapons in Europe. The inhabitants of NATO nations and other European countries did not wholeheartedly accept the alliance's decision to place additional U.S. tactical nuclear forces in Europe as counters to Soviet SS-20s, SS-5s, and SS-4s. Street protests erupted in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, while parliaments and citizens across Europe reacted with alarm. Any Soviet attempt to turn these apparent fissures in NATO to negotiating advantage was foredoomed by a rapid succession of top leaders in Moscow. President Brezhnev had died in 1982, his successor, Yuri Andropov, in 1984, and Andropov's heir a year later.

Negotiations based on versions of Reagan's 1981 zero sum languished until Mikhail Gorbachev became the new secretary general of the Communist Party in March 1985. Relatively young at age fifty-four, and refreshingly dynamic in contrast with the typical Soviet apparatchik, Gorbachev was absolutely determined to liberalize the Soviet political system (*glasnost*), reform the economy (*perestroika*), and reduce expenditures for arms, especially nuclear missile systems. According to Michael K. Deaver, who served as Ronald Reagan's personal adviser for twenty years, the president sensed in Gorbachev a kindred spirit. "With Gorbachev, Reagan could do business, and business they would do, eliminating entire classes of nuclear weapons and paving the way for the literal collapse of arguably the greatest enemy we have ever faced." In three separate summit meetings between 1985 and 1987, this unique rapport greatly facilitated negotiations—up to a point. At the October 1986 meeting in Reykjavík, Iceland, the two heads of state came tantalizingly close to agreement on sweeping reductions in nuclear armaments and withdrawal of all American IRBMs from Europe. But things came unstuck when Gorbachev told Reagan, "All this depends, of course, on your giving up SDI." The president reacted with extreme defensiveness, and the meeting collapsed.

START was paralyzed, but all was not lost. The less glamorous INF talks had been revived by Reagan and Gorbachev, and in 1987 the two superpowers signed a treaty that for the first time eliminated an entire class of existing weapons. On-site inspections would verify the elimination of all Soviet and American land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. There is debate as to how much the treaty actually lowered the nuclear threat. Both the Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear forces by that time were becoming obsolete, and each side already was working on new systems. The INF treaty's successful conclusion, on the other hand, signaled that the two powers were ready to resume cooperation in arms control, and that they recognized a mutual need to maintain strategic stability. Gorbachev deserves credit for his flexibility and imagination in breaking the stalemate. He understood that he could not hope to match a U.S. arms buildup when his own domestic economy was on the verge of implosion. Reagan, too, deserves plaudits. In May 1988 he won Senate approval of the INF treaty by a vote of 93 to 5. Six months later, Reagan's phenomenal popularity helped elect his understudy to the presidency.

GENTLY INTO THAT GOOD NIGHT

A former Central Intelligence Agency director and ambassador to China, Vice President George H. W. Bush succeeded Reagan in January 1989. President Bush's one-term administration inherited a tentatively cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, the moribund START I negotiations, and a well-funded research and development program for strategic missile defense. Gorbachev, meanwhile, had been proceeding with unprecedented reforms in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. As he cut the Soviet military by 500,000 men and reduced Red Army troop levels in Eastern Europe, public demonstrations demanding freedom from communist rule spread

from the shipyards of Gdansk to the coffee shops of East Berlin. A totally unpredictable unraveling had begun. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall was literally dismantled by crowds of young people fed up with the economic and political sterility of the communist system. The destruction of the emblem of East-West division shook the Soviet Union to its core, but somehow in the midst of chaos Gorbachev managed to reach out to the new government in Washington. For its part, the Bush administration sharply slowed Reagan's very costly force buildup and began to reconfigure the planned missile defense architecture that had been created to support SDI. Eventually, the president would attempt to modify the ABM Treaty, but first he and Gorbachev sought to revitalize the START process, a casualty of the Reagan-Gorbachev contretemps over SDI. Meeting in Washington, D.C., in June 1990, Bush and Gorbachev initialed a trade pact and opened negotiations for deeper cuts in strategic weapons.

A year later, in July 1991, they met in Moscow to sign the START I treaty. The new accord reduced and limited total numbers of warheads rather than delivery systems. This was a breakthrough for arms control, although a cap of 4,900 ballistic-missile warheads does seem phantasmagorical. The approach had political appeal as a tool for both leaders to demonstrate to their constituents their seriousness about reducing the threat of nuclear war. It is equally true, however, that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact within six months of each other made the enormous size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal a political and economic liability more than a security asset. American strategic planners began to calculate the level of weapons actually needed to ensure the security of the United States in a world order no longer defined by nuclear bipolarity.

START I was Gorbachev's diplomatic swan song. On the evening of 25 December 1991, the hammer and sickle was lowered from the Kremlin's flagstaff for the last time, and the Soviet Union ceased to be. Boris Yeltsin, who had been outmaneuvering Gorbachev for primacy within the Soviet Union, became president of the new Russian Federation. Bush preferred to work with the less volatile Gorbachev, but in a typically pedestrian aside he said, "You dance with who is on the dance floor." The American pragmatist and the Russian usurper contrived to sign the SALT II agreement just before Bush left office in January 1993. It reduced the total of nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500 for each side. All MIRVed missiles were to be eliminated by the year 2003.

No matter how comprehensive, Russian-American cooperation was no longer a sufficient guarantee of nuclear security, as both Yeltsin and Bush realized. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Russia and the United States suddenly encountered a new and unprecedented danger of attack by "rogue states" equipped with nuclear missiles. It was common knowledge that Iraq and Iran had used chemical weapons against one another during their eight-year war (1980–1988), and it had been estimated in 1990 that the Iraqis were "perhaps one year away from deploying a nuclear device." During the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq brazenly launched short-range Scud missiles to terrorize Saudis in Riyadh and Israelis in Tel Aviv, and American-designed Patriot missiles performed marginally as counters to the Scuds. Subsequent arms-elimination inspections by the United Nations exposed an extensive and sophisticated Iraqi network of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons installations. Iraq and other so-called rogue states could no longer be discounted as insignificant to the international nuclear calculus. Something had to be done to ensure that the American homeland remained invulnerable to missile attack by minor powers possessing weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush reacted to the alarm with a new missile defense concept called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. Bearing the friendly acronym GPALS, the innovation of 1991 showed that the proponents of Reagan's "Star Wars" had never really gone away. Like SDI before it, GPALS would take nuclear warfare into space, initially with space-based sensors but eventually to include actual missile interceptors in earth orbit. To allow testing and deployment of these new systems, the administration formally proposed changes to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Suddenly divested of its sacrosanct character, the treaty would remain under siege for the rest of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.

LOOSE NUKES, SUCCESSOR STATES, ROGUES, AND FRIENDS

Throughout the tenure of Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton, Europe was experiencing a political reordering of a magnitude not witnessed since the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. As a component of the continental recon-

figuration, Clinton inherited from George H. W. Bush a wide array of unresolved nuclear issues. Some of them dated well back into the Cold War. Others were of recent vintage, the by-products of the disappearance of one of the Cold War's two principal protagonists and the global hegemonic ambitions of the self-proclaimed "one remaining superpower." Foremost among these dark bequests was the precipitous proliferation of nuclear weapons.

When the Soviet Union broke up, U.S. strategists were appalled to see the largest foreign nuclear arsenal suddenly scattered among four unstable, economically weak, and potentially antagonistic successor states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. Simply by declaring their independence, Ukraine and Kazakhstan became the third- and fourth-largest nuclear powers in the world. Russia, with U.S. concurrence, quickly declared itself the legal heir to the Soviet Union and the inheritor of its treaty obligations. Russia therefore became the only legitimate nuclear weapons power among the four successor states, according to the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, and it joined the United States in insisting that the other three disarm as soon as possible. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan took the first hesitant step in this direction in May 1992 when they signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty. This action made them parties to what was originally a bilateral agreement. They further pledged to adhere to the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear weapons states, a move that would codify their acquiescence to the global nuclear order and put their civilian nuclear assets under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Clinton administration and Congress provided some monetary assistance to the Soviet Union's successor states for their transition to nonnuclear status. One means of aid, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (CTR)—also known as Nunn-Lugar—advanced $1.5 billion to the four struggling nations. With this aid, Russia would bring its strategic weapons inventory into compliance with START I limitations; the other three states would dismantle their segments of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and sequester all weapons materials in Russia for indefinite safekeeping. Under CTR, President Clinton promised to purchase 500 metric tons of highly enriched Russian uranium for $12 billion over a twenty-year period. More immediately, in 1994 American technicians mounted a top-secret operation, code-named "Sapphire," which spirited 600 tons of weapons-grade uranium out of Kazakhstan. The objective was to keep this unprotected stockpile beyond the reach of Iran's nuclear weapons fabricators.

CTR attracted sharp criticism from some members of Congress for failing to focus narrowly on disarmament and for not adequately verifying destruction of nuclear weapons in Russia. Moscow, for its part, complained that most of the CTR money went to pay American contractors rather than to helping Russian firms develop the expertise to eliminate nuclear weapons. However, as one of the act's sponsors, Senator Richard G. Lugar, pointed out, the fact that most of the CTR appropriations remained in the United States was an essential selling point for the American people and Congress: "Eighty-four percent of Nunn-Lugar funds have been awarded to American firms to carry out dismantlement operations in the former Soviet Union. There are no blank checks to Moscow." As with the early Cold War's Marshall Plan, U.S. industry stood to profit from critical European instability.

Clinton supplemented the monetary inducements with diplomacy, but each of the three non-Russian nuclear-armed descendants of the Soviet Union presented unique impediments to the negotiation of nuclear disarmament. Belarus, highly Russified and sporadically ambivalent about independence, was the most readily compliant of the three; it also was the most lightly armed of them. Ukraine and Kazakhstan were tougher nuts to crack.

Bitterness against the former Soviet regime ran deep in Ukraine. Despite repeated assurances to George H. W. Bush's secretary of state, James A. Baker III, and to others concerning their intention to give up their nuclear arsenal, Ukraine's leaders stalled negotiations on assistance and delayed ratification of the Lisbon Protocol. By 1993 it was clear that Ukraine was working to establish positive control—the ability to launch—over its strategic arsenal. Ukrainian technicians already had gained negative control, which meant that President Leonid Kravchuk could prevent a missile launch by Moscow from Ukrainian soil if Russian President Boris Yeltsin should neglect to consult Kiev beforehand. Kiev's negotiators sought three main benefits from any agreement to disarm: attention and respect from the international community, money, and security guarantees from the remaining nuclear weapons states. Their intransigence delayed the Supreme Rada's ratifica-

tion of START I until February 1994, and of the NPT until December of that year. Ultimately, Kiev simply had to acknowledge that it could not afford, either financially or politically, to maintain a nuclear arsenal in the face of intense international pressure.

Kazakhstan trod a path somewhere between the acquiescence of Belarus and the hard line of Ukraine. Security guarantees figured prominently in the negotiations of Alma-Ata (Almaty) with Russia and the West over disarmament. Located at the juncture of Russia, China, India, and the Middle East, Kazakhstan feared losing its nuclear deterrent without acquiring the compensating umbrella of a powerful ally. While the United States stopped short of giving positive guarantees that it would intervene if Kazakhstan were attacked, it did help to alleviate the Kazakhstani parliament's apprehensions when it joined Russia and the other weapons states in guaranteeing Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus that they would never be attacked with nuclear weapons. After holding out along with Ukraine as long as possible, Kazakhstan reluctantly faced up to the realization that it had neither the fiscal resources nor the expertise to maintain, much less use, its weapons. The Supreme Council of Kazakhstan ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol on 23 July 1992 and, finally, the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state on 13 December 1993.

With Russia, nuclear matters were more complicated. When Clinton entered office in January 1993, the implementation of START I was under way and ratification of START II seemed imminent, but serious obstacles soon arose on both sides of the Atlantic. American opponents to START II raised the fear that swift action on arms reductions could leave the United States vulnerable if political instability in Russia should lead to a breakdown in bilateral arms control cooperation. An attempted parliamentary coup against President Yeltsin in October 1993 and the gradual deterioration of Yeltsin's ability to govern reinforced these concerns. Aside from the geostrategic relationship, domestic political maneuvering between the Republican-led Congress and the Democratic White House kept START II off the Senate's agenda for the better part of a year, until a quid pro quo on legislative priorities could be worked out between them. The U.S. Senate finally ratified START II by a large margin on 26 January 1996.

Strong opposition to key provisions of the treaty arose in the Russian Duma, whose members were sensitive to the changes in the U.S.–Russian strategic relationship and distressed over Russia's uncertain status as a world power. If Russia were to give up its MIRVed warheads, opponents to START II argued, it would be forced to invest in the creation of a new single-warhead ICBM force, an expenditure it could not afford, or lose its superpower status. Others believed that START II already was outdated and that negotiations should move directly to START III, as a means of bringing the U.S. arsenal down to the level at which Russian strategic forces probably would find themselves anyway. START III, it also was hoped, would eliminate objectionable features of START II, such as the provision that the United States would keep half its MIRVed SLBMs while Russia would have to eliminate all its MIRVed ICBMs.

The increase in NATO's membership, first proposed by Clinton in 1994, dealt another serious blow to prospects for the Duma's ratification of START II. Enlargement of the pact would be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post–Cold War era," according to George F. Kennan, the "father" of the 1947 containment policy who was still alive and writing in the 1990s. The grand master of American political-strategic thinking predicted that such a move would inflame hard-line nationalism within Russia, damage Russia's nascent democracy, and shift bilateral relations back to a Cold War status. Within Russia, analysts argued that expansion of NATO, juxtaposed with the downsizing of Russia's conventional forces, would force Moscow to rely even more heavily on its strategic arsenal. To calm this apprehension, the Russian Federation and NATO signed the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. They promised to build "a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security," and they proclaimed "the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia." While it did not satisfy the concerns of many who opposed expansion, the Founding Act did mitigate the damage enough for Moscow and Washington to continue cooperation on other issues. In 1997 Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to coordinate the START II and START III processes, with implementation of both to be complete by 31 December 2007.

Ratification of START II, and the START III talks themselves, unfortunately were soon paralyzed by the brouhaha over U.S. national missile defenses and the status of the ABM Treaty. This

controversy, in turn, stemmed from the serious setbacks to nonproliferation that characterized the 1990s. The United States and Russia had been working feverishly to contain the threat of uncontrolled nuclear arsenals in the former Soviet Union at the same time that North Korea, Pakistan, and India were demonstrating their intention to crash the five-member Nonproliferation Treaty nuclear club at all costs.

The first eruption occurred in early 1993, when North Korea violated its signatory obligations to the treaty by refusing to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of nuclear waste sites. Agency inspectors had found radioactive evidence suggesting that North Korea was separating plutonium from reactor waste in direct violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korean President Kim Il Sung accused the United States and South Korea of using the inspectors to spy on North Korea's military facilities and of planning to launch a "nuclear war" against the North as part of a joint military exercise, "Team Spirit." Tensions mounted throughout the spring of 1993. In March, Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty, while the United States sought sanctions through the United Nations to force North Korea to back down. At one point, the Pentagon raised the possibility of a preventive strike against the suspected facilities. Fearing an attack upon themselves as the U.S. allies geographically closest to North Korea, Tokyo and Seoul were urging Washington to consider diplomatic solutions that would avoid "cornering" Pyongyang. China and Russia also refused to support U.S. efforts to force North Korean compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency regime. A second war on the Korean peninsula, perhaps employing nuclear weapons, began to seem possible.

Pyongyang began to moderate its position eighteen months later, however, after Kim Il Sung's son, Kim Jong Il, succeeded his father as president. In October 1994 the Clinton administration and North Korea signed an accord known as the Agreed Framework pledging that North Korea would receive light-water reactors, which do not produce plutonium, and economic aid in exchange for free and full inspections of its declared nuclear facilities. Under the accord both sides agreed to make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations. As a further concession, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry canceled Exercise Team Spirit. U.S. public opinion, however, remained strongly opposed to providing any economic support for the "rogue nation," so financing for the assistance was arranged through an international consortium of private and governmental agencies from Japan, South Korea, and the United States. These imposed inhibitions on North Korea's nuclear aspirations did not last.

On 31 August 1998, North Korea rocketed a three-stage Taep'o-dong ballistic missile over Japan's main island of Honshu. Western intelligence attributed to the missile a surprising range of between 3,800 and 5,900 kilometers. This extended reach constituted remarkable progress in five years for the North Korean missile program, from the 500 kilometer-range Nodong-1 in 1993. It sparked American fears that North Korea might be working on an intercontinental ballistic missile to bring the western United States under threat of nuclear attack. More likely, North Korea's motives for unveiling the Taep'o-dong in such a dramatic fashion had as much to do with political posturing as with aggressive concepts of national security. Just before the test, North Korea's leaders indicated that they would halt the missile program if the United States lifted economic sanctions and compensated them for lost missile sales. There also were solid indications that North Korea's nuclear weapons program, halted under the Agreed Framework, had been put back on track in reaction to U.S. failure to provide the light-water reactors it promised in 1994.

The Taep'o-dong missile launch was not the only setback to Clinton's hopes for halting the diffusion of nuclear weapons in 1998. In May of that year India announced that it had detonated five nuclear devices at its testing range in the Thar Desert near Pakistan's border. The subcontinent had been problematic for the international nonproliferation regime ever since India's refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968. India had become a de facto, but undeclared, nuclear power in 1974, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized what Indian officials characterized as a "peaceful nuclear explosion." Governance of India's nuclear program was tightly held by its civilian leaders, to the almost complete exclusion of the Indian military. Since 1974, India had chosen to rely on an ambiguous "existential deterrent" policy toward its declared enemy, Pakistan, and toward its arch-rival, China. Although India clearly possessed the capability to deploy warheads, none were placed on delivery vehicles or deployed at launch sites; nor was their existence officially conceded.

Upon India's announcement of the tests in 1998, the United States and the United Nations immediately launched efforts to persuade Pakistan, long suspected of having a rudimentary nuclear capability, not to test in reaction to India. All threats and pleas failed, and Pakistan conducted six tests of its own within a month. With tensions between the two adversaries already soaring due to a chronic Islamic insurgency in Kashmir, world attention swung to the subcontinent as the next possible site for a nuclear war. In this quarter, the United States and United Nations faced a dilemma quite different from that posed by North Korea. The largest democracy in the world and a challenger to China for hegemony in South Asia, India was not constrained by the nonproliferation or safeguards conventions. Moreover, India's people and their political leaders had in the past proved remarkably resistant to threats or attempts at coercion regarding their nuclear status. Pakistan for its part was able to depend upon a close relationship with China to sustain its nuclear defense program in the face of international opprobrium.

UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998, which had been sponsored by the five permanent members of the Security Council, demanded an immediate end to testing by New Delhi and Islamabad and called on the two countries to reopen negotiations over disputed territories. It enjoined them to sign the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 as nonnuclear weapons states. In the United States, the Glenn Resolution to the Arms Export Control Act of 1998 legally required President Clinton to impose sanctions on both countries in response to the tests. Military and financial aid was restricted, but commercial intercourse continued without impediment.

International opinion was divided on the utility of sanctions as a means to coerce India or Pakistan. Many analysts thought such attempts were more likely to harden than soften the resolve of the two countries' leaders, given the overwhelming domestic approval of the tests. There was the additional risk of intensifying Pakistan's political instability by disrupting an already unsteady economy and strengthening the hand of its military in political affairs. Finally, vigorous anti-American factions in both countries resented what they regarded as Washington's interference in their bilateral affairs, while each state was highly suspicious of the other's relations with the United States. This atmosphere limited Washington's ability to influence either government, particularly in the area of arms control. Clinton and the U.S. Congress therefore gradually eased or waived many of the Glenn Resolution's prohibitions, and the administration's diplomats continued to encourage nuclear prudence on the part of India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regimes made no provision for admitting new weapons states or for safeguarding the nuclear facilities of states that lacked official treaty nonweapon status. This hiatus left Pakistan and India in a nonproliferation limbo, and their civilian nuclear assets remained beyond international oversight.

The dramatic proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and missile arsenals, together with the bombing of the World Trade Center by a group of international terrorists in 1993, the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and simultaneous car bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, left Americans feeling uncomfortably vulnerable in an increasingly hostile and unpredictable world. Interest was revived in a total ban on testing nuclear weapons. First broached during the Kennedy presidency, the idea remained moribund until the 1990s, when it again gained currency as the most obvious means to halt nuclear weapons proliferation and arms races. In 1996 the UN General Assembly had formulated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and disseminated it for signature. President Clinton, one of the first heads of state to sign, characterized the treaty as the "longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history." He submitted the treaty to the Senate for approval, confident he would be able to cite its ratification as one of the chief foreign policy victories of his presidency. His confidence was premature. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina, with the full support of Republican Majority Leader Trent Lott, saw the treaty as a golden opportunity to thwart Clinton. They let it die in committee without a single hearing. In light of U.S. senatorial obstinacy, other governments began to question the wisdom of forgoing their right to test. By 1998 few countries had ratified the pact, and hope for a comprehensive test ban faded.

In retrospect, the monumental dangers of the Cold War's bipolar nuclear standoff had been manageable, and decades of arms control negotiations had made the likelihood of war between the

two superpowers appear increasingly remote. In the afterglow of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Americans were faced with a world full of apparent enemies against whom the tremendous U.S. nuclear deterrent was impotent. The threat of massive retaliation simply could not be used to deter terrorists, not only because their provenance usually was unclear, but also because it was politically untenable and morally unjustifiable to carry out such a lopsided exchange.

The function of the nuclear deterrent in the post–Cold War world became a subject of intense concern, and the topical center of gravity within U.S. security and policymaking circles began to shift from nonproliferation to counterproliferation. A search was begun for promising new technologies to defend U.S. territory and citizens against possible attack. As the threat of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction became a favorite subject of national security debates within Washington, Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" concept began a relentless comeback.

President Clinton gave missile defenses a lower priority than had George H. W. Bush, but he continued a modest developmental program. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization metamorphosed into the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, with a much smaller budget than its predecessor had enjoyed. Drawing lessons from the Gulf War of 1991, Clinton shifted the program's concentration from strategic to regional or "theater" defense. Theater missile defenses (TMD) were seen by critics in both the United States and Russia as an attempted end run around the ABM Treaty, even though the treaty did not specifically cover TMD. Some TMD hardware could easily be reconfigured to counter strategic as well as tactical ballistic missiles, opponents argued. They predicted that development of TMD would induce Russia to build up rather than reduce its strategic arsenal, thus undoing the historic achievements of arms control negotiations and agreements. In 1993 the Clinton administration sought to alleviate these concerns by negotiating a "line of demarcation" between strategic and theater defenses based on Article 6 of the ABM Treaty, which forbade giving an ABM "capability" to non-ABM defense systems. This approach met with powerful opposition from the newly elected Senate Republican majority in 1994. The Republicans insisted that the Russians should not have a "veto" over the future of American missile defenses, as they did under the ABM Treaty.

Caught between these conflicting factions, Clinton worked directly with Yeltsin to fashion language that would evade both the legal triggers of the treaty and the political guns of the U.S. Senate. The result was a joint statement by the two presidents issued in May 1995. It paved the way for negotiating a demarcation agreement, recognized the validity of TMD in principle, and reaffirmed the importance of the ABM Treaty to the bilateral relationship. The negotiations themselves were complex. The current parties to the ABM Treaty—the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—had to hammer out a common interpretation of interceptor range and velocity, flight-testing, space- and land-based sensors, and other arcane technical issues within the parameters of the treaty before they could reach agreement on what any signatory actually was allowed to do with its missile defenses.

Meanwhile, the controversy in the United States over a national missile defense continued to evoke strong reactions from powerful international friends and potential adversaries. China and Russia were the most vociferous in their condemnation of what they viewed as a unilaterally destabilizing course of action. European and Asian allies asked whether the United States was attempting to withdraw behind a "Fortress America" defensive bulwark that would leave them facing potential threats without a credible deterrent. Having gotten itself entangled in some future overseas adventure, their argument went, the United States could retreat without fear of reprisal, leaving its allies exposed as defenseless targets for the missiles of disgruntled adversaries. The Clinton administration disingenuously countered that, on the contrary, a United States free from the fear of retaliation would be more willing, not less, to come to the aid of its allies in a nuclear emergency. This was a ghostly reprise of the American assertions that in the early 1960s had led a skeptical Charles de Gaulle to form a French nuclear *force de frappe* and to withdraw from NATO strategic planning. De Gaulle knew in the 1960s, as European leaders knew in the 1990s, that there was only a negative answer to the question, "Would the Americans really be willing to trade Washington for, say, Paris?"

To appease a dubious Russia, the Clinton administration in 1999 proposed that the two countries cooperate in the development of national missile defense systems. Before any real progress could be made, in December 2000, Yeltsin abdicated and was succeeded by the former secret police (KGB) officer Vladimir Putin.

The new Russian president warned Clinton that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would force Russia to reconsider all of its treaty obligations with the United States, including the pending ratification of START II. Clinton vacillated. He had signed the 1999 National Missile Defense Act calling for an effective missile defense system as soon as one was technologically feasible, but he deferred a final decision to deploy one and passed that hot potato to his successor. Putin in the meantime was doing his best to keep the United States committed to bilateral strategic arms control and to salvage the ABM Treaty. Strong lobbying by the Russian president persuaded the Duma to ratify START II in April 2000. The desperate gesture's futility would be demonstrated soon after President Clinton left office.

YIELDING TO THE NEW ORDER

George W. Bush, the son of Clinton's predecessor, entered the White House in January 2001 as a strange amalgam of neoisolationist and latter-day cold warrior. Lacking his father's lifetime of exposure to world affairs or to politics beyond Texas, Bush had very rarely traveled overseas. From the first days of his administration he showed an alarming tendency to discount the stabilizing results of a half century's patient negotiation, especially the thirty-year-old ABM Treaty. His most senior advisers were men and women with broad foreign policy expertise and extensive experience in managing the national security apparatus. Richard Cheney, the vice president, had been secretary of defense at the time of the Gulf War; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had held the same office under President Reagan; General Colin Powell, the secretary of state, was a former national security adviser who had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War. Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was a newcomer to high office but she brought to the Oval Office an intimate academic familiarity with the military and foreign policy of Soviet Russia. On balance, these counselors were aggressive and combative veterans of the Cold War; they were not inclined to dissuade the president from attacking the ABM Treaty as obsolete in a world of nuclear-armed rogue states, or from pushing the eastward expansion of NATO regardless of the objections of Russia.

Bush immediately made it clear that creation of a missile defense system would command his highest priority. At the same time, he began distancing himself from the traditionally close strategic and arms control relationship the United States had maintained with Russia since Nixon's presidency. In the earliest days of his administration Bush warned that if Russia refused to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty the United States might abrogate the pact. He further suggested that the United States would make future changes to its strategic arsenal on a unilateral basis. This autarchy would free the United States from the need to negotiate missile defenses in tandem with arms reductions, thereby decoupling Russian and American strategic interests for the first time in more than fifty years.

Early in 2001 the éminence grise of the Republican foreign policy establishment, Henry Kissinger, weighed in on the side of the opponents of the ABM Treaty, which had been negotiated when he was President Nixon's national security adviser. In a book entitled *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* Kissinger quite remarkably traced the treaty's origins to congressional and bureaucratic opposition to an ABM defense system that, he claimed, was what President Nixon had preferred. Kissinger said the opponents of Nixon's antiballistic missile program used the same arguments as were being used in 2001 to discredit President Bush's national and theater missile defense proposals. In Kissinger's version, the Cassandras incoherently predicted that a ballistic missile defense program "would not work; that it would work so well as to be destabilizing; that it would weaken the Atlantic Alliance by decoupling the defense of the United States from that of Europe; that it would drive the Soviet Union into intransigence and an arms race."

Kissinger and others who would scrap the ABM Treaty in order to construct antiballistic missile systems postulated that regardless of any treaty, the United States and Russia would not attack one another because each side had far more than enough nuclear weapons to obliterate its rival. On the other side of the debate was Thomas L. Friedman, the foreign correspondent of the *New York Times*. A strategic thinker who believed that "the information revolution and [economic] globalization" were radically transforming international relations, Friedman vigorously denounced Kissinger and "the Bush team's latest version of a high-tech missile defense shield." It was "an idea that, so far, doesn't work, [and] shows every possibility of unraveling the complex web of arms control and diplomatic initiatives that have kept the peace for 50 years."

President Bush met Vladimir Putin, the president of the Russian Federation, for the first time in Slovenia in June 2001. Bush said he looked his counterpart in the eye, liked what he saw, and invited him to his ranch in Texas. Some naive columnists were quick to herald a breakthrough and a revitalization of Russian-American relations. But prudent skeptics wondered whether real Russian-American harmony could be established or persist given the substantive differences dividing the two countries. Asked about the U.S.–Russian relationship in May 2000, the deputy chairman of the defense committee of the Russian Duma, Alexei Arbatov, replied without hesitation, "There are a lot of very bad feelings, bad expectations, suspicions and mistrust. A lot of those are not justified, some are, unfortunately, justified. Russia sees itself as now being an opponent of the United States. . . . Russia is willing to compete . . . in important areas such as the post-Soviet states, the Balkans, the issue of ballistic missile defenses and strategic offenses [sic]."

Another pertinent question to consider when assessing Russian-American relations in the first decade of the twenty-first century was whether the relationship between the two should really remain the central thread of American nuclear strategy and diplomacy. The United States might bill itself as the "one remaining superpower" in 2001, but the People's Republic of China was a nascent great power with potentially unlimited geopolitical ambitions and energy. Vociferous in denouncing the Bush administration's plans to build missile defenses as destabilizing, China shrugged off American accusations that it was benefiting from the ABM Treaty while the United States lay exposed to missile attacks by powers other than Russia. Beijing continued to vilify the United States as a "rogue hegemon" whose self-aggrandizement threatened the security of the rest of the world. At the same time, China modernized its own nuclear and conventional forces and opened mutual defense discussions with Russia. President Putin of Russia, seeking a counterweight to U.S. power, turned eagerly to China, where he found enthusiasm for cooperation in arms and technology transfers. A Sino-Russian voting alliance in the UN Security Council became less and less far-fetched, but this was not the most ominous development. Alexei Arbatov warned, "Russia certainly views China as its present partner. . . . [F]or the nearest and medium-term future, China is perceived as much closer to Russia on international security issues than the United States and the West in general."

In mid-2001 it was hard to see how the emergence of a Sino-Russian bloc could do other than increase the Bush administration's resolve to abandon the ABM Treaty and go it alone with nuclear missile defenses. In July of that year a missile-borne "kill vehicle" dramatically intercepted a Minuteman II warhead 144 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The highly orchestrated test convinced credulous proponents of Star Wars "that we can hit a bullet with a bullet." Less than a week later, at a summit in the Kremlin, the presidents of Russia and China jointly condemned George W. Bush's national missile defense and his intended abrogation of the ABM Treaty as threats to the security of their countries. For the first time in fifty years, Beijing and Moscow concluded a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation. This rapprochement between America's two former major antagonists was a far cry from the benign "new world order" that the first President Bush had proclaimed at the end of the Cold War.

CONCLUSION

The world has turned round many times since Harry S. Truman permitted the U.S. Army Air Forces to drop atomic bombs on Japan. Having borne the full moral responsibility for opening the age of nuclear warfare, he courageously repudiated advisers who would have him repeat the macabre performance in Korea or China. His five-star successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, constructed a magnificent nuclear armory and resolutely refused to use a single weapon in the inventory, despite the proclivity of his secretary of state for saber-rattling warnings of imminent Armageddon. After the bone-chilling scare of John F. Kennedy's Cuban missile crisis, a long period of mature Soviet-American nuclear diplomacy and restraint settled over Washington and Moscow. The well-understood rules of the nuclear-diplomatic road did not become obsolescent until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thereafter, the restless new nuclear powers and a freshly assertive China cast the most ominous shadows over the future. It would take extraordinary American statesmanship to steer a safe course through a world of revanchist states armed with weapons of mass destruction. George H. W. Bush, William Jefferson Clinton, and George W. Bush were only the first of a long line of American presidents who would face a challenge for which the Cold War's nuclear policy offered precious little direct guidance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alperovitz, Gar. *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam.* New York, 1965. The classic formulation of the revisionists' questions about the motives behind the atomic bombing of Japan. See also the author's revised edition (London and Boulder, Colo., 1994), in which, after reconsidering the evidence, he reasserts his earlier thesis.

Arbatov, Alexei. "Arbatov on U.S.–Russian Arms Reduction." Proliferation Brief 3, no. 16 (18 May 2000) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A pithy analysis of Russia's decision to ratify START II, by the deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee.

Bernstein, Barton J. "Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941–1945: A Reinterpretation." *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (spring 1975): 23–69. A prominent Cold War revisionist defends the Truman administration for dropping the bomb and refutes some of the Alperovitz criticism.

Bertsch, Gary K., and William C. Potter, eds. *Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.* New York, 1999. An exhaustive study of export controls and the danger of illegal transfer of nuclear materials in the four nuclear successor states to the Soviet Union.

Brodie, Bernard, ed. *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.* New York, 1946. The scholarly argument for a balance of terror by the American master of military strategy.

Burdick, Eugene, and Harvey Wheeler. *Fail-Safe.* New York, 1962. Two political scientists resort to fiction to explain what would happen if SAC lost control of any of its aircraft and the superpowers had to choose which cities to offer up in a mutual sacrifice to prevent all-out nuclear war.

Chang, Gordon H. "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis." *International Security* 12, no. 4 (spring 1988): 96–122. President Eisenhower took the United States closer to nuclear war with China in 1955 than has been imagined.

Cirincione, Joseph, ed. *Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.* New York, 2000. Papers from the premier annual conference on controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha, eds. *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* Armonk, N.Y., 1995. A glimpse into the complexities facing American policymakers in their dealings with the remains of the Soviet Union.

Deaver, Michael K. *A Different Drummer: My Thirty Years with Ronald Reagan.* New York, 2001. An insider's frightening view of Reagan's mind and diplomacy.

Drew, S. Nelson, ed. *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze.* Washington, D.C., 1996. The document itself, accompanied by a post-hoc exegesis by the principal author.

Fitzgerald, Frances. *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War.* New York, 2000. Antimissile defense systems thoroughly debunked with literary lucidity, by one of the great political and social critics of the late twentieth century.

Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War.* Annapolis, Md., 2000. A technologically oriented analyst's comprehensive account of the strategy and diplomacy of the Cold War.

Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.* New York, 2000. Businessmen, not bombers, hold the key to the world's future according to a leading opponent of visionary missile defense systems.

Gaddis, John L. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York, 1982. Ideas formulated during strategy seminars at the Naval War College just after the Vietnam War.

———. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations.* New York, 1992. Some projections about "where we may be going" written at the very end of the Cold War, as the Soviet Union was dissolving.

———. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.* New York, 1997. The distinguished conservative blames Stalin for the Cold War, credits Khrushchev with a victory in the Cuban missile crisis, and chastises revisionists for interpretive flexibility.

Herkin, Gregg. *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War, 1945–1950.* New York, 1980. A finely balanced assessment of atomic diplomacy in practice.

Hersey, John. *Hiroshima.* New York, 1946. The classic conscience-shattering account of six who survived the bombing.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr. *A History of the Atomic Energy Commission: The New World, 1939–1946*. University Park, Pa., 1962. The first of two volumes of the history of the AEC written with unflagging precision and based on the agency's documents.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Francis Duncan. *A History of the Atomic Energy Commission: Atomic Shield, 1947–1952*. University Park, Pa., 1969. The second volume of the AEC's history.

———. *Nuclear Navy, 1946–1962*. Chicago and London, 1974. An extremely detailed study of Admiral Hyman Rickover's struggle for a nuclear-powered submarine, the first step toward the Polaris system.

Holloway, David. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956*. New Haven, Conn., 1994. A full account of how Stalin instantly perceived the atomic bombing of Japan as an anti-Soviet act disrupting the international balance of power.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. New York, 1961. A superior survey of 1945–1960 by a pioneer in the study of strategy.

Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*. New York, 1986. The makers of policy and strategy in thought, deed, and camaraderie from World War II through Vietnam.

Kaplan, Morton A. *S.A.L.T.: Problems and Prospects*. Morristown, N.J., 1973. A glimpse of the intricacies of arms limitations by a distinguished observer.

Kartchner, Kerry M. *Negotiating START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Quest for Strategic Stability*. New Brunswick, N.J., 1992. One of the best in-depth analyses of U.S. and Soviet-Russian policies and positions in the first START negotiations.

Kaufman, Robert G. *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics*. Seattle, Wash., 2000. A highly sympathetic and comprehensive scholarly biography of the "senator from Boeing."

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. W. Wittkopf, eds. *The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War*. New York, 1985. A variety of views from the American perspective on such crucial topics as MAD and civil defense.

Kissinger, Henry. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. New York, 2001. A plea for admission to George W. Bush's inner circle, made at the price of disavowing his own ABM Treaty.

Kolodziej, Edward A. *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963*. Columbus, Ohio, 1966. A good summary of the military arguments presented to Congress each year.

LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1973*. 3d ed. New York, 1976. A careful portrait of the diplomatic context shaping nuclear policies by one of America's preeminent diplomatic historians.

Lavoy, Peter R., Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons*. Ithaca, N.Y., 2000. This ground-breaking work seeks to explain why different actors want to obtain unconventional weapons and how they intend to use them. Case studies of six states and a chapter on terrorists.

Lodal, Jan. *The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership*. New York, 2001. Warning that complacency is unwarranted, the author proposes a comprehensive post–Cold War nuclear strategy for the United States.

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control*. New York, 1990. Excellent dissection of the Soviet Union's motivations and reasoning by an internationally recognized scholar.

McCullough, David. *Truman*. New York, 1992. A Pulitzer Prize–winning biography.

Messer, Robert L. *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, and the Origins of the Cold War*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982. Documents the belligerency of the Truman cold warriors and casts doubt on the diplomatic efficacy of verbal bluster.

Mueller, John. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York, 1989. Advances the dubious thesis that historical conditions other than the advent of nuclear warfare account for the elimination of major war as a serious policy option.

Myrdal, Alva. *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race*. New York, 1976. A critical analysis of the arms race from the perspective of an advocate of disarmament.

Newhouse, John. *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*. Washington, D.C., 1989. A detailed and fascinating account of the first attempt to control the nuclear arms race through bilateral negotiations.

———. "The Missile Defense Debate." *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 4 (July/August 2001): 97–109. The master of the subject again opposes an American missile defense system as technologically and politically impractical.

Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1996. Thoughtful and critical evaluation of the utility of nuclear and nonnuclear strategic bombing as an instrument of policy.

Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.* Princeton, N.J., 1986. A grand survey by authors who believe in wars of annihilation.

Paterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan. *American Foreign Relations.* Vol. 2: *A History Since 1895.* 5th ed. Boston, 2000. This revisionist but balanced survey contains at least one succinct paragraph on every major episode in Soviet-American nuclear relations.

Rhodes, Richard. *The Making of the Atomic Bomb.* New York, 1986. Every aspect of the creation and use of the first atomic bombs.

——. *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb.* New York, 1995.

Rotblat, Joseph, ed. *Security, Cooperation, and Disarmament: The Unfinished Agenda for the 1990s.* Proceedings of the Forty-sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 2–7 September, 1996, in Lahti, Finland. London, 1998. A group of experts from twenty countries debate a broad array of issues facing the world, including nuclear arms control and disarmament. Valuable for its sometimes widely divergent points of view.

Sapolsky, Harvey M. *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government.* Cambridge, Mass., 1972. A provocative explanation of why and how strategic weapons systems are built.

Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence.* New Haven, Conn., 1966. The argument for practicing coercive nuclear diplomacy or atomic blackmail by an originator of deterrence theory.

Schroeer, Dietrich. *Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race.* New York, 1984. A stunning integration of the technical and political components of the nuclear arms race by a nuclear physicist concerned about the loss of life that would attend a nuclear war.

Sherry, Michael S. *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon.* New Haven, Conn., 1987. Strategic bombing in the context of the historical evolution of theory.

Sherwin, Martin J. *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance.* New York, 1975. Persuasively argues the pros and cons of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki and criticizes the strategic doctrine of unconditional surrender.

Stimson, Henry L. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb." *Harper's* (February 1947). The orthodox position on the use of the atomic bomb in 1945 by one of the participants in the decision making.

Takaki, Ronald. *Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb.* New York, 1995. A Japanese American finds Truman fully responsible, but with understandable military justification.

Thomas, Evan. *Robert Kennedy: His Life.* New York, 2000. A balanced look at the pivotal role the president's brother played in defusing the Cuban missile crisis.

Trachtenburg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. Contends that Germany, not Soviet-American nuclear accommodation, held the key to global peace in the Cold War.

Van Cleave, William R., and S. T. Cohen. *Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue.* New York, 1987. A conservative view that is critical of test-ban agreements.

Walsh, James, ed. *The Future Role of United States' Nuclear Weapons.* Defense and Arms Control Studies Program Working Paper. Cambridge, Mass., August 1994. Experts from the U.S. arms control community gathered in February 1994 to discuss the present and future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and U.S. strategic policy.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* New York, 1973. The ageless and classic study of the American strategy of annihilation.

Weintraub, Stanley. *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero.* New York, 2000. Puts MacArthur's advocacy of using atomic weapons in the Korean War into national perspective.

Weir, Gary E. *Forged in War: The Naval Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940–1961.* Washington, D.C., 1993. A superb historian puts Rickover into context.

Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. *Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and World Politics.* Boulder, Colo., 2002. Generally favorable analyses by U.S. experts of the arguments for development of a national missile defense. A wealth of historical and technical information for those unfamiliar with the issue.

York, Herbert. *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race.* New York, 1970. Disturbing criticism by a disillusioned nuclear scientist who was present at the creation.

Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996. Superb and readable discussion of the other side's nuclear diplomacy from Soviet sources opened after the Cold War.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WARRIORS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONGRESSIONAL POWER; CONTAINMENT; DETERRENCE; DOCTRINES; IDEOLOGY; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; OUTER SPACE; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; POWER POLITICS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; SUMMIT CONFERENCES; SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY; TREATIES.

Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

Advisory Board

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman
San Diego State University

Nick Cullather
Indiana University

Chester Pach
Ohio University

William O. Walker III
Florida International University

ENCYCLOPEDIA *of* AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Second Edition

★ ★ ★ ★

VOLUME 3

O – W
Index

Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, and Fredrik Logevall, Editors in Chief

Louise B. Ketz, Executive Editor

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

GALE GROUP
THOMSON LEARNING

New York • Detroit • San Diego • San Francisco
Boston • New Haven, Conn. • Waterville, Maine
London • Munich

Copyright © 2002 by Charles Scribner's Sons

Charles Scribner's Sons
An imprint of the Gale Group
300 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Charles Scribner's Sons.

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy : studies of the principal movements and ideas / editors, Alexander DeConde ... [et al.]--2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-684-80657-6 (set : alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-684-80658-4 (v. 1) -- ISBN 0-684-80659-2 (v. 2) -- ISBN 0-684-80660-6 (v. 3)
1. United States--Foreign relations--Encyclopedias. 2. United States--Foreign relations--Philosophy--Encyclopedias. I. DeConde, Alexander.

E183.7 .E52 2002
327.73'003--dc21 2001049800

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z3948-1992 (Permanence of Paper)

CONTENTS

OIL 1
David S. Painter

OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION 21
William Appleman Williams

OPEN DOOR POLICY 29
Mark Atwood Lawrence

ORGANIZED LABOR 45
Elizabeth McKillen

OUTER SPACE 61
Roger Launius

PACIFISM 73
Charles Chatfield

PAN-AMERICANISM 83
Thomas M. Leonard and Thomas L. Karnes

PARTY POLITICS 99
Fredrik Logevall

PEACEMAKING 113
Berenice A. Carroll

PEACE MOVEMENTS 129
Robert H. Ferrell

PHILANTHROPY 141
James A. Field, Jr., and Tim Matthewson

POST–COLD WAR POLICY 153
Richard A. Melanson

POWER POLITICS 169
Thomas H. Etzold and Robert L. Messer

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS 179
Albert Bowman and Robert A. Divine

PRESIDENTIAL POWER 195
Alexander DeConde

THE PRESS 221
Ralph B. Levering and Louis W. Liebovich

PROPAGANDA 239
Kenneth A. Osgood

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD 255
Burton F. Beers

PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 265
Raymond A. Esthus

PUBLIC OPINION 275
Melvin Small

RACE AND ETHNICITY. 289
John Snetsinger

REALISM AND IDEALISM 311
Norman A. Graebner

RECIPROCITY 329
Robert Freeman Smith

RECOGNITION 345
Paolo E. Coletta

REFUGEE POLICIES 357
David M. Reimers

RELIGION 371
Leo P. Ribuffo

REPARATIONS 393
Carl P. Parrini and James I. Matray

REVISIONISM 407
Athan G. Theoharis

REVOLUTION 425
Jeremi Suri

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 443
Ronald E. Doel and Zuoyue Wang

SELF-DETERMINATION 461
Betty Miller Unterberger

SPECIAL-INTEREST LOBBIES 483
William Slany

SUMMIT CONFERENCES 501
Theodore A. Wilson

SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY 513
Vojtech Mastny

TARIFF POLICY. 531
Thomas W. Zeiler

TELEVISION. 547
Chester Pach

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 563
Brian Michael Jenkins

TREATIES 571
J. B. Duroselle and Ian J. Bickerton

THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT 597
Larry Berman and Jason Newman

WILSONIANISM 617
Tony Smith

WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY 627
Roger R. Trask

EDITORS AND ADVISERS 637

CONTRIBUTORS 639

INDEX 643

CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES

VOLUME 1

PREFACE xiii

CHRONOLOGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1607–2001 xvii
Richard Dean Burns and Louise B. Ketz

AFRICAN AMERICANS 1
Brenda Gayle Plummer

ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES . . 13
Warren F. Kimball

AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES 29
Kenneth J. Grieb

ANTI-IMPERIALISM 49
Robert Buzzanco

ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION 61
Calvin D. Davis

ARMED NEUTRALITIES 73
Ian Mugridge

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 79
Richard Dean Burns

ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE 105
Michael T. Klare

ASYLUM 117
Michael Dunne

BALANCE OF POWER 131
A. E. Campbell and Richard Dean Burns

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 141
J. David Singer

BIPARTISANSHIP 155
Randall Woods

BLOCKADES 171
Frank J. Merli and Robert H. Ferrell

THE CHINA LOBBY 185
Warren I. Cohen

CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY 193
Kinley Brauer

COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS 207
Walter L. Hixson

COLD WAR ORIGINS 223
Anders Stephanson

COLD WARRIORS 241
Andrew J. Rotter

COLD WAR TERMINATION 257
Thomas R. Maddux

COLLECTIVE SECURITY 273
Roland N. Stromberg

COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM . . . 285
Edward M. Bennett

CONGRESSIONAL POWER 293
Robert David Johnson

CONSORTIA 313
Warren I. Cohen

THE CONSTITUTION 323
David Gray Adler

CONTAINMENT 345
Barton J. Bernstein

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION 365
David M. Pletcher

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 377
Marvin R. Zahniser

COVERT OPERATIONS 387
John Prados

CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 397
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES . . . 409
Akira Iriye

DECISION MAKING 427
Valerie M. Hudson

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 439
Steven L. Rearden

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 451
Jerry Israel and David L. Anderson

DETERRENCE 463
David Coleman

DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY 477
Nick Cullather

DICTATORSHIPS 493
David F. Schmitz

DISSENT IN WARS 505
Russell F. Weigley and David S. Patterson

DOCTRINES 521
Marc Jay Selverstone

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 543
Eugene P. Trani

DOMINO THEORY 551
Edwin Moïse

VOLUME 2

ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY 1
David Shreve

ELITISM 17
Alan K. Henrikson

EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS 33
Jerald A. Combs

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 49
Kurk Dorsey

EXCEPTIONALISM 63
Trevor B. McCrisken

EXTRATERRITORIALITY 81
Jules Davids and Jonathan M. Nielson

FOREIGN AID 93
Katherine A. S. Sibley

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 111
Armin Rappaport and William Earl Weeks

GENDER 123
Laura McEnaney

GLOBALIZATION 135
Thomas W. Zeiler

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF 151
Darlene Rivas

HUMAN RIGHTS 173
T. Christopher Jespersen

IDEOLOGY 187
Jennifer W. See

IMMIGRATION 203
Roger Daniels

IMPERIALISM 217
David Healy

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 225
John Prados

INTERNATIONALISM 241
Warren F. Kuehl and Gary B. Ostrower

INTERNATIONAL LAW 259
Christopher C. Joyner

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK 283
Francis J. Gavin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 299
Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Klaus Larres

INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION . . . 315
Doris A. Graber

ISOLATIONISM 337
Manfred Jonas

JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE 353
Terrence R. Guay

LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION 365
Richard W. Van Alstyne and Joseph M. Siracusa

MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS 381
Edward M. Bennett

MILITARISM 387
William Kamman

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX . . . 403
James A. Huston

MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE 417
Justus D. Doenecke and Michael R. Adamson

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 429
Burton I. Kaufman

THE MUNICH ANALOGY 443
Joseph M. Siracusa

NARCOTICS POLICY 455
William O. Walker III

THE NATIONAL INTEREST 473
H. W. Brands

NATIONALISM 485
Lawrence S. Kaplan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 499
Anna Kasten Nelson

NATIVISM 511
Geoffrey S. Smith

NAVAL DIPLOMACY 529
William R. Braisted

NEUTRALISM 543
T. Michael Ruddy

NEUTRALITY 559
Thom M. Armstrong

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 573
Klaus Larres

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY . . . 595
Kenneth J. Hagan and Elizabeth Skinner

Encyclopedia *of* American Foreign Policy

Oil

David S. Painter

Oil was an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century, and its influence has shown no sign of diminishing in the twenty-first century. Oil has been and continues to be central to military power and to modern industrial society, and possession of ample domestic oil supplies and control over access to foreign oil reserves is a significant, and often overlooked, element in the power position of the United States relative to its rivals. While demand for oil is worldwide, for most of the twentieth century the major industrial powers, with the significant exceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union, had meager domestic oil production, and, with the same two exceptions, the major oil producers were not industrial powers. Because of this disparity, struggles over access to oil have been an important focus of rivalry among the great powers and a significant source of conflict between oil-consuming industrial countries and oil-producing nonindustrial nations.

Control of oil has been intimately linked to broader political, military, and economic objectives. These larger foreign policy concerns have shaped the issue of control and have, in turn, been shaped by it. For example, all the major postwar doctrines of U.S. foreign policy—the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan doctrines—relate, either directly or indirectly, to the Middle East and its oil.

The history of oil and foreign policy also provides important insights into the relationship between private power and public policy that are crucial to understanding the nature and development of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. Finally, the impact of oil use on the environment has become almost as important an issue as access to oil.

OIL AND WORLD POWER

The United States dominated world oil production in the first half of the twentieth century. U.S. fields accounted for slightly more than 70 percent of world oil production in 1925, around 63 percent in 1941, and over 50 percent in 1950. The U.S. oil industry operated in a unique regulatory environment that included a permissive legal regime, generous tax treatment, and a cooperative system of national production control centered on the state of Texas, which accounted for almost half of total U.S. production. During the Great Depression, the federal government, several state governments, and the oil companies worked out a control system that placed a ceiling on total output and allocated production so that marginal producers could survive in the face of considerable excess capacity. Although Texas authorities refused to require producers to pool their extractive activities in each oil field, thereby allowing wasteful extractive processes to continue, the system allowed high-cost marginal wells to continue to produce, thus preserving lower-cost fields for future use. Higher prices also somewhat reduced consumption. With the Texas Railroad Commission as a balance wheel, the system remained in place until the early 1970s, when domestic production alone could no longer fill national demand.

In addition to being blessed with a thriving and productive domestic oil industry, five of the seven great oil corporations (the so-called Seven Sisters) that dominated the international oil industry from the 1920s to the 1970s were American companies. U.S. oil companies, along with British firms, dominated the oil industries of the two main producing countries in Latin America, Mexico and Venezuela, and had smaller holdings throughout the region. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the United States successfully supported efforts by U.S. oil companies to gain oil concessions in the Middle East. U.S. companies were also involved in regionally significant oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies. By the eve of World War II, U.S. companies accounted for nearly 40 percent of oil production outside the United States and the Soviet Union.

THE SEVEN SISTERS

Seven large, vertically integrated oil companies dominated the world oil industry from the 1920s to the 1970s. With annual sales in the billions of dollars, the so-called "seven sisters" have consistently ranked among the largest industrial companies in the world. The five American international major oil companies were Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), which became Exxon in 1972; Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, which became Socony Mobil in 1955 and Mobil in 1966; Standard Oil Company of California, later Chevron; the Texas Company, which became Texaco in 1959; and Gulf Oil Company. Chevron bought Gulf in 1984, and in 1998 Exxon and Mobil merged to form Exxon-Mobil.

The other two international majors were Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which changed its name to Anglo-Iranian in 1935 and to British Petroleum in 1954, and the Royal Dutch/Shell group. The British government held a majority share in British Petroleum from 1914 to the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher's government sold its shares to private investors. Although ownership was divided between Dutch (60 percent) and British (40 percent) interests, Shell had its operating and commercial headquarters in London and was regarded as a British company.

More importantly, the United States possessed the means to ensure the stability of the producing regions and gain access to their oil. The United States Navy had emerged from World War I second to none, thus providing the United States with the capability of securing access to overseas oil-producing areas. The United States was already firmly entrenched in the oil-rich Gulf of Mexico–Caribbean region before World War I for security reasons that predated oil's emergence as a strategic commodity. World War II and the Cold War reinforced traditional U.S. determination to maintain an economic and strategic sphere of influence in Latin America. Securing the Persian Gulf, which emerged as the center of the world oil industry following World War II, was more difficult for several reasons, including the region's distance from the United States, the involvement of rival great powers, and the dynamics of regional politics. Great Britain had emerged as the leading power in the Middle East following World War I. Following World War II, the United States gradually assumed Britain's role as the main guarantor of Western interests in the Middle East.

Oil became an important element in military power in the decade before World War I when the navies of the great powers, led by Great Britain and the United States, began to switch from coal to oil as their source of power. In addition, the major military innovations of World War I—the submarine, the airplane, the tank, and motorized transport—were all oil-powered. Although the surface fleets of the great powers played a relatively minor part in the fighting, German submarines wreaked havoc on British and French shipping and helped bring the United States into the war. In addition, oil carved out a role in the manufacture of munitions when the British, using a process developed by Royal Dutch/Shell, began extracting toluol, an essential ingredient in the explosive TNT, from oil. Access to oil became more important toward the end of the war with the transition from static trench warfare, with its limited demand for oil-powered machinery, to a more fluid operational environment in which tanks, motorized transport, and aircraft played a larger role.

Britain and France were able to draw on overseas sources of supply from Iran, Mexico, and the United States, while the Germans were limited to oil from Romania. By the last year of the war, the United States was supplying more than 80 percent of Allied oil requirements, and the American navy was playing a key role in supplying and protecting tanker transport of oil to Europe. Although Lord Curzon's boast that the Allied cause had floated to victory on a wave of oil was an overstatement, severe shortages of oil in 1917 and 1918 threatened to immobilize the Royal Navy and the French army. In both cases, urgent requests to the United States for help led to the provision of the needed supplies. In contrast, without such external assistance, oil shortages hindered German military operations at critical points.

In addition to being a tremendous military asset, access to ample supplies of oil provided the United States with important advantages in the industrial transformation of the first half of the twentieth century. By the 1890s, the United States had overtaken Great Britain as the leading industrial power in the world, and by the 1920s, the U.S. economy was larger than the combined economies of the next six great powers (Great

Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Soviet Union, and Japan).

Cheap and plentiful supplies of oil were a prerequisite for the automobile industry, which played a central role in the U.S. economy from the 1920s to the 1960s. Oil became the fuel of choice in land and sea transport as well as the only fuel for air transport, and challenged coal as the main source of energy for industry. Oil also played an important, if somewhat less crucial, role in heating and electricity generation, but oil-powered machinery became crucial to modern agriculture, and oil became an important feedstock for fertilizers and pesticides. Indeed, with the development of the petrochemical industry, oil reached into almost every area of modern life. Already almost one-fifth of U.S. energy consumption by 1925, oil accounted for around one-third of U.S. energy use by World War II. Outside the United States, in contrast, oil was a secondary fuel reserved mainly for transportation and military uses and accounted for less than 10 percent of energy consumption in western Europe and Japan before World War II.

The Soviet Union was the only other great power that possessed significant quantities of oil within its borders. The Russian empire had been the world's leading oil producer in 1900, accounting for more than half of world production. Soon thereafter a combination of geological and political problems caused output to plummet. Soviet oil production recovered rapidly in the 1920s, and by 1939 the Soviet Union was the second-largest oil producer in the world, far behind the United States and slightly ahead of Venezuela. Although the Soviets reentered exports markets briefly in the late 1920s, by the end of the 1930s almost all Soviet oil production was being devoted to internal uses.

The other great powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) lacked indigenous oil reserves and were therefore dependent on foreign sources. Although British companies held concessions in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia, maintaining access to this oil required stability in the oil-producing areas and control of the sea routes linking the oil-producing areas to Britain. British security policy called for the Mediterranean and the Middle East to be defended because they lay athwart land, sea, and air routes to India, the Far East, and the Pacific dominions. If the Mediterranean were closed, a prospect that seemed increasingly likely as Britain's relative power declined in the 1930s, access to Middle East oil would be very difficult, assuming that the oil fields and other facilities could be defended. Production in the Far East was not great, and access to its oil would be even more difficult to defend in wartime. Wartime access to Western Hemisphere oil would be dependent on the acquiescence and probably the assistance of the United States, to which Britain had conceded regional supremacy shortly after 1900 and whose help would be needed to transport the oil safely across the Atlantic. This dependence on the United States for vital oil supplies was a critical weakness in Great Britain's power position.

During the 1930s, the British government studied the possibility of reducing its reliance on imported oil by using Britain's ample coal supplies as a source of synthetic oil. It rejected this alternative on security grounds, concluding that, given the British position in the major oil producing areas and the strength of the Royal Navy, reliance on imported oil would be less vulnerable to interdiction than large synthetic oil plants that would be conspicuous targets for air attack.

France's stake in foreign oil was largely limited to a share in Iraqi oil production and a few holdings in Romania. Access to Iraq, which by 1939 supplied almost half of France's oil imports, was dependent on British assistance to keep the Mediterranean open and the Middle East secure. Romania was able to fill only a small portion of French oil requirements, and access to Romanian oil would be unreliable in the event of a conflict with Germany. Access to Western Hemisphere oil, the other source of French imports, was dependent on U.S. goodwill and assistance. The French also explored extracting oil from coal and using alcohol as a motor fuel, but neither alternative provided sufficient supplies to relieve France's dependence on imported oil. France was thus doubly dependent, needing British and U.S. cooperation to ensure access to oil.

German and Japanese oil companies had been shut out of the major foreign oil-producing areas, leaving both nations dependent on foreign companies for necessary supplies and thus vulnerable to economic and political pressure. Moreover, their access to oil in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere was threatened by British and U.S. control of the oil-producing areas and Anglo-American command of the sea routes to these regions.

Convinced that oil was essential to fuel his ambitions, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler moved to promote the development of a synthetic fuel industry in Germany shortly after taking power in 1933.

By the outbreak of World War II, coal-derived synfuels accounted for nearly half of Germany's peacetime oil needs. The process of extracting oil from coal was complicated and expensive, and the huge installations required massive amounts of steel and were very vulnerable to air attack. Therefore, obtaining access to oil that did not depend on sea routes subject to interdiction by enemies remained an important part of Nazi expansionist strategy.

Germany received large quantities of oil from the Soviet Union under the terms of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, and in November 1940 gained assured access to Romanian oil when Romania was forced to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. These supplies were inadequate for Germany's needs, leading Hitler to look to the conquest of the rich oil fields of the Caucasus as a way to gain oil for Germany's highly mechanized military machine. Thus, the desire to gain assured access to oil was an important factor in Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.

Obtaining access to oil was also a key factor behind Japan's decision to attack the United States. By the end of the 1930s, Japan was dependent on the United States for 80 percent of its oil needs. Most of the rest came from the Netherlands East Indies, where Shell and the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, a jointly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil (New Jersey) and Socony-Vacuum, controlled production. The Netherlands East Indies possessed the largest reserves in East Asia, and control over its oil would go a long way toward meeting Japan's oil needs. On the other hand, seizing the Netherlands East Indies would lead to conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, the Japanese chose this course after the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands imposed an oil embargo on Japan in the late summer of 1941 in response to Japan's decision to take control of all Indochina.

World War II marked the apogee of oil's direct military importance, and the role of oil-powered weapons systems demonstrated that oil had become the lifeblood of the modern military machine. All the key weapons systems of World War II were oil-powered: surface warships (including aircraft carriers), submarines, airplanes (including long-range bombers), tanks, and a large portion of sea and land transport. Oil continued to play an important role in the manufacture of munitions, and the development of petroleum-based synthetic rubber helped relieve Allied dependence on Southeast Asian natural rubber supplies, most of which were in the hands of the Japanese for much of the war.

The United States entered World War II with a surplus production capacity of over one million barrels per day, almost one-third of U.S. production in 1941. This margin enabled the United States, almost single-handedly, to fuel not only its own war effort but that of its Allies, once the logistics of transporting the oil safely across the Atlantic had been mastered. In addition, U.S. leadership in oil-refining technology provided the U.S. military with such advantages as 100-octane aviation gasoline and specialty lubricants needed for high performance aircraft engines.

The Soviet Union also benefited from having indigenous oil supplies. The Soviets were able to retain control of the vital Caucasian oil fields, and rushed new fields in the Volga-Urals region, safely removed from the fighting, into production. These successes helped Soviet forces attain the mobility necessary to repel the German invaders and go on the offensive.

German and Japanese failure to gain secure access to sufficient oil supplies was an important factor in their defeat. German synthetic fuel production proved barely adequate for wartime requirements, and failure to gain control of the rich oil fields in the Caucasus, coupled with setbacks in the Middle East and North Africa, left the German military vulnerable to oil shortages throughout the war. Indeed, Germany was able to hang on as long as it did only because the absence of a second front until the summer of 1944 kept oil requirements at manageable levels. In the late summer of 1944, the Allied bombing campaign began belatedly targeting synthetic fuel plants. By the end of the war, the German war machine was running on empty.

The Japanese gained control of the Netherlands East Indies in 1942, but many of the oil facilities had been sabotaged and took time to restore to full production. More importantly, transporting oil from the East Indies to Japan proved increasingly difficult owing to the remarkable success of U.S. submarines in interdicting Japanese shipping. By late 1944, Japan faced serious oil shortages, with crippling military consequences.

With the exception of the jet engine, the major military innovations of World War II—radar, ballistic missiles, and the atomic bomb—were not oil-powered. Nevertheless, oil remained central to the mobility of land, sea, and air forces. Despite the development of nuclear-powered warships (mainly aircraft carriers and submarines), most of the

world's warships remained oil-powered, as did aircraft, armor, and transport. In addition, each new generation of weapons required more oil than its predecessors. Thus, while the advent of the atomic age meant that access to oil would not have been a key factor in a full-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union, which presumably would have been fought primarily with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, such conflicts as the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf were fought with conventional, largely oil-powered weapons, thus demonstrating the continued centrality of oil-powered forces, and hence oil, to military power.

Oil's economic importance increased after World War II as the United States intensified its embrace of patterns of socioeconomic organization premised on high levels of oil use, and western Europe and Japan made the transition from coal to oil as their main source of energy. U.S. and world oil consumption skyrocketed in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1950 and 1972, total world energy consumption increased 179 percent, much faster than population growth, resulting in a doubling of per capita energy consumption. Oil accounted for much of this increase, rising from 29 percent of world energy consumption in 1950 to 46 percent in 1972. By 1973, oil accounted for 47 percent of U.S. energy consumption. Western Europe and Japan were even more dependent on oil for meeting their energy needs; by 1973 oil accounted for 64 percent of west European energy consumption and 80 percent of Japanese energy consumption.

Control of oil played a vital role in establishing and maintaining U.S. preeminence in the postwar international system. Adding to its domestic power base, the United States consolidated its control of world oil in the decade following World War II. By the mid-1950s, U.S. oil companies were firmly entrenched in the great oil-producing areas outside the Soviet Union. Equally, if not more important, the United States, as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, controlled access to the region's oil, and the United States alone had the economic and military power to secure Western access to Middle East oil.

The Soviet Union also possessed a powerful domestic oil industry, but despite geographical proximity, extensive efforts, and widespread anti-Western sentiment in Iran and the Arab world, the Soviets failed to achieve a secure foothold in the Persian Gulf and had little impact on the region's oil industry. The Soviets had even less influence over the Western Hemisphere's oil producers. Indeed, the U.S.-led economic boycott of Cuba forced the Soviets to supply the one foothold they possessed in the Western Hemisphere with oil at subsidized prices.

The strong position of the United States in world oil provided multiple advantages. In addition to being central to military power and economic prosperity, control of oil gave the United States leverage over its allies and its former and prospective enemies. U.S. policymakers saw economic growth as essential to preventing the recurrence of the divisive ideological and social conflicts of the interwar years. Soviet expansion into eastern and central Europe as a result of World War II left the Soviet Union in control of almost all of Europe's known indigenous oil reserves as well as important sources of coal in Poland and the Soviet zone of Germany. Making matters worse, postwar western Europe faced a coal shortage of alarming proportions owing to wartime overproduction and destruction and postwar food, transportation, and other problems.

To fuel economic recovery and to prevent western Europe from becoming dependent on the Soviets for energy, the United States sought to ensure that this critical area received the oil it needed. Economic growth, in turn, was crucial to mitigating the divisive class conflicts that had divided European and Japanese society in the first half of the century. Economic growth and prosperity undercut the appeal of leftist parties, financed the welfare state, perpetuated the ascendancy of moderate elites, and sustained the cohesion of the Western alliance. By controlling access to essential oil supplies, the United States was able to reconcile its aim of German and Japanese economic recovery and integration into a Western alliance with that of ensuring against the recurrence of German and Japanese aggression.

Economic growth in western Europe and Japan was central to the containment of Soviet power and influence during the Cold War because it helped prevent these areas from falling to communism through internal processes. Finally, for many years after World War II the Soviets lacked sufficient oil to fight a major war. Hit hard by wartime damage, disruption, transportation problems, equipment shortages, and overuse, Soviet oil production dropped after the war, and the Soviet Union was a net importer of oil (mostly from Romania) until 1954. Exclusion of the Soviets from the Middle East retained oil for Western recovery, and kept the Soviets short of oil. In addition, U.S. and British strategic planners

wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East because the region contained the most defensible locations for launching a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union in the event of a global war. Throughout the Cold War, ensuring Western access to Middle East oil was a basic objective of U.S. foreign policy.

THE ORIGINS OF U.S. FOREIGN OIL POLICY

Access to foreign oil first emerged as an issue in U.S. foreign policy following World War I, because of the growing importance of oil to modern industrial society and modern warfare, fear of exhaustion of U.S. domestic reserves, and the need of U.S. companies with foreign markets for additional sources of supply. Although U.S. oil production quickly rebounded with several new oil finds, culminating in the discovery of the great East Texas oil field in 1930, increasing the presence of U.S. companies in foreign oil fields allowed U.S. companies to supply their foreign markets from overseas sources. Not only was foreign oil usually cheaper to produce and transport, thus boosting company profits, but utilizing overseas oil to meet foreign demand reduced the potential drain on U.S. reserves.

Rejecting such alternatives as government ownership of oil reserves or the division of the world into exclusive spheres of influence, the United States insisted instead on the Open Door policy of equal opportunity for U.S. oil companies to gain access to foreign oil. A clash with the British over access to Middle East oil was averted when the U.S. government threw its support behind private cooperative arrangements between U.S. and British oil corporations. A multinational consortium, the Iraq Petroleum Company, established in 1928, allowed selected U.S. oil companies access to Iraq's oil along with British and French companies. To ensure that the development of the region's oil took place in a cooperative manner, the consortium agreement contained a self-denying ordinance that prohibited its members from engaging in oil development within the area of the old Ottoman Empire, which was marked on a map with a red line. In addition to the Red Line Agreement, the major British and U.S. oil companies sought to manage the world oil economy through a series of agreements between 1928 and 1934 that allocated markets, fixed prices, eliminated competition, and avoided duplication of facilities.

The U.S. government successfully supported subsequent efforts by other U.S. oil companies to gain concessions in the Middle East. In 1930, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), which had not been party to the cooperative agreements, obtained a concession on the island of Bahrain, off the coast of Saudi Arabia, and in 1933 obtained extensive concession rights in Saudi Arabia. The Texas Company joined forces with SOCAL in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 1936. Meanwhile, Gulf Oil Company, in partnership with Anglo-Persian, had gained access to Kuwait, which was not within the Red Line.

U.S. and British companies also worked together to control Latin American oil. U.S. and British oil companies had been active in Mexico since the turn of the century, drawn by the rich deposits along the Gulf of Mexico coast and the generous terms offered by Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz. Production continued during the revolution (1910–1920), and Mexico was briefly the world's leading oil exporter during World War I and the early 1920s.

One of the chief goals of the Mexican revolution was to reassert national control over the nation's economic life. The revolutionary constitution of 1917 reserved subsoil rights to the state, leading to almost a decade of conflict with the foreign oil companies, who had convinced Díaz to go against Spanish law and grant them ownership of subsoil rights. Private ownership of subsoil rights would make it difficult for Mexico to share in the profits generated by oil exports since the oil companies, as owners of the oil, would not have to pay royalties to the Mexican government. Although the United States and Mexico were able to work out a compromise that protected the position of companies already operating in Mexico, Mexican oil production declined sharply during the 1920s as the major oil companies remained concerned over the course of the revolution and shifted their investment to Venezuela. By the eve of World War II, Venezuela had become the third leading oil producer in the world and the leading exporter.

In March 1938, a labor dispute between the major oil companies and Mexican oil workers resulted in government intervention and the nationalization of the main U.S. and British oil companies operating in Mexico. Not only did the companies lose their properties, but henceforth foreign capital was denied access to a basic sector of the Mexican economy. Moreover, the resource in question was an exportable commodity in great

demand by the developed countries. Thus, the Mexican action challenged not only the position of the international oil companies but also the role of multinational corporations in the economic development of what would become known as the Third World.

The oil companies reacted strongly to nationalization, instituting a boycott of Mexican oil and pressuring oil equipment manufacturers not to sell equipment to Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the state-owned oil company that took over the nationalized properties. Concerned about the impact of nationalization on U.S. investment abroad, the Department of State supported the companies' demands for full and immediate compensation. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt softened "immediate" compensation to "prompt," Mexico could only raise the funds to pay compensation through the long-term operation of the industry. Since the companies, with the support of the U.S. government, were working to prevent Mexico from selling its oil abroad, the demand for full and prompt compensation amounted to denying Mexico the means of carrying out nationalization.

The Mexicans refused to give in, however, and Pemex turned to Germany, Italy, and Japan for markets and equipment. In addition to oil, U.S. economic interests in Mexico included mining, ranching, and manufacturing firms, and the worsening international situation provided further impetus for a shift in U.S. strategy. In November 1941, with war imminent, the U.S. government reached agreement with Mexico on compensation. Contrary to the views of some scholars, the settlement of the oil controversy did not constitute acceptance of nationalization or abandonment of the oil companies. The U.S. government remained opposed to nationalization and viewed settlement of the compensation issue not only as necessary to ensure Mexico's cooperation in international affairs but also as a way to keep the door open for U.S. companies to return to Mexico in the future. The agreement was limited to the issue of compensation for the expropriated properties and was significantly silent on the question of the future status of foreign participation in the Mexican oil industry. For the rest of the 1940s, the United States sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince the Mexican government to reverse nationalization.

Concerned not to repeat the Mexican experience, the U.S. government played a major role in facilitating a settlement between the Venezuelan government and the major oil companies that resulted in a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement in early 1943. Although some scholars see the oil settlement as evidence of the subordination of the interests of U.S. corporations to larger foreign policy goals, those goals and the interests of the U.S. oil companies involved did not conflict but were complementary. Both aimed at ensuring the continuation of the companies' control and continued U.S. and British access to Venezuelan oil. In addition to profit sharing, the settlement included confirmation of the companies' existing concession rights, their extension for forty years, and the opening of new areas to the companies. Venezuelan oil production increased substantially, and Venezuelan oil played an important role in fueling the British and U.S. war efforts.

Although the United States was able to fuel its own war effort and that of its allies from domestic oil production during World War II, the increased consumption strained U.S. oil reserves. The possibility of running short of oil led to concerns over the long-term adequacy of U.S. reserves. Policymakers in the U.S. government soon focused their attention on the Middle East, especially on Saudi Arabia. The Middle East not only contained one-third of the world's known reserves; it also offered better geological prospects for the discovery of additional reserves than any other area.

Believing that government ownership was necessary to protect the national interest and to ensure public support for whatever measures might be necessary to secure access to Saudi Arabia's oil, the Roosevelt administration contemplated creating a government-owned national oil company to take over the concession rights in Saudi Arabia held by the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), a jointly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of California and the Texas Company. It also proposed having the U.S. government construct and own an oil pipeline stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean as a means of demonstrating and securing the U.S. stake in Middle East oil. By war's end, the U.S. government had also worked out the text of an oil agreement with Great Britain that called for guarantees of existing concessions, equality of opportunity to compete for new concessions, and a binational petroleum commission to allocate production among the various producing countries in order to integrate Middle East oil into world markets with minimal disruption. Expansion of Middle East production would enhance U.S. security by reducing the drain on U.S. and other Western Hemisphere reserves.

Divisions within the U.S. oil industry, coupled with the strong ideological opposition of American business and politicians to government involvement in corporate affairs, derailed these initiatives. In the case of the plan to purchase ARAMCO, the company's owners, while willing to accept some government involvement to secure their position and provide capital for further development of their potentially rich concession, were not willing to sell out entirely. The rest of the oil industry, ideologically and pragmatically opposed to government involvement in corporate affairs, vigorously opposed the plan, forcing its abandonment.

Similarly, while the companies that would benefit from the proposed pipeline supported the plan, the other major oil companies opposed it because it would give their competitors significant advantages. Domestic producers, fearing that the pipeline would allow Middle East oil to push Venezuelan oil from European markets into the United States, also opposed the plan. Congress, increasingly conservative and ever receptive to appeals cast in terms of defense of free enterprise, joined the opponents to defeat the pipeline plan.

The Anglo-American Oil Agreement was compatible with the interests of the major U.S. oil companies. All the U.S. majors held concessions in the Middle East, and all initially believed that an international allocation mechanism was needed to assimilate growing Middle East production without disrupting markets. The domestic oil industry, on the other hand, had worked out a system of production control in the 1930s, which protected the interests of smaller companies. Domestic producers feared that the proposed petroleum commission would allow cheap foreign oil to flood the U.S. market. While the U.S. government had no intention of destroying the domestic oil industry, it did intend to use the proposed commission to increase Middle East oil production and conserve U.S. oil supplies for future defense needs. The concerns of the independent oil companies were heard in Congress, and the Anglo-American Oil Agreement never came to a vote.

The only foreign oil policy on which all segments of the industry could agree was that the government should limit its involvement in foreign oil matters to providing and maintaining an international environment in which private enterprise could operate with security and profit. Thus, in the end, the United States, as it had in the 1920s, turned to the major oil companies to secure the national interest in foreign sources of oil. Even though oil industry divisions limited some types of government assistance to the major oil companies, reliance on the major oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil enhanced the influence of the oil industry and facilitated control of the world oil economy by the most powerful private interests.

In a series of private deals in 1946 and 1947, the major U.S. oil companies managed to secure their position in the Middle East by joining forces with each other and their British counterparts. The centerpiece of the so-called "great oil deals" was the expansion of ARAMCO's ownership to include Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum. The result was a private system of worldwide production management that facilitated the development of Middle East oil and its integration into world markets, thus reducing the drain on Western Hemisphere reserves. To help consolidate this system, the U.S. government supported fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangements between the major oil companies and host governments. Owing to provisions in the U.S. tax code granting U.S. corporations credits for taxes paid overseas, this solution to host-country demands for higher revenues transferred the cost of higher payments from the oil companies to the U.S. Treasury.

Utilizing private oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil did not mean that the government had no role to play. On the contrary, the policy required the United States to take an active interest in the security and stability of the Middle East. This was especially the case in Iran, where fear of Soviet expansion and determination to maintain access to the region's resources transformed U.S. policy from relative indifference to deep concern for Iranian independence and territorial integrity. To secure Iran's role as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf, the United States provided economic and military assistance and gradually assumed Britain's role as a barrier to the expansion of Russian influence in the Middle East. U.S. support came at a price, however. During this period, the United States began looking to the shah of Iran as the main guarantor of Western interests in Iran. U.S. support for the shah and the Iranian military was crucial to the young shah in his struggle with internal rivals for power.

Although mention of oil was deliberately deleted from President Harry Truman's address, the Truman Doctrine (1947), with its call for the

OIL AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE

The history of oil and foreign policy provides many examples of the links between the internal organization of the United States and its external behavior. Oil and the automobile have been potent symbols of the American way of life since the second decade of the twentieth century, and American popular culture has come to equate the private automobile and personal mobility with individual freedom. Thus, when it became clear in the 1940s that U.S. domestic oil production would soon no longer be able to meet domestic demand, American leaders looked abroad for additional sources of oil. The alternative of reducing, or at least slowing, the growth of rapidly rising consumption was not considered.

Remarks by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in early January 1948 illustrate this tendency to look to external expansion to solve internal problems rather than confronting them directly. Meeting with the head of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company to discuss the impact of turmoil over Palestine on access to Middle East oil, Forrestal stated that he "was deeply concerned about the future supply of oil for this country, not merely for the possible use in war but for the needs of peace." He then warned that unless we had access to Middle East oil, American motorcar companies would have to design a four-cylinder motorcar sometime within the next five years." Annual per capita oil consumption in the United States in 1948 was 14.4 barrels. Had U.S. public policy, through the preservation of public transportation, the promotion of efficiency, and other measures (including four-cylinder motorcars), maintained this level of oil use, the United States would have consumed significantly less oil over the following half century, with consequent benefits for the environment, the quality of life, and U.S. oil security. Instead, U.S. oil consumption climbed steadily, reaching an annual per capita level of 31 barrels in 1978. Although it declined sharply for a brief period in the early 1980s, annual per capita oil consumption soon renewed its upward trend, reaching 26.1 barrels in 1999.

global containment of communism, provided a political basis for an active U.S. role in maintaining the security and stability of the Middle East. The Marshall Plan also helped solidify the U.S. position in the region by providing dollars for western Europe to buy oil produced by U.S. companies from their holdings in the Middle East. Fully 10 percent of Marshall Plan aid went to finance oil imports.

U.S. support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine complicated but did not nullify U.S. efforts to maintain access to Middle East oil. The apparent conflict between U.S. economic and strategic interests in Middle East oil on one hand, and its emotional support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine on the other, led the United States to follow a policy of minimal involvement. Although the United States voted for the United Nations resolution calling for the creation of Israel in November 1947 and recognized the new country immediately in May 1948, it refrained from sending troops, arms, or extensive economic assistance to enforce the UN decision for fear of alienating the Arab states and providing an opening for Soviet influence in the Middle East. Ironically, the Palestine problem enhanced the status of the major oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in Middle East oil. While official relations with the Arab states suffered somewhat because of U.S. support for Israel, the oil companies managed to maintain a degree of distance from government policy and thus escaped the burden of Arab displeasure. On the other hand, failure to enforce the UN decision led to the issue being decided through arms, with results that still haunt the region.

The policy of public support for private control of the world's oil reinforced traditional U.S. opposition to economic nationalism, especially when it affected U.S. companies and threatened to reduce oil production for export to world markets. U.S. security interests called for the rapid and extensive development of Mexico's nearby reserves, but U.S. assistance to Mexico to achieve that goal could be seen as a reward for nationalization and thus encourage other nations to take over their oil industries. Unable to convince the Mexican government to reverse nationalization, the United States maintained its policy of providing no assistance to Pemex, and, as it had before the war, focused instead on Venezuela. Although

willing to work with the nationalist government that ruled Venezuela between 1945 and 1948 as long as it did not challenge corporate control of the oil industry, the United States stood by when the democratically elected government was ousted in a November 1948 military coup, and worked closely with the brutal dictatorship that ruled Venezuela for the next decade.

The Truman administration also sought a solution to the problem of oil security by undertaking a large-scale program of synthetic fuel production as a way of obtaining oil from domestic sources. Synthetic fuel production required massive amounts of steel, produced millions of tons of waste products, and cost more than natural petroleum. Although a potential boon to the ailing coal industry, the oil industry opposed the development of competition at public expense, and convinced the Eisenhower administration to cancel the government's synthetic fuel program in 1954.

The U.S. response to the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry highlighted the main elements of U.S. foreign oil policy—opposition to economic nationalism, an activist role in maintaining the stability and Western orientation of the Middle East, and public support for and nonintervention in the operations of the major oil industry. The Iranian crisis of 1951–1954 grew out of Iran's nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the spring of 1951. AIOC's Iranian operations were Britain's most valuable overseas asset, and the British feared that if Iran succeeded in taking over the company all of Britain's overseas investments would be jeopardized. Although the United States shared British concerns about the impact of nationalization on foreign investment, it also feared that British use of force to reverse nationalization could result in turmoil in Iran that could undercut the position of the shah, boost the prospects of the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, and might even result in intervention by the Soviets at Iranian invitation. The crisis broke out in the midst of the Korean War, making U.S. policymakers extremely reluctant to risk another confrontation. Therefore, the United States urged the British to try to reach a negotiated settlement that preserved as much of their position as possible. The British, however, preferred to stand on their rights and force Iran to give in by organizing an international boycott of Iranian oil and attempting to manipulate Iranian politics.

U.S. efforts to mediate a settlement failed, as did less public attempts to convince the shah to remove nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. By 1953 the oil boycott had sharply reduced Iran's export earnings and decimated government revenues, and British and U.S. involvement in Iranian internal affairs had exacerbated the polarization of Iranian politics. Moreover, the end of the Korean War and the completion of the U.S. military buildup allowed a more aggressive posture toward Iran. Fearing that Mossadeq might displace the shah and that Tudeh influence was increasing, the United States and Britain organized, financed, and directed a coup that removed Mossadeq and installed a government willing to reach an oil settlement on Western terms.

Following the coup, the United States enlisted the major U.S. oil companies in an international consortium to run Iran's oil industry. Cooperation of all the majors was necessary in order to fit Iranian oil, which had been shut out of world markets during the crisis, back into world markets without disruptive price wars and destabilizing cutbacks in other oil-producing countries. The antitrust exemption required for this strategy undercut efforts by the Department of Justice to challenge the major oil companies' control of the world oil industry on antitrust grounds and strengthened the hand of the major oil companies, whose cooperation was needed to ensure Western access to the region's oil.

The U.S. role in the coup and the subsequent inclusion of U.S. oil companies in the Iranian consortium mark important milestones in the gradual process by which the United States replaced Great Britain as the main guardian of Western interests in the Middle East. The experience also reinforced the U.S. tendency to see the shah as the best guarantor of Western interests in Iran. U.S. security and economic assistance helped the shah establish a royal dictatorship, ending the progress Iran had been making toward more representative government. Iranian nationalism, in turn, veered from liberalism and secularism, laying the groundwork for the fundamental rupture in Iranian-American relations that followed the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979. Finally, the short-term success of the Iranian model of covert intervention influenced subsequent U.S. actions in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.

COPING WITH CHANGE

With Mossadeq's fate serving as a warning to those who might challenge the international oil

companies and their sponsors, the 1950s and 1960s were the golden age of the postwar oil regime. At the peak of their influence in the 1950s, the seven major oil companies controlled over 90 percent of the oil reserves and accounted for almost 90 percent of oil production outside the United States, Mexico, and the centrally planned economies. Moreover, they owned almost 75 percent of world refining capacity and provided around 90 percent of the oil traded in international markets.

Despite these strengths, the system contained the seeds of its own demise. The Iranian crisis demonstrated that threats to Western access to Middle East oil could come from within the region. Although the United States did not rule out the possibility of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East, U.S. threat assessments increasingly focused on the decline of British power, instability within the countries of the region, the anti-Western cast of Middle Eastern nationalism, and turmoil resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Suez crisis grew out of the nationalization of the British- and French-owned Suez Canal Company by Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1956. The Suez Canal was an important symbol of the Western presence in the Middle East and a major artery of international trade; two-thirds of the oil that went from the Persian Gulf to western Europe traveled through the canal. Viewing Nasser's action as an intolerable challenge to their position in the region, the British, together with the French, who resented Nasser's support for the Algerian revolution, and the Israelis, who felt threatened by Egyptian support for guerrilla attacks on their territory, developed a complex scheme to recapture control of the canal and topple Nasser through military action.

The plan, which they put into action in late October, depended on U.S. acquiescence and cooperation in supplying them with oil if the canal were closed. The Egyptians closed the canal by sinking ships in it. In addition, Saudi Arabia embargoed oil shipments to Britain and France, and Syria shut down the oil pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Incensed by his allies' deception, concerned about the impact of their actions on the Western position in the Middle East, and embarrassed by the timing of the attack—just before the U.S. presidential election and in the midst of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt—President Dwight D. Eisenhower put pressure on the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw. The United States refused to provide Britain and France with oil, blocked British attempts to stave off a run on the pound, and threatened to cut off economic aid to Israel. The pressure worked. Following the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces, the U.S. government and the major oil companies cooperated to supply Europe with oil until the canal was reopened and oil shipments from the Middle East to Europe restored.

In the wake of the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower pledged to protect Middle East states from the Soviet Union and its regional and local allies. In addition, the United States sought to bolster its friends in the region through economic and military assistance. With the exception of Lebanon, where fourteen thousand U.S. troops landed in July 1958 to shore up a pro-Western regime, most of these friends were authoritarian monarchies, demonstrating that despite its rhetoric about democracy, the United States was primarily interested in access to oil. Israel presented the United States with an additional dilemma. On one hand, it was pro-Western and militarily the most powerful country in the region. On the other hand, U.S. support for Israel was a major irritant in relations with the Arab states of the Middle East, including the key oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf.

The Suez crisis highlighted the growing importance of Middle East oil for western Europe. During the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, the United States was capable of supplying its oil needs from domestic sources, and Middle East oil went mainly to western Europe and Japan. Some Middle East oil made its way into the United States, and, more importantly, Middle East oil displaced Venezuelan oil from European markets and led to an increase in U.S. oil imports with consequent pressure on prices and high-cost domestic producers.

The question of oil imports presented U.S. policymakers with a strategic dilemma. If what would be needed in an emergency was a rapid increase in production, oil in the ground was of little use, and even proved reserves would not be particularly helpful. The need could only be filled by spare productive capacity. Too high a level of imports would undercut such capacity by driving out all but the lowest cost producers. Moreover, reliance on imports, especially from the Middle East, was risky from a security standpoint because of the chronic instability of the region and its vulnerability to Soviet attack. However, restricting

imports and encouraging the increased use of a nonrenewable resource would eventually undermine the goal of maintaining spare productive capacity and preserving a national defense reserve.

Rising oil imports led to demands by domestic producers and the coal industry for protection against cheaper foreign oil. In contrast, the President's Materials Policy Commission, appointed by President Truman in January 1951 and headed by the chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System, William S. Paley, had called for a policy of ensuring access to the lowest cost sources of supply wherever located. The commission's report, issued in June 1952, rejected national self-sufficiency in favor of interdependence, arguing that the United States had to be concerned about the needs of its allies for imported raw materials and about the needs of pro-Western less developed countries for markets for their products. Although the commission admitted that self-sufficiency in oil and other vital raw materials was possible, it argued that it would be very expensive, that the controls necessary to make it possible would interfere with trade, that it would undercut the goal of rebuilding and integrating western Europe and Japan under U.S. auspices, and that it would increase instability in the Third World by limiting export earnings.

Nevertheless, after attempts to implement voluntary oil import restrictions failed, the Eisenhower administration, in March 1959, imposed mandatory import quotas, with preferences given to Western Hemisphere sources. Although the Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) seemed to be a victory for advocates of national self-sufficiency, the result, ironically, was to make the United States more dependent on oil imports in the long run because the restrictions meant that increases in U.S. consumption were met mainly by domestic production.

High levels of oil use were built into the U.S. economy in several ways. Following World War II, the U.S. transportation sector was transformed as automobiles, trucks, buses, airplanes, and diesel-powered locomotives replaced steam and electric-powered modes of transportation. Between 1945 and 1973, U.S. car registrations increased from 25 million to over 100 million, and per capita gasoline consumption in the same period skyrocketed as fuel efficiency fell and gas-guzzling car models grew more popular. Neglect of public transportation and dispersed housing patterns fostered by increasing suburbanization further fueled increased automobile use. In addition, the nation's truck population grew from 6 million in 1945 to around 21 million in 1973, and trucks increased their share of intercity freight traffic from 16 percent in 1950 to 21 percent in 1970.

Public policy aided and abetted these changes. Since the early 1930s, the so-called highway lobby had been promoting public expenditures for highway construction. Between 1956 and 1970, the federal government spent approximately $70 billion on highways, as contrasted with less than $1 billion on rail transit.

The dramatic rise in U.S. oil consumption, coupled with a shift in investment to more profitable overseas areas, decimated the U.S. reserve position. By 1965, the U.S. share of world production had fallen to about a quarter and by 1972 to a fifth. The U.S. share of world oil reserves declined even more drastically, from around 46 percent on the eve of World War II to a little more than 6 percent in 1972. With U.S. oil consumption continuing to climb, domestic production was no longer able to meet demand, and oil imports rose from 9 percent of U.S. consumption in 1954 to 36 percent by 1973.

U.S. oil import restrictions also put downward pressure on world oil prices by limiting U.S. demand for foreign oil. Beginning in the mid-1950s, increasing numbers of smaller, mostly U.S.-owned companies challenged the majors' control over the world oil economy by obtaining concessions in Venezuela, the Middle East, and North Africa. Drawn by the lure of high profits, aided by the increasing standardization and diffusion of basic technology and the security provided by the Pax Americana, and unconcerned about reducing the generous profit margins available in international markets, the newcomers cut prices in order to sell their oil. Pressure from the production of these companies, coupled with the reentry of Soviet oil into world markets in the late 1950s, exerted a steady downward pressure on world oil prices.

Declining oil prices led to a resurgence of economic nationalism in the producing countries, whose incomes were reduced. In September 1960, following cuts in posted prices (the price on which government revenues were calculated) by the major oil companies, the oil ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela met in Baghdad and formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC was able to prevent further declines in posted prices, and a strong increase in world demand in the 1960s allowed the companies to increase production,

thereby maintaining their overall level of profits. As new sources of African production entered the market later in the decade, however, market prices resumed their downward trend.

Despite falling prices, the spectacular increases in oil consumption enhanced the position of Middle East oil in the world oil economy. At the same time the U.S. oil position was eroding, the Middle East and North Africa were becoming the center of the world oil industry. By 1972 these areas accounted for 41 percent of world oil production and contained almost two-thirds of the world's proved reserves. Reacting to the changing circumstances, the region's oil producers, along with other OPEC members, began to pressure the oil companies to gain control of pricing and production decisions.

The profound political, economic, and strategic consequences of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and the overall course of the Cold War reinforced the geological and economic factors that gave Middle East oil increased importance. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had achieved rough strategic parity with the United States, which raised the risks involved in U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Moreover, in the midst of the Vietnam War, the British decided to end their military commitments "east of Suez." To make matters worse, U.S. relations with the Arab oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, were becoming increasingly strained owing to U.S. support for Israel following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which left most of Palestine under Israeli control.

When the United States moved to airlift arms to Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab members of OPEC imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands and reduced shipments to other countries, depending on their position in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The oil companies carried out the embargo, though they undercut its political purpose by shifting non-Arab oil to the embargoed countries and distributing the cutbacks so that both embargoed and nonembargoed countries had their oil imports cut by about 15 percent. Arab OPEC members unilaterally raised the price of oil by 70 percent in October, and by December the price had quadrupled from its level before the embargo. Although Iran and other non-Arab OPEC members did not join the embargo and cut back production and exports, they were happy to go along with the price increases spurred by the embargo and production cutbacks.

Differences among the United States and its allies on higher oil prices and on the Arab-Israeli conflict undercut attempts at a unified response to the embargo. Although there was some tough talk about military action to regain control of the Middle East oil fields, the reality of the Cold War and fears during the Gulf War of 1991 (later borne out), that use of force would lead to the destruction of the oil fields, prevented such action. U.S. allies, noting that higher international oil prices could provide the United States, which was much less dependent on imported oil than they were, with a means of reversing the decline in its share of world production, doubted the U.S. commitment to lowering oil prices, further complicating a unified response.

The United States sought to salvage the old oil order by organizing the Western consuming nations in a united front against OPEC. In February 1974 the U.S.-initiated Washington Energy Conference laid the groundwork for the establishment later in the year of the International Energy Agency. The IEA called on member states to reduce their reliance on Middle East oil by diversifying their sources of energy and adopting policies promoting reductions in oil consumption.

The United States also moved to shore up its position with the oil-producing countries. In 1969, President Richard Nixon had announced that the United States could no longer intervene directly in all parts of the world, but rather would rely on regional allies, which it would provide with arms and other assistance to carry out their tasks. In the Middle East, the United States looked to Iran and Saudi Arabia as the "twin pillars" of pro-Western stability in the region, and rewarded the two monarchies with almost unlimited access to the latest U.S. military equipment. Between 1970 and 1978, for example, the United States sold Iran over $20 billion worth of military equipment and training. The United States also provided massive military and economic assistance to Israel following the 1973 war, viewing the Jewish state as a strategic asset and counter to Soviet client-states such as Syria and Iraq. Egypt (after 1973) and Turkey also received large amounts of U.S. aid.

The Arab oil embargo had a major economic impact. Higher oil prices intensified the economic problems faced by the United States and the other Western industrial countries in the 1970s, especially inflation, which was now accompanied by stagnation and increased unemployment. Non–oil-producing developing countries were

also hit hard as they had to pay higher prices for products from the developed countries as well as for oil. Many countries borrowed large sums from Western banks to cover their costs, a move that contributed to the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s when the United States sharply raised interest rates in late 1979.

In contrast, higher prices enabled the Soviets, who were in the process of developing new oil and gas fields in Siberia, to increase their export earnings. While allowing the Soviets to import large amounts of Western grain and machinery, most of the exports came from new areas east of the Urals, and the cost of developing the necessary transportation infrastructure drained scarce capital from other sectors of the economy. Oil earnings also tended to mask the Soviet Union's increasingly severe economic problems and to reduce incentives for undertaking sorely needed structural reforms. The oil crisis may also have contributed to Soviet decisions to increase their involvement in the Third World in the 1970s, decisions that proved costly not only in terms of resources but also in their negative impact on détente.

The first oil shock also accelerated efforts by oil-producing countries to gain control of their oil industries. While the timing and extent of nationalization differed, most OPEC nations effectively nationalized their oil industries during the 1970s. The equity participation of the international oil companies in OPEC production fell from about 94 percent in 1970 to about 12 percent in 1981. Although they lost control of production and their ability to set prices, the major oil companies received generous compensation. In most cases, the companies maintained access to the oil they had previously owned through long-term contracts and were retained to manage the newly nationalized industries. Moreover, higher oil prices provided the major oil companies with windfall profits, easing the pain of losing formal control of their concessions.

Because it was both a major oil producer as well as the leading oil consumer, higher oil prices posed a dilemma for the United States. On one hand, higher prices could provide U.S. domestic producers with incentives for increased exploration and development, making the nation more self-sufficient in oil. On the other hand, higher prices fed inflation and slowed economic growth. The fact that the oil companies profited from higher oil prices and oil shortages prompted suspicions that the companies had colluded with OPEC to produce such an outcome. These suspicions made it impossible for the U.S. government to remove oil price controls, initially imposed in August 1971 as part of a larger package of wage and price controls. Although lower domestic oil prices lessened the impact of the rise in international oil prices on the U.S. economy, they also encouraged consumption and led to increased demand being met mainly by imported oil. When the second oil shock hit in 1979, the United States was more dependent on oil imports than in 1973.

The overthrow of the shah of Iran in early 1979 provoked this second oil shock, disrupting markets and causing prices to double. The fall of the shah and fears of internal unrest in Saudi Arabia convinced U.S. policymakers that the previous policy of reliance on regional surrogates to guard Western interests in the Middle East was no longer viable. While Israel was useful to counter Soviet clients, too great a reliance on Israel could prove counterproductive by alienating the Arab states. Therefore, the United States began to explore the possibility of introducing U.S. military forces into the region. These plans received a boost from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, which revived fears of direct Soviet encroachment in the region. In addition, the United States was concerned that Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa, an area in the northeast part of the continent close to the Middle East, could threaten Western access to Middle East oil.

The prospect of losing access to Middle East oil led President James Earl Carter to announce in January 1980 that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The Carter administration followed up soon thereafter with steps to create the long-discussed rapid deployment forces for possible use in the region. Planned from the time of the collapse of the shah's regime, the move reflected U.S. belief that local forces were not sufficient to protect Western interests in the Middle East from either Soviet aggression or internal instability. The Carter administration also sought to strengthen the "special relationship" between the United States and Saudi Arabia by continuing to sell sophisticated arms to the desert kingdom and by allowing the Saudis to buy massive amounts of U.S. Treasury securities outside normal channels.

The administration of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) built on these initiatives, forging a

foreign oil policy based on market forces and military power. Reagan began by ending oil price controls, allowing U.S. prices to rise to international levels in the hope that this would provide incentives to domestic producers and spur conservation. The Reagan administration continued the buildup of U.S. forces in the Middle East, transforming the Rapid Deployment Force into the Central Command. The Reagan administration also stressed close relations with Saudi Arabia, and worked with the Saudis and other conservative Persian Gulf producers to drive down international oil prices. Lower oil prices would not only help Western consumers but would also cut Soviet oil earnings. Finally, the United States began filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), established in 1977 to reduce the nation's vulnerability to oil supply interruptions. By 1990 the SPR held almost 600 million barrels of oil, somewhere between eighty and ninety days of net oil imports at then prevailing import levels. The other industrial nations also built up similar, and in some cases higher, levels of strategic reserves. Strategic reserves, although expensive to create and maintain, functioned as a substitute for the spare production capacity that the United States had once possessed.

Higher oil prices worked their way through the economies of the Western industrial nations and Japan to encourage significant increases in energy efficiency. The amount of energy required to produce a dollar of real gross national product declined 26 percent between 1972 and 1986. The gains in efficiency in oil use were even more dramatic: by 1990, 40 percent less oil was used in producing a dollar of real GNP than in 1973. As a result, by 1990 oil played a less significant role in the economies of the Western industrial nations than it had before the two oil shocks of the 1970s.

Higher oil prices also encouraged consumers to switch to other energy sources. While the use of coal and nuclear power increased, both turned out to have significant drawbacks, particularly those relating to the environment, and neither addressed the transportation sector, which accounted for the bulk of oil use. Although U.S. automobile fuel efficiency almost doubled between 1970 and 1990, this gain was partly eroded by a 40 percent rise in total motor vehicle use in the same period. In addition, the number of trucks on U.S. roads tripled between 1970 and 1990, and their fuel consumption doubled.

Higher oil prices also encouraged the development of alternative sources of oil. With higher prices and improving technologies of exploration and development, new sources of oil came on line in Alaska, Mexico, the North Sea, and the Soviet Union. U.S. production increased only briefly, however, and soon leveled off at around seven million barrels a day. Middle East oil production, which had accounted for 41 percent of world output in 1973 and 37 percent in 1977, fell to 19 percent by 1985. In 1986, with supply increasing and demand dropping, oil prices collapsed.

The collapse of oil prices provided a boost to Western economies but it also decimated the U.S. domestic oil industry, forcing the closure of high-cost wells. All producers experienced huge declines in export earnings. The Soviet Union was especially hard hit, and the collapse of oil earnings undercut Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's hopes to use oil revenues to cushion the shock of economic reform. By the end of the decade, the Soviet oil industry was suffering from the same problems affecting the nation as a whole, and production and exports declined sharply.

Although lower prices led to increased demand for oil, producers in the Middle East captured most of the increase because they controlled the lowest cost fields. By 1990, oil imports were making up nearly half of U.S. oil supply, around 70 percent of western Europe's oil supply, and over 90 percent of Japan's oil supply; and 25 percent of U.S. imports, 41 percent of western Europe's imports, and 68 percent of Japan's imports originated in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, after rising sharply in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, oil prices soon returned to preinvasion levels. The IEA contributed to stability by calling on member countries to make simultaneous use of their respective stockpiles. The success of U.S. diplomacy and military forces in the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that with the end of the Cold War and the resulting retreat of the Soviet Union from a world role, the ability of the United States to intervene in the Middle East had increased significantly.

Low prices prevailed throughout most of the 1990s despite Iraq's exclusion from world oil markets. Russian oil exports recovered owing to Russia's need for export earnings and the drastic drop in domestic demand because of widespread deindustrialization. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 also kept demand down despite China's increasing imports. In the United States, lower oil prices led to increased consumption, as the number of private motor vehicles, especially gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicles and light trucks, continued

to climb. By the end of the decade, the fuel efficiency gains of the 1980s had been lost. Rising consumption and OPEC production cuts led to sharp price increases in 2000 and 2001. What happened in the 1990s may foreshadow a pattern whereby lower prices lead to greater consumption which leads to higher prices which lead to lower consumption which leads to lower prices and the repeat of the cycle. Thus, a foreign oil policy based on market forces and military power has its own set of problems.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN OIL POLICY

Oil has been unique as a vital resource owing to its pervasiveness in the civilian economy and its continuing centrality to military power, and maintaining access to the great oil-producing areas of the world has been a key goal of U.S. foreign policy since World War I. The objective of maintaining access to economically vital overseas areas resonated with the global conception of U.S. national security interests that emerged during World War II and dominated U.S. policy throughout the Cold War. U.S. leaders sought to prevent any power or coalition of powers from dominating Europe and/or Asia, to maintain U.S. strategic supremacy, to fashion an international economic environment open to U.S. trade and investment, and to maintain the integration of the Third World in the world economy.

Control of oil helped the United States contain the Soviet Union, end destructive political, economic, and military competition among the core capitalist states, mitigate class conflict within the capitalist core by promoting economic growth, and retain access to the raw materials, markets, and labor of the periphery in an era of decolonization and national liberation. Moreover, the strategic forces necessary for maintaining access to overseas oil were fungible; that is, they could, and were, used for other purposes in other parts of the world. Likewise, as the Gulf War demonstrated, strategic forces from other parts of the world could be used to help maintain access to oil. Thus, there has been a symbiotic relationship between maintaining power projection capabilities in general and relying on strategic forces to maintain access to overseas oil. In short, control of oil has been a key component of American hegemony.

While national security concerns have been an important source of foreign oil policy, definitions of national security and national interest have not been shaped in isolation from the nature of the society they were designed to defend. Arguments that claim a noncapitalist United States would have followed the same policies, even when sincere, assume no changes in domestic economic, social, and political structures, and thus miss the point entirely. They also ignore the constraints, opportunities, and contradictions that the structure of society, and in particular the operation of the economic system, impose on public policy.

The expansion of U.S. business abroad beginning in the late nineteenth century increasingly linked the health and survival of the U.S. political economy to developments abroad. These concerns were not restricted to fears for the nation's physical security or to the well-being of specific companies or sectors but rather were linked to concerns about the survival of a broadly defined "American way of life" in what was seen as an increasingly dangerous and hostile world.

U.S. oil companies were among the pioneers in foreign involvement, looking abroad initially for markets and increasingly for sources of oil. The U.S. government facilitated this expansion by insisting on the Open Door policy of equal opportunity for U.S. companies. Although the United States became a net importer of oil in the late 1940s, it was able to meet its oil needs from domestic resources until the late 1960s. Still, U.S. leaders were aware as early as World War II that one day the nation would no longer be able to supply its growing consumption from domestic oil production. This realization led to a determination to maintain access to the great producing areas abroad, especially in the Middle East.

Once the issue was defined in terms of access to additional oil, the interests of the major oil companies, which possessed the means to discover, develop, and deliver this oil, coincided with the national interest. In these circumstances, the major international oil companies have been vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil, not just another interest group. To maintain an international environment in which private corporations could operate with security and profit, the U.S. government became actively involved in maintaining the stability and pro-Western orientation of the Middle East, in containing economic nationalism, and in supporting private arrangements for controlling the world's oil.

Although there was a broad consensus in favor of policies aimed at ensuring U.S. control of

world oil, the structure of the U.S. oil industry significantly shaped specific struggles over foreign oil policy. Like much of U.S. industry, the oil industry was divided between a mass of small- and medium-sized companies and a handful of large multinational firms. Within these divisions the competing strategies of different firms often led to intense conflict and to efforts to enlist government agencies as allies in the competitive struggle. Any public policy that seemed to favor one group of companies was certain to be opposed by the rest of the industry. Divisions within the industry were at the base of much of the oil companies' ideological opposition to government involvement in oil matters. In addition, oil companies shared the general distrust of the democratic state that prevailed throughout American business.

There were also conflicts with other energy producers, especially the coal industry, though these were somewhat muted owing to oil's near monopoly position in the transportation sector. Coal, in contrast, was used mainly for heating and electricity generation, as was natural gas, which increased its share of overall U.S. energy consumption, largely at the expense of coal. There was less conflict with industries that were themselves heavy oil users, in part because most of them were able to pass increased costs along to consumers. The automobile industry, in particular, has been heavily dependent on inexpensive oil for its very existence, and thus has shared the oil industry's interest in continued and growing use of its products.

The U.S. government was also frequently divided over foreign oil policy. Competing bureaucracies and institutions, each with their own set of organizational interests, supported different policies. While these divisions often influenced the specific contours of foreign oil policy, they generally reflected the divisions in the U.S. oil industry. For both organizational and ideological reasons, the Department of State has represented the interests of the major oil companies whose actions can have a great impact on U.S. foreign policy. Congress, in contrast, has played its traditional role as the protector of small business and often backed the numerically dominant independent oil companies and the coal industry, whose interests have been mostly within the United States. Presidents have tried to mediate the conflicts among government agencies, with Congress, and among competing industry groups, and craft compromises acceptable to the greatest number of groups possible.

Even though industry and government divisions effectively blocked some types of government actions, the splits did not reduce the oil industry's influence on U.S. foreign policy. Almost all segments of the oil industry agreed on policies aimed at creating and maintaining an international environment in which all U.S. companies could operate with security and profit. Thus, the impact of business conflict was not a free hand for government agencies but rather strict limits on government actions and control of the world oil economy by the most powerful private interests.

Foreign oil policy has been shaped not only by the structure of the oil industry, which has changed over time, but also by the privileged position of business in the United States. The oil industry has operated in a political culture that favored private interests and put significant limits on public policy. Thus, the fact that business interests were often divided and that specific business interests at times did not prevail does not mean, as some analysts argue, that the oil industry and other business sectors had little influence on U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, the overall structure of power within the United States had a profound impact on U.S. foreign oil policy.

Corporate power not only influenced the outcome of specific decisions but more importantly, significantly shaped the definitions of policy objectives. The realization that U.S. oil consumption threatened to outpace domestic production led to plans to ensure access to foreign oil reserves. The alternative of reducing, or at least slowing, the growth of rapidly rising consumption has only rarely been seriously considered.

Part of the reason for a supply side focus has been the obvious strategic and economic advantages of controlling world oil. Nevertheless, the degree to which U.S. public policy has ignored conservation cannot be explained solely by foreign policy considerations. The consideration and adoption of alternative policies limiting the consumption of oil has also clashed with well-organized political and economic interests, deep-seated ideological beliefs, and the structural weight of an economic system in which almost all investment decisions are in private hands.

The oil industry has been one of the most modern and best-organized sectors of the U.S. economy, and both domestic and international companies have opposed policies that reduce the demand for their products. Domestic producers have argued that greater incentives for domestic production are the answer to U.S. oil needs, while

companies with interests overseas have argued that they can supply U.S. oil needs, provided they receive government protection and support.

Demand-side planning, in contrast, involves end-use and other restrictions that clash with the interests of the oil industry and other industries using oil. Planning for publicly defined purposes, such as limiting demand for oil products, requires a role for public authority—supplanting the market in some areas—that has been unacceptable to the dominant political culture of the United States. In addition, the patterns of social and economic organization, in particular the availability of inexpensive private automobiles, the consequent deterioration of public transportation, and the continuing trend toward increased suburbanization, all of which were premised upon high oil consumption, have been regarded as natural economic processes not subject to conscious control, rather than as the results of identifiable, and reversible, social, economic, and political decisions. Conservation also goes against the ideology of growth and the desire, reinforced by the experiences of depression and war, to escape redistributionist conflicts by expanding production and the absolute size of the economic "pie." Finally, decisions to look to external expansion to solve internal problems rather than confront them directly has been characteristic of U.S. foreign policy throughout the nation's existence.

The structure of power within the United States has also deeply affected the U.S. response to the environmental impact of oil use. While abundant oil has helped fuel American power and prosperity, it also helped entrench social and economic patterns dependent on ever-higher levels of energy use. Whether or not these patterns are sustainable on the basis of world oil resources, it has become increasingly clear that they are not sustainable ecologically, either for the United States or as a model of development for the rest of the world.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, oil accounted for 40 percent of world energy demand, and energy use was the primary source of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. For this reason, environmental scientists considered air pollution associated with energy use to be the main threat to the earth's climate. Increased energy demand will only make the situation worse. In short, there are environmental limits to continuing, let alone expanding, the high production–high consumption lifestyle associated with the U.S. model of development. Therefore, the most important question facing the United States in regard to oil in the twenty-first century may not be how to ensure access to oil to meet growing demands, but rather how to move away from what is clearly an unsustainable development path.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adelman, M. A. *The World Petroleum Market.* Baltimore, 1972. Attempt to apply neoclassical economics to world oil markets.

———. *The Genie Out of the Bottle: World Oil Since 1970.* Cambridge, Mass., 1995. Continues the analysis to the 1990s.

Anderson, Irvine H. *The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933–1941.* Princeton, N.J., 1975. Oil and Pearl Harbor.

———. *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study in the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933–1950.* Princeton, N.J., 1981. Stimulating combination of business history and foreign policy analysis from a perspective that plays down industry influence.

Blair, John M. *The Control of Oil.* New York, 1976. Classic study of the oligopolistic organization of the oil industry.

Bromley, Simon. *American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State System, and the World Economy.* University Park, Pa., 1991. Critical account of the role of oil in underpinning U.S. hegemony within the global system.

Clark, John G. *The Political Economy of World Energy: A Twentieth-Century Perspective.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990. Full of useful information and statistics.

Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals.* Austin, Texas, 1979. Study of oil and other minerals as sources of conflict.

Engler, Robert. *The Politics of Oil: A Study of Private Power and Democratic Directions.* New York, 1961. Classic study of the impact of private power on American democracy.

Goode, James. *The United States and Iran: In the Shadow of Mussaddiq.* New York, 1997. Perceptive account of the oil nationalization crisis.

Heiss, Mary Ann. *Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954.* New York, 1997. Solid study, focusing on Anglo-American relations.

Kapstein, Ethan B. *The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944.* New York, 1990. Solid study of oil and the Western alliance.

Koppes, Clayton R. "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation." *Journal of American History* 69 (June 1982): 62–81.

Lesser, Ian O. *Resources and Strategy.* London and New York, 1989.

Levy, Walter J. *Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941–1981.* Edited by Melvin A. Conant. Boulder, Colo., 1982. Collection of papers by a leading oil consultant compiled by another leading industry analyst.

Lieber, Robert J. *The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West.* New York, 1983. Astute account of the oil crises of the 1970s and alliance politics.

Meyer, Lorenzo. *Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942.* Translated by Muriel Vasconcellos. Austin, Texas, 1977. Oil and U.S.–Mexican relations as seen by a leading Mexican scholar.

Miller, Aaron David. *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980. Pioneering study of the origins of the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia; very informative on security issues and the Palestine question.

Nye, David E. *Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies.* Cambridge, Mass., 1998. Valuable for long-term perspective.

Painter, David S. *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1953.* Baltimore, 1986. Detailed examination of U.S. foreign oil policy during the critical transition years of World War II and the early Cold War and an important source for this essay.

———. "International Oil and National Security." *Daedalus* 120 (fall 1991): 183–206.

———. "Oil and World Power." *Diplomatic History* 17 (winter 1993): 159–170. Analysis of oil's contribution to U.S. power based on a critical review of Yergin and Bromley and a source for this essay.

Palmer, Michael A. *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992.* New York, 1992. Useful overview.

Patterson, Matthew. "Car Culture and Global Environmental Politics." *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 253–270. Insightful on the symbiosis between the automobile and oil use.

Penrose, Edith T. *The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry.* Cambridge, Mass., 1969. Indispensable to understanding the operations of vertically integrated corporations.

Philip, George. *The Political Economy of International Oil.* Edinburgh, 1994. Concise and analytical historical account focusing on relations between the oil companies and Third World oil producers.

Rabe, Stephen G. *The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919–1976.* Austin, Texas, 1982. Solid study of relations with important Latin American producer.

Randall, Stephen J. *United States Foreign Oil Policy, 1919–1948: For Profits and Security.* Kingston, Ontario, 1985. Especially strong on Latin America.

Sampson, Anthony. *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped.* New York, 1975. Colorful and insightful study of the major oil companies.

Schneider, Steven A. *The Oil Price Revolution.* Baltimore, 1983. Detailed examination of the origins and consequences of the oil shocks of the 1970s.

Skeet, Ian. *OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics.* New York, 1988. Dispassionate and well-informed.

Skeet, Ian, ed. *Paul Frankel, Common Carrier of Common Sense: A Selection of His Writings, 1946–1988.* New York, 1989. Includes Frankel's classic *Essentials of Petroleum* (1946), a basic work for understanding the oil industry.

Stivers, William. *Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918–1930.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1982. Analysis of oil and Anglo-American relations in the 1920s.

Stoff, Michael B. *Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–1947.* New Haven, Conn., 1980. Examines oil and Anglo-American relations during World War II.

United States Senate, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Washington, D.C., 1975. Critical report based on the invaluable work of the Church Committee in the mid-1970s.

Venn, Fiona. *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.* New York, 1986. Pioneering study stressing oil's strategic importance.

Vernon, Raymond, ed. *The Oil Crisis.* New York, 1976. Still the best study of the 1973–1974 oil crisis.

Vietor, Richard H. K. *Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations.* New York, 1984. Useful account of energy policy from a pluralist perspective.

Yergin, Daniel. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.* New York, 1991. Anecdotal but comprehensive and informative, a treasure-trove of information with an extensive bibliography.

See also COLLECTIVE SECURITY; ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; GLOBALIZATION; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS; THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

Open Door Interpretation

William Appleman Williams

A significant number of historians and other commentators have viewed the Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900 as the culmination of earlier attitudes, objectives, and policies, and as a coherent and decisive formulation of the major forces affecting American diplomacy during the century after 1865. But such people are too different (and too separated in time) to be jumbled together as a school. They are not, for example, defined by the ideological, institutional, personal, generational, and political affinities that characterized the Frankfurt School of Marxist sociologists that flourished from the 1930s through the 1960s and that produced a clearly defined body of analysis and interpretation. Hence, it is more helpful to speak of an Open Door interpretation of American foreign relations that has been advanced, from the 1890s to the present, by a disparate group of policymakers and politicians, bureaucrats, nonacademic intellectuals, and university and college teachers.

That odd assortment of people has nevertheless shared, however obliquely, the conviction that the Open Door policy is the keystone of twentieth-century American diplomacy. Elected policymakers, for example, as well as the bureaucrats they ushered into positions of influence, have used it as the intellectual vantage point from which to view and deal with the world. Such people have defined the policy as the touchstone of their dialogues—and confrontation—with the American public and other countries. The Open Door policy has been their idiom of thought, discourse, and action: it defines American perceptions and objectives, and hence, those who criticize or oppose the policy have been viewed as problems if not enemies. Germany was thus a troublemaker long before Adolf Hitler, Japan long before Hideki Tojo, and Russia long before Joseph Stalin.

Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson operated within the framework of the Open Door policy when they served as secretaries of war, as well as during their tenures as secretaries of state. William Jennings Bryan thought within that framework prior to World War I just as surely as Charles Evans Hughes, Cordell Hull, and James S. Byrnes did in later years. And Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (and others) worked within the idiom that had been stated by President William McKinley even before Secretary of State John Hay announced it to the chancelleries and the publics of the world. The historian A. Whitney Griswold made the central point very neatly in his study *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (1938): "It is wrong, perhaps, to say that Hughes stole Wilson's thunder, for Wilson himself had stolen Hay's."

The contextual persuasiveness of the Open Door outlook among American bureaucrats becomes apparent during a routine survey of the volumes in the State Department's published record, as offered in its *Bulletin* and *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Indeed, the student grows weary of the references to the Open Door policy: he or she is inclined to consider it a meaningless ritual save for the seriousness with which it is repeatedly used to explain and justify American actions. Another kind of evidence is provided by the testimony (before congressional committees, as well as in memoirs) of such influential bureaucrats as William S. Culbertson, John Van Antwerp MacMurray, Joseph Clark Grew, and George F. Kennan.

Kennan, an influential foreign service officer and scholar, provides a particularly striking example of the power of the *Weltanschauung* of the Open Door. Writing as a historian in *American Diplomacy: 1900–1950* (1951), he damned the Open Door policy (and its underlying outlook) as idealistic, moralistic, legalistic, unrealistic, and ineffective. But his own zealous proposal to contain, and thereby drastically change, the Soviet Union through the global deployment of American moral, economic, political, and military

power was designed to realize the objectives of Secretary Hay's original notes: a world open to American ideals and influence. Kennan was initially proposing—whatever his later denials, caveats, and remorse—an exponential escalation of President McKinley's deployment of American power against the Boxer Rebellion in China.

Because China was the initial subject of the Open Door Notes, the early commentators focused their analyses of the policy upon its operation in Asia. While some observers (and participants) felt that the government ought to act more vigorously against what they considered to be the more restrictive policies of Japan, Russia, and Germany (and even China), they generally agreed that Secretary Hay's integration of moralism, ideology, political strategy, and economic expansion provided a definitive statement of the need and the wisdom of extending the area of Anglo-American freedom and enlarging the American marketplace without war. Even leading Populists, otherwise bitterly critical of the McKinley administration, admitted that the policy addressed the basic issues. The editors of the *Prairie Farmer,* for example, urged their readers in 1900 to elect expansionist politicians. And *Wallace's Farmer* was enthusiastic about the prospect of using "our moral advantage" to expand a "valuable" trade.

Three very different people—Brooks Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson—promptly placed the Open Door policy within a broader—and even more dynamic—intellectual context. Adams, the grandson of President John Quincy Adams (and the brother of Charles Francis and Henry Adams), was the most original—and eccentric—of that unusual group. He suffered from those differences in two ways: he never became famous, and his major idea became associated with another person.

From the late 1880s to the publication of *The Law of Civilization and Decay* in 1894, Adams developed an explanation of world civilization that defined westward expansion as the key to progress, prosperity, and culture. The centers of civilization had moved ever westward until, in the 1890s, the scepter was passing from Paris and London to New York. That meant to Adams that the United States, if it was to seize its hour, had to move westward across the Pacific to dominate Asia. Otherwise Russia or another country would become the next center of world power and civilization. Adams then published a series of magazine articles on foreign policy, collected in 1900 as *America's Economic Supremacy,* in which he praised Hay's Open Door Notes as a basic strategy for the United States and advocated a vigorous imperial policy—including the containment of Russia. In his view, Hay was "the only minister of foreign affairs in the whole world who grasped the situation."

Adams and his history-on-the-spot exerted a significant influence on Theodore Roosevelt (even though the latter did once remark that he thought Adams was "half-crazy"); but, in the larger arena, Adams lost out to the formulation of a similar idea offered by Frederick Jackson Turner. Adams was a disillusioned and acerbic Boston Brahmin writing history in the petulant frustration of having lost power, while Turner was an excited and romantic midwestern poet-historian who stirred the mind of the public. In December 1893, Turner offered "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," a dramatic reinterpretation of American history that explained the nation's democracy and prosperity in terms of westward expansion from Virginia and Boston to Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii.

Turner was not as overtly imperial as Adams. He even seemed sometimes to imply that a native form of socialism was as appropriate to the end of continental frontier expansionism as overseas expansion into Asia and other regions. But his stress on past expansion, and his interpretation of the outward push from 1897 to 1901 as a natural continuation of the earlier rush across the continent, left his readers with the idea that the Open Door policy was the new frontier. Certainly Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson read that message in his essays and took that idea from their correspondence and conversations with him.

Roosevelt was primed for Turner by Adams (and by his romantic cowboy interludes in the Dakota Territory), and his role in acquiring the Philippines and Cuba completed this transformation into what a psychologist might call a true believer. American expansion was a crusade for the Open Door virtues of peace, democracy, and prosperity. Roosevelt was sometimes discouraged by the difficulties of implementing the outlook in the face of opposition by other nations, or by the reluctance of the public to support the measures he considered desirable; but his commitment to the *Weltanschauung* remained firm: "We advocate the 'open door' with all that it implies."

Not only did Roosevelt view the Open Door policy as the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia; he moved in 1905–1906 to extend the policy to Africa. His discussions with Secretary of State

Elihu Root led to one of the clearest expressions of the way in which the open door interpretation guided such policymakers. Seeking to prevent either France or Germany from establishing exclusive control over Morocco, Root advised American negotiators that "here, again, the 'open door' seems to be the sound policy to advocate." He then emphasized that it was vital "that the door, being open, shall lead to something; that the outside world shall benefit by assured opportunities, and that the Moroccan people shall be made in a measure fit and able to profit by the advantages of the proposed reform."

A very similar view was held and acted upon by President Wilson. During the late 1880s he had met and talked with Turner at Johns Hopkins University, and the results were impressive. As a historian and political scientist on his way to the White House, Wilson used Turner's frontier thesis to explain much of American history. "All I ever wrote on the subject," he once commented, "came from him." That remark qualifies as one of Wilson's unusual acts of intellectual generosity, and therefore mirrors his usual arrogance by giving Turner too much credit. Wilson was an idealistic missionary crusader on behalf of American virtues and economic supremacy in his own right, and added his particular insights to the American political system.

Even so, Wilson-as-historian leaned very heavily on Turner. "The days of glad expansion are gone, our life grows tense and difficult," he wrote in 1896 in explaining the crisis of the 1890s. Five years later, after Hay's Open Door Notes, he considered such expansion a "natural and wholesome impulse." "Who shall say," he added, "where it will end?" In 1902 he published the four-volume *History of the American People,* which made it clear that the historian-as-politician-as-would-be-world-leader viewed economic expansion as the frontier to replace the continent that had been occupied. A section in volume 5 (which reads like a close paraphrase of some essays written by Brooks Adams) recommended increased efficiency in government so that the United States "might command the economic fortunes of the world." He concluded his analysis by stressing the need for markets—markets "to which diplomacy, and if need be power, must make an open way."

Wilson classically revealed his involvement with the Open Door *Weltanschauung* during the 1915 confrontation with Japan over its Twenty-one Demands on China. He explained to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan that the basic objective was "the maintenance of the policy of an open door to the world." Thereafter, Bryan periodically reminded various individuals and groups that the president's policy was to "open the doors of all the weaker countries to an invasion of American capital and enterprise." The principal importance of these and earlier quotations in this historiographical context lies not in revealing the policy per se but in suggesting how early policymakers were intellectuals developing and applying an Open Door interpretation of American foreign relations.

Moreover, even before Wilson was elected, a few historians and political scientists had recognized the importance of the policy in that sense. Archibald C. Coolidge, for example, in *The United States as a World Power* (1908), called the Open Door outlook "one of the cardinal principles of American policy." John A. Hobson, the perceptive English liberal who initiated the critical Western study of imperialism (1902), was the first scholar to recognize the pervasive nature of the Open Door *Weltanschauung*. Viewing it as the key to American policy, and reacting with a favorable judgment, he argued in an essay in *Towards a Lasting Peace* (1916) that the policy and its underlying outlook provided the basis for lasting peace and prosperity.

That statement was almost a prediction, for in January 1918 President Wilson presented in his Fourteen Points a program that was clearly a product of the Open Door *Weltanschauung*. He not only used (consciously or unconsciously) phrases from Hay's original notes, but the encompassing idiom of what he called "the only possible program" for peace was clearly an Open Door view of the world. The historian-become-policymaker and the historian as analyst-turned-public-commentator had reached an unplanned consensus.

The ensuing debates over Wilson's program, and the causes of the war and American intervention, buried Hobson's insight. His approach was ignored and unexplored for many years; and even when it was revived, it was done without any overt recognition of his pioneering effort. That did not mean, however, that the Open Door policy and its underlying outlook were wholly neglected. But that is the essence of the historiographical question: the issue involved whether or not historians (and other commentators) recognized that the Open Door policy was in truth the expression of a broad understanding of America and its relationship with the world.

Defined more formally in philosophical terms, the problem concerned a choice between a Cartesian world and a Spinozan world. Most American historians who came to maturity between 1895 and 1950 were Cartesians; they accepted a world composed of discrete atomistic units, some of which sometimes interacted with each other much as various billiard balls hit this time one ball and next time another ball. This led to what came to be known as the interest-group approach: individual A or P, or association D or S, exerted a determining influence upon decision F or Z.

Such an approach produced in history, as it did in science, some stimulating—if limited—research and analysis. Thus, in *Americans in Eastern Asia* (1922), Tyler Dennett could perceive "the Reassertion of the Open Door Policy" during the McKinley administration, but within a few pages assert that it was all "a purely temporary expedient." But Alfred L. P. Dennis's "The Open Door in China," in his *Adventures in American Diplomacy* (1928), used Dennett to suggest the long-term development of a guiding outlook. He cited Dennett's summary of the situation in 1858: the United States "desired for its citizens an open door to trade." Then he, too, retreated to call it all "an expedient." Revealing the ambivalence of early postwar scholarship, Dennis next quoted a comment that reminds one of Root and Wilson: "The policy of the Open Door . . . is the one and only policy. . . . Neither is it any use keeping the door open without insuring that the room on the other side of the door is in order."

Dennett was at his best on the broader nature of the Open Door policy a few years later when, in *John Hay: From Poetry to Politics* (1933), he was the first historian to sense the role of Brooks Adams in developing a worldview that guided Hay and other policymakers. But the key figure of the interwar years was Charles Austin Beard. The magnificent study *The Rise of American Civilization* that he and Mary Ritter Beard first published in 1927 talked candidly about the turn-of-the-century expansion as "Imperial America," and they hinted at the development of an imperial *Weltanschauung* that was crystallized in the Open Door policy.

The Beards perceptively saw the origins of that outlook in Secretary of State William H. Seward's mid-nineteenth-century vision of a global American empire. Their description of the Open Door policy made the point that it integrated three elements—while "designed with realistic and practical ends in mind, the policy of the open door also had a lofty moral flavor"—but they did not develop it as a *Weltanschauung*. They said nothing of Theodore Roosevelt's extension of the policy to Africa, for example, and barely mentioned it in dealing with the later diplomacy of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.

That curiously titillating performance can be explained by two considerations: the Beards were writing a sweeping essay rather than a study of foreign policy per se, and Charles Beard was in the process of modifying his theory of knowledge and causation. His early work was grounded in an orthodox scientific-atomistic conception of reality that led him into a sophisticated interest-group analysis of history and politics, as in *The Economic Basis of Politics* (1916) and *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (1913). There is strong evidence, however, that even as those books were being published, Beard was turning away from his methodology. That became apparent between 1928 and 1937, when he wrote a great deal about the problem. Beard had referred to various German antipositivists as early as 1913, and their influence reappeared in *The American Party Battle* (1928), in which he discussed the weaknesses of his earlier theory. He then opened a direct confrontation with the issue in two books and an article in 1934: *The Idea of National Interest, The Open Door at Home,* and "Written History as an Act of Faith" (*American Historical Review*).

Beard did not break completely free of the atomistic, interest-group theory of reality in *The Idea of National Interest,* but he did place the conflict between urban and agrarian interests in a much broader context. He spoke most directly about the question near the end of the book, remarking that the danger of the atomistic, Cartesian view of the world was in "limiting the understanding of the whole." That enriched the meaning of his earlier references to such intellectual heirs of Spinoza as Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Frederich Meinecke, Karl Huessi, Karl Mannheim, Wilhelm Dilthey—and even Albert Schweitzer.

The issue was the ongoing dialogue between Descartes and Spinoza: the discrete, atomistic conception of reality versus the view that all things are related to each other. Given the American intellectual environment of those years, Beard was engaged in a lonely, courageous, and difficult task of reexamining his *Weltanschauung* in his middle years (see Lloyd Sorenson, "Charles Beard and German Historiographical Thought," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* [September 1955]).

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

"Williams displayed great intellectual courage. Reflecting on the prerequisites for achieving individual or collective change, at least in our understanding of the world but also ideally in our actions to change it. Williams liked to pair 'intelligence and courage.' . . . His own record of intellectual courage is more complicated than it appears at first glance. Clearly he risked—and received—much criticism for challenging the intellectual orthodoxies of the 1950s, including what is usually called 'consensus' history. . . . Yet Williams was also intelligent and courageous enough to look beyond radical cant. . . .

"When attempting to categorize Williams as a critic of U.S. foreign policy, it is easiest to say what he was not. He was not a Wilsonian. Since Wilsonians have dominated discussion of foreign policy since World War II, this stance left Williams vulnerable to another epithet. Because he dissented from the Wilsonian 'imperialism of idealism,' he was stigmatized as an *isolationist* economic determinist and conspiracy theorist.

"Williams's relationship to what is usually called 'isolationism' is very complex. One of his greatest contributions was to deny over and over and over again that the United States was an isolationist nation until world power was thrust upon it in 1898 or 1917 or 1941 or 1945. On the contrary, the United States was expansionist from the outset, and the British, Spanish, French, Mexicans, and Native Americans certainly did not think the country isolationist. . . . Unfortunately, Wilsonian diplomatic historians, pundits, and officials still seem to think that the continent was more or less empty at the end of the eighteenth century and destined to be absorbed by the small country on the Atlantic coast (though, less candid than their forebears, they shun the term 'Manifest Destiny'). Accordingly, they presume that significant foreign policy only began in fits and starts during the 1890s.

"While repeatedly repudiating two centuries of American expansionism, Williams also criticized the United States for trying to be a 'world unto itself.' In his view, the internationalists' definition of internationalism was narrow and self-serving. They continually offered and often forced American solutions onto other nations yet only rarely acknowledged that the United States could learn lessons from abroad. This provincial internationalism was neither intelligent nor courageous."

—*From Leo P. Ribuffo, "What Is Still Living in the Ideas and Example of William Appleman Williams? A Comment,"* Diplomatic History *25, no. 2 (spring 2001): 310, 312–313* —

He did not, however, develop and use the new approach in a rigorous manner. The results can be seen in *The Discussion of Human Affairs* (1936), "Currents of Thought in Historiography" (*American Historical Review* [April 1937]), and *The American Spirit* (1942).

Instead, Beard veered off into a quasi-biographical approach, interpreting foreign policy after 1934 as largely the result of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's power drive and inability to deal with the domestic crisis. Those books, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940* (1946) and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War* (1948), raised troublesome questions, but Beard's personalizing of policy neglected broader issues. Hence, his methodological explorations were ultimately developed by others who returned to Beard after they had come to the concept of an Open Door *Weltanschauung* along different lines.

In the meantime, however, the study of the Open Door policy was dominated by A. Whitney Griswold's *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (1938). Sensing that the Open Door was more than just a policy, he offered, for example, the suggestion that President Wilson and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had transformed Hay's notes into a way of perceiving and thinking about foreign relations, and indicated that Cordell Hull's dedication to that outlook had more than a little to do with the subsequent confrontations with Germany and Japan. But all he said explicitly was that the Open Door was a "time honored American principle."

The concept of a principle emerging from the pragmatic needs and demands of various interest groups, and then becoming a *Weltanschauung,* was the analytical and interpretive tool that Beard had tried to forge between 1925 and

1935. Although they did not reveal his consciousness of purpose, three historians did advance that work during the decade after Griswold. Fred Harvey Harrington was the most intelligent and sophisticated interest-group historian of his generation, and if he had remained a historian, he would probably have gone beyond Beard in the application of a more subtle methodology. Harrington, along with William Best Hesseltine, his friend and colleague at the University of Wisconsin, had a genius for integrating biography and policy in a way that implicitly transcended interest-group analysis.

Harrington's study of American policy in Korea, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese* (1944), culminated in a three-page passage that implicitly revealed the broad outlook of Theodore Roosevelt and other early architects of the Open Door *Weltanschauung*. Sylvester K. Stevens provided a related approach in *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898* (1945). A third book, Edward H. Zabriskie's *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895–1914* (1946), displayed the post-Beardian ambivalence in American historiography. Zabriskie (like Harrington) placed the protagonists in a broad framework and even suggested that they operated within an encompassing overview, but he never delineated that outlook.

At the end of the war, therefore, Beard's methodological explorations had neither been exploited directly nor reinforced by parallel investigations. The account of what happened next is complicated, as with all intellectual history, but the essentials are reasonably clear. To speak in the idiom of nuclear physics, a highly charged field was penetrated by highly charged particles. The environment was defined primarily by the history department of the University of Wisconsin: a great tradition was reinvigorated by the stimulating and contrasting minds of such scholars as Paul Knaplund, Paul Farmer, Robert Reynolds, and Gaines Post in European history, and Merrill Jensen, Hesseltine, and Harrington in American history. But other scholars in related fields, such as Hans Gerth in sociology and Frederick J. Hoffman in literature, were also a vital part of the ensuing nuclear reaction that was triggered by the arrival in 1946–1947 of hundreds of excited and hungry veterans who wanted to become excellent historians.

An unusually large number of them achieved that objective during the next four years and went on to make important contributions in every field of American history. The major elements involved in the part of that process that produced what came to be known as the Open Door interpretation can be defined as follows: the ongoing intellectual interaction among the professors, among the students, and between those groups; the broad training in European as well as in American history, and in related disciplines; and the particular genius of Harrington. Thus, what emerged is best understood as the result of a true community that flowered for most of two decades.

The story can be told through focus on William Appleman Williams, although he explicitly insists that the result was a communal product and, furthermore, that it involved the work of scholars who are not usually identified as part of the Wisconsin School of diplomatic history. Given his exposure to the history faculty, the vital elements in Williams's development were his previous training in mathematics and science and his work with Gerth. Gerth gave Williams a broad knowledge of the methodology of *Weltanschauung* (including the serious study of Marx) and helped him to begin developing it as a tool for the study of foreign relations. Williams thus came to Beard twice: first as a beginning graduate student who read him as an interest-group historian and later, educated by Gerth, viewing him as a man struggling briefly with the concept of *Weltanschauung*.

Williams first experimented with that methodology in *American-Russian Relations, 1784–1947* (1952), as in his discussion of the influence of Brooks Adams; but he was not fully in command of the approach, and the effort to open the orthodox form of the monograph to include such analysis posed severe additional difficulties. The next phase of his work cannot be fully understood outside his friendship with Charles Vevier, a fellow student in Harrington's seminar, for they often did primary research together over the next three years and exchanged notes and ideas on a regular basis. Vevier's *The United States and China, 1906–1913* (1955) interpreted the specific events of those years within the broad framework of a knowing effort by decision makers to act upon the Open Door view of the world.

Also in 1955, Williams provided a clear example of how he was developing and using the concept of *Weltanschauung* in his study of the way that Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and John Hay's Open Door Notes were related parts of the same overview ("The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," *Pacific Historical Review* [November 1955]). He next used the methodol-

ogy in dealing with contemporary foreign policy ("The American Century: 1941–1957," *Nation* [November 1957]) and in offering a broad analysis of the revolutionary and early national period ("The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American Political Economy," *William and Mary Quarterly* [October 1958]).

Shortly after he returned to Wisconsin as a member of the faculty, Williams published *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959), an interpretive essay on twentieth-century foreign policy. Although it came to be viewed rather narrowly as the basis for the "Open Door interpretation," and as a critique of policy after 1944, the book actually dealt with the development of a *Weltanschauung* through the interaction and integration of ideas, interest-group pressures, and the dynamic processes of marketplace capitalism. That more complicated nature of the approach was shortly underscored by Verier, just before he left history to help build the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. His "American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion, 1845–1910" (*American Historical Review* [January 1960]) was a subtle interpretation of the shift from continental conquest to overseas expansion.

As Williams has repeatedly pointed out, he and others working in the idiom of an Open Door *Weltanschauung* learned much from other scholars who favored a different approach. Charles C. Campbell's *Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy* (1951), for example, made it clear that the Open Door policy was an idea—and an ideal—that embraced the practical demands of many different groups. And Paul Schroeder's early and perceptive *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations* (1958) remains a revealing analysis of the way that Secretary of State Cordell Hull's intense commitment to the Open Door outlook defined the ultimately violent confrontation with Japan.

Williams continued his own work in *The Contours of American History* (1961), a broad interpretation of American history based on the argument that the United States has developed under three major worldviews, and in *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (1969), an effort to provide a quasi-monographic history of how one *Weltanschauung* matures and then infuses and influences its successor. But the methodology and the interpretation took on lives of their own as the people who participated in Williams's seminar at Wisconsin began to produce their own articles and books.

As a teacher, Williams was graced with an unusual number of exceptional students, the legacy of the department's preeminence during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Perhaps his most important contribution was to give them their heads, to encourage them to explore the great resources of the university faculty, and to push them to realize the very best that was within themselves. The way that some of them received and used his version of the methodological tool of *Weltanschauung* makes the point. Martin J. Sklar, for example, produced the striking essay "Woodrow Wilson and the Political Economy of Modern United States Liberalism" (*Studies on the Left* [1960]). And James Weinstein, one of Richard Hofstadter's most perceptive students, who entered and was influenced by the Wisconsin milieu, wrote the excellent *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1968* (1968).

If Williams had operated more traditionally, directing and controlling his seminar in a narrow and orthodox manner, then the subsequent professional discussion (and gossip) about a "Wisconsin School" would have more substance. As it happened, however, the students—and their students—went their own ways. One need only consider the impressive trio who worked with Harrington as well as Williams. Walter LaFeber's first book, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (1963), dealt with intellectuals (and other ideamongers) more as an interest group than as craftsmen of a *Weltanschauung*. In a later study, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1960* (1967), he further refined that process. But one of his students, David Green (*The Containment of Latin America* [1971]), did more in the way of using a worldview to explain a regional policy.

Thomas J. McCormick offered an imaginative marriage, so to speak, of Harrington and Williams in an exquisite study, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901* (1967). McCormick was deceptively empirical, for while his pages were filled with facts that no one else had uncovered, and his style was almost arid, he nevertheless constructed an account of how an expansionist *Weltanschauung* (in his own idiom, "informal empire") came into being at the turn of the century.

Lloyd C. Gardner's initial study, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (1964), seemed more interest-group-oriented than it was: his climactic chapter, "Restoring an Open World," made the point about the power of Secretary of State

Hull's worldview with an almost fey sense of humor. He quoted Harry Hopkins telling President Roosevelt that Prime Minister Churchill ought to be "disabuse[d]" of the idea that Hull's persistence about the Open Door policy was only "a pet hobby." In a later and unusually sophisticated volume, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (1970), Gardner transcended Beard by using the intellectual biography to explain the development of a worldview shared by many top policymakers. Gardner's students used that approach with great effectiveness in dealing with the various aspects of the origins of the outlook and its later manifestations.

The ahistorical mistake involved in personalizing the Open Door interpretation—and the methodology of Spinoza, Marx, and Dilthey—around Williams is revealed in the work of many other historians. Robert Freeman Smith, for example, demonstrated in *What Happened in Cuba* (1963) that Harrington produced many students who moved beyond the interest-group methodology. And Stephen E. Ambrose made it clear, in *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938–1970* (1971), that Hesseltine was a key figure in that milieu.

Finally, the approach also attracted younger European historians who knew independently, and perhaps better, the philosophical roots in Spinoza, Marx, Dilthey, George Lukacs, and the Frankfurt School. Perhaps the most stimulating work has been done by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, as in *Der Aufsteig des amerikanischen Imperialismus* (1974). With enviable finesse he treats the process through which interests, problems, and ideas produce a *Weltanschauung*.

Given their variations on a theme, and their energy, it is not surprising that the protagonists of the Open Door interpretation have provoked much comment. Many of those who have responded favorably, however, have been as inattentive to the essentials of the methodology as have the critics—who have also overemphasized the influence of Williams and who have not differentiated and discussed the primary issues. An excellent example of the latter failure is provided by Arthur S. Link's commentary (in *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays* [1971]) on Carl P. Parrini's *Heir to Empire: United States Diplomacy, 1916–1923* (1969).

Link acknowledges that Parrini (a member of the Williams seminar) is correct in arguing that Wilson advocated Open Door expansionism, but then comments that Wilson's motives were the best—"the slow and steady improvement of mankind through the spread of a reformed and socially responsible democratic capitalism." Link not only misses the integration of economic and idealistic elements in Wilson's outlook that is stressed by Williams, Sklar, and Parrini, but further confuses their description and analysis of the consequences of that worldview with the attribution of evil motives to Wilson. He also fails to credit Wilson, his own hero, with being a perceptive capitalist who understood the system's need for imperial expansion.

A few scholars have discussed the issues with greater insight and balance. Warren F. Kimball's "The Cold War Warmed Over" (*American Historical Review* [October 1974]) ranges far beyond his announced subject. And Joan Hoff Wilson's exploration of the subject in *Ideology and Economics: United States Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918–1933* (1974) is an example of her discerning insight into the primary problems of post-Beardian historiography. Such keen commentary underscores the judgment of Melvyn Leffler in "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921–1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation" (*Journal of American History* [December 1972]). Williams and other advocates of his approach have "compelled all diplomatic historians to grapple with a complex set of criteria that heretofore had been frequently minimized."

See also CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; IMPERIALISM; OPEN DOOR POLICY; WILSONIANISM; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

Open Door Policy

Mark Atwood Lawrence

As he surveyed East Asian affairs in the first months of 1899, Secretary of State John Hay saw few reasons for optimism. America's main rivals for influence in that part of the world—Russia, Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain—bristled with imperial ambition as China, weakened by war and rebellion, steadily lost its capacity to resist them. The great powers laid claim to special privileges in various parts of the country, a process that recalled the subjugation of Africa and suggested that China might be similarly partitioned. What worried Hay most was the prospect that the United States would be shut out of this new scramble as the Europeans and Japanese, with strong footholds in the area and a far greater taste for territorial conquest, divided up China and protected their new possessions with impenetrable barriers to American trade. Like many of his contemporaries, Hay imagined China as a vital and nearly limitless market for the burgeoning output of America's rapidly industrializing economy. By 1899 the United States had made little progress toward realizing that dream, but the vision beckoned powerfully. Preserving access to the China market ranked high on the McKinley administration's foreign policy agenda even as the prospects seemed to dim.

In a bold move to reverse this alarming trend, Hay dispatched his famous Open Door Notes to the leading imperial powers. Buoyed by his country's victory over Spain the previous year, Hay demanded that each of the powers respect the principle of equal commercial opportunity in the spheres of influence they were consolidating in China. The notes neither challenged the spheres' existence nor demanded equal access for American investment. Hay's dispatches stood firm, however, on the matter about which Americans cared most—the transport and selling of American goods. "Earnestly desirous to remove any cause for irritation," the United States insisted on "perfect equality of treatment for . . . commerce and navigation with such 'spheres.'" Washington asked each power to give "formal assurances" that it would charge uniform harbor dues and railway rates and leave the job of levying and collecting import duties to Chinese authorities. The door to trade, in other words, must remain open to everyone who wished to pass through.

Hay's proclamation of the Open Door policy was a landmark moment in the history of U.S. foreign relations. For one thing, it reflected the rise of the United States as a major power prepared to assert its interests in a distant part of the world where Europeans had reigned supreme. Hay set in motion a process that led ineluctably if fitfully to America's emergence as the predominant outside power attempting to shape Asia's economic and political destiny. Hay's policy also established a pattern of U.S. behavior that had long-term consequences far beyond Asia. With its annexations of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898, the United States had demonstrated a clear interest in territorial acquisition as the means of satisfying its expansionist impulse. But Hay's notes indicated a shift toward a different approach: The United States would expand its influence through economic hegemony rather than imperial control. The idea proved to have enormous staying power, partly because it fit with America's self-conception as a nation founded on the twin principles of anticolonialism and individual opportunity. Over the following century, Americans scorned the imperial intentions of others even as their own leaders made ambitious efforts to secure economic opportunity abroad. So characteristic was this pattern that some scholars regard it as the dominant attribute of U.S. foreign policy across the twentieth century. Beginning with William Appleman Williams in the late 1950s, a controversial but highly influential group of materialist historians elaborated the "open door interpretation" to explain America's extraordinary record of international activism since the 1890s. In the view of

these scholars, Hay's initiative epitomized a quintessentially American approach to foreign policy. On the one hand, Hay invoked high-minded principles such as anticolonialism, self-determination, and equal opportunity to advance his proposals. On the other hand, he showed a hardheaded determination to protect the interests of American capitalists by promoting access to overseas markets. Advocates of the open door interpretation argue that a similar blend of proclaimed selflessness and relentless self-interest runs through the history of American diplomacy. From 1899 through the Cold War, these scholars assert, the U.S. government persistently invoked universal principles even as it intervened abroad in an unceasing effort to order the world to serve the interests of American capitalism.

Ironically, for all its indisputable importance as a watershed, an idea, and an interpretive tool, the Open Door policy produced scant results in practice. Through the period of the Open Door policy, the United States never obtained the markets about which late-nineteenth-century politicians and businessmen dreamed. Between 1899 and 1931 exports to China never exceeded 4 percent of the value of America's total annual exports and more often hovered around 1 percent. Nor did the Open Door policy discourage other powers from grabbing new chunks of Chinese territory or excluding American trade. Indeed, international compliance with American demands was always grudging and tenuous at best before collapsing completely in the 1930s as Japan unilaterally shattered Hay's vision. Even during its heyday in the early twentieth century, the Open Door proved more an illusion maintained by its promoters than a policy with real force and meaning. Moreover, the Open Door policy failed the United States by fueling resistance against foreign meddling in China. Americans clung devoutly to the belief that their policy, in contrast to European imperialism, would benefit China by preserving its integrity and bringing American know-how to its benighted masses. From the Chinese standpoint, however, the United States was often just another foreign country determined to prevent China from controlling the terms of its relations with the outside world. Chinese leaders sometimes attempted to manipulate the United States to serve their interests but rarely proved willing to play the passive and cooperative role arrogantly scripted for them by Washington.

THE ORIGINS OF THE POLICY

The Open Door policy originated in the treaty port system that emerged in China during the 1840s. For centuries, China had resisted the efforts of Western traders to penetrate the country, restricting their activities to the port of Canton (Guangzhou) and subjecting them to severe punishment for violation of Chinese law. Following Britain's sweeping military victory over China in the First Opium War from 1839 to 1842, however, the Qing dynasty had no choice but to grant major concessions. The British government forced China to open four new ports to foreign trade: Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow (Fuzhou), Ningpo (Ningbo), and Shanghai. British negotiators also insisted upon two privileges that would become hallmarks of Western imperialism in China. First, they demanded extraterritoriality, the right to subject British offenders to British rather than Chinese law. Second, they demanded most-favored-nation status, meaning that Britain would automatically benefit from concessions that China granted to any other country. In fact, as the historian Warren I. Cohen has observed, this demand for equal opportunity meshed well with Chinese calculations at the time. The imperial government, hoping to garner the goodwill of other Western powers to resist further British pressure, declared that all nations would have equal privileges in the treaty ports. "Now that the English barbarians have been allowed to trade," declared the Daoguang emperor, "whatever other countries there are, the United States and others, should naturally be permitted to trade without discrimination." In this way the United States, without firing a shot, came to enjoy the benefits that Britain had extracted through military intervention.

The treaty system became more elaborate in the following years as Qing authority continued to deteriorate amid civil wars and new military humiliations by Britain and France. What had been a trickle of Chinese concessions to the imperial powers grew into a torrent with the Treaties of Tientsin in 1858. Under those agreements China opened eleven new ports and for the first time permitted foreigners to navigate the Yangtze River and to travel throughout China's interior. The agreements also dictated a low tariff on foreign goods entering China, essentially robbing the Chinese government of the right to set its own trade policy. As in the 1840s, Americans were well placed to benefit from these concessions. The United States maintained a minimal diplomatic

staff in China and had no military presence whatsoever. Yet under most-favored-nation provisions reaffirmed in the new treaties, American merchants received all of the advantages extracted by Britain and France. Historians have labeled Americans "hitchhiking" imperialists or, in a different formulation, "jackals" fattening up thanks to the British lion and other European predators.

The scavenger's role served American merchants well for half a century. In relative terms, U.S. exports to China remained tiny—just 0.5 percent of all U.S. exports as late as 1895. But American merchants managed to gain a significant toehold in a period when the U.S. government, with its commitment to laissez-faire economic principles, denied them the kind of backing their European rivals received from elaborate diplomatic and military establishments. By the early 1850s Americans operated about twenty-five of the two hundred Western firms doing business in China, and American ships carried one-third of all Western trade with the country. American shipping boomed, especially in Shanghai, the busiest treaty port, where U.S. bottoms carried about one-half of all Western trade. Over time, American merchants obtained important shares of the Chinese market for textiles, oil, metals, and tobacco, all by exploiting what the Europeans made possible.

Two developments in the 1890s—one in the United States, the other in the Far East—drove Washington to seek far more formal assurances of American trading rights. In the United States, the staggering economic collapse of 1893 led to a surge of interest in China as a market for American goods. The depression bankrupted more than fifteen thousand businesses, sent commodity prices plummeting to new lows, and fed unemployment rates as high as 25 percent in many American cities. Most alarming to the political and economic elite, the crisis touched off a wave of strikes and protests that shook the foundations of the free-wheeling Gilded Age economy. Industrialists, politicians, and intellectuals naturally sought to explain the cause of such a cataclysm, and by the mid-1890s most had their answer: overproduction. The United States, they believed, simply produced more than its population could absorb and was choking on the surplus. The closing of the Western frontier left these men with little hope of expanding the domestic market, and none of them entertained demands from organized labor to increase the purchasing power of ordinary Americans. The only solution seemed to lie in exporting more to new markets abroad. "Our manufacturers have outgrown or are outgrowing the home market," the National Association of Manufacturers proclaimed in a characteristic claim of the day. "Expansion of our foreign trade," it added, was the "only promise of relief."

Few potential markets appealed as strongly as China. Since the eighteenth century Americans had commonly imagined China as a vast market peopled by millions of consumers eager for American goods. Along with India, China represented "an extensive field for the enterprise of our merchants and mariners," Alexander Hamilton wrote as far back as 1791 in his *Report on Manufactures,* proclaiming the distant Asian lands "an additional outlet for the commodities of the country." Following the events of 1893, the hyperbole soared to new heights amid a general outpouring of enthusiasm for an expansionist foreign policy. "In China there are 400 millions of people, more than five times as many as exist in the United States," marveled one business journal. "The wants of those 400 million people are increasing every year. What a market!" Other currents of the time reinforced purely commercial motives for intensified American interest in China. Social Darwinists stressed that China was an ideal stage on which the United States could demonstrate its competitive vigor. "Our geographical position, our wealth, and our energy pre-eminently fit us to enter upon the development of eastern Asia and to reduce it to part of our economic system," wrote the economic theorist Brooks Adams. Widespread fretting about national stagnation following the end of continental expansion also encouraged Americans to view China as a vast new frontier to absorb American energies. "What was once the old Far East," asserted one cotton seller, "is now our new Far West." Missionaries and social reformers, meanwhile, embraced American traders as potentially powerful allies in their efforts to penetrate China and convert its people—"a vast inert mass of humanity," in Secretary of State Walter Gresham's characteristic phrase—to American ways.

The second event that altered American thinking about China was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Tension between China and Japan had mounted for several years amid obvious Japanese designs on Korea, which maintained an ambiguous tributary relationship with the Qing court. A political crisis in Korea sparked war in 1894. Within six months Japan dealt the crumbling Qing dynasty yet another humiliating defeat, destroying the Chinese military on land

and at sea. The lopsided settlement awarded Japan a sphere of influence in Korea and outright possession of Taiwan and the Pescadores, major gains for a rapidly industrializing power that, like the United States, sought new markets and influence abroad. At first many Americans sympathized with Japanese demands, hoping that a badly defeated China would open more treaty ports and seek Western goods and expertise in a desperate attempt at modernization. Before long, however, Americans came to see the Japanese victory in a much different light. By further weakening Chinese authority, the Japanese victory, far from creating new opportunity, set off an intense three-year period of great-power jockeying that threatened to partition China and close off American opportunities once and for all.

With a newly wounded China floundering as never before, the smell of blood was in the water. The sharks—imperial powers hoping to take a bite of Chinese territory—gathered quickly. Russia made the first in a complicated series of moves. The Sino-Japanese War had exposed Japanese designs on Manchuria, where the Russian government also harbored long-standing economic and political ambitions. Playing skillfully on Chinese vulnerabilities, Moscow extracted extensive concessions in a treaty signed in May 1896. In return for a Russian guarantee to aid China against Japanese or other foreign aggression, the Qing rulers granted Russia permission to extend its transcontinental railway through northern Manchuria. Furthermore, China awarded Russia political authority along the rail line, free right of public domain, and a tariff reduction on goods entering China along the railroad. Jealous of Russia's gains, Germany made a far more dramatic move in 1897, seizing the port of Tsingtao (Qingdao) on Kiaochow (Jiaozhou) Bay and demanding exclusive railroad-building and mining rights in Shandong province. China had little choice but to accede, spurring further exactions. Russia moved again, forcing China to concede a leasehold over Port Arthur (Lüshun) and its hinterland on the Liaodong Peninsula in early 1898. In southern China, meanwhile, France extracted a lease for Kwangchow (Guangzhou) Bay on the Leizhou Peninsula.

This feeding frenzy confronted the United States with an ominous situation. With American leaders increasingly convinced of China's importance to the American economy, the country seemed in serious jeopardy of being entirely consumed by the imperial powers. To be sure, few of the concessions granted to Japan, Russia, Germany, or France immediately infringed upon American commercial privileges; for the moment, at least, the most-favored-nation principle remained intact. But the situation was agonizingly unsettled, and heightened competition for privileges raised the prospect that the imperial powers would soon transform relatively porous spheres of influence into exclusive possessions. Intense concession-hunting also raised the specter of a great-power war in the Far East, another scenario that boded nothing but ill for U.S. interests. American merchants worried especially that imperial rivalries were concentrated in northern China and Manchuria, regions that absorbed a high percentage of U.S. exports to China. With key ports under their control, Germany or Russia could easily impose new tariffs and railroad rates that would discriminate against American goods. But it was not the threat to any particular port or railroad that alarmed Americans so much as the apparent challenge to the whole principle of equal opportunity enshrined in the treaty port system. American industrialists, after all, wished to retain access to all of China on a permanent basis. If this principle collapsed, the United States, with no sphere of its own and no capacity for obtaining one, would be in a dire position.

LAYING DOWN THE POLICY

Two sets of voices insisted that the United States abandon its passive approach in China and take the lead to shore up the principle of equal privilege. One set came from Britain. Although not averse to securing special privileges of its own, it remained the principal great-power champion of the Open Door idea. In fact, the British-controlled Shanghai Chamber of Commerce may have been the first to hit upon the phrase in expressing the view that the whole of China should be opened to foreign trade. In any case, the scramble for concessions precipitated a sense of crisis in Britain, whose dominance in the China trade was threatened just as much as the far smaller U.S. stake. A lengthy debate on the situation took place in the House of Commons in January 1898, during the course of which two government speakers invoked the Open Door by name as the desirable alternative to partition. Three months later the British government proposed a joint Anglo-American declaration calling for equal commercial opportunity in China.

The other voices demanding that Washington take bold action to protect American interests came from within the United States. By 1898, as the historian Thomas J. McCormick has documented, a chorus of trade associations, publications, jingoistic politicians, and activist diplomats urged the McKinley administration to set aside old laissez-faire notions and actively defend American interests. "We must make our plans to secure our full share of the great trade which is coming out of the Orient," the National Association of Manufacturers demanded in 1897. Early the following year, the New York Chamber of Commerce sent McKinley a petition urging "proper steps" for the "preservation and protection of . . . important commercial interest in the [Chinese] Empire." The press took a similar view. With Moscow apparently threatening to absorb Manchuria into the Russian customs area, the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* demanded a "strong representation in favor of keeping open the trade on equal terms to all nations." Meanwhile the *New York Tribune* asserted that "commercial interests, which are now great and which promise one day to be enormous," demanded that the U.S. government be "deeply involved in China." Activism was essential, it insisted, contending that "without strenuous insistence by this Government the indisputable treaty rights of the United States are likely to be ignored and violated by the more aggressive European powers."

Washington responded cautiously to this pressure, only gradually accepting the notion that it should play an active role in promoting American economic interests abroad. The possibility clashed with laissez-faire notions of economics and governance, ideas that remained influential with many Americans even in the 1890s. Only the Spanish-American War resolved the issue in favor of the industrialists and others who advocated bold action abroad. Following its crushing victory over Spain in the spring of 1898, the United States became the scene of a vast public debate over whether to annex the Philippines, the former Spanish colony ripe for the taking if the United States was willing to become a colonial power. The debate concerned not only the Philippines themselves, of course, but also the role that the U.S. government would play in the Far East generally, including China. Advocates of annexation argued that possession of the Philippines would greatly facilitate American exploitation of the China market by providing an insular "stepping stone" to the mainland—a coaling station, naval base, cable relay station, and observation post that would enhance America's capacity to keep the door to China open. Although U.S. behavior in the Philippines smacked of naked colonialism, Americans, including McKinley himself, disavowed any such intention in China. The United States, McKinley said, desired "no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all." Still, in accepting the administrative and military burdens of empire in the Philippines, the United States signaled a new era of activism on the Asian mainland.

Hay's Open Door Notes thus formed part of a package of policy decisions taken in 1898 and 1899, the foremost being the Philippines annexation, aimed at promoting American commerce in China. The delay between McKinley's decision and Hay's issuing of the notes owed mainly to the secretary of state's fears that the other powers would reject any U.S. initiative that he did not time carefully. New great-power maneuvering in China during the first months of 1899 kept the notoriously cautious Hay from acting. But imperial rivalries eased in the summer, leading Hay to believe that Britain, Japan, Germany, and probably even Russia would respond favorably to a diplomatic démarche on behalf of the Open Door. Hay ordered his chief adviser on Far Eastern affairs, William W. Rockhill, to prepare a statement of U.S. policy. Rockhill, a champion of the Open Door with a strong sense of the dangers that would flow from China's disintegration, was only too happy to oblige. With Alfred Hippisley, an English friend who had served in the Chinese customs service, Rockhill prepared the six memoranda that Hay sent to the governments of Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, and France beginning on 6 September. With the proclamation of the new U.S. policy, the "scepter of Open Door champion," in McCormick's words, passed from Great Britain to the United States.

The Open Door policy appeared a natural course of action for the United States for a variety of reasons. For one thing, proponents were confident that the United States would be the winner on a level commercial playing field. U.S. exports to China in 1899 amounted to a bare 1.1 percent of all U.S. exports, but in absolute terms the China trade was booming, with the value of U.S. goods shipped to China climbing to $14 million from just $6 million five years earlier. American textiles and oil companies especially profited, and further growth seemed certain as the U.S. economy revived in 1897. "In the field of trade and commerce," Hay proclaimed in 1899, "we shall be

AN EXCERPT FROM THE FIRST OPEN DOOR NOTE

"Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming 'spheres of interest' that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such 'spheres,' the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty's Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence—

"First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China.

"Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' . . . , no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

"Third, that it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any sport in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances."

the keen competitors of the richest and greatest powers, and they need no warning to be assured that in that struggle, we shall bring the sweat to their brows." *Banker's Magazine* predicted that "without wars and without military aggression that nation will secure the widest and best markets which can offer the cheapest and best goods"; only British wares, it continued, could rival those of the United States. Some Americans predicted that their exports would balloon to billions of dollars a year if the U.S. government could keep the door open.

If the Open Door suited supposed American commercial supremacy, it also suited U.S. military weakness and aversion to great-power politics. In Central America and the Caribbean, where the United States towered over any potential rival, the United States eagerly pursued exclusive economic privileges. In the Far East, however, the situation was very different. The Spanish-American War signaled the emergence of the United States as a major world power with the capacity to project force as far away as the western Pacific, but it could hardly rival the capabilities of Japan, Russia, and even the European powers already well-ensconced in China. If great-power relations in China developed into a game of coercion and partition, the United States would inevitably lose. The Open Door policy promised to remove force from the equation and to limit competition to fields where the United States would likely prevail. The policy, with its multilateral aspect and emphasis on universal principles, also carried the advantage of keeping the United States clear of international alliances as an alternative method of protecting American interests. Even as the United States emerged as a major power, the vast majority of Americans opposed foreign entanglements, and the McKinley administration saw no reason to risk its popularity. An alliance with Britain, the most likely candidate based on shared interests, was out of the question because of widespread Anglophobia. The other good possibility, Japan, showed an off-putting inconsistency and opportunism in China. The Open Door policy, by contrast, promised to win the cooperation of the other powers without sacrificing the administration's political standing, reducing American freedom of action, or creating military burdens that Washington was unwilling to assume.

Perhaps most importantly, the Open Door policy suited Americans ideologically by sustaining their traditional aversion to colonialism and their commitment to liberal principles. Although the United States repeatedly violated its own supposed anticolonial commitments in the late nineteenth century and maintained quasi-imperial control over Latin America, a substantial portion

of congressional and public opinion abided by a perception of the United States as a fundamentally anticolonial country. The resistance that the McKinley administration confronted during the debate over Philippine annexation in mid-1898 attested to the strength of anti-imperial opinion. The Open Door offered an ideal solution because it permitted the United States to obtain markets in China while assuming the moral high ground. The notes, in the words of historian Matthew Frye Jacobson, represented "an imperialist economics in the guise of anticolonialism." Both avid expansionists and old-guard devotees of laissez-faire could unite behind the Open Door idea. The policy also appealed because it promised to sustain Chinese unity and give the Chinese access to the most modern goods and ideas that Westerners had to offer. The policy thus meshed well with Americans' self-perception as a force for modernization and enlightenment in backward areas of the world. One of the foremost promoters of the Open Door in the United States, the English author and lecturer Lord Charles Beresford, struck the theme in characteristic terms a few months before Hay's notes. Proclaiming that the Open Door represented a "grand, chivalrous, [and] noble sentiment in regard to what should be done with weaker nations," he asserted that such an approach would not only advance "the interests of trade and commerce, but it will push the interests of humanity and of Christianity."

For all these reasons, the Open Door policy was popular in the United States. In China, however, the policy encountered serious obstacles from the start. The problem was not so much the response of the great powers. Although none of them was particularly pleased with Hay's initiative, they were fearful that partition would lead to war and impressed that Washington demanded nothing more than simple equality of commercial access. One by one they grudgingly went along with Hay's demands—or at least displayed enough ambivalence so that Americans could assume acquiescence. By far the greater problem was mounting resentment among the Chinese people, whose real attitudes contradicted the ethnocentric American fantasy of a docile population that would welcome modernization from the West. The Boxer Rebellion, the most serious antiforeign uprising of the period, broke out in 1898 and grew more serious over the following two years. Armed insurgents slaughtered hundreds of missionaries and thousands of their Chinese converts and destroyed foreign property, including the railways and communication lines integral to Western commerce. In 1900 the Boxers marched on Peking, killing foreign diplomats and missionaries and, for nearly two months, laying siege to the foreign legations. To meet the emergency, the McKinley administration dispatched five thousand U.S. troops from the Philippines to join the international expeditionary force that raised the siege in mid-August.

The fighting threw the Open Door policy into disarray. Not only did the upheaval make a mockery of American insistence that China should be regarded as an integral, sovereign nation, but the intervention of foreign troops also presented the possibility that one or more of the imperial powers would try to exploit the chaotic situation by seizing new parts of China. "Your Open Door is already off its hinges, not six months old," the author Henry Adams complained to Hay as the crisis unfolded. "What kind of door can you rig up?" Hay, once again relying on Rockhill and Hippisley, responded with his second Open Door Note on 3 July. The new circular restated American commitments from the year before and asked the powers to affirm that they supported China's "territorial and administrative integrity." U.S. policy, Hay asserted, "is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China . . . and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." Meanwhile, American diplomats went to work shoring up the authority of local rulers in China's center and south to minimize the temptation for any of the great powers to move in on the pretext of restoring order.

As in the previous year, American policy succeeded superficially. In 1901 all the powers withdrew from Peking and, unwilling to risk shattering the status quo, indicated at least tolerance for the Open Door principle. That result came slowly and reluctantly, however, and various developments along the way suggested trouble for the Open Door policy over the long term. First, Russia threatened to exploit the presence of its troops in China to force the Qing to yield further privileges in Manchuria. Then American support for the Open Door policy tottered as President McKinley toyed with the idea of abandoning the policy altogether. Under fierce election-year criticism for his overseas adventures and frustrated with great-power maneuvering, McKinley considered withdrawing U.S. troops from the international force in China, a move that would have destroyed the con-

cert of powers that Washington had worked hard to maintain. As McKinley recognized, the move also would have freed the United States to participate in the partitioning of China by carving out a sphere of its own, a prospect that gained sudden support among a number of policymakers. From Peking, U.S. minister E. H. Conger made a startling proposal to acquire a lease over Zhili province, including apparently the Chinese capital itself. More modest in its aims, the U.S. Navy called for the establishment of a base on the Chinese coast, preferably Samsah (Sansha) Bay in Fujian province. McKinley and even Hay endorsed that proposal, but China, in an unusual gesture of defiance, rejected it out of hand, quoting from America's own cherished Open Door principles.

Before 1900 was out, the administration had retreated to the Open Door policy. The American flirtation with empire in China ended amid grudging acceptance that exerting influence within the concert of powers—rather than breaking out on its own—remained the best course for the United States. But events left Hay keenly aware of the many problems that beset his policy. There was not, he wrote in late 1900, "a single power we can rely on for our policy of abstention from plunder and the Open Door." Nor, he recognized, did the United States have the military or moral authority to control events in China if any of the powers chose to oppose American preferences. In a remarkably candid assessment of the limits of U.S. influence, Hay asserted:

> The inherent weakness of our position is this: we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing her. Besides, we have no army. The talk of the papers about "our preeminent moral position giving us the authority to dictate to the world" is mere flap-doodle.

American impotence was on display in 1901 as the imperial powers ignored U.S. protests and demanded that China pay a debilitating $300 million indemnity to cover foreign property destroyed in the Boxer uprising. When Japan and the Europeans chose to ignore it, the Open Door policy counted for little.

THREE APPROACHES TO THE OPEN DOOR

The weakness of American policy would be further borne out over the next two decades as three U.S. administrations, each in its own way, struggled to keep the door open. At first, the main challenger to U.S. policy was Russia, which continued to tighten its grip on Manchuria in ways that directly threatened American market access. Although American trade with China remained modest (accounting for less than 1 percent of all U.S. exports in 1904), Manchuria was increasingly critical to American merchants, absorbing about 90 percent of all U.S. exports to China. As the historian Michael H. Hunt has shown, American success resulted partly from Chinese encouragement of American trade as a way to offset Russian domination. The Chinese strategy worked fairly well. The administration of Theodore Roosevelt registered vigorous protests with the Russian government and even threatened to join an emerging military alliance between Japan and Britain if Moscow did not respect American prerogatives. "I wish, in Manchuria, to go to the very limit I think our people will stand," Roosevelt wrote to Hay. In fact, war in China remained an impossibility for the United States, which was even more averse to military commitments there during the Roosevelt administration than it had been earlier. When Japan proposed cooperation against Russia in 1901, the United States indicated no interest whatsoever. As before, domestic political constraints and sheer lack of military capacity in the Far East left the United States with no alternative but to pursue its goals diplomatically. Washington gave its quiet support to the British-Japanese alliance formed in 1902, practicing the time-honored weak nation's strategy of putting other nations' power to work on its behalf.

Japan, by contrast, had enormous interests in Manchuria and military power to match. When Russia refused to permit foreign settlement of newly established treaty ports in Manchuria, Japan declared war in February 1904, smashing the Russian fleet at Tsushima Strait fifteen months later. The overwhelming Japanese victory reverberated around the world, signaling the emergence of a non-Western great power and inspiring a generation of Asian nationalists to challenge Western hegemony. It also dramatically altered the situation in China, catapulting Japan into the role of the most formidable and, from Washington's standpoint, potentially most threatening power. If the European powers necessarily had "divided interests, divided cares, double burdens" as they looked to their affairs in both Europe and the Far East, Roosevelt recognized that Japan could concentrate entirely on China. It had, as

Roosevelt wrote, "but one care, one interest, one burden." From that moment forward, the challenge of maintaining the Open Door would be mainly the challenge of managing Japanese power—a task that ultimately proved impossible.

Initially, though, the United States showed little of the alarm that Hay or Rockhill might have displayed a few years earlier. In the years following the Russo-Japanese War, China—and with it the Open Door policy—lost much of its importance for U.S. policymakers. One reason lay in Roosevelt's basic approach to foreign policy. A realist with a clear sense of the limits of American power, the president opted to appease Japan rather than to risk conflict in a part of the world where he understood Japanese interests and power were vastly superior. U.S.–Japanese tensions already simmered because of violence and discrimination against Japanese immigrants in California, and Roosevelt saw no reason to stir the pot further by insisting upon anything more than minimal toleration of American trade. A bland 1908 agreement, signed by Secretary of State Elihu Root and the Japanese ambassador in Washington, Takahira Kogoro, restated the Open Door principle but contained no new provisions to shore it up. Roosevelt may have believed that conflict with Japan was inevitable, but he was only too happy to postpone the day of reckoning into the indefinite future.

Another reason for declining U.S. interest in actively defending the Open Door was fading American enthusiasm for the China market. Following the burst of American interest in the 1890s, many U.S. businessmen began to lose faith in the vision of vast profits. Chinese nationalists helped dampen American hopes in 1905 by organizing a boycott of U.S. goods to protest Washington's indefinite extension of an 1882 law barring Chinese laborers from entering the United States. Hay, now out of office, blamed the Chinese for failing to exploit the Open Door to their advantage. "We have done the Chinks a great service which they don't seem inclined to recognize," Hay complained in 1903, revealing the scorn beneath supposedly beneficent American policy. If many Chinese lacked the desire for American goods, it also became clear that China lacked the purchasing power and infrastructure to furnish the market about which Americans fantasized. As the U.S. consul general in Hong Kong had written in 1899, "99 percent of China is still closed to the world. When the magazine writer refers in glowing terms to the 400,000,000 inhabitants of China, he forgets that 350,000,000 are a dead letter so far as commerce is concerned." The statistics sustained that judgment: in the first two decades of the twentieth century, U.S. exports to China continued to hover around a meager 1 percent of the value of all U.S. exports.

China hardly faded away, however, as a matter of American concern. Paradoxically, as policymakers and businessmen lost interest during the Roosevelt years, the Open Door policy became increasingly intertwined with—and sustained by—the powerful reform movement that captured the imagination of Americans as the country struggled to cope with the effects of industrialization, immigration, and other massive social transformations of the preceding quarter century. For decades, of course, Americans had assumed a special responsibility for China and viewed their efforts to exploit the China market in an altruistic light: The United States would profit, Americans believed, but so too would the Chinese, who would gain access to Christianity and modernizing ideas as well as American goods. In the Progressive era, American reformers expanded on this connection between material and moral progress and helped preserve, and even extend, American faith in the Open Door policy as the actual material basis of the policy stagnated. As the historian Jerry Israel demonstrates, Progressives were among the most important advocates of preserving the American access to China and maintaining the integrity of the Chinese state. However disappointing China had proved so far, the reformers held boundless confidence in its potential for both moral and material progress, which were indistinguishable in their minds. For the Progressives, Israel argues, China was an extension of the United States, and to admit failure there would have been tantamount to admitting failure of the reformist vision at home.

Mining engineer Herbert Hoover, Red Cross worker Mabel Boardman, education reformer John Dewey, sociologist Edward A. Ross, and many other leading Progressive figures focused their attention on China at one time or another. Ross's 1912 book, *The Changing Chinese: The Conflict of Oriental and Western Culture in China,* was typical of the Progressives' optimism about China's potential for modernization under Western tutelage. The apparent inertness of Chinese society was not, he wrote, the result of a "horror of the new." Rather, it resulted from the stultifying weight of millennia-old traditions that needed to be cracked. Among the reforms Ross advocated

were "dropping ancestor worship, dissolving the clan, educating girls, elevating women, postponing marriage, introducing compulsive education, restricting child labor, and otherwise individualizing the members of the family"—all changes that Americans were ideally suited to help bring about. With similar goals, Yale University established Yale-in-China, an overseas philanthropic program for the education and "uplifting of leading Chinese young men toward civilization." Meanwhile, the Young Men's Christian Association set itself the multiple purposes of providing living quarters for visiting American businessmen, sponsoring lectures on industrial education, working to ameliorate slum conditions, combating prostitution, and spreading the Christian gospel. In a revealing quip, Mark Twain poked fun at these reformers, with their blend of material and moral objectives, as the "blessings of civilization trust."

If the door was wide open in the American imagination, William Howard Taft perceived that it was in fact creaking shut because of continued encroachment by the other powers, especially Japan. As he assumed the presidency in 1909, Taft rejected his predecessor's practice of appeasing Tokyo and advocated a major expansion of American economic activity in the Far East as part of his broader practice of "dollar diplomacy." The new administration, led by its top Far Eastern specialist, Willard Straight, not only hoped to invigorate U.S. exports but also wished to promote American investment in China, an activity that Washington had not previously emphasized. The response from the other powers indicated that the Open Door policy was becoming a fond illusion. When Taft asked the Chinese government to grant part of a major railroad-construction loan to the United States, he discovered that the decision belonged to Britain, France, and Germany, members of the banking consortium that controlled China's finances. The consortium grudgingly admitted the United States, but before long Washington's aspirations ran up against another roadblock when it sought the opportunity to invest in railroad construction in Manchuria. Peking favored the scheme, hoping to use the United States to offset Japanese and Russian influence in the region. But Chinese approval hardly mattered. Faced with great-power hostility, Taft's secretary of state, Philander Knox, resorted to a proposal that came straight from the heart of the Open Door ideal: all railroads in Manchuria, Knox suggested, should be internationalized, thus easing the competition for concessions and permitting all of the powers equal opportunity. In one fell swoop, the scheme aimed to bolster Chinese autonomy, benefit American investors, and deal a blow against imperialism. Russian indebtedness made Knox optimistic of gaining Moscow's consent, but Tokyo predictably would have none of it. The scheme died quickly.

Roosevelt and Taft thus offer a study in contrasts in their conceptions of the Open Door policy. While Roosevelt attached a low priority to the policy and chose not to antagonize Japan by insisting on it too strongly, the Taft administration was determined to prop the door open firmly and went further than even Hay had thought wise in promoting U.S. economic activity in China. Woodrow Wilson offered a third alternative when he ascended to the White House in 1913. By that time, the Chinese Revolution of 1911–1912 had toppled the Qing dynasty, an inspiring development for Americans like Wilson who fancied themselves champions of democracy and progress. Wilson and his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, immediately distanced the United States from both Roosevelt's solicitude for power and Taft's solicitude for bankers, embracing instead a more principled variant of the Open Door based on strict anticolonialism. Far more than either of his predecessors, Wilson had imbibed the moralistic rhetoric about America's mission in China. First, he withdrew the United States from the international lending consortium in China, an enterprise of Taft's that, in the new administration's view, put Washington in league with the imperial powers. China, Wilson believed, should be permitted to obtain financial aid that did not entail dependency on the great powers. Then the administration, in a self-conscious display of support for the principle of self-determination, leaped ahead of the other powers to grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China.

Wilson's gestures of solidarity with America's "sister republic" were no more successful than earlier U.S. efforts to protect the Open Door policy. The new U.S. approach simply had no capacity to resolve the two problems that plagued American policy: the chronic weakness of Chinese central authority and mounting Japanese ambition. The Chinese Revolution failed to install a central government capable of unifying the country or resisting foreign exactions. Instead, political authority soon fell to an assortment of local politicians and warlords who generally accommodated themselves to the demands of the

great powers. Japan was ideally positioned to profit from this situation, all the more so after the outbreak of World War I. With the other powers preoccupied in Europe, the Japanese government saw a golden opportunity to expand its grip on the mainland with minimal risk of opposition. Japan quickly seized German territories in the Far East, including those in the Shandong Peninsula. But the boldest stroke came in January 1915, when Japan presented the enfeebled Chinese government with the infamous Twenty-One Demands. The document demanded that China regularize Japanese gains in Shandong and elsewhere and surrender new concessions in Manchuria. Still more damagingly, it required that China grant no new leaseholds to other powers along the Chinese coast, allow Japan to control most of China's key natural resources, buy at least half its armaments from Japan, allow Japanese police to operate in various key locations, and accept Japanese advisers in administering domestic affairs—arrangements that would have given Japan a virtual protectorate over China.

The Japanese démarche left American officials stunned and uncertain. Initially, amid major distractions in Europe, Washington had little interest in tangling with Japan in a part of the world that was decidedly of secondary importance. After a few weeks, however, the affair caught Wilson's attention. The president brought U.S. policy back in line with his anticolonial instincts, instructing Bryan to be "as active as the circumstances permit in showing ourselves to be the champions of the sovereign rights of China." Faced with opposition from the United States and even its close ally Britain, Japan backed down on the most extreme of its demands. But Tokyo clearly understood that there was little the Western nations could do in the matter and pressed ahead with all terms that centered on economic privileges. Under the threat of force, China yielded with little delay. U.S. policy had clearly suffered a major blow, although the Wilson administration would not admit it at the time. Bryan put the best face on the episode by declaring that the United States would not recognize any agreement that violated Chinese sovereignty or conflicted with the Open Door.

In an effort to give substance to such pledges, the Wilson administration slid back toward Taft's old approach. In 1916, under the guidance of the U.S. minister in Peking, Paul Reinsch, the United States rejoined the banking consortium that Wilson had so brusquely abandoned three years earlier. American investment, the administration concluded, was the only avenue open to Washington for bolstering Chinese unity and checking Japanese influence, which otherwise would go virtually unopposed. Working within the consortium, American thinking went, would enable the United States at least to sit at the table with Japan as equals in discussions of the crucial matter of foreign lending. Wilson also tried direct negotiations with Japan in 1917. Under an agreement signed by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the Japanese ambassador in Washington, the United States acknowledged Japan's "special interests" in China in exchange for a promise to respect the principles of Chinese sovereignty and the Open Door. These steps changed nothing, however, about the basic problem that confronted the United States in China: if Japan chose not to cooperate, there was nothing Washington could do about it. That underlying reality came to the fore in 1919 at the Versailles Conference, where Wilson, armed with his rhetoric of self-determination, proposed to roll back foreign privileges in China and affirm Chinese sovereignty. Japanese control over Shandong province became the symbolic test case for Wilson's ideas. The president demanded the restoration of Chinese sovereignty; Japan refused. When Japanese representatives threatened to leave the peace conference rather than concede the point, Wilson backed down.

THE END OF THE OPEN DOOR

Wilson's capitulation provoked fierce criticism in China, where irate students took to the streets. It also fed Wilson's growing problems at home with Congress, where opposition to the president's cherished League of Nations mounted amid accusations that the administration had sold out its own principles. But Wilson's calculation was plain: it was better to stay on Japan's good side and ensure the country's participation in the League of Nations, which would inevitably take up the China question later on. Things might, then, turn out well in the long run. Wilson's ambitious vision of an international solution in China came to naught, of course, when Congress rejected the league in 1920. Ironically, however, his successor, the notoriously unambitious Warren Harding, followed Wilson's reasoning quite closely, opting to deal with rivalries in China by gathering all of the great powers together to work

out their differences and establish new principles of conduct in the Far East. The result, the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, was an important diplomatic victory for the United States and a major—if temporary—breath of life for the Open Door policy.

Following World War I, Japanese power in the Far East continued to mount. In the 1920s Japan accounted for about 90 percent of all new foreign investment in China, while a quarter of all Japanese exports went there. In many ways, Japan's relationship with the mainland resembled the economic and political stranglehold the United States held over the Caribbean and Central America. The Chinese economy was increasingly locked in to Japanese needs, as both recipient of Japanese investment and manufactured goods and as supplier of food and raw materials. The dramatic growth of Japan's naval power also alarmed American observers by raising the specter of a Japanese challenge to Anglo-American control of Pacific commerce. By 1921 warship construction consumed fully one-third of Japan's budget. Fearing a naval arms race, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes invited the foreign ministers of eight maritime nations to Washington to reduce tensions in the Far East. The Japanese government, content to pursue its aims peacefully, entered into all three of the resulting treaties. A four-power nonaggression pact committed Japan, the United States, Britain, and France to consult in the case of future controversies. Meanwhile, a five-power agreement, which included Italy, checked the naval arms race by fixing limits on the size of each navy. By far the most important treaty for the future of the Open Door policy was the Nine-Power Treaty that called for noninterference in China's internal affairs and respect for the Open Door principle. In words that John Hay himself might have written, the agreement bound signatories "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

The treaty was the most promising assertion of the Open Door policy since Hay's notes. In contrast to the halting and piecemeal promises of the various powers over the previous two decades to uphold the principle of equal economic opportunity, the Washington agreements solemnly bound all of the principal powers (except the excluded Soviet Union) and even reflected input from a full-fledged Chinese delegation. Moreover, the agreements had the strength of acknowledging, rather than resisting as so often in the past, Japan's emergence as the dominant power in the Far East. As a strategy for maintaining the Open Door, the international approach outshined Roosevelt's appeasement, Taft's dollar diplomacy, or Wilson's early dedication to principle. To be sure, underlying problems remained. For one thing, the agreements contained no enforcement mechanism. Nor did they challenge the existing Japanese position in China. In fact, Elihu Root assured Japan early in the negotiations that the United States would not challenge Tokyo's special privileges. All the Chinese government obtained from the powers was permission to raise its import tariff by 5 percent and a promise to study ways of ending extraterritoriality. Most importantly, the agreements held little promise for slowing Japan's economic penetration of China and preserving a truly fair field for American goods. So strong had Japan's economic grip over China become that it no longer had much reason to fear American competition. To a considerable degree, Japan had achieved the dominant commercial position in China that Americans believed would naturally fall to them if the door were kept open.

Those underlying problems remained submerged, however, during the hopeful years that followed the Washington Conference. In Tokyo, a relatively democratic and progressive Japanese government abided by the conciliatory stance adopted at the meeting. Although overpopulation, resource shortages, and old dreams of empire on the mainland continued to drive Japanese policy, the government displayed little appetite for bold moves that would arouse the other powers. Meanwhile, U.S.–Japanese relations warmed dramatically amid a burst of American enthusiasm for Japan's economic efficiency and administrative reliability, which stood in sharp contrast to ongoing chaos in China. World War I had witnessed a vast expansion of U.S.–Japanese commerce, and during the 1920s the United States confirmed its position as Japan's most important trading partner.

If improved relations with Japan gave Americans reason to think the Open Door policy was safe from its most likely opponent, the shifting situation in China gave them hope that their ultimate dream—a unified China freed from foreign constraints and providing stable access for American goods—might be coming true. After years of political turmoil, the nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek began to make headway in the mid-1920s toward unifying the country under a viable central government. Among the

nationalists' foremost objectives was the abolition of the "unequal treaties" that enshrined foreign privileges on Chinese soil. At first, U.S. officials resisted Chinese pressure to end the privileges it had obtained. Indeed, when Sun overstepped treaty provisions in 1923 by claiming surplus customs receipts, U.S. warships joined an international fleet to deter him. But Americans were hardly unified behind that approach, and an increasing number were horrified by practices that suggested colonial designs against a vigorous young republic. While some diplomats prized U.S. treaty privileges and backed gunboat diplomacy to maintain them, most Americans returned to the old vision of a wholly sovereign and administratively competent China as the key to realizing the bounty of the China market. The latter group gained the upper hand in 1928 after Chiang successfully concluded his Northern Expedition, a moment Americans chose to interpret as signaling the arrival of a united China under Kuomintang rule. On 25 July, the United States unilaterally granted tariff autonomy to China in exchange for a new guarantee of most-favored-nation status.

The American move ended one of the most humiliating aspects of the foreign presence in China and marked a moment of triumph for those Americans who had never lost faith that the United States would be China's savior. But it also provoked a powerful Japanese response against which the United States was powerless. It is one of the instructive ironies of the Open Door policy that its final downfall followed so closely on the heels of its apparent heyday. Even at its high point, the policy was more illusion than reality, riddled with so many flaws that it could be demolished once Japan decided to act. Japanese policy began to turn in the late 1920s, when Chiang challenged Japanese privileges in Manchuria. That Chiang did so with the clear support of the United States meant that American economic interests would inevitably gain at Japanese expense. As Tokyo feared, Japanese exports dropped by one-half between 1929 and 1931. The threat to Japan's prestige and its hard-won privileges on the mainland was more than the Japanese military and hard-line nationalists could abide. On 18 September 1931, mid-ranking Japanese army officers acted boldly to reverse this trend, blowing up a section of railway in Manchuria and then blaming Chinese nationalists for the act. The episode, known as the Mukden Incident, became the pretext for Japan to occupy the entire region. Less than a year later, Japan's Kwantung army succeeded in detaching Manchuria from the rest of China and creating the puppet state of Manchukuo.

The timid U.S. response pointed up the weaknesses that had riddled the Open Door policy since its inception. The Hoover administration answered not with economic sanctions but with an ineffective declaration of "nonrecognition" of Japanese aggression. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson informed the Japanese government that the United States would not recognize any "treaty or agreement" brought about by force or coercion. The U.S. response partly reflected the administration's domestic preoccupations and the unwillingness of the American public to take on foreign commitments as the Great Depression worsened. But other deterrents to bold American action had existed long before the global economic crisis. First of all, the United States, just as in 1898, lacked the ability to back up any diplomatic démarche with force. The U.S. Navy was the world's second largest by 1930, but it still could not hope to challenge Japan in Far Eastern waters. Also discouraging any bold American reply was the longstanding problem, recognized by Theodore Roosevelt two decades before, that China just did not matter very much. Despite all of the hype about the China market and America's special role, China still played a relatively insignificant role in the U.S. economy. Through the 1920s and 1930s, China accounted for only about 2 percent of total U.S. exports each year. In the same period, by contrast, Japan absorbed between 8 and 10 percent of U.S. exports. There was thus little incentive to challenge Japan on behalf of China.

When exactly the demise of the Open Door policy should be dated is open to debate. Certainly, 1931 qualifies as a leading contender. In that year, after all, the partition of China, the development that the Open Door policy had been designed to avoid, came about with breathtaking decisiveness. Moreover, Japan's 1932 attack on Shanghai signaled that Tokyo's ambitions extended far beyond Manchuria. Another possible end point is 1937, the beginning of a full-fledged Sino-Japanese war that quickly resulted in Japanese control over virtually all of the ports, railroads, and other industrial facilities throughout China. A third contender is 1950, when Mao Zedong, having completed the communist conquest of China, slammed the door shut against the United States. Only then, perhaps, did Americans finally give up on the idea that the United

States could reopen the door after Japan's defeat. Indeed, during the mid-1940s U.S. leaders had clearly entertained notions of reestablishing a major American presence, only to see their hopes crushed by a movement that, more than any other, reflected a century of Chinese resentment over foreign intervention. The communists' special wrath for the United States illuminates more clearly than anything else the delusion of exceptionalism that had underpinned American policy for half a century.

THE POLICY AND THE INTERPRETATION

Measured in one way, the Open Door policy might be evaluated as a success. Considering what a weak hand the United States actually held in China between the 1890s and the 1930s, it arguably played the game well, constantly manipulating its rivals into paying at least lip service to American policy and helping to prevent an all-out scramble for China. Even if Americans failed to achieve the market of which they dreamed, 1 or 2 percent of U.S. exports still represented an enormous amount of trade. Measured against the aspirations of its most ardent supporters, however, the Open Door policy rates as a failure. While American businessmen and social reformers elaborated a vision of China as a protégé nation offering boundless opportunity for profit and good deeds, the reality was something else entirely. From the very moment when the Open Door was conceived and identified as a distinctive American policy, powerful forces went to work against it: the treaty port colonialism of the European powers, the rise of a robust Japan eager for control of the mainland, and mounting resistance within China itself.

If these forces destroyed American policy in China, they hardly demolished the idea of the Open Door. On the contrary, the architects of the Open Door policy, whatever their achievements—or lack thereof—in China, helped to establish an attitude toward the non-Western world that would persist powerfully in the Cold War era and beyond. The problem that confronted John Hay in 1899 had called for a decision of epoch-making importance. By what means would the nation extend its reach overseas? The emerging industrial economy seemed to demand bold steps to acquire new markets abroad, but ideological and political traditions made Americans, outside of a brief fascination with territorial acquisition at the time of the Spanish-American War, averse to formal colonialism. The principal contribution of Hay, Rockhill, Knox, Straight, Reinsch, Hughes, and the other guardians of the door was to resolve the dilemma through a formula that enabled the United States to pursue an aggressively expansionist economic policy, while avoiding the taint of political domination and the burdens of territorial administration. It was a clever solution that, whatever its immediate failures in China, established the pattern for many decades of American foreign policy.

William Appleman Williams and his followers recognized the pattern and elaborated an "open door interpretation" of U.S. foreign policy that remains strongly influential more than forty years after Williams published the foundational text *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. In the writings of these scholars, the open door metaphor not only survived its eclipse in the 1930s Far East, it emerged as one of the most enduring interpretive concepts in the study of U.S. foreign relations. The interpretation remains powerful mainly because it provides a persuasive answer to one of the questions at the heart of the study of American foreign relations: How is it that the United States could be the world's most vociferous opponent of colonialism yet also a remarkably interventionist nation that would, in the second half of the twentieth century, control one of the largest empires, albeit of a new and different sort, that the world had ever known? Williams, Walter LaFeber, Thomas McCormick, and others suggest that the promotion of free trade enabled American capitalists to have it both ways. Under the banner of high-minded principles that supposedly enhanced the interests of all nations, they could justify all sorts of political, economic, and military action to prop up a system that in practice enabled the United States to reap more than its proportionate share of the profits.

The open door interpretation remains influential for two additional reasons. First, it provides a neat, totalizing explanation for more than a century of American history stretching back into the period of continental expansion. For advocates of the open door interpretation, the quest for overseas economic opportunity was simply an extension of the westward push that extended the U.S. market to the Pacific Ocean. With the closure of the frontier in the 1890s, the interpretation suggests, U.S. businesses turned their attention to overseas markets and justified the expansion of American influence through the same ideology of open markets and individual opportunity that

had prevailed at home. Constant penetration of new markets was, in this view, essential to the health of an American capitalist system that depended on an ever-expanding economy to preserve social harmony in a nation characterized by vast inequities of wealth. According to the open door interpretation, American expansion in the 1890s, Wilson's appeals for an open global economy, and American determination to prevent the Sovietization of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s all stemmed from the same impulse to find and preserve markets for American industry and preserve domestic tranquility.

Second, the open door interpretation remains influential because it helps explain one of the most salient characteristics of twentieth-century international affairs, the tense relationship between the United States and much of the nonindustrial world. Americans, Williams and other argue, have persistently viewed their liberal principles as conducive to the development of the Third World. In practice, however, free trade has tended to concentrate wealth in industrial nations and to deprive poor countries on the periphery of control over their own economic circumstances. Increasingly, Third World peoples found themselves locked into subordinate roles as suppliers of raw materials and consumers of good manufactured elsewhere. "To many through the world," wrote Williams, "the Open Door Policy appeared to confront them with a door closed to their own progress." When nations attempted to break out of this unfavorable relationship and claim control over their own economies, the open door interpretation suggests, they confronted counterrevolutionary U.S. intervention aimed at restoring them to the integrated international economy dominated by Washington. During the Cold War, the pattern repeated itself in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Vietnam, Chile, Nicaragua, and many other places where the United States resisted the emergence of nationalist or leftist governments that threatened American economic privileges. The open door interpretation offers a power explanation for the trail of repression and blood left by American activity across the Third World.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Buckley, Thomas H. *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1970.

Cohen, Warren I. *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations.* 4th ed. New York, 2000. Outstanding survey that sets the Open Door period in a broad context.

Fairbank, John King. *The United States and China.* 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

Goldstein, Jonathan, Jerry Israel, and Hilary Conroy, eds. *America Views China: American Images of China Then and Now.* Bethlehem, Pa., 1991.

Hunt, Michael H. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* New Haven, Conn., 1973. One of the first scholars to use Chinese sources, Hunt stresses China's attempts to manipulate the Open Door policy to its advantage.

———. *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914.* New York, 1983.

Iriye, Akira. *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911.* Cambridge, Mass., 1972. The best work comparing U.S. and Japanese ideas about expansionism in China.

———. *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931.* Chicago, 1990. Useful survey of the Open Door's final years.

———. *The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945.* Cambridge, 1993.

Israel, Jerry. *Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905–1921.* Pittsburgh, 1971. Links domestic reformism with American ambitions in China.

Jacobson, Matthew Frye. *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917.* New York, 2000. Outstanding work that sets the Open Door within the broad flow of U.S. foreign policy and hostility to foreign workers.

Jesperson, T. Christopher. *American Images of China, 1931–1949.* Stanford, 1996.

LaFeber, Walter. *The American Search for Opportunity, 1815–1913.* Cambridge, 1993. With his *The New Empire,* elaborates the Open Door interpretation.

———. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898.* New ed. Ithaca, N.Y., 1998.

May, Ernest R., and John Fairbank, eds. *America's China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance.* Cambridge, Mass., 1986. Refines McCormick's account in important ways.

McCormick, Thomas J. *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901.* Chicago, 1967. Remains an authoritative account of the Open Door policy's origins.

McKee, Delber L. *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era.* Detroit, Mich., 1977. Analyses one of the most striking paradoxes of American behavior toward China.

Minger, Ralph Eldin. *William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900–1908.* Urbana, Ill., 1975.

Ninkovich, Frank. *The United States and Imperialism.* Malden, Mass., 2001. An excellent survey that sets the Open Door in a broad context.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945.* New York, 1982. Brilliant analysis of the Open Door, especially valuable for contrasting U.S. policies in the Far East and Latin America.

Ross, Edward A. *The Changing Chinese: The Conflict of Oriental and Western Culture in China.* New York, 1911.

Scully, Eileen. "Taking the Low Road in Sino-American Relations: 'Open Door' Expansionists and the Two China Markets." *Journal of American History* 82 (June 1995): 62–83.

Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search for Modern China.* New York, 1990.

Thomson, James C., Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry. *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia.* New York, 1981.

Varg, Paul A. *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897–1912.* East Lansing, Mich., 1968.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* New ed. New York, 1988. The classic formulation of the Open Door interpretation.

Young, Marilyn B. *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901.* Cambridge, Mass., 1968. Influential revisionist work that highlights the activities of U.S. business groups in promoting the Open Door.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; THE CHINA LOBBY; CONSORTIA; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; EXTRATERRITORIALITY; IMPERIALISM; MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE; OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION.

Organized Labor

Elizabeth McKillen

An oft-quoted blue collar worker, questioned about international issues by pollsters in the 1940s, quipped: "Foreign Affairs! That's for people who don't have to work for a living." Given the complexity of the world order that emerged in the aftermath of World War II and the long hours that most working people labored, such sentiments are easy to understand. Yet since the mid-nineteenth century, when national labor unions emerged in the United States, many workers, grassroots labor activists, and trade union leaders have believed that political relations among nation states, transnational economic developments, and international labor migrations should be of vital concern to the American working class. U.S. labor groups and trade unions have sometimes sought to exercise international influence through international labor organizations or by encouraging transnational forms of collective action among workers. At other times, they have focused primarily on influencing U.S. foreign policy and economic expansion. In an effort to wield power in Washington, D.C., labor groups have typically engaged either in traditional forms of interest group lobbying or have participated in evolving corporatist power-sharing arrangements among business, trade union, and government leaders within the executive branch of government. Dominant trade union groups such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations that pursued international influence both by participating in international labor organizations and by trying to forge a corporatist partnership with business and state representatives in promoting U.S. foreign policy goals often discovered that these two avenues to power led in different directions.

THE EARLY LABOR MOVEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZING

The first systematic efforts to encourage international cooperation between trade unions most likely occurred in Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. Labor leaders there sought to develop alliances with trade unions from other countries for reasons that would be familiar to workers today. In part, suggests Lewis Lorwin in his pioneering work *The International Labor Movement* (1953), they sought to prevent the importation of strikebreakers from other countries. They also feared competition from foreign sweatshop labor and believed it was in their best interest to try to raise workers' wages throughout Europe. Some anticipated the increasing concentration of international capital and sought to develop alliances with foreign workers in the same industry so as to prevent international financiers and capitalists from playing workers in one country against those in another. Finally, some unions initiated contacts with unions from other countries for the practical reason that they needed financial assistance for their organizing or strike activities.

Most of these early efforts at international labor cooperation were suppressed by European governments or came to naught. It was only in 1864 that European workers successfully formed the International Working Men's Association, later known as the First International. Among the most influential members of the organization was Karl Marx, who wrote the preamble and rules, as well as an inaugural address that included the now famous appeal "Workmen of all countries, unite!" The organization grew slowly at first, and national delegates expressed a wide variety of viewpoints about questions of capitalism and collective ownership. As the organization expanded, however, it became increasingly dominated by Marxists. Eventually, an internal struggle developed between Marx and the Russian revolutionary and writer Michael Bakunin. After Bakunin was expelled, the First International's headquarters were transferred to New York City, where it declined rapidly and was finally dissolved at a meeting of the General Council in Philadelphia in 1876.

How American workers responded to these early European efforts at international labor coop-

eration is not entirely clear. The First International boasted some twenty-seven American sections representing several hundred U.S. workers, mostly immigrants. The short-lived National Labor Union, under the leadership of William Sylvis, also announced its attention to affiliate with the First International and to adhere to its principles. But no record has been unearthed of an official relationship between the First International and the more predominant Knights of Labor, which was created in 1869 and reached a peak membership of some 750,000 workers in the mid-1880s. Indeed, some Knights of Labor activists and leaders adopted a hostile attitude toward socialists like those who dominated the First International. Thus, historians have often treated the Knights as a uniquely American organization that developed in relative isolation from the European labor movement. They emphasize the importance of an ideology of labor republicanism within the Knights of Labor that drew on American political traditions rather than on European socialist and Marxist doctrines emphasizing international labor solidarity.

But the Knights may not have been as isolated from European political currents and internationalist activities as previously assumed. Leon Fink and Kim Voss note parallels between the Knights of Labor's condemnations of wage labor and emphasis on worker cooperatives, and the socialist critiques and programs promoted by European labor activists. They suggest that the Knights' emphasis on inclusive membership and broad-based, working-class solidarity across nationality lines was similar to that of other industrial labor organizations developing in Britain and France at the time. Eric Foner notes the importance of immigrants within local chapters of the Knights of Labor and illuminates their role in promoting an ethos of international labor solidarity upon which future generations could draw.

Particularly important, suggests Foner, was the influence of Irish-Americans within the Knights of Labor, for they brought with them an interest in the land question in Ireland. When Knights of Labor chapters faced opposition from hostile clergy and local governments in areas such as the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania, Knights of Labor activists often met covertly under the guise of local Irish Land League chapters. A creative cross-breeding of Irish nationalist and American labor reform ideas resulted and frequently led workers to conceptualize their local trade union struggles as part of a worldwide struggle between the owning and producing classes. Terence Powderly, Knights of Labor "Grand Master Workman," embodied the interconnections between class and ethnicity in shaping the international orientation of some Knights of Labor activists. Born in Carbondale, Pennsylvania, of Irish immigrant parents, Powderly became active in both Irish and labor activities as a young man. During his tenure as grand master of the Knights of Labor, Powderly also served as vice president of the Irish Land League Council. Inevitably, the two causes became intertwined as Powderly used Knights conventions to publicize the linkages between the Irish land struggle and the class struggle in the United States. Although Knights of Labor activists advanced few actual international programs and developed few substantial ties with foreign labor movements, they thus sowed fertile ground for future immigrant labor activists who would develop an international labor vision that clashed fundamentally with that of the American Federation of Labor.

EARLY INTERNATIONAL POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

Founded in 1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was comprised predominantly of craft unions—many of whom had fled the Knights of Labor—that emphasized improving economic conditions for workers rather than eliminating or fundamentally transforming industrial capitalism. Although the national organization claimed to represent all workers, many constituent unions were quite exclusionary in practice, primarily made up of skilled, white male workers. Despite its narrow focus and membership base, the fledgling AFL was not opposed to international labor cooperation. When an international conference of labor leaders convened in Paris in 1889 to create the Second International, AFL President Samuel Gompers solicited its support for the AFL's campaigns on behalf of an eight-hour day. The congress responded favorably and organized May Day labor demonstrations in conjunction with the AFL's eight-hour-day rallies in the United States. The demonstrations marked the beginning of the international trade union tradition of May Day labor celebrations and rallies.

But in the decade following the Paris Congress, the AFL remained largely aloof from the Second International. In part, the AFL failed to

develop a relationship with the Second International for pragmatic reasons. Still in its infancy, the AFL could not always afford to send delegates to European conferences. The organization was also preoccupied during its early years with strike activity. Perhaps most importantly, both American and European socialists became increasingly critical of the AFL's conservative orientation. When Gompers tried to arrange an international labor conference at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, only the British Trades Union Congress responded favorably. Gompers subsequently canceled the conference and, while encouraging the exchange of fraternal delegates between the British Trades Union Congress and the AFL, largely eschewed contacts with European socialist and labor leaders.

AFL interest in European labor affairs revived only after 1904, when many individual unions within the AFL began to affiliate with international trade secretariats. These organizations were comprised of national trade unions from the same industry that came together to promote their international interests. For example, miners from France, Germany, and Austria created the International Miners' Federation in 1890. Constituent AFL unions became interested in these secretariats when they realized they could provide valuable information about international conditions in their industries and coordinate activities that would prevent businessmen from importing strikebreakers from other countries. Among the AFL unions that joined secretariats between 1904 and 1908 were the miners, molders, painters, shoemakers, lithographers, bakers, and brewers.

As more AFL unions joined their secretariats, Gompers in turn became more interested in joining the International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers, which had been formed in 1903 at the behest of leaders of the international secretariats who sought an international trade union organization that would be independent of the Second International. Gompers attended one of its conferences in 1908, and the AFL convention subsequently voted to affiliate with the organization. The AFL was an active member of the International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers between 1910 and 1913 and successfully promoted an initiative to have the organization's name changed to the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). After failing in their efforts to use international labor organizations to prevent war in 1914, Gompers and other AFL leaders confidently waited for an end to the conflict, assuming that the AFL would play a predominant role in international labor organizations following the armistice.

The AFL's influence in postwar labor organizations, however, would ultimately be undermined by the corporatist role it had tried to carve for itself in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the previous two decades. The first U.S. foreign policy issue in which the AFL took a systematic interest was the McKinley administration's policies toward the Cuban rebellion against Spain in the 1890s. Like many groups in the United States, the AFL lobbied Congress to recognize Cuban belligerency. A majority of representatives from the constituent unions of the AFL apparently believed it was their responsibility to promote liberty for fellow workingmen. In the minority within the AFL, suggests Delber McKee, were those who warned that labor should avoid committing itself on the question because it might be encouraging a U.S. war with Spain. War, they argued, always disproportionately hurt the workingman, because they were the ones who fought and died. Fewer still were labor leaders like Andrew Furuseth of the Seamen's Union, who questioned whether business and government leaders supporting the Cubans might have imperialist motives of their own. As Furuseth explained, the question over whether to support Cuban belligerency was one of "whether the New York speculator or the Spanish capitalist should skin the Cuban workingman."

AFL President Gompers, for his part, supported proposals to recognize Cuban belligerency but opposed McKinley's decision to declare war against Spain. Yet the AFL did nothing to oppose U.S. mobilization for war. Instead, Gompers focused on opposing annexation of Spanish territories at war's end. Gompers highlighted his reasons for opposing empire in an article entitled "To Free Cuba, Not to Chineize [sic] America Was the War Begun." In part, as McKee has demonstrated, Gompers shared the racial assumptions of many white trade unionists of his day and feared that annexing territories would enable "semibarbaric laborers" to immigrate to the United States and undermine American labor standards. As a former cigar maker, Gompers also sought to prevent goods like cigars produced by sweatshop labor in Cuba and the Philippines from competing with American products in the U.S. market. Finally, the AFL president also hoped to preempt possible American business flight to these low-wage areas by stopping U.S. annexation.

But after the Senate approved a peace treaty with Spain that resulted in the formal annexation of the Philippines, Gompers came to what McKee calls a "tacit compromise" with the State Department. The AFL president toned down his opposition to U.S. imperial policies and even endorsed temporary ward status for the Philippines and Puerto Rico in return for government and business acquiescence in an AFL campaign to build labor unions in these areas. In rationalizing his policies, Gompers argued, "We realized that in order to protect our standards within the states we must help the Island workers to develop their own higher political, social and industrial problems [sic]."

Gompers and the AFL thus began to move away from a policy of opposing government and business imperialism and toward a corporatist partnership between business, labor, and the state in promoting American economic expansion. Gompers and other AFL leaders reasoned that if they could raise labor standards in the new island protectorates, then U.S. imperial control over them might actually benefit U.S. workers. Goods produced there would not undersell those made by U.S. workers for domestic markets and American businessmen would not be tempted to establish low-wage factories on the islands. On the other hand, wealthier island workers might welcome consumer goods from the United States, thereby promoting American economic growth in ways that benefited U.S. business and U.S. workers alike. The islands might also prove to be important strategic outposts for securing access to other markets or raw materials deemed vital to the health of U.S. industry. Lost in such reasoning, of course, were the aspirations of indigenous working-class populations in the islands for economic, political, and cultural independence.

Meanwhile, a more amicable alliance had evolved among labor, business, and state leaders to resolve domestic economic problems during the early twentieth century. In 1900 the National Civic Federation was formed to encourage a "community of interest" among the three groups that would reduce industrial strife and promote the development of a healthy capitalist economic system in the United States. Upon assuming office, President Woodrow Wilson built on the initiatives of the National Civic Federation by creating the Department of Labor and the Commission on Industrial Relations to oversee industrial arbitration and to make recommendations for promoting harmony and efficiency in industry. But this cooperative agenda—to encourage industrial peace at home and American expansion and hegemony abroad—would fully blossom only during World War I.

WORLD WAR I

For the first several months of the war, the American Federation of Labor—like most of the American public—remained adamantly opposed to U.S. intervention in the conflict. But in 1916, Gompers began to actively support the Wilson administration's preparedness campaigns. Gompers, like Wilson, was alarmed by Germany's use of submarine warfare and believed the United States might need to enter the war to stop German aggression. Equally significant, Gompers had watched with fascination the evolving wartime partnership between British labor and the government during the early months of the war. He anticipated that by supporting Wilson's preparedness policies he might gain a voice for the AFL in executive branch defense councils comparable to that which British labor had won for itself. Gompers's reasoning proved correct: in 1917 he was appointed to the Council of National Defense, an organization created to prepare the country for possible involvement in the war. Gompers subsequently formed a labor subcommittee within the council that brought together representatives from business, labor, and the government to study questions of industrial coordination and to draw up guidelines on wages, hours, and mediation in war-related industries.

When a U.S. declaration of war against Germany seemed likely in March 1917, Gompers called a special labor assembly of the leaders of the AFL's constituent unions and secured its support for an AFL pledge to support any future U.S. war effort. The assembly was widely criticized by local AFL activists, socialists, and some members of the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World, who charged that the labor assembly was not democratically constituted. They demanded that the AFL have a referendum vote of its entire membership to determine if workers actually favored a U.S. declaration of war against Germany. But Gompers ignored such militant proposals and instead used the AFL's patriotic pledge of support for the government as a bargaining chip to gain more representation for AFL leaders within emerging wartime agencies and councils created to mobilize the country for war. He antic-

ipated that the defense agencies, far from being temporary, would lay the basis for a new bureaucratic order in Washington after the war in which the AFL would play a prominent role.

Gompers also sought to use his new leverage within the Wilson adminstration to expand the AFL's diplomatic influence. He obtained AFL representation on the Root Commission, a council of emissaries whose purpose was to travel to Russia to encourage it to stay in the war. He also secured the Wilson administration's support for two AFL labor commissions to go to Europe to win support among discontented European labor movements for Wilsonian war aims and to thwart European trade union efforts to plan an interbelligerent labor conference designed to negotiate an early end to the war. The AFL labor missions, as Elizabeth McKillen has shown, were greeted with hostility by European labor leaders who complained that its members behaved "as if their mission was to convince the misguided foreigners how wrong it is to differ with Americans." Labor and socialist leaders, moreover, continued to promote an interbelligerent labor conference despite the AFL's opposition. Although their plans would ultimately be stymied by their own governments, the issue provoked a profound split between the AFL and European labor movements.

That chasm widened during the Paris Peace Conference. Both European labor groups and the AFL at first supported a plan for an international labor congress to be held at the same time and place as the conference. But when France's premier, Georges Clemenceau, refused to allow labor leaders from the defeated countries on French soil, European labor leaders changed the location of their meeting to Bern, Switzerland. Gompers and other AFL leaders boycotted the Bern meeting and instead traveled to Paris to be in close contact with the leaders of the Paris Peace Conference. In return for his loyalty, Wilson appointed Gompers to head the International Labor Legislation Commission, which in turn created the International Labor Organization, a labor adjunct to the League of Nations. The organization clearly bore the imprint of Gompers's corporatist thinking about labor's role in international affairs. Far from being purely an organization of trade union representatives, the International Labor Organization was designed to consist of national delegations comprised of representatives from business, labor, and government. The organization was empowered to create international labor legislation governing such issues as hours, working conditions, and the protection of women and child workers, which individual states could either accept or reject.

Not surprisingly, the Bern labor conference reacted with hostility to the creation of the International Labor Organization and drafted their own international labor charter. However, in an ironic twist of fate, European labor activists became dominant in the International Labor Organization after the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles, thereby preventing U.S. membership in the League of Nations or its adjuncts. Meanwhile, the AFL distanced itself from the newly reconstituted International Federation of Trade Unions, which committed itself to international collective labor action after the war. The AFL also bitterly opposed the activities of the Red International of Trade Unions, created by Russian communists and their allies to promote world revolution. By the early 1920s, Gompers's vision of the AFL as a partner with business and government in promoting U.S. foreign policy had thus produced a seemingly irreconcilable split between American and European labor.

The AFL's diplomatic programs also spurred profound divisions within the ranks of labor at home. The greatest opposition to the AFL's postwar international agenda came not from the Socialist Party or the Industrial Workers of the World, both of which had been greatly weakened by wartime persecution and were ridden with factionalism at war's end, but from militant AFL-affiliated city labor councils and local unions with strong ties to immigrant communities. Leading the rebellion was the Irish immigrant John Fitzpatrick, president of the powerful Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL) and the Labor Bureau of the American Commission on Irish Independence. Following in the tradition of Terence Powderly of the Knights of Labor, Fitzpatrick drew on the intellectual heritages of both the American labor movement and Irish nationalist movement in trying to understand the global condition of workers. In contrast to Gompers, Fitzpatrick bitterly opposed all forms of imperialism, arguing that imperial control by industrially developed countries of underdeveloped hinterlands buoyed the power of the capitalist class at the expense of workers. Fitzpatrick and his colleagues also believed that war was the inevitable by-product of the capitalist quest for markets and natural resources. They energetically opposed U.S. intervention in World War I until 1917, when the AFL's declaration of labor loyalty made continued

WORKING-CLASS SUBCULTURES AND LABOR INTERNATIONALISM

In 1917, when AFL President Samuel Gompers staged a meeting to secure approval of a labor declaration of loyalty to the government during wartime, he purposely excluded representatives from local labor councils, correctly suggesting to advisers that many were centers of pacifism. City labor councils often became hotbeds of antiwar and anti-imperialist sentiment during World War I because they were more organically connected to local working-class subcultures than to the AFL leadership. Chicago boasted one of the most oppositional labor subcultures of the World War I era. It was one of those rare places, suggests James Barrett, "where it was easier to be a union member than to be nonunion" in the early twentieth century. Disillusionment with President Woodrow Wilson's war policies in the city's teeming immigrant working-class neighborhoods inspired a labor party that raised critical questions about the AFL's unwavering support for Wilsonian foreign policy. Similar labor parties erupted in some forty-five other cities in the immediate postwar period and eventually culminated in the Farmer-Labor Party of 1920, a party with a strongly anti-Wilsonian agenda. Local, regional, or ethnic working-class subcultures could thus sometimes inspire alternative visions of labor internationalism that impeded AFL attempts to win working-class support for its international policies.

Other forms of oppositional working-class subcultures sometimes developed within particular industries or vocations. For example, maritime workers, by virtue of their travel, often came in contact with other cultures and ideas that instinctively bred a sense of internationalism. Yet the conditions of a seaman's life, suggests Bruce Nelson, were also characterized by "raw exploitation" and "a legendary rootlessness and transiency that led to a persistent isolation from the main integrative institutions of American society." Such a subculture lent itself to militant and sometimes violent displays of international labor solidarity. Seamen and other maritime workers were particularly aggressive in opposing fascism during the 1930s. One typical incident occurred when crew members from American and Danish merchant ships joined together to pull a swastika from a German ship trying to enter Olympia Harbor in Washington State in July 1933. Such seamen were aware well in advance of most Americans that Nazism posed a danger to the rights of democratic trade unions. In another instance, in 1935, seven thousand longshoremen, machinists, and scalers in San Francisco struck to protest a German ship entering San Francisco Harbor with swastika flying. Maritime workers also mobilized to protest Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and refused to load cargo bound for Italian soldiers participating in the campaign. The militancy of the maritime workers proved difficult for either the AFL or CIO to contain.

Oppositional labor subcultures also proved critical in stimulating an independent labor internationalism during the Vietnam War. Despite the AFL-CIO's unwavering support for the nation's war effort, a host of local labor groups such as the Cleveland Federation of Labor—with strong community support—opposed U.S. government policy in Vietnam. Such examples suggest the need for historians to examine the dynamic interaction between labor leadership and oppositional subcultures within the labor movement when exploring questions of labor internationalism.

agitation strategically unwise. The CFL, however, remained critical of the AFL's wartime partnership with the Wilson administration, believing it hindered labor's advancement both at home and abroad, and launched the Farmer-Labor Party movement following the armistice.

Although an electoral failure, the Farmer-Labor movement, as McKillen has shown, served as a haven for AFL dissidents from city labor councils and trade union locals across the country that opposed Gompers's and Wilson's international programs. Along with the powerful Chicago Federation of Labor, particularly important in shaping the movement were the Seattle Central Labor Council, New York Labor Union, delegates from locals of the United Mine Workers and the railway brotherhoods, and representatives from a host of small-town labor councils that had created local labor parties in the aftermath of war. In contrast to Gompers and the AFL executive council, party advocates bitterly attacked the Versailles peace treaty, arguing that its terms were dictated by the leading imperialist powers on behalf of international capital. Labor Party leaders opposed the

League of Nations on the grounds that it would "not be satisfied with a league of imperialist governments dominated by an international league of money bosses to cement an international control of industry by a small group of men who manipulate the bulk of the world's wealth." Rather than seeking token representation for labor in the league-sponsored International Labor Organization, Labor Party advocates sought representation for workers in international tribunals "in proportion to their numbers in the armies, navies, and workshops of the world." Representatives from the Farmer-Labor Party also expressed sympathy with the Irish, Mexican, and Russian revolutions and promoted an anti-imperialist agenda for the United States in Latin America and Asia.

Since many of the activists within the Farmer-Labor Party also belonged to immigrant nationalist groups, their ideas received wide circulation and swelled the tide of opposition to the peace treaty and to the Wilson administration. That Gompers viewed such a rebellion within the ranks as a threat to his efforts to promote both a corporatist international role for labor and a Wilsonian blueprint for a new world order was evidenced by the energy he devoted to suppressing the movement. Yet it was not Gompers who succeeded in destroying the movement but communist activists within the Chicago Federation of Labor such as William Z. Foster, who outmaneuvered Fitzpatrick and won control of the executive council of the Farmer-Labor Party. Subsequently, Fitzpatrick and most other local AFL activists disavowed the party and officially renewed their commitment to the AFL's supposedly nonpartisan politics. With the Farmer-Labor Party died a unique vision of U.S. labor's international role that emphasized the responsibility of U.S. workers—as heirs to traditions of American labor republicanism and a diverse array of immigrant labor ideologies—to lead in the battle against international capitalism and international organizations that reified imperial forms of control by industrial-creditor nations over their less economically developed counterparts.

THE INTERWAR YEARS

With internal critics silenced, Gompers and his successor, William Green, were free to devote the AFL's international energies in the 1920s to developing a leadership role for U.S. labor in the Western Hemisphere—a renewed interest that in part was inspired by the AFL's alienation from European labor diplomacy. Unable to shape either the International Federation of Trade Unions or International Labor Organization in ways it deemed constructive, the AFL instead chose to concentrate after 1920 on exercising influence over its immediate neighbors. Economic issues also played a role: AFL leaders recognized that American business was expanding rapidly throughout the hemisphere and that immigrants from Canada and Latin America were swelling the U.S. workforce. Since many AFL unions had already established strong footholds in Canada by World War I, AFL leaders primarily focused on encouraging better relations with Latin American labor movements. Their avenue to influence was the Pan American Federation of Labor, created in 1918 with secret financial aid from the Wilson administration. The Pan American Federation sought to raise labor standards in Latin America, curb abuses of labor by international capitalists, and promote the growth of unions in the Americas. Gompers and the AFL also wanted to use the organization to resolve immigration problems between Mexico and the United States and to give legitimacy to corporatist-oriented labor organizations such as the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana at the expense of the Industrial Workers of the World and other anarchist, communist, or socialist labor movements and organizations, which were winning converts in Latin America and within the Mexican-American community in the U.S. Southwest.

Although the Pan American Federation and the AFL sometimes condemned U.S. military interventionism within Latin America, AFL delegates often asserted that the U.S. presence in Latin America was primarily a beneficial one. Significant within the Pan American Federation conventions, as Sinclair Snow has shown, were debates over the Monroe Doctrine, with delegates from the AFL defending the doctrine as one that protected Latin American countries from greedy European powers, and many Latin American trade unionists condemning it as an instrument of U.S. imperialism. The AFL's frequent support for U.S. foreign policy and predominant role in the Pan American Federation fostered much criticism among radical Latin American trade unionists, who came to view it as a tool of U.S. imperialism. The organization declined rapidly as more left-leaning labor organizations gained influence in Mexico and Latin America in the mid- and late 1920s.

Largely isolated from their European and Latin American counterparts, the AFL at first promoted a nationalist response to the Great Depression. The organization resisted Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to expand trade through reciprocal agreements with other countries and instead suggested that the best way to end the depression was by implementing a thirty-hour work week. Mandated shorter hours, argued AFL leaders, would force employers to hire unemployed workers and lead to increased spending. To further stimulate the economy, many AFL unions recommended increased tariff protection for some industries and even promoted William Randolph Hearst's "Buy American" campaigns. Yet the AFL's isolationist impulse proved temporary. German and Japanese aggression in the 1930s, as well as challenges from the newly created Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), forced the AFL to take a renewed interest in international affairs. In 1933 the AFL instituted a boycott of German goods and supported Roosevelt's ban on strategic materials to Italy. Although AFL leaders continued to support the neutrality laws and to oppose U.S. military involvement overseas throughout the 1930s, it reaffiliated with the International Federation of Trade Unions in 1937. In part, the AFL sought to support antifascist forces in Europe. But equally important it hoped to prevent the organization from admitting either the CIO or labor delegates from the Soviet Union.

The symbolic origins of the CIO lay in United Mine Workers President John L. Lewis's historic right-cross punch to the chin of William Hutcheson of the Carpenters Union during an AFL convention in 1935. The fistfight occurred following a heated debate in which Lewis attacked the AFL for failing to take advantage of the depression and Roosevelt's labor policies to organize the unorganized. Following the 1935 convention, Lewis met with other disaffected leaders to create the Committee for Industrial Organization, which would spawn the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Although the AFL had many semi-industrial unions by the 1930s, leaders of the new CIO objected to the slow rate at which the AFL organized unskilled workers and to the continued dominance of craft unions within the organization. Capitalizing on rank-and-file labor militance in industries like rubber, automobiles, and steel, the CIO organized mass industrial unions that incorporated most grades of workers within particular industries. The CIO became famous for its militant tactics, scored decisive victories for workers in numerous industries, and vied with the AFL for leadership of the American labor movement.

Less well known than the domestic quarrels between the AFL and CIO were their conflicts over foreign policy. In contrast to the AFL's heavy-handed "Monroe Doctrine" for labor, CIO leaders preached nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latin American unions. When pursuing negotiations over labor issues, moreover, the CIO chose to bargain with leftist and often communist-led organizations like the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina rather than with AFL-inspired organizations such as the Inter-American Labor Union. Such activities won the CIO much goodwill among Latin American trade unionists, as did its decision to endorse Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas's decision to expropriate British and American oil fields in 1938. By contrast, AFL leaders argued that Cardenas's nationalization programs were a violation of the right to private property. The CIO also parted ways with the AFL in its willingness to envision the Soviet trade union movement as a part of future international labor organizations.

The top leaders of the CIO hierarchy, such as Sidney Hillman, Philip Murray, James Carey, and Walter Reuther, were all noncommunists who had battled communists during their ascent to power. Yet all were willing to work with communists at home when it supported their purposes and to negotiate with communist labor leaders abroad because they believed their support to be critical to the defeat of fascism and to future international labor cooperation. Such sentiments were comparable to those of the European leaders of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who had battled the Red International Labor Union in the 1920s but who saw the need for a popular front against fascism in the 1930s. By contrast, the AFL remained vehemently anticommunist throughout the 1930s and strongly opposed Soviet participation in the International Federation of Trade Unions. AFL leaders argued that only "free" trade unions, unattached to government parties or institutions, should be allowed to join international labor organizations. Soviet supporters countered that Western labor movements—including the AFL—were not entirely free of state interference either. A full debate on the issue of Soviet participation in the International Federation of Trade Unions was postponed in 1939 because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But the success of the Grand Alliance during World War

II again led western European and CIO union leaders to speculate about the value of a postwar labor organization that would include the communist world.

WORLD WAR II AND THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS

Replicating a pattern that developed during World War I, many European labor movements as well as the AFL and CIO worked closely with their respective governments to promote efficient wartime economic planning and aid their countries' war efforts. The British Trades Union Congress also sought to promote the war effort (and to preempt British communists) by forming the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, designed to encourage cooperation and solidarity between unionists in the two countries. The British Trades Union Congress subsequently invited the Americans to join the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, but these efforts failed because of the unwillingness of the AFL to work with either the Soviets or the CIO. In early 1945, however, the British trade union leaders hosted a labor conference designed to create a new international labor organization that would include the Soviets. The AFL refused to attend, but the CIO eagerly sent delegates, and in October 1945 the new World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was created.

This new federation embodied the hopes of a generation of trade union leaders for a substantive role for labor in international affairs. Most did not foresee for it a revolutionary role comparable to that sometimes espoused by the International Federation of Trade Unions. Rather, suggests Victor Silverman in *Imagining Internationalism* (2000), the leaders of the World Federation were labor bureaucrats who "envisioned a corporative world—one ruled by global institutions that would represent all elements of society." Yet the corporatist vision of these leaders differed in important ways from that of Samuel Gompers during World War I. Gompers had envisioned the International Labor Organization comprised of national delegations representing equal numbers of business, labor, and government officials. By contrast, World Federation leaders believed it was vital that labor have its own organization that could speak independently for world labor and represent the world's working classes within the United Nations.

The drive for a powerful labor international that included all significant elements of world labor was apparently given momentum by an increased spirit of internationalism that pervaded working-class life in the major democracies after 1941. Silverman suggests that in Britain the war fostered a greatly increased awareness and concern for foreign relations among workers and argues that a "vague sympathy for the Soviet 'experiment' grew into tremendous enthusiasm for cooperation in reordering the world." Because the working-class population in the United States was more diverse than that of Britain, it failed to develop a comparable consensus on internationalism or on cooperation with the Soviets. Nonetheless, many American workers had come to feel vaguely sympathetic toward a new labor internationalism by war's end. As one union carpenter cited in Silverman explained, "We can't stay on our side of the pond anymore. It's one world now and we got to go in and do our share. The Union's taught me that. Workers everywhere want it fair for all." In contrast to their British counterparts, however, many American workers—especially first- or second-generation immigrants from Eastern Europe—were distrustful of the Soviets. Yet perhaps because of their long experience with red-baiting in the unions, workers were initially slower to embrace the Cold War than wealthier Americans. The lack of a Cold War consensus about America's postwar role within the working class in turn bought time for CIO leaders to experiment with a reordering of international labor politics within the World Federation.

In addition to supporting the federation's major efforts to gain a role for itself within the United Nations and to encourage cooperation between communist and noncommunist trade unions, the CIO took the lead in developing the federation's colonial department. In contrast to many European trade union leaders, the CIO promoted independent trade unions in colonial areas and supported their efforts to gain representation in the federation. Even French communists within the organization, for example, battled CIO representatives over the question of representation for African labor, insisting that the French trade union delegates to the federation already represented workers from French possessions in Africa. Of course, CIO leaders could sometimes be naive about their own country's imperial record, as when James Carey insisted that U.S. rule in the Philippines had been entirely benevolent and designed to give democracy to the Filipinos. CIO leaders, moreover, embraced a Rooseveltian faith in the virtues of free trade that

sometimes blinded them to the dangers of economic imperialism. Nonetheless, Silverman suggests that the CIO's defense of colonial rights within the federation earned it popularity in much of the underdeveloped world and offered hope that the new organization might serve the interests of Third World labor.

But several factors ultimately undermined the federation. The AFL's Free Trade Union Committee collaborated with the State Department to weaken the organization by sowing discord between communist and noncommunist unions in Europe. As Peter Weiler has shown, the AFL also successfully worked to prevent international trade secretariats from affiliating with it. Without the trade secretariats, the task of coordinating labor activities within individual industries proved impossible. Meanwhile, both the CIO and AFL became increasingly vulnerable at home following passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which required that all union leaders sign affidavits pledging that they were not Communist Party members. The predominantly noncommunist CIO leadership at first resisted but soon chose to purge communists and communist-led unions from their ranks. Their support for purges was likely motivated both by a desire to consolidate their own leadership positions within their unions and to safeguard their unions from government persecution. Desperate to appear loyal in the face of the anticommunist hysteria sweeping the nation, the CIO also embraced the Marshall Plan and, along with other Western unions, asked the World Federation to endorse it. As Weiler wrote, the "introduction of the Marshall Plan into the WFTU brought the Cold War directly into the international trade union movement." Predictably, the Soviets opposed an endorsement of the Marshall Plan and instead advocated neutrality on the issue. Leading Western union movements with the exception of the French Confédération Générale du Travail and Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro then withdrew from the federation in 1949 and, in concert with the AFL, created the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

COLD WAR IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT

One of the primary goals of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was to support people trying to free themselves from totalitarianism. Silverman has revealed that CIO leaders, in joining the new international, expressed hope that the organization would support neither "Stalin" nor "Standard Oil" but a "broad democratic middle where people may fight to have both bread and freedom." The CIO placed faith, in particular, in the capacity of the organization to assist in implementing the Marshall Plan in ways that would benefit European workers. True to their New Deal roots, many CIO leaders anticipated that the Keynesian spending fostered by the Marshall Plan would stimulate European economies. The ICFTU, meanwhile, would encourage labor-management cooperation in increasing productivity and presumably both European workers and business owners would benefit.

Workers in many European countries, however, failed to profit from the Marshall Plan to the extent that AFL and CIO leaders envisioned. The activities of the AFL, and to some degree the CIO, in undermining communist-led unions and in encouraging splits within them, helped to weaken the labor movements in many countries and prevented them from claiming an increased share of their nation's wealth in the postwar era. For example, Ronald Filippelli and Federico Romero have demonstrated that in Italy the AFL worked in collaboration with the U.S. State Department to encourage discord between communists and noncommunists within the Confederacion Generale Italiana del Lavoro, or Italian General Confederation of Labor. Subsequently, both the AFL and CIO supported the formation of rival free trade union organizations in Italy that were devoid of communist influence. While some divisiveness within Italian labor circles would likely have occurred regardless of American meddling, the AFL and CIO nonetheless played some role in making the Italian labor movement one of the most faction-ridden and weakest in Europe by the 1950s. Thus, while Italy experienced the *miracalo italiano,* or the Italian economic miracle, in the aftermath of Marshall Plan spending, Italian workers remained among the lowest paid in the developed world. As European workers became increasingly dissatisfied with the fruits of the Marshall Plan, European trade union leaders within the ICFTU challenged many American initiatives and a greater balance emerged between the Europeans and Americans in the organization. (In 1969, the by-then merged AFL-CIO withdrew from the ICFTU because it believed that Europeans within the organization had become soft on

communism. The AFL-CIO rejoined the ICFTU only in 1984).

The AFL and CIO's early Cold War foreign policy activities also produced mixed results in occupied Japan and in Latin America. As Howard Schonberger has demonstrated, American labor officials played an important role in the U.S. occupation of Japan because U.S. policymakers hoped to build a strong AFL-styled union movement there to check the power of traditional business and political elites whom they believed responsible for Japanese aggression during World War II. A powerful Japanese trade union movement, moreover, would force Japanese Zaibatsu corporations to share some of their profits with workers and lead them to redirect some trade exports toward their domestic markets and away from other markets where they might compete with U.S. goods. In 1945 occupation officials sponsored a trade union law that established the legal framework for Japanese workers to organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike. The Japanese labor movement subsequently grew exponentially and by 1949 represented more than half of all Japanese workers.

Charged with directing the growth of the Japanese labor movement in ways the U.S. government deemed constructive was the Labor Division of the occupation bureaucracy. The Labor Division always contained AFL representatives, and in 1947, James Killen, vice president of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers within the AFL, was appointed chief of the division. Occupation leaders sought Killen's help because they feared the Japanese labor movement was drifting to the left and were concerned about the militant tactics adopted by Japanese unions. Killen sought to counter the influence of communists by establishing anticommunist cells called *mindo* within Japanese unions. Yet Killen was also critical of the occupation bureaucracy for not stemming the tide of inflation, which undermined any gains workers achieved, and for its decision to remove government workers from the trade union movement. Eventually, convinced that occupation leaders were more concerned with weakening the Japanese labor movement than with eliminating communist influence, Killen resigned, as did several members of his staff.

Nonetheless, AFL and CIO leaders cooperated with occupation officials in 1949 and 1950 in encouraging the development of an anticommunist labor federation in Japan called Sohyo, which they hoped would affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. But much to the chagrin of AFL and CIO leaders, Sohyo did not affiliate with the ICFTU en bloc but instead allowed individual unions to choose whether or not to affiliate. Thus, by 1954 only one-third of Japanese union members belonged to organizations that affiliated with the ICFTU. Even more problematic, Sohyo became one of the leading critics of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Sohyo leaders, for example, persistently criticized the peace and security treaties proposed by the Americans for terminating the Japanese occupation because they did not include Russia and the People's Republic of China and because they did not remove U.S. military bases from Japan. Sohyo leaders also opposed the Korean War. By the spring of 1953, the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee had concluded that Sohyo was a puppet of the Kremlin.

Although its independent positions on foreign policy issues and increasingly militant tactics won it the admiration of many Japanese workers, Sohyo nonetheless failed to develop into a sufficiently strong and unified organization to act as a formidable counterweight to the power of Japan's large Zaibatsu corporations. Enterprise unions, or unions within one company, continued to flourish, helping to cement the loyalty of permanent workers to their companies. Meanwhile, many temporary workers remained without union representation altogether. The fragmented nature of Japan's labor movement undermined Japanese workers' efforts to gain a larger portion of business profits, thereby undermining domestic consumption and propelling the Japanese economy along an export-driven path. Thus, American labor's goals for postwar Japan were largely frustrated.

The AFL and CIO, meanwhile, also became very active in Latin America during the early Cold War. The interest of AFL and CIO leaders in Latin America stemmed not just from their anticommunist animus but from their belief that Latin America was a vital source of raw materials for the United States and an important market for U.S. industrial products. Thus, despite their early differences on Latin American policy, both AFL and CIO leaders supported a plan proposed by Secretary of State William Clayton in 1945 that called on Latin American nations to lower tariff barriers on U.S. goods in return for greater U.S. investment in extractive and agricultural industries. Ronald Radosh has demonstrated that many Latin American labor leaders, by contrast, opposed the

plan, which they argued would result in "uncontrolled foreign capital investment in Latin America [which] will cause the deterioration of programs which look to the industrialization of the countries of Latin America, aggravating their great dependence on one crop culture and exports." AFL and CIO leaders believed that communist labor leaders posed a particular threat to American economic expansion and in 1951 developed a Latin-American affiliate of the ICFTU known as the Inter-American Regional Workers' Organization (ORIT). This organization was designed to promote anticommunism within the labor force of Latin America and to undermine support for the communist-led Confederation of Latin American Unions.

The AFL and ORIT became particularly involved in Honduras and Guatemala during the early 1950s. The U.S.-based company United Fruit played a dominant role in the economies of both countries. When impoverished Honduran workers struck United Fruit in 1954, demanding a 50 percent wage increase, the AFL and ORIT intervened. According to a Senate study cited by Al Weinrub, they soon "gained the leadership of the strike." AFL President George Meany encouraged mediation by the State Department and the company quickly chose to settle. Honduran labor activists complained: "After the strike, the AFL-CIO, the U.S. Embassy and ORIT" descended upon them "like a plague," gaining them special favors with employers in return for embracing AFL principles of collective bargaining. Meanwhile, left-leaning Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected president of Guatemala in 1950 and began a process of land reform that involved expropriating hundreds of thousands of acres of unused United Fruit Company land. Arbenz also enacted a generous labor code that gave trade unions unprecedented rights. Yet AFL President Meany protested the Guatemalan leader's toleration of communists in the labor movement and the AFL and ORIT tried to establish a rival free trade union confederation in Guatemala. Arbenz's government, however, arrested or deported many of the leaders of the new organization.

Following a private conference between Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles and Meany, the AFL president announced that U.S. labor supported a plan to come to a showdown with communists in Guatemala. In June 1954 an invasion force that included members of the free trade union confederation created by the AFL and ORIT crossed the border from Honduras and toppled the Arbenz government. As subsequent scholars would reveal, the coup was financed and carried out under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. The AFL immediately hailed the coup as a victory for democracy. By contrast, some CIO leaders initially opposed the coup, suggesting that communist penetration in Latin America had been greatly exaggerated and that State Department policy was really driven by its desire to give aid to the United Fruit Company. After Carlos Castillo Armas took power in Guatemala, AFL, CIO, and ORIT members traveled to Guatemala to reorganize the labor movement along anticommunist lines. Yet his government proved quite hostile to labor and thousands of unions were dissolved by the military regime. Union membership plummeted and Guatemalan workers remained impoverished. The Armas government, however, satisfied the U.S. government and corporate interests by returning expropriated United Fruit land. Activities like these helped to discredit ORIT. As the U.S. Senate conceded, "To many Latin Americans . . . ORIT is an instrument of the U.S. State Department."

The AFL and CIO merged in 1955, and during the 1960s, to overcome its increasingly bankrupt image in Latin America and other underdeveloped regions, the AFL-CIO created three new labor centers: the American Institute for Free Labor Development (Latin America), the African-American Labor Center, and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute. The organizations' goals were to provide education and training for trade unionists from underdeveloped countries. Yet some charged that paternalistic assumptions permeated the centers' educational programs. As Nathan Godfried writes, American labor leaders active in the centers tended to assume a stage theory of trade union development comparable to the stages of economic development posited by Western economic theorists for developing countries. Trade union movements in the Third World were allegedly in a "primitive" stage of development and thus were preoccupied with unrealistic political and radical agendas. By contrast, mature unions from the developed world focused on plausible economic goals that could be obtained through peaceful collective bargaining. Thus, Everett Kassalow, director of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department, argued that American labor-education efforts would enable unions in the Third World to skip "long years of struggle which molded Western union leadership and membership." But critics from Africa, Asia, and

Latin America countered that U.S. models were often unsuitable for conditions existing in other areas of the world.

More troubling than criticisms of the content of the centers' educational programs were charges that the institutes worked with the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government operatives to undermine democratically elected but left-leaning governments in Third World areas. The American Institute for Free Labor Development, in particular, was implicated in U.S. efforts to undermine the governments of Joao Goulart in Brazil in 1964 and of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. In both cases, the institute channeled money to conservative union groups that staged disruptive protests and strikes designed to paralyze their governments. Both Goulart and Allende were eventually overthrown in military coups supported by the United States. Former CIA agents such as Philip Agee subsequently disclosed that the institute was riddled with CIA operatives during these years and was a conduit for the agency. In contrast to the early Cold War period, the institute's activities provoked dissension within the U.S. labor movement as critics like Victor Reuther of the United Auto Workers concluded that it represented "an exercise in trade union colonialism." By the 1980s many grassroots labor councils had also emerged to oppose U.S. policy in Central America and to criticize the AFL-CIO's collaboration in these policies. The African-American Labor Center and Asian-American Labor Center operated in greater obscurity, but they too faced increasing criticism for allegedly collaborating with the CIA and other government agencies to promote U.S. Cold War objectives.

The Vietnam War also provoked opposition to the AFL-CIO's international agenda during the 1960s and 1970s. George Meany, president of the organization during these years of turmoil, unstintingly supported the policies of the Lyndon Johnson administration, as did the regular yearly conventions of the AFL-CIO. The executive council, in defending the AFL-CIO's hawkish position on the war, argued that to undermine support for U.S. military forces in Vietnam would be aiding the "communist enemy." Newscasts left an indelible imprint on the American memory by featuring demonstrations of "hard hat unionists" supporting the war and sometimes attacking antiwar demonstrators. Yet opposition to the war within the labor movement began to build from at least 1967, when a National Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace met in Chicago. Chapters of the assembly spread to at least fifteen cities. Following the bombing of Cambodia, United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther condemned the widening of the war, as did a host of other labor unions and local and regional labor bodies. The dissenters ultimately failed to alter the prowar policies of the AFL-CIO, but they set the stage for revival of debate within the labor movement over the proper direction of the AFL's international policies in an increasingly global economy.

LABOR AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Confronted with economic stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s, many labor activists began to question not only the morality of the AFL-CIO's Cold War policies but also whether they protected the economic interests of American workers. Undergirding the AFL-CIO's international agenda during the early Cold War lay the assumptions that a freer international marketplace would enable American capitalism to flourish and that some of the profits would trickle down to U.S. workers. Yet as industrial products from other countries—such as Japanese cars—flooded U.S. markets, many American workers faced layoffs and concessions and began to question whether a freer marketplace was really in their best interest. Thus, activists from the United Auto Workers launched a "Buy American" campaign and staged demonstrations at which they bashed Japanese cars with sledgehammers to demonstrate their point. UAW leaders sought to discourage the racism that surfaced in these campaigns but nonetheless jumped on the bandwagon of economic nationalism by promoting domestic content legislation. Such legislation took into account the global assembly line, recognizing that even cars bearing an American logo were often partly or wholly produced abroad, while some foreign companies had plants in the United States. The solution, believed UAW leaders, was to legislatively mandate that most cars sold in the United States have a 25 percent U.S. domestic content. Faced with widespread discontent among constituent unions, even the national leadership of the AFL-CIO began—in seeming contradiction to its earlier Cold War advocacy of a freer marketplace—to promote protectionist legislation.

Other labor activists, however, eschewed economic nationalism and believed that globalization instead called for a new kind of labor interna-

tionalism. The reform initiatives of these activists were given momentum by the fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

With no Cold War to give legitimacy to their policies, Lane Kirkland and his advisers within the AFL-CIO increasingly found it difficult to defend the organization's international strategies. The AFL-CIO hierarchy temporarily joined hands with reformers in 1992 and opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement. But as union membership continued to plummet and U.S. workers continued to feel themselves at the mercy of globalization, reformers gained ascendency within the AFL-CIO and in 1995 elected as president John Sweeney of the Service Employees International Union.

Sweeney revamped the AFL-CIO's foreign policy apparatus, shutting down many of its existing overseas operations—including the CIA-linked American Institute for Free Labor Development. In its place the new American Center for International Labor Solidarity was created. The AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department was placed under the direction of the reformer Barbara Shailor of the International Association of Machinists, an experienced transnational strategist in labor solidarity. Many credited the AFL-CIO's new foreign policy team with helping to defeat the Clinton administration's efforts to gain congressional ratification for special presidential authority to "fast-track" North American trade agreements in 1997.

Also propelling the U.S. labor movement along a new international track in the 1980s and 1990s were individual AFL-CIO unions that initiated negotiations and forged ties with Canadian and Latin American unions representing workers in comparable industries. The case of the United Mine Workers of America is one of the most striking. When the Exxon Corporation closed a coal mine in West Virginia in 1983 and instead invested in one in El Cerrejon, Colombia, the United Mine Workers eschewed economic nationalism and chose to help the Colombian miners union, SINTERCOR, in its fight for better wages for Colombia miners. Perhaps most notably, the United Mine Workers filed a protest in the early 1990s under the Generalized System of Preferences, a U.S. tariff system, which charged Exxon with violating internationally recognized workers' rights. It also joined the International Metalworkers Federation in publicizing the plight of Colombian miners throughout the world. Significantly, SINTERCOR won substantial wage increases for Colombian miners in 1992 and 1993 without resorting to a strike. The United Mine Workers president, Richard Trumka, defended his union's activities on behalf of Colombian miners by arguing that if the American labor movement did not help strengthen unions and improve working conditions in low-wage countries, then "the multinational corporations will attempt to lower our standards to the lowest international common denominator."

Trumka's arguments suggested that the American labor movement had come full circle in its approach to international affairs. During its earliest years, the AFL-CIO had tried to foster international labor cooperation in an effort to gain some influence for workers over global economic and political developments. Yet for most of the twentieth century, the AFL, and later the AFL-CIO, seemed to place greater priority on promoting national economic expansion and U.S. foreign policy goals than on fostering international labor solidarity through international labor organizations. The dangers of the AFL-CIO's nationalist approach became particularly apparent during the Cold War, when AFL leaders engineered the destruction of the World Federation of Trade Unions and often joined government officials, U.S. businesspersons, and CIA operatives in undermining left-leaning and communist labor movements and governments abroad. Such activities often had the long-term effect of weakening foreign labor movements and helping create low-wage economies that invited capital flight and encouraged a loss of U.S. jobs. As the twenty-first century dawned, however, many labor activists seemed reawakened to the need to continue the task of building a strong international labor movement that European workers had begun early in the nineteenth century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrews, Gregg. *Shoulder to Shoulder? The American Federation of Labor, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1924.* Berkeley, Calif., 1991. The best account of U.S.–Mexican labor relations in the early twentieth century.

Babcock, Robert H. *Gompers in Canada: A Study in American Continentalism Before the First World War.* Toronto and Buffalo, N.Y., 1974.

Barrett, James R. *Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers, 1894–1922.* Urbana, Ill., 1987.

Berger, Henry W. "Union Diplomacy: American Labor's Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1932–1955." Ph.D. diss. University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., 1966.

Brundage, David. "Denver's New Departure: Irish Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Gilded Age." *Southwest Economy and Society* 5 (winter 1981): 10–23.

———. "Knights of Labor." In Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, eds. *Encyclopedia of the American Left*. 2d ed. New York, 1998.

Buhle, Paul. *From the Knights of Labor to the New World Order: Essays on Labor and Culture*. New York, 1997.

Busch, Gary K. *The Political Role of International Trades Unions*. New York and London, 1983.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History*. Boston, 1992.

Eisenberg, Carolyn. "Working-Class Politics and the Cold War: American Intervention in the German Labor Movement, 1945–1949." *Diplomatic History* 7 (fall 1983): 283–306.

Filippelli, Ronald L. *American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943–1953: A Study of Cold War Politics*. Stanford, Calif., 1989.

Fink, Leon. *Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics*. Urbana, Ill., 1983.

Frank, Dana. *Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism*. Boston, 1999. A fascinating study of impulses toward economic nationalism within American society from the Revolution to the present.

Foner, Eric. "Class, Ethnicity, and Radicalism in the Gilded Age: The Land League and Irish-America." *Marxist Perspectives* 1 (summer 1978): 6–55. A pathbreaking article on the linkages between ethnicity, class, and international attitudes.

Foner, Philip S. *U.S. Labor and the Vietnam War*. New York, 1989.

Godfried, Nathan. "Spreading American Corporatism: Trade Union Education for Third World Labour." *Review of African Political Economy* 39 (September 1987): 51–63. An insightful article exploring the activities of the African-American Labor Center.

Gompers, Samuel. *Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography*. New York, 1925.

Gordon, Jerry. *Cleveland Labor and the Vietnam War*. Cleveland, Ohio, 1990.

Grubbs, Frank L., Jr. *The Struggle for Labor Loyalty: Gompers, the A.F. of L., and the Pacifists, 1917–1920*. Durham, N.C., 1968.

Larson, Simeon. *Labor and Foreign Policy: Gompers, the AFL, and the First World War, 1914–1918*. London and Rutherford, N.J., 1975.

Levenstein, Harvey. *Labor Organizations in the United States and Mexico: A History of Their Relations*. Westport, Conn., 1971.

Lichtenstein, Nelson. *Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War II*. New York, 1982.

Lorwin, Lewis Levitski. *The International Labor Movement: History, Politics, Outlook*. New York, 1953. One of the few books that covers U.S. labor groups and their involvement in early international labor activities.

McKee, Delber Lee. "The American Federation of Labor and American Foreign Policy, 1886–1912." Ph.D. diss. Stanford University. Stanford, Calif., 1952.

McKillen, Elizabeth. *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1995.

———. "Ethnicity, Class, and Wilsonian Internationalism Reconsidered: The Mexican-American and Irish-American Immigrant Left and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1914–1922." *Diplomatic History* 25 (fall 2001): 553–587.

McShane, Denis. *International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York, 1992.

Moody, Kim. *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. London and New York, 1997.

Nelson, Bruce. *Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s*. Urbana, Ill., 1988. Examines the international orientation of maritime workers in addition to domestic issues.

Radosh, Ronald. *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*. New York, 1969.

Roberts, John W. *Putting Foreign Policy to Work: The Role of Organized Labor in American Foreign Relations, 1932–1941*. New York, 1995.

Romero, Frederico. *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951*. 2d ed. Translated by Harvey Fergusson. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992.

Schonberger, Howard B. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952*. Kent, Ohio, 1989. Includes an excellent chapter on U.S. labor's participation in the occupation of Japan.

Silverman, Victor. *Imagining Internationalism in American and British Labor, 1939–1949*. Urbana, Ill., 2000. A fresh approach to the history of labor internationalism in the post-

war era that includes much fascinating material on working-class attitudes toward international issues in Britain and the United States.

Sims, Beth. *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy.* Boston, 1992.

Snow, Sinclair. *The Pan-American Federation of Labor.* Durham, N.C., 1964.

Voss, Kim. *The Making of American Exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1993.

Weiler, Peter. "The United States, International Labor, and the Cold War: The Breakup of the World Federation of Trade Unions." *Diplomatic History* 5 (winter 1981): 1–22.

Weinrub, Al, and William Bollinger. *The AFL-CIO in Central America.* Oakland, Calif., 1987.

See also ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; INTERNATIONALISM; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS; RACE AND ETHNICITY; TARIFF POLICY; WILSONIANISM.

Outer Space

Roger Launius

For years the issue of international competition and cooperation in space has dominated much space exploration policy. Indeed, it is impossible to write the history of spaceflight without discussing these themes in detail. The early U.S. space exploration program was dominated by international rivalry and world prestige, and international relations have remained a powerful shaper of the program since. From the time of the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), all of its human spaceflight projects—the Apollo program, the space shuttle, and the space station—have been guided in significant part by foreign relations considerations.

In the 1950s and 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in the "Moon race," an intensely competitive Cold War struggle in which each sought to outdo the other. No cost seemed too high; no opportunity to best the rival seemed too slight. U.S. astronauts planted the American flag on the surface of the Moon when the great moment came in 1969. The irony of planting that flag, coupled with the statement that "we came in peace for all mankind," was not lost on the leaders of the Soviet Union, who realized that they were not considered a part of "all mankind" in this context.

THE FREEDOM OF SPACE DOCTRINE

From before the beginning of the space age, U.S. leaders sought to ensure the rights of free passage of spacecraft anywhere in the world. In a critical document, "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack," issued on 14 February 1955, a group of academics, industrialists, and the military, working at the request of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, raised the question of the international law of territorial waters and airspace, in which individual nations controlled those territories as if they were their own soil. That international custom allowed nations to board and confiscate vessels within territorial waters near their coastlines and to force down aircraft flying in their territorial airspace. But outer space was a territory not yet defined, and the United States called for it to be recognized as free territory not subject to the normal confines of territorial limits.

"Freedom of space" was extremely significant to those concerned with orbiting satellites, because the imposition of territorial prerogatives outside the atmosphere could legally restrict any nation from orbiting satellites without the permission of those nations that might be overflown. U.S. leaders thought that the Soviet Union might clamor for a closed-access position if the United States was the first to orbit a satellite. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, committed as he was to development of an orbital reconnaissance capability to spy on the Soviet Union as a national defense initiative, worked to ensure that no international bans on satellite overflights occurred.

Eisenhower tried to obtain a "freedom of space" decision on 21 July 1955 when he attended a summit conference in Geneva, Switzerland. The absence of trust among states and the presence of "terrible weapons," he argued, provoked throughout the world "fears and dangers of surprise attack." He proposed a joint agreement "for aerial photography of the other country," adding that the United States and the Soviet Union had the capacity to lead the world with mutually supervised reconnaissance overflights. The Soviets promptly rejected the proposal, saying that it was an obvious American attempt to "accumulate target information."

Eisenhower bided his time and approved the development of reconnaissance satellites under the strictest security considerations. Virtually no one, even those in high national defense positions, knew of this effort. The WS-117L program was the prototype reconnaissance satellite effort of the United States. Built by Lockheed's Missile Systems

Division in Sunnyvale, California, the project featured the development of a two-stage booster known as the Agena and a highly maneuverable satellite that took photographs with a wide array of natural, infrared, and other invisible light cameras. This early military space effort, while a closely guarded secret for years, proved critical to the later development of the overall U.S. space program.

The Soviets proved singularly inhospitable to Eisenhower's entreaties for "freedom of space," but that changed in a rather ironic way on 4 October 1957 when *Sputnik 1* was launched and ushered in the space age. Since the Soviet Union was the first nation to orbit a satellite, flying as it did over a multitude of nations, including the United States, it established the precedent of "freedom of space." It overflew international boundaries numerous times without provoking a single diplomatic protest. On 8 October 1957, knowing the president's concern over the legality of reconnaissance satellites flying over the Soviet Union, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles told the president: "The Russians have . . . done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space." Eisenhower immediately grasped this as a means of pressing ahead with the launching of a reconnaissance satellite. The precedent held for *Explorer 1* and *Vanguard 1*, and the end of 1958 saw established the tenuous principle of "freedom of space."

LAUNCHING NASA

Sputnik kicked off an intensely competitive space race in which the two superpowers sought to outdo each other for the world's accolades. At a fundamental level a primary reason for NASA's emergence was because of U.S. rivalry during the Cold War with the Soviet Union—a broad contest over the ideologies and allegiances of the nonaligned nations of the world in which space exploration emerged as a major area of contest. From the latter 1940s the Department of Defense had pursued research in rocketry and upper atmospheric sciences as a means of assuring American hegemony. A part of the strategy required not only developing the technology for war, but also pursuing peaceful scientific activities as a means of demonstrating U.S. leadership worldwide. A major step forward came in 1955 when Eisenhower approved a plan to orbit a scientific satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) for the period 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958, a cooperative effort to gather scientific data about the Earth. The Soviet Union quickly followed suit, announcing plans to orbit its own satellite.

The Naval Research Laboratory's Project Vanguard was chosen on 9 September 1955 to support the IGY effort. The Eisenhower administration did so largely because the Vanguard program did not interfere with high-priority ballistic missile development programs—it used the nonmilitary Viking rocket as its basis—while a U.S. Army proposal to use the Redstone ballistic missile as the launch vehicle waited in the wings. The Redstone was being developed by Wernher von Braun and a team of engineers as a response to ballistic missile advances by the Soviet Union and was designed to carry a warhead a distance of two hundred miles on a preplanned trajectory. Project Vanguard enjoyed exceptional publicity throughout the second half of 1955 and all of 1956, but the technological demands upon the program were too great and the funding levels too small to ensure success.

A full-scale crisis resulted when the Soviets launched *Sputnik 1*, the world's first artificial satellite, as its IGY entry. This had a "Pearl Harbor" effect on American public opinion, creating an illusion of a technological gap and providing the impetus for increased spending for aerospace endeavors, technical and scientific educational programs, and the chartering of new federal agencies to manage air and space research and development.

Sputnik led directly to several critical efforts aimed at "catching up" to the Soviet Union's space achievements, among them: (1) a wide-ranging review of the civil and military space programs of the United States (scientific satellite efforts and ballistic missile development); (2) establishment of a presidential science adviser in the White House who had responsibility for overseeing the activities of the federal government in science and technology; (3) creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense and consolidation of several space activities under centralized management; (4) creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to manage civil space operations for the benefit "of all mankind" by means of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958; and (5) passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 to provide federal funding for education in scientific and technical disciplines.

More immediately, the United States launched its first Earth satellite on 31 January 1958, when *Explorer 1* documented the existence

of radiation zones encircling the Earth. Shaped by the Earth's magnetic field, what came to be called the Van Allen radiation belt partially dictates the electrical charges in the atmosphere and the solar radiation that reaches Earth. The *Explorer 1* launch also began a series of scientific missions to the Moon and planets in the latter 1950s and early 1960s.

As a direct result of this crisis, NASA began operations on 1 October 1958, absorbing the resources of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics intact, including its 8,000 employees, an annual budget of $100 million, three major research laboratories—Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, and Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory—and two smaller test facilities. NASA quickly incorporated other organizations into the new agency. These included the space science group of the Naval Research Laboratory in Maryland, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory managed by the California Institute of Technology for the U.S. Army, and the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama. Eventually NASA created several other centers and by the early 1960s had ten located around the country.

NASA began to conduct space missions within months of its creation, and during its first twenty years NASA carried out several major programs:

1. Human space-flight initiatives: Mercury's single astronaut program (flights during 1961 to 1963) to ascertain if a human could survive in space; Project Gemini (flights 1965–1966) with two astronauts to practice space operations, especially rendezvous and docking of spacecraft and extravehicular activity (EVA); and Project Apollo (flights 1968–1972) to explore the Moon.
2. Robotic missions to the Moon (Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter), Venus (*Pioneer Venus*), Mars (*Mariner 4, Viking 1* and *2*), and the outer planets (*Pioneer 10* and *11, Voyager 1* and *2*).
3. Aeronautics research to enhance airplane safety, reliability, efficiency, and speed (X-15 hypersonic flight, lifting body flight research, avionics and electronics studies, propulsion technologies, structures research, aerodynamics investigations).
4. Remote-sensing Earth satellites for information gathering (Landsat satellites for environmental monitoring).
5. Applications satellites for communications (*Echo 1, TIROS,* and *Telstar*) and weather monitoring.
6. *Skylab,* an orbital workshop for astronauts.

In no case were these cooperative ventures with other nations, because the Cold War patina that overlay everything done by NASA during its first thirty years necessitated that the United States demonstrate its unique technological capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

THE LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM

When U.S. astronauts planted the flag on the surface of the Moon in 1969 it signaled the final triumph of the United States over the Soviet Union in the space race, nothing more nor less. Indeed, this singular achievement of Project Apollo during NASA's early years—one that was particularly focused on demonstrating American preeminence as a spacefaring nation to the people of the world—made possible the cooperative ventures that followed.

The effort to land Americans on the Moon came about because of a unique confluence of political necessity, personal commitment and activism, scientific and technological ability, economic prosperity, and public mood. When President John F. Kennedy announced on 25 May 1961 his intention to carry out a lunar landing program before the end of the decade, he did so as a means of demonstrating U.S. technological virtuosity. In so doing Kennedy responded to perceived challenges to U.S. world leadership not only in science and technology but also in political, economic, and especially military capability.

For the next eleven years Project Apollo consumed NASA's every effort. It required significant expenditures, costing $25.4 billion in 1960s dollars over the life of the program to make it a reality. Only the building of the Panama Canal rivaled the Apollo program's size as the largest nonmilitary technological endeavor ever undertaken by the United States; only the Manhattan Project was comparable in a wartime setting.

The first mission to capture public attention was the flight of *Apollo 8.* On 21 December 1968 it took off atop a Saturn V booster from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Three astronauts were aboard—Frank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. Anders—for a historic mission to orbit the Moon. After *Apollo 8* made

one and a half Earth orbits, its third stage began a burn to put the spacecraft on a lunar trajectory. It orbited the Moon on Christmas Eve and then fired the boosters for a return flight. It splashed down safely in the Pacific Ocean on 27 December. Two more Apollo missions occurred before the climax of the program, but they did little more than confirm that the time had come for a lunar landing.

That landing came during the flight of *Apollo 11,* which lifted off on 16 July 1969 and, after confirmation that the hardware was working well, began the three-day trip to the Moon. Then, on 20 July 1969 the lunar module—with astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. "Buzz" Aldrin aboard—landed on the lunar surface while Michael Collins orbited overhead in the command module. After checkout, Armstrong set foot on the surface, telling millions who saw and heard him on Earth that it was "one small step for [a] man—one giant leap for mankind." Aldrin soon followed him out and the two explored their surroundings and planted an American flag but omitted claiming the land for the United States, as had been routinely done during European exploration of the Americas. They collected soil and rock samples and set up scientific experiments. The next day they rendezvoused with the *Apollo* capsule orbiting overhead and began the return trip to Earth, splashing down in the Pacific Ocean on 24 July.

Five more landing missions followed at approximately six-month intervals through December 1972, each of them increasing the time spent on the Moon. The scientific experiments placed on the Moon and the lunar soil samples returned have provided grist for scientists' investigations ever since. The scientific return was significant, but the program did not answer conclusively the age-old questions of lunar origins and evolution. Three of the latter Apollo missions also used a lunar rover vehicle to travel in the vicinity of the landing site, but despite their significant scientific return none equaled the public excitement of *Apollo 11.*

Even as Project Apollo proceeded, the United States and the Soviet Union—as well as other nations—crafted in 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. Its concepts and some of its provisions were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that document it sought to prevent "a new form of colonial competition" and the possible damage that self-seeking exploitation might cause.

After years of discussion this treaty became a possibility on 16 June 1966 when both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted proposals to the United Nations. While there were some differences in the two texts, these were satisfactorily resolved by December 1966 in private consultations during the General Assembly. This allowed the signature of the treaty at Washington, London, and Moscow on 27 January 1967. On 25 April the U.S. Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the treaty entered into force on 10 October 1967. This treaty has remained in force and both provides for the nonmilitarization of space and directs use of the Moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. It expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications; for testing weapons of any kind; or for conducting military maneuvers. After the treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet Union began to collaborate in several joint space enterprises.

TOWARD A TRAJECTORY FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE 1970S

With the successful completion of the Apollo program, everyone realized that the United States was the unquestioned world leader in scientific and technological virtuosity, and continued international competition seemed pointless. President Richard M. Nixon, who took office in January 1969, made it clear that there would be during his leadership no more Apollo-like space efforts. Coupled with this was the desire of those working for a continuation of an aggressive space exploration effort, and the result, predictably, was the search for a new model. While successfully continuing to tie space exploration to foreign relations objectives, now the linkage would be based more on cooperation with allies rather than competition with the nation's Cold War rival. From the 1970s NASA leaders increasingly emphasized visible and exacting international programs. All of the major human space flight efforts, and increasingly as time progressed minor projects, have been identified with international partnerships, particularly with America's European allies.

The European Space Agency was created in 1975 after the space race of the Cold War gave way to worldwide cooperation. Its aims are to provide cooperation in space research and technology. Its ten founding members were France,

Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Ireland, Austria, Norway, Finland, and Portugal joined later, and Canada is considered a cooperating state. The agency acts for Europe in a global way by promoting creative interaction and collaboration with other global space agencies, aerospace industries, and civilian space activities. In addition, there is a cooperation of international space law and a practical sharing of resources, research, and personnel.

The Cold War context in which the U.S. civil space program arose in 1958 ensured that foreign policy objectives dominated the nature of the activity. This led to the need for cooperative ventures with U.S. allies. The U.S. Congress said as much in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the legislation creating NASA. In this chartering legislation Congress inserted a clause mandating the new space agency to engage in international cooperation with other nations for the betterment of all humankind. This legislation provided authority for international agreements in the broad range of projects essential for the development of space science and technology in a naturally international field. NASA's charter provided the widest possible latitude to the agency in undertaking international activities as the means by which the agreed goal could be reached. The scope of NASA's international program has been fortified since that time by repeated involvement with the United Nations, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and a host of less formal international agreements.

The central question for the United States has always been how best to use space exploration as a meaningful foreign policy instrument. At times an odd assemblage of political, economic, and scientific-technological objectives emerged to guide the development of international programs. The most fundamental of these objectives were the overarching geopolitical considerations, without which there would have been no space exploration program at all, much less a cooperative effort. Cooperative projects in space were thought to create a positive image of the United States in the international setting, an image that in the early years of the space age was related to the greater battle to win the "hearts and minds" of the world to the democratic-capitalistic agenda, and after the Cold War to ensure continued goodwill between the United States and the European community. Such cooperation also was thought to encourage both European unity and American relations to collective European entities.

Equally important, the United States pursued two overarching economic objectives with its cooperative space efforts. First, cooperative projects expanded the investment for any space project beyond that committed by the United States. (Kenneth S. Pedersen, NASA director of international programs in the early 1980s, opined that "by sharing leadership for exploring the heavens with other qualified spacefaring nations, NASA stretched its own resources and was free to pursue projects which, in the absence of such sharing and cooperation, might not be initiated.") Second, cooperative projects might also help to improve the balance of trade by creating new markets for U.S. aerospace products. Finally, a set of important scientific and technological objectives have motivated U.S. international cooperative efforts in space, including the idea that such efforts enhance the intellectual horsepower applied to any scientific question, thereby increasing the likelihood of reaching fuller understanding in less time. These initiatives also have helped to shape European space projects along lines compatible with American goals, encourage the development of complementary but different experiments from European scientists, and ensure that multiple investigators throughout the international partnership make observations that contribute to a single objective.

In light of these macro-national priorities, NASA has always wrestled with how best to implement the broad international prospects mandated in legislation and polity in line with its own specific history and goals. NASA leadership developed very early, and it remained in place until an international partnership was required to build the International Space Station (ISS) in the early 1990s. As a result of that history, a set of essential features have guided the agency's international arrangements with European partners, among them, that cooperation is undertaken on a project-by-project basis, not on an ongoing basis for a specific discipline or general effort; that each cooperative project must be both mutually beneficial and scientifically valid; that scientific-technical agreement must precede any political commitment; that funds transfers will not take place between partners, but each will be responsible for its own contribution to the project; that all partners will carry out their part of the project without technical or managerial expertise provided by the other; and that scientific data will be

made available to researchers of all nations involved in the project for early analysis.

From the NASA leadership's point of view, moreover, cooperative projects offered two very significant advantages in the national political arena. First, at least by the time of the lunar landings, the leadership recognized that every international partnership brought greater legitimacy to the overall project. This important fact was not lost on NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine in 1970, for instance, when he was seeking outside sponsorship of the space shuttle program and negotiating international agreements for parts of the effort. Second, although far from being a coldly calculating move, agreements with foreign nations could also help to insulate space projects from drastic budgetary and political changes. American politics, which are notoriously rambunctious and shortsighted, are also enormously pragmatic. Dealing with what might be a serious international incident resulting from some technological program change is something neither U.S. diplomats nor politicians relish, and that fact could be the difference between letting the project continue as previously agreed or to dicker over it in Congress and thereby change funding, schedule, or other factors in response to short-term political or budgetary needs. The international partners, then, could be a stabilizing factor for any space project, in essence a bulwark to weather difficult domestic storms.

Perhaps the physicist Fritjof Capra's representative definition of a social paradigm is appropriate when considering the requirements for space projects in the United States in the aftermath of the Apollo Moon landings. While Apollo was seen as an enormous success from a geopolitical and technological standpoint, NASA had to contend with a new set of domestic political realities for its projects thereafter, and a radical alteration had taken place in what Capra described as the "constellation of concepts, values, perceptions and practices shared by a community, which forms a particular vision of reality that is the basis of the way the community organizes itself." International cooperative projects helped NASA cope with that changing social paradigm.

IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE

At the same time that critical objectives at both the national and agency levels might be achieved through cooperative space projects both individually and collectively, there were genuine and not inconsiderable impediments to undertaking international programs. The most important was that NASA would lose some of its authority to execute the cooperative program as it saw fit. Throughout its history the space agency had never been very willing to deal with partners, either domestic or international, as equals. It tended to see them more as hindrance than help, especially when they might get in the way of the "critical path" toward any technological goal. R. Buckminster Fuller in his 1982 book *Critical Path* discussed the evolution of technology involving project scheduling and resource allocation. Assigning an essentially equal-partnership responsibility for the development of some critical system or instrument meant giving up the power to make changes, dictate solutions, and control schedules and other factors. Partnership, furthermore, was not a synonym for contractor management—something agency leaders understood very well—and NASA was not very accepting of full partners unless they were essentially silent or at least deferential. Such an attitude mitigated against significant international cooperation in space efforts, and difficulties arose whenever any project was undertaken.

In addition to this concern, some technologists at NASA, but even more so at the U.S. Department of State, expressed fears that bringing foreign nations into any significant space project really meant giving those nations technical knowledge that only the United States held. Only a few nations were spacefaring at all, and only a subset of those had launch capabilities. Many American leaders voiced reservations about the advisability of ending technological monopolies. The prevention of technology transfer in the international arena was an especially important issue to be considered.

NASA officials understood that European space leaders were aware of these issues and that the latter understandably took a guarded approach toward dealing with American overtures in space. They also believed that this watch-and-wait attitude was not solely due to the United States, although it may have been the deciding factor, but also related to the unique difficulties of European space activities. Senior NASA officials were also convinced that the history of European involvement in space had been marked by difficulties in obtaining long-term commitments to specific programs in which participating nations

had a reasonable part. And long-term, highly focused projects required centralized management capable of enforcing order on a diverse set of interests. Americans recognized that NASA had its own difficulties on this score, but with national and language barriers added in, the demands were daunting. Finally, the costs of involvement in such endeavors with the United States were not inconsiderable. The financial, organizational, and political issues of European space activity had long been understood by leaders in the field, but they had not been fully resolved. Unfortunately, NASA's efforts have long been insufficient to fully resolve them.

THE RECORD OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE

From its inception in 1958 to 2000, NASA concluded nearly 2,000 cooperative agreements with other nations for the conduct of international space projects. While most of these were bilateral in focus—such as the very first, which led to the Alouette mission with Canada in 1962—some, and increasingly so, have been multinational efforts. These agreements resulted in 139 cooperative science projects with European nations between 1962 and 1997: 29 in the earth sciences, 23 in microgravity and life sciences, and 87 in space sciences.

When this development is explored over time there are some interesting trends. First, there were small numbers of projects in the 1960s—something to be expected—but they began to rise precipitously during the late 1960s and peak in the first third of the 1970s. This coincided with the downturn in the NASA budget from a high in 1965 to a low in 1973. In the 1980s and 1990s this trend also accelerated in relation to the political realities of the era.

Is there a correlation between the demise of the NASA budget and increased international cooperative ventures with other nations? Probably, but it is also related to the emphasis on détente and international relations of the Nixon administration in the late 1960s through mid-1970s. This seemed to collapse in the early 1980s, perhaps in relation to the rise of the NASA budget during the Reagan buildup and the renewal of Cold War hostilities. If this is a correct analysis, one would expect the number of cooperative efforts to rise in response to the drastic cuts in the NASA budget undertaken by the Clinton administration in the 1990s. Such was indeed the case, but more in relation to the former Soviet Union than with international partners.

THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

In 1984, as part of its interest in reinvigorating the space program, the Reagan administration called for the development of a space station. In a "Kennedyesque" moment, Reagan declared in his 1984 State of the Union address that "America has always been greatest when we dared to be great. We can reach for greatness again. We can follow our dreams to distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful, economic, and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within a decade."

The dream of a space station had been omnipresent within NASA since the 1950s, when a station had been envisioned as a necessary outpost in the new frontier of space. The station, however, had been forced to the bottom of the priorities heap in the 1960s and 1970s as NASA raced to the Moon and then went on to build the space shuttle. When the shuttle first flew in April 1981, the space station reemerged as the priority in human space flight. Within three years space policymakers had persuaded Reagan of its importance, and NASA began work on it in earnest.

From the outset both the Reagan administration and NASA intended space station *Freedom* to be an international program. Although a range of international cooperative activities had been carried out in the past, the station offered an opportunity for a truly integrated effort. The inclusion of international partners, many with rapidly developing spaceflight capabilities, could enhance the effort. In addition, every partnership brought greater legitimacy to the overall program and might help insulate it from drastic budgetary and political changes. Inciting an international incident because of a change to the station was something neither U.S. diplomats nor politicians relished, and that fact, it was thought, could help stabilize funding, schedule, or other factors that might otherwise be changed in response to short-term political needs.

NASA officials pressed forward with international agreements among thirteen nations to take part in the space station *Freedom* program. Japan, Canada, and the nations pooling their resources in the European Space Agency agreed in

the spring of 1985 to participate. Canada, for instance, decided to build a remote servicing system. The European Space Agency agreed to build an attached pressurized science module and an astronaut-tended free-flyer, a vehicle to transport an astronaut and equipment away from a spacecraft. Japan's contribution was the development and commercial use of an experiment module for materials processing, life sciences, and technology development. These separate components, with their "plug-in" capacity, eased somewhat the overall management (and congressional) concerns about unwanted technology transfer.

Almost from the outset, the space station program was controversial. Most of the debate centered on its costs versus its benefits. One NASA official remembered that "I reached the scream level at about $9 billion," referring to how much U.S. politicians appeared willing to spend on the station. To stay within budget, NASA pared away at station capabilities, in the process eliminating functions that some of its constituencies wanted. This led to a rebellion among some former supporters. For instance, the space science community began complaining that the space station configuration under development did not provide sufficient experimental opportunity. Thomas M. Donahue, an atmospheric scientist from the University of Michigan and chair of the National Academy of Science's Space Science Board, commented in the mid-1980s that he thought the government should be honest about the goals of the station, and "if the decision to build a space station is political and social, we have no problem with that . . . but don't call it a scientific program."

Because of the cost challenges, redesigns of space station *Freedom* followed in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. Each time, the project got smaller, less capable of accomplishing the broad projects envisioned for it, less costly, and more controversial. As costs were reduced, capabilities also had to diminish, and increasingly political leaders who once supported the program questioned its viability. It was a seemingly endless circle, and some leaders suggested that the United States, the international partners, and the overall space exploration effort would be better off if the space station program were terminated.

In the latter 1980s and early 1990s a parade of space station managers and NASA administrators, each of them honest in their attempts to rescue the program, wrestled with *Freedom* and lost. They faced on one side politicians who demanded that the jobs aspect of the project—itself a major cause of the overall cost growth—be maintained, with station users on the other demanding that *Freedom*'s capabilities be maintained, and with people on all sides demanding that costs be reduced. The incompatibility of these various demands ensured that station program management was a task not without difficulties.

Just as the Cold War was the driving force behind big NASA budgets in the 1960s, its end was a critical component in the search for a new space policy in the 1990s. Cold War rivalries no longer held real attraction as a selling point for an aggressive space exploration program at least by the mid-1980s. Accordingly, when he became NASA administrator in 1992, Daniel S. Goldin worked to salvage the space station effort with a total redesign that brought the significant space capabilities of the former Soviet Union into the effort. The demise of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, created a dramatically changed international situation that allowed NASA to negotiate a landmark decision to include Russia in the building of an international space station. On 7 November 1993 the United States and Russia agreed to work together with the other international partners to build an International Space Station for the benefit of all.

This strikingly new spin on international relations regalvanized support for the program, and for the next eight years building the ISS dominated the efforts of all the spacefaring nations. In the post–Cold War era this decision provided an important linkage for the continuation of the space station at a time when many were convinced that for other reasons—cost, technological challenge, return on investment—it was an uninviting endeavor.

As a lead-in to the ISS, twenty years after the world's two greatest spacefaring nations and Cold War rivals staged a dramatic docking in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project during the summer of 1975, the space programs of the United States and Russia again met in Earth orbit when the space shuttle *Atlantis* docked to the aging Russian *Mir* space station in June-July 1995. "This flight heralds a new era of friendship and cooperation between our two countries," said NASA's Goldin. "It will lay the foundation for construction of an International Space Station later this decade."

The docking missions conducted through 1998 represented a major alteration in the history of space exploration. They also portended considerable controversy. For example, several accidents

took place aboard the aging Russian space station that called into question the validity of American involvement in a Russian program that might compromise the safety of American astronauts aboard. Mishaps on *Mir* in 1996–1998 included a fire inside the station, failure of an oxygen generator, leaks in the cooling system, a docking accident that damaged both the station and the spacecraft to be docked to it, and the temporary malfunction of an attitude control system.

These accidents triggered criticism of U.S.–Russian cooperation in the shuttle-*Mir* program. That criticism emphasized the safety of the astronauts and the aging character of *Mir,* noting it was in such bad shape that no meaningful scientific results could be achieved aboard the station. Most asked that Russia deorbit *Mir* and thereby bring it to "an honorable end," something that finally took place in the spring of 2001. Only with the launch of the first elements of the International Space Station in the autumn of 1998 did public criticism subside on the role of the shuttle-*Mir* missions in the American space program.

Other questions about the International Space Station program, however, did not subside even with first-element launches in 1998. In addition to schedule and budget concerns, many complained about the integral part played by Russia in building the International Space Station. Most observers agreed that the fundamental problems associated with Russian participation in the space station program could be reduced to a few fine points, as stated by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., chair of the House Committee on Science, in 1998: "One, the Russians failed to follow through on their funding commitments, and two, the Clinton administration brought the Russians into the project for the wrong reasons, placed the Russians in the critical path, and routinely let them off the hook for their failures."

Some warned of complications with Russian involvement as early as September 1993, when President Clinton formally invited the Russian government to join the project, ostensibly as a gesture of goodwill to the former Cold War enemy. In reality, the invitation to the Russians involved gaining Russian compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary arrangement among twenty-seven countries to control the export of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration admitted as much to Congress on 20 April 1994, when the U.S. ambassador to Russia James Collins was asked by Representative Ralph M. Hall, "Give me a 1 to 10 on whether or not we are building the space station with Russia to achieve a particular foreign policy objective such as Russian compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime." Ambassador Collins replied, "Getting Russia into the Missile Technology Control Regime and bringing it into willingness to comply with those guidelines is a very important objective." This proved unsuccessful, however, as the Russian Space Agency continued selling missile technology to so-called rogue nations. According to Sensenbrenner, American "nonproliferation goals for cooperating with the Russians in the civil space area have not been realized."

Even more than this, the Russians were integrated deeply into the critical path of International Space Station assembly. If they failed to deliver their modules on schedule, ISS assembly had to wait, and every slippage on the part of the Russian Space Agency stretched out the overall station schedule. NASA had assumed a position of complete reliance on Russia for the service module—sole provider of oxygen, avionics, reboost, and sanitary facilities—until much later in the assembly process. This meant, in simple terms, that the entire program was held hostage pending resolution of Russia's internal economic and political problems and external goodwill.

With the belated launch of the Russian service module in July 2000, however, it became clear that international competition had been firmly replaced with cooperation as the primary reason behind huge expenditures for space operations. As the dean of space policy analysts John M. Logsdon concluded, "there is little doubt, then, that there will be an international space station, barring major catastrophes like another shuttle accident or the rise to power of a Russian government opposed to cooperation with the West."

While the challenges of completing the ISS remained quite real, as the twenty-first century dawned the dream of a permanent presence in space seemed on the verge of reality. Before the end of 2000 the first ISS crew inhabited the station. Furthermore, the spacefaring nations of the world had accepted ISS as the raison d'être of their space efforts. Only through its successful achievement, space advocates insisted, would a vision of space exploration that includes all nations venturing into the unknown be ultimately realized. This scenario makes eminent sense if one is interested in developing an expansive space exploration effort, one that leads to the perma-

nent colonization of humans on other planets. At the end of the century, that debate continued. What no one was sure of was how this would unfold in the next century.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY ISSUES IN SPACE COOPERATION

In the last decade of the twentieth century U.S. space policy entered an extended period of transition. This was true for several reasons. For one thing, U.S. preeminence in space technology was coming to an end as the European Space Agency developed and made operational its superb Ariane launcher, and the agency's ancillary space capabilities made it increasingly possible for Europe to "go it alone." At the same time, U.S. commitment to sustained leadership in space activities overall waned, and significantly less public monies went into NASA missions. U.S. political commitment to cooperative projects seemingly lessened as well: for example, the United States refrained from developing a probe for the international armada of spacecraft that was launched toward Comet Halley in 1984–1985 and withdrew part of its support from the controversial International Solar Polar Mission to view the Sun from a high altitude, renamed Ulysses and launched in 1990. Of those cooperative projects that remained, NASA increasingly acceded to the demands of international collaborators to develop critical systems and technologies. This overturned the policy of not allowing partners into the critical path—something that had not been accepted in earlier development projects—and was in large measure a pragmatic decision on the part of American officials. Because of the increasing size and complexity of projects, according to Kenneth Pedersen, more recent projects had produced "numerous critical paths whose upkeep costs alone will defeat U.S. efforts to control and supply them." He added, "It seems unrealistic today to believe that other nations possessing advanced technical capabilities and harboring their own economic competitiveness objectives will be amenable to funding and developing only ancillary systems."

In addition to these important developments, in the 1990s the rise of competitive economic activities in space mitigated the prospects for future activities. The brutal competition for launch business, the cutthroat nature of space applications, and the rich possibilities for future space-based economic activities such as asteroid mining were rapidly creating a climate in which international ventures might once again become the exception rather than the rule. John Krige astutely commented in 1997 that "collaboration has worked most smoothly when the science or technology concerned is not of direct strategic (used here to mean commercial or military) importance. As soon as a government feels that its national interests are directly involved in a field of R&D, it would prefer to go it alone." He also noted that the success of cooperative projects may take as their central characteristic that they have "no practical application in at least the short to medium term."

The sole exception to this perspective might be when nations decide that for prestige or diplomatic purposes it is appropriate to cooperate in space. A concern existed that in the United States, where economic competitiveness in space was such a powerful motivation for "going it alone," and where prestige and diplomacy seemed to have taken a backseat to nationalistic hyperbole, that with every passing year there would be less tolerance for large-scale cooperative, and by extension difficult, projects in space. Indeed, there was a constant reduction under way in government spending for space exploration and open discussions of strategies on how to shift the thrust of space flight to the private sector. That would, of necessity, curtail international space exploration activities, with less funding available for scientific space missions, the very missions that are natural candidates for cooperative work. Corporations, that may well provide the greatest share of investment for space flight in the United States in the twenty-first century would be loathe to engage in partnerships in which their technological advantages might be compromised. The proliferation of space technology throughout the world, especially to those nations perceived as rogue states, may well prompt U.S. leaders to clamp down on anything that smacks of technology transfer. (This has already been seen in relation to the supposed satellite technology transferred inadvertently to the People's Republic of China through Hughes Aerospace Corp.) Finally, the disagreeable experiences of such cooperative projects as the International Space Station might sour both national and NASA officials on future endeavors. It is certain, for example, that it will be a long time before anyone in authority in the United States will sign on to an international project of similar complexity.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the key conclusions that we might reach about both the course of international cooperation between the United States and other international partners is that it has been an enormously difficult process. Apropos is a quote from Wernher von Braun, that "we can lick gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming." Perhaps the hardest part of spaceflight is not the scientific and technological challenges of operating in an exceptionally foreign and hostile environment but in the down-to-earth environment of rough-and-tumble international and domestic politics. But even so, cooperative space endeavors have been richly rewarding and overwhelmingly useful, from all manner of scientific, technical, social, and political perspectives.

Kenneth Pedersen observed in a public forum in 1983 that "international space cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; countries cooperate because they judge it in their interest to do so." For continued cooperative efforts in space to proceed into the twenty-first century it is imperative that those desiring them define appropriate projects and ensure that enough national leaders judge those projects as being of interest and worthy of making them cooperative. Since the 1960s space-exploration proponents have gained a wealth of experience in how to define, gain approval for, and execute the simplest of cooperative projects. Even those have been conducted only with much trial and considerable force of will. For those involved in space exploration it is imperative that a coordinated approach to project definition, planning, funding, and conduct of future missions be undertaken. Only then will people be able to review the history of international programs and speak with pride about all of their many accomplishments while omitting the huge "but" that must follow in considering all of the difficulties encountered.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bonnet, Roger M., and Vittorio Manno. *International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency.* Cambridge, Mass., 1994. A prize-winning study of the philosophy and inner workings of internationally supported space exploration projects.

Bulkeley, Rip. *The Sputnik Crisis and Early United States Space Policy: A Critique of the Historiography of Space.* Bloomington, Ind., 1991. An important discussion of early efforts to develop civil space policy in the aftermath of *Sputnik*. It contains much information relative to the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Divine, Robert. *The Sputnik Challenge.* New York, 1993. Contains insights into the space program as promoted by the Eisenhower administration.

European Science Foundation and National Research Council. *U.S.–European Collaboration in Space Science.* Washington, D.C., 1998. An official research report on collaborative issues in space science.

Frutkin, Arnold W. *International Cooperation in Space.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965. An interesting early discussion of the possibilities and problems of international cooperation written during the height of the Cold War by NASA's head of international relations.

Handberg, Roger, and Joan Johnson-Freese. *The Prestige Trap: A Comparative Study of the U.S., European, and Japanese Space Programs.* Dubuque, Iowa, 1994. An interesting study of the various programs and their development.

Harvey, Brian. *The New Russian Space Programme: From Competition to Collaboration.* Chichester, England, and New York, 1996. A solid history of the development of the Soviet space program through the mid-1980s. It has several chapters on the race to the Moon, describing what information was available before the end of the Cold War.

Harvey, Dodd L., and Linda C. Ciccoritti. *U.S.–Soviet Cooperation in Space.* Miami, Fla. 1974. A detailed exploration of the competition and cooperation in space exploration by the two superpowers of the Cold War era through the détente that led to the joint Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

Johnson-Freese, Joan. *Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space.* Malabar, Fla., 1990. An interesting exploration of the movement from competition to cooperation in space exploration.

Kay, W. D. "Space Policy Redefined: The Reagan Administration and the Commercialization of Space." *Business and Economic History* 27 (fall 1998): 237–247. A reassessment of the space policy of the Reagan administration.

Krige, John. "The Politics of European Collaboration in Space." *Space Times: Magazine of the*

American Astronautical Society 36 (September–October 1997): 4–9. A lucid analysis of the difficult political issues involved in international collaboration in space.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, 1970. A classic analysis of how science changes perspective using the Copernican revolution as a case.

Launius, Roger D. *NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program*. Malabar, Fla., 2000. A short history of the U.S. civilian space efforts with documents.

Launius, Roger D., John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith, eds. *Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite*. Amsterdam, 2000. A collection of essays on various aspects of the Sputnik crisis of 1957.

Launius, Roger D., and Howard E. McCurdy, eds. *Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership*. Urbana, Ill., 1997. A collection of essays on presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter with addition discussions of international cooperation and the role of the presidency in shaping space policy.

Logsdon, John M. "The Development of International Space Cooperation." In John M. Logsdon, ed. *Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program*. Vol. 2. *External Relationships*. Washington, D.C., 1996. An essential reference work with key documents in space policy and its development.

———. *Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in Space Station Freedom*. Washington, D.C., 1998. An excellent short account of the international coordination for the space station.

McDougall, Walter A. *"The Heavens and the Earth": A Political History of the Space Age*. New York, 1985. A Pulitzer Prize–winning book that analyzes the space race to the Moon in the 1960s.

Pedersen, Kenneth S. "Thoughts on International Space Cooperation and Interests in the Post–Cold War World." *Space Policy* 8 (August 1992): 215–224. A fine discussion of the problems of international collaboration in space.

Shaffer, Stephen M., and Lisa Robock Shaffer. *The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison of U.S. Experience in Space and Security*. Denver, Colo., 1980. A political science study of the subject.

See also SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

PACIFISM

Charles Chatfield

The meaning of "pacifism" was altered in Anglo-American usage during World War I. Before 1914 the word was associated with the general advocacy of peace, a cause that had enlisted leaders among the Western economic and intellectual elite and socialist leadership. In wartime, "pacifism" was used to denote the principled refusal to sanction or participate in war at all. This doctrine was associated with the nonresistance of the early Christian church or the traditional "peace" churches, such as the Mennonites, Quakers, and Brethren. During and after World War I, absolute opposition to war was joined with support for peace and reform programs to produce modern, liberal pacifism. The earlier broad usage is still current in Europe and, to some extent, in the United States; and so the significance of changes in the concept is somewhat lost.

The shift in conceptualization of pacifism early in the twentieth century is the key to its significance for American foreign policy, however. Once this is understood, it is possible to interpret pacifism as simultaneously the core of several modern peace movements and, ironically, a source of factionalism among peace workers; it is also possible to appreciate the contributions of pacifism to the foreign policymaking process.

THE ORIGINS OF MODERN PACIFISM

Pacifism, although absolutely opposed to war, never has been confined to antiwar movements. It has been a way of life for individuals and religious sects, and it has characterized peace organizations founded in the wake of wars. Thus, pacifism contributed to the formation of the first peace groups after the Napoleonic wars, notably the American Peace Society (1828). It was the basis of the Garrisonian New England Non-Resistance Society, founded in 1838 by abolitionists and others dissatisfied with the moderate position of the American Peace Society, and of the Universal Peace Union, founded in 1866 by Alfred A. Love following the collapse of peace societies during the Civil War.

The modern conceptualization of pacifism draws upon the doctrinal sacredness of life and abrogation of violence in the Christian religion, strains of philosophical anarchism and socialism, nineteenth-century internationalism, and a religious principle of social responsibility. These were the basic elements that were brought together in the context of World War I.

The oldest element of modern pacifism is the tradition of religious nonresistance that was formed in the first three centuries of the Christian church, under Roman rule. Abandoned for the concept of just war, in fact by the time of Constantine I and in theory Saint Augustine, nonresistance pacifism appeared again with Christian sects in the medieval era. It emerged in the Protestant Reformation, notably under Peter Chelčický and the Unity of the Brethren (Bohemian Brethren) in the fifteenth century and among the Anabaptists. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, it was institutionalized in the writings and practice of so-called peace churches: the Mennonites, the Quakers, and the Brethren.

Nonresistance characterized the thought of leaders in the early-nineteenth-century peace societies of the United States. It was officially recognized as ground for exemption under the conscription systems of the Civil War and World War I. Many of the Mennonites and Brethren who immigrated to the United States late in the nineteenth century at least partly sought to escape conscription abroad. Traditional nonresistance implied not only the repudiation of violence and warfare but, frequently, dissociation from government, based as it seemed to be on physical force.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, traditional nonresistance was supplemented by anarchism deriving from the religious inspiration of Leo Tolstoy and from those philosophical anar-

chists who repudiated violence. In addition, some leading European socialists took the position that national wars were instruments of class action that should be boycotted by workers. In the United States during World War I these elements of pacifism brought objectors into conflict with American law, which provided for conscientious objection based only on religious opposition to fighting and not that which derived from secular or political principles or was directed against conscription itself. Furthermore, the majority position of the Socialist Party then condemned American involvement, thus bringing socialists to the antiwar cause.

Also during the second half of the nineteenth century, nonresistance as a force motivating peace advocacy was supplemented by organized internationalism. In some measure this derived from the humanistic traditions of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, and it evolved into programs for international law, international arbitration, and even international organization. In some measure, too, internationalism derived from classical economists who, like Jeremy Bentham, repudiated mercantilism and advocated free trade. In the United States, internationalism was buttressed by Americans' tendency to assume that their institutions would produce harmonious progress if written on a world scale, and it garnered enthusiastic support from men of means and prestige in the years before World War I. It is important in the development of modern pacifism because its institutional and world views, and even some of its programs, were incorporated into the encompassing policy platforms of pacifists.

A fourth element of modern pacifism was the sense of social responsibility that derived from antebellum evangelical religion and especially from religious analyses of industrialism and urbanism about the turn of the century. The reform spirit, the transnational outlook, and the political philosophy of liberal pacifism were rooted in two decades of Social Gospel and Progressive activity that preceded World War I.

Upon the outbreak of that conflict, most traditional internationalists supported the Allied cause and became reconciled to American intervention. When the United States entered the war, they viewed the crusade as the vehicle of international organization and tried to write their views into the Allied war aims, notably in the case of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, between 1914 and 1917 several organizations were formed to oppose Woodrow Wilson's preparedness program and intervention, and to support conscientious objectors: the American Union Against Militarism (1915–1921), which was succeeded by the National Council for Prevention of War; the Women's Peace Party (1915), which was succeeded by the United States Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; the Fellowship of Reconciliation (1915), which was supplemented in 1923 by the War Resisters' League; and the American Friends Service Committee (1917). In wartime these groups were sifted of nearly all but pacifists, and they became the institutional base of modern pacifism in the United States.

The leaders of these and other wartime pacifist organizations were predominantly Progressives, often women, and with few exceptions were religious. They included Jane Addams and Emily Balch, directors of Hull House and Denison House settlements; Crystal Eastman, an ardent suffragist and expert on the legal aspects of industrial accidents; her brother Max Eastman, who edited two radical literary journals, *Masses* and *Liberator;* Norman Thomas, later the leader of the Socialist Party; Roger Baldwin, longtime director of the American Civil Liberties Union; Rufus Jones, a Quaker historian; Paul Jones, an Episcopal bishop; Jessie Wallace Hughan, founder of the War Resisters' League; John Nevin Sayre, interwar stalwart of the Fellowship of Reconciliation; and John Haynes Holmes, a Unitarian pastor. They identified with transnational ideologies, whether religious, humanitarian, or socialist; but politically they were pragmatists in the Progressive tradition. They believed in the ultimate worth of the individual, but they appreciated the influence of social institutions upon personal development.

They associated with antiwar radicals, with whom they were often persecuted. Indeed, pacifists formed the American Civil Liberties Bureau in 1917 for the defense of conscientious objectors and radicals during the war. Leading pacifists identified force as an instrument of social control and associated violence with authoritarianism. They therefore associated their own quest for peace with a commitment to social justice, so that they combined complete opposition to war with the spirit of reform and internationalism. Their organized expression of this belief during World War I marks the beginning of modern liberal pacifism and the development of an activist core of the peace movements in recent American history.

Traditional religious pacifism as documented by Peter Brock and colleagues has been a vital, often poignant part of the twentieth-century

experience in Europe and North America. It was the liberal and activist strand of pacifism, however, that became most relevant to American foreign relations.

THE PACIFIST ROLES IN POLICYMAKING

Peace and antiwar movements can be viewed, institutionally, as a single element of the foreign policymaking process. To draw a distinction between them is legitimate with regard to specific foreign policy issues—that is, specific wars—but not with regard to the process of policy formation. Taken together, peace and antiwar movements in all periods of U.S. history have been coalitions of separate groups aligned variously with regard to different policy issues. These constituencies have combined to influence public policy either directly through the professional expertise of peace advocates (as in the case of numerous projects of the Carnegie Endowment) or through political lobbying, or indirectly through public opinion. In any case, pacifists have been relevant to the policymaking process in terms of the broader peace movements, and they cannot be evaluated apart from them.

CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

There is one possible exception to this observation: the contribution made by pacifist pressure groups to the administration of conscription and the treatment of conscientious objectors. In this case pacifist pressure groups acted directly upon government agencies and substantially affected policy formation.

Efforts on behalf of conscientious objectors have taken essentially three forms. First, pacifists representing the peace churches—the ecumenical Fellowship of Reconciliation and, prior to World War II, the secular War Resisters' League—lobbied to broaden the basis of exemption. At the outset of World War I objectors were exempted only if they belonged to churches with doctrinal positions against military service, and even then they were legally exempted only from fighting. Provisions were broadened administratively during the war to include all religious objectors. Subsequently, exemption was expanded by court decision to include philosophical authority embodying a universal principle, and leading churchmen and church bodies later endorsed the principle of selective objection to war on political grounds.

Second, pacifists have lobbied in support of administrative agencies that would remove objectors from military jurisdiction, in recognition of those who object to conscription per se. The Civilian Public Service of World War II was the result of such pressure, although it proved to be an unsatisfactory solution. Various forms of exemption for civilian jobs since that time represent attempts to accommodate pressure from pacifists, buttressed as it often is by church bodies and liberals who recognize conscientious objection as an authentic ethical choice even when they do not endorse it as a preferred one.

Third, pacifists lobbied for amnesty for conscientious objectors following each war of the twentieth century. The basic rationale for amnesty has been that objectors are really political prisoners, although the laws of the United States do not recognize political crimes and treat objectors as criminals. During the Vietnam War the number of men who publicly deserted from the military or fled the country to escape the draft created a situation in which pacifists found themselves joined in their demand for amnesty by nonpacifists interested in political and social reconciliation. Insofar as conscientious objection has become recognized as a legitimate ethical option and a form of protest, it has ceased to become the exclusive concern of pacifists.

Even with regard to conscientious objection, therefore, the influence of pacifists must now be evaluated in relation to that of the general peace movements. Indeed, as John Chambers and Charles Moskos have shown, the recognition of conscientious objection is integral to the modern character of military service.

COALITION POLITICS

Pacifists affected peace coalitions in which they participated by their cultivation of a political base in specific publics and by the political techniques they employed. In the Cold War period they introduced new techniques of nonviolent protest. They also gave distinctive emphases to movements in which they were associated.

Pacifists were drawn together both by their opposition to World War I and by their isolation from the American public during the conflict. Increasingly, they became committed to a campaign against all future wars (and to campaigns for

social and labor justice). They cooperated with those who had supported the war effort as a vehicle of internationalism and who, in the 1920s, supported membership in the League of Nations and the World Court, or ratification of a treaty outlawing war. In an era when leading peace advocates maneuvered to secure their own pet approaches at the expense of others, the more pacifist among them tended to be the most inclusive. Pacifists also systematically cultivated constituencies that had been largely neglected by other peace workers: religious bodies, college youth, Christian youth organizations, and labor. Although their primary appeal was to repudiate warfare altogether, pacifists also educated the public on international relations and recruited support for specific legislation, notably arms limitation. They lobbied through their own associations and also created a major coalition organization, the National Council for Prevention of War (1921).

By the mid-1930s a core of pacifist leaders had developed a network of support groups, a political base from which they tried to build a public consensus for strict neutrality. To this end they managed to align nonpacifist internationalists affiliated with the League of Nations Association in their $500,000 Emergency Peace Campaign. Occasionally they were able to translate public opinion into congressional positions, and they considerably reinforced popular resistance to overseas involvement. In the course of the neutrality controversy, however, the League of Nations Association gradually broke from its coalition with pacifists and organized a counter-campaign for collective security arrangements. In this respect, the activity of pacifists heightened the political organization of the interwar peace movement, which, however, it also helped to polarize.

During World War II pacifists were largely isolated from political influence except insofar as they cooperated with prowar internationalists to popularize the proposed United Nations. They remained isolated after the war, as the world became polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union, and collective security was reinterpreted in terms of Cold War containment, still ostensibly in the service of internationalism.

Then, in 1957 pacifists became instrumental in forming a new national coalition to challenge nuclear weapons testing. Disclosures about the threat of nuclear fallout engendered worldwide protest that was led in the United States by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the Committee for Nonviolent Direct Action (CNDA). The former was a coalition with nonpacifist liberals like Norman Cousins, and it used traditional techniques of education, lobbying, and electoral action. CNDA represented an activist pacifist core, and it employed the tactics of nonviolent direct action, including civil disobedience like climbing or sailing into nuclear test zones and blockading nuclear submarines.

The bulk of the test-ban campaign was carried by SANE and the pacifist groups that had sponsored it—the American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The cause also spawned new organizations, notably Women Strike for Peace and the Student Peace Union, and the whole U.S. effort was in limited measure coordinated with the international campaign. It contributed to a moratorium on atmospheric testing during the Eisenhower administration and had a direct role in the adoption of the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban treaty under President John F. Kennedy.

The test-ban coalition formed the initial base for the antiwar coalition that challenged the U.S. war in Vietnam, even before that conflict became formalized in the bombing campaign early in 1965. Again SANE negotiated the linkage between pacifists and nonpacifist liberals, although increasingly an independent left wing competed for recognition. In the first three years of the Vietnam War, antiwar constituencies multiplied: business and professional groups, cultural and entertainment notables, Peace Corps and social service groups, Old Left socialists and New Left students (notably Students for a Democratic Society), and religious leaders (notably Clergy and Laity Concerned). The latter was predominantly though not exclusively pacifist, while a core of radical pacifist Catholics led by the priests Daniel and Philip Berrigan developed a sharp civil disobedience witness in the Catholic Worker tradition.

In 1968 the antiwar coalition fully informed Democratic Party politics and conditioned even the Republican platform on the war. The following year the coalition severely constrained President Nixon's war policies. By then the large liberal wing of the antiwar movement was becoming thoroughly politicized, especially in Democratic Party politics, while its smaller radical wing spun apparently out of control (where it could not be disciplined by pacifists). Given its media-driven stereotype as radical and countercultural, the movement seemed to have died, whereas actually the coalition had become mainstreamed.

Throughout this period, activist pacifists in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, and Catholic and other groups were intensely involved in coalition politics of the political left and center. By the same token, pacifist communities were sharply tested by the tension between the radical and liberal approaches their members espoused.

Two other large-scale peace coalitions made serious impacts on twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations: the nuclear freeze campaign against nuclear weapons of the 1980s and the concurrent campaign for solidarity with Latin American liberation movements. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, by contrast, no serious coalition arose. At the outset it was widely conceded that the evenly divided country was ripe for protest, and pacifist groups were prepared even to wield nonviolent disobedience. However, the limited duration and tight control of military operations obviated the development of a broad public coalition in opposition to the Gulf War.

The nuclear freeze campaign in the first half of the 1980s was systematically organized against the background of massive European protest, dramatic revelations of the destructive scope of nuclear weapons, and fear of nuclear war that was intensified by the Ronald Reagan administration. Pacifists were among the organizing and motivating core of a broad, diverse public coalition that was fed by media coverage. Although it failed to secure an outright freeze on nuclear weapons building or deployment, the nuclear freeze campaign was substantially responsible for reinstating the policy and institutions of arms control that the administration had begun to scrap.

Out-publicized by the more visible and larger nuclear freeze campaign, another coalition successfully challenged the Reagan administration on Latin America. It consisted of innumerable grassroots groups with direct contacts in Central America, which were linked by a few national organizations. These groups disseminated information from sources abroad, mounted public pressure, and lobbied in Congress. Their main focus was on human rights abuses in El Salvador and Honduras and U.S. intervention in the civil war in Nicaragua through the contras. In the former two countries, transnational associations channeled economic help to revolutionary forces and peasant war victims, exposed human rights abuses, and challenged U.S. ties to military regimes. On Nicaragua, peace groups lobbied and disseminated information. In all three cases they worked with the international community. Pacifists also brought organized nonviolent action to bear in the solidarity campaign.

NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION

From World War I on, a core of pacifists supported domestic reform programs as a concomitant of cultivating labor and reform constituencies for peace. Increasingly, they developed techniques of nonviolent direct action (often modeled on the example of Mohandas Gandhi) that they employed on behalf of labor and especially in the civil rights struggle. Thus, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE, 1942) was nourished by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. By the time of the Reverend Martin Luther King's campaign to desegregate buses in Montgomery, Alabama (1955–1956), a few pacifists had considerable experience with these forms of protest. The Fellowship of Reconciliation, American Friends Service Committee, and War Resisters' League played an active role in the early civil rights movement about the same time that the core of radical pacifists in the Committee for Nonviolent Direct Action employed civil disobedience in the test-ban campaign. Accordingly, nonviolent direct action was a ready tool in the pacifist repertoire during the Vietnam War.

The technique took many forms: it involved returning or burning draft cards, trespassing, blocking arms shipments and troop trains, or otherwise challenging authority. On occasion it meant defiling or destroying draft records or providing sanctuary for draft resisters. It was street theater, designed to dramatize the tragedy and moral turpitude that pacifists attached to the war. Occasionally, direct action was applied violently by nonpacifists, and then it was counterproductive.

It was again applied in the 1980s campaign against nuclear weapons, notably in the actions of the Berrigans' Plowshares group, which aimed to defile or destroy missile components, or of Women's Pentagon Action. By that time the technique had become widely, even legally, accepted as a viable form of public protest. It found expression in the last decade of the twentieth century as a form of protest against economic globalism, where it appears to have inclined governments to be more discreet if not more responsive to protest.

TRANSNATIONAL LINKS

It has become conventional to regard transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as players in the foreign relations field. The peace movement, viewed as a transnational social movement, spans two centuries, and its pacifist core comprises a century of transnational experience.

The International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR, 1919), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF, 1919), and the War Resisters' International (WRI, 1921) all were transnational associations with strong U.S. components. Except for the WRI, they were formed during World War I. (Indeed, the WILPF derived from a 1915 meeting in The Hague, where mainly pacifist women from the then belligerent countries delegated emissaries to heads of government in search of a mediated peace.) In wartime these groups linked isolated pacifists and conscripted war resisters. Thereafter they cooperated in relief and reconstruction projects, except that the WRI focused on providing a socialist matrix for war resistance.

In the interwar years the WILPF established an office in Geneva from which it sought to mobilize a transnational, citizen constituency for disarmament and other League of Nations initiatives. Pacifists in fascist countries were part of an international network. As the prospect of war grew again, U.S. pacifists strengthened their international ties, sponsoring colleagues from abroad to the United States on behalf of neutrality legislation.

The largely pacifist-initiated U.S. test-ban coalition of the 1950s was part of a world movement, as was its successor campaign against nuclear weapons in the 1980s. In both cases transnational coordination was secondary to national concerns, although the 1980s campaign was explicitly interfaced with the UN agenda. Similarly, pacifists extended their international links during the Vietnam War. The Fellowship of Reconciliation mounted an ambitious attempt to coordinate Vietnamese Buddhist and American antiwar efforts, publicized the existence and persecution of antiwar South Vietnamese, sent reconciliation and information teams to North Vietnam, and tried to relate public protest in Europe to that in the United States.

In Latin America the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and its U.S. national chapter worked from the 1960s to the 1980s to spread the concept and techniques of nonviolent resistance as a viable alternative to both violent revolution and apathy. U.S. civil rights and Fellowship of Reconciliation leaders reached both Protestants and Catholics in Latin America, while IFOR emissaries Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr were particularly effective in Catholic circles. A period of social evangelism and preliminary organization led to the formation of SERPAJ (Servicio Paz y Justicia en América Latina, or Service for Peace and Justice) in 1974. Itself a regional organization, SERPAJ provided Latin American national and church leaders with nonviolent resistance techniques and with contacts in the international community, greatly empowering, for example, Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel of Argentina.

Nonviolent direct action was brought to bear upon the region's human rights crises and civil wars. Beginning in 1983, for example, Witness for Peace stationed trained North Americans in teams along the Nicaraguan border. They helped with economic development, but their high visibility was designed also to deter contra attacks. After U.S. support for the contras was withdrawn in 1988, the Witness for Peace program of intercession was expanded to other areas. Pacifist nonviolent action thus became one of several instruments through which a coalition with transnational linkages effectively challenged U.S. Latin American policy in the 1980s. Meanwhile, within the United States there was a surge of refugees from political life-threats in Central America. The U.S. government's reluctance to grant them asylum led to a sanctuary movement to provide safety, most often in churches. By the time the refugee flow subsided late in the decade, hundreds of sites were networked to smuggle people across borders and provide safe havens and legal and humanitarian services. Sometimes this modern Underground Railroad moved refugees on into Canada. The operation was a case of large-scale civil disobedience so widely condoned that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service was slow to challenge it.

FRAMING POLICY ISSUES WITH PACIFIST PERSPECTIVES

Pacifists have not evolved a vision of foreign policy as coherent as collective security or its counterpart, containment. Nonetheless, they have shared distinctive qualities with which they helped to frame foreign policy issues. These qualities include their transnational orientation,

moral thrust, and skepticism about the efficacy of military force.

Transnational Orientation The orientation of nineteenth-century pacifists was largely religious and resulted from the dualism of Christian perfectionism, which assigned different roles to religious bodies and secular societies. To this was added the antistate individualism of philosophical anarchists and the class analysis of socialists. But none of these elements yielded specific implications for foreign policy.

In the twentieth century the perspective of pacifists was secularized, but it remained essentially ethical and humanistic rather than political. It was oriented to the quality of life and the equitable distribution of power rather than to the political relations of states. In this sense, leading pacifists found World War I, for all its magnitude, to be irrelevant to the solution of fundamental world problems. What they found truly basic was human need, creativity, and community. Progressive pacifists, and especially the articulate women among them, thus brought a strong sense of community to peace work (by contrast to the social, legal, and political structures emphasized by other peace advocates). They eventually supported the League of Nations, but they harbored the reservation that such international organizations were inadequate vehicles for change and human welfare.

But some pacifists were systems oriented. The outstanding pacifist analyst of international affairs in the 1930s was Kirby Page, who argued that traditional European rivalries had vitiated the League of Nations and would lead to another world war unless a new foundation could be built for international relations. Ironically, although pacifists viewed historical revisionism as the basis for a realistic assessment of traditional diplomacy and a justification for radically internationalizing world power, many Americans used it as their justification for a new isolationism.

Following World War II some pacifists followed pacifist leader Abraham J. Muste in seeking a new basis for a transnational foreign policy. By the 1950s, Muste viewed the Third World as the fulcrum for a global policy beyond the bipolar terms of the Cold War. This notion was taken up in the following decade by some New Left radicals; but as a basis for foreign policy analysis, it was eclipsed by the rhetoric against nuclear arms and then war in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the American Fellowship of Reconciliation and other pacifists actively promoted the "Third Force" concept of Vietnamese Buddhists as a standard against which to frame U.S. policy goals.

Moral Emphasis The moral emphasis of nineteenth-century pacifism was individualistic. Pacifists tended to assume that good people would make a good world. Twentieth-century pacifists, however, initially reflected the Progressive emphasis on social environmentalism. They included war among the social institutions in which good men and women become enmeshed with devastating consequences. Accordingly, they made pacifism an expression of social ethics; and their journal, *The World Tomorrow* (published 1918–1934), became the most forthright exponent of the social gospel. "If war is sin," wrote Kirby Page, then it must be abjured and overcome by every available stratagem. Their essentially moral outlook enabled several pacifist leaders to transcend the narrow allegiances to specific programs that set so many internationalists at odds with one another.

In the 1920s, for example, Page and his colleagues made futile attempts to devise a plan of unity between the advocates of a World Court and of a general treaty to outlaw war. Similarly, in the 1930s pacifists were able to write an umbrella platform that attracted nonpacifist internationalists to their Emergency Peace Campaign, with its neutralist bias. In 1957 a pacifist nucleus stimulated the formation of both the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and the Committee for Nonviolent Direct Action in order to enlist both liberal and pacifist constituencies in action against nuclear arms. And in the 1960s, a generalized sense of moral outrage accounted for whatever cohesion there was in the organized antiwar movement. It was the basis on which pacifists could associate with groups having nonpacifist political biases.

The very sense of moral commitment that led to comprehensiveness in some circumstances engendered division in others. Ideologies often have served as standards of factional loyalty within out-of-power groups, and the principled total repudiation of violence and warfare sometimes functioned in this way among pacifists in the coalitions they joined. A few examples illustrate this problem. Prior to the Civil War, the American Peace Society was impelled by a sense of moral obligation, but it was wracked by factional disputes over the question of whether to prohibit all wars or only aggressive ones. Again,

in World War I absolute pacifism was both the cohesive element of pacifist organization and the reason that prowar liberals refused to work with pacifists even for liberal goals. Although the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, formed just after the war, included pacifists Jane Addams and Emily Balch, the coalition was too broad for Fanny Garrison Villard and other absolutists, who created the separate Women's Peace Society. Early in the 1930s both the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Socialist Party were sharply divided over how completely they should renounce violence in a potential class struggle. Socialists never recovered from the political effects of that controversy, and they also were faced with the theoretical issue of whether to support an antifascist war.

By 1938 pacifist groups were united against intervention, but they tended to withdraw from political action in order to prepare communities of believers for the coming crisis. During World War II the pacifist community was divided over the implications of its moral commitment to conscientious objection, and its support groups disagreed about the limits of cooperation with Civilian Public Service, the administrative agency for objectors.

The antiwar movement of the 1960s was no more immune to factionalism than its predecessors, and the division was often over conflicting principles. Divisive issues included whether to exclude communists from coalitions, whether to criticize North Vietnamese and communist policy in the context of analyses of American involvement, tactics for demonstrations, and organizational principles within the movement. Protest during the Vietnam conflict was united under an intense sense of moral outrage, but it also was divided by the question of allegiance to specific principles, of which the total repudiation of violence and authoritarianism was one.

In any case, pacifists have reinforced an essentially ethical interpretation of national interest: that world interest should be a criterion of national policy and that the concomitants of peace are change as well as order, justice as well as stability. This moral thrust is not unique to pacifists, but it has been sharpened by their participation in American peace movements.

Skepticism of War No less than belief, skepticism has characterized pacifist propaganda and attitudes. Indeed, modern pacifism was formed in opposition to a popular war, the so-called Great War, and to the power assumed by government in it. That skepticism became a valuable credential when disillusionment followed the war. Pacifists themselves assiduously propagated skepticism about the justness of specific wars, the credibility of war aims, and the constructive potential of victory. For most of the twentieth century they challenged the general claim that preparedness deters warfare and the specific claims of military security needs. From Woodrow Wilson's 1916 preparedness campaign to legislation for arms spending in the 1920s and nuclear arms in the 1950s, from the inauguration of conscription in 1917 to its reinstatement in 1940 and the peacetime draft of 1948, the small body of pacifists constituted a core of political opposition. They challenged not only programs but also the rationale for them. Some pacifists also marshaled economic and anti-imperialist interpretations of war to expose the economic linkages of warfare and to challenge official explanations of foreign policy. And they propagated skepticism about the efficacy of American intervention abroad, whether public or covert, whether in World War I or the Cold War, in Southeast Asia or Latin America.

Skepticism about the use of military power and the rationale for violence has been extended to systematic inquiries about the nature of power by building first on the experience of Mohandas Gandhi and then on American reform experience. Late-twentieth-century scholarship put nonviolent application of social force on a systematic and empirical basis and explored its implications for national security. In this sense the study of nonviolence is no longer confined to ethical pacifism.

Skepticism about foreign policy and governmental accountability is the legacy of the nonresistants and the experience of the peace sects. It was reinforced when pacifists were persecuted or were treated as irrelevant. It is the concomitant of the pacifist values of individual worth, harmony, and brotherhood, contrasted as they are with articles of foreign policy such as national interest, conflict, and sovereignty. Skepticism follows from the pacifist emphasis on a transnational orientation and moral commitment, as against foreign policy based on national interest and pragmatic choices. It is at the heart of the demand that foreign policy be tested publicly by the very values it purports to secure. Skepticism is not unique to pacifism, but it has been significantly sharpened in the American peace movement as a result of pacifist activity.

CONCLUSION

Foreign policymaking can be interpreted as the process of relating national interest to international situations. A crucial stage of the process is the definition of national interest, and it is at this point that ideals are related to concrete self-interests. A given principle of American institutions is that policy choices should be subject to public scrutiny and popular pressure. Accordingly, coalitions of peace advocates are essential in a democratic republic because they serve the twin functions of providing independent education about international affairs and of organizing public opinion and translating it into political pressure.

Pacifism has been significant for foreign policymaking insofar as pacifists have influenced peace coalitions. Pacifists have broadened the popular base of pressure, stimulated political organization, and developed techniques with which minorities may challenge majority consensus. They also have imbued the peace movements with such distinctive qualities as their transnational orientation, moral thrust, and skepticism about the efficacy of military force to bring about orderly change or an equitable distribution of world power.

Furthermore, organized pacifists have occasionally played historical roles in consensus formation, notably in the resistance to preparedness and intervention in World War I, in the neutrality controversy of 1935–1937, in constraining nuclear weapons, in the protest against the Vietnam War, and in solidarity with Latin Americans resisting repression. They have attempted to abolish conscription and have liberalized the treatment of conscientious objectors. At the opening of the twenty-first century, pacifists mobilized Nobel Peace Prize winners to challenge U.S. sanctions on Iraq and were working directly with the United Nations to promote a culture of peace.

Influenced by social-movement approaches, modern analysts have treated peace movements as transnational social change movements, often with liberal pacifists at their core. Pacifists in this sense can be understood as integral to foreign policymaking as they collectively interact with the general public, national government, other national and international nongovernmental organizations, and international agencies.

Most people who repudiate violence and war on the basis of pacifist beliefs are not politically active. But even their faith is significant for American foreign policy in two respects. First, in its conduct of foreign relations, including warfare, the nation has been obligated to protect principled dissent from persecution or repression. The fact that this rule has been abrogated does not minimize its constraint on the foreign policy process. Second, the definition of national interest and power is subject to openly advocated alternative conceptions. Whatever the merits of pacifist judgments on specific policies, the free existence of pacifism and its political expression constitute a significant index of the consistency of foreign policymaking with democratic institutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackerman, Peter, and Jack DuVall. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict.* New York, 2000. A sweeping account of twentieth-century nonviolent campaigns that form the global context of U.S. activist pacifism.

Allen, Devere. *The Fight for Peace.* New York, 1930. Written by a journalist and editor who advocated war resistance and political activism, this substantial volume remains an important primary source of pacifist thought and history.

Alonso, Harriet Hyman. *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights.* Effectively fills a gender gap in the history of twentieth-century peace activism.

Brock, Peter. *Pacifism in the United States from the Colonial Era to the First World War.* Princeton, N.J., 1968. The best history of the subject, thorough in its coverage of pacifism in sects, peace churches, and antebellum reform and includes a valuable bibliography.

Brock, Peter, and Nigel Young. *Pacifism in the Twentieth Century.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1999. A brief, balanced treatment of pacifism in an international context.

Chatfield, Charles. *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1971. Rev. ed., New York, 1973. Traces the development of modern, liberal pacifism through the interwar period in relation to peace coalitions and foreign policy issues, and also in relation to reform movements.

———. *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism.* New York, 1992. The standard survey of the subject that includes a resource mobilization approach.

Curti, Merle Eugene. *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936*. New York, 1936. Unsurpassed for its balanced, chronological narrative of the period and treats pacifism in relation to the broad peace coalition.

DeBenedetti, Charles, with Charles Chatfield. *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1990. A thorough and comprehensive narrative.

Early, Frances H. *A World Without War: How U.S. Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1997. A full treatment that fills a gender gap in the literature on the period.

Howlett, Charles F. *The American Peace Movement: References and Resources*. Boston, 1991. Indispensable resource that combines an annotated bibliography with a history of the field.

Josephson, Harold. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders*. Westport, Conn., 1985. A massive reference work that includes biographies of major pacifists.

Kleidman, Robert. *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1993. A well-researched comparative study.

Klejment, Anne, and Nancy L. Roberts, eds. *American Catholic Pacifism: The Influence of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement*. Westport, Conn., 1996. Treats this modern dimension of Catholicism biographically.

Moskos, Charles C., and John Whiteclay Chambers, II, eds. *The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance*. New York, 1993. The standard treatment.

Patterson, David S. *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914*. Bloomington, Ind., 1976. A scholarly narrative of the rise of the modern peace and internationalist movement with particular attention to organizational roles, social origins, and attitudes.

Powers, Roger S., and William B. Vogele, eds. *Protest, Power, and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women's Suffrage*. New York, 1997. A basic reference work.

Wittner, Lawrence S. *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1983*. Revised ed. Philadelphia, 1984. A work in which pacifists provide the thread of continuity, although Wittner describes shifting and contending patterns within the broad peace coalition; contains an extensive bibliography.

———. *The Struggle Against the Bomb*. Stanford, Calif., 1993. A trilogy (of which two volumes have been published) narrating the history of transnational movement against nuclear weapons; the only comprehensive account of a transnational peace movement.

See also COLLECTIVE SECURITY; DISSENT IN WAR; IDEOLOGY; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; ISOLATIONISM; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; NEUTRALITY; PEACE MOVEMENTS; PUBLIC OPINION.

PAN-AMERICANISM

Thomas M. Leonard and Thomas L. Karnes

According to Joseph B. Lockey, the closest student of Pan-Americanism's early days, the adjective "Pan-American" was first employed by the *New York Evening Post* in 1882, and the noun "Pan-Americanism" was coined by that same journal in 1888. The convening of the first inter-American conference in Washington the next year led to wider usage of the first term about 1890 and popularization of Pan-Americanism in the early years of the twentieth century. While the terms have since become familiar expressions to most of the reading public in the Western Hemisphere, their connotations remain vague. Broadly defined, Pan-Americanism is cooperation between the Western Hemisphere nations in a variety of activities including economic, social, and cultural programs; declarations; alliances; and treaties—though some authorities narrow the definition to include political action only. However, the specific definition must always be partly in error, and the broad one borders on the meaningless.

THE ROOTS OF PAN-AMERICANISM

Pan-Americanism is more easily traced than defined. In the middle of the nineteenth century, various "Pan" movements achieved popularity as adjuncts or exaggerations of the powerful nationalisms of the times, throwbacks to ancient Pan-Hellenism. Pan-Slavism was perhaps the first to acquire some measure of fame; Pan-Hellenism revived about 1860 and was followed by Pan-Germanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Celtism, Pan-Hispanism, and others. Probably all these "Pan" movements share certain predicates: their believers feel some unity, some uniqueness—perhaps superiority—and they share mutual interests, fears, history, and culture. In short, their similarities make them different from the rest of the world, and they combine for strength. Pan-Americanism, however, fails to meet most of those criteria and must fall back upon the weaker elements of a common geographical separation from the rest of the world and something of a common history.

From early colonial times, Western Hemisphere peoples believed that they were unique. Statesmen of the Americas, both North and South, were united in affirming that some force—nature, or perhaps God—had separated the Old World and the New World for a purpose; and this isolation in an unknown land had brought a common colonial experience that deserved the name of "system." Among leaders who saw and described this division was Thomas Jefferson; Henry Clay often argued before Congress for its preservation; Simón Bolívar acted upon it; and President James Monroe's doctrine most fundamentally assumes it.

What were the elements of this American system? First was independence, defined by Clay as freedom from despotism, either domestic or European. Peoples of the Americas believed in a common destiny, a body of political ideals, the rule of law, and cooperation among themselves (at least when threatened from the outside). In later years Secretary of State James G. Blaine saw these factors strengthened by commerce; the Brazilian statesmen Joaquim Nabuco and José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Baron Rio Branco, talked of a common past; Woodrow Wilson thought he saw a unique American spirit of justice.

Americans could not ignore geography. They had moved to, or been born in, an underpopulated continent, where the strife of Europe was put aside and mobility, vertical or horizontal, was easily achieved. Nature isolated the American, and that isolation would produce a different people. But the most apparent difference between Americans and their European cousins was in the form of government. The vastness of America enhanced the individual's worth, and the right of each person to have a share in government found

fertile soil there. Thus, when the Spanish and Portuguese colonies struggled to gain their freedom in the half-century after 1789, most deliberately chose the unfamiliar republican form of government that would safeguard the rights of citizens to choose those who would govern them. Inevitably some constitutions were copied, but that was the plagiarizing of words; the ideas were pandemic. (That a few nonrepublican administrations arose was a matter singularly ignored and always easily explained away to anyone who pursued the puzzle.) From Philadelphia to Tucumán in the Argentine, new constitutions proclaimed that Americans had a new way of life and a new form of government to ensure its continuance.

Nowhere were these American ideas better expressed than in paragraphs of the presidential address that became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe asserted a belief in the existence of two worlds, one monarchical and one republican; the New World was closed to further colonization by the Old, and neither should interfere with the other. Third parties were not to tamper even with regions in the Americas that were still colonies. Whether the U.S. will to protect this separation was based upon geography or, ironically, the British fleet, the doctrine expressed what Americans believed and would fight to preserve.

At times Americans have been carried away with the enthusiasm of their rhetoric and have found unifying interests where they did not exist. Proponents of Pan-Americanism have often spoken of the existence of a common heritage, a statement with limited application, for in the hemisphere there is no common language, culture, or religion. Contrary to most "Pan" movements, Pan-Americanism has little basis in race or ethnicity, and it scarcely seems necessary to belabor the cultural diversity of the persons who bear the name American. If heritage were the chief basis of community, Spanish Americans would have their strongest ties with Spain, Brazilians with Portugal, Anglo-Americans with Great Britain, and so on. Nor can Pan-Americanism ignore those millions of African heritage or those who are indigenous to the Americas. Language and religion are even more varied than race in the Americas and can offer no more means of unification.

Finally, consideration must be given to the geographical basis for Pan-Americanism. It is a fact that the Americas occupy their own hemisphere and that they had been comfortably separated from the disturbances of Europe by great seas until the mid-twentieth century. Clearly this isolation resulted in some community of interest. The danger lies in exaggeration, for the modern traveler soon learns that in terms of dollars, hours, or miles, much of the United States is far closer to Europe than it is to most of Latin America, and Buenos Aires is far closer to Africa than it is to New York or Washington, D.C. In short, it is a fallacy to contend that the Americas are united by their proximity. The Americas, North and South, occupy the same hemisphere, and that does present an important mythology and symbolism to the world. More than that cannot be demonstrated.

Who are the Pan-Americans? No one has ever established requirements for membership nor set forth the procedures by which a people can become part of the elect. Form of government played a more or less clear part; the American nations all seemed to understand that colonies could not participate in Pan-American movements, but that local empires (the only one bearing that title for any duration was Brazil) were welcome. Nations sent delegates to the various conferences called during the nineteenth century primarily because they were invited by the host, not because of any established rules. Thus, some meetings that are classified as Pan-American might have had delegates from only four or five states. After 1889 nearly all of the republics of the hemisphere took part. The proliferation of new states in the years following World War II is reflected in Pan-Americanism, and former British colonies, no matter how small (and perhaps unviable), seem to have been welcomed into the American family, as has Canada, though generally the Canadians have often pursued their own policies. A nation can also be excommunicated, as Cuba was in 1961. And despite sanctions imposed upon Cuba by the Organization of American States (OAS), it continued to have diplomatic and economic relations with several American states, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

PAN-AMERICANISM TO 1850

Pan-Americanism most often expresses itself through international conferences, very loosely joined in the early years, highly structured in more recent decades. In the nineteenth century, conferences were often called to seek combined action against some specific problem. In the twen-

tieth century, sessions have been scheduled long in advance and have had wide-ranging agendas. Attendance at the latter meetings has neared unanimity; in the early days it was irregular, made the worse by slow communications. The record is filled with accounts of delegations not formed in time or sent too late to take part in the proceedings. A final distinction is clear: while in recent times the impetus usually has come from the United States, during the nineteenth century almost all of the leadership came from Spanish America, often to the exclusion of the Anglo-Americans and Portuguese Americans. Some writers, in fact, seeking to divide Pan-Americanism chronologically, have classified the years 1826–1889 as the "old," or Spanish-American, period of the movement.

While many Latin Americans, including José de San Martín, Martínez de Rozas, Bernardo O'Higgins, and Bernardo Monteagudo, understood the necessity for Spanish-American cooperation, the "liberator" of Spanish-American independence, Simón Bolívar, is considered the father of the "old" Pan-Americanism. Long before any other leader, he dreamed of a strong league of American states leading to permanent military and political cooperation. Initially, at least, Bolívar thought of a confederation of only the Spanish-American states, if for no other reason than their common heritage and struggle for freedom from Spain. In 1815 he predicted the creation of three Spanish-American federations: Mexico and Central America, northern Spanish South America, and southern South America. But his ultimate goal, what became known as the "Bolivarian dream," was the unification of all Spanish America. In defeat and in victory his plan never disappeared, and in 1818 he (somewhat inaccurately) wrote to an Argentine friend, "We Americans should have but a single country since in every other way we are perfectly united."

By the 1820s the freedom of most of the Latin American colonies seemed assured, and the United States and some European nations began extending diplomatic recognition to the new governments. Bolívar saw this as an opportunity to implement his plan, and in 1822 he persuaded the government of Gran Colombia to send emissaries to the other South American nations, which resulted in general treaties with Chile, Peru, Buenos Aires, Mexico, and Central America. The signatories agreed to cooperate in sustaining their independence from foreign domination. Still, Bolívar sought much more.

The fear that Spain might attempt to reclaim its empire with the assistance of Europe's Holy Alliance provided Bolívar with the opportunity for his grand alliance. In December 1824 he called for an " assembly of plenipotentiaries" to meet at Panama to address the security issue. Bolívar's notice was addressed to "the American republics, formerly Spanish colonies," and therefore omitted several American states. The invitation included Great Britain, signaling Bolívar's understanding that British support was essential for the success of his confederation. He also permitted the Netherlands to send an observer, apparently without an invitation. Bolívar had ignored both the United States and Brazil, which of course, were not "formerly Spanish colonies"; but when their attendance was sought by other Latin Americans, he posed no objection.

Bolívar's classical training caused him to see Panama as the modern counterpart of the Isthmus of Corinth, and parallel to the Greek experience, he selected Panama as the site of the conference. That unsavory location had many defects as a host of an international conference. In fact, every delegate took ill during the sessions, but it did have the advantage of a central location. In June 1826 the representatives of Peru, Gran Colombia, Mexico, and the Central American Federation met and planned the first steps toward Pan-Americanism.

Technically speaking, attendance was much greater, for in time Gran Colombia was to be divested of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, and in 1838 the Central American Federation was split into its original five parts, which became the republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. In that sense, the four nations accounted for eleven future Latin American republics. But what of the others? The United Provinces of La Plata already evidenced the isolationism and antipathy to alliances that were to mark the policy of its successor state, Argentina. Even more self-contained was Paraguay, which simply declined to be represented. Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia exhibited some interest but for various reasons failed to send delegates to Panama.

Bolívar not only mistrusted U.S. intentions in the hemisphere but thought its presence would preclude an honest discussion about the African slave trade. For its part, when the invitation did come, the United States, officially neutral in Latin America's wars for independence, could quite properly have declined the invitation. However, members of President John Quincy Adams's administration, led by Secretary of State Henry

Clay, were eager to join in any movement toward inter-American cooperation, if for no other reason than economic opportunity. Strong congressional opposition arose. Some of it could be attributed to the Democrats seeking to embarrass the Adams administration, but there were more serious concerns. The isolationists objected to participating in any conclave that might produce a permanent and entangling alliance. Many southerners feared a discussion of the slavery issue. In contrast, representatives from the Northeast saw the need to protect commercial interests against British competition. After four months of debate, Congress approved sending two delegates, but to no avail. One died en route to Panama; the other made no effort to reach Panama, but journeyed instead to Tacubaya, Mexico, where the Spanish-American statesmen planned further meetings.

Rivalries, both petty and large, soon appeared at Panama. Some states professed to fear Bolívar's ambitions; others wanted only a temporary league to complete the independence of Latin America from Europe. Even the role of the British at the sessions was debated. Owing to the local climate and unsanitary conditions, the Panama Congress lasted less than one month, but not before concluding a treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation; a convention providing for future meetings; and a second convention outlining each participating state's financial support for maintenance of an armed force and the confederation's bureaucracy. The treaty contained thirty-one detailed articles designed to implement the treaty's objective: "to support in common defense . . . the sovereignty and independence" of each state against foreign domination.

After signing the agreements, some of the representatives departed for home; others traveled to Tacubaya, a small village near Mexico City, where they planned to reconvene if their governments deemed the effort worthwhile. Some informal talks were held at Tacubaya, but no formal sessions ever took place, and the Panama Congress had to stand upon its completed work. A dismal fate awaited the Panama Congress treaties across Latin America. Only Gran Colombia ratified them all, despite the surprising opposition of Bolívar.

In only one regard can the Panama Congress be looked upon as a success: the fact of its existence perhaps made the holding of future such conferences a bit easier. Little else was accomplished. Why did it fail so badly? The end of the threat from Spain and the beginnings of civil strife all over Latin America had coincided to make the congress a forum for expressing the new republics' distrust of each other. For the time being, the newly independent nations of Latin America set about the task of nation building. Panama was a noble experiment. Though its aims were obviously far ahead of its time, they were appropriate to any time.

The failure of the Panama Congress also demonstrated that its prime mover, Bolívar, had changed his mind about the vast confederation of states, and would concentrate instead upon establishing a tight federation of the Andes with himself as permanent dictator. This change left a leadership vacuum in Pan-Americanism that was briefly filled by Mexico. Despite rapid shifts from conservative to liberal administrations, the Mexican government for a decade followed a policy of urging the Latin American states to consummate some of the plans drafted at Panama and help protect the region against the possibility of European intervention. Armed with a proposal for a treaty of union, and calling for renewal of the Panama discussions, Mexican ministers were dispatched to several capitals. Mexico was willing that the meetings be convened in almost any convenient spot, but the suggestion received little support. This first bid of 1832 was repeated in 1838, 1839, and 1840, by which time Mexico faced an increasing North American presence in Texas. However, the other nations lacked Mexico's concern, and the proposals did not result in even one conference. Only when the South Americans feared for their own security did they decide to band together again.

The United States also distanced itself from Latin America. President James Monroe's 1823 announcement that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits to European encroachments because the hemispheric nations shared common democratic and republican ideals lost its luster as U.S. diplomats reported back from the region that the Latin American nations were anything but democratic or republican. Nor did the visions of commercial success ever materialize. These same diplomats found the British, who helped to finance Latin America's independence, well entrenched.

The second Latin American conference took place in Lima, Peru, from December 1847 to March 1848. The conference was in response to two threats: the fear of Spanish designs upon South America's west coast and the U.S. incursion into Mexico. General Juan José Flores, a Venezuelan-born conservative, became Ecuador's first

president but was subsequently exiled. Flores went to Europe for help and appeared to be successful in raising private troops and a fleet to restore himself to the presidency. Anticipating an invasion by Spain or Great Britain, the government of Peru invited the American republics to meetings at Lima in December 1847. The sessions lasted until March 1848, even though it was known by that time that the British government would prohibit the sailing of the Spanish fleet.

The United States was invited to send a representative, ostensibly to demonstrate to Europe that all the hemispheric nations would unite against a foreign threat. The Latin Americans also intended to remind the North Americans, then engaged in a war with Mexico, that the conference's fundamental purpose was to demonstrate mutual respect for the territorial integrity of all nations. President James K. Polk refused the invitation to send a delegate and instead dispatched J. Randolph Clay as a nonparticipating observer.

Only ministers from Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru participated in the Lima conference, where they concluded four treaties, most of them concerning mutual assistance. Only Colombia ratified one of the agreements. Ironically, Clay, the U.S. observer, expressed great satisfaction with the conference resolutions regarding noncolonization and denying Europe the right to intervene in hemispheric affairs. The conference concluded just as the U.S. Congress was ratifying the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which stripped Mexico of its vast northern territories for annexation to the United States.

PAN-AMERICANISM, 1850–1900

What appeared to be the insatiable U.S. appetite for territory prompted two Latin American meetings in 1856. Santiago, Chile, was the site of the third Pan-American conference under Spanish-American auspices. The conference was called because Ecuador proposed granting the United States the right to mine guano on the Galápagos Islands, an action that disturbed Ecuador's Pacific Coast neighbors. The republics of Peru, Ecuador, and Chile sent delegations to Santiago, where they drafted plans for another confederation and agreed upon joint measures for handling "piratical" expeditions. In September 1856 the delegates signed the Continental Treaty, dealing with many aspects of international law, filibustering, and acts of exiles, as well as the usual nod in the direction of a confederation. Significantly, while all of the nations of Latin America were urged to join, including Portuguese-speaking Brazil, the United States was not invited to attend the conference or to join the confederation. But once more failure ensued. The Continental Treaty was not ratified.

Meanwhile the United States, not a European nation, appeared as the chief threat to Latin America's territorial integrity. Its acquisition of more than one-third of Mexico was followed by the presence of filibusters in the circum-Caribbean region. William Walker's filibustering expedition into Nicaragua caused the ministers of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, New Granada, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela assigned to Washington, D.C., to sign a treaty of alliance and confederation on 9 November 1856. The signatories pledged themselves to prevent the organizing of expeditions by political exiles against an allied government and, if an attack occurred, to provide military assistance to the aggrieved nation. Hoping to convert this arrangement into a Hispanic-American Confederation, the delegates called for a conference to convene in Lima in December 1857. As in the past, nothing materialized. The Washington agreement was not ratified, and the conference was not convened.

The fourth and last of the "old" Spanish-American conferences took place at Lima, Peru, in 1864. The weakness of many of the Latin American states and the U.S. preoccupation with its Civil War had allowed a series of European flirtations in the American hemisphere. Spain claimed the reannexation of the Dominican Republic in 1861; Spain, Great Britain, and especially France threatened, and then invaded, Mexico; and Spain occupied Peru's Chincha Islands to collect debts, under the pretext that Peru was still a Spanish colony. In response, in 1864, the Colombian government encouraged the Peruvians to invite all former Spanish colonies to a conference at Lima to take up the matter of intervention by foreign powers. In addition to Peru, states attending included Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The United States and Brazil were not invited, ostensibly because they were not former Spanish colonies. The Lima Congress failed to negotiate with Spain for the withdrawal of its troops from the Chincha Islands, and when the delegates turned their full attention to the usual grand treaty of confederation, the failure was just as complete. Once again no nation ratified any of the agreements. The end of the American Civil

War and the renewed preoccupation of Spain and France with domestic and foreign problems elsewhere account for the departure of those two nations from their Latin American adventures.

The War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1870), which pitted Paraguay against a loose league of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), in which Chile easily mastered Bolivia and Peru, left bitter residues that in the short run meant the end of any program of Pan-Americanism led by Spanish-American republics. Although a few technical and nonpolitical conferences were held in the next few years, Pan-Americanism was discarded until the United States assumed the responsibility.

U.S. leadership marks the beginning of the "new" Pan-Americanism, dating from the 1880s until its demise in the 1930s. The "new" Pan-Americanism differed significantly from the "old." The four early conferences were dominated by the Spanish-American states and concerned themselves with problems that, while not exclusively Spanish American, seemed to threaten those states particularly. The meetings were usually provoked by the threat of outside aggression, and the solutions sought were political and military in nature. The "new" Pan-Americanism was more inclusive yet less ambitious in scope. It focused on low-profile issues, which contributed to increased conference participation and the building of Pan-Americanism into an institution of imposing size and machinery. Concomitantly, Latin Americans became increasingly vocal regarding U.S. dominance of hemispheric relations, culminating at the 1928 Havana conference.

Credit for inaugurating the series of "new" Pan-American conferences rests with James G. Blaine, who served as secretary of state in the brief (March to September 1881) administration of James A. Garfield. Blaine owed much of his genuine interest in Latin America to his admiration for Henry Clay. Both men envisioned a free-trade relationship among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. While U.S.–Latin American trade was nearly immeasurable during Monroe's presidency in the 1820s, by the 1880s the United States faced a healthy unfavorable trade balance caused by its large purchases of Latin America's raw materials and the small sales of manufactured goods to the area in return.

In addition to trade issues, Blaine confronted several ongoing disputes. The worst of these was the War of the Pacific, in which Bolivia had been decisively defeated by Chile, whose troops were occupying Lima, Peru. The Chileans gave every indication of making vast territorial acquisitions at Bolivia's and Peru's expense. In addition, several boundary disputes threatened the stability of Latin America and provoked Blaine into assuming the unpopular role of peacemaker. Blaine's intentions were better than either his methods or his agents, and he incurred significant displeasure from Latin Americans during his brief first term in office. Following Garfield's death, Blaine resigned the secretaryship. Before leaving the State Department, however, he promoted a call for the first International Conference of American States, to be held in Washington, D.C. Blaine's successors, Frederick T. Freylinghuysen and Thomas F. Bayard, had little interest in Latin American affairs. Freylinghuysen withdrew Blaine's invitation for an Inter-American conference in Washington.

The movement was renewed a few years later by the U.S. Congress, when it sponsored a survey of Latin America's economic conditions. With a more friendly atmosphere, the First International Conference convened in 1889, when the secretary of state was again James G. Blaine. All of the American states except the Dominican Republic (its absence was due to U.S. failure to ratify a trade treaty with its Caribbean neighbor) sent delegations of high caliber. With some opposition Blaine was chosen chairman of the sessions, a post in which he demonstrated considerable tact and skill.

In the midst of its industrial revolution, the United States anticipated that the conference would bring economic benefits through a customs union. Toward that end, the Latin American delegates were entertained lavishly and given an impressive and fatiguing six thousand mile railroad tour through the industrial heart of the nation. Understanding the U.S. intention, the Latin American delegates, led by the Argentines, failed to accept Blaine's proposed customs union. As producers of raw materials, the Latin Americans preferred open markets. Opposition also came from some U.S. congressmen, particularly those from the nation's agricultural sectors. Instead, a program of separate reciprocal trade treaties was recommended; a few were instituted, decades ahead of the Good Neighbor program of the 1930s. On the political front, an ambitious arbitration treaty was watered down in conference, nullified by a minority of delegations, and ratified by no one.

The most notable achievement of the Washington conference was the establishment of the International Union of American Republics for the

collection and distribution of commercial information. The agency to execute this command was the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, supervised by the U.S. secretary of state in Washington, D.C. This bureau met regularly and, expanding in both size and functions, became a useful agency to the American states, though a far cry from the Pan-Americanism of Bolívar's day. The date of the union's establishment, 14 April 1890, became known as Pan-American Day.

Although the delegates to the First International Conference had not scheduled any future meetings, they left Washington with the clear intention of so doing. Nothing happened until 1899, when President William McKinley suggested another conclave. Only then did the Commercial Bureau act. It selected Mexico City as the site for the second conference and handled the drafting of agenda and invitations.

PAN-AMERICANISM, 1900–1945

In this fashion the institutionalization of the International Conferences of American States developed. To reduce the appearance of U.S. domination, the conferences were held in the various Latin American capital cities, with the presumed hope of meeting in all of them. The record of attendance was very high, frequently unanimous, and only once were as many as three states absent (from Santiago, Chile, in 1923). The frequency of the sessions varied because of world wars, but four- or five-year intervals were the norm.

The second through sixth conferences (Mexico City, 1901–1902; Rio de Janeiro, 1906; Buenos Aires, 1910; Santiago, Chile, 1923; Havana, Cuba, 1928) experienced minimal success. The issues recurring most prominently at these meetings were arbitration, hemispheric peace, trade, the forcible collection of debts, U.S. dominance of the organization, and intervention by one state in the affairs of another (and, in the 1920s, arms control). Specific accomplishments of these many conferences were more modest. Resolutions, conventions, and treaties were often debated, but compromise was endless, and major solutions were rarely reached or ratified. One exception was the 1923 Gondra Treaty, designed to create machinery for the peaceful settlement of American disputes. This treaty served as the basis for similar machinery in the later Organization of American States. Major alterations included the substitution in 1910 of the name Pan-American Union for the Commercial Bureau, and in popular usage Pan-American Conference replaced International Conference of American States. From time to time some delegates expressed their dismay that Pan-Americanism was taking no steps toward the confederation so often praised, but the majority clearly preferred the use of the Pan-American Union as a sounding board for international public opinion and an agency that moved slowly in the settlement of specific problems.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES

First	Washington, D.C.	1889–1890
Second	Mexico City	1901–1902
Third	Rio de Janeiro	1906
Fourth	Buenos Aires	1910
Fifth	Santiago	1923
Sixth	Havana	1928
Seventh	Montevideo	1933
Eighth	Lima	1938
Ninth	Bogota	1948
Tenth	Caracas	1954

The growing U.S. presence in the circum-Caribbean region after 1898 gave the Latin Americans cause for concern, and they used the Pan-American forums as the vehicle to chastise Washington's imperialistic policies. Before World War I, at Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires, the Latin Americans insisted on recognition of national sovereignty as a means to thwart U.S. intervention. For the same reasons, they joined the League of Nations following the end of World War I, hoping to use that international forum to curtail U.S. ambitions south of the Rio Grande River. When the United States failed to join the league, the Latin Americans lost interest in the organization, and by the mid-1920s their attendance at annual meetings had dwindled greatly. At Santiago in 1923 and again at Havana in 1928, the Latin Americans vociferously protested the U.S. domination of the hemispheric agenda and its continued presence in several circum-Caribbean countries. Only the efforts of former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes prevented the passage of a resolution declaring that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another." This was the last major U.S. stand on behalf of its interventionist policies.

In addition to the growing Latin American pressure, other factors influenced the United States to abandon its interventionist policy, and with it bring to an end the era of the "new" Pan-Americanism. The roots of the U.S. policy change can be traced to the end of World War I, which left Europe incapable of threatening the Western Hemisphere. Also, within the State Department since the early 1920s there was a growing frustration about the failure of the numerous interventions. The 1924 Democratic Party platform criticized the interventionist policy, a position repeated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1928. What did the United States have to show for its interventions in the circum-Caribbean region? the critics asked. As secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover argued that the larger and more prosperous Latin American states refused to purchase U.S. goods as a protest against its Caribbean presence. And as president-elect in 1928, Hoover embarked on a goodwill tour of Central and South America, a harbinger of forthcoming change. Subsequently, State Department official Joshua Reuben Clark's *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* renounced U.S. interventions in Latin America's domestic affairs under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.

The policy shift climaxed on 4 March 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt, in his inaugural address, promised to be a "good neighbor." Originally intended for all the world, in application it came to apply to Latin America. A further indicator of Roosevelt's intention not to interfere in Latin America's internal affairs was the selection of Sumner Welles as assistant secretary of state, a man who believed that hemispheric relations should be conducted on the basis of absolute equality. The policy shift was completed at the 1933 Montevideo conference, where the U.S. delegation approved the Convention on Rights and Duties of the States. It affirmed that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." The Latin American delegates at Montevideo were equally pleased when Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced that their countries need not fear intervention during the Roosevelt administration. Still, the Latin Americans needed to be reassured. Not sharing Washington's concerns about the rising European war clouds, they were not interested in discussing hemispheric defense at the 1936 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held in Buenos Aires, and in 1938 at the Lima Conference. Instead, they pressed for, and received, additional U.S. pledges of nonintervention. With these pledges, the "new Pan-Americanism" passed into history.

Roosevelt's words were followed by pragmatic actions. American troops were withdrawn from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The United States did not interfere in either the Cuban or the Panamanian political turmoil of the 1930s. In fact, a new treaty with Panama provided additional advantages to the isthmian republic. Nor did the United States act when Central American dictators Tiburcio Carías, Maximiliano Hernández-Martínez, Anastasio Somoza, and Jorge Ubico illegally extended their presidential terms. A potentially explosive question raised by Mexico's expropriation of vast foreign oil holdings was treated by the Roosevelt administration as a matter of concern between the Mexican government and the oil companies.

Contrasted with the "old," the "new" Pan-Americanism was marked by more concern for nonpolitical objectives, both technical and social. The "old" had been geographically more restrictive and often purely Spanish; the "new" was deliberately hemispheric in scope, and the leadership clearly rested with the United States. Just as the "new" Pan-Americanism was passing into history, the trajectory of inter-American relations took yet another turn, and again the United States took the leadership role. Confronted with international crises—the Great Depression, World War II, and the cold war—the United States attempted to incorporate the Pan-American movement into its international policies.

The world was staggering under economic collapse when Franklin D. Roosevelt took the presidential oath in March 1933. World trade had declined by 25 percent in volume and by 66 percent in value since 1929. At the same time, U.S. trade with Latin America had declined more drastically: exports, by 78 percent in value and imports, by 68 percent. Convinced that economic nationalism exacerbated the depression, Secretary of State Hull sought the liberalization of trade polices. Congress consented in 1934 with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which enabled the U.S. government to strike beneficial tariff agreements with trading partners. Latin America fit neatly into the plan because it did not have a competitive industrial sector, nor did its major exports compete with U.S. commodities. In comparison, the United States was in a stronger position because it could serve as Latin America's chief supplier of manufactured goods, and given the fact that reciprocal trade agree-

ments favored the principal supplier, tariff negotiations would focus only on products that constituted the chief source of supply. In sum, the act gave the U.S. a favorable negotiating position.

The Latin Americans understood the U.S. position, and that understanding contributed to the refusal of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay to reach trade agreements with the United States. The United States managed to conclude agreements only with countries that were heavily dependent upon its markets for agriculture (usually monoculture) exports: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the end, the reciprocal trade agreements with these countries had little economic impact, but for the Central American dictators the agreements provided an air of legitimacy for their illegal regimes.

Negotiations with Brazil illustrated the need to address another international issue: the threat of Nazi Germany to the Western Hemisphere. In addition to Brazil, influential German communities were located in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Paraguay. Over the course of the 1930s the United States viewed these communities as threats to hemispheric stability by spreading German propaganda, sending funds back to Berlin to be used for Nazi purposes, and engaging in espionage and, possibly, sabotage. The increased U.S. concern with Axis influence prompted Washington policymakers to commence western hemispheric defense plans in 1936. For the most part, Latin America's political leadership did not share Washington's concerns, and believed that Roosevelt was using the European troubles to circumvent the nonintervention pledge made in 1933 at Montevideo. Only after the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the fall of France in June 1940 did the Latin American nations feel a sense of urgency about hemispheric defense. Until then, the United States obtained only an innocuous agreement at the 1936 Buenos Aires conference, reaffirmed at Lima in 1938, which called for consultation when an emergency threatened the hemisphere. The Lima conference was the last regular meeting of the American states until after World War II, but on three occasions the foreign ministers convened to confront wartime issues. Their work proved essential to the continuity of Pan-Americanism at a time when world-scale military agreements took precedence.

The first meeting of the foreign ministers took place in Panama City after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939. To protect hemispheric neutrality, the ministers agreed upon a safety zone south of Canada, extending an average of three hundred miles out to sea around the remainder of the hemisphere. Belligerent nations were warned not to commit hostile acts within this zone. Within a matter of weeks the zone was violated by both the British and the Germans, and frequent ship scuttlings in American waters in 1940 made the zone something of a nullity. More important, however, was the unanimity of the Americans in their resolve to keep the war away.

The second meeting of the Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the full title of these sessions) followed the fall of France to the Germans in June 1940. Again at the urging of the United States, the ministers met at Havana, Cuba, in July to discuss the question of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere and the danger of their falling into German hands. They agreed upon the Act of Havana, which provided that if a non-American state (Germany) should attempt to obtain from another non-American state (France, for example) any islands or other regions in the Americas, one or more American states would step in to administer such territory until it was able to govern itself freely or had been restored to its previous status. Fear that the Axis powers might attempt to occupy some of the many possessions in America was real enough; however, no such attempt was made. The ministers also affirmed the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas, the gist of which was that an attack upon the sovereignty of any American state was to be treated as an attack upon them all, a further broadening or multilateralizing of the Monroe Doctrine in process since 1933.

The third and last wartime meeting of the foreign ministers convened at the request of Chile and the United States as a consequence of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The statesmen met at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, by which time ten American nations, including the United States, had declared war upon the Axis powers. The U.S. military services were not anxious for the participation of underequipped and poorly trained Latin American forces in a global struggle. U.S. military officials agreed with many of the ministers that the proper gesture would be the severing of diplomatic relations, which would eliminate the Axis influence in the Americas, and thereby help to reduce the flow of classified information to those governments. However, a strong

declaration requiring the American states to break relations (favored by Secretary Hull) was so rigidly opposed by Argentina and Chile that the U.S. delegation, led by Sumner Welles, settled for a milder version that merely recommended such an action. The issue was deeper than one of semantics, for the Argentines were doing more than expressing their usual reluctance to appear to be following U.S. policy. The Argentine military was actually pro-German and gave considerable assistance to the Axis in the war.

The most important agreements at Rio dealt with the elimination of Axis influence in the Americas. With the exception of Argentina and Chile, the Latin American governments agreed to cooperate with the United States in deporting selected German nationals and their descendants back to Germany or to internment camps in the United States. Those who remained behind would be subject to tight supervision of their properties and greatly restricted freedoms. With a few exceptions, such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the war impacted adversely upon the Latin American economies, setting the stage for postwar political and social upheaval.

The United States also spread its ideals, values, and culture throughout Latin America via the wartime Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller. OIAA proselytized the war's democratic objectives through educational programs and dissemination of propaganda literature and Spanish-language Walt Disney films. It sponsored visits by U.S. artists, writers, and athletes to Latin America, and brought many Latin American students and professionals to U.S. institutions for advanced training. Of course, this was Pan-Americanism as seen by the United States, and it did not always achieve universal acceptance. Sometimes too glossy, and frequently expensive, it was reasonably sincere even when some cultural programs insulted the intelligence of the Latin Americans. But under the veneer was a solid construction of goodwill, and the U.S. policymakers—Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, Nelson Rockefeller, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—understood the Latin American need for equality and dignity.

PAN-AMERICANISM SINCE 1945

Toward the close of the war, the American states met in the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in February 1945. Uninvited Argentina was conspicuously absent. The diplomats focused their attention upon the place that Pan-American regionalism would have in the plans for the proposed United Nations. Prodded by the United States, the Latin Americans insisted upon their right to protect themselves without having to seek the approval of the UN Security Council. Ultimately this demand was approved in the UN Charter. The conference also recommended that Argentina, after declaring war on the Axis, be permitted to participate in the San Francisco sessions that formalized the United Nations. The delegates drafted the Act of Chapultepec, which required the states to conclude a treaty of reciprocal assistance, a treaty on the settlement of disputes, and a new regional arrangement that would substitute a permanent treaty for the various informal agreements underlying the inter-American association in the past. These objectives were concluded in 1947 at a special conference in Rio de Janeiro and in 1948 at Bogota, Colombia, when the next regular International Conference of American States (the ninth) convened. Significantly, these meetings came at a time when the Truman administration was fashioning a Latin American policy that reflected its larger global strategy of containing Soviet aggression.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947, committed the signatories to the solidarity sought against external aggression since Bolívar's days. An armed attack by a state against any American state was henceforth considered an attack against all, and each contracting party agreed to assist in meeting the attack. The assistance would be rendered collectively, following a consultation of the inter-American system and in accordance with the constitutional process of each nation, a recognition that not all countries were practicing democracies. The same obligations also applied should an armed attack occur within the region. In 1947, however, influenced by the World War II experience, policymakers focused upon potential external aggression.

The 1948 Bogota conference was nearly destroyed when the assassination of a popular Liberal Party leader was followed by citywide rioting. Nevertheless, the sessions were completed. The treaty for the pacific settlement of disputes was signed, but with so many additions and amendments that several states failed to ratify it. The major achievement was the reorganization of the entire inter-American system by the Charter

of the Organization of American States (OAS), the first permanent treaty basis for the old structure. The charter declares the principles upon which the organization is based and the necessity for such machinery to be welded into the UN framework. Briefly, the OAS accomplishes its purposes by means of the following:

1. The Inter-American Conference, the supreme organ of the OAS, meeting every five years to decide general policy and action.
2. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, called to discuss urgent matters and to serve as the organ of consultation.
3. The Council of the Organization of American States, meeting in permanent session and composed of one delegate from each member state. The council takes cognizance of matters referred to it by the agencies listed above and supervises the Pan-American Union.
4. The Pan-American Union is the general secretariat of the OAS, with a wide variety of functions. In addition there are several organs of the Council, specialized organizations, and special agencies and commissions.

In the 1960s several amendments were made to the OAS charter, the most fundamental being the replacement of the Inter-American Conference with an annual general assembly.

The final measure that incorporated Pan-Americanism into the U.S. global strategies came with U.S. congressional approval of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1951. Since the end of World War II in 1945, the Truman administration had pushed Congress to approve MAP, designed to harmonize military equipment, training, and strategy throughout the hemisphere. Congress consistently resisted, on the grounds that the United States would be blamed for securing the positions of Latin American dictators. But with a global cold war, Congress relented. From 1951 through 1960, the U.S. materiel supplied to Latin America focused upon the need to resist external aggression in general, and to protect the Panama Canal and Venezuelan and Mexican oil supplies, in particular. In addition, Latin American military officers received training at U.S. military bases and institutions, most notably the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone.

During the period 1945–1951, administration spokesmen continued to espouse traditional Pan-American ideals, such as the need for political stability, faith in democracy, and promises of nonintervention. While preaching these ideals, the United States ignored Latin American demands for an end to dictatorships and an improvement in the quality of life for the less fortunate. Until the mid-1950s, communism in Europe and Asia appeared more important.

In Latin America the tendency to indict social and political reformers as communists intensified as the cold war took root. Fearing the personal consequences of changes to the established order, Latin America's political leadership and socioeconomic elites came to accept the U.S. view that these reformers were Moscow-directed communists and that they were part of the Soviet scheme for world domination. The test case became Guatemala, where reformers Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz introduced social programs that challenged the local elite's privileges. Arbenz's nationalization of United Fruit Company lands convinced Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of the need for action. In 1954 he took his case to the tenth inter-American conference at Caracas, where he sought a multinational blessing for a unilateral action. Dulles denied the existence of indigenous communist movements and asserted that every nation in the hemisphere had been penetrated by international communists under Moscow's direction. He called for decisive action, presumably under the terms of the Rio treaty, to eliminate subversive activities in the hemisphere. In effect, Dulles sought to Pan-Americanize the Monroe Doctrine in order to prevent what he alleged was Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Dulles did not single out Guatemala, but all present understood it was the target. Following the vote, Dulles left Caracas just as the conference began its discussion of Latin America's social and economic distress.

At Caracas, the U.S.-sponsored resolution was approved by a 17–1 vote, with Guatemala dissenting and Argentina and Mexico abstaining. A month later the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored an "invasion" of Guatemala by loyalist forces that ousted Arbenz and restored the traditional order. The United States manipulated events at the United Nations to prevent international scrutiny of its actions. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, regional organizations were permitted to deal with regional problems before the United Nations intervened. In this case, the United States convinced the Security Council that the OAS had the Guatemalan situation under control.

The U.S. actions fueled anti-American sentiment across Latin America. Coupled with its failure to address the region's socioeconomic problems, the intervention in Guatemala reaffirmed Latin America's view that the United States did not intend to treat its southern neighbors as equals. Security from foreign intervention remained at the heart of Pan-Americanism, but since the late 1930s only the United States had determined the parameters of the threat.

The rise of communism as a threat in Latin America unquestionably provoked the feeling among many Americans, both North and South, that the Pan-American movement needed a long-range program to improve the economy and quality of life across South America. The first organized economic assistance to Latin America had been a part of the Good Neighbor program of the 1930s. Other precedents rested with the Point Four and mutual security programs during the Truman administration. Still, these programs did not address the disparities that characterized Latin America's socioeconomic landscape. In 1958, when Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek suggested some kind of "Economic Pan America," he unknowingly forewarned of Latin America's impending social revolutions. In response to Kubitschek's appeal, the OAS and the United Nations developed financial assistance programs for the hemisphere, and the Eisenhower administration initiated the Social Progress Trust Fund, but little was accomplished until the success of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba, which by 1961 destroyed Cuba's traditional political, social, and economic orders.

To meet the challenge, in 1961 President John F. Kennedy implemented the Alliance for Progress, which pledged a U.S. contribution of $1 billion per year over a ten-year period to modernize Latin America's economic and political systems. In effect the alliance was an admission that previous private and public investment and technical assistance programs alone were insufficient for the steady development of the region. The Latin Americans were to raise a total of $80 billion in investment capital over that ten-year period. Machinery for the alliance was established in 1961 at Punta del Este, Uruguay. The aim was to increase the per capita wealth of participating Latin American states by 2.5 percent each year for ten years. The revolutionary elements of the alliance, the vast amount of cooperative spending, and the strict requirements—such as tax reform, a commitment to land distribution, and broadening the democratic process—in order to qualify for alliance assistance raised the expectations of many Latin Americans.

For the most part, expectations were not realized. Despite advances in gross national products and progress in land tenure patterns, education, and health care, the same people who were in power in 1960 remained the most privileged in the 1970s, and the socioeconomic gap between them and the poor had not narrowed. There was sufficient blame to go around. Latin American elites refused to accept economic and political reforms. Latin Americans wanted a larger share in the decision making; the U.S. government wanted to give them less. As the fear of Castroism diminished by the late 1960s, owing to the bankruptcy of the Cuban economy and the emergence of military governments throughout Latin America, so did regional interest in socioeconomic reform. U.S. administrators and members of Congress became frustrated with Latin America's graft and corruption. Latin America's blip on the U.S. radar screen disappeared with the continuing crises in the Middle East and in Vietnam. Subsequently, the Watergate scandal preoccupied the Nixon administration until its downfall in 1973 and marred the brief presidency of Gerald Ford. Although aid to Latin America continued in reduced form after 1970, the U.S. Congress continually asked questions about the validity of any foreign aid program. In the vacuum created by the U.S. absence, the Latin American governments either turned inward or looked beyond the Western Hemisphere for economic assistance.

If the spirit of mutual respect projected in the early days of the alliance was jeopardized by the program's inadequacies, it was destroyed by unilateral U.S. political decisions: the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961; the Cuban missile crisis in 1962; the landing of U.S. marines in the Dominican Republic in 1965; and the sale of U.S. arms to Latin America's military governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For all intents and purposes, a Pan-American consciousness did not exist by the mid-1970s.

President Jimmy Carter came to Washington in January 1977 determined to repair the damage done to Pan-Americanism during the previous fifteen years. He set the tone by negotiating treaties with Panama that returned the canal to that country in 2000. He made friendly gestures toward Cuba, which had been ousted from the inter-American system and had been experiencing a U.S. trade embargo since 1961. His human rights

policy gave credence to the ideals of Pan-Americanism, but prompted the military governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to produce their own armaments, and forced the besieged Central Americans to purchase their equipment on the world market.

If Carter had nudged toward closer cooperation with Latin America, President Ronald Reagan took several steps backward. His insistence that the Central American civil wars of the 1980s were yet another Soviet effort to extend communism in the Western Hemisphere fell on deaf ears in Latin America. Not only did Reagan fail to gain the support of the OAS, but his position was openly challenged by the Contadora Group—Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela—which received encouragement from the "support group" of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay. The Latin Americans perceived the Central American crisis as a local one, caused by the socioeconomic and political disparities that characterized the region, not Soviet interventionism. These nations were determined to bring peace to the embattled region at the expense of the United States. Their efforts led eventually to the successful peace initiative by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez, who received the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Other U.S. unilateral actions that damaged inter-American relations included its invasions of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) and the threatened invasion of Haiti (1993). In tightening its embargo against Cuba in the early 1990s, the United States placed itself outside the hemispheric trend, which included the opening of trade relations between Cuba and several Latin American countries and Canada.

While U.S. Cold War policies gave credence to the charges of U.S. hegemonic influence over hemispheric affairs, they also severely damaged the spirit of Pan-Americanism. And the political purpose of Pan-Americanism, hemispheric security from a European threat that dated to the days of Simón Bolívar, disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

As the twentieth century came to a close, three issues dominated the hemispheric agenda: illegal drugs, migration, and commerce. Because these problems are multinational, each provides the opportunity for reviving the intention of Pan-Americanism: cooperation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. While drugs have corrupted governments and terrified society in such places as Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru, all hemispheric nations pay a heavy social and economic price for drug use. Rather than find a common ground for cooperation, the United States and Latin America place responsibility at one another's doorstep. Washington policymakers appear determined to eradicate drugs at the source—the remote areas of Colombia and the Andean countries—and to punish those nations that serve as transit points for the entry of drugs into the United States. In contrast, the Latin Americans charge that if U.S. residents cut their demand, there would be a concomitant decrease in the production of illegal drugs.

Migration, particularly of Latin Americans to the United States, is a most vexing problem. Given the fact that since the mid-1980s democratic governments have taken root across the region, save Cuba, immigrants can no longer claim to be escaping political persecution, the most valid reason for seeking asylum in the United States. Instead the new migrants are seen as economic refugees, and therefore are not admissible under current U.S. law. The United States also focuses its attention on the poor and unskilled immigrants, not the skilled or professional workers who are absorbed quickly into the North American economy and society. The unskilled workers are viewed as a threat to U.S. workers and a drain upon state and federal social programs that sustain them. On the other hand, Latin American nations fret at the loss of skilled and professional workers, but not the loss of the unskilled (because of limited economic opportunities for them at home). Furthermore, these workers remit badly needed U.S. currency to their relatives at home, and these monies become an important part of smaller nations' gross domestic product.

One way to address the drug and migration problems in Latin America is economic development, and since the 1980s these nations have become increasingly involved in the global economy. At first, regional cooperation appeared to be the best route. Toward that end several regional economic organizations were formed. The Central American Common Market (CACM) dates to 1959. Others include the Andean Pact (1969) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) of 1972. Each took on new significance with the globalization process that began in the 1980s. The most promising organization appears to be the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Established in 1991, it brought together Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay for the purpose of establishing a customs union similar to the European Union. By

2000 Chile and Bolivia had become associate members in anticipation of full membership at some point in the future. The United States joined the parade in 1993 when Congress finally approved the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), linking it with Mexico and Canada in what is to be a free market by 2005. But the United States would go no farther. Congress denied President Bill Clinton "fast track" negotiating privileges to reach an accord with Chile that would bring the latter into the NAFTA accord. The latter congressional action may be symptomatic of the basic problem that has plagued the Pan-American movement since its inception in the early nineteenth century: national interest.

In June 1990, President George H. W. Bush launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, its ultimate goal being a free trade zone "stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego." Shortly thereafter the NAFTA agreement was concluded, prompting many analysts to predict that it would become the vehicle to expand free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere. President Bill Clinton kept the initiative alive when he convened a meeting of thirty-four heads of state (only Cuba's Fidel Castro was not invited) in Miami in December 1994. This was the first such gathering since 1967. In the end, the signatories designated 2005 as a deadline for the conclusion of negotiating a Free Trade Association of the Americas (FTAA), with implementation to follow in subsequent years. Advocates hailed the agreement for its high-minded principles and ambitious goals. Critics lamented its vagueness and its drawn-out timetable. The pledge of free trade was repeated when the heads of state gathered again in Santiago, Chile, in 1998 and Quebec City, Canada, in April 2001. In between, technical committees have been working on the details of a free trade pact. Still, national interests stand in the way. Given the history of inter-American relations, Latin Americans question the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to hemispheric free trade. Brazil has made clear its intention to unite all of South America into one trading bloc before dealing with the FTAA. Mexico has signed a trade agreement with the European Union, and the MERCOSUR partnership is seeking agreements with Europe and South Africa. Chile, the unabashed example of free market reforms, pursues its own global strategies.

The world has changed drastically since the Latin Americans sought security from European intervention in the nineteenth century. It also has changed from the early twentieth century through the end of the cold war, when the United States single-handedly worked to keep the Europeans out of the Western Hemisphere. With the end of the Cold War, the need for hemispheric political security disappeared, at least momentarily, and with it, the original reason for the Pan-American movement. But the realities of the new world—drugs, migration, and commerce—provide the opportunity to revive the Pan-American spirit. The challenge before the nations of the Western Hemisphere is great: Can they overcome the national interests that have plagued the relationship in the past?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aguilar, Alonzo. *Pan-Americanism from the Monroe Doctrine to the Present.* New York, 1968. A critical Latin American assessment of Pan-Americanism.

Burr, Robert N., and Roland D. Hussey, eds. *Documents on Inter-American Cooperation.* 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1955. Includes well-selected and well-edited documents from 1810 to 1948.

Gellman, Irwin F. *Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933–1945.* Baltimore, 1979.

Gil, Federico G. *Latin American–United States Relations.* New York, 1971. A dated but popular survey of the subject, providing broad, not intensive, coverage.

Gilderhus, Mark T. *Pan-American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913–1921.* Tucson, Ariz., 1986.

———. *The Second Century: U.S.–Latin American Relations Since 1889.* Wilmington, Del., 2000.

Harrison, Lawrence E. *The Pan-American Dream.* Boulder, Colo., 1991. A most critical assessment of U.S. aid policies to Latin America.

Inman, Samuel Guy. *Inter-American Conferences, 1826–1954.* Washington, D.C., 1965. Gives accounts, both personal and official, by perhaps the most zealous specialist on Latin America and includes intimate information available from no other source.

Johnson, John J. *A Hemisphere Apart: The Foundations of United States Policy Toward Latin America.* Baltimore, 1990.

LaRosa, Michael, and Frank O. Mora, eds. *Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.–Latin American Relations.* Lanham, Md., 1999. Updates the volume by Burr and Hussey.

Lockey, James B. *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings*. New York, 1920. A good starting point for understanding the concept of Pan-Americanism that provides a detailed, sympathetic study of the movement from independence through the end of the Panama congress of 1826.

Mecham, J. Lloyd. *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960*. Austin, Tex., 1961. One of the foremost studies of Pan-Americanism, providing a detailed, chronological approach to all the major conferences.

Merk, Frederick. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation*. New York, 1963.

Pastor, Robert A. *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*. Princeton, N.J., 1987.

Paterson, Thomas G. *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*. New York, 1994.

Perkins, Whitney T. *Constraint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions*. Westport, Conn., 1981. A crisp analysis of the circum-Caribbean region.

Rabe, Stephen G. *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988.

Scheman, L. Ronald. *The Inter-American Dilemma: The Search for Inter-American Cooperation at the Centennial of the Inter-American System*. New York, 1988.

Scheman, L. Ronald, ed. *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective*. New York, 1988.

Schoultz, Lars, ed. *Security, Democracy and Development in U.S.–Latin American Relations*. Miami, Fla., 1994.

Sheinin, David, ed. *Beyond the Ideal: Pan-Americanism in Inter-American Affairs*. Westport, Conn., 2000. An important collection of essays that demonstrates the utilization of Pan-Americanism beyond the security issue.

Smith, Peter H. *Talons of the Eagle: The Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations*. New York, 1996. A broad survey that includes the Latin American response to U.S. hegemony.

Weintraub, Sidney, ed. *Integrating the Americas: Shaping Future Trade Policy*. New Brunswick, N.J., 1994.

Whitaker, Arthur P. *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1954. A stimulating study of Pan-Americanism as an idea and of how time has destroyed much of the buttressing hemispheric relations.

See also DICTATORSHIPS; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NARCOTICS POLICY; RECOGNITION.

PARTY POLITICS

Fredrik Logevall

"A splendid little war," John Hay called the 1898 conflict between Spain and the United States. It was splendid, he told his fellow Republicans Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, because it had moved things "our way." In other words, military victory and overseas expansion were helping President William McKinley and his Republican administration against William Jennings Bryan's Democrats. "I do not see a ghost of a chance of Bryanism in the new few years," remarked Hay. At the time, the summer of 1898, John Hay was the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. Before long he would be appointed secretary of state. Thus, his was no ivory tower statement pronounced far from the halls of power. Rather, his comments on the connection between party politics and foreign policy came from the highest level of American officialdom.

The ambassador was not claiming that McKinley had chosen war to help the Republican Party, although it was widely believed that the president would have suffered politically if he had not requested a declaration of hostilities against Spain. What Hay was saying was that the course of American foreign policy was inextricably tied to domestic politics in the United States, and that the party in power has partisan politics partly in mind when it acts on international developments. Hay saw nothing wrong with this. The developments in 1898 meshed with his own worldview; he had no objection to the use of force "when necessary," and he saw an imperial push into the Caribbean and Pacific as potentially helpful to his business friends. If the Republicans benefited as well, so much the better. Hay believed in the GOP, considering it the "party fit to govern," a bulwark against inflation, radicalism, and civil disorder. Bryan's Democratic-Populist rural alliance almost won the 1896 presidential election on free silver, a domestic issue. Hay now judged that the Republicans would pick up strength on foreign policy and could establish themselves in power for a decade or more.

This is by no means an unusual example in American history. If anything, John Hay represents less than the usual identification of domestic politics with U.S. foreign relations. He never ran for elective office, although other secretaries of state have, from Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to William H. Seward and James G. Blaine on down to William Jennings Bryan, Charles Evans Hughes, James F. Byrnes, and John Foster Dulles. Nor did Hay depend on politics for his living after his early thirties. Hence, he was not forced to think of the next election in terms of personal financial survival.

In contrast, most of those who have shaped American foreign policy have been professional politicians, accustomed to thinking of individual recognition, career progress, and personal income in connection with party favor and victory at the polls. So it has been with presidents of the United States, the most important makers of foreign policy. So also with secretaries of state and defense, at least until the last few decades, when these offices have usually been held by nonpoliticians (who, of course, are bound to the president's political positions). So with a number of those who have headed American diplomatic missions abroad; now, as always, many of these assignments are handled under political patronage. So also with congressmen who specialize in international matters and with other leaders in both major parties, in and out of office.

Could these individuals, being practical party politicians, be expected to forget domestic politics when they weigh foreign policy alternatives? Hardly. And, as a general rule, they do not. No doubt some have obsessed about it more than others, but all, or virtually all, have operated from the assumption that if they do stop thinking of the next election or ignore the reaction of the other professional politicians in Congress and in the field, they are not likely to be able to put across their programs. In the words of the histo-

rian Fred Harvey Harrington, "Success in American foreign policy, like success on domestic issues, requires continuing success in domestic politics."

Which is not to say it is only about winning elections. As the Hay example illustrates, politicians often have had particular and deeply felt ideas about international matters, ideas that their party (or a large segment of their party) have shared or endorsed. Often the candidates of the opposing party have had different ideas. Foreign policy, therefore, is about choosing among real policy choices as well as getting partisan advantage from those choices.

That said, the argument here is that elections are particularly important in determining why the United States has followed the international course it has. In America the jockeying for political advantage never stops. Viewed from a president's perspective the next election (whether midterm or presidential) will arrive all too soon, and presidents are well aware that voters are capable of giving incumbent parties the boot (as they have done with regularity since 1945: in 1952, 1960, 1968, 1976, 1980, 1992, and 2000). Moreover, the overall state of a president's relations with Congress and his standing in public opinion deeply impact his ability to get things done and, in general, to lead effectively. As Ralph Levering reminds us, political campaigns are significant because they indicate which foreign policy issues each candidate believes his opponent is vulnerable on, and which issues each candidate believes are likely to strike a response chord in the voting public. "The interplay between candidates and voters, culminating in the voting first in the primaries and then in the general election in November, thus establishes (a) the winners who will have primary responsibility for shaping U.S. foreign policy, and (b) the broad parameters of acceptable political discourse on foreign policy for the foreseeable future."

It seems obvious, then, that those who analyze U.S. foreign policy decisions should carefully consider the role of domestic politics in those decisions and in what happened afterward. Analysis must, of course, also take into account geostrategic, economic, cultural, moral, and other influences. Sometimes these influences, rather than practical politics, have been decisive. More often than not, however, the nonpolitical factors have been interwoven with political considerations, which need to be identified and explained. Although students of the interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy often include within their purview—and properly so—a wide range of potential influences, including public opinion, the media, and ethnic groups and other special interest groups, the focus here is on party politics, in particular on the impact of partisan imperatives and election-year concerns on presidential decision making in foreign affairs.

A CURIOUS NEGLECT

Over the years scholars have produced some excellent special studies of the interrelationship between politics and diplomacy. What is striking, though, is how often studies altogether omit mention of domestic politics. Some do so because they tell the story in the old-fashioned way, recording exchanges of diplomatic notes and making no attempt to get behind the formal documents. Others dig much deeper yet still treat the professional politicians involved in the making of foreign policy as though they were not politicians at all.

Historiographical trends among diplomatic historians, it is clear, have conspired against a prominent place for domestic politics. Most of the early giants in the field, among them Samuel Flagg Bemis, Dexter Perkins, and Arthur Whitaker (Thomas A. Bailey was a notable exception), focused on state-to-state interaction, on high U.S. officials and their counterparts in the countries with which Washington dealt. The research of these "orthodox" historians was often intelligent and exceptionally valuable, but they tended to frame their questions in a manner that allowed them to avoid inquiring into the domestic political calculations that helped shape policy, or the partisan disputes that often accompanied the implementation of that policy. Perkins's three-volume study of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, for example, takes more or less as a given that national security concerns brought about the doctrine, while Bemis's book on Jay's Treaty concludes before the bitter debate in Congress in 1795–1796 on the treaty's implementation. Herbert Feis, an orthodox historian of the early Cold War, likewise focused exclusively on the White House, the State Department, and state-to-state relations in his effort to assign responsibility for the origins of the Soviet-American confrontation.

This emphasis among orthodox historians on high politics met with a spirited response from a group of "revisionist" scholars who came of age in the late 1950s and 1960s. But although revi-

sionists distinguished themselves by emphasizing the importance of domestic forces in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, they paid curiously little attention to party politics. No less than the traditionalists, they treated the U.S. government as a monolithic actor, albeit one shaped largely by the economic and ideological interests associated with the U.S. government's capitalist structure. The emphasis was on internal sources of foreign policy, but not on partisan wrangling, election-year maneuvering, or other political concerns. Thus, Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire* (1963), which dealt with Gilded Age foreign relations, gave little room to the congressional coalition that time and again thwarted the expansionist initiatives of the high officials that are a chief concern of the book. In William Appleman Williams's classic work *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) one looks in vain for any sense that partisan concerns have on occasion played a key role in shaping American foreign policy. In this and other Williams works, congressional speeches and campaign pronouncements were generally cited only to show the supposed consensus behind American economic expansion. As the historian Robert David Johnson has rightly noted, revisionist interpretations of the Cold War by the likes of Gabriel Kolko and Noam Chomsky share little or nothing in common with Herbert Feis apart from a tendency to treat the U.S. government as a unitary actor unencumbered by internal dissension.

The emergence in the last two decades of the twentieth century of "postrevisionists"—a loose collection of scholars of the Cold War who did not fit easily into either the orthodox or revisionist camps—did not change the pattern. John Lewis Gaddis, a founder of postrevisionism, gave close scrutiny to domestic politics in his first book, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,* but gave steadily less attention to it in his subsequent works—to the point that in *We Now Know* (1997), Gaddis's major reinterpretation of the early Cold War, party politics figured hardly at all. Melvyn P. Leffler's *A Preponderance of Power* (1992), a highly important volume on the Truman administration's national security policy, likewise gave little space to the interplay between foreign policy and party politics, a characteristic shared as well by Marc Trachtenberg in his prize-winning book *A Constructed Peace* (1999). Trachtenberg's study, subtitled "The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963," says nary a word about domestic politics, and his American policymakers appear to operate in a rarefied geopolitical stratosphere that keeps them largely immune to domestic pressure.

What is striking about these and other postrevisionist studies is not that they have tended to place geopolitics at the top in their hierarchy of causality; given the neorealist or national security perspectives to which many postrevisionists adhere, that is to be expected. Rather, what is striking is that domestic politics appears so far down in that hierarchy, if it even makes it on the list at all.

To a remarkable degree, then, scholars of American diplomacy, whatever their other disagreements, have tended over the years to agree on one important point: partisan wrangling and electoral strategizing have generally not been significant determinants of the nation's foreign policy. It is a perspective that accords with the popular belief that political differences among Americans should, and in fact usually do, stop at the water's edge, that it would be improper and indecent to mix politics and foreign policy, and that American leaders generally have avoided doing so.

In 1974, when the Watergate scandal was catching up with President Richard M. Nixon, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was asked if the resignation of the chief executive and the resulting damage to the Republican Party would change the course of American diplomacy. Certainly not, retorted Kissinger, everything would be the same. "The foreign policy of the United States," he maintained, "has always been, and continues to be conducted on a bipartisan basis in the national interest and in the interest of world peace." Others have voiced like sentiments, though usually without introducing quite so much historical error. Operating here is the traditional belief that national patriotism holds Americans together against the outside world. However much citizens may disagree on domestic questions, runs the argument, they must—and will—present a united front on foreign relations, in the national interest and to uphold the nation's honor. Discussions of this subject can become heated and bring forth Stephen Decatur's celebrated toast given at Norfolk in 1816: "Our Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong."

It is a comforting notion, since it protects America's leaders from charges of "sordid political calculation" or "playing politics with the national honor." But it also separates diplomatic history from reality. It fails to consider the plain fact that

there inevitably are differences of opinion on foreign policy, and that in a democracy these differences are put before the people, if at all, through the political process (that is, through politics)—facts that professional politicians are not likely to forget.

THE FIRST DECADES

These differences were much in evidence from the very beginning of the two-party system, in the 1790s. Few were the foreign policy decisions in that decade that were not affected by partisan concerns. Even George Washington's Farewell Address, to this day the major statement of the need for American freedom of action in foreign affairs (it warned against "permanent alliances"), must be seen in light of the 1796 election. The French minister to Philadelphia, Pierre Adet, upset over the pro-British Jay's Treaty and America's failure to honor the 1778 alliance with France, worked hard to have Thomas Jefferson win the 1796 presidential race over the Federalist candidate, John Adams. That interference influenced Washington (and his coauthor Alexander Hamilton, a bitter foe of Jefferson) to issue the Farewell Address that warned Americans against tying themselves to the fortunes of any "foreign influence." The historian Alexander DeConde put it succinctly: "Although cloaked in phrases of universal or timeless application, the objectives of the address were practical, immediate, and partisan."

Party politics and electoral strategizing also permeated the atmosphere in the lead-up to the War of 1812 and indeed helped bring on the hostilities. As many historians have demonstrated, the increasingly bitter partisan struggle over domestic and foreign policy in the early years of the century, exacerbated by the effects of the war between Britain and France, grew into corrosive mutual distrust. Federalists and Republicans were deeply split on the best policy vis-à-vis Great Britain, and the vote for war followed partisan lines—81 percent of Republicans in both houses voted for war (98 to 23), and all Federalists voted nay (39 to 0).

But President Madison's concerns went deeper than defending against Federalist attacks on his commercial warfare policy. He also had to worry about dissension among fellow Republicans and the possibility that these "malcontents"—who wanted a tougher line against the British—might move to create an anti-Madison ticket in 1812. By the spring of 1811, sympathetic legislators were warning Madison that he had to do something to unify the party, and by July of that year the pressures of domestic politics were making it very hard for the administration to agree to anything short of Britain's total capitulation to American demands. According to the historian J. C. A. Stagg, for Madison "there seemed to be only one course of action that would be both honorable and effective. He could regain the initiative at home and abroad by moving toward the positions advocated for so long by his Republican opponents. If he did not do so, there was the possibility that they would coalesce into a formidable anti-administration party, make the issue of war and preparedness wholly their own, and turn them against him in the months to come." In Stagg's words, "the nation's honor, the president's political salvation, and the unity of the Republican Party required that American policy now be directed toward war." What's more, the strategy worked: by May 1812 the malcontents had faded and a sufficiently large Republican majority had emerged in both houses to renominate Madison. The declaration of war followed in June.

This is not to suggest that Madison's fears for his domestic political standing alone drove the decision making that led to war with Great Britain. Monocausal history is seldom satisfactory history. The violations of American maritime rights, the impressment of American seamen, British incitement of hostile Native Americans, American designs on Canada and Florida, the depressing effects of British policy on American farm prices—each of these mattered as well, as did the long-standing partisan squabbling between Federalists and Republicans. It is also clear, though, that the president's perceived political needs, specifically his concern about possibly losing his party's nomination in 1812, shaped American policy in crucial ways. In particular, understanding why the war happened when it did—in a presidential election year, and with the incumbent in a precarious position at home—requires understanding the high-stakes struggle within the Republican Party.

Consider again the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In a provocative work bearing the prosaic title *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (1975), the historian Ernest R. May rejected the claim of Perkins and others that conceptions of national interest and foreign policy were supreme in the origins of the doctrine. Instead, May argued, party politics were decisive. ("The positions of the poli-

cymakers were determined less by conviction than by ambition.") In May's view the outcome of the foreign policy debates can only be understood in relation to the struggle for the presidency, because the Monroe Doctrine was "actually a by-product of an election campaign." The threat of intervention by the European powers into the Western Hemisphere was nonexistent, and American officials knew it. As a result, they could play politics with the British proposal for a joint policy statement; John Quincy Adams opposed joint action while his bitter presidential rival John C. Calhoun fervently supported it. Adams's candidacy would have been hurt by consummation of an alliance with Britain because the British were thoroughly unpopular among the U.S. electorate. As secretary of state, Adams would have been attacked for joining with the British even if he opposed the alliance in private cabinet discussions. Calhoun pushed for acceptance of the London government's offer, knowing Adams would be blamed for it, while President Monroe, anxious to leave the presidency with his reputation intact, gave in to Adams to avoid a fight that might tarnish his record. It is a compelling argument, made in part, as May noted, on the basis of "inference from circumstantial evidence." One does not have to embrace May's thesis in its entirety—Were officials really so certain that no foreign danger existed?—to see that party politics were instrumental in the making of the doctrine.

And party politics were instrumental in foreign policymaking at various other times as well in the decades before John Hay took such delight at the outcome of the war against Spain. Here one thinks, for example, of the debate over whether to recognize Greek independence in 1823 (which, like the Monroe Doctrine, was intimately bound up with the 1824 presidential race); of President Franklin Pierce's attempt to acquire Cuba in 1854 in order to placate proslavery leaders in the American South; and of Grover Cleveland's decision—made partly for partisan reasons—not to submit the 1884 Berlin agreement on Africa's partition (of which he basically approved) to the Senate for approval.

Nor did things change after the century turned. The Wilson administration's original decision to postpone recognition of Bolshevik Russia in 1918 was not primarily the product of political pressure within the United States, but the fact that this nonrecogition continued for fifteen years and was intimately connected with domestic politics. A few politicians seem to have felt that nonrecognition would damage the Soviet Union or protect the United States against real dangers. Many more were convinced that taking a stand against the Soviet Union and domestic radicals was "good politics" or that those who openly favored diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union would suffer political punishment. Consequently, practical politics in the United States served to prevent these two major powers from discussing their differences until the need for foreign trade enabled Franklin D. Roosevelt to reestablish diplomatic relations in 1933.

In 1936 and again in 1940, Roosevelt allowed reelection concerns to affect his approach to the Nazi menace. In the late summer of 1936, Roosevelt told journalists of his desire to convene a conference of world leaders to discuss ways to assure the peace of the world; at the same time, he ruled out taking any steps prior to the election that could open him to Republican charges that he was embroiling the United States in overseas commitments. Four years later, Roosevelt's hesitation in finalizing the destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain—he delayed for nearly four months after receiving Winston Churchill's desperate pleas for destroyers—owed much to his fear that Republican challenger Wendell Willkie might use the issue to rouse isolationist sentiment and thereby cost Roosevelt the election that fall. Only after Willkie agreed not to make the transaction a campaign issue was the deal struck. Overall during that critical year, Roosevelt moved cautiously on foreign policy, concerned that open diplomatic moves would evoke isolationist predictions of U.S. involvement in the fighting and undermine his chances for a third term.

THE EARLY COLD WAR

To be sure, Americans have on occasion set partisan and personal political concerns aside in foreign policy, in line with the sentiment of Stephen Decatur's toast. This has been the pattern in the early stages of the nation's wars. But such consensus on international matters has often been short-lived, more so than is generally acknowledged. It is often assumed, for example, that the period surrounding the onset of the Cold War—from the end of World War II to the start of 1950—was a bipartisan period in U.S. foreign policy. A close examination of these years suggests otherwise. There was a period of strong bipartisanship on foreign policy decisions in Washington from the

passage of the aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 through the middle of 1949, but it was not there before that time or after.

In late 1945, with the popular Franklin D. Roosevelt dead and World War II over, Republicans in Congress saw a chance to gain control on Capitol Hill in the 1946 elections and to take the presidency two years later. On domestic issues they could run against the federal government and against trade unions, especially the open influence of the American Communist Party in those unions. On foreign policy issues the GOP could denounce Truman's "weakness" in dealing with the Soviet Union—that is, unless the administration preempted this line of attack by standing up forcefully to Moscow.

Domestically, Truman could do relatively little to deflect the Republican challenge on policy issues. He could, however, be firmer with the Soviets—a shift urged on him in the fall of 1945 by his White House chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, and by the two leading senators on the Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat Tom Connally of Texas and Republican Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Vandenberg, who represented a state with a large number of Polish Americans unhappy with developments in their native land, was especially adamant about standing up to the Kremlin on all fronts.

It is unclear just how much of an effect partisan politics had on Truman's decision to "stop babying" the Soviets in early 1946. But he was very much aware of the growing congressional criticism of Secretary of State James Byrnes's continuing efforts to make deals with Moscow, and also Congress's aim, now that World War II was over, to reassert legislative authority of some foreign policy issues. The evidence is not conclusive, but it appears Truman was significantly affected by strong pressures from Congress to take a harder line toward the Soviet Union in the early weeks of 1946. In the election campaign that autumn, political paranoia and exploitation was much in evidence. Republican campaigners delighted in asking voters: "Got enough inflation? . . . Got enough debt? . . . Got enough strikes? . . . Got enough communism?" Senator Robert Taft, one of the most distinguished figures on Capitol Hill, accused Truman of seeking a Congress "dominated by a policy of appeasing the Russians abroad and fostering communism at home," while in California, a young House candidate named Richard Nixon denounced his opponent as a "lip service American" who consistently voted the Moscow line in Congress and who fronted for "un-American elements." And indeed, the GOP scored a resounding victory in the election, gaining control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1928. The day after the election several of Truman's advisers met and concluded that the White House would have to take definite steps to put the Democratic coalition back together if Truman was to have any chance of winning the 1948 election. One such step: make clear to the American people that Harry Truman opposed Soviet domination of eastern Europe.

As the 1948 election approached, Truman missed few opportunities to talk up the Cold War, a strategy urged on him by numerous advisers. Such a stance, they pointed out, would insulate the president against Republican charges that he was too soft on Moscow and at the same time undercut Henry Wallace's bid for the presidency on the Progressive ticket. In November 1947, White House aide Clark Clifford and former FDR assistant James Rowe predicted that relations with Moscow would be the key foreign policy issue in the campaign, that those relations would get worse during the course of 1948, and that this would strengthen Truman's domestic political position. "There is considerable political advantage in the administration in its battle with the Kremlin," the two men told the president. "The worse matters get . . . the more is there a sense of crisis. In times of crisis, the American citizen tends to back up his president." In the months that followed, White House speechwriters talked tough on Soviet-American relations and mocked Wallace's call for improved relations with the Kremlin, portraying him as an unwitting dupe of communists at home and abroad.

It was a conscious blurring of domestic and foreign communism, and it would have important implications for politics in Cold War America. In the spring of 1947, Truman had created the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, which gave government security officials authorization to screen two million employees of the federal government for any hint of political deviance. It marked the inauguration of an anticommunist crusade within America's own borders that paralleled the Cold War abroad, a crusade that contained a large element of practical politics. Opposing radicals and the Soviet Union was a way of attracting votes and building a political reputation, or of avoiding being denounced as a fellow traveler. Meanwhile, any possibility for honest debate and criticism about policy toward the communist world disap-

peared, as those on the left who might have articulated an alternative vision lost cultural and political approval. For at least a quarter of a century thereafter, campaign attacks from the left on either Democratic or Republican foreign policies proved singularly unsuccessful.

Truman went on to win the 1948 election against the expectations of many. Stunned Republicans immediately began working overtime to exploit the communist victory in China, allegations of communists within the U.S. government, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's support of the accused spy Alger Hiss as they maneuvered for revenge in the midterm election two years later. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Truman initially received strong bipartisan support for his decision to intervene. But he knew the Republican support could evaporate quickly. When Truman that summer considered a plan to expand the war into North Korea, he feared that what the historian Melvin Small called "the prudent but not anticommunist-enough decision" to halt at the Thirty-Eighth Parallel could hurt the Democrats at the polling booth in November. Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur to try to liberate North Korea and announced his decision at a cabinet meeting where the major item on the agenda was the election.

MacArthur's gambit caused Chinese forces to intervene from the North in November 1950, and a military stalemate quickly developed. When the Truman administration commenced armistice talks in 1951, GOP leaders, still determined to make foreign policy a central part of their criticism of the Democrats, immediately went on the attack. Any truce at or near the Thirty-Eighth Parallel would be an "appeasement peace," they charged. When the presidential election campaign geared up the following year, Republican leaders, including nominee Dwight D. Eisenhower, asserted that Truman had been foolish to agree to negotiations and that he was compounding the error by continuing them in the face of clear evidence that the communists were using the time to build up their forces in Korea. Even the apparent economic health of the nation was turned against the White House: the prosperity, GOP spokesmen charged, "had at its foundation the coffins of the Korean war dead," slaughter that as yet appeared to have no end. The historian Rosemary Foot, in her study of the Korean armistice talks, showed that this partisan pressure contributed to the hardening of the administration's bargaining posture in 1952. "Sensitivity to public charges, to congressional attacks, and to electoral charges that the Democratic administration had been led into a negotiating trap by its 'cunning' enemies, all reinforced the administration's preference for standing firm rather than compromising," Foot concluded. Pleas from the State Department for a flexible posture, especially on the nettlesome issue of repatriating prisoners of war, fell on deaf ears.

Attacking an incumbent's policies is a simpler matter than governing, as the Republicans would soon learn. Upon taking office in January 1953, Eisenhower faced not merely the task of bringing the Korean War to an end (a deal was reached in July 1953) but a myriad of other thorny issues as well. Party politics, it is clear, influenced his approach to many of them. And it was not just the Democrats Eisenhower had to think about; he also confronted differing impulses on foreign policy within his own party. Some so-called old guard Republicans such as Robert Taft were dubious about the Europe-centered internationalism to which Eisenhower and his soon-to-be secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, adhered in the 1952 campaign; many of them wanted a limited American role in world affairs, rooted in an airpower-oriented Fortress America strategy and weighted more toward Asia. Eisenhower immediately set upon placating this old guard on military, Asian, and domestic security matters to gain its acquiescence in a Europe-first internationalism. He undoubtedly had the old guard partly in mind when he wrote to his NATO commander, Alfred Gruenther, in the midst of the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1954–1955, that "at home, we have the truculent and the timid, the jingoists and the pacifists." On Taiwan, the president continued, he was considering "what solutions we can get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time *can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action*" (original emphasis).

VIETNAM

On Indochina, as well, domestic political imperatives affected Eisenhower's policymaking. During the intense administration discussions about whether to intervene militarily to help the beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Eisenhower told his cabinet that he could not afford to let the Democrats ask who lost Vietnam. But he was not prepared to get involved without

broad domestic and international backing. At a news conference Eisenhower invoked the domino theory to try to create support for intervention (probably less because he believed in the theory than because its dramatic imagery could rally support to the cause), and he consulted with Congress and key allied governments. The misgivings of the Senate leadership and the British government convinced the president to reject air strikes to save the French position, but there is no doubt that fear of the "who lost Vietnam" charge continued to weigh on his mind. One reason the administration worked hard to distance itself from the Geneva Accords on Indochina later that year was that it feared it might get a hostile reaction from vocal anticommunists on Capitol Hill.

It was not the first Vietnam decision by an American president in which domestic politics played a role, nor would it be the last. Indeed, a good argument could be made that for all six presidents who dealt with Vietnam from 1950 to 1975—from Truman to Ford—the Indochina conflict mattered in significant measure because of the potential damage it could do to their domestic political positions.

This was especially true of the three men who occupied the White House during the high tide of American involvement—John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon. From the start in 1961, and especially after Kennedy agreed to seek a negotiated settlement in Laos giving the communist Pathet Lao a share of the power, senior U.S. officials feared what would happen to the administration at home if South Vietnam were allowed to fall. Kennedy told his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith: "There are just so many concessions that one can make to communists in one year and survive politically. . . . We just can't have another defeat this year in Vietnam." In November 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara advised JFK that the loss of South Vietnam would not merely undermine American credibility elsewhere but would "stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon to divide the country and harass the administration." U.S. assistance to South Vietnam increased steadily in 1962 and 1963, ultimately reaching the amount of $1.5 million per day. Still, success remained elusive. By mid-1963 the president had grown disillusioned about the prospects in the struggle, and he reportedly told several associates of his desire to get out of the conflict. But it could not happen, he added, until after the 1964 election.

Johnson's misgivings did not go quite so deep, but he too, after he succeeded JFK in office in November 1963, ruled out a major policy change before voting day. As McGeorge Bundy would later say, "Neither [Kennedy nor Johnson] wanted to go into the election as the one who either made war or lost Vietnam. If you could put if off you did." Bundy's comment carries great historical importance, and not merely because he was right in his assessment—Johnson, we now know, sought above all else that year to keep Vietnam from complicating his election-year strategy, judging all Vietnam options in terms of what they meant for November. No less important, the comment matters because 1964 proved so crucial in the making of America's war in Vietnam. It was a year of virtually unrelieved decline in the fortunes of the South Vietnamese government, a year in which the Vietcong made huge gains and the Saigon government lost steadily more support. It was a year when America became increasingly isolated on Vietnam among its Western allies, and when influential voices in Congress and the press—and indeed within the administration itself—began voicing deep misgivings about the prospect of a major war. And it was a year when the administration made the basic decisions that led to Americanization early in 1965. Already in the spring of 1964 the administration commenced secret contingency planning for an expansion of the war to North Vietnam, but with the tacit understanding that nothing substantive would happen until after Election Day. In November and December, with LBJ safely elected, the administration moved to adopt a two-phase escalation of the war involving sustained bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch of U.S. ground troops (subsequently implemented in February–March 1965). The White House strategy of delay through the first ten months of 1964 had not eliminated Johnson's freedom of maneuver, but it had reduced it considerably.

Nixon, it is clear, had his eyes very much on the home front in making Vietnam policy, not merely in the lead-up to the 1972 election but from the start of his administration in 1969. In vowing to get a "peace with honor," he and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger thought as much about voters in Peoria as about leaders in Moscow and Beijing and Hanoi. Top-level conversations captured on the taping system Nixon had installed in the Oval Office early in 1971, for example, make clear just how deeply concerns about Nixon's domestic standing permeated Viet-

nam policy. In a phone conversation that took place late in the evening of 7 April 1971, shortly after a televised Nixon speech announcing further Vietnam troop withdrawals, Nixon and Kissinger concurred on the matter of the "breathing space" they would get domestically by ending the draft:

KISSINGER: I think, Mr. President, I'm gonna put the military to the torch [on the matter of the draft].
NIXON: Yeah. They're screwing around on this.
KISSINGER: They're screwing around. They're worried that it will make the volunteer army not work. But the hell with that if we can get ourselves breathing space for Vietnam.
NIXON: Listen. Ending the draft gives us breathing space on Vietnam. We'll restore the draft later, but goddamn it, the military, they're a bunch of greedy bastards that want more officers clubs and more men to shine their shoes. The sons of bitches are not interested in this country.
KISSINGER: I mean, ending, going to all-volunteer in Vietnam is what I mean, is what we ought to do.
NIXON: Mmm-hmm.

In the summer of 1972, as a negotiated settlement with Hanoi looked to be within reach, Nixon expressed ambivalence about whether the deal should come before or after the election that November. On 14 August Nixon told aides that Kissinger should be discouraged from expressing too much hopefulness regarding the negotiations, as that could raise expectations and be "harmful politically." On 30 August, Nixon chief of staff H. R. Haldeman recorded in his diary that Nixon did not want the settlement to come too soon. The president, according to Haldeman, "wants to be sure [Army Vice-Chief of Staff Alexander] Haig doesn't let Henry's desire for a settlement prevail; that's the one way we can lose the election. We have to stand firm on Vietnam and not get soft."

Even before he assumed the presidency, Nixon had sought to manipulate foreign policy for personal political advantage. In the final weeks of the 1968 campaign, rumors that Johnson was on the verge of announcing a bombing halt (to hasten a peace settlement and thereby help Democratic presidential candidate Hubert H. Humphrey), sent the Nixon campaign into a panic. Nixon secretly encouraged the South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu to refuse to participate in any talks with Hanoi before the election, with assurances that if elected he would provide Thieu with more solid support than Humphrey would. It is possible that Thieu's subsequent refusal to take part in the negotiations in Paris, announced just days before Election Day, might have damaged Humphrey's campaign sufficiently to deliver what was a razor-thin victory to Nixon.

THE LATE COLD WAR AND BEYOND

The Vietnam War may be somewhat unusual in the degree to which it linked domestic political considerations and foreign policy, but it is by no means exceptional in the nation's recent history. Jimmy Carter's decision to launch a risky and ultimately disastrous mission to free American hostages in Iran in the spring of 1980, for example, owed something to his domestic political difficulties in an election year, including a tough challenge for the Democratic nomination from Senator Edward Kennedy. Carter's chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, urged the action "to prove to the columnists and our political opponents that Carter was not an ineffective Chief Executive who was afraid to act." Carter himself explained that he had "to give expression to the anger of the American people. If they perceive me as firm and tough in voicing their rage, maybe we'll be able to control this thing."

A decade later another president confronted the perception that he was too timid. During the 1988 campaign George Bush had to endure a *Newsweek* story on him in which the words "Fighting the Wimp Factor" were emblazoned on the cover, and there were charges from conservative quarters in the months after the inauguration that he was not resolute enough in foreign policy. The "wimp" charges could be heard again in October 1989, when Bush failed to back a nearly successful coup d'état against the drug-running Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega. "We'll be hit from the left for being involved at all," the president noted privately, "and we'll be hit harder from the right for being timid and weak." This right-wing reaction to his inaction—Republican Senator Jesse Helms referred to a "bunch of Keystone Kops" in the administration—almost certainly contributed to Bush's decision in December to order the invasion of Panama to arrest Noriega. In August 1990 various motives moved Bush to adopt an uncompromising position toward Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, but one of them was surely the domestic political benefits

that he and his advisers believed could accrue from it. Locked in a budget battle with Congress, faced with a messy savings and loan scandal, and with approval ratings sagging, Bush saw a chance to demonstrate forceful presidential leadership and galvanize popular support. Tellingly, perhaps, he received encouragement to "draw a line in the sand" from British prime minister Margaret Thatcher—who herself had received a powerful boost to her domestic position from Britain's "splendid little war" in the Falkland Islands eight years earlier.

The war against Iraq was the first military conflict of the post–Cold War era. In the years thereafter various commentators complained that America's newfound status as the world's sole superpower, one without a compelling external threat to unify the populace, had allowed party politics to infuse foreign policymaking to an unprecedented degree. Many drew a contrast with the supposedly bipartisan and selfless days of the Cold War. It was a dubious claim; party politics and foreign policy have always enjoyed a close relationship in the United States. This was so in the most tense periods of the superpower confrontation—during the Cuban missile crisis, John Kennedy considered the domestic political implications of the various options before him—and it was true in less traumatic times.

Still, few would deny that the partisanship became more pronounced in the Clinton years than it had been in decades, the atmosphere in Washington more poisonous. The power of the presidency in foreign policy seemed diminished and that of Congress as well as ethnic and other special-interest lobbies enhanced. Republicans saw personal political advantage as motivating virtually every one of Bill Clinton's foreign policy decisions and, after capturing control of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections, worked diligently to thwart many of his initiatives. In April 1999, for example, during the war in Kosovo, the House of Representatives refused to vote to support the bombing; that October, the Senate voted down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—an action the *New York Times* compared with the Senate defeat of the League of Nations after World War I—even though the president and sixty-two senators asked that it be withdrawn. Clinton and his advisers, meanwhile, insisted that their only concern in making policy was promoting the national interest. The early evidence about the policymaking process in the Clinton White House suggests strongly that he and his aides paid close attention to how various policy options would be perceived at home and that their determinations in this regard helped inform their decisions. In other words, Clinton was much like his predecessors.

During the debate over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's eastward enlargement in 1996–1997, Clinton administration officials insisted that bringing as much of Europe as possible under the NATO banner would serve the nation's strategic interests. They also said it was important to reassure the eastern and central European populations after Moscow became more nationalistic and assertive in 1994. No doubt they were being truthful in these claims, but Democratic Party leaders surely also saw enlargement as a surefire vote-getter among eastern European ethnic communities in battleground states in the Midwest, states Clinton had to win in the 1996 election. Foreign observers often perceived this domestic political element to be the root motivation behind the expansion. Said Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien (who thought his microphone was turned off) to Belgium's prime minister about NATO enlargement in August 1997: "All this for short-term political reasons, to win elections. In fact [U.S. politicians] are selling their votes, they are selling their votes. . . . It's incredible. In your country or mine, all the politicians would be in prison."

EVERY VOTE COUNTS

The skeptical reader will wonder if the case here is not being made too strongly. After all, foreign policy issues seldom decide elections in the United States. Does it not follow that American diplomacy and party politics must have only minor influence on each other? Not necessarily. It is true that in the United States, as in other countries, voters tend to give their chief attention to domestic matters. But foreign policy questions, though of less importance, have in most years been significant enough to merit the attention of practicing politicians. The professionals in politics have always realized that when domestic issues are in the forefront, diplomatic questions can still shift a few votes in swing districts in critical states. This can mean the difference between victory and defeat for a national ticket or decide control of Congress. That, essentially, has always been the politician's interpretation of the politics of American foreign policy—both for those who are in and those who are out of office.

This is still true and can be seen in the care with which presidential aspirants take on Israeli questions and the related matter of the Jewish vote. Small in national totals, this vote is critically important in New York, California, and other states with major urban centers. Even in 1948, Clark Clifford and other Truman aides were thinking partly about electoral politics in urging the president to extend recognition to the new State of Israel. Since 1876, Clifford knew, every winner of a presidential election had carried New York State, where in the 1940s Jews constituted 14 percent of the population. Extending recognition to Israel would help deliver the state to Truman in November and could also help the president in other states with sizable Jewish populations. The Emergency Committee on Zionist Affairs, and later the American Zionist Council and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee—the latter self-described as "the most powerful, best-run, and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington"—proved effective in exploiting the potential power of the Jewish vote to gain continued material and diplomatic backing for Israel.

True, the close U.S.–Israel relationship after 1948 was the product of many things. Israel had the strongest military force in the Middle East, and there were good geostrategic reasons why Washington sought to maintain close ties with Israel and work together on matters of common interest. Moreover, the convictions of evangelical Christians, as well as the feelings of other Americans touched by the courage of Israel, meant that a broad cross-section of Americans could be counted on to back firm U.S. support for Israel's security. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to deny that electoral imperatives influenced American policy toward the Middle East at all points after the late 1940s.

Likewise, America's policy toward Cuba after 1959 was deeply affected by the influence of the Cuban-American community in South Florida and the desire of presidential contenders to win Florida's sizable chunk of electoral votes. In October 1976, for example, Cyrus Vance, then a foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign, advised that "the time has come to move away from our past policy of isolation. Our boycott has proved ineffective, and there has been a decline of Cuba's export of revolution in the region." If the United States lifted the long-standing embargo on food and medicine, Vance speculated, the Castro government might reduce its level of support for the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola. Carter was sympathetic, but he acted cautiously in the campaign. "There were no votes to be won, and many to be lost, by indicating friendliness toward Castro," the historian Gaddis Smith wrote of Carter's thinking. Subsequent presidents would encounter the same dilemma when they contemplated a change in Cuba policy: the need to weigh an alteration to a failed and indeed counterproductive embargo policy against the perceived power of the militantly anti-Castro Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) to sway the Florida vote.

These kinds of calculations were nothing new in American politics. From 1865 to 1895, for example, most Americans were too absorbed in goings-on at home to spare much time for overseas developments. Voter attention revolved around such domestic concerns as the reconstruction of the South, sagging prices, and recurrent depressions. Nevertheless, national politicians labored hard on the diplomatic sections of their party platforms, and candidates spent time outlining or camouflaging their opinions on foreign policy. The reason was plain. The Republicans and Democrats were evenly balanced, and presidential and congressional elections were decided by razor-thin margins. The least slip, even on diplomatic positions, might mean the loss of a handful of votes, which could spell calamity at the polls.

It is well to remember that, when domestic questions rule, they often relate closely to foreign policy. This has been the case with tariffs, immigration, witch hunts against radicals, and, in the early twenty-first century, with agricultural prices and production and trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994. The relation of these problems to party politics—which is often very close—again draws diplomacy into the domestic political arena.

CONCLUSION

In an interview in the summer of 1965, McGeorge Bundy, a former Harvard dean who served John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson as national security adviser and was an architect of the Americanization of the Vietnam War, was asked what was different in the actual conduct of American diplomatic affairs from how it had seemed to be "from the safety of Harvard Yard." According to the

interviewer, Bundy replied that the first thing that stood out was "the powerful place of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policies."

It was a revealing comment, but not a surprising one (except to the extent that officials seldom make this admission on the record). The relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has been an intimate one throughout the nation's history. It may be debated whether the connection is a good thing or a bad thing—whether overall it has been beneficial to the nation's record on the world stage. For the moment, though, it is enough to say that the connection is there and is important. Just why so many students of American diplomacy seemingly have lost sight of this reality over the years is somewhat of a mystery. Partly, the inattention can be explained by the historiographical trends outlined early in this essay, which moved many diplomatic historians away from giving serious and sustained attention to domestic politics. Partly, too, it may reflect an overreliance by scholars on official U.S. government documents in their research; essential though these documents are, they can mislead. American statesmen have always been averse to admitting, even to themselves, that their foreign policy decisions could be affected by private political interest. As a result, a reader of the vast archival record, finding little or no evidence of partisan wrangling or election year strategizing, could (wrongly) conclude that these must have mattered little in shaping American policy.

Whatever the case, it is clear that the influence of party politics on the American approach to international affairs needs to be identified, measured, and explained. Foreign policy, it turns out, is always a political matter. It is not always a crass partisan matter. It is well to remember that the parties historically have tended to speak for different constellations of values and interests, different constituencies with genuine philosophical differences about America's place in the world, and that those differences have sometimes also been evident within parties. But it is always political.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blumenthal, Sidney. *Pledging Allegiance: The Last Campaign of the Cold War.* New York, 1990.

Chafe, William H. *The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II.* 4th ed. New York, 1999. A first-rate textbook on the United States after 1945.

DeConde, Alexander. "Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 43, no. 4 (March 1957): 641–658. A provocative article on the shaping of the Farewell Address.

———. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992.

Divine, Robert A. *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940–1948, 1952–1960.* 2 vols. New York, 1974.

Drew, Elizabeth. *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency.* New York, 1994.

Foot, Rosemary. *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1990. The second of two important studies by the author on the Korean War.

Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948.* New York, 1972.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947.* New York, 1972. An essential study of U.S. decision making in World War II and the early Cold War.

Haldeman, H. R. *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House.* New York, 1994. An indispensable source on the Nixon presidency.

Hughes, Barry B. *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1978.

Johnson, Robert David. "Congress and the Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3 (2001): 76–100.

Kegley, Charles W., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* New York, 1988.

Lebow, Richard Ned. "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and the Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated." *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990).

Levering, Ralph B. "Is Domestic Politics Being Slighted as an Interpretive Framework?" *Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter* 25 (1994): 17–35. An accomplished historian calls for greater attention by foreign relations historians to domestic politics.

———. *The Cold War: A Post–Cold War History.* Arlington Heights, Ill., 1994.

Logevall, Fredrik. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif., 1999.

May, Ernest R. *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine.* Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

Perkins, Bradford. *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823.* New York, 1964.

Quandt, William. "The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986). A specialist on the Middle East expresses concern about the influence of elections on the conduct of foreign policy.

Rosati, Joel A. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy.* New York, 1993.

Rosenau, James N., ed. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy.* New York, 1967.

Small, Melvin. *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994.* Baltimore, 1996. A concise and penetrating history that defines "domestic politics" broadly.

Smith, Gaddis. *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years.* New York, 1986.

Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 2000.

Snyder, Jack. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1991. A leading political scientist tackles the subject with verve and insight.

Stagg, J. C. A. "James Madison and the Malcontents: The Politics Origins of the War of 1812." *William and Mary Quarterly* 33 (1976): 557–585.

———. *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830.* Princeton, N.J., 1983.

Westerfield, H. Bradford. *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea.* New Haven, Conn., 1955.

Woods, Randall B., and Howard Jones. *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for World Order.* Athens, Ga., 1991.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; RECOGNITION; REVISIONISM; THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT.

PEACEMAKING

Berenice A. Carroll

"Peacemaking" appears to be a commonplace term, easily understood and frequently used in public discourse and in peace movements. The Internet reports more than 50,000 entries containing the term "peacemaking." On closer examination, it is much more elusive. Dictionaries define it tautologically as "the making of peace"; standard encyclopedias do not recognize it as a topic for separate entry (though it does appear in two encyclopedias of peace); and there is surprisingly little on "peacemaking" in academic texts on international politics.

Where it does appear, the term "peacemaking" is used primarily in four senses:

1. Settlement or termination of a war or dispute by explicit agreement among the belligerent parties or others ("peace settlements").
2. The process of transition from hostility to amity, or from war to peace ("ending hostilities and preferably also resolving the active issues of war"), with or without explicit agreement.
3. The development of procedures and institutions to facilitate conflict resolution, or termination or prevention of wars or conflicts ("pacific settlement of disputes").
4. Efforts to create the foundations or conditions for lasting peace ("peacebuilding").

THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING

The number of scholarly works explicitly devoted to peacemaking has been relatively small as compared to studies of war and its causes, but there is now a substantial literature available to scholars and practitioners. Until about 1985, almost all of the scholarly studies devoted to peacemaking limited their concern to peace settlements, particularly settlements of interstate wars by explicit agreement. Since that time, the focus has shifted to related topics such as conflict resolution and prevention, preventive and multitrack diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In addition, a large body of work has emerged that examines or applies these concepts in regard to specific conflict areas in various parts of the world.

There have been many works on specific peace settlements, such as Richard B. Morris's *The Peacemakers* (1965), dealing with the negotiation of the settlement of the American Revolution, and Harold Nicolson's *Peacemaking 1919* (1965) as well as Arno J. Mayer's *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918–1919* (1967), dealing with the settlement reached at the end of World War I. Robert Randle, in *The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements* (1973), broadened the scope to a wider range of examples, but made clear in the preface: "Although I have dealt with a number of aspects of peacemaking, I have concentrated mainly upon the structure and content of *peace settlements.*" In a later work, while recognizing that peacemaking studies embrace "all matters relating to the transition from a state of war to a state of peace," including "an analysis of the conditions prompting the parties to move toward peace," Randle still placed central emphasis upon settlements by explicit agreement. Thus, in Randle's summation, peacemaking studies include, first, study of the peace negotiations; second, "an analysis of the form, content and meaning of the peace settlement"; and third, "a study of the impact of the war and its settlement, including consideration of any postwar negotiations aimed at completing, amending or improving the settlement, a history of the implementation of its terms, and its value as precedent for the management or resolution of future disputes."

This focus on agreed peace settlements was consistent with the position, then generally accepted in the field of international law, that "The most frequent mode of terminating a war . . .

is a treaty of peace, negotiated either while operations continue or after the conclusion of a general armistice." This was true of wars between recognized members of the international system in the period prior to World War II, but since 1945 fewer peace treaties have been concluded, and truce or cease-fire agreements have "tended in some respects to move forward to the place of the old treaty of peace."

For a general understanding of peacemaking, however, it must be recognized that a great many wars, or large-scale hostilities, ended without any agreed settlement—for example, by outright conquest, annexation, or military rule of foreign territory, by suppression of insurrectionary forces, or by overthrow of an existing regime and its replacement by a new government. The number of armed conflicts ending with any kind of agreement diminished significantly over the last half of the twentieth century, and many were transformed into long-term protracted conflicts. Of ninety post–Cold War conflicts in the years 1989–1993, only forty-one were terminated in that period, the rest remaining active years later. Of the forty-one, only six ended with a peace accord, the others ending either with a clear-cut victory by one side (seventeen), some form of cease-fire or truce without a peace settlement, or various patterns of decline in armed hostilities.

Study of the causes of war has engendered a vast literature since at least the monumental work of Quincy Wright, *A Study of War,* first published in 1942. Analysis of peacemaking, or "the causes of peace," is a more recent project that presents difficulties even greater than analysis of the causes of war. While the latter has received much more attention, there is no consensus among scholars on the solution of either problem. With respect to the causes of making peace, however, debate has centered upon the relative importance of selected events, conditions, or policies in inducing the parties to make peace. Battle victories, war costs, "unconditional surrender" policies, misperception, coalition diplomacy, secrecy, the role of mediators, and domestic politics are among the factors often treated as primary to the process of ending or prolonging hostilities. In reality, all these and other factors enter into the calculations of belligerents weighing the prospects for peace, and it is unlikely that any simple formula could lead us to predict which would be "decisive" in any given case.

As the decade of the 1960s drew to a close, special issues of the *Journal of Peace Research* (December 1969) and of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November 1970) were devoted to the topic "How Wars End," providing illuminating early analyses of war termination. Robert F. Randle's *The Origins of Peace* (1973) was followed by David Smith's *From War to Peace: Essays in Peacemaking and War Termination* (1974). In subsequent years, the number of works addressing peacemaking grew rapidly and expanded the information base, the scope, and the analytical complexity of knowledge and theory on the subject. Nevertheless, peacemaking remains a relatively neglected area of study as compared with warmaking.

ATTITUDES TOWARD PEACEMAKING

Throughout its history, the United States has sought to project an image of dedication to peace and to peacemaking. George Washington, in his Farewell Address in 1796, exhorted Americans to avoid "overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty," and urged Americans: "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all." Nearly two centuries later, President John F. Kennedy was obliged to acknowledge that, far from "cultivating peace and harmony," the United States found itself "caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other and new weapons beget counterweapons"; nevertheless, he too exhorted Americans to turn their attention to "the most important topic on earth, world peace":

> What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace . . . not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.

But the record of the behavior of the United States in regard to both "peace in our time" and "peace for all time" has been ambiguous at best.

Certainly there have been strong traditions of antimilitarism, internationalism, and pacifism in American society. The history of peace movements in the United States, reaching back at least to the formation of the New York, Massachusetts,

and Ohio Peace Societies in 1815, is long and rich, and can lay claim to having influenced the peace settlements in a number of wars or other conflicts, most prominently in World War I. On the level of governmental action, the long-term peacemaking efforts of the United States have focused on the development of international legal and institutional instruments for pacific settlement of disputes and peacekeeping by international organizations. The Rush-Bagot Convention (1817) established a lasting basis for disarmament on the long border between the United States and Canada, and the Treaty of Washington (1871) provided for the resolution of other outstanding issues (boundary and fisheries questions, and the Alabama Claims) by a court of arbitration.

The United States has also given strong support to the formulation of treaties of arbitration, both voluntary and compulsory, though the Senate has as strongly resisted acceptance of compulsory arbitration without significant reservations. The United States has also shown itself willing and even eager to extend its services as mediator, and has had some success in this role—for example, in mediating the Russo-Japanese peace settlement of 1905. In the protracted conflicts that troubled many parts of the world in the late twentieth century, the efforts of the United States to serve as mediator, as in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia, have had mixed success and have elicited charges of bias, hypocrisy, and even direct military aid to preferred parties in the conflicts.

Finally, the United States has sometimes adopted the role of peacemaker on a global scale, taking the initiative in the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League of Nations. Although the United States never joined the league and even declined to become a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court, it later played a major role in the establishment and development of the United Nations, and has accepted (though with major reservations) the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as reconstituted under the United Nations Charter.

There has also been strong interest in the United States in the development of techniques of peacekeeping and other approaches to conflict resolution. On the governmental level, United States involvement in "peacekeeping" or "peace enforcement" operations has unfortunately been associated with the large-scale use of military force, especially in Korea, the Persian Gulf, and the former Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, on the level of independent citizen action and professional research, there has been widespread interest in peacekeeping without the use of military force and in nonviolent modes of conflict resolution at international as well as domestic and interpersonal levels. The decades since World War II have witnessed the establishment of numerous peace studies programs, research institutes and centers, journals and professional associations devoted to peace and peacemaking, in the United States and around the world. In 1978 a citizen campaign in the United States led to the appointment by Congress of a commission to consider the establishment of a national academy of peace that would carry out and support research about international peace and peacemaking; educate and train persons from government, private enterprise, and voluntary associations about peace and peacemaking skills; and provide an information service in the field of peace learning. In 1984 legislation to create the United States Institute for Peace was passed by Congress, providing for an agency to support research but not to serve as a teaching and training academy. Since that time, Congress has increased funding and other forms of support for the institute's programs, including grants and fellowships, conferences, publications, library resources, and other activities, and has designated a tract of land for the institute's permanent headquarters, "in recognition of the Institute's accomplishments and the heightened relevance of its work in a dangerous and uncertain world."

FORMAL PEACE AGREEMENTS

In the period between 1775 and 1945, the United States entered into a great many treaties or other formal peace agreements, of which the overwhelming majority were treaties with the Indian nations or tribes. Five major wars between the United States and recognized foreign states were concluded by peace treaties: the American Revolution (Treaty of Paris, 3 September 1783), the War of 1812 (Treaty of Ghent, 24 December 1814), the Mexican War (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 2 February 1848), the Spanish-American War (Treaty of Paris, 10 December 1898), and World War I. The U.S. Senate declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and associated treaties negotiated by President Woodrow Wilson at the conclusion of World War I, but the United States

subsequently signed separate treaties of peace with Germany (Berlin, 25 August 1921), Austria (Vienna, 24 August 1921), and Hungary (Budapest, 29 August 1921). No treaties were signed and ratified by the United States with Bulgaria and Turkey, and the Soviet Union was absent from the entire peace settlement.

A number of lesser foreign wars or partial engagements of the United States were also concluded by treaties of peace: the Moroccan War (treaty of 28 June 1786), the Tripolitan War (Treaty of Tripoli, 3 June 1805), two Algerian wars (treaties of 1795 and 1815), the second Opium War (Treaty of Tientsin, 18 June 1858), and the Boxer Rebellion (Treaty of Peking, 7 September 1901). The undeclared naval war with France (Quasi-War) of 1798–1800 was also settled by a formal convention of 30 September 1800.

WAR ENDINGS WITHOUT FORMAL SETTLEMENTS

The United States has been involved in a considerable number of undeclared foreign wars or "interventions," particularly in the twentieth century. Such wars typically were not concluded by formal agreement but were ended rather by U.S. suppression of opposition, military rule, unilateral imposition of terms, or, in some cases, unilateral withdrawal of American forces. These undeclared wars included the suppression of the Philippine independence movement in 1899–1902, the Siberian interventions of 1918–1921, and numerous interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada. They also included military interventions in civil wars in Greece, China, Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, and others since World War II; covert actions and coups or attempted coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere; enforcement actions under "coalition" or North Atlantic Treaty Organization authority against Iraq and Serbia; and "antiterrorist" bombings in Libya and Afghanistan.

A study of American peacemaking must give some attention to the way the United States has handled the conclusion of civil wars and insurrections. The distinction between these and "foreign wars" becomes somewhat doubtful when we recall that the United States itself originated in an insurrectionary war. When an incumbent government is obliged to concede statehood and separate territorial sovereignty to rebel belligerents, the ending of the conflict takes on the character of a settlement between sovereign states. On the other hand, the treatment accorded to defeated belligerents in civil wars and insurrections often is not significantly different from the treatment accorded to defeated foreign nations in colonial wars of conquest or interventions.

The United States has experienced a substantial number of insurrections or rebellions, including at least thirty-five slave uprisings, at least five significant domestic insurrections or civil conflicts, the great Civil War of 1861–1865, and other types of conflicts such as large-scale riots, vigilante expeditions, and mass protests in labor, civil rights, and antiwar struggles. The United States government has consistently refused to give rebels, rioters, or protestors any recognized status as belligerents or negotiating partners, and these conflicts have been terminated by piecemeal suppression of the uprisings by military or police forces or by tacit concessions.

This was true even for the Civil War, in which the refusal of the U.S. government to negotiate with the rebel forces affected both the duration of hostilities and the character of the outcome. Efforts of the Confederate generals Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston to negotiate terms of general surrender with Union generals Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman were expressly rejected by both President Abraham Lincoln and President Andrew Johnson. Far from welcoming the opportunity to put a rapid end to the fighting, on 3 March 1865 Lincoln instructed Grant "to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter." Furthermore, Grant was "not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the president holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages."

Similarly, when Sherman, unaware of this directive to Grant, later met with Johnston and drafted terms for a general surrender of the Confederate forces remaining after Lee's surrender at Appomattox, the draft agreement was sharply rejected by President Johnson and his cabinet. Sherman was authorized to accept only the surrender of the army commanded by Johnston, and to engage in no negotiations. As Sherman observed, this policy meant that the war might continue indefinitely in sporadic engagements with dispersed "guerrilla bands." Indeed, while the Civil War formally terminated one year later

with a proclamation by President Johnson (2 April 1866), some hostilities continued even after that date and a separate proclamation was required to end the fighting in Texas (20 August 1866).

While the position taken by Lincoln and Johnson appears at first sight to be based primarily on the principle of civilian control over vital political and civil questions, it must be observed that it was not particular political terms drafted by the generals that were rejected, but any conference or negotiation between the military leaders for terms of general surrender. Nor was the United States government itself willing to negotiate with the Confederate government or its generals. In contrast, in both World War I and World War II, general surrender or armistice agreements were received and signed by military leaders of the Allied armies. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, general-in-chief of the Allied armies in France, signed the armistice agreement for the Allies in World War I. In 1945, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, signed the German instrument of surrender, while General Douglas MacArthur signed the Japanese surrender agreement for the Allied powers in World War II. Although the terms of these documents were determined ultimately by the civilian authorities, the Allied governments did not hesitate to have the military leaders receive the surrenders and, indeed, accorded them considerable influence on the formulation of surrender terms and occupation policies.

It seems probable that the refusal of the presidents during the Civil War to approve the receipt by either Grant or Sherman of general surrender by Lee or Johnston was less a question of military versus civilian control of policy than it was a question of refusing to treat with any party claiming to represent or exercise general authority in or over the Confederate states or forces. Such a position is characteristic of incumbent governments faced with insurrectionary forces, not only at the cost of prolonging armed hostilities but even at the cost of making impossible a settlement based on mutual accord and amity.

PEACEMAKING WITHOUT PEACE: THE INDIAN WARS

In *Custer Died for Your Sins* (1969), Vine Deloria wrote that "Indian people laugh themselves sick" when they hear American whites charge Soviet Russia with breaking treaty agreements: "It would take Russia another century to make and break as many treaties as the United States has already violated" in its dealings with American Indians. In the century between 1778 and 1871, the United States government made some 370 treaties with Indian tribes and nations. About one-third of these were peace treaties, but it is open to question what relationship should be understood between these treaties and "peacemaking" as construed above.

Since 1871 the United States has declined to sign treaties with Indian tribes, though it has continued to sign "agreements" understood to have the same binding force as treaties. The difference lies in rejection of the notion that the Indian tribes should be recognized as independent nations. Prior to 1871 this had been a matter of dispute, subject to varying interpretation and practice. In 1828, President John Quincy Adams declared that at the establishment of the United States, "the principle was adopted of considering them as foreign and independent powers." But in 1831, in the case of *Cherokee Nation* v. *Georgia,* Chief Justice John Marshall gave the majority judgment of the Supreme Court that the Indians were "domestic dependent nations," not to be considered "a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution." However, the Supreme Court was closely divided on the issue. In their dissent, Justices Smith Thompson and Joseph Story argued that the history of past treatment of the Indians led irresistibly to the conclusion that "they have been regarded, by the executive and legislative branches of the government, not only as sovereign and independent, but as foreign nations or tribes, not within the jurisdiction nor under the government of the states within which they were located."

Moreover, while Chief Justice Marshall maintained that the Indians were not "foreign states in the sense of the Constitution" with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, he acknowledged that for other purposes the Cherokee nation clearly did have the character of

> a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself. . . . The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community.

The following year, in the related case of *Worcester* v. *Georgia,* Marshall reaffirmed as the judgment of

the Court that treaties with the Indians had the same standing as treaties with other nations:

> The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.

The first treaty of peace ever made by the U.S. government was with the Delaware Indians in 1778, at Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh). This was in fact a treaty of alliance between the United States and some of the Delaware tribes, at a time when most of the Indians of Ohio and New York, including the Delaware, were fighting on the side of the British in the revolutionary war. The treaty repudiates the allegations of "enemies of the United States" who have

> endeavoured by every artifice to possess the Indians with an opinion that it is our design to extirpate them, and take possession of their country; to obviate such false suggestions, the United States guarantee to said nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in the fullest and most ample manner as bounded by former treaties.

Similar guarantees were reiterated numerous times in succeeding years—for example, in 1790, when President George Washington assured the Iroquois Nations that the U.S. government would "protect you in all your just rights. . . . You possess the right to sell, and the right of refusing to sell your lands. . . . The United States will be true and faithful to their engagements." In reality, the United States repeatedly violated these engagements, systematically dispossessing the Indian tribes of their lands and depriving them of their traditional means of subsistence, utilizing every means at hand including force and fraud, trickery and bribery, and finally murder, arson, and massacre. Although no war was ever declared by Congress against an Indian nation, one may well name the entire period of white colonization of the territory now comprising the United States the "Four Hundred Years' War." This protracted war reduced the Indian population of some twelve million in the area of the continental United States before the arrival of the colonists to about 300,000 in 1872. By that time the Delaware, who had been assured in 1778 that it was only the "false suggestions" of "enemies of the United States" that it was "our design to extirpate them, and take possession of their country," had been driven from their native territory and so reduced and dispersed that the report of the commissioner of Indian affairs for 1872 mentioned only eighty-one Delaware, living with the Wichita in Indian Territory.

In the present context, three main points are salient about the relations between the United States and the Indian nations: first, the consistent failure of the U.S. government to adhere to commitments made in numerous treaties of peace and amity; second, the outright resistance of many officers of the U.S. Army, and many state and federal government officials, to making peace with Indians on any terms other than unconditional surrender, removal to reservations, or, if necessary, extermination; and third, the use of peace treaties as weapons of war.

Although the full history of "broken peace pipes" has yet to be written, one may read parts of it in such works as Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* (1881), Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (1971), Vine Deloria's *Of Utmost Good Faith* (1971) and *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties* (1985), and M. Annette Jaimes's collection *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance* (1992). With respect to peacemaking, the effect of the most glaring atrocities, such as the Sand Creek massacre, was to shut all doors to peace. On 29 November 1864, Colonel John M. Chivington and Major Scott Anthony led seven hundred men to mutilate and slaughter some two hundred Indians, encamped at Sand Creek under assurances from Anthony himself that they would be under the protection of Fort Lyon. As Dee Brown concludes: "In a few hours of madness at Sand Creek, Chivington and his soldiers destroyed the lives or the power of every Cheyenne and Arapaho chief who had held out for peace with the white men. After the flight of the survivors, the Indians rejected Black Kettle and Left Hand, and turned to their war leaders to save them from extermination."

Despite the hideousness of this and other massacres, far more Indians were killed and driven off their lands by the devices of dishonest, dictated, and disregarded peace treaties. Among the clearest examples of this was the case of the Cherokee. First persuaded by treaty commitments in 1785–1791 that the United States "solemnly guarantees to the

Cherokee nation all their lands" not expressly ceded in the treaties, the Cherokees refrained from making war despite many hostile encounters with whites and the illegal entry onto their lands of numerous white settlers. Pressured into ceding more territory by treaty in 1817, some of the Cherokee began to move west of the Mississippi; but many refused to sign the treaty and most of the Cherokee clung stubbornly to their traditional lands. In 1829, however, the state of Georgia adopted an act that annexed their whole territory to the state and deprived them of all legal and political rights, annulling "all laws made by the Cherokee nation, . . . either in council or in any other way," and providing that "no Indian . . . shall be deemed a competent witness in any Court of this State to which a white man may be a party." The Cherokee sought to challenge this in the Supreme Court, but were discouraged by the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the refusal of the Supreme Court to hear their case in 1831, and the refusal of President Andrew Jackson to implement the more favorable decision of the court in *Worcester* v. *Georgia* (1832).

Under these circumstances, some of the Cherokee were induced to sign the Treaty of New Echota (1835), relinquishing all the Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi (encompassing territory in four southern states exceeding in size the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) in return for five million dollars and seven million acres west of the Mississippi. The treaty again assured the Cherokee that the new lands ceded to them "shall in no future time, without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory." Whether they recognized that these assurances would be as worthless as earlier ones, or simply preferred their ancestral lands, most of the Cherokees refused to sign the Treaty of New Echota; in 1837, General John Ellis Wool reported that the Cherokee people "uniformly declare that they never made the treaty in question." Nevertheless, at the expiration of the stipulated time the U.S. Army appeared to carry out the removal, "in obedience to the treaty of 1835." Fifteen thousand Cherokee were forcibly evicted under conditions of such inadequate food, shelter, and sanitation that four thousand died on the long trek west. Thus, in retrospect, treaty-making takes on the appearance of the most deadly weapon employed by the whites in their war to wrest the continent from the Indians; to persuade, trick, or coerce them into giving up their lands; and to reduce them to a remnant of their former numbers.

Nevertheless, with the emergence of Indian activism in the Americas and other indigenous movements around the world since the 1970s, there was a revival of interest in past treaties and contemporary treaty-making to clarify and reaffirm the rights of Indian tribes and other indigenous groups promised in earlier treaties and agreements, resolve the destructive conflicts over these rights that persist today, and restore the dignity and lands of indigenous peoples. In 1974 the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) was established to press for the rights of indigenous peoples across the Americas and around the globe. The IITC has worked through the United Nations and through autonomous meetings and action to secure recognition and redress, with some degree of success.

For example, in 1995, Queen Elizabeth II signed an apology to the Maori people of New Zealand and announced the return to the Maori of 39,000 acres of land the British had confiscated from them illegally in 1863, and the provision of a $42 million fund for the repurchase of privately owned land. Although the amount restored was far less than had been taken, and hundreds of tribal claims remained in litigation, this was an unprecedented and important gesture of reconciliation. In the United States some lands and rights were restored to Native Americans through the Indian Claims Commission between 1946 and 1978, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and other legislative acts. However, the claims settlements have been very limited, and since 1978, Indian claims have been pressed mainly through the federal courts and acts of Congress. Some of these have been settled, notably the Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, which provided a settlement award of $60 million to the Seneca, but in 2001 many claims were still pending, including the long-fought Black Hills land claim of the Lakota Nation, and there was little ground for optimism about early resolution of the major claims and issues.

In 1996 a subcommission of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights issued a Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While the General Assembly did not vote to approve the draft, it recognized the adoption of such a declaration as one of the main goals of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (1995–2004). Article 36 of the Draft Declaration states: "Indigenous peoples have the right

to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors, according to their original spirit and intent, and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements."

TREATY MAKING VERSUS PEACEMAKING

The experience of the American Indians is the most glaring example, but by no means unique, illustrating the limitations of treaty-making as a model for peacemaking. It is widely recognized that so-called "peace settlements," explicit agreements for the termination of a particular war or dispute, may fail to resolve key issues in dispute, and may even plant the seeds for new hostilities.

In the case of World War I, for example, President Woodrow Wilson resisted strong pressures from political opponents at home to demand "unconditional surrender" as the only basis for a settlement of the war with Germany, but he was later obliged to make many concessions weakening or contradicting the principles of his Fourteen Points, and forcing Germany to accept dictated terms of peace. When the Senate declined to ratify the resulting Treaty of Versailles, it was in the setting of a national campaign portraying the treaty terms and even the Covenant of the League of Nations as a betrayal of hopes for a lasting peace. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge argued before the Senate on 12 August 1919:

> Whatever may be said, it [League of Nations] is not a league of peace; it is an alliance, dominated at the present moment by five great powers, really by three, and it has all the marks of an alliance. The development of international law is neglected. The court which is to decide disputes brought before it fills but a small place . . . it exhibits that most marked characteristic of an alliance—that its decisions are to be carried out by force. Those articles on which the whole structure rests are articles which provide for the use of force; that is, for war.

Nor did the opposition to the treaty as a provocation of future wars come only from the right. Indeed, the first organized group to condemn the Treaty of Versailles was the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, whose international congress at Zurich, meeting 12–17 May 1919, declared:

> This International Congress of Women expresses its deep regret that the terms of peace proposed at Versailles should so seriously violate the principles upon which alone a just and lasting peace can be secured, and which the democracies of the world had come to accept.
>
> By guaranteeing the fruits of the secret treaties to conquerors, the terms of peace tacitly sanction secret diplomacy, deny the principles of self-determination, recognize the right of the victors to the spoils of war, and create all over Europe discords and animosities, which can only lead to future wars.
>
> By the demand for the disarmament of one set of belligerents only, the principle of justice is violated and the rule of force continued.

One may argue that the Treaty of Versailles was not so bad as its opponents portrayed it, that its terms were less harsh than they might have been, that the disarmament of Germany was a first step toward the general disarmament that the treaty envisaged for the future, and that the League of Nations, imperfect as it was, offered a framework for international cooperation and peace that would have been effective had it been given responsible support and leadership by the United States and other great powers. One may argue that the failure of the peace settlement of 1919 was less a consequence of its internal flaws than of its abandonment in the subsequent years, first by the withdrawal of the United States and then by successive retreats by other major signatories (especially Great Britain and France), particularly from the treaty's provisions for general disarmament and for collective action against breaches of the peace. These questions are still debated; nevertheless, it is probable that disillusionment with the settlement of 1919 contributed to the failure to arrive at any general peace settlement in World War II, and perhaps to the near abandonment of treaties of peace as a mode of terminating hostilities in the period since 1945.

Doubts concerning the necessity and advisability of concluding a treaty of peace at the end of World War II were expressed in the work on planning for peace during the last years of the war. In the report "Procedures of Peacemaking: With Special Reference to the Present War," the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress pointed out in August 1943 that the Declaration of the United Nations bound the signatories not to conclude a separate peace. Nevertheless, the report noted:

> The worldwide scope of the present war and the multitude of problems which its settlement

> entails constitute a strong temptation for the solution of certain questions independently of the overall settlement. . . . Even the major problems of boundaries, of federations, and of economic and political alliances among foreign States, insofar as the United States is not directly committed, might be thus decided without these decisions ever appearing in the text of a treaty which the United States would be called upon to ratify. . . . The cessation of hostilities in different parts of the world may be far from simultaneous. . . . And should a prolonged interval intervene between the end of the fighting in the main theatres of war and the definitive peace, the situation might become so deeply influenced by decisions made and regimes established in the meantime, that the peace conference might find its freedom of action considerably prejudiced. As a result of this development, the peace treaty or treaties may lose a great deal of their importance.

This analysis proved remarkably close to the actual course of events at the end of World War II. As one text summed it up, "peacemaking was a long drawn-out process which never quite ended but turned into the Cold War between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies." The wartime conferences at Casablanca, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam laid down some of the principles and specific terms of the postwar arrangements, including the demand for "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers, the policy of "complete disarmament, demilitarization and dismemberment of Germany," the establishment of the United Nations, and various specific provisions relating to the Far East and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Nevertheless, many key issues were left imprecise or totally unresolved, and all the agreements were understood to be provisional pending a final peace treaty. By the time the peace conference convened in Paris, however, the situation had indeed become "so deeply influenced by decisions made and regimes established in the meantime" that the formulation of a general peace settlement acceptable to all the major participants had become impossible.

Thus, no general treaty settlement of World War II in Europe was concluded; the peace treaty with Japan was delayed until 1951, and was not signed by the Soviet Union. Nor were peace treaties concluded in other wars fought by the United States since then. No peace treaty followed the armistice in the Korean War, concluded at Panmunjom in July 1953. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam was arranged by a cease-fire agreement of 28 January 1973. Although this was called "An Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," it was actually, as Randle notes, "a military settlement without the concomitant political settlement that completes the peacemaking process." Moreover, the withdrawal of U.S. uniformed forces did not end the war or restore the peace; fighting continued among the Vietnamese and other Indochinese belligerents in subsequent years.

On the whole, the United States has held an image of peacemaking as "sitting down around the table to negotiate." But with the exception of the early period of its history in relations with European powers, especially Great Britain, the United States has not had a strong record of making peace on negotiated terms, such as to establish a lasting basis of concord. The terms of the treaties with Mexico in 1848, Spain in 1898, and Germany in 1919 were essentially dictated, as were the terms of surrender of the Axis countries in World War II. In the latter cases, the United States was obliged to negotiate at least with its own allies. In World War I, negotiation with allies may have cost the United States the freedom to negotiate with the opposing belligerents, but in World War II, it was the declared policy of the United States to achieve "unconditional surrender." This was also the policy most often adopted by the United States in dealing with insurgents, both domestic, as in the Civil War, and foreign, as in the Philippines. Moreover, in dealing with Native Americans, the United States has shown that negotiating treaties may be a device not to establish peace but to disarm, defeat, and gradually drive an opponent into a dependent condition.

The United States has sometimes sought to ameliorate the harshness of terms imposed on defeated opponents by financial awards (payments and annuities to Native Americans, $15 million to Mexico for 40 percent of its territory from Texas to California) or postwar programs of aid and rehabilitation (loans to Germany after World War I, the Marshall Plan after World War II). Even in this respect, however, the provision of aid has been more generous and given on less humiliating terms to powerful opponents, especially those of white race, than to those peoples of different race and culture who have found themselves in the path of "manifest destiny" and U.S. global expansion, whether Native Americans, Filipinos, or Vietnamese.

RACE AND PEACEMAKING

In the scholarly literature focusing on peacemaking in the international arena, surprisingly little attention has been given to issues of race. Although "ethnic" conflict is recognized as a cause of war or internal armed conflict and as sometimes especially intractable, the treatment of racial conflicts as such in works on "peacemaking" has been limited mainly to those concerned with conflict resolution in the schools, in the criminal justice system, or in community relations. Yet the salience of race as a factor in international relations and peacemaking has been called to our attention repeatedly, from W. E. B. Du Bois's declaration that "the problem of the twentieth century is the color line" to a number of contemporary works that emphasize the international and transnational importance of race. These include, in particular, George W. Shepherd, Jr., *Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy* (1970); Hugh Tinker, *Race, Conflict, and the International Order* (1977); and Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (1988).

As Shepherd argued in 1970, "all great powers must face the reality of racial attitudes in their policies." This includes recognition of the dominant group interests as well as attitudes of racial superiority that may drive foreign policy choices and decisions and may shape support or disaffection from those choices at home. It has been suggested, for example, that the failure of the United States and other powers to support preventive action in Rwanda, while intervening at much higher levels of commitment in the Middle East and the Balkans, reflected a racially biased choice. Another aspect of the influence of race in international politics is that of transnational communication and interaction. As in the case of indigenous peoples, the transnational force of race identity and solidarity may have a powerful influence on policies relating to conflicts both at home and abroad. At the same time Shepherd called upon us to engage "a more perceptive study of the special contribution of nonwhite and non-Western peoples within and among nations."

Lauren later expanded on these themes, recognizing the problematic nature of the very concept of "race" but arguing that it has nonetheless profoundly influenced global politics and diplomacy. As he sums it up, race issues have affected relations between and among states and have posed serious threats to international peace and security. They have "motivated domestic groups concerned with racial discrimination to exert noticeable pressure upon the foreign policy of their own governments and to seek the active support of other nations for their protection." Despite the silence on these issues in most of the "peacemaking" literature, they have held a very high place on the international agenda of matters relating to a broad conception of peace. The first global attempt to speak for equality focused upon race. The first human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter were placed there because of race. The first international challenge to a country's claim of domestic jurisdiction and exclusive treatment of its own citizens centered upon race. The first binding treaty of human rights concentrated upon race. The international conventions with the greatest number of signatories is that on race. Within the United Nations, more resolutions deal with race than with any other subject. It may be hoped that as work continues and grows in the peacemaking field, more direct attention will be accorded to the issues of race at the international level.

GENDER AND PEACEMAKING

Given the widespread and persistent popular association between women and peace, and the worldwide presence of women's peace movements, it is not surprising that we now have several large bodies of literature on women, war, and peace. These include histories and biographies of women's peace activism, collections of women's poetry, fiction, and other writings on war and peace, sociological and political studies on women's peace movements, the gender gap on peace issues, and women's roles in peace and war, grueling accounts of women's losses, sufferings, displacement, and subjection to torture, rape, and sexual slavery in situations of war and armed conflict. Also portrayed are inspiring accounts of women's creativity, intellectual brilliance, courage, daring, and solidarity in the use of nonviolent direct action or other techniques of resistance, and a wide variety of theories to explain and comprehend women's struggles to overcome violence and subjection and build peace.

It may seem surprising, however, to find that in all this wealth of theory and knowledge there is relatively little about women and the processes of peacemaking as such. Less surpris-

ing, but more troubling, is that there is even less on women and gender in the mainstream studies on peacemaking, suggesting that women's peace work remains nearly as invisible to scholars and experts in the academy as the male political and military establishments would like it to be in the arenas of "real world" conflict. Of course the reason for this invisibility is above all the practical exclusion of women from most of the official and even unofficial avenues of peacemaking. At peace talks for Burundi in Arusha, a delegation of women was not welcomed to participate—male delegates declared: "The women are not parties to this conflict. This is not their concern. We cannot see why they have come, why they bother us. We are here and we represent them." While these sentiments may not be so readily expressed aloud in other contexts, they are in fact all too common in practice. On a positive note, women have gained high-level positions in U.S. foreign relations, including Madeleine Albright as secretary of state under President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. However, the number of women admitted to the sacrosanct premises of peace or cease-fire negotiations is minuscule, and the adage, "out of sight, out of mind," is all too accurate here. The women themselves, their proposals for peace, and their concerns with regard to peace settlements, are steadfastly relegated to the sidelines. Nonetheless, the multiple roles women play relative to settling conflicts and restoring peace are in fact highly important, sometimes decisive, and the gendered character of all wars and armed conflicts is central to a clear comprehension of the context and path to resolution.

There are a number of works that are especially valuable in this regard, including: Gita Sen and Caren Grown, *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (1987), Betty A. Reardon, *Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security* (1993), and Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference* (2000). The latter, a publication of UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), deals most directly with women's participation in peace movements during wars and conflicts and in the processes of negotiation and peacebuilding to end the conflicts and secure a sustainable peace with benefits not only for the "winners" but for women and people at the grassroots. Anderlini interviews women who have been engaged in the peace processes, including Hanan Ashrawi, and explores both the obstacles the women have faced and the importance of their contributions to the peace processes. Further research and analysis in this area are urgently needed.

PEACEMAKING AND THE PERILS OF "VICTORY"

It was long held in the scholarly literature that wars for the most part end in victory for one side and defeat for the other. Stalemates and settlements with no discernible victor or defeated were regarded as relatively rare. This was not often stated as a general principle and was sometimes subjected to challenge. Nevertheless, it appeared repeatedly, sometimes as an empirical observation on selected groups of wars, sometimes as an underlying assumption in the theoretical analysis of war endings.

Thus, Melvin Small and J. David Singer in *The Wages of War: 1816–1965, A Statistical Handbook* (1972), assigned victor or defeated status to the belligerents in all but one of fifty interstate wars and forty-three "extra-systemic" wars that they included in their study. Similarly, George Modelski found that some four-fifths of one hundred internal wars since 1900 ended in an "outright win" or victory of one side or the other. The theoretical significance of assigning victory had been set forth earlier by H. A. Calahan, who held that the key to peacemaking lies simply in the recognition of defeat on the part of the vanquished: "war is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished."

This view was echoed later by others, including Paul Kecskemeti and Lewis Coser, but its fullest theoretical statement appears in Nicholas S. Timasheff's *War and Revolution* (1965). Timasheff views war as "a means of solving an inter-state conflict by measuring the relative strength of the parties." Timasheff goes on to make clear that the return to peace must take place through the initiative of the defeated, concluding that in studying the "movement from war to peace" (that is, war endings), the determination of victory is central: "Therefore, the study of the causal background of the return of political systems from war to peace is tantamount to the study of the premises of victory and of the mechanism converting victory into peace."

This preoccupation with victory and defeat persists in some measure today despite the fact that, as James D. Smith and others have pointed out, there has been a significant trend away from

the conclusion of wars and armed conflicts by clear-cut victory of one side. Negotiated settlements, stalemates, and withdrawals of all parties are increasingly prevalent as outcomes of war in the late twentieth century. "'Victory,' then, is becoming increasingly elusive in modern warfare." Yet in their text *How Nations Make Peace* (1999), Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond center their entire analysis on "situations in which there was a clear winner and loser," exploring the "policy problems and moral dilemmas victors face," the choices to be made by "victors" after a "decisive military victory," and particularly "the relative merits of compassionate versus punitive peace settlements." In posing these issues, Kegley and Raymond express the laudable hope that their work may help to "bring the ethical dimension of decision making into the study of international relations." However, by narrowing the focus to exclude the great diversity of contemporary armed conflicts and their different kinds of endings, Kegley and Raymond obscure the broader question of "how nations make peace" and direct disproportionate attention to the relatively few instances in which the winner/loser, victor/defeated model prevails. Meanwhile, the elusive goal of victory continues to command the imaginations of both military and civilian leaders, often standing as a significant obstacle to timely and effective peacemaking, as illustrated in a number of case studies examined by James D. Smith in *Stopping Wars* (1995).

ON THE ROAD TO PEACE: PEACE PROCESSES SINCE WORLD WAR II

With the decline of formal peace settlements as the prevailing mode of terminating wars in the period since World War II, studies of peacemaking have shifted to the analysis of peace processes: the factors influencing parties in a conflict to move toward peace, procedures to facilitate the process, methods and techniques to bring about cessation of hostilities and implement cease-fire terms, and approaches to peacebuilding for the longer term. In these processes, the United Nations has been called on with increasing frequency to play a central part, yet often sidestepped to suit great-power interests.

In his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spelled out the multiple roles that the United Nations has taken in regard to peace, under the rubrics of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. It may be noted that "peacemaking" appears here in a specific sense as one of a series of stages in the peace process, though the term is still widely used to denote the entire process, and the designations cover actions and procedures that are overlapping and interrelated.

"Preventive diplomacy" refers to efforts to resolve disputes before violence occurs. Such efforts may be conducted by the secretary-general or other offices of the United Nations, or by diplomatic engagement of others such as neutral states or regional associations, or by multitrack diplomacy involving both public and private parties. These may lead to a variety of steps to encourage resolution of the disputes without armed force, such as confidence-building measures, fact finding, early-warning systems, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones. As Gareth Evans notes, in some circumstances "the preventive diplomacy techniques—negotiation, enquiry, mediation and so on—which are aimed at averting armed hostilities, are also appropriate if fighting *does* break out."

"Peacemaking" in the specific sense used here refers to efforts to bring together parties already engaged in hostilities to seek agreement for peaceful resolution of their conflict. The United Nations role in this context is spelled out under chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which specifies the options of mediation, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, sanctions, and "other peaceful means." Mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and judicial settlement have been central to the theory and practice of peacemaking over the course of history and have been treated in numerous historical, legal, and political works. Two noteworthy contemporary examples are Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (1983), and I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (1997). Peacemaking efforts in the last decades of the twentieth century sought less to arrive at any comprehensive peace agreement than to achieve a cessation or pause in hostilities in the form of a cease-fire, truce, or "suspension of arms." The processes of arriving at a cease-fire have been somewhat neglected in the existing literature, but have been addressed particularly by James D. Smith in *Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-fire* (1995).

Sanctions, which are conceived in this context as an inducement to bring parties to the

negotiating table, have also been invoked to bring international pressure on a state in favor of internal change, as in the case of sanctions imposed upon South Africa to end its apartheid policies. Here it can be argued that the combined impact of economic, strategic, social, and cultural sanctions imposed by the international community played an important peacemaking role in promoting an end to a violent system. On the other hand, sanctions used as a form of peace enforcement can become punitive action, amounting to a weapon of war. Sanctions imposed upon Iraq in conjunction with the Persian Gulf War of 1991 were maintained (though with some modifications) for over a decade at the insistence of the United States, with devastating consequences for the Iraqi people.

"Peace enforcement" under United Nations auspices is authorized under chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This provides for the use of any measures deemed necessary by the Security Council, including the use of armed force, to "maintain or restore international peace and security." In general, the United Nations has been somewhat reluctant to resort to this provision of the Charter, the main exceptions being the two major military enforcement actions spearheaded and directed by the United States in Korea and the Persian Gulf. In contrast, the efforts of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1994 to assemble a peace enforcement mission of five thousand troops to prevent the genocidal violence that eventually claimed over half a million lives in Rwanda were rebuffed by the United States and other powers. The United States also spearheaded the military enforcement action against Yugoslavia in 1999, under the aegis of NATO, declining to take the matter to the United Nations.

"Peacekeeping" refers to intervention by unarmed or lightly armed forces of the United Nations or other intergovernmental bodies, to monitor or supervise implementation of cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other agreements reached through preventive diplomacy or peacemaking efforts. Peacekeeping bodies may include military personnel, police forces, or civilians and, as Evans points out, their presence usually presupposes "that the governments or parties involved in the conflict are willing to cooperate and are able to reach and maintain agreement." In the decades since the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine in 1948, the United Nations and other international bodies have accumulated extensive experience with scores of peacekeeping operations around the world. A large body of works reporting, analyzing and assessing these operations has appeared, ranging from individual case histories such as Connor Cruise O'Brien's *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History* (1964) and overviews such as *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (United Nations, 1990, 1996), to collections of scholarly and interpretive studies such as Tom Woodhouse et al., eds., *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts* (1998), and Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, eds., *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (1998).

"Peacebuilding" is a newer concept, emerging from a growing recognition that termination of armed conflict is no guarantee of "peace," which depends on underlying social, political, and economic conditions. Peace studies as a field has moved away from an exclusive focus on "negative peace," conceived simply as the *absence* of organized warfare and other forms of armed violence, to the study of "positive peace." In the context of peacemaking, this means going beyond cease-fire or even peace accords to address underlying issues of justice and the structural violence of exploitation, racism, patriarchy, and other forms of oppression and dominance relations. This is sometimes described as a process of "conflict transformation," designed to build "cooperative, peaceful relationships capable of fostering reconciliation, reconstruction, and long-term economic and social development." John Paul Lederach, in *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997), sets out to provide "a set of ideas and strategies that undergird sustainable peace." As summarized in the foreword by Richard H. Solomon, a president of the United States Institute for Peace: "Sustainable peace requires that long-time antagonists not merely lay down their arms but that they achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained by a society-wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity." Peacebuilding thus expands the field of vision in peacemaking to encompass a broad range of individual, group, and societal and international problems and action.

It may be that there is no better symbol of the paradoxes in the history of United States peacemaking than dubbing the Colt .45 gun "the Peacemaker." Yet it may be hoped that the voices

will be heard of those other peacemakers who hold with Jane Addams that peace cannot be secured merely by the temporary conclusion of fighting, but "only as men abstained from the gains of oppression and responded to the cause of the poor; that swords would finally be beaten into plowshares and pruning hooks, not because men resolved to be peaceful, but because the metal of the earth would be turned to its proper use when the poor and their children should be abundantly fed," and when peace came to be conceived "no longer as an absence of war, but the unfolding of worldwide processes making for the nurture of human life."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bell, Christine. *Peace Agreements and Human Rights*. New York, 2000.

Boulding, Elise. *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1990.

Brown, Dee. *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West*. New York, 1971.

Caplow, Theodore. *Peace Games*. Middletown, Conn., 1989.

Carroll, Berenice A. "How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses." *Journal of Peace Research* (December 1969): 295–320.

———. "War Termination and Conflict Theory: Value Premises, Theory, and Policies." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (November 1970): 14–29.

Challinor, Joan R., and Robert L. Beisner, eds. *Arms at Rest: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in American History*. New York, 1987.

Daffern, Thomas Clough. "Peacemaking and Peacebuilding." In Lester Kurtz and Jennifer Turpin, eds. *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*. Vol. 2. San Diego, 1999.

Deloria, Vine, Jr. *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence*. Austin, Tex., 1985.

Diamond, Louise, and John McDonald. *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. 3d ed. West Hartford, Conn., 1996.

Elias, Robert, and Jennifer Turpin, eds. *Rethinking Peace*. Boulder, Colo., 1994.

Fox, William T. R., ed. *How Wars End*. Special issue of *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (November 1970).

Goldstein, Erik. *Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816–1991*. London, 1992.

Hampson, Fen Osler. *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, D.C., 1996.

Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*. Princeton, N.J., 2001.

Ireton, Steven W. "Conflict Resolution and Indian Treaties on the American Indian Frontier, 1730–1768." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at Santa Barbara, 1988.

Jackson, Helen Hunt. *A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with Some of the Indian Tribes*. 2d ed. Boston, 1885.

Jaimes, M. Annette, ed. *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance*. Boston, 1992.

Karsh, Efraim, and Gregory Mahler, eds. *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace*. New York, 1994.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. *How Nations Make Peace*. New York, 1999.

Kurtz, Lester, and Jennifer Turpin, eds. *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*. Vol. 2. San Diego, 1999.

Lederach, John Paul. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C., 1997.

Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles 1918–1919*. New York, 1967.

Morris, Richard B. *The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence*. New York, 1965.

Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking, 1919*. New York, 1965.

Otunnu, Olara A., and Michael W. Doyle, eds. *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*. Lanham, Md., 1998.

Pauling, Linus, Ervin Laszlo, and Jong Youl Yoo, eds. *World Encyclopedia of Peace*. Vol. 2. Oxford, 1986.

Phillipson, Coleman. *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace*. London, 1916.

Pillar, Paul R. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton, N.J., 1983.

Powers, Gerard F., Drew Christiansen, and Robert T. Hennemeyer, eds. *Peacemaking: Moral and Policy Challenges for a New World*. Washington, D.C., 1994.

Randle, Robert F. *The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements*. New York, 1973.

Regan, Patrick M. *Organizing Societies for War: The Process and Consequences of Societal Militarization*. Westport, Conn., 1994.

Rupesinghe, Kumar, with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*. London, 1998.

Smith, David S., ed. *From War to Peace: Essays in Peacemaking and War Termination*. New York, 1974.

Smith, James D. D. *Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-fire*. Boulder, Colo., 1995.

Stiffarm, Lenore A., with Phil Lane, Jr. "The Demography of Native North America: A Question of American Indian Survival." In M. Annette Jaimes, ed. *The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization, and Resistance*. Boston, 1992.

Stone, Julius. *Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes-and War-Law*. New York, 1959.

United Nations. *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States*. New York, 1992.

Woodhouse, Tom, ed. *Peacemaking in a Troubled World*. New York, 1991.

Woodhouse, Tom, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando, eds. *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts*.New York, 1998.

Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*. 2d ed. Chicago, 1965.

Zartman, I. William, and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*. Washington, D.C., 1997.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; DISSENT IN WARS; GENDER; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; PACIFISM; PEACE MOVEMENTS; RACE AND ETHNICITY; TREATIES.

Peace Movements

Robert H. Ferrell

The idea of peace is ancient, reaching back to the beginnings of organized society and perhaps even earlier; but until the Renaissance it had not passed beyond the stage of individual thought. Society was rural, save for a few towns and cities. Nationalities, while recognized, were not well formed. International relations did not exist. The relations of the Greek city-states were casual and unorganized, moving from hostilities to lack of hostilities without much of a dividing line. The very basis of international organization—existence of different peoples, organized in states, usually speaking different languages, was not present in the Greek world. Nor was it present in the world of Rome, where a single city, through extension of citizenship, recognized no equals in the area of the Mediterranean. To the Romans the people with whom they came in touch were either to submit to the domination of the empire or forever remain barbarians. There was no such thing as interstate relations. The same lack of international relations marked medieval life, where princes and principalities might fight or not fight, for whatever reason, conducting warfare as if it were a natural state of affairs and halting it when convenient, without much or any formality. In such disorganized relations between the peoples of Europe there was, to be sure, little reason to try for a better order of affairs when all that people knew was chaos or domination. In any event, the generality of the citizens or subjects was not consulted in advance of fighting or its conclusion.

The appearance of peace movements awaited both the formal division of Europe into nation-states and a notable intellectual development often overlooked by analysts of modern European history—the division of international relations into times of peace and times of war. This latter change came during the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century, and did not occur so much in the statecraft of the time as in the thinking of jurists and students of law, who began to see not merely that the primitive international customs and traditions of the era must be ordered but also that the task of ordering involved division into laws for fighting and laws for peaceful existence. In this regard the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius proved most influential. A citizen of one of the major maritime states of the era, and therefore interested in the freest possible trade on the high seas, he found the military forces of his countrymen outnumbered by the professional armies of the monarchs whose territories surrounded the States-General. The convenience of trading with many European states had fascinated the Dutch, and they wanted to continue this commerce. At the same time they needed guarantees of freedom of trade. Life during the Thirty Years' War was almost insufferable for so rich a group as the Dutch burghers. Grotius was imprisoned, and friends contrived his escape in a large chest. With reason he wished to try to order the international relations of his time, and the result was *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625). In it he drew a sharp line between what was war and what was peace. It was, incidentally, a line that was not recognized until the nineteenth century, when there were no major European wars except the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). Grotius's distinction between war and peace would be blurred by the statesmen of the twentieth century, who through cold wars and other such undeclared conflicts pushed international relations back toward the pre-Grotian chaos. In any event, the drawing of a war-peace line—however theoretical, and thereafter slowly accepted and eventually violated—set the stage for popular peace movements. In a real sense Grotius and his supporters among the legal theorists were the originators of peace movements.

The essentially theoretical nature of peace movements was observable from the outset, and it may well have been one of the reasons why the innumerable drawings of ideal international societies, the perfect renderings of international rela-

tions, have never been translated even approximately into reality.

The first designs of men of peace in modern times, which themselves were not characterizable as the programs of peace movements but received a good deal of attention during their periods of interest, were markedly theoretical. One of the leaders of France in the early seventeenth century, the duc de Sully, was the author of the "great design" of King Henry IV, which, though it stipulated an international force, asked for one so small that it amounted to disarmament. Much notice was taken of this hope for peace, and it was speculated upon for years thereafter. The supporters of later peace movements were also accustomed to cite the hopes of Benjamin Franklin, who was convinced that standing armies diminished not only the population of a country but also the breed and size of the human species, for the strongest men went off to war and were killed. He pointed out obvious waste in the maintenance of armies. His analysis made sense to many Americans who themselves, or whose ancestors, had come to the New World to escape the constant wars of the Old. The Farewell Address of President George Washington in 1796 was plain about the need for peace and the wastefulness of war: "Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty." Here was another rationale that would recur in the pronouncements of the nineteenth-century peace movements in both the United States and Europe.

The intellectual foundations of peace movements were laid in the years prior to 1815. Beginning in that year, with the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon at an end, and the emperor of France on his way to St. Helena in a British frigate, it was possible to bring together the formalities of the international lawyers and the philosophical hopes of Sully, Franklin, and Washington, and to enlarge upon and systematize ideas about how American or European—or even world—peace might be achieved.

The years from 1815 to 1848 saw major developments in organization of peace groups in the United States. For a while it appeared as if they might carry everything before them. Peace seemed secure between the United States and Great Britain. In the Rush-Bagot Convention (1817) the two English-speaking nations undertook a virtual disarmament of their borders upon the Great Lakes, across New York State, and along the northern borders of the New England states. Why could not such an arrangement between erstwhile enemies spread to the entire world? This was the era of the founding of the American Peace Society in 1828 and of state peace societies. It was an ebullient time, often characterized by later historians as an age of reform: the antislavery movement, prison reform, insane asylum reform, experiments in communitarian living, and the rise of reformist religions such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

Members of the new peace organizations advanced their ideas with unwonted vigor and with a very considerable intellectual precision. The principal organizer of the American Peace Society, William Ladd, arranged for distribution of tracts and advocated a congress of nations, together with the riddance of war through treaties of arbitration. Elihu Burritt established the League of Universal Brotherhood in 1846, which soon was claiming an American membership of twenty thousand and a similar number of British members; Burritt's organization was largely responsible for a series of "universal peace congresses" held in European cities over the next years.

The peace groups of the first half of the nineteenth century took interest in international law, as Grotius had two centuries before, and the American Peace Society in the person of Ladd, as well as the reformer Alfred Love, founder of the Universal Peace Union (1866), looked to a stronger law of nations that, they were certain, would make war more difficult, perhaps even impossible.

As for precisely how influential the peace groups were, during the years from Waterloo to the revolutions of 1848 and the Crimean War (for Europe) and to the Mexican War and the passing of the slavery issue into national politics, and ultimately the coming of the Civil War (for the United States), it is impossible to say. The problem of analysis here is that during an age of reform there was goodwill in so many directions, often expressed by the same individuals, that its forcefulness or lack thereof cannot be easily determined. Moreover, the absence of even fairly small international conflicts was probably not a result of the peace movement, but of contemporary circumstances in the international relations of Europe—the unpopularity of war after the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the momentary sense of community among the great powers known as the Concert of Europe. To many people of the time, peace nonetheless seemed a

logical outcome of the peace movement; and the workers for peace tended to pursue their plans and purposes—abolition of standing armies, development of international law on land and sea, organization of peace congresses—with a confidence that was unjustified by the international relations of the time.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, peace workers began to have a new sense of urgency because of an armaments race that at first was not very noticeable but later became highly evident. By the 1860s and 1870s the stresses and strains incident to the rise of a Prussia-dominated German state in Europe began to send armament expenditures on an upward trend that continued into the twentieth century. The sharpening of nationalisms everywhere, and the increasing authority of national bureaucracies, impelled nations to increase their armaments. Weapons also began to increase in complexity and costliness. Muskets gave way to rifles. Smooth-bore cannon were replaced by rifled guns, and projectiles went farther and penetrated deeper. The navies of the world converted from sail to steam. They armored their ships. Transport—first the railroad and then, after the end of the century, motor transport over paved roads—made land armies mobile in ways unknown to generals during the age of Napoleon, Gebhard von Blucher, and the duke of Wellington.

The Industrial Revolution allowed nations with heavy industries to produce arms for themselves and sell arms to their agricultural neighbors in exchange for foodstuffs. Introduction of such weapons as the French 75, a new field gun, forced all the leading European states to purchase the new ordnance. By the 1890s men of goodwill everywhere were alarmed at the dreadfully costly battles and campaigns of any new war, given the new equipment. They were alarmed at the talk about military might by the leaders of Germany after Bismarck. The surge of imperialism in the 1890s momentarily took European and American energies into the Far East. Earlier the Europeans had devoted themselves to the imperial task of dividing Africa. Shortly after the turn of the century, there was no more territory to divide, and rivalries began to concentrate in Europe, as they had just before outbreak of the Napoleonic wars. It was a vastly troubled situation; and peace groups began to look for solutions, to try to do what statesmen seemed incapable of doing—to contrive some kind of international arrangement of ideas and interests so that war could be prevented.

Limitation of armaments was the task of the peace movements prior to 1914, and the result was disappointing. Calvin D. Davis has justly remarked that a strange dichotomy of thought existed in the United States and Europe. International rivalries never had burned so brightly, and never had there been so much talk about national interest; yet never had there been more popular interest in peace. Peace groups received broad public support, even from statesmen, who perhaps saw them as so important, so obviously influential, that it would be best to join them, at least in appearance. Universal Peace Congresses began to assemble, the first such meeting being held in 1889. The men and women who attended these meetings favored disarmament and the advance of arbitration through treaties. The Dissenting churches of Great Britain heartily supported disarmament during the 1890s, before the British army and navy were modernized on the eve of World War I. British members of these groups looked anxiously to their American cousins, hoping that from unity of language could come unity of national purposes. The English-Speaking Union was a reflection of this hope. During the years from the turn of the century until 1914, a rapprochement became apparent between the two countries and was much remarked upon. The two countries together could join their European friends in a peace movement that would overwhelm the forces for war. It was thought by people who were interested in peace that the two English-speaking nations might well be considered impartial in urging a disarmament conference because of their separation from Europe by water—not very much in the case of Britain but a vast expanse in the case of America.

The pre–World War I years seemed to promise a great peace reform. Baroness Bertha von Suttner in 1889 published a book titled *Die Waffen Nieder (Lay Down Your Arms)*. It was perhaps the greatest peace novel of all times and was translated into almost every known tongue. The British journalist W. T. Stead reprinted it in English in 1896, and sold the book at the nominal price of one penny. The Russians appeared to be interested in world peace, or at least it was clear that the great novelist Leo Tolstoy was fascinated by the idea. At the suggestion of Baroness von Suttner, the inventor of dynamite, Alfred Nobel, became devoted to the peace movement. Nobel, who believed that he could cooperate with the baroness through making dynamite, wrote to her on one occasion, "Perhaps my factories will put

an end to war even sooner than your Congresses; on the day when two army corps may mutually annihilate each other in a second, probably all civilized nations will recoil with horror and disband their troops." Little did Nobel know that this day to which he looked mystically, albeit seriously, would arrive in the latter twentieth century, but civilized nations not only would fail to recoil with horror and disband their troops, but also would prove willing to allow the weapons of destruction to proliferate.

Nobel characterized the hopes of his generation by endowing a peace prize that was to go annually "to that man or woman who shall have worked most effectively for the fraternization of mankind, the diminution of armies, and the promotion of Peace Congresses." This was the spirit that produced the most notable product of the peace movement of the turn of the century, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

Unfortunately, the first conference did little for peace. The czar of Russia called it in the vain hope that it would limit adoption of French 75 rifles by the armies of Europe, so that the Russian government could put available funds into modernizing its navy. This purpose was well understood by representatives of the nations meeting at The Hague, and nothing came of it. Evidence of how little the administration of President William McKinley expected from the First Hague Peace Conference could be seen in the composition of the American delegation, which included Captain William Crozier of the U.S. Army and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who had recently retired from the U.S. Navy. Crozier was coinventor of an ingenious disappearing gun carriage, and Mahan was the philosopher of a large American navy; neither was about to let the czar's government get away with anything. The first conference did, however, define the rules of civilized warfare. It arranged for an international tribunal that nations thereafter promised to use, albeit excepting so many of their national interests that such use was virtually a symbol of the court's uselessness.

The Second Hague Peace Conference was delayed until after the Russo-Japanese War, by which time the European armaments race was so far developed that the conference's prospects were almost zero. President Theodore Roosevelt knew that 1907 was not a good year for peace, yet felt that he had to do something, for many of his Republican friends in New England were members of peace societies and anxious for achievement. He sent the American fleet around the world that year, and later wrote that the voyage was the best thing he had done for peace. He considered doing more, and urged the British government to limit the size of battleships to fifteen thousand tons displacement. Apparently he was seeking to halt the naval arms race begun by the British with the launching of the battleship *Dreadnought* the preceding year. But then Roosevelt's idea disappeared, as naval architects pointed out to him that fifteen thousand tons was too small a platform for the best combination of the essentials of fighting ships—guns, armor, and propulsive machinery. Neither the British nor the German government wished to do anything serious about disarmament at the Second Hague Peace Conference, and so the idea languished and the conferees contented themselves with tidying up the projects for judicial settlement and international law advanced at the initial conference. The Third Hague Peace Conference was scheduled just about the time World War I broke out; and the Hague idea, as it was called, then blended into the larger notion of a League of Nations.

The American peace groups in these years concentrated not merely on congresses and conferences but also on a national program of bilateral treaties of arbitration and conciliation. Secretaries of State Richard Olney, John Hay, Elihu Root, Philander C. Knox, and William Jennings Bryan sought to negotiate such treaties, and Hay, Root, and Bryan concluded several dozen. The only way that this program of the American peace groups could have ensured world peace was for the United States to have signed up every nation—and the other nations would have had to arrange their own treaty networks. Because of the outbreak of World War I there was not enough time for so many instruments to be signed and ratified. Although the American network remains on the statute books, nothing came of the hope for peace through treaties of arbitration and conciliation.

THE INTERWAR YEARS

World War I marked the end of the program of the peace movement of preceding years. The war was a chilling experience. Although statesmen had anticipated the war, they and people everywhere were shocked when it did not end quickly, like the Franco-Prussian War, and lasted more than four years. The United States intervened. It became necessary, so it seemed, for the New World to redress the balance of the Old. It was necessary,

Americans believed, to get the Europeans off dead center, to move them toward peace.

The principal accomplishment of peace-minded Americans during the war and in the months of negotiations afterward in Paris was to draw up the constitution, or Covenant, of the League of Nations. Participation in the war convinced many Americans that they had not merely repaid their debt to the marquis de Lafayette but that their country, as President Woodrow Wilson said, comprised all nations and therefore understood all nations, and American organization of the peace would ensure a decent future for mankind.

But then came another shock for the millions of Americans who looked forward to world peace—rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and thereby of the Covenant, which constituted the first twenty-six articles of the treaty, by the Senate in 1919–1920. President Wilson had told everyone who would listen that Article X, which promised international action to prevent war, was the "heart" of the Covenant. To the millions of League of Nations supporters in the United States, it seemed that the Senate had broken the heart of the world.

The American peace groups of the interwar era divided over the wisdom of establishing a League of Nations, and perhaps the best way to understand the division is to characterize it as pro-league and anti-league—or conservative and radical—because of differing outlooks on the organization of peace. Most conservative peace groups—including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the World Peace Foundation, the League of Nations Association, and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation—had originated in the eastern portion of the country. They possessed financial strength—at its foundation in 1910 the Carnegie Endowment received $10 million in bonds of the United States Steel Corporation. Those bonds had been insured by the profits of World War I, a situation presenting the odd picture of a peace organization operating on the profits of war. The World Peace Foundation had also begun its work in the same year, with $1 million. The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, created in 1923, received initial contributions of nearly $1 million.

The work of the conservative wing of American peace organizations varied, for their members realized that all sorts of activity could come under the general heading of peace. The Carnegie Endowment annually spent $500,000 sponsoring such projects as a monthly bulletin, *International Conciliation,* and "international mind alcoves" in small libraries throughout the United States. Its publishing program included the monumental *Economic and Social History of the World War* in one hundred volumes. It financed smaller peace organizations in the United States and abroad, maintained the Paris Center for European Peace, rebuilt the library of the University of Louvain in Belgium, endowed university chairs in international relations, and advanced codification of international law. The World Peace Foundation worked in favor of the World Court and distributed League of Nations publications in the United States. The Woodrow Wilson Foundation worked to perpetuate Wilsonian ideals.

Radical peace organizations of the interwar era were far less staid and restrained. Almost all had come into existence as a result of World War I. Names of these groups changed as finances and memberships waxed and waned, but altogether there were perhaps forty operating at the national level, with many more local organizations. These were groups of believers in world peace, filled with hope for their programs. Often their purposes were revealed in their names: the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, the American Committee for the Cause and Cure of War, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Council for the Prevention of War, the Committee on Militarism in Education, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Parliament of Peace and Universal Brotherhood, the Peace Heroes Memorial Society, the War Resisters' League, the Women's Peace Society, the World Peace Association.

Operating procedures of the radical peace organizations, the evangelists among the peace workers, varied markedly. Some were virtually one-man operations, such as the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, financed by the Chicago lawyer Salmon O. Levinson, who spent $15,000 a year to spread the idea that war should not be permitted under international law—it should be outlawed. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had as many as six thousand members and thousands of dollars each year for expenses, much of the money provided by friends of the Chicago social worker Jane Addams. The National Council for the Prevention of War was the creation of the Congregational minister Frederick J. Libby to work against arms manufacturers during the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922, and after the success of that meeting Libby continued his group in sup-

port of other causes. It acted as a Washington lobby for peace groups, but always reflected the pacifism of its founder. It spent $100,000 a year; in 1928 its office roster included twelve secretaries and eighteen office assistants. Among other radical groups the Women's Peace Society had two thousand members; the Fellowship of Reconciliation, forty-five hundred; and the War Resisters' League, four hundred. Their financial situations were relatively modest.

How, one might ask, could even substantial groups (in terms of finances) like the conservative organizations, or small groups such as the radical peace organizations, hope to influence the millions of American citizens in the years after World War I? How can one speak of the peace movement in America when the organizations for peace, affluent or otherwise, were composed of such disparate groups and often of committees dominated by a few persons or even one individual?

An important reason for their influence was their ability to act through a maze of supporting peace groups and interlocking committees. Membership of the radical peace organizations was astonishingly small, and within it the core of full-time peace workers was less than one hundred individuals in Washington and New York. But individuals could join more than one group or otherwise obtain cooperation between peace organizations. And the ardent peace worker Carrie Chapman Catt federated organizations not primarily interested in peace; she brought together as many as a dozen of these national organizations—such as the American Association of University Women and the Young Women's Christian Association—into the American Committee for the Cause and Cure of War.

Peace organizations were influential because of their frequent claim to represent the female voters of the United States. After World War I the franchise had been extended to all American women. Their voting preferences were highly uncertain, and Catt was able to threaten the nation's political leaders with a unified female vote in support of whatever she was advocating.

Still another reason for the extraordinary influence of American peace groups during the 1920s and 1930s perhaps needs to be explained. Elected officials of the time were sensitive to pressure from voters advocating a program. Of course there has always been pressure upon officials. But to leaders of the postwar period a new force, an aroused public opinion, seemed to be at work. Participation in the war had brought interest in propaganda, and in turn produced much learned and unlearned speculation about public opinion. Walter Lippmann published a book on the subject during the early 1920s. The science of persuasion, as applied to mass consumption, came into vogue, with advertising taking on the proportions of a national industry. Political leaders felt that they were being watched, their actions scrutinized, as never before. Any individuals or small groups who could claim to represent larger groups or great organizations received instantaneous attention. It was a nervous, rather unsophisticated era in which claims to importance, carefully advanced, could propel their bearers toward success in whatever they were advocating.

American peace organizations indulged in a pressure politics that for years proved far more successful than it should have been—because of the hypersensitive political climate. They did everything possible to give the impression that their programs represented the thoughts of the American people. In their letter-writing campaigns to members of Congress, workers for peace learned early on that it was advisable to make each letter appear different, even if it was for the same purpose and said the same thing; the technique was to have separately written appeals, individually signed—never should there be forms that, apparently, had been signed without much thought or purpose. They also engaged in the tactic of presenting petitions, and in the time-honored activity of interviewing members of Congress. In the latter work Catt was an expert; she warned one of her workers that she never believed a senator's attitude was sincere unless he had been interviewed by several people and said the same thing to each one.

As for the ideas of American peace workers during the period from the Armistice in 1918 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941, ideas about world peace, or peace for the United States, proliferated but most Americans interested in peace found a reason for advocacy of one of several major plans or purposes. The League of Nations was the greatest source of hope for peace, and many Americans looked to the future, if not immediate, membership of their country in that organization. The force of the league idea owed a great deal to its novelty. The United Nations has never captured the imagination of Americans in the way that the League of Nations did. The idea of a league had not been a part of earlier American peace programs, which had looked either to the codification of interna-

tional law, including treaties of arbitration and conciliation, or to a working out of more diplomatic arrangements through periodic congresses like the Hague Peace Conferences.

Only during World War I did the idea of a more political League of Nations find favor in the United States. Interest had risen to a considerable height by the summer of 1919—so far, indeed, that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge found himself forced to temporize during hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee until popular sentiment lessened. During passage of the Treaty of Versailles through the tortuosities of Senate maneuver, Lodge always avoided criticism of the league idea; if he criticized, it was because the League of Nations was Wilson's league, not because of the idea itself. As the years passed, it became evident that American membership in the league was, practically speaking, impossible, because the league seemed too concerned about the smaller points of European politics. But many Americans—Wilsonians, they frequently called themselves—continued to feel that the Senate amendments of the League Covenant had broken the heart of the world and that the turning of the world toward war during the 1930s was a direct result of failure of the United States to join the League of Nations.

A second program for American peace workers during the 1920s and 1930s was membership in the World Court. Advocates of the League of Nations often were advocates of the court, which, though technically separate from the league, was actually one of its organs. The World Court reflected the traditional American concern for codification of international law. Its protocol stated, in classic form, that among the sources of this law (in addition to treaties, decisions of international conferences, and writings of publicists) were decisions of jurists. It seemed sensible to assist in codification in this way, just as municipal law was organized through daily work of the courts. Yet connection of the league with the World Court, the proviso that the court could give advisory opinions to the league's council, encouraged the league's enemies in the Senate to affix so many onerous conditions to membership in the World Court as to make it impossible. Peace organizations did their best to secure membership, but failed to anticipate the importance of the league connection.

Disarmament was a popular program, and at least in the realm of naval disarmament (a better term would be "limitation" of armaments) there was some progress. As is now fairly evident, limitation of American, British, Japanese, Italian, and French naval arms was a useful activity during the 1920s. In the next decade it made less sense. It was not a major support of peace, for the peace of Europe was conditioned upon the size of armies, not navies. Germany and the Soviet Union were unaffected by the naval conferences sponsored by the allies of World War I. Germany and the Soviet Union attended the World Disarmament Conference held at Geneva in the early 1930s, and the Soviet spokesman, Maxim Litvinov, was eloquent in support of proposals for peace. But these two powers placed little trust in disarmament. Peace workers in the United States never really understood the peripheral importance of disarmament. It seems safe to say that they attached far too much meaning to it, spending too much time and energy working for it. Like the World Court, disarmament acted as a magnet, drawing their attention away from German and Japanese aggression that in the 1930s brought the collapse of world peace.

Another fascination of Americans interested in peace after World War I was the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), in which almost all nations of the world promised to renounce and outlaw war. The pact was the crowning achievement of American peace groups in the interwar period. Despite Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg's initial and private feeling that peace workers were "a set of God-damned fools" and "God-damned pacifists," the groups managed to coerce and then convert Kellogg to support the Pact of Paris. The secretary received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1929. Unfortunately, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was too ethereal a creation, too impossible in terms of practical world politics, to assist world peace. It was an illustration of the traditional American liking for pronouncement, for doctrine and dogma. Peace movements, by their nature doctrinaire, were much attracted to formulas officially announced. Insofar as American groups occupied themselves with Kellogg's pronouncement, they failed, as in other programs, to work realistically for peace.

In the interwar years Americans continued to adhere to their traditional faith in freedom of world trade—in a trade largely unrestricted by tariffs, quotas, and other regulations. The American peace groups frequently championed this path to peace, although the idea of freedom of world trade failed to attract them in the manner of such programs as the League of Nations, the World Court, naval disarmament, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, for it seemed to be a less direct

FROM THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT (1928)

"The president of the German Reich, the president of the United States of America, his majesty the king of the Belgians, the president of the French Republic, his majesty the king of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, emperor of India, his majesty the king of Italy, his majesty the emperor of Japan, the president of the Republic of Poland, the president of the Czechoslovak Republic,

"Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

"Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

"Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

"Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

"Have decided to conclude a Treaty. . . . and for that purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries . . . who, having communicated to one another their full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

attack on war. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was fascinated by the problem of lowering tariff barriers. An old Wilsonian, he received much favorable public comment by promoting what to his mind was almost a substitute for American membership in the League of Nations, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934).

In the late 1930s, with war beginning to be talked about in Europe and then becoming a reality, many Americans interested in peace restricted their concerns to their own country's neutrality. The idea of neutrality flourished, an ancient American hope embodied in belief in a New World and an Old. There was a desire to restrict the merchants of death, the dealers in the international arms trade. Another belief of the time was that President Wilson's interpretation of neutral rights to include the right of Americans to travel aboard belligerent ships had taken the country into World War I; and if this interpretation and other latitudinarian views of neutrality were avoided, with the nation seeking only the most narrow of rights upon the sea, then the forthcoming European war would not touch the United States. The series of neutrality enactments beginning in 1935 attracted immense attention from American workers for peace. Congress eventually changed this legislation to permit American trade with the democratic nations of Europe, but the changes were made in gingerly fashion so as to avoid offending the predominantly isolationist peace organizations.

AFTER 1939

To speak of an American peace movement in the years after 1939 is to look to a far more complicated effort to preserve the peace of Europe and the world than had been made in the years before. Americans interested in peace realized the need for much more organization and much more money.

The number of peace groups proliferated beyond the imagination of workers during the 1920s and 1930s. A survey of peace groups in 1988 found that there were 500 with budgets of more than $30,000 annually, and 7,200 groups with budgets of less.

The programs to which the new and old peace groups turned were remarkably diverse. Most groups took interest in the United Nations, notably the surviving conservative groups of the interwar era, which easily changed their support from the League of Nations to the United Nations. During World War II the country concentrated on victory, but there was much interest in the Department of State's plans for a United Nations, which were well advanced by 1944, when the Dumbarton Oaks Conference met to draw up a draft of the United Nations Charter. Undersecretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., carefully encouraged the formation of a network of committees and organizations across the country that was to give advice on the structure of the new world organization. He provided for public representation at the San Francisco Conference (1945). The resultant charter and the constitutions of its many supporting organs showed that the people of the United States this time considered the maintenance of peace to be more than a political task, and that it comprised social, economic, and intellectual concerns.

In the immediate years after World War II, peace groups found an almost dizzying group of issues to focus upon, but principally their concern was the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union. This turned attention to the American and Soviet buildup in armaments, both conventional and nuclear.

After such foreign policy developments as the Truman Doctrine and support of Greece and Turkey against the Soviet Union; Soviet explosion of a nuclear test device in 1949; the Korean War; the Suez crisis of 1956, involving intervention in Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel; and continuing troubles in the Middle East, notably American occupation of Lebanon in 1958, there came the intervention in Vietnam, which for a dozen years in the 1960s and early 1970s, until withdrawal in 1975, brought a coalition of American peace groups in strident opposition.

When the issue of the Vietnam War arose, could it be said that the many youthful dissenters represented a revival of the older peace movements, which were generally against war rather than advocating special causes? Some of the antiwar protesters generalized their feelings about Vietnam to include all wars. In the 1960s young people everywhere, not merely in the United States, found war distasteful. It might have appeared that they were reconstituting the world peace movement of the interwar years. Or perhaps they were harking back to the views of Tolstoy and other philosophical pacifists at the end of the nineteenth century. Yet in the United States the antiwar protesters focused on involvement of the country in Vietnam. Their special cause set them apart from older peace movements. Their tactics also were markedly different; they took inspiration from the Indian protest movement of Mohandas K. Gandhi, a generation and more earlier, against British imperialism. Gandhi's movement had been a means of registering dissent and forcing change. In the United States the civil rights protesters in the South were employing civil disobedience, with marked success. The Vietnam protesters similarly employed it to persuade the American public to stop supporting the Vietnam War.

Americans interested in peace after World War II were necessarily attracted to the problems of nuclear disarmament, but here the technicalities proved so complex that no single assemblage, such as another Washington Naval Conference, and certainly no campaign by private individuals, could hope to resolve them. The contentions of the 1920s over gun calibers and tonnage and the thickness of armor plate now appeared to represent an antediluvian age. In the years after 1945 much initiative passed to the federal government, which sponsored nuclear disarmament programs and organized the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Private organizations assisted in its work. The atomic physicists organized themselves through the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and through the Federation of Atomic Scientists.

Such efforts tended to attach to aspects of nuclear disarmament, and in the early years after World War II peace groups in America concentrated on an end to nuclear testing, once the dangers of tests became evident. The limited test ban of 1963 appeared to be the initial result—although it might be argued that for the nuclear powers testing by that time no longer was of advantage. Another factor, seldom mentioned, in passage of the test ban treaty through the U.S. Senate was an arrangement for Republican support in exchange for a promise by President Lyndon B. Johnson not to undertake an investigation of the income tax returns of President Dwight Eisenhower's chief of staff, Sherman Adams—a deal negotiated by former president Eisenhower.

In the early 1980s the groups in the United

States concentrated on limitation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, and the success of this endeavor raised a question as to what tactics—those of the movement in America and Europe, or the competitive rearmament sponsored by the Ronald Reagan administration vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—were successful. The administration sponsored the B-1 bomber, the MX missile system, and the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"). The last sought a defense against Soviet missiles by an antiballistic missile system. The movement cited the enormous cost of competition over many years, and it was easy to show all the alternatives, peaceful alternatives, available for the same price: construction of schools, of roads and dams, of rail lines between cities, of new or improved airports; better health care; housing for the poor. Groups cited the risk of destruction of cities and national infrastructures, not to mention the millions of people who would die in a nuclear war.

The attack against the nuclear programs of the Reagan era led to the nuclear freeze campaign, an issue that appeared on ballots in many states during the November 1982 elections, and 11.5 million people, 60 percent of those voting on the freeze issue, voted in favor. State legislatures, city councils, and national labor unions declared themselves in favor of a freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. All this resulted in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1987. Not long afterward the Soviet Union collapsed, and with it a considerable part of the world's nuclear competition, although the remaining nuclear powers constituted a considerable threat to peace and a very real complexity in negotiating further arms cuts.

Continuing concerns meanwhile were arising over threats to peace of a conventional sort, including American actions in scattered places around the world. Each threat or action gathered its groups in opposition. Here one speaks of interventions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Somalia (1992), the last two occurring during the George H. W. Bush administration. The Reagan administration's support of the contras in Nicaragua led to clashes with peace groups opposing sponsorship of right-wing partisans against a left-wing government.

In 1990 another opportunity arose for protesting intervention, again in the Middle East, where the U.S. government and the United Nations sought to press the regime of the dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, whose troops had invaded and occupied the neighboring country of Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. The immediate concern of the movement during the time of negotiation, prior to the UN military attack, Desert Storm, was to give sanctions time to work rather than rushing to war. Some American groups supporting the need for time believed that it was also an opportunity to spread their message and recruit new members. Most groups simply desired more time than President Bush and his increasingly supportive UN allies were willing to offer.

The older generation of peace movement supporters, one should remark, was not altogether pleased with the diffuse concerns of the younger generation, and beheld weakness rather than strength in the much larger numbers of American groups and their far larger finances. Their criticisms perhaps had a point, and are worth mentioning. The historian Arthur Ekirch, who had been a conscientious objector during World War II, was disgusted with the postwar peace workers. He wrote of the factionalism, self-examination, and debate over alternatives after 1945. He thought that the only purpose of a peace movement was opposition to militarism and war.

And what to say of this criticism? Of the factionalism there could be no question, for each of the bewildering number of American groups, numbering into the thousands, had its purpose. A Canadian group in the 1970s began publication of a periodical—a digest of peace books, articles, and conference papers—on the principle that chemists and other scientists possessed such digests, and so should the peace movement. The span of the books, articles, and papers was almost unlimited, displaying the way in which the post–World War II groups had edged into subjects never hitherto deemed of much, if any, interest to a peace movement. One conference participant advocated tourism, because seeing other cultures would produce tolerance, and therefore understanding, and maybe peace. The confusion of purposes, the welter of what Ekirch described as factionalism, was evident in the categories of the digest's editors, who changed their categories every few years, to the confusion of readers.

In the factionalism of the post-1945 movement it was evident that only two general distinctions, which might be described as organizing principles, marked the new movement. The authors of the survey of peace groups in 1988 wrote that pacifist groups tended to lead the entire movement; in times of slumps of interest in

peace, they tended to stay together and offer new ideas. Pacifist groups served as "halfway houses" to ensure the movement's survival during the doldrums. They were especially persistent during troubling experiences, as when in Iran they sought to "do peace" but found the task difficult in the midst of violence. Their task of testimony was also difficult. How could they be heard when the United Nations engaged in peacekeeping, and its proposals and programs dominated public attention?

According to the analysts of the movement, the nonpacifist groups sought to change foreign policy by working within the political system. In the United States this entailed proposing legislation to halt development of particular weapons or generally cut spending for programs, creating support for such efforts through lobbying, and making positions known during elections.

Another point made in the survey, somewhat countering the accusation of factionalism, was that constituents of groups were not themselves divided into a few factions: women, students, and professionals. Constituents were more diverse than expected, among both pacifist and nonpacifist groups. With the exception of religious persons, the often cited constituent groupings were small proportions of any of the peace groups. Students were found in small-budget groups and professionals in nonpacifist groups, but differences otherwise were not large.

Self-examination also was a characteristic of the post–World War II American groups. Interviewers of "persistent peace activists" developed a theory of sustained commitment that included creating an activist identity, integrating peace work into everyday life, building beliefs that sustain activism, bonding with a peace group, and managing burnout. Ekirch's third criticism, that the American peace advocates were fond of debate, was undeniable, as all readers of the *Peace Research Abstracts* could see.

But in retrospect one might conclude—despite present-day factionalism and self-examination and debate over issues, and the failure of peace movements of the past—that groups everywhere have done much good. In the United States they have had public support based on the nation's history. The resort to colonies in the New World was in part to escape the incessant wars of Europe, including enforced military service. Through experience involving the exploitation of a great new continent, Americans became hopeful people, and the age-old hope of peace naturally appealed to them. The very success of the American experiment in democracy raised the possibility of changing the ways of other peoples. *E pluribus unum* has succeeded beyond all expectation in the United States, and Americans have expected this motto to have meaning for Europe and the world.

Another factor has entered into support for the peace movement in the United States that was not present in earlier years. The American people have come to realize that the bounties of geography and the rivalries of other nations have given their country protection for many decades longer than they could have expected, and it is time now for them to take part in the organization of world order. Jules Jusserand, France's ambassador to the United States (1902–1920), was fond of saying that America was bordered on north and south by weak nations, and on east and west by nothing but fish. During the American Revolution, and throughout the nineteenth century, the United States benefited from what President Washington described as the ordinary combinations and collisions of the European powers. The noted twentieth-century historian of American foreign relations, Samuel Flagg Bemis, was accustomed to write regarding this era that "Europe's distress was America's advantage." C. Vann Woodward aptly labeled it a time of "free security." Beginning with World War I, this remarkable period was no more. After World War II most Americans realized that fact. When the nuclear age opened, the problems of world peace became so omnipresent, so persistent, that they no longer were possible to ignore.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alonso, Harriet H. *The Women's Peace Union and the Outlawry of War: 1923–1942*. Knoxville, Tenn., 1989.

———. *Peace as a Women's Issue: A U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1993.

Brock, Peter, and Thomas P. Socknat, eds. *Challenges to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945*. Toronto, 1994. Half of the twenty-eight essays are on the interwar period.

Buckley, Thomas H. *The United States and the Washington Conference: 1921–1922*. Knoxville, Tenn., 1970.

Chatfield, Charles. *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941*. Knoxville, Tenn., 1971.

———. *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism*. New York, 1992.

Cooper, Sandi E. *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815–1914*. New York, 1991. Emphasis on the peace movement between 1889 and 1914.

Curti, Merle. *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936*. New York, 1936.

Davis, Calvin D. *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1962.

———. *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914*. Durham, N.C., 1976. Relates the history of "the Hague idea" until World War I.

DeBenedetti, Charles. *The Peace Reform in American History*. Bloomington, Ind., 1980.

Doenecke, Justus. *Discerning the Signs: American Anti-Interventionism and the World Crisis of 1939–1941*. Lanham, Md., 2000.

Early, Frances H. *A World Without War: How Feminists and Pacifists Resisted World War I*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1997.

Ferrell, Robert H. *Peace in Their Time*. New Haven, Conn., 1952.

Foster, Carrie A. *The Women and the Warriors: The U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1913–1946*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1995.

Howlett, Charles F. *The American Peace Movement: Reformers and Resources*. New York, 1991. Annotated, 1,600 entries.

Joseph, Paul. *Peace Politics*. Philadelphia, 1993. Peace movement of the 1980s.

Kleidman, Robert. *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1993. Covers the years 1936–1937, 1957–1963, 1979–1986.

Marullo, Sam, Alexandra Chute, and Mary Anna Colwell. "Pacifism and Nonpacifist Groups in the U.S. Peace Movement of the 1980s." *Peace and Change* 16, no. 3 (July 1991): 235–259.

Patterson, David S. *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914*. Bloomington, Ind., 1976.

Peace and Change. Vols. 1–16 (1975–2001).

Peace Research Abstracts Journal. Vols. 1–38 (1964–2001).

Schott, Linda K. *Reconstructing Women's Thoughts: The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Before World War II*. Stanford, Calif., 1997.

Small, Melvin, and William Hoover, eds. *Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement*. Syracuse, N.Y., 1992.

Tracy, James. *Direct Action: From the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven*. Chicago, 1996. Half the book addresses racial conflict.

Wells, Tom. *The War Within America: America's Battle over Vietnam*. Berkeley, Calif., 1994.

Wittner, Lawrence S. *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933–1984*. Philadelphia, 1984.

———. *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953*. Stanford, Calif., 1993.

———. *Revisiting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970*. Stanford, Calif., 1997.

Ziegler, Valarie H. *The Advocates of Peace in Antebellum America*. Bloomington, Ind., 1992.

See also ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION; DISSENT IN WARS; GENDER; IDEOLOGY; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; ISOLATIONISM; NEUTRALITY; PACIFISM; PEACEMAKING; PUBLIC OPINION; THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT; WILSONIANISM.

PHILANTHROPY

James A. Field, Jr., and Tim Matthewson

The idea of philanthropy, of concern for the welfare of the human race, has from the beginning been so tightly interwoven with other aspects of the American experience that the strand is difficult to disentangle. To many, the survival of the colonies and the success of the new nation were works of philanthropy: John Winthrop, colonial governor of Massachusetts, spoke of the "city on a hill"; aspiring revolutionaries felt themselves to be forwarding "humanity's extended cause"; to the young Herman Melville "national selfishness [was] unbounded philanthropy"; to Abraham Lincoln the nation was the last best hope of earth. In the active sense, as well, the philanthropic purpose appeared with the first attempts at colonization. The Virginia Company and Massachusetts Bay Company charters included the propagation of the Christian religion among the principal ends of these enterprises; this aim was reflected in the work of John Eliot, the apostle to the Indians, and in the concern of Cotton Mather and Samuel Sewall for the evangelization of Mexico.

Despite this background, accomplishments during the colonial period were small: the requirements of survival governed; missionary work among the Indians proved unrewarding and among black slaves was precluded as an interference with local self-government. The development of active American philanthropy dates from the first half-century of independence, which in this area, as in so many others, imposed an abiding structure upon American attitudes and institutions. Success in the Revolution produced a confidence in an American worldview in which philanthropy and self-interest happily appeared to coincide, and which led, in the external sphere, to a beginning export of American answers to the problems of the human race. In politics this brought forth a bias in favor of liberal revolution, self-determination, and economic freedom that would inform the conduct of foreign affairs through the period of Woodrow Wilson's missionary diplomacy, and beyond.

Faith in applied science and in the educability of mankind encouraged Americans to take service with foreign rulers in order to teach a generalized modernity, which focused in the early years on military skills, agriculture, and the mechanic arts. While proffering the gift of salvation, the greatest gift of all, an expanding foreign missionary movement took with it powerful cultural influences: literacy, educational systems, new techniques, civil servants, and advisers. With the growing wealth of America there developed a notable philanthropy in the narrower sense of the giving of money or goods or skills, first for the relief of disaster and subsequently for measures of constructive social policy and cultural preservation. Originally manifested in extemporized individual or group activity, these endeavors in time became institutionalized in such organizations as the American Red Cross and the major foundations, while their political and modernizing aspects attracted increased government participation.

The efforts to transfer American ideas, skills, and institutions to those "dwelling in darkness" had, prior to the development of American funding agencies, an inevitable admixture of careerism; nevertheless, the early work of individuals established precedents on which organized philanthropy, with its inherited assumption of the malleability of mankind, could subsequently build. The latter years of the eighteenth century saw the work of the American Tory, Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, in Bavarian administrative reform, and John Paul Jones's brief command of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The French Revolution attracted the helpful efforts of Joel Barlow, Thomas Paine, and Robert Fulton. New waves of revolution, first in the New World and then in the Old World, emphasized the relation between military skills and the universal benefits of freedom and self-determination: Americans held important posts in the revolutionary navies of Argentina and Mexico; the Greek War of Inde-

pendence drew American philhellenes across the Atlantic; American naval constructors rebuilt the Ottoman navy after Navarino.

LIMITED GOVERNMENT

Over its course, American philanthropy has often reflected constitutional scruples about separation of powers. As secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson urged that, if government were to engage in philanthropy, it should be state governments—not the federal government—that should take up the cause. In 1793–1794 refugees from the black revolution in Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti) received assistance from a mixture of private, state, and federal funds. In 1812, Congress appropriated $50,000 for earthquake victims in Venezuela. Generally, however, reservations as to the constitutional propriety of federal government action prevailed, the work remained voluntary, and help from the United States was limited to the occasional loan of a public ship to transport and distribute relief supplies.

Outside the area of federal funding, however, the situation was less clear-cut and constitutional scruples have not been so engaged. Rather than charge the federal government, Jefferson paid out of his own pocket for the transport of different types of plants to further agriculture while he tried via personal correspondence and private groups such as the American Philosophical Society to advance knowledge to those who would benefit, domestic and international. President Andrew Jackson, "acting in his private capacity," recommended a naval constructor to the Turks, and the Turkish request for agricultural experts brought favorable response from the Department of State. In various far places, missionaries, as citizens residing abroad, by mid-century became the occasional beneficiaries of diplomatic interposition or show of naval force, while their local knowledge at times made them helpful in diplomacy, as in the missions of Caleb Cushing to China and of Matthew C. Perry to Japan.

As contact with non-European societies increased, Americans served as generals in the Afghan and Chinese armies and as diplomatic representatives of the Hawaiian kingdom and the Chinese empire. The early nineteenth century also saw the first efforts to encourage economic modernization: the attempts of William Maclure to improve Spanish agriculture (1819) and the condition of the Mexican Indians (1828) proved abortive, but the 1840s witnessed the railroad building of G. W. Whistler in Russia and the response of American agronomists to a Turkish request for assistance in the introduction of cotton culture.

In contrast to the sporadic work of individuals in the antebellum years was the organized and continuing effort of the foreign missionary movement. The Reverend Samuel Hopkins's ideas of "disinterested benevolence," the sense of urgency deriving from the felt imminence of the millennium, new knowledge of far places, and the example of Great Britain stimulated interest in overseas evangelism: the founding of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1810 was followed by that of denominational boards. From the small beginnings of the mission to India the work grew rapidly: by 1860 the American Board alone had deployed 844 men and women overseas, and the country's expenditures on foreign missions, concentrated on the Indian subcontinent and the Near East, exceeded $500,000 a year.

The effort to evangelize the world had significant secondary consequences. The emphasis on a Bible religion called for the translation of Scripture into the vernacular and stimulated the founding of schools. The imperative to do good and the need for access to closed societies encouraged the dispatch of medical missionaries: Peter Parker's dispensary at Canton in China, founded in the 1830s, was the first of many missionary-supported health care centers. The stress on the importance of the individual, whether in the conversion experience, in education, or in medical care, was emphasized, in a manner startling to the traditional societies, by the prominent role of women in mission work and by the early establishment of schools for girls; from this attitude also stemmed the attacks on caste, polygamy, suttee, prostitution, foot binding, opium, and rum.

But of all these by-products of the missionary enterprise, work in education proved the most important. The success of lower schools created a demand for more advanced instruction, a prospect so congenial to American preconceptions that the 1860s brought the founding of overseas colleges at Constantinople and Beirut. And whether in the area of conversion, medicine, education, or the status of women, the missionary enterprise emphasized not only the American view of the importance of the individual but also the idea of change, and of the possibility of breaking through layers of custom into a more open and modern world.

The emergence of a free black population in the United States following the Revolution had led an unstable coalition of antislavery advocates and slaveholders to found the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1817, which sought to establish a refuge for free black men and women on the African coast and to further the evangelization of Africa. Even many genuine evangelicals believed that blacks and whites could not live together peaceably on the basis of equality, so strong was the racism prevalent in the North and South. Expecting black immigrants to serve as missionaries to Africa, the ACS helped purchase the land for Liberia in 1821 and the settlement of Monrovia was established in 1822. By the eve of the Civil War, some 15,000 free black men and women lived in Liberia, about 12,000 of them having voluntarily immigrated with the assistance of the ACS. The ACS had joined with state and federal governments to form the freedman's colony on the African coast, modeling their plan on the British colony for free blacks at Sierra Leone.

The period before the Civil War also saw the development of a tradition of relief of disaster, whether natural or human-made. In 1816 and 1825 the citizens of Boston and New York assisted Canadian victims of great conflagrations. Support of the Greek War of Independence in the years after 1823 led not only to the departure of volunteers but also to contributions totaling perhaps $250,000 and to the relief work of Samuel Gridley Howe. In the 1830s and again two decades later, famine relief was sent to the Cape Verde Islands. Despite the distractions of the Mexican War, the years 1847–1848 saw the greatest effort thus far, as more than $1 million worth of supplies was sent to the victims of the great Irish famine in more than a score of ships, two of which were on loan from the U.S. Navy. In 1860, when civil war and massacres in Lebanon led to a major refugee problem, missionary influence brought about the creation of an Anglo-American relief committee and the dispatch of supplies by naval store ship. In 1862–1863, at the height of the American Civil War, further funds were raised in response to another failure of the Irish potato crop, while humanitarianism and policy combined to provide $250,000 to assist Lancashire mill operatives suffering from the cotton famine.

Like much else in post–Civil War America, the philanthropic effort grew larger, richer, and more highly organized, while the transfer of skills to countries striving to modernize themselves continued on an expanded scale. American military men served the governments of Egypt, China, Japan, and Korea; and Americans advised the Japanese Foreign Office, the king of Korea, the Dalai Lama, and the Chinese viceroy Li Hung-chang. In economic development, mining engineers like Raphael Pumpelly and agronomists like Horace Capron provided their expertise. In Japan, American teachers contributed notably to the new educational structure; in China, W. A. P. Martin became the first president of the Imperial University in Peking; in Siam, S. G. McFarland served as head of the royal school in Bangkok and superintendent of public instruction.

Although many of the teachers were laymen, some of the most distinguished—Martin and McFarland, for example—were products of the foreign missionary movement, which in these years increasingly concentrated its efforts on East Asia. Assisted by their new allies from the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions and the Young Men's Christian Association, and supported by large gifts from the new fortunes of William E. Dodge, John F. Goucher, H. J. Heinz, John D. Rockefeller, and Louis H. Severance, the missionaries continued to export, together with their sectarian versions of God's word, their American bias in favor of modernization, resource development, health care, and education.

By the end of the century the effort overseas had created a network of Christian colleges reaching from the Balkans to Japan and had opened wide, for those who wished to enter, the doors to Western knowledge and to informed participation in the activities of an increasingly westernized world. So valued, indeed, had the educational enterprise become, that governments came to embrace the cause, as in proposals within the administration of Abraham Lincoln for the establishment of a Sino-American college, in the Chinese employment of the remitted excess of the Boxer Rebellion indemnity, and much later (and most notably) in the Fulbright Act of 1946, which transmuted overseas war surplus into an extensive program of educational exchanges.

If the missionary movement and its associated enterprises provided the chief vehicle for late nineteenth-century philanthropy in Asia, the new wealth deriving from finance and industry also found outlets in the Old World. In this area in the 1860s the pioneer modern philanthropist George Peabody led with gifts, in part intended to diminish Civil War tensions, of $2.5 million for English working-class housing. A concern for the preservation of other countries' valued pasts was evidenced

in the founding of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens (1881) and the American Academy in Rome (1894). These years also saw the beginning of gifts by immigrants who had prospered in the United States to churches, libraries, orphanages, and the like in their countries of origin. With the new century the social concern evidenced in the Peabody gift reappeared in the contribution of Edward and Julia Tuck, retired in France, of a hospital, school, and park to the environs of Paris, and in the work of Joseph Fels, who, abandoning the manufacture of soap, spent largely to promote the single-tax doctrine abroad.

A similar solicitude for the social and cultural improvement of the advanced countries of western Europe informed the philanthropies of a most successful immigrant, Andrew Carnegie. Beginning in 1873 with a gift of baths to his Scottish birthplace, Carnegie subsequently gave Dunfermline a library, a park, and an endowment. His contribution of public libraries to American towns and colleges was repeated abroad; 660 in Great Britain and Ireland, 156 in Canada, and others in other dominions and colonies. In 1901 Carnegie gave $10 million to revive the Scottish universities, and in 1913 a like sum for the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust for "the improvement of the well-being of the masses." His gifts to the British Empire totaled $62 million.

For many philanthropists, Carnegie's philosophy regarding philanthropy remains the essence of the philanthropic ideal, as spelled out in *The Gospel of Wealth* (1900):

> This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of wealth: first, to set an example of modest unostentatious living, shunning display; to provide moderately for the legitimate wants of those dependent upon him; and, after doing so, to consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds which he is strictly bound as a matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community.

Carnegie spent his later years implementing this ideal and in the process gave new shape to American philanthropy. His grants to Marie Curie and Robert Koch inaugurated American support of foreign scientific research. Transcending all national boundaries and reflecting the aspirations of the Progressive Era, he supported the peace and arbitration movements, as evidenced in his 1907 gift of the Hague Peace Palace and (following Edwin Ginn's establishment in 1910 of the World Peace Foundation) in the $10 million Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for "the speedy abolition of international war between the so-called civilized nations."

In contrast with the evangelical effort in the non-European world and the projects of individual donors in Europe and Canada, the relief of disaster long depended on the efforts of individuals on the spot and ad hoc appeals to the public at large. Such traditional methods provided relief for victims of revolution in Crete (1866) and for France during the Franco-Prussian War. On various occasions in the 1870s and 1880s missionary groups worked to mitigate hunger in Persia, China, and Turkey. But by this time new agencies were assuming an important role. A vigorous campaign by the *New York Herald* spurred relief of the Irish famine of 1880. Some $1 million in goods and services contributed to help victims of the Russian famine of 1892 owed much to the support of Western flour interests, concerned both for humanity and for the agricultural price level, and to the energy of Louis Klopsch, editor of the *Christian Herald,* whose subsequent campaigns—for example, in the Indian famines of 1897 and 1900—raised in the course of fifteen years more than $3 million in gifts averaging less than $3. Under the leadership of Clara Barton and with presidential support, the American National Red Cross (1881) provided both funds and an increasing continuity of administration for the relief of disaster abroad as well as at home.

Generally speaking, American relief efforts in the years before 1914 were unaffected by political developments. Famines in Japan and China drew generous response, but sympathy for Russia was seriously diminished by end-of-the-century violence against Russian Jews. In 1895–1896 concern for Armenian victims of Turkish atrocities led to congressional agitation for American intervention; and in 1897–1898 the collection of funds for Cuban relief was encouraged by President William McKinley, among others, in the hope of dampening pressures to intervene.

GROWING INFLUENCE

During the twentieth century, American philanthropy was increasingly influenced by American foreign policy while the philanthropic ideal exerted a powerful influence on the formulation of foreign policy. Before World War I, as European colonial powers sought to acquire territory in the Americas, federal policymakers sought to prevent

European interventions in the Caribbean and Philippines, which led them to fund public works projects and schools in the region. The Messina earthquake of 1908 resulted in an unprecedented congressional appropriation of $800,000 and a reconstruction program supervised by American naval personnel. And a public-private partnership resulted in a proactive agenda to prevent flooding in China. The agenda aimed to extend cooperation between the American Red Cross, the federal government, and private bankers.

World War I produced a vast outpouring of philanthropic activity abroad, and resulted in remarkable federal-state-private cooperation and cooperation of philanthropic and foreign policy agencies. Early in the war, the American Red Cross attempted to provide hospitals for both sides, but an upsurge of sympathy for Belgium and France produced a pro-Allied tilt to American philanthropy. In the United States there sprang up numerous pro-Allied relief groups, for care of the wounded, and for aid to widows and orphans. Most important was the feeding of nine million Belgians, as Americans contributed some $34.5 million, and established the worldwide reputation of its director, Herbert Hoover.

Following the American declaration of war, military and philanthropic mobilization marched together. A significant development was expansion of the Red Cross, which, with new leadership from finance and industry and vastly expanded membership and contributions, deployed some 6,000 workers to France and provided hospitals, relief supplies, and an antituberculosis campaign, as well as refugee resettlement. At the same time the newly founded American Friends Service Committee (1917) sent volunteers to help with reconstruction.

Far from demobilizing after the war, American relief efforts expanded, owing to a large infusion of federal government funds. In 1919, with Europe suffering from destruction, starvation, and disease, Congress established the American Relief Administration (ARA) under Herbert Hoover with an appropriation of $100 million; within a year, public appeals yielded an additional $29 million for assistance. The ARA emphasized feeding undernourished children and delivered large quantities of food. The aid was intended, moreover, to bolster feeble East European parliamentary regimes against the Bolshevik threat.

Despite opposition to Bolshevism, famine in Russia brought forth a vigorous response. Congress raised $20 million, and by 1922 the ARA, under the direction of Colonel William N. Haskell, operated 18,000 feeding stations in Russia, as public and private contributions grew to a total of $80 million. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee contributed to the peoples of Poland and the Ukraine. Some liberal groups, suspicious of the ARA's presumed aims, contributed several million dollars more.

In the Near East, the Ottoman Empire was beset by revolutionary activity, ethnic conflict, and Greco-Turkish warfare. Some urged the United States to accept a philanthropic mandate for the former empire, but when Congress failed to respond, they turned to private initiative, and between 1918 and 1924, they raised almost $90 million for Near East relief. Moreover, chaotic conditions in Turkey, Persia, and Armenia stirred missionary interests to raise almost $7 million by 1917, while concern for coreligionists in central Europe and Palestine yielded contributions of $15 million from Jewish groups in America. Coincident with these initiatives, Chinese famine relief produced gifts from both churches and government, and gave rise to an extensive program of work relief.

Despite the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations, American philanthropists were not isolationist; indeed, between 1919 and 1939 the philanthropic expenditures of American voluntary agencies averaged $63.5 million annually. As at earlier times, the pattern of giving reflected cultural and ethnic affinities: Europe and Asia received the lion's share and Latin America lagged far behind, as did Africa. Protestants contributed 47 percent of the total, which focused on Europe, India, China, and Japan; nonsectarian donors contributed 34 percent of the total and focused on Europe, the Near East, and China; Jewish contributors gave 12 percent and it went mainly to Europe and Palestine; and the Catholic portion, 7 percent, went mainly to Europe and China.

During the interwar period, philanthropy's attention focused on problem areas of the world involving large population groups. Civil strife in Ireland drew forth from the Irish-American community generous contributions for relief, as well as for support of independence. American Jewish donors provided more than one-third of the outside support for the Jewish community in Palestine, while it also aided the resettlement of some 200,000 Jews in the Ukraine, Crimea, Poland, and Germany. In the case of China, the American public responded to the disastrous famine of 1927 and the Yangtze flood of 1931.

Natural disasters also called forth American responses, the most dramatic being for the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, which left some 200,000 dead and 2 million homeless. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Department of the Army sent supplies costing $6 million for immediate help; private donations totaled more than $12 million, including $1.5 million donated by Rockefeller foundations to help rebuild the University of Tokyo. American contributions amounted to almost three-quarters of total relief, but such generosity was vitiated by the ban on Japanese immigration, which was imposed by the same Congress that had funded emergency relief.

Between the wars, American foundations assumed an increasingly prominent role in the totality of American philanthropy, especially in cultural activities and health care. The Carnegie Endowment rebuilt libraries and supported large-scale academic studies of war. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., built the League of Nations Library at Geneva, while the Rockefeller Foundation financed foreign policy studies and international scholar exchanges. The Harkness family founded the Commonwealth Fund (1918), which dedicated itself to the welfare of mankind; and in 1930 the Pilgrim Trust gave $10 million to Great Britain for its "future well-being." The Rockefeller Foundation helped rebuild the University of Louvain and the cathedral at Rheims, and it underwrote maintenance costs of Versailles and Fontainebleau, as it expanded the American schools at Athens and Rome.

Moreover, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and private individuals made sizable gifts to British, European, Canadian, and Mexican universities. Outside the Atlantic world, educational efforts were concentrated on the Near Eastern colleges, Hebrew University of Palestine, Chinese colleges, and surveys of educational programs in Africa and East Asia. James Loeb supported a psychiatric institute in Munich and George Eastman provided dental clinics in a number of European capitals. The Rockefeller Foundation funded work on parasitic and infectious diseases when it established Peking Union Medical College.

As world peace gave way in the late 1930s, American philanthropists watched with foreboding and, despite the U.S. Neutrality Acts, philanthropists engaged from the outset of the growing world crisis. In 1939 there developed a coordinated effort marked by cooperation between sectarian relief agencies, organized labor, and government. The Spanish Civil War drew American volunteers to the Loyalist side in opposition to fascism, but the Neutrality Acts dampened the spirit of giving and led to only $3 million raised for humanitarian assistance.

Relief funds followed the chronology of disaster and were sent to the Czechs after the Munich agreement, as well as the conquered Poles, Finns, Dutch, French, Greeks, and Russians as their countries were overrun. Especially notable was the rapid organization of a Russian relief effort and its impressive backing from professional and financial groups. In 1941 assistance provided to China by missionary organizations and the Chinese-American community gained new support when growing concern for Asia led to the organization of the United China Relief Agency with Eleanor Roosevelt as honorary chairperson.

By far the greatest assistance went to Britain, as the mother of parliaments stood alone against the Nazi threat. The Bundles for Britain campaign was followed by a dispatch of ambulances and medical personnel, and by the summer of 1941, British War Relief achieved backing from business and labor and raised more than $10 million and $90 million had been raised for overseas war relief by the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Department of State coordinated these efforts and by 1945 the number of relief agencies had been reduced from 300 to 90.

The Axis occupation of Europe posed the difficult ethical question of whether the subject populations should be helped, for fear of assisting the occupying Axis powers. Although Herbert Hoover strongly urged feeding the victims of Nazi aggression, the opposite view prevailed. Only about $2 million went to relief in Nazi Germany. Congress appropriated $50 million for relief, which was administered by the Red Cross, and more than half went to Britain and none to occupied areas.

By 1945 organized labor emerged as a major donor and together with religious and ethnic groups, it raised the annual total of private giving for overseas assistance to $234 million. By this time, government coordination had coalesced voluntary agencies, and total contributions, between 1939 and 1945, included $54 million for Russia, $38 million for Great Britain, $36 million for Palestine, $35 million for China, and $30 million for Greece.

However impressive, this private assistance was not nearly enough. As increasing needs called for increased response, and as relief supplies fol-

lowed the armies into liberated areas, stop-gap governmental efforts were succeeded first by interallied coordination and then by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), headed by Herbert H. Lehman. The work of UNRRA, on a wholly new scale, was of necessity largely American-supported: of almost $4 billion dispensed between 1943 and 1947, 70 percent was provided by the United States. Again with victory the demands increased. In the theaters of conflict the destruction vastly exceeded that of World War I, an enormous refugee problem existed, and dislocations between city and countryside threatened a dangerously deteriorating food situation.

Although some Americans, relieved of the strains of war, evinced a willingness to let the world be, most still saw a compelling need to help, both on ethical and humanitarian grounds and for reasons of policy, as they sought to further democracy, stability, peace, and prosperity, reminiscent of the period after World War I. Given the tensions that later developed, it is worth noting that the appeal of Russian relief, so strong during the fighting, survived the moment of victory: $32 million in cash and kind was provided in 1945 and assistance continued into 1946. But soon the Soviets declared their independence of outside aid, while the coming of the Cold War brought the containment of communism into the forefront of motives for reconstruction.

The response of the voluntary agencies in the immediate postwar period was impressive: expenditures between 1945 and 1948 totaled $1.1 billion. For the government, withdrawal from UNRRA on grounds of bad administration and ideological conflict was followed by support of the International Refugee Organization; by implementation of the Marshall Plan, a mixture of policy and humanitarian objectives between 1948 and 1952; contribution of some $13 billion to the rebuilding of postwar Europe; and by the Food for Peace program inaugurated in 1954 under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act.

The postwar years were also marked by a "remarkable partnership" of public and private efforts founded on the extemporized successes of private agencies in postwar Germany and Japan; by the contributions of American Jews, who taxed themselves more heavily than any other sectarian group; and by the innovative Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), which advanced from early shipment of surplus army rations to the large-scale movement of surplus agricultural products and whose deliveries grew in value from $500,000 in 1946 to $54 million in 1955. Whether all this generosity, if such it can be considered, was adequate to the need may be argued. Perhaps the best assessment comes through comparison of this treatment of liberated and conquered peoples with that provided by other nations in other campaigns.

In the 1950s, as European reconstruction progressed, the focus of overseas philanthropy shifted back to the less developed world: after 1958 more than half of disposable resources went to non-European areas. This shift also emphasized the surprising vigor of the missionary movement, now more than ever equated with social welfare, to which in 1956 American Protestants contributed some $130 million and American Catholics some $50 million. In the early 1950s, indeed, Protestant groups spent more for overseas technical assistance than the United States and the United Nations combined, and their accomplishments provided precedents for governmental action: the Point Four program, launched in 1950, early modeled itself on the Near East Foundation; a decade later the Peace Corps drew on the experience of the interdenominational International Voluntary Services (1953).

These private and public efforts were accompanied by expanded activity on the part of the larger foundations, which greatly increased their contributions to projects concerned with international affairs. Of these institutions, two were preeminent. Shifting its focus from its prewar concern with the eradication of disease, and following in the steps of such nineteenth-century pioneers as Horace Capron, Charles J. Murphy, and David Lubin, the Rockefeller Foundation took as its major goal the modernization of agriculture in the developing countries. Among the striking results were a doubling of Mexican food production between 1943 and 1963 and that of India between 1951 and 1971, and the establishment in 1960 of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines.

Important assistance in establishing the Rice Institute came from the Ford Foundation, a new giant of philanthropy, whose resources of $3.6 billion (1968) enabled it to provide more than a quarter of all foundation grants devoted to international affairs. In pursuit of its ambitious aims, reminiscent of Andrew Carnegie, of the "establishment of peace," the Ford Foundation undertook extensive efforts to attack poverty, hunger, and disease, and to further social science and

planning. And as birth rates steadily threatened to outstrip production, notwithstanding the successes of plant geneticists in producing high-yield varieties ("Green Revolution"), foundations and government agencies alike edged delicately into stabilizing population growth.

Except for Liberia, American philanthropy had stayed away from Africa, but neglect shifted somewhat in the 1970s, partly owing to the emergence of an African-American lobby. During the 1920s and 1930s, African Americans had protested against U.S. occupation of Haiti and Italian aggression in Ethiopia via traditional channels like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, but it was in the 1970s that African Americans organized groups devoted solely to the purpose of influencing American foreign policy and leveraging private and government aid for Haiti and Africa. Following the congressional elections of 1970, African Americans in the House of Representatives organized the Black Caucus.

In March 1971 the Black Caucus urged President Richard Nixon to enact economic sanctions against minority white rule in South Africa. In Washington in May 1978, U.S. Congress Representatives Charles C. Diggs, Jr., and Andrew Young, among others, organized TransAfrica, Inc., a mass-based African-American foreign policy lobby. As leader of TransAfrica, Randall Robinson helped orchestrate an economic blockade against South African apartheid and TransAfrica established itself as the foremost voice for expressing African-American opinion on foreign policy issues. In 1986, when President Ronald Reagan vetoed a ban of loans and investments in South Africa, African Americans regarded it as hostile to their interests. In October, Congress overrode the presidential veto, as it responded to the lobbying of TransAfrica and white liberal opinion. South Africa is now free from apartheid partly because of the U.S. economic sanctions enacted following 1986. And once apartheid was eliminated, TransAfrica and other groups shifted their focus from imposing an embargo to leveraging increases in private and government grants to South Africans and to fighting the scourge of AIDS in Africa.

Meanwhile, as head of TransAfrica, Robinson's highly publicized twenty-seven-day hunger strike, which called upon President William Jefferson Clinton to restore democratic rule in Haiti, led the president to initiate new policies toward the repressive military dictatorship in Haiti. President Clinton intervened there with a force of 20,000 U.S. troops, which resulted in the restoration of the democratically elected leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to the presidency of the former French West Indian colony. Robinson has helped leverage private and government assistance for Haiti while the George Soros Foundations provided private assistance to island republics and southern Africa.

GEORGE SOROS AND THE CAPITALIST THREAT

A leading global philanthropist, the Hungarian-born George Soros was attacked as a corporate raider, a speculator who achieved billionaire status via fluctuations in stocks, commodities, and currencies, but he has also been recognized as a billionaire who, like others before him, seemed determined to give away much of his money. He also received substantial attention because of the books he wrote that sought to explain his ambitious agenda for strengthening democracy and the rule of law on a global scale. Born in Budapest, he moved to England in 1947 and graduated from the London School of Economics; he moved to the United States in 1956 and founded the Open Society Fund (1979) and Soros Foundation–Soviet Union (1987). Soros's goals were "to help open up closed societies, to help make open societies more viable, and to foster a critical mode of thinking." He established some thirty semiautonomous foundations, principally in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but also in Guatemala, Haiti, and southern Africa. Established in 1993 in New York City, his Open Society Institute provided administrative, financial, and technical support, as well as establishing network programs to address certain issues on a regional or network-wide basis. In 1997, the various Soros foundations spent a total of $428.4 million on philanthropic activities. Along with the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper and others, Soros juxtaposed totalitarian ideologies with recognition that nobody has a monopoly on truth. Different people have different views and different interests, and he notes a need for institutions that encourage people to live together in peace and respect democracy and the rule of law. His goal was to protect individual rights and ensure freedom of choice and freedom of speech, and as an ardent supporter of toleration, he sees questions of choice and freedom as keys to the open society. By 2001, Soros had donated $1 billion: $350 million in 1997,

including $50 million to a fund to help legal immigrants, and $100 million to set up Internet centers at universities in Russia. Soros's donations strengthened U.S. commitments in Eastern Europe and helped compel the realization that the region was vital to American foreign policy.

TED TURNER AND PHILANTHROPIC COMPETITION

Robert Edward "Ted" Turner, CNN founder and Time Warner vice chairman, announced on 18 September 1997 that he would donate $1 billion ($100 million per year in Time Warner stock) over the next decade to United Nations programs. Speaking of his gift, Turner said, "This is only going to go for programs, programs like refugees, cleaning up land mines, peacekeeping, UNICEF for the children, for diseases, and we're going to have a committee that will work with a committee of the UN so that the money can only go to UN causes." He announced that his goal was to stimulate philanthropic competition, and his grant of $1 billion was intended to raise the bar to a new level.

Starting in 1970 with a single UHF television station in Atlanta, Turner's business grew into a global colossus that included cable channels, movie studios, and professional sports teams. He started his TBS satellite superstation in 1976 and CNN in 1980. In 1996, Turner gave away $28 million, mainly to environmental causes, so the donation of $1 billion to the UN was a departure for him. Because the UN could not legally accept money from individuals, Turner created a foundation to spend the money and administer the programs, which he expected to focus on job creation, eradication of land mines, expansion of education, and research on global warming. He also became a fundraiser for the United Nations and actively sought publicity both for himself and for a number of causes, such as the environmental movement and world peace. His gift of $1 billion to support the United Nations was considered at the time the largest single donation by a private individual. By comparison, all charitable giving by Americans in 1996 was approximately $120 billion. "Few Americans," noted *Newsweek,* "have cut such a swath through life." Turner's donations strengthened the United Nations as a platform for the resolution of world conflicts and a commitment to international peace.

BILL GATES

Bill Gates, in 2001 the world's richest person, had a personal philosophy of philanthropy that seemed to reflect the views of Andrew Carnegie: "If they want to put in the consent decree that I'm going to give away 95 percent of my wealth, I'd be glad to sign that." A Harvard dropout, Gates had seemed an unlikely successor to his overachieving parents. His father was a prominent Seattle attorney, and his gregarious mother served on charitable boards and ran the United Way. At age thirteen Gates wrote his first computer program, at a time when computers were still room-sized machines run by scientists in white coats. In December 1974, his friend Paul Allen showed Gates a *Popular Mechanics* cover featuring the Altair 8800, a $397 computer that any hobbyist could build. The only thing the computer lacked, besides a keyboard and monitor, was software. Following complex developments, the company Gates and Allen formed, Microsoft, introduced the Windows operating system, and by 1993 Microsoft was selling a million copies of Windows a month. In 1986, when Microsoft went public, Gates became a paper billionaire at the age of thirty-one. Meanwhile, he increased his charitable giving: He earmarked $750 million over five years to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, which involved an alliance with the World Health Organization, the Rockefeller Foundation, UNICEF, pharmaceutical companies, and the World Bank.

In 1999 the Gates Foundations awarded more than $2 billion in grants, including what is believed to be the largest single private grant in U.S. history—$750 million to the global vaccine program over a five-year period. His vaccine project specifically targeted HIV and AIDS, which he identified in a speech in Redmond, Washington, on 18 October 2000 as having potentially dramatic consequences for the infrastructure of many countries, including Botswana. He also joined with Ted Turner on the vaccine program to give $78 million to eradicate polio from the world by the end of 2000. Gates's donations helped alert the world to the problems of disease as problems of international relations and of American foreign policy.

CONCLUSION: THE CRITICS

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, American philanthropists could point with pride

to two centuries of giving and voluntary association for the good of humanity abroad. But as some critics have suggested, the American philanthropic tradition reached a crossroads arising from the broader context of American diplomacy and from unprecedented criticism from abroad and at home.

The advent of America's hyperpower status since the collapse of the Soviet Union led many to turn a critical eye toward the United States and its philanthropy. As the hegemonic power in the world, even American allies and friends sought to portray the United States as part of the problem, not the solution. American missionaries were criticized as self-righteous meddlers and cultural imperialists and U.S. foreign aid as philanthropic imperialism. Foundations came under attack, as when missionaries were criticized for accepting tainted Rockefeller oil money. Critics suggested that American philanthropy was corrupted by excessively close connections to U.S. foreign policy. Some foreign critics interpreted American philanthropy as the last refuge of Western colonialism.

Some accusations were true enough, but the goals of salvation, survival, or modernization, were always among American philanthropy's goals, and the foundations, like the missionaries, emphasized the unity of mankind and tried to downgrade the importance of nationalism, political frontiers, and political differences. Such attitudes were reflected in practice, for not all private charities cooperated with the U.S. government, and most had reservations. Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959 moved the Ford Foundation to direct a major effort toward Latin America. Still, the philanthropic ideal remained deeply rooted in the American people.

Far more significant than any politicizing of philanthropy has been the continued influence of the philanthropic ideal on the conduct of American foreign relations. Persistent hope for liberal causes were exemplified in the nineteenth century by James Monroe and Richard Rush during the French and Latin American revolutions, in the reception accorded the Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth in the United States in 1851, and in Daniel Webster's attacks upon the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, the U.S. view that expanding trade has advanced civilization informed early American commercial treaties with the Islamic world and the Far East and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Although open to charges of racism, an important domestic philanthropic concern underlay the founding of Liberia in 1847, as did a genuine desire to enhance the welfare of African Americans. Persistent American belief in self-determination gave American policy an anticolonial bias and led to diplomatic support for weak regimes against their more powerful oppressors.

President Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights during the second half of the 1970s was well received around the world and seemed to be an extension or reflection of earlier pronouncements of his predecessors. Early in the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson had noted that it was "a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of material interest"; as Wilson had led the American nation into World War I, he had defined American war aims as seeking "no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make." In later periods of crisis, Franklin D. Roosevelt offered the Four Freedoms to the world, and his successor, Harry S. Truman, noted that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation," while John F. Kennedy in the 1960s promised that America would "pay any price . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty." At times, however, philanthropy has been ill advised; at times change has proved destabilizing, as expectations rose faster than performance. Often results did not materialize, as custom proved resistant and ruling groups were averse to the American plan. Some recipients were resentful of gifts and donations, feeling that being unable to reciprocate to a gift from the United States has brought dishonor upon them. Indeed, it would be possible to write about U.S. philanthropy from the perspective of recipients rather than donors and arrive at much different conclusions.

As critics have noted, a danger of both foreign aid and philanthropy has been entanglement in the local politics and power struggles occasioned by wars, famines, and natural disasters. In Africa, CARE unwittingly assisted a Somali dictator in building a political and economic power base; and the United Nations, Save the Children, and many other groups provided raw materials for ethnic rivalries. A case of frustrated ambitions has been that of India, where an assistance program measured in billions of dollars turned out to be a holding operation, ending in mutual disillusionment, even before population explosion, limited resources, and an energy crisis suggested a very different future.

Some critics have rejected American foreign aid and private philanthropy abroad, but they have failed to acknowledge the good that has been achieved, as in education and health care. Faced by such critics, some have suggested that, if America perfected its own ideals at home, perhaps America's greatest gift to the twenty-first century would be its example rather than its philanthropic aid packages and coercive powers. So, perhaps it is now possible, given current skepticism, to achieve a new balance, one that recognizes the virtue of limiting American political intervention abroad and yet acknowledges the genuine achievements of America's philanthropic tradition. And while seeking a new balance, it may be useful to keep in mind Bill Gates's insight that it is at least as difficult to give money away as it is to make money.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anheier, Helmut K., and Stefan Toepler, eds. *Private Funds, Public Purpose: Philanthropic Foundations in International Perspective.* New York, 1999.

Arnove, Robert F., ed. *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad.* Bloomington, Ind., 1980.

Chambers, Clarke A., and Beverly Stadum. *An Exploration of New Themes in the Study of American Philanthropy Arising from Archival Research.* Bloomington, Ind., 1998.

Curti, Merle Eugene. *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1963. Though dated regarding its context and inclusiveness, still the best survey.

Curti, Merle Eugene, and Kendall Birr. *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938.* Madison, Wis., 1954.

Daniel, Robert L. *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820–1960.* Athens, Ohio, 1970.

Davis, David Brion. *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1966.

———. *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823.* New York, 1999. This work and the preceding book discuss the antislavery movement as a form of philanthropy.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992. Provides fresh insight on politics of foreign policy.

Dennis, James S. *Christian Missions and Social Progress: A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions.* 3 vols. New York, 1898–1906. Discusses nineteenth-century philanthropy.

Field, James A., Jr. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969. Information on early American philanthropy.

Ilchman, Warren F., Stanley N. Katz, and Edward L. Queen II, eds. *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions.* Philanthropic Studies Series. Bloomington, Ind., 1998. Information on philanthropy in Western and non-Western societies.

Jordan, Winthrop D. *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812.* New York, 1977.

King, Kenneth. *Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa.* Oxford, 1971.

Lewis, Robert Ellsworth. *The Educational Conquest of the Far East.* New York, 1903.

Maren, Michael. *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity.* Glencoe, Ill., 1996. Twentieth-century philanthropy.

Miller, Christopher L. *Prophetic Worlds: Indians and Whites on the Columbia Plateau.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1985.

Morris, David. *Gift from America: The First Fifty Years of CARE.* Atlanta, 1996.

Nichols, Bruce, and Gil Loescher, eds. *The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy Today.* South Bend, Ind., 1989.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1953.

Saillant, John. *Black, White and "The Charitable Blessed": Race and Philanthropy in the American Early Republic.* Bloomington, Ind., 1998.

Schneewind, Jerome B., ed. *Giving: Western Ideas of Philanthropy.* Bloomington, Ind., 1996.

Schrift, Alan D., ed. *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity.* New York, 1997. Provides anthropological perspectives on gift giving.

Schwantes, Robert S. *Japanese and Americans: A Century of Cultural Relations.* New York, 1955.

Wall, Joseph Frazier. *Andrew Carnegie.* 2d ed. Pittsburgh, 1989.

See also CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES; FOREIGN AID; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; RELIGION; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

POST–COLD WAR POLICY

Richard A. Melanson

While the precise dates that marked the beginning and the end of the Cold War remain the subjects of scholarly debate, the era's major foreign policy focus was unambiguous: containing the spread of Soviet power and international communism by supporting friendly governments with aid, arms, and, occasionally, troops; deterring nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies; and supporting economic institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Deprived of a global enemy, American foreign policy since the Cold War seemingly became more diffuse, perhaps even incoherent. But, though political elites awaited the arrival of a reincarnated "X" (the pseudonym senior State Department official George F. Kennan used in his famous article on the strategy of containment in 1947) to articulate a crystalline, new strategy, several discernible and related themes and concepts have, nevertheless, characterized post–Cold War American foreign policy.

At least six themes and concepts have steered U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War:

1. the preservation of American global hegemony
2. the fostering of globalization through the continued development of liberal international economic institutions
3. the promotion of an ever-growing "zone of democratic peace"
4. the repeated employment of military power to ease humanitarian disasters
5. the isolation and punishment of a handful of "rogue" states that allegedly threatened regional stability and American security;
6. growing concerns about the vulnerability of the United States to attacks from these regimes as well as from transnational terrorist groups.

Efforts to formulate concrete policies from these themes and concepts have provoked both domestic and international dissent about their appropriateness and feasibility.

PRESERVING AMERICAN GLOBAL HEGEMONY

American foreign policy officials almost never use the word "hegemony" in their public discourse. When Henry Kissinger did so at his first press conference after being named President Richard Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs in 1968, puzzled reporters scurried to their dictionaries for help. Presidents and their advisers prefer more positive terms such as "global leadership" or "indispensable nation" to describe America's role in the world, yet "hegemony," because it is less loaded, better captures the essence of recent U.S. strategy. The ancient Greeks understood "hegemony" to mean preponderant international influence or authority, and preserving such preponderance has been a fundamental goal of all post–Cold War administrations.

At century's end the American economy had experienced the longest peacetime expansion in its history. Low inflation, sustained growth, and rising worker productivity had made it the engine of global prosperity and technological change. Americans owned more than half of the world's computers and received more than half of the world's royalties and licensing fees. The eight largest high-tech companies were headquartered in the United States. American pop culture was virtually ubiquitous, with Michael Jordan posters, McDonald's golden arches, and Hollywood movies its most familiar symbols.

The United States retained the globe's most powerful and expensive military establishment with expenditures larger than all of the other nations combined. Its forward presence in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf was secured by a host of garrisons, air bases, and aircraft carrier task forces. U.S. regional commanders often acted like Roman tribunes, not only leading American forces but also initiating direct diplomatic contacts with foreign governments. The technological gap

between American weapons systems and those of other nations, already evident in the Gulf War of 1991, had become enormous by the 1999 Kosovo air campaign against the Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic.

At the same time, American global commitments expanded. U.S. ground troops landed in Somalia in 1992 to help end a famine (only to be withdrawn the next year as a result of casualties that were incurred after the mission had grown); returned Haiti to its ousted democratically elected president in 1994; and entered Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 as "peacekeepers." American aircraft carriers protected Taiwan from the People's Republic of China, patrolled the Persian Gulf, and sailed the Indian Ocean. Its warplanes routinely bombed Iraq for more than a decade, helped end the war in Bosnia in 1995, and brought Yugoslavia to its knees in 1999.

Far from disappearing after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at Washington's insistence, expanded into central and eastern Europe. In Asia, American planners anticipated maintaining troop levels at around 100,000 for at least twenty more years. And at the United Nations, the United States, under congressional pressure, prevented Boutros Boutros-Ghali from being reelected secretary-general, primarily because he had criticized the United States for failing to play a more active role in UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Rwanda.

Surely such power and influence constituted "global hegemony," and American leaders, as well as those of a surprisingly large number of foreign nations, wished to preserve it. But domestic divisions surfaced about whether it could best be accomplished unilaterally or by working closely with allies and international organizations. This debate began in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War and by the millennium remained unresolved. President George H. W. Bush, envisioned America's role as that of benevolent hegemon, protecting the growing "zone of democratic peace" against regional outlaws, terrorists, nuclear proliferators, and other threats to world order. It would do so in concert with others, if possible, as in the Gulf War, or unilaterally, if necessary.

Work soon began in the Department of Defense to make this concept operational, and in March 1992 the results were leaked to the press. The main Pentagon planning group outlined a strategy of "global leadership" that presumed America's continuing international preeminence and argued that the United States should actively prevent the emergence of states that could challenge it. By using existing security arrangements to ensure the safety of its allies, Washington would view as potentially hostile any state with sufficient human and technological resources to dominate Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East. This strategy acknowledged that within a decade Germany or Russia might threaten Europe; Japan, Russia, and eventually China might do likewise in East Asia; and that the domination of either region would consequently imperil the Middle East. But this group suggested that the United States could create incentives for Germany and Japan to refrain from challenging American preeminence. No mention was made of the United Nations or any other international organization, and because the strategy smacked of unilateralism, a number of allies, led by France, condemned it. And, although its untimely release embarrassed the George H. W. Bush administration, these recommendations nevertheless reflected the thinking of an important segment of the foreign policy community.

Upon entering office in 1993, President Bill Clinton adopted—initially, at last—"muscular" or "assertive" mulilateralism to preserve America's position in the post–Cold War world, while he concentrated on reviving the domestic economy. But the poor performance of the United Nations in Somalia and the European Union's failure to halt the war in Bosnia gradually persuaded the administration that American leadership was, indeed, "indispensable." Nevertheless, many Republicans in Congress, fresh from their historic 1994 triumph at the polls, remained deeply suspicious of international organizations because they allegedly threatened American sovereignty and freedom of action. During the 1996 presidential campaign, Robert Dole, the Republican nominee, promised that when he was in the White House, "no American fighting men and women will take any orders from Field Marshal Boutros Boutrous-Ghali." Republican unilateralists opposed aiding Mexico during its peso crisis in 1994 and 1995, repeatedly criticized the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, refused to pay American dues owed to the United Nations, and tried to abolish the Agency for International Development (AID). Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for AID's replacement with a new international development foundation with a mandate "to deliver block grants to support the work of private relief agencies and faith-based institutions." The Senate defeated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in

2000 with many members convinced that it represented "unilateral disarmament," and a majority in Congress opposed U.S. membership in the new International Criminal Court, fearing that U.S. military personnel stationed overseas could be hauled before it.

Although the Clinton administration attempted to discredit these critics by calling them isolationists, they were, in fact, determined to preserve American global hegemony by protecting it against the encroachments of international organizations. In effect, Republican unilateralists echoed many of the arguments made by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge against U.S. membership in the League of Nations after World War I.

While certain nations clearly resented America's preeminent position in the post–Cold War world, none was able to mobilize an international coalition against the United States. China grumbled about American "hegemonism," France complained about the U.S. exertion of "hyperpower," Russia deeply resented the expansion of NATO, and states like Iraq and Iran tested Washington's patience. Yet the stability and protection afforded by America's global predominance were welcomed, or at least tolerated, by the vast majority of foreign nations. East European states clamored for admission to NATO, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization participated in a U.S.-led "peace process," and countries from South America to Africa invited the United States to serve as an honest broker to help settle regional disputes.

Global preeminence, of course, has never been permanent. Previous hegemons were eventually humbled by overextension, a weakening domestic social fabric, or by rising competitor states. No doubt the "American century" would not endure forever, but in the absence of some unanticipated catastrophe like a nuclear war or a massive biological attack, it remained difficult to imagine an imminent end to American primacy.

FOSTERING GLOBALIZATION

The makers of post–Cold War American foreign policy believed that by fostering globalization, the growth of both the U.S. and the world economy would be increased. Globalization was not a wholly new phenomenon, but it did attain unprecedented prominence in the public discourse during the 1990s. Indeed, one of its chief articulators, the journalist Thomas L. Friedman, suggested that the post–Cold War world be dubbed "the age of globalization." Although difficult to define precisely, scholars and policymakers appeared to understand globalization as the integration of markets, finance, and technologies in a way that shrunk space and time. Some observers even predicted that the ultimate consequence of this process would be the elimination of all national borders and, thus, the nation-state.

That was clearly not the aim of U.S. foreign policy officials. Rather, they saw globalization as an economic tool that could be managed to open foreign markets, stimulate American exports in goods and services, and bring economic growth and prosperity to large portions of the world. The Clinton administration had a strategy for accomplishing these goals—the "big, emerging markets" (BEM) strategy—though its origins can be traced to Robert Zoellick, a senior policymaker in both Bush administrations. From Zoellick's perspective, the United States could best serve its economic interests by acting as the primary catalyst for a series of integrative economic structures that would substantially increase global prosperity. First, it would deepen the institutionalized economic and security relations with western Europe and Japan. Second, the United States would reach out to a second tier of potential partners in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe to develop dense institutional linkages such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). And third, even farther on the periphery loomed Russia, China, and the Middle East, areas that in the more distant future might be brought into this global economic system too. This foreign economic strategy asserted the indispensability of American global leadership, for it strongly supported the creation of a host of regional economic institutions in which the United States would function as the common linchpin.

By elaborating and refining Zoellick's ideas, the Clinton administration developed the BEM strategy that lay at the core of its foreign policy. The strategy identified ten regional economic drivers supposedly committed to trade-led economic growth and reasonably cordial relations with the United States. The "Big Ten," as they were called, included China (plus Taiwan and Hong Kong), India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Poland, Turkey, and South Africa—states whose expansion could benefit neighboring markets as well. Clinton officials

projected that by 2010 American trade with these countries would be greater than combined trade with the European Union and Japan. Jeffrey E. Garten, undersecretary of commerce for international trade and a chief architect of this strategy, argued that the BEMs possessed enormous potential for the expansion of U.S. trade in goods and services, because they purchased heavily in economic sectors dominated by the United States: information technology, health and medical equipment, telecommunications, financial services, environmental technology, transportation, and power generation.

To achieve these goals the Clinton administration launched a global effort to persuade the BEMs to open their markets to both trade and investment. The push for financial liberalization was directed at East Asia and Southeast Asia, in particular, largely because it was seen as especially fertile ground for American banks, brokerage houses, and insurance companies. To further this strategy, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin persuaded the G-7 nations (the world's leading industrial democracies) in April 1997 to issue a statement "promoting freedom of capital flows" and urging the International Monetary Fund to amend its charter so it could press countries for capital account liberalization. But other Clinton economic officials like Laura D'Andrea Tyson and Joseph Stieglitz, successive chairs of the president's Council of Economic Advisers, warned of the dangers of opening these capital markets too rapidly, and soon Rubin and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers began to publicly caution that financial liberalization in the BEMs must be accompanied by banking and other fundamental economic reforms. Yet, convinced that the International Monetary Fund would bail them out of any trouble (as the United States had done in Mexico in 1994), the leaders of many of these states ignored this advice.

In 1997 and 1998 the dark side of globalization appeared in the form of a series of currency collapses in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Social unrest in Indonesia claimed one thousand lives and led to the forced resignation of its long-serving president. The so-called Asian dynamos fell like dominoes as currency speculators undermined their financial systems. Deeply shaken by these events and fearful that the crisis would spread to the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank cut short-term interest rates three times within six weeks, and President Clinton called on Rubin to devise ways to reform the global financial system in order to avert future disasters. The secretary responded with a series of speeches in which he called for the creation of a new global financial "architecture" that involved improving transparency and disclosure in emerging markets, giving the International Monetary Fund additional power, encouraging the private sector to share some of the economic burden in times of crisis, and strengthening the regulation of financial institutions in emerging economies. Rubin implicitly acknowledged what many economists had argued for years: any attempt to liberalize capital markets lacking the structures to support the subsequent inflow in foreign investment was dangerous.

In fact, the seemingly inexorable growth of globalization produced both academic debates and public protests. Globalization enthusiasts celebrated the unprecedented extent to which poorer economies had been incorporated into the international system of trade, finance, and production as partners and participants rather than colonial dependencies and believed that this condition had produced greater economic growth. But skeptics worried that since substantial numbers of nations were landlocked and isolated, they would find it extremely difficult to attract trade and investment. Furthermore, other countries, such as the Persian Gulf oil states, in possession of huge natural resource bases, found it impossible to establish competitive, and more sustainable, manufacturing sectors. Hence, the process of globalization was far from global. Second, while proponents of increased capital flows across borders argued that they gave to developing nations an enhanced ability to borrow and lend (and thus better control patterns of investment and consumption), others pointed to the destabilization and financial panics that these unfettered capital flows had allegedly caused in Latin America and Asia during the 1990s as worried investors hurriedly withdrew their assets at the first sign of weakening currencies. Third, economists disagreed about the impact that globalization had on domestic and international income distribution. Some suggested that since the United States exported high technology products to Asia in return for less expensive labor-intensive goods, American workers in certain industries had suffered a loss of income in the face of low-wage foreign competition, while, at the same time, skilled workers in Asia incurred similar dislocations. On the other hand, the number of U.S. workers directly competing with unskilled

workers in emerging markets appeared to be too small to explain widening income disparities among Americans.

The age of globalization also produced contradictory political impulses. On the one hand, it fostered a host of new international organizations, including, most prominently, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some observers feared that the proliferation of such institutions, accompanied by rules regulating the behavior of its members, posed a threat to national sovereignty. On the other hand, defenders of the nation-state also worried about the growing tendency of local governments, regions, and ethnic communities to pursue greater political and cultural autonomy as a way to ward off the demands of globalization. In his Farewell Address, President Clinton, while noting that the global economy was giving "more of our own people and billions around the world the chance to work and live and raise their families with dignity," acknowledged that integration processes "make us more subject to global forces of destruction—to terrorism, organized crime and narco-trafficking, the spread of deadly weapons and disease, the degradation of the global environment."

Indeed, concerns such as these and others triggered a series of public, sometimes violent demonstrations against the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank in Seattle (November 1999), Washington, D.C. (April 2000), Prague (September 2000), and several other locations. Loose coalitions of protesters made up of union members, animal rights advocates, environmentalists, anarchists, and senior citizens claimed that wealthy countries and their institutional tools—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—had incurred an "ecological debt" to the Third World by draining its natural resources, destroying the environment, and causing human rights violations. They believed that this ecological debt should wipe out the monetary debt that poor countries owed to these organizations. They wanted the World Bank to order a moratorium on foreign investments in oil, mining, and natural gas projects because of their environmental threats. Others argued that fledgling democracies should be forgiven the debts incurred by previous, repressive regimes. All were convinced that multinational corporations—most of them based in the United States—behaved more like robber barons than responsible global citizens.

In sum, the nature and consequences of globalization remained deeply contested in the post–Cold War world. The Clinton administration's initial desire to foster its spread had been tempered by foreign financial crises and public dissent. Yet it was not even clear whether globalization should be viewed as a conscious national policy or as an unstoppable force ultimately immune to either governmental management or control.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

By the late 1980s, as Mikhail Gorbachev allowed anticommunist revolutions to sweep through Moscow's satellites, President Bush called for a Europe "whole and free." Soon he began to speak more broadly of a growing "zone of the democratic peace," tacitly accepting the academic thesis that democracies did not fight wars against one another. According to this view, the roots of which can be traced back at least as far as Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century, democracies (or "republics" as he called them), shared certain characteristics that precluded conflict among them. His claims were expanded by several American political scientists, including, most prominently, Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett. They and others advanced several arguments to account for the "democratic peace." Some emphasized that because of the internal structures of democratic states, leaders could not mobilize their publics to support any wars except those against authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Others stressed the norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts within democracies because of the habit of compromise and the rule of law. Still others argued that the transparency of democratic institutions and the easy flow of information between democracies made violence extremely unlikely. Another group of scholars was impressed by the shared social purposes of democratic states and an underlying identity of interests that sharply limited the rise of disputes worthy of war.

Indeed, virtually every president since Woodrow Wilson accepted the basic tenets of this "liberal" argument about how democracies behave. He believed that militarized, autocratic regimes had caused World War I and that American security depended on the successful transition of these states to democracy. Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman shared similar sentiments about the origins of World War II and the

requirements of U.S. security in the postwar world. In the 1980s, the Reagan Doctrine, which reserved to the United States the right to assist groups attempting to overthrow Marxist dictatorships, sprang from the same set of assumptions. All of these presidents were convinced, as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry put it, that democracies were "more capable of developing peaceful, continuous, rule-based, institutionalized relations among each other than [was] possible with or between non-democracies."

Nevertheless, a lively scholarly debate arose after the Cold War about the merits of these arguments and assumptions. Christopher Layne examined four instances when democracies nearly went to war against one another and found that conflict was averted not because of shared values but because of national self-interest. Further, he argued that the War of 1812 and the American Civil War should be seen as wars between democratic states. David Spiro claimed that because the chance that any given pair of states will be at war at any given time was low, and because before 1945 few democracies existed, the absence of conflict between them might be the result of random chance. He also complained that proponents of the democratic peace thesis often failed to offer clear definitions of "democracy." Finally, Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa concluded that only after 1945 were democracies significantly less likely to be involved with disputes with one another, and that was because most democracies were aligned against the Soviet threat. With the ending of the Cold War, the chief impediment to intrademocratic conflict had been removed.

These counterclaims notwithstanding, democracy promotion represented a fundamental theme in post–Cold War American foreign policy and was closely tied to the preservation of U.S. hegemony and the fostering of globalization. In its efforts to create a successor to the strategy of containment and to rally domestic support for the Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration offered a "new world order," which, among other things, included the notion that the United States should help to widen the "zone of the democratic peace." Although Bush quickly dropped this phrase from his public rhetoric in the face of heavy media criticism and the need to focus on domestic issues in advance of the 1992 presidential campaign, the administration, nevertheless, acted to promote democracy in Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America, and Africa through a variety of diplomatic and economic initiatives. Bush officials could not help but be impressed by the democratization process then occurring in many parts of the world.

The Clinton administration, also groping for a post-containment strategy and similarly taken by the sweep of democratization, soon unveiled "engagement and enlargement" as its lodestar. In a September 1993 speech tellingly entitled "From Containment to Enlargement," Anthony Lake, Clinton's first special assistant for national security affairs, attempted to explain this strategy. After noting that its geography and history had continually tempted the United States to be wary of foreign entanglements, Lake argued that the Clinton administration intended "to engage actively in the world in order to increase our prosperity, update our security arrangements, and promote democracy abroad." Beyond engagement, then, lay enlargement, and Lake identified four components of such a strategy. First, the United States would "strengthen the community of major market democracies . . . which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding." Second, the Clinton administration would "help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity." Third, America "must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy and markets." And fourth, "we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracies and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern." At the same time, Lake hedged "engagement" with several caveats. He warned that the tide of democratic advance could slow and even reverse; he stressed that this strategy had to be tempered by pragmatism, for other national interests would doubtless require the United States to befriend and defend nondemocratic states for mutually beneficial reasons; and he noted that this strategy must view democracy broadly and not insist that all adhere rigidly to the American example.

In the short term, this strategy was seemingly discredited by the bloody battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, the following month as well as the embarrassment suffered when a U.S. ship carrying training personnel to Haiti was turned back by a protesting mob in Port-au-Prince. Furthermore, opinion polls repeatedly indicated that only one in five Americans thought it important to promote democracy abroad. Nevertheless, to a remarkable degree, Lake's speech anticipated

much of the Clinton administration's democratization efforts, which, in turn, adhered closely to those of the first Bush presidency.

Both gave primacy to Eastern Europe and Latin America—those regions that were already the most democratized—to initiate a policy of "democratic differentiation" in order to urge further movement toward democracy and open markets. A variety of carrots and sticks were employed to nudge these nations along. In the case of Haiti, the Clinton administration threatened force to reinstall the democratically elected president, but this action was taken more for domestic political reasons than from any confidence that genuine democracy would take root in that troubled country.

Initially, Clinton tried to link the continuance of most-favored-nation trading status to improvements in China's human rights record, but by 1994 he was forced to abandon that approach in light of Beijing's intransigence. Indeed, neither administration wanted to allow democracy promotion to undermine the opening of markets throughout Asia. And in the Middle East the need for energy security and fears about Iraq and Iran dissuaded both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton from evincing any interest in democratization. Post–Cold War American foreign policy was frequently frustrated in its attempts to foster democracy in Russia because of a combination of rampant corruption, the physical decline of Boris Yeltsin, and Moscow's resentment of NATO enlargement. Yeltsin's replacement by the enigmatic former KGB agent Vladimir Putin triggered a debate in Washington about his devotion to democracy. By the time of George W. Bush's election in 2000, more Americans viewed Russia with hostility than at any time since the mid-1980s.

But in Africa, where there was palpable evidence of a democratization trend, American actions appeared inconsistent. On the one hand, economic assistance programs were restructured to reward those governments undertaking democratic reforms, and every embassy in Africa was ordered to formulate a strategy for democracy promotion. Yet when the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Congo collapsed in 1997, the United States encouraged Uganda and Rwanda to offer armed support to Laurent Kabila's efforts to seize power. Kabila's democratic credentials were questionable at best, yet the Clinton administration chose him over Etienne Tshisekedi, the popular prime minister who possessed the clearest claim on democratic legitimacy. Washington's decision to endorse the strongman approach proved disastrous, as Kabila proceeded to wreck what was left of this long-suffering nation before being assassinated in a palace coup in 2001. Critics charged that despite official rhetoric about the importance of bringing democracy to Africa, the United States continued to patronize African nations and to tacitly believe that they remained unprepared for democratic governance.

On balance, however, post–Cold War American foreign policy generally promoted democracy where economic and security interests and discernible democratization trends existed. In those regions where U.S. interests required working with authoritarian regimes and where prospects for democratization were bleak, no effort was made to promote democracy. Indeed, a rough consensus emerged among American political elites in support of this pragmatic approach to democracy promotion.

UNDERTAKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS

Humanitarian interventions—the use of military force to save civilian lives in the absence of vital national interests—emerged as a major theme in post–Cold War American foreign policy and generated heated political and scholarly debates about their advisability, efficacy, and legitimacy. During the Cold War humanitarian interventions were rare, unilateral, and generally condemned by the international community. For example, in 1971 India invaded East Pakistan (Bangladesh) during a Pakistani civil war allegedly to save civilian lives, but the consequence was to split India's traditional enemy in two. Comparable international skepticism greeted the 1978 Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia)—supposedly to end the "killing fields" of the Khmer Rouge—and the 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda was not only designed to oust the abhorrent Idi Amin but also to retaliate against a Ugandan invasion the previous year.

But after the Cold War a commitment among democratic states to respond to humanitarian disasters became the norm, if not always the rule. The United States assumed a global humanitarian role, intervening both unilaterally and multilaterally in an unprecedented number of situations. In 1991, U.S. forces provided aid and protection to the Iraqi Kurds shortly after the con-

clusion of the Gulf War. Many commentators and members of Congress criticized President Bush for not intervening sooner.

In December 1992, U.S. troops were ordered to Somalia in an effort to end a disastrous famine and then to turn over responsibility to the United Nations. But when eighteen U.S. Rangers were killed in a firefight with hostile Somali clan members in October 1993, an outraged Congress pressured a panicked Clinton administration to withdraw all U.S. forces. Misery soon returned to southern Somalia. No doubt in reaction to this experience, the United States did virtually nothing to halt a full-scale genocide the following year in Rwanda that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsis. Europeans, in particular, criticized this inaction, and several years later Clinton apologized for his failure to provide more assistance.

In September 1994, in the face of an imminent U.S. invasion, Haiti's junta left the country and the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was reinstalled. At the time, former President Bush and former Secretary of State James Baker publicly opposed this action on the grounds that no vital national interests were at stake. But confronted with a humanitarian disaster in the form of thousands of Haitian refugees attempting to reach the U.S. mainland, and pressured by the Black Congressional Caucus to return President Aristide to power, the Clinton administration—armed with a UN resolution—prepared to use military force.

A decade earlier, in 1984, Ronald Reagan's secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, suggested that six tests ought to be passed before dispatching U.S. troops: (1) "The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest"; (2) the commitment should only be made "with the clear intention of winning"; (3) it should be carried out with clearly defined political and military objectives"; (4) it "must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary"; (5) it should "have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress"; and (6) it should "be a last resort." Believing that the outcome of the Vietnam War would have been vastly different if these stringent tests had been applied, the Weinberger Doctrine was quickly embraced by many senior military officers, including Colin Powell, who would serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993. And it was the fear of creating a "Balkan quagmire" that steered American policy toward Yugoslavia for much of the 1990s.

Prompted by the inspiring example of democratic revolutions sweeping Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, several republics in the Yugoslav confederation sought to break away from Belgrade's rule. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. While Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic did little to oppose the Slovenian action, he directly supported an uprising of ethnic Serbs in Croatia, and a ghastly civil war ensued. In December, Germany recognized both new governments, and the European Union and the United States soon followed, even though Secretary of State James Baker had declared previously that "we don't have a dog in this fight."

Macedonia was allowed to secede from the federation, but after Muslims held an independence referendum in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina that was boycotted by its Serbian residents, a horrific war broke out among Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. The Bosnian Serbs, who were enthusiastically supported by Milosevic, undertook a systematic "ethnic cleansing campaign" designed to rid the republic of its Muslim population. The Bush administration, while recognizing the independence of a Muslim-led Bosnia, maintained that the Balkans constituted a European problem and refused to send U.S. forces there as part of a UN "peacekeeping" operation, even though several members of NATO did so. Some senior Clinton officials, led by Anthony Lake and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, argued that the United States should lift the arms embargo that the United Nations had imposed on all the warring parties and initiate air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. But the Joint Chiefs chairman Powell repeatedly rejected the feasibility of this "lift and strike" option, while nations such as Britain and France, with peacekeepers on the ground, argued that their troops would be the first targets of Serb retaliation.

Despite the worst fighting in Europe since World War II, the Clinton administration did little until August 1995, when, after an exceptionally heinous slaughter of Muslim civilians in the town of Srebrenica, NATO carried out five days of bombing that had the ultimate effect of bringing all of the factions to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio. Soon, NATO peacekeepers with American participation entered Bosnia, but Clinton, under congressional pressure, announced quite

unrealistically that U.S. forces would remain there for only one year. Indeed, their continued presence became a major campaign theme in 2000 when George W. Bush and several of his advisers suggested that the Balkans should be policed exclusively by Europeans. On the other hand, in 1999, when reporting on the Srebrenica massacre, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that "the tragedy will haunt our history forever. A deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel, or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion." He implied that the United States bore a major responsibility for providing that political will.

In early 1999, Milosevic indicated his intention to purge Kosovo—a province of Yugoslavia whose semiautonomous status he had revoked ten years earlier—of its ethnic Albanian (Muslim) majority. After rejecting a demand that NATO forces be allowed to enter Kosovo to prevent "ethnic cleansing," Milosevic was subjected to an unprecedented seventy-seven-day bombing campaign. During Operation Allied Force, which ultimately threatened the cohesion of NATO, Yugoslav troops forced hundreds of thousands of Muslim Kosovars into neighboring Albania and Macedonia and thus created the very humanitarian catastrophe that the air strikes had been designed to avoid. From the outset, Clinton, fearing public and congressional criticism over possible casualties, ruled out the use of ground troops. American officials, remembering how quickly NATO bombing had ended the fighting in Bosnia four years before, expected a similar outcome in Kosovo. But it was not until Russia withdrew its support from Belgrade that Milosevic finally capitulated. Then he allowed peacekeepers under UN—not NATO—authority to enter Kosovo, where they encountered sustained hostility from both Muslims and Serbs.

All of these humanitarian interventions—as well as the decision to ignore Rwanda—provoked intense debate within the United States about the essential purposes of American foreign policy. Michael Mandelbaum, a leading scholar of American foreign relations, captured one side of the issue quite colorfully in a 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "Foreign Policy as Social Work," in which he likened Anthony Lake to Mother Teresa for telling a newspaper reporter that "when I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television, I want to work to end every conflict, I want to save every child out there." In rejoinder, Stanley Hoffmann, another renowned student of American foreign policy, predicted that the twenty-first century would be full of ethnic conflict and disintegrating states. While not all of them would be preventable or resolvable, instances of extreme violence should be considered as inherently dangerous for international peace and security and morally and prudentially unacceptable.

The national debate about humanitarian interventions involved at least four issues. First, under what circumstances would military power be used as opposed to other, less coercive tools of statecraft? Some observers, like Henry Kissinger, argued that unless a clear, vital interest could be found, military force should never be used. A substantial number of congressional Republicans shared his view. This position obviously reflected that of the Weinberger Doctrine. Yet no U.S. official or influential commentator suggested that the United States should intervene in all humanitarian crises, for the obvious reason that because resources were limited, priorities had to be set. Most political elites reached the conclusion that these situations should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Yet they disagreed about which ones warranted American action. Positions often were taken on the basis of ethnic identity. For example, the Congressional Black Caucus was especially eager to intervene in Haiti and Rwanda. Similarly, Cuban Americans, Armenian Americans, and American Muslims expressed other, predictable preferences.

Second, how much and what kind of force would be needed? Because there was a widely shared perception by civilian and military leaders that, after the Somalia "debacle," the American public would not tolerate casualties suffered during humanitarian operations, the Clinton administration refused to deploy ground combat troops in the Balkans. Rather, it relied exclusively on airpower. In fact, the administration may have misread the "lessons" of Somalia, for polling data indicated that the public was considerably more tolerant of casualties as long as the intervention resulted in success.

Third, what kind of training should be given to U.S. troops who might become peacemakers or peacekeepers? This facet of the debate was primarily conducted within the Defense Department between those who believed that special peacekeeping units should be created and those who argued that all forces should be taught to be

potential peacekeepers. But some observers outside the Pentagon questioned the whole concept of training forces for what they compared to police duties rather than traditional military roles.

And, fourth, how central a role should humanitarian missions play in U.S. foreign policy? In general, liberals like Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times* contended that their role should be central. Moreover, the interventions should do more than simply restore order and feed and clothe civilians; they should also aim to rebuild failed states, arrest war criminals, and integrate ethnic groups. Conservatives, who remained skeptical that such operations should be undertaken at all, believed that they should occur infrequently and seek to achieve modest objectives. These disagreements became prominent during the 2000 presidential campaign when Condoleeza Rice, a top adviser to George W. Bush and his future special assistant for national security, called for the rapid return of U.S. peacekeepers from Bosnia and Kosovo at the same time that Vice President Albert Gore indicated that, if elected, he would devote even more resources to humanitarian missions.

ISOLATING AND PUNISHING "ROGUE" STATES

American foreign policymakers used the terms "rogue," "outlaw," and "backlash" states virtually interchangeably after the Cold War. As early as July 1985, President Reagan had asserted that "we are not going to tolerate . . . attacks from outlaw states by the strangest collection of misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich," but it fell to the Clinton administration to elaborate this concept.

Writing in the March–April 1994 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Anthony Lake cited "the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of democratic nations] but also assault its basic values." He applied this label to five regimes: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya and claimed that their behavior was frequently aggressive and defiant; that ties among them were growing; that they were ruled by coercive cliques that suppressed human rights and promoted radical ideologies; that they "exhibited a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world"; and that their siege mentality had led them to attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. For Lake, "as the sole superpower, the United States [had] a special responsibility . . . to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform" these miscreants into good global citizens.

The first Bush administration had agreed with Lake's analysis and in 1991 adopted a "two-war" strategy designed to enable U.S. forces to fight and win two regional wars simultaneously against "renegade" nations. The second Bush administration emphasized the urgent need to develop a national missile defense to protect the United States from weapons launched by rogue states. In short, the "outlaw" nation theme pervaded U.S. foreign policy throughout the post–Cold War era.

Critics seized on these terms as inherently fuzzy, subjective, and difficult to translate into consistent policy. Although Lake had defined rogues as nations that challenged the system of international norms and international order, disagreement existed about the very nature of this system. For example, whereas the Organization for European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and UN Secretary-General Annan advocated international norms that would expose regimes that mistreated their populations to condemnation and even armed intervention, others argued that such norms would trample on the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the State Department sometimes included Serbia on its outlaw list solely because President Milosevic had violated the rights of some of his nation's citizens, and NATO undertook an air war against him in 1999 because of his repression of an internal ethnic group.

In theory, at least, to be classified as a rogue, a state had to commit four transgressions: pursue weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, severely abuse its own citizens, and stridently criticize the United States. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya all behaved in this manner during at least some of the post–Cold War era. Yet the inclusion of Cuba, which certainly violated human rights and castigated the United States, was put on the list solely because of the political influence of the American Cuban community and specifically that of the Cuban American National Foundation. Moreover, in 1992 Congress approved the Cuban Democracy Act, which mandated secondary sanctions against foreign companies who used property seized from Americans by the Castro government in the 1960s. Attempts to implement this law outraged some of Washington's closest allies, and President Clinton, while

ROGUE STATES AND STATES OF CONCERN

In a long and vigorous round of questioning at a 21 June 2000 State Department press briefing, spokesman Richard Boucher tried to explain the implications of the change in terminology from "rogue" to "state of concern":

Question: Is "rogue state" then out of the lexicon as of today?

Boucher: I haven't used it for a while.

Question: Is it possible that some states will still be referred to as "rogue states" if they—

Boucher: If they want to be rogues, they can be rogues, but generally we have not been using the term for a while, I think.

Question: So it's not a matter of some countries continue to be "rogue states" and others have progressed to "states of concern"; all of them henceforth are "states of concern"?

Boucher: Yes.

Question: But does this lower the bar for what a "state of concern" is, now that there's no "rogue state"?

Boucher: Does this lower the bar? No, because, as I said, it's more a description than a change in policy, because the issue is: Are various countries whose activities around the world have been troubling to us, are they actually dealing with the issues that we have been concerned about? And if we are able to encourage them or pressure them or otherwise produce changes in their behavior, and therefore a change in our relationship, we're willing to do that. If they're not, then we're going to keep our sanctions on and we're going to keep our restrictions on and we're not going to change our policies.

Question: Can you tell us how many there are?

Boucher: No.

Question: Has anyone actually done a rough list?

Boucher: We have found the opportunity to express our concerns about different states at different times in different ways. We try to deal with each one on its behavior, on its actions, on its merits.

Question: I just want to ask a question on the former rogue state of North Korea. (Laughter)

Boucher: The state previously known as rogue; is that it? (Laughter)

backing this legislation as a presidential candidate, tried hard to avoid enforcing it. On the other hand, states like Syria and Pakistan, hardly paragons of rectitude, avoided being added to the list because the United States hoped that Damascus could play a constructive role in the Arab-Israeli "peace process," and because Washington had long maintained close relations with Islamabad—a vestige of the Cold War.

The United States employed several tools to isolate and punish rogue states. Tough unilateral economic sanctions, often at congressional behest, were imposed on or tightened against Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, and Afghanistan. Airpower was used massively against Serbia in 1999 and selectively against Iraq for years after the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991. Cruise missiles were fired at Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998. The Central Intelligence Agency supported a variety of covert actions designed to depose Saddam Hussein, while Congress approved the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 aimed at providing Iraqi opposition groups with increased financial assistance. Several leading Republicans who would occupy high positions in the George W. Bush administration publicly urged President Clinton in February 1998 to recognize the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as the provisional government of Iraq. Some of these critics, including Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Zoellick, hinted that U.S. ground forces might ultimately be required to help the INC oust Saddam. In all of these anti-rogue efforts, however, Washington found it exceedingly difficult to persuade other nations (with the partial exception of Britain) to support its policies of ostracism and punishment.

In light of these difficulties, some observers suggested that the United States drop its "one size fits all" containment strategy that allegedly limited diplomatic flexibility in favor of a more dif-

ferentiated approach that addressed the particular conditions in each targeted nation. Indeed, the Clinton administration adopted this policy alternative with North Korea and, to a lesser degree, with Iran. Faced with the dangers posed by Pyongyang's ongoing efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, the United States briefly considered air strikes against suspected nuclear facilities or stringent economic sanctions. Yet both options were rejected out of fear of triggering a North Korean invasion of the South. Consequently, the Clinton administration reluctantly entered into negotiations designed to compel Pyongyang's nuclear disarmament. In October 1994 the U.S.–North Korea Agreed Framework was signed, committing North Korea to a freeze on nuclear weapons development and the eventual destruction of its nuclear reactors. In exchange, the United States, South Korea, and Japan promised to provide two light-water nuclear reactors that would be virtually impossible to use to produce nuclear weapons, along with petroleum to fuel North Korea's conventional power plants and food assistance to alleviate near-famine conditions. During the last years of the Clinton administration, relations with Pyongyang warmed considerably. North Korea claimed that it had suspended its missile development program pending a permanent agreement, and Madeleine Albright, now secretary of state, made the first official American visit to North Korea in 2000. Nevertheless, because this conditional engagement with North Korea involved reaching agreements with a regime widely perceived as extremely repressive and untrustworthy, many in Congress attacked this approach as tantamount to appeasement and called on George W. Bush to cease negotiations with Pyongyang. He obliged, announcing that he had no intention of quickly resuming efforts to reach an agreement on North Korean missile development.

Interestingly, despite the budding rapprochement between these two states in the late 1990s, officials in the Clinton administration repeatedly argued that a national missile defense system needed to be constructed to protect the United States against nuclear missile attacks from rogue states such as North Korea. George W. Bush's decision to end talks with Pyongyang suggested to many observers that he preferred to pursue national missile defense. To critics of the rogue state concept, these actions merely reinforced their view that while the concept had proven to be very successful in garnering domestic support for punitive measures, the derogatory nature of the term necessarily complicated efforts to improve relations with states like North Korea.

Similarly, Iran represented another case in which altered circumstances challenged the rogue-state strategy. The surprise election of Mohammed Khatemi to the presidency in May 1997 and his subsequent invitation for a "dialogue between civilizations" led Secretary Albright to propose a "road map" for normalizing relations. Conservative Shiite clerics warned Khatemi against engaging the "Great Satan," but the continued designation of Iran as a rogue state also contributed to the Clinton administration's difficulty in responding constructively to positive developments in Tehran.

The gradual realization that calling states "rogues" might in some cases have proven counterproductive induced the United States in June 2000 to drop this term in favor of the less fevered "states of concern." Secretary Albright emphasized that the change in name did not imply that the United States now approved of the behavior of these regimes: "We are now calling these states 'states of concern' because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activities, their development of missiles, their desire to disrupt the international system." Yet State Department officials acknowledged that the "rogue" term had been eliminated because some of these states—such as North Korea, Libya, and Iran—had taken steps to meet American demands and had complained that they were still being branded with the old label.

Regardless of the terms employed, however, on another level this post–Cold War strategy of regional containment reflected an effort by the United States to define acceptable international (and even domestic) behavior. As a hegemonic state it was, perhaps, appropriate that Washington attempted to write these rules. Yet it inevitably risked exposing the United States to charges of arrogance and imperiousness.

DEFENDING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

The Cold War had barely ended before American policymakers began to worry about the possibility that hostile states and transnational terrorist organizations would soon be able to undertake nuclear, chemical, biological, and informational attacks against the continental United States. Recognizing that the United States, because of its

overwhelming military superiority, would not be threatened in the foreseeable future with traditional adversaries, national security planners pointed to the dangers posed by "asymmetrical" assaults on the American homeland. These might include nuclear missiles launched by rogue states, national plagues caused by the clandestine introduction of biological agents, and the destruction of the American financial system through the use of computer viruses by unknown enemies.

Such fears intensified in 1997 when the blue-ribbon National Defense Panel warned that the United States remained utterly unprepared for dealing with these threats. Three years later, the U.S. Commission on National Security, cochaired by former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart, concluded that "a direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century." Consequently, the commission proposed that the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Border Patrol be unified as a new homeland security body, whose director would have cabinet status. The new agency would coordinate defense against attacks as well as relief efforts if deterrence proved unsuccessful. According to Rudman, "the threat is asymmetric, and we're not prepared for it."

American foreign policymakers responded to these alleged vulnerabilities in several ways. First, as we have seen, diplomatic and military instruments were used to prevent rogue states from developing weapons of mass destruction. These efforts proved to be only partially successful, and in 1998, Pakistan, formerly a close ally, enraged Washington by testing a nuclear device. Second, counterterrorism programs were intensified after the 1998 embassy bombings. But they could not prevent the attack on the USS *Cole* in Yemen in October 2000. Moreover, the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 by two Americans with homemade explosives, and the attempted destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993 by foreign nationals, had demonstrated the extreme difficulty in defending the nation against asymmetrical assaults. And while a consensus about the need to make the U.S. homeland less vulnerable to these sorts of occurrences certainly emerged in the post–Cold War era, designing a strategy for doing so proved to be extremely difficult.

In March 1983, President Ronald Reagan had proposed that the United States build weapons capable of defending the nation against Soviet nuclear attack. His Strategic Defense Initiative proved to be very controversial and expensive, yet the program managed to survive the Cold War. In 1992 the Bush administration opened negotiations with Russia seeking to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 that prohibited the deployment of sea-based or space-based missile defenses and placed strict limits on land-based defenses. President Bush wished to permit the construction of several hundred land-based ABM systems to protect the United States and its allies against between 200 and 250 ballistic missiles from any source. But these talks produced no agreement, and in late 1993 the Clinton administration withdrew Bush's proposed amendments to the ABM Treaty and further reduced the scale of national missile defense (NMD) research and development.

The Republican Party, however, remained deeply committed to NMD, and upon capturing both houses of Congress in 1994 quickly increased appropriations for research and development. Moreover, Congress created a commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Chaired by former (and future) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the commission issued its final report in July 1998. Directly contradicting a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that the United States need not fear missile attacks until at least 2010, the Rumsfeld Commission claimed that such nations as Iran and North Korea could threaten the United States within five years of a decision to acquire this capability—and that Washington might not be aware of the point at which such a decision had been made.

Just six weeks later, on 31 August 1998, North Korea test launched a Taepo Dong-1 missile, which, to the surprise of the U.S. intelligence community, possessed a third stage, which meant that in theory, at least, this missile had intercontinental capability. Congressional Republicans seized on the Rumsfeld report, as well as the North Korean test launch, to pressure Clinton to sign the Missile Defense Act of 1999, which made it official policy to "deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective NMD system." Strongly encouraged by Ted Stevens, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, planning began on the construction of a radar system on an Alaskan island, but after a series of embarrassing failures by the Defense Department to intercept missiles from ground-based sites, in September 2000 Clinton decided to delay deployment.

President George W. Bush's determination to

construct a national missile defense system as soon as possible unleashed a fractious and complex public debate. Opponents offered six main arguments against NMD. First, the deployment of even the limited system envisioned by Bush, which would be designed to intercept no more than twenty-five warheads, would be expensive. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that a ground-based NMD would cost at least $60 billion. Critics recalled that ambitious Defense Department programs had in the past frequently encountered significant cost overruns and warned that NMD could contribute to future budget deficits if pursued in tandem with President Bush's proposed tax cuts. Second, opponents strongly doubted the technological feasibility of any NMD. They emphasized the difficulties of intercepting incoming warheads, likening it to hitting a bullet with a bullet, and suggested that the task would be made even more daunting if enemy ICBMs were equipped with decoys and other countermeasures.

Third, even if these enormous odds were somehow overcome and a reliable NMD system was deployed, critics worried that the creation of a Fortress America mentality among the public could be a major result. They warned that some congressional Republicans might seize on NMD and the consequent public retreat into isolationism as a pretext to reduce dramatically America's international role. Fourth, even if Russia could be persuaded that a limited NMD posed no threat to its massive nuclear arsenal, China, in possession of only about two dozen ICBMs, would be likely to build more missiles in order to deter a U.S. nuclear attack. Beijing's actions would trigger an Indian response to increase its nuclear capabilities, and that, in turn, would spur Pakistan to do likewise. Hence, an unintended consequence of NMD would be to heighten the likelihood of a South Asian nuclear war.

Fifth, critics contended that NMD constituted a quick technological "fix" that would serve as a poor substitute for patient diplomacy and nonproliferation efforts. Thus, instead of negotiating further agreements with North Korea, for example, armed with an NMD, the United States would have no incentive to try and help Seoul improve North-South relations or to attempt to alter peacefully the nature of the Pyongyang regime. Finally, opponents claimed that NMD represented a "Maginot Line" approach to nuclear defense. Recalling that the Nazis had invaded France in 1940 by simply circumventing the elaborate defensive fortifications known as the Maginot Line, critics predicted that NMD would, at best, defend the United States against an extremely remote sort of attack with ICBMs. Much more plausible was the so-called "man in a van" scenario, whereby a single terrorist could kill millions of Americans with a suitcase bomb or through the release of deadly biological agents into the water supplies of major cities.

While some NMD advocates, especially House Republicans, harbored isolationist sentiments, most in the Bush administration believed, at least privately, that a limited national missile defense system would enhance American global hegemony. Robert Joseph, Bush's counterproliferation expert at the National Security Council, dismissed the likelihood of a rogue state launching a preemptive missile attack on the United States as a false issue created by NMD opponents. He argued that such regimes viewed weapons of mass destruction as their best means of overcoming the American technological advantages that would lead to their certain defeat in conventional wars. Rather, ICBMs would enable these states to hold American and allied cities hostage, thereby deterring the United States from intervention in regional crises. In other words, their missiles could reduce the likelihood of massive retaliation by the United States if they employed chemical and biological weapons regionally, even against American forces. Implicit in Joseph's hypothesis was the assertion that a limited national missile defense system would cement the ability of the United States to intervene anywhere it deemed necessary. Russian and Chinese appreciation of this consequence doubtless explained much of their hostility to such a program.

Proponents furthermore claimed that only China had the ability to defeat an NMD system with decoys and that any effort to substantially increase its inventory of ICBMs would be extremely expensive and threaten future economic development. They also rejected the arguments of those who doubted the technological feasibility of such a system, noting that the United States only succeeded in placing a satellite in orbit after thirty failed attempts. Moreover, unlike Reagan's "Star Wars" plans, this system would only be aimed at intercepting a small number of missiles.

Yet NMD advocates disagreed about what sort of national missile defense system to build. In order to adhere to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, the Clinton administration decided to pursue a land-based system, and three trials were conducted. As a result, a consensus within the

Pentagon developed that the Alaskan system could be finished more rapidly. Some in the Bush administration, however, preferred a sea-based NMD that would use and upgrade the navy's Aegis air defense system. They suggested that in addition to being less costly, it would also have the ability to defend U.S. allies against rogue attacks by simply moving ships close to Europe and Japan. Moreover, it would have the advantage of firing at ICBMs in their "boost" phase (that is, immediately after launch), when their speed is much lower than during the reentry phase. But others argued that such a system would take many more years to construct, because it could not, in fact, rely on existing Aegis technology. Some observers predicted that the Bush administration would attempt to pursue both land- and sea-based systems simultaneously despite the enormous costs involved. In any event, homeland defense and the closely related issue of national missile defense appeared ready to assume prominent roles in early twenty-first century American foreign policy.

For the Bush administration the post–Cold War era ended on the morning of 11 September 2001, when international terrorists used hijacked U.S. commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center in New York City and to damage the Pentagon. American foreign policymakers announced that the nation was at war with terrorism and girded it for a long and potentially frustrating struggle. Putting aside its early unilateralist inclinations, the administration immediately began to organize a broad international coalition to assist it in "draining the swamps" where terrorism thrives. For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States apparently confronted a direct threat to its physical and moral well-being, albeit one that seemed extraordinarily elusive, ruthless, and hydra-headed. Some commentators suggested that the period between the breaching of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 and the attacks of 11 September 2001 be renamed "the interwar era."

CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's sole superpower, it should not be surprising that American policymakers worked hard to sustain this hegemonic situation. Eventually another state or coalition might attempt to challenge America's preeminence. Many conservatives became convinced that China had geopolitical goals that directly clashed with U.S. interests and predicted the onset of a Sino-American cold war. Others believed that the continuing integration of China into the international capitalist economy would discourage it from trying to undermine American primacy. As the post–Cold War era entered its second decade, it had become obvious that relations with the People's Republic of China would occupy a central place in U.S. foreign relations. The future nature of that relationship, however, remained unclear.

In seeking to keep America the world's "indispensable nation," post–Cold War American foreign policymakers fostered globalization, promoted democracy, undertook humanitarian interventions, isolated and punished rogue states, and worried about homeland defense. Each of these initiatives proved controversial both domestically and internationally. None was pursued with perfect consistency, but all were designed to preserve America's enviable position in the post–Cold War world.

The views expressed here are those of the author exclusively and do not represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berger, Samuel. "American Power: Hegemony, Isolationism, or Engagement." Remarks delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, 21 October 1999.

Bowden, Mark. *Black Hawk Down: A Study of Modern War.* New York, 1999. Graphically describes the fire-fight that erupted in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, between U.S. forces and Somali clans on 3 October 1993.

Brilmayer, Lea. *American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World.* New Haven, Conn., 1994.

Brinkley, Douglas. "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine." *Foreign Policy* 106 (spring 1997): 111–127.

Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader.* Cambridge, 1996.

Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Promotion Under Clinton." *Washington Quarterly* 18 (summer 1995): 13–25.

Cox, Michael, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds. *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts.* New York, 2000. An exceptionally valuable volume as an introduction to this issue.

Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo.* Washington, D.C., 2000.

Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree.* New York, 1999. A spirited defense of globalization that is engagingly written.

Garten, Jeffrey E. *The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives.* New York, 1997.

Goodman, Melvin A. "The Case Against National Missile Defense." *Journal of Homeland Defense* (20 October 2000).

Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.* Washington, D.C., 1995.

Holbrooke, Richard C. *To End a War.* New York, 1999. Holbrooke's valuable memoir on his efforts to end the war in Bosnia.

Joseph, Robert. "The Case for National Missile Defense." *Journal of Homeland Defense* (20 October 2000).

Kaplan, Lawrence F. "Offensive Line: Why the Best Offense Is a Good Missile Defense." *New Republic* (12 March 2001).

Klare, Michael. *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy.* New York, 1995.

Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement." Remarks delivered at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 21 September 1993.

———. "Confronting Backlash States." *Foreign Affairs* 73 (March–April 1994): 45–55.

Layne, Christopher. "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?" *World Policy Journal* 15 (summer 1998): 8–28.

Litwak, Robert. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War.* Baltimore, 2000.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "Foreign Policy as Social Work." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (January–February 1996): 16–32. A highly critical article about the Clinton administration's humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia that fully reflects the "realist" critique of these operations.

Melanson, Richard A. *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton.* Armonk, N.Y., 2000.

O'Sullivan, Meghan L. "Sanctioning 'Rogue' States: A Strategy in Decline?" *Harvard International Review* 22 (summer 2000): 56–61.

Rubin, Barry. "U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (September 1999): 49–57.

Sachs, Jeffrey. "Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization." *Foreign Policy* 110 (spring 1998): 97–111.

Stiglitz, Joseph. "The Insider." *New Republic* (17–24 April 2000). An article by a former senior official at the IMF criticizes that organization for its imperious policies toward developing countries.

Walker, Martin. "The New American Hegemony." *World Policy Journal* 13 (summer 1996): 13–21.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Globalization and American Power." *The National Interest* 59 (spring 2000): 46–56. An article by a leading "realist" scholar that debunks globalization as a wildly exaggerated phenomenon that has done little to alter the ways states conduct their foreign policies.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; COLD WARRIORS; CONTAINMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; GLOBALIZATION; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; INTERNATIONALISM; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; POWER POLITICS; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY; TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM.

POWER POLITICS

Thomas H. Etzold and Robert L. Messer

On the level of international politics, power can take many forms, from moral suasion to the carrot of economic benefits to the stick of sanctions or military force. "Power politics" is one of the more equivocal terms in the lexicon of international affairs. In common usage, including that of politicians, it often is value-laden, usually in a negative sense. It implies using coercion—force or threats of force—to impose one's will upon others. However, in academic usage, especially among scholars specializing in the history and theory of international relations, it is more often treated as a neutral phenomenon, descriptive of special or general characteristics of international politics. Further semantic or linguistic confusion results from the divergent shades of meaning that attach to the words in languages of Western scholarship such as German, English, and French. Among these three languages there is no precise equivalent for the phrase "power politics."

Thus one can define power politics both as a term commonly used in political rhetoric and a theoretical description of how states interact in pursuit of their interests in the international arena. In American English it usually means politics based primarily on coercion rather than on cooperation, whether that coercion be military or economic. More often than not it also implies pursuit of national self-interest rather than broader ideals, principles, or ethics. Such a definition shows clearly the value judgment usually implied by use of the term. Those who are accused of practicing power politics are condemned for having abused power in pursuit of a self-serving political agenda.

As a description of political behavior rather than a condemnation of it, scholars use the term in a variety of ways. Some theorists of the "realist" school believe that states inherently seek power for its own sake, so that competition and struggle naturally characterize international relations. Others argue that power is not an end but a means. They propose that states seek security above all, that they try to attain or maintain security by identifying and working toward national interests, and that they require power to achieve such national interests and security. The fact that no state has complete power and that all states have some power creates what one political scientist has called the "power problem," for each state must reckon with the potential hostility of other members of the international community. Relative security for one state all too often seems to mean relative insecurity for others, and so in this schema one must expect conflict and competition.

Another important theory about the nature of power and its effects in international affairs is set forth in the writings of the French political theorist Raymond Aron. By comparing the variant languages, philosophies, and practices of European and American states in regard to power politics, he has elaborated the important distinction between the politics of force and the politics of power. Power, he argues, is the ability to influence or control others. At times that may require the threat or use of force; at other times it will be possible to influence or control the behavior of other states with much less drastic methods. The latter two ideas are particularly useful in examining the history of American foreign affairs.

AMERICA'S POWER PROBLEM

Over the last two centuries, U.S. diplomatic history has been marked by varying attempts to solve the "power problem" in the form of debates, decisions, and divisions over the politics of force and of power. Some of these attempts and decisions shaped foreign policy for decades, so that, from 1775 to 1945, American diplomacy assumed distinctive and what might be termed traditional forms. After 1945 the changing position of the United States in international affairs altered, but did not destroy, such traditions.

Any discussion of early American foreign relations is complicated by Americans' contradictory sense of themselves in two very different roles. One role was that of victims of Old Word power politics—colonists vulnerable to imperial machinations and abuse of power from abroad. But these same Americans also saw themselves as an aggressive, powerful people destined to expand into "the West" as a new "rising American empire." Both these self-images had foreign policy implications.

How Americans reconciled their sense of mission or "manifest destiny" in expanding over the continent with the dispossession, and in the case of Indian tribes virtual extermination, of foreign competitors is discussed later. The American colonists' sense of victimization by Old World power politics was ultimately dominated by the issue of independence from Britain. It is probably an error to assume that most Americans in 1776 sanctified liberty by force in revolution, notwithstanding Thomas Jefferson's later glorification of bloodshed in the French Revolution, of which he remarked that the tree of liberty needed to be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. American colonists were, on the whole, reluctant to resort to force even to win independence. For many years they were more ready to negotiate than to fight.

The clearest indications of the ways in which Americans first hoped to resolve the problems of power, influence, and force in foreign affairs appear in explicit plans for the organization and conduct of foreign relations, the treaty plans of 1776 and 1784. In those documents American leaders recognized, and at the same time abhorred, the predominant features of international politics in their time: war, deception, and ruthlessness. In their view, international relations could be, and should be, harmonious. Americans devised plans for a diplomacy antithetical to that of Europe. Their treaty plans called for freer trade in an era of mercantilism and assumed national independence in the heyday of colonial empire. Americans proposed to influence nations great and small and to establish foreign ties by granting or withholding access to the riches of the nation's commerce.

In sum, Americans hoped both to solve their initial power problem—the way in which they would deal with the threat posed by the power of France, Spain, Britain, and other great states—and to avoid the strenuous and immoral politics of force by basing foreign policy on neutral economics. In demoting the power of force and promoting the power and mutual benefits of commerce, they looked forward to a new nation freed from the immorality and violence of European-style power politics by the principle of mutual advantage. Finally, Americans of the founding generation hoped to guard themselves from baneful Old World powers by studious noninvolvement in the affairs of Europe. The warnings of President George Washington and President Thomas Jefferson against foreign alliances and entanglements, as well as the additional principles enunciated by John Quincy Adams and James Monroe in 1823, shaped and limited American foreign affairs well into the twentieth century.

POWER IN PRACTICE

Despite their best hopes and intentions, Americans soon encountered difficulties in conducting foreign affairs peacefully and without entanglements. As set out in the treaty plans of 1776 and 1784, their program contained contradictions and weaknesses that would lead to conflict. The three great themes of America's first century of foreign affairs—peace, commerce, and growth or expansion—proved incompatible in practice rather than mutually supportive, as they had seemed in theory. As for weaknesses in design, it was soon clear that those three themes would bring the new United States into contention with the powers of the time rather than solve America's power problem or obviate the difficult politics of force.

The bright hopes of the revolutionary years dimmed almost before the nation had well begun its independent course in world affairs, for the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars revived the American power problem. Although in private and public life Americans vigorously contested the questions of political theory and governmental policy raised by the Revolution and the moribund Franco-American alliance dating from 1778, President Washington's attempt to preserve the first solution to the American problem was clear. The principal of noninvolvement in European affairs during peacetime became the principle of neutrality in war as of 1794.

Greater difficulties attended American attempts to carry on business as usual—that is, to trade in and transport commodities and merchandise with and among belligerents, and yet remain at peace. The warring nations of Europe lost little time in denying the broadening interpretations of

neutral rights that Americans propounded, with the result that by the latter 1790s the United States faced the uncomfortable necessity of negotiating with the French for an end to the now-entangling Treaty of Alliance of 1778 and to the French practice of interfering with and seizing American merchant ships trading with France's enemies. The diplomatic mission sent from America in 1797 ended in the infamous XYZ affair, named for three French secret agents, who shocked their American counterparts by proposing that negotiations regarding American aid to the French in its war against Britain be facilitated by a substantial bribe. The American response was summed up in the slogan "millions for defense, not one cent for tribute" and the ensuing undeclared war between French and American naval forces in the Atlantic. Ironically, one may suspect that Americans fought the French at sea not so much over the larger questions of the day—the matter of the alliance and neutral rights at sea—as because of the almost insignificant issues of honor and propriety raised by the venality of the French court.

Later, during the Napoleonic wars, the contradictions between the goals of peace and commerce became more acute. In the years following the turn of the nineteenth century, American ideals and plans for foreign affairs based on economics failed the test. Attempts to maintain neutrality and neutral rights in trade amid the wars of the time led President Jefferson to close access to, or embargo, American trade. The results were catastrophic. Americans themselves were not willing to accept the interruption of foreign trade, for whatever reasons, and smuggled the Jeffersonian embargo of 1807–1809 into uselessness. When the Jefferson and Madison administrations attempted to play off the British and French against each other in the years of the Nonintercourse Act, wily European diplomats, especially Napoleon's foreign minister, the duc de Cadore, Jean Baptiste de Champagny, outsmarted the Americans and emphasized the weakness and consequent ineffectiveness of American economic diplomacy.

Finally, American economic coercions and maneuvers led to the almost disastrous War of 1812, an unnecessary conflict, since within weeks of its outbreak the British government rescinded the most offensive orders in council affecting American commerce with the Continent. But the people of the time, caught up in political and sectional quarrels and interests, apparently overlooked the flaws of design in foreign affairs. The War of 1812, which ended in 1814, did not prevent American statesmen from continuing to believe that peace rather than war was mankind's natural condition, and that the surest way to unnatural behavior (to war) was the politics of force.

EXPANSION AND POWER

Throughout the nineteenth century one notable American activity—continental expansion—regularly threatened to revive the power problem and to exacerbate disagreements over the relative merits of force and suasion in foreign affairs. Time and again Americans took advantage of opportunities for territorial expansion, but few such opportunities were without opposition from the established powers of the day. The United States had to face British opposition in the Old Northwest until the signing of Jay's Treaty in 1794. Within a generation there were the further complications of the Oregon dispute. Despite the jingoist cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight," the Oregon question was settled peacefully, but there remained contentions over the Canadian-American boundary, including Alaska, until 1903. French resistance to American expansion seemed to disappear with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, but it reappeared in the diplomacy and maneuvering surrounding the annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, and during the Civil War in the ill-fated imperium of Maximilian in Mexico. Spanish-American antagonism over expansion marked the era of the 1790s and of separatism in the early American Southwest, flared in connection with the disputed boundaries and the American annexations of East Florida and West Florida as well as over use of the Mississippi River, and culminated in contests for predominance in Cuba and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War (1898). The United States even managed to come into conflict with Russia in the matter of the Oregon boundary, which provided occasion for some of John Quincy Adams's most pointed démarches.

Expansionism also affected those without sufficient power to resist or negotiate its progress across the continent. For four centuries expansion was the central theme of European-Indian relations. Much of the devastation of the Indian peoples in colonial America can be attributed to disease. But their fate was also the result of how white Americans used their power in dealing with Indians. A succession of treaties attempted to rec-

oncile the traditional cultural norms of hunting-gathering, often nomadic, communal peoples with the demands of an expanding agrarian, capitalist culture driven by an unprecedented immigration and population explosion. Twenty-five years before the American Revolution, Benjamin Franklin used demographic projections to prove the need for new lands in the west to support a population that doubled every twenty years. He also pointed out that such expansion would mean war with the Indians and their French allies—a price Franklin and others before and after him were willing to pay.

Other Americans wrestled with the "Indian problem." Thomas Jefferson considered these "noble savages" possible candidates for assimilation. Andrew Jackson rationalized removal of the so-called Civilized Tribes of the Southeast to Indian Territory beyond the Mississippi as a version of protective custody. The reservation system continued this "Great White Father" paternalism. On both sides of the debate over Indian policy, what were termed humanitarians and exterminationists shared social Darwinism ideas of white racial and cultural superiority and faith in the inevitably of progress in the form of the economic development of the American frontier. The West, or frontier, was both a powerful myth in the American mind and in reality a colonial area to be exploited for its resources by the more developed East and investors from abroad. Indians, buffalo, the environment itself had to give way to this economic imperative wrapped in the myth of progress, prosperity, and "manifest destiny."

Often Americans regarded continental expansion as a matter of destiny and strength, the strength of righteousness. Because the United States was a progressive, moral, humane country, its extension to the Pacific Ocean was foreordained, proper, and inexorable. In contrast to the repressive Old World empires, theirs was an "empire of liberty." The end justified the means in this case, and most Americans believed that in the grand process of expansion, force was allowable and probably necessary. It was likewise necessary to counter the attempts of Old World governments to subdue other territories in the New World and reintroduce autocratic government and Machiavellian diplomacy into the hemisphere.

To a certain extent the enthusiastic expansion and protection of American interests by John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, James Polk, and the signers of the Ostend Manifesto (1854), which set forth American designs on the annexation of Cuba, were counterbalanced by the hesitations and objections of other prominent Americans. Some people doubted the wisdom and propriety of each expansion of national domain, especially beginning with the Louisiana Purchase. There were dissenters in each instance of armed conflict—for example, Henry David Thoreau's civil disobedience and jailing during the Mexican War. Expansionist secretaries of state such as William Seward were succeeded by more restrained and prudent men such as Hamilton Fish, who rejected some of the grand imperial designs toward the Caribbean and Mexico that his predecessor had elaborated. Despite internal disagreements and external power problems, by the end of the nineteenth century the process of continental expansion had resulted in an American "imperial democracy" that stretched from Atlantic to Pacific and included Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines. That continental expanse and newly acquired overseas empire was bolstered by an economic power that rivaled and in many cases surpassed that of the Old World colonial empires. By virtually any measurement the United States had become a world power.

AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER

The era of American prominence in world politics, which began with the twentieth century, occasioned reconsideration of traditional attitudes regarding foreign entanglements and the use of force. From a foreign perspective, the United States was too powerful to ignore but too unpredictable to deal with satisfactorily. From the American viewpoint, global interests and capabilities made for uneasiness and confusion. The new circumstances of American foreign affairs seemed to require reevaluation of traditional American policies and portended new military necessities.

Americans found themselves caught up in new difficulties rather suddenly; they had not fully appreciated the problems that policies and developments of the last decades of the nineteenth century had brought. They had traded as they always had, vigorously and aggressively. They had expanded their boundaries, sought naval strength (beginning in the 1880s), and acquired a position unchallengeable in the hemisphere—but they had not anticipated the effects of such changes on their position beyond the hemisphere. They had hoped to exert a considerable influence on the nations of the world, but by

example rather than by forcible instruction. American strength was meant to make the nation impervious to the caprice or malice of European governments and to enable it to vindicate rights and protect interests, but not to require U.S. participation in European political affairs.

Citizens of the United States took pride in the energy, growth, and strength of their nation. Only after they had acquired great power did they begin to consider the problems that national strength created. One idea was appealing: Could not the issue be resolved if the United States were to use force only in just causes, and thus make it the servant of morality? In such terms, Americans preferred to explain their "splendid little war" with Spain—a war, they said, to end Spanish tyranny and repression in Cuba, where the situation of the people had become intolerable. But the liberation of Cuba coincided with the "benevolent assimilation" of the Philippines. The brutal suppression of an insurrection by Filipinos who sought independence rather than assimilation was neither splendid nor little, and it sparked an anti-imperialist protest against what was termed an immoral, un-American abuse of power. The American anti-imperialists failed to alter U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines. But some of the issues they raised about the legitimacy of the use of force in pursuit of foreign relations objectives would arise again later in the century.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt could confidently add his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine's assertion of the separation of the New World from the Old by proclaiming the right of the United States to wield "police power" in the hemisphere to correct either incompetence or wrongdoing. For Roosevelt and those who shared his vision of America's role in the world, righting wrongs in Latin America and elsewhere ultimately would be determined by American power.

Participation in World War I even more clearly demonstrated the determination to make power and force serve good ends. After two and half years of neutrality, during which he attempted to negotiate a "peace without victors," President Woodrow Wilson called upon Americans to embark on a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. In that war to end all wars, the United States was not content to defeat enemies but fought for principles embodying the liberal features of American diplomacy. So, at least, Wilson explained his conversion from opposing force in 1914–1916 to calling for force without stint in 1917.

POLITICS AND POWER

Harry Truman, who as president presided over the creation of modern American foreign relations, once wryly observed that a statesman was merely a dead politician. He in turn defined a successful politician as someone who got other people to do what they should have done all along. From this perspective, politics is simply the process of getting people to do the right thing. But even under this seemingly benign formulation, politics involves power—the power to move people in a particular direction, toward a particular end. It begs the questions of who decides what direction, to what end, and what the right thing to do might be. In domestic politics the answers to such questions are often contested. The range of political discourse and debate is still broader in international relations. What to one party is obviously the proper or right course can be to another not only wrong but a threat to well-being or perhaps even survival. At the international level, politics and power, so obviously interrelated, are not so easily reconciled.

Statesmen and politicians have long wrestled with the problems of power—its acquisition, use, and sometimes abuse. Increasingly in world affairs, power emanates not only from states but also from nongovernmental organizations such as multinational corporations, economic communities, or cartels. By the end of the twentieth century, the process of globalization had become the focus of scholarship and public debate. Power, a constant in politics at all levels at all times, had taken on new forms and new meaning as the world and the United States, the preeminent superpower, entered the third millennium.

By the end of World War I, many Americans were no longer convinced that the United States could ensure that good intentions in the use of force would bring right results. Except for the defeat of the Central Powers, none of the things for which Americans had fought seemed to have been achieved. The keystone of Wilson's fourteen-point peace plan, the League of Nations, was rejected by the U.S. Senate as a result of a combination of partisan politics and Wilson's physical incapacity following a massive stroke. Lacking participation by the most important world power,

what has been called the Versailles system of world politics was, in the view of some historians, fatally flawed from its beginning. Others have argued that the peace Wilson sought might have endured but for the actions of revisionist powers such as Germany, Italy, and Japan. The lessons of Versailles and the failure of the League of Nations were even less clear to those who guided American foreign relations between the world wars.

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

After World War I, debate in the United States over the use of force in pursuit of national goals continued. What has been misleadingly called a period of isolation did not witness an American withdrawal from world power, only from an active leadership role in world politics. Americans in the 1920s pointed to the perversity of war and the perversion of the peace to prove that power—power politics, the old politics of Europe—was still corrupt and corrupting. They did not refuse to recognize that their country was powerful, but they proposed a narrower definition of the national interest than that proposed by Wilson. They also advocated restraint in the use of force and a partial withdrawal, at least at the political and diplomatic level, from the complicated and uncontrollable world arena. In opposition, other Americans, imbued with what was described as Wilsonian or liberal idealism, held out the prospect of harmonious, just, lawful international relations, dependent on the determination of upright men and a policing of the international community by moral nations—forcibly, if necessary.

For the ensuing interwar period the polarization of opinion on the proper uses of American power defined the limits of the nation's diplomacy. Chastened by the experience of the world war, Americans were uncomfortable with the use of force and determined not to employ it except within the Western Hemisphere. Even there, American policy was noticeably uncertain; the days of repeated and prolonged military intervention slowly but surely came to an end. What emerged came to be known under Franklin Roosevelt as the Good Neighbor Policy, a shift from the use of military force to reliance on economic hegemony to lead hemispheric affairs in a direction consistent with U.S. national interests. But even earlier, in the 1920s, American foreign policy had turned once more to economics as an alternative to the politics of force; not to coercive economic diplomacy but to defensive diplomacy, the conservative economics of protection, sound money, and relatively equal treatment for all comers to the American marketplace. This was policy until the Great Depression overturned the conventional wisdom of economics and diplomacy and forced politicians to use untried and previously unimaginable expedients.

In one sense the limits on power imposed by divisions of opinion in the 1920s and 1930s proved a liability for policy and leadership, or so it seemed in retrospect. The same doubts about the uses of power and force that caused Americans to terminate interventions in Latin America later caused them to hesitate, equivocate, and delay too long in dealing with the aggressive European and Asian autocracies of the 1930s.

At the same time Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, having learned the lesson of Woodrow Wilson's failure in forging too far ahead of public and congressional opinion, focused on anti-Depression New Deal policies as the international system forged at Versailles began to come apart in Asia and Europe. Having tacitly endorsed the popular policy of appeasement as late as the 1938 Munich Conference, Roosevelt aligned U.S. economic power with the anti-Axis Allies after the outbreak of war in 1939, declaring that America would act as the "arsenal of democracy." That policy of supplying both the British and later the Soviet Union with American-made arms and other matériel led by late 1941 to an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. In Asia and the Pacific, Roosevelt's increasingly determined opposition to Japanese expansion included a show of force in the form of forward basing of American naval and air power and ever-tightening economic sanctions aimed at forcing Japan into abandoning its imperial aims. In what was perhaps the first test of the lessons of Munich, Japan responded by attacking the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. In the end, the American dilemma of whether and how to use its power finally was settled not by Americans but by the course of events—that is, by the power and politics of Europe and Asia.

AMERICA'S RISE TO GLOBALISM

In World War II, Americans realized they could not wish or will away the implications and complications of power. As one leader of Senate Republicans and a former critic of international

commitments put it, after Pearl Harbor "isolationism was dead for any realist." Autocrats in Europe and Asia threatened U.S. security in a drastic revival of the power problem. Americans had to face both the necessity and the consequences of force and violence in international affairs. Even such an idealist as Secretary of State Cordell Hull was led to believe that only total victory based on unconditional surrender would bring total peace. The greatest debates in the United States in the late months of the war focused less on the iniquity of force than on the question of who was a friend and who an enemy.

At war's end some Americans tried to grasp a second chance to internationalize their power problem and the specter of force. They believed or hoped that international organization might provide a solution to the power problem and a way to avoid perpetually violent international politics through collective security and peacekeeping. At the same time, other Americans, less confident in the future of international politics, favored unilateralism and national security based on America's unparalleled economic and military power. They relied especially on the newfound power of the atomic bomb as the ultimate or absolute weapon. What Harry Truman called America's "sacred trust" would not be shared with the world or with the new international peacekeeping body until such time that Americans could be sure that there could be no abuse of this awesome power.

After the demonstrated weakness of the United Nations, which proved incapable of subordinating great-power conflicts of interest or of assuming responsibility for control of atomic technology and weapons, international idealism was supplanted in 1947 by a determined application of American power and force in every form and in virtually every forum. What was dubbed the Truman Doctrine committed American might to the containment of communism in whatever form, be it internal subversion or external aggression. However, in a larger sense, American leaders in the years following World War II redefined the idea of national security. The goal of this new postwar or Cold War policy was to establish and maintain a preponderance of American power throughout the world. This globalist approach to world affairs involved both military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and massive economic programs such as the Marshall Plan. Although sometimes collective, these commitments were predicated on U.S. military and economic power. Looking back on this period, Truman's secretary of state, Dean Acheson, aptly described it as the "creation" of modern American foreign relations.

After World War II, Americans accommodated themselves to the possession and exercise of economic power and military force on an unprecedented scale and sought new answers to the perennial problems of power. The various forms of traditional unilateralism—nonentanglement, neutrality, isolationism—gave way to a new structure of American globalism. Most important, Americans became reconciled to the use of force to such an extent that they entered a new era of interventionism that, with the Cold War, resulted in a huge standing military establishment.

THE BURDENS AND LIMITS OF POWER

Unfortunately but predictably, new solutions to the old problems brought new problems that in some ways were more complicated than the old ones. The societies of the United States and most other nations prominent in world affairs had to shoulder the enormous costs of standing military forces and modernization of rapidly changing technology. In the inflationary 1970s those costs would mean unpleasant choices of priorities in both internal and external affairs.

In some cases, as in Korea, the use of military force, despite critics on both ends of the political spectrum, was supported by most Americans as justified and, if not conclusive, at least an effective application of American power in pursuit of the Cold War goal of containment of communism. In other cases, such as the war in Vietnam, the prolonged and seemingly ineffective use of force destroyed the Cold War consensus, divided the nation, and contributed to moral and political uncertainty. For many Americans the protracted and ultimately unsuccessful involvement in Vietnam destroyed the Cold War consensus that containment of communist influence justified paying any price and bearing any burden anywhere in the world. In the face of the uncensored image of war, many in the United States rejected the idea of using force to destroy what one was trying to save.

In the years following the Vietnam War, American public attitudes regarding the use of force in foreign relations reflected what was termed, usually by its detractors, the Vietnam syndrome, or neo-isolationism—a reluctance to commit American power and prestige abroad. In

the face of public and congressional resistance, American foreign policymakers felt obliged to pursue power politics in a more circumspect and sometimes secret manner. A policy of covert or deniable applications of power, dating back at least to Dwight D. Eisenhower's "hidden hand" presidency of the 1950s, was revived in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan. Through circuitous and even questionable routes, American support went to anti-Sandinista contras in Nicaragua and anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan.

The danger of direct military intervention was dramatically brought home in 1983 by the deaths at the hands of a terrorist bomber of 241 U.S. marines who had been dispatched to Lebanon to protect an airfield in the midst of renewed Arab-Israeli fighting. The U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada a few days later was an easy military victory, but it had little foreign policy significance. Perceived threats by anti-American regimes such as the one in Grenada might be dealt with effectively by decisive and "surgical," or specifically targeted, military intervention. But terrorist violence frustrated attempts at retaliation at an elusive, often unknown enemy.

By the 1990s Americans had discovered that in some ways the resort to force was achieving less and less. The Cold War, which had cost trillions in military spending on both sides, ended not by military victory but as a result of the Soviet Union's political and economic collapse. The breakup of the Soviet empire appeared to have left the United States the victor by default. But the world's only remaining superpower still found that its power did not necessarily guarantee hegemony or control over world politics.

In the Gulf War of 1991, the single most massive application of U.S. military force in the post–Cold War era, the United States, in partnership with Arab and European allies, successfully expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. But that tactical military success did not translate into significant changes in the geopolitical power relationships in the region. At the time, President George H. W. Bush pointed to the stunning military victory and the successful coalition diplomacy as evidence that America had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome." Yet that same victorious commander in chief was voted out of the presidency the following year. Short-term military success—the effective use of force—did not necessarily mean political success either abroad or at home.

THE DIFFUSION OF POWER

At the close of the twentieth century the United States continued to commit its military power for humanitarian purposes, such as famine relief in Somalia, or as part of multilateral peacekeeping efforts, such as in the Balkans. Nonetheless, it seemed that the subtleties of power—influence, suasion, nonmilitary coercion—often played more important roles in the post–Cold War environment.

Ironically, as the utility of force seemed to decline, the significance of economic diplomacy seemed to be growing more important, although its role differed from what it had been in early American foreign affairs. In many cases this meant that the game of power politics would be played by relatively small countries that hitherto had not participated in what the great powers had always considered their private pastime. The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—not all of which were Arab countries—had by the 1970s begun to play a substantial role in world affairs. Despite remarks by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in response to OPEC's 1973 oil embargo that force might be necessary to break the cartel's stranglehold over so much of the world's oil, the politics of force was not an effective course in the novel international circumstances.

This was particularly true in the case of economic competition by America's allies, such as Japan and the European Economic Community, or in relation to multinational corporations' growing power over national economies, particularly those of developing countries. In a post–Cold War atmosphere characterized by the diffusion of power, growing concerns about global environmental and health issues did not fit the established norms of international power politics. In this increasingly complex and challenging world order, there was the concurrently developing possibility that many small nations, and perhaps criminals and terrorist groups, might develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

In the face of such challenges, neither the hopes of a young nation nor the confidence of a strong one were sufficient to provide answers to the perennial problems of power. The only certainty was that the problems would endure, change form from time to time, and require new solutions. As it entered the new millennium, the United States would have to deal with the aspirations of newer and smaller nations from the position of an established power adjusting to the diffusion of power and the profusion of conflicting rights characteristic of the new world order. In such an envi-

ronment American leadership and statesmanship would be tested. It was not inconceivable that one principle of early American diplomacy—mutual benefit, as proposed by Benjamin Franklin—might revive in importance along with the traditional virtues of caution, prudence, and modesty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Power and Diplomacy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1958. Truman's secretary of state treats the relation between sources of power and the problems of postwar American foreign affairs.

Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations.* New York, 1967. One of the most thoughtful examinations of the differences between politics of influence and politics of force.

———. *Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973.* Translated by Frank Jellinick. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974.

Burns, Arthur Lee. *Of Powers and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968. A survey of the contemporary status of ideas on the logic and nature of power relationships.

Cohen, Warren I., ed. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations.* 4 vols. New York, 1993. The authors of each volume in this history provide a thorough and expert treatment of the development of American power in the world since 1776.

Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. *Force and States Craft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time.* 3d ed. New York, 1995. This collection of essays and case studies includes a discussion of America's dilemma of power.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950.* Chicago, 1951. In this series of early Cold War lectures the "father" of the containment doctrine popularized the realist critique of Wilsonian idealism.

Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000.* New York, 1987. This sweeping overview gives global and comparative perspective on the acquisition and complications of world power.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy.* New York, 1994. A student and practitioner of balance-of-power politics surveys America's changing role in the new world order.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. A detailed account of how U.S. leaders developed a global framework for national security after 1945.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1951. Presents the views of the best known of the "realist" political scientists who suggest that states seek power for its own sake.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* 6th ed. New York, 1985. Morgenthau develops his theoretical approach at length.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* New York, 1990. Describes the challenges and limits of American power after World War II and the diffusion of power at the end of the Cold War.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1953. Focuses on the realist versus idealist approaches to peace, internationalism, and the responsibilities of world power.

Prucha, Francis Paul. *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indian.* Abridged edition. Lincoln, Nebr., 1986. A thorough but very readable history of American Indian policy from 1776 to 1980.

Stannard, David E. *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World.* New York, 1992. An impassioned account of the destruction of the native peoples of the New World.

Van Alstyne, Richard Warner. *The Rising American Empire.* Chicago, 1960. An interpretive history that emphasizes uses of force and the theme of expansion in American foreign relations from Washington to Wilson.

See also COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; GLOBALIZATION; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS

Albert Bowman and Robert A. Divine

In his foreword to *Decision-Making in the White House* by Theodore C. Sorensen, President John F. Kennedy wrote:

> The American presidency is a formidable, exposed, and somewhat mysterious institution. It is formidable because it represents the point of ultimate decision in the American political system. It is exposed because decision cannot take place in a vacuum: the presidency is the center of the play of pressure, interest, and idea in the nation; and the presidential office is the vortex into which all the elements of national decision are irresistibly drawn. And it is mysterious because the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself.

After more than two centuries of experience, there is no longer any doubt concerning the formidability of the presidency. The spare and general presidential powers conferred by the Constitution have evolved and developed in proportion to the phenomenal growth of the nation, although until recently at a much slower rate. A list of the powers included in Article II of the Constitution contains the barest hint of presidential power and authority today: the vesting in the president of the executive power of government, his designation as commander in chief of the military forces of the United States, the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and other public officers—powers exercised in both cases in partnership with the Senate of the United States, and the authority to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. Perhaps the most interesting of the president's constitutional powers, since it touches on the mysterious process of decision making, is this: "he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments."

The Constitution created no executive departments. That was left to the Congress, which on 27 July 1789 created the Department of Foreign Affairs (later changed to Department of State). It was headed by a secretary who was to conduct its business "in such manner as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, order or instruct."

It was hardly to be expected, however, that so formal a line of authority would be restrictive; and every president has to some degree relied on the counsel of advisers outside of and in addition to the Department of State. Indeed, in view of "the play of pressure, interest, and idea in the nation," an important element in arriving at wise presidential decisions may well lie in the diversity and quantity of opinions or, as they are now referred to, options among which to select. Limits are indispensable, of course, and the quality of the opinions, as well as the president's capacity to discriminate, are of the highest importance.

Mystery is inherent in the presidency, and it may seem paradoxical that the office is at the same time the most exposed one in the land. From George Washington, reluctant first president and probably the only one who did not aspire to the office with some degree of cupidity, to Richard Nixon, perhaps at the opposite extreme, the presidency of the United States has usually been described as a lonely eminence. Even those presidents who relished the power and majesty of the office managed to convey a sense of the solitary nature of the presidential decision-making process.

But the ultimate solitude of the presidency is not mysterious; the singular and final responsibility of the president is generally visible. The mystery, the impenetrability, lies in the sources of presidential decision, which, as Kennedy noted, may be unfathomable even by the president himself. If the president cannot always know how he decides, how can even the closest observer know? After declining a request to rate the performance of previous presidents, Kennedy exclaimed to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., then serving as a White House

special assistant: "How the hell can you tell? Only the president himself can know what his real pressures and his real alternatives are. If you don't know that, how can you judge performance?"

Presidents have the further advantage of making their decisions in private. Unlike Congress and the judiciary who conduct their business, for the most part, in public, the president cannot only keep the decision-making process secret, but he can keep the records sealed even after leaving office. A president may publicly state one thing while secretly planning another, he may say one thing in public and another in private, and he may inexplicably—even to his advisers—change his mind. But even more difficult for the student of presidential decision making is the deliberate obscuring of presidential intentions from everyone. Intimates of Franklin D. Roosevelt have been unanimous in attesting to his delight in mystifying even his closest lieutenants and in setting them at cross-purposes. Schlesinger, a Roosevelt biographer, assessed the Rooseveltian technique thus: "Once the opportunity for decision came safely into his orbit, the actual process of deciding was involved and inscrutable."

However mysterious and inscrutable the processes of presidential decision, there can be no doubt that every president has recognized the need of advice and counsel, if not consent. Nor can there be any doubt concerning at least two aspects of the presidential use of advisers: in addition to the formal, almost cryptic constitutional provision relating to "principal Officers of executive Departments," presidents have always solicited or received counsel from both public and private sources, and there has been an evolutionary growth in the number and variety of presidential advisers.

THE FOUNDERS

Understandably and characteristically, George Washington began his presidency by following the letter of the Constitution as closely as he could. Not only had he presided over the debates in the Constitutional Convention in 1787, but he was keenly aware that his every act as the first president of the United States would tend to set a precedent.

The first potential foreign crisis of Washington's administration arose in 1790, when war between Great Britain and Spain appeared to be imminent over remote Nootka Sound on the northwest coast of America. Anticipating a British request to move troops through American territory to attack Spanish Louisiana, Washington requested written opinions on a possible answer from the three heads of departments—Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state; Alexander Hamilton, secretary of the Treasury; and Henry Knox, secretary of war—and of Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Vice President John Adams. Although the matter related most directly to the duties of the secretary of state, it obviously had implications much broader than simply diplomatic, and Washington evidently wanted to widen his range of advice as much as was constitutionally possible. On later questions of significant national or constitutional import, he adhered to much the same procedure.

On matters of direct personal concern, however, Washington turned to old and trusted friends for advice. He had decided by the spring of 1792 that he would retire from public life. As he had so often done, he wrote to a fellow Virginian, James Madison, for help: "namely, to think of the proper time, and the best mode of announcing the intention; and that you would prepare the latter." Despite his long collaboration with Madison, his affectionate regard for Randolph, and his esteem for Jefferson, Washington's foreign policy was nevertheless increasingly directed by Hamilton. Looking upon himself as a kind of prime minister in addition to being finance minister, after the British tradition that frequently combined the two roles, Hamilton secretly conducted his own foreign policy and consistently opposed the secretary of state in meetings of Washington's official advisers. When Washington made his firm decision to retire at the end of his second term as president, he turned to Hamilton for advice on both the method and the substance of his farewell to public service.

Washington was, according to James David Barber's model, a "passive-negative" type, a president who sought stability as the precondition to establishing the legitimacy of the American experiment in self-government, so it was natural that he should resist innovation and generally choose the path of least resistance. In a period of intense foreign and domestic turmoil, such a president would naturally be drawn to the adviser whose counsel seemed most likely to promise tranquillity at home and safety abroad. That meant validating the power of the central government over its citizens while bowing to superior force in the conduct of foreign relations. Specifi-

cally, it meant a succession of centralizing fiscal and economic measures and a persistent tilting toward Britain in its war against revolutionary France. Hamilton's pro-British foreign policy, culminating in Jay's Treaty of 1794, could easily have been fashioned in London. In fact, Hamilton has been described as the effective minister of the British government to the American, although Washington never knew how intimate and cooperative were Hamilton's relations with the nominal representatives of George III.

By the end of Washington's second term, all dissenters to Hamiltonian policy had been purged and Hamilton himself had left office. But President John Adams, to his later undoing, kept the department heads he had inherited from Washington, most of them unswervingly loyal to Hamilton. The latter, who once wrote that he had not "lost my taste for a little politics," continued to run the government from his New York law office. Adams only later, in the midst of an undeclared war with France, realized that the advice he received from his subordinate officers originated with his arch rival. Perhaps Hamilton had this extension of his influence over the Adams administration in mind when, after Washington's death, he described their relationship: "he was an *Aegis very essential to me*" (Hamilton's emphasis).

After he had removed the Hamiltonian influence over his administration, Adams was able to end the Quasi-War with France. His son John Quincy Adams had recently been sent as minister to Berlin and, with the treachery of Secretary of State Timothy Pickering in mind, the president told his son to "write freely" to him but "cautiously to the office of State." It was the advice of John Quincy Adams that convinced the president that France sincerely wanted peace and led him to extricate the United States from a war only the Hamiltonian extremists wanted.

John Adams yielded to no one when it came to knowledge of foreign affairs, although until his break with the war faction in his Federalist Party, he had allowed himself to be influenced by the Hamiltonians in his cabinet and in the Senate. Jefferson, however, after the "revolution of 1800," was able to make a fresh start, with a cabinet of his own choosing and Democratic-Republican majorities in both houses of Congress. No American, save perhaps Benjamin Franklin, had had a richer diplomatic experience than the new president, and probably no president ever had a secretary of state who was closer, both personally and intellectually, than James Madison was to Jefferson. The advice of his brilliant secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, was valuable to Jefferson, but the efficiency and subtlety with which Jefferson and Madison synchronized their efforts in pursuit of American foreign policy objectives probably have never been matched.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE

Two periods of intense involvement in foreign affairs have marked the history of the United States: the nation-forming period, when the new Republic sought to register its independence while the world was being shaken by the mortal conflict of the great powers of the time, France and Great Britain; and the period beginning with World War II, when the United States itself became the world's greatest power. A more striking contrast between two eras could scarcely be imagined, though the simple substitution of the roles of all the powers involved is a start.

In addition to the irrelevance of affairs outside of North America to the growth of the United States during the nineteenth century, those who would probe the sources of national action are faced with another problem: how to detect and analyze possible connections between domestic influences and foreign policy actions. It is probably safe to say of this period, however, that presidents generally felt little need of advice on foreign affairs except from their secretaries of state, and sometimes not even from them.

Some presidents, such as James Madison, acted as their own foreign ministers. Deprived by Senate hostility of his first choice for secretary of state, the able Albert Gallatin, Madison was forced to appoint the incompetent Robert Smith and for a time even found it necessary to rewrite Smith's dispatches. Historians still debate the influence on Madison in 1812 of such war hawks as Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Felix Grundy; but Madison's most perceptive and thorough biographer, Irving Brant, believes that the president reached his own decisions.

President James Monroe, who had been secretary of state under Madison, relied almost exclusively on Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, except for the president's questions to his Virginia friends and predecessors, Jefferson and Madison, during the formulation of what became the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, Adams, generally recognized as the greatest of all American secre-

taries of state, was responsible for the two major foreign policy achievements of the Monroe administration. It was Adams who negotiated the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 (Adams-Onís Treaty) by which the United States not only acquired Florida but also laid claim to the Oregon territory. And it was Adams who persuaded the president and the cabinet to reject a British offer and instead have the United States alone declare itself the protector of the New World against European interference, and thus was responsible for the doctrine that bore Monroe's name.

President James K. Polk evidently had imbibed the elixir of "manifest destiny" long before John O'Sullivan coined the phrase in an editorial in the *Democratic Review* (1845). The idea of westward expansion was at least as American as the Declaration of Independence—it had been a fact since 1607—but the war with Mexico to advance it was mostly the president's idea. The accusation "Mr. Polk's war" was undoubtedly accurate.

The Civil War marked an end and a beginning to many things in America, but neither an end nor a beginning to expansionism. William H. Seward, secretary of state under Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, had in the 1840s believed that "our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the north, and to encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific." Thus he welcomed the suggestion that Russia might be willing to sell Alaska. Presented with an opportunity to expand to "the icy barriers of the north," ostensibly to guarantee Alaskan fishing rights and to repay Russian Unionist sympathy during the war, Seward rushed through a treaty to purchase Alaska in 1867.

THE RISE TO WORLD POWER

In the American rise to world power, which began in the 1890s, one man who was neither president nor secretary of state played a crucial role. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval strategist and historian, provided the theoretical framework for the extension of American power into the Pacific as the key to national security and world peace. If Seward can be called the precursor of American imperialism, then Mahan was its prophet. Mahan's influence upon American foreign policy is easy to demonstrate because he was so visible. His first book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783,* achieved an instant success when it was published in 1890, and it had an effect on the Anglo-American world comparable with Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* a generation earlier. A rising group of dynamic, nationalistic American leaders pondered Mahan and became his fervent disciples.

Theodore Roosevelt brought to the presidency a coherent program for the expansion of American power. The ideas of Mahan formed Roosevelt's frame of reference in almost all his discussions of foreign policy: a large navy that could control the sea-lanes; the acquisition of naval bases and coaling stations, and possibly colonies; the construction of an isthmian canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by water, with bases to guard the approaches on either side; and the development of a large merchant marine to expand American foreign trade. By tireless propaganda (Roosevelt described the presidency as "a bully pulpit"), cajolery of Congress, and often by breathtaking expansion of presidential powers, Roosevelt was able to realize Mahan's program. Although it was not as large as he wished, he built the "Great White Fleet" and sent it around the world. He acquired naval bases in Cuba and the Philippines, and he carried out what Secretary of State Elihu Root described as the rape of Colombia in order to build the Panama Canal.

Personally much closer to Roosevelt was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts who was also a disciple of Mahan. Lodge thought as Roosevelt did and consistently supported him in his imperialistic initiatives. Other notable members of Roosevelt's circle of intimates were the brothers Brooks and Henry Adams, grandsons and great-grandsons of the Massachusetts presidents. They were historians, as was the president himself, and they shared his expansionist views without, however, possessing his ebullient optimism.

If foreign policy had always been an unpleasant distraction to American government officials, it was so no longer. The administrations of Theodore Roosevelt were the turning point, and the hopes of Mahan, Lodge, the Adamses, and Roosevelt himself for the growth of American power and influence were realized. The War with Spain, which Roosevelt and his friends had promoted so ardently, and World War I, even more so, thrust the United States into a commanding world position.

WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE

Ironically, it was not Theodore Roosevelt but rather Woodrow Wilson who presided over this

breakthrough. Wilson brought to the White House not only a total lack of experience in foreign affairs but also a disinterest of similar proportion. He had been untouched by the muscular doctrines of Mahan, and he might have been content to establish his "New Freedom" only in America if it had not been for World War I. Wilson's response to that challenge contrasted sharply with the aggressive Rooseveltian style, giving point to John F. Kennedy's remark, "to govern . . . is to choose."

Presidents choose their advisers and weigh the advice they receive. Probably more than any president before him, Wilson focused his confidence on one adviser, "Colonel" Edward M. House, a Texan whose only title was friend of the president. House and Wilson first met late in 1911, when the former was shopping for a Democratic presidential candidate he could support. They hit it off instantly, and House managed Wilson's 1912 campaign. Thenceforth, he was Wilson's alter ego. His New York City apartment and his summer home in Magnolia, Massachusetts, were both connected by direct telephone lines to the president's study in the White House. Once, when asked whether House accurately reflected his thinking, Wilson replied: "Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one." House was the outstanding example of the species of presidential advisers whom Patrick Anderson called "distinguished outsiders."

Wilson and House had extraordinarily complementary personalities. Both were extremely ambitious, but Wilson reveled in the limelight while House preferred the shadows. Wilson's style was rhetorical, and he was at his best in public exhortation. House, on the other hand, liked to work behind the scenes; he once told an interviewer: "I do not like to make speeches. I abhor routine. I prefer the vicarious thrill which comes to me through others. . . . I want to be a myth." Wilson saw this as selflessness: "What I like about House," he told Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, "is that he is the most self-effacing man that ever lived. All he wants to do is serve the common cause and to help me and others."

It was House who, at the outbreak of war in Europe, tried to turn Wilson's attention to foreign affairs, arguing that the president's leadership would offer a unique opportunity to effect a revolution in international morals. House wanted Wilson to assume the mediator's role in the war: "the world expects you to play the big part in this tragedy—and so indeed you will, for God has given you the power to see things as they are."

Wilson sent House to Europe early in 1915 to sound out the leaders of the warring powers on the possibilities of a negotiated peace. That mission was unproductive but, with the end of the war in sight, in October 1918, House returned to Europe to obtain Allied acceptance of Wilson's peace program. He wrote in his diary: "I am going on one of the most important missions anyone ever undertook, and yet there is no word of direction, advice or discussion between us." Wilson had simply said: "I have not given you any instructions because I feel you will know what to do." It was Wilson and House who, on the morning of 5 January 1918, hammered out the Fourteen Points. They had the work of the Inquiry to assist them, a mountain of maps and special studies drawn up by the 150-man team of experts House had established to do the research for Wilson's reordering of Europe.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's rule that "an adviser should have a passion for anonymity" has special relevance to the break that eventually ended the Wilson-House collaboration. Wilson wanted agreement, support, and of course loyalty from his confidants; and House supplied all of these, even while sometimes recording criticism of the president in his diary. When asked for advice, House wrote early in 1918, "I nearly always praise at first in order to strengthen the president's confidence in himself which, strangely enough, is often lacking." Between the president's triumphal visit to Europe late in 1918 and his return in early 1919, most of the bloom had faded from Wilson's peace plans as nationalistic interests of the Allies asserted themselves.

As Wilson's "second personality," House fought for the Fourteen Points but realized that compromise was inevitable; he got along better with the Allied statesmen than had Wilson, and he increasingly deplored Wilson's mistakes and believed he himself could have avoided them. The attention showered on him during the president's absence produced a new and overpowering desire to "come into his own." This was probably the crucial factor in the president's withdrawal of affection from House and the end to consulting him. In the final stages of the peacemaking, Wilson consulted no one.

Colonel House had beguiled Wilson and encouraged him in the intense moral commitment that became an obsession. Wilson had depended too much on House, and then not enough; ulti-

mately he was isolated in the destructive rigidity that defeated, and then destroyed, him.

FDR AND HARRY HOPKINS

No other foreign policy adviser would exercise House's almost exclusive influence over presidential decision making until Henry Kissinger, save perhaps Franklin D. Roosevelt's Harry Hopkins. In some ways, Hopkins's relationship to Roosevelt resembled that of House to Wilson, whom Roosevelt had served as a rather free-floating assistant secretary of the navy. By 1941, as Hopkins's biographer Robert E. Sherwood explained it: "The extraordinary fact was that the second most important individual in the United States government . . . had no legitimate official position nor even any desk of his own except a card table in his bedroom. However, the bedroom was in the White House." To the recently defeated Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie, who had asked why the president kept so close to him a man widely distrusted and resented, Roosevelt replied: "I can understand that you wonder why I need that half man around me. But someday you may well be sitting here where I am now as president of the United States. And when you are, you'll be looking through that door over there and knowing that practically everybody who walks through it wants something out of you. You'll learn what a lonely job this is, and you'll discover the need for somebody like Harry Hopkins who asks for nothing except to serve you."

During his unprecedented three-plus terms as president, of course, Roosevelt had hundreds of advisers. But none wielded more than a transitory and peripheral influence on foreign policy, while Hopkins's brilliant talent for getting things done was exercised with authority throughout the government and the coalition against Germany and Japan. Sherwood described Hopkins's service thus: "Hopkins made it his job, he made it his religion, to find out just what it was that Roosevelt really wanted and then to see to it that neither hell nor high water, nor even possible vacillations by Roosevelt himself, blocked its achievement."

But Hopkins was not without convictions of his own, although they usually coincided with those of the president. Eleanor Roosevelt once wrote that Hopkins "gave his opinions honestly, but because Franklin did not like opposition too well—as who does—he frequently agreed with him regardless of his own opinion, or tried to persuade him in indirect ways." But Hopkins could intervene directly. Once, when Roosevelt was unable to join Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin at a conference because of the 1944 election, he was about to send Churchill a cable implying that the prime minister could speak for him. Hopkins ordered the cable to be held and rushed to get Roosevelt to cancel it, which Roosevelt did. Hopkins had the respect of Stalin, who spoke to him with "a frankness unparalleled in my knowledge in recent Soviet history," according to the American ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, and the respect and deep affection of Churchill, who dubbed him "Lord Root of the Matter" and talked feelingly to Sherwood of "the great heart that is within that frail frame." Hopkins successfully supported Churchill in persuading Roosevelt that France had to share in the postwar occupation of Germany, and he often toned down the president's communications with the haughty General Charles de Gaulle.

Roosevelt and Hopkins last saw each other after the Yalta Conference, when Hopkins, too ill to return home by ship with the president, flew back to enter the Mayo Clinic, where he was still hospitalized when Roosevelt died. He returned to Washington to brief the new president, Harry Truman, who later recalled that "I hoped that he would continue with me in the same role he had played with my predecessor." Hopkins undertook one more mission to Moscow and succeeded in obtaining Russian concessions that opened the way to the United Nations founding conference at San Francisco, but he was too sick to continue. Six months later he was dead, leaving behind another fascinating historical "if": How differently would subsequent Soviet-American relations have developed if Hopkins could have fulfilled the wish of President Truman?

CREATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Notwithstanding the preeminence of Harry Hopkins during the last years of the Roosevelt administration, far-reaching changes were in the making. During World War II, Roosevelt accelerated one developing pattern, the bypassing of the secretary of state and his department, and established another, what the veteran diplomat Charles Yost considered "an even more unfortunate precedent . . . the persistent and intimate involvement of the military in foreign-policy decision making."

Another development of the Roosevelt years was the beginning of the growth of a large bureaucracy. However, since Roosevelt had an improvised and very personal administrative style, and there was no rationalization by statute, his personal assistants were scattered throughout the government. Truman introduced a significant degree of order, albeit with a large increase in the size of the White House staff. Moreover, under Truman the policymaking process was institutionalized through the creation of agencies responsible to the president. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and established the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as a top-level forum for thrashing out policy alternatives for the president's decision. An important corollary of the NSC was that it was provided with a staff, thus potentially giving the president his own mini Department of State.

Truman's belief in orderly administrative methods included a belief in a strong cabinet. He once said: "I propose to get Cabinet officers I can depend on and have them run their affairs," and as a result his White House staff was singularly weak. Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson were the principal architects of Truman's foreign policy, with Defense Secretary James Forrestal at times playing a significant role. But the star of the Truman White House, Clark Clifford, made a mark because of the confidence Truman placed in him. Clifford generally reinforced with the president the views of such activist department officers as Acheson, Forrestal, and Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, with one notable exception. In May 1948, Truman followed Clifford's advice to recognize the new State of Israel over the objections of George Marshall and the Department of State.

As principal speechwriter, Clifford drafted the address enunciating the Truman Doctrine. George F. Kennan, then counselor of the United States embassy in Moscow, is usually credited with originating the doctrine of containment in his famous "long telegram" from Moscow, later published in *Foreign Affairs* under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Truman read the message and was impressed, but then he asked Clifford to prepare a memorandum on United States–Soviet relations. After talks with Marshall, Acheson, Forrestal, Lovett, and others, Clifford presented to Truman in September 1946 a memorandum differing from Kennan's chiefly in its military emphasis. "The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand," Clifford wrote. "The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations." Kennan had stressed political and economic measures to contain Soviet expansionism and in later years, notably in his *Memoirs*, repeatedly deplored the military interpretation placed on his thesis.

Clifford resigned at the beginning of 1950 and later became a "distinguished outsider," advising Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, who in the last months of his presidency drafted him to be secretary of defense. Ironically, it was the man who had helped to militarize the American posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in 1946 who helped persuade President Johnson to end the bombing and seek a negotiated peace in Vietnam in 1968.

THE EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY YEARS

President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought to the White House an unprecedented experience with the military staff system and a settled conviction that it was the only sensible and efficient way to run the government. The White House was therefore reorganized to resemble a military table of organization: the assistant to the president became the chief of staff, and other positions were established under him to systematize the flow of paperwork to and from the White House. Like Truman, Eisenhower believed that cabinet officers should run their departments, and he discouraged them from bringing their problems to the White House.

Like his successors Kennedy and Nixon, Eisenhower was most interested in foreign affairs. Eisenhower's passion for organization was exercised most closely in an attempt to perfect foreign policy decision making through formalizing and expanding the National Security Council. He converted the NSC staff into a planning board under a special assistant for national security affairs, with responsibility for preparing policy papers and coordinating them among interested government departments and agencies for NSC consideration. The Operations Coordinating Board was established to see that NSC decisions were carried out.

Despite this formal machinery, Eisenhower relied heavily on key advisers in deciding what policies to implement. While Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles played an important role as the chief spokesman and negotiator for Eisenhower, the president gathered advice and counsel from such individuals as disarmament adviser Harold Stassen, psychological warfare advocate C. D. Jackson, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss, UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and, after the launch of *Sputnik,* presidential science advisers James Killian and George Kistiakowsky. As a result, Eisenhower's foreign policy was never as rigid as the organizational charts suggested but instead included such innovations as Atoms for Peace, "open skies," and an expanded and generous foreign aid program.

Under John F. Kennedy, the elaborate national security structure of the Eisenhower years gave way to a more modest and informal foreign policy apparatus. Distrusting bureaucracy, and disappointed in Dean Rusk, his choice as secretary of state, the president preferred to deal directly with desk officers in the Department of State who had operational responsibility for specific foreign policy issues. Kennedy did away with the cumbersome Operations Coordinating Board and relied instead on his special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, a former Harvard dean. Bundy assembled a small group of academic experts to staff the scaled-down NSC in the basement of the White House, where they attempted to reconcile the conflicting foreign policy recommendations of the Pentagon and the Department of State.

Several others on the White House staff had regular access to the president, among them Theodore Sorensen, special counsel, chief speech writer, and long Kennedy's closest aide; scientific adviser Jerome Weisner; and special military representative General Maxwell Taylor, former army chief of staff, whose advocacy of a "flexible response" defense strategy in opposition to the Eisenhower-Dulles "massive retaliation" doctrine suited the activist approach of the New Frontier. Kennedy also placed great reliance on Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who became a sort of "supersecretary." But as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 proved, Kennedy's most trusted and valued adviser was always his brother Robert, the attorney general.

JOHNSON AND THE TUESDAY LUNCH

Suddenly thrust into the presidency by the assassination of John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson did what other "accidental" presidents had done under similar circumstances: he promised to continue unchanged the policies of his predecessor. Johnson also retained the Kennedy staff and, in general, the loose Kennedy system. As a formerly close aide, Bill Moyers, noted after he had left the White House, Johnson had regarded the National Security Council as "not a live institution, not suited to precise debate for the sake of decision." Johnson much preferred to "call in a handful of top advisers, confidants, close friends." Johnson also tried to emphasize the foreign policy leadership of the secretary of state and was persuaded to create a system of interdepartmental committees to promote this. Johnson leaned heavily on Secretary of State Rusk, but the system was less than successful. Rusk made little use of it and Johnson came to rely, as Kennedy had, on Bundy and his NSC staff as well as on Secretary of Defense McNamara.

When Bundy left the White House staff for the presidency of the Ford Foundation in 1966, he was succeeded by Walt W. Rostow, formerly his deputy and then chief of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, who had been a professor of economic history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The change was significant. Rostow had written extensively on American foreign policy, notably a book entitled *The United States in the World Arena.* As that title suggested, Rostow thought in terms of broad historical frameworks; he was a theoretician who from beginning to end saw American involvement in Vietnam as essential to the nation's world preeminence. Along with General Maxwell D. Taylor, who later changed his mind, Rostow had urged Kennedy in 1961 to bomb the Vietnamese insurgents and Rostow's advice to Johnson was always slanted toward escalation.

Like Wilson after 1914 and Roosevelt after the fall of France in 1940, Johnson became totally absorbed in a foreign war after the decision to escalate in 1965. Increasingly, his circle of advisers contracted, as the president immersed himself in the details of the Vietnam conflict and tolerated dissent less and less. Johnson continued to rely, however, on a small group of friends outside the White House, often speaking to them at length on the telephone or meeting with them individually and off the record. His intimates included Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, and Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara as secretary of defense in early 1968. On Vietnam, Johnson also relied on the advice of

a group of distinguished former government officials known as the Wise Men, who included Dean Acheson, Henry Cabot Lodge, and, by 1968, McGeorge Bundy. Initially strong supporters of the Vietnam War, the Wise Men had a change of heart after the Tet offensive and helped persuade Johnson to seek peace with Hanoi in March 1968.

Early in 1965, Johnson instituted the "Tuesday lunch," which for the next four years represented the focal point of foreign policymaking. While Vietnam came to dominate the agenda, topics ranged across the globe, from the Dominican intervention in 1965 to the Six Day War in 1967. The initial grouping of Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy gradually expanded to include the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Johnson's press secretary, first Bill Moyers, later George Christian. Johnson kept the proceedings informal to encourage give-and-take, but eventually Deputy Press Secretary Tom Johnson was added to keep a record of major points.

The Tuesday lunch helped the president hear a variety of views on important foreign policy issues. "They were invaluable sessions," Rusk claimed, "because we all could be confident that everyone around the table would keep his mouth shut and wouldn't be running off to Georgetown cocktail parties and talking about it." Others, however, contended that the sessions were too disorganized and rambling, rarely leading to thoughtful decisions. The Tuesday lunch, however, was never intended to be a decision-making body. As H. W. Brands points out in *The Wages of Globalism*, Johnson used it as "a forum for receiving information and opinions. Sometimes he announced decisions at the Tuesday lunch. More often he took the information and opinions back to his private quarters, where he compared them with intelligence obtained from his night reading and from his telephoning to Fortas, Clifford, and who knew who else, and only then gave his verdict."

THE KISSINGER YEARS

In April 1975 President Gerald Ford was asked whether he received advice on foreign policy from anyone besides Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He replied that he was advised by the National Security Council, where decisions were made, but added that he met with Kissinger for an hour each day "on day-to-day problems." Ford's invocation of the NSC was ritualistic—there was presumed to be something reassuring to the public mind about it—and his comment was also circular, for to a hitherto unimaginable degree Kissinger was the NSC. The former Harvard professor had been chosen by president-elect Richard Nixon in 1968 to be his assistant for national security affairs. By September 1973, Kissinger so dominated foreign policy, which he had made his own, that he had won a Nobel Peace Prize (for negotiating an end to American involvement in Vietnam) and senatorial confirmation as secretary of state by an overwhelming vote. Significantly, Kissinger retained the title of assistant to the president; that was still the source of a power greater than that wielded by most other presidential advisers or even secretaries of state in American history.

During the Nixon years, it was almost always impossible to determine whether Nixon or Kissinger made foreign policy decisions, and commentators became accustomed to writing of "Nixon-Kissinger" policies. The judgment that that reflects is probably correct. The president's unlimited personal confidence in Kissinger apparently was grounded in an identity and a congeniality of their respective views of the world and of the role of the United States in it. The two men favored similar operating styles: a driving, essentially amoral stance in which the end justified the means and results were what counted, and a secretive, almost conspiratorial approach that delighted in dramatic surprises. Neither Nixon, who had built a political career on hard-line anticommunism, nor Kissinger, whose writings of a decade and a half had accepted the Cold War stereotypes, was inhibited from engineering new approaches—détente—to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The secrecy and then the carefully staged theatrics of the Nixon visit to China represented the epitome of Nixon-Kissinger collaboration.

Kissinger was Nixon's resident philosopher, master planner, and personal executor of foreign policy. He provided Nixon with a coherent theory of international relations that postulated the maintenance of a balance-of-power equilibrium constantly adjusted to minimize friction. The principal problem was that it was initially impossible for "revolutionary" and status quo powers to negotiate: hence the necessity for painstaking planning to reduce international insecurity and create a "legitimate" world order. A supremely self-confident perfectionist, Kissinger believed that only he had the necessary conceptual expertise and skill to manage the slow process of accommodation.

Kissinger's power depended not only on his unique relationship with the president but also on the bureaucratic machinery he created and controlled. The staff Bundy assembled in 1961 had grown steadily in size, but by 1971 Kissinger's NSC staff was three times the size of Rostow's, with more than fifty professionals and one hundred clerical employees. In addition, under Kissinger's chairmanship there was a proliferation of new groups at the undersecretary and director levels, groups that exercised operational control over every aspect of national security policy, including the most comprehensive one of all, the Defense Program Review Committee, created to review "major defense, fiscal, policy and program issues in terms of their strategic, diplomatic, political, and economic implications." When Kissinger became secretary of state, therefore, he merely acquired the added prestige of the title and direct authority over the vast Department of State bureaucracy. Little else changed, except that with the Watergate scandal Kissinger seemed to personify whatever legitimacy the sinking Nixon administration could claim.

In the post-Vietnam era much of the Kissinger structure of international relationships appeared to be coming unstuck. A coalition of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1973, which stymied the policy of détente by making the legal emigration of Jews a precondition for liberalizing American trade with the Soviet Union. In late 1975, growing opposition to détente from conservative Republicans led President Ford to strip Kissinger of the position of national security adviser to the president, but he remained as secretary of state. During the 1976 presidential campaign against challenger James Earl Carter, Ford felt compelled to stop using the term "détente." Although Carter's narrow victory turned primarily on domestic issues, especially energy and inflation, the outcome clearly was a rejection of the secretive and power-oriented diplomacy practiced by Kissinger under Nixon and Ford.

DISSENSION UNDER CARTER

As president, Jimmy Carter proved unable to stamp American foreign policy with his own imprint. Rhetorically, he did succeed in stressing human rights in contrast to Kissinger's obsession with power politics. But his own lack of experience with world affairs and a serious rift between his principal foreign policy advisers left him ill-prepared to deal with a series of crises overseas that eventually overwhelmed his presidency.

Carter relied on two very different men, representing conflicting foreign policy positions, to help him deal with world affairs. The first, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was an establishment figure who hoped to continue the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, stressing cooperation rather than confrontation between the superpowers, while at the same time expanding American aid and assistance to emerging nations. Carter's appointment of civil rights leader Andrew Young as UN ambassador was a further attempt to appeal to Third World sensibilities. In contrast, the president's choice of Zbigniew Brzezinski as national security adviser invited conflict within the administration. The Polish-born Brzezinski opposed Kissinger's policy of détente and instead favored a hard line against the Soviet Union. Carter's two primary foreign policy advisers could not have been more different. "While Mr. Vance played by the Marquis of Queensbury rules," remarked one observer, "Mr. Brzezinski was more of a street fighter." The president, however, believed that he could draw upon each man's ideas in framing his foreign policy.

In the first two years, Carter sided with Vance and Young in seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union and assist Third World countries. Policies such as the return of the Panama Canal to Panamanian sovereignty by the end of the century and support for black majority rule in southern Africa, especially in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), together with the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, marked early victories for the softer approach. But by 1978, as the result of aggressive Soviet moves in the horn of Africa and difficulty in negotiating a SALT II disarmament agreement with Leonid Brezhnev, Carter began to turn to Brzezinski more than to Vance for advice. The climax came when the administration extended full diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, a move advocated by Brzezinski as a way to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. The result was a return to Cold War tensions, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. At the same time, the growing conflict between the Department of State and the National Security Council had a paralyzing effect on the American response to the Iranian revolution. With Brzezinski backing the shah of Iran and Vance favoring change in

Iran, the Carter administration lost control of the situation and finally ended up in the hopeless hostage crisis.

Carter's foreign policy failures were not entirely self-inflicted. The legacy of the Vietnam War, the rising tide of nationalism among emerging nations, and the reactionary leadership of the Soviet Union all worked against effective American diplomacy. But Carter's belief that he could transform the conflicting views of such antagonistic foreign policy advisers as Vance and Brzezinski proved unfounded. By 1980, the American people had lost confidence in Carter's ability to use American power effectively in the world and were responding instead to the promise of his Republican challenger, Ronald Reagan, to "make America great again."

SUCCESS AND FAILURE UNDER REAGAN

Presidential advisers played an important, if sometimes unfortunate, role in the administration of Ronald Reagan. The president set forth the goals he sought to achieve—challenge the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union, assist those around the globe fighting against communist subversion, and do everything possible to spare the world a nuclear catastrophe. But Reagan had little interest in the details of foreign policy and delegated broad authority to his subordinates in the day-by-day conduct of diplomacy. As a result, his presidency helped pave the way for the end of the Cold War, but also was badly shaken by the Iran-Contra scandal.

At the outset, Reagan tried to avoid the internal tension that had hampered the Carter administration by relying on a strong secretary of state and downplaying the status of the national security adviser. Alexander Haig, his first secretary of state, proved too imperious and domineering and the White House staff finally forced him to resign in 1982. His successor, George Shultz, was much more successful. A conservative economist skilled at bureaucratic maneuvering, he ran the Department of State smoothly and became an effective advocate of negotiation with the Soviet Union. The first five national security advisers, on the other hand, lacked stature and yet were allowed a surprisingly large amount of discretion in carrying out their duties. Only the final two, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, had the high professional qualifications that the post required.

Within the Reagan administration, the primary tension was between Shultz, who favored a more cooperative policy toward the Soviet Union, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who championed Cold War confrontation. As president, Reagan tried to avoid siding with either antagonist, often seeking a middle course or avoiding a clear-cut policy decision. At the same time, Reagan turned to others in his administration for advice, notably two hard-liners. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the American ambassador to the UN, challenged Carter's stance against aid to friendly dictators like the shah of Iran, arguing instead that the United States should support "authoritarian" leaders who believed in the free market and were cooperative. William Casey, the Central Intelligence Agency director, a wealthy lawyer and veteran of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, favored an active American role in challenging what he and Reagan saw as Soviet surrogates, notably Cuba.

Reagan's reliance on Kirkpatrick and Casey proved most dangerous in Central America. The administration's efforts to use the CIA to back the contras in Nicaragua, as well as to defeat the rebels in El Salvador, led Congress to use its power of the purse to cut off funding for the contras. The president, moved by the plight of American hostages in Lebanon, approved a plan to sell arms to Iran in exchange for the release of Americans held by groups friendly to Iran; the NSC staff, led by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and his successor Admiral John Poindexter, assisted by Colonel Oliver North, went much further. Following the advice of CIA Director Casey, they channeled the money generated by the arms sales to Iran into the hands of the contras, in defiance of Congress. When the resulting Iran-Contra scandal became public in late 1986, McFarlane, Poindexter, and North all insisted that the president knew nothing of the illegal diversion of funds (Casey died of a brain tumor in early 1987). While Reagan took responsibility for the unwise decision to sell arms to Iran, he went along with his aides' assertion that he was ignorant of the financial transaction.

Reagan finally was able to offset the damage done by the Iran-Contra affair by his success in a series of summit conferences with the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Encouraged by the quiet diplomacy of George Shultz, the president abandoned his stinging rhetoric and instead embraced the new polices of *glasnost* and *perestroika* begun by

Gorbachev in an effort to reform the Soviet system. Although the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, would take place after Reagan left office, he could claim credit for laying the foundation with his highly publicized meetings with Gorbachev and his negotiation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, a first step toward meaningful arms control by the superpowers. Reagan could also claim that the massive buildup of the American military carried out under Weinberger had played a crucial role in bringing the Soviet Union to the bargaining table. His presidency, however, would remain tarnished by the Iran-Contra affair, the result of granting excessive discretion to his national security advisers.

BUSH IN COMMAND

George H. W. Bush was deeply involved in foreign policy throughout his presidency. Unlike Ronald Reagan, he brought a depth of experience in international affairs to the oval office—ambassador to the UN, envoy to China, director of the CIA, and frequent travels abroad as vice president. Bush's hands-on approach meant that in his administration American foreign policy would emanate from the White House, not the Department of State.

President Bush appointed James Baker, a close personal friend and successful campaign manager, to be secretary of state. Baker had shrewd political judgment, but little experience with foreign affairs. For advice, the president leaned more on two others within his administration. Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, was a retired air force general who had served in the same position under Ford as Kissinger's successor. Prudent and cautious, Scowcroft had been critical of Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union, viewing the early denunciation as too confrontational and the later meetings with Gorbachev too accommodating. When the Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989 and the Soviet regime gradually collapsed, Scowcroft reinforced Bush's careful policy of letting events take their course without active American participation. The other man Bush relied on heavily was Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Experienced both as a member of Congress and as Ford's White House chief of staff, Cheney would play a key role in defining the dominant foreign policy event of the Bush administration—the Persian Gulf War.

When Saddam Hussein caught the United States by surprise with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Bush reacted strongly, sending American troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the vital flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region. Once Saudi Arabia was secure, the critical issue was whether the United States should use force to liberate Kuwait or rely instead on economic pressure. Secretary of State Baker, along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, warned against getting involved in a ground war with Iraq. Scowcroft and Cheney, however, argued that sanctions would take too long to work, and the president sided with them. Cheney played an especially important role, criticizing the initial army plan to liberate Kuwait with a frontal assault and suggesting a flanking maneuver instead.

Bush's advisers also had considerable influence on the controversial decision to end the fighting short of full success. After five weeks of intense aerial bombardment, General Norman Schwarzkopf launched the ground offensive on 24 February 1991. When American armored units swept into southern Iraq in a daring flanking movement and coalition forces liberated Kuwait in just three days, Bush heeded the advice of Scowcroft and Powell to halt the attack after only a hundred hours of fighting. Powell was concerned that the United States not be seen as a heartless bully, commenting, "You don't do unnecessary killing if you can avoid it." Scowcroft had strategic concerns, primarily a fear that a prolonged invasion of Iraq would alienate Arab allies and shatter the international coalition. He also saw the need for a postwar Iraq strong enough to balance off the power of Iran in the vital Persian Gulf region. After insisting on securing Schwarzkopf's consent, Bush followed the advice of Powell and Scowcroft, thus ending the war with Saddam, still in power in Baghdad. Later, when Schwarzkopf suggested he could have destroyed the Republican Guard on which Saddam relied so heavily with just a day or two more of fighting, Powell intervened to remind the theater commander that he had agreed to the early cease-fire.

Despite the regrets over the failure to depose Saddam, the Bush foreign policy team proved effective in action. The cautious policy toward the downfall of the Soviet Union prevented the United States from providing an excuse for a final effort by hard-liners in Russia to revive the Cold War. In the Middle East, the Bush administration had succeeded in forging a

remarkably broad international coalition to liberate Kuwait and thus uphold the principle of collective security. Bush's foreign policy advisers had accomplished these goals by displaying a high degree of teamwork. In contrast to the infighting that had characterized the Carter and Reagan presidencies, Bush, in the words of Baker, had "made the national security apparatus work the way it was supposed to work."

CLINTON: LEARNING ON THE JOB

In contrast to George H. W. Bush, William Jefferson Clinton relegated foreign policy to a secondary concern when he took office in 1993. As he put it, he focused "like a razor beam" on domestic issues—reviving the sluggish American economy, balancing the budget, and proposing a sweeping reform of the health care system. He delegated foreign policy to two veterans—Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, who favored a cautious, lawyerly approach to world affairs, working harmoniously with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, a former aide to Henry Kissinger who had resigned in protest during the Vietnam War.

Two other foreign policy advisers came to play an important part in the Clinton administration. The first was Strobe Talbott, a journalist and expert on the Soviet Union, who had close personal ties with Clinton, his Rhodes Scholar roommate at Oxford. After brief service as ambassador-at-large to the countries of the former Soviet Union, Talbott became deputy secretary of state and oversaw the administration's efforts to support Boris Yeltsin's leadership of Russia. Talbott supervised the granting of $2.5 billion in economic aid as well as the Clinton administration's efforts to promote free market reforms and democracy in Russia.

Richard Holbrooke, another veteran of the Carter administration, emerged as a key player in the most critical foreign policy problem confronting the Clinton presidency—the civil war in Bosnia. Although Clinton had criticized Bush for failing to halt the bloodshed in this former Yugoslavian territory, the new president proved equally reluctant to intervene militarily to stop the fighting. In 1995, however, Clinton finally approved U.S. participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization air strikes designed to halt Bosnian Serb shelling of the Muslim city of Sarajevo. Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, carried out the difficult task of negotiating a cease-fire among the ethnic rivals in Bosnia—Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. The accords that he succeeded in getting representatives of the three groups to sign in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 ended the fighting in Bosnia and led to a fragile but viable political settlement.

The ethnic tensions in the Balkans continued to create difficulty for Christopher's successor, Madeleine Albright, who became secretary of state at the start of Clinton's second term in 1997. The first woman to hold the office, Albright, the daughter of a Czech diplomat, had taught international affairs at Georgetown University and served as ambassador to the UN from 1993 to 1996. More activist than Christopher, she was a firm believer in democracy and was willing to use force to achieve American goals abroad. When Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic began terrorizing the majority Albanian population in Kosovo, Albright was determined to halt his ethnic cleansing. After Holbrooke's efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement had failed by early 1999, Albright helped persuade Clinton to intervene militarily to protect the Kosovars. For nearly three months, from March to June 1999, NATO aircraft bombed Serbia in an effort to halt Milosevic's attempt to drive all the Albanians out of Kosovo. The secretary of state defended this policy against fierce criticism and she and Clinton were vindicated when the air offensive began to target the infrastructure of Serbia (bridges, power plants, TV stations), finally forcing Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. Remarkably, not a single American life was lost in this military campaign. The outcome in Kosovo, however, was ambiguous—the territory was still nominally Serbian but only the presence of NATO troops kept an uneasy peace between the returning Kosovars and the minority Serbs.

Inevitably, foreign policy came to occupy more of Clinton's attention during his second term in office. The failure of his health care reform and the Republican control of Congress after 1994 limited his freedom of action on domestic matters. He became personally involved in two difficult efforts at mediation—trying to broker peace between the Protestant and Catholic factions in Northern Ireland and attempting to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian rivalry in the Middle East. Although he relied on advisers in both cases (former Senator George Mitchell in Northern Ireland and troubleshooter Dennis Ross in Israel), Clinton took an active personal role,

most notably in negotiating the Wye River Accord between Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasir Arafat in Maryland in 1998. By the time he left office, Clinton had traveled to nearly every part of the world and felt much more confident, and less dependent on his advisers, than when he had entered the White House.

CONCLUSION

Modern presidents have learned that foreign policy is a major responsibility for the office they hold and that they must rely on talented and experienced advisers in handling the diverse problems they encounter in the world. The dual system of national security advisers and secretaries of state, while sometimes leading to great friction as under Carter, helps a president choose between two different sets of advisers, while still leaving him free to seek the counsel of others outside the government. But the days when one individual, such as Colonel House or Harry Hopkins, would act as the president's surrogate in foreign policy, are long past. Future presidents are likely to draw on a wide variety of experts, both within and outside their administrations, in seeking ways to fulfill their responsibilities as world leaders.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.* New York, 1969.

Anderson, Patrick. *The President's Men: The White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson.* Garden City, N.Y., 1968.

Baker, James A., III. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992.* New York, 1995.

Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1992.

Brands, H. W. *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power.* New York, 1995.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: The Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981.* New York, 1983.

Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed.* New York, 1998.

Cannon, Lou. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime.* New York, 1991.

Christopher, Warren. *Chances of a Lifetime.* New York, 2001.

Clifford, Clark, with Richard Holbrooke. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir.* New York, 1991.

Destler, I. M. *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform.* Princeton, N.J., 1974.

Greene, John Robert. *The Presidency of George Bush.* Lawrence, Kans., 2000.

Greenstein, Fred I. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton with a New Afterword on George W. Bush.* Princeton, N.J., 2001.

Hess, Gary R. *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf.* Baltimore, Md., 2001.

Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War.* New York, 1998.

Immerman, Richard H. *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy.* Wilmington, Del., 1999.

Kaufman, Burton I. *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* Lawrence, Kans., 1993.

Kennan, George F. *Memoirs, 1925–1950.* Boston, 1967.

Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years.* Boston, 1979.

———. *Years of Upheaval.* Boston, 1982.

———. *Years of Renewal.* New York, 1999.

McJimsey, George T. *Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy.* Cambridge, Mass., 1987.

Neustadt, Richard E. *The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter.* New York, 1980.

Paterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan. *American Foreign Policy: A History.* 3d ed. 2 vols. Lexington, Mass., 1991.

Reedy, George E. *The Twilight of the Presidency: From Johnson to Reagan.* Rev. ed. New York, 1987.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency.* New ed. Boston, 1989.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy.* New York, 1989.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History.* New York, 1948.

Shultz, George Pratt. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State.* New York, 1993.

Small, Melvin. *The Presidency of Richard Nixon.* Lawrence, Kans., 1999.

Sorensen, Theodore C. *Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows.* New York, 1963.

Vance, Cyrus R. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.* New York, 1983.

Walker, Martin. *The President We Deserve: Bill Clinton, His Rise, Falls, and Comebacks.* New York, 1996.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; DECISION MAKING; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ELITISM; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; PRESIDENTIAL POWER.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Alexander DeConde

From the founding of the United States to the present, concerned citizens have debated the breadth of presidential power in foreign affairs. The Founders, from their reading of European history and their experience with the English Crown, feared extensive executive authority. Believing that broad control over the military over the shaping of relations with foreign nations and over the making of war paved the way to tyranny, in these matters they placed explicit constitutional curbs on the executive. As the nation grew, these restraints led often to tension between the president and Congress. Regardless, except in a few instances, the authority of the executive expanded along with the growth of the nation's wealth and influence in the world.

The reasons why the executive prevailed and in the twentieth century presidential wars became virtually standard procedure are complex. Some scholars maintain the presidents could use massive force on their own because Congress abdicated its constitutional authority. Others saw as a cause the rise of the United States to the status of a world power, an imperial power, and a superpower. Many perceived the executive's dominance in war as a logical consequence of the corrupting influence of vast power. Still others saw that power as politically and personally based. They maintained that presidents catered to popular sentiment because, often in the guise of patriotism, strong, violent muscle-flexing against foreign foes was rewarded at the ballot box.

CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES

Writing in the 1830s, the French political theorist Alexis de Toqueville described the American president as possessing, especially in foreign relations, "almost royal prerogatives." More than a century later, Harry S. Truman claimed the presidency had "become the greatest and most important office in the history of the world." Into the twenty-first century, the media and scholarly treatises repeated this concept so often it became commonplace.

Ironically, leaders of the generation that fought the revolutionary war had a deep distrust of wide-ranging executive power. When they drafted the nation's first constitution, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, they omitted a permanent executive office. They feared concentrating immense power in any one person because they regarded executive authority the natural enemy of liberty and a potential repository for military tyranny. So they established a single legislature that chose a member as president. He could not serve more than one year in any three-year congressional term and had no special authority in the conduct of foreign affairs.

After the United States won independence, political leaders such as John Jay, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison perceived the Articles as inadequate, particularly in the making of foreign policy. They desired a permanent president with sufficient authority to carry out a unified policy toward the rest of the world. With this objective, they sought to amend the Articles in a manner that would provide for a stronger central government. They persuaded Congress to authorize a convention for that purpose. After delegates from seven states met on 25 May 1787 in Philadelphia, they decided to get rid of the Articles of Confederation and frame a new constitution.

The debate over the nature of the presidency consumed more time than did any other major problem before the convention. Framers supposedly influenced by an eighteenth-century doctrine of an inherent executive prerogative—advanced by political thinkers such as John Locke—desired "a vigorous Executive." Others pointed out that the people opposed anything resembling an elective monarchy. After much dis-

cussion, the Founders created a presidential office with specific constraints as well as considerable power. They separated it from the legislative and judicial branches with a system of checks and balances designed to prevent the president from becoming a tyrant.

In keeping with this objective, the framers placed more curbs on the president's power in domestic affairs than in foreign relations. They also denied him the most vital of monarchical powers, that of initiating war. Envisaging him as the agent of Congress, they vested the war power in the legislature. They conferred on the president the authority, with the approval of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and other emissaries and to receive similar diplomats from other countries. With the advice and consent of the Senate, given in a two-thirds vote, only he could make and negotiate treaties.

The new constitution also stated that the "President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . . . and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual Service of the United States." This title did not give him authority to declare or instigate war. In *The Federalist* No. 69, Hamilton assumed, therefore, that the president's role as commander in chief would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces. The real power, as he perceived it, belonged to Congress. In the long run, Hamilton's assumptions proved wrong. Increasingly, presidents would use the commander in chief clause to expand their authority over foreign policy in its most vital aspect, the power to make war. For this reason, presidents, their political supporters, and others would come often to refer, incorrectly, to the clause as the president's war power.

Other powers, such as the president's choosing heads of executive departments or cabinet members, his pardoning and veto authority as in budget matters, his right to inform and request legislation from Congress, and his duty to execute laws faithfully, all touched on foreign affairs. Regardless of the safeguards built into these various powers, the Founders created what they had tried to prevent, an office that in foreign affairs had the potential of becoming a kind of elective monarchy.

George Washington had an acute awareness that as the first president his behavior would set precedents for future occupants of the office, and it did. For instance, frustration in August 1789 in dealing with legislators over treaties with Indian tribes led him to abandon the constitutional requirement of obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate before or during negotiation of treaties. Instead, he concluded treaties and then asked for Senate approval, a procedure that since his time other presidents have followed. With a broad view of his authority, he viewed the president as having the power to enforce aspects of relations with foreign peoples even if his actions could lead to armed conflict. He first seized the initiative in using force in dealing with security on the western frontier, where he regarded the Native Americans as a foreign people who menaced white inhabitants. Beginning in October 1790, he sent three armies against Native Americans in the Northwest. In August 1794, the third expedition, headed by General "Mad" Anthony Wayne, crushed the Indian resistance.

Washington also acted with considerable independence in dealing with Europeans. After revolutionaries in France in September 1792 abolished the monarchy and established a republic, he used his power to receive foreign representatives to establish formal relations with the new regime. This decision established precedent for prompt de facto recognition of a government when it demonstrated effective control of a nation. The first significant controversy over the president's power in foreign affairs erupted after January 1793, when England and France went to war. France expected help from Washington because of its alliance with the United States during the American Revolution. Instead, on 22 April, he proclaimed neutrality. Critics regarded this policy as pro-British with the potential of provoking France to hostilities. Hence, they denounced it as usurping Congress's war power. Supporters of the policy, such as Hamilton, defended it as flowing logically from the executive's conduct of foreign affairs.

Writing under the pseudonym "Helvidius," Madison denied the president possessed the power on his own to take actions that would precipitate war. "Those who are to conduct a war," Madison wrote, "cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded." Regardless of the validity of this perspective, Washington had indeed taken a bold step in setting a precedent for presidents to claim the right to determine foreign policy unilaterally.

Meanwhile, despite the neutrality policy, friction with England over trade practices, over the frontier with Canada, and especially over the royal navy's seizure of American shipping and

impressment of American seamen roiled relations with the mother country. Fearing possible hostilities, members of the newly formed Federalist Party pressed the president to send a special mission to London to resolve the differences. He chose John Jay, then chief justice, for the task and abandoned his usual practice of sharing an envoy's instructions with the Senate. Washington's action angered Democratic-Republicans, members of the opposition party, but the Federalist majority in the Senate approved the mission, and on 19 November 1794, Jay concluded a treaty that aroused harsh public criticism. Despite bitter controversy, the Senate approved the treaty and on 14 August 1795, the president ratified it. From this time on, Washington increasingly became a target of political abuse—"the head of British faction," one critic characterized him. French leaders called the treaty a negation of their alliance. Opponents in the House of Representatives tried to kill it by withholding appropriations for carrying it out. They also demanded to see the documents of the negotiation, thus raising the question, To what extent did the constitutional right of control over funding give the House power to participate in the treaty-approving process?

Democratic-Republicans argued that the House, as the immediate representative body of the people, had a right, even a duty, to consider whether or not a treaty should go into effect. Federalists countered that the Constitution restricted the treaty power to the president and Senate. On this premise, Washington refused to release the Jay papers. Finally, on 29 April 1796, by the margin of one vote, the House agreed to appropriate funds to implement the treaty. Thus, on the basis of party-line considerations, Washington set another precedent that extended presidential power in foreign affairs, one that exempted the executive in this process from close legislative oversight.

Washington reacted defensively to the criticism that he had wrongly inflated presidential authority. During the controversies over that issue, he maintained that the powers of the American president "are more definite and better understood perhaps than those of almost any other Country," and that he had aimed "neither to stretch, nor relax from them in any instance whatever, unless imperious circumstances shd. render the measure indispensable." Later, in discussing the content of his Farewell Address, in which he set the principles for an isolationist policy, he wanted to make clear to all that "he could have no view in extending the Powers of the Executive beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution." Regardless, when he left office and foreign policy became an issue in the presidential election of 1796, critics still believed he had aggrandized executive authority in a manner that placed the nation on the verge of war with France. Later generations of historians who characterized presidents as weak or strong would rank him as a strong executive.

THE QUASI-WAR AND AFTER

John Adams thought carefully about the powers of the evolving presidency. He believed in a strong executive because "the unity, the secrecy, the dispatch of one man has no equal." To prevent abuses in the office, he felt that "the executive power should be watched by all men." He described the president as the leader of "a monarchical republic" who exercised greater power than heads of government in various European countries. He perceived the American president's prerogatives as "so transcendent that they must naturally and necessarily excite in the nation all the jealousy, envy, fears, apprehensions, and opposition that are so constantly observed in England against the crown." While deploring limitations on the president's authority, as "in cases of war," he still acknowledged that "the legislative power in our constitution is greater than the executive."

In July 1797, after the French stepped up attacks on American commerce, Adams moved to resolve the crisis, much of which he had inherited. When French officials humiliated his emissaries, he asked his cabinet if he should recommend to Congress an immediate declaration of war. When the cabinet split, he decided against seeking a formalized war, sent copies of the envoys' dispatches to Congress substituting the letters W, X, Y, and Z for the French officials involved, and asked the legislators to authorize preparations for war. He also took steps to protect the lives of American citizens from French attacks and to convey publicly the image of a vigorous executive. When Congress, under Federalist pressure, published the XYZ documents, much of the public reacted with a demand for war that brought Adams a popularity he had always lacked. He gloried in the role of a warrior-leader, delivering numerous combative speeches while sporting a military uniform and a sword. He told approving crowds, "Let us have war." This bellicosity alarmed opposition Republicans. One of

them, George Logan of Pennsylvania, warned that ambitious executives launched wars more for their own aggrandizement than for the protection of their country.

Despite such sentiment, Federalists in Congress voted for warlike measures. For the first time under the Constitution, in recognition of undeclared hostilities at sea, Congress empowered the president to deploy naval forces on a scale larger than a short-term police action. When extreme Federalists pressured Adams to expand this Quasi-War, as it later became known, Adams wavered. He did so not because of an unwillingness to use more force but because he questioned his power to do so without the consent of Congress. He believed, furthermore, that minority Republicans, with some moderate Federalists, would vote against a declaration of war.

Extreme Federalists then characterized Adams as lacking the virile qualities they presumed necessary in the strong executive. Feeling betrayed by many of his own party on this issue, Adams changed his perspective toward a full-scale war. Consequently, when the French offered a second round of peace negotiations, Adams welcomed the overture. He then a sent a second mission to France, and expansion of the Quasi-War became an issue in the presidential campaign of 1800. Republicans portrayed themselves as friends of peace and Federalists as partisans of war. On 1 October the American negotiators in France signed the Convention of Mortefontaine that ended the war. News of the peace arrived in the United States too late to benefit Adams in the election. Thomas Jefferson won. Nonetheless, Adams later regarded his decision for peace as the "most disinterested and meritorious action of my life." It set a noble example for posterity but his use of naval force set a less admirable precedent. Future presidents would invoke it, under the concept of an implied constitutional power, when they employed the military unilaterally in limited hostilities against weak foes.

Even though Jefferson took office as a believer in strict construction, meaning a narrow interpretation of the Constitution, he acted on the assumption of a magnified construction of presidential power in foreign policy in the pattern set by Washington. He claimed that only the president could carry on transactions with foreign governments. Within two weeks of his inauguration, Jefferson decided to send four warships to North Africa to protect American shipping against attack by alleged pirates along the Barbary Coast. Shortly thereafter he asked his cabinet if he should seek a declaration of war from Congress. Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin responded that the president "cannot put us in a state of war," but if other nations put us in that state the executive could on his own use military force. Without consulting Congress or receiving its sanction, he waged war, or what later would be called a police action, against the Barbary States. Later, Congress did authorize the president to employ the navy at his discretion.

Meanwhile, after Jefferson learned in May 1801 that France had reacquired Louisiana from Spain, his strict constructionist views clashed with his concept of a strong executive power in foreign affairs. He considered the possibility of war to block consummation of the transfer and to safeguard the American right of deposit at New Orleans. First, in January 1801, he sent a special emissary to France with a proposal to purchase New Orleans and territory at the mouth of the Mississippi River. When Napoleon Bonaparte offered to sell all of the Louisiana Territory, Jefferson hesitated to act on his own. Soon, though, he decided to act "beyond the Constitution" and not let "metaphysical subtleties" stand in the way of a great bargain that would benefit the nation. He thus added to the precedents for extending presidential authority in international matters beyond its original constitutional limits. Under the concept of enlarged authority, Jefferson claimed, on questionable ground, Spain's West Florida as part of the Louisiana Purchase. He threatened force if Spain did not acquiesce. Although most cognizant Americans approved of his bellicosity as proper presidential vigor, he backed off from hostilities mainly because of deteriorating relations with England and France. In a crisis with Britain in June 1807, when a British warship attacked the American naval frigate *Chesapeake,* Jefferson at first appeared eager for war, but when public sentiment for it dwindled he retreated. When he left office, he retained faith in the strong executive willing to use military force with the support of Congress and in some circumstances on his own.

When James Madison took over the White House, he had the experience of having helped create the presidency and, as Jefferson's secretary of state, of having administered foreign affairs for eight years. Still, he had less confidence in executive authority than did Jefferson. He had frequently expressed the view that the president, "being a single individual, with nothing to balance his faults and deficiencies, was as likely to go

wrong as the average citizen." His views fluctuated over time, leading him later to believe "in the large construction of Executive authority," notably in the conduct of foreign affairs.

As president, Madison secretly backed American settlers who in July 1810 seized West Florida from its Spanish authorities. For a time he hesitated in annexing it to the United States, fearing such openly unilateral action would raise "serious questions as to the authority of the Executive." Within four months he overcame his qualms and took over the territory. Many Americans applauded what they saw as proper presidential power. One senator said that if the president had not taken West Florida, he would have been charged with imbecility.

For almost three years, Madison resisted pressure from hawks in his own party to take bold measures against Britain, action that would most likely precipitate war. Federalists, however, opposed hostilities. When on 1 June 1812 he requested a declaration of war, he used his power to persuade wavering legislators to support him. During the hostilities he could not, however, capitalize on that power without encountering considerable public defiance. The war went badly and became unpopular. Critics denounced him for lacking effective leadership. Some scholars would later characterize him as a failed executive and a weak war leader. Yet in annexing West Florida he had been high-handed and as tough as his predecessors.

James Monroe, too, acquired a reputation as a passive leader, but he contributed to the enlarging of presidential power in international affairs through the use of an executive agreement. In the Rush-Bagot Agreement in April 1817 with Britain that limited naval armaments on the Great Lakes, he bypassed the Senate's veto power over treaties. He thus set the precedent for unilateral action that technically operated only during the term of a president who negotiated an agreement. Nonetheless, executive agreements became an effective means for presidents to exercise power in foreign affairs without congressional consent.

Monroe faced the possibility of war with England and Spain when Andrew Jackson, at the head of a small army, in April 1818 raided East Florida and executed two English subjects. Although Monroe had not authorized the incursion, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams defended Jackson, stating that his actions involved "the Executive power to authorize war without a declaration of war by Congress." He believed that if the president disclaimed such power he would set "a dangerous example; and of evil consequences." Monroe quickly embraced this argument, calling Jackson's invasion of a neighbor's territory self-defense. Critics denounced the invasion as an act of war without the consent of Congress. "If it be not war . . . ," one of them stated, "let it be called a man-killing expedition which the President has a right to direct whenever he pleases."

Several years later, when militants wanted Monroe to defend Spain's rebelling colonies against reconquest, he decided to act on his own but not with force. On 2 December 1823, he warned European powers not to intervene in the New World struggles. This concept, in what became known as the Monroe Doctrine and accepted by future presidents, demonstrated another aspect of executive power in foreign matters, the ability to influence with words.

Through deed as well as word, Andrew Jackson acquired the reputation of a vigorous no-nonsense president in both foreign and domestic affairs. His concept of an expansive authority surfaced in an incident in 1831 with Argentine authorities in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). On the basis of slim evidence, he accused them of endangering the lives of American seal hunters. He threatened force that critics said brought the nation to the brink of war, but he did not go much beyond words.

In another dispute, when marauders from the town of Kuala Batu, Sumatra, killed three American pepper traders, Jackson used force. On his orders, on 6 February 1832, an assault force of 262 heavily armed marines attacked the town, torched it, and slaughtered more than a hundred Sumatrans, some of them women. Political opponents wondered, "If the President can direct expeditions with fire and sword against the Malays . . . why may he not have the power to do the same in reference to any other people." In this manner, "a very important provision of the Constitution may in time become a mere nullity." Defenders, though, praised Jackson for his executive energy.

Jackson also secretly aided American rebels in Texas in their fight in 1836 to secede from Mexico. In addition, he occupied militarily Mexican territory, ostensibly to protect Louisiana from cross-border raiders. John Quincy Adams, who had now abandoned his earlier advocacy of a presidential war authority, condemned this "most extraordinary power" as illegal. When Congress approved Jackson's action, Adams com-

mented, the startling "idea that the Executive Chief Magistrate has the power of involving the nation in war even without consulting Congress" had taken root. It had grown, he maintained, out of fifty years of presidents' de facto exercise of such power.

Contemporaries characterized John Tyler as a man with talents not above mediocrity while historians rate him a weak president. Yet, he came up with a tactic for placing more power in the hands of the executive at the expense of Congress that later presidents would adopt. He wanted to acquire Texas but could not obtain a two-thirds majority in the Senate for a treaty of annexation. So, he asked the whole Congress to approve annexation with joint resolution that required only a mere majority. It agreed. Opponents, who called this action an abuse of power that evaded constitutional restraint, urged impeachment. Tyler prevailed, he explained later, because in handling foreign affairs he had been "freer of the furies of factional politics than he had been in domestic affairs."

THE MEXICAN AND CIVIL WARS

James K. Polk came to the presidency belittled as another mediocrity. He vowed to reverse this popular perception by asserting vigorous leadership. He defended the annexation of Texas, with its potential for war with Mexico, and quickly stoked a quarrel with Britain over title to the Oregon territory. Despite some saber rattling, in the spring of 1846 he resolved the Oregon dispute peacefully. All the while he took a tougher stance against Mexico, which refused to recognize its loss of Texas.

Polk ordered troops to occupy disputed territory between Texas and Mexico implicitly, if not explicitly, with the intent to provoke hostilities. This tactic led a critic to ask, "Why should we not compromise our difficulties with Mexico as well as with Great Britain?" The answer could be found in the classic policy of aggressive leaders—compromise with the strong but bash the weak. So, when Mexican forces killed several of the American soldiers occupying the no-man's land north of the Rio Grande, the president claimed the Mexicans had shed American blood on American soil, an assertion disputed by Abraham Lincoln and other Whigs. Nonetheless, on 13 May 1846, a majority in Congress ratified the president's action by resolving that a state of war existed.

Dissenters charged that "a secretive, evasive, and high-handed president himself had provoked Mexico into firing the first shots." John C. Calhoun of South Carolina denounced Polk's procedure as "monstrous" because "it stripped Congress of the power of making war." The war bill "sets the example," he warned, "which will enable all future presidents to bring about a state of things, in which Congress shall be forced, without deliberation, or reflection, to declare war, however opposed to its convictions of justice or expediency." John Quincy Adams stated, "It is now established as an irreversible precedent" that the president "has but to declare that War exists, with any Nation upon Earth . . . and the War is essentially declared." Critics called the Mexican War an "Executive War" or "Mr. Polk's War." The House of Representatives voted to censure Polk for "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" bringing on war. Lincoln stated that by accepting Polk's rationale, Congress allowed the president "to make war at pleasure." Polk mustered support for his policies with a quasi-official newspaper he established in Washington, D.C., but garnered most of his popularity by winning the war at low cost and bringing vast territory into the Union. In subsequent years, his aggressive style earned him the enduring admiration of the strong-presidency cult. In all, Polk stretched the president's power as commander in chief more than had his predecessors.

Polk's immediate successors readily accepted a narrow constitutional interpretation of their powers, sometimes called the Whig conception, and faced no foreign crises that tested that view. Although as a Whig congressman Abraham Lincoln had condemned Polk's amplification of executive power, as president he exercised that power boldly in both domestic and foreign affairs. In waging war against the Confederacy, Lincoln enlarged the army and navy by decree, paid out funds from the Treasury without congressional appropriation, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and closed the mails to reasonable correspondence. He proclaimed, with questionable legality, a naval blockade of Confederate ports that embroiled the Union in unnecessary foreign quarrels. In the *Trent* affair, his government claimed exaggerated powers but backed down when confronted with the possibility of hostilities with Britain.

In September 1864, when Western powers organized an international naval force to retaliate against the Japanese for assaults on their shipping

in the Strait of Shimonoseki, Lincoln cooperated with Britain and other nations. Thus, for the first time a president authorized a U.S. vessel to join a foreign armada in a police action to punish a foreign people for harming American nationals and others. American sailors remained engaged in this kind of policing, solely on presidential initiative, for a decade.

More importantly, during the Civil War critics denounced Lincoln's exercise of presidential authority as despotic. He justified his use of military force as within the executive's power to suppress rebellion, as within the scope of his authority as commander in chief, and as necessary for enabling him to take any necessary measure to subdue the enemy. His tough measures, he told Congress, "whether strictly legal or not," were forced upon him. He prevailed because he won both popular and legislative support. Numerous contemporaries and scores of scholars since his time have defended his arbitrary rule as necessary to preserve the Union and to emancipate four million slaves. These were noble causes and hence validate his actions as proper. Lincoln gave substance to the concept that, in a crisis, the president, in the name of the people, should dominate the government. Congress and the courts should defer to him. He enhanced the power of commander in chief beyond what the framers of the Constitution had envisioned or what previous executives had done. Aggressive successors would exploit this precedent, primarily in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Unlike most presidents, Benjamin Harrison came to office reputedly without the drive to amass power. Biographers indicate that this attitude changed after a dispute principally with Germany over Samoa. After tasting executive power in a foreign confrontation, it entranced him. He used this authority harshly in a dispute in 1891 with Italy over a lynching of Italian subjects in New Orleans and in humiliating Chile in the same year in a quarrel that grew out of a barroom brawl in Valparaiso, where a mob killed two American sailors. He demanded an apology and reparations. When the Chilean government hesitated, he threatened force. Analysts maintain he trumped Congress's war power as decisively as if he had unilaterally committed troops to battle. The constitutional niceties involved did not concern most Americans, who in large numbers applauded his toughness. Harrison intervened also in a revolution in Hawaii. He denied personal involvement but backed the revolutionaries and sought to annex the islands. In later years, he again shifted his perspective on foreign policy. He told a journalist, "We have no commission from God to police the world."

Grover Cleveland also had an ambivalent attitude toward presidential power. He came to office believing in a cautious interpretation of the Constitution's clauses on executive functions. He also regarded the presidency as superior to any executive position in the world, implying it had divine sanction. In office, he bridled at legislative restraints. During his first term, Cleveland intervened with surprising toughness in a domestic uprising in Nueva Granada (later Colombia), when he exaggerated a threat to America's right of transit across the Isthmus of Panama. Unilaterally, he dispatched more than twelve hundred marines backed with artillery to help crush rebels defying the central government. Jingoes applauded his vigor but people in the region regarded him as an imperialist bully. When Germany threatened to take over Samoa, in a kind of police action, he sent three warships to the islands to preserve their independence. No hostilities ensued but the big-power confrontation continued.

In his second term, Cleveland acted with unnecessary bellicosity toward Britain in a dispute over the boundary separating British Guiana and Venezuela. Through an inflation of the Monroe Doctrine, he claimed unwarranted authority over the Western Hemisphere. Members of Congress and much of the public cheered the president's stance as a proper defense of national honor. Historians and others perceived his saber rattling, with its risk of war over a quarrel posing no threat to the United States, as a dangerous exploitation of presidential power.

In a rebellion in Cuba, Cleveland resisted pressure from Congress, journalists, and much of the concerned public to lead the country into war to force Spain to relinquish its colony. He told legislators, "There will be no war with Spain over Cuba while I am president." When one of them reminded him that Congress could on its own declare war, he responded that the Constitution also made him commander in chief. As such, he said, "I will not mobilize the army." Cleveland's perception of presidential power produced a standoff with Congress that lasted until he left office. Views vary on William McKinley's exercise of power in foreign affairs. Historians depict him as both dominant and passive. He entered the presidency with respect for congressional authority and with a circumscribed view of its powers.

Instead of asking Congress for a declaration of war against Spain, he requested discretionary authority to use the armed forces. It led a senator to ask why legislators should "give the President power to intervene and make war, if he sees fit, without declaring war at all?" Congress granted McKinley the power he desired. He served an ultimatum on Spain, blockaded Cuban ports, and thus initiated hostilities. On 24 April 1898, Spain declared war, and the following day Congress voted that a state of war had existed since the date of the blockade. After that, the story goes, McKinley shed his passivity and became an aggressive, virile leader. He willingly took on the responsibility of war and, after victory, of policing another country's possession. Also at this time, when he could not round up enough votes in the Senate to annex Hawaii by treaty, he did so with a joint resolution of Congress, following the precedent set by Tyler. McKinley then governed the islands with a presidential commission.

When Filipinos demanded the right to rule themselves, McKinley refused, and they fought the American occupiers. He then deployed large forces in an undeclared war he justified as a police action. Critics asked, "How can a president of the great republic be blind to the truth that freedom is the same, that liberty is as dear and that self-government is as much a right in the Philippines as in the United States?"

McKinley exerted his will in another military venture. As commander in chief, he sent five thousand troops to China to join an international expeditionary force to suppress Boxer rebels. Analysts point out that he intervened for political purposes, or to demonstrate hard-hitting leadership in foreign affairs in an election year. Publicly, though, he justified his "international police duty" with the now established principle of protecting American lives and property. The *Philadelphia Times,* however, termed the intervention "an absolute declaration of war by the executive without the authority or knowledge of Congress, and it is without excuse because it is not necessary." Neither constitutional restraints nor the critics mattered much because both Congress and the public approved of McKinley's conduct. Partisan biographers and analysts have viewed him as a courageous executive who maneuvered both Congress and the public into accepting presidential primacy in foreign relations. They praise him also for asserting executive power in external affairs in an era of purported congressional ascendancy.

THE STEWARDSHIP THEORY

Unlike his immediate predecessors, Theodore Roosevelt came to the presidency with an expansive view of its power and an appetite to use it. Immediately, he decided to continue the war in the Philippines, cloaking his reliance on force there with irrelevant rhetoric. For example, he justified it as part of a mission to keep "barbarous and semi-barbarous peoples" in line, or as "a necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind." The casualties in this presidential policing, which he called the most glorious war in the nation's history, were lopsided. Some 4,200 Americans died while they killed 18,000 Filipino military, and through war-induced hunger and disease well over 100,000 Filipino civilians died.

Roosevelt also claimed success for presidential power in thwarting Germany in a crisis involving debts owed by Venezuela and for extorting a favorable boundary for Alaska at Canada's expense. In the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the Algeciras Conference in 1906 over the fate of Morocco, he meddled in foreign quarrels that only remotely touched American national interests. In haste to build a canal at the Isthmus of Panama, he used executive power to order warships and marines to wrench a province from Colombia, a weak country unable to counter with either effective diplomacy or force. Critics denounced his contention that he had a right to take Colombia's land as the robber's claim of might makes right. Admirers, though, perceived his Panama diplomacy as a symbol of presidential strength and a new American internationalism.

The president used similar big-stick tactics to coerce other small Latin American countries, rationalizing his actions with what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Their "chronic wrong doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society," he explained, required him on behalf of a civilized nation, to exercise "an international police power." When he sent marines to occupy Cuba in September 1906, he defended his sidestepping of Congress with the argument "that it is for the enormous interest of this Government to strengthen and give independence to the Executive in dealing with foreign powers."

This conduct reflected Roosevelt's personal conception of executive authority. He believed "there inheres in the Presidency more power than

in any office in any great republic or constitutional monarchy in modern times." He perceived no harm "from the concentration of powers in one man's hands," boasting he had "been President most emphatically" and had "used every ounce of power there was in the office." At another time he stated, "I believe in a strong executive; I believe in power." This attitude stemmed from Lincoln's exercise of executive power that Roosevelt adopted as his own and came to be known as the stewardship theory of the presidency. It claimed that "the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers." Historians, popular writers, and others credit Roosevelt with transforming the presidency by bringing to it a popularity, an aggressiveness, a dynamic leadership, and an empowerment greater than in the past. Roosevelt's conduct marked a significant incremental change rather than a new transition from passiveness to strength.

Historians paint William Howard Taft as a passive executive who governed in the Whig tradition. Still, in foreign affairs he exercised his power aggressively in interventionist polices in Asia and Latin America, derided often as dollar diplomacy. Less flamboyantly than Roosevelt, he took upon himself the role of policeman. He ordered marines into Nicaragua and Honduras, ostensibly to protect American lives and property but basically to advance American economic interests. As in the past, Congress acquiesced in these uses of force. Some legislative skeptics, though, wanted to deny appropriations for these interventions without the consent of Congress, except in emergencies. When out of office, Taft defended his presidential style and attacked the stewardship theory. He maintained "that the President can exercise no power" unless granted by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. He had "no residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest." Even so, Taft did not regard himself a passive leader.

Well before reaching the White House, Woodrow Wilson held clear-cut views on presidential power. As a young academic, he regarded Congress as possessing the dominant federal power and the chief executive as feeble. Four years before running for president, he reversed his outlook on how much power a president could command in competition with Congress. Once a president assumed control with popular backing, he maintained, no single force could withstand him. He "is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit." Wilson believed the president could exercise his greatest power in foreign affairs, primarily because of his ability to initiate policy. In sum, Wilson maintained that the executive "office will be as big and as influential as the man who occupies it."

In 1914, in a minor incident involving American sailors and a Mexican revolutionary leader Wilson detested, he decided to use military force. He claimed constitutional authority to act as he wished "without recourse to the Congress" but said he preferred to have its consent. The House approved his request. Before the Senate acted on the measure, however, a German ship with arms for revolutionaries headed for Veracruz, and Wilson, on his assumed authority as commander in chief, ordered warships to bombard the city and troops to occupy it. The legislators then consented to a fait accompli. Outside Washington, most observers found no satisfying justification for this violence. Many perceived it as a capricious use of executive power against a feeble opponent.

Wilson relied on the same personal conviction of being compelled to act in support of a righteous cause in policing Haitians. When he wanted to extend the occupation of Haiti, his secretary of state told him international law could not justify it but humane reasons might. The president said he too feared "we have not the legal authority to do what we apparently ought to do." Nonetheless, he proceeded with the occupation. He reported his action to Congress only after he had taken control. As usual, by now in such unilateral intervention, Congress acquiesced. With similar reasoning, Wilson policed the Dominican Republic with U.S. troops commanded by a naval officer.

In 1916, when Mexican rebels command by Francisco "Pancho" Villa raided American border towns, raising demands in Congress and elsewhere for retaliation and even war, Wilson resisted. Then, for a number reasons, including an assumed need to appear tough to an electorate that would soon vote on his bid for a second term, he ordered an invasion of Mexico to capture and punish Villa. It brought the nation to the brink of war before the president pulled back to face a crisis with Germany.

When World War I erupted, Wilson proclaimed neutrality and, despite his feelings of kinship with England, tried to maintain a balanced policy toward the belligerents. When he took a

hard position against Germany because of its submarine warfare against Allied and neutral shipping, his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in protest. He said the country opposed the intervention in Mexico and to being drawn into the war in Europe. Nonetheless, on his own authority in defiance of Congress and "without special warrant of law," the president armed merchant ships and took other measures against Germany.

Finally, Wilson declared German submarine attacks "a warfare against mankind" but did not ask Congress to declare war. Instead, he requested it to declare Germany's actions "nothing less than a war against the . . . United States," asserting that "the status of a belligerent" had been "thrust upon" the nation. People from all walks of life begged the legislators to vote against war, but Congress did as the president desired. As some biographers and others point out, Wilson's will and his exercise of presidential power stand out as decisive in taking the nation from neutrality to armed neutrality and then to war. Immediately, as commander in chief he requested, and Congress granted, vast authority to mobilize the nation's resources, a power he used dictatorially because he believed it necessary to win the war. He curbed civil liberties and squelched dissenters at home more fiercely than had Lincoln.

At his own discretion, the president also thrust 14,000 troops into Russia to fight Bolshevism, or what skeptics dubbed "Mr. Wilson's little war with Russia." On his own authority, he also dispatched troops to Manchuria. Critics attacked these interventions as usurping congressional authority. In 1919, Wilson broke the tradition of having the secretary of state and others negotiate with foreign leaders by himself leading the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. He thus set the precedent for presidents to participate in summit conferences. At Paris he exploited the prestige of his office and the force of his personality to achieve personal goals he identified with those of the nation. In this instance, his use of power backfired. When, as a semiparalyzed invalid, he insisted that the Senate approve the Treaty of Versailles with the League of Nations embedded in it, his exploitation of presidential power came to an end that he refused to recognize. He had lost the confidence of both Congress and the public.

In subsequent years, evaluators differed sharply, and sometimes emotionally, over Wilson's wielding of power in foreign relations. Friendly biographers and historians viewed his extension of presidential power, mostly in foreign affairs, as virtuous. They contend he performed extraordinarily well and praise him as a splendid example of the strong, decisive executive. Critics argue that he abused his powers, pointing out he had resorted to force more often than any previous president. Regardless of the varying perspectives on his handling of power, Wilson set new precedents for expanding the president's role in foreign affairs and domestically in matters related to war.

In part as a backlash against Wilson's perceived arrogance in wielding power, the electorate chose Warren G. Harding and then Calvin Coolidge to lead the nation. Both men usually left management of foreign affairs to their secretaries of state and diplomats in the field. Coolidge, though, drew on presidential authority according to precedent in what he termed police actions to protect American lives and property abroad. When he intervened in China with warships and marines, he said that the civil turmoil there had compelled him to employ force. When he deployed some 5,500 marines in Nicaragua, ostensibly to protect Americans and their investments but especially to battle revolutionaries he called bandits, Democrats called the clash his private war. Coolidge shot back that his actions no more constituted making war than those of a policeman carrying out his job. He demonstrated again that even a weak president could unilaterally use his power abroad on the basis of ideology or a personal agenda.

Herbert Hoover believed "the increasing ascendancy of the Executive over the Legislative arm . . . has run to great excesses" and that the legislature's authority "must be respected and strengthened." In his memoirs he stated that the "constitutional division of powers . . . was not designed as a battleground to display the prowess of Presidents." Yet as president, he wanted to shape foreign policy in his own way. He repudiated dollar diplomacy and promised not to use his foreign relations power to intervene in small states, as in Latin America. When Japan in 1931 seized Manchuria, he withheld recognition of the conquest but resisted pressure to impose economic sanctions on Japan because he believed they would trigger war. He opposed employing force because "it would be a recommendation that Congress should declare war." Contemporaries and numerous historians mark him as a failed president because he embraced what they called isolationism and refused to exercise his power expan-

sively to combat the Great Depression or to police Japanese, Cubans, and others. Yet he did not act as a weakling. Unlike some other presidents, he used his power in foreign affairs to keep the nation at peace when some advisers wanted to court war.

THE WAR POWER AS PREROGATIVE

Franklin D. Roosevelt believed a president should exude strength and use his power boldly to achieve what he perceived as desirable goals. In his inaugural address in 1933, alluding to the nation's economic crisis he said, "I shall ask Congress for . . . broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."

From the start, Roosevelt had to contend with the isolationist and revisionist theory that America's intervention in World War I had stemmed from a malign presidential discretion in foreign affairs. In 1936 his perspective on executive authority received a boost from the Supreme Court case *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation*. This case involved the right of the president to ban the sale of arms to a belligerent, in this instance to Bolivia during the Chaco War with Paraguay. The Court's ruling, in the words of Justice George Sutherland, described the president incorrectly as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." This decision would confer an erroneous legitimacy beyond the Constitution on the unilateral actions of executives in matters of war and peace. In contrast, the legislative branch wanted to prevent the president from manipulating the nation into war.

So, in legislation known as the neutrality acts, Congress placed restraints on the president's power in foreign affairs. Roosevelt disliked the laws but accepted them because they might quiet the public fear of "excessive fear of presidential control." In a speech in Chicago on 5 October 1937, he spoke out against the neutrality laws as favoring aggressors, whom he wanted to quarantine. He also expressed alarm over a referendum movement headed by Louis Ludlow, a Democratic representative from Indiana, that proposed a constitutional amendment requiring voter approval before a declaration of war could go into effect. Roosevelt contended it "would cripple any President in his conduct of our foreign relations." His opposition proved critical in defeating it.

As war loomed in Europe, Roosevelt became increasingly assertive about his foreign policy prerogatives, announcing in January 1939 he would as commander in chief provide arms to Britain and France for defense against Nazi Germany. In September, when Adolf Hitler triggered World War II by invading Poland, the president's standing in opinion polls shot up. Increasingly, he acted in foreign matters independently of Congress, as when Britain requested old warships in exchange for some of its bases in the Western Hemisphere. Even though legislation prohibited such a transaction, Roosevelt made use of Sutherland's opinion, circumvented the Senate, and made the deal. Critics condemned the swap as a breach of the Constitution and violation of international law, but it stood.

Proclaiming the United States the arsenal of democracy, Roosevelt in March 1941 persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act, which permitted him to give arms to beleaguered Britain. Critics called it a qualified declaration of war and the most sweeping delegation of legislative power ever made to a president. When German submarines sank vessels carrying American munitions, he ordered the navy to patrol the North Atlantic sea lanes to protect the shipping. Patrol in this case functioned as a euphemism for convoy, an act of war under international law. By unilateral executive action he ordered troops to occupy Greenland, imposed increasingly stiff economic sanctions against Japan, and took over Iceland. By November, clashes with Axis submarines brought the United States into an undeclared naval war with Nazi Germany, a belligerent status he did not make clear to the American people. On his own authority, he also promised armed support to the British, Dutch, and Thais in Asia if Japan struck at them.

When Japan on 7 December 1941 attacked the United States, with Germany and Italy then declaring war, the president asked Congress to recognize that a state of war already existed. Political opponents and others charged him with leading the nation into war through deception via the back door of Asia rather than Europe and by maneuvering the Japanese into firing the first shot because he could not obtain enough support for a congressional declaration of war. No one had proof for these theories, but the president's supporters as well as his critics acknowledge that step by step he exploited his foreign relations power to move the nation toward active belligerency.

Roosevelt also utilized his augmented power to conduct the war with virtually dictatorial authority. He seldom referred to Congress, violated civil liberties by incarcerating with an executive order thousands of Japanese Americans, inaugurated secret security files on government employees, and instituted price controls. "This total war . . . ," he told Congress, "makes the use of executive power far more essential than in any previous war." He added, "I shall not hesitate to use every power vested in me" to win the war. With Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin at Yalta, he slipped around Congress with personal promises on territorial questions and international organization. He assumed full responsibility for developing the atomic bomb. Viewing himself as the nation's steward and his leadership role as personal and institutional, he rarely allowed anything to stand in the way of his exercise of power. The courts supported that role, upholding as constitutional every wartime measure he took. Nonetheless, his hoarding of power alarmed the enemies of executive aggrandizement.

In thirteen years, Roosevelt raised presidential power in foreign affairs to a level higher than that reached by any of his predecessors. As had Lincoln and Wilson, he upset the constitutional balance of checks and balances using the same justification of the need to rescue the nation from a great peril. Various scholars maintain he transformed the presidency, or, at least in the area of foreign policy, brought changes to it that have endured and influenced successors.

The public, together with academics who admired the strong president regardless of how he stretched his constitutional powers, welcomed the changes and praised Roosevelt and his leadership style. This admiration, along with the cumulative effect of the previous presidents who had swelled executive authority in dealing with foreign affairs, laid the basis for a kind of cult that exalted the presidency at the expense of Congress. The flowering of this cult could be seen during the presidency of Harry S. Truman and the start of the Cold War.

Roosevelt had kept Truman in the dark on the intricacies of foreign policy. For instance, Truman did not learn the details of the atomic arms project until several weeks into office, but he soon made one of his most controversial foreign policy decisions. He ordered the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and then of Nagasaki. Skeptics denounced this action as ethically wrong and unnecessary, but he took full responsibility for it as necessary to save lives. Thereafter, he became accustomed to wielding power and was determined to prove himself a take-charge executive.

Truman asked Congress to extend the executive's wartime power as Roosevelt had possessed it. In December 1945 the legislators agreed and Truman carried that authority into the Cold War. Largely at his insistence, in the Atomic Energy Act of August 1946, Congress placed control over nuclear weapons in the president's hands. Proponents of the strong-executive concept then began to argue that atomic weapons and the need for quick response to foreign dangers increased the need for presidents to have more power as commander in chief.

In January 1946, with an executive directive, Truman created a central intelligence agency group directly responsible to the president. In July 1947, in the National Security Act, Congress converted the group into the Central Intelligence Agency, later freed it from budgetary controls imposed on other agencies, and with it amplified presidential power abroad. In addition to analyzing intelligence, the CIA quickly engaged in covert activities. It thus came to serve as a shield for secret executive decisions on the use of military force. The legislation also established the National Security Council, a body designed to advise the president on all matters affecting military power and national security as well as foreign policy. Since the law, amended in 1949, required neither the council nor the national security adviser to be approved by Congress or to report to it, the act had the effect of enhancing the president's power in deploying the military on his own and on embarking unilaterally on foreign policy ventures that could lead to war.

As an avid anticommunist, Truman used his power to embark on a program, usually called the Truman Doctrine, of containing Soviet expansion, at first in Turkey and Greece and then in Western Europe with the Marshall Plan. This program, approved by Congress, became the vehicle for another expansion of executive authority in foreign affairs. It had precedents, as in Theodore Roosevelt's policing in the Caribbean, but since Truman viewed communism as a global threat, he asserted a right to intervene militarily anywhere in the world when he deemed the action proper. He converted the nation's military machine into the world's foremost anticommunist police force with himself as its commander in chief.

During a crisis that began when the Soviets in June 1948 blockaded Berlin, 110 miles into East

THREE VIEWS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER

"In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature and not to the executive department. . . . War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will which is to direct it. . . . In war the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. . . . Hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence: hence it has grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war."

—James Madison, "Helvidius" no. 4, 14 September 1793 —

"Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever *he* shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, *whenever he may choose to say* he deems it necessary for such purpose—and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix *any limit* to his power in this respect. . . . Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. . . . [The Constitution maintains] that *no one man* should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us."

—Abraham Lincoln, 15 February 1848 —

"When the push of a button may mean obliteration of countless humans, the President of the United States must be forever on guard against any inclination on his part to impetuosity; to arrogance; to headlong action; to expediency; to facile maneuvers; even to the popularity of an action as opposed to the rightness of an action. He cannot worry about headlines; how the next opinion poll will rate him; how his political future will be affected."

—Dwight D. Eisenhower, 4 November 1960 —

Germany, the question of presidential power came up in the courts. As usual, they upheld executive activism, ruling that "the war power does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities." Justice Robert H. Jackson, who had justified the stretching of executive authority in the destroyer-bases deal, objected to "this vague, undefined and undefinable 'war power'" that presidents "invoked in haste" to deal with crises, often of their own making. "No one will question," he wrote, "that this power is the most dangerous one to free government in the whole catalogue of powers."

Truman nonetheless pressed ahead with his Cold War policy. He negotiated and persuaded Congress to approve a series of multilateral treaties that ended the nation's traditional policy of avoiding formal alliances in time of peace. Consequently, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947, known also as the Rio Pact), the charter of the Organization of American States (1948), and the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) placed more of the war-making power in the executive branch.

In January 1950, as part of his anticommunist crusade, Truman on his own authorized the building of a hydrogen bomb. Five months later, he made another swift decision of worldwide significance. When communist forces from the north invaded the Republic of Korea to the south, he intervened militarily. In rushing into hostilities, he circumvented both Congress and the United Nations Security Council. When opponents in Congress wondered if Truman had arrogated to himself the authority of declaring war, he denied being at war. Using a traditional euphemism, he called the conflict a police action. Later, though, he contended that "when a nation is at war, its leader . . . ought to have all the tools available for that purpose." When pressed to seek a congressional declaration, he dismissed the idea because public opinion polls indicated broad support for his stance. When the war went badly, with mounting costs and casualties, the polls reported a sharp decline in his popularity and support for what many called "Truman's War."

As the discontent grew, so did distrust of presidential authority as wielded by Roosevelt and Truman. In consequence, in February 1951 a movement for a two-term cap for any president succeeded in making the limitation part of the Constitution as the Twenty-second Amendment. As time would reveal, it did not curb presidential power in foreign matters. In April 1952, when Truman seized steel mills under the guise of his war power, his elastic use of executive authority received another setback. In one of its rare decisions against a president in time of war, the Supreme Court ruled the takeover unconstitutional because it considered neither the Korean War nor the Cold War full-scale emergencies that justified such an arrogation of executive power.

Again, a president had amplified the foreign policy powers of his office beyond his predecessors. Where others had employed the military on their own in small ventures abroad or had maneuvered Congress and the public into supporting major wars, Truman, without congressional assent, initiated a large-scale war against a sovereign nation backed by two great powers. He and his advisers cited earlier small commitments of troops as precedents for his actions, but legal scholars pointed out that reliance on previous executive breaches of the constitutional war power did not legitimate subsequent violations. He and his advisers, such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson, also claimed that as commander in chief he possessed a prerogative to initiate war. Other presidents had also theorized about inherent power, but he became the first to exploit that concept as though it were fact. Regardless of the questioned legitimacy of Truman's use of the foreign policy power, other presidents would follow his lead.

COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM

Dwight D. Eisenhower sought the presidency because he disliked the assaults on what he perceived, in his words, as "the President's constitutional rights, in peacetime, to deploy and dispose American forces according to his best judgment and without the specific approval of Congress." He regarded those rights as "unassailable" and wanted to thwart politicians in his own party, the Republicans, eager to diminish executive authority. He also had a Whiglike conception of the office based on his conviction that Franklin Roosevelt and Truman had upset the proper balance between the branches of government at the expense of Congress. So, despite his determination to protect executive authority, contemporaries viewed him as opposed to aggrandizing the presidency.

In practice, Eisenhower, like Jefferson, did not allow abstract considerations to stand in the way of actions he perceived appropriate. To end the Korean War, for example, he informed the North Koreans through several channels that he would employ atomic weapons against them if they refused an armistice. He acted with similar determination when conservatives in his own party, led by Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, tried, with a proposed constitutional amendment, to eliminate the president's power to make executive agreements. Eisenhower contended the measure would cripple executive authority in world affairs. "The President," he insisted, "must not be deprived of his historic position as spokesman for the nation in its relations with other countries." His opposition proved critical in the amendment's narrow defeat.

When the French, involved in an anticolonial war in Southeast Asia, begged the president to intervene to save troops beleaguered in a fortress in northern Vietnam, despite his deep anticommunist convictions, Eisenhower refused. "Part of my fundamental concept of the Presidency," he explained, "is that we have a constitutional government and only when there is a sudden, unforeseen emergency should the President put us into war without congressional sanction." Despite this perspective and contrary to what many assumed, Eisenhower was not a dove. He was willing to use armed force in Vietnam but only on his own terms.

At the same time, Eisenhower expanded use of the CIA as a weapon in covert Cold War armed ventures. With secret anticommunist operations he put aside the constitutional restraints on the presidency he professed to value. He ordered the CIA to topple Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran's nationalist prime minister, which with local help it did. Eisenhower also employed covert violence to overthrow the legally elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, a populist he viewed as a communist. These episodes reveal that despite what contemporary pundits perceived as passive qualities in Eisenhower's leadership, when determined to attain his own foreign policy objectives, he would use a heavy hand.

Eisenhower exercised his power as commander in chief more openly when the People's Republic of China threatened to attack Chiang

Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Taiwan (Formosa). When the mainland communists bombed Quemoy and Matsu, two offshore islands held by the Nationalists, his military advisers urged retaliatory strikes. Ike said no, indicating that against a major foe he would not use the war power lightly. Although Eisenhower assumed that in this situation as commander in chief he had authority to act on his own, he asked Congress for consent to deal with any emergency that might subsequently arise in the Taiwan Strait. He wanted to avoid the divisive debate that had followed Truman's intervention in Korea. Congress responded with a joint resolution authorizing him to use the armed forces "as he deemed necessary" to protect Taiwan and other islands in friendly hands. In voting this blank check, Congress diminished its own war power, enhanced that of the president, and opened a door for later presidents to seek similar authority.

Meanwhile, with a secret CIA operation the president had launched a program to foment rebellion in Eastern European countries that would liberate them from Soviet domination. Then, in October 1956, as he campaigned for reelection, students in Budapest, Hungary, revolted. When Soviet troops crushed the uprising, Eisenhower admitted he could do nothing tangible to aid them without risking a major war, thus recognizing the limitations on executive power. His decision also reflected what he had stated many times, that he would "never be guilty of any kind of action that can be interpreted as war until Congress, which has the constitutional authority, says so."

The foreign relations power also became an issue in a concurrent crisis. It began when Egyptian strongman Gamal Abdel Nasser seized the Suez Canal from its European owners. On 29 October 1956, Israeli troops, followed by British and French forces, invaded Egypt without informing their American ally. An angry Eisenhower condemned the attack, but when the Soviets threatened intervention, he ordered a partial mobilization of the armed forces. In addition, with economic and diplomatic pressure, he compelled the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw from Egypt. In this situation, he exercised his foreign policy power unilaterally, swiftly, and decisively.

Next, fearing that the Russians might still resort to force in the Middle East, Eisenhower moved to deter them. As during the Taiwan Strait crisis, he asked Congress to authorize him to employ the armed forces to defend the "independence and integrity" of Middle Eastern countries menaced by "communist armed aggression." After two months of debate, the legislators voted him another blank check, this one termed the Eisenhower Doctrine, that endorsed his role as a global, anti-Marxist policeman. A year later, the president applied the doctrine indirectly to a civil war in Lebanon. In his only overt intervention, in July 1958, on his authority as commander in chief, he ordered troops to invade Lebanon. Insisting he had not committed an act of war, Eisenhower argued he had acted within his constitutional authority and in keeping with executive precedents. Critics, though, maintained he had initiated a presidential war. At the same time, he used the CIA in a secret intervention in Indonesia designed to crumble the regime of Achmad Sukarno, considered too cozy with communists. Popular sentiment could speak less clearly on Eisenhower's overt and covert policy toward a left-wing revolutionary government in Cuba headed by Fidel Castro. At his discretion, the CIA clandestinely launched commando strikes against Castro, hatched schemes to assassinate him, and planned, with Cuban exiles in Florida, an invasion of the island. Before Eisenhower could unleash this operation, his presidency ended.

Analysts differ in their assessments of Eisenhower as president and his use of power in foreign affairs. Some say he delegated too much of his authority while others portray him as a strong executive who exercised his power with a hidden hand. He claimed to have had the final word in every major foreign policy issue and hence had served as an activist president. He also believed that he had curbed executive aggrandizement. Yet, through his aggressive anticommunist ventures, his covert operations, and the global reach of American power, under him the power of the president in foreign affairs as commander in chief continued to rise.

During the presidential election campaign of 1960, John F. Kennedy announced he would "be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word" and that the president should "exercise the fullest powers of his office—all that are specified and some that are not." He also carried into office a preference for dealing with foreign over domestic affairs. For instance, he devoted most of his inaugural address to the Cold War. "Domestic policy," he later repeated, "can only defeat us, foreign policy can kill us."

Into his official family Kennedy brought intellectual young zealots "full of belligerence," as one of them later remarked, who admired the concept of the tough, activist executive. With them he quickly immersed himself in the details of foreign policy, deciding at the outset to continue Eisenhower's covert plan to crush Cuba's Castro. Most of Kennedy's intimate advisers backed the venture. Among the few who knew of it, Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, objected. He pointed out that "the Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger in the heart." Dismissing this advice, Kennedy continued the practice of using the CIA to harass Cubans and prepare for an invasion, which, without the consent of Congress, he launched on 17 April 1961, on Cuba's south shore at the Bay of Pigs. It turned into a fiasco, for which the president publicly accepted blame. Despite the bloody blunder, polls showed that his popularity shot up. In a private discussion of the disaster, he asked, "It really is true that foreign affairs is the only important issue for a President to handle, isn't it? . . . Who gives a shit if the minimum wage is $1.15 or $1.25 in comparison to something like this?" As confidants noted, Castro then became a personal affront, an obsession that Kennedy transmuted into a threat to American security. He persevered, therefore, in covert efforts to overthrow the dictator.

At the same time, Kennedy had to deal with the Berlin question. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev renewed demands that Allied occupiers depart the city and set a deadline with an implied threat of war if not met. With a determination to show toughness, Kennedy prepared for possible hostilities. He expanded the armed forces, ordered reservists to active duty, and asked Congress for an additional $3 billion in military spending, which it granted. When this crisis passed, he again focused on Castro.

State Department officials and others reported the presence of Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba. Kennedy warned that if the communist buildup menaced American security, he would take forceful action. He said that "as President and Commander in Chief" he had full authority to act on his own. But he did request Congress to endorse the use of arms. It agreed overwhelmingly with a joint resolution. On 14 October 1962, when a U-2 surveillance plane reported Soviet launching pads in Cuba with medium-range missiles targeted on American cities, the crisis deepened. Initially, as his closest advisers urged, the president wanted to respond with air strikes on Cuba and even possibly on the Soviet Union. After six days of discussion, he chose to ring Cuba with a naval blockade he called a quarantine. If the Soviets challenged it, the world would face its first nuclear war. Except for a few friendly members whom the president had informed of his decisions, Congress had no role in this war scare. Fortunately, Khrushchev backed down and the crisis passed. With toughness, the president appeared to have won a great diplomatic victory.

Kennedy's admirers praised his behavior as brilliant, as an example of "genuine statesmanship" that in thirteen critical days "dazzled the world," and as the greatest achievement of his presidency. They cited his conduct as validation for supreme presidential control over foreign policy and war-making in the nuclear age. Skeptics, and even several close advisers, thought differently. They perceived his rattling of nuclear arms as irresponsible and reckless. One critic commented that he risked "blowing the world to hell in order to sweep a few Democrats into office" in forthcoming congressional elections. Others questioned the wisdom of placing so much power in the hands of one man. As for the public, that power did not bother it much. Polls showed that after the crisis, Kennedy's approval rating climbed from 61 to 84 percent. Later, when Soviet sources revealed the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba, Kennedy's conduct proved more prudent than either the public or detractors had realized.

Elsewhere, Kennedy continued his armed interventionism, as in the Dominican Republic to get rid of an aging dictator and to aid Joaquín Belaguer, a leader he thought would edge the republic toward democracy. When elections brought to power a left-wing intellectual, Kennedy refused to help him because he saw him as tainted with communism. As in other instances, the personal perception of a president, as much as policy considerations, governed use of the foreign policy power.

This happened also in Southeast Asia, where Kennedy accepted Eisenhower's domino theory that if communism prevailed in one country, as in Laos or Vietnam, it would spread over the entire region. Kennedy believed that if he tolerated communism there, he could not win reelection. So, he poured economic and military assistance into the anticommunist Republic of Vietnam. In addition, he sent in military advisers, who ferried troops into battle against local communists called Viet-

cong and against northern communists. Ultimately, he committed more than 16,000 troops to the anticommunist side in the civil wars in Laos and Vietnam.

Kennedy left a mixed legacy. Strong-presidency believers praise him as a vigorous, charismatic leader who understood the true art of statecraft. Other appraisers charge him with crisis mongering, escalating the arms race, and being enamored with military power. His unilateral use of power abroad, his conviction that he must make his mark primarily in foreign affairs, and his belief in an exceptional authority in those affairs, reflected the prevailing public approval of an expansive presidential power.

PRESIDENTIAL WAR IN VIETNAM

As an experienced politician, Lyndon B. Johnson moved swiftly to exploit this sentiment. Johnson told an aide, "Just you remember this: There's only two kinds at the White House. There's elephants and there's pissants. And I'm the only elephant." This attitude encapsulated Johnson's conception of the presidency. He saw the president as the initiator of major legislation, the creator of the national agenda, and the dominant force in foreign affairs. "The congressional role in national security," he maintained, "is not to act but to respond to the executive." He proceeded with this perspective in dealing with the warfare in Southeast Asia. "I am not going to lose Vietnam," he told an ambassador. Accordingly he sent more troops to South Vietnam and instituted secret incursions along North Vietnam's coast and naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. This activity led to escalating clashes with North Vietnamese forces. After an alleged second torpedo boat attack on U.S. naval vessels, without verifying the reality of the assault and determined to give the communists "a real dose," Johnson ordered massive bombing of North Vietnamese coastal bases. Then he asked Congress for a resolution, modeled on that handed to Eisenhower in the Taiwan crises. With it, Congress promised to support all measures he would take against armed attacks or to prevent aggression. Only two senators objected to this open-ended grant of power. One of them pointed out that "the Constitution does not permit the President to wage war at his discretion."

Johnson argued he possessed that power but wanted it reinforced by the resolution, which he compared to Grandma's nightshirt because "it covered everything." He also made clear the decision to use force "was mine—and mine alone." On this basis, initially with high public approval as measured by polls, he steadily enlarged the American war in Vietnam. Slowly, though, an antiwar movement gained support and spread over the country. Some of its leaders accused him of seeking support for a war that involved no vital national interest by lying to the public.

Briefly, Johnson's intervention in a civil conflict in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 shifted attention from the Vietnam debate. He gave a variety of reasons for deploying 23,000 troops on the island. Most often, he said he acted to avert a communist takeover and to protect endangered American lives. The occupiers found no evidence of a communist plot or peril to American lives. At home and abroad, jurists and others denounced the intervention as a violation of international law. Domestic critics pointed out that he had invaded without seeking congressional consent. He responded that he merely exercised what had become traditional executive power in foreign affairs.

Johnson offered similar rationalization for making war in Vietnam. He cited the Tonkin Gulf resolution as evidence of congressional support for his policy but asserted that he did not need its approval because the "Commander in Chief has all the authority that I am exercising." In the summer of 1966, as the public's approval rating of his presidency plummeted, he said defiantly, "I'm not going down in history as the first American President who lost a war." He persisted in viewing conflict largely in terms of his own stake in it, which he stretched to identify with the national interest. He spoke of "my troops" and of his war that he would run his way.

In an effort to refute critics, Johnson ordered the State Department to prepare a tract justifying the war. Dutifully, a subordinate argued that the president had ample authority to use force on his own, to decide what constituted an attack on the United States, and thus to commit troops anywhere in the world for such defense. He cited the Quasi-War and the Korean War as precedents, thus in the latter case using an example of dubious constitutionality to sanction another case of questionable validity. All the while, antiwar activists denounced Johnson as a "slob" and "murderer." This personal disdain stained the presidency. Reverence for it declined. Polls indicated that about half the public considered the war a mistake. Johnson took criticism personally,

dismissing it usually as unpatriotic. He placed antiwar leaders under surveillance and violated their civil rights. At one point he blurted, "This is not Johnson's war. This is America's war."

Finally, much of the public and various legislators, even in the president's own party, could stand no more. They said he had come to exercise "virtually plenary power to determine foreign policy" and "it is time for us to end the continual erosion of legislative authority." Gallup polls showed that the public view of the war as wrong had risen to 79 percent. Then, when a primary in New Hampshire indicated that Johnson could not win reelection, he withdrew his candidacy. The pubic did not turn against Johnson for using power illegitimately, for lying, or for waging war unilaterally. They wanted him out because of a failed use of the foreign affairs power in a war with high casualties and no benefits. Americans had tolerated, and even praised, comparable use of the war power by other presidents. None, though, had exploited that power as outrageously as he did. With that power he ran amok but did not, as some analysts claim, weaken the presidency. Although Richard M. Nixon, in his second bid for the presidency in 1968, benefited from the backlash against Johnson's Vietnam policy, he too believed in the concept of executive supremacy in foreign affairs. Like Johnson, Nixon was a man of vaulting ambition well known for his hawkish views on the war. In his election campaign he stressed that "the next President must take an activist view of his office" and have a strong will. Nixon maintained that bold initiatives abroad always had come from strong presidents. In office, he acted on that premise.

From the start, Vietnam clouded Nixon's administration. Even though he had promised to terminate the entanglement there, at his inaugural, antiwar demonstrators—shouting "Four more years of death!"—pelted his limousine with debris. Undeterred, he reshaped Johnson's Vietnam policy while retaining its substance. He continued an air war in Laos and peace negotiations in Paris, began sustained bombing of North Vietnam, and launched secret air strikes in neutral Cambodia. We must, he explained, negotiate from strength and not withdraw unilaterally from the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Alarmed senators then passed a resolution that deplored past executive excesses and recognized no presidential commitment to continue the war. Claiming that as commander in chief he possessed sole authority over the armed forces and could order them abroad without specific congressional approval, Nixon ignored the resolution. He thereby charted a collision course with Congress. He did pull some troops out of Vietnam, but peace advocates complained about the slow pace. As antiwar demonstrations escalated, Nixon bristled. As had Johnson, he declared he would not be the "first American President to lose a war." Polls taken at this time, October 1969, indicated majority support for his position.

In April of the next year, without consulting Congress, the president launched an invasion of Cambodia, justifying it with various explanations such as routing North Vietnamese ensconced there. "Bold decisions," he said, "make history." A substantial segment of the public viewed the action differently, as an unwarranted widening of the war. Peace demonstrations escalated across the nation. To counter the furor, Nixon asked the State Department to make a case for his decision. Accordingly, an assistant attorney general, William H. Rehnquist, argued that as commanders in chief, presidents had the authority to order troops "into conflict with foreign powers on their own initiative" and even to deploy them "in a way that invited hostile retaliation." Hence, Nixon had acted properly. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. dismissed Rehnquist's contention as "persiflage"—compromising historical and legal scholarship for service to his client. Congress then revived an endeavor to restrain the president's assumed power to make war unilaterally. The Senate passed a bill forbidding involvement in Cambodia without its consent and repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Nixon dismissed these measures, avowing that as commander in chief he could maintain the warfare on his own. At this juncture, for seemingly personal reasons, Nixon unilaterally made another controversial foreign relations decision. In a war between India and Pakistan that broke out in December 1971, despite considerable sentiment for at least neutrality, he sided with Pakistan. He ordered a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India. Critics pointed out that the United States had no vital stake in the conflict, yet he alienated India and risked possible war with the Soviets, who sided with India. In February he did enhance his image as a maker of foreign policy with a trip to the People's Republic of China that initiated a détente with that old foe.

In December 1972, Nixon ordered twelve days of around-the-clock bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. Critics denounced it as war by tantrum,

as violence beyond all reason, and called him a maddened tyrant. He responded that if the Russians and Chinese thought "they were dealing with a madman," they might then "force North Vietnam into a settlement before the world was consumed by larger war." Finally, public pressure drove him in January to conclude cease-fire accords with North Vietnam, but he continued secret bombing raids in Cambodia and Laos as well as aid to anti-communist regimes in the region. When these actions became known, Congress decided to enact "definite, unmistakable procedures to prevent future undeclared wars." It compelled Nixon to end hostile actions in Indochina.

Meanwhile, the Cold War presidential practice of covertly aiding conservative candidates for high office in foreign countries backfired. Nixon had directed the CIA to block Salvador Allende Gossens, a socialist legally elected president in Chile, from taking office. When that effort failed, Nixon ordered the CIA to organize a military coup against Allende that on 12 September 1973 led to his murder and to a right-wing dictatorship in Chile.

In October, as Nixon's involvement in the Watergate scandal came to light, the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt and Syria erupted. He airlifted supplies to Israel. To counter an alleged Soviet plan to intervene, he ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. forces, including nuclear strike forces. Critics regarded this order as unnecessarily drastic. They suspected he issued it to divert public attention from his troubles with Congress, or as an example of using the foreign policy power to deal with domestic political exigencies. Then, on 7 November, after decades of debate over the war-making capacity in the president's foreign-affairs power, Congress overrode Nixon's veto to adopt the War Powers Resolution. It required the president, in the absence of a declaration of war, to report to Congress within forty-eight hours after ordering troops into a foreign conflict. Unless the legislators approved a longer deployment, he had to withdraw the force within sixty days. The law allowed an extension of thirty days if the president deemed that time necessary for a safe withdrawal. It also placed curbs on his ability to circumvent Congress, to deploy armed forces in hostile situations, and to engage in covert military ventures. But by permitting the president to deploy forces for a limited time without congressional consent, it subverted the aim of collective decision making in foreign policy. As skeptics pointed out, the resolution delegated to the president more power in foreign affairs than the Constitution allowed. It granted him freedom to wage war for several months anywhere in the world as he chose.

Despite his critics and facing impeachment, Nixon contended he had acted much like other strong executives who had taken for granted an inherent right to employ their foreign policy power to intervene unilaterally in other nations, especially weak ones. They, too, had lied, acted covertly, and had skirted Congress. Only he suffered punishment, and only because of evidence uncovered in secret tapes he made of White House conversations about his involvement in the Watergate scandal. This was true, but he did abuse the foreign policy power more than his predecessors.

While out of office, Nixon continued to defend his extravagant conception of the strong executive. He contended that in wartime the president has "certain extraordinary powers" that make otherwise illegal acts lawful when taken to preserve the nation. In this perspective, the president alone decided what served the best interest of the nation. Critics maintained that with such views and his behavior, primarily in foreign affairs, he demonstrated that unrestrained power in the hands of a paranoid president could endanger democratic government.

REVIVAL OF THE STRONG PRESIDENCY CULT

On taking over the presidency in 1974 after Nixon's resignation, Gerald R. Ford made clear he would continue his predecessor's war policy and that he had no intention of reducing what he perceived as the executive's power in foreign affairs. In his first speech before Congress, he expressed briefly his view of that authority: "Throughout my public service, I have upheld all our Presidents when they spoke for my country to the world. I believe the Constitution commands this." For example, he continued covert operations. So, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Congress placed minor restraints on this practice. With this law, for the first time it openly recognized the president's assumed power to engage in covert ventures in the name of national security. Congress thus augmented the executive's power to initiate warfare unilaterally.

Ford tried to salvage what remained of Nixon's policy by asking Congress for $972 mil-

lion in military and other aid for South Vietnam. Congress refused. In April 1975 the government of South Vietnam collapsed and the northern communists took over, uniting Vietnam. Several weeks later, when a Khmer Rouge, or communist, gunboat seized an American merchant ship, the SS *Mayaguez,* sixty miles off the Cambodian coast, Ford called the capture piracy and demanded release of the vessel and crew. Tardily, the Cambodian communists said they would free the men and ship. Determined to demonstrate that the commander in chief could still flex muscle, Ford resorted to force. Furthermore, instead of consulting Congress as the War Powers Resolution required, Ford "informed" it of his decision to use force. He ordered air strikes on Cambodian bases and marine commandos to rescue forty crew members already out of danger at the cost of eighteen marines and twenty-three Air Force personnel dead. Ford's popularity zoomed upward because, as Senator Barry Goldwater commented, he had not allowed "some half-assed country" to kick him around. Admirers of the strong presidency called the venture Ford's finest moment. Critics denounced this "indulgence in machismo diplomacy" as "another example of military overkill and trigger happiness." Once more, a supposedly weak president, without significant restraint by law or Congress, for personal benefit used his foreign affairs power to magnify a minor incident into an unnecessary crisis.

In his bid for the presidency, Jimmy Carter promised a foreign policy that would distinguish the United States as "a beacon light for human rights throughout the world." He also denounced covert military operations and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The foreign policy crisis that most bedeviled Carter's administration began with the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran. In November 1979 the trouble escalated when a mob in Teheran invaded the American embassy and seized a hundred people as hostages. When Carter failed to obtain their release through diplomacy and the crisis threatened to torpedo his chances for reelection, he decided on force in his capacity as commander in chief. He did not consult Congress, because, he contended, in this instance the War Powers Resolution did not apply. As had other presidents involved in questionable military strikes, he claimed an "inherent constitutional right" to act unilaterally. So, on his orders, on 24 April 1980, a commando group attempted by air to rescue the hostages. The operation failed, and much of the public viewed it as fiasco. Carter did not, as some advisers urged, try to smother his failure with a massive show of force and possibly war.

A civil war in Afghanistan followed by a massive invasion of Soviet troops also led Carter to shift his attitude toward the use of his power in foreign affairs. He imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union and, when they did not work as desired, exaggerated the Soviet threat to American security. He warned the Soviets that if they seized the Persian Gulf, war would follow. When European allies opposed this bellicosity, Carter pulled back. He then embarked on a program of supposedly covert aid to the Afghans. Carter exhibited less reluctance to use force in perceived low-risk, undercover interventions in Central America and Africa. Despite his tough moments, Carter did use foreign policy power effectively but for human rights and peace rather than for war.

In campaigning for the presidency, Ronald Reagan disparaged Carter for bungling the Iranian crisis, described the Vietnam War as a noble cause, promised to deal harshly with terrorists, and declared he would regenerate American pride. He pictured communism as a monolithic enemy and the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." He said little about theories of executive power, even when in office. In foreign affairs matters that interested him, however, he was an activist, hands-on executive. Reagan began using his power promptly by directing the CIA to engage in domestic spying, clandestine foreign ventures, and surveillance of Americans abroad. Within three years, he launched more than fifty covert operations, more than half of them in Central and South America. He claimed, in a form of intervention that became known as the Reagan Doctrine, the right to support with arms and other means "people fighting for their freedom against Communism wherever they were." Most international jurists regarded this globalism untenable in law.

Reagan applied his doctrine most tenaciously in Nicaragua, where, starting in March 1981, he ordered the CIA to conduct military operations against a Marxist government. The agency created an army of military adventurers and anticommunists in Honduras, called contras, from the abbreviation in Spanish for counterrevolutionaries, to carry out this mission. When the intervention became known in the United States, several legislators charged Reagan with violating the War Powers Act, but he persisted with impunity. Finally, in three pieces of legislation

known as the Boland Acts, Congress cut off direct executive aid to the contras.

At the same time, in a quarrel with Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi, Reagan, as commander in chief, ordered the Sixth Fleet to Libyan waters. In a violent confrontation, it destroyed two Libyan warplanes. Reagan again defied the War Powers Resolution by twice deploying hundreds of troops in Lebanon to aid a conservative government fighting a civil war. After the fact, Congress approved this commitment. Rebels in Beirut attacked the troops, and U.S. warships shelled rebel positions. In October 1983 a rebel suicide bomber in a truck crashed through the American compound, slaughtering 241 marines. In December, after a minor confrontation, U.S. forces struck at Syria. Fearing that the casualties would become a damaging issue in the forthcoming presidential election, Reagan reluctantly removed the troops from the area.

Earlier the president had manufactured another crisis, this one on the island of Grenada in the Caribbean, reputedly to divert attention from the Beirut losses. He intervened there with some 2,000 troops to oust a far-left regime that, he said, without substantiation, threatened the lives of American students living there. He again violated the War Powers Act but defended his unilateral violence as within his power as commander in chief. Some Democrats demanded enforcement of the law and seven asked for impeachment, but Congress stood by the president. He called the events in Lebanon and Grenada "closely linked," because "Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries." Polls showed that Americans, by a margin of 90 percent, approved his bashing of Grenada.

Later, again on meager evidence, Reagan blamed Qaddafi for the bombing of a disco in Berlin frequented by American servicemen. In retaliation, he ordered the bombing of Benghazi, killing scores of civilians but not the dictator. Jurists maintained Reagan had unilaterally carried out an act of war, and again violated the War Powers Act. Similarly, in his proxy war in Nicaragua, he breached international law by having the CIA lay magnetic mines in three of that nation's harbors. Later, the International Court of Justice at The Hague found the United States guilty of an unlawful use of force. Reagan dismissed the condemnation without qualm.

Finally, the president's illegal use of his foreign policy power led to negative repercussions. Congress had banned the export of arms to Iran, but Reagan's subordinates secretly sold it weapons to finance the undercover contras, contrary to the Boland laws. They also used some of the money for ransom for release of American hostages in Lebanon. When details of this Iran-Contra affair leaked to the public, the president's popularity plummeted. Some legislators again talked of impeachment. Initially, Reagan denied knowledge of the affair. Later, he admitted that the decision to trade arms for hostages was his. Senate and House investigating committees concluded he had been responsible, but neither Congress nor the courts held him accountable for his illicit actions.

Reagan continued to use force in the Persian Gulf, in Nicaragua, and indirectly in covert aid in Afghanistan against the Russians. When the Russians withdrew in 1988, he and his aides touted their retreat as a victory for the Reagan Doctrine. When he left office, harsh critics stood by their characterization of him as an amiable dunce, but most of the public thought differently. It overlooked or forgave his illicit behavior to view him as a decisive leader who had regained for the presidency much of the foreign relations power it presumably had lost in the Watergate scandal.

In contrast to Reagan, George H. W. Bush initially seemed bland, but he sought to demonstrate qualities as a strong, activist leader in a clash with the small-time Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had been on the payroll of Washington intelligence agencies but lost favor because of criminal activity. The Reagan administration had imposed economic sanctions against Panama, and Bush quickly assigned high priority to Noriega's removal, through various means including a coup. This strategy fizzled, leading hard-liners to speak of executive weakness.

When questioned about ousting the dictator, Bush answered, "Well, I want as broad a power as possible, and I think under the Constitution the President has it." He "has broad powers, broader than some in the Senate or the House might think." On this assumption, Bush exploited a clash between Panamanian soldiers and two American servicemen as a reason to resort openly to force. On 15 December 1989, on his own as commander in chief, he ordered the invasion of Panama. Six weeks later, U.S. troops captured Noriega. Ultimately a U.S. court tried, convicted, and jailed him.

Many Americans asked why this massive force over a minor quarrel? The president came up with a variety of answers, including self-defense, upholding democracy, and protecting

American lives. Skeptics dismissed the arguments as flimsy, pointing out that virtually every day in some part of the world somebody harassed Americans. To safeguard them or uphold nascent democracy everywhere with bayonets would commit the nation to endless hostilities. They accused Bush of using violence politically to dispel the wimp factor. The General Assembly of the United Nations condemned the invasion as a "flagrant violation" of international law, but Americans overwhelmingly approved the muscle-flexing. Hence, only a few legislators challenged the president's defiance of the War Powers Act. The House even passed a resolution praising him for his decisive action.

Seemingly intoxicated by such commendation, the president turned on another international villain, Iraq's Saddam Hussein. On 2 August 1990, some 80,000 Iraqi troops invaded and quickly overran Kuwait. Properly condemning the invasion as "naked aggression," Bush took the lead in a movement to reverse it. The American public and the United Nations supported him in a policy of sanctions against Hussein. Impatiently, Bush decided sanctions took too long to work, prepared for war, and claimed he did not need congressional assent before taking military action. Many legislators disagreed. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan of New York pointed out that "the great armed force" created to fight the Cold War was now "at the president's own disposal for any diversion he may wish, no matter what it costs." Undeterred, Bush insisted that "I have the right, as commander in chief, to fulfill my responsibilities, and I'm going to safeguard those executive powers." Fifty-four legislators filed suit in a federal court to prohibit the president from using force without congressional authorization. The court ruled the suit premature but reiterated that only Congress could declare war. Still, Bush announced that no matter what Congress or the people had to say, he would decide for or against war. As had various predecessors, he cited flawed precedents for presidential war-making. Most of the media sided with him.

Finally, the president gave in to pressure from advisers not to defy Congress but to persuade it to go along with him. He asked for a resolution approving force but not for a declaration of war. Congress agreed and on a partisan vote narrowly passed such a measure, thus sanctioning a presidential war. On 16 January 1991 he led the nation into war. Two days later, he informed Congress of his action, in a manner, he said, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." In the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. military juggernaut blasted the Iraqis into a lopsided defeat, Bush's popularity rating zoomed to an unprecedented height, and he bathed in the glory of a Caesar.

During Bush's term, the Soviet Union broke up, the Cold War ended, and ethnic strife tore apart Yugoslavia. He campaigned for reelection as a successful war leader and the master of an aggressive foreign policy, who, along with Reagan, had finalized the winning of the Cold War. But he lost. Nonetheless, as a lame duck president, he once more exercised his power as commander in chief. For humanitarian reasons, or what he called "God's work," he intervened in Somalia, torn apart by civil war and famine. He ordered more than 30,000 troops to take "whatever action is necessary" to carry out their mission. As various analysts noted, Bush with his war-making pushed the presidential power in foreign affairs to its outer limits.

THE INDISPENSABLE NATION AND PRESIDENT?

During his run for the presidency, William Jefferson Clinton campaigned on a domestic program. When he did refer to foreign affairs, he tried to sound tougher than Bush. For instance, Clinton favored forcible intervention in the Bosnian civil war to punish aggressive Serbs. As president, his first major foreign policy decision was on the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Initially, Clinton anticipated no difficulties because he planned gradually to withdraw U.S. troops and turn over the operation to the United Nations. When clan warriors killed Pakistani peacekeepers and wounded American soldiers, that goal changed. The president authorized U.S. troops to use force against what he called "two-bit" terrorists. When Somalis killed eighteen Americans and wounded seventy-four, Clinton ordered 5,000 more troops, heavy armor, and additional warships to Somalia. What had started as a humanitarian mission took on the coloring of a military occupation. This change alarmed many in Congress. Some talked of placing restrictions on how the president could deploy the armed forces. As had predecessors in comparable circumstances, Clinton contended questionably that the executive possessed the ultimate authority on the use of troops. Finally, without relinquishing this claim but in reaction to the criticism, he withdrew the forces from Somalia.

During this episode, the president also flexed muscle in the Middle East. He learned of an alleged plot to assassinate George Bush while the former president was visiting Kuwait in April 1993. The CIA attributed this conspiracy to Saddam Hussein. Denouncing it as "an attack against our country and against all Americans," Clinton on 26 June ordered a missile attack on battered Baghdad. Constitutional lawyers commented that "calling the U.S. bombing of Iraq an act of self-defense for an assassination plot that had been averted two months previously is quite a stretch." Other skeptics viewed this exercise in force as personal, or as countering a reputation for indecisiveness with an image of a strong, assertive leader. The tactic worked. According to polls, the public approved of the president's rash resort to force by a large margin.

Concurrently, Clinton plunged into another sticky minor foreign problem, this one involving corruption in Haiti and special-interest group politics in the United States. In a coup, militarists ejected Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first elected president, from office. Various liberal groups, media pundits, and especially the congressional black caucus demanded that Clinton restore Aristide to power. The president agreed. He tightened sanctions against the island republic, ordered warships to patrol its waters, and placed troops on alert for a possible invasion. He justified his actions with what he designated as important national interests in Haiti, a need to protect American lives there, and an obligation to promote democracy. In Congress, dissenters came up with legislation to prevent Clinton from committing troops. He denounced the proposal as encroaching "on the President's foreign policy powers." Congress avoided a direct clash with a nonbinding resolution that opposed the executive actions. Involved legislators asked should a president act as a global gendarme with authority to intervene with force whenever dictators seize or hold power anywhere. Others perceived personal or domestic political considerations as motivating the president's determination to move on his own. Advisers admitted that in this manner Clinton would demonstrate "the president's decision making capability" and his firmness in using his foreign affairs power.

Clinton remained defiant, announcing that, like predecessors, he did not regard himself "constitutionally mandated" to obtain congressional approval before invading. He also repeated muddled justifications, such as a duty to secure the nation's borders and safeguard national security, though neither was threatened. At the last minute, in September 1994, he avoided another clash with Congress by accepting an arrangement that permitted the Haitian militarists to retreat peacefully and made a hostile invasion unnecessary. American troops then occupied the country and returned Aristide to power. Clinton boasted, "We celebrate the return of democracy," even though democracy had never flowered in Haiti. Two years later, the occupation officially ended without violent mishap. The administration touted it as a foreign policy triumph but others viewed it as a revival of big-stick paternalism. The intervention and $2.2 billion in aid produced neither democracy nor well-being. In Haiti viable politics and the economy crumbled.

Clinton also embroiled himself in controversy over brutal ethnic warfare in former Yugoslavia, expressing a desire to intervene for the laudable purpose of protecting human rights. "We have an interest," he said, "in standing up against the principle of ethnic cleansing." He intruded in a number of instances with food and medicine air drops for beleaguered Muslims in Bosnia, with deployment of a few hundred troops in Macedonia, and with bombings and other attacks on Serb forces. Finally, in a conference in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, Clinton brokered an end to the civil war in Bosnia. He considered the peace agreement a diplomatic triumph, but it had problems. The settlement called for deployment of 23,000 U.S. ground troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. A majority in Congress and most Americans opposed the policing commitment. Regardless, Clinton deployed the troops, counting on the usual rally-round-the flag attitude of the public when soldiers were placed in harm's way. As aides admitted, the decision in an election year also had a political dimension. It could increase his stature as a bold leader. He had learned, a staffer asserted, "that foreign policy can help your image. It makes him look like a president." Ultimately, the Senate backed the troop commitment and, as anticipated, the public rallied behind the president.

Clinton also flexed muscle over an incident with Castro's Cuba and another with China over Taiwan, and continued to blast Iraq with missile attacks. In these crises the president portrayed himself as a global crusader committed to combating evil. At the start of his second term, he explained this concept as part of doing "what it takes to remain the indispensable nation . . . for another fifty years."

Two years later, on 7 August 1998, while Clinton was entangled in scandal over a relationship with Monica Lewinsky, a young White House intern, terrorists bombed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Ten days later, he publicly admitted the sexual liaison and three days after that ordered missile attacks on suspected terrorists in Sudan and Afghanistan. Opponents accused him of using violence abroad to divert attention from a domestic problem. On 19 December, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Clinton on charges of perjury and abuse of power related to the Lewinsky affair. On 12 February 1999, after a five-week trial, the Senate acquitted Clinton. A month later, when asked if he had damaged the Office of the President, Clinton responded, "I hope the presidency has not been harmed. I don't believe it has been."

Clinton continued to exercise his foreign relations power boldly, primarily against another international villain, Slobodan Milosevic, the hard-line president of what remained of Yugoslavia. Clinton accused him of brutal ethnic cleansing of Albanian residents in the Serb province of Kosovo and decided to employ force against him. Clinton explained this decision, as a skeptic pointed out, with an "orgy of analogy" that included an obligation to humanity to halt what he termed genocide, defend American interests, stop Serb aggression, and enforce democratic values. Critics asked, why the selective humanitarianism? Did not genocide in Rwanda, Chinese brutalities against Tibetans, Russian repression in Chechnya, ethnic horrors in the Sudan, and Taliban atrocities in Afghanistan call for comparable military intervention?

Regardless, on 24 March the United States, supported by eighteen other NATO countries that Clinton had persuaded to join him, launched an air war against Milosevic's Yugoslavia. Clinton and his aides avoided the word "war," describing the vast violence they unleashed with an impersonal euphemism, a campaign to "degrade" the enemy. In eleven weeks of war, or degrading, the NATO forces flew 37,000 sorties and dropped 23,614 bombs on Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia, most of them by American planes. The United Nations did not support the war, nor did many people even in NATO countries. Congress and the American public, though, as usual in the initial stages of hostilities, backed the executive but with less enthusiasm than in previous presidential wars.

With the rise of domestic opposition to the war, with its destruction of much of Serbia, Clinton resorted to the dubious contention that the executive as commander in chief needed no congressional declaration to fight a war. The House, mainly along party lines, voted against supporting him with a declaration of war, but it did not try to stop the hostilities. In addition, a bipartisan group of legislators filed suit seeking a ruling that the bombing violated the Constitution and laws such as the War Powers Resolution. Across the country a new antiwar movement began taking shape. Elsewhere, as in Japan, people viewed Clinton as an international bully.

On 10 June, before opposition to the war became full blown, it ended. The Serbs agreed to withdraw from Kosovo and to accept a NATO occupation of the province. Clinton then claimed another triumph for a presidential war. The victory proved tarnished when postwar investigators could produce no evidence of grand-scale genocidal Serb activities. Clinton had claimed that under Milosevic's orders, Serbs had slaughtered tens of thousand of Albanians. In addition, when Albanians returned to Kosovo, they carried out ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Gypsies.

In other instances, Clinton used his foreign affairs power constructively, notably through diplomacy to help control ethnic violence in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East and to save Mexico from bankruptcy with some $25 billion in loans. To the end of his presidency, he liked the taste of power that enabled him to influence events the world over and stuck to his self-assumed role, which he often denied, of global policeman. He left office, according to polls, with most Americans approving of his handling of foreign affairs.

In the 2000 election, foreign policy played a minor role, though the Republican candidate, George W. Bush, criticized morally based armed interventions. He preferred using force only where tangible, perceivable American interests were at stake. He won the presidency even though his Democratic opponent received more of the popular vote, despite ballot snafus in Florida, and by surviving various court challenges. In the crucial challenge, the Supreme Court awarded him the office on the basis of shared ideology. In the aftermath, academics and others contended that this outcome tarnished the presidency. As critics pointed out, Bush's awkward handling of foreign affairs during his first months in office indicated that this assessment had merit.

On 11 September 2001 this view of the presidency changed. Unknown Islamic terrorists

hijacked four commercial airplanes, smashed two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon, outside Washington, D.C., and crashed the fourth in a field in Pennsylvania. They killed an estimated seven thousand people. The disaster galvanized the nation, rallying the citizenry, as usual in foreign affairs crises, around the flag and behind the president.

Bush responded with incendiary rhetoric laced with references to war and by asking Congress for expanded power to combat terrorism "with all necessary and appropriate force." As had his predecessors, he claimed he already had the authority to initiate military action on his own but wanted a resolution of approval from the legislators to cement national unity. Polls indicated that more than 70 percent of the public supported his stance. Congress rushed to go along with the president's request. On 14 September, unanimously in the Senate and with only one dissenter in the House of Representatives, Congress voted approval for the president to strike at "nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."

A few in Congress maintained that this resolution, unlike the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, did not give the president blanket authority to make war. In substance, though, it amounted to that, and Bush interpreted it that way. Five days later, speaking to Congress and to the nation via television, he announced "a war on terror," issuing an ultimatum to Afghanistan: deliver to the United States the prime suspects behind the attacks, especially Osama bin Laden, a shadowy anti-Western terrorist who had sanctuary in that country, or expect the consequences. Again, Bush's standing in the polls soared. Afghanistan's Taliban rulers, refused surrender of bin Laden without, they said, seeing convincing evidence of his guilt.

Once more, despite the War Powers Act and post-Vietnam War concerns over untrammeled presidential war power, the public, Congress, and most media pundits eager for retaliation backed the use of military force virtually as the executive saw fit. Moreover, for the first time in the role of a warrior who spoke of involvement in "the first war of the twenty-first century," even to those who previously had belittled him, Bush appeared presidential.

This crisis reinforced what has been, virtually from the first presidency, a steady expansion of the executive power in foreign affairs at the expense of Congress. This happened often because of the force of strong executives' personalities and their thirst for power. It happened also because the American public and its elected representatives, initially at least, in times of foreign crises willingly put aside original intent in the warmaking power as the framers had embodied it in the Constitution. Again, in the September 2001 crisis, without hesitation, they shifted this ultimate power to one person—the president.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbott, Philip. *Strong Presidents: A Theory of Leadership.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1996.

Adler, David Gray. "The President's War-Making Power." In Thomas E. Cronin, ed. *Inventing the American Presidency.* Lawrence, Kans., 1969.

———. "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate." *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (spring 1988): 1–36.

Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Presidency and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 70 (winter 1992): 120–137.

Bailey, Thomas A. *Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present.* New York 1966. Readable and provocative.

———. *The Pugnacious Presidents: White House Warriors on Parade.* New York, 1980.

Berger, Raoul. "The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Affairs." *Michigan Law Review* 71 (November 1972): 1–58.

Bledsoe, W. Craig, et al. *Powers of the Presidency.* 2d ed. Washington, D.C., 1997.

Cheever, Daniel S., and H. Field Haviland, Jr. *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers.* Cambridge, Mass., 1952.

Corwin, Edward S. *The President's Control of Foreign Relations.* Princeton, N.J., 1917.

Corwin, Edward S., et al. *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984, History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion.* 5th rev. ed. New York, 1984. Corwin's books are the pioneering works on the subject. They are still valuable for their scholarship and analyses.

DeConde, Alexander. *Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations.* Boston, 2000. Covers in greater detail, with documentation and an extensive bibliography, much of the subject and interpretations in this essay.

Eagleton, Thomas F. *War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender.* New York, 1974.

Fisher, Louis. *Presidential War Power.* Lawrence, Kans., 1995. Both of Fisher's books are scholarly, authoritative, and important sources.

———. *Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President.* 4th ed. Lawrence, Kans., 1997.

Franck, Thomas M., ed. *The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power.* New York, 1981.

Friedman, David S. "Waging War Against Checks and Balances: The Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power." *St. John's Law Review* 57 (winter 1983): 213–273.

Glennon, Michael J. "Can the President Do No Wrong?" *American Journal of International Law* 80 (October 1986): 923–930.

Goldsmith, William M. *The Growth of Presidential Power: A Documented History.* 3 vols. New York, 1974. A collection of documents with commentary.

Graber, Doris A. *Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years.* New York, 1968. Covers the early national era.

Henkin, Louis. *Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution.* 2d ed. New York, 1996. A scholarly and perceptive mainstay in the field.

Lehman, John F. *Making War: The 200-Year-Old Battle Between the President and Congress over How America Goes to War.* New York, 1991. A readable popular account.

Levy, Leonard W., and Louis Fisher, eds. *Encyclopedia of the American Presidency.* 4 vols. New York, 1994.

McDonald, Forrest. *The American Presidency: An Intellectual History.* Lawrence, Kans., 1994.

Marks, Frederick W., III. *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution.* Baton Rouge, La., 1973.

May, Ernest R., ed. *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief.* New York, 1960. Essays on selected presidents and their influence.

Mullen, William F. *Presidential Power and Politics.* New York, 1976.

Murray, Robert K., and Tim H. Blessing. *Greatness in the White House: Rating the Presidents.* 2d ed. University Park, Pa., 1994.

Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: Politics and Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan.* Rev. ed. New York, 1990. An influential study that stresses the power of persuasion.

Rakove, Jack N. *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution.* New York, 1996. The chapter "Creating the Presidency" is particularly rewarding.

Riccards, Michael P. *The Ferocious Engine of Democracy: A History of the American Presidency.* 2 vols. Lanham, Md., 1995.

Robinson, Edgar Eugene, Alexander DeConde, Raymond G. O'Connor, and Martin B. Travis, Jr. *Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs, 1945–1965.* San Francisco, 1966.

Rose, Gary L. *The American Presidency Under Siege.* Albany, N.Y., 1997.

Rourke, John T. *Presidential Wars and American Democracy: Rally 'Round the Chief.* New York, 1993.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency.* Boston, 1973. Scholarly, insightful, and gracefully written, this book is a fundamental read.

Shenkman, Richard. *Presidential Ambition: How the Presidents Gained Power, Kept Power, and Got Things Done.* New York, 1999. A readable popular account.

Skowronek, Stephen. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush.* Cambridge, Mass., 1993.

Smith, J. Malcolm, and Stephen Jurika, Jr. *The President and National Security: His Role as Commander-in-Chief.* Dubuque, Iowa, 1972.

Thomas, Ann Van Wynen, and A. J. Thomas, Jr. *The War-Making Powers of the President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects.* Dallas, Tex., 1982.

Warburg, Gerald F. *Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle Between Congress and the President over Foreign Policymaking.* New York, 1989.

Wildavsky, Aaron. *The Beleaguered Presidency.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1991.

See also CONGRESSIONAL POWER; THE CONSTITUTION; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MILITARISM; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; PARTY POLITICS; POWER POLITICS; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; SUMMIT CONFERENCES.

THE PRESS

Ralph B. Levering and Louis W. Liebovich

Officially, American foreign policy is made by the executive branch of the federal government, led by the president, and by Congress, with rare involvement by the Supreme Court. Unofficially, other institutions—notably interest groups and the press (including electronic media as well as the print media)—typically play a large role in the often lengthy and politically charged policymaking process in Washington. Most voters also learn of impending and completed U.S. foreign policy initiatives through the news media. Roughly three-fourths of adult Americans read daily newspapers and many read magazines that discuss foreign policy issues. The press thus occupies a central place in the communication of ideas that lies at the heart of the ongoing political process both in Washington and in the two-way flow of information between officials and the voting public.

Because of its importance, journalist Douglass Cater and other writers have called the press the "fourth branch of government." But neither the news media as institutions nor journalists as individuals have any formal power to shape U.S. foreign relations. The communication of ideas is different from making or implementing policy. Unlike specific presidential decisions or votes in Congress, moreover, the press's influence on an issue normally cannot be measured precisely. And because the day-to-day influence of journalists on the thinking of policymakers and the public varies from individual to individual and from issue to issue, it is important not to overestimate the press's impact. Yet Cater's metaphor has considerable validity because the role of the press in foreign policy decisions—and in the reactions to those decisions that influence future actions—often has been substantial. Since the 1950s this fascinating, intellectually challenging topic has attracted the interest of numerous journalists, officials, and political activists. It also has lured scholars from several disciplines, notably communications, history, political science, and sociology.

DIVERSITY AND ETHNOCENTRISM

There is a diversity of views that exists within multifaceted institutions—"the government" and "the press"—that often are written about as if each were unitary and hence susceptible to broad generalizations and concise theories. The reality is much more complex. In establishing the federal government, the Founders set up an inherent competition between the prerogatives and powers of the executive branch and Congress. On both the proper goals of U.S. foreign policy and the best means to achieve them, moreover, there repeatedly have been strong differences of opinion within the executive branch, within Congress, and between the two branches. Thus, when scholars discover that as many as 70 or even 80 percent of sources used in news stories on some foreign policy issues are "government" sources (either executive branch alone or executive plus congressional), one normally need not be concerned that only one or two viewpoints are being presented. Such statistics do point to a lack of aggressiveness by journalists in gathering information outside official circles, however.

On any major foreign policy issue, the few thousand journalists who work in Washington are almost certain to present varied perspectives based on public statements, interviews, and "leaks" (information whose source or sources cannot be named) from the president and members of Congress and from the many thousands of officials who work for the White House, for the other executive agencies, and for Congress. Especially since the mid-1970s, journalists also have used as sources spokespersons for affected interest groups, academics, diplomats stationed in Washington, and experts from public interest groups and from the capital's numerous liberal and conservative think tanks. As several scholars have shown, foreign policy stories in the 1990s generally were based less heavily on "government

sources" (themselves often diverse) than they had been thirty years earlier.

The diversity of views from sources is paralleled by the diversity of views on foreign policy presented in the press. It is true that both the number of daily newspapers (about 1,600 by the 1990s) and the number of cities with more than one daily newspaper declined steadily throughout the twentieth century. But these declines have been at least partly offset by other developments: the widespread availability in recent decades of three national newspapers (the liberal *New York Times,* the moderate *USA Today,* and the conservative *Wall Street Journal*); the growing use by many dailies of foreign policy coverage and foreign stories from the news services of such papers as the *New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Los Angeles Times;* and the practice by many local-monopoly dailies of featuring both liberal and conservative columnists. Also, the widespread publication of weekly or biweekly alternative papers, many of which are distributed free of charge and feature liberal or mildly radical perspectives, and the availability of liberal and conservative viewpoints on the growing number of television and radio news programs and talk shows, as well as at numerous Internet sites, have all increasingly complemented the daily newspapers.

For Americans interested in foreign affairs, the greatest diversity of views and depth of analysis during the twentieth century typically were found in magazines. Mass-circulation weekly news magazines—*Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News and World Report*—generally were strong supporters of America's anticommunist policies from the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s. Their coverage of foreign affairs generally has become more varied since then, though it sometimes comes across (like some newspaper stories) as simplistic or overblown. It must be remembered, however, that news magazines are intended to appeal to the general public, which normally is less interested in foreign affairs than the much smaller number of Americans who regularly read journals of opinion.

Among journals of opinion, such long-established liberal periodicals as the *New Republic* and *Nation* have flourished, as have conservative periodicals, including *National Review* and *Commentary.* In the center, with much in-depth analysis of foreign affairs, are journals like *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy.* Many religious and environmental periodicals also discuss foreign affairs regularly. Therefore, diversity thrives in foreign policy coverage in magazines.

As in most other nations, ethnocentrism—the belief that one's own nation and its values are superior to all others—has long been a standard feature of the American press's reporting and commentary on U.S. foreign policy and on other nations. Throughout modern American history, most liberal, moderate, and conservative journalists have praised other nations that practiced political democracy and freedom for individuals (for example, Great Britain, Norway, and Costa Rica), and have criticized governments that quashed democracy and freedom (such as Adolf Hitler's Germany, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, and Fidel Castro's Cuba). As the sociologist Herbert Gans has noted, the press's "ethnocentrism comes through most clearly in foreign news, which judges other countries by the extent to which they live up to or imitate American practices and values."

During the Cold War, many newspapers and magazines—often including the prestigious *New York Times*—applied the nation's core values unevenly by being much more critical of the communist dictatorships that gave at least verbal support to the overthrow of noncommunist governments in other countries than they were of pro-Western dictatorships. Yet even during the long struggle against communism, many newspapers and magazines sharply criticized right-wing dictatorships in such allied nations as South Korea, South Vietnam, Chile, and the Philippines.

The largest policy failure to which ethnocentrism in the press (and among officials) contributed was the common assumption in news stories and editorials from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s that most of the people living in South Vietnam deeply desired to continue to have a pro-Western, noncommunist government—even if that meant having a dictatorial and corrupt one. This dubious assumption, based on wishful thinking much more than on facts, contributed greatly to America's ill-fated war in Vietnam. Although the particular double standards and blind spots of the Cold War era are history, the sharp criticisms of mainland China's and Iraq's repressive dictatorships by contemporary journalists of all political persuasions suggest that ethnocentrism continues to influence America's news and commentary.

THE PRESS'S MANY ROLES

Among the press's roles are what are called the "three I's"—information, interpretation, and inter-

est. Roger Hilsman, a political scientist and State Department official in the John F. Kennedy administration, identified "the gathering and dissemination of information" as a major function of the press. The flow of information through the press—among all the people seeking to influence policy in Washington, from the capital to the public, and from the public back to officials partly through press coverage and reporters' questions—is the lifeblood of America's democratic system.

Information in press coverage of foreign affairs is almost always accompanied by interpretation. Journalists provide contexts (often called "frames") in which information is conveyed. "By suggesting the cause and relationships of various events," the political scientist Doris A. Graber observes, "the media may shape opinions even without telling their audiences what to believe or think. For example, linking civil strife in El Salvador [in the 1980s] to the activities of Soviet and Cuban agents ensured that the American public would view the situation with considerable alarm." Among policymakers in Washington, Hilsman notes,

> the press is not the sole source of interpretation. The president, the secretary of state, the assistant secretaries, American ambassadors, senators, congressmen, academic experts—all are sources of interpretation. But the fact that the press is there every day, day after day, with its interpretations makes it the principal competitor of all the others in interpreting events.

The press also can play an important role in stirring interest in an issue both in Washington and among the public. During the Ronald Reagan years media reporting awakened public interest on starvation in Ethiopia, a topic that Americans had shown little interest in prior to the appearance of illustrated stories about dying children in the press and on television. An example from the James Earl Carter years was the debate over whether to deploy enhanced radiation nuclear bombs (also called neutron bombs) in western Europe. The debate began with a story by Walter Pincus in the *Washington Post* on 6 June 1977. A quotation in the story noted that the bombs would "kill people" while "leaving buildings and tanks standing." Once the story was framed in this negative way—on television and radio as well as in newspapers and magazines—the administration was not able to gain public and congressional support for deploying the new weapon. The unfolding of this story illustrates a frequent pattern in foreign policy: print journalists often bring stories to public attention, after which they are covered by other print and electronic reporters.

Stirring interest through extensive news and editorial coverage is often called the agenda-setting function of the media. The political scientist Bernard C. Cohen explained this concept cogently: "The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*."

Building on Cohen's path-breaking research, other scholars have refined the concept of agenda setting. While agreeing that the news media often play an important role in the agenda-setting process, most analysts now believe that agenda setting is a complex process in which unexpected events or administration officials or (less frequently) members of Congress or interest groups often play at least as significant roles as journalists. Because officials and other participants in the policymaking process in Washington frequently work hard to get their viewpoints into the press, the communications professor J. David Kennamer notes, "[t]he news media are as much the target of agenda-setting as they are the source." Moreover, the relative importance of journalists to other actors in agenda setting varies from issue to issue. Thus, although the press plays a significant role in deciding which foreign policy issues to cover and which ones to make into "big stories," it shares the agenda-setting function with other actors in the political process.

In another important role, that of "watchdog," the press ferrets out and publicizes questionable policies or abuses of authority. As a reporter for a Midwestern newspaper told Cohen: "We are the fourth estate, and it is our duty to monitor—to watch and interpret—what our government does." Because officials often control the flow of information to the press in regard to secret operations, the press's performance as a watchdog has been mixed. During the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-1980s, for example, American journalists were slow to learn about the operation—indeed, the story was broken by a publication in Lebanon well after the administration had engaged in illicit activity in the Middle East and in Central America. After the story broke, however, leading newspapers and magazines did an excellent job of bringing details to the attention of policymakers in Washington (including members of Congress) and the American people.

Journalists also can play an important role as critics of particular foreign policies. Although far fewer people read editorials and columns (opinion pieces) than read front-page news stories (or, for that matter, the comics and the sports pages!), the people most interested and involved in foreign affairs—officials, journalists, other leaders in society, and the "attentive public" (the roughly 10 to 20 percent of the public with the greatest interest in public issues)—not only read editorials and columns regularly, but they often discuss them with other people, thus enhancing their impact. In influencing the thinking of elites, editorial writers and columnists affect the public discussion of foreign affairs that gradually works its way down to many average voters. While the exact influence of editorials and columns cannot be determined, it seems clear that the serious questions that were being raised about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam on the editorial pages of numerous newspapers beginning in the mid-1960s helped to create the climate of opinion in which the continuation of the war by the Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon administrations became increasingly difficult.

Finally, the press contributes greatly to the policymaking process in Washington, both in the executive branch and in Congress. Administration officials read leading papers and magazines to learn what other officials and members of Congress are thinking and doing, and to try to figure out which other officials are "leaking" information to the press and what policy goals they are seeking to advance by doing so. Officials also are interested in reading stories by journalists stationed in other countries in order to get opinions other than the ones being sent from the U.S. embassies there.

Members of Congress and their staffs are eager to learn what is going on in the administration, so that they can support or oppose the current direction of policy. Especially since the late 1960s, many members of Congress—particularly ones who are not members of the president's party—have been eager to limit the executive branch's power in foreign affairs and increase their own influence on particular foreign policy issues. To achieve these goals, they frequently have worked closely with reporters.

Robert J. Kurz, a former legislative assistant, wrote in 1991 that members of Congress "form alliances with the press because they share a common interest, often a rivalry, against the executive." Kurz continued:

> These alliances solidify during times of controversy and tension with a president. It is not unusual for the Congress and the press to work together to discover what the executive is up to, uncover wrongdoing, or expose inherent contradictions in policies or their implementation. They share the desire for the notoriety and attention that comes with this conflict.
>
> An important role for the press, therefore, has been to help to maintain the tenuous balance of power between the executive branch and Congress in foreign affairs. Cohen has written that, because "the media are themselves one of the most articulate and informed outside participants in the foreign policymaking process," they "unavoidably affect the environment in which foreign policy decisions are made by 'insiders.'"

The "alliances" between reporters and members of Congress that Kurz writes about provide an apt illustration of Cohen's point.

REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: CONFLICTING GOALS, FREQUENT TENSIONS

In Washington, the officials responsible for foreign policy and the reporters who cover them have such fundamentally different jobs that conflicts frequently erupt between them. Officials—especially presidents, much of whose power stems from perceived competence and popularity—understandably want to look good as they make and implement policies. Officials generally want an orderly, rational decision-making process in which decisions are reached—and then announced—after discussions both within the executive branch and, if needed, with leaders in Congress and in other nations. In other words, officials want to control the content and timing of statements and other initiatives relating to particular foreign policies. Based on several case studies, including the Iran hostage crisis of 1979–1981, journalism professor Philip Seib describes what can happen when media coverage of a crisis undermines the president's control of the timing of decision making:

> News coverage can accelerate the tempo by heightening public interest. Depending on which aspects of the story the press emphasizes, coverage can also influence public opinion in ways that increase political pressure on the president to act in a specific fashion, such as more aggressively or more compassionately. The chief executive may soon realize that the ideal of nicely insulated policy formulation has evaporated. Instead, his every move is anticipated and then critiqued almost instantly.

High officials also want to leak secret information when it suits their purposes to do so, but not before and not by a lower-level official unauthorized to do the leaking. A wry joke that made the rounds during the Kennedy years—a time when the president himself was a frequent source—sums up their view of appropriate leaks: "The ship of state leaks from the top." Viewing favorable press coverage as necessary for high levels of public and congressional support, presidents and other top officials prefer to manage the news as much as possible.

Except during an obvious national emergency such as World War II, reporters reject this vision of favorable, managed news as incompatible with their jobs as journalists and with what they call "the public's right to know." In competition with reporters for other media organizations, journalists seek to "get the story" and move it quickly into print. And because disagreement, conflict, and failure are key components of the definition of "news," the more these components are part of the story, the more likely it is to be featured on the front page in newspapers or as the cover story in magazines. As the Associated Press international editor Tom Kent rightly noted at a 1996 conference at Ohio University, "There's something in the human condition that finds a greater fascination in bad news than in good news."

As long as stories are factually accurate and deal with legitimate public issues, reporters and editors believe that America's freedom of the press gives them the right—even the duty—to publish them, regardless of whether they portray an administration favorably. From the press's viewpoint, moreover, very few stories should be kept out of print for the reason that officials often cite—national security. To reporters, invoking national security is often an attempt to ward off embarrassment or bad news.

Frequently, therefore, officials and reporters come into conflict when the press publishes stories that officials believe should have remained secret or when stories contain information that might upset delicate negotiations within the government or with other nations. Officials often have been scathing in their criticisms of journalists. "The competitive press finds it almost impossible to exercise discretion and a sense of public responsibility," Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote. "If a man digs a secret out of an official or a department and takes it around to the Soviet Embassy, he is a spy; if he digs out the same secret and gives it to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world at the same time, he is a smart newspaperman." Complaining to journalists about some coverage his administration was getting, President Lyndon Johnson commented, "I know you don't like your cornpone president." Criticisms of the press by administration officials have been bipartisan. Republican George Shultz, who served as secretary of state under President Reagan, commented that "these days . . . it seems as though the reporters are always against us."

Scholars often have used metaphors like "rocky marriage" or "bad marriage" to characterize the relationship between reporters and officials. At least the "marriage" part fits: like married couples, the press and government are tied to each other as each carries out its activities in the same home, Washington, D.C. And, despite some journalists' claim that they occupy an inferior role relative to officials, officials (in making policy) and journalists (in deciding what is news) are equal in the same ways that married couples are: neither partner has inherent power over the other, and both have ways to get back at the other if they feel mistreated or disrespected.

The marriage metaphor is useful, moreover, because officials and journalists have needs that only members of the other group can satisfy. Officials (including members of Congress) need publicity for their ideas to win support for them in the administration, in Congress, and among the American people. In order to meet their editors' and readers' demand for stories, reporters need officials who are willing to talk with them about what is going on in the administration and Congress. Because of these complementary needs, overall relations between officials and reporters are inherently cooperative as well as adversarial. Like spouses who wish to stay married, individual officials who desire to remain effective have to keep talking to reporters even if some stories have angered them, and individual journalists have to attempt to be fair in writing their stories lest they lose access to the officials who have been talking to them. Officials who repeatedly lie to reporters lose their credibility and hence their value as sources; reporters who repeatedly misrepresent officials' views lose their sources and hence their ability to write news-breaking stories. These informal rules help to maintain both the flow of information and the balance of power between reporters and officials in Washington.

The difficulty with the "rocky marriage" metaphor, at least as applied to dealings on foreign policy, is that it overgeneralizes. It was much

more persuasive for some presidencies (Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon) than it is for others (John Kennedy and George H. W. Bush). Kennedy, a former reporter, understood how to deal with journalists on foreign policy issues far better than Johnson and Nixon did. Like most presidents, Kennedy often became upset after reading press coverage that, in his view, was inaccurate or portrayed his administration unfavorably. But at a press conference on 9 May 1962, Kennedy made it clear that he understood and accepted the press's role in disseminating information, interpretation, and criticism: "I think that they are doing their task, as a critical branch, the fourth estate. I am attempting to do mine. And we are going to live together for a period, and then go our separate ways." Unlike Johnson and Nixon, Kennedy also had friendships with several journalists; he generally was forthright and respectful during frequent interviews, and he tried to be as forthcoming as possible at press conferences. Overall, despite occasional deserved criticisms of "news management," Kennedy's (and his administration's) relationships with the press were fair to good, especially considering the inherent conflicts between government and press.

In contrast, Johnson and Nixon's press relations on foreign policy issues typically were poor. In 1965, during the first year of the large U.S. troop buildup in Vietnam, journalists began writing about the "credibility gap," one definition of which was the gap between the administration's statements about what the U.S. military was doing in Vietnam and what reporters learned from lower-level officials in Vietnam about what was actually occurring. David Broder of the *Washington Post* offered a definition more narrowly focused on Johnson's efforts to stifle the flow of information that helps to explain why many reporters and members of Congress had become highly suspicious of the president well before the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in early 1968 effectively ended his political effectiveness:

> I do not believe that the press . . . ever made it clear to the readers and viewers what the essential issue was in the "credibility gap" controversy. It was not that President Johnson tried to manage the news: all politicians and all presidents try to do that. It was that in a systematic way he attempted to close down the channels of information from his office and his administration, so that decisions could be made without public debate and controversy. Ultimately he paid a high price, politically, for his policy.

During the Nixon years, some officials and conservative commentators claimed that press coverage unflattering to the administration's foreign policies (especially its Vietnam policy) resulted from "liberal bias" in the "eastern establishment press." That argument would have been much more persuasive if, first, newspapers like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek*, and the major television networks had been overwhelmingly supportive of Johnson's Vietnam policies until he left office and then had become highly critical of Nixon's approach, and, second, clear majorities of the public and Congress had been strongly supportive of Nixon's continuation of America's military involvement in Vietnam. In fact, given the media's penchant for disagreement, conflict, and violence, it seems certain that the "liberal press" would have included large amounts of negative coverage on Vietnam and on domestic dissent if Nixon's liberal Democratic opponent in 1968, Hubert Humphrey, had been elected and had continued the war.

The fact that Nixon's relations with most journalists were, if anything, more strained and adversarial than Johnson's also did not help him get favorable coverage on Vietnam. The columnist James Reston of the *New York Times* believed that Johnson and Nixon's difficulties with the press stemmed from the same roots:

> Mr. Nixon has had more than the normal share of trouble with reporters because, like Lyndon Johnson, he has never really understood the function of a free press or the meaning of the First Amendment. . . . He still suffers from [the] old illusion that the press is a kind of inanimate transmission belt which should pass along anything he chooses to dump on it.
>
> Both presidents, in other words, neither understood nor accepted the inherent equality of officials and reporters. Unlike the Netherlands and some other democratic nations where officials normally do not treat journalists as equals, this equality—and the tensions that partly result from it—is a hallmark of America's political system.

THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY TO 1941: SOME HIGHLIGHTS

During the first century of America's independence, the most notable feature of the discussion of foreign affairs in America's steadily growing number of newspapers and magazines was partisan-

ship. The sharp divisions of opinion between patriot and loyalist newspapers during the American Revolution arose in new contexts in the 1790s as Federalists and Republicans debated many of President George Washington's policies, including relations with Great Britain and France. Federalist editors strongly supported Washington's emphasis on good relations with Great Britain and neutrality in the Franco-British war, whereas Republican editors believed that America should side with France, its ally during the American Revolution.

From the 1790s through the Civil War, most newspapers that discussed political issues were founded to support a particular party or candidate. Their coverage of public issues, including foreign affairs, tended to be highly partisan. An example was coverage during the Mexican War (1846–1848). In general, Democratic newspapers supported their party's president, James K. Polk, whose actions had contributed greatly to the outbreak of the war. Most Whig newspapers, in contrast, sharply criticized "Mr. Polk's war." They raised doubts about the public's support for it and repeatedly questioned Polk's motives and goals.

Between the Civil War and World War II, the editorial pages of most newspapers remained partisan, especially during election years. But there were important changes during these seventy-five years that affected coverage of foreign affairs. First, there were advances in technology that permitted much more timely coverage. Whereas news of military developments in Mexico in the 1840s typically took two weeks or more to reach the East Coast, telegraph and radio transmissions permitted news of the fighting in Europe during World War I to reach American cities within hours or even, in some cases, almost instantaneously. Second, many papers' rapidly growing paid subscriptions and advertising revenues gave them money to spend on foreign and Washington correspondents, on memberships in such news services as the Associated Press, and on nationally syndicated columnists who often wrote on foreign affairs. Third, in their competition for readers and advertising dollars, newspapers and magazines could emphasize illustrated stories with broad public appeal (for example, lurid crimes and Spanish "atrocities" in Cuba), they could stress in-depth, "objective" reporting of major public issues, or, like most newspapers and magazines by the early 1900s, they could try to strike a balance between these two approaches. Fourth, English-language newspapers and magazines faced significant competition by 1900 from foreign-language publications that appealed to the millions of recent immigrants from Europe (and, to a lesser extent, from Latin America and East Asia) who retained ties to their former homelands and native languages. These publications often championed causes associated with governments or opposition movements in the former homelands and urged readers to contact U.S. political leaders on behalf of these causes. And fifth, the rapid growth of radio, newsreels, and news magazines after 1920 meant that newspapers and magazines of opinion had novel competitors not only in coverage of news and information, but also for the public's attention.

Newspapers' involvement in the events leading up to the Spanish-American War of 1898 especially illustrates two of these changes: the fierce competition for readers and the issue of sensationalism versus relative objectivity in coverage. In New York City, where the competition for readers was intense, the two papers with the largest circulations—Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal*—used Cuba's war for independence from Spain that began in 1895 as a source of sensational stories about Cuban heroism and Spanish atrocities that helped to sell newspapers. Unfortunately, many of these stories were partly or entirely false, thus leading to the epithet "yellow journalism." An example of "yellow journalism" was a headline in the *Journal* after the U.S. battleship *Maine* blew up—probably from an accidental explosion in a boiler—in Havana's harbor on 15 February 1898: "The Warship Maine Was Split in Two by an Enemy's Infernal Machine." Meanwhile, the *New York Times* and other newspapers tried to increase their circulations by contrasting their "responsible" coverage with the unsubstantiated claims that often appeared as news in the *World* and the *Journal*.

Whether sensational or responsible, the extensive press coverage of the war in Cuba—and the overwhelming sympathy in newspapers and magazines for Cuba's independence movement—helped to prepare the American public for possible war with Spain. In other words, the coverage helped to give President William McKinley the public and congressional support he would need if he decided to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. By the time McKinley did so in April 1898, he shrewdly had waited until enough tensions had built up in U.S.–Spanish relations to make it appear that war had become inevitable.

As the United States gradually moved between August 1914 and April 1917 toward another war, this time with Germany, the overwhelming majority of English-language newspapers and magazines were more sympathetic toward Great Britain and its allies than they were toward Germany and its allies. Most editors blamed Germany for starting the war and for invading France through neutral Belgium; most agreed with President Woodrow Wilson that German submarine attacks without warning on British and U.S. ships were immoral and unacceptable violations of international law; and most found Britain's anti-German propaganda more persuasive than Germany's often clumsy anti-British propaganda. British-inspired stories about German "atrocities" in Belgium and elsewhere were especially effective in the contest for American sympathies. The fact that England cut the telegraph cable from Germany to America early in the war, thus limiting Germans' ability to communicate with Americans, also helped the Allied cause.

Nevertheless, a significant minority of editors opposed U.S. arms sales to England and France, and a larger number opposed efforts by Allied governments and some of their American supporters to draw the United States into the war against Germany. The best known journalistic opponent of America's pro-Allied approach was William Randolph Hearst, who owned newspapers in several major cities. The journalism historian Frank Luther Mott explained Hearst's opposition:

> Hearst had long shown an anti-British feeling; and now he supported the Irish insurrectionists, savagely attacked the English censorship, and featured the extremely pro-German wireless dispatches sent from Berlin by his special correspondent William Bayard Hale. In retaliation, both the British and French governments in October, 1916, denied further use of their mails and cables to Hearst's International News Service.

In addition to the Hearst papers, the anti-British *Chicago Tribune*, leading newspapers in such heavily German-American cities as Cleveland and Cincinnati, socialist and pacifist publications, and many German-American and Irish-American journals all challenged pro-Allied attitudes and policies. The criticisms were so intense, especially from German- and Irish-Americans, that President Wilson scolded "hyphenates" for being more loyal to their former homelands than to America.

"THE LAW OF THE LUSITANIA CASE"

On 7 May 1915 the Cunard passenger liner was sunk in the Atlantic without warning by a German submarine; close to two thousand civilians and crew perished, including 128 Americans. The following are excerpts from a *New York Times* editorial that appeared on 9 May.

"The rule of maritime warfare which imposes upon the commander of a ship of war the duty of providing for the safety of the passengers and crew of any vessel he may elect to destroy is plain, unmistakable in its application to every case, and . . . everywhere and by all civilized nations accepted as a binding obligation. . . .

"The man in the street may have some possible excuse for ignorance of this humane usage of war, but it is . . . surprising to hear from the lips of Senator William J. Stone of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, . . . insinuated excuses or palliations of the dastardly crime committed by Germany. . . .

"Now that we are warned that Germany has resolved to make war in disregard of the laws of God and man, like a Malay running amuck, we know what to do. The time for protests has passed. It becomes now our duty as a nation to demand that Germany shall find means to carry on her war without putting our citizens to death.

If the dispatch without warning of torpedoes against the great Lusitania with 2,000 human beings on board is to be accepted as a true manifestation of the German spirit, . . . if she has deliberately determined that all the world shall know that this is the way in which she proposes to make war, that this is her attitude toward law, . . . then all neutral nations are on notice that the complete defeat of Germany and eradication of the military spirit of Germany are essential to their peace and safety.

After Congress approved Wilson's request for war against Germany in April 1917, the president and Congress made it a crime to criticize America's involvement in the war or to encourage young men to refuse to cooperate with the military draft. During the war, the postmaster general denied mailing privileges to publications that continued

to criticize America's involvement. Three editors of a German-language newspaper in Philadelphia were sent to jail for publishing disloyal articles. Partly due to a widespread perception by the early 1920s that suppression of dissenters had been excessive, the courts generally gave better protections to America's basic freedoms—including freedom of the press—during future wars than they had during World War I.

After briefly disappearing during World ßWar I, the rich diversity of press opinion on foreign affairs returned during the debate over the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in 1919–1920. Ethnic and socialist publications offered a wide range of views, many critical of specific provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Liberal editors who had supported Wilson during the war were dismayed that the peace treaty was harsh in its treatment of Germany. Most Republican editors favored the provisions in regard to Germany and U.S. participation in the League of Nations, but they also supported the efforts of Republican leaders in the Senate to add reservations that would clarify U.S. obligations as a member of the league. When the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles (including U.S. membership in the league) after Wilson refused to accept the Republicans' reservations, most Republican and Democratic editors were disappointed that a compromise that would have permitted passage had not been found.

Press coverage of the wars in East Asia, Africa, and Europe in the 1930s that eventually led to the U.S. involvement in World War II also was highly diverse. Generally not having to fear alienating Japanese-American readers, editors and columnists sharply criticized Japan for occupying Manchuria in 1931 and then invading China in 1933. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 especially angered African-American editors. Communist and liberal publications tended to support the leftist government in the Spanish Civil War, whereas Catholic and conservative journals generally sympathized with the rebel movement led by General Francisco Franco. Even when the overwhelming majority of newspapers and magazines denounced Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, which began World War II in Europe, a scattering of communist and pro-Nazi publications disagreed.

Like the American public as a whole, journalists often disagreed about which policies to pursue toward the wars in Europe and Asia between September 1939 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. In Chicago, for example, the leading newspaper, the *Chicago Tribune,* opposed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposal to revise the neutrality acts in the fall of 1939 to permit England and France to buy supplies in the United States, whereas the other major paper, the *Chicago Daily News,* supported the president's proposal. Although antifascist, the *Chicago Defender,* a leading African-American newspaper, urged its readers to continue to focus on fighting racism in America.

The great debate on foreign policy in the press between 1939 and 1941 generally took place at a more sophisticated level than the debate between 1914 and 1917 over involvement in World War I. For one thing, syndicated columnists like Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson gave newspaper readers a deeper understanding of the issues involved than did the reading of news stories and editorials alone. For another, the issue this time was the nature and extent of U.S. involvement, not the relative merits of the Allied versus the Axis side. Most important, journalists and readers alike understood the stakes: if America became a belligerent in this war, it almost certainly would give up its selectively interventionist heritage and be transformed into a world power with unprecedented global responsibilities.

THE PRESS AND GLOBAL AMERICA SINCE 1941: AN OVERVIEW

The year 1941—when the United States went to war against Germany, Japan, and the other Axis powers in World War II—marked a watershed in America's participation in world affairs. Before then, the U.S. government's involvement outside the northern half of the Western Hemisphere had been limited and episodic. Since then, America has been so internationalist that it has had interests and troop deployments on every continent and ocean. Among many other things, America's perceived interests have included military security, international institutions, opposition to communism, trade and investment, foreign aid, health issues, and freedom of information. The press as a whole has supported this, the most expansive definition of national interests in human history. At the same time, the press has been the major locus of an often heated debate about precisely how America's internationalism should be defined and applied in many of the thousands of specific

issues that have faced policymakers during the years since 1941.

In retrospect, the history of the relationship between the press and U.S. foreign policy since 1941 divides at the time of the large-scale U.S. involvement in Vietnam (1965–1973). If one were forced to pick one event that formed the watershed between the two eras in the press-government relations on foreign policy, it might well be the heavily publicized hearings on the Vietnam War held by Senator J. William Fulbright's Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the winter of 1966. These hearings exposed the sharp differences of opinion between witnesses like Secretary of State Dean Rusk who strongly supported the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the continued validity of a firm stance against communism, and witnesses like former State Department official George Kennan who argued that the containment policy should not be applied in Southeast Asia and that major changes were underway in communist nations that made earlier anticommunist approaches obsolete.

As part of a continuum of developments beginning with the well-publicized improvement in U.S.–Soviet relations during 1963, the hearings helped to make it intellectually respectable for some newspapers and magazines (for example, the *New York Times* and *Newsweek*) to abandon their strong traditional support for containment, whereas others (the *Wall Street Journal* and *National Review*) largely continued their Cold War approach. Thus the hearings—and, much more, the Vietnam War that prompted them and continued long after the hearings ended—divided press coverage of U.S. foreign policy from a pattern of largely supportive coverage of major administration policies—from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 roughly through 1965—to a new pattern from 1966 forward in which coverage was much more divided and typically was contested—at least until the end of the Cold War—along liberal/conservative ideological lines.

The Vietnam War coincided with a marked shift in news coverage away from the ideal of "objectivity" toward the acceptance of more analysis and interpretation in news stories in newspapers (news magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek* had never hesitated to mix news and interpretation). In part this shift by newspapers was a response to the fact that, by the 1960s, television had become the major source of breaking news for growing numbers of Americans. Thus print journalists moved toward a new focus: interpretation in greater depth than network television news could accomplish.

The shift toward larger numbers of interpretive stories also resulted from (1) a growing recognition that the norm of objectivity, however desirable in theory, was an unattainable ideal; and (2) the belief that this ideal had given government officials (including the notorious Senator Joseph McCarthy) too much power to get their often questionable views into print in such a way that they appeared to be facts. In practice, interpretation meant that most newspapers carried more stories that raised questions about particular foreign policies, notably on the front pages that previously had been reserved for "news."

Although it is accurate to emphasize the greater diversity and more critical tone of press coverage of U.S. foreign policy after the mid-1960s, one should not draw too sharp a contrast between pre-Vietnam and post-Vietnam coverage. It is true that most journalists (and most newspapers and magazines) supported the major goals of U.S. policy from Pearl Harbor through the early 1960s: defeating Germany and Japan, helping to establish a peace favorable to American interests and ideals, and then providing leadership in containing communist and other challenges to America's preferred postwar world order. It is also true that the press generally accepted government censorship of news relating to military activities during World War II and the Korean War.

Yet anyone who reads large numbers of newspapers and periodicals on foreign affairs between the early 1940s and the early 1960s will find a tremendous diversity of views. That was true on many subjects during World War II, and it was even more evident thereafter. During the late 1940s, for example, the leading syndicated columnists—Walter Lippmann and Joseph Alsop—disagreed sharply about the approach America should take in containing the Soviet Union. And the nation's leading magazine publisher, Henry Luce of Time Incorporated, vehemently disagreed with the government and with the editors of the nation's leading newspaper, the *New York Times*, about U.S. policy toward China. Despite their differences of opinion, leading journalists like Lippmann, Alsop, and Luce were befriended and courted by presidents and other high officials after World War II to an extent that was unprecedented in American history.

Diversity of coverage was found in both of the studies of the press and foreign policy during this era in which the authors of this essay were

involved. Both studies used content analysis of coverage during several periods. In *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1947,* Louis W. Liebovich did content analysis of coverage between 1944 and 1947 in *Time* magazine, the *New York Herald Tribune,* the *Chicago Tribune,* and the *San Francisco Chronicle.* He repeatedly found varied coverage in the four publications, with coverage in the highly idiosyncratic *Chicago Tribune* (the newspaper with the largest circulation in the Midwest) diverging the most sharply. In a time of considerable uncertainty in relations between America and Russia in which President Harry S. Truman did not spell out his own views on U.S.–Soviet relations for more than eighteen months after the end of World War II, Liebovich concluded that "[o]nly the *Chicago Tribune* could claim steady opposition to any Soviet-U.S. accord."

In a book on the press and four foreign policy crises during the Kennedy years, Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering found substantial differences in coverage in all five newspapers studied—the *New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* and *San Francisco Examiner.* Not surprisingly, given its location in Washington, the *Post* gave the most weight to administration sources, the *Times* had the most foreign sources, the *Post-Dispatch* offered the most criticisms from a liberal perspective, the *Tribune*'s news stories and editorials frequently were imbued with the paper's unique blend of isolationism and militant anticommunism, and the *Examiner* emphasized a Republican internationalism that viewed President Kennedy as too weak in dealing with communist nations.

In light of the relative liberalism and internationalism of northeastern elites and government employees, the fairly liberal, internationalist views of the *Post* and *Times* are easily understood. But could even most residents of Chicago and St. Louis explain why the leading papers in their cities were, respectively, militantly isolationist and liberally internationalist? And who would expect a conservative Republican paper to be one of the two leading newspapers (along with the *San Francisco Chronicle*) in traditionally liberal San Francisco? Diversity indeed.

A broad range of opinion on foreign policy between Pearl Harbor and the mid-1960s was even more pronounced in magazines. During World War II, for example, several prominent conservative magazines published articles warning that it would be impossible for America to continue to cooperate after the war with the dictatorial, expansionist Russian government. During the mid-1950s, writers for the liberal *Nation* and *New Republic* argued that America should pursue policies designed to end the Cold War; meanwhile, contributors to the conservative *National Review* were insisting that World War III already was underway and that the communist side was winning. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, some conservative journals prematurely denounced Fidel Castro's "communist" revolution in Cuba, whereas some liberal magazines featured articles praising Castro even after he acknowledged his allegiance to communism.

Despite this diversity of coverage even at the height of the Cold War, there were significant differences beginning about 1966. The changes resulted primarily from the Vietnam War and the breakdown of the Cold War consensus among the "responsible" mainstream journalists who worked for leading newspapers and magazines. Because the *New York Times* was the most respected newspaper among officials and journalists in Washington, and because its news and editorial judgments influenced coverage at the major magazines and television networks located in New York, the shift at the *Times* away from the Cold War consensus was especially significant.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the *Times* effectively had supported Central Intelligence Agency interventions designed to overthrow existing governments, either by accepting official denials of U.S. involvement (for example, Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954) or by playing down coverage of planned interventions (such as Cuba in 1961). The *Times* also helped the government maintain numerous official secrets, including the fact that some U.S. journalists stationed abroad were part-time CIA employees who assisted the government in waging the Cold War. In contrast, when the *Times* learned from disgruntled officials that the Nixon administration had secretly been bombing North Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia, it printed the information and thus demonstrated the falsity of the administration's public statements on the subject.

In subsequent years the *Times* repeatedly exposed and denounced the CIA's (that is, Nixon's) efforts to oust Chile's Marxist president and the CIA's (Reagan's) efforts to defeat Nicaragua's Marxist leaders. The *Washington Post,* which had given at least as fervent support as the *Times* to most anticommunist policies, also challenged the government's continuing Cold War approach by the late 1960s and early 1970s. The

publication of large sections of the Pentagon Papers (a classified official study of the evolution of U.S. policy in Vietnam) by the *Times, Post,* and *Boston Globe* in June 1971 was a clear sign from leading news organizations that the era of unquestioning cooperation with officials on national security issues was over.

In addition to growing differences of opinion over U.S. foreign policy, the 1960s ethos of questioning authority—an ethos reinforced by Nixon's dishonesty during the Watergate affair that cost him his presidency—also affected relations between reporters and officials for many years thereafter. During and after Watergate, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger recalled, "the press took great delight in demonstrating that the government was wrong." In comparing Dean Rusk's relations with reporters in the early 1960s with the experience of another Democratic secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, in the late 1970s, Martin Linsky found "no sense from Vance of personal intimacy with reporters, and no sense that from his perspective they were waiting for his wisdom." Vance told Linsky that he saw the press as "playing a critically important role. The press can either make or break a policy initiative."

Many high officials in the Reagan administration believed that the government, by giving the news media a relatively free hand in covering the conflict in Vietnam, had contributed to America's failure there. Accordingly, when Reagan in October 1983 ordered U.S. troops to invade the small Caribbean nation of Grenada and overthrow its pro-Cuban government, the administration did not permit any reporters to accompany the troops. Two immediate results were the press's dependence on administration sources for information about the invasion and criticism of official news management in many news stories and editorials. The invasion revealed that conservative concerns about a monolithic "eastern liberal press" were overblown: after U.S. troops had defeated Cuban forces and installed a noncommunist government, editorials in the liberal *New York Times* criticized the invasion, but the moderate *Washington Post* concluded that "President Reagan made the right decision in Grenada."

Press coverage of the Grenada invasion and its consequences largely occurred within a couple weeks in late October and early November 1983. A relatively big story that spanned the entire decade—U.S. policy toward the civil wars in Central America—illustrated the sharp divisions within Congress and American society that found their way into press coverage of many foreign policy issues after the mid-1960s. To the Reagan administration and its conservative supporters, the Marxist left, aided by the Soviet Union and Cuba, had gained power in Nicaragua in the late 1970s and was threatening to establish pro-Soviet communist regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala as well. Deeply concerned that communist ideology and Soviet power were expanding in "America's backyard," conservatives believed that the Marxist left needed to be defeated decisively. Liberals, who viewed the existing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala as highly repressive and feared "another Vietnam," thought that America should send neither military aid nor troops to assist anticommunist governments in those two nations or rebel "contra" forces in Nicaragua. Because of the sharp ideological divisions on this issue and most Americans' lack of knowledge about the region, U.S. policy toward Central America in the 1980s was a subject on which many reporters, editorial writers, and columnists had almost as much difficulty in obtaining accurate information and presenting balanced perspectives as did administration officials, members of Congress, academics, religious leaders, and political activists.

With the ending by early 1990 of both the Cold War and the U.S.–Soviet–Cuban contest in Central America, journalists and officials turned their attention to new issues that thankfully could no longer be placed in Cold War frames. America still had alliances and a strong general interest in peace and stability, but vital interests in specific situations were harder to define in the absence of an international communist movement. When foreign policy issues involving possible military interventions arose in the 1990s, therefore, the debate in Washington and in the press focused on whether the nation had sufficient national interests to send troops to nations like Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.

Even within the affluent news organizations, the issue of priorities became more difficult to resolve in the absence of a communist threat. "We have chosen to invest major resources in covering the former Yugoslavia, but is this the correct move?" Bernard Gwertzman of the *Times* wrote. "Should we care what happens to Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians?" Except in a few papers like the *Times* with a strong tradition of international reporting, the volume of foreign news coverage dropped sharply in both newspapers and news magazines in the 1990s.

There were positive trends as well. Reporting and commenting on the lengthy deliberations over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) treaty in the early 1990s and over most-favored-nation trading status for China several years later, the press played important roles in the largest public discussions of America's international economic policies since the debates over tariff policy in the 1920s and early 1930s. Because the print media are indispensable for detailed analysis, and television excels in presenting vivid images, newspapers and magazines may well have had relatively greater influence than television in the debates over economic policy than in the discussions of possible military interventions.

The press also has played an important role in bringing environmental issues—including proposed international actions to deal with them—to public attention. An example is the debate over the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to address global warming. An analysis by Brigitte Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia of press coverage in two national newspapers during a six-month period from September 1997 through February 1998 found that the *New York Times* published sixty-five articles on the subject and the *Wall Street Journal* published twenty-three. The authors also found that

> contrary to the American media's more common coverage of foreign policy issues, government officials did not dominate that press coverage. Taken together, policy and scientific experts, a variety of organized interests (business, labor unions, environmentalists), as well as the public, were more frequently covered than officials at Washington's major news beats. . . . As a result, the media—especially newspapers—reflected the kind of robust debate that is especially essential in the American system of government, where decision makers pay considerable attention to public opinion.

This and other studies suggest that, with the Cold War over, the press is less likely to rely as heavily on administration and congressional sources for its news stories as it did earlier. To be sure, the views of governmental leaders in a democracy need to be publicized and evaluated, so that voters can have information on which to base judgments in future elections. But the views of others—including the representatives of the groups listed in the above quotation—also need to be included so that voters have a broad base of information and perspectives upon which to form their opinions. By giving detailed coverage to relatively neglected issues like international economics and the environment, and by providing greater balance between governmental and nongovernmental sources for news stories about these issues, the press may well be doing a better job in covering foreign policy issues today than it did during the Cold War.

THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISES

Much of the most systematic scholarship on the press and foreign policy has focused on coverage during the many crises that occurred from the early 1960s through the early 1990s. Two studies that include systematic analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, *The Kennedy Crises* (1983) by Montague Kern and colleagues and *The Press, Presidents, and Crises* (1990) by Brigitte Nacos, agree that the Kennedy administration faced difficulties from negative press coverage of issues relating to Cuba, especially in Republican-leaning newspapers, in the months leading up to the discovery of the missiles in mid-October 1962. Conservative newspapers highlighted the charges of Republican politicians and anticommunist Cuban exiles that the administration was too weak in dealing with Castro and with a large-scale Soviet military buildup in Cuba that, contrary to administration denials, might well include nuclear weapons.

The two studies also agree that, after Kennedy went on national television and radio on 22 October to reveal the missiles' presence in Cuba and to insist upon their removal, coverage in all studied newspapers swung decisively in his favor, thus building up his reputation as a strong and sensible leader who was "in control." After Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev publicly agreed on 28 October to remove the missiles and thus handed Kennedy a widely perceived victory, coverage gradually returned to the more normal pattern of liberal support for the administration on Cuba and conservative questioning of its resolve to "stand up to" Khrushchev and Castro.

Based on their study of the missile crisis and three other crises of the Kennedy years, Montague Kern and her colleagues concluded that "the president dominates press coverage primarily in situations [such as the climatic week of the Cuban missile crisis] where competing interpretations of events are not being espoused by others whom journalists consider important." Brigitte Nacos

agreed with this conclusion and added another: "The extent to which the president's domestic proponents or opponents were highlighted or downplayed in the news depended on the editorial stance of each newspaper. During all phases of the Cuban crisis there was a relationship between so-called straight news reporting and editorial positions of each news organization." This finding, confirmed in her study of other crises, suggests that editorial perspectives—especially general support for or opposition to the administration in power—correlated with news coverage of crises in the pro-Democratic *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and in the pro-Republican *Chicago Tribune*.

On the Sunday before Kennedy planned to take to the airwaves to confront Khrushchev and state the administration's policy, he learned that James Reston of the *New York Times* and other reporters had pieced together large parts of the story about the missiles in Cuba and about Kennedy's plan to blockade the island and demand that the missiles be removed. Fearing that premature publication of this information might derail his efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully, Kennedy phoned Reston and high-level officials of the *Times* and the *Post* and *Time* magazine and pleaded that details of the administration's plans not be published before Tuesday. Reston recalled that Kennedy "didn't deny what was afoot, but said that if I printed what we knew, he might get an ultimatum from Khrushchev even before he could go on the air to explain the seriousness of the crisis." Reston and the "eastern establishment" executives agreed to cooperate with Kennedy.

Kennedy's phone calls stand as striking high-level testimony about the perceived importance of the press in the policymaking process during international crisis. They also raise an intriguing question, prompted by Nacos's conclusion: if one of the reporters for the *Chicago Tribune* had gotten the story, would that anti-administration paper have responded as positively as the *Times* and the *Post* did to Kennedy's request not to reveal his plans?

During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy received highly positive, "rally 'round the flag" coverage at the time he needed it most. During the Vietnamese communists' Tet Offensive a little more than five years later, in contrast, the Johnson administration generally failed to get the positive press coverage that might have strengthened public and congressional support for America's war in Vietnam. At a time when U.S. and allied troops were being killed and wounded in unprecedented numbers, why was most of the coverage in the mainstream media unsupportive of the administration?

A major reason is that most journalists viewed the large-scale communist offensive beginning at the end of January 1968 as yet another example of the gap between U.S. officials' optimistic public assessments of America's and South Vietnam's "progress" in the war, and the reality that North Vietnam and its Vietcong allies were determined enemies who were far from being beaten. In other words, many journalists were skeptical about U.S. leaders' depictions of the war before Tet, a skepticism that the communist offensive appeared to confirm. Writing later, Don Oberdorfer of the *Washington Post* mentioned another factor: "One reason the press was not 'on the [government's] team' was because the country was not 'on the team.' To a substantial degree, the newsmen represented and reflected American society, and like the rest [of the public], they had no deep commitment to or enthusiasm for the war."

Several developments during the offensive also contributed to the largely unfavorable press coverage. The fact that Vietcong troops attacked targets in Saigon—including the U.S. embassy—frightened the hundreds of American journalists stationed there and suggested that U.S. military leaders had been wrong to describe parts of South Vietnam as "secure." Another example: the widely published photo (and widely played television footage) of the shooting of a captured Vietcong suspect by a South Vietnamese brigadier general on a Saigon street raised new questions about that government's standards of behavior. And an American major's comment to a reporter about the battle to remove the enemy from Bentre—"It became necessary to destroy the town to save it"—increased doubts at home about whether some of America's own military practices in the war were moral.

In a detailed study of press coverage during the offensive, journalist Peter Braestrup argued that the media mistakenly portrayed Tet as a "defeat for the allies" and hence by implication a victory for the communist forces. In fact, after early reverses, America and its allies won a major victory over enemy forces throughout most of South Vietnam—a victory that received little coverage compared with the heavy dose of negative news early in the crisis. "Rarely has contemporary crisis-journalism turned out, in retrospect, to have veered so widely from reality," Braestrup concluded.

Although Braestrup rightly pointed out failings in press coverage, his thesis is only partly persuasive. One can agree that, from a military viewpoint, allied forces by mid-March generally had dealt communist troops at least a temporary defeat. But the Vietnam War also had large psychological and political components. From those viewpoints, the communists were strikingly successful: they convinced most Americans (including most journalists and many members of Congress) that, after three years of heavy fighting with superior equipment, America still faced capable, courageous opponents who could not be defeated in the foreseeable future, if ever. Braestrup's criticisms notwithstanding, journalists were right to portray the Tet Offensive as an impressive military attack and, more importantly, as a severe blow to Johnson's belief that America could "prevail" in Vietnam while continuing to fight a limited war there.

The third crisis, sparked by Iraq's conquest of neighboring Kuwait in August 1990, was so different from the first two situations—themselves very different from each other—as to demonstrate that the concept "foreign policy crisis" is itself multifaceted. Unlike the situation in Cuba or South Vietnam, a sovereign nation was conquered before U.S. leaders had time to take effective action. Moreover, the public (including the press) debate about what moves, if any, America should make in response took place with memories still strong about America's painful departure from Vietnam only fifteen years before.

Scholars rightly point out that, during the first few weeks after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the George H. W. Bush administration largely framed the issue in terms of the immorality of the conquest, the Hitler-like expansionism of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein that threatened such important U.S. allies as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the necessity of restoring Kuwait's independence through either diplomacy or force. What some scholars opposed to President Bush's policy are less likely to acknowledge, however, is that the overwhelming majority of mass-circulation newspapers and magazines (and major television and radio news operations) basically agreed with the administration's arguments and willingly assisted in building public support for an active U.S. role in ending the Iraqi occupation. In newsrooms across the nation as well as in Congress, the only large-scale debates centered on whether America and its allies could achieve this objective through economic sanctions, or whether the nations opposed to the occupation also needed to be prepared to use military force in the relatively near future. A broadly based study of newspaper editorials on the Gulf crisis found them overall to be "respectful toward the president and generally supportive. When there was dissent, it was usually over tactics and timing, rather than goals and principles."

Especially helpful to the administration was support from respected news organizations that frequently had disagreed with recent presidents—especially with Republicans like Nixon and Reagan—on major foreign policies. An example was the *New York Times*. From the start of the crisis, political scientist Benjamin I. Page noted, editorials in the *Times* "condemned the Iraqi invasion and insisted upon a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait." Page also lamented the limited range of opinions expressed in the *Times* columns as well as editorials: "There was certainly no talk of U.S. imperialism or hegemony, or of our historical policy of trying to control Middle Eastern oil reserves." Compared with the *Times*, however, *Newsweek* was blatantly supportive of the administration. In late November it even published a column by President Bush entitled "Why We Must Break Saddam's 'Stranglehold.'"

Building upon solid but far from unanimous backing at home, during the fall of 1990 Bush gained strong support from allied nations in western Europe and the Middle East and from the United Nations Security Council. The administration and its allies (notably Great Britain) also built up a large, well-equipped military force in Saudi Arabia and threatened to go to war with Iraq if Hussein did not withdraw from Kuwait. Assuming that Iraq did not end its occupation quickly, only two important questions remained. First, would the Democratic-controlled Congress, many of whose members still had vivid memories of the Vietnam debacle, pass a resolution supporting a war with Iraq to liberate Kuwait? And second, would the mainstream media accept the unprecedented degree of control over journalists and their stories that the administration, with its own fresh memories of press coverage of Vietnam and other interventions, insisted upon imposing? When Congress and the mainstream media effectively answered "yes" to both questions, the administration's victory over potentially powerful domestic opponents was complete.

Now all that the United States and its allies had to do was liberate Kuwait, which occurred more quickly and with fewer casualties—at least on America's side—than most observers had

anticipated. Begun with allied bombing attacks on Iraqi targets on 16 January 1991, the war ended with a cease-fire agreement six weeks later. Although systematic studies remain to be done, it appears that, given the almost total absence of congressional criticism while the nation was at war, news and editorial coverage was even more favorable to the administration during the war than it had been earlier. In this and other ways, both press coverage and the press-government relationship during the Gulf War were strikingly different from what they had been during the Tet Offensive twenty-three years earlier.

If past experience holds, one would expect continued diversity in press coverage and in press-government relations during foreign policy crises in the future. One also would expect continued diversity in noncrisis situations and in coverage of the many different kinds of foreign policy issues that draw journalists' attention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berry, Nicholas O. *Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of the New York Times' Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1990. Although limited to analysis of the *Times,* this is a superb study of how journalists cover foreign policy issues during various stages of crises.

Braestrup, Peter. *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington.* 2 vols. Boulder, Colo., 1977.

Broder, David S. *Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News is Made.* New York, 1987. A leading journalist's account of relations between the press and government, and especially valuable for the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.

Cater, Douglass. *The Fourth Branch of Government.* Boston, 1959. Especially useful for the presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower.

Cohen, Bernard C. *The Press and Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1963. An important scholarly study of the press and U.S. foreign policy at the height of the Cold War.

———. *Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the Netherlands.* Madison, Wisc., 1995.

Gans, Herbert J. *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time.* New York, 1979. A study by a well-known sociologist known for effective use of interviews and for comparisons of journalistic practices at leading news magazines and television networks.

Graber, Doris A. *Mass Media and American Politics.* 4th ed. Washington, D.C., 1993. A standard work that includes an excellent section on the press and foreign policy; especially helpful for the 1970s and 1980s.

Hallin, Daniel C. *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam.* New York, 1986. A detailed study that argues that the executive branch of the U.S. government greatly influenced press coverage of the Vietnam War.

Hilsman, Roger. *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs.* 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1993. An insightful study by a political scientist who also was a high-level official in the Kennedy administration.

Kennamer, J. David, ed. *Public Opinion, the Press, and Public Policy.* Westport, Conn., 1992. Useful partly because it is more theoretical and conceptual than most other works that analyze the subject.

Kern, Montague, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering. *The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983.

Liebovich, Louis W. *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1947.* New York, 1988.

———. *The Press and the Modern Presidency: Myths and Mindsets from Kennedy to Election 2000.* 2d ed. Westport, Conn., 2001.

Linsky, Martin. *Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking.* New York, 1986. Based partly on interviews, this book contains in-depth analysis of press coverage of several foreign policy issues in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Mott, Frank Luther. *American Journalism; A History: 1690–1960.* 3d ed. New York, 1962. A standard history of American journalism, it pays more attention to the press and foreign policy than most other surveys.

Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. *The Press, Presidents, and Crises.* New York, 1990. An excellent study that includes quantitative analysis of both news and editorial coverage in leading newspapers.

Nacos, Brigitte Lebens, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds. *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.* Lanham, Md., 2000. Several

chapters contain excellent analyses of press coverage of selected issues in U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s.

Newsom, David D. *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy.* Bloomington, Ind., 1996. A former U.S. diplomat offers insights into the press and foreign policy and other subjects; especially useful for the 1980s and early 1990s.

Page, Benjamin I. *Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy.* Chicago, 1996. Especially useful for press coverage of the events leading up to the war in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

Rivers, William L. *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press.* Boston, 1970. An analysis of the frequent conflicts between officials and journalists during the 1960s.

Rosati, Jerel A. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy.* 2d ed. Fort Worth, Tex., 1999. Includes a well-argued chapter on the news media and foreign policy; especially useful for the 1980s and early 1990s.

Schneider, James C. *Should America Go to War?: The Debate over Foreign Policy in Chicago, 1939–1941.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989. An excellent study of the role of the press and other actors in shaping public discussion in one city.

Seib, Philip. *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy.* Westport, Conn., 1997. An outstanding nonquantitative study of the press and foreign policy over the past several decades.

Serfaty, Simon, ed. *The Media and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1991. Excellent analyses, primarily by journalists and officials, of press coverage and relationships between journalists and officials on foreign policy issues; especially insightful on the 1980s.

Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. *The White House Press on the Presidency: News Management and Co-Option.* Lanham, Md., 1983. Journalists and former officials discuss press coverage, including coverage of foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s.

See also PUBLIC OPINION; TELEVISION.

PROPAGANDA

Kenneth A. Osgood

The United States has utilized propaganda techniques repeatedly through its history, particularly during periods of war and international crisis. As early as the revolutionary period, Americans evinced a shrewd grasp of the utility of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy. The total wars of the early twentieth century led the U.S. government to employ propaganda on a massive scale as an accessory to military operations, but the Cold War institutionalized propaganda as a central component of American foreign policy. The governmental use of propaganda continued to expand in the twenty-first century, largely due to the harnessing of the revolution in communications. But for most Americans, propaganda has a negative connotation as a treacherous, deceitful, and manipulative practice. Americans have generally thought of propaganda as something "other" people and nations do, while they themselves merely persuade, inform, or educate. Americans have employed numerous euphemisms for their propaganda in order to distinguish it from its totalitarian applications and wicked connotations. The most common of these has been "information," a designation that has adorned all of the official propaganda agencies of the government—from the Committee on Public Information (1917–1919) and the Office of War Information (1942–1945) to the U.S. Information Agency (1953–1999) and its successor, the Office of International Information Programs in the Department of State.

For a brief period during the 1940s and early 1950s, the terms "psychological warfare" and "political warfare" were openly espoused by propaganda specialists and politicians alike. Increasingly, they turned to euphemisms like "international communication" and "public communication" to make the idea of propaganda more palatable to domestic audiences. During the Cold War, common phrases also included "the war of ideas," "battle for hearts and minds," "struggle for the minds and wills of men," "thought war," "ideological warfare," "nerve warfare," "campaign of truth," "war of words," and others. Even the term "Cold War" was used to refer to propaganda techniques and strategy (as in "Cold War tactics"). Later, the terms "communication," "public diplomacy," "psychological operations" (or "psyops"), "special operations," and "information warfare" became fashionable. Political propaganda and measures to influence media coverage were likewise labeled "spin," and political propagandists were "spin doctors" or, more imaginatively, "media consultants" and "image advisers."

The term "propaganda" has spawned as many definitions as it has euphemisms. Harold Lasswell, a pioneer of propaganda studies in the United States, defined it as "the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols." Like other social scientists in the 1930s, he emphasized its psychological elements: propaganda was a subconscious manipulation of psychological symbols to accomplish secret objectives. Subsequent analysts stressed that propaganda was a planned and deliberate act of opinion management. A 1958 study prepared for the U.S. Army, for example, defined propaganda as "the planned dissemination of news, information, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific group." In the 1990s the historian Oliver Thomson defined propaganda broadly to include both deliberate and unintentional means of behavior modification, describing it as "the use of communication skills of all kinds to achieve attitudinal or behavioural changes among one group by another." Numerous communication specialists have stressed that propaganda is a neutral activity concerned only with persuasion, in order to free propagandists (and their profession) from pejorative associations. Some social scientists have abandoned the term altogether because it cannot be defined with any degree of precision; and others, like the influential French philoso-

pher Jacques Ellul, have used the term but refused to define it because any definition would inevitably leave something out.

As these examples indicate, propaganda is notoriously difficult to define. Does one identify propaganda by the intentions of the sponsor, by the effect on the recipients, or by the techniques used? Is something propaganda because it is deliberate and planned? How does propaganda differ from advertising, public relations, education, information, or, for that matter, politics? At its core, propaganda refers to any technique or action that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of a group, in order to benefit the sponsor. Propaganda is usually, but not exclusively, concerned with public opinion and mass attitudes. The purpose of propaganda is to persuade—either to change or reinforce existing attitudes and opinions. Yet propaganda is also a manipulative activity. It often disguises the secret intentions and goals of the sponsor; it seeks to inculcate ideas rather than to explain them; and it aspires to modify or control opinions and actions primarily to benefit the sponsor rather than the recipient.

Although manipulative, propaganda is not necessarily untruthful, as is commonly believed. In fact, many specialists believe that the most effective propaganda operates with different layers of truth—from half-truths and the truth torn out of context to the just plain truth. Propagandists have on many occasions employed lies, misrepresentations, or deceptions, but propaganda that is based on fact and that rings true to the intended audience is bound to be more persuasive than bald-faced lies.

Another common misconception identifies propaganda narrowly by its most obvious manifestations—radio broadcasts, posters, leaflets, and so on. But propaganda experts employ a range of symbols, ideas, and activities to influence the thoughts, attitudes, opinions, and actions of various audiences—including such disparate modes of communication and human interaction as educational and cultural exchanges, books and scholarly publications, the adoption of slogans and buzzwords, monuments and museums, spectacles and media events, press releases, speeches, policy initiatives, and person-to-person contacts. Diplomacy, too, has been connected to the practice of propaganda. Communication techniques have been employed by government agents to cultivate public opinion so as to put pressure on governments to pursue certain policies, while traditional diplomatic activities—negotiations, treaties—have been planned, implemented, and presented in whole or in part for the effects they would have on public opinion, both international and domestic.

TYPES OF PROPAGANDA

Modern practitioners of propaganda utilize various schema to classify different types of propaganda activities. One such categorization classifies propaganda as white, gray, or black according to the degree to which the sponsor conceals or acknowledges its involvement. White propaganda is correctly attributed to the sponsor and the source is truthfully identified. (The U.S. government's international broadcast service Voice of America, for example, broadcasts white propaganda.) Gray propaganda, on the other hand, is unattributed to the sponsor and conceals the real source of the propaganda. The objective of gray propaganda is to advance viewpoints that are in the interest of the originator but that would be more acceptable to target audiences than official statements. The reasoning is that avowedly propagandistic materials from a foreign government or identified propaganda agency might convince few, but the same ideas presented by seemingly neutral outlets would be more persuasive. Unattributed publications, such as articles in newspapers written by a disguised source, are staples of gray propaganda. Other tactics involve wide dissemination of ideas put forth by others—by foreign governments, by national and international media outlets, or by private groups, individuals, and institutions. Gray propaganda also includes material assistance provided to groups that put forth views deemed useful to the propagandist.

Like its gray cousin, black propaganda also camouflages the sponsor's participation. But while gray propaganda is unattributed, black propaganda is falsely attributed. Black propaganda is subversive and provocative; it is usually designed to appear to have originated from a hostile source, in order to cause that source embarrassment, to damage its prestige, to undermine its credibility, or to get it to take actions that it might not otherwise. Black propaganda is usually prepared by secret agents or an intelligence service because it would be damaging to the originating government if it were discovered. It routinely employs underground newspapers, forged documents, planted gossip or rumors, jokes, slogans, and visual symbols.

Another categorization distinguishes between "fast" and "slow" propaganda operations, based on the type of media employed and the immediacy of the effect desired. Fast media are designed to exert a short-term impact on public opinion, while the use of slow media cultivates public opinion over the long haul. Fast media typically include radio, newspapers, speeches, television, moving pictures, and, since the 1990s, e-mail and the Internet. These forms of communication are able to exert an almost instantaneous effect on select audiences. Books, cultural exhibitions, and educational exchanges and activities, on the other hand, are slow media that seek to inculcate ideas and attitudes over time.

An additional category of propaganda might be termed "propaganda of the deed," or actions taken for the psychological effects they would have on various publics. The famous Doolittle Raid of April 1942 is a classic example. After months of negative news from the Pacific during World War II, Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle of the U.S. Army Air Corps led a force of sixteen planes on a bombing raid of Japan. The mission was pointless from a military point of view, but psychologically it was significant. For Americans, it provided a morale boost and evidence that the United States was "doing something" to strike at the enemy directly; for the Japanese, it was a warning that the United States possessed the capability to reach their homeland with strategic bombers and a reminder that the attack at Pearl Harbor had not completely destroyed the U.S. fleet. "Propaganda of the deed" can also include such disparate actions as educational or cultural exchanges, economic aid, disaster relief, disarmament initiatives, international agreements, the appointment of investigating commissions, legislation, and other policy initiatives when employed primarily for the effects they would have on public opinion.

REVOLUTION, WAR, AND PROPAGANDA TO 1917

By whatever name we call it, propaganda has a long history. War propaganda is as ancient as war itself. Anthropologists have unearthed evidence that primitive peoples used pictures and symbols to impress others with their hunting and fighting capabilities. The Assyrian, Greek, and Roman empires employed storytelling, poems, religious symbols, monuments, speeches, documents, and other means of communication to mobilize their armed forces or demoralize those of their enemies. As early as the fifth century B.C., the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu advocated various techniques to maintain fighting morale and to destroy the enemy's will to fight. The nineteenth-century German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz identified psychological forces as decisive elements of modern war.

Thus, propaganda is not, as it is sometimes believed, a twentieth-century phenomenon born of the electronic communications revolution. Throughout history the governors have attempted to influence the ways the governed see the world, just as critics and revolutionaries have aspired to change that view. The word itself originated during the Reformation, when the Roman Catholic Church created a commission of cardinals to "propagate" the faith in non-Catholic lands. The principle differences between modern and ancient propaganda are the use of new techniques and technologies, greater awareness of the utility of propaganda, and perhaps also the sheer pervasiveness and volume of modern propaganda.

Although the concept is often associated with dictatorship, propaganda has figured prominently in American life and history. Political propaganda has been an essential ingredient of the democratic process, as politicians and political parties have employed a range of communication techniques to win public support for their ideas and policies. Similarly, countless private groups—from early antislavery societies to modern political action committees—have turned to propaganda techniques to push their agendas. Advertising and public relations, fields that came into fruition during the early twentieth century, have made commercial propaganda a permanent feature of the cultural landscape. War propaganda has been utilized by both government agencies and private groups to win the support of neutrals, demoralize enemies, and energize domestic populations. The pluralistic nature of American life and the existence of a free press has prevented the emergence of a monolithic propaganda apparatus, but it could be argued that these factors have in fact made American democracy better equipped than totalitarian societies for effective propaganda, if only because the free marketplace of ideas has required would-be propagandists to develop ever more sophisticated means of persuasion.

As far back as the colonial period, influential Americans exhibited a remarkable grasp of propaganda techniques. Propaganda and agitation

were essential components of the American Revolution. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, propaganda played a pivotal role in creating the intellectual and psychological climate of the Revolution itself.

Philip Davidson, in his history of the propaganda of the American Revolution, documented a remarkably sophisticated grasp of propaganda techniques among the leading organizers of the Revolution. Although the Founders are rarely recognized as propagandists—probably because of propaganda's pejorative associations—the evidence of a conscious, systematic effort by colonial leaders to gain public support for their ideas is unmistakable. Benjamin Franklin admitted to exposing "in as striking a light as I could, to the nation, the absurdity of the [British] measures towards America"; Thomas Jefferson spoke of "arousing our people from . . . lethargy"; and George Washington advocated the release of information "in a manner calculated to attract the attention and impress the minds of the people." Thomas Paine was the Revolution's most famous (and radical) propagandist. He wrote numerous pamphlets articulating with rhetorical flourish the ideological justification for the Revolution, including the influential *Common Sense* and the poetic *Crisis,* which began with the memorable words, "These are the times that try men's souls."

These men were keenly sensitive to the importance of public opinion, and they employed a wide variety of techniques to arouse public sentiment against the British. Through town meetings, assemblies, churches, legal documents, resolutions, demonstrations, songs, plays, oratory, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and letters they agitated relentlessly against the policies of the British government. Newspapers such as the *Providence Gazette* and the *Boston Gazette* were crucial in organizing opposition to the Stamp Act and in exploiting such incidents as the Boston Massacre. Powerful slogans such as "No Taxation Without Representation" and "Liberty or Death" were utilized to mobilize colonists for revolution, as were such rituals as effigy burning and the planting of "liberty trees."

Several revolutionaries employed the tactics that would later be known as gray propaganda. They wrote articles, letters, and pamphlets under pseudonyms to disguise their identities and to create the impression that opposition to British policies was much greater than it was. Samuel Adams, for example, wrote under twenty-five different pseudonyms in numerous publications. Benjamin Franklin articulated a shrewd understanding of the techniques of propaganda, including the use of gray and black materials. He remarked: "The facility with which the same truths may be repeatedly enforced by placing them daily in different lights in newspapers . . . gives a great chance of establishing them. And we now find that it is not only right to strike while the iron is hot but that it may be very practicable to heat it by continually striking." The tactics Franklin was referring to—incessant repetition of propaganda themes and the transmitting of ideas through local media outlets in the form of news—described core techniques of modern propaganda and are an indication of the sophistication of revolutionary war propaganda.

The Revolution also saw the utilization of these and other propaganda techniques as instruments of diplomacy. Franklin worked assiduously to mold European views of the conflict and he especially cultivated French opinion to secure France's assistance in the war. To isolate the British diplomatically and to encourage domestic opposition to the war in Britain, Franklin widely publicized British war atrocities, even resorting to black propaganda to exaggerate and fabricate crimes. In 1777 he distributed a phony letter, purportedly written by a German commander of Hessian mercenaries, indicating that the British government advised him to let wounded soldiers die. The letter caused a sensation in France and also induced numerous desertions by the Hessian mercenaries. Franklin also forged an entire issue of the *Boston Independent,* which contained a fabricated account of British scalp hunting. The story touched off a public uproar in Britain and was used by opposition politicians to attack the conduct of the war. The historian Oliver Thomson described these efforts as "one of the most thorough campaigns of diplomatic isolation by propaganda ever mounted."

The revolutionary war itself promoted themes common to most war propaganda: the righteousness of the cause, the savageness of the enemy, and the necessity and certainty of victory. Although no theme received greater treatment than the depravity of the enemy, it was the Revolution's appeal to high moral purpose that had the most lasting impact on American life. The Declaration of Independence was a brilliant document on the rights of man, but, at the same time, it was a brilliant document that employed emotive rhetoric to justify the Revolution and to rally public opinion to the cause. The war itself was portrayed

as a struggle for liberty against tyranny, freedom against slavery. In this, the Revolution provided the model for the themes and ideas that would animate many subsequent propaganda campaigns (and much of the political rhetoric) of the United States. From the planting of liberty trees during the Revolution, to the cultivation of liberty gardens during World War II, symbolic appeals to freedom and liberty were staples of wartime mobilization efforts.

During the American Civil War both the Union and Confederate governments utilized propaganda abroad to influence foreign sentiment. The Union sent propaganda commissions to Europe to influence the governments and people of England and France. President Abraham Lincoln personally appealed to British opinion by writing directly to labor unions and textile industrialists to press the Union case. Lincoln, who had a strong appreciation of public relations techniques, was perhaps the Union's best propagandist. His "house divided" metaphor was one of the most powerful images of the 1860s, and his public addresses—most notably the Gettysburg Address—were calculated to unite Northerners behind the cause. The Emancipation Proclamation was deliberately timed to encourage defections from the Confederacy by border states and was skillfully exploited by Union representatives abroad to win European sentiment.

The Confederate government sponsored a meagerly funded, but relatively sophisticated, propaganda operation in Britain under the direction of Henry Hotze. Hotze successfully placed numerous articles in British newspapers by giving them gratis to journalists, who in turn sold them to newspapers in their own names for personal profit. In this manner he both courted the goodwill of a select company of journalists and concealed his own sponsorship of the articles—a classic tactic of gray propaganda. He also developed a scheme whereby he paid several journalists to work for a weekly paper he produced, *The Index*. While earning their salaries as Hotze's editors, they also continued writing for influential London dailies. *The Index* thus provided Hotze with a mechanism for articulating pro-Confederate viewpoints and for subtle bribery of the press.

The Confederacy also sent a representative to France, Edwin De Leon, who openly bribed French newspapers to print favorable editorials on the Confederate cause. De Leon also penned a fervid defense of slavery that probably did more harm than good; few hated the "peculiar institution" as much as the French, and his arguments merely reinforced French hostility to Southern slavery. Despite some successful operations, Confederate propagandists in Europe failed in their ultimate objective of securing recognition by foreign governments. Above all else, this was due to the existence of slavery in the South, which isolated the Confederacy from British and French public opinion.

Propaganda accompanied other pre–twentieth century conflicts in which the United States participated, but it was conducted primarily by private groups and news organizations. Propaganda during the War of 1812 reiterated many of the themes of the revolutionary period by portraying the British as tyrannical opponents of American liberty. American westward expansion in the nineteenth century was justified by appealing to the "manifest destiny" of the United States to colonize North America, while the Indian wars and the Mexican-American War were bolstered by racist and bigoted portrayals of Native Americans and Mexicans. At the end of the nineteenth century, the infamous "yellow press" incited U.S. participation in the Spanish-American War by portraying the Spaniards as monsters, by sensationally reporting and fabricating Spanish atrocities, and by emphasizing the noble and enlightened intentions of the United States. Similarly, during the American-Filipino Wars, U.S. advocates of imperialism portrayed the Filipinos as uncivilized monkeys and as children in need of American tutelage. Much of this propaganda was private, but it reflected popular sentiment and official attitudes, if not direct policy.

TOTAL WAR, 1917–1945

Notwithstanding this early experience with propaganda, it was primarily the age of total war that inducted the U.S. government into the business of propaganda. During World War I, national governments employed propaganda on an unprecedented scale. The arrival of the modern mass media together with the requirements of total war made propaganda an indispensable element of wartime mobilization. All of the major belligerents turned to propaganda to woo neutrals, demoralize enemies, boost the morale of their troops, and mobilize the support of civilians.

One of the most vital of all World War I propaganda battles was the struggle between Germany and Britain for the sympathy of the Ameri-

can people. The German government organized a program of propaganda in the United States that was so heavy-handed it did more to alienate American public opinion than to win it. The British government, on the other hand, conducted most of its propaganda in the United States covertly, through a secret propaganda bureau directed by the Foreign Office. The British adopted a low-key approach that selectively released news and information to win American sympathies. The publication of the Zimmerman telegram in 1917 (in which Germany sought to enlist Mexico in a war with the United States) was undoubtedly the most important propaganda achievement of the British, and it helped to bring the Americans into the war on the Allied side.

A week after declaring war, President Woodrow Wilson established the first official propaganda agency of the U.S. government to manage public opinion at home and abroad—the Committee on Public Information. Headed by the muckraking journalist George Creel, the committee was responsible for censorship, propaganda, and general information about the war effort. The Creel committee focused on mobilizing support on the home front, but it also conducted an extensive campaign of propaganda abroad, overseeing operations in more than thirty overseas countries.

The committee bombarded foreign media outlets with news, official statements, and features on the war effort and on American life, using leaflets, motion pictures, photographs, cartoons, posters, and signboards to promote its messages. The committee established reading rooms abroad, brought foreign journalists to the United States, crafted special appeals for teachers and labor groups, and sponsored lectures and seminars. In its international propaganda, the committee advertised American strength and commitment to victory in order to curb defeatism among Allied troops and to demoralize enemy soldiers. Stressing the unselfish, anti-imperialistic war aims of the United States, it put forth an idealistic message that reflected the idealism of the Progressive Era, the tone of the Wilson presidency, and long-standing traditions in American ideology. Creel himself spoke excitedly about using the committee to spread the "gospel of democracy" around the world, and staff members pursued that objective with religious fervor. Taking its cue from the president (and British propaganda), the Creel committee stressed that the war was fought for freedom, self-determination, and democracy.

Despite the many successes Creel attributed to the Committee on Public Information, Congress swiftly abolished it in June 1919—a decision that reflected both the natural American distrust of propaganda and Congress's fear that the president would utilize the committee for domestic political purposes. The Creel committee had a short life but a lasting impact. It established the principle that government-sponsored propaganda was a necessity in times of war or national emergency. It also demonstrated the utility of propaganda as a tool of national policy and became the basic model for subsequent U.S. propaganda agencies.

The years that followed nurtured a popular fascination with, and revulsion toward, the practice of propaganda. A series of investigations in the 1920s exposed the nature and scope of Britain's propaganda campaign in the United States, including revelations that the British had fabricated numerous stories about German atrocities. Many Americans came to blame British propaganda for bringing the United States into a wasteful and ruinous war, and the practice of propaganda became associated with deceit and trickery. It was thus in the aftermath of World War I that propaganda acquired its negative connotations—a development that stemmed from the employment of propaganda by a democracy, not, as is generally supposed, from that of a dictatorship. Although British propaganda was probably more effective than Germany's because of military and political blunders by the Germans—such as unrestricted submarine warfare—many observers took from the war a legendary belief in the power of propaganda.

These propaganda campaigns affected the United States in other ways as well. The belief that Americans had been tricked into participating in the first world war delayed U.S. intervention in the second. Moreover, news of Nazi atrocities connected to the Holocaust were greeted incredulously by the American public in part because of the exaggerated and fabricated atrocity propaganda released by the British two decades earlier.

At the same time, the social science revolution and Freudian psychology brought about a public fascination with ideas about subconscious psychological manipulation and mind control. The science of persuasion, in the form of advertising and public relations, came into vogue in the 1920s, and advertising became a large-scale national industry. These developments created a skilled group of professionals with expertise in the employment of symbols, images, and techniques to interpret and to manipulate perceptions.

The development of radio revolutionized the practice of propaganda by making it possible to reach audiences of unprecedented size instantaneously. A short-wave propaganda battle began in the mid-1920s as the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, and Britain developed international broadcasting capabilities. American suspicion of foreign propaganda was sufficiently aroused that in 1938 Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which required foreign propagandists to register with the U.S. government. The same year, Nazi propaganda in Central and South America led the Roosevelt administration to create the first peacetime propaganda agency of the U.S. government, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), headed by Nelson Rockefeller.

Initially, the CIAA focused on cultural and educational activities designed to improve relations between the United States and Latin America. The CIAA inaugurated a new tradition in U.S. foreign policy: government sponsorship of educational and cultural exchanges. It sponsored tours by ballet, theater, and music groups, archaeological expeditions, art exhibits, comic books, and academic conferences. Publicly, the CIAA's cultural programs were defended for their reciprocal benefits in promoting "international understanding." Behind closed doors, however, the agency frankly emphasized propaganda motives. It attached far greater importance to interpreting the United States to Latin America than vice versa. The principle theme promoted by the coordinator's office was "Pan-Americanism," stressing that the key to defense of the region lay in hemispheric solidarity. After the United States entered World War II, Rockefeller's CIAA became a full-blown propaganda agency, utilizing film, publications, and radio to "combat the Nazi lie." By 1943, the CIAA had become a large federal agency with a generous budget and nearly 1,500 employees.

In the early part of 1941, as war appeared imminent, Roosevelt created several additional agencies to disseminate propaganda at home and abroad. In 1942 these various information programs were combined into the Office of War Information (OWI) under the direction of the well-known journalist and broadcaster Elmer Davis. Roosevelt also established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, and authorized it to engage in black and gray propaganda abroad, mostly in connection with military operations.

The OWI was a sprawling organization that conducted domestic and international propaganda on a truly massive scale. In addition to millions of leaflets, it produced entire newspapers, which were dropped by airplane to France, Norway, Spain, Ireland, and Germany. One newspaper distributed by the OWI in France achieved a circulation of 7 million per week, compared to a grand total of 3 million leaflets distributed in Europe through all of World War I. The OWI established posts attached to U.S. diplomatic missions overseas, known as the U.S. Information Service, and it operated reading rooms and libraries in more than twenty countries. Radio was the most crucial medium in the overseas propaganda war, and in 1942 the Voice of America was established under OWI jurisdiction. By the end of the war, the Voice of America was broadcasting around the world in forty different languages.

Combat propaganda, or what began to be called "psychological warfare," was utilized by all the belligerents, including the United States. These operations focused on breaking enemy morale, encouraging enemy troops to surrender, publicizing U.S. military victories, positively projecting U.S. war aims, providing aid and encouragement to partisans in occupied territories, and stiffening the resolve of American and Allied troops. Initially, these operations were conducted by OWI personnel, but the idealistic outlook of many of the agency's propagandists clashed with the more conservative mindset of many U.S. military officers who believed it was more interested in advertising Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal than in promoting military objectives. In December 1942, General Dwight D. Eisenhower created a separate psychological warfare branch of the army to participate in the Allied invasion of North Africa. In 1944 he created an even larger organization, the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to prepare propaganda for the D-Day invasion. Psychological warfare was especially important in the Pacific theater, where U.S. propaganda sought to convince Japanese soldiers—who had been taught by their army that to surrender meant relinquishing their place as members of Japanese society—to cease resistance.

COLD WAR

Despite the importance of propaganda and psychological warfare to the war effort, the United States moved quickly to dismantle the propa-

THE POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA

One of the most difficult tasks facing all U.S. propaganda agencies has been simply convincing the American people and members of Congress of their right to exist. This was dramatically revealed in the debate over the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act—the first peacetime legislative charter for government propaganda—which was one of the most controversial pieces of legislation ever enacted. By the time it was passed, it had been rewritten twice and had acquired more than one hundred amendments. It also earned more days of debate and filled more pages of the *Congressional Record* than the controversial Taft-Hartley labor disputes legislation—at that time arguably the most controversial bill in U.S. history.

Controversy surrounding government-sponsored propaganda has also been a recurring theme in modern American political history. U.S. information programs have been subjected to incessant harassment from journalists, American citizens, and from both conservative and liberal members of Congress. These critics often charged that the information programs were ineffective, unnecessary, and wasteful. Critics also held that these programs were infiltrated by spies and saboteurs, or that they were promulgating undesirable and un-American ideas. During World War I and World War II, when the Committee on Public Information and the Office of War Information were openly conducting propaganda in the United States, critics also charged that these agencies were being used for partisan political advantage.

The best-known (and most strident) criticism of the U.S. information program came at the beginning of the 1950s, when Senator Joseph McCarthy launched a prolonged attack on the Voice of America in concert with his broader assault on suspected communists in the State Department. In 1953, two of McCarthy's aides toured the U.S. Information Service libraries in Europe and announced that they had found 30,000 books by authors with communist sympathies in the stacks. Although these charges were wildly exaggerated, hundreds of books were purged from the libraries and in some cases burned. As a result of the investigations, the U.S. information program lost dozens of employees who resigned or were pushed from their jobs (one prominent official committed suicide), while those that remained were thoroughly demoralized. Perhaps the most serious effects were felt abroad, where the highly publicized investigations devastated American prestige.

Although McCarthy's investigation was the most famous case of domestic political controversy generated by the information program, it was by no means the only one. From the 1917 decision to create the Committee on Public Information to the 1999 decision to dissolve the U.S. Information Agency, American propaganda agencies have been a favorite target of congressional critics. This incessant criticism has in part stemmed from a general American apprehension about any government program that influences, sponsors, or promulgates ideas and values. It has also reflected a powerful belief that democracies have no business engaging in cynical propaganda either at home or abroad. The belief that information activities are wasteful and unnecessary except in times of war or national emergency underlined the decision by Congress to dissolve the U.S. Information Agency.

ganda apparatus it had constructed during World War II. Within weeks of Japan's surrender, President Harry Truman liquidated the Office of War Information, transferring only the bare bones of an information service to the Department of State. Although the OWI was abolished and the budget of its successor was slashed, Truman insisted that the United States maintain at least a modest information program to support U.S. foreign policy. This was a remarkable step, since prior to the 1940s no one seriously considered an organized, government-sponsored effort to influence foreign peoples except during a national emergency.

While Truman acknowledged the importance of propaganda as a peacetime instrument of foreign policy, it was primarily the Cold War that institutionalized propaganda as a permanent instrument of U.S. foreign policy. A widespread belief developed that the United States was losing the "war of ideas" to the Soviet Union's supposedly superior propaganda apparatus. As Cold War tensions intensified, the United States gradually expanded its propaganda capabilities.

In 1948, the information program received permanent legislative sanction with the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act—the first legislative charter

for a peacetime propaganda program. The act gave the State Department jurisdiction over both international information operations and cultural and educational exchange programs. Additional propaganda activities were conducted by the newly created Central Intelligence Agency, the economic assistance agencies (forerunners to the Agency for International Development), and the armed forces, especially the army.

In 1950, Truman called for an intensified program of propaganda known as the Campaign of Truth. In a speech delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Truman articulated the perennial domestic justification for official U.S. propaganda: in order to combat enemy lies, the U.S. needed to promote the truth. Under the Campaign of Truth, the State Department's budget for information activities jumped from around $20 million in 1948 to $115 million in 1952—a development aided by the outbreak of the Korean War a few weeks after Truman's speech. The Campaign of Truth also brought a change in the style and content of U.S. propaganda output, which shifted from objective-sounding news and information to hard-hitting propaganda in its most obvious form—cartoons depicting bloodthirsty communists, vituperative anticommunist polemics, and sensational commentary.

In April 1951, Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board to coordinate the American psychological warfare effort. The board acted as a coordinating body for all nonmilitary Cold War activities, including covert operations. It supervised programs for aggressive clandestine warfare and propaganda measures against the Soviet bloc and it developed "psychological strategy" plans for dozens of countries in western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. By the time Truman left office, the U.S. government had established a far-reaching apparatus for influencing public opinion in both friendly and hostile countries.

During these years, the practice of propaganda became inextricably tied to the practices of psychological warfare and covert action. During World War II, psychological warfare was largely seen as an accessory to military operations, but with the onset of the Cold War, psychological warfare specialists defined the concept broadly to include any nonmilitary actions taken to influence public opinion or to advance foreign policy interests. Psychological warfare was transformed into a catchall formula that went beyond mere propaganda to embrace covert operations, trade and economic aid, diplomacy, the threat of force, cultural and educational exchange programs, and a wide range of clandestine activities. Psychological warfare became, in essence, a synonym for Cold War. It reflected the belief of many politicians and foreign policy analysts that the Cold War was an ideological, psychological, and cultural contest for hearts and minds that would be won or lost on the plain of public opinion rather than by blood shed on the battlefield.

Psychological warfare in the Cold War context was also associated with the policy of "rollback," or the employment of nonmilitary means to force the retraction of Soviet power and the "liberation" of Eastern Europe. Rollback was openly espoused by the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, which campaigned in 1952 against the "immoral" and "futile" policy of containment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the policies of liberation and rollback did not originate with the Eisenhower administration. Scholarship in the late 1990s by Gregory Mitrovich, Scott Lucas, and others reveals that Truman's Democratic administration inaugurated a muscular form of rollback years earlier. To these scholars, U.S. efforts to liberate areas under Moscow's control indicate that American foreign policy in the early Cold War was not as defensive and fundamentally nonaggressive as the term "containment" implies or as earlier historiography suggested.

Indeed, the "father of containment," George F. Kennan, was also the driving force behind an aggressive program of psychological warfare and covert action against the Soviet bloc. In early 1948, Kennan, who was then serving as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, developed a plan for "organized political warfare" against communism. The plan was set forth in National Security Council Document 10/2. The document, approved by President Truman in June 1948, authorized a comprehensive program of clandestine warfare, including black propaganda, psychological warfare, subversion, assistance to underground resistance movements, paramilitary operations, and economic warfare. NSC 10/2, although not generally recognized as a landmark policy paper like the future NSC 68, was especially significant in that it established psychological warfare and covert action as vital instruments of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War.

Under the authorization provided by NSC 10/2, the Central Intelligence Agency made a botched attempt to detach Albania from the Kremlin's grip, launched leaflet-dropping opera-

tions via enormous unmanned hot-air balloons, encouraged defections from behind the Iron Curtain, and sponsored provocative (and generally unsuccessful) paramilitary operations involving U.S.-trained émigrés from Russia and Eastern Europe. The agency's most famous form of anti-Soviet propaganda came in the form of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast to Eastern Europe and Russia, respectively. The radios were staffed by émigrés and exiled political leaders from the Soviet bloc, but the CIA maintained a fairly loose control over their broadcasts through the National Committee for a Free Europe (also known as the Free Europe Committee), an ostensibly private organization created to camouflage U.S. government involvement.

The CIA also conducted clandestine propaganda operations in allied and neutral areas. The agency subsidized noncommunist labor unions, journalists, political parties, politicians, and student groups. In western Europe the CIA conducted a secret program of cultural and ideological propaganda through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a purportedly private, but CIA-funded, organization that supported the work of anticommunist liberals. Through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the agency published more than twenty prestigious magazines, held art exhibitions, operated a news and feature service, organized high-profile international conferences, published numerous books, and sponsored public performances by musicians and artists.

For much of the Cold War, the CIA also organized both successful and unsuccessful "political action" programs to influence democratic elections, sponsor revolutions or counterrevolutions, and, on a few occasions, topple governments. It conducted numerous operations to influence political developments around the world, most notably in Italy, the Philippines, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cuba, Vietnam, Thailand, Chile, Iraq, and Angola. Although details surrounding these operations are murky, the available evidence indicates that propaganda and psychological warfare were the principle instruments of the agency's political action programs. These activities became a means for the United States to influence and manipulate developments in foreign countries so that they served the perceived interests of American national security policies. The extensive employment of covert action signaled an unacknowledged revolution in the way the government conducted its foreign policy: it was now actively intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign nations to encourage the development of ideas, actions, and policies to benefit the United States.

During the Korean War, sensationalized charges that the United States had been waging bacteriological warfare, accounts of Soviet brainwashing techniques, and communist-inspired "peace" campaigns, focused American attention on psychological warfare as a mysterious Cold War weapon. During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower repeatedly called for an expansive and coordinated psychological warfare effort on a national scale. In San Francisco he delivered a major speech on the subject, arguing that every significant act of government should reflect psychological warfare calculations. He emphasized that the Cold War was a struggle of ideas and argued that the United States must develop every psychological weapon available to win the hearts and minds of the world's peoples. Defining psychological warfare in truly expansive terms, Eisenhower included among the means of psychological warfare diplomacy, mutual economic assistance, trade, friendly contacts, and even sporting events.

These campaign speeches were not mere rhetoric; they reflected Eisenhower's unparalleled faith in psychological warfare. This faith grew in part from his experience with it during World War II and in part from his strong conviction that the Cold War was a long-haul struggle that would be won by nonmilitary means. Whereas Truman was relatively uninvolved in the information activities of his administration, Eisenhower was personally involved in several major propaganda campaigns and played an active role in establishing propaganda themes and tactics.

One of his very first acts as president was to appoint a personal adviser to serve as special assistant for psychological warfare planning, a position filled first by Time-Life executive C. D. Jackson and later by Nelson Rockefeller. He also established a high-level committee, chaired by William H. Jackson, to make recommendations on how to strengthen the U.S. psychological warfare effort. The Jackson committee investigation was arguably the most influential study of U.S. information policy ever conducted. The investigation led to numerous innovations including the establishment of a high-level coordinating body attached to the National Security Council devoted to psychological warfare and strategy. Euphemistically designated the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), it replaced the Psychological Strategy Board in the fall of 1953.

Under Eisenhower, the United States abandoned the aggressive anti-Soviet psychological warfare tactics initiated by his predecessor. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty continued to broadcast propaganda to the Soviet bloc, but gradually they abandoned the strident, polemical tone that characterized the Campaign of Truth. This trend was accelerated by controversy surrounding the involvement of Radio Free Europe in provoking the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The brutal suppression of the revolt by Soviet armed forces demonstrated that Moscow would fight to maintain its influence over Eastern Europe and revealed that the policy of liberation carried with it unacceptable psychological, political, and human costs. By the end of 1956, as the historian Walter Hixson has shown, "liberation" had been replaced by an evolutionary strategy that stressed cultural infiltration and straight news and information over aggressive psychological warfare.

Eisenhower also oversaw the creation of an independent propaganda agency, the United States Information Agency (USIA). (Information posts abroad were called the U.S. Information Service, or USIS, because "information agency" had an intelligence connotation in many languages, but both names referred to the same organization.) The agency was modeled after the Office of War Information and Creel's Committee on Public Information, but, unlike its predecessors, the USIA was authorized to conduct only foreign propaganda; domestic operations were explicitly forbidden. The USIA assembled under one roof all the various information programs scattered throughout the government, except those administered by the CIA and the military. It operated a press and publication service and a motion picture and television service. The USIA also assumed responsibility for the Voice of America and for U.S. libraries and information centers abroad.

Despite the many attempts by the United States to "pierce the Iron Curtain" with American propaganda, most of the USIA's resources were directed on the other side of that curtain, in the so-called free world. The agency was primarily concerned with winning the support of neutrals and strengthening the resolve of allies. As a USIA policy document stated: "We are in competition with Soviet Communism primarily for the opinion of the free world. We are (especially) concerned with the uncommitted, the wavering, the confused, the apathetic, or the doubtful within the free world." The agency oversaw more than 208 USIS posts in ninety-one countries, all of them in allied or neutral countries. For much of the Cold War, the USIA's largest programs were in Germany, Austria, Japan, India, Indochina (Vietnam), Thailand, France, and Italy. The USIS also maintained sizable operations in Spain, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Mexico, Brazil, and Pakistan. Beginning in the mid-1950s, an increasing amount of attention was spent "targeting" countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with U.S. propaganda—a development that reflected the growing importance of the developing world to the Cold War competition.

When the USIA was created in 1953, Congress insisted that the Department of State retain jurisdiction over cultural programs in order to distinguish cultural relations from propaganda. In practice, the distinction proved mostly symbolic, since public affairs officers abroad, under orders from the USIA, managed both cultural and information policy and pursued both with an eye to improving the "climate of opinion." Increasingly, foreign policy experts recognized that such activities could be more effective in promoting pro-American attitudes than conventional types of propaganda. During the Cold War, such activities as the Fulbright exchange program, the People-to-People program, and the Peace Corps were utilized to promote goodwill between the United States and other countries through person-to-person contacts. Although many Americans who participated in these programs did not see themselves as propagandists, government administrators saw them as positive, long-range programs to create a favorable atmosphere abroad for U.S. political, economic, and military policies.

In broad form, the USIA's principal propaganda themes remained fairly constant throughout the Cold War. The obvious theme was anticommunism, and the agency exploited the ideological contradictions, forced labor camps, restrictions on freedom, and absence of consumer goods in communist countries. The agency devoted a greater percentage of its programming, however, to positive themes about the United States. The USIA publicized U.S. economic and technical assistance programs, scientific and technological advances, and other policies, programs, and developments that reflected positively on the United States. It promoted free trade unionism, explained the workings of American democracy, and extolled the benefits of consumer capitalism. The agency also developed cultural propaganda depicting the lives of ordinary Americans in a

favorable light and celebrating American achievements in the arts. Many USIA films, radio broadcasts, publications, and other programs were devoted to educational purposes, covering topics ranging from agriculture to English-language instruction. Most of these activities were slow media operations that aspired to cultivate favorable attitudes over the long haul. They also reflected the belief that, in addition to military defense and economic prosperity, U.S. security required the active promulgation of American ideas, values, and beliefs.

One of the most important activities of the USIA was simply to present U.S. policies favorably to international audiences on a daily basis. The USIA explained and promoted policy decisions through all its media, transmitted complete texts of important speeches to news organizations around the world, and distributed, authored, and secretly subsidized books and publications that defended controversial aspects of U.S. policies.

The USIA professed to adhere to a "strategy of truth" in its operations, in the belief that to be effective its propaganda had to be credible, and to be credible, it had to be truthful. The agency thus repudiated the sensationally propagandistic tone that had characterized the Campaign of Truth, instead adopting as its model the neutral tone and style of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). That does not mean, however, that the USIA merely dished out objective information; there was undoubtedly an element of protesting too much in the agency's claim to truth. While the agency generally avoided deliberate distortions, wild exaggerations, and broad generalizations, it remained in the business of shaping, influencing, and manipulating popular opinion. As the first director of the USIA, Theodore C. Streibert, noted: "We are no less engaged in propaganda because we are to minimize the propagandistic."

The USIA operated on the assumption that it could best influence international opinion in the free world by influencing opinion makers. Its most important target was the world press. The bulk of USIA operations fell under the category of "media control projects" designed to influence the news and information that reached the public through indigenous media outlets. Rather than address audiences directly—through radio and overtly propagandistic materials—the USIA preferred to plant news, place programs on local television, and utilize personal contacts to influence the views of foreign journalists and other influential persons.

U.S. propagandists also worked to enhance the potential persuasiveness of American propaganda by obscuring the source. A large percentage of USIA propaganda was of the unattributed gray variety, even though the agency was not explicitly authorized to engage in covert propaganda. USIA operatives maintained a network of contacts with journalists and media outlets in countries around the world, many of whom knowingly cooperated with the agency in placing unattributed materials prepared by the U.S. government. Another strategy involved the participation of private groups and nongovernmental organizations, or what the USIA termed "private cooperation." The agency maintained an Office of Private Cooperation, which worked to involve nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and ordinary Americans in campaigns to promote a positive image of the United States abroad.

When John F. Kennedy won the presidency in 1960, he attached a high priority to the USIA. Kennedy was acutely sensitive to the importance of images and ideas to international relations, and he made the apparent decline in American prestige abroad a major theme of his campaign. Upon his election, Kennedy appointed the respected journalist Edward R. Murrow as the agency's new director. Murrow's appointment raised the stature and visibility of the agency both at home and abroad. Murrow's prominence also helped the USIA in Congress: agency funding increased dramatically from around $100 million in 1960 to more than $160 million in 1963. Despite Murrow's journalistic background, the USIA under his tenure became more, rather than less, focused on hard-hitting propaganda. It also became increasingly focused on propaganda in the developing world. In just under three years, it opened more than two dozen new posts in newly independent countries in Africa.

Kennedy also assigned the USIA a new advisory function. The agency was now explicitly charged with contributing to the formulation of U.S. foreign policies by advising the president on issues pertaining to international opinion. Nevertheless, it was primarily an operational agency rather than a policymaking one. (In fact, on several notable occasions, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the agency was not informed of what the U.S. government was doing.) Its most important advisory function began in the 1950s, when it administered international public opinion surveys to collect "psychological" intelligence. This information was used in part to gauge and

improve the effectiveness of USIA propaganda, but it was also sent to the president and the National Security Council for consideration in the policymaking process. Successive U.S. presidents, especially Eisenhower and Kennedy, monitored these public opinion surveys very closely, an indication of the seriousness with which they took international public opinion.

As the United States became involved in Vietnam, the information program, like the rest of the country, became focused on the war. Both overt and covert propaganda programs had been going on in Southeast Asia since the 1940s and continued through the Vietnam War. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Carl T. Rowan as director of the USIA—at the time the highest post held by any African American in the U.S. government. Rowan oversaw the creation of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, which managed all the U.S. psychological warfare programs in Vietnam and accounted for some 10 percent of the agency's overseas manpower. In May 1965, Johnson assigned the USIA responsibility for all U.S. propaganda in Vietnam, the largest role ever undertaken by the agency.

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing U.S. propagandists during this period lay outside the combat zone, where the USIA tried to sell an unpopular war to international public opinion. The agency presented the war as a noble defense of a free country under attack by communist insurgents. It stressed American peaceful intentions and argued that the United States had turned to military force only as a last resort. The Johnson and Nixon administrations attached a high priority to propaganda in support of the war effort, but their information policies ultimately devastated the credibility of the USIA as it became widely known that the United States was painting an excessively rosy, and at times patently false, picture of the events in Vietnam.

These distortions were less the fault of the agency's propaganda than of the policies and public relations strategies employed by the White House. For example, in April 1965 the USIA widely publicized a speech by Johnson indicating U.S. willingness to enter into "unconditional" negotiations with the government of North Vietnam. When it was later revealed that the Johnson administration maneuvered and delayed to avoid such negotiations, the United States was criticized abroad (and at home) for manipulating the peace issue for propaganda purposes. International public opinion was further alienated by the USIA's portrayal of the government of South Vietnam as a functioning democracy and by its unceasing publicity of U.S. military progress when evidence presented by the independent news media contradicted such claims. Cases of deliberate deception, such as President Richard Nixon's secret bombing campaign, worsened the "credibility gap" that plagued all official U.S. pronouncements.

All in all, the Vietnam War served as a reminder of a principle U.S. propagandists knew but neglected: obvious falsehoods, when exposed, could exact irreparable harm on the credibility, and hence the believability, of the propaganda and of the sponsor. The war also demonstrated how a crusading and skeptical press could counterbalance the effects of propaganda. No amount of clever spin-doctoring could counteract the powerful images that appeared on television screens around the world.

During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the USIA adopted a remarkable change of mission. Carter argued that the agency should not simply communicate to the world about America; it should also communicate to America about the world. He renamed the agency the United States International Communication Agency (ICA), curtailed its anticommunist programming, and ordered it to cease its covert propaganda programs. Carter also assigned the ICA a "second mandate" to educate Americans about foreign countries. It was an idealistic task that the agency, which had spent twenty-five years selling the United States to foreigners, was ill-equipped to perform.

When Ronald Reagan took control of the White House, he promptly shelved Carter's "second mandate" and restored the USIA's name. During Reagan's tenure the agency adopted the crusading zeal of the cold warrior in the White House. The president who presided over the massive arms buildup of the 1980s also presided over psychological rearmament through the USIA. In a speech in 1982 he called for a new war of ideas and values against communism. He repackaged the Campaign of Truth as Project Truth to rally the country behind an expanded psychological offensive to spread democracy and combat Soviet propaganda. Under Reagan, the USIA was funded more lavishly than ever before. The new director, Charles Z. Wick, embarked on a number of reforms to modernize the agency, including the creation of the Worldnet satellite television broadcasting system and Radio Marti, which broadcast U.S. propaganda to Cuba. Reagan himself, the "great communicator," set the tone for the new

ideological offensive by branding the Soviet Union the "evil empire."

With the end of the Cold War, the USIA turned its attention from the communist threat to promoting economic expansion. National security and anticommunist justifications for propaganda and exchange activities gave way to economic justifications: these programs were now evaluated in terms of their contributions to American commerce. In October 1999, largely as the result of Senator Jesse Helms, the USIA was abolished and its functions transferred to the Office of International Information Programs in the Department of State.

PROPAGANDA, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

The Cold War inaugurated a paradigm shift in the U.S. practice of diplomacy that reflected changes in the nature of diplomatic activity worldwide. Through propaganda, policy initiatives, and covert action, agents of the U.S. government acted directly to influence the ideas, values, beliefs, opinions, actions, politics, and culture of other countries. Foreign affairs personnel not only observed and reported, they also participated in events or tried to influence the way that they happened. The old maxim that one government does not interfere in the internal affairs of another had been swept aside.

The pattern of international relations was further transformed by the electronic communications revolution and the emergence of popular opinion as a significant force in foreign affairs. Foreign policy could no longer be pursued as it had during the nineteenth century, when diplomacy was the exclusive province of professional diplomats who used (often secret) negotiations to reach accords based on power and interest. Developments in mass communication and the increased attentiveness to domestic audiences abroad to foreign affairs meant that the target of diplomacy had now widened to include popular opinion as much, if not more so, than traditional diplomatic activities.

A report published by the House Foreign Relations Committee in 1964, entitled "Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive," captured this sentiment well:

> For many years military and economic power, used separately, or in conjunction, have served as the pillars of diplomacy. They still serve that function but the recent increase in influence of the masses of the people over government, together with greater awareness on the part of the leaders of the aspirations of people . . . has created a new dimension of foreign policy operations. Certain foreign policy objectives can be pursued by dealing directly with the people of foreign countries, rather than with their governments. Through the use of modern instruments and techniques of communications it is possible today to reach large or influential segments of national populations—to inform them, to influence their attitudes, and at times perhaps even to motivate them to a particular course of action. These groups, in turn, are capable of exerting noticeable, even decisive, pressures on their government.

In other words, by appealing over the heads of governments directly to public opinion, effective propaganda and other measures would encourage popular opinion to support U.S. policies, which would in turn exert pressure on government policymakers.

Throughout the Cold War, propaganda and diplomacy operated on multiple levels. At the most obvious level, propaganda as it is conventionally understood (the utilization of communication techniques to influence beliefs and actions) was employed as a distinct instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Through the United States Information Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and other mechanisms, the United States waged a war of words and of ideas that attacked communism, promoted capitalism and democracy, defended U.S. foreign policies, and advertised the American way of life in order to win the Cold War.

On another level, the awareness that international public opinion had become a major factor in the conduct of diplomacy meant that propaganda considerations intruded on the policymaking process itself. American policymakers were increasingly aware that international public opinion had to be an ingredient in policy formulation at all levels: in the planning and policy formulation stage, in the coordination and timing of operations, and finally in the last phase of explanation and interpretation by government officials and information programs.

This attitude played itself out most visibly in the United Nations, which became one of the most important arenas for Cold War propaganda. It also was reflected in the marked increase in the foreign travel of U.S. presidents and vice presidents, an important device for generating news coverage and for reaching international audiences

directly. On a more routine basis, consideration of international public opinion simply involved the careful selection of words and phrases to describe the objectives of American foreign policy—including the process of creating what came to be known as a "sound bite."

Even within the State Department—an institution wedded to traditional diplomacy and wary of popular opinion—the Policy Planning Staff began to argue in the mid-1950s that convincing foreign officials was often less important than carrying issues over their heads to public opinion, reasoning that popular opinion would exert more of an impact on government officials than vice versa. The extensive and instantaneous media coverage that accompanied diplomatic conferences meant that negotiations needed to be conducted on two levels: on the diplomatic level between governments, and on the popular level to win international public support for policies. Diplomatic conferences were no longer merely opportunities for resolving international disputes; they were sounding boards for public opinion and forums for propaganda. Arms control proposals in particular were not infrequently tabled predominantly to satisfy the demands of public opinion for progress in disarmament. President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace and Open Skies initiatives, for example, were sophisticated propaganda exercises designed to put the Soviet Union on the defensive and establish the U.S. commitment to peace and disarmament without making costly concessions or entering into protracted negotiations.

The psychological dimension of postwar American diplomacy also included a preoccupation with American prestige and credibility—concepts that connoted the reliability of American commitments and served as code words for America's image and reputation. As Robert McMahon has argued, throughout the postwar period American leaders invoked the principle of credibility to explain and justify a wide range of diplomatic and military decisions. American actions in such disparate crises as Korea (1950–1953), Taiwan Strait (Quemoy-Matsu) (1954–1955), Lebanon (1958), and Vietnam (1954–1973) were driven by a perceived need to demonstrate the resolve, will, and, determination—in a word, credibility—of the United States. In these and other cases, American actions were driven as much if not more by calculations of how the U.S. would be perceived abroad than by narrowly focused calculations of national interest.

Concerns about the maintenance of American prestige and credibility were undoubtedly magnified by the presence of nuclear weapons. The high stakes of all-out war in an age of nuclear devastation meant that the United States and Soviet Union channeled the competition into symbolic modes of combat. Nothing better illustrates this than the space race, which became the preeminent propaganda contest of the Cold War. Spectacular feats in outer-space exploration were at once symbolic of the scientific, technological, economic, educational, and military achievements of the superpowers. The space race also allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to demonstrate their military prowess—and thus reinforce the credibility of their deterrent capabilities—without appearing warlike. The successful Soviet launch of *Sputnik I* in 1957 and the American moon landing in 1969 were two of the most significant events of the Cold War, largely because of what they symbolized to people around the world.

The infusion of psychological considerations and propaganda tactics into the practice of diplomacy is one of the Cold War's most important legacies, but given the revolution in communication technologies of the late twentieth century it was perhaps inevitable that the ancient art of diplomacy would become affected by the techniques of propaganda and public persuasion. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War's propaganda battles, foreign policy continued to be swayed by images transmitted instantly around the globe.

The days of brazenly propagandistic posters and radio broadcasts may have faded into history, but the science of propaganda has simply evolved into less overt forms of image making and media manipulation. Paralleling a broader development in international politics, where symbols and images loom large as critical components of political power, the phenomenon of posturing for public opinion has become increasingly sophisticated, involving such techniques as staged media events, generated news, orchestrated public appearances, and carefully scripted sound bites. The communication techniques that camouflage modern propaganda have obscured the basic fact that the end of the Cold War has brought about more propaganda, not less.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Daugherty, William E., and Morris Janowitz, eds. *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*. Baltimore, 1958. Compiled for U.S. Army psy-

chological warfare experts, the work covers a wide range of subjects from both theoretical and historical perspectives.

Davidson, Philip. *Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763–1783.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1941.

Ellul, Jacques. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes.* Translated by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. New York, 1973. Influential philosophic treatise on modern propaganda.

Haefele, Mark. "John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion." *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (winter 2001): 63–84. Useful on the importance of international public opinion to U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Kennedy administration.

Henderson, John W. *The United States Information Agency.* New York, 1969.

Hixson, Walter L. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961.* New York, 1998.

Jackall, Robert, ed. *Propaganda.* New York, 1995. Focuses on the twentieth century.

Krugler, David F. *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945–1953.* Columbia, Mo., and London, 2000. Explores the domestic political controversies surrounding the Voice of America.

Lasswell, Harold Dwight. *Propaganda Technique in the World War.* New York, 1927. Classic work that influenced a generation of propaganda specialists.

Laurie, Clayton D. *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany.* Lawrence, Kans., 1996. Focuses on combat propaganda.

Lucas, Scott. *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union.* New York, 1999. Focuses on state-private collaboration in Cold War propaganda campaigns.

McMahon, Robert J. "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy." *Diplomatic History* 15, no. 4 (fall 1991): 455–471.

Mitrovich, Gregory. *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956.* Ithaca, N.Y., 2000. Explores the relationships among psychological warfare, covert action, and national security strategy in the early Cold War.

Ninkovich, Frank A. *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950.* Cambridge, 1981.

———. *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy.* New York, 1996. A brief but thorough and insightful overview of postwar information and cultural policies.

Osgood, Kenneth A. "Form Before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (summer 2000): 405–433. On the relationship between propaganda and diplomacy during the Eisenhower administration.

———. "Total Cold War: U.S. Propaganda in the 'Free World,' 1953–1960." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif., 2001. Many of this essay's conclusions are drawn from the original research in the dissertation.

Page, Caroline. *U.S. Official Propaganda During the Vietnam War, 1965–1973: The Limits of Persuasion.* London and New York, 1996.

Puddington, Arch. *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.* Lexington, Ky., 2000. Celebrates the purported successes of Cold War propaganda.

Saunders, Frances Stonor. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.* New York, 1999.

Snow, Nancy. *Propaganda Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World.* New York, 1998.

Sorensen, Thomas C. *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda.* New York, 1968.

Taylor, Philip M. *Munitions of the Mind: War Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Nuclear Age.* Glasgow, 1990. A good overview of the wartime use of propaganda in world history.

Thomson, Oliver. *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda.* Gloucestershire, Eng., 1999. Comprehensive investigation of propaganda in world history.

Winkler, Allan M. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945.* New Haven, Conn., 1978. Focuses on domestic politics.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WARRIORS; CONTAINMENT; COVERT OPERATIONS; DISSENT IN WAR; PUBLIC OPINION.

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD

Burton F. Beers

In December 1995 Peruvian police arrested and jailed twenty-one members of a terrorist group, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Among those jailed was Lori Berenson, an American woman, then twenty-seven years old, accused of having conspired with leaders of the MRTA to seize and hold members of Peru's Congress as hostages who would be exchanged for imprisoned members of the MRTA. Berenson and the Peruvians arrested with her were promptly tried in secret sessions of a military court, one of several tribunals established outside the civil court system to expedite the trials of prisoners swept up in police raids. The judges—military officers untrained in law—excelled at conducting swift trials, and almost everyone coming before the courts went to jail. In January 1996 the court found Berenson guilty and sentenced her to life in prison.

In August 2000 the highest military tribunal threw out the 1996 verdict, finding that the prosecution had failed to establish that Berenson had been a leader of the terrorists as they shaped their plot. The evidence at best demonstrated only a close association between the American and leaders of the MRTA. The prosecution ordered a second trial, on the new charge of "collaboration with terrorists," a crime carrying a maximum twenty-year sentence. The case was transferred to a civil court where the sessions were open and transmitted to the public in live telecasts. In June 2001 Berenson was convicted for the second time and given the maximum penalty, reduced by the five years she had already served. Her release was scheduled for 2015. As of the summer of 2001, the defense has filed an appeal with Peru's Supreme Court, and if that fails, Berenson's parents say that they will seek a hearing before one or more international bodies.

At this point, even as unfinished business, the Berenson case is worth examining as an introduction to one of the most serious challenges that the United States faces in its efforts to protect American citizens abroad. In some respects the case is much like those of other Americans imprisoned abroad. Berenson, like other Americans on foreign soil, is subject to overlapping jurisdictions of two nations. The United States has defended her because she is one of its citizens, but she is also subject to the laws of Peru. Under international law, Peruvian authorities may arrest her, put her on trial, and imprison her for any violation of law. Thus far the circumstances of the case seem much like those of other Americans imprisoned abroad but, unlike others, Berenson has suffered the misfortune of becoming involved in international politics. This latter entanglement has made a solution elusive. The continuing disagreement has been deeply disturbing for the Berenson family, and it has imposed strains on American-Peruvian relations.

THE PROSECUTION'S CASE

The explanation for the impasse can be found partly in an ongoing disagreement between the United States and Peru over whether or not Berenson was accorded justice in either of her trials. The Department of State had criticized Peru's courts in each annual *Country Human Rights Report* in the 1990s. It noted in 1999, for example, that "Proceedings in the military courts—and those for terrorism in civilian courts—do not meet internationally accepted standards for openness, fairness, and due process." Indeed, reports of the initial trials, which Peru has not refuted, portray a panel of judges, hooded to conceal their identity; prosecutors who were allowed virtually unlimited opportunities to present their case; and a defense that had few opportunities to speak. After the trial, Berenson reported that she had been allowed to spend very little time with her attorney to prepare her defense.

Also, reports that are unconfirmed but not refuted indicate that the prosecution's cases in both trials were very similar. Berenson was portrayed as a key figure drawing plans to invade the Congress and kidnap its members. She was not, as she claimed, a freelance journalist writing about impoverished women. Rather, she was a professional revolutionary who had come to Peru after an agent of the MRTA had discussed with her how she might aid his organization and had paid in advance for her assistance. In Lima, the agent had helped her rent a large house in which a cadre of terrorists took over the top floor. Here she formulated plans while the terrorists built an arsenal of guns, ammunition, and explosives. She had also used her credentials as a journalist to take the wife of a terrorist leader, who posed as her photographer, to Congress, where the two gathered information on the layout of the building and identified the seats occupied by every member of Congress. To corroborate these latter activities, police displayed a chart filled with this information and produced evidence that presumably proved the handwriting was the defendant's. Finally, Berenson was said to have purchased a computer and other electronic equipment for the MRTA.

BERENSON'S DEFENSE

In the second trial, the defense was afforded more opportunities to plan and present its rebuttal to these allegations. Berenson spoke frequently in fluent Spanish. American reporters noted her cool self-possession and were struck by her quick, articulate responses to questions. Peruvian prosecutors, however, described her as an unrepentant, calculating, and dangerous terrorist.

Berenson described her political views as "slightly to the left" and affirmed her deep sympathy for Peru's impoverished people. Peru, she said, must undergo a revolution before the status of the poor could be improved. She said repeatedly that the revolution she envisioned would not—indeed, could not—emerge from terrorism. It followed, therefore, that she was not a terrorist and had no sympathy for those employing terrorism. When asked how these views squared with her association with the MRTA, Berenson refused to condemn the organization. She knew its members only as people who were working peacefully to bring about the kind of revolution that she had in mind.

The defense denied any deal with the MRTA. Berenson had indeed met the man whom the prosecution claimed was an agent of the organization, but she knew nothing of his alleged links to terrorists and she had not taken any payments to become their leader. Moreover, she was completely unaware of any links between the MRTA and tenants in her house or her photographer. The men on the top floor of her house had used assumed names and concealed their store of arms and explosives. She had hired the photographer solely because she was skilled with a camera.

Berenson, the defense continued, was a journalist who had been drawn to Peru by the country's rich history as well as the plight of its poor. Prior to her arrest, she knew nothing of any plans to seize members of Congress, and she had not knowingly provided her acquaintances with any assistance that might serve this purpose. Finally, the defense charged the prosecution with using tainted evidence to make its case. A man convicted of terrorism had served as the government's witness, testifying that Berenson had been paid to come to Peru to assist the MRTA. Other potentially damaging evidence, such as the detailed drawing of the Congress building, had been forged. In summation, the defense dismissed the government's case as flimsy and irrelevant. The government had not brought charges against Berenson because it had uncovered incriminating evidence of terrorist activity. She was on trial as a symbol of the government's determination to wipe out terrorism.

AMERICAN PRESSURE: OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

Americans who are arrested in almost any foreign country should expect that their host government will promptly notify the United States and that officials—usually from the American consulate—will be present as observers at their trials. Such steps have become standard procedures, the particulars of which have usually been defined in bilateral treaties.

Peru evidently notified the United States when Berenson was arrested, but since her initial trial was secret, an American official may not have been present. In any event, the Department of State was not surprised by her conviction and sentencing on 11 January 1996. On that day the State Department issued a sharply worded note to the Peruvian government. The United States, the note said, deeply regretted that "Ms. Berenson was not tried in an open civilian court with full rights of legal defense, in accordance with international

juridical norms." The note went on: "The United States remains concerned that Ms. Berenson receive due process. . . . We call upon the Peruvian Government to take the necessary steps in the appeals process to accord Ms. Berenson an open judicial proceeding in a civilian court."

When President Alberto Fujimori visited the White House in May 1996, demonstrators outside chanted, "Fujimori, free Lori." Inside, President Bill Clinton urged that Peru grant Berenson a fair trial in a civilian court. In August, Representative Bill Richardson, a Democrat from New Mexico and the Clinton administration's informal diplomatic troubleshooter, went to Peru. He and Fujimori discussed several possible solutions, including the exchange of Berenson for a Peruvian jailed in the United States.

Meanwhile, the congresswoman representing the Berenson family's district was collecting letters in both the House and the Senate calling for the young woman's release. Former President Jimmy Carter joined the cause. Human rights groups on a number of college campuses sent letters to the World Bank asking that body to block loans to Peru, and to American corporations urging them not to invest in that country. Operating out of their apartment in New York City, Berenson's parents set up a web site encouraging such protests and drawing media attention to their daughter's imprisonment. By the autumn of 1996, an unidentified Peruvian official described the case as "a stone under everybody's foot." The government wanted to rid itself of this source of tension with the United States, but officials also had to satisfy a public that believed Berenson was guilty.

THE BERENSON CASE IN PERUVIAN POLITICS

There was considerable substance to Berenson's allegation, made during her second trial in 2001, that the Peruvian government had profited politically from her conviction and imprisonment. In the months following her first trial, the Fujimori administration spoke repeatedly of its success in thwarting the MRTA plot against the Congress, and it seldom missed an opportunity to boast of its courage in jailing the terrorists' "American leader." The case touched deep-seated public sensitivities. Almost everyone had felt the deep-seated economic problems of the 1980s and the compounding of them by the emergence of left-wing guerrilla groups, especially the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and MRTA, both of which employed terror. In ten years, guerrilla attacks and government counterattacks took some thirty thousand lives.

Fujimori, a controversial figure at the outset of his presidency in 1990, gained popularity when his administration began to bring inflation under control and the government launched a determined effort to wipe out terrorism. His initial triumph against terrorism came in 1992, when police seized the leaders of the Shining Path and military courts sentenced them to life in prison. Late in 1996, the MRTA handed Fujimori a means for countering the increasing American pressures to grant Berenson a new trial. In December, armed members of the MRTA stormed the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima during a party and took hundreds of hostages. In return for their release the MRTA demanded release of imprisoned members of their group. By April 1997 only seventy-two hostages remained. Government troops then attacked, killing all of the guerrillas and freeing all but one of the hostages.

If Berenson had any Peruvian sympathizers, they were gone by the time the hostage episode was over. As Berenson's second trial approached in 2001, American reporters heard Peruvians repeatedly condemn her as a "gringa terrorist," deserving harsh punishment. The MRTA's operation against the Japanese embassy echoed the plan that Berenson had allegedly helped to draft against the Peruvian Congress. Moreover, the guerilla leading the charge on the embassy was Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, the man the Peruvian prosecutors claimed had asked Berenson to establish a safe house in Lima.

Despite Department of State pressure after April 1997 for a new trial for Berenson in a civil court, Peru would not back away from the life sentence handed down by its military court and Berenson's incarceration in a bleak, unheated prison high in the Andes.

THE ROAD TO A NEW TRIAL

The United States may not have had any advance notice of Peru's decision in August 2000 to concede to demands for a new trial in a civil court, yet the State Department was certainly aware that the Fujimori government had become vulnerable to American pressure. Fujimori's political fortunes had plunged at home, and he had come under sharp criticism in the U.S. Congress. In the Senate, bipartisan support had emerged for link-

ing foreign aid payments to Peru to "substantial progress" toward holding fair elections and respecting human rights, free speech, and the rule of law, as had a threat to cut by half the $125 million allocated to Peru in foreign aid.

Fujimori could not offer much resistance. He had come under fire at home for forcing revision of the constitution so that he could seek an unprecedented third term as president. Then his opposition found two serious charges to bring against him: widespread fraud in the balloting for president and a key aide's corruption. Given these circumstances, Peru's judicial system did what it could to placate the United States. The country's supreme military tribunal, presumably the same body that had earlier described Berenson as a "dangerous leader" of the MRTA, cleared the way for a new trial by announcing that she had not been proven guilty of treason.

However, Fujimori quickly found that these and other steps were not enough to save him. He fled to his parents' home country, Japan, from which he sent word of his resignation to Lima. An interim president took office, and a new presidential election in the spring of 2001 brought Alejandro Toledo, the most prominent of Fujimori's opponents, to office in midsummer. Shortly thereafter Berenson's parents appealed for a pardon for their daughter from president-elect Toledo, but he turned down the request. He explained to reporters that presidential intervention would be a poor way of initiating his administration's efforts to build an independent judiciary. The trial had been open, and he intended to respect the independence of the courts. Toledo added that he had visited with Berenson's family in New York City during the latter part of June but refused to reveal the substance of their conversation.

State Department officials in Washington told reporters soon after the second trial that the embassy in Lima had reviewed with Berenson options she might pursue. The department thought that a request for clemency or a pardon offered the best chance, especially if she first requested—as she was entitled to do under a United States–Peruvian treaty—transfer to a prison in the United States. Berenson had rejected each of these possibilities. Her position appears to have been that since she was innocent of the charges against her, she refused to request a pardon for something she had not done. Moreover, she refused to ask for any special consideration. To do so would separate her from people who had been unjustly arrested and convicted with her.

THE BERENSON CASE AND BROADER AMERICAN CONCERNS

The Berenson family's web site regularly posted material that called attention to the disparity between the Department of State's annual reports on Peru's violations of human rights and its reliance on quiet diplomacy in dealing with their daughter's plight. Supporters were asked to write letters to the president or secretary of state that cited 22 U.S. Code 1732, which directs the president to take all necessary steps—short of going to war—to secure the release of an incarcerated American citizen, "if it [the incarceration] appears to be wrongful."

About half of the members of the House of Representatives signed a letter, addressed to President Clinton, in April 2000 (three months before Peru agreed to a second trial in civil court) citing this statute. The letter advised, "A failure to intervene on Ms. Berenson's behalf would send the message that the United States will not act when its citizens are wrongfully imprisoned in foreign countries." Those signing the letter did not specify what they meant by "intervene."

LIMITS OF POWER

It had been difficult to find solid grounds for requesting that Berenson be given special treatment because she has steadfastly denied wanting any favors and is determined to stand with the Peruvians who had been arrested with her. In addition, the United States has been peculiarly handicapped in requesting special treatment for a citizen found guilty of crimes growing out of her association with the MRTA. The United States had welcomed Peru's efforts to wipe out terrorism, and the Clinton administration had joined Peru in designating the MRTA as a terrorist organization.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

The overlapping jurisdiction of the United States and Peru in the Berenson case is a fundamental characteristic of modern international relations. In part it is the product of a legal principle related to the concept of a nation's sovereignty. As nations took shape, individuals and property (today that means—among other things—companies or corporations, ships, and aircraft) came to be identified for legal purposes with some sovereign, and

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Chinese authorities in 1821 charged a seaman, Francis Terranova, a crewman aboard an American merchant vessel trading in Canton, with having killed a woman. Her death was accidental. An earthen pot had been knocked overboard, striking the victim, who was in a boat below. Neither the ship's captain nor crew believed Terranova was guilty, but the woman's family was offered a cash settlement. Chinese authorities, however, stepped in to insist on a trial that was held on the deck of the American vessel. The proceedings were brief. The magistrate heard the charges and promptly sentenced Terranova to death by strangulation. No testimony on behalf of the defendant was allowed. The outraged Americans initially refused to surrender Terranova, but they relented when authorities embargoed any further trade. After Terranova died, trade resumed.

Incidents such as this prompted the United States to go along with European nations in negotiating treaties that granted extraterritorial rights to Americans in China. Reduced to essentials, extraterritorial rights exempted Americans from the operation of Chinese law and courts. If an American in China committed either a criminal or a civil offense, he could theoretically be charged and tried in an American court. As a practical matter, this proved virtually impossible.

China was not alone in granting extraterritorial rights. Other countries in the Middle East and Asia signed similar treaties. None of them, of course, did so willingly. They capitulated in the face of the superior power of British or French forces. Americans shared these rights, largely because their government proved adept at negotiating treaties that embodied the advantages Europe had won.

Extraterritoriality was not destined to survive very long (except as a special privilege known today as diplomatic immunity). The system was doomed by the resurgent power of the "Third World" states. It was gone everywhere by the end of World War II. An American in Saudi Arabia, for example, may not seek refuge in his own nation's laws if he violates his host's dress codes or prohibitions against consumption of alcohol. He will be subject to the full weight of the host nation's system of justice.

this identification followed them wherever they went. This principle was then joined with an affirmation that the honor of a nation was injured when one of its citizens abroad or his or her property was subjected to an injustice. These two principles were interpreted to mean that each state would decide for itself when its citizens abroad had suffered mistreatment, how seriously the offenses had damaged the national honor, and what had to be done in order to make amends.

But these asserted rights had to be accommodated to the claim that nations exercised jurisdiction over everyone and everything within their boundaries. In effect, the individual or property abroad was placed in a legal relationship with two governments: one that claimed the individual as a citizen and one that insisted on the individual's compliance with its laws.

The awkwardness (or potential for trouble) of these overlapping claims was scarcely noted in the formative years of nation-states. Even in the relatively limited confines of the place of their birth (western Europe), nations tended to be isolated. Few people crossed their sovereign's borders. That being so, the father of international law, Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century statesman and jurist, made no explicit reference to how governments should ensure the protection of nationals traveling or residing abroad. Before the end of the eighteenth century, however, the Western world's commercial and industrial revolutions were opening a new era in international intercourse. By 1758, the year in which Emerich von Vattel's classic *The Law of Nations* was published, the treatment—or mistreatment—of foreign nationals had become a problem. From that point on, governmental agencies and law aimed at their protection developed rapidly.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION

Early law and practices for protecting nationals abroad reflect the fact that the first nation-states were few in number and shared in some degree heritages derived from civilizations rooted in Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman traditions—and thus some commonalties in law. This encour-

aged European nations—and the United States after independence—to agree that their nationals should submit to the full operation of local law whenever their nationals traveled in one another's domains. Generally speaking, these nations acted on the presumption that their nationals would be accorded justice. However, if their nationals suffered wrongs and found no relief in local remedies, these nations reserved rights to intervene on their nationals' behalf.

However, the system was scarcely trouble-free. The United States, for example, quarreled with European states when the latter imprisoned immigrants who had returned from America to visit family. The returned immigrants were often charged with having failed to meet their military obligations. At issue in such cases was whether the immigrants, while in the United States, had established indisputable claims to American citizenship and whether the United States could legitimately spring to their defense.

Sometimes disagreements generated serious tensions. In 1891, for example, American sailors on shore leave in one of the seamier sections of Valparaiso, Chile, were set upon by a mob that killed two of the sailors and injured others. Chile dismissed the incident as an unfortunate drunken brawl, but the United States charged the Chilean government with complicity in the clash. The assault had been a premeditated way of expressing Chilean resentment of the United States. The exchange of recriminatory charges escalated and led the United States to threaten war. At that point Chile met American demands for "prompt and full reparations" by issuing a formal apology and paying $75,000 in damages.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The president, the secretary of state, and the American ambassador in Lima worked on the Berenson case, but the involvement of such high officials occurs in only a small percentage of problems relating to protection. However, Berenson's second trial in 2001 proved to be only one of a number of cases drawing the attention of the president and secretary of state. China arrested half a dozen Americans of Chinese descent and convicted them of spying for Taiwan. Russia jailed two Americans. One was charged with espionage, and the other was convicted on minor drug charges, following more serious allegations that he was an American spy-in-training. In each instance, these convictions occurred at times when the Chinese and Russian leaderships looked toward serious discussions with the United States on a number of vital concerns. The Chinese defused the problem by releasing the prisoners and expelling them from the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin pardoned the man convicted of espionage after discussions with President George W. Bush. The second American was paroled after six months in prison and allowed to return to the United States.

SANCTIONS AND MILITARY FORCE

When the United States has resorted to measures extending beyond negotiation—such as the rupture of diplomatic relations or use of military force for the protection of citizens—the president and secretary of state have inevitably been involved. In Brazil (1826) and Mexico (1858), for example, American diplomats demanded their passports and prepared to return to Washington when those governments refused to indemnify Americans for the seizure of property and mistreatment. Both governments promptly capitulated by making the required payments.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States used, or sometimes just displayed, military force when American lives and property were threatened. For example, the secretary of state warned Turkey's minister in Washington in 1895 that the United States had dispatched a warship to stand guard off his nation's coast as long as disorder in that country threatened American lives and property.

Not infrequently the United States has moved beyond showing its flag. In 1927, for example, warring factions in China trapped Americans and British nationals in Nanking. Both Western nations had warships anchored in the Yangtze River, positioned so that they could aid their beleaguered countrymen. The ships laid down protective curtains of shellfire that proved crucial in saving foreign lives. And in 1962, during a congressional debate on the potential use of force in Cuba, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had the State Department compile a list of about 150 instances, dated 1798 to 1945, in which American forces had acted without congressional approval. On most of these occasions, the military had been employed to protect American lives and property abroad.

POLITICS OF PROTECTING PROPERTY ABROAD

Among the duties of the U.S. Consular Service, the facilitation of American trade and investment abroad has figured prominently. Since the 1920s and 1930s, however, the United States has increasingly found it difficult to safeguard American property abroad against the rise of intense nationalist feelings in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Attempts to use military power in their defense, especially if the use of force assumes the character of "gunboat diplomacy," has often proven counterproductive. In these circumstances, the United States has increasingly come to depend on diplomacy.

By the 1920s, for example, Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, recognizing that military intervention was arousing the ire of Latin American nations, began a shift toward cooperation. This new line, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicized as the policy of the "Good Neighbor," was welcomed in the Western Hemisphere, but private interests in the United States were notably less enthusiastic.

Confirmation of the private interests' apprehensions came in the late 1930s, when Mexico ordered the nationalization of American, British, and Dutch oil companies. The American firms valued their expropriated property at $100 million and demanded that their government force Mexico to make restitution. The Roosevelt administration instead embarked on extended and difficult negotiations that ultimately produced a comprehensive settlement. It provided Mexico with economic assistance, an advantageous trade agreement, and a mechanism for settling a variety of claims. The Roosevelt administration regarded such a sweeping settlement as a major success, especially since it promised the United States increased security along its southwestern frontier at a time when the world was going to war. Administration officials also thought that American negotiators had won a substantial victory in gaining $24 million for American interests in Mexican oil. Mexico's initial intent had been to expropriate those interests, making no payment. American oilmen saw much less to praise, but they had no alternative to taking the sum offered.

After World War II, U.S. corporations faced wholesale nationalization of their overseas property in eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The United States attempted to counter what amounted in most cases to uncompensated seizures with two steps: the negotiation of commercial treaties with guidelines for compensation for nationalized property, and passage of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, a measure that provided government-financed insurance for a limited range of investments. Neither the treaties nor the legislation helped much because they covered relatively few of the businesses that were taken over. In consequence, the United States sought, wherever it could, lump-sum settlements on property that had been seized. These settlements were reached in the early years of the Cold War, a time when bitter U.S.–Soviet rivalries prompted competitive bidding for the friendship of "Third World" nations. Again, American investors claimed that the negotiated sums were much less than what they had lost. Moreover, the payments came in so slowly that investors suffered additional losses.

THE CONSULAR SERVICE

Nothing has been said yet about the work of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, an agency that operates within the Department of State, in the Berenson case. Throughout the years of Berenson's imprisonment, American consular officials have visited her regularly, checking on the conditions of her jail, her needs, and her well-being. Soon after her initial conviction, Berenson was shipped to a prison that had been constructed to house terrorists. It was in a remote location, some twelve thousand feet high in the Andes. No heat warmed the frigid mountain air. Rats were everywhere, and medical services were not provided.

What the consuls saw touched off sustained American efforts to have Berenson moved to another prison. American consuls argued that, given the prison environment, her health would suffer. Peruvian authorities initially refused, but they eventually conceded when Berenson's physical condition did begin to deteriorate. Beyond these efforts, the consular office facilitated her family's shipments of warm clothing, blankets, medicine, and food. Except for the disagreement over where Berenson was to be imprisoned, Peru did not interfere with the services of the consular office. The United States, Peru, and almost all other nations signed the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. In addition, the United States had concluded with Peru, as it has with most other nations, bilateral agreements that

refined the Vienna Convention's understandings so that they more precisely fit the circumstances of the two countries' relationships. This means that what the consular officers may do on behalf of American citizens varies from country to country, but, generally speaking, they provide an impressive array of services for citizens almost everywhere in the world.

America's Founders, as former British subjects, knew how much Great Britain valued its consular officers as facilitators of that nation's trade. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Constitution links presidential appointment of consuls with other officials representing the United States abroad. However, the consular service of the infant Republic did not resemble the one operating today. American consuls were initially assigned to posts—often foreign ports—where American merchants traded.

Not infrequently, these early consuls were themselves merchants willing to perform official duties on the side. When an American ship sailed into port, the consul received and held the ship's papers until the captain had met his obligations to the crew and local authorities. He certified invoices on merchandise bound for the United States. He might also send to the State Department information that helped American merchants identify local marketing trends. In lieu of salaries, consuls retained a portion of the fees that they collected for handling documents related to trade. In only a very few places could substantial incomes be realized from these fees. Nineteenth-century consuls in Amoy, China, reputedly collected upward of $40,000 annually, and those at Liverpool, England, earned about $60,000 a year.

American seamen were the most likely recipients of any protective services offered by these early consuls. Sometimes consuls found themselves mediating controversies between officers and crews of American vessels, investigating charges of mutiny, or representing American seamen in trouble with local authorities. A stranded and destitute seaman could sometimes look to the consul for a loan that funded his return to the United States. If an American died abroad, the nearest consul might ship his body home and help with settling his estate.

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the number of Americans traveling or residing abroad escalated rapidly. The U.S. government, however, apparently gave little thought to the impact of these developments on the Consular Service. The impact, however, immediately became apparent when some fifty thousand Americans were trapped in Europe at the outbreak of World War I. Most of those in Europe had gone abroad without passports. Only as war closed in did they discover an urgent need to establish their national identity. The disruption of banking facilities left thousands without funds, and pressures on shipping stranded thousands of those anxious to return home. American consuls throughout Europe attempted to locate and report to families in the United States on Americans scattered over the continent. Their offices issued emergency passports, arranged loans, and pressured steamship lines into providing immediate passage for thousands of Americans. This emergency proved to be one of the experiences that prompted efforts to modernize and expand the Consular Service. The Rogers Act of 1924, for example, authorized important steps toward staffing the Consular Service with trained professionals and integrating consuls into the nation's corps of career foreign service officers.

The modern Bureau of Consular Affairs' efforts to protect Americans abroad have become much broader than those of the agency in its earlier years. Americans preparing to leave the United States to travel or live may consult the bureau's voluminous, and continually updated, files on the Internet. Those who do, will find much more than detailed descriptions of how consular officers may assist those who are arrested and jailed or those caught in emergencies.

THE RANGE OF CONTEMPORARY CONSULAR SERVICES

Much on the bureau's web site addresses the potential concerns of travelers, some routine and some dealing with emergencies:

- Passports and visas; travel publications; country background notes; key officers at U.S. Foreign Service posts and how to contact them.
- Travelers' health concerns; U.S. customs information; cruise ship sanitation inspection scores; foreign airline safety data and related performance information.
- Emergency services available through consular offices and aid available in international parental child abduction.
- Detailed travel warning for each of the world's countries, covering all manner of

things that might catch Americans by surprise (everything from slight differences in U.S. and Canadian traffic laws to rigidly enforced dress codes in Muslim countries).

Those going abroad to work for an American corporation may attend seminars (the Bureau of Consular Affairs does not release agendas for these gatherings) that in all likelihood deal with business law in one or more targeted countries, policies of host governments relating to foreign corporations, labor relations, and—in countries where terrorism has been a threat—security for executives and their families. Both those in business and others planning to live abroad are offered information for most countries on a number of domestic issues: marriage and divorce, dual citizenship and births overseas, and schools for American children.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Borchard, Edwin M. *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad.* New York, 1928. Remains basic, despite its age.

Crane, Katherine. *Mr. Carr of State.* New York, 1960. Biography of the man who helped transform the Department of State into a twentieth-century institution.

Dunn, Frederick S. *The Protection of Nationals.* Baltimore, 1932. An older but still indispensable study.

Frey, Linda S., and Marsha L. Frey. *The History of Diplomatic Immunity.* Columbus, Ohio, 1999. A splendid study of the origins of modern immunity bestowed on diplomatic personnel and the roots of extraterritoriality.

Gordon, Wendell C. *The Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Property in Mexico.* Washington, D.C., 1941.

Hackworth, Green H. *Digest of International Law.* 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1940–1944. Updates and supplements John B. Moore's older multiple-volume work (1906).

Law, Castor H. P. *The Local Remedies Rule in International Law.* Geneva, 1961. Deals with the complex interplay between municipal and international laws.

Lee, Luke T. *Consular Law and Practice.* New York, 1961.

———. *The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.* Leiden, 1966. Complements Lee's 1961 study.

Lillich, Richard B. *The Protection of Foreign Investment: Six Procedural Studies.* Syracuse, N.Y., 1965.

———. "The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of International Law Under Attack." *American Journal of International Law* 69 (1975). Criticizes the tendency of nations to subordinate the protection of nationals to political considerations.

McDougal, Myres S., Harold Laswell, and Lung-chu Chen. "The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights." *American Journal of International Law* 70 (1976). Another criticism of the subordination of human rights to politics.

Plischke, Elmer. *Conduct of American Diplomacy.* 3d ed. Princeton, N.J., 1967. Offers insights into the impacts of Cold War politics on the protection offered by the United States to its citizens.

Stuart, Graham H. *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel.* New York, 1949. A classic.

———. *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice.* 3d ed. New York, 1976. Especially useful for the early work of the consular service.

Von Glahn, Gerhard. *Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law.* 3d ed. New York, 1976. Contains four chapters summarizing the nature of law pertaining to the protection of foreign nationals abroad.

White, Gillian. *Nationalization of Foreign Property.* New York, 1962.

See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE; EXTRATERRITORIALITY; HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM.

PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Raymond A. Esthus

The word "protectorate" usually describes the relation between a protecting state and a protected state, though it sometimes may describe the country under protection. In a protectorate relationship, the protecting state normally assumes control of the foreign relations of the protected state in addition to providing for its defense. Often the protecting state has some control over the internal affairs of the protected state. As to the status of a protecting state in international law, the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1923 rendered an advisory opinion stating that the extent of the powers of a protecting state depended upon the treaties between it and the protected state that established the protectorate, and upon the conditions under which the protectorate was recognized by third powers whose interests were affected by the protectorate treaty. The court went on to observe that despite common features possessed by protectorates under international law, they had individual legal characteristics resulting from the special conditions under which they were created. United States protectorates, as traditionally defined, have been limited to the Caribbean area, except for a brief protectorate over Hawaii in 1893.

The term "sphere of influence" signifies a claim by a state to some degree of control or preferential status in a foreign territory or in some region of the world. It may refer to a military, political, or economic claim to exclusive control or influence that other nations may or may not recognize. As in the case of protectorates, the legal status of a sphere depends upon the treaties establishing it and the extent to which other affected nations recognize it. American policy regarding spheres of influence has not adhered to a definite pattern. On many of the treaties creating spheres, the United States has not had occasion or necessity to take a stand. In cases where a position has been taken, policy has varied greatly. Generally, advocacy of an Open Door policy for trade and investment has placed the United States in opposition to spheres of influence, but on occasion it has not only acquiesced but actually looked with favor upon spheres.

U.S. PROTECTORATES PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

When the white sugar barons in Hawaii overthrew the native dynasty in 1893, the United States minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, proclaimed a protectorate. Stevens acted without instructions from Washington, and the incoming administration of Grover Cleveland soon repudiated the arrangement. In addition to this short-lived protectorate over Hawaii, the relationship between the United States and Samoa in 1889–1899 has sometimes been characterized as a protectorate, specifically a tripartite protectorate of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany over Samoa. It is doubtful, however, that the United States possessed sufficient rights or obligations in Samoa to justify the use of the word "protectorate" in this case.

The first United States protectorate in the Caribbean was established when the Platt Amendment was incorporated in a treaty with Cuba in 1903. Having helped Cuba win its freedom from Spain, the United States endeavored to assure the political and financial stability of the island republic by limiting its freedom. The Platt Amendment, initially written by Secretary of War Elihu Root, had been attached to the Army Appropriations Bill in 1901 by Senator Orville H. Platt. By one of its many provisions, the United States could intervene in Cuba for the preservation of Cuban independence and for the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. This right of intervention was exercised in 1906–1909, and in subsequent years various American mis-

sions were sent to the island to untangle electoral difficulties and financial problems. This protectorate lasted until the administrations of Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt fashioned the Good Neighbor Policy in the early 1930s. In a new treaty signed in 1934, the United States relinquished all its Platt Amendment rights except the right to retain a naval base at Guantánamo Bay.

The acquisition of the Cuban protectorate in 1903 was followed in the same year by the establishment of a protectorate over Panama. Having aided a Panamanian rebellion against Colombia, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt proceeded to secure valuable Canal Zone rights from the newly created nation. Simultaneously, the United States sought to protect these rights by making Panama a protectorate. In the canal treaty signed by Secretary of State John Hay and the Panamanian minister to the United States, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the United States agreed to guarantee and maintain the independence of Panama. Outside the Canal Zone, which it administered, the United States could use lands necessary and convenient for the operation and protection of the canal. It also could intervene to maintain public order in the cities of Panama and Colón. These extensive powers were reduced in 1936, when a new treaty was negotiated. The United States gave up most of its rights outside the Canal Zone. Also, the obligation to guarantee and maintain the independence of Panama was replaced by a provision stating that in the event of an international "conflagration" or the existence of a threat of aggression that endangered Panama or the security of the canal, the two governments would take such measures as they deemed necessary for the protection of their common interests. Measures taken by one government that might affect the territory of the other would be the subject of consultation. When the United States Senate approved the treaty in 1939, Panama agreed by an exchange of notes that in an emergency, consultation might follow rather than precede action. The United States thus retained at least a limited right of intervention to protect both Panama and the Canal Zone.

In 1977 the United States concluded two treaties with Panama that completely changed their relationship. The Canal Zone was abolished, and the canal was to be administered until 2000 by a joint commission. At the end of the interim period, the canal would be turned over to Panama. United States armed forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1999. The United States retained only the right to defend the neutrality of the canal.

Despite the restricted wording of the new treaty provision limiting the United States to defending the canal's neutrality, a U.S. intervention occurred in 1989 that could have been more easily justified under the old protectorate treaty rights. In the 1980s, politics in Panama became unstable, with demonstrations and attempted coups. There emerged from the chaos a military dictator, Manuel Noriega. From his position as commander of the National Defense Forces, he intimidated civilian political leaders and undermined the democratic processes. A pivotal turning point came in 1988 when two U.S. grand juries indicted Noriega on drug smuggling charges. When in December 1989 a rump political body named Noriega head of state, President George H. W. Bush sent in 24,000 U.S. troops to capture Noriega and restore civilian rule. Bush's administration based its legal position on the right to defend the neutrality of the canal. Noriega was captured and taken to the United States for trial. He was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine and sentenced to forty years in prison. Meanwhile, civilian government was reestablished and U.S. forces withdrew to the Canal Zone. In the years following the American intervention, Panama's politics remained somewhat chaotic, but the treaties of 1977 were nevertheless effectively carried out. In December 1999, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Canal Zone was completed.

In addition to the protectorates of Cuba and Panama, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt sought to establish a protectorate over the Dominican Republic. Roosevelt feared that European creditor nations might intervene there to collect debts, and he feared particularly that Germany might thereby gain some lodgment in the Caribbean. This was one of the considerations that led to the enunciation in 1904 of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, affirming that when debt default or other wrongdoing or impotence made intervention necessary in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine required U.S. intervention.

Having announced this policy, Roosevelt proceeded to conclude a treaty with the Dominican government (1905) placing the collection of customs revenues under U.S. control and making the country a protectorate. The treaty provided that the United States would, at the request of the Dominican government, render assistance to pre-

serve order. When the U.S. Senate delayed approval of the treaty, Roosevelt set up the customs receivership and applied the protectorate principle. With a characteristic flourish, the president told his secretary of the navy: "As to the Santo Domingo matter, tell Admiral [Royal B.] Bradford to stop any revolution. . . . That this is ethically right, I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical or red tape difficulty." When Elihu Root became secretary of state later in 1905, he limited the protectorate role to protection of the customs administration. It was this policy that prevailed. When it became evident that the Senate would not approve the general protectorate provision, a new treaty, obligating the United States to protect only the customs administration, was concluded and approved (1907).

The administration of William Howard Taft made Nicaragua a protectorate in practice, though the relationship was never regularized by treaty. In 1911 a customs receivership was set up, even though the Senate failed to act on the treaty, concluded in that year, that provided for it. In 1912 marines were landed to aid the regime of President Adolfo Díaz against rebel forces. When the rebels were defeated, most of the troops were withdrawn, but a legation guard remained behind to police elections, train a Nicaraguan constabulary, and serve as a reminder that more troops could be landed. In 1913 the outgoing Taft administration signed a canal treaty with the Díaz government; it provided for the purchase by the United States, for $3 million, of an option on a canal route and leases on naval base sites.

The Senate did not take action on the treaty before Woodrow Wilson entered the White House, but the new administration did not repudiate the protectorate policy. On the contrary, at the request of the Nicaraguan government, it agreed to include in the treaty a new article giving the United States the right to intervene for the preservation of Nicaraguan independence and for the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to approve this article, and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan finally signed a new treaty in 1914 that omitted the protectorate provision and essentially reiterated the terms of the 1913 canal treaty. Even this treaty was held up in the Senate for two years before being approved. Meanwhile, U.S. troops remained in Nicaragua. They were withdrawn in 1925 but landed again in 1926 as a result of renewed revolutionary unrest. The protectorate-in-practice was not ended until January 1933, when the troops were withdrawn again. The control over the customs was not ended until 1944.

The failure of the Wilson administration to gain Senate approval for the Nicaraguan protectorate in 1913–1914 did not dissuade it from pursuing the protectorate policy in the Caribbean. Indeed, Wilson pushed the policy with far more vigor than his predecessors had. Theodore Roosevelt's policy toward the Dominican Republic had been motivated primarily by strategic considerations, especially the desire to protect the approaches to the Panama Canal. Taft had been motivated by this consideration, but he had also pursued a complementary interest, that of having U.S. capital force European bondholders out of the Caribbean area. The Wilson administration added to the strategic and financial motivations a missionary zeal to spread U.S. political institutions and practices to the nations of the Caribbean. As Wilson remarked on one occasion, he wished to teach the South Americans how to elect good men.

The protectorate policy was carried out most vigorously in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In 1915, when Haiti's chronic revolutionary disturbances reached a high point, Wilson wrote to Secretary of State Robert Lansing: "I fear we have not the legal authority to do what we apparently ought to do. . . . I suppose there is nothing for it but to take the bull by the horns and restore order." Wilson proceeded to land troops and force a protectorate treaty upon the Haitian government. Restating the Platt Amendment formula, the treaty provided that the United States would "lend an efficient aid" for the preservation of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Along with this went a U.S. customs administration and a constabulary with officers from the United States. In 1916 the U.S. Senate approved the treaty without public debate. The outbreak of World War I and the developing submarine controversy with Germany had brought the Senate to share at least Wilson's strategic concerns, if not his politico-missionary zeal. The protectorate was to last until 1934, at which time the troops were withdrawn and the constabulary was "Haitianized." The treaty of 1916 actually expired in 1936, and until then the United States still had the right to intervene. The customs control lasted until 1941.

The intervention in the Dominican Republic came in 1916, the year after the neighboring

Haitian protectorate was set up. The outbreak of a revolution in the Dominican Republic in that year brought the landing of U.S. troops. When Dominican authorities refused to cooperate in setting up a Haitian-style protectorate, U.S. military rule was imposed. Six years later this military regime allowed a provisional Dominican government to take office, and two years after that the military overlordship was ended and the troops were withdrawn. The protectorate thus came to an end without having been regularized by treaty. The agreement concluded in 1924, at the time of the withdrawal, did provide, like the 1907 treaty, that the United States could protect the customs administration, which was to continue under its administration. This financial control, as in the case of Haiti, ended in 1941.

In the era preceding World War II, the policy of the United States toward the protectorates of other powers was generally to accept the establishment of protectorates and attempt to preserve as many of its rights in the protected state as was consistent with its overall interests. An example of this is the case of Morocco. By treaty between France and Morocco in 1912, France was given the right to occupy Morocco militarily, control Moroccan foreign relations, and station a French resident commissioner general in Morocco. Later in the same year, by agreement between France and Spain, the latter was allowed to assume a protectorate over small segments of Morocco. In recognizing the French protectorate in 1917, Secretary of State Lansing informed the French government that the question of U.S. extraterritorial rights, as well as other rights, would remain for later negotiation. In subsequent talks the United States refused to relinquish its extraterritorial rights. American recognition of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco was blocked by Spain's demand that the United States give up its extraterritorial rights with the act of recognition.

The United States has not always attempted to preserve its existing rights in recognizing another power's protectorate. When, as a consequence of victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan established a protectorate over Korea in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt enthusiastically approved the development because he believed it would help secure a balance of power in East Asia. Subsequent U.S. policy continued to be shaped by this consideration as well as by the expectation that Japan would in time annex the area outright. The Roosevelt administration was not even greatly concerned about preserving commercial rights in Korea. When in 1907 some Japanese leaders considered the advisability of establishing a Japan-Korea customs union—a step that would enable Japan to dominate the Korean market—Roosevelt was willing to approve such a scheme if in return he could get some concession on the Japanese immigration question. In this case and in many other instances, U.S. policy toward the protectorates of other powers has varied and has been determined primarily by the overall national interests as interpreted by succeeding administrations.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

The first agreement to use the term "spheres of influence" was one concluded between Britain and Germany (1885) that separated and defined their respective spheres in the territories on the Gulf of Guinea. By its provisions, Britain agreed not to acquire territory, accept protectorates, or interfere with the extension of German influence in that part of Guinea lying east of a specified line. Germany undertook a like commitment regarding Britain and the territory west of the line. As the terms of this treaty indicate, it is possible for a nation to have a protectorate within a sphere of influence when the sphere concept is applied in a broad regional sense.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, many agreements were concluded recognizing spheres of influence in Africa, the Middle East, and China. By the Anglo-French agreement of 8 April 1904, Britain recognized that Morocco was within France's sphere of influence and France recognized that Egypt was within Britain's sphere. Britain and Russia signed a treaty on 31 August 1907, specifying that Afghanistan was outside of Russia's sphere—meaning, of course, that it was within Britain's. Persia was divided into three zones: a Russian sphere in the north, a British sphere in the south, and a neutral area in between.

In China, the spheres of influence were initially marked out in 1896–1898. At the beginning of that period, Russia secured from China the right to construct a railway line across Manchuria that would provide a short route for the Trans-Siberian Railway to reach Vladivostok on the Pacific coast. The Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which was to construct and operate the line, was given exclusive administrative control of

the railway zone stretching across Manchuria. Two years later, in 1898, Russia secured from China a twenty-five-year lease on Port Arthur, a naval base site in southern Manchuria. By this agreement, Russia was also permitted to construct a north-south railway line between Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Harbin, thus connecting the naval base with the main line of the Chinese Eastern Railway running across Manchuria. Russia also secured some mining concessions in Manchuria.

The treaties between Russia and China did not specifically recognize Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence, but by the end of 1898, Russia's rights in Manchuria were so extensive that it was apparent that the czarist regime would seek to dominate capital investment and to make its political influence preeminent in that area of China. An Anglo-Russian agreement in 1899 greatly strengthened Russia's claim to a Manchurian sphere of influence. Britain agreed not to seek any railway concessions north of China's Great Wall, which separated China proper from Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Russia reciprocated with a pledge not to seek railway concessions in the Yangtze (Chang) Valley.

While Russia was seeking rights in Manchuria, Germany was gaining a sphere in China's Shantung (Shandong) province. Using the murder of two German missionaries as an excuse, Germany landed troops in Shantung in 1897 and proceeded to extract from China (1898) a treaty granting extensive rights in Shantung. By its terms, Germany obtained a ninety-nine-year lease of a naval base site at Kiaochow (Jiaoxian) on the southern coast of Shantung and the exclusive right to furnish all foreign capital and materials for projects in Shantung. Added to these sweeping rights were specific railway concessions and mining rights in the province. The monopoly on capital investment in Shantung province gave Germany a claim to a sphere of influence in China stronger than that of any other power.

The British and French spheres in China that were delineated in 1898 were not granted in such definitive terms. Britain's sphere in the Yangtze Valley rested primarily upon an Anglo-Chinese treaty concluded in February 1898, whereby China committed itself not to alienate any of the Yangtze area—meaning that China could not cede or lease territory in that area to another power. Britain secured a lease on a naval base site on the China coast in the same year but not in the Yangtze area. It was, rather, on the northern coast of Shantung, across the Gulf of Chihli (Bo Hai) from the Russian base at Port Arthur. France's claim to a sphere in southern China rested partly upon specific concessions and partly upon a nonalienation agreement. In 1885, France began securing railway concessions in southern China, and in 1895, China agreed to call exclusively upon French capital for the exploitation of mines in the three southernmost provinces. In 1898, China concluded a treaty with France in which it agreed not to alienate any Chinese territories bordering French Indochina. Later in the same year, France obtained a ninety-nine-year lease on a naval base site at Kuangchow (Guangzhou) Bay, on China's southern coast.

As stated, although advocacy of an open door for trade and investment has generally led the United States to oppose spheres of influence, it has occasionally looked upon them with favor. During the Moroccan crisis of 1905–1906, for instance, the United States vigorously opposed any compromise that might lead to a German sphere in a portion of Morocco. At the same time, after receiving assurances that the open door would remain in effect for thirty years, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt voiced no opposition to terms of a settlement that obviously recognized Morocco as being in France's sphere. In fact, Roosevelt gave every indication that he favored a virtually complete takeover of Morocco by France.

It is with regard to spheres in China that American policy has been most thoroughly delineated. When in 1899 the United States enunciated the Open Door policy for China, it sought only the preservation of equal opportunity for ordinary trade within the spheres, not the destruction of the spheres themselves. Equal investment opportunity was not demanded. Although the Open Door Notes did not formally recognize the spheres, Secretary of State John Hay accepted the spheres as existing facts. When Russia militarily occupied Manchuria in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion and then proceeded to demand extensive rights there, the United States was willing to recognize the exceptional position of Russia in Manchuria if Russia would permit equality of opportunity for trade. When in 1905, at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan secured all the Russian rights and concessions in southern Manchuria, it did so with the full blessing of the U.S. government. President Theodore Roosevelt even indicated to China that it could not question the transfer to Japan of either the Port Arthur leasehold or the part of the Chinese Eastern Railway that was in southern Manchuria.

There were, however, limits to the accepting attitude of the Roosevelt administration. When in 1908 Russia attempted to take over the administration of Harbin on the ground that it was part of the railway zone, Secretary of State Elihu Root resisted vigorously. His opposition was motivated by the desire not only to restrain Russia in its northern Manchurian sphere but also to forestall Japan from making a similar interpretation of its railway zone rights in southern Manchuria. U.S. policy in the Harbin dispute indicates clearly that the Roosevelt administration did not give either Russia or Japan a free hand in their respective spheres.

The administration of William Howard Taft, redefining the Open Door policy to include the demand for equal investment opportunity, launched a full-scale attack on the spheres of influence in Manchuria. Secretary of State Philander Knox came forward with a plan to have the major powers loan China money to purchase the Russian railway line (the Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Japanese railway (later known as the South Manchurian Railway). He also proposed, as an alternate plan, the construction of a new line from Chinchow (Jinzhou) to Aigun that would parallel and compete with the Japanese line. Neither of these schemes was implemented because of lack of support from the other interested powers, including Britain. The principal result of the Knox program was to drive Russia and Japan closer together. In 1907 they had signed a secret treaty recognizing each other's spheres in Manchuria; and in 1910 they signed another accord, this time agreeing to support each other in the further development of their spheres. Meanwhile, the spheres were softening in China south of the Great Wall. In 1909, Germany, Britain, and France agreed to share in a project for a railway line stretching from Canton to Hankow and then westward to Chungking (Chongqing). The following year the United States was admitted to the project and the Four-Power Consortium was formed by the United States, Britain, France, and Germany for the purpose of sharing Chinese railway concessions.

The outbreak of World War I significantly changed the power relationships in the Far East. Whereas the Taft administration had waged an offensive campaign against the spheres in Manchuria, the administration of Woodrow Wilson was forced into a defensive position. In the first months of the war, Japan seized the German sphere in Shantung. This was followed in January 1915 by the presentation to China of the Twenty-one Demands, which included assent to the transfer of German rights in Shantung and a great increase in Japan's rights in southern Manchuria. Japan also demanded rights in eastern Inner Mongolia that would make that area a Japanese sphere. Wilson, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, and Robert Lansing attempted, by making concessions to Japan, to influence it to observe restraint. In doing so they made some remarkable statements relating to the Japanese spheres. In a note to Japan drafted by Lansing and sent over Bryan's signature, the United States recognized that territorial contiguity created "special relations" between Japan and the districts of southern Manchuria, eastern Mongolia, and Shantung.

The attempt to restrain Japan was only partly successful. The Japanese settled for considerably less than they had sought in the Twenty-one Demands, but this was probably due more to British than to U.S. influence. In 1917, Lansing, now secretary of state, made another attempt to restrain the Japanese. In doing so, he concluded an exchange of notes with a special Japanese envoy, Kikujiro Ishii, that contained an even more sweeping recognition of Japan's special interests than had been given in 1915. It stated that territorial propinquity gave Japan "special interests" in China, particularly in that part of China contiguous to Japanese possessions. In return for this extraordinary statement, Lansing obtained a secret protocol in which the United States and Japan agreed not to take advantage of conditions in China to seek special rights that would abridge the rights of other friendly states. Again, the endeavor to bridle the Japanese met with only limited success. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Japan won approval for the transfer of the German rights in Shantung, a gain that was softened only by Japan's informal agreement to give up the navy base at Kiaochow.

Many of the goals that the Wilson administration sought in East Asia were finally achieved by the administration of Warren G. Harding at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. By the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922, Japan and the other signatories pledged to refrain from seeking new rights in China that would create new spheres of influence or enhance rights in existing spheres. Furthermore, in bilateral negotiations with China during the Washington Conference, Japan gave up all the former German rights in Shantung, retaining only a mortgage on the Tsing-

tao-to-Tsinan railway line that was sold to China. Later in 1922, Japan agreed to the abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes. Existing historical accounts do not fully explain why Japan pursued such a moderate policy at the Washington Conference. It was in any case a moderation that ended with the seizure of Manchuria in 1931–1933. In 1937 came full-scale war with China, and by the end of 1938, Japan was claiming all of East Asia as its sphere.

Japan's application of the sphere of influence concept to an entire region of the world was not wholly new. The Western Hemisphere had often been referred to as being in the United States sphere as a result of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1940 the sphere concept received another regional application. The Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan in that year, though not specifically using the term "sphere of influence," in essence recognized East Asia as a Japanese sphere and Europe as a German and Italian sphere.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE SINCE WORLD WAR II

Following World War II, Eastern Europe became a Russian sphere. This was foreshadowed by wartime agreements on spheres that resembled the traditional type. In May 1944, Britain sought U.S. approval for a trade-off giving the Soviet Union a controlling influence in Romania and giving Britain a controlling influence in Greece. Secretary of State Cordell Hull flatly opposed the scheme, fearing that it would lead to a division of Europe into spheres of influence. As he later wrote: "I was not, and am not, a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping the peace." Despite Hull's opposition, when the secretary of state went out of town for a few days in June 1944, Roosevelt gave his assent to the arrangement on a three-month trial basis, with the understanding that it was only a wartime agreement. Later, Hull felt that his apprehensions were justified when Churchill and Stalin reached an informal accord in October 1944 giving the Soviets 90 percent predominance in Romania and 75 percent predominance in Bulgaria, Britain a 90 percent predominance in Greece, and specifying an equal sharing of influence in Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Actually, it was Russian power, not wartime agreements, that made Eastern Europe a Russian sphere of influence consisting of satellite states. Hull's concept of a world without spheres of influence—a world with a broad and effective system of general security—was not to be. The realities of power continued to operate.

U.S. PROTECTORATES SINCE WORLD WAR II

Following World War II, the United States undertook by treaty responsibility for the defense of a number of countries in the Pacific: the Philippines in 1946 (revised in 1951), Japan in 1951, South Korea in 1953, and Taiwan in 1954. The relationships between the United States and these entities were so different in character from the prewar concept of protectorates that it would probably produce more confusion than clarity to use the term "protectorate" in these cases. With the exception of Japan, all have substantial armed forces of their own, and U.S. influence on their domestic affairs and even on their foreign relations is limited. The treaties, again with the exception of Japan, have some measure of mutuality in that they provide for assistance in the western Pacific if the forces of either signatory are attacked. The 1951 treaty between the United States and Japan came closest to the old protectorate concept. By its terms the United States could maintain troops in Japan not only to protect that country but also to defend East Asia. United States troops could, at Japanese request, even be used to quash internal disturbances in Japan. When the treaty was revised in 1960, largely one-sided defense provisions were agreed upon. The United States undertook to protect Japan, while Japan undertook to aid the United States only in case of an attack on U.S. forces on Japanese territory. Under this treaty Japan is certainly a protectorate of the United States in a military sense, but to use that word without qualification to describe the relationship between the first- and third-ranking industrial nations of the world is obviously to give a new definition to the term.

A closer parallel to the traditional concept of protectorates can be seen in the case of the islands of the North Pacific. These islands had been acquired by Germany during the heady years of nineteenth-century imperialism. During World War I, in agreement with its ally Britain, Japan seized the German Islands in the Pacific north of the equator: the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Marianas. At the close of the war, the island groups became a League of Nations

mandated territory under the administration of Japan. More than two decades later, during World War II, the islands were the scene of some of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific War, including Saipan and Peleliu. Following Japan's surrender in 1945, the islands were made a United Nations trusteeship territory under U.S. administration. Subsequently, in a process spread over several decades, the UN trusteeship status was ended, replaced in three cases by compacts of free association with the United States and in one case a commonwealth covenant with the United States. In all cases, the United States undertook the responsibility for armed defense and retained a role in the foreign relations of the new entities, at least as related to defense.

It was the relationship between the United States and the Marshall Islands that was the most controversial case. During the trusteeship period, these islands, situated more than two thousand miles southwest of Hawaii, became a testing site for U.S. nuclear weapons. A total of sixty-six nuclear tests were carried out on Bikini (1946–1958) and Enewetak (1948–1958). The operations were conducted with scant consideration for the health and welfare of the islanders. It was not until 1986 that the United States agreed to set up a fund of $150 million to settle claims for compensation. The first payments did not begin until 1992, by which time many suffering from radiation sickness had died.

A compact of free association for the Marshall Islands was drafted in 1982. By that time the United States had overseen the setting up of a locally elected government. The compact provided that the Marshall Islands would constitute a new international entity capable of conducting foreign relations and entering into treaties. The United States, however, was given full authority and responsibility for security and defense, and in recognition of that, the government of the Marshall Islands was obligated to consult with the United States in the conduct of its foreign affairs. The United States agreed to a number of funding arrangements, the largest of which was an annual rent of $170 million for the use of Kwajalein as a missile-testing range. The compact was approved by the islanders in a referendum in 1983. It went into effect in 1986.

It was not until 1990 that the United Nations formally ended the trusteeship status of the Marshall Islands and the other island groups. In 1986, when the Marshall Islands gained free association status, the United States secured a majority vote in the UN Trusteeship Council to end the Pacific islands trusteeships, but the council lacked the authority to make such a change. From the outset of those trusteeships, they had been designated "strategic," and under Articles 82 and 83 of the United Nations Charter, decisions concerning such trusteeship were to be exercised by the United Nations Security Council. In the Security Council, the Soviet representatives threatened a veto. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the Russians relented. In December 1990, Russia and all other members of the Security Council except Cuba voted to formally end the trusteeship status of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Northern Marianas.

The Federated States of Micronesia (formerly the eastern Caroline Islands) took the same path to free association as the Marshall Islands. The federation was made up of four states: Kosrae, Pohnpei, Chuuk, and Yap. Situated to the west of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States stretched eighteen hundred miles from east to west. Chuuk (formerly Truk) had been the Japanese Imperial Fleet's most important central Pacific base during the Pacific War. Today, some sixty Japanese warships lie at the bottom of Chuuk Lagoon. Despite this heritage of war, in the postwar years the United States showed little interest in maintaining a military or naval presence in the Federated States.

The compact of free association that was concluded between the Federated States and the United States was identical with that which applied to the Marshall Islands. In fact, the two compacts were included in a single document. As with the Marshall Islands, it obligated the United States to protect the Federated States of Micronesia, and it gave the United States a consultative role in the foreign affairs of the federated government. The compact went into effect in 1986, although, as noted, the UN did not formally approve the termination of the trusteeship until 1990.

Palau (formerly the Western Caroline Islands), which are directly to the west of the Federated States, agreed to a compact of free association with the United States in 1982, but its coming into force was long delayed. In setting up an elected Palau government in the 1970s, a provision was included in the constitution outlawing the transit and storage of nuclear materials. The United States had no plans to make Palau a nuclear base, but it did not wish to agree to such a restriction when it was accepting the responsibility to protect

Palau. A change in the constitution required passage by a 75 percent vote of the electorate, so it was assumed that the compact (which invalidated the restriction) would require a like majority. Over the period of a decade (1983–1992), seven referenda on the compact were conducted; each time the favorable vote was substantially more than a simple majority but short of the 75 percent mark. Finally, in 1992, a referendum approved a process for adoption of the compact that required only a simple majority vote. The following year the compact was approved by a 68 percent vote of the electorate, and it went into effect in 1994.

The Palauan compact of free association gave the United States exclusive military access to Palau's waters and the right to operate two military bases. As in the case of the other compacts, various financial payments agreed to by the United States meant the continuing financial dependence of Palau upon its former trusteeship overlord.

The people of the Northern Marianas did not opt for a compact of free association, choosing instead a closer relationship with the United States. The Northern Marianas included all the Marianas except Guam, a U.S. territory at the southern end of the island chain. In 1975 the people of the northern area, by a majority of more than 78 percent, approved what was called commonwealth status. Similar to the protectorates of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the commonwealth covenant gave the United States "complete responsibility for and authority with respect to matters relating to foreign affairs and defense affecting the Northern Mariana Islands." The covenant gave the United States fifty-year leases on three military bases, the largest base being on the island of Tinian.

Implementation of the commonwealth status was long delayed due to apprehension that the Soviet Union would block the termination of the UN trusteeship status. Finally, in 1986, without waiting for UN approval, the commonwealth covenant was instituted. When the Russians ended their resistance to the termination of the Pacific trusteeships in 1991, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas was formally freed from UN control along with the island groups that chose free association.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beers, Burton Floyd. *Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry.* Durham, N.C., 1962. The best treatment of Lansing's policy regarding the Japanese spheres in China.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The Latin American Policy of the United States.* New York, 1943. A good general survey.

Buckley, Thomas H. *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* Knoxville, Tenn., 1970. Contains an excellent chapter on the Nine-Power Treaty relating to spheres of influence in China.

Calder, Bruce J. *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924.* Austin, Tex., 1984. Asserts that U.S. intervention did not emanate from largely economic motives but from strategic considerations.

Challener, Richard D. *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914.* Princeton, N.J., 1973. Gives extensive coverage of the military aspects of the protectorate policy.

Esthus, Raymond A. *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan.* Seattle, 1966. Includes an analysis of the Roosevelt administration's policy toward Japan's sphere in southern Manchuria.

Europa Publications. *The Europa World Year Book.* London, annual publication.

Fifield, Russell H. *Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question.* New York, 1952. The standard monograph on the topic.

Griswold, Alfred Whitney. *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States.* New York, 1938. Old but still useful, particularly for McKinley and Wilson administrations.

Healy, David F. *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy.* Madison, Wis., 1963. Analyzes the development of policy leading to the Platt Amendment.

———. *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915–1916.* Madison, Wis., 1976. A detailed and colorful narrative.

———. *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1917.* Madison, Wis., 1988. An indictment of many aspects of U.S. policy.

Hunt, Michael H. *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911.* New Haven, Conn., 1973. Based on both Chinese and Western sources.

Kamman, William. *A Search for Stability: United States Diplomacy Toward Nicaragua, 1925–1933.* Notre Dame, Ind., 1968. An excellent monograph.

LaFeber, Walter. *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective.* New York, 1989. An updated edition of the author's study published in 1978; a comprehensive history.

Langer, William Leonard. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902.* 2d ed. New York, 1951. The most exhaustive treatment of the acquisition of spheres of influence in China.

Langley, Lester D. *The United States and the Caribbean, 1900–1970.* Athens, Ga., 1980. Contains much information on the Caribbean protectorates of the United States.

———. *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–1934.* Lexington, Ky., 1983. Covers U.S. military and financial interventions in Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

Major, John. *Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903–1979.* Cambridge and New York, 1993. Critical of U.S. paternalism toward Panama.

Miner, Dwight Carroll. *The Fight for the Panama Route: The Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herrán Treaty.* New York, 1940. An excellent account of the acquisition of the Canal Zone and the Panama protectorate.

Monger, George W. *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907.* London, 1963. Excellent study from the British records that includes analyses of the treaties of 1904 and 1907 relating to spheres in Egypt, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Persia.

Munro, Dana G. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921.* Princeton, N.J., 1964. The most detailed study of the diplomatic aspects of U.S. protectorates policy.

Plummer, Brenda Gayle. *Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902–1915.* Baton Rouge, 1988. Recounts Haiti's relations with the Germans, French, British, and North Americans.

Price, Ernest B. *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia.* Baltimore, 1933. The standard work.

Schmidt, Hans. *The United States Occupation with Haiti, 1915–1934.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1971. Stresses the cultural impact of American influence.

Scholes, Walter V., and Marie V. Scholes. *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration.* Columbia, Mo., 1970. The best account of the beginnings of intervention in Nicaragua.

See also CONSORTIA; DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; EXTRATERRITORIALITY; IMPERIALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS; OPEN DOOR POLICY.

PUBLIC OPINION

Melvin Small

The public's role in the American foreign policy process is a controversial subject. Generations of diplomats, political theorists, and historians have argued about the nature of the elusive opinion-policy relationship. They have been concerned about the abilities of American leaders to operate according to democratic precepts in a pluralistic international system often dominated by autocratic powers.

In arguing for greater authority in foreign affairs for the proposed new Senate in the *Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton saw the senior house of the U.S. Congress as serving as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. Striking a similar theme almost a half-century later, that perceptive observer of the American scene Alexis de Tocqueville was not very sanguine about the prospects for a democratic foreign policy. Writing during a period when the diplomatic activities of the United States were relatively unimportant, he explained:

> Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all of those faculties in which it is deficient. . . . [A] democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. . . . [D]emocracies . . . obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence and . . . abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice.

According to Tocqueville and other so-called realists, diplomacy should be the province of a small group of cosmopolitan professionals who perform their duties in secret and with dispatch. Leaders must not encourage their constituents to mix in heady matters of state because the uninformed and unsophisticated mass public is unable to comprehend the subtle rules of the game of nations. Democratic leaders are severely handicapped in diplomatic jousts with authoritarian rulers who are able to contain the foreign policy process within chancellery walls.

Defenders of popular participation in international politics maintain that despite the clumsiness and inefficiency inherent in open diplomacy, the alternative is worse. Leaders who employ devious means to defend a democratic system will, in the long run, pervert or transform that system. At the least, the public and its representatives must have as much influence in the making and execution of foreign policy as they have in domestic policy. A foreign policy constructed and controlled by the people is stronger than one that rests upon a narrow popular base. The victory of the United States in the Cold War can be offered to support that contention.

Historians are just as contentious as political theorists. Despite an enormous amount of rhetoric, speculation, and research, very little is known about the actual relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. Since the late 1940s, survey researchers have explored the dimensions of public opinion while political scientists have considered the ways in which decision makers perceive opinion. Nevertheless, a broad consensus about the nature of the opinion-policy nexus has yet to emerge.

Many studies describe the power of the public and how it has forced presidents into wars and crises against their better judgments. The journalist Walter Lippmann, among others, felt that Tocqueville's prophecies have been fulfilled:

> The people have imposed a veto upon the judgements of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too

> intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death.

Lippmann's position is supported by a host of historical legends: that congressional war hawks, responding to popular jingoism, compelled James Madison to ask for war in 1812, during a period of improving British-American relations; that a spirit of manifest destiny swept James K. Polk along in its wake into the Mexican War of 1846; that expansionist fervor and humanitarian impulses created by an irresponsible yellow press propelled William McKinley into war against hapless Spain in 1898; that myopic popular isolationism restrained Franklin D. Roosevelt's realistic anti-Axis program in the late 1930s; that antiwar protesters humbled the once-omnipotent Lyndon Johnson in 1968 and forced both his withdrawal from public life and his de-escalation of the war in Southeast Asia; and that the bitter memories of that war made it difficult for presidents to intervene militarily in the Third World during the last quarter of the twentieth century. All of these examples lend credence to the principle that the public is sovereign in the United States, even when it comes to matters of *weltpolitik*.

But all of those historical cases have been interpreted in a very different fashion. Many reputable historians contend that war hawks were not elected in 1810 and that an unimaginative Madison merely lost control and mindlessly drifted into war in 1812; that Polk was the prime instigator of jingoism in 1845 and 1846 with his blunt messages to Great Britain about the Oregon dispute and his provocative movement of troops into an area claimed by Mexico; that McKinley, who exercised weak leadership in 1897 and early 1898, created a serious political problem for the Republicans—a problem whose solution depended upon a declaration of war against Spain; that Roosevelt underestimated his ability to move the nation and, in any event, was more of an isolationist than an internationalist; that Johnson backtracked in Vietnam because the military policies he had pursued for four years had failed on the battlefield; and that when necessary, as in Grenada in 1983 and the Persian Gulf in 1991, presidents had little trouble convincing their constituents to accept their interventions.

To be sure, there is a certain degree of truth in both sorts of interpretations; but, in the last analysis, a careful reading of American history reveals few clear-cut situations in which public opinion has forced presidents to adopt important foreign policies that they themselves opposed. Furthermore, in most diplomatic confrontations, American decision makers were able to act in secrecy and with dispatch to meet challenges from rivals representing authoritarian systems. Indeed, during his administration, the secretive Richard Nixon may have exercised more personal control over his nation's foreign policy than did his counterpart, Leonid Brezhnev, the ruler of the totalitarian Soviet Union. At the least, there was more genuine debate in his Politburo than in Nixon's National Security Council.

Historians, political scientists, and even the participants themselves report that American decision makers pay little direct attention to public preferences, especially in a crisis. Presidents have maintained that it would be unseemly to worry about the public's often uninformed views, and thus their own political futures, when the nation's security is threatened. All the same, fear of outraged public opinion undoubtedly serves as an implicit veto against such extreme options as the preemptive bombing of North Korean nuclear facilities or unilateral disarmament. Moreover, popularly elected statesmen are loath to adopt policies that could lead to a loss of personal prestige. Thus, with their votes U.S. citizens allegedly hold the ultimate club over the heads of their representatives.

Nevertheless, despite the occasional case of a Robert Kennedy who worried openly about popular reactions to a sneak attack on Cuba in the fall of 1962, most decision makers do not consciously consider public opinion when they discuss responses to external threats. As for that ultimate club, foreign policy has rarely figured prominently in national or local elections. The personalities of the candidates, party loyalties, and domestic politics have obscured such major electoral issues as imperialism in 1900, the League of Nations in 1920, the escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1964, and the apparent renewal of the Cold War in 1984.

It is true, however, that although elections may not frequently turn on foreign policy issues, foreign policy sometimes turns on electoral politics. Beginning in October 1968, Americans became aware of the "October Surprise," a dramatic diplomatic or military démarche in the weeks before an election that appeared to have been orchestrated to affect that election. That year, Lyndon Johnson announced a breakthrough

in peace talks with the communists in Vietnam a week before what was going to be a very close election. Four years later, the shoe was on the other foot when Richard Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, announced a breakthrough in his peace talks with the North Vietnamese in late October.

Other nations may also "participate" in U.S. elections. The Russian leader Nikita S. Khrushchev claimed he helped elect John F. Kennedy by refusing to release U.S. flyers who had been shot down and captured by the Soviets until Kennedy, and not his opponent Nixon, was elected. In 1988, as Vice President George H. W. Bush genuflected toward the anticommunists in his party during his run for the president, he sent a message to the Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev to not pay much attention to his campaign rhetoric about U.S.–Soviet relations.

THE PUBLIC AS GOAL SETTER

The lack of compelling evidence for direct popular influence in diplomatic interaction does not necessarily make American foreign policy undemocratic. On the contrary, theorists see the public as sovereign, because it establishes parameters for action and sets goals for presidents and their agents. Broad national policy is said to originate with the people. For example, during the Cold War, the public's foreign policy mandate was clear. It included the desires to defend U.S. interests around the world against the onslaughts of communism and anti-Americanism, to refrain from direct involvement in unnecessary wars, and to engage in diplomatic conduct becoming to a great democratic power. Theoretically, such a mandate was implemented by policymakers who developed shorter-term tactical programs. This widely accepted view is not without its logical and evidential flaws.

In the first place, because of their preeminent roles in the opinion-making process, presidents generally define the relationship of the United States to international events. Consequently, they can make almost any of their actions appear to defend the national interest and to be within the bounds of decorous democratic foreign policy. Further, the limits that the public ostensibly sets for them are remarkably flexible. They can be expanded because of the exigencies of a changing international climate that, according to the policymaker, demand new approaches. In early 1946, for example, Americans looked forward to a long period of normalcy and nonentanglement. Apparently, joining the United Nations was all the internationalism they desired. At the time, few would have approved of the permanent stationing of military units in Europe, nor would they have accepted giving away millions of dollars to foreign friends. By 1948, however, the impact of events—events interpreted by the foreign policy establishment—convinced a majority of citizens that unprecedented interventionist activities were needed to maintain national security. The limits that restrained American diplomats in 1946 were expanded by 1948 through a combination of events and propaganda.

The view is also inadequate when analyzed from the bottom up. The abstract differentiation between the public's task of defining strategic interests and the government's task of developing tactical policies is difficult to make operational. During the early 1960s most Americans supported their government's general attempt to stop "communism" in Southeast Asia. Yet, the bombing of North Vietnam, putatively a tactical policy decision implemented to achieve that goal, became a matter for widespread public debate. Both hawks and doves refused to leave the bombing issue to the planners in the Pentagon. And rightly so, for most major military policies are fraught with serious political implications.

In sum, despite widespread scholarly agreement about its basic outlines, the dominant paradigm delineating the public's role is faulty. The suggestion that the public sets goals and limits while the president executes policy does not adequately describe the opinion-policy relationship in American diplomatic history.

The public and the policymaker do interact in a more fundamental way. Historic periods are marked by unique climates of opinion. From time to time, Americans have been more isolationist than expansionist, more tolerant than intolerant, or more pessimistic than optimistic. Such general moods, which develop as a result of a concatenation of social, economic, and, to some degree, psychological factors, cannot be rapidly changed through elite manipulation.

Those who challenge the notion that national mood is impervious to sudden transformation point to the Spanish-American War and the manner in which the yellow press supposedly created mass interventionist hysteria. Interestingly, many of the explosive elements present during the crisis of 1895–1898 were also present

during the Cuban Revolution of 1868–1878. However, the earlier stories of atrocities, gun running, assaults on American honor, and the struggle for Cuban freedom did not arouse a population recovering from its tragic and bloody Civil War. During the 1890s, a different generation of Americans was receptive to the inflammatory accounts in the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. The "psychic crisis" of the Gilded Age produced an audience primed for jingoist journalists and politicians.

Similarly, Richard Nixon, the architect of détente with the People's Republic of China in 1972, could not have proposed such a démarche in 1956. According to most indicators of public opinion, American citizens then would not have been willing to consider such a drastic reorientation of national policy. No one could have been elected to a position of power in 1956 who talked openly about sitting down with Mao Zedong, the "aggressor" in the Korean War. Five years later, President John F. Kennedy, a Democrat from the party that "lost" China in 1949, believed it impossible to alter U.S. policy in Asia. A majority of Americans would first have to unlearn the propaganda lessons of the early 1950s before such a dramatic program could be safely broached by a national leader.

In the years after the Vietnam War, the American public was in no mood to intervene in other distant struggles in the Third World. It is possible that had the public not felt so strongly about this issue, Ronald Reagan would have intervened with U.S. troops in El Salvador in 1981. And while Americans had apparently licked their so-called Vietnam syndrome by 1991, when George H. W. Bush led the nation into war in the Persian Gulf, Bush was convinced he had to terminate the war before marching on Baghdad because he feared his constituents would not support a longer war or more GI casualties. Bush's chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, supported that decision with what came to be called the Powell Doctrine. The United States could not again participate in a lengthy, Vietnam-style war unless the public expressed enthusiasm about such a venture at the outset.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Aside from participating in the development of a climate of opinion and possessing a latent electoral veto over major foreign policy decisions—two not insignificant functions—the public's direct influence in the making of foreign policy is minimal. Here, more than in domestic affairs, presidents are dominant over both Congress and the mass public. Their ability to create opinion and dominate the opposition assures them a relatively free hand in planning and executing foreign policies.

Because of the vast information-gathering and information-disseminating facilities at their disposal and because they are the only truly national spokespersons, presidents are the most important source of information on foreign affairs. Through their public attention to specific international problems, they can go a long way toward determining the agenda of the national foreign policy debate. Although congressional committees and the mass media have developed their own informational and promotional capabilities, until recently they have not commanded the resources available to the president. It was only during the last decade of the twentieth century that round-the-clock cable television news and Internet sources, available everywhere around the world, began to level the information and propaganda playing fields.

The president's ability to conduct day-to-day diplomacy, free from public pressures, rests on the fact that most Americans are not very interested in esoteric international issues. Naturally, some obscure policies that the public does not care to monitor eventually become major issues. One such example was the unpublicized U.S. assistance to forces opposing Salvador Allende's socialist regime in Chile during the early 1970s.

If presidents' freedom of action in the development of foreign policy depends in good measure upon public inattention, their power in a crisis depends upon public helplessness. During sudden crises citizens must accept their accounts of fast-breaking events or risk further loss of American lives. In May 1846, Americans had no option but to accept President Polk's misleading account of the way American blood had been shed on American soil by Mexican soldiers. Given the apparent need for immediate retaliation and Polk's relative credibility, the public rallied behind his policies and asked questions later. In similar situations Americans supported their leaders during the Korean crisis in the summer of 1950 and the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. Surprisingly, the public does not always withdraw its support when crisis diplomacy or military intervention fails. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, John F. Kennedy's popularity rose in the

polls, as did Jimmy Carter's after the failed rescue mission in Iran in April 1980.

In noncrisis periods the president can develop support for a program by selectively suppressing or releasing secret information. Madison published letters from a turncoat British spy in an attempt to demonstrate that Federalists who challenged his British policies had been conspiring with the enemy. More than a century later, Woodrow Wilson's release of the purloined Zimmermann telegram contributed to the onrushing torrent of anti-German sentiment on the eve of American entry into World War I.

As for the suppression of important information, Harry S. Truman decided to withhold General Albert C. Wedemeyer's 1947 report on China because it was potentially offensive to Jiang Jie-shī (Chiang Kai-shek). More important, its conclusions ran counter to official policies. From 1970 to 1973, Richard Nixon suppressed information on the bombing of Cambodia while some of his aides participated in a cover-up that involved falsification of military records. In one of the most celebrated cases of all, Franklin D. Roosevelt concealed the extent of his involvement as a silent partner in the Allied effort in World War II for fear that such revelations might lead to his electoral defeat and a change in the direction of national policy. His defenders contend that the president and his advisers had a better grasp of what constituted national security than did the well-meaning but untutored public. Like the doctor who tells his patient that the bitter but vitally important medicine tastes good, Roosevelt obscured the issues and misled the people for their own alleged best interests.

Such a position might seem tenable in the light of the times, but its acceptance as a legitimate procedure for all presidents is unlikely. Many of those sympathizing with Roosevelt's position were displeased when Lyndon Johnson was not entirely forthcoming with the electorate about his plans for the war in Vietnam during the 1964 election campaign. Yet both presidents later cited national security in defense of their tactics.

Conceivably, an alert, crusading press can counterbalance the awesome power of the president to mold foreign policy opinions. However, editors move with caution when it comes to printing material potentially detrimental to national security. The *New York Times* learned of the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation on the eve of the attack. After conferring with the White House, its editors decided not to run the story because they were convinced that the success of that covert operation was a matter of the highest national interest. In a related vein, when columnist Jack Anderson published excerpts from the minutes of the National Security Council during the Bangladesh war of 1971, many reporters joined with the government to criticize his "impropriety." Nixon's aides went beyond mere criticism as they contemplated ways to do away with the columnist who told Americans that contrary to what the White House was saying, the administration was supporting the rapists of West Pakistan against the freedom fighters in East Pakistan.

In general, the press has been far more circumspect in printing diplomatic than domestic exclusives. For journalists, it is one thing to uncover scandals and quite another to publish material that could render aid and comfort to a foreign enemy. Since the 1990s, however, unaffiliated investigative reporters on the Internet have not been so circumspect.

Despite their general mastery of the opinion problem, American leaders have traditionally claimed that the people are important to them as a source of support and inspiration. Since the Jacksonian period, most have probably believed that they were duty-bound to heed the people. Thus, they have constantly attempted to assess public opinion, or at least the opinions of relevant publics. Of course, the opinion evaluated and used by decision makers does not always meet the social scientists' definition of public opinion.

Public officials have traditionally relied heavily upon newspapers and other mass media to discover what people are thinking about. The media, however, are better indicators of the topics in the current foreign policy debate than of the range of opinions on those topics. Despite charges about the biases of the "liberal press," most U.S. newspapers have been owned by Republicans who fill their editorial pages with materials that do not always represent majority opinion in their communities.

Many leaders consider newspaper and magazine columnists to be peers whose approval they covet. Occasionally, they use friendly journalists to float trial balloons for them, so that they can test the political waters before committing themselves to a new course. In some cases columnists may become directly enmeshed in the policy process. In the fall of 1962, Walter Lippmann proposed the dismantling of U.S. missile bases in Turkey as a quid pro quo for the dismantling of Russian bases in Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev mistakenly interpreted the trade-off presented by

America's most distinguished columnist as a cue from the White House. This misunderstanding about the nature of Lippmann's relationship to the inner circles of the Kennedy administration contributed to the tension during the Cuban missile crisis. Moscow may have been confused by the fact that the Americans were using John Scali, a television journalist, as an unofficial go-between with one of their diplomats during the affair.

Congress has been the policymakers' second most important source for public opinion. Primarily, they are concerned about the activities of committees with interests in foreign affairs, but they also view senators and representatives as reflecting constituents' interests. From time to time such an interpretation of opinion on Capitol Hill has affected policy outcomes. During the late 1930s, President Roosevelt may have underestimated the public's interventionist sentiment when he treated congressional isolationism as an accurate reflection of the national mood. Today, social scientists suggest that though legislators may reflect the majority opinion in their respective districts on domestic issues, they frequently support foreign policies that run counter to their constituents' preferences. In part, they tend to vote their consciences or party lines on international issues because foreign policy is not important to their constituents. In most cases, members of Congress will be neither rewarded nor punished for their endeavors in the international sphere.

Even when they attempt to reflect faithfully their districts' foreign policy attitudes, the aggregation of their views is not always an accurate reflection of national public opinion. After all, there is no guarantee that national opinion leaders, to whom the president looks for guidance, will share the opinions of local leaders to whom legislators may listen.

During the first twenty years of the Cold War, the handful of congressional critics of presidential foreign policy on both sides of the aisle was not influential. The concept of bipartisanship meant that the opposition was expected to approve executive programs while the president went through the motions of prior consultation. As a product in part of the Vietnam War, in the late 1960s, Congress began to flex its long-atrophied muscles and offer programs and ideas independent of the president and, to some degree, more representative of the range of opinions in the country.

Since the 1930s, policymakers have employed polls as a third indicator of opinion. Even the best of them, however, are not always reliable, especially when they attempt to elicit opinions on foreign affairs. Survey instruments do not lend themselves to sophisticated treatment of such questions and, moreover, rarely cover enough contingencies to be of immediate use to decision makers. During the months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a majority of those polled thought that the United States would go to war in the near future and recommended such a course if it appeared that England was about to go under. But up to December 1941, only a very small minority told interviewers that they favored an immediate declaration of war. It is impossible to determine on the basis of these data how Americans would have responded to a presidential request for war in the absence of a direct attack on U.S. territory. In addition, some polls are worded so ambiguously that antagonists derive support from the same poll. So it was during the 1960s, when hawks and doves often utilized the same poll to prove that they spoke for the majority concerning the Vietnam involvement. During the last decade of the twentieth century, particularly during the administration of Bill Clinton, policymakers used their own sophisticated polling techniques and focus groups to see how various foreign initiatives might be received by the public. This reliance on first trying out foreign policies on focus groups drew a good deal of criticism during the presidential campaign in 2000 from those who argued that presidents must do what they think is right without checking the nation's pulse and then lead the public to accept their policies.

Phone calls, mail and e-mail, telegrams, and faxes received by the White House and other executive branches represent a fourth source of information about public opinion for the president. Modern administrations keep careful count of the weekly "scores" on specific issues, paying attention to communication that does not appear to be mass-produced by a lobby or political organization. Presidents view significant changes in the direction of opinion or in the number of complaints or commendations on an issue as possibly representing shifts in national public opinion, even though they understand that their sample is very small and hardly a random one. When the mail flow is going their way, presidents often trumpet the news, hoping to affect those who did not write in to climb aboard the bandwagon. Richard Nixon took this part of the activity so seriously that he organized secret Republican operatives around the country to send in supportive letters and telegrams on demand after a speech or a foreign policy initiative.

NIXON AND THE VIETNAM WAR

When Richard Nixon became president in 1969, he vowed not to make the mistakes his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, had made in conducting foreign policy. In particular, he was most concerned with the way some elements in the public had affected Johnson's policies in Southeast Asia through telegenic mass demonstrations and other dissenting actions of their anti–Vietnam War movement. Foreign policy should not be made in the street, he and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, insisted. They wanted to demonstrate that they could operate just as their foes did in the communist bloc, unencumbered by domestic opinion.

On 15 July 1969, Nixon sent the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh a secret ultimatum that demanded, in effect: Soften your negotiating position for ending the war in Vietnam by 1 November or face a new and potentially devastating military escalation in the war. Soon after, White House security aides began considering a variety of options that would mete out punishment if Ho failed to meet the president halfway. At the time that Nixon sent his ultimatum, the antiwar movement was relatively dormant, giving the new president a brief honeymoon while he fulfilled his campaign promise to bring the war in Vietnam to a speedy conclusion. When this did not happen by that summer, activists began to plan for a new series of demonstrations against the war. On 15 October 1969, protesters held their largest and most successful antiwar action of the entire war, the Moratorium. In a decentralized series of mostly quite dignified and decorous demonstrations, marches, and prayer vigils, more than two million Americans in some 200 cities took time off from work or school to send the message to Washington that they were displeased with the pace of withdrawal from Vietnam. More important for Nixon, the tone was liberal, not radical, the participants more middle-class adults than hippies. Even Lyndon Johnson's chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, the distinguished diplomat W. Averell Harriman, took part in the ceremonies. And Moratorium leaders promised another such demonstration every month until the war in Vietnam ended.

Nixon was astonished by the breadth and depth of antiwar sentiment. When the North Vietnamese called his bluff and failed to respond to his ultimatum on 1 November, he decided not to go through with any of the retaliatory "savage blows" planned by his aides. Although the vast support for the Moratorium was not the only reason why he chose not to escalate, it weighed heavily with him. Indeed, it compelled him to go on the offensive against the antiwar movement, beginning with his celebrated Silent Majority speech of 3 November and with a concurrent campaign against the allegedly antiwar liberal media, spearheaded by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. When the time came again to escalate, Nixon hoped to neutralize if not destroy those who disagreed in public with his policies in Vietnam.

Last, and most important, politicians claim they have developed finely tuned antennae that enable them to "sense" public opinion. Through an unscientific sampling of opinion from newspapers, Congress, and the polls, and from talking to family members, friends, advisers, and influential leaders, they contend that they can accurately read public opinion on any major issue. Harry Truman told his friends that the polls were wrong in 1948. As he traveled across the nation, he sensed a swing to the Democrats that did not show up in the polls.

To some degree Truman's faith in his political intuition was warranted. Social scientists report that leaders of small groups are better able to assess the range of opinion in their groups than other members are, and, in fact, their rise to leadership status may relate to their superior ability to assess group opinion.

Nevertheless, the politicians' antennae sometimes pick up only opinions that conform to their preconceived notions. Thus, when William McKinley toured the country in 1898 to determine what Americans thought of expansion, he apparently saw and heard only those who favored acquisition of the Philippines. In a slightly different case in the fall of 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly proposed that the United States begin to take a more active role in curbing expansionists in Asia and Europe. According to most opinion indicators available today, a majority of Americans supported his bold quarantine speech. However, before the fact, the president had convinced himself that his

remarks would launch a storm of isolationist protest. Consequently, after scanning the newspapers, telegrams, and letters, he found more opposition than was merited by the empirical data. It is irrelevant to students of the foreign policy process that presidents and their advisers often assess public opinion in an unscientific manner and confuse opinions stated publicly with public opinion. When officials act on the basis of an inaccurate reading of opinion, the opinions they hear represent effective public opinion. Naturally, this might indicate that they use public opinion to rationalize or justify a course already decided upon.

The public is usually most important to the decision maker after a major policy has been implemented. At that point, dissenters who challenge both the legitimacy of the policy and presidential authority may be heard. In most cases, presidents have been able to cope with those who oppose their foreign programs. When they are confronted with some negative and little positive reaction to a policy, they can argue that the absence of widespread dissent is the same as tacit support—the silent majority assents by remaining silent. When the ranks of the dissenters swell in Congress and in the media, presidents can dismiss them as partisans who sacrifice national security for political gain. When, as in the 1960s, hundreds of thousands of dissenters march on Washington and support moratoriums, presidents can call attention to the 250 million who stay home. Most citizens would never think of protesting publicly or marching in open opposition to an official foreign policy. Such behavior appears unpatriotic, especially when it is confounded by officials and the media, sometimes purposely, with the scattered violence and revolutionary rhetoric present on the fringes of contemporary mass protests.

In general, presidents can secure their positions by assailing critics for their irresponsibility—they do not know what the presidents know, nor do they have access to the intelligence reports that flow across a president's desk. Furthermore, critics lack knowledge of the intricate linkages between all diplomatic activities from Asia to Latin America. However, this line of argumentation lost some of its power after the 1970s. Many of the more sensational revelations contained in the *Pentagon Papers* merely documented rumors and leaks that perceptive citizens gleaned from fragmentary accounts in the media during the 1960s. The spirited public debates over the wisdom of intervention in Vietnam demonstrated that critics in the opposition often have as accurate intelligence and knowledge about the issues as those in the White House.

In the last analysis, presidents can usually contain their critics because they hold the office of president, the most visible symbol of the American nation. Many who may privately express skepticism about certain foreign policies are reluctant to speak up for fear of insulting the dignity of the presidency and, perhaps, the prestige of the United States in the international arena.

The power of the president to mold opinion has been enhanced in the twentieth century by electronic media. During much of American history, national leaders encountered difficulties when they tried to appeal to the mass public. In the 1840s, James K. Polk threatened to "go to the people" whenever Congress challenged him. His threat, however, lacked credibility because he did not possess the physical means to reach them. Almost seventy-five years later, Woodrow Wilson might have succeeded in developing irresistible public pressure for his League of Nations had national radio hookups been available.

In the 1920s radio began to play an important role in the political life of the nation. Franklin D. Roosevelt, a consummate master of the new medium, increased his popular support through frequent direct contact with the public. Television, in the right hands, is an even more powerful tool than radio. During the period following World War II, Americans began to suffer from information overload, a condition brought on by constant bombardment with all sorts of material on complex problems. This condition can produce both frustration and confusion. It is only natural, therefore, that Americans turn to the president for relief; he appears on television as a reassuring father figure to simplify reality and ease anxiety. During most of the post–World War II era, contemporary presidents enjoyed easy access to the airwaves. Even when network executives were skeptical about the importance of a presidential speech or a press conference, they could not resist White House demands for free airtime. According to the journalist Tom Wicker, writing in October 1974:

> This is a Presidential "power" that no one wrote into the Constitution, or even "implied" in that document. . . . It is the power to command a vast audience almost at will, and to appear before that audience in all the impressive roles a President can play—from manager of the economy to Commander in Chief. . . . This "power" . . . gives a President an enormous advantage over his political opposition, as well as over the other branches of govern-

ment, in molding opinion. It magnifies a thousandfold what Theodore Roosevelt, long before television, called the "bully pulpit" of the Presidency.

Naturally, after presidents lose credibility, even the cleverest television and media experts are unable to help them regain their audiences. And with the advent of cable television, which meant that Americans could view scores of stations, the major networks began to refuse to carry many presidential appearances, arguing that interested viewers could always find the president on a public-service channel.

Presidents have been assisted by agencies and departments of the executive branch in their dealings with the public. The Department of State has assumed the major responsibility in foreign affairs. Through the years it has been more interested in information and lobbying functions than in survey research. In 1909, Secretary of State Philander C. Knox established the Division of Information, which was responsible for placing news releases into newspapers and other information channels. In 1934 the department became especially active when it launched a lobbying campaign to assist passage of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. During World War II, the department began systematically to survey the press and to provide opinion studies to foreign service officers. In 1944 all of its information functions were placed under an assistant secretary for public affairs. During the Cold War, the promotional aspects of the department's work with the public were expanded through liaison with such influential private foreign policy groups as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association.

The government has had one unfortunate experience with a formal propaganda agency. The Committee on Public Information (also known as the Creel Committee), operating during World War I, angered legislators and other influential leaders because of the methods it used to sell the war effort to Americans. When the Office of War Information was established during World War II, Congress explicitly prohibited domestic propaganda work. The United States Information Agency and the Voice of America are similarly banned from operating in the United States.

WHO IS THE PUBLIC?

No matter how we assess the public's role in the foreign policymaking process, Americans do have opinions on international affairs. The range of their attitudes, knowledge, and interest is wide. As there are many opinions, so are there many publics.

At the apex of the pyramidal structure often used to depict the American polity is a small group of opinion makers: business leaders, politicians, statesmen, publishers, journalists, intellectuals, and organizational spokespersons. There are four basic types of opinion makers. In descending order of importance, they are national multi-issue opinion makers, such as senators; national single-issue opinion makers, such as presidents of corporations with defense contracts; local multi-issue opinion makers, such as the president of a large bank; and local single-issue opinion makers, such as a professor of Islamic studies at a local university.

This elite, which is involved with international affairs in its daily professional capacities, constitutes the policymakers' primary constituency. Many members of this foreign policy establishment periodically serve in either official or advisory government positions. As opinion makers they transmit their ideas through the media to the rest of the population. In their ancillary role as opinion submitters, they present their policy preferences to those in power. These opinion makers influence, articulate, and represent mass opinion. In such relatively low-profile areas as tariff and trade policies (except for such issues as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization), they may be the only interested public. Consequently, they can exercise a good deal of influence in the policymaking process. Through their lobbies, pressure groups, and informal contacts with decision makers, they are often able to ensure that national policy serves their needs.

Through most of American history a disproportionate number of opinion makers lived along the eastern seaboard. By the mid-twentieth century, however, they were more widely dispersed throughout the country. Although New York City still maintained its hegemony as the national media and financial capital, new opinion makers in regional power centers like Atlanta and Los Angeles began to play leading roles in the foreign policymaking process.

Below this rarefied group of powerful individuals is a segment of the population, perhaps as large as 10 percent, that has been labeled "the attentive public." This well-educated group, whose composition can shift from issue to issue, is informed about foreign affairs and may be mobi-

lized for some form of political activism. These members of the middle and upper-middle class read intellectual magazines and books, belong to organizations and pressure groups with continuing interests in problems in the international sphere, and are likely to be among those who sign petitions and write letters to politicians. The attentive public helps to transmit ideas and information from opinion makers to the rest of the population through interpersonal communications. Much of the foreign policy debate takes place within the ranks of the attentive public, the primary audience for the opinion makers on most issues.

The remainder of the population, a vast and generally silent majority, is basically disinterested in most diplomatic events and uninformed about the nature of the international system. Wars and crises that result in banner headlines or preemption of popular television shows will arouse them, but they ignore the day-to-day operation of the foreign policy machine. Furthermore, they rarely contemplate the broad strategic concerns that define the American national interest.

The mass public is latently powerful. On occasion it can be persuaded to exert pressure upon the directors of the nation's foreign policy, or even to counterbalance more articulate critics among opinion makers and the attentive public. When Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon began to lose the backing of the foreign policy establishment, they appealed to the silent majority for support of their Vietnam policies.

The static pyramidal structure masks some of the behavioral interaction among the three groups. One of the leading students of the issue, James N. Rosenau, proposes the analogy of a gigantic theater featuring daily dramas of international intrigue on its stage. Seated in a disproportionately large and distant balcony, the mass public is unable to see and hear much of the action and, consequently, becomes involved only when the actors reach dramatic peaks. The attentive public, in the much smaller orchestra section, follows the performance closely and even helps those from the balcony whom it meets during intermissions. The players or opinion makers on stage variously direct their attentions to other actors, to specific groups in the orchestra, and, occasionally, to those in the balcony. From time to time, almost everyone within the theater is engaged in activities simultaneously, although the majority in the balcony only rarely applauds or boos.

The American public's ignorance of and disinterest in international affairs is not unique. Surveys tell us that most people in most countries are little concerned with diplomacy. Nevertheless, when compared with their peers in western Europe, Americans tend to score lower on questions demanding knowledge of the outside world.

This situation appalls many observers. Americans are better-educated and more literate today than they have ever been. Print and electronic mass media provide their audiences with more essential information than was available to the decision makers themselves in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, the public is still woefully uninformed about foreign affairs. As late as 1964, more than one-quarter of those polled in a national survey did not know that a communist regime, which had been in power since 1949, ruled on the mainland of China. During the same period, only a handful of Americans could distinguish among Prince Souvanna Phouma, General Phoumi Nosavan, and Prince Souphanouvong, the three rival leaders contending for power in Laos, a country to which millions of dollars and some U.S. military personnel had been committed. In 1997, only 5 percent of the population could name one European nation that was a candidate for membership in NATO. Paradoxically, in earlier days, despite primitive means of communication, the average American probably was better-informed about foreign affairs than he or she is now. Then, boundary disputes and tariff imbroglios not only were diplomatic problems but also dominated the domestic political debate and determined the health of the economy. Of course, the U.S. role in the international system was not very complicated during the first century and a half of American history.

According to several influential scholars, the widespread disinterest in many political issues is not necessarily an undesirable feature of contemporary American democracy. As long as the majority of the uninformed and noncosmopolitan mass public is disinterested, leaders do not have to worry about irrational inputs into the foreign policy process. Indeed, some theorists contend that democracy in a large polity depends upon mass apathy in order to function effectively. If all Americans were to become interested, informed, and active in the political process, decision makers would be subject to constant crosscutting pressures that would render them incapable of performing their duties. Such a model of the civic culture in the United States disturbs some commentators. They call attention, among other things, to a period in the early 1960s when, insu-

lated from public opinion, the government made decisions about political and military commitments to South Vietnam that had tragic consequences for Americans and Vietnamese alike. Had more Americans been aware of the covert and, at the time, relatively obscure programs, the ensuing ventilation of the issues might have led to the development of alternate policies for South Vietnam. The mass public is not always correct in its assessment of prudent foreign policies, but it can monitor and challenge decision makers who may be moving along dangerous pathways.

THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC

The American public's lack of interest in and information about foreign affairs is intimately related to the relative lack of interest displayed in such topics by their news and informational organs. Except for a handful of cosmopolitan dailies, few newspapers maintain a staff of foreign correspondents or offer many column inches of international news. Most rely upon one of the major wire services for whatever foreign news they see fit to print. By 2000, the Associated Press, which had come to dominate the wire services in the United States, was used by 1,700 U.S. newspapers and 5,000 U.S. radio and television outlets. The most influential shapers of media presentations of international problems may be the handful of journalists who produce the daily news budgets for the wire services. The *New York Times* plays a comparable role, particularly for the editors of the television networks' nightly newscasts, who, like most journalists and politicians, consider its judgment about what is important foreign news preeminent among all newspapers.

Electronic media bring foreign news to Americans over regularly scheduled news broadcasts and special programs. For the most part, however, their treatments lack the continuity and background material that would enable their audience to make sense out of a one-minute report on a riot in Nigeria or a thirty-second reference to the fall of the Euro. Television time is so expensive, and the time allocated to news so limited, that viewers are afforded only fleeting, disjointed glimpses of complex international events. News of body counts, bombings, and inflammatory rhetoric are treated without concern for the historical processes in which they are embedded. Only when there is a major crisis do some networks, particularly the cable news networks, offer sustained treatment of an international problem that goes beyond the brief snapshot of the sensational happening. And even then, most viewers, except "news junkies," quickly begin to surf other channels to find lighter programming.

Publishers and editors are convinced that, except in times of crisis, foreign news does not attract large enough audiences to satisfy the demands of their cost accountants. Although they probably are correct in their judgment, a feedback process is at work here. The directors of the mass media perceive their audience as uninterested in most stories with international datelines. Consequently, they offer a skimpy diet of such materials. Presented with such fare, the audience will never become either informed about or interested in international affairs. Whatever the explanation for public and media disinterest in such news, the situation is unlikely to change radically in the foreseeable future. The increasingly complicated diplomatic arena, with its numerous international organizations and nations no longer operating in a simpler bipolar world, makes the task of understanding foreign policy more difficult than it has ever been and, perhaps, not worth the effort for most Americans. After all, to become competent in international affairs in the 1990s, one had to know something about the history of the Balkans, the nature of Islamic fundamentalism, and the social structure of the Peruvian peasantry. In the 2000 election campaign, many Americans sympathized with the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, who not only had a difficult time pronouncing "foreign" names but often could not remember them at all. This lack of interest in learning about the world intensified after the Cold War ended and the international system became a less dangerous but also far more complicated place for most citizens.

SOURCES OF THE PUBLIC'S OPINIONS

Although the vast majority of Americans do not closely follow foreign affairs, they do express opinions about foreign countries and problems of peace and war. These opinions, as well as their underlying attitudinal and value structures, are developed in various ways from a variety of sources. Quite often people form attitudes about public affairs because of factors that may have nothing to do with the merits of a case.

An individual's attitude toward foreign policy is determined in part by his or her educa-

tional experiences, religious affiliation, age, place of residence, and even sex. Citizens belonging to the same cohorts tend to share similar foreign policy attitudes. College graduates are more likely to be internationalists than people with a high-school education; Catholics are more likely to be hostile to socialist nations than non-Catholics; young people in the 1990s were more friendly to the Japanese than those who remembered Pearl Harbor; midwesterners are usually more isolationist than easterners and westerners; and women tend to be less militaristic than men. All of these rather simplistic dichotomous generalizations are more complicated than they appear at first glance. For example, midwesterners may be isolationist because they live hundreds of miles from the coasts, or because farmers are more isolationist than city dwellers, or for several other reasons. Young people may be relatively friendly to Japanese because they are more tolerant of Asians in general, or because they have learned to understand the Japanese point of view in 1941, or because they harbor guilt feelings about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

The groups to which an individual belongs are not the only predictors of foreign policy attitudes. Psychological and personality factors also influence, and may even determine, political attitudes. In one of the most famous explorations in this area, researchers discovered that those who score high on the "F" or authoritarian scale are often xenophobic and militaristic, while those with low scores are more tolerant of foreigners and more pacific. The authoritarian and other specific personality types are affected by the pattern of the individuals' relationship to their parents, their sexual experiences, and their career development. In one study of the impact of personality on foreign policy attitudes, psychologists theorized that a subject was pro-Russian during the 1950s because his mother had been an oppressively dominant factor during his childhood. At the other end of the political spectrum, a subject's violent Russophobia was attributed to his need to display the courage and toughness that he lacked as a youth. Interestingly, it is likely that the more important a public issue is for an individual, the more his or her attitudes will be determined by such psychological factors.

Regardless of the social or personality group to which one belongs, people the world over are generally suspicious of outsiders, whether those outsiders represent a different church, community, or country. Such suspicions increase in inverse proportion to knowledge. Since many Americans lack knowledge of other nations, they often view foreigners both in negative and in stereotypical terms. Stereotypes that simplify a complicated world are most comforting when the individual who relies upon them is not exposed to dissonant information.

For many Americans, and a good many Europeans, Latins are lazy, Jews are shrewd, and Arabs are terrorists. Not all stereotypes are negative. The smaller and less threatening the country, the more likely Americans are to admire its people. Charming and peaceful countries like the Denmark of Hans Christian Andersen and the Switzerland of hardy democrats have long had pleasant images in the United States. Stereotypes for larger and more powerful states are usually more ambiguous. Depending upon the specific historical situation, the positive or negative components of those stereotypes may be dominant. Although at times Americans have been attracted to the polite and clever Chinese seen in the Charlie Chan character, they have at other times been fearful of the fiendish Mandarin Fu Manchu. Germans have been esteemed for their efficiency and cleanliness but also despised for their arrogance and brutality. During the 1940s, Russians went from godless communist conspirators to partisan freedom fighters and then back to godless communist conspirators in a matter of eight years.

In some cases, Americans have confused a country's foreign policy with its nationals. However, when asked about this distinction, they respond that they have nothing against ordinary folk in a rival state, only the ruling class. Indeed, they express sympathy for those who live under dictatorial regimes. All too often Americans have assumed that such benighted people must be hostile to their overlords. This sort of analysis led some to conclude, during the early years of the war in Vietnam, that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong performed so well in the field because they were either drugged or chained to their weapons. Similarly, in the 1990s many Americans believed that the people of Iraq could not wait to overthrow their evil dictator, Saddam Hussein.

The Soviet-American relationship during the Cold War produced the intriguing hypothesis that the antagonists tended to view each other in terms of a mirror image. That is, each side saw its rival as its polar opposite. Russians viewed themselves as defensive and conciliatory and Americans as offensive and refractory, while Americans

reversed these images. Such an interpretation is supported by the general psychological principle of projection, in which individuals project their own character flaws onto those whom they dislike. As they emerged from the crushing Vietnam experience in the 1970s, Americans became more self-critical and began to see themselves as others saw them. The mirror-image phenomenon of the 1950s was replaced by a more realistic view of America's role and actions in the international system, at least for a while. Such realistic introspection did not sit well with many citizens who rallied to their old vision of national superiority under the administration of Ronald Reagan.

Although American images of foreign countries may shift from generation to generation, groups organized around their ethnic origins often constitute permanent lobbies for their homelands. Such Americans have been active throughout American diplomatic history. The mythical melting pot has failed to create a new American; even to the fourth and fifth generations, many citizens cling to their original nationality. In diplomatic and military disputes that do not directly involve the United States, German Americans, Polish Americans, and Arab Americans, among others, tend to support their homelands. Often this support is given without regard to the national interest of their adopted country. Fenians of Irish origin tried to bring England and the United States to war in the 1860s. During World War I, German Americans vigorously contested Woodrow Wilson's drift toward the British and ultimately his decision for war. Throughout much of the post–World War II era, Jewish Americans exercised a powerful influence, if not a veto, over U.S. Middle East policy. Cuban Americans played a similar role in affecting the nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba under Fidel Castro.

The ethnically based lobby is only one type of mass pressure group. Other segments of the public can be mobilized because of shared economic interests. In the months before the outbreak of the War of 1812, midwestern farmers agitated for war against England because they blamed their depressed condition on the British Navigation Acts. In the late twentieth century, New England fishermen pressured the State Department to support measures that would keep Russian and other competitors away from their traditional fishing grounds, while most corporate leaders pressured Washington to break down tariff barriers through free-trade and other international organizations.

Ideology can also arouse citizens to action. During the 1930s, many American Catholics worked to prevent the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt from permitting arms sales to the Republican government of Spain. Conversely, many college students who saw the Spanish Republicans as heroic antifascists attempted to force Roosevelt to relax the arms embargo. During the 1950s, the conservative Committee of One Million was a powerful voice in the debate over America's China policy. Two decades later, a comparable anticommunist group, the Committee on the Present Danger, exercised great influence within the Republican Party in destroying support for Nixon and Ford's policy of détente with the Soviet Union.

Although, from time to time, special interest groups have been able to play powerful roles in American diplomatic history, they have not been as influential in the shaping of foreign policy as they have been in domestic policy. For the most part, American diplomats have been able either to ignore them or to play them off against one another.

CONCLUSION

Wherever we probe in our study of public opinion and foreign policy, we encounter frustrating complexities and ambiguities. Political theorists and historians disagree about the ways the public ought to influence foreign policy and the dimensions of the actual nature of the relationship in American history. Most contend that presidents are somehow constrained by a public that defines broad national goals and sets parameters for action. Yet the presidents' preeminence in the opinion-making process guarantees them almost as much freedom in the international arena as leaders from less democratic systems. The public itself is not monolithic. Several publics possess varying degrees of knowledge of, interest in, and influence on foreign policy. Individuals develop foreign policy attitudes because of exposure to events and as a result of socioeconomic status and personality development.

The wealth of sophisticated research produced by social scientists since World War II underscores the gaps in knowledge about the opinion-policy relationship. Although we know much more about the origins of foreign policy attitudes, as well as the world of the decision maker, the precise nature of the opinion-policy

nexus still eludes us. Because of the questions raised about the meaning of the Vietnam experience for the American democratic system, scholars and statesmen began reexamining the public's impact on foreign policy. As might have been expected, considering the earlier debates over this complicated and contentious issue during the life of the republic, they have failed to reach a clear consensus on this most important and often troubling aspect of their unique political system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Almond, Gabriel A. *The American People and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1950. A pathbreaking effort by a social scientist, now rather dated.

Bailey, Thomas A. *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy.* New York, 1948. The classic impressionistic and wonderfully anecdotal treatment by a dean of diplomatic historians.

Barnet, Richard J. *The Rocket's Red Glare: When America Goes to War—The Presidents and the People.* New York, 1990.

Benson, Lee. "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30, no 4. (1967–1968): 522–567.

Cohen, Bernard C. *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy.* Boston, 1973. One of the soundest treatments of the subject, especially the introductory chapter on the state of the art.

Foster, H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940–1975.* Washington, D.C., 1983.

Foyle, Douglas C. *Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy.* New York, 1999. An interesting attempt by a political scientist to categorize the approaches of recent presidents.

Graber, Doris A. *Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years.* New York, 1968.

Hilderbrand, Robert C. *Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897–1921.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981.

Holsti, Ole R. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* New York, 1988. Several useful contemporary studies in this political science volume.

Levering, Ralph B. *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978.* New York, 1978. A valuable brief survey by a leading specialist in the field.

Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion.* New York, 1922. Still a thought-provoking treatise.

———. *Essays in the Public Philosophy.* Boston, 1955. A critique of democratic leaders' pandering to the emotional masses.

May, Ernest R. "An American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion." In William H. Nelson, ed. *Theory and Practice in American Politics.* Chicago, 1964, pp. 101–222.

Mueller, John E. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion.* New York, 1973. An influential work by a political scientist concentrating on the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Newsom, David D. *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy.* Bloomington, Ind., 1996. A practitioner takes a look at the problem.

Rosenau, James N. *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation.* New York, 1961. A still-important study of the various publics and their relationships to the policymakers.

Shapiro, Robert Y., and Benjamin I. Page. "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion." In David A. Deese, ed. *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1994.

Small, Melvin. "Historians Look at Public Opinion." In Melvin Small, ed. *Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* Detroit, Mich., 1970. An analysis of the shortcomings of traditional historical approaches to the subject.

———. *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1988. An attempt by a historian to evaluate the influence of the antiwar movement on presidential decision making.

———. *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994.* Baltimore, 1996.

See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DISSENT IN WAR; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; THE PRESS; RACE AND ETHNICITY; REALISM AND IDEALISM; TELEVISION; THE VIETNAM WAR.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

John Snetsinger

To many observers one of the surprises of the 2000 census was that fully 10 percent of Americans reported that they had been born in a foreign country. Thirty years earlier the figure had been just 4.7 percent, the smallest in the Republic's history. The significance for the future formulation of U.S. foreign policy is not to be lost in the current number of foreign-born within the population. The political reality of the American system is that the greater the number of foreign-born, as well as of others within the population who retain ties with ancestral associations, the more likely it is that ethnic group politics can influence foreign policy. Demographic trends in twenty-first century America hold the promise that ethnicity may well play an even greater role in the making of foreign policy than has generally been the case.

A defining element of the American experience has been the degree to which ethnic affiliations, and to a lesser degree racial identity, have influenced foreign policy. Since the first census in 1790, the federal government has gathered information on ethnicity and race, although the type of data collected has changed over time as interests have shifted. With public awareness heightened by the impact of surging immigration by 1850, census respondents were asked not just their place of birth but also that of their parents. The influence of ethnic groups on the making of foreign policy has fluctuated with the ebb and flow of immigration.

Because there has never been a time in which a higher percentage of Americans had themselves been born in a foreign country, or had at least one parent born overseas, historians commonly focus on the influence of ethnic constituencies on President Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy of war and peace. There is merit in identifying the winners and losers among those engaging in ethnic politics in this era, as will be discussed later. The 1920 census reported that approximately one-third of the national population either had been born overseas or had at least one parent who had been. This remarkably high figure is worthy of attention, but it is also significant that ever since the founding of the Republic, foreign policy issues have been viewed by millions of Americans through the prism of their ancestral ties of culture, nation, language, religion, or race.

ORIGIN OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN DIPLOMACY

Reasons for the link between American diplomacy and ethnicity are found in the manner in which the country was settled. In Europe it was common to have a single national or religious identification shared by the public. In the emerging American republic, however, the composition of the population reflected a high degree of national, religious, and racial diversity. One wave of immigrants after another swelled the American population with persons of vastly dissimilar backgrounds.

White English settlers made up the clear majority in the American colonies, but only through the second half of the eighteenth century. During that period three-quarters of the new settlers were Scotch-Irish, Scottish, German, French, and Swiss. Thirty percent of New Englanders came from places other than England in the years immediately preceding the War for Independence. Settlers of English ancestry were only 30 percent of the population in German-dominated Pennsylvania. In the southern colonies African slaves comprised the single largest ethnic or racial group.

These immigrants, and in many instances their descendants, have retained ancestral loyalties. Over centuries, waves of immigration have brought to America innumerable groups and tens of millions of immigrants whose ancestral iden-

tity has been handed down to present generations. It has been, and remains, common for ethnic minorities—such as Italian Americans, Jewish Americans, and Polish Americans—to embrace their new American loyalties while clinging to their kinship ties. Groups with millions of immigrants, such as those noted above, have the advantage of their large numbers in lobbying for a particular foreign policy. A fascinating element of ethnic politics that will be explained is that even a relatively small ethnic group representing only a fraction of 1 percent of the national population, such as Armenian Americans, can exert significant influence on the conduct of foreign policy.

The process through which American foreign policy is formulated works to the advantage of ethnic groups interested in assisting some cause of their homeland. All forms of government, including dictatorships, ultimately rely upon the support of public opinion to sustain their activities abroad. In a democracy, however, the link between the nation's diplomacy and the desires of the citizenry is more direct than in nondemocratic states.

The extent to which ethnic minorities are able to shape foreign policy is a uniquely American phenomenon. No other nation has absorbed such extensive waves of immigration as the United States. Sixty percent of the world's international migration between the early nineteenth century and 1930 came to the United States.

IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1965 AND ETHNIC POLITICS

Until the 1960s many historians believed that ethnic group influence on foreign policy would gradually diminish as the population became an American population with fewer immediate ethnic ties. Beginning in the 1920s, the flow of immigration slowed dramatically with laws reflecting anti-immigration public sentiment. Depression and war continued the trend to the point where under 5 percent of the population had been born in a foreign country. The political and cultural trends that lasted through the 1950s stressed the need for assimilation and conformity to the mainstream norms. The Cold War, with its emphasis on the righteousness of the American position and its constant invocation of national patriotism, further inhibited criticism of mainstream American values and institutions. School textbooks extolled the virtues of the "melting pot" to which other cultures contributed, but nonetheless stressed the importance of unity and adaptation to the national norm.

As with so much else in national life, these concepts and the national ethnic and racial makeup changed dramatically in the 1960s. An event that unmistakably precipitated the changes, and one whose legacy might well include significantly altering the policies of American diplomacy in the decades ahead, is the Immigration Act of 1965. Sponsored by liberal Democrats in Congress and Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, this law changed the rules of entering, and thereby opened the doors to the greatest influx of immigrants in history. The Hart-Celler Act, as it was then known, received little attention when it was passed, and continues to be relatively ignored in histories recounting Johnson's reform program, the Great Society. Nonetheless, it may be the single most significant legislation of that era as far as its impact on the nation's future.

Rejecting national origin quotas as the basis for admittance, as had previously been the case, in the 1965 law family reunification became the basis for admittance for nearly two-thirds of those who would immigrate. Three subsequent laws increased the impact of the 1965 law: the Refugee Act of 1980, which recognized a separate category of those fleeing political oppression; the Immigration and Control Act of 1986, which provided amnesty for three million immigrants who had entered the United States illegally before 1982; and a 1990 amendment to the 1965 law that substantially raised the number who could enter as legal immigrants.

The flow of immigrants has risen steadily, particularly after 1990, when the annual totals for legal immigration peaked for several years at approximately 1.5 million. Between 1965 and 2000, approximately 23 million immigrants legally entered the United States. Adding estimates that there are also from 8 to 12 million illegal immigrants, the total attests to a massive foreign-born influence. Twenty-five percent of California's population is foreign born, and New York state is not far behind, with about 20 percent.

As important as the sheer number of immigrants is, it is also significant that 85 percent of the legal immigrants are from non-European backgrounds without the traditional foreign policy interests of most Americans. Europeans comprise approximately 15 percent of legal immigrants, Asian Americans about one-third, and Latin Americans most of the rest. The foreign

policy issues that concern these new Americans have already begun to shape the direction of diplomacy, notably on trade and on immigration issues, such as amnesty for undocumented workers already in the country. Future diplomacy is likely to concern such issues more directly. One reason is that demographers project that, because of higher Hispanic birthrates and the origins of future immigrants, the United States will see a decline in its population of European background and a substantial rise in its Hispanic and Asian population.

POLITICAL REALITIES

Astute politicians not only must be aware of broad-based national sentiment concerning a diplomatic issue, but also must give a hearing to ethnic minorities who have a particular interest in certain areas of the nation's foreign policy. Organized ethnic minorities can bring pressure on the government for specific policies that are peculiarly their own and that may favor their original homeland in relation to another nation or a particular political movement within the homeland, or simply reflect an attitude that is common to similar American immigrant groups.

So apparent and consistent are the desired diplomatic policies of some ethnic minorities that politicians can frequently anticipate what actions will solidify their support among these groups. Even though the resulting positions may flout foreign policy objectives outlined by the federal government, politicians have made attempts to please the large ethnic blocs within their constituency. Mayor William H. ("Big Bill") Thompson, for example, placated citizens of Irish extraction when in the late 1920s he threatened that he would "punch the snout" of the king of England should the monarch dare to enter Chicago.

New York City mayors Robert F. Wagner, John V. Lindsay, and Abraham D. Beame pursued a policy designed to meet with the approval of the city's three million Jews by refusing to welcome Arab rulers on goodwill tours of the United States. Politicians across the political spectrum share their contempt for Cuba's Communist dictator, Fidel Castro, in seemingly endless verbal assaults when the goal is to win the support of Cuban Americans.

Mayors and other local officials may irritate foreign leaders, but the extent to which such actions affect American diplomacy is relatively slight. More serious consequences can arise when ethnic minorities place sufficient pressures on the national government to alter the direction of foreign policy. During the first half of the twentieth century, for example, the development of a close understanding between the United States and Great Britain was blocked on several occasions by persistent Anglophobia that centered among citizens of Irish and German ancestry. These two minorities opposed early American intervention to aid Britain in both world wars. Partly on account of such opposition, the United States not only postponed early wartime alliances with Britain, but also handled peacetime rapprochement with extreme caution.

ETHNIC GROUP INFLUENCE PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Concern about ethnic groups and efforts they might make to pressure policy decisions dates from before the founding of the Republic. James Madison and others who collaborated in writing the *Federalist Papers* (1787–1788) translated their concerns over what they saw as the inevitable impact of ethnic factions into a representative government in which popular passions and individual pressure groups could be countered by calmer and wiser leaders. President George Washington expressed misgivings over what the impact of ethnic factions might be on the young nation's diplomacy. One of the earliest examples of ethnic group pressure came from Irish Americans, who by 1800 made up a majority of the newly naturalized immigrants to America. Favoring the cause of an independent Ireland, and the revolutionary activities already under way to accomplish that goal on the home island, Irish Americans broke with the pro-British stance of Washington and the Federalists and backed the political fortunes of Jeffersonian Republicans.

During John Adams's presidency the passage of the restrictive Alien and Sedition Laws (1798) were in part an effort to silence the criticisms voiced by Irish Americans. Although never seriously competing in effectiveness with the greater influences that moved national foreign policy toward association with Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century, Irish Americans were a consistent and significant force in diplomatic deliberations. The large-scale immigration of Irish to America during the famine of the 1840s, the political activism with which the Irish became

associated, and the constant turmoil that seemed to define the struggle in Ireland itself demanded the attention and concern of those who had left. These factors combined to heighten interest in attempting to shape their new nation's diplomacy toward Irish independence and relations with the British.

A domestic affinity group, the Fenian Brotherhood—which was associated with the revolutionary Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in Ireland—had substantial support among Irish Americans in attempting to achieve twin goals. First, the Fenians were committed to assist their revolutionary brothers abroad and, second, to try to foment a war between the United States and Britain as a way to somehow secure Irish independence. Both the Republican and the Democratic Parties looked the other way when the Fenians engaged in activities as radical as launching abortive armed raids on Canada. These raids (1866–1870) were intended to bring the United States into a war over Canada, but they were dropped after Canadian forces easily repelled them.

As the United States moved inexorably toward closer association with the British around the turn of the twentieth century, Irish Americans' hatred toward their avowed enemy, and any diplomatic understanding between them and America, were translated into political campaigns. Irish-American organizations, lobbyists, and voters unsuccessfully opposed U.S. support for the British in the Boer War, the Hay-Pauncefote treaties (1900 and 1901) that ensured an accommodation on the building of a U.S. canal in Central America, and, most significantly, the U.S. entry into the Great War in 1917.

Racial minorities, including African Americans and Chinese Americans, found themselves excluded from the democratic system as it existed in the nineteenth century, and therefore without leverage to influence policy. Some Caucasian immigrant groups found that they had limited influence because of their precarious economic status and widespread prejudice directed against them. A diplomatic episode involving Italian Americans demonstrates this situation. In 1891 a mob of white nativists in New Orleans converged on the jail in which eleven Italians and Italian Americans were being held following their acquittal on murder charges. Stirred by ethnic animosities, the mob lynched the eleven and subsequently received what must be considered general plaudits from "respectable" Americans, some public figures, and the press. Future president Theodore Roosevelt declared the lynching "a rather good thing."

Italian Americans were justifiably outraged, and demanded prosecution of those involved in the lynching and compensation to the victims' families. The perfunctory rejection of their demands by the American government led to a campaign, spearheaded by Italian Americans, to engage the help of the Italian government. Italy severed diplomatic relations with the United States, and rumors of war between the two nations were widely circulated. President Benjamin Harrison defused the situation by issuing an apology and agreeing to pay compensation to the families of those who had been lynched.

It was less than a satisfying resolution for Italian Americans, who unsuccessfully sought to have justice served through the arrest and conviction of those who had participated in the lynching, and who also wanted some efforts to be made to dampen anti-Italian prejudice. Although Italian Americans lacked any real political influence and were commonly subjected to vicious discrimination that isolated them, they were white and they had sufficient numbers to gain them at least some role in electoral politics.

Tempering any dynamic role that ethnic groups might play in the shaping of policy in the nineteenth century was the reality that for all but the final few years of the century, the United States was not much of an influential player in world affairs. That would change abruptly in the new century.

WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY

President Woodrow Wilson projected the United States into the center of postwar European political issues, and his call for self-determination to become an underlying principle in drawing the new map of Europe excited many domestic ethnic constituencies with the possibilities of national independence for their ancestral homes. After having stirred the aspirations and raised hopes of ethnic groups as never before, Wilson the peacemaker could not match expectations. He had not counted on either the multiple conflicting aims among the hopeful nations or his inability to win the approval of the other allied powers. Ethnic groups that had once supported him now fought the approval of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). His inability to press for Irish independence as part of

the World War I peace settlement resulted in bitter Irish-American attacks against the president and the treaty, and played a key role in blocking its passage in the Senate.

Whether to ratify the treaty was, in fact, an issue that resulted in several other emotionally charged campaigns. Various ethnic minorities, each specially motivated to seek a negative Senate vote on ratification, assailed Wilson's handiwork. German Americans could not accept the relatively harsh punishment meted out to Germany. Since the Versailles agreement failed to provide for the expanded Italy hoped for by Italian nationals, initial Italian-American enthusiasm for Wilson soon turned to denunciation. Exclusion of the Adriatic city of Fiume from Italy's control was considered to be one of the treaty's most objectionable points.

Not only the larger and more influential ethnic minorities resisted Wilson's endeavors to secure U.S. acceptance of the treaty; Armenian Americans, Syrian Americans, Greek Americans, and Lithuanian Americans, as well as several other groups, joined forces with the foes of ratification for a variety of reasons. Millions of Americans viewed Wilson as the man who had betrayed dreams of nationalistic glory for their land of origin.

New nations did come into existence as a result of Wilson's insistence that the treaty recognize self-determination, and Americans with ties to those fortunate nations were delighted. Few ethnic groups have been as successful in influencing foreign policy as were Polish Americans during the peacemaking following the world war. The re-creation of Poland following the war has been linked to the Wilson administration's interest in securing the Polish-American vote.

Scholars have clashed over the issue of whether Anglo Americans, whose contributions of language, law, and culture have been synonymous with the launching of the Republic, can legitimately be considered another of the nation's ethnic groups. There is no doubt, however, that Americans of English ancestry have had a significant impact on formulating diplomatic relationships with Great Britain. Since the earliest days of the Republic, Anglo Americans have influenced American foreign policy. For instance, by placing pressure upon President Wilson, who was of English ancestry, the Anglo Americans exerted a powerful influence in stimulating American intervention in World War I.

JEWISH AMERICANS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR ISRAEL

Examining individual ethnic groups and their particular campaigns on behalf of shaping policy in a region or toward a particular nation provides clues as to how and why ethnic politics can work in America's pluralistic democracy. It is likely that the most extraordinary case of an ethnic group successfully shaping the direction of foreign policy is the campaign of American Jews to win U.S. support for both the creation of Israel and the close partnership between the two nations that has followed.

Many factors need to be in place for ethnic politics to succeed; what is interesting about the campaign initiated by American Jews following World War II is that the community did so many things so well. Although small in numbers, there was near unanimity among American Jews in support of the Zionist goal of creating a viable Jewish state. Furthermore, it was understood that although direct support to those creating Israel in Palestine was important, what was essential politically would be to bring the United States in on the side of the new state.

American Jews represented only 3 percent of the population, but in the presidential election year of 1948, when Zionists declared the existence of Israel, American Jews were concentrated in those states that constituted the biggest electoral prizes. Half of the nation's Jews lived in New York State, which had by far the most electoral votes.

Winning American support for Israel became the community's most important political objective, ensuring that politicians would pay attention to the issue. Firmly established within the political structure, almost all Jews voted, many were activists involved in campaigns, and as a high-income group they had already established a record of financial support for candidates and organizations that backed their causes. President Harry Truman, and most members of Congress, responded favorably to the call to assist the newly established state when Zionists proclaimed the creation of Israel on 14–15 May 1948.

It was Truman's support in extending de facto American recognition of Israel just eleven minutes after it was declared to exist that proved crucial. It not only gave Israel, which was immediately plunged into defense of itself in the first Arab-Israeli war, great moral legitimacy by being acknowledged as a state by the most powerful

nation in the world, but it also proved to be the first step in a continuing stream of support from the United States. It is always difficult to attribute motivation, but a case can be made that Truman recognized Israel and continued American support for the new nation out of a concern for the political consequences in a presidential election year.

Thanks in large measure to American Jews' fostering the "special relationship" that grew between Israel and the United States, by the 1970s the political, economic, and military ties were so firm that they became a foundation of American foreign policy. American Jews identified with and felt pride when Israel achieved its goals in the face of constant adversity. When Israel stunned the world with its unexpected military victories in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, perhaps no citizens of one nation have ever been as committed to another nation's fate as Jews in America were to Israel. More than any other event, the outcome of the war forged unanimity toward Israel on the part of Jewry in the United States.

An American lobbying group, the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC), has met with so much success that it has become a symbol of foreign policy lobbying effectiveness. Some political observers have said that AIPAC has become the most powerful foreign policy lobbying group in Washington. Focused exclusively on lobbying the U.S. government for Israel's needs, AIPAC avoids identification with the liberal causes with which Jewish groups usually associate. This has allowed AIPAC to remain ideologically comfortable with anticommunist conservatives such as Ronald Reagan and the territorial expansionists on the political right in Israel. AIPAC developed the capacity to mobilize thousands of activists across the United States when needed, and into the 1980s they were able to stifle dissent among Jews who questioned the direction Israel was taking.

DIVISION AMONG JEWISH AMERICANS

Israel's policies first stirred signs of unease among American Jews when Israeli bombers destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and, in a separate event, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, was the target of Israeli bombers. It was, however, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent massacre of at least six hundred Palestinian civilians by Christian Phalangist (Lebanese) troops allied with Israel that began a new era for American Jews. Prior to the invasion of Lebanon, Israel's wars had been struggles for survival. The invasion tested the resolve of many Jews who had followed the unwritten prohibition against Jews publicly criticizing Israel.

In their dash north, the sixty to ninety thousand Israeli troops, supplemented by naval and air support, left mass destruction of property and substantial numbers of civilian casualties. World public opinion, including most Americans, opposed the invasion. American Jews rallied to Israel's cause at the time, but an erosion of support had begun. One poll found that 93 percent of American Jews still supported Israel, and 83 percent reported that if Israel were destroyed, it would "be one of the great personal tragedies in my life."

Yet as time passed, individual mainstream Jewish leaders and major organizations spoke out in anger and dismay at the actions taken in Lebanon by Prime Minister Menachem Begin's right-wing government. The massacres were particularly troubling because the Israeli army had taken responsibility for the civilians' safety and had been nearby during the two days in which the killings occurred. How could a nation of Jews, with a 5,000-year heritage of respecting human life and a history of suffering nearly as long, be in any way involved in massacres of civilians? As the debate heated up, criticism of Israel reached a new level within Jewish circles in America and elsewhere.

Three years later, Jonathan Jay Pollard, an American Jew employed by the navy as a civilian analyst, was arrested and charged with being the most prolific spy in American history. Over a two-year period he had stolen and turned over to Israel 360 cubic feet of top-secret files. The U.S. government argued that Pollard had compromised the entire American intelligence-gathering apparatus. Many American Jews found it incomprehensible that Israel would engage in such spying. Israel's use of an American Jew seemed to play into the hands of anti-Semites who would surely charge American Jews with dual loyalty. Why, it was written, would Israel steal secrets from the one ally whose goodwill was essential and upon which the country was almost absolutely dependent?

One more event undercut the breadth of support that Israel had had from American Jews. Beginning in 1987, Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, Gaza, and Israel itself, engaged in a

mass revolt against Israeli authority. Led mainly by the young, the Intifada has transformed relations between Palestinians and Israelis, and among many American Jews has led to greater calls for a peace process that will end the fighting and provide Palestinians with some degree of self-governance.

Israel still has the support of American Jews, and the "special relationship" that underpins U.S.–Israeli relations continues. Israel receives more foreign aid from America than any country in the world, and is likely to continue to do so. However, Jewish-American unity has fragmented, with significant criticism of Israel being expressed openly as never before. AIPAC remains a model of how a successful lobbying group can represent the policy goals of an ethnic pressure group, but even its supporters acknowledge that it may have lost its edge because there no longer is community consensus on some issues. These changes have created an opportunity for an opposition group to emerge and challenge pro-Israeli policies of the American government. Still relatively in the shadows, an Arab-American group has taken on the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

PUBLIC OPINION AND ISRAEL

Proponents of pro-Israel policies might well be sobered by changing public attitudes toward Israel and Middle Eastern issues, and what such changes might mean for future U.S. policy. In the fifteen surveys since 1989 in which the Gallup Poll has asked Americans to describe their attitude toward Israel, there is still a 59–30 percent advantage of favorable to unfavorable. However, these results indicate declining public support from earlier times. For comparison, the three countries with the highest rankings in the Gallup survey are Canada (17 May 1999), Australia (12 February 2001), and Great Britain (16 February 2001), with, respectively, 90–7, 85–8, and 85–9 percent favorable to unfavorable ratings.

Events in the Middle East occasionally signal the very real possibilities of regional war, a world energy crisis, the use of nuclear weapons, or an unleashing of worldwide terrorist activities. As a result the American public has heard, read, and seen more about this region than most others, and increasingly has arrived at conclusions not shared by the government of Israel or its American proponents. Successful lobbying groups would often prefer to have their issues exist "under the radar" of public attention.

A Gallup Poll survey in May 1999 indicated that the American public, by a margin of 53–26 percent, favored the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Creating such a state has long been the goal of the Palestinian Authority, the internationally sanctioned agency that legally represents the interests of Palestinians currently living within the boundaries of Israel.

Israel remains one of the firmest allies of the United States, and it continues to draw support from the majority of Americans. Arabs are generally viewed unfavorably by the public. The Palestinian Authority received a 22–63 percent unfavorable rating when Gallup surveyed public opinion in February 2001. What is likely to change in the future is that the efforts of Jewish Americans, and other supporters of Israel, will no longer go unchallenged by other ethnic groups or larger elements of the general public who have views contrary to those of Israel and Israel's American supporters.

AN ARAB-AMERICAN CHALLENGE

The emergence of a significant Arab-American population, along with its inclination to be more engaged in politics, may already have begun to change the dynamic of how the United States deals with Middle Eastern issues. Until the 1970s Arab Americans were few in number and seemingly invisible on issues involving their ancestral lands. James Abourezk, an articulate senator of Arab-American descent from South Dakota, became one of the first outspoken proponents of the Arab position in national life.

Enumerated at one million in the 1990 census, Arab Americans were estimated to have increased to 3.5 million in preliminary figures of the 2000 Census Report. A source of emerging strength rests in the clustering of Arab Americans in four states crucial in presidential elections. Arab voters are a factor in southern California, New York City, northern New Jersey, and, most critically, Detroit and southern Michigan. The largest concentration in the country is in metropolitan Detroit, with 350,000 Arab Americans. Only African Americans represent a larger minority group in Detroit.

There is now recognition that Arab Americans are a factor in political strategy, particularly in Michigan, where they represent 4 percent of the vote. Spencer Abraham, an Arab American, was

elected to the U.S. Senate in 1994. Arab Americans vote in high percentages (62 percent in the 1996 election), they have high incomes, and they are increasingly involved in national elections. In 1996 neither Democratic President Bill Clinton nor the Republican challenger, Bob Dole, attended events, but in 2000 all the serious presidential contenders addressed Arab-American groups.

CUBAN AMERICANS AND FIDEL CASTRO

Another contemporary case of an ethnic group dominating regional policy is provided by Cuban Americans. As with Jewish Americans, the record of Cuban Americans in shaping policy toward Cuba proves that groups do not need to be large in number to succeed. Only in the 1960s did significant numbers of Cuban exiles arrive in the United States, fleeing Castro's revolution. Driven by an often all-consuming singleness of purpose concerning one overriding foreign policy issue, Cuban Americans gradually became the driving force behind Washington's unyielding hard-line policy toward the Cuban regime. Most exiles left behind their property in Cuba and settled in Florida, and a significant number among them devoted their time and resources to pressuring the U.S. government to bring down the Castro regime and restore an anticommunist government. Since this result has never occurred, the movement has continued to thrive among Cuban Americans.

Cuban exiles were close to their homeland, only ninety miles away, and expected that the Castro regime might collapse at any time, which in turn would allow them to return. Thus in their first decade in the United States, Cuban Americans were said to have a "visitor mentality," which acted against engagement in local civic activities. Cuban Americans instead promoted an intense interest in how Washington dealt with Cuba and Castro.

Other factors have also been responsible for Cuban Americans' rapidly becoming a force in shaping foreign policy. Many of the early exiles, from the upper classes, were well educated and provided leadership for the group. Continued emigration from Cuba has provided a reasonably significant population base; the 2000 census reported 1.24 million Cuban Americans. A population of over a million is enough for politicians to pay attention. Yet that number dramatizes how even a relatively small ethnic group can be effective. Cuban Americans represent less than 0.50 percent of the national population and less than 10 percent of Hispanics in the United States.

An important factor enhancing the influence of Cuban Americans as a group is their shared political ideology, and the fact that the conservative Republicans with whom they identify have controlled the presidency, and hence the levers of foreign policy implementation, during recent decades. In 1984, for example, Ronald Reagan received 90 percent of the Cuban-American vote in Dade County (which includes Miami). Since it has been estimated that 63 percent of Cuban Americans live in the Miami area, the political significance of winning the support of this group is not lost on presidential candidates. Florida is a crucial swing state in presidential elections, as the presidential race in 2000 amply demonstrated. It is simply political reality that those seeking the presidency must consider the implications of their policy toward Cuba if they wish to win Florida's electoral votes.

Another advantage Cuban Americans have had in driving policy is that there is no significant group challenging their anti-Castro agenda. In fact, the anticommunism expounded by Cuban exiles fit in easily with the Cold War rhetoric that dominated the campaigns of presidential contenders. A series of chief executives, who have been humbled by Castro's resilience, have found it politically advantageous to align with the hard-line policies proposed by the exiles.

The result has been a U.S. diplomatic assault on Cuba so virulent and excessive that it has been condemned by many nations, including some that are considered staunch American allies. No other regime anywhere in the world can currently be said to suffer from as clearly prejudicial diplomatic measures on the part of the United States as the Castro regime. Since the early 1960s an embargo has denied trade and investment from the United States. Travel by U.S. citizens has been denied, although since the 1990s exceptions have been made for travelers who can justify their trips as having an educational purpose. Alone among all nations the United States denies the right of its citizens to send medicine or food to Cuba.

In 1992 passage of the "Cuban Democracy Act" prohibited U.S.-owned or -controlled subsidiaries overseas from engaging in any business with Cuba. The harshest measure of all has been the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, a tightening of the embargo that allowed U.S. citizens to sue foreign corporations that had purchased U.S. property confiscated by the Castro regime.

Almost alone in the world, the island nation of Cuba struggles with a total embargo, including medical and food products, imposed by the United States. With a gross domestic product that is less than 6 percent of what the United States spends on its military, the island hardly poses a security threat to its northern adversary. The degree of the isolation and hostility aimed at the Cuban regime is in large measure the result of a successful campaign of a relatively small but dedicated and powerful advocacy group, the 1.24 million Cuban Americans.

SIZE OFTEN NOT A BARRIER

American Jews and Cuban Americans, respectively 3 percent and 0.50 percent of the national population, are two groups with enormous influence in shaping foreign policy even though they are relatively small in number. Other similarly marginal groups in terms of population have demonstrated that size alone is not always an impenetrable barrier. One such group, Armenian Americans, were at first unsuccessful when they sought American support against Turkey during World War I. From 1915 to 1923 Turkey engaged in a policy of genocide that cost approximately one million Armenian lives. Yet when Armenia declared itself a republic independent of Turkey in 1918, Armenian Americans waged a campaign that resulted in Wilson extending de facto recognition of the new state. Similar efforts to prevent the United States from recognizing Turkey during this period proved futile.

More recently, Armenian Americans, who number over one million, have demonstrated that they wield a certain degree of influence in their particular area of interest. A California-centered group whose politics leans to the Republican, Armenian Americans lobbied Congress in 1990 to commemorate the aforementioned genocide. Even though Turkey's long-standing record as a crucial NATO military ally of the United States might have suggested different treatment, Congress nearly passed the resolution. Even though the administration of George H. W. Bush opposed it, it took a Senate filibuster to defeat the resolution and prevent a likely break with Turkey. If Congress had approved the measure, which used the term "genocide," Turkey made it clear that a grave crisis would result. Even though they lost, the political acumen of the Armenian-American lobbyists in nearly securing passage of a measure that had significant implications for diplomacy had to be acknowledged.

Although Turkey was firmly integrated within American defense policies during the Cold War, Greek Americans were able to lobby successfully in favor of punitive diplomatic measures against that nation in the wake of bitter Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus in 1974. Even though Greece was governed by militarists who had overthrown elected democratic leaders, and had instigated the troubles on Cyprus, the fact remained that there were one million Greek Americans whose lobbyists knew how to use political leverage to affect foreign policy. Washington responded to the pressure by placing a three-year embargo on military sales to Turkey and agreeing to provide Greece with 70 percent of the military aid that would be given to Turkey in future years. Ethnic politics prevailed over what was accepted to be the national security interest in maintaining good relations with a crucial geopolitical partner on the Soviet border.

Finally, the intervention of the United States in the Balkans in the 1990s revealed not only that the Balkan nationalities themselves were broken into competing factions, but also that the conflicts among the various nationalities within America presented policymakers with another kind of Balkanization. U.S. troops entered Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in an effort to block Serbian territorial expansion and genocide ("ethnic cleansing"). As a strategy to stop Serbian genocide in Kosovo, and at the same time limit American armed forces personnel in the campaign, President Bill Clinton in 1999 began a massive bombing campaign within Serbia.

Constituencies in the United States associated with those nationalities that benefited from American intervention supported Clinton's action. Orthodox Christian ethnic groups, including Serbian Americans, Greek Americans, and Russian Americans, all protested. Although there are Serbian enclaves on the east coast, the most politically sensitive Serbian population is made up of the 250,000 who live in Chicago and comprise the largest community of Serbs outside Serbia. Orthodox Christians in America charged Washington with being insensitive to the suffering of their coreligionists in the Balkans while overlooking the excesses and favoring the cause of western Christians and Muslims.

MEXICAN AMERICANS: TOMORROW'S LEVIATHAN?

Because the results to date have been so marginal for Mexican American efforts to influence diplo-

matic issues that affect them, there is some temptation to conclude that this is a group destined to fall short in the future. Yet with the 2000 census reporting what might well be described as an explosion in Hispanic and Mexican populations, cautious observers will likely reserve judgment before suggesting that the future will resemble the past for Mexican Americans. Demographics, the current attention being paid by both political parties, and group activism seem likely to combine to make this ethnic group one with enormous future influence on foreign policy.

From the time of the Mexican cession in 1848, Mexicans were targets of prejudice, violence, and economic exploitation in the land that was once theirs. Whether established residents or itinerant agricultural workers, they were an underclass striving to avoid poverty and discrimination in the United States. The Mexican government was indifferent toward them, and public attitudes in the United States ensured that they remained politically inactive.

Civil war in their homeland and severe economic problems drove one-tenth of Mexico's population into the United States in the two decades prior to the Great Depression. However, a search for scapegoats in the 1930s led to mass deportation of Mexicans back to Mexico. Distinctively dressed Mexican-American youths were frequently attacked by white servicemen in Los Angeles during World War II. These "zoot suit riots" led the Mexican government to protest, and request that measures be taken to end the violence. After the war the Mexican population in the United States rapidly increased with the addition of millions of contract laborers (braceros) and undocumented workers. These groups did not participate in politics, and even those immigrants who could have participated did not move quickly toward naturalization and a role in the political system.

Political activism at the national level began in the 1960s with Mexican-American organizations lobbying for immigration legislation, congressmen of Mexican ancestry playing the major role in forming the Hispanic Caucus, and the Mexican government finally cooperating with the community's leaders and associations. The first real success Mexican Americans demonstrated as a pressure group on foreign policy issues was in shaping the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The inclusion of an amnesty program for millions of the undocumented who could prove they had been in the United States prior to 1982 was a striking victory.

Because of demographic changes and their emerging political activism, Mexican-American leaders have suggested that in the future their record of influencing foreign policy in areas of interest could match that of any other ethnic group. The increase in Hispanic population, to 35,305,818 (13 percent of the national total), was the phenomenon of the 2000 census. Mexican Americans comprised 59 percent of that Hispanic total and 7 percent of the national total. The 20,640,711 Mexican Americans represented a 53 percent increase in just ten years. Eighty-seven percent of Mexican Americans live in the West and the South, giving them a regional importance in both sections that could well be translated into even greater political advantage. In two crucial states in presidential elections, Mexican Americans make up 24 percent of the population of Texas and 21 percent in California.

Barriers still exist that militate against Mexican Americans' reaching their potential political strength. Even those Mexican Americans who have been in a position to exercise their citizenship rights by participating in electoral politics have failed to take advantage of the opportunity. Proximity to Mexico has made it possible for some immigrants to travel back and forth and not identify themselves with the cause of working for their rights as residents of the United States. As an ethnic group in the lower economic strata, the route to political influence through financing candidates and causes is not as likely as it might be for high-income groups. The median age of Mexican Americans is twenty-four, compared with a national median age of thirty-five, so a substantial percentage of Mexican Americans are not yet of an age that allows them to participate in the electoral system. Yet with all these qualifications, the overriding conclusion is that someday Mexican Americans will play an influential role in American foreign policy.

The major foreign policy initiatives that most interest Mexican Americans involve immigration and trade issues between Mexico and the United States. These include amnesty for undocumented Mexicans working in the United States, consideration of a new guest-worker program, controls over drug trafficking, liberalizing trade and investment ties, regulation of the border, and fighting discrimination and violence against immigrants. The attention that has recently been given to these issues by the political parties and politicians testifies to an awareness of the political potential of Mexican Americans.

When he ran for governor of Texas, George W. Bush made a concerted and successful effort to win the Mexican-American vote. Both as a candidate and as an elected president, Bush has stressed his understanding of Mexican-American concerns, his interest in immigration liberalization, the promotion of Hispanics to high government positions, implementation of policies to improve the economic status of the group, and his ties with Mexico and its new president, Vicente Fox. Most dramatically, in 2001 Bush promised to work to legalize the status of millions of undocumented workers, mostly Mexicans, living in the United States.

Republicans consider Mexican Americans an ethnic minority that can be won over from its tradition of being Democrats. In 1996 Bill Clinton received 72 percent of the Hispanic vote, so there is no reason why Democrats will concede Hispanics and Mexican Americans to the Republicans. However, since Bush won one-third of the Hispanic vote in 2000, Republicans are confident that a shift is under way. Throughout the presidential and congressional elections from 1990 to 2000, the two major political parties have been as evenly divided in electoral strength as has ever been the case. Perhaps whichever is more successful with Mexican-American voters will prevail early in the twenty-first century as the majority party. Given the history of ethnic politics in making foreign policy, it seems likely that politicians and parties will endorse much of the agenda in foreign policy that Hispanic and Mexican-American groups will put forward in the future.

RACE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Since the time of the Constitution, racism frequently has been a part of the mix of factors that shaped diplomacy. Although there were other forces involved, such as the unbridled national enthusiasm for "pole to pole" territorial expansion, race became an articulated element of the expansionist policies associated with "manifest destiny." The term first appeared in 1845, and suggested that the Almighty in his ultimate wisdom had "manifestly destined" the procreative and vigorous Americans to extend their ennobling institutions of republican governance. The result was seen by some as way to spread superior democratic ways of life, but to others, focused on race, it provided a way to replace uncivilized and backward populations with those of purer blood.

President James K. Polk (1845–1849) translated "manifest destiny" into a plan of action, and the result was the annexation of Texas, purchase of the Oregon Territory, and a war with Mexico that resulted in the northern one-third of that nation being ceded to the victorious United States. Settling the western land acquired during the Polk administration, and the intervening Civil War, dampened further interest in foreign policy initiatives until the 1890s. By the turn of the century there were new ideas that had gained currency and influenced incorporating race into the making of foreign policy.

The British biologist Charles Darwin had introduced his theory of evolution in *On the Origin of Species* (1859), and by the turn of the century his views had been widely popularized in America. Evolutionary theory suggested that in the biological world, higher life-forms evolved through a process of "natural selection," popularized as "survival of the fittest" in the struggle for existence. Such a hypothesis was easily applied by some to sociological theorizing, even in the realm of international affairs. Since there was a ruthless struggle for existence within the biological sphere that resulted in survival of the fittest, or "best," some concluded that a similar struggle among nations or races might produce similar results. Ruthless international competition might well be justified in the name of "progress." Popular writers and clergymen believed that in the future, Anglo-Saxons, particularly Americans, would dominate in the world.

America's foreign policy initiatives were the result of a variety of forces, and one such force was racism. Before, during, and after his presidency (1901–1909), Theodore Roosevelt expounded upon the Social Darwinist interpretations of "natural selection," "survival of the fittest," the supremacy of Anglo-Saxons, and the "white-man's burden" to uplift and civilize backward peoples. It is sometimes difficult to separate the racism from other factors that motivated conduct. Yet as America began to move into the world at large around the turn of the twentieth century, attitudes of racial superiority were observable. One example is provided by the American presence in the Philippines following the settlement of the war with Spain in 1898.

When it became clear to the Filipino nationalists that the United States was intent on occupying the islands rather than providing for their independence, a four-year war ensued. The historian Brian McAllister Linn, in *The Philippine War,*

1899–1902, warns that it is incorrect to ascribe racism to all the vicious behavior of American troops against the Filipinos. However, even with Linn's cautionary note that such behavior has been typical of combat soldiers for hundreds of years, the evidence demonstrates that part of the reason for the poor treatment of Filipinos was racial hostility.

The pacification and occupation of Central America and the islands of the Caribbean during the early decades of the twentieth century also reflect America's attitude of racial superiority. The occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, for instance, resulted from a mixture of morality and strategic concerns, along with racism. Reflecting the racial attitudes of American policy and the occupation troops, Haitians were involuntarily placed in labor gangs, beaten and terrorized, and treated as prisoners. Marines killed two thousand "workers" in 1919, following an insurrection. Enforced segregation was imposed, and Americans favored the mulattos over the darker-skinned Haitians. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who had deployed marines in Haiti, wrote that the "African race" had an "inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization which are irksome to their physical nature. Of course there are many exceptions to this racial weakness, but it is true of the mass as we know from experience in [Haiti]."

RACE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Racism continued as a sometimes expressed element in American foreign policy through the 1920s and 1930s. World War II, however, set in motion events that resulted in a change in attitude on race both domestically and in foreign policy. Ambivalence on racial issues marked the U.S. record during the war. On the one hand, the tradition of white supremacy and racial prejudice, enforced through segregation, in many ways remained the standard of race relations in American society. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, some 112,000 Japanese Americans living in the western states were arrested and removed to a series of "relocation centers" in isolated interior locations. Two-thirds of this group were U.S. citizens, and most of the rest had been denied the right of citizenship because they were not born in the country. The sole criterion for removal was their Japanese ancestry.

Military service was rigidly segregated by race and defined the nonwhite soldier as inferior in every way. Decorated war heroes returned to a society in which they could not get a haircut from a white barber if their skin was not white. However, World War II also proved to be the cauldron from which dramatic changes in race relations would come forth. The beginning of the modern civil rights movement can be traced to the national wartime experience, and these domestic events, as well as the imperative of dealing with a different world, would influence changes in how U.S. foreign policy would deal with racial issues in international affairs.

The world order that emerged from the war was one in which a handful of western European nations no longer were supreme over the majority of the world's populations. The United States, emerging as the single most powerful economic and military nation, found it was in its own interest to distance itself from the racism with which Western nations had been identified. It was essential to Washington that a distinction be drawn between current American policies and association with the European legacy of colonialism, antinationalism, and racism. Interacting with a world no longer predominantly white or European, American policy distanced itself as much as it could from the influence of racism in its past.

Although this new emphasis was pragmatic in nature, it also was shaped by undeniable changes in attitude toward race that were occurring in American society. By the end of the 1960s, the colonies once held by European nations had largely disappeared. Nonwhite populations were assuming control of their own fate around the world, and proponents of white supremacy were increasingly on the defensive. During the war the United States had condemned the racism inherent in Nazi German society. Postwar policies increasingly reflected a condemnation of racial prejudice.

In planning for a continued global American presence, the reality was that the governments and populations with which the United States would deal were inevitably going to be nonwhite. In the presidencies of Harry Truman (1945–1953) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), nationalism among the nonwhite populations of the world was publicly acknowledged to be a force that the United States supported. Although the administrations did not always back up their rhetoric on nationalism with action, there were important examples of the United States supporting nationalistic aspirations of nonwhite popula-

tions at the expense of traditional European allies. One such example was Eisenhower's decision during the 1956 Suez crisis to side with the cause of Arab nationalism at the expense of British and French interests.

HUMAN RIGHTS, RACISM, AND THE UN CHARTER

U.S. commitment to the ideals incorporated in the principles of the United Nations symbolized the change in attitude toward race that marked postwar foreign policy. A legacy of Wilsonian diplomacy, the impetus for a United Nations developed during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. The charter of the world organization was written by Roosevelt's aides, and it came into existence in October 1945 largely because Roosevelt made it a centerpiece of his postwar diplomacy.

The charter provides evidence of how postwar U.S. diplomacy identified with policies of fundamental human rights, and had taken a step back from policies that were influenced by racist attitudes. The UN Charter "reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." Pledging its member nations to "practice tolerance and live together in peace," the charter promotes the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."

Although this ideal was not necessarily always adhered to, the concepts noted above became major elements in the message that America presented to leaders, governments, and populations throughout the world. Policies of the United States were to be based on fundamental human rights and an acceptance of the nationalistic strivings of underdeveloped, largely nonwhite populations. It was never an option in diplomacy to revert to the ideological racism that for so long had been one of the factors shaping the making of policy.

The continued overt existence of racism within American society, and the increasing attention that was drawn to it by the civil rights movement, posed problems for Washington. It made it more difficult to assure others that the racism that had marked American diplomacy for so long was gone for good. News reports of racial discrimination, violence against peaceful civil rights activists, and growing white resistance to integration undercut the message of equal rights and tolerance abroad. When violent protest blocked the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, President Eisenhower commented that it was "a tremendous disservice . . . to the nation in the eyes of the world." When dark-skinned diplomats were refused service in segregated restaurants, it was reported around the world.

The passage of time brought success for much of the civil rights agenda at home, which was reported the world over. The United States has identified with many of the third world nationalist movements, and it has opposed its European allies when they moved toward policies that could be interpreted as a reassertion of colonial-style conduct. A good example of the latter was the blunt warning given in 1956 by President Eisenhower to Britain and France during the Suez crisis. In effect the American president said that if these two European allies did not end their military campaign in the Suez region, swift economic and political retaliation from the United States would result.

EMERGING POLITICAL IDENTITY OF ASIAN AMERICANS

Racial attitudes in the United States ensured that prior to World War II, Asian populations would have little political leverage and would play only a marginal role in determining foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific region. With dramatically increased population and economic affluence, since the 1970s Asian Americans have built the political structure that has allowed them to participate in the process of influencing American foreign policy. It is still more the promise of what the future holds in this arena for Asian Americans than their current ability to shape policy that should be noted.

Chinese were the first Asians to immigrate to the United States in significant numbers: by 1880, with their community numbering seventy-five thousand, they comprised 10 percent of California's population. Fear that Chinese Americans might use the vote was one reason behind congressional passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Among the provisions was one that made Chinese "aliens ineligible to citizenship." With this legislation Chinese Americans were banished to the political margins, and a significant precedent was set for the political and social marginal-

ization of all Asian groups who would follow. Only in 1952 were the last of the legal restrictions against Asian citizenship removed.

During World War II the United States lifted the ban on Chinese immigration; in the first year of implementation (1943) the change was as much symbolic as substantive as only 105 persons were allowed to enter the United States. Chinese immigrants were allowed to become naturalized citizens. Since China was an ally of the United States during World War II, these moves were made in large measure to win favor with Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Chinese Americans were too few in number and too politically inexperienced to be of much influence in promoting such changes. After the war Asian Americans remained politically marginalized in foreign policy decisions. No Asian-American group or individual, for instance, proved influential in shaping the events and policies that brought America into the Korean War.

Koreans in America were too few in number, and they had little experience with American politics. The condescension shown by many U.S. government officials toward both the Korean and the Chinese Communist combatants in the war smacks of racist mentality; these leaders were unlikely to have taken seriously those Asian Americans who would have tried to influence policy. White American soldiers commonly disparaged both the Chinese and the Koreans (including their South Korean allies) with racial barbs. The same pattern prevailed in the growing involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia that began in the 1950s. No Asian-American ethnic groups, nor individual Asian Americans, had any meaningful role in the policies that led to the war in Vietnam.

Several factors changed for Asian Americans beginning in the 1970s. Driven by a surge of immigration from Asia as the result of the 1965 immigration law, Asian Americans command attention by their sheer numbers—10,242,998 (3.6 percent of the nation's population, according to the 2000 census). They are well situated politically because in California, the greatest electoral prize by far, between 11 and 12 percent of the population is Asian American. These ethnic groups collectively can boast exceptionally high levels of educational attainment. Education is a primary reason for another political strength shared by Asian Americans, their affluence. Median family income for Asian Americans is 138 percent of the national average.

Obstacles continue to block the path of these groups as they attempt to achieve a level of political sophistication and develop the capability to influence foreign policy toward their ancestral homes in Asia. The population numbers themselves may be misleading when the level of political participation is considered. Because so many of the immigrants allowed in by the 1965 law are part of reunited families, the rate of immigrants who become naturalized is low. The percentage of Asian Americans who register to vote is low, as is the percentage of those who actually vote. If some other ethnic groups have attracted political attention because of their community solidarity and bloc voting tradition, it remains a liability for Asian Americans that they evenly split their votes between Republicans and Democrats. Split votes inevitably remove political leverage. Certain groups also split on the issues involving their land of ancestry. Chinese Americans, for instance, divide over the central issue of what policy should be promoted by the United States toward the communist regime in Beijing.

An "80–20 initiative" was begun in the 1990s with the goal of delivering 80 percent of the Asian-American vote to one presidential candidate. However, there are six significant Asian groups represented, and the ideological differences among them make the kind of political solidarity that the "80–20 initiative" promotes unlikely. Chinese Americans are the largest ethnic group, with nearly 2.5 million, followed in order by Filipinos, Indians, Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese. Each has its own particular foreign policy issues that relate to the homeland, so collaboration among the groups has proved to be difficult.

The Vietnamese, politically the most conservative group, have focused on U.S. policy toward the government in Hanoi. As opponents of the regime, Vietnamese Americans have acted as somewhat of a brake on the inexorable American move toward normalizing relations. With a huge influx of immigrants within their community, Chinese Americans have focused on both immigration issues and the U.S. relationship with China. Dubious charges of espionage against Lee Wen Ho, a Chinese-American nuclear scientist at Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 2000 mobilized Chinese Americans to protest that the American government perpetuated the stereotype that Chinese Americans were somehow doing the bidding of the government of China. Because China is seen as the enemy by many Americans, Chinese Ameri-

cans believe they are tainted by association because they are ethnic Chinese. In a fund-raising scandal in the 1996 election, millions of dollars were illegally collected from Chinese sources outside the United States; Chinese Americans protested that press coverage did not adequately explain that it was not Chinese Americans engaged in raising illegal contributions, but foreign Chinese who may well have been associated with the communist Chinese government. Chinese Americans believe that their ability to influence policy has been compromised by these episodes in which they have been unfairly accused of wrongdoing and of being in the service of a foreign nation disliked by the American public.

Each of the Asian groups wants to bring more Asian Americans into the foreign policy decision-making process involving Asia and the Pacific region. With so many different cultures involved, finding a consensus has not been easy for the Asian-American groups.

THREE BALANCING FACTORS

There are countervailing pressures that can neutralize or even eliminate the opportunity an ethnic group has to affect foreign affairs. If public sentiment is clearly defined as opposed to the policy being sought, or if nonethnic special-interest lobbies in the United States wage a campaign against an ethnic minority's goals, or if other ethnic groups commit themselves to work on behalf of a different policy, the influence that an ethnic minority can command is mitigated.

The first of these balancing factors has frequently proved to be critical to ethnic minorities desiring to convince a president and Congress that specific policies should be accepted. Ethnic groups can exert disproportionate pressure in a specific area if their demands arouse no broad opposition from the public at large. Part of the Jewish-American success in winning American support for the creation of a Jewish state following World War II resulted from the existence of this condition.

It was fortunate for the Zionists that throughout the struggle to obtain official U.S. backing for a Jewish state, the American public was either mildly sympathetic or at least apathetic. The basic Zionist aim of establishing a Jewish state was consistently favored by those in the polling samples who had an opinion, although at times the margin of support was as narrow as a few percentage points.

Perhaps as significant as the opinions expressed was the fact that so large a percentage of the public did not follow the Palestine controversies. Only 45 percent of those questioned in one poll (National Opinion Research Center poll, May 1946) could identify Britain as the country that had the mandate for Palestine. As late as the fall of 1946, 49 percent admitted that they had not followed the discussion about establishing a Jewish national homeland (American Institute of Public Opinion poll, September 1946). Outside the Jewish community the Zionist program did not raise very intense political issues.

Generally, the public tunes in to foreign policy issues only at times of international crisis or when a policy debate is infused with overwhelming significance—for example, when a war may be on the horizon, or when policies fail (as with the continuing commitment to fighting in Vietnam). Most international issues do not interest the public at large; such apathy translates into public ignorance. In 1964 only 58 percent of those surveyed knew that the United States was a member of NATO. Nearly two-fifths replied that the Soviet Union was a member,

Only half of Americans polled in 1978 knew that the United States imported any oil, at a time when approximately half of the nation's oil came from overseas. It is a tremendous advantage to members of a unified, organized ethnic group when they have the field to themselves to promote an issue that does not interest the public at large.

When an ethnic group does recommend a policy position that is clearly opposed by the general public, they are unlikely to receive it. Significantly, the one aspect of the Zionist program in 1948 that ran into clear-cut public disapproval was never accepted by the American government. Following Israel's birth in May 1948, the new nation asked for positive action by the American president on three specific issues. One was for President Harry S. Truman to extend de jure recognition to Israel. Great urgency was also attached to the request for a $100 million American loan to Israel. Truman responded favorably to both requests. Truman was also asked to lift the American arms embargo on the Middle East, thereby allowing Israel to purchase weapons. On 5 December 1947 the American arms embargo had been imposed at the request of the UN Security Council.

Truman was persuaded by the State Department that any unilateral revocation of the embargo would be regarded as exhibiting a strik-

ing disregard for UN efforts to pacify the Middle East. Another compelling reason for presidential inaction derived from the public response to the embargo. Although the Zionist program generally met with either mild public approval or indifference, one nationwide poll (National Opinion Research Center, 1 July 1948) indicated that 82 percent of the electorate opposed any change in the status of the embargo.

A second balancing factor that can challenge the influence of an ethnic minority's ability to influence policy is nonethnic special-interest lobbies that are determined to have foreign policy conducted along the lines they desire. For example, economic interests within the United States might seek policies that are diametrically opposed to the programs sought by ethnic groups. In a democracy, ethnic minorities make up just a small percentage of pressure groups hoping to influence foreign policy.

A third factor that works against the policy-making influence of a particular ethnic minority consists of other ethnic groups taking on the role of the adversary. President Wilson was faced with a variety of ethnic groups, each of which insisted that he fully endorse the claims of their homeland. America's ethnic populations collided over how the map of the world should be redrawn. Wilson's attempts at compromise left most of the groups dissatisfied, and led in part to his inability to have the Treaty of Versailles ratified.

The situation of having one ethnic group lined up against another occurred in 1935 when the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini sent his troops into Ethiopia in an effort to expand his colonial empire. Supporting their ancestral home, most Italian Americans defended the action, and many lobbied against any American plan to establish a discriminatory embargo against Italy. Since President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed Mussolini's actions during the Ethiopian campaign, large numbers of Italian Americans turned against the president and the Democrats.

On the other side, African Americans rallied to Ethiopia's support on the basis of their ethnic identification with the black African nation. They called for the United States to stand up firmly against Italy. Lester Taylor, the chairman of the New African International League, wired the State Department: "Black citizens are surprised and filled with misgivings at the lukewarm attitude of this government." In the Ethiopian crisis of 1935, there was a tendency for the two ethnic groups, Italian Americans and black Americans, to cancel out whatever political influence the other hoped to wield on this issue.

In summary, the three countervailing factors that can diminish an ethnic group's ability to shape particular policies are the existence of widespread public sentiment in opposition, the presence of nonethnic special-interest lobbies on the other side, and the existence of other ethnic groups who take a contrary position. Where none of the three countervailing pressures exist, even a relatively small ethnic minority can dominate a policy area.

Placing foreign policy in the context of electoral politics, the candidate or officeholder has everything to gain and nothing to lose by endorsing the goals of a particular ethnic group. Politicians can obtain the political support of the members of the group who consider the issue in question to be of significance; at the same time no voters are alienated.

Truman's political advisers made just this argument in obtaining the president's support for the new state of Israel during the 1948 presidential election. White House staff members Clark Clifford and David Niles suggested to the president that he could obtain the support of Jewish voters by taking a pro-Israel stand; at the same time he would not lose any significant number of votes.

MULTICULTURALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

For nearly two centuries following the establishment of the American republic, it was generally accepted that a common identity and purpose bound the nation together even though the population itself had various ethnic origins, languages, and religions. Although there was an acknowledgment that immigrants added to the culture through their unique contributions, unmistakably the American standard was white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and European.

Often referred to as the "melting pot," American society was constantly in transition as new ideas changed it. It remained clear that the dominant values and traditions were still those of the generation of the Founders and their Anglo-Saxon heritage. This tradition provided a standard to which immigrants must strive. Early in the twentieth century the largest influx of immigration in world history brought millions of eastern and southern European immigrants into the

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

At age thirty-eight Clark McAdams Clifford arrived in Washington, D.C., in 1945 to serve in a relatively minor position as an assistant to the president's naval aide. By 1946 Harry Truman was so delighted with Clifford's performance that he chose the lawyer from St. Louis to be special counsel to the president. Clifford was immediately responsible for preparing many of Truman's state papers, speeches, and memoranda.

Once at the center of power, Clifford displayed an intelligence and an instinct for power that made him Truman's most influential adviser and one of the handful of most important White House aides in history. Labeled a "golden boy," the elegant, handsome, and charming aide seemed an unlikely political and personal partner of the president. With the enthusiastic backing of Truman, Clifford prepared a memorandum that in general terms outlined a strategy for Truman to win the 1948 election. In November 1947 the forty-three-page document, "The Politics of 1948," was presented to the president. This bold report demonstrated that Clifford was a tough political pragmatist.

Recommending a "course of political conduct" for Truman, his aide emphasized that the approach was based "solely on an appraisal of the politically advantageous course to follow." Truman read the memorandum carefully, and agreed with Clifford's analysis and proposed victory strategy. The report became the blueprint for the 1948 campaign waged by the president. One section dealt with the various special interest groups that the Democrats hoped to attract, including Jewish voters.

The memorandum, "The Politics of 1948," from Clifford to Truman on 19 November 1947, stated:

> The Jewish vote . . . is important only in New York. But (except for Wilson in 1916) no candidate since 1876 has lost New York and won the Presidency, and its forty-seven [electoral] votes are naturally the first prize in any election. Centered in New York City, that vote is normally Democratic and, if large enough, is sufficient to counteract the upstate vote and deliver the state to President Truman. Today the Jewish bloc is interested primarily in Palestine and will continue to be an uncertain quantity right up to the time of election.

Throughout the election year of 1948 Clifford recommended policies on the Palestine issue (involving the Zionist effort to establish a Jewish state in Palestine) that were intended to improve the president's standing with the American Jewish community. In the final six months of the campaign the president's decisions on Palestine bore the mark of Clifford's influence. Truman was increasingly willing to follow recommendations based upon domestic political considerations.

United States. Since these newcomers were less familiar with the accepted American values (such as democracy) than previous immigrant groups had been, "Americanization" programs were initiated to ensure that new Americans came to accept the values of the old. Education, politics, and popular culture promoted the bedrock message that America was a single nation, one people, with a common culture regardless of the mixture of backgrounds.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union there had been a perceived common threat to national security that further emphasized to Americans the importance of consensus and approaching problems with a singleness of purpose. The Cold War created a mood that encouraged solidarity and reinforced the argument that Americans should remain a unified people with shared values. The failure to replace that Cold War consensus with any coherent foreign policy agenda that might have brought the public together has become a factor in the disintegration of consensus for at least a segment of the public.

In recent years a contrary vision concerning how much Americans hold in common has received wide currency and has in turn opened up a serious dialogue concerning what the rights and obligations of individuals and groups should be in a democracy. The question of what it is that holds a nation together is at the heart of the issue. Implications regarding how foreign policy should be determined, as well as the appropriate influence of ethnic and racial groups in the making of policy, are involved.

World War I destroyed the European order and empowered Wilson's doctrine of self-determination, and World War II ended western colonial empires and opened the way for greater racial and

ethnic militancy everywhere, including the United States. Changes in immigration law in the 1960s ensured that most immigrants would no longer come from Europe, but rather from Central and South America and Asia. Along with a new militancy on the part of African Americans, millions of non-European immigrants were equally unwilling to accept the old rules of assimilation because their backgrounds were so different from that of the mainstream American ideal.

Among African Americans, other racial minorities such as Native Americans, and new immigrants there has been a growing acceptance of what has been labeled the multiculturalist interpretation of what holds America together. Rejecting assimilation and promoting the concept of America not as one nation but rather a nation of groups, the multiculturalists aim for an acceptance of pluralism without any cultural hegemony. In a nation of groups, race and ethnicity, rather than a national identity, can be the defining experience for individuals. The basic meaning of American history, say the multiculturalists, is as much the divisions into racial and ethnic groups as the traditional explanation of there being one nation and one people.

Is there one national interest that should be protected in the making of foreign policy? In the past, ethnic groups hoping to influence policy had to justify their specific goals as being consistent with basic policy guidelines. Blaming the change on the influence of multiculturalism, Samuel Huntington has written: "They [multiculturalists] deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other sub-national cultural identities and groupings."

Critics of multiculturalism decry what they see as a higher priority being placed on ethnic identity than on identifying with the greater American community. By pursuing a diplomatic agenda that is of interest only to itself, an ethnic group is expecting the entire nation to serve its interests. The political scientist Tony Smith, in *Foreign Attachments,* comes down hard on multiculturalists, who, he charges, have given a higher priority to one's sense of ethnic identity than to the greater American community. Smith believes that American influence in the world, which should be used for goals related to the common national good, is at risk of being squandered by a process in which ethnic minorities split up the resources and use them for individualized group interests.

With the end of the Cold War leaving America without a defined policy that sets boundaries on what ethnic constituencies can request, and with influencing policy so easy today because of the scramble for money and votes in a political system so evenly balanced between the two major parties, Smith fears that the balance has tipped in favor of pressure groups that include ethnic minorities. While ethnic groups certainly have the right to lobby the government, Smith believes that they also have an obligation to reconcile their ethnic agenda in foreign policy with a broader national interest.

Smith argues that as difficult as it sometimes is to define, America needs a sense of national purpose in world affairs. Individual ethnic groups cannot define that purpose, and they should not have exclusive rights to determine policy, as they sometimes claim they do. Who speaks for America in international affairs? Smith says that the answer should be that it is those who think of themselves first as Americans. Too many multiculturalists are unable to give that answer.

ETHNIC POLITICS AND SOUND POLICYMAKING

As American diplomacy enters a new century, it is indisputable that ethnic politics plays an important role in shaping policy. A substantive question is whether such influences upon the conduct of foreign affairs are an obstruction to sound policymaking or make a legitimate contribution. The traditional approach has been for students of American diplomacy to condemn the interrelationship between ethnic pressure and the direction of foreign policy. Diplomatic decision making, it is often said, should be determined solely on the basis of what is best for the national interest of the United States. This sentiment was presented clearly by the political scientist G. Lowell Field, who in 1964 wrote that he was interested in discovering remedies "for the curse of ethnicity in American politics."

According to Field, ethnicity poses a "danger to prudent national decision-making." Besides suggesting the abolition of the nationalities divisions of the Republican and Democratic parties, Field favors the "ostracism . . . [of] any political leader who obviously directs special appeals for the support of particular foreign policies to ethnic groupings with an undue emotional involvement."

Field argues that in the "proper moral climate" an ethnic group should be embarrassed when politicians make "this kind of appeal, just as a judge would be embarrassed by efforts to get him to participate in the decision of a case involving a close relative." It is simply illegitimate, Field says, to promote or even "tolerate situations—like those in which foreign policy hearings are conducted by the major parties before their national conventions—in which it appears that the feelings of ethnic minorities are legitimate grounds for deciding whether or not such intervention by American power is possible or desirable."

Taking decision making in foreign policy out of domestic politics and consigning it to the experts is a suggestion not limited to academe. In 1961 Senator J. William Fulbright insisted that foreign policy should not be determined in a deliberative forum in which parochial domestic interests would have influence. "The question I put," wrote Fulbright, "is whether in the face of the harsh necessities of the 1960s we can afford the luxury of 18th century procedures of measured deliberation."

Fulbright doubted that a successful foreign policy could originate "by continuing to leave vast and vital decision-making powers in the hands of a decentralized, independent-minded, and largely parochial-minded body of legislators. . . . I submit that the price of democratic survival in a world of aggressive totalitarianism is to give up some of the democratic luxuries of the past." Foreign policy, Fulbright argued, should be determined by the experts in the executive branch of government and should not be a political football in Congress. Implementation of Fulbright's thesis that Congress should play less of a role in foreign policy formulation would clearly hinder the ability of ethnic groups to lobby for their particular interests.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, those who approve of the link between ethnic minorities and foreign policy no longer argue from a defensive position. They instead point out that policymakers are themselves often highly partisan and political on specific foreign policy issues. For example, Jewish Americans have long contended that the Middle East desk at the State Department has traditionally been staffed by personnel who are pro-Arab. Since some persons in the State Department contend that the national interest lies in protecting American commercial interests in the Middle East, ethnic bias is not the only possible explanation of the State Department position. Similarly, supporters of America's pro-Israel stance are not necessarily Zionists but can instead insist that the national interest is best served by supporting democracies, such as Israel, wherever they exist. Why, the critics of official Washington ask, should it be assumed that the State Department's interpretation of the national interest is any more creditable than the views of State Department critics?

Ethnic leaders have suggested that nothing could be more appropriate in a democracy than to bring interest groups into the decision-making process. Following an era in Washington marked by governmental disdain for the public, the concept of broadening the public's role in decision making has substantial appeal.

Promoting good relations with foreign nations is basic to American diplomacy. One way to foster such friendly ties would be to make conspicuous a link between specific ethnic minorities and U.S. foreign policy toward their homeland. Ethnic leaders have argued that the goodwill that can be won by emphasizing the interrelationship between the ethnic group and policy toward the land of origin provides a compelling argument for encouraging such a relationship.

Among world powers, only the United States, with its diversity of ethnic populations, has had such obvious opportunities. Individual representatives, as well as an entire ethnic community, can be effectively used for diplomatic purposes. When President John F. Kennedy visited his ancestral home in Ireland and when he frequently referred to his Irish background, the resulting benefit to Irish-American relations was enormous. Similar goodwill is gained when a prominent member of an ethnic group is given a diplomatic assignment.

One example of using an entire ethnic group to obtain a foreign policy goal was presented in Italian-American relations during the late 1940s. Washington became concerned that the Italian electorate might vote the Communist Party into control of the national government. Encouraged by U.S. officials, Italian Americans mounted a mail campaign in which relatives in Italy would be persuaded to vote against the Communists. Italian Americans responded enthusiastically.

The legitimacy of ethnic groups' lobbying for policies they desire no longer seems as questionable as it was once considered to be. American elections and the political process have moved in the direction of multiple interests seeking to have their ideas heard and the policies they support

accepted. Why is the attempt by ethnic minorities to influence the direction of foreign policy any less legitimate than the lobbying efforts of any number of economic interest groups? Why should it be any less legitimate to vote from ethnic considerations than for economic or social reasons? These are questions asked by spokesmen for ethnic minorities involved in foreign affairs issues.

ETHNIC GROUP INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY: PRO AND CON

An argument made against ethnic influence on foreign policy is that such influence is likely to spring from emotional loyalties rather than rational objectives. The goals of U.S. foreign policy can be summarized as military security, protection of economic interests, and minimization and peaceful settlement of international disputes. Ethnicity certainly has no obvious relation to any of these goals, and to the extent that it might be in conflict with them, it is an improper influence.

What this argument ignores is that the rational objectives articulated by professional policymakers generally omit such "emotional" factors as fairness to downtrodden or impoverished peoples. This has usually been the case with respect to colonial or dictatorial governments friendly to the United States. Such governments, especially in strategically located or mineral-rich countries, have consistently been supported by the United States for the reasons previously suggested.

Thus, the articulation of arguments for a contrary policy—based on justice, commitment to democracy, and other ideals—is typically left to the affected ethnic groups. An example in the recent past is the dictatorship in Greece, in the creation of which the United States played a considerable and unsavory role. American support was drastically curtailed, in large measure, on account of the persistent efforts of Greek Americans. Similarly, the ethical commitment to displaced Jewry after World War II was argued mainly by Jewish Americans, while the State Department and the public at large took little interest. Any ethical commitment to Palestinian Arabs, who had been consistently under foreign domination, was overlooked. There was not a significant Arab-American lobby to promote the cause of the victimized Palestinian Arabs.

It is argued that to insist that the formulation of foreign policy should remain separate from the right of ethnic groups to exert influence would be to abandon a central attribute of a vital democratic state. Ethnic participation in foreign policy is defended as being consistent with the American political ideals of democracy and freedom.

Those opposed to ethnic participation counter by saying that the result of openly sanctioning such political bartering would be a foreign policy in which a president or Congress would risk national survival simply to uphold a political pledge. The safeguard against such a disaster would likely be the general public. The political reality would seem to be that the public would not tolerate a president or a Congress embroiling the United States in some ill-conceived adventure designed to placate a particular group.

Although it would have been popular with a variety of ethnic voters, the Republican Party did not "liberate" eastern Europe from communism following the 1952 election. Republican campaign pledges proved to be insincere, since there was little likelihood that the new administration was actually going to war in order to terminate communist control of eastern Europe. Presented with the opportunity to intervene in the 1956 Hungarian revolt against the Soviet Union, the administration quickly indicated that it would stay uninvolved in that effort to throw off Soviet domination.

The political scientist Lawrence Fuchs, arguing in favor of a close interrelationship between minority group pressure and American diplomacy, has suggested "that foreign policy is too important to be left to the experts." Opponents of the enhanced role that ethnic constituencies have in contemporary foreign policy decision making remain unimpressed. They instead forecast grave danger ahead for any coherent national diplomatic agenda if foreign policy continues to be even more of a political football than it has in the past. The question of the appropriateness of mixing ethnicity with foreign policy will no doubt continue to be debated, but even diehard opponents of the phenomenon now concede that ethnicity is probably an inevitable concomitant of the American political process.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahrari, Mohammed E., ed. *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York, 1987. Articles on selected ethnic constituencies and their efforts to shape American diplomacy.

Baldassare, Mark. *California in the New Millennium: The Changing Social and Political Landscape.* Berkeley, Calif., 2000. A treasury of quantified data and political analysis of California's current political scene that includes much on the state's multiple ethnic constituencies.

Chang, Gordon, ed. *Asian Americans and Politics: Perspectives, Experiences, and Prospects.* Washington, D.C., 2000. Rich collection of articles on both the collective Asian-American political experience and individual studies of particular ethnic groups. Section on voting behavior contains useful quantified data on the political behavior of Asian Americans.

Cohen, Michael J. *Truman and Israel.* Berkeley, Calif., 1990. Account of both the Jewish-American campaign to influence the Truman administration before and after the creation of the Jewish state, and the administration's response to the pressure, always with its own political interests in mind.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992. By far the best and most thorough contemporary history of ethnic groups and the influence they have in shaping American foreign policy.

Druks, Herbert. *The Uncertain Friendship: The U. S. and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy.* Westport, Conn., 2001. Political history of the diplomacy of four presidential administrations and how they responded to the campaign to establish a Jewish state, and the alliance that developed between Israel and America.

Free, Lloyd, and Hadley Cantril. *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.* New York, 1968. Public opinion study with useful material on attitudes on foreign policy issues.

Fuchs, Lawrence. "Minority Groups and Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 76 (1959). An early exception to the view that ethnic pressure on foreign policy goals was undesirable.

Gerson, Louis. *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914–1920.* New Haven, Conn., 1953. Specialized study of how one ethnic group affected a particular aspect of foreign policy. Gerson identifies the role played by Polish Americans in helping to create an independent Poland in the aftermath of World War I.

———. *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy.* Lawrence, Kans., 1964. One of the first thorough studies of ethnicity and American foreign policy, Gerson's perspective was the inappropriateness of ethnic group pressure being an important factor in shaping diplomacy.

Gomez Quinones, Juan. *Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940–1990.* Albuquerque, N.M., 1990. Examines the barriers Hispanics encountered in efforts to establish a position of legitimacy within the American political system, and the initial successes they experienced within the Democratic Party structure beginning in the 1970s.

Gutierrez, David G. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity.* Berkeley, Calif., 1995. Of particular value for the material on the relationship between Mexican Americans and the Mexican government.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Erosion of American National Interests." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): 28–49.

Levering, Ralph B. *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978.* New York, 1978. Valuable work on the link between public opinion and foreign policy from the end of World War I through the late 1970s.

Levy, Mark, and Michael Kramer. *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections.* New York, 1972. Contains some valuable statistical data on ethnic group voting patterns.

Linn, Brian McAllister. *The Philippine War, 1899–1902.* Lawrence, Kans., 2000. History of the war waged in the Pacific that includes material on U.S. troops' racial attitudes and antagonisms toward the native population.

Moynihan, Daniel P., and Nathan Glazer, eds. *Ethnicity.* Cambridge, Mass., 1975. Moynihan and Glazer sympathize with the goals of ethnic political campaigns and emphasize the significant impact ethnicity has had on American diplomacy; they state "that immigration is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy."

Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System.* 3d ed. Baltimore, 1994. Survey of what Americans know of world affairs.

O'Grady, Joseph P. *The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies.* Lexington, Ky., 1967. Account of the efforts by several groups to influence Wilson's peacemaking.

Rosenthal, Steven T. *Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel.* Hanover, N.H., 2001. Well-argued study to the effect that what was once unquestioned American Jewish support for Israel has been replaced by a number of sharp disagreements over Israel's conduct that have divided American Jews.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society.* New York, 1998. A highly influential rejoinder to multiculturalism by a noted historian identified with the establishment. Although there is no real attempt to examine multiculturalism and its relationship to the issue of who should speak for the United States in foreign policy, the arguments nonetheless relate to the central issue of identity and policy.

Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 2000. Persuasive argument that ethnic groups play a larger role in making foreign policy than is widely understood, and that the negative consequences of this phenomenon far outweigh any benefits.

Snetsinger, John. *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel.* Stanford, Calif., 1974. An effort to explain the critical role that Jewish Americans played in bringing the state of Israel into existence.

Torres, Maria de los Angeles. *In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1999.

United States Census 2000. Washington, D.C.: Department of Statistics and Administration, United States Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, 2001.

See also ASYLUM; CULTURAL IMPERIALISM; CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES; IMMIGRATION; PUBLIC OPINION; REFUGEE POLICIES; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

REALISM AND IDEALISM

Norman A. Graebner

Philosophically, realism and idealism comprise opposing approaches to the definition and pursuit of national objectives abroad. Realists tend to accept conditions as they are and to define the ends and means of policy by the measures of anticipated gains, costs, necessities, and chances of success. Idealists tend to define goals in ideal, often visionary, forms, and presume that the means for their achievement lie less in measured policies, relying on diplomacy or force, than in the attractiveness of the goals themselves.

CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS

These two modes of perceiving world politics were never uniquely American in precept or experience. Western political thought always recognized the tension between realist and idealist views toward the actions of governments in both domestic and international transactions. The stark realism of Niccolò Machiavelli stood in profound opposition to the dominant Christian teachings that favored ethical constraints upon rulers. In the eighteenth century, doctrines of *raison d'état* contended with Enlightenment doctrines propounded by philosophers who objected to such practices of monarchical statecraft as mercantilism, balance-of-power politics, and the pursuit of dynastic goals at the expense of peace and human welfare.

While the American clash between realism and idealism owes an intellectual debt to antecedent European thought, it was in the United States that both doctrines were fully established, in theory and in practice. Whereas in continental Europe, utopian idealism remained excluded from the realm of practice, in the United States it became a recurrent, contrapuntal theme of statesmen and politicians, commentators and theorists. What underlay the conflicting presumptions regarding the requirements and possibilities of external action was the anarchical nature of the international environment. Whereas governmental structures within established countries assured some degree of order and security, the absence of international authority compelled individual countries to fend for themselves, relying on their own capacities to coexist in what social contract theorists termed a state of nature. Realists and idealists disagreed totally over the capacity of human society, and especially international politics, to eliminate the vagaries of existence in an anarchic state system.

Realists, recognizing no genuine alternative to coexistence in an anarchical world of individual sovereign nations, accepted the modern state system as a necessity. They would defend the country's interests by following the rules of diplomacy and war as propounded by a host of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers and statesmen. These rules of conduct were not designed to prevent conflict and war, but rather to mitigate their effects and thereby assure the survival of states. For realists, moreover, war was not an aberration, but a condition sometimes unavoidable, a contingency for which to prepare, but also, when possible, to deter by force or accommodation. Wars, they knew, were generally the only means available for changing unwanted political or territorial conditions. Realists thus accepted power politics as a natural phenomenon of international life, with the concomitant reliance on armies and navies, secret diplomacy, and alliances. Asserting the primacy of national over individual interests, they viewed the universal norms governing human rights as conditional when they threatened the national welfare. Realists observed the essential truth that nations existed successfully amid the world's anarchy. The evidence lay in the precedence of peace over war, as well as the continued material advancement in human affairs.

Idealists viewed the international system, with its accoutrements of conflict and war, as not only deeply flawed but also capable of meliora-

tion, if not total cure. For them, international strife was the unnecessary and reprehensible product of outmoded forms of human organization, both in the internal structuring of states and in their international practices. Idealists saw in the trappings of power politics little but ambition, opportunism, deception, and impositions. Whereas realist doctrine focused on national interests and security, idealist concerns looked to individual welfare and the general interests of humanity. Idealists presumed that the objective validity and authority of universal norms, laws, and principles could and should apply to international as well as domestic affairs.

Realists and idealists disagreed fundamentally on the primary determinants of state behavior in international politics. For realists, external factors defined the options available to policymakers. Those options were uncertain and elusive, requiring preparedness as well as caution. Secretary of State Dean Acheson once remarked: "The future is unpredictable. Only one thing—the unexpected—can be reasonably anticipated. . . . The part of wisdom is to be prepared for what may happen, rather than to base our course upon faith in what should happen." The German historian Leopold von Ranke formulated this view in terms congenial to American realists. The dangers and uncertainties of international life, he wrote, not only established the primacy of foreign affairs but also dictated the precedence of security interests over domestic concerns. While cognizant of the historical vicissitudes in national fortunes, realists nevertheless saw constancy in the essential traits and behavior of nations. Policies might vary with regimes, but fundamental interests, once established, tended to remain consistent.

Idealists, on the contrary, tended to view the sources of external state action as residing in internal political processes, based largely on political structures, the distribution of political power, and the ambitions of ruling elites. Involvements abroad reflected not external necessity, but internal choice. To idealists, different forms of government led to different modes of foreign policy. Autocratic states, some idealists presumed, too readily threatened the cause of humanity by placing demands on individuals that were sharply at odds with private conscience. By ordering men into mortal combat with other members of the human race, they shattered the peace and defied the civilized norms of human conduct. Authentic republics did not wage aggressive wars, nor did free peoples impose imperial control over others.

However apparent the wellsprings of aggressive national behavior, realists accepted limits on both their intentions and their power to interfere. They recognized the barriers that national sovereignty placed on meliorist efforts to alter the political structures and domestic decisions of other countries. Idealists, as children of the Enlightenment, expected more of themselves and society. For them, the world was not hopelessly corrupt, but could, through proper leadership and motivation, advance morally and politically. This optimistic view of the world became endemic to the idealists' presumptions of human progress and the concomitant conviction that the United States, because of the superiority of its institutions, was ideally constituted to lead the world toward an improving future. The belief that institutional and moral superiority distinguished the United States from other countries found its central expression in the concept of "exceptionalism." This assigned to American suppositions of exceptional virtue the imperative of exceptional obligation to serve the peace and improve the human condition.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA

America's idealist crusade to minimize the country's role in power politics was heavily influenced by the debates of eighteenth-century British politicians, journalists, and pamphleteers. Despite the quarrel between Britain and its American colonies after the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), largely over Parliament's jurisdiction in imperial, commercial, and political matters, the contestants were closely linked intellectually. What troubled English critics of Britain's role in European politics was the heavy burden of taxation, alliances, and perennial wars demanded of Britain because of its continental connections. By steering clear of such attachments, Britain could concentrate on the pacific activities of trade and commerce, assigning the saved resources to benign uses. Such arguments for reducing Britain's role in European politics applied as well to America's ties with Britain.

Thomas Paine, above all other American writers, created the link between English reformist thought and that of the colonies. Bankrupt and a failure at everything he attempted, Paine immigrated to America in 1774. There he quickly emerged as the chief pamphleteer for American independence. In his famed essay *Com-*

mon Sense (1776), Paine argued that America's attachment to Britain alone endangered its security. It was the British connection that tended "to involve this Continent in European wars and quarrels, and set us at variance with nations who would otherwise seek our friendship, and against whom we have neither anger nor complaint." More specifically, Paine predicted that France and Spain, both New World powers, would never be "our enemies as *Americans,* but as our being *subjects of Great Britain.*" An independent United States would have no cause to defy other countries with demanding foreign policies. He assured his readers that "our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of Europe; because it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free port." American independence would symbolize the rejection of Europe and the entire system of power politics. During the ratification debates regarding the U.S. Constitution a decade later, the Antifederalists employed these isolationist arguments against ratification, convinced that the oceans assured the country's security without the Constitution's war-making powers.

Paine's writings contained the fundamental assumptions of idealist thought on foreign policy. For him the young republic, freed from the contamination and constraints of power politics, appeared ideally constituted to create a new order in world affairs. The American Revolution, as a triumphant avowal of the principle of free government, seemed an auspicious event in the eternal quest for peace and human rights. "The cause of America," proclaimed Paine, "is in great measure the cause of mankind." He regarded the institution of monarchy the chief cause of human misery and war. "Man is not the enemy of man," he wrote, "but through the medium of a false system of government." How, he wondered, could the monarchies of Europe, unable to satisfy the needs of their citizens, survive the revolutionary pressures being unleashed by events in America? Those moral principles, which allegedly maintained peaceful and just relations among individuals, would, in time, rule the behavior of nations.

Other American contemporaries found Paine's views highly congenial. Benjamin Franklin proclaimed such sentiments when, in April 1782, he said: "Establishing the liberties of America will not only make that people happy, but will have some effect in diminishing the misery of those, who in other parts of the world groan under despotism, by rendering it more circumspect, and inducing it to govern with a lighter hand." Thomas Jefferson elaborated virtually identical views in both his public and private observations. "I have sworn upon the altar of God," he wrote, "eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man." For Jefferson, force was evil unless informed by some moral purpose. But whereas Paine harbored visions of an activist, messianic role for the United States in world politics, Jefferson generally held to more modest aspirations. America would best serve the interests of mankind by setting an example of purity and perfection, and by offering an asylum for the wretched and oppressed. "A single good government," he once wrote, "becomes a blessing to the whole earth." James Madison, a contemporary idealist, echoed the sentiment: "Our Country, if it does justice to itself, will be the workshop of liberty to the Civilized World, and do more than any other for the uncivilized."

Contemporary conservatives attacked as utopian Paine's idealist notions regarding the world's future and America's role in its creation. They knew that the United States could not project a successful international crusade beyond the reach of American law. What determined the external behavior of republics, they believed, was not the uniqueness of their political structures or the outlook of their people, but the international environment beyond their control, the demands imposed by their own ambitions, and the countering requirements of other states. James Madison, no less than others, denied that the foreign policies of republics differed essentially from those of monarchies. Hard experience had taught the revolutionary generation that nations dealt with others solely on the bases of interests and the capacity to render them effective.

Alexander Hamilton, in *The Federalist* (1788), questioned the assumption that commerce softened the manners of men and extinguished "those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars." He observed that nations responded more readily to immediate interests than to general or humane considerations of policy. He asked: "Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? . . . Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? . . . Has commerce hitherto done any thing more than change the objects of war?" Hamilton suggested that Americans look to experience for answers to such

questions. Carthage, a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that terminated its existence. Holland, another trading republic, played a conspicuous role in the wars of modern Europe—as did Britain, markedly addicted to commerce. Hamilton concluded: "The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state."

Hamilton dwelled on the dangers that the real world of power politics posed for the United States. Some Americans, he warned, had been amused too long by theories that promised them "an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape." It would be better for the country to assume, as did all other nations, that the happy empire of wisdom and virtue did not exist. "To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties . . . ," he wrote in *The Federalist* No. 6, "would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of [the] ages." Because constant disputes could lead to war, he concluded that national safety required a strong central government, with a capacity to wage war and advance common interests in a potentially hostile world. For him, defense against the nation's external challenges lay in the powers granted by the new U.S. Constitution.

THE EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD

Not surprisingly, the French Revolution, and the subsequent war between revolutionary France and England after 1792, kindled the burgeoning rivalry between Jefferson and Hamilton, members of President George Washington's cabinet as, respectively, secretary of state and secretary of the Treasury. Earlier, such idealists as Paine and Jefferson had abhorred power politics and war; Hamilton, the realist, had preached preparedness with its warlike implications. The idealism generated by the French Revolution compelled a reversal of positions. Paine, supported by Jefferson, roused public clamors for support of the French Revolution and its principles. Idealists demanded that the United States support France's war effort. Hamilton, with Washington, inclined to peaceful neutrality, with the effect, if not the intention, of serving the British cause. The idealists argued from principle, the realists from prudence and experience. Hamilton's view prevailed when Washington issued his Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.

In Jefferson's subsequent debate with Hamilton over the wisdom and morality of Washington's proclamation, he based his advocacy of U.S. support for revolutionary France on the grounds that the United States must be faithful to its obligations under the Franco-American alliance of 1778, demonstrate gratitude for French assistance during the war against Britain, and reveal its affinity for republican institutions in a monarchical world. Jefferson's three arguments rested on sentiment, not interests. Hamilton attacked these propositions head-on in a series of long public letters. In "Pacificus" of 6 July 1793, he argued that a country's first obligation was to itself. The United States, he noted, had no power to aid France in its European war. No country, he concluded, could be obligated to do what it could not do. Next, Hamilton attacked Jefferson's notion of gratitude to France for past favors, noting simply that France had aided the United States to serve its own interests in England's defeat, not those of the United States. Governments, he argued, could not operate as individuals. Individuals could engage in actions of generosity or benevolence at the expense of their own interests, but a government, he said, could rarely be justified in pursuing such a course. It was responsible for the welfare of all of its citizens and for all time. In his "Americanus" papers of 1794, Hamilton denied, thirdly, that the cause of revolutionary France, with all of its excesses, was the cause of liberty, or that the failure of French revolutionary principles would undermine the security of the United States.

Hamilton read the nation another series of lectures on the fundamentals of a realist foreign policy in his "Camillus" essays of 1795. He published these papers in defense of Jay's Treaty, negotiated with Britain and signed in November 1794. Hamilton made little effort to defend the treaty's specific provisions or omissions, but lauded the settlement's role in preventing war. In no way, he declared, were the negotiations dishonorable, the terms disgraceful. He counseled moderation: "Nations ought to calculate as well as individuals, to compare evils, and to prefer the lesser to the greater; to act otherwise, is to act unreasonably; those who advocate it are imposters and madmen." Hamilton admonished Americans to recall that the United States, no less than the powers of Europe, were bound by the established modes of international behavior. "In

national controversies," Hamilton averred, "it is of real importance to conciliate the good opinion of mankind, and it is even useful to preserve or gain that of our enemy. The latter facilitates accommodation and peace—the former attracts good offices, friendly interventions, sometimes direct support, from others." Against such appeals to tradition and common sense, Jefferson stood helpless. He confessed to Madison that Hamilton was "really a colossus. . . . In truth, when he comes forward, there is no one but yourself who can meet him." "For God's sake," he pleaded, "take up your pen, and give a fundamental reply to . . . Camillus." Madison declined the challenge.

Washington's Farewell Address of 17 September 1796 was the culminating statement of Federalist thought on matters of external policy. It reflected the views of Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay, the three authors of *The Federalist.* Hamilton, in revising it, made it largely his own. Washington's valedictory was a message for the times, but it was far more. He admonished the country to behave in accordance with established eighteenth-century principles as they applied to international affairs. Throughout his second term, Washington had been troubled by the dangerous attachments of too many Americans to the European belligerents. In October 1795 he had stressed the necessity of greater independence in a letter to Patrick Henry: "My ardent desire is . . . to see that [the United States] *may be* independent of *all,* and under the influence of *none.* In a word, I want an *American* character, that the powers of Europe may be convinced we act for *ourselves* and not for *others.*" In his Farewell Address, Washington explained why foreign attachments endangered the country's well-being: "The Nation, which indulges toward another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest." Sympathy for favored countries or governments, he warned, assumed common interests that seldom existed and enmeshed a people in the enmities of others without justification. For Washington, there was no room in the country's external relations for crusades against evil.

Hamilton's voluminous writings during Washington's two administrations comprised a single, massive plea that the United States weigh its interests carefully before venturing abroad. Still, the persistent upheavals on the European continent, and their extension onto the Atlantic, touched American interests and sentiments sufficiently to keep alive the tensions between realists and idealists as they sought to influence national reactions to events abroad. The Napoleonic wars, especially as they ventured onto the Atlantic in one gigantic commercial conflict between the British navy and Napoleon's continental system, challenged the profits of America's neutral trade with Europe's belligerents. President Jefferson demanded both British and French recognition of American neutral rights and responded to his failure to obtain either with his embargo on American trade in late 1807. Under President Madison, after 1809 the country's frustration and animosity began to center on Britain because its infringements on the principle of freedom of the seas were more apparent than those of France.

As anti-British sentiment pushed the country toward war, it separated idealist sentiment, which focused on British immorality and the need to defend the principle of neutral trade, from realist arguments that war with Britain would be needless and futile. What those known as the War Hawks in Congress required was a rationale that would justify a declaration of war; the Republican Party, generally cohesive, would readily fall into line. That rationale lay in the supposition that Britain sought less the defense of belligerent rights than the ruination of the United States itself. Henry Clay of Kentucky claimed proof that Britain "will do everything to destroy us." Peter B. Porter of New York added that if the United States continued to submit to British indignities, it "might safely calculate to be kicked and cuffed for the whole of the remainder of [its] life." For some War Hawks, Britain desired no less than the recolonization of America. John A. Harper of New Hampshire charged that British conduct "bespeaks a determination to rule us, and can only be answered by the appeal to the God of Battles." Similarly, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina warned Congress that Britain was determined to reduce the United States to a colonial status.

Realists in Congress contested the march toward war. John Randolph, Virginia's noted conservative, questioned the assumption that American honor and security required a British-American conflict. In December 1811, he reminded Congress that the United States had no interest in contributing to Napoleon's success. Why, he wondered, should the country regard Britain as its special enemy? Every consideration of blood, language, religion, and interest, he observed, should incline the American people toward England. Randolph

reminded Congress that the United States had no power to defeat England in war. Similarly, John Quincy Adams, U.S. minister in St. Petersburg, recalled from the Gospel of Saint Luke (14:31): "Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand." The conditions confronting the United States, Adams reminded his wife, Abigail, on 1 January 1812, were even less favorable than that. When Congress, without preparation, declared war on 19 June 1812, Obadiah German of New York condemned the action. "After the war is once commenced . . . ," he warned, "I presume gentlemen will find something more forcible than empty war speeches will be necessary." It was his purpose, said German, "to check the precipitate step of plunging [the] country prematurely into a war, without any of the means of making the war terrible to the enemy; and with the certainty that it will be terrible to ourselves." Having declared war, the country would have peace only with the enemy's consent.

LATIN AMERICA AND GREECE

In 1815 the United States emerged from the War of 1812 amid a burst of nationalism and a sense of deep satisfaction from having faced England. On the one hand, the war experience encouraged a pervading interest in the future of the North American continent and a pride of distinctness and separation from Europe's international politics. On the other hand, it perpetuated a popular sensitivity to events abroad that repeatedly reopened the realist-idealist debate in the United States. The immediate postwar challenge to U.S. sentiment was Latin America's struggle for independence from Spain. Determined to sever Europe's ties to the New World in what they believed would be a triumph for humanity, editors led by William Duane of Philadelphia's *Aurora* demanded U.S. guardianship of Latin American independence. In Congress, the powerful Henry Clay denounced the administration of James Monroe, with John Quincy Adams as secretary of state, for neglecting U.S. interests and the cause of liberty in Latin America. Adams was appalled at the widespread defiance of the official U.S. policy of neutrality. "There seems to me," he complained in June 1816, "too much of the warlike humor in the debates of Congress—propositions even to take up the cause of the South Americans . . . , as if they were talking of the expense of building a light house."

As the public pressure for involvement continued, Adams, in December 1817, reminded his father, John Adams, that Latin America had replaced the French Revolution as the great source of discord in the United States. "The republican spirit of our country . . . sympathizes with people struggling in a cause. . . . And now, as at the early stage of the French Revolution, we have ardent spirits who are for rushing into the conflict, without looking to the consequences." Monroe and Adams, against mounting public and congressional pressures, sustained the country's official neutrality until, in 1821, the striking victories of the revolutionary forces all but destroyed Spain's remaining authority in South America. In a special message to Congress on 8 March 1822, Monroe recognized the independence of Argentina, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

Already, a similar debate over the future of Greece had divided the Monroe administration as well as much of the country. The Greek revolution had gathered momentum until, by 1821, it posed an immediate threat to Turkey's Ottoman rule. Turkish sultan Mahmud II retaliated against the Greek revolutionaries with such violence that he aroused anti-Turkish sentiment throughout western Europe and the United States. American idealists took up the cause of the repressed Greeks even as Adams expressed his total disapproval of foreign crusades. In his famed speech of 4 July 1821, Adams declared that the United States "goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." Monroe expressed regret over Turkey's despotic rule in his annual message of December 1822. Then, in 1823, Edward Everett, professor of Greek at Harvard, championed Greece's independence in a long essay that appeared in the *North American Review*, a journal that he edited. Adams was not impressed and argued strongly against any U.S. meddling in the affairs of Greece and Turkey, especially since the country was not prepared financially or militarily to intervene.

In January 1824, Adams's allies in Congress disposed of the Greek issue. Among Everett's converts was Daniel Webster, then a U.S. representative from Massachusetts. In December 1823, Webster introduced a resolution into the House that provided for defraying the expense of an agent or commissioner to Greece, whenever the

president might deem such an appointment expedient. On 19 January 1824, while discussing this apparently noncommittal text, Webster launched into an eloquent appeal to American humanitarian sentiment. The Greeks, he said, look to "the great Republic of the earth—and they ask us by our common faith, whether we can forget that they are struggling, as we once struggled, for what we now so happily enjoy?" He asked nothing of Congress. Previously, he acknowledged, "there was no making an impression on a nation but by bayonets, and subsidies, by fleets and armies; but . . . there is a force in public opinion which, in the long run, will outweigh all the physical force that can be brought to oppose it. . . . Let us direct the force, the vast moral force of this engine, to the aid of others."

In his reply on 24 January, Randolph challenged Webster's effort to commit the country abroad to what it could not accomplish, except at enormous cost to its own interests. How, Randolph wondered, would the United States operate effectively in a country as distant as Greece? "Do gentlemen seriously reflect," he asked, "on the work they have cut out for us? Why, sir, these projects of ambition surpass those of Bonaparte himself." Finally, Randolph attacked the resolution itself:

> We are absolutely combatting shadows. The gentleman would have us to believe his resolution is all but nothing; yet again it is to prove omnipotent, and fills the whole globe with its influence. Either it is nothing, or it is something. If it is nothing, let us lay it on the table, and have done with it at once; but, if it is that something which it has been on the other hand represented to be, let us beware how we touch it. For my part, I would sooner put the shirt of Nessus on my back, than sanction these doctrines.

Such argumentation, much to Adams's delight, eliminated the issue of Greek independence from the nation's consideration.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Although scarcely a subject of controversy, the Monroe Doctrine, after its promulgation in 1823, remained vulnerable to disagreement over its meaning. For realists, the Monroe Doctrine represented a fundamental interest in preserving the nation's unique position as the predominant force in the hemisphere. As such, it was a policy rendered effective by the realities of power and interest in the Atlantic world. So realistic, indeed, was American purpose in preventing the establishment of rival power in the Western Hemisphere that the United States required neither war nor the threat of war to protect this essential interest. British leaders tended to accept the Monroe Doctrine as a statement of policy and nothing more.

Idealists viewed the Monroe Doctrine as a broad declaration of liberal principles. For them, the United States, in defying the Holy Alliance, had promoted less the nation's interests than the liberty of Latin America. Because the doctrine appeared to attach American purpose to a universal democratic ideal, many European masters of Realpolitik viewed it as purely utopian. They condemned it because, as a body of abstract principle, it would overreach actual U.S. economic and security interests, as well as seek to diminish European influence in Latin American affairs, solely on claims to superior political virtue. For Prince Metternich of Austria, such suppositions were nothing less than sheer arrogance. "The United States of America," he complained, "have cast blame and scorn on the institutions of Europe most worthy of respect. . . . In permitting themselves these unprovoked attacks, in fostering revolutions wherever they show themselves, in regretting those which have failed, in extending a helping hand to those which seem to prosper, they lend new strength to the apostles of sedition and reanimate the courage of every conspirator." In practice, every administration from Monroe to John Tyler recognized the Monroe Doctrine as policy, not principle. They accepted changes in the region, such as the British seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1833, because they did not endanger U.S. economic or security interests.

In 1845, President James K. Polk provided John C. Calhoun, at the time one of the nation's stellar realists, an opportunity to read the country a lesson on the Monroe Doctrine. During the summer of 1845, the president received reports of British designs on California. In June, François Guizot, in a speech before the French Chamber of Deputies, claimed a European interest in preserving "the balance of the Great Powers among which America is divided." In his December message to Congress, Polk, under pressure from American expansionists, repeated Monroe's declaration on noncolonization. On 14 January 1846, Senator William Allen of Ohio, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced a resolution designed to commit Congress to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as

WAR AND DOCTRINES

The economist and social scientist William Graham Sumner (1874–1910) was a prolific publicist of social Darwinism. Through public addresses and periodical essays, he carried on a warfare against economic and political evils, treating practically every social question of his day in an unsentimental and critical fashion. In 1903 he published his observations on the role of doctrines as a guide to foreign policy:

"If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside a man's own reason and betray him against himself. Civilized men have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines. . . . What are they all? Nothing but rhetoric and phantasms. Doctrines are always vague; it would ruin a doctrine to define it, because then it could be analyzed, tested, criticised, and verified; but nothing ought to be tolerated which cannot be so tested. Somebody asks you with astonishment and horror whether you do not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. You do not know whether you do or not, because you do not know what it is; but you do not dare to say that you do not, because you understand that it is one of the things which every good American is bound to believe in. Now when any doctrine arrives at that degree of authority, the name of it is a club which any demagogue may wing over you at any time and apropos of anything. . . . A doctrine is an abstract principle; it is necessarily absolute in its scope and abstruse in its terms; it is a metaphysical assertion. It is never true, because it is absolute, and the affairs of men are all conditioned and relative. . . .

"The process by which such catchwords grow is the old popular mythologizing. Your Monroe Doctrine becomes an entity, a being, a lesser kind of divinity, entitled to reverence and possessed of prestige, so that it allows of no discussion or deliberation. The President of the United States talks about the Monroe Doctrine and he tells us solemnly that it is true and sacred, whatever it is. He even undertakes to give some definition of what he means by it; but the definition which he gives binds nobody, either now or in the future, any more than what Monroe and Adams meant by it binds anybody now not to mean anything else. He says that, on account of the doctrine, whatever it may be, we must have a big navy. In this, at least, he is plainly in the right; if we have the doctrine, we shall need a big navy. . . .

"What has just been said suggests a consideration of the popular saying, 'In time of peace prepare for war.' If you prepare a big army and navy and are all ready for war, it will be easy to go to war; the military and naval men will have a lot of new machines and they will be eager to see what they can do with them. There is no such thing nowadays as a state of readiness for war. It is a chimera, and the nations which pursue it are falling into an abyss of wasted energy and wealth. When the army is supplied with the latest and best rifles, someone invents a new field gun; then the artillery must be provided with that before we are ready. . . . A wiser rule would be to make up your mind soberly what you want, peace or war, and then to get ready for what you want; for what we prepare for is what we shall get."

— *From "War." In Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice R. Davie, eds.* Essays of William Graham Sumner *(1934)* —

repeated by the president. Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan led the enthusiastic response of Democratic expansionists.

Calhoun challenged the resolution as a dangerous commitment; it seemed to invoke U.S. guardianship for all New World states against foreign aggression. If this be settled policy that was intended to have meaning, Calhoun warned, the country must concentrate its energies to carry out the policy. For Calhoun, policy required that the ends of policy be determined not by rhetoric, but by the means that the country intended to use. For him, the country had no intention of acting. Thus, Calhoun advised the Senate that it was

> the part of wisdom to select wise ends in a wise manner. No wise man, with a full understanding of the subject, would pledge himself, by declaration, to do that which was beyond the power of execution, and without mature reflection as to the consequences. There would be no dignity in it. True dignity consists in making no declaration which we are not prepared to maintain. If we make the declaration, we ought to be prepared to carry it into effect against all opposition.

Cass, in another exchange with Calhoun, argued that the United States could enunciate principles without assuming any obligation to act on them. "Will mere vaporing bravado," Calhoun replied, "have any practical effect?" Effective policy, if resistance seemed proper, Calhoun asserted, required armies, navies, powerful revenues, and a determination to act. Declarations of principle would achieve nothing except to needlessly antagonize countries normally well disposed to the United States. The Senate returned the Allen resolution to committee—from which it never reemerged.

In April 1848, President Polk inaugurated the most searching examination of the Monroe Doctrine and its relevance to U.S. foreign policy in the nation's history. That month an agent of the Yucatán government, Don Justo Sierra, appealed to Polk for military aid against the rebellious Indians of the Mexican interior who threatened to drive the whites into the sea. He offered the United States, in return for its support, "dominion and sovereignty" over the state of Yucatán, adding that the same appeal had been extended to England and Spain. On 19 April, Polk, in his message to Congress, repeated his earlier sweeping assertion that it was the settled policy of the United States "that no future European colony or dominion shall . . . be planted or established on any part of the American continent." Polk anchored his appeal for U.S. involvement in Yucatán on both the moral obligation to rescue its white inhabitants and to prevent the possible reduction of the region to the status of a European colony. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations quickly reported a bill to provide for an American military occupation of Yucatán. Democratic nationalists rushed to the defense of the president's request.

Again it was left for Calhoun, in a major speech of his long career, to dispose of the president's appeal to the Monroe Doctrine by demonstrating historically that the doctrine had no relevance to the Yucatán question. As a member of Monroe's cabinet in 1823, Calhoun reminded the Senate that Monroe's message was directed at one specific threat to Latin American independence—the Holy Alliance. That alliance's disintegration rendered the doctrine meaningless. Then Calhoun turned to the Monroe Doctrine as policy. In response to the president's insistence that Monroe's declarations were the settled policy of the United States, Calhoun retorted: "Declarations are not policy and cannot become settled policy." Then he asked, "Has there been one instance in which these declarations have been carried into effect? If there be, let it be pointed out." Control of Yucatán, declared Calhoun, would add nothing to the protection of Cuba or U.S. commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. For Mexico, U.S. intervention in Yucatán would be a breach of faith. Mere occupancy would resolve nothing, and without some resolution, would either collapse or become permanent. Fortunately, a sudden, unanticipated agreement between the Yucatán contestants terminated the question of U.S. intervention.

KOSSUTH AND HUNGARY

America's seldom expressed but widely shared antagonism toward Europe's monarchical governments broke loose at the first news of the revolutions that, beginning in France during February 1848, swept rapidly across Germany and the whole continent. The U.S. minister in Paris recognized France's provisional government. Senator Edward Hannegan of Indiana reported a joint resolution from the Committee on Foreign Relations that offered the country's congratulations to the people of France. The absence of any obligations to France assured the resolution's overwhelming approval.

By 1849, the spontaneous uprising of one European people after another diverted attention from France to Hungary, where the Magyar patriots were engaged in a heroic struggle against Austrian rule. That summer, while the American people applauded the successive Hungarian triumphs, Secretary of State John M. Clayton dispatched Ambrose Dudley Mann as a special agent to report on the progress of the revolution and offer the nation's encouragement. After winning momentary success under their eloquent leader, Lajos Kossuth, the Hungarians suffered disaster at the hands of Russian troops brought to the aid of the Austrian emperor. Early in 1850 Cass proposed a resolution demanding that the administration sever diplomatic relations with Austria. Clay, a realist since his stint as secretary of state under John Quincy Adams, turned his ridicule on Cass's proposal. There was, he told the Senate on 7 January, no relationship between the Michigan senator's premises and his conclusions. His resolution offered nothing to the Hungarians. Why, Clay asked, single out Austria? Hungary lost its independence struggle to Russian, not Austrian, forces. The country's very greatness, Clay cautioned, "draws after it great responsibilities . . . to

avoid unnecessary wars, maintaining our own rights with firmness, but invading the rights of no others." The Senate tabled Cass's resolution.

Meanwhile, the exiled Kossuth languished under detention in Turkey. But in September 1851, Webster, now secretary of state, with the cooperation of U.S. minister George Perkins Marsh, secured the release of Kossuth and fifty of his Magyar associates. Congress passed a resolution inviting Kossuth to visit the United States, while the president dispatched the USS *Mississippi,* already in the Mediterranean, to carry him to England. After a triumphal stop in England, he proceeded to the United States. Upon his arrival in New York City on 5 December, announced by the booming of cannon, Kossuth received the city's greatest ovation since the visit of Lafayette a quarter century earlier. New York experienced a Magyar-mania epidemic. Soon the Kossuth craze spread from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes. American orators used the occasion of his presence to express sympathy for the oppressed of Europe. Whigs—largely realists—were not amused; they resented both the cleverness of Kossuth's appeal to the country's idealist sentiment, as well as the approval his words apparently received. What troubled Kossuth's realist critics especially was his open quest for diplomatic, economic, and even military assistance to rekindle the Hungarian independence movement. For them, such appeals exceeded the bounds of acceptable international behavior.

Congress voted to invite Kossuth to Washington, D.C. The Hungarian accepted with alacrity; the success of his mission in America hinged on his acceptance by an administration that was determined to offer him nothing. On 23 December, Webster acknowledged privately the need for caution in dealing with Kossuth: "We shall treat him with respect, but shall give him no encouragement that the established policy of the country will be in any degree departed from." Two days later, Webster admitted that Kossuth's presence in Washington would be embarrassing. Upon Kossuth's arrival, Webster privately outlined his course of action: "I shall treat him with all personal and individual respect, but if he should speak to me of the policy of 'intervention,' I shall 'have ears more deaf than adders.'" At the White House on 31 December, Kossuth, despite Webster's request, could not resist the temptation to make a lengthy plea for American aid. President Millard Fillmore reminded the Hungarian leader that U.S. policy on intervention had been uniform since the Republic's founding. At subsequent dinners hosted by the Websters and the president, Kossuth's scarcely concealed anger embarrassed all who attended.

At a congressional banquet in Kossuth's honor, Webster expressed his hope to see the American model established upon the Lower Danube. He toasted Hungarian independence but refused to offer what Kossuth needed: something tangible for the Hungarian cause. On 9 January 1852 ,Clay received Kossuth in his chamber. Clay assured the Hungarian leader that the United States could not transport men and arms to eastern Europe in sufficient quantity to be effective against Russia and Austria. Such an attempt, he added, would depart from the country's historic policy of nonintervention. "Far better is it for ourselves, for Hungary, and for the cause of liberty," Clay concluded, "that, adhering to our wise, pacific system . . . , we should keep our lamp burning brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations, than to hazard its utter extinction amid the ruins of fallen and falling republics in Europe." Kossuth soon returned to Europe, suffering the disillusionment of those who expect too much of sentiment.

WAR WITH SPAIN

During the generations of general peace between 1815 and 1898, American idealism and realism remained compartmentalized, the former residing in the realm of opinion, ideas, and moral posturing, the latter existing in the realm of policy and action. On occasion, the levers of policy were put at the disposal of moral purposes, but not in a manner that would deflect the basic guidelines of American external policy. But in 1898 the compartments began to break down; the surge of popular passion on behalf of other peoples, against which realists such as Hamilton had warned, erupted on behalf of moral crusades in defense of Cuba, the Philippines, and China.

Following the outbreak of the Cuban revolt in February 1895, the Cuban junta, with headquarters in New York, supported by the Cuban League, its American counterpart with branches in all large cities, launched a campaign to involve the United States in this renewal of the Cuban struggle for independence. Cuban rebels understood the peculiar appeal of humanitarian causes to nineteenth-century Americans. The Spanish government, by employing measures of extreme

repression, played into their hands. The Madrid government damaged its image almost beyond recall when, in 1896, it dispatched General Valeriano Weyler to Cuba, where he proceeded to herd civilians suspected of rebel leanings into concentration camps. President Grover Cleveland resented the Cuban assault on American emotions and held to a policy of neutrality against the rising tide of pro-Cuban sentiment. The Spanish government offered Cuba autonomy, but President William McKinley's decision of 1897 to oppose any arrangement unacceptable to the revolutionaries, whose minimum goal was indepen-dence, eliminated every possibility of a peaceful Cuban settlement. Washington gave Spain the choice of capitulation or war. The sinking of the battleship *Maine* on 15 February 1898, along with other unfortunate incidents, aroused a congressional demand for war, a responsibility that McKinley accepted to protect the principle of executive leadership in external affairs. On 21 April the United States broke diplomatic relations with Spain and embarked on a war for Cuban independence.

Few Americans attempted to justify the war except in humanitarian terms. Such motives were not strange to American liberal thought, but before 1898 they had never governed action. Whether it was a people's war, forced on a reluctant administration, or one reflecting a slow, steady evolution of presidential policy, it did not result from any deliberate weighing of interests and responsibilities. The president asked for war in the name of humanity and civilization as well as endangered American interests. "Our own direct interests [in Cuba] were great," observed Theodore Roosevelt in his *An Autobiography* (1913), "but even greater were our interests from the standpoint of humanity. Cuba was at our very doors. It was dreadful things for us to sit supinely and watch her death agony." Similarly, Senator George F. Hoar acknowledged that the American people could not "look idly on while hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings, women and children and old men, die of hunger close to our doors." Had Cuba not lain off the coast of the United States, there would have been no war of liberation in 1898. Previous generations of Americans had sought new deals for Greeks and Hungarians in vain. In 1898 sentiment mattered because it was directed at oppression by a weak power in an adjacent region where the United States held the clear strategic advantage.

Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor on 1 May did not presage an annexationist movement in the Pacific. But almost immediately a number of expansionists, both inside and outside the administration, clamored for the occupation and annexation of the Philippines—islands in the western Pacific where other nations possessed greater naval power than did the United States. Succumbing to expansionist pressure, the administration, in its instructions to the peace commission dated 16 September, announced its intention to acquire the Philippines. McKinley rationalized the decision by citing the country's obligation to humanity. This theme dominated his speeches during his midwestern tour in October 1898. Always he dwelt on the accidental nature of the country's de facto possession of the Philippines and its special responsibility to the Filipinos that, he insisted, flowed from that possession. He declared at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, that "we accepted war for humanity. We can accept no terms of peace which shall not be in the interests of humanity." He repeated that appeal in Omaha: "The war was no more invited by us than were the questions which are laid at our door by its results. Now as then we will do our duty." Later, in Boston, he declared that "our concern was not for territory or trade or empire, but for the people whose interests and destiny, without our willing, had been put into our hands." Thucydides, the Greek historian, wrote many centuries earlier: "You cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honours." McKinley, however, failed to dwell on the burdens of empire at all. It was not strange that the American people, given the simple choice between humanity and irresponsibility, assured him of their overwhelming support.

Realists charged that the acquisition of the Philippines was a serious departure from the country's traditional conservatism in foreign affairs. They noted that the annexation of distant territories would entail financial and military burdens with few rewards. The United States, wrote Andrew Carnegie, lacked not only the naval power to protect the Philippines but also the will to create it. The former U.S. Senator Carl Schurz feared that Philippine annexation would so completely overcommit the nation that it would reduce the United States to complete reliance on the British fleet. Such reliance would demand a heavy price. "If we do take the Philippines," he predicted, "and thus entangle ourselves in the rivalries of Asiatic affairs, the future will be . . . one of wars and rumors of wars, and the time will be forever past

when we could look down with condescending pity on the nations of the old world groaning under militarism and is burdens." Senator Augustus O. Bacon of Georgia foresaw "peace at evening, perhaps, with no certainty but that the morrow will find us participants in a world's war." Against such arguments Senate approval of the annexation treaty came hard. The final vote was fifty-seven to twenty-seven, one more than necessary to gain the required two-thirds.

CHINA AND THE OPEN DOOR

Events in China drew the United States ever deeper into the politics of the western Pacific, largely as the consequence of another moral crusade. After 1897, China's political and military weakness exposed it to foreign encroachments that threatened to reduce it to colonial status. The McKinley administration, through Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900, saved China from further disintegration. In the process, however, the United States assumed an immense, if informal, obligation to defend the commercial and administrative integrity of China. For its adherents, these apparently cost-free obligations comprised not a burden, but a remarkable triumph for American humanitarian principles. Some observers hailed Hay's achievement equal to those of the country's greatest nineteenth-century diplomats. Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois offered a characteristic eulogy: "The magnitude of the man [Hay] will only appear in the magnitude of his work when it reaches its colossal proportions in the proper perspective of the past." Much of the press lauded the secretary for his momentous success. The *New York Journal of Commerce* called the Open Door episode "one of the most important diplomatic negotiations of our time." The *Nation* praised the Open Door policy as a great national triumph. "Our intervention in China," ran its conclusion, "has given the world a transcendent exhibition of American leadership in the world of ideas and the world of action. We have proved that we are guided by a diplomacy unsurpassed . . . in its patient moderation, its firmness, its moral impulse."

Others explained why Hay's apparent achievements on behalf of China carried the seeds of disaster. Like the acquisition of the Philippines, Hay's easy successes confirmed the illusion that the United States could have its way in Asia at little or no cost to itself. Realistic observers noted, however, that Hay's diplomacy either had committed the United States to the use of force in a distant, disorganized region of the Far East, or it had achieved nothing; no nation would have compromised its essential interests in China merely at Hay's request. "Diplomacy has done nothing to change the situation," warned the *Springfield Republican,* "while the Government has gone far toward placing itself in a position where, to be consistent, it must guarantee by military force the territorial integrity of China, or share in its possible partition." Similarly, Alfred Thayer Mahan observed in November 1900 that the United States could not "count on respect for the territory of China unless we are ready to throw not only our moral influence but, if necessity arise, our physical weight into the conflict." Mahan noted that both Russia and Japan, the two dominant powers in the Far East, had far greater interests in China than did the United States. The Open Door policy, by establishing a powerful and exaggerated American concern for the commercial and territorial integrity of China, rendered any country that might interfere in Chinese affairs the potential enemy of the United States.

WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY

This repeated willingness of the United States to permit its burgeoning obligations, especially in the Pacific, to be driven by moral considerations culminated in Woodrow Wilson's crusade in Europe. The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 thoroughly conjoined the realist and idealist elements in U.S. foreign policy. While realists and idealists differed in their judgments of the causes and meaning of the war, they agreed on the necessity of the struggle. Theodore Roosevelt, like other realists, feared that a German victory would endanger U.S. interests by undermining the historic European balance of power—a balance that had provided the United States almost perfect security through much of its history. Wilson, however, quickly turned the war into another moral crusade. For him, the breakdown of the peace revealed serious flaws in the international system that required correction. Determined to exert a powerful voice in world affairs at the war's end, he favored a policy of strict neutrality to hold America above the fray. When German submarine warfare brought the United States into the war, Wilson would seek to reform the world through his dominant voice in erecting the postwar peace structure.

Wilson's program for avoiding another catastrophic crisis, such as that of 1914, required both changes in the quality of national behavior and an international mechanism for settling international disputes peacefully. To that end, he believed it essential that the world relieve itself of the traditional accoutrements of power politics: the balance of power and the pursuit of national interests. His solution lay in the principle of collective security, in which all peace-loving nations would pledge themselves to joint action in behalf of peace. The necessary multilateral institutions, through which the protectors of the peace would function, took the form of the League of Nations and the World Court, both enforcing the rule of law. Wilson found additional hope for a peaceful future in the expansion of world commerce, operating under a body of most-favored-nation treaties that would assure equal access to world markets. The result would be both a more prosperous and a more peaceful international system. For Wilson, finally, the new world order would require the active leadership of the United States.

Wilson's vision of enduring peace required, as well, a democratic foundation that would assure the necessary fusion of policy and moral purpose. In his war message to Congress in April 1917, Wilson declared:

> A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Wilson's faith in a concert of democracies to maintain the peace presumed a common interest that would eliminate conflict and war. In his advocacy of a world of law and order, Wilson identified the interests of humanity with the interests of the United States and other democratic, status quo powers. This vision of universal peace acquired its special appeal from Wilson's insistence that peace required not the wielding of superior power by advocates of the status quo, but the limitation of change to general agreement and the rule of law. In a world governed by law, based on a common interest in peace, neither the United States nor any other country had the right to bargain with aggressors over changes in established treaties. Peaceful change alone was a morally acceptable burden of diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the essential assumption of a common interest in peace ignored the reality that, while all nations favored peace, some favored the status quo and some did not. E. H. Carr addressed this dilemma in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939): "The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is identifiable with the interest of each individual nation helped politicians and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a fundamental divergence of interest between nations desirous of maintaining the status quo and nations desiring to change it." Nowhere in the Wilsonian approach to international affairs was there any recognition of the persistence of conflict that defied easy solution or the need to define the interests of the United States in a still troubled world and prepare a strategy for their defense. It was not strange that wishful thinking and generalization soon prevailed over analysis of the ongoing realities of international life. The end of lasting and universal peace overwhelmed the problem of means. Wilson once quieted the doubts of his adversaries who questioned the effectiveness of the League of Nations by assuring them that "if it won't work, it must be made to work." Schemes for rendering the league effective did not require explanations of how they would work; the consequences of failure were too disastrous to contemplate.

ISOLATIONISM, INTERNATIONALISM, AND WORLD WAR II

In proclaiming goals whose achievements always eluded the possibilities of his prescriptions, Wilson laid the foundation for a pervading postwar isolationism. For countless Americans, nothing in the country's recent experience dictated the necessity of a permanent, continuous American involvement in European politics.

For other Americans, often intellectuals and academicians, Wilson's vision of a new world order, free of all reliance on force, was too essential for the world's welfare to be discarded in deference to isolationism. Inasmuch as both groups were antagonistic to the conservative tradition of American diplomacy, there was little to separate idealists from realists in the national debate. Isolationism insisted that the nation had no external interests that merited the use of force, that events outside the hemisphere were inconsequential.

In apparent contrast, internationalism declared that U.S. interests existed wherever gov-

ernments challenged peace or human rights. It insisted not only that they mattered but also that the universal acceptance of democratically inspired principles of peaceful change would control them. Every program fostered by American internationalists during the two postwar decades—membership in the League of Nations and the World Court, the employment of arbitration conventions, the resort to consultation in the event of crises, collective security, naval disarmament, or the outlawry of war—denied the need of any precise definition of ends and means in American foreign policy. The burgeoning fields of diplomatic history and international law rested on Wilsonian principles. Under the presumptions of a controlling public opinion and a common interest in peace, international lawyers joined national leaders in rationalizing inaction in the face of growing threats. Notions of collective security served as a device of the status quo powers to prevent change in the international system. The Western preference for the status quo, in the absence of any program to change it peacefully, never recommended the means for preserving it beyond the acceptance of war.

Whatever remained of the realist-idealist cleavage in American thought and action was again clouded by the almost universal national acceptance of U.S. involvement in World War II. Realists presumed that the war, like the Great War of 1914, would, with the defeat of the Axis, reaffirm Europe's traditional balance of power and reestablish the essential elements of the Versailles settlement of 1919. To that end, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, advocated the return of East-Central Europe to its prewar status. American idealism, however, assigned the war a deeper, largely humanitarian purpose. In his lend-lease proposal of January 1941, Roosevelt adopted the goal of the Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—in his crusade against the Axis powers. In his book *Price of a Free World* (1942), Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace proposed, as the war's true purpose, not only the elimination of fascism from the world, but also the establishment of freedom for all peoples, the final triumph of democracy, and the elimination of poverty and hunger everywhere. At the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, Roosevelt announced his goal of unconditional surrender to eliminate any German, Italian, or Japanese influence from the postwar treaty-making process—essential for the construction of the perfect peace. Unfortunately, such idealist presumptions failed to anticipate the Soviet Union's overwhelming contribution to the allied victory and the demands that the Kremlin would make on any postwar settlement.

THE COLD WAR

It required no more than the postwar Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, in defiance of the Western principle of self-determination, to create doubts regarding the Kremlin's ultimate intentions. As early as 1946, anti-Soviet officials and members of Congress predicted further Soviet expansion into war torn Europe and elsewhere. Clark Clifford's September 1946 report to President Truman, reflecting the views of top U.S. officials, described a deeply threatened world. When suspected Soviet ambitions, in early 1947, seemed to focus on Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration framed the Truman Doctrine, with its corresponding rhetorical predictions of falling dominoes across Europe, Africa, or Asia, should Greece fall to the country's communist-led guerrillas. Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan accepted the administration's dire predictions uncritically. "Greece," he wrote on 12 March, "must be helped or Greece sinks permanently into the communist order. Turkey inevitably follows. Then comes the chain reaction which might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China Seas." Never before, critics noted, had U.S. leaders described external dangers in such limitless, imprecise terms. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Soviet expert George Kennan, and columnist Walter Lippmann objected to the language. Lippmann accused the administration of launching a crusade, not defining a policy.

Even as the West triumphed in all of its anti-Soviet policies during the next two years, including the creation of West Germany and the formation of NATO, U.S. fears of the Soviet Union continued to mount. The National Security Council's study NCS 7, dated 30 March 1948, defined the Kremlin's challenge in global terms. "The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism," the document averred, "is the domination of the world." NCS 68, of April 1950, comprised the final and most elaborate attempt of the Truman Cold War elite to arrive at a definition of the burgeoning Soviet threat. It concluded that the Soviet Union, "unlike previous aspirants to

hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." What underwrote such fears was not the prospect of Soviet military expansionism; Soviet armed forces were not prepared to march anywhere. Rather, it was the fear that the Kremlin, with its alleged control of international communism, could expand endlessly, without force, merely by inciting communist revolutions. Actually, by mid-century, Europe was stabilized with a vengeance. The United States and its allies would not risk war to change the status quo on the European continent; the Soviets had no power to do so. Europe was divided, but incredibly stable.

Events in East Asia, where the United States faced two unwanted, powerfully led communist revolutions in China and Indochina, seemed to confirm the fears of Soviet expansionism. The reason is clear. Washington officials presumed, logically, that both revolutions were under Soviet control. The State Department's China experts, in a memorandum of October 1948, concluded that the Soviets had established control of China as firmly "as in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain." The Soviet Union, apparently, had taken over China without one conquering or occupying soldier. Dean Acheson claimed no less. "The communist leaders," he declared, "have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia." Following the Chinese communist victory in late 1949, NSC 48/1 declared: "The USSR is now an Asiatic power of the first magnitude with expanding influence and interests extending throughout continental Asia and into the Pacific."

By the 1960s, much of America's predominant realism had become soft, emphasizing less the requirements of security and defense than the need of accommodation with the realities of coexistence. Convinced that previous administrations had exaggerated the Soviet threat, President Jimmy Carter set out in 1977 to establish a more relaxed, flexible, nonideological relationship with the Soviet Union and China. With the U.S. failure in Vietnam, the country could no longer maintain the illusion of global power. Carter recognized that reality by lessening the strategic importance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nationalism, he believed, limited Soviet as well as American influence in the Third World. In dismissing the Cold War commitment to global containment, the Carter administration accepted Soviet activity in the Afro-Asian world with profound indifference. It expected the Soviets to respond by showing strategic restraint in exploiting opportunities for adventurism created by the new burst of revolutionary turmoil across the Third World. By the mid-1970s, former Democratic liberals launched, as neoconservatives, an anticommunist crusade to reassert America's role as defender of the free world against the renewed Soviet danger. The neoconservatives found themselves aligned with the traditional Right, characterized by Republican columnists William Buckley, George Will, William Safire, and Patrick Buchanan.

Already facing open challenges to its alleged loss of will, the Carter administration reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in late December 1979, with bewilderment and rage. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned the country that the Soviet Union now threatened American interests from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan. On 4 January, the president revealed his fears to the nation. "A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan," he declared, "threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies. . . . If the Soviets . . . maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed."

The widespread assumptions that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan exposed south and Southwest Asia to further Soviet encroachment pushed American hawkishness to a new high. For many journalists and public officials, the Soviet invasion sounded the inauguration of another cold war. Polls as well as the reports of newspaper correspondents around the country revealed the return of an assertive, Cold War mentality.

Ronald Reagan caught the country's post-Afghan alarms at full tide, embellished them, and rode them to victory in the presidential campaign of 1980. He and the Republican Party pilloried the Carter administration for leading the country into the posture of "weakness, inconsistency, vacillation, and bluff" that enabled the Soviet Union to surpass the United States in military power. Under Reagan, the Committee on the Present Danger gained the influence that Carter had denied it; fifty-one of its members secured positions in the Reagan administration. The Reagan team determined to counter the global Soviet threat by aiding Nicaragua and El Salvador, thereby preventing the rhetorical dominoes from falling across both South America and North America.

Despite the new administration's tough rhetoric and massive expansion of the military budget, it maintained the same defense posture of previous administrations, much to the disgust of those who took the Reagan rhetoric of rollback seriously. The Reagan administration made no effort to recover the alleged losses of the Carter years in Africa and the Middle East. It accepted the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but held the established containment lines. Indeed, what perpetuated the decades of laudable superpower coexistence was the decision of successive administrations to abjure the dictates of ideology and pursue the limited goals of containment.

The process of Soviet disintegration culminated in the collapse of the Soviet satellite empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the Cold War during the following year. Reagan supporters attributed the Soviet collapse to the rhetorical toughness and military buildup of the Reagan years. For Soviet experts, the communist regime's crash flowed naturally from its internal flaws, its political erosion, and its ideological rejection.

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA

With the termination of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR in 1990–1991, the United States quickly emerged as the world's lone superpower. Under the leadership of President Bill Clinton, the realization of the country's superpower status inaugurated another massive disagreement over the country's proper role in world affairs. Not since classic Rome had a single state towered so completely over its potential rivals. Behind the debate over American global responsibility was President George H. W. Bush's refusal, in 1992, to confront the well-publicized genocide in Bosnia and his tardy, reluctant involvement in feeding the starving people of Somalia. For his critics, the end of the Cold War presented the United States, with all its power, an unprecedented opportunity to embrace the country's historic mission to humanity. The risk-avoiding approaches of the Bush years seemed to assure only the loss of national self-respect and the denial of America's proper role in world affairs. The country, some argued, had the obligation to exercise its exceptional power aggressively in its own and the world's deepest interests.

Undaunted by the doubtful relevance of America's self-assigned obligations to humanity, President Clinton promised that, after January 1993, U.S. foreign policy would focus on the goal of expanding democracy and humane values. In his inaugural address, he pledged U.S. action whenever "the will and conscience of the international community is defied." There would be interventions, he promised, not only to defend national interests, but also to satisfy the national conscience. On becoming U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in February 1993, Madeleine Albright acknowledged: "If there is one overriding principle that will guide me in this job, it will be the inescapable responsibility . . . to build a peaceful world and to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization." Clinton elucidated his agenda before the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1993. "During the Cold War," he said, "we sought to contain a threat to [the] survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions." For the first time in history, he added, "we have the chance to expand the reach of democracy and economic progress across the whole of Europe and to the far reaches of the world." From the outset, Clinton faced a powerful realist critique of the necessity and feasibility of his burgeoning campaign, much of it based on the admonitions of Hamilton, Washington, and John Quincy Adams against foreign crusading.

For the Clinton administration, three countries seemed to require immediate attention—Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. It launched immediate interventions in all three, with doubtful results. In none of the three did Washington achieve its stated objectives. Haiti remained a basket case, economically and politically; the death of American soldiers in Somalia late in 1993 prompted Clinton to withdrew those that remained. In Bosnia, the three goals of U.S. involvement—the return of the refugees, the creation of a multiethnic state, and the arrest and trial of Serb war criminals—remained unfulfilled. In 1999, Kosovo emerged as the defining issue in Clinton's crusade for human rights by scolding and chastising foreign transgressors. On 24 March he unleashed a NATO-backed air war against Serbia, both to protect the Kosovars and to bring Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, to justice. Clinton's Kosovo intervention was the first resort to force for purely humanitarian objectives in the nation's history. The seventy-eight days of bombing brought a Serb capitulation without creating the desired peaceful, multi-ethnic regime in Kosovo.

NATO leaders, meeting in Washington during April 1999, accepted membership in Clinton's global crusade for human rights. They proclaimed human rights, not national sovereignty, as the guiding principle in international affairs. It mattered little. U.S. critics of both the ends and the means of the Kosovo war predicted that the experiment would not be repeated.

Clinton's idealist crusade to improve the human condition turned out to be Eurocentric; in the Atlantic world, at least, massive repression had become unacceptable, especially if it occurred in a small, defenseless region. The Serbian experience was no measure of the West's response to ubiquitous challenges to Western values elsewhere. Neither Washington nor the European capitals responded to the pervading horrors of Africa and Asia, beginning in Rwanda in 1994 and continuing through central Africa to Sierra Leone and elsewhere. Continued global suffering illustrated the magnitude and tenacity of the world's political and societal disabilities, as well as the absence of external power and will to confront them.

Through two centuries of its history, the United States experienced a persistent debate over approaches to foreign policy. It was a controversy absent in nations whose political philosophy derived from different assumptions about humanity and the state. In general, the American debate embraced a realist-idealist contest, although at times the issues produced shifting positions and clouded the fundamental clash between realist and idealist goals and assumptions. But the continued debate, with neither side acknowledging defeat, attested to the abiding fundamentals of both positions. Realists argued that the country's external policies be guided by national interests and the simple desire to maximize stability and minimize harm. They asked that the United States exert its leverage in pursuit of humane objectives only where assured successes were commensurate with costs and effort. For them, no policy choice would achieve utopia. Idealist proposals comprised largely sentimental and rhetorical responses to meliorist visions of a malleable world, supposedly subject to the reforming influences of American political and economic institutions. It was an approach dominated by seductive ends, with little concern for means.

America's vibrant civilization enhanced the attractiveness of the American model, while the uniqueness of the country's traditions and environment limited the expansive power of its example. The country's long pursuit of meliorist dreams demonstrated its limited knowledge and authority to institute democracy and a humane order in other lands. Still, the meliorist vision never faltered and always remained subject to arousal by the trials of other lands. In practice, however, realism defined the fundamental formulations of all U.S. foreign policy, except the moral crusading in Cuba and East Asia at the turn of the nineteenth century, as well as the Wilson-dominated responses to the challenges of the interwar decades. The country's long experience in foreign affairs demonstrated that objectives that ignored or transcended the nation's interests could not long endure.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Power and Diplomacy.* New York, 1958. Provides a former secretary of state's reflections on morality and power.

Beard, Charles Austin. *The Republic: Conversations on Fundamentals.* New York, 1943. Seeks to test the validity of current conceptions of foreign policy against the wisdom of the Founders.

Boorstin, Daniel J. *The Genius of American Politics.* Chicago, 1953. Argues that the uniqueness of America's experiences as a nation makes its political principles inapplicable to the problems of other nations.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961. Traces the intellectual origins of Washington's departing advice to his countrymen, finding his ideas about the nature of international politics in the views of early eighteenth-century English thinkers.

Graebner, Norman A., ed. *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1964. Presents countering arguments in all the major realist-idealist debates in American history.

Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. *The Federalist Papers.* New York, 1961. Written originally as tracts supporting the proposed U.S. Constitution, includes coherent realist arguments in favor of strong centralized control of foreign affairs and national defense.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950.* Chicago, 1951. An ex-American diplomat's denunciation of utopianism in foreign affairs and advocacy of an elitist conduct of statecraft.

Kristol, Irving. *On the Democratic Idea in America.* New York, 1972. The chapter "American Intellectuals and Foreign Policy" attacks the validity of the notion that concrete foreign policy decisions can be judged according to abstract principles.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1951. A leading American realist's arguments in favor of judging international events according to the realities of interest and power.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. *The Irony of American History.* New York, 1952. Argues that America's pre-1941 experiences as a nation provide poor groundwork for purposeful existence in a world of competing rival nations.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century.* Chicago, 1953. Offers a historical account of the enduring dispute among America's realists and idealists, particularly useful for its treatment of concrete episodes of controversy.

Perkins, Dexter *The American Approach to Foreign Policy.* Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass., 1962. A forceful defense of the vitality of democratic principles in the conduct of foreign relations.

See also DOCTRINES; EXCEPTIONALISM; INTERNATIONALISM; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; OPEN DOOR POLICY; POWER POLITICS; SELF-DETERMINATION; WILSONIANISM.

RECIPROCITY

Robert Freeman Smith

Reciprocity in diplomatic negotiations is a process of exchange between nations, a negotiating tool whereby nations bargain with each other for equivalent treatment. It can be either restrictive or open in nature. The restrictive form usually is embodied in a bilateral agreement between two countries and can involve privileges (or different types of treatment) that are denied to other parties, or that must be specifically bargained for by third parties. For the United States, the latter type of quasi-restrictive reciprocity was embodied in the conditional most-favored-nation principle, which was part of almost every commercial treaty negotiated between 1778 and 1922. This was not necessarily an exclusion policy, but it did require continued bargaining after an agreement was ratified, and it could lead to discriminatory practices. The term "restrictive reciprocity" also can be applied to agreements that affect only a limited number of items and leave various prohibitive discriminations intact.

Open reciprocity can be embodied either in bilateral treaties or in multilateral agreements. In general, it means that concessions granted to one nation are automatically extended to all others that have signed most-favored-nation agreements with the granting nation. Since the 1840s (and especially since the British shift to free trade), the unconditional version of the most-favored-nation principle has contributed to open reciprocity. Prior to the development of liberal trade policies, it only tended to generalize discrimination (or guarantee equality of discrimination), and in practice was as restrictive as the conditional version.

Open reciprocity is closely connected to a liberal trading system, with the emphasis on lowering barriers to international intercourse in as broad a manner as possible. Open reciprocity also applies to agreements that tend generally to abolish or modify discriminatory practices rather than provide for the privileged treatment of certain items.

The reciprocity concept has been applied to negotiations over tonnage dues on ships and goods, access to ports and rivers, access to markets, and various types of port fees and internal taxes. Starting in the eighteenth century, reciprocity negotiations also dealt with the equivalent treatment of foreign nationals, especially in matters of religious practice. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the meaning of reciprocity has been enlarged to include equal access to raw materials, the protection of foreign investments, aviation overflight and landing rights, treatment of tourists, and a host of financial matters involving such items as exchange controls and debt payments.

If the American concept of reciprocity only involved reciprocity as a bargaining tool, then the historical record would be one of treaty negotiations and little else. But in the historical experience of the United States, reciprocity has been more. It also has been a concept of international relations involving the breaking down of barriers to international intercourse and opposing closed or highly restrictive economic systems. Intimately related to this has been the idea of a peaceful world based upon complete reciprocity, with nations freely exchanging goods, services, and ideas. This conceptual and ideological aspect of reciprocity can be characterized as the open world schema. Bargaining reciprocity can take place, and has done so, on a matter-of-fact basis. But in the experience of the United States, it has been viewed generally as part of the larger world schema, as an instrument to help secure the broader objectives of an open world. There have been periods in American history when this relationship has been obscured or modified, as between 1860 and 1922, but overall the history of reciprocity has been a combination of diplomacy and of concept and ideal. The historical experiences and the cultural heritage of the United States have combined to give a peculiar and unique shape to the history of reciprocity in American foreign policy.

In its original format the concept of an open world of unlimited reciprocity was basically nonimperial. Many prominent leaders in the late eighteenth century broadly viewed reciprocity as rather the polar opposite of power politics, European-style mercantilism, and traditional imperialism. But in the years after American independence, the harsh realities of international politics produced modifications and compromises in the practice of reciprocity. Mercantilistic elements were introduced into American policy as part of the interplay between conflicting sectional and group ambitions and ideas of national interest. Similarly, the open world concept developed a peculiar duality during the nineteenth century. Such elements as the mercantilist idea of the need for economic and social "safety valves," perceptions of external threats, and the messianic thrust of the Redeemer Nation idea (that the United States was chosen by God to remake the world in both a religious and a secular sense) combined in the development of a restrictive and imperial version of the open world. This variant can be labeled the open-door view, and these dual versions of world order have competed and coexisted in American policy-making since the late nineteenth century. Like many historical developments, the reciprocity policies and concepts of the United States have been afflicted by ambiguity and paradox.

1776–1830

The first treaty signed by the infant republic was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France in 1778. The preamble to the document stated that equitable and permanent commercial relations between the two countries

> could not be better obtained than by taking for the basis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity, and by carefully avoiding all those burdensome preferences which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment, and discontent; . . . and by founding the advantage of commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse, reserving withal to each party the liberty of admitting at its pleasure other nations to a participation of the same advantages.

Writing in 1823, John Quincy Adams declared that this preamble "was to the foundation of our commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, what the Declaration of Independence was to that of our internal government. The two instruments were parts of one and the same system matured by long and anxious deliberation of the founders of this Union in the ever memorable Congress of 1776." To the younger Adams, "the most perfect equality and reciprocity" constituted the "cornerstone" for the commercial foreign policy of the United States. And, he argued, it was the United States that first proclaimed not only the political ideals of equality and independence but also the "true principles of all fair commercial negotiations between independent states."

Adams may have been indulging in a bit of nationalistic enthusiasm, but he was generally accurate concerning the origins of the American policy of reciprocity and the pioneering role of the United States in promoting a liberal international commercial system. The American concept of reciprocity was shaped by a mixture of the colonial experience and eighteenth-century economic liberalism. During the first three-quarters of the century, the British North American colonies made substantial gains in international shipping. By 1776 they were already a major power engaged in carrying not only domestic goods but also the goods of other nations. In fact, shipping provided a major source of colonial income.

Yankee merchants were not noted for their adherence to mercantilist restrictions on trade. They pushed into the Caribbean and the Mediterranean and to the coasts of Africa, often violating the imperial restrictions of France, Spain, and even Britain. Of course, they enjoyed the privileges of the British Empire even though they did not obey the extracolonial restrictions of the Navigation Acts. In short, the Yankee merchants were breaking down trade barriers by various means prior to 1776, and before Adam Smith put the thoughts on paper, they were firm believers in the liberty to "truck, barter, and exchange." In his *Summary View of the Rights of British America* (1774), Thomas Jefferson argued that the colonists had a "natural right" to trade freely with all parts of the world. Many of the Founders saw the new nation as a preeminent commercial republic where prosperity and independence would be ensured by the free flow of goods and ships.

The ideas of English liberals and French philosophes reinforced the commercial experience of American colonials and added new dimensions to their concept of international commercial relations. Adam Smith summarized many of these ideas in his book, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), but the themes of distribution of labor among nations, comparative advantage, and unrestricted commerce had already been developed by

various English and French thinkers. The French Physiocrats argued that the unrestricted flow of goods among the nations would replace power politics and war, since merchants were "citizens of the whole world." Many of the policymakers of the new American republic were quite familiar with these ideas. Economic liberalism in international commerce not only coincided with their concept of the interests of the United States, but also justified the mission of the nation to promote a new system of international relations. Thus, the Founders viewed reciprocity as a bargaining tool and as an integral part of a peaceful, open world order based on equality of treatment and the free flow of goods and ships.

These ideas were first spelled out in the Model Treaty that the Continental Congress adopted in 1776 for purposes of negotiating with France. John Adams drafted the treaty with the assistance of John Dickinson, Benjamin Harrison, Robert Morris, and Benjamin Franklin. He probably was influenced by the writings of Thomas Paine. The latter's *Common Sense* (1776) had expressed the idea that America's "plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of all Europe, because it is the interest of all Europe to have America as a free port." Adams and the other committee members generally agreed with this proposition and believed that the principles of the Model Treaty would ensure the independent existence of the United States. They hoped that the offer of "perfect" commercial reciprocity would repeal the British Navigation Acts as they affected America, and secure French assistance without involving the nation in the European alliance system. Adams's Model Treaty clearly defined "perfect" reciprocity as complete equality of treatment; France and the United States were to make no distinctions between natives and the citizens of the other country (the doctrine of reciprocal national treatment). This was freedom of trade in the eighteenth-century context, which meant equality of treatment rather than elimination of all duties and dues (the definition that developed in the nineteenth century).

The Model Treaty was a fine declaration of American hopes and aspirations, but it was grounded on an exaggerated idea of the value of American trade to France and other nations. The American principles were stated in the preamble to the commercial treaty of 1778. The French, however, were not willing to grant national treatment; the Americans had to settle for most-favored-nation treatment in the "King's European dominions" and admission to established free ports in the French colonies. French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, did add a special proviso that created the conditional version of the most-favored-nation clause. Accordingly, if either party to the treaty granted a special commercial favor to a third party, this favor would not be granted automatically to the other signatory; an equivalent compensation would be required if the third party had paid a price. The historian Vernon Setser has argued that Vergennes added the proviso to demonstrate to the world that France was not demanding special privileges from the United States. This interpretation of reciprocity was added to the treaty without much discussion or analysis.

The negotiations of the French commercial treaty clearly revealed the impact of external circumstances on the American concept of "perfect reciprocity." In addition, they also indicated the role of internal political and economic factors in modifying the use of reciprocity. The original draft contained a reciprocal prohibition on certain export duties; the French would drop export duties on molasses shipped from the West Indies to the United States, and the latter would drop such duties on all domestic products sent to the French islands. A majority of Congress opposed this article, and it was suppressed. This incident was a mild foretaste of future domestic battles over the nature and use of reciprocity.

An independent United States faced an international system in which all the major participants followed restrictive, monopolistic policies. The anticipated trade bonanza did not materialize, and the nation was now cut off from almost all of the formerly lucrative West Indian trade. The closing of the British islands was especially painful. In 1782, John Adams negotiated a commercial treaty with the Netherlands, but the Dutch would agree only to a most-favored-nation clause and not to reciprocal national treatment. The conditional clause was omitted, because its utility had not yet been recognized.

The policymakers of the Confederation government began to realize that their nation's economic and political position allowed it almost no bargaining power. As minister to France, Jefferson realized that the most-favored-nation principle worked to the disadvantage of the nation with the most liberal system. In practice, French traders had almost the same rights in the United States as natives, since the United States had very few

restrictions on trade. In contrast, the French controlled the entry of goods, even into free ports, by subjecting trade to the monopolistic control of the Farmers General. This group fixed the quantity and price of goods admitted. The most-favored-nation principle only granted the United States equal discrimination. In 1785, Jefferson launched an attack on the French monopolies with the assistance of the Marquis de Lafayette, but the results were very limited. Indeed, as Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts noted, under existing circumstances the most-favored-nation principle was a system of "cobwebs to catch flies."

Jefferson realized that in a world of monopolies, the United States had few favors to grant because it had a relatively open economic system. In such a world, commercial restrictions obviously meant bargaining power. During the 1780s, Congress devoted considerable attention to this dilemma, and to the lack of congressional power to enact navigation laws and regulate trade. A special committee reported in 1784: "It will certainly be admitted that unless the United States can act as a nation and be regarded as such by foreign powers, and unless Congress for this purpose shall be vested with powers competent to the protection of commerce, they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade; and without such reciprocity, our foreign commerce must decline and eventually be annihilated."

In the spring of 1785 another committee studied these problems, and its recommendations marked a distinct modification in the concept of perfect reciprocity. The committee noted that without authority to impose restrictions, "reciprocity means nothing and foreign powers may follow what policy they please." It also recommended that treaties were not needed with nations that had no colonies, since the United States must consider giving special advantages in return for some trading rights in the West Indies (and the most-favored-nation principle would prohibit such special advantages).

Various proposals were made during the 1780s to amend the Articles of Confederation or to request the states to provide Congress with more power. The states could not agree, however, and nothing happened. Some states did impose commercial restrictions on their own; but the effect was limited because several states, including Connecticut, took advantage of the restrictions of others by acting as a free entrepôt.

During negotiations with the British in October 1782, Congress formally recognized the use of the conditional most-favored-nation principle as a bargaining device. The draft commercial treaty provided for the reciprocal free navigation of all rivers, lakes, and harbors. Congress insisted that a conditional most-favored-nation clause be added so that other nations would have to "purchase them [navigation privileges] by a reciprocal grant." The negotiations for a commercial treaty were dropped, however, when the British issued an order in council closing the West Indies to American ships.

By 1787 a number of American leaders generally agreed that the United States could not obtain any effective degree of reciprocity without a national government possessing the power to regulate commerce both externally and internally. This sentiment was part of the movement for a constitutional convention, and the document produced at Philadelphia reflected the congressional debates of the Confederation government. The new Constitution provided much of the power that the advocates of commercial diplomacy had demanded; the international scene had not changed, however, and, internally, sectional and group interests provided a continuing debate over the exact use of the power.

Generally, the debate took place between two groups. One was led by Alexander Hamilton (secretary of the Treasury) and George Washington, the other by James Madison (a U.S. representative) and Thomas Jefferson (secretary of state until 1793). All of these men agreed that perfect reciprocity was not possible in the world of the late eighteenth century, and that as a result some important modifications would have to be made in the practical uses of reciprocity. They also had retreated from the dreams of a world thirsting for American trade. Most of them still retained some hope that eventually the policies of the United States might lead to an open world of unrestricted trade, but in the interim their main concern was what immediate steps could be taken to ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation. The two groups disagreed significantly not over basic principles, but over tactics and the interpretation of primary interests.

Madison and Jefferson believed that a considerable degree of economic independence could be obtained immediately through a modified system of exclusive reciprocity. They wanted to break the British monopoly on American trade by enacting a navigation law that would favor continental nations and encourage bargaining through discriminatory duties and dues that would affect

nations discriminating against the United States. Jefferson explained the need for discrimination in his final report as secretary of state in December 1793. He began by extolling the physiocratic ideals of open trade as the best course for human happiness, then added:

> But should any nation contrary to our wishes suppose it may better find its advantage by continuing its system of prohibitions, duties, and regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce, and navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties, and regulations, also. Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and vexations, nor are they likely to produce a relaxation of them.

Jefferson hoped that an initial policy of exclusive reciprocity would eventually produce a system of open trade.

Hamilton considered such a retaliation policy to be a declaration of commercial war against Britain. He was convinced that in the short run the United States should accept economic subordination and British restrictions because import duties, largely derived from trade with Britain, were vital to the economic development of the country. His goal was economic independence through the development of domestic industry. Hamilton and Washington opposed any measures designed to force reciprocity and proclaimed a simple policy of equal treatment for all nations. Thus, they hoped to buy time and not be drawn into European controversies.

The first congressional battle over commercial policy continued from 1789 to 1795. In July and August 1789, Congress passed four acts that laid the foundation for a new commercial system. These were the Tariff of 1789, the Tonnage Act, the act to regulate the collection of duties, and the act for registering and clearing vessels. They provided protection for American industry and shipping but did not discriminate against any foreign country in particular. All foreign vessels were required to pay fifty cents per ton, in comparison with six cents for American ships. A 10 percent discount on customs duties was provided on dutiable goods imported in American ships, a provision changed in 1790, after which merchandise imported in American ships paid the normal duty and a 10 percent surcharge was added to all goods imported in foreign ships. Madison had attempted to add further discriminatory tonnage dues for nations that had not negotiated commercial agreements with the United States. He was not successful then, or in his subsequent efforts to enact retaliatory measures, such as closing American ports to vessels that came from ports closed to American ships.

Jay's Treaty (1794) settled several outstanding questions between the United States and Britain and provided for some reciprocity. Trade with the British Isles was opened on a most-favored-nation basis, and provisions were made for reciprocal trade across the Canadian border. The West Indies remained closed, however, because the Senate rejected the clause providing for a very limited access and a prohibition on exports of certain agricultural products from the United States. Opponents of the treaty claimed that a policy of exclusive reciprocity would have done more to break down the restrictive systems. In his Farewell Address, however, Washington defended the noncoercive method of obtaining reciprocity, which he characterized as "consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing."

Between 1796 and 1815, American leaders did very little about reciprocity. The wars in Europe generally stimulated exports and led to the relaxation of restrictions (especially in the West Indies). Questions of neutral rights and impressment took precedence over matters that appeared less urgent. In fact, Congress refused to act on a reciprocity bill, proposed in 1802, that would have allowed, for any nation that would reciprocate by repealing its similar legislation, the abolition of the discriminatory tonnage dues on ships and the customs surcharges on the produce of the country owning the vessel. Rufus King had negotiated such an arrangement with Britain, and a bill providing for repeal had even been rushed through Parliament.

In 1815 the United States government, in a burst of nationalistic vigor, launched an attack on the restrictive systems of the European states. American leaders were determined to open the world to U.S. shipping and to make reciprocity an effective tool in breaking down the "excluding and exclusive" policy of the old colonial order. The first step was the passage of the Reciprocity Act of 1815. This was the proposal that had been rejected in 1802, and it affected only the direct trade between countries. Several months later, the United States and Great Britain signed a convention that reciprocally abolished all discriminatory duties and dues levied on ships and goods in the direct trade. (This convention was still in force in 2001.) In April 1818, Congress passed a special reciprocity act providing that discriminating

duties on goods shipped from the Netherlands would be dropped, not only for goods produced by the Dutch but also for "such produce and manufactures as can only be or most usually are first shipped from a port or place" in the Netherlands. According to this broader principle, national treatment would be accorded all goods that a country normally exported even if they were not produced within that country. In January 1824, Congress extended this principle to Prussia, the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg, Sardinia, the dukedom of Oldenburg, and Russia.

In his annual message in December 1825, President John Quincy Adams recommended that the rule of complete reciprocity be adopted, and that all discriminatory duties and dues be dropped for those countries that would do the same for the United States. The origin of goods no longer would be a factor. In the same month Secretary of State Henry Clay negotiated a treaty of complete reciprocity with the Central American Federation. He considered this to be a model treaty and later wrote, "All the shackles which the selfishness or contracted policy of nations had contrived, are broken and destroyed by this broad principle of universal liberality."

By the Marine Reciprocity Act of 1828, Congress gave the president power to proclaim complete reciprocity with all reciprocating nations. In the next few years, this principle was embodied in more than thirty commercial treaties negotiated by the United States. In 1830, Congress repealed the tonnage dues on American ships and offered the same concession to the vessels of any nation that would extend such treatment to American ships.

The attempt to apply reciprocity to the West Indian trade proved to be more difficult. Congress utilized retaliation against the British in the Navigation Acts of 1818 and 1820. The first closed all American ports to British ships that came from ports closed to the United States. The second applied the closing to British ships coming from any colonial port in America, and prohibited the importation of goods from British colonial ports, even in American ships, unless the goods came directly from the producing colony. The latter provision was designed to block the circuitous trade through Bermuda, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The British Parliament offered a liberalization of the West Indies trade in 1822, and the United States relaxed its restrictions by presidential proclamation and by an act of Congress in March 1823. President Adams did not respond to subsequent British offers of relaxation, but President Andrew Jackson accepted these in 1830. As a result, reciprocal trade relations between the United States and the British West Indies (with some exceptions) were established. Negotiations with France and Sweden concerning their West Indian colonies led to reciprocal agreements in 1828 and 1837. The Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico had been closed officially, but the regulations were not enforced. In 1830, Spain accepted a United States consul for Cuba, and trade between the United States and Cuba increased.

Official U.S. attitudes and policies toward the newly independent nations of Latin America were part of the same ideological structure that produced the reciprocity system. John Quincy Adams stressed this in 1822 when he informed Stratford Canning, the British minister to Washington, that the "liberation of the Spanish colonies would mean the end of exclusive commercial policies everywhere." The Latin American policy of the Monroe and Adams administrations was aimed at establishing reciprocity as a key element in inter-American relations, and preventing the reestablishment of the old colonial order of economic mercantilism and political authoritarianism. In May 1823, Secretary of State Adams stressed the U.S. policy "to counteract the efforts which it cannot be doubted European negotiations will continue to make in the furtherance of their monarchical and monopolizing contemplations." In regard to Latin America he noted, "The only object which we shall have much at heart in the negotiation [on commercial relations] will be the sanction by solemn compact of the broad and liberal principle of independence, equal favors, and reciprocity." In addition, Adams hoped that the principle of complete national treatment of foreigners would be established in the hemisphere, and that all discriminating duties would be abolished.

To Adams and Monroe, the open world was to be established first in the Western Hemisphere. And the Monroe Doctrine was, in part, a general declaration of these aspirations. Commercial freedom was an important part of the American rivalry with the European system, but the authors of the Monroe Doctrine envisioned the "American system" in a broader sense. As Adams pointed out in his policy statement of May 1823: "Civil, political, commercial, and religious liberty, are but the various modifications of one great principle, founded in the unalienable rights of human nature, and before the universal application of which the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere has fallen."

During the 1820s and subsequently, the gap between power and aspirations would limit the efforts of the United States. During the 1820s, treaties embodying commercial reciprocity were negotiated with Colombia and Brazil, but economic liberalism in the hemisphere would not become a widespread reality for more than a century. Adams and Monroe did, however, proclaim the integral nature of reciprocity, the open world, and a Western Hemisphere independent of the European colonial system.

1830–1860

By 1830 the American push for commercial reciprocity was bringing results, and discriminatory barriers to trade were falling rapidly. In fact, the Western world was entering a period of widespread commercial liberalism. Leading British statesmen were pushing for reciprocity and for the general elimination of customs duties. The British Corn Laws were repealed in 1846, the Navigation Acts were abolished three years later, and the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 with France greatly stimulated free trade in Europe. During this period the meaning of free trade was expanded to encompass the elimination or reduction of all tariffs on goods.

With a few exceptions, the United States participated in the trend that it had helped to promote. Tariff rates generally dropped after 1832. The "Black Tariff" of 1842 was highly protective, but the Walker Tariff of 1846 dropped the rates, and the Tariff of 1857 pushed them even lower. In his 1845 report, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Walker identified "reciprocal free trade" with low duties and argued that such a policy "would feed the hungry and clothe the poor of our fellow-men throughout all the densely peopled nations of the world." The Democratic Party pushed for lower duties, and the platform of 1856 pledged the party to a policy "in favor of free seas, and progressive free trade throughout the world." One of the Democratic Party's main areas of strength was the agricultural South, and farmers opposed protective tariffs because they raised prices on the manufactured goods they purchased. During this period, many large industries wanted protection from foreign competition and the Republican Party favored industry over agriculture.

The United States–Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 constituted a milestone in this expanded definition of reciprocity, establishing almost complete free trade in natural products between the two countries. It also provided for the joint use of the Atlantic coast fisheries and for reciprocal transit rights in canal systems, the St. Lawrence River, and Lake Michigan.

During this period another version of reciprocity and the open world began to emerge. This was the right and duty of the "Christian nations" to force closed states to trade and to accept the Western system of commercial rights. John Quincy Adams praised the British during the Opium War with China for forcibly upholding the natural right of free commerce among nations. According to Adams, the "righteous cause" of Britain was not opium but the principle of "equal reciprocity." He also hoped that the peace treaty would establish future trade with China "upon terms of equality and reciprocity." Perhaps Adams and others did not necessarily envisage the system of rather unequal treaty relations that developed after the 1840s, but he had completely accepted the idea that the Western nations had the right and duty to force the "backward," or non-Christian, nations to accept the Western presence and systems. During these years, however, the open-door version of reciprocity was still in its infancy, and very limited in its application.

The United States followed Britain in the opening of China and took the lead in opening Japan. In the process, Americans altered the interpretation of reciprocity. As in commercial treaties with Morocco (1836) and Zanzibar (1837), the treaties with Japan (1854) and China (1858) provided unconditional most-favored-nation treatment for the United States in those countries. However, the United States did not give most-favored-nation treatment in return. In addition, China and Japan accorded the United States the privilege of extraterritoriality, which meant that in many cases Chinese and Japanese laws did not apply to Americans. The United States did not grant reciprocal privileges because American officials did not regard reciprocity in "backward" nations as a two-way street. The United States did continue to stress the principle of equality of treatment for all foreign interests.

1860–1922

After 1860 the United States moved into a period of increasingly high tariffs. At the same time, the American economy became much more diversified, encompassing both commercial agriculture

and industry. Various groups within these sectors disagreed on market priorities and the need for a protective tariff. This conflict carried over into political debates and made the tariff one of the primary political issues of the period. For the most part, the Republican Party supported high tariffs and the Democratic Party campaigned for reduction. Both, however, reflected the diverse nature of the economy and the concomitant effect on tariff views. As a result, most tariff acts were complicated bundles of regional, group, and political demands. Some free trade sentiment continued. In *Free Land and Free Trade* (1880), Samuel S. Cox argued that "under its benignant influence, the enmities, wars and brutalities of men will yield to concordant reciprocity." The physiocratic ideal had slipped on the American value scale, however, and the dominant protectionist group stressed national independence based on the home market. They agreed that world peace and internationalism were fine aspirations, but decidedly unrealistic in a world of nation-states. The reductionists wanted low tariffs but not free trade. Another group emerging in the 1870s stressed a limited form of reciprocity as a compromise between absolute protectionism and reduction, thus reflecting a combined interest in some home market protection and a vigorous push for foreign markets.

Internationally, protectionism surged during the late 1870s and 1880s. Ironically, American economic strength contributed to this reversal. The Bismarck tariff of 1879 reflected the desertion of free trade by the German agrarian conservatives in the face of American competition. The protective push was renewed after 1902, except for Britain.

Reciprocity underwent changes after 1860 in response to new priorities and interests. A rigidly exclusive version of reciprocity was utilized. American officials sought preferential agreements and special privileges, especially concerning customs duties. As a symbol of this trend, the nonexclusive Canadian Reciprocity Treaty was abrogated in 1866.

Reciprocity was also used to secure political advantages for the United States as part of exclusive economic arrangements. The first political use of reciprocity came in 1875 with the Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty. The Hawaiians gave the United States special economic privileges that were denied to other nations, and in return Hawaiian sugar was given preferential treatment in the United States market. In addition, the Hawaiian government agreed not to make any territorial grants or to lease ports to other powers. The British protested that this treaty violated their most-favored-nation agreement with Hawaii, but the United States replied that this was a "special and extraordinary" case arising from "geographical and political reasons." This was the beginning of a limited United States imperial preference system that after 1900 was extended to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine islands (the latter two by act of Congress). When the renewed treaty was ratified in 1887, the United States received exclusive rights to the use of Pearl Harbor. The Cuban Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 had been promised by Secretary of War Elihu Root to the members of the Cuban Constitutional Convention in order to secure their acceptance of the Platt Amendment. The treaty provided more privileges for Cuba in the American market than the United States received in Cuba. However, American officials believed the treaty would ensure Cuban prosperity and the strengthening of American influence by peaceful means.

During the 1870s the administration of Rutherford B. Hayes considered other reciprocity treaties, but only the Hawaiian treaty reached completion. In the early 1880s, Secretary of State James G. Blaine became a vigorous proponent of reciprocity as a means of opening markets, especially in Latin America, and broadening the domestic support of the Republican Party. Blaine initiated talks with Mexico, which were completed in 1882 by his successor, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. The latter, with the support of President Chester A. Arthur, also started negotiations with the Dominican Republic, Spain (for Cuba and Puerto Rico), El Salvador, Colombia, and Great Britain (for the West Indies). Treaties were negotiated with the first two in 1884, and both emphasized tariff reductions or eliminations for American manufactured goods. The Mexican treaty also gave the United States a privileged concession by eliminating Mexican interstate taxes on American goods.

Rigid protectionists stalled consideration on these treaties. The Senate approved the Mexican treaty but added a proviso calling for enabling legislation by the House. This was not given, and the treaty lapsed. President Grover Cleveland withdrew the Spanish and Dominican treaties, and ended the other negotiations.

Blaine returned to the State Department and the reciprocity struggle in 1889. One of his first efforts was to push for a customs union at the

Conference of American States (1889–1890). The Latin American states did not approve such a bold and exclusionary move, but they did recommend the negotiation of individual reciprocity treaties.

Blaine then began a campaign to have reciprocity bargaining powers included in the tariff bill being drafted by Congress. After much maneuvering, Congress finally included in the McKinley Tariff of 1890 a provision for a very restricted penalty method of bargaining. Sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides (the "tropical list") were placed on the free list. The president was given the power to restore these items to the dutiable list for any country that had duties on American products that "he may deem to be reciprocally unjust or unreasonable." In addition, the president was given the power to negotiate reciprocity treaties with countries to bind the specified items on the free list. These did not require Senate approval. In 1891 and 1892 the United States concluded such agreements with ten countries. Eight treaties concerned the Western Hemisphere, and seven of these involved nations or possessions in the Caribbean and Central America. Penalty duties were imposed on three Western Hemisphere nations when they refused to make concessions.

The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 did not include bargaining provisions and undermined the agreements by reimposing the duty on sugar. Subsequently, the Republican Party, with some internal dissent, adopted reciprocity as a compromise position designed to secure the principle of protective tariffs yet give some consideration to groups arguing that the country had to build up foreign trade. "Protection and Reciprocity are twin measures of Republican policy and go hand in hand," the platform of 1896 declared. William McKinley became president in 1897 and immediately pressed Congress for a new tariff act that would ease the protective system and modify the policy of exclusive reciprocity.

The Dingley Tariff of 1897 increased duties but provided for three types of reciprocity treaties. The first was a limited version of the 1890 penalty-bargaining section. The new tropical list of free items consisted of coffee, tea, tonka beans, and vanilla beans. The only treaty of any consequence negotiated under this section was a reciprocity agreement with Brazil in 1904. Brazilian coffee remained on the free list (more than 50 percent of the crop), and the Brazilian government gave a 20 percent reduction on many American products.

The second and third types of reciprocity bargaining reflected the administration's growing concern over trade with Europe and the retaliatory measures enacted by countries such as France. These sections of the tariff act provided for concessionary bargaining. The second type authorized the president to negotiate agreements with countries exporting argol (crude tartar used in winemaking), brandy, champagne, all other sparkling wines, vermouth, paintings, and statuary. If "reciprocal and equivalent concessions" were given to American goods, the president was empowered to grant specified lower duties. The McKinley administration concluded four of these "argol agreements," and the administration of Theodore Roosevelt signed nine more. None of these had any significant effect.

The third type of bargaining provision marked an important modification in the system of exclusive reciprocity and had some potential for trade liberalization. It authorized the president to negotiate reciprocity treaties that could lower duties up to 20 percent on all goods. He also could negotiate the transfer to the free list of goods not produced in the United States. However, such treaties would have to be approved by both houses of Congress and would have five-year limitations.

President McKinley had appointed a reciprocity commission in 1897, under the leadership of John Kasson. This commission negotiated the treaties authorized by the tariff act, and thirteen of these (called the Kasson treaties) were under the provisions of the third section of the act. The treaty with France was the most significant, since it shifted most American products to the minimum schedule. However, the protectionists in Congress would not accept the Kasson treaties, realizing that the executive branch was proposing an important step toward open reciprocity concerning customs duties. In 1901, McKinley took the reciprocity fight to the public. In his last speech, at Buffalo, New York, a few hours before his assassination, he declared: "The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. . . . Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not."

McKinley's death took much of the drive out of the reciprocity movement. The National Reciprocity Convention was held in November 1901, under the auspices of the National Association of Manufactures, and the National Reciprocity League was organized in 1902. Neither had any

effect on congressional protectionists, and the executive branch under Theodore Roosevelt did not press the issue. As a result, the treaties failed, but a pattern had developed that still characterizes the reciprocity struggle. Leadership for trade liberalization through reciprocity would come from the executive branch and would encounter resistance from a Congress representing diverse interests.

The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1908 repealed all of the reciprocity agreements made by the Kasson commission. It did, however, mark a slight shift in bargaining objectives from special concessions to equality of treatment. The act set minimum rates and provided for penalty rates in cases of undue discrimination.

The reciprocity movement revived during the administration of William Howard Taft because of various political and economic factors. Taft, under considerable pressure to revise the tariff, believed that some limited reciprocity was needed to save the protective system. Canada seemed to offer several advantages for such a move, and a reciprocity treaty was negotiated in 1911. Newspapers rushed to support the treaty because of the provision for free admission of paper and wood pulp. The U.S. Congress approved the treaty, but it was rejected by the Canadian Parliament.

The Democratic-sponsored Underwood-Simmons Act of 1913 provided for a significant lowering of the tariff and the elimination of penalty bargaining. One section authorized trade agreements containing reciprocal concessions, but none were negotiated. The act also contained a peculiar reversion to the 1790s: lower duties for goods imported in American ships, unless existing treaties prohibited the discrimination. World War I soon obliterated all questions of reciprocity and bargaining, and the negotiating potential of the act was never tested. Protectionist pressures mounted after the war, leading to the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921.

Reciprocity as part of a concept of world order was a limited and inconsistent part of the open-door concept that reached maturity in the 1890s. Equality of opportunity and nondiscrimination tended to be applied to competition with other industrial powers in Asia and Africa, areas where American power was limited. In its new colonial empire the United States enforced a discriminatory commercial system and, despite the open-door rhetoric, the government made some efforts to achieve a privileged position in various Latin American countries. The effects were limited to the Caribbean and Central America. The administration of Woodrow Wilson tried to expand the Monroe Doctrine to include the restriction of European economic activity in these areas.

American officials also used the arguments of equality of opportunity and nondiscrimination to justify the "right" of Americans to invest in underdeveloped countries and have access to their raw materials. In some cases they defended this position by citing reciprocity. When the Mexican government attempted some regulation of foreign oil companies after the adoption of the constitution of 1917, State Department officials argued that such action violated the principle of reciprocity, since Mexican capital in the United States was not subject to discriminatory treatment. For Mexico and other underdeveloped countries, this was a hypothetical argument, since there was little if any Mexican capital invested in the United States.

Revolutionary nationalism, with its concomitant policy of control or elimination of foreign investments and properties, first emerged during this period. The United States and other industrial-creditor nations attempted to meet the challenge with a special definition of openness that implied a limitation on the sovereignty of the expropriating or regulating nations. How far would the United States go, and what means would it use, to enforce the open door? This question dogged American policymakers throughout the twentieth century. The results were mixed, and even ambivalent, as a result of changing circumstances and interpretations of national interest.

Part of the ambiguity was caused by the revival of the noncoercive, open world view. The peace movement prior to 1914 sought some type of world order beyond the open door. And, paradoxically, Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points described a partial vision of an open world with the "removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." To some Americans, the League of Nations seemed to promise the establishment of an open world order. Although a mixed opposition prevented United States entry, various Americans continued to try to implement peace and reciprocity by other means.

1922–1975

After World War I the nations of Europe began to assert a greater degree of economic nationalism.

The unconditional most-favored-nation clause that had generalized bilateral tariff negotiations before the war was not effectively rehabilitated. After 1930 the Great Depression accelerated these trends, and a wide variety of new discriminatory economic tactics emerged. These included exchange controls, quotas, internal taxes on foreign goods, and the creation of vast preferential trading systems. The British created the imperial preference system in 1932, and Germany developed a similar structure using barter and a special currency that could be exchanged only for German goods.

Subject to the same pressures, the United States also exhibited some protective reactions. In the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Congress pushed the tariff to the highest levels in American history. In 1920, Congress attempted to restrict the entire commercial treaty system by "authorizing and directing" the president to scrap the existing treaties and thereby reimpose discriminatory tonnage duties on foreign ships. During the 1930s, Congress authorized import quotas on agricultural products, and imposed these in some cases. It also levied excise taxes on imports.

Paradoxically, the executive branch began gradually and sporadically to move against the prevailing trends and toward a revitalization of equality of treatment and reciprocity. By the latter half of the 1930s, the United States had emerged as the leading (and perhaps only) exponent of an open world commercial system.

All of the Republican administrations of the 1920s refused to implement the act providing for merchant marine discrimination. The Tariff Commission under William S. Culbertson launched a campaign to revitalize reciprocity by shifting the United States to the unconditional most-favored-nation principle. President Warren Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes accepted the argument that the conditional principle had produced "discriminatory reciprocity" and implemented the change. The tariff acts of 1922 and 1930 contained elastic clauses, advocated by the Tariff Commission, that authorized the president to raise or lower duties by 50 percent on a nondiscriminatory basis (that is, if the duty was reduced on an item, the reduction would apply to all nations, regardless of treaty status). This was not implemented because of the political conflicts involved.

The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt divided into two factions over the issue of economic nationalism, and followed a vacillating and even contradictory policy for several years. The home market group, led by George Peek of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, wanted import quotas and bilateral barter deals. In 1933 this group seemed to be winning the internal power struggle, especially when Roosevelt undermined Secretary of State Cordell Hull's liberalization efforts at the London Economic Conference.

Hull was the leader of the trade liberalization group. In many respects, he and other officials of the period were intellectual descendants of the philosophes, who believed that an open world based upon reciprocity in all areas was the only prescription for a peaceful world. The international scene of the 1930s provided a powerful argument for this position. Hull believed that economic nationalism had produced the collapse of the world economy and was continuing to provoke a vicious cycle of economic retaliation, militarization, and a struggle for privileged positions that could end only in war. In the last analysis, it was a struggle between open and closed economic systems, and between freedom and tyranny. The two were indivisible.

Hull's position gradually, and with some difficulty, gained ground after 1933. The victories were limited and mixed with contradictory elements. The first breakthrough came with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. This amendment to the tariff act of 1930 was a tactic that avoided a congressional battle over consideration of the entire tariff schedule. The president was empowered to conclude bilateral trade agreements that reduced duties as much as 50 percent. All such treaties were to incorporate the most-favored-nation principle, which was broadened to include negotiations over internal taxes, import prohibitions and quotas, and exchange controls. All treaties, however, were to contain the "Cuban exception" clause (allowing preferential treatment) and an "escape" clause.

Between 1934 and 1945 the United States concluded twenty-seven treaties, and tariff rates were reduced on average by 44 percent of their base rate. Hull's efforts to eliminate other forms of discrimination produced mixed results, and his attack on the British imperial preference system was shelved during World War II. Hull also used the reciprocity argument in demanding "equitable" treatment for U.S. interests in Latin America, arguing that the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States required reciprocal behavior. However, the administration did relax the insistence

on extraterritorial rights, as evidenced by U.S. policy toward Mexico's expropriation of the oil industry in 1938.

Planning for the postwar world by American officials cannot be comprehended adequately without an understanding of their intense belief, even to the point of obsession, that the United States must lead the way to an open world or face another cycle of depression and war. At times the intensity of this belief blinded them to other factors and produced a self-righteous image of the purity of American policies. The fears and ideological fervor engendered by the Cold War complicated and confused the push for an open world. In the years after 1945 many of the ideas and impulses associated with the imperial, open-door concept were reasserted, to coexist and compete with the open world view.

American officials wanted to make reciprocity an integral part of the postwar world order. Many hoped that the United Nations would lead the way in eliminating spheres of interest. In addition, the United States helped to create the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as means to restore multilateralism and nondiscrimination in international economic relations.

In 1947, twenty-three nations took another important step toward a liberal trading system by concluding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This agreement provided for multilateral reciprocity and included a code for fair trading in international commerce. In 1948, the U.S. Congress refused to ratify a charter that would have institutionalized GATT in the International Trade Organization, because Congress opposed the creation of an international body that would exercise control over U.S. trade policies. But GATT has survived through periodic conferences. By the 1970s, eighty nations accounting for more than 80 percent of total world trade had joined. In 1963 the national representatives of GATT relieved the underdeveloped nations within the system of the necessity to reciprocate fully for concessions granted by the more developed countries.

Since 1945 Congress has periodically extended the president's bargaining power and authorized additional reductions in the tariff. However, protectionist sentiment has moderated reciprocity and preserved some areas of discrimination. A "United States exception" clause was added to the GATT charter, in deference to American desires to retain import quotas on some agricultural products. In the 1950s, Congress also directed the president to place import quotas and embargoes on various products in the interest of national security. Oil import quotas were imposed in 1959, and during the 1950s similar restrictions were applied to such goods as Gouda cheese, safety pins, and dental burs.

Cold War antagonisms also produced some retreat from complete reciprocity. In 1950 the United States placed an embargo on all trade with the People's Republic of China and North Korea, and most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union and other communist nations was withdrawn in 1951. In 1960–1961 the government proclaimed an embargo on all trade with Cuba and tried to obtain European and Latin American cooperation; even to the point of blacklisting ships going to Cuba and forbidding them entry into United States ports. In August 1975 the Organization of American States abolished the "paper" embargo against Cuba. Subsequently, the United States eliminated the blacklist and other sanctions imposed on nations trading with Cuba. In May 1977, President James E. Carter began the process of restoring trade relations by authorizing Cuban purchases of food and medicine.

In August 1971, under mounting economic pressures, President Richard M. Nixon took several steps that seemed to imply a retreat from reciprocity and a shift to a decidedly nationalistic policy. The president suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, imposed a surcharge on imports and export quotas on soybeans, and threatened quotas on textile imports from Asia. Paradoxically, in June he had lifted the embargo on trade with China and removed some restrictions on wheat, flour, and grain shipments to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Subsequently, President Nixon removed or modified the restrictions imposed in 1971 and requested authority from Congress to enter a new round of GATT negotiations. In December 1974, Congress finally passed the Trade Act of 1974, an extensive bill that clearly revealed the duality of American policy. The Japanese described it as a "two-edged sword." The act gave the president broad new powers to bargain away various tariff and nontariff trade barriers, but it also provided for several retaliatory actions against "unfair trade practices." In the area of nontariff barriers, the president could negotiate pacts guaranteeing access to the products of other nations (with congressional approval required). This would allow the United States to enter a world food reserve program.

However, the president for the first time was given explicit authority to raise tariffs and tighten import quotas to deal with balance-of-payments deficits and import competition problems. The act also provided duty-free treatment (with some items excluded) for about one hundred underdeveloped nations, but the preferences were denied to nations enforcing export embargoes against the United States (aimed especially at those belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and not cooperating on expropriation and drug matters. Most-favored-nation treatment was authorized for communist nations that permitted free emigration (earlier acts had extended the principle to Poland and Yugoslavia). In 1975 most-favored-nation treatment was extended to Romania. The Soviet Union objected to the emigration provisions and withdrew the trade agreement (with most-favored-nation status) that had been negotiated earlier.

1974–2001

After eight rounds of GATT negotiations, this regime was finally transformed into the World Trade Organization in 1995. During its lifetime, average tariff rates on industrial products had been lowered from 40 percent in 1947 to 4 percent by the early 1990s. Although every U.S. administration supported liberalized trade, in fact, Cold War diplomacy took precedence over reciprocity until the 1990s. U.S. leaders tended to take a soft line when its allies or trade partners were less than faithful in this area.

Congress in 1974 renewed for five years the president's trade negotiating authority and established the fast track authority for considering trade legislation. The president promised regular consultation, and Congress gave up the right to amend any trade agreement and agreed to consider any agreement within ninety days. In this act Congress emphasized reciprocity with developed nations ("the harmonization, reduction, or elimination of devices which distort trade or commerce"). Congress, however, stated that it would not insist on full reciprocity for developing countries.

The seventh GATT (Tokyo) round of negotiations began in 1973 and lasted until November 1979. These negotiations stressed nontariff barriers for the first time. In many cases these had become more important than actual tariffs. Among other factors, health and safety regulations were quietly used to limit imports. The members approved a series of specialized, nontariff codes pertaining to countervailing duties, antidumping duties, subsidies, product standards, import licensing, and government procurement. Relatively few countries signed these codes, and a decade later the six nontariff codes had little effect outside of the European Community, the United States, and Japan.

After 1975 the U.S. trade deficit began to grow rapidly. In 1975 the United States had nearly a $1 billion surplus in trade with Asia, but by 1987 this had changed to a $101 billion deficit. During the 1980s, U.S. attempts to promote free trade and reciprocity faced difficult times. The administration of Ronald Reagan imposed some import restraints for steel, motorcycles, semiconductors, and automobiles. In the latter case, strong hints that Japan needed to head off congressional action led to voluntary limitations. Although Japan lowered its tariffs significantly after the Tokyo Round, foreign manufactured imports were impeded by restrictive marketing customs and through a combination of cultural loyalties and administrative guidance.

The Reagan administration also began a two-track approach to liberalizing trade. It urged GATT members to begin negotiations to expand the Tokyo Round Codes and it developed a bilateral approach to free trade agreements (FTAs). Such an agreement was signed with Israel in 1984 and Canada in 1987. The latter provided for some integration of the two economies. All tariffs and nontariff barriers were to be eliminated by 1998, and in the agricultural area all tariffs were to be eliminated during a ten-year period and nontariff barriers would be reduced. Several major controversies and legal challenges have developed in the agricultural area. To complicate matters, each nation continued to enforce its own antidumping and countervailing duty laws to imported goods. Publishing and communications were excluded from the nontariff provisions because of the Canadian policy of "protecting" its cultural heritage. Financial services were not included in this agreement.

President George H. W. Bush pushed for a trilateral free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. This North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in October 1992. Two of the most important elements were the investment provisions and the mandatory dispute settlement. Foreign investors, for the most part, received national treatment and various other safeguards. President Bill Clinton supported

NAFTA despite heated opposition from labor unions and his own party. He negotiated limited side agreements concerning labor and environmental issues but a majority of House Democrats voted against NAFTA. Businessman and 1992 presidential candidate Ross Perot predicted a "great sucking sound" of jobs moving south of the border.

Economic historian Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. has written an overall summary of the FTAs. He notes:

> Interestingly, the FTA's with Israel, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) represented significant departures from U.S. commitment to the multilateral GATT process. FTA provisions digressed somewhat from the principle of nondiscrimination, but arguably they complemented the overall objective of liberalizing trade in that bilateral FTA's sought to address specific issues not handled successfully in the GATT forum—agriculture, services, investments, intellectual property, and other non-tariff issues.

One of the most controversial aspects of NAFTA has been the binational panel process to revise the application of antidumping and countervailing duties. One of the three-member panel's first decisions was to reverse the U.S. Commerce Department's subsidy determination. It was later revealed that two of the Canadians on the panel had business and government connections that compromised their neutrality. A U.S. judge ruled that the process was flawed under U.S. law and ordered Canada to negotiate restraints on its softwood lumber exports to the United States. Some authorities believe, however, that the binational panels have been effective in "relatively routine" cases.

In early 2001 the United States and Mexico clashed over a Clinton administration refusal to allow Mexican trucks full access to U.S. highways—they were limited to a twenty-mile zone north of the border where they had to transfer their loads to U.S. trucks. A NAFTA arbitration ruled that the United States had violated the treaty. In May 2001 the U.S. government issued revised rules to meet the arbitration panel's ruling. Under the new rules, all Mexican trucks that operate in the United States must apply for permission and their companies must provide detailed information about their safety practices and show that they are in compliance with U.S. trucking regulations.

The United States and Canada were at odds over a U.S. ban on the import of potatoes from Prince Edward Island, on the grounds that potato wart fungus had been found in a field on the island. Canada referred the issue to NAFTA negotiations.

In April 2001 newly elected President George W. Bush provided the leadership for a Free Trade of the Americas initiative called Super NAFTA. A three-day summit meeting of hemisphere leaders in Quebec, Canada, hoped to outline a free trade zone that would wipe out most trade restrictions by 2005. If it comes to fruition it will be the greatest advance for reciprocity in the history of the world. The leaders ratified a plan barring undemocratic nations from the free trade zone. The so-called democracy clause would suspend the benefits of the free trade zone from any country that ceases to be a democracy. Cuba was the only nation excluded from the summit because of its totalitarian regime. An odd amalgamation of anarchists, communists, labor activists, environmentalists, New Agers, and others took to the streets in violent protests against free trade and capitalism in general. President Bush noted that he was willing to discuss their grievances, and in his address to the meeting, he stated that the proposed agreement had to be accompanied by a "strong commitment" to protecting the environment and improving labor standards. Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso pledged to push for "trade openings that are reciprocal and [to] help close rather than widen the disparities in our region."

The eighth round of GATT talks (the Uruguay Round) began in 1986. In 1984, 109 nations signed a new agreement to create a World Trade Organization to replace GATT and implement the last GATT accord. This final accord, in December 1993, cut overall import duties by about 40 percent, phased out import limits that made clothing and textiles more expensive, scaled back (but did not end) state support to farmers, boosted protection for copyrights and patents, and set new rules to help liberalize trade in services such as tourism. Separate accords also covered government contracts, dairy products, and beef. The World Trade Organization was given enforcement authority. In January 1995 the new accords became official.

For the next two years the WTO did very little and negotiations to extend free trade failed. In December 1996 a conference of ministers from 128 nations finally agreed to sweep away customs duties on computers, software, semiconductors, and hundreds of other information technology

products by 2000. Significant progress in telephone services negotiations was also made.

The mandatory dispute settlement provision has created a problem for the United States. In the WTO it has one vote, while the European Union, which negotiates as a bloc, has fifteen separate votes. And developing nations have 83 percent of the votes. But this disparity does not seem to have had serious consequences for the United States to date. In late 2000 the General Accounting Office testified that out of forty-two cases involving the United States as a plaintiff or defendant, America had won fourteen and lost eight; the remaining cases were decided through negotiation.

But in some areas reciprocity continues to take a beating. The European Union has set up trade barriers to U.S. beef produced with growth hormones and to bananas grown on American-run plantations in the Caribbean and Central America. In turn, the United States retaliated with $116.8 million in trade sanctions on a range of European goods. Negotiations in late 2000 failed. The EU did relax its ban on genetically modified organisms. This prepared the way for an end to Europe's moratorium on bioengineered seeds and food. But debates continued over the role of government subsidies in protecting industries. The United States pointed to British, French, and German low-interest loans to Airbus Industries in its efforts to build a rival to Boeing's jumbo jet. The French demanded the right to protect their film industry from U.S. competition and to extensive agricultural subsidies. In turn, the Europeans complained that the United States also provided massive support to farmers and used restrictive quotas and high tariffs to protect sectors such as sugar, peanuts, and tobacco.

Another complicating factor in reciprocity negotiations is the demand by labor unions, environmentalists, and leading Democrats that any agreements must include worker protection and environmental concerns. Robert Zoellick, the Bush administration's trade representative, argued that free trade should be about free trade and nothing else. According to Zoellick, "the WTO should not be seen as a global government with power to order new environmental or labor laws—or, for that matter, better tax regimes, pension plans, health programs, civilian control of militaries, or a host of other meritorious outcomes."

Trade with the People's Republic of China was an ongoing problem. For years the U.S. Congress annually reviewed China's trade status before voting on renewing most-favored-nation status. In 2000 the Clinton administration pushed to make this status permanent and even changed its name to "permanent normal trade relations." Under the terms of the new agreement, China consented to cut tariffs and restrictions on American agriculture, industrial products, banking, insurance, telecommunications, and movies. The United States agreed to accept Chinese membership in the WTO and give up its annual review of China's trade status. The opponents argued that with this deal the United States gave up its efforts to influence China's human rights policies. But in past annual reviews, the United States had never done anything except lecture the Chinese government. A new antidumping law took effect in 2001. Under its provisions, any company that proves it was harmed by "unfair competition" will be given protection by a special antidumping duty. The proceeds from this duty will be paid to the companies involved. For example, on behalf of the Diamond Sparkler Company, the U.S. government imposed a 93.4 percent import tax on Chinese sparklers. It is estimated that $100 million will be collected in 2001 as a result of all such special duties. The steel industry dominates the list of companies in line for the payments, with 46 percent of the 360 cases preliminarily qualified for payment.

According to the law, the funds received by each company can be used only for training, new technology, health benefits, pensions, and other specific items. That leaves the Customs Service with the problem of determining whether the funds are spent legally. Thus, the problem of "unfair competition" continues to plague reciprocity.

As of 2000, the European Union, Japan, Australia and several other countries had filed complaints with the WTO. The government of Canada warned that if duties levied against Canadian or Mexican products were turned over to competing U.S. companies, Canada will charge this to be a violation of NAFTA.

President George W. Bush in 2001 requested that Congress restore "fast track" negotiating authority to the president. The authority was first granted in 1974 and expired in 1994. Congress refused to renew it in 1997, because of congressional demands that environmental and labor rights protection be included in all trade negotiations. Under fast-track authority, Congress cannot amend a treaty—it can only approve or disapprove.

As in 1789, reciprocity in 2001 was buffeted and shaped by internal pressures and external circumstances. In the twentieth century the United

States emerged as the leader in the struggle for an open world based on reciprocity. Contradictions, limitations, and modifications are still present, but the world is more open and reciprocity is more widespread than in 1789. The ideas proclaimed in that earlier period are still a vital part of American foreign relations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bovard, James. *The Fair Trade Fraud.* New York, 1991. A very harsh denunciation of U.S. trade policies.

Culbertson, William Smith. *Reciprocity: A National Policy for Foreign Trade.* New York: London, 1937. A valuable source of information about reciprocity policy from the 1890s to the 1930s, especially good for the 1920s.

Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995.

Ellis, L. Ethan. *Reciprocity 1911: A Study in Canadian-American Relations.* New Haven, Conn., and Toronto, 1939. An intensive study of political and economic factors in both countries.

Evans, John W. *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT?* Cambridge, Mass., 1971. One of the best treatments of American commercial policy since the 1930s, although the focus is on the 1960s.

Gilbert, Felix. *To The Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961. A valuable analysis of the conflicting ideas that influenced the foreign policy concepts of the Founders; the main theme is the interaction and conflict between realism and idealism.

Hornbeck, Stanley K. "The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Commercial Treaties: Its Function in Theory and in Practice and Its Relation to Tariff Policies." *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin.* 343: Economics and Political Science series, 6, no. 2 (1910). Remains the most complete treatment of a generally ignored subject.

Kottman, Richard Norman. *Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1932–1938.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1968. One of the most detailed and well-researched discussions of the negotiations of reciprocal trade agreements with Canada and Britain.

Lovett, William A., Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., and Richard L. Brinkman. *U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory and the WTO.* Armonk, N.Y., 1999. A highly critical work on recent trade policy; argues that the U.S. must be much more aggressive in pushing for true reciprocity.

Low, Patrick. *Trading Free: The GATT and U.S. Trade Policy.* New York, 1993. An in-depth examination of the way GATT has worked.

Ratner, Sidney. *The Tariff in American History.* New York, 1972. A succinct history but needs supplementing for fine points and technicalities.

Setser, Vernon G. *The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 1774–1829.* Philadelphia and London, 1937. Absolutely essential to any understanding of economic foreign policy for the period; an intensive study based on multiarchival research.

Terrill, Tom E. *The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy 1874–1901.* Westport, Conn., 1973. A valuable analysis of economic policies and their relationship to domestic politics and economic factors.

Williams, Benjamin H. *Economic Foreign Policy of the United States.* New York, 1929. Still one of the best reference works for all aspects of the subject; organized topically with many details.

Zeiler, Thomas W. *Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999.

See also ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE; OPEN DOOR POLICY; TARIFF POLICY; TREATIES.

RECOGNITION

Paolo E. Coletta

Until a global organization competent to extend recognitions binding upon the world can be created, each state handles the question of recognition on the basis of national policy rather than international law. The principle of recognition can be traced back to the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who asserted that the obligation of a state remains unmodified despite changes made by constitutional, revolutionary, and other means. Given the large number of states and the peaceful or forcible changes often made in them (regular elections or successor states in the first instance; accretion, prescription, conquest, occupation, and cession in the second), and the application of recognition to belligerency as well as to statehood, the question of recognition remains a constant in the conduct of international relations.

DEFINITIONS OF "RECOGNITION"

All "new" states seek recognition from other states because recognition admits that a state has an international personality. All states have the legal duty to decide whether a "new" state meets certain conditions and therefore warrants being recognized. Does it have complete independence from parent and other states, exercise authority over a defined geographic area, enjoy the obedience of the great majority of its population, reveal willingness and ability to assume international obligations and duties?

Express recognition may be extended unilaterally in an explicit executive statement by one state or collectively following the agreement of several states. Recognition is implied if a state undertakes some sort of intercourse with another, as in concluding treaties with it or sending diplomatic representatives to it, without, however, having recognized it, thereby revealing at least intent to recognize it explicitly at a later time. A state's imposition of demands upon a community seeking recognition is a conditional type of recognition. Contingent recognition is generally reserved for acknowledgment by a parent state that a revolution against it has succeeded—indeed, it endorses the rupture. Recognition is granted by some states if a state is admitted to an international conference (for example, China, Persia, and Siam at the Hague Conference of 1907), or to an international organization (Ethiopia admitted to membership of the League of Nations in 1923, Syria and Lebanon admitted to the United Nations in 1945), or if a mother country grants independence to a former colony, mandate, or trusteeship.

Despite much argument over precise meanings, de facto recognition seems to mean a "qualified" or "provisional" recognition that subsequently may be withdrawn, whereas de jure recognition is final and irrevocable, indicates the legitimacy of title, and signifies closer political ties than de facto recognition. The phrase "de facto" has caused confusion because it has been applied indiscriminately in constitutional and international law and also with respect to recognition. De jure or de facto describes the character of the act of recognition, whereas recognition of a de facto or de jure government or state characterizes the status of the entity recognized. The courts or other agencies of the recognizing power, however, treat the validity of the acts of recognized powers in identical fashion, regardless of how they were recognized.

The determination of the government to be recognized, even of the "policy" governing such determination, is an executive function in the United States. In 1897, when congressional resolutions sought recognition of Cuban independence and United States mediation between Cuba and Spain, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee objected, saying, "Resolutions of their [nation's] legislative departments upon diplomatic matters have no status in international law."

President Grover Cleveland agreed—indeed, he said privately that he would not mobilize the army even if Congress declared war.

Controversies involving certain aspects of foreign affairs occasionally provoke conflict between the president and the courts, the latter of which may or may not agree to recognize a new state in legal proceedings and to enforce that state's laws in American territory. It is nevertheless possible to have *officieuses* ("officious") intercourse, as the French put it, with states that are denied recognition—for instance, by carrying on private undertakings in such fields as the recovery of property and exchange of persons.

A distinction is often made between "constitutive" (or "creative" or "positivist") and "declaratory" (or "de facto") recognition. According to the constitutive theory, prior to recognition a community possesses neither the rights nor the obligations associated with statehood. Moreover, recognition is a political rather than a legal action. The declaratory theory, denying the legal necessity for a community to be recognized as a state, holds that a community seeking recognition possesses many of the characteristics inherent in statehood but has no right to claim recognition as such. The constitutive doctrine remains the preferred one.

The precise timing of the acceptance of a new state into the community of nations thus may vary. The British colonists in America, for example, proclaimed their independence on 4 July 1776. Although Britain never formally recognized their belligerency, they were recognized as independent by France on 6 February 1778, when Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Britain recognized the United States as independent in the Peace of Paris of 3 September 1783. Not until the Nootka Sound controversy of 1789–1790 did it realize that the United States existed as a viable community. In consequence, in 1791 Britain sent a minister plenipotentiary and then began diplomatic relations with its former colony. A commercial treaty was not written, however, until Jay's Treaty of 1794. In accordance with the declaratory theory, the United States became a state when it declared its independence, 4 July 1776; in accordance with the preferred constitutive view, toward which Britain leans, the date is 6 February 1778, when it was recognized by France. In more recent years the question of timing arose in October 2000, after North Korean officials contacted British and German officials and requested recognition—already granted by Canada, Italy, and Australia. While on his way to a summit meeting in Seoul, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was asked by a reporter when he would grant recognition. Blair replied, "Diplomatic moves of that kind move at a leisurely pace. But we intend to give a positive response to the letter we received last month." German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder revealed a similar attitude.

U.S. POLICY IN THE RECOGNITION OF STATES

The distinction between a state and its government is made primarily for the purpose of recognition, since a state as a corporate person may continue after change has occurred in its government. Indeed, a state remains a state until it has been abolished. That recognition extends to a government rather than to a person was decided upon early in the American government and set a pattern followed by most states. When Louis XVI of France was deposed and beheaded in 1793, Alexander Hamilton argued that the supplanting of an admittedly tyrannous government by an equally tyrannous mob should go unrecognized and that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France should be considered suspended until a French government was formed. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson instead held that the French people had the inherent right to form their own government, and that the treaty should remain in full force regardless of change in the French government, because treaties, not governments, bind nations. President George Washington agreed with Jefferson and recognized the new French republic and subsequent governments, as did the British, although they were at war with France.

For its first century, the policy of the United States was to recognize de facto governments. (Despite many military coups and dictatorial governments established in Mexico between 1823 and 1860, for example, the United States withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Mexico City only three times, and that for only short periods.) In the early twentieth century this changed somewhat as a large element of moralism motivated the administration of Woodrow Wilson. Subsequent administrations reverted to the policy of "de factoism" during the 1920s and 1930s, but the United States refused to recognize forcible changes made in the territory or governments of victims of aggression, be the offender Japan, as in the case of Manchuria, the Soviet Union with

respect to the Baltic states, or Germany with respect to its conquest of western Europe during World War II. A policy of nonrecognition was followed toward the Baltic states until these were freed of Russian control at the end of the Cold War. The United States also obtained collective support for the policy from democratic European nations and the Latin American states.

Until Wilson's presidency, United States practice prior to extending recognition was to eschew the question of legitimacy and to demand effectiveness and evidence of popular consent, with the element of democratic legality proved by means of free elections. Although monarchic heads of state took as an open declaration of war by the French National Convention in 1792 that it would aid those seeking to recover their liberties, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson stated, "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the people, substantially declared." By adding, however, that he would deal in certain instances with a "government de facto," he has been declared a pioneer of "de factoism."

Rather than insisting rigidly that a new government have the consent of its people, the United States, recalling its own revolutionary origin, adopted the principle of the people's subsequent legitimation of a government deemed to be de facto. The result was that the United States almost automatically extended recognition to de facto governments even though it took into account the use of democratic processes by a new government and the latter's disposition to fulfill international obligations. Sometimes, however, Jefferson's dictum with respect to "the will of the nation" was "interpreted" so as to take on a tinge of legitimism and to equate legitimism with legality or constitutionalism, as under Secretary of State William H. Seward in the 1860s and under Wilson early in the twentieth century.

Legally, the quality of a state's civilization, municipal law, legitimacy, politics, and religion should not be weighed, but states sometimes pay attention, for reasons of national advantage, to constitutional, political, legal, commercial, and even partisan, moral, and humanitarian considerations before extending recognition. Excellent examples are available in President Wilson's relations with China, Mexico, and Bolshevik Russia. With respect to China, Wilson and his first secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, wished to see it become a constitutional republic freed from imperialistic powers and the clutches of American dollar diplomacy. They were also moved by humanitarian and moral considerations, for they spoke of love, brotherhood, and friendship. They therefore rejected a proposal of collective recognition made by Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and other powers and unilaterally recognized the government of Yüan Shih-k'ai on 2 May 1913, after which the European powers and Japan accorded formal recognition.

Abuse of the weapon of recognition appeared in especially aggravated form with respect to Mexico. Early in 1913, the government of Victoriano Huerta controlled about 80 percent of Mexico and had been recognized by twenty-eight states. Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee, counselor of the Department of State John Bassett Moore, and most American businessmen demanded its recognition. Wilson, however, demanded an orderly government that would not only protect Americans in Mexico and their large investments there—and perhaps keep out competing foreign investors, such as the British—but also fulfill the social aspirations of its people. The administration clearly meant to exercise a moral judgment upon Mexico's internal affairs and so apply the test of constitutionality before granting recognition.

Over a two-year period, Wilson obtained a recision of recognition from the important European and Latin American powers; violated U.S. neutrality laws by letting arms reach Huerta's constitutionalist opponents, even though he refused to recognize them as belligerents; probably made a "deal" over Panama Canal tolls in which Great Britain let the situation in Mexico become strictly an American affair; intervened militarily at Veracruz, and then grasped eagerly at mediation offered by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Huerta fled into exile in July 1914, but Wilson's relations with the government of Venustiano Carranza remained unhappy even though de facto recognition was granted to it in 1915. In 1918, Carranza's threat to make retroactive Article 27 of the Mexican constitution of 1917, which nationalized Mexico's subsoil properties, increased acerbities. It was not until 1923, after being clubbed again with a threat of nonrecognition, that President Alvaro Obregón pledged that the article would not be applied retroactively. His government was then recognized.

As Louis L. Jaffe has put it, "The whole world went off the de facto standard in its policy toward Soviet Russia." Giuseppe Mazzini and other Italians had followed the "principle of

nationality," or self-determination, in creating the Italian state between 1861 and 1870. Wilson had used the principle to obtain independence for the subject nationalities of central Europe between 1918 and 1920. He considered some extremely subjective, as well as objective, factors in declining to recognize the Soviet Union, however. Russia had "defected" to Germany in World War I. Its Bolshevik leaders, not the people, had made the accommodations reached in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The new government, which did not reflect popular political desires, faced such turmoil and revolution that it lacked definite geographical boundaries and a recognizable bureaucracy. And the minority in control of the government killed or imprisoned certain groups in the interest of progress for others.

In 1920, Bainbridge Colby, Wilson's third and last secretary of state, said that the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union because it had subverted popular government and denied Russians the democratic right of self-determination, had taken American property without paying for it, had sent agents abroad to foment communist revolutions, and had negated the conventions of international law.

In 1922 Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes asserted: "We recognize the right of revolution and we do not attempt to determine the internal concerns of other states." He added, however, "There still remain other questions to be considered." Since the acquiescence of the people was the most important question, Hughes seemed to be abandoning the Wilsonian concept of moral intervention. In 1930, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson agreed that subsequent legitimation by constitutional methods would warrant the recognition of a new government. In that year, when the United States recognized new governments in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru on a de facto basis, and in 1932, when it recognized a new government in Chile, all Stimson required was that a new government furnish evidence "that it is in control of the country and that there is no active resistance to it." He suggested, however, that each government "hold in due course elections to regularize its status." Stimson had thus retreated to the principle of recognition based simply upon the effectiveness of a government, thereby repudiating the Wilson policy of moralism.

Even though it had apparently reverted to a policy of "de factoism," the United States refused to recognize a number of states other than the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Although not a signatory, it sometimes acted in accordance with the so-called Tobar Doctrine that grew out of the treaties written among the Central American republics in 1907 and renewed in 1923. Designed to discourage revolutions, these provided that the parties "shall not recognize any other Government which may come into power in any of the five Republics as a consequence of a coup d'etat, or of a revolution against the recognized Government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country." They also disqualified the leaders of a coup d'état from assuming the presidency or vice presidency. The United States applied the doctrine to the revolutionary leader Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica in 1917, to Honduras in 1924, and to the government of Emiliano Chamorro of Nicaragua in 1925, thereby giving extreme expression to Jefferson's "will of the nation substantially declared," perhaps out of fear that dictatorships and revolutionary governments posed a danger for international peace.

States may withhold recognition or withdraw it in order to punish regimes they regard as illegitimate and those guilty of illegal conduct. In either case the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of an offender are treated as nonexistent. Treaties with the offender can be suspended, and foreign forces may be admitted to aid rebels against it. It may be rejected as a plaintiff in foreign courts and denied property situated abroad. Secretary of State Seward refused to recognize a revolutionary government in Peru in 1868; at the request of the Wilson administration a number of states rescinded their recognition of the Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta in 1918; still others refused to recognize the state of Manchukuo that Japan created in Manchuria on 18 February 1932. The major reason for recognizing the Soviet Union in 1933 was the (vain) hope that trade with it would help the United States climb out of the Great Depression.

When Nazi Germany overran a number of western European states in 1940, the United Kingdom and the United States, without declarations of recognition, regarded the governments in exile of these countries as de jure, even though they could not exercise effective control over their national territory. The United States took a similar hard line toward the victims of Soviet aggression in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, which were quickly recognized as independent after the downfall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, but it refused to recognize North Korea and

North Vietnam. Conversely, Austria, which lost its international personality in 1938, when forced into an *Anschluss* with Germany, had it restored by treaty with the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union in 1955. The United States has also followed the principle that recognition would not be granted to territorial changes made by force in violation of treaty rights. The principle was first enunciated in the Continental Treaty resulting from the Inter-American Conference held at Santiago, Chile, in 1847–1848, and was restated in the recommendations of the International Conference of American States held at Washington in 1890. In 1915, Bryan used it in dealing with Japan's Twenty-one Demands on China. If agreed to, the demands would have made China a Japanese protectorate, in violation of the treaty rights of Americans and others, and of the Open Door policy. Bryan told Japan, "The United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts"(Shantung, Manchuria, and eastern Mongolia). Japan's demands, however, "while not infringing the territorial integrity of the Republic, are clearly derogatory to the political independence and administrative entity of that country." On 11 May 1915, Bryan issued the blunt caveat that the United States would not honor "any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy."

As viewed by the United States, Japan's seizure of southern Manchuria in 1931 countered its adherence to the Open Door as expressed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy written into the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, and to the comportment of nations as required by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Herbert Hoover would have no part of war. Although Secretary of State Stimson strongly supported collective security, he realized that there was a popular American and official British and French opposition both to strong unilateral action and to joint action with the League, of which the United States was not a member. Admittedly building on Bryan's note of 11 May 1915, Stimson told China and Japan that the United States would not recognize arrangements in Manchuria detrimental to American rights and that it "does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact." But he could not persuade Hoover, such powers as Britain and France, or the League of Nations to impose even economic sanctions against Japan, or convince Britain to invoke the Nine-Power Treaty. When Manchukuo, as Japan renamed its stolen territory, proclaimed itself a new state, the United States denied it recognition. The Assembly of the League of Nations followed suit, with no observable results; and it was not until the end of World War II that Manchuria was restored to China.

Similarly, when Italy forcibly annexed Ethiopia, most league members handled the situation "in the light of their own situation and their own obligations." By denying Ethiopia de facto existence, they vitiated the league covenant. The United States stood by the Stimson Doctrine but refused to intervene. After World War II began, the European Allied powers rescinded their action, thereby admitting previous error, and "restored" Ethiopia's independence. These actions notwithstanding, the U.S. demand for an expression of popular will was slackening, as it was also in Great Britain, particularly toward states like Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan, in which free popular expression was not provided for or tolerated. Britain recognized the Soviet Union de facto in 1921 and de jure in 1924. The United States extended recognition in 1933 even though to some persons it appeared that the unchallenged exercise of governmental authority had been substituted for the principle of subsequent legitimation through popular consent as a test for recognition. However, because the choice of self-determination extends to constitutions, the legal source of validity of a state's actions, and must not restrict the opportunity for change, international law permits the recognition of nondemocratic states that give evidence of effective government.

MULTINATIONAL RECOGNITION

A multinational approach to recognition has been observable since the mid-1930s. The Declaration of the Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Confederation (1936) proscribed both the recognition of territorial conquest through violence and the intervention by one state in the internal or external affairs of another. When it appeared that the Axis powers might seek to acquire the

American possessions of European nations they had overrun, the Act of Havana (1940) stated that those possessions would be placed under the provisional administration of the American republics. In 1943 it was suggested that the countries of the Western Hemisphere that had declared war or broken relations with the Axis powers should not, for the duration of the war, recognize governments created by force in Latin America without prior consultation among themselves.

In the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) the United States and the United Kingdom declared their desire "to see no territorial changes that would not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned," and sought respect for "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The Crimean Charter of the Yalta Conference suggested the admission of democratic procedures in the determination of governments in countries liberated from Axis control; those governments should then be recognized collectively following consultations by the Allied powers. The Charter of the United Nations states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" and bars from membership any state unwilling to carry out its international obligations. For example, Francisco Franco's Spain was barred. The United Nations has thus sought to substitute for unilateral recognition a collective decision whether a state seeking membership is a "peace-loving state" able and willing to carry out the obligations of the charter, hence deserving of recognition. The question of whether the nationhood of a people is better determined by the United Nations or by the several states nevertheless remains moot.

In a rare case, an international organization has practiced nonrecognition. Despite sympathy for Fidel Castro among left-wing Latin American groups, the Organization of American States condemned Castro's denial of popular liberty in Cuba, his attempts to make his island a launching pad for Soviet missiles, and his exporting of communism to neighboring nations. In 1964 it voted economic sanctions against him and barred official relations with Havana to all its members, thereby technically rescinding recognition. Since 1974, however, six major and several minor Latin American states have violated the ban, and in 1975 the United States relaxed its trade restrictions. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and their secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, declined to recognize Castro on terms he proposed, but President Jimmy Carter sought a rapprochement. The United States in 2000 did not recognize Castro but permitted the sale to him of foods and medicines and a limited amount of American tourism to Cuba.

West Germany, strongly supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, tried for many years to avoid a "two-Germany" concept by threatening economic sanctions and breaking diplomatic relations with third states that recognized East Germany, which was fully recognized by the communist world but denied representation in most international organizations. It was not until September 1974 that the United States sent an ambassador, John Sherman Cooper, to East Germany. Both Taiwan and Beijing (capital of the People's Republic of China), under the Mao Doctrine of 1949, refuse to deal with any third power that has recognized the other as the government of all of China. Taiwan maintains that the communist government of Beijing does not enjoy the support of its people, while Beijing insists that Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory. The issue is confused because some states that recognize Beijing also recognize Taiwan as de facto. Although some states, like France, broke relations with Taiwan after recognizing Beijing, the long-held idea that both Chinas could not be represented in the same international organizations gave way when Beijing was admitted to the United Nations in 1972, and Taiwan was ejected as a member of its Security Council.

From 1 October 1949, when the People's Republic of China was formed, until 1972, the United States refused to recognize it and also tried to keep it out of the United Nations because it lacked the character of a "peace-loving" nation, proved unwilling to abide by international regulations, and might replace Taiwan on the UN Security Council. Other considerations included U.S. unwillingness to dishonor its commitments to Taiwan by rescinding recognition; fear that the "domino theory," starting with Taiwan, would work its way through Southeast Asia; Chinese intervention in Korea and support for North Vietnam; the bombing of the islands of Matsu and Quemoy (1958); Beijing's brutal takeover of Tibet (1959) and attack on India (1962); the seizure of American property without compensation, mistreatment of American citizens, and implementation of a "Hate America" campaign; and the repression of democratic reforms at home and denial of liberty to its people. Moreover, the dictatorship threatened to spread communist doctrine

by war rather than follow methods of peaceful coexistence, and its recognition would increase its power and prestige.

Among the reasons for a change of decision were President Nixon's desire to achieve a historic diplomatic victory; the conclusion that Taiwan could never recover mainland China; the effective de facto character of a government controlling some 800 million people; its military, including atomic power; its serving as a buffer against the Soviets; the absence in its government of the bribery, graft, and corruption that had characterized the prerevolutionary Chiang Kai-shek regime; and its recognition not only by Britain, France, and West Germany but also by most of the nations of the Third World. With a large number of "developing" nations in the United Nations that favored Beijing over Taipei (Taiwan's capital) and were critical of America's role as the "world's policeman," it was clear that Beijing would be admitted to the United Nations. By a vote of 76 to 65 it was admitted on 25 October 1971.

The United States had begun to thaw the frigid Sino-American relations in 1969 by relaxing some trade and travel restrictions. In April 1971, Beijing invited American Ping-Pong players to visit China. Nixon then began to gradually abolish all trade restrictions and let it be known that Beijing would receive him. To this end, he secretly sent his adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, to speak with Premier Chou En-lai and others and arrange for an eight-day presidential visit in late February 1972. The joint communiqué issued stressed the national interests of the parties, but Nixon said he would remove his troops from Taiwan. Chou En-lai predicted that normalization of relations would follow enlarged contacts. With Sino-American diplomatic relations reestablished, other nations had to adjust to the new situation. Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and eventually other Southeast Asia states jumped on the bandwagon. While liaison offices were opened in Beijing and Washington, it was not until 15 December 1978 that, after several months of secret meetings, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States and China had agreed to establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979 and that they would exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on 1 March. Further, the United States would maintain commercial and unofficial relations with Taiwan and sell it materials needed to keep its defenses operating but would terminate the mutual defense treaty of 1954. While some in Congress regarded the agreement as "selling Taiwan down the river" and others as a "historical inevitability," China said that returning Taiwan to mainland control would be an "internal" problem.

BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION

Because recognition applies to belligerency as well as to state governments, precise discrimination and timing must be paid to the facts in a civil war. Premature recognition of political parties seeking to establish a state separate from a parent state may be deemed tortious or delictual, if not actual intervention, and may even lead to war with the parent state, which is vested with the presumption of right until the rebels triumph. The writing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1778) between France and the rebellious British subjects in America resulted in a war between France and Great Britain, as France intended. The United States threatened war because of what it believed to be too prompt a recognition of belligerency of the Confederate States of America by Great Britain, and Colombia assumed a very aggrieved stance after what appeared to it as the precipitous—six hour—recognition by the United States of the Panama Republic in 1903. In contrast, belated recognition of eventually victorious rebels may result in unpleasant relations, such as those attending the unwillingness of the United States to recognize for a dozen years the Latin American republics that seceded from Spain, Texas throughout 1836, Mexico at times between 1913 and 1923, the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1933, Manchukuo from 1932, the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1972, and East Germany from 1945 to 1974.

The test applied to belligerents, unless the parent state has stopped trying to impose its authority or has assented to its loss of sovereignty, is whether they have created a separate political existence capable of maintaining order at home and worthy of respect from abroad. Applicable to rebellions or secessions seeking independence is the formula stated by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams when writing to the American minister to Colombia on 27 May 1823: "So long as a contest of arms with a rational or even a remote prospect of eventual success, was maintained by Spain, the United States could not recognize the independence of the colonies as existing de facto without trespassing on their duties to Spain by assuming as decided that which was precisely the question of the war." By prematurely

recognizing the independence of the Latin American republics, Adams might give Spain justification for declaring war and for not negotiating with the United States for the release of the Floridas. On the other hand, if he recognized the Latin Americans too late, he would arouse resentment in their governments and also lose trade to active British rivals. Consequently, he devised the "utterly desperate" formula. "It is the stage," he wrote President James Monroe on 24 August 1818, "when independence is established as a matter of fact so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate." After Spain protested the intention of the United States to recognize the revolted provinces as independent, Adams replied that American policy was to recognize as independent states "nations which, after deliberately asserting their right to that character, have maintained and established it against all the resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose it."

Timing is important, as the Texas revolution against Mexico and the American Civil War reveal. Friction between U.S. settlers and the Mexican government provoked a revolution in 1835. President Andrew Jackson remained neutral until 3 March 1837, the last day of his administration, when he recognized the independence of Texas, announced in 1836. When Mexico protested that recognition, Secretary of State John Forsyth replied that it was the policy of the United States to recognize de facto governments. For seven years an independent Texas had been recognized by at least the United States, Great Britain, and France but not by Mexico, which had repeatedly stated that its annexation by the United States would mean war. The question of recognition became academic when the United States annexed Texas in 1845 and, in the treaty ending the Mexican War, won confirmation of its title to the former republic.

Until the Civil War, the United States looked upon secessionist activity, such as that of the Latin American states, as following its own revolutionary model. Moreover, it frowned upon the monarchical principle and objected especially to the forcible maintenance of monarchical legitimacy in the New World. In brief, rebellion against monarchy was not illegal; it was the assertion of natural right. During the American Civil War, although the shoe appeared to be on the other foot, the Union refused to change its historic policy with respect to the recognition of belligerency or, for that matter, the duty of neutrals.

On 19 April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed a maritime blockade of seven seceded southern states. By thus granting the Confederacy the status of belligerent, he elevated a domestic disturbance to a full-fledged war and recognized the Confederacy as an "apparent" international entity, or "embryonic state," or "local de facto government" possessed of all the rights of a state with respect to the conduct of war. Although the Union never recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in the prize cases (1863), that the Confederacy was engaged in a civil war.

With two parts of the United States at war, third states could agree that the as yet ineffective blockade was legal and thereby uphold the Union; could recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent by proclaiming neutrality; could recognize the Confederacy as an independent state and invite war with the Union; or could do nothing and leave their international relations to the vicissitudes of an ill-defined international law.

Particularly involved was Great Britain, whose ubiquitous ships could be captured by Union ships enforcing the blockade. Its decision to remain neutral—based upon the announced Union blockade, President Jefferson Davis's proclamation of the intent of the Confederacy to exercise the rights of a belligerent, and upon its own Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819—was followed by all the major powers. Such neutrality gave the Confederacy both a morale boost and hope for eventual recognition as being independent, because both belligerents were placed on a legal par; the Confederacy could license privateers, send ships to the ports of recognizing powers, exercise the right of visit and search at sea, seek foreign loans, conduct a blockade, and seize contraband. The British proclamation was issued on 6 May 1861. Had the British waited until after the Union defeat at the second Battle of Bull Run, they might have opted for recognition of independence instead of merely belligerency.

Instead, in July 1862, when a representative asked Britain to recognize the Confederacy as a separate and independent power, the prime minister, Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, advised Earl John Russell, the foreign minister, that recent military reverses indicated that the time for recognition had not yet come. Russell therefore replied that "In order to be entitled to a place among the independent nations of the earth, a State ought to have not only strength and resources for a time, but afford promise of stabil-

ity and permanence." On the other hand, when the Union protested Britain's having any relations with the Confederacy, Russell stated that the protection of British interests there might cause him to deal with the Confederate capital and even with southern state capitals, "but such communications will not imply any acknowledgment of the Confederacy as a separate state." The French took the same attitude, so that both Britain and France acknowledged that belligerents obtain their rights from the fact of war rather than from recognition.

Following the crushing Union defeat at the second Battle of Bull Run, Palmerston suggested to the French a joint mediation proposal that Washington accept as an "arrangement on the basis of a separation." The ability of the Union to hold southern forces at Antietam Creek, Maryland, blunted British and French ardor for this proposal. Resolution of the question of recognition had thus depended upon a military victory over the North that attested to the viability of the South as a community warranting membership in the international sphere. Then, as an example of how moral and humanitarian elements may alter a situation, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation drove all thought of the recognition of the Confederacy from the minds of the leaders of the major European powers.

The law of belligerent recognition attained maturity during the Civil War. Because the historical policy of the United States was to remain neutral in case of civil war, the Union secretary of state, William H. Seward, took umbrage at the attempts by the European powers to recognize the Confederacy. He denied that the southern rebellion amounted to a state of war, and saw no need for foreign action even if a state of war existed. On 28 February 1861, he instructed U.S. ministers abroad to counter any suggestion of recognition and to ask foreign powers to "take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movement of the seceding states; or increase danger of disaffection in those which still remain loyal." In April he told the U.S. minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, that European states customarily used the collective method of granting recognition, a method not used in the Americas.

Furthermore, Seward was inclined to treat recognition of even belligerency as an unfriendly act, to the point that he pondered seeking compensation for damages done by a premature grant of belligerent rights, which he viewed, he told Adams, as interference with the sovereign rights of the United States. Indeed, Seward asserted that a proclamation of neutrality by Great Britain would challenge the right of the Union to protect its government and territory, and that he would declare war on any nation that recognized the independence of the Confederacy. Throughout the Civil War, then, the policy of the United States with respect to the recognition of belligerency remained consistent with earlier practice.

Consistency continued with respect to both Cuban revolutions. In 1875, during the Ten Years' War, President Ulysses S. Grant told Congress that the policy of the United States was to recognize de facto governments. Cuba was not at the time "a fact" because it lacked an effective and stable government. Therefore, it could not be recognized. Similarly, President William McKinley told Congress on 11 April 1898 that "recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away"—a rewording of John Quincy Adams's "utterly desperate" formula.

The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), "the most disputed case of belligerent recognition since the American Civil War," presents a special case illustrative of the abuse of power of recognition. Few will deny that war existed and that a recognition of belligerency was in order. Germany and Italy championed the rebel, pro-Catholic General Francisco Franco, against the anticlerical Republican (Loyalist) regime supported by the Russians and enjoying the sympathy of a goodly number of Americans. By recognizing Franco two and a half years before the end of the war, much too early to tell how the struggle would end, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini reversed the situation so that the lawful government became the rebellious party. Most other countries simply stood by. Twenty-seven European states banned the export of war materials and departure of volunteers to Spain, and Britain announced its neutrality.

Although several thousand Americans volunteered to fight with the Loyalists, such was the popular support for noninvolvement that the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt amended its neutrality laws to cover civil wars and thus denied support customarily given to the legitimate government, as in embargoing the export of munitions. When Franco won in 1939, the United States recognized him de facto and took steps to resume diplomatic relations suspended during the civil war. Instead of the test of

effectiveness being the free expression of popular approval or of democracy, it was made to read effectiveness of authoritarian control, or of dictatorship.

If the character of a civil war will be admitted to the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, that will serve as a fine example. The British shifted responsibility for their League of Nations mandate over Palestine on 3 December 1947, effective 15 May 1948, to the United Nations, which late in 1947 adopted a partition plan vehemently opposed by the Arabs but upheld by President Harry S. Truman. At midnight local time, 14 May 1948, the provisional government of Israel proclaimed the existence of the Republic of Israel that it had carved out of Palestine. Overriding objections from the Department of State, disregarding the wishes of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, overlooking the nonrecognition of Israel by strategically located and oil-rich Arab states, the general fighting between Arabs and Jews throughout Palestine, and stating that he did so in keeping with the principle of self-determination and for humanitarian reasons, Truman extended de facto recognition when Israel was but eleven minutes old. Perhaps his need to win the Jewish vote in the fall elections stimulated his prompt action. After Israel held its first elections, on 25 January 1949, Truman extended it de jure recognition six days later. War between Israel and its Arab neighbors has been intermittent since the Republic of Israel first saw light. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was demanding a Palestine state with the capital in Jerusalem and sovereignty over shrines sacred to both Jews and Muslims—which Israel would not let him have.

A most unexpected and exciting transfer of sovereignty occurred in Yugoslavia beginning in September 2000. Elections held on 24 September chose a fifty-six-year-old attorney, Vojislav Kostunica, rather than Slobodan Milosevic, who had enjoyed thirteen years of autocratic and corrupt rule. The latter asked for a runoff election and sent an aide to summon Kostunica. When Milosevic said he had won the election, Kostunica informed him that a constitutional court had ruled in his own favor—information Milosevic lacked. In any event, a crowd of some 200,000 persons paraded in Belgrade and burned the parliament building, with the army and police doing little to hinder them. On 6 October, Milosevic admitted defeat. Following Kostunica's formal investiture as president, the United States and western Europe quickly recognized him. After holding out for several days, Russia and China extended recognition as well.

CONCLUSION

It is the prerogative of each state to extend recognition to a new community. Recognition admits to a state's having an international personality, yet the tests applied to statehood have often been violated by the use of constitutional, moral, humanitarian, and other subjective judgments. The practice of democratic states generally has been to recognize effective, or de facto, governments; the practice of undemocratic states, to recognize states espousing the objectives of their own national policies. Even if popular legitimation by free elections does not follow their extension of de facto recognition, democracies manage to live with undemocratic governments that are stable and permanent. States may withhold or withdraw recognition to punish illegitimate state or illegal conduct—by the latter, for example, for undertaking territorial changes by force in violation of the sovereignty of the victim and of the treaty rights of third parties. It is, of course, possible to have intercourse on a limited basis with states that are not recognized. Recognition is an executive act that extends to governments rather than to persons. Although regional and world organizations have used collective recognition to admit states to their membership, and thereby recognize them, unilateral recognition is still practiced.

Belligerent parties seeking freedom from a parent state may be recognized whenever they have created a new government capable of maintaining order within its boundaries and worthy of respect from abroad. If the parent state has stopped trying to impose its authority or has assented to its loss of sovereignty, recognition may be granted freely. Otherwise questions of timing and of degree must be weighed carefully by third parties, lest premature recognition lead to war with the parent state and belated recognition leads to loss of the friendship and trade of the victorious belligerents. In this connection it is difficult to improve upon John Adams's "utterly desperate" formula. Nevertheless, because insurgency has largely replaced civil wars, the recognition of belligerency by the United States was rarely accorded between World War I and World War II and has not been granted since 1945.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chen, Ti-chiang. *The International Law of Recognition, with Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United States*. London, 1951. Pays particular attention to the many similarities of international law with respect to recognition policy as adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Goebel, Julius. *The Recognition Policy of the United States*. New York, 1915. Although dated, provides an excellent account of the recognition policy of the United States for its first century, when it largely followed the de facto principle.

Hackworth, Green Hayward. *Digest of International Law*. 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1940–1944. A very careful and learned synthesis of international law subjects by an expert in the U. S. Department of State.

Harcourt, Sir William Vernon. *Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of International Law*. London-Cambridge, 1863. Explains why war was averted between the United States and United Kingdom despite Lincoln's proclamation of blockade, the Trent affair, and British recognition of Confederate belligerency.

Jaffe, Louis Leventhal. *Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, in Particular of the Recognition of Foreign Powers*. Cambridge, Mass., 1933. Deals mostly with the theory and practice of recognition and nonrecognition and with legal questions involved in recognition.

Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*. Boston, 1979. Fully details how Richard Nixon granted recognition to Red China.

Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. 2d ed. Cambridge, 2000. Holds that Yugoslavia failed to develop a sense of common citizenship that could override competing national loyalties.

Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch. *Recognition in International Law*. Cambridge, U.K., 1947. Written by perhaps the greatest authority on modern international law; includes a close examination of British and American practices in the field.

Moore, John Bassett. *A Digest of International Law*. 8 vols. Washington, D.C., 1906. Indispensable reference on international law matters.

Oppenheim, L. (Lassa). *International Law, A Treatise*. 2 vols. 8th ed. Toronto, 1955. Edited by Hersch Lauterpach, London and New York, 1948. Not as extensive as Moore, Hackworth, or Whiteman but deals separately and clearly with the myriad subjects included in international law.

Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. Rev. ed. Santa Monica, Calif., 1997. Discovery Channel video that covers the history of the Balkans and explains why ethnic conflicts continue to exist.

Tarulis, Albert N. *American-Baltic Relations, 1918–1922*. Washington, D.C., 1965. Explains why it took the United States four years to recognize the Baltic states after they obtained their independence from Russia in 1918.

Tyler, Patrick. "The (Ab)normalization of U.S. –Chinese Relations." *Foreign Affairs* 78 (Sept.–Oct. 1999): 122. Concerns the battle between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski over the matter of fully recognizing Red China.

Whiteman, Marjorie M. *Digest of International Law*. 15 vols. Washington, D.C., 1963–1973. Brings Hackworth and Moore up to date in a learned and meticulous manner, using copious references to the literature of international relations and law.

See also INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; NEUTRALITY; REVOLUTION; SELF-DETERMINATION; WILSONIANISM.

REFUGEE POLICIES

David M. Reimers

According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." The U.S. Senate accepted this definition sixteen years later, but it was not officially made part of immigration law until the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. From 1789 to 1875 the states controlled immigration policy and admitted refugees, but they did not label them as such. From 1875 to the 1940s the federal government continued this policy. During the early years of the Cold War, refugees were generally defined as persons fleeing communism.

In admitting refugees, foreign policy has often played a key role, but it has not been the only factor. Economic conditions in the United States have helped determine how generous the nation would be in accepting refugees. Lobbying by particular ethnic, nationality, and religious groups also has influenced refugee flows. Finally, Americans liked to think of the nation as, in George Washington's words, an "asylum for mankind." This humanitarian impulse often dovetailed with foreign policy as the United States wanted to appear generous to other nations. It is also important to realize that many refugees also have economic motives for wanting to escape their home countries and seek their fortunes in the United States. Indeed, the line between "a well-founded fear" and the desire for an improved lifestyle is often blurred.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

The American colonies had little control over the admission of newcomers; they could not even halt the English practice of sending convicts to the New World. Americans began to shape their own destinies after 1789 when the nation's Constitution went into effect. That document said nothing about refugees, or immigrants for that matter. Moreover, the federal government did not begin to regulate the flow of newcomers until 1875. Three events and subsequent flows of migrants to the United States emerged in the 1790s. First was the French Revolution (1789), second, the Haitian Revolution (1791), and third, the failure of the United Irishmen to win independence for Ireland in the 1790s.

The first test of the nation's policy occurred when French émigrés, fleeing the increasing violence of the French Revolution, began to come to America. Those arriving in the fall of 1789 were mostly of the elite classes who witnessed the collapse of the old regime and who feared that their wealth, status, and privileged positions were under siege. Their numbers were small by comparison to those who followed. The second wave consisted of patriotic and intellectual nobles and the middle classes who had supported them. These refugees, who had backed liberal reform, watched with dismay as the French Revolution turned radical and violent. A few priests who opposed the confiscation of their lands and secularization of the revolution joined them, as did some members of the military who did not favor the ideals of the French Revolution. Numbers are not precise, but between ten and fifteen thousand crossed the Atlantic. They settled in Atlantic coastal towns and cities, with Philadelphia receiving the largest number.

Americans, including George Washington and the ruling Federalist Party, were supportive of the revolution in its first days. The Marquis de Lafayette sent the key to the Bastille to Washington, but as bloodshed increased, many Americans turned against the revolution. The Federalists especially were shocked by the growing violence. When war broke out between England and France, the Jeffersonian Republicans supported France and the Federalists England. Yet neither

party wished to go to war, and the government's policy of neutrality was widely accepted. The cities and states where the refugees settled raised money to aid them, many of whom had brought little money and few possessions with them. In other cases, individuals and voluntary groups assisted in finding employment. The refugees themselves raised funds and even published several newspapers. The French minister Edmond-Charles Genet was not sympathetic to the refugees, especially those who seemed to favor England over revolutionary France. When he tried to influence American politics, he won little favor and was recalled to France. Yet the intrigues of a French minister and the radicalization of the revolution in France did not change the official neutrality of the United States, and émigrés were still permitted to enter even though the two political parties differed over aspects of exile culture and politics. However, as conditions changed in France some of the refugees returned.

Closely allied to the events in France was the slave uprising in St. Domingue (Haiti) in the 1790s. The revolt erupted in 1791, three years before revolutionary France outlawed slavery. After thirteen years of civil war, Haiti achieved independence in 1804 and became the first independent black state in the Western Hemisphere. Initially, the United States supported white planters' efforts to put down the revolt, but the French were ultimately unsuccessful. After 1791, as the white planters witnessed losses of their estates and power and increasing violence, they fled—a few to France, some to Cuba and Jamaica, and others to the United States. These refugees differed from those from France proper. To be sure, the elite planters held political views similar to the elite of France, but the refugees were not limited to the white elite; only a minority of the newcomers were white. Some planters carried their slaves with them. These slaves remained slaves whether they were brought to slaveholding states or even if they were brought to northern cities such as Philadelphia and New York, for the northern states were just beginning to end slavery in the 1790s. In addition, "free people of color"—a mixed-race group in Haiti who were not equal to whites in law but who were free and often skilled workers—believed that they would not prosper in a successful slave rebellion and fled too.

The slave revolt posed the question of whether Americans should receive another influx of refugees and how the United States should respond diplomatically if the uprising succeeded. The white Haitians were welcomed especially by American slaveholders who sympathized with the principle and reality of slavery. Some others believed the nation should receive the refugees because it would maintain the principle of America as an "asylum for mankind." The refugees settled in coastal cities, with New Orleans the center of their community. That city did not become part of the United States until after the Louisiana Purchase, but even then it continued to receive refugees when many of the St. Domingue exiles who at first went to Cuba were forced by the Spanish to settle elsewhere in 1809.

Like those fleeing France, many of these exiles brought few possessions and little money with them. Funds were raised by cities, states, and community groups to assist them. An official position was taken by the U.S. Congress when it appropriated $15,000 to assist the refugees and suspended duties on French ships arriving in American ports if they were carrying exiles.

While welcoming St. Domingue's planters, slaveholders grew alarmed that so many slaves and free people of color entered. They feared that persons from these two groups were too familiar with events in Haiti and might attempt to stir up opposition to slavery in the United States. To white southerners a black-ruled Haiti was a symbol of decadence and ruin. Moreover, they were alarmed by the rise of antislavery sentiment and groups in the North. Faced with these perceived threats, the southern states tightened restrictions on slavery. Several banned the importing of slaves from the Caribbean, but the federal government did not outlaw the international slave trade until 1808 as it was required to do by the Constitution. In 1861 the United States finally recognized the black republic and established diplomatic relations.

The third revolution of the 1790s was a failed one, but it sent refugees to the United States and prompted a debate about foreign policy and immigration. The Society of United Irishmen, composed of both Catholics and Protestants, sought to end English control of Ireland. However, Ireland did not win its freedom; England crushed the rebels, tried and sentenced some leaders to jail, and encouraged others to leave. England also passed the Act of Union in 1800, which merged the mother country with Ireland and divided the Protestant-Catholic alliance. The failure to win Irish independence led thousands of Irish refugees to immigrate to America in the next one hundred years.

The Jeffersonian Republicans generally sympathized with the rebels, but the Federalists wanted to align American foreign policy with that of Great Britain against France. Many Federalists also believed the Irish were a "wild horde" and were none too eager to see them settling in American coastal towns and cities. The Irish refugees in turn sided with the Jefferson party. As a result, the Federalists succeeded in raising the number of resident years needed for naturalization from two to fourteen. Some Republicans joined the Federalists in raising the time required for naturalization because they believed the Naturalization Act of 1790, which set two years as the required period, did not provide enough time for newcomers to be indoctrinated in the principles of republicanism. Congress also passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, one of which gave the president power to deport immigrants even in peacetime if they were considered dangerous. President John Adams did not exercise this provision, but the Sedition Act did lead to several newspaper editors being arrested and sent to jail, including the Irish-born Representative Matthew Lyon of Vermont.

One wing of the Federalist Party favored war against France and alliance with England. But while fighting an undeclared war against France in the last few years of the 1790s, President Adams blocked efforts for a declaration of war, and the crisis passed. With the election of Thomas Jefferson as president in 1800, the naturalization period dropped from fourteen to five years, where it has remained ever since. The Alien and Sedition Acts were also allowed to lapse.

THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The crisis of the 1790s set the tone for the next century. The United States would proclaim neutrality but permit refugees from foreign lands undergoing war or revolution to settle in the United States. In the 1820s, when the Greeks revolted against Turkish rule over Greece, most Americans sympathized with the Greek cause, and they willingly received a few Greek refugees in the United States. However, the official position of the United States was the new Monroe Doctrine (1823). President James Monroe declared that he expected European powers to refrain from ventures in the Western Hemisphere and not attempt to halt the revolutionary process there, and in return the United States would stay out of European affairs.

CARL SCHURZ (1829–1906)

Carl Schurz participated in the German revolutionary activities of 1848. He joined a failed attempt to seize the arsenal at Siegburg and was forced to flee to the Palatine, also in Germany, where he joined the revolutionary forces there. He quickly became a wanted man by German authorities; rather than face charges of treason, he fled to France. He did return long enough to liberate one of the leaders but was forced to take refuge again in France and also England. Schurz came to the United States in 1852 and began a long career in American politics and government. He eventually became a U.S. senator, fought in the Civil War on the side of the Union, and served as secretary of the interior. He also worked with German groups, encouraging them to fight in the Civil War and become active in politics. Most scholars believe that Schurz was the most prominent German American in the nineteenth century.

In 1831, Poles sought to overthrow Russian domination of their land. After exchanges of notes between the United States and Russia, the former remained neutral in the dispute and both powers agreed to a commercial treaty in 1833. However, important American citizens expressed their sympathy with the Poles and warmly welcomed several hundred Polish exiles who fled when the rebellion failed and raised money to assist in their settlement. Some Poles wanted Congress to grant them a tract of land in the West that was to become a new Poland in America. The legislators, while willing to permit the refugees to obtain land on the same terms as all others, rejected the scheme.

Revolutions broke out once more in Europe in 1848, and when they failed, thousands of refugees, chiefly Germans, fled to the United States. Once again, many Americans hailed the principles of the "forty-eighters" in their quest for constitutional government in their homelands, but officially the United States government elected to pursue a policy of neutrality. No case represents this position more than that of Hungarian Lajos Kossuth. While American officials proclaimed to the Austrians that they favored the principles of

liberty anywhere, and sympathized with those Hungarians seeking independence from Austria, the United States did not intervene in the affairs of Hungary and Austria. When the Hungarian leader Kossuth arrived in the United States in 1852, he drew large crowds, but there was no chance that America would intervene in European affairs.

When the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, called the Fenian Brotherhood in the United States, launched two attacks on Canada from the United States in 1866 and 1870, America was faced with a diplomatic crisis or embarrassment. As much as many Americans opposed English rule in Ireland, the government moved to halt these assaults, which seemed to many to have the flavor of a comic opera. Moreover, the United States was at peace with Great Britain, and American officials said that the Irish question was Britain's affair, not that of the United States.

In Latin America the United States pursued a different policy. Americans sympathized with the Cuban revolt against Spain that began in 1868 and lasted until the Spanish-American War (1898) ended Spanish rule. In the early years of the rebellion, when conditions deteriorated for the rebels, many sought asylum in the United States, where they settled in New York and Florida and began to organize again to overthrow Spanish control. American politicians demanded that Spain grant Cubans their independence. Relations between the United States and Spain deteriorated in the 1890s, and when the battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana's harbor, the cries for action led to a congressional declaration of war in 1898. As a result of the ensuing Spanish-American War, Cuba received independence but found itself closely tied to America.

A MODIFIED REFUGEE POLICY

The federal government finally took control of immigration in 1875 when it banned prostitutes from entering the United States, as well as convicted felons and Asians said to be "coolies." Coolies were defined as Asians brought into the United States without their consent. Seven years later, Congress barred Chinese immigrants, but not dissenters of one kind or another from Europe. After President William McKinley was assassinated by an American-born anarchist in 1901, Congress passed the first law barring immigrants because of their political beliefs when it restricted anarchists from coming to the United States.

Various ethnic groups put pressure on the federal government to take an active role in aiding their people in their homelands, either by admitting refugees or by condemning the oppression faced by their countrymen. Armenian groups periodically attacked the government of Turkey for fostering massacres of Armenians under Turkish rule, especially the particularly violent one in 1915. In a similar manner, American Jews attacked Russia for permitting and even fostering pogroms. German Jews organized the American Jewish Committee in 1906 in order to influence the U.S. government to put pressure on Russia to end such violence and to assist Jewish immigrants. These efforts by various groups had only limited success until 1945, but they did foster aid to fellow ethnics in their homelands.

During and after World War I, which witnessed the communist seizure of power in Russia, some European refugees considered too radical and sympathetic to communism found themselves unwanted. Raids carried out by the federal government, peaking in 1920, led to thousands of arrests and deportation of foreign-born immigrants. In addition to shipping some radicals to Russia, the federal government refused to recognize the Soviet Union until 1933.

With the rise of fascism in Italy in the 1920s and Adolf Hitler's winning power in Germany in 1933, a new crisis of refugees loomed. As nazism spread, thousands of Jews and political dissenters searched for a haven outside Germany. Many fled to neighboring countries, but as the German army overran those nations, to emigrate was understandable, but getting into the United States was difficult. High unemployment tempered the desire to immigrate to America, and if they did want to come, the "likely to be a public charge" provision of the immigration laws was strictly enforced during the early days of the Great Depression. Moreover, the national origins quotas established during the 1920s limited the number of Europeans who would come.

Groups working to aid immigrants did suggest that the nation open its doors, but Congress was in no mood to change laws, and public opinion polls indicated strong opposition to admit many immigrants. In the depression years and during World War II, advocates of a tight immigration policy, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the American Legion, even suggested that all immigration be halted. The Roosevelt administration did ease its restrictions in 1938 but then tightly enforced the rules again

ALBERT EINSTEIN (1879–1955)

Albert Einstein was the most prominent man to take refuge in the United States during the twentieth century. He won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1921 for his work on the photoelectric effect, but is best known for his theories of relativity. When Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party seized power in Germany in 1933, he was in Princeton, New Jersey, at the Institute for Advanced Study. He elected to remain in the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1940. He never returned to Germany. Alarmed by the rising power of Hitler's Germany, he wrote his most famous letter, a plea to President Franklin D. Roosevelt urging that the United States fund research into the possibility of the making of an atomic bomb.

in 1939. With nearly a quarter of the labor force unemployed during the worst years of the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration was reluctant to embark upon a liberal policy for refugees. Because many of those trying to leave were Jews, anti-Semitism also played an important role. President Franklin Roosevelt denounced the atrocities in Germany, but the plight of refugees did not prompt the administration to change immigration policy. Several hundred thousand refugees did manage to come to the United States during the 1930s, but overall only one half million immigrants were admitted, a figure considerably less than admitted during a single year between 1900 and 1914.

Fewer people arrived during World War II when shipping was disrupted. Roosevelt and his cabinet and other government officials were informed about the Holocaust by reports from Europe relayed to Washington by Jewish organizations, but the administration insisted that defeating Germany quickly was the best way to bring the Holocaust to an end. As more news about the Holocaust reached Washington, the president expressed concern and other officials hinted that refugees be allowed to come to America. In June 1944, President Roosevelt admitted 1,000 persons who were living in North African internment camps to a temporary refuge shelter at Fort Ontario in Oswego, New York. The president's action was meant to provide an emergency home for these refugees, but they were eventually allowed to stay.

REFUGEES AND THE COLD WAR

It was after World War II that the United States finally recognized refugees in law, with foreign policy playing a key role in the emerging legislation and executive action, especially the Cold War between the United States and Russia. It is also important to note that American refugee policy was not limited to the admission of immigrants. During the 1930s a number of organizations, operating in an international arena, were formed to deal with the European crisis, but they had little impact. These groups continued to function in the postwar decades. Moreover, the newly formed United Nations also played a growing role in settling refugees. Building upon the work of the League of Nations, the United Nations emerged as the most important international agency coping with refugees when it created the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and adopted the Convention on Refugees in 1951. The United States supported the UNHCR financially and eventually accepted the convention's statement as its own. While more than three million refugees settled in the United States from 1945 to 2000, American support of the UNHCR was based on the belief that most refugees wanted to return home when conditions permitted and not necessarily immigrate to the United States.

The sweep of the Allies across Europe in 1944 and 1945 made possible a huge population movement as persons enslaved in Germany attempted to go home, as ethnic Germans were forcibly removed from nations where they had lived, and as millions who had seen their villages and cities destroyed sought refuge. The liberation of Jews from the concentration camps also left these survivors homeless, and most were in poor health. Other persons fled the approaching Russian army and ended up in the Western powers' territory. Many of these unfortunate people found themselves housed in displaced persons camps.

On 22 December 1945, President Harry S. Truman directed that 40,000 refugees be admitted and charged against national origins quotas, in the future if necessary. Truman's action was only a first step in dealing with the postwar refugees, and it hardly scratched the surface. American authorities and their European allies realized that the refugee situation had to be resolved if the

economies and societies of western Europe were to be rebuilt. And as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated, American leaders also developed other programs to bolster their allies. These included the Truman Doctrine of aid to Turkey and Greece in combating communism (1946), the Marshall Plan for stimulating the economies of western Europe (1948), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) for its collective security. Congress barred communist immigrants from coming to America and voted to admit others by passing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. As amended in 1950, the measure eventually permitted roughly 400,000 persons to immigrate to the United States, which relieved the western Europeans of some of their financial and population burdens.

While the immediate crisis in western Europe eased, there still remained people without homes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked Congress for a law to admit additional refugees, and the legislators responded with the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 that admitted another 189,000 persons. The measure also included a few thousand Palestinians from the Middle East and 5,000 Asians. This marked the first time that the term "refugee" appeared in U.S. law. Subsequent legislation in the 1950s admitted other persons fleeing communist nations and the Middle East. Most Middle Easterners came under regular immigration laws, even though many were stateless or fleeing from violence. It is not known how many were Palestinians because many entered as immigrants from Jordan or other nations.

The emerging Cold War refugee policy faced another test when the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 failed. Some 180,000 Hungarian "freedom fighters," as they were called, fled to Austria before the Austrians closed the border. The Austrian government was willing to temporarily aid them but wanted the Western powers to provide for their permanent settlement. The Hungarian quota allowed for only 865 immigrants, but President Eisenhower established a precedent that evoked the "parole" power of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 to admit nearly 40,000 refugees. Being classified as "parolees" left them in limbo because parolees could remain in the United States but were not permanent resident aliens (immigrants) or refugees. Congress had to pass legislation to permit them to change their status. Because this provision had been intended for individual cases, some in Congress protested. In the Cold War climate of the 1950s, however, the desire to strike a blow against communism and aid these anticommunists overcame congressional qualms, and the lawmakers passed the Hungarian Escape Act of 1958 to grant the Hungarians refugee status.

The ad hoc nature of refugee admissions bothered some legislators, and when Congress revamped the national origins system in 1965 they provided for a more organized policy. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 created seven preferences for the Eastern Hemisphere, mostly based on family unification. However, the seventh preference set aside 10,200 places for refugees, defined as persons fleeing communist or communist-dominated nations or the Middle East. Under this provision several thousand Czechoslovakian refugees came to the United States when the Soviet Union and its allies crushed the "Prague Spring" rebellion in 1968. Thousands of Soviet Jews also entered under the new laws. The president was also given the power to admit refugees from a "natural calamity." The last part of the definition was meant to be humanitarian. For example, some refugees had come in the 1950s following an earthquake in the Azores. Originally, the new system covered only the Eastern Hemisphere, but when a uniform worldwide system was created in 1978, the seventh preference increased to 17,400.

Thousands of Soviet Union Jews also entered under the new laws, but Jewish immigration became a foreign policy matter when Congress put in place trade restrictions against the Soviets. A bill sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik passed in late 1974 and was signed by President Gerald Ford in early 1975. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to a trade bill made future trade and credit policies tied to Jewish immigration. The Soviets responded by severely curtailing Jewish emigration and thereby cutting trade with the United States. Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union had to wait until the end of the 1980s for a major increase.

The Cold War was by no means limited to Europe. In Asia the United States intervened in the Korean War (1950–1953) and again in the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 and embarked upon a policy making it a communist country. These wars, along with Castro's victory, led to another wave of refugees. Shortly after Castro won control, some elite Cubans fled to Miami. As the flow grew, Pres-

idents Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson used the parole power to admit them. From 1959 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, more than 200,000 arrived. Flights were suspended after the missile crisis, although some escaped by boat to Florida. In early 1965 Castro indicated that he was interested in renewing the exodus, and when President Johnson signed the new immigration act at the foot of the Statue of Liberty in October, he said that the United States was willing to accept all who desired to leave Castro's communist state. American policymakers believed that accepting refugees would demonstrate the failure of communism in Cuba and also be a humanitarian gesture. Once again the president paroled them. In 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act that assumed that any Cuban to reach American soil was a refugee from communism and was welcome in the United States. Several hundred thousand Cubans took advantage of the new law, but the flow slowed to a trickle in the early 1970s. In addition, the federal government provided aid for these newcomers, which marked the first time after World War II that the government gave monetary assistance for refugee resettlement.

Another wave from Cuba entered in the spring of 1980. They sailed from the Cuban port of Mariel and were thus called "Marielitos." The Marielitos were picked up by boats operated by Cubans already in the United States, and by the time the U.S. government halted the exodus, about 130,000 had arrived. President Jimmy Carter did not use immigration laws to admit them; he created a new classification called "conditional entrants," a limbo status. Eventually, they were permitted to change their status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The entire episode made it seem that immigration policy was out of control, especially in view of the fact that Castro dumped criminals and mental patients into the boats heading for America.

As Cuban emigration slackened, that of Southeast Asia began. The Vietnam War uprooted tens of thousands of Vietnamese, many of whom left rural areas for cities. The U.S. government aided these persons in settling in their new homes in Vietnam, but officials had no thought of bringing them to America. Then came the 1975 collapse of the American-backed regime in Vietnam. As Saigon was besieged and conquered by communist forces, tens of thousands of Vietnamese were rescued by helicopters and thousands more fled by boat. Roughly 130,000 came in this first wave of 1975. They were brought to the United States for resettlement. In view of the American military role in Vietnam, U.S. officials believed that the United States had to accept them. In 1978 and 1979 Vietnam's ethnic Chinese also fled, largely by boat, which earned them the name "boat people." Moreover, conditions in Cambodia and Laos deteriorated, which prompted many to cross the Thailand border for the safety of refugee camps supported by the United States and the United Nations. The total from 1975 to 1980 vastly exceeded the 17,400 slots provided annually for refugees. Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter paroled them into the United States, and Congress provided funds for their settlement and allowed them to become refugees.

It seemed to many that refugee policy, other than aiding those fleeing from communism, still lacked coherence. In 1980, Congress passed a new law, the Refugee Act of 1980. It increased the annual "normal flow" of refugees to 50,000 and established and funded programs to assist them. In addition, it dropped the anticommunist definition of "refugee" and substituted for it the United Nations statement. While the law said 50,000 refugees were the "normal flow" to be admitted annually, the president retained the power to permit more to arrive, and in no year after 1980 did the number drop as low as 50,000; it usually averaged twice that figure. More than one million Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians alone came to the United States from 1975 to the 1990s.

Cubans and Southeast Asians were the main beneficiaries of American foreign and refugee polices, but others also managed to become refugees. When the anticommunist Polish Solidarity movement sputtered in the early 1980s, Poles in the United States were permitted to remain temporarily and eventually to become refugees. It was a common practice to permit citizens of another nation visiting or studying here to win a temporary reprieve from returning home when their visas expired if their country suddenly experienced violence. Eventually, like the Poles, many were able to stay permanently in the United States.

The Cold War mentality was clearly evident when citizens of countries who were not fleeing communist regimes tried to win refugee status. After the successful 1973 revolt against the socialist government of Chile led to the execution and internment of thousands of Chileans, the United States took in fewer than 1,700 Chilean refugees. Since the United States had opposed the socialists and had been involved

with the revolt, the American acceptance of so few refugees is understandable.

The government's position on communism and the admission of refugees also explain why so few refugees were admitted from Haiti. The dictatorial regime there run by the Duvalier family from 1957 to 1986 supported American positions taken on Western Hemisphere affairs and the Cold War, which pleased the State Department. There is no doubt that Haitians lived under oppressive rule, but there is also no doubt that Haiti was one of the poorest nations in the world. Immigration officials stressed the poverty of potential immigrants, not their lack of political rights and the violence conducted by authorities. Consequently, few immigrants were granted refugee status from Haiti. During the Mariel Cuban crisis, thousands of Haitians also made it by boat to Florida. They were included in President Carter's "entrant" category, but their status remained in limbo until the Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) granted amnesty to those in the United States before 1982.

The IRCA did not mean a new policy for Haitians coming after 1982. The immigration authorities and the State Department continued to call them economic migrants. Federal officials insisted that if Haitians were considered refugees, a tide of boat people would head for America. After the end of Duvalier rule, a democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, took power. When the Haitian military overthrew the regime of Aristide in 1991, the boat exodus picked up again. Under presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard seized boats trying to escape from Haiti to Florida and sent them back to Haiti or temporarily housed them at the Guantánamo naval base in Cuba, where their claims could be processed. Bill Clinton had criticized the policy of President Bush, but he continued it when he became president in 1993. Moreover, the fear of Haitians fleeing the military regime and flocking to America, without proper documents and claiming asylum, motivated President Clinton to order an invasion of Haiti in the fall of 1994 to restore democracy. Among other reasons, the president repeated the belief that if democracy were not restored to Haiti, tens of thousands would try to come to America.

A similar situation prevailed in Guatemala and El Salvador and to a lesser extent in Honduras. These nations lived under right-wing and dictatorial governments recognized and supported by the United States and were plagued by civil wars. Many Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans claimed that they should be considered refugees, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) insisted that, like Haitians, they were economic migrants and not legitimate refugees fearing persecution. Nor did the INS believe that the fear of being killed in a civil war was sufficient for winning refugee status; hence, few managed to emigrate as refugees.

In Nicaragua a different situation prevailed. There, the left-wing movement, the Sandinistas, overthrew the dictatorial rule of the Somoza family. The Carter administration attempted to work with the new government, but under Ronald Reagan the Central Intelligence Agency armed so-called contra forces that crossed Nicaragua's border in guerrilla raids attempting to overthrow the Sandinistas. Yet Nicaraguans fleeing to the United States also had difficulty emigrating as refugees.

There was another way to become a refugee, an immigrant, and eventually a U.S. citizen. According to immigration law, if a migrant was on American soil, even if one had entered illegally, one could claim asylum, arguing that the applicant had a "well founded fear" of persecution if returned home. Only two thousand or so persons won asylum annually in the 1970s. For example, the government denied asylum to most of the Haitian boat people during the 1970s and deported them. After the 1980 refugee act incorporated the new UN definition of refugee status in place of the anticommunist one, and when the civil wars in Central America escalated, the number applying for asylum skyrocketed. More than 140,000 applied in 1995, for example, and by the end of the 1990s the backlog reached several hundred thousand. Haitians came by boat, but tens of thousands of Central Americans illegally crossed the border separating the United States and Mexico. The State Department and the INS insisted they were mostly illegal immigrants who should be deported. INS officials in Florida did modify policy slightly toward Nicaraguans. An official said that he could not deny asylum to Nicaraguans when the United States insisted that the government of that country was undemocratic and that the CIA-backed contras were trying to overthrow it. Nicaraguans still had difficulty in winning asylum status, but their approval rate was more than double that of their neighbors. In 1989, for example, 5,092 Nicaraguans won asylum, compared with 102 Guatemalans and 443 Salvadorans.

Friends of these contestants for asylum insisted that a double standard was being applied:

Cubans merely had to get to the United States, but Central Americans had to win their claims on an individual basis. Many undocumented immigrant Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans did adjust their status due to an amnesty for undocumented immigrants passed in 1986. As noted, the law covered those in the United States before 1982, but for others fleeing violence in Central America after that date individual asylum was required, which was even more difficult to demonstrate when the civil wars in Central America ended in the early 1990s. Fewer than 10 percent of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans were granted asylum in 1999—up slightly from the rate of the 1980s but less than half of the general approval rate. Those who came after the IRCA amnesty were left in limbo, although minor modifications in immigration policy did permit some to remain. Moreover, once these Central Americans won asylum, they were eligible to adjust their status to that of regular immigrants and could then use the family preference system to sponsor their relatives. For example, in 1996 Haitian immigrants numbered 18,386, with 8,952 of these under the family preference system and another 4,815 coming as immediate family members of U.S. citizens who were exempt from the quotas. Comparable figures for Salvadorans were 17,903; 8,959; and 5,519. Data for Hondurans and Guatemalans were similar. The United States did permit Salvadorans and Hondurans the right to stay temporarily in the United States when earthquakes and hurricanes struck in the 1990s. These temporary stays, called temporary protected status (TPS), were not asylum; when TPS ended, the undocumented aliens were expected to go home.

Although during the Cold War the United States clearly favored persons fleeing communism, it also accepted those seeking refuge from other oppressive regimes. The United States accepted more than 20,000 refugees from Afghanistan when the Soviets invaded in 1979, but after the Soviets left and the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban took control of the nation in the 1990s, the United States still accepted some Afghan refugees, numbering about 2,000 annually.

American relations with Iran changed dramatically when another Islamic movement overthrew the American-backed shah of Iran in 1979. U.S. policy was aimed at keeping Iran's oil flowing to the West and at using the shah's government as a buffer against Soviet expansion. Anti-shah Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and imprisoned fifty-three Americans for more than a year. They were released at the same time that Ronald Reagan replaced Carter as president. Clearly, the United States could not oppose this new government holding American employees and at the same time deny refugee status or asylum to those Iranians already in the United States who did not want to return to Iran. In the 1980s, 46,773 persons from Iran arrived as refugees or recipients of asylum. Over 60 percent of those applying for asylum won it, which was among the highest rates of acceptance of any group.

POST–COLD WAR REFUGEES AND POLICY

The end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989 changed the nature of refugee policy, but it was still closely tied to foreign affairs, if not to the Cold War's anticommunism. The United States gave asylum to Chinese dissidents, the largest single group being Chinese students in the United States when the pro-democracy demonstrators were violently repressed in China in 1989. When the movement collapsed in bloodshed at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, President George H. W. Bush granted the students the right to remain in the United States on a temporary basis. The students' allies pointed out that because some of the students had been outspoken in their opposition to the Chinese government, they faced persecution at home. Congress later made them refugees; they did not have to prove on an individual basis that they qualified under the principles of the 1980 immigration act.

In 1996 Congress also provided 1,000 asylum places for Chinese who opposed the one-child-per-family policy of the Chinese government. There had been precedent for this political decision. When the *Golden Venture,* a ship loaded with 282 Chinese immigrants without legal documents, ran aground off the coast of Long Island in 1992, the INS took the passengers into custody and heard their claims for asylum. About one-third of the passengers' claims were denied and they were deported; another third were settled in Latin America, and the rest were eventually allowed to stay in the United States. Some had claimed that they were refugees because they opposed the one-child-per-family policy and forced abortions in China.

Refugees also continued to arrive from Russia and other nations of the former Soviet Union. Senator Frank Lautenburg of New Jersey convinced Congress in 1989 to amend the Foreign

Aid Appropriations Act to permit Jews and evangelical Christians to be considered religious refugees provided that they could demonstrate a "credible basis for concern about the possibility" of persecution rather than the more difficult to prove "well founded fear." This shift was motivated by political factors rather than anti-Russian fears or fears of communism. Congress extended it until 1994 and eventually 300,000 persons came to America under the Lautenburg amendment.

Immigrants still came from Indochina. Most were Vietnamese; only a few thousand Cambodians and Laotians arrived. Even the Vietnamese numbers were drastically cut by the 1990s, and most simply arrived under the family unification preferences of the immigration system. Indeed, relations improved between the United States and Vietnam in the 1990s, and the U.S. government no longer perceived communism to be a threat in Asia.

Armed conflict against Iraq during the Gulf War of 1991 was hardly a Cold War affair. The United States marshaled military support from several Arab and European nations after Iraq occupied Kuwait. While the struggle was unfolding, persons from Kuwait and Iraq were granted temporary protected status. The U.S.-led forces quickly drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, so a large stream of refugees did not develop. Nonetheless, Iraqis who managed to leave before the war began or after were given refuge in the United States. The INS could hardly do otherwise. More than a thousand per year were admitted as refugees in the last years of the twentieth century.

A sign of the shifting priorities of the post–Cold War era was the treatment of Cubans trying to reach the United States by boat in 1994. Because the Mariel exodus included mentally ill and criminal passengers, the U.S. and Cuban governments argued about Cuba taking back these persons considered undesirable. Negotiations partly resolved the crisis, with Cuba receiving some Marielitos and the United States agreeing to process Cubans who wanted to emigrate. Roughly 11,000 Cubans managed to come through regular channels between 1985 and 1994. A few also reached Florida by boat after the Mariel exodus ended, but their numbers were not large from 1980 to 1994.

As social and economic conditions deteriorated in Cuba, many more Cubans, using what boats they could find, headed for Florida in the summer of 1994. These "rafters" posed a diplomatic problem for the Clinton administration. Not wishing to see a repeat of the Mariel crisis, when more than 130,000 entered the United States without inspection, the president announced that the "rafters" would not be allowed to reach the United States. Rather, the Coast Guard returned them to Cuba or detained them at the Guantánamo naval base in Cuba. The administration knew that if the Cubans reached Florida, they would be covered by the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. Eventually, Cuba and the United States worked out an agreement for an orderly process to admit eligible Cubans, up to 20,000 annually, and in return Cuba would try to halt the exodus. Those at the Guantánamo base were to be processed through careful screening. Cuban Americans and their friends in the United States claimed that under this arrangement the Cuban Adjustment Act was effectively repealed, but the Clinton administration did succeed in preventing another Mariel exodus. With no support from the Soviet Union, Cuba seemed much less threatening—hardly a danger to the noncommunist nations of the Western Hemisphere.

American interest in Africa was considerably less than its interest in Latin America, Europe, and Asia during the Cold War years. As a result, few African refugees entered, and most of them originated in Ethiopia. That country had been an American ally in the Cold War until 1974, when a military and left-wing revolution succeeded in overthrowing the existing government. Washington gave Ethiopians who were in the United States at that time the right to remain temporarily. When it did not appear that the left-wing government would be replaced, the State Department and INS agreed to the admission of a few thousand Ethiopians annually and granted asylum to many who were already in the United States. By the end of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, about 20,000 Ethiopians had won asylum cases or had been permitted to enter as refugees. These numbers are not large compared to Asian, European, and Cuban refugees, but until the early 1990s, Ethiopians constituted the vast majority of African refugees.

Ethiopians continued to arrive as refugees after 1989, but American policy toward Africa looked to other issues than Marxism or communism. Stability and humanitarian concerns were at the center of the new policy. In 1992 the United States entered a civil war in Somalia. The effort to stabilize Somalia failed, and U.S. troops were ordered home. However, as an aftermath to aid those caught in the war, the door was opened to Somali refugees, numbering nearly 30,000 during

the 1990s. In 1997, Somalis accounted for half of all African refugees.

Somalia was by no means the only nation divided by civil war and violence. Other African nations experienced such upheavals, and although U.S. forces were not engaged in a major way, the Clinton administration admitted African refugees from some of these conflicts. When Liberia, a nation that the United States had helped establish in the nineteenth century, experienced violence, Liberians in the United States received temporary protected status and others became refugees. The State Department and INS also admitted several hundred ethnic Nuer from the Sudan. Included were the "Lost Boys of Sudan," part of a group of 10,000 boys who had fled the Sudan's violence in 1992 and had lived in various African refugee camps. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the State Department recommended that 3,600 of these young men be admitted, and the first group of 500 arrived in the United States in 2001. Sudanese, Ethiopians, Liberians, and Somalis arrived from Africa in the largest numbers, but a few hundred others also found a safe haven in the United States during the 1990s. Among these were the sensational cases of several African women who received asylum on the grounds that if they returned to their homeland they would be subject to genital mutilation. The INS announced that it would consider mutilation as a factor in determining what a "well-founded fear" meant for asylum cases. While the United States avoided military intervention in the ethnic bloodshed in Rwanda, it announced that more refugees from that nation would be admitted. However, the numbers were only a few hundred.

While the decisions rested in part on humanitarian considerations, President Clinton was also responding to the pressures of the Black Caucus in Congress and various lobbying groups that wanted to increase the number of refugees arriving from Africa. The Black Caucus also attacked the INS and the State Department for sending Haitian refugees back to Haiti or interning them at the Guantánamo naval base for careful screening. Clinton signaled a shift in foreign policy to give more attention to Africa during two visits he made there toward the end of his second term. After his first trip in 1998, the president announced that the refugee quota from all of Africa would be increased. African quotas were upped to 7,000 in 1997 and 12,000 the next year. After Clinton's second visit in 2000, the State Department said that the African quota would be increased to 20,000. The figure was still only 25 percent of the total, but it marked a major increase in African refugees.

The last area of foreign policy considerations with implications for refugee policy was the Balkans and the bloodshed there in the 1990s. When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the 1990s, ethnic violence erupted. The Bosnian parliament declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, but Bosnian ethnic Serbs violently opposed it. Soon a three-way war broke out between Bosnia's Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Serbs massacred thousands of Muslims and engaged in "ethnic cleansing" to drive Muslims out of Bosnia. The western European powers and the United States condemned Serbs for their killing and raping in Bosnia and finally negotiated a peace in 1995 and put in place an international peacekeeping force. The truce was an uneasy one, and before it and after, tens of thousands of Bosnians fled to western Europe and the United States for refuge. The flow continued even after the peacekeepers arrived. From 1986 to 1999 more than 100,000 Bosnians entered as refugees, with 30,906 recorded in 1998 and 22,697 the next year. In 1991, 1,660 refugees from Croatia were also received as refugees. The INS does not keep religious data, but most Bosnian refugees were Muslims.

When Yugoslavian Serbs expanded the ethnic conflict to Kosovo and killed many ethnic Albanians or sent them across the border to Albania, the West once again witnessed more "ethnic cleansing." This time NATO powers carried out their threat of military force and used airpower to drive the Serbs out of Kosovo and attacked Yugoslavia as well. After a successful air war in 1999, NATO troops occupied Kosovo to try to maintain a truce between those Serbs and ethnic Albanians remaining there. While the "ethnic cleansing" of Albanians was under way and during the war itself, as in so many other cases, the number of refugees increased: 14,280 refugees, who were mainly Kosovars, were received in the United States from Yugoslavia. A few hundred others in the United States won their asylum pleas.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the United States has always accepted refugees, even though such immigrants were not necessarily defined in the immigration laws. Government officials in Washington, including mem-

bers of Congress and the president, often responded to overseas crises by linking refugees to foreign policy. A variety of nationality, religious, and ethnic private groups also pressured the government to admit refugees. Most of the admissions, from the arrival of exiles from the French Revolution in the 1790s to World War II, were permitted because the nation wished to inform the world that the United States was an "asylum for mankind."

After World War II, refugee policy underwent change. America's new role in the world prompted political leaders to admit thousands of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. As the Cold War came to dominate American foreign affairs, most refugees were perceived as fleeing communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in eastern Europe, America changed the type of refugee it was willing to receive, but that new policy was still heavily influenced by foreign affairs and domestic politics.

From 1789 to the present, refugee policy was often made on an ad hoc basis. Even following the 1965 immigration act's provisions and the Refugee Act of 1980, government officials often responded to political pressure groups in determining which persons were accepted. Cubans were refugees but Haitians were not. Refugee policy differs little from immigration policy in that it is often confused, ad hoc, and constantly changing. For the immediate future it appears that these policies will continue to be the result of foreign affairs and internal pressures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Catanese, Anthony V. *Haitians: Migration and Diaspora.* Boulder, Colo., 1999.

Childs, Frances Sergeant. *French Refugee Life in the United States, 1790–1800: An American Chapter of the French Revolution.* Baltimore, 1940. Short work on the French refugees to the United States during the 1790s.

Coutin, Susan Bibler. *Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants' Struggle for U.S. Residency.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 2000. Careful study of Salvadoran attempts to win refugee status and asylum in the United States.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992. An important book on the connection between American ethnic groups and foreign policy.

Dinnerstein, Leonard. *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust.* New York, 1982. The definitive work on passage of the Displaced Persons Act after World War II.

Gimpel, James G., and James Edwards, Jr. *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform.* Boston, 1999. Detailed study of congressional immigration policy, with a discussion of refugee policy.

Hein, Jeremy. *From Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: A Refugee Experience in the United States.* New York, 1995.

Hunt, Alfred N. *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean.* Baton Rouge, La., 1988. Solid book on how America responded to Haitian attempts to win asylum.

Keely, Charles B., Robert W. Tucker, and Linda Wrigley, eds. *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Boulder, Colo., 1990.

Koehn, Peter H. *Refugees from Revolution: U.S. Policy and Third World Migration.* Boulder, Colo., 1991. Good summary of post–World War II immigration policy as it relates to developing nations.

Lerski, Jerzy Jan. *A Polish Chapter in Jacksonian America: The United States and the Polish Exiles of 1831.* Madison, Wis., 1958.

Loescher, Gil. *Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis.* New York, 1993.

Loescher, Gil, and John A. Scanlan. *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to the Present.* New York and London, 1986. Excellent account of anticommunism and American refugee policies after 1945.

Masud-Piloto, Felix Roberto. *From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959–1995.* Lanham, Md., 1996. Useful summary of American policy toward Cuba, noting the shifts beginning in 1994.

Miller, Kerby A. *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America.* New York, 1985.

Poyo, Gerald Eugene. *With All, and for the Good of All: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, 1848–1898.* Durham, N.C., 1989.

Reimers, David M. *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America.* 2d ed. New York, 1992.

Robinson, W. Courtland. *Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response.* London and New York, 1998. Good summary not only of American but world response to the Indochinese refugees.

Schrag, Philip G. *A Well-Founded Fear: The Congressional Battle to Save Political Asylum in America*. New York, 2000. Detailed summary of congressional politics and recent refugee policy.

Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2000. Important study of ethnic groups and their role in shaping American foreign policy, with useful material on refugees.

Stepick, Alex. *Pride Against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States*. Boston, 1998.

Wilson, David A. *United Irishmen, United States: Immigrant Radicals in the Early Republic*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1998.

Wyman, David S. *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945*. New York, 1984. Major study of American policy toward the Holocaust during World War II, critical of U.S. policy.

Zucker, Norman L., and Naomi Flink Zucker. *The Guarded Gate: The Reality of American Refugee Policy*. San Diego, 1987.

See also ASYLUM; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF; IMMIGRATION; NEUTRALITY; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

RELIGION

Leo P. Ribuffo

For national leaders and specialists in the study of diplomacy alike, the notion that religion has affected United States foreign policy is familiar—too familiar. Whereas the Massachusetts Puritan John Winthrop's charge in 1630 to build an inspiring "city upon the hill" came to be quoted almost routinely by presidents as different as John F. Kennedy, James Earl Carter, and Ronald Reagan to sanctify one version or another of American mission, students of diplomacy rarely go beyond citing such rhetorical conventions to explore the complicated influence of religious ideas or denominational interests.

Thus, any discussion of religion and foreign relations must begin with an appreciation of the diversity of American faiths, their development over the centuries, and the problematical nature of their connection to international affairs. Contemporary liberals who celebrate a "Judeo-Christian tradition" and contemporary conservatives who conflate all "people of faith" both homogenize American religion, past and present. Not only have people of faith differed among themselves about domestic and foreign policy issues, but they have also often done so precisely because they took their respective faiths seriously. Nonetheless, even the most devout among them were also affected, usually without any sense of contradiction, by political, economic, strategic, racial, and ethnic considerations, as well as by personal feelings about worldly success, power, and glory. Furthermore, American foreign policy decisions, especially those relating to expansion, war, and peace, have affected religious life as well as the other way around.

Nor has a high level of religious commitment been constant throughout American history. Both the intensity of belief in the aggregate and the strength of particular religious groups have waxed and waned. So have interdenominational tolerance, competition, and cooperation. Religious groups have proliferated for reasons ranging from constitutional disestablishment to theological disagreement to mass immigration. In this context—and much to the consternation of clergy committed to one orthodoxy or another—individual Americans have always tended to create their own syncretic belief systems.

FROM EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT TO MANIFEST DESTINY

Few of the Europeans who settled North America in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries held the contemporary liberal view that all faiths were essentially equal before God. On the contrary, divergent religious doctrines bolstered imperial rivalries. For the British subjects in North America, almost all of whom were heirs in some respect to Reformation-era Protestantism, Spain and France represented not only economic rivals and strategic threats, but also tyrannical "popery." During the French and Indian War, anti-Catholic sentiment rose and some of the colonies forbade "papists" to bear arms.

Although residents of the thirteen colonies that formed the United States in 1776 were overwhelmingly Protestant, the religious situation already showed signs of the complexity that would become an American perennial. Roughly half of the colonists were at least pro forma Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians, but there were also large numbers of Baptists, Lutherans, Dutch Reformed Calvinists, Quakers, and German pietists. Differences among these Protestants may look insignificant to the contemporary secular eye, but they bulked large at a time when taxes were levied to support established churches in most of the states. In addition, the Great Awakening of the 1740s had left a legacy of division in several denominations between evangelical "new lights" and more stolid "old lights." There were also roughly 25,000 Catholics and 2,000 Jews.

Equally important, by several criteria the era in which the United States was formed qualifies as the least religious period in the country's history. Fewer than 20 percent of Americans were church adherents. Many of the foremost Founders, including the first four presidents, were influenced to some extent by deism and viewed God as a distant force in human affairs.

Recent religious developments influenced the first and foremost event of American foreign policy: the decision to separate from Great Britain. These also affected the shape of the revolutionary coalition, the size of the country, and the form of the new government. While dividing denominations, the Great Awakening had fostered colonial unity as men and women saved by the same itinerant evangelists hundred of miles apart felt a common bond. To the British government, the Awakening provided further evidence that the colonists needed a resident Anglican bishop to limit their religious autonomy. None was named, but even colonial deists viewed such an appointment as part of the comprehensive British "conspiracy" to strangle American freedom, religious as well as political and economic. The Quebec Act of 1774, which granted civil rights to French Catholics and all but established the Roman Catholic Church in that province, underscored the threat of "ecclesiastical slavery." Now, many American Protestants concluded, British tyranny had allied with papal absolutism. On balance, religious forces and issues speeded the momentum toward independence.

Religious factors also influenced decisions to support the Revolution, remain loyal to King George III, or try to avoid the conflict altogether. Adherents to the Church of England frequently sided with the Crown but there were many notable exceptions, including George Washington. Evangelical heirs to the Great Awakening disproportionately joined the patriot cause; Scots-Irish Presbyterians were particularly zealous. New England Congregationalists, the clearest spiritual heirs of John Winthrop, frequently framed the cause as part of a divine mission. On the other hand, the Declaration of Independence reflected Enlightenment republicanism rather than evangelical Protestantism. Jews usually favored independence. In general, however, religious minorities feared the loss of royal protection. Catholics were wary of living in an overwhelmingly Protestant republic. Yet Charles Carroll, the only Catholic signer of the Declaration of Independence, expected—correctly, as matters turned out—that independence would foster disestablishment. Neither Carroll's diplomacy nor military force convinced Quebec Catholics to join the United States. French Canadian bishop Jean-Olivier Briand denounced the invading "Bostonians" and threatened to withhold sacraments from Catholics who aided them.

Decisions about the war were particularly difficult for adherents to what are usually called the historic peace churches. The Society of Friends (Quakers) and the predominantly German pietists—notably, the Mennonites, Moravians, and Dunkers—are best known for their repudiation of violence. But also, instead of building ever larger cities, states, or imperial republics "upon a hill," they hoped to change the world, if at all, through a separatist moral example. During the Revolution, as in all future wars, they struggled to determine the right mix of cooperation and resistance.

Members of all of the peace churches faced some degree of ostracism, seizure of property, loss of employment, and imprisonment when they refused to pay taxes or swear allegiance to the new government. The German pietists—predominantly rural, further from the political mainstream, and generally willing to pay fines in place of military service—suffered less than the Quakers. The Society of Friends contained some strong loyalists and was suspected of shielding many more. Other members were expelled for fighting in the Revolution; a prowar contingent seceded to form the Free Quakers. Quakers also began their practice of providing humanitarian assistance to all victims of the war

Just as religious affiliations influenced the Revolution, both the war and the ultimate victory decisively affected the religious scene. The departure of loyalist Anglican clergy left the successor Episcopal Church weakened. The alliance with France dampened fears of "popery," much to the benefit of American Catholics. The Constitution precluded religious tests for federal office and the First Amendment banned an "establishment of religion." Religious minorities, sometimes in alliance with Enlightenment deists, began a long but ultimately successful campaign for disestablishment in the states. Thus, although religious denominations would continue to influence foreign policy, they enjoyed no constitutional advantage over secular lobbies. A treaty with Tripoli in 1796 assured the Muslim ruler of that country that the government was "not in any sense founded on the Christian religion." The absence of a federal establishment prompted competition,

which in turn encouraged both religious commitments and a proliferation of faiths as clergy from rival denominations competed to win adherents. Also, the grassroots egalitarianism nurtured by the Revolution provided a hospitable environment for the theologically and institutionally democratic Baptists and Methodists.

The victorious revolutionary coalition began to fall apart almost immediately. Disagreements about faith and foreign affairs shaped the development of acrimonious party politics starting in the 1790s. The Jeffersonian Republicans were religiously more diverse and tolerant than the Federalists. Looking abroad, the Republicans tilted toward revolutionary France, while the Federalists typically admired Great Britain—which they viewed as a bastion of Christianity rather than French infidelity. During the War of 1812, Federalist Congregationalists and Presbyterians reiterated their admiration of British Protestantism and characterized impressed seamen as runaway Irish Catholics unworthy of sympathy. Baptists and Methodists denounced the autocratic Church of England and hailed the Republican President James Madison as a friend of religious liberty.

Above and beyond these controversies was the broad consensus that the United States must expand its territory, trade, and power. Expansion often received but did not require a religious rationale. Thomas Jefferson, who held the least conventional religious beliefs of any president, arranged the Louisiana Purchase, the largest single land acquisition in American history. Even Protestant clergy who viewed expansion as part of a divine plan often supplemented Scripture with economic and geopolitical arguments.

John L. O'Sullivan, editor of the *Democratic Review*, captured the dominant expansionist theme of republican mission when he famously proclaimed the "manifest destiny" of the United States in 1845. The continent was destined to be American by a nonsectarian Providence for a great experiment in freedom and self-government.

Even so, religious controversies relating to foreign policy proliferated between the 1810s and the 1850s—partly because the United States was expanding its territory and international interests. Equally important, this era of manifest destiny coincided with another revival among Protestants that lasted at least through the 1830s and the first mass immigration of non-Protestants. By the 1850s the three largest religious groups were the Methodists, Baptists, and Catholics; the population also included 150,000 Jews, most of them recent immigrants from German states.

The second Great Awakening energized virtually every reform campaign of the first half of the nineteenth century. Two in particular intersected with the history of foreign policy: the creation of an organized peace movement and a systematic Protestant missionary effort.

Northern Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Unitarians provided most of the leadership and rank-and-file strength of the peace movement. In 1815, David Low Dodge, a devout Presbyterian, founded the New York Peace Society, perhaps the first such organization in the world. There were many other local stirrings in the wake of the War of 1812. In 1828 the most important among them coalesced into the American Peace Society.

Historical accounts of Protestant missionaries typically begin with the creation of the first "foreign" mission board in 1810 and then trace evangelical activities in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This perspective has a certain plausibility, not least because many missionaries viewed the story that way. Yet it obscures the essential fact that for several generations U.S. foreign policy also occurred on the North American continent. The Africans and Asians encountered overseas were no more alien to bourgeois Protestant missionaries than were the Native Americans whom their precursors had been trying to convert since the 1600s. Moreover, mission boards sent evangelists to American Indian "nations" well into the nineteenth century. As the historian Kenneth Scott Latourette observed in *The Great Century in the United States of America* (1941), the conquest of the American West was a "vast colonial expansion, nonetheless significant because it was not usually regarded as such."

Missionaries played three major roles in this continental colonialism. First, their glowing descriptions of the land drew settlers westward—sometimes to disputed territory. Oregon was such a case, where the U.S. advantage in population helped secure a peaceful division with Great Britain in 1846. Second, along with Methodist circuit riders and countless local revivalists, missionaries instilled bourgeois traits useful for developing and holding the frontier. Third, they worked to christianize the Indians as part of an effort to assimilate them. In 1819 the federal government began funding churches to inculcate the "habits and arts of civilization" among Native Americans. Missionary successes in this area did not save the Native Americans from the inex-

orable forces of expansion. The Cherokees in the southeastern United States accepted Christianity and their leader adopted the name Elias Boudinot, after the first president of the American Bible Society. Even so, they were forcibly removed beyond the Mississippi River in the 1830s.

Overseas missions ultimately became, as the historian John K. Fairbank wrote in *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (1974), the nation's "first large-scale transnational corporations." The institutional beginnings were modest. Spurred by the awakening at Williams College and Andover Seminary, Congregationalists took the lead in 1810 in founding the (temporarily) interdenominational American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Within a decade, missionaries were sent to India, Hawaii, and the Middle East. Although diverse denominations soon created their own boards, the ABCFM remained the leading sponsor of overseas missions for the next fifty years.

The fields of activity were determined by opportunity as well as theology. The ABCFM established missions in India and Ceylon because Great Britain barred their establishment in Burma. Not only did the Holy Land have an obvious appeal, but also the Ottoman Empire permitted missionaries to work with its Christian communities (although they were quite willing to offer Protestantism to Muslims and Jews as well as Coptics, Catholics, and Eastern Orthodox believers when those opportunities arose).

While rarely advocating racial equality, white religious leaders were nonetheless eager to send black missionaries to sub-Saharan Africa. According to prevailing medical theory, blacks were less susceptible than whites to tropical diseases. Whatever the motives of their (usually) white sponsors, black missionaries often felt a special calling to save Africa from paganism and Islam. In addition, thriving African Christian communities might serve as a refuge from persecution and show the world that blacks could build civilized societies.

The first missionaries concentrated on bringing individual men and women to Christ, perhaps as a prelude to his imminent Second Coming. Always few in number, they hoped to establish indigenous congregations to carry on the work. At first, too, they paid close attention to the quality of faith among aspiring converts. Missionaries and their sponsoring agencies frequently agonized over the question of how much they should modify indigenous cultures. Some evangelical Protestants thought a large measure of "civilization" necessary for Christianity to take hold. In theory, most wanted to change local ways of life as little as possible consistent with the demands of the gospel. In practice, both the prevailing definition of civilized morality and their own personal traits undermined missionary restraint. Inevitably, they fostered values esteemed by middle-class Protestants: hard work, efficiency, technological innovation, sexual propriety, and respect for "true womanhood." The missionaries were usually ignored, often opposed, and sometimes physically attacked. Even converts mixed Protestant precepts with aspects of their previous religious faiths. Missionaries learned to simplify Christianity and relax their requirements for spiritual rebirth.

Pre–Civil War missionaries did not see themselves as agents of American economic expansion. Frequently they set out for places where trade was negligible and unlikely to develop. They often assailed merchants for their chicanery, sale of alcohol, and promotion of prostitution. Yet Charles Denby, Jr., U.S. minister to China later in the nineteenth century, was correct to see missionaries as "pioneers of trade." Businessmen who contributed to missionary societies and provided free passage on ships agreed. In many cases missionaries were the only translators available to entrepreneurs trying to open foreign markets.

Government officials saw the missionary enterprise as a means to extend American political influence. Writing on behalf of the ABCFM to King Kamehameha of Hawaii, President John Quincy Adams declared that "a knowledge of letters and of the True Religion—the Religion of the Christian's Bible" were the only means to advance any people's happiness. Despite such endorsements, the U.S. government offered less direct help than overseas missionaries wanted.

The Middle East, which attracted the largest number of missionaries before the Civil War, provides a case in point. Commodore David Porter, the American chargé d'affaires in the Ottoman Empire from 1831 until 1843, urged Turkish officials at all levels to safeguard the missionaries, worked to establish consulates in places where they operated, and occasionally arranged visits by the navy as quiet demonstrations of American strength. At the same time, Porter repeatedly warned against offending Muslims. From the perspective of the Turkish government, missionaries were welcome as long as their activities were not disruptive. But their proselytizing inevitably

offended not only Muslims, but also Greek and Armenian Orthodox Christians. Disruptive responses included riots, destruction of property, and occasional murders.

The missionaries in the Middle East and their patrons at home worked diligently to influence government policy and enjoyed mixed success. Missionaries themselves received consular or diplomatic appointments in Athens, Beirut, and Constantinople. Encouraged by an ABCFM lobbyist, Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote Porter in 1842 that missionaries should be assisted "in the same manner" as merchants. Indeed, in the Middle East they seem to have received slightly more direct assistance than businessmen. Still, government action fell short of their hopes. Warships were dispatched only to "show the flag," not to fire their cannon in retribution for attacks on missionaries, and the Turkish-American treaty of 1862 contained no provision guaranteeing the right to evangelize.

The worldwide Christian missionary campaign was confined neither to Protestants nor to Americans. From the perspective of the Vatican, the United States itself remained a mission field under the supervision of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith until 1908. While this subordinate status should not obscure the American hierarchy's quest for influence and autonomy, Catholic bishops, priests, and nuns necessarily concentrated on preserving—or creating—faith among millions of immigrants and their children. Thus, few Americans participated in the Vatican's far-flung missionary efforts. Among Protestants, the largest number of overseas missionaries came from Great Britain until roughly 1900. Friendly contacts between Protestant and Catholic missionaries were rare in the early nineteenth century. More typical was the complaint by ABCFM representatives in the Middle East that agents of popery allied with Islamic infidels to thwart their efforts. On the other hand, American Protestant missionaries not only cooperated with their British counterparts, whose efforts predated their own by at least two decades, but also sought protection from British diplomats and warships. This cooperation was both a sign of and modest contribution to the rapprochement that proceeded fitfully between the two countries.

Although no more than two thousand American missionaries had been sent abroad by 1870, their impact on indigenous cultures was occasionally extraordinary. Nowhere was their influence more apparent than in the Hawaiian Islands. When the first missionaries, from the ABCFM, arrived in 1820, Hawaii was already enduring rapid—and usually destructive—change through contact with the outside world The missionaries were appalled by many Hawaiian practices, including polygamy, incest, and the "licentious" hula dance. To some Hawaiians, however, these evangelical Protestants seemed preferable to the merchants and sailors who had introduced alcohol, prostitution, and deadly diseases. The missionaries' shrewdest tactic was to cultivate Hawaiian royalty. By 1840 they had transformed the islands into a limited monarchy with a legislature, judiciary, and constitution barring laws "at variance with the Word of Lord Jehovah."

Although the ABCFM initially cited Hawaii as an example to emulate, success there was neither problem-free nor permanent. Many pro forma converts lapsed into what the missionaries considered sin. Despite zealous efforts to exclude religious rivals, advocates of Catholic and Mormon "idolatry" established footholds. Even Hawaiian Christians prayed for relief from white "mission rule." The ABCFM reprimanded its representatives for going beyond their charge to bring the gospel. Yet the political and social changes were irreversible. By the 1850s former missionaries, their children, and protégés had established themselves as Hawaii's elite.

No field offered less promise than China in the early nineteenth century. The population was indifferent. The Manchu dynasty barely tolerated missionaries (often disguised as businessmen) along with other foreign "barbarians" in an enclave near Canton. In 1858 the Reverend Samuel Wells Williams judged the Chinese "among the most craven of people, cruel and selfish as heathenism can make men." Thus, the gospel must be "backed by force if we wish them to listen to reason."

Force came primarily in the shape of the British navy. American missionaries enthusiastically backed Britain's frequent assaults and regretted only that U.S. warships rarely joined the fray. The Opium War that began in 1839 was a turning point for China and the missionaries there. With few exceptions they cheered the British victory, even though it meant continuation of an illegal narcotics trade the Chinese were trying to suppress. Perhaps, they reflected, God was using naval bombardments to open China to the gospel.

The Sino-British agreement that ended the Opium War in 1842 and established five treaty ports was the first of many "unequal treaties" that

provoked Chinese resentment. In 1844 the Treaty of Wanghia granted the United States access to these ports and most-favored-nation status. The pact was largely the work of three missionaries, one of whom, Dr. Peter Parker, became U.S. commissioner in China a decade later.

The Taiping Rebellion, led by Hung Hsiu-chuan, again showed that evangelism could be a catalyst for extraordinary and wholly unanticipated consequences. After living briefly in the house of a missionary, Hung baptized himself and created a religious movement combining elements of Christianity, Confucianism, his own mystical visions, and a reformist social program. In 1851 he led an uprising against the Manchu dynasty; by the time he was defeated, at least twenty million Chinese had been killed.

Although missionary influence certainly did not cause the Taiping Rebellion, and both Protestants and Catholics repudiated Hung's syncretic faith after an initial show of interest, the revolt made the Manchu court more wary than ever of Western religion. At the same time, the revolt rendered China less able to resist Western power. After further British bombardment, in a few instances aided by the U.S. Navy, China agreed in the late 1850s to new and increasingly unequal treaties with the West. Thus, unlike their colleagues in the Middle East, missionaries in China were guaranteed the right to spread the gospel.

A second Great Awakening at a time of mass non-Protestant immigration energized prejudice as well as domestic reform and missionary activity. Slurs against Jews routinely included the charge that their ancestors had crucified Christ. Nonetheless, Jews seemed less threatening than the more numerous and raucous Catholic immigrants. Neither the nativists who burned convents nor the Catholics who fought back with equal vigor were moved by the fine points of theology. Even so, well-publicized attacks on "popery" by prominent clergy hardly served the cause of tolerance. No clergyman was more prominent than Congregationalist Lyman Beecher. In *A Plea for the West* (1835), Beecher accused the Vatican of flooding the frontier with ignorant immigrants who were easily manipulated by priests. Unlike anti-Semitism, hostility to Catholics affected national politics. In the mid-1850s the nativist American Party, popularly called the Know-Nothings, became a powerful force in Congress.

As the population grew more diverse during the first half of the nineteenth century, so too did diplomatic personnel and political controversies involving religion and foreign policy. Starting with the Jeffersonian Republicans, Jews served as diplomatic and commercial representatives abroad, notably in Scotland and the Caribbean. The first major post went to Mordecai Noah, appointed consul at Tunis in 1813. Removing Noah two years later, Secretary of State James Monroe claimed that his Judaism had been an "obstacle" to performance of his duties. It seems doubtful that the Muslim ruler of Tunis was discomfited by Noah's religion. Indeed, Noah's appointment continued a diplomatic tradition in which Jews often served as mediators between Christians and Muslims. Responding to inquiries by Noah's political backers of various faiths, Secretary Monroe backtracked to say that his religion, "so far as related to this government," played no part in the recall. Many Jews remained unconvinced.

In 1840 the persecution of Jews in parts of the Ottoman Empire attracted widespread attention. Officials in Damascus charged Syrian Jews with killing a Catholic monk and his servant in order to use their blood in Passover services, arrested dozens of Jews, and tortured some of them to secure spurious confessions. Both the "blood libel" charge and attacks upon Jews quickly spread to other parts of the empire. French diplomats apparently encouraged the persecution in order to maximize their own country's influence. Great Britain led the international protests and the United States joined in. American diplomats were instructed to use their good offices "with discretion" to aid Jewish victims of persecution. According to Secretary of State John Forsyth's instructions, the United States was acting as a friendly power, whose institutions placed "upon the same footing, the worshipers of God of every faith."

Public meetings by Christians and Jews alike encouraged government action. Some Jewish leaders hesitated to rally behind their Eastern coreligionists; others doubted the prudence or propriety of seeking government action. Ultimately, however, the Damascus affair brought American Jews closer together and legitimated demonstrations against anti-Semitism abroad. Six years later they organized protests against the persecution of Russian Jews. During the 1850s, along with such Christian allies as Senators Henry Clay and Lewis Cass, they denounced a treaty that recognized the right of Swiss cantons to discriminate against Jews. The administration of President Millard Fillmore negotiated cosmetic changes in the agreement.

Foreign policy issues prompted animosity as well as cooperation among religious faiths. Many Protestants supported Jewish protests not only because they valued the republican principle of equal treatment of all white citizens, but also because they wanted to set a precedent for receiving equal treatment in Catholic countries. John England, the Catholic archbishop of Charleston, attended a mass meeting condemning the Ottoman persecution of Jews in 1840. Conversely, Jews and Catholics were bitterly divided over the Mortara affair in the 1850s. Edgardo Mortara, a Jewish child in Bologna, Italy, was secretly baptized by a servant and then removed from his family by the church. Caught between Catholic and Jewish constituencies, President James Buchanan claimed that he could not intervene in the affairs of another state.

The Mexican War was the most controversial foreign policy event between the War of 1812 and World War I. Although sectarian religious arguments were not absent, rival interpretations of the nation's nonsectarian republican mission predominated among proponents and opponents alike. According to opponents, President James K. Polk had provoked an illegitimate war with a fellow Christian republic. According to proponents, not only did the United States need to defend itself in an undemocratic world, but also the corrupt Mexican state resembled European autocracies rather than a true republic. Therefore, an American triumph would help to purify Mexico and inspire the forces of liberty everywhere. Instead of fostering freedom, opponents countered, such a victory would increase the territory open to slavery.

In this complicated ideological context, the major denominations took no official stand on the war. The Disciples of Christ, which had just begun to emerge during the awakening, called it a crime. Presbyterian leaders showed the most enthusiasm, especially about the prospect of saving Mexico from Catholic "idolatry." Congregationalists, Unitarians, and Quakers, the strongest foes of slavery, were also the most ardent opponents of the war.

The issue of Catholic loyalty to the United States engaged American nativists, Mexican military strategists, and the Polk administration. Circulating lurid tales of seductions by Mexican nuns, nativists feared that the Catholic troops, roughly 1,100 in number, would spy for or defect to the enemy. The Mexicans hoped so. Despite their propaganda efforts, only a few Irish-American soldiers switched sides to join the Battalion of Saint Patrick.

As president and leader of the Democratic Party, which received a disproportionate share of the Catholic vote, Polk declined to make the war an anti-Catholic crusade. Emissaries to the Mexican Catholic hierarchy emphasized that their church was not endangered by the U.S. invasion. Polk asked the American bishops to recommend Catholic chaplains for the army. In addition, Moses Beach, Catholic editor of the *New York Sun*, served as one of Polk's numerous agents seeking to secure a peace treaty. Many American soldiers accepted the ready-made stereotype that Catholicism had corrupted the Mexican government and rendered the population docile, yet some found the priests surprisingly amiable and enjoyed the romance of billeting in monasteries.

FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR I

The Civil War era affected the American religious life in important ways. What some scholars consider a third Great Awakening began in the 1850s and continued during the war itself. Indeed, the conflict looked much more like an evangelical Protestant war than had the Revolution, the War of 1812, or the Mexican War. Union and Confederate clergy called upon God to aid their respective causes, military camps hosted revival meetings, and soldiers sometimes marched into battle singing hymns. Thoughtful supporters of the Union from President Abraham Lincoln on down framed the war as a time of testing. For many northerners, victory in 1865 proved that the test had been passed and that God truly blessed America and its mission in the world.

The consequences for Catholics were mixed. On the one hand, service for the North and South brought new legitimacy; on the other hand, erstwhile Know-Nothings found a home in the Republican Party. Although Jews served disproportionately in both the Union and Confederate armies, rising evangelical fervor combined with venerable stereotypes about Jewish profiteering to provoke notable anti-Semitic incidents and accusations. Finally, except for the historic peace churches, the war decimated the organized antiwar movement as even fervent pacifists were tempted to acquiesce in violence to end slavery.

Important as these developments were, the Civil War affected the religious scene much less

than the powerful trends of the following four decades. Starting in the 1880s, millions of poor Catholic and Jewish immigrants began to arrive from eastern and southern Europe. Although the population remained predominantly Protestant and the elite institutions overwhelmingly so, politics and popular culture were soon affected. For the Catholic and Jewish minorities, the problem of defining and defending their Americanness acquired fresh urgency. Moreover, the "new immigration" coincided with a rapid industrialization rivaled only by that of Germany. Both the benefits and liabilities were obvious. On the one hand, unprecedented wealth was available to a few Americans and upward mobility possible for many. On the other hand, the gap widened between the rich and poor, frequent economic busts interrupted the long-term boom, and violent social conflict escalated. Perhaps God was once again testing rather than blessing America.

Worse yet, perhaps God did not exist at all—or at least His mode of governing the universe may have differed from what Christians had taken for granted since the ebbing of the Enlightenment. Amid the social turmoil, Protestants in particular faced serious intellectual challenges. The Darwinian theory of evolution undermined the Genesis account of creation. Modern science raised doubts about all biblical miracles. Less known to the praying public but especially distressing to educated clergy, archaeological discoveries and "higher criticism" of the Bible suggested that Scripture was in no simple sense the word of God.

The religious responses to this social and intellectual turmoil included insular bigotry and cosmopolitan reflection, apocalyptic foreboding and millennial optimism, intellectual adaptation and retrenchment, withdrawal from the world and expanded efforts to perfect it. The choices made by individual men and women involved anguish, ambivalence, and inconsistency. In the aggregate, their decisions transformed American religious life.

By the 1890s Protestantism was entering a fourth Great Awakening, which, like its predecessors, was marked by heightened emotions, stresses and splits within existing denominations, and the founding of new faiths. Among believers in new faiths were the followers of former Congregationalist Charles Taze Russell (known since 1931 as Jehovah's Witnesses), whose teachings required separation from a world ruled by Satan. Other spiritual searchers, convinced that God's grace brought a second blessing with such signs as the gift of speaking in tongues, formed their own Pentecostal churches. Doctrinal differences strained relations within the major denominations. Theological liberals, who often called themselves modernists, viewed the Bible as a valuable but not necessarily infallible book, emphasized Jesus's humanity and moral example, and aspired to build God's kingdom on earth. Theological conservatives, most of whom called themselves fundamentalists after World War I, championed the "inerrancy" of the Bible, the divinity of Jesus, and the expectation that God's kingdom would be established only after His miraculous return. While staunch modernists and conservatives occasionally confronted each other in heresy trials, moderates from both camps usually continued to work together until World War I.

Although theological conservatives were not necessarily politically conservative, they emphasized that the church as an institution must above all else save souls. While modernists stressed the church's role in improving this world, their earthly version of God's kingdom fell far short of twenty-first-century political liberalism. Indeed, sophisticated religious ideas coexisted in the typical theological liberal's worldview with routine affirmations of laissez-faire economics. A few theological liberals preached an explicitly "social gospel" in support of workers' rights, a regulatory state, and (occasionally) moderate socialism. Yet even social gospelers were susceptible to anti-Semitism, anti-Catholic nativism, and ostensibly scientific theories of "Anglo-Saxon" superiority.

By the 1880s affluent and assimilated American Jews experienced growing social discrimination. By that point, too, anti-Catholic activism was again on the rise. The American Protective Association (APA), founded in 1887, attracted 100,000 members who pledged not to hire or join strikes with Catholics. In countless tracts, efficient, fair, and democratic Anglo-Saxon Protestants were celebrated at the expense of tricky Jews, drunken Irish, sullen Poles, and impulsive Italians. Despite this emphasis on racial or cultural superiority, religious motifs were not absent from this latest form of nativism. Jewish chicanery came naturally, many Christians believed, because Jews had crucified Jesus. Ignorant Catholic peasants from eastern or southern Europe, like the Mexicans defeated in the 1840s, looked dangerously susceptible to clerical manipulation. The affirmation of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council in 1869 and 1870, the increasingly insular papacy of Pope Leo XIII, and the Holy See's suspicion of the American

Catholic Church suggested that Protestant fears were not entirely fanciful.

The behavior of Jews and Catholics was much more complicated than even tolerant Protestants supposed. On the one hand, many immigrants were rapidly acculturated and their native-born children considered themselves Americans. On the other hand, rivalry among "nationalities" within the same religious community was commonplace. Sephardic and German Reform Jews viewed Judaism as a religion akin to liberal Protestantism; for the Orthodox eastern European Jews who outnumbered them by the early twentieth century, Judaism was central to cultural identity. Catholic bishops disagreed among themselves about their religion's place in a democracy devoid of a state church but nonetheless dominated by an informal Protestant establishment. Nationalists like Cardinal James Gibbons and Archbishop John Ireland expected Catholicism to thrive in such circumstances. They warned, however, that strict Vatican control would only fuel Protestant animosity.

All of these developments not only affected the immediate relationship between faith and foreign policy, but also left a long legacy of beliefs and institutions. Most obviously, sermons, articles, and books by mainstream clergy put a religious imprimatur on post–Civil War expansion. In 1885 the Reverend Josiah Strong's *Our Country,* the most widely read of these tracts, was published. The book itself was a mixture of nativist themes, popularized Darwinism, apocalyptic foreboding, and millennial hope. *Our Country* also reflected Strong's participation in both the home and overseas mission movements. Strong believed that authoritarian religions threatened the political freedom and "pure spiritual Christianity" that Anglo-Saxons had nurtured in the United States. Echoing Lyman Beecher's earlier "plea for the West," he considered the heartland particularly vulnerable. Not only were ignorant European Catholics settling there, but the Mormon heresy was also firmly established.

If the peril was great, so were the opportunities. Despite his ethnocentrism, Strong did not consider eastern and southern European Catholics inherently inferior. If converted to Protestantism and Americanized in the public schools, these ersatz Anglo-Saxons would make the country stronger than ever. "Our country" could then fulfill its destiny. As the fittest nation in the international struggle, the United States would easily impress its institutions on the world.

Beyond tracts and sermons, the fourth Great Awakening sparked a resurgence of overseas missions, which had been suffering from a lack of recruits. In 1886 the cause struck a nerve among hundreds of young people attending a conference under the auspices of Dwight L. Moody, the foremost evangelist of the day. The next year some of those present took the lead in founding the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM). The Reverend Arthur Pierson, a theological conservative who expected an imminent Second Coming, gave the group a millenarian motto: "The evangelization of the world in this generation." John R. Mott, a Methodist layman, became SVM executive secretary and master organizer. Mott recruited educated missionaries, built a network of supporters on college campuses, and fostered interdenominational and international cooperation. Ties to Canadian Protestants were particularly strong.

The SVM was only the most striking manifestation of growing interest. Once again, diverse religious groups founded mission boards, auxiliary societies, and umbrella organizations. Between 1890 and 1915 the number of overseas missionaries rose from roughly one thousand to nine thousand. This was the largest group of Americans living abroad on a long-term basis. By 1920 Americans and Canadians together made up half of the Protestant missionary force worldwide. Equally important, the campaign to "evangelize the world" became a vivid presence in thousands of congregations. Many Americans first learned something about life in Asia, Africa, or the Middle East, however ethnocentric the perspective, from a returned missionary's Sunday sermon.

The expanding movement reflected general social and cultural trends. Appropriating the military analogies that abounded for two generations after the Civil War, missionaries framed their task as a religious "war of conquest." In an era of scientific racial theories, legal segregation, and disfranchisement of African Americans, denominations led by whites ceased sending black missionaries to Africa. As middle-class women sought to bring the benefits of "social housekeeping" to a corrupt and sinful world, some found careers—as well as adventure and fulfillment—in missionary work. By 1890, 60 percent of overseas missionaries were women. Confined to working within their own gender, they focused on such "female" issues as seeking to end the crippling binding of women's feet in China.

The expanding movement also reflected prevailing religious animosities. Isolated West-

erners in alien lands, American Protestant and European Catholic missionaries now occasionally fell into ad hoc cooperation during medical or military emergencies, but suspicion continued to characterize their relations in calmer times. The international missionary war of conquest led to increased cooperation among Protestants in other areas. At the same time, the doctrinal differences spreading within most major denominations produced disputes about what exactly overseas missionaries were supposed to do. Theological liberals, especially those with a social gospel bent, emphasized the improvement of living standards both as an ethical imperative and an effective evangelical strategy. According to theological conservatives, preaching of the unadorned gospel was both a Christian duty and a better way to attract sincere converts. Ironically, the cosmopolitan modernists usually sanctioned greater intrusion on indigenous ways of life. A few of them, however, edged toward the position long held by Quakers and Unitarians that no people should be evangelized into surrendering their historic religion.

Indigenous peoples were not passive recipients of the missionary message. In many cases, missionary activity responded to local demands for medical care and education. As early as 1885, eight colleges had been founded in the Ottoman Empire; by the 1910s a majority of missionaries in China were no longer involved in directly spreading the gospel. Moreover, Western learning was sometimes seen as a way to resist further Western encroachments.

As was the case before the Civil War, missionaries sometimes significantly influenced the countries in which they served. A few did so by switching from religious to diplomatic careers. No one followed this path with greater success than Horace N. Allen, who arrived in Korea as a Presbyterian medical missionary in 1884. After tending to a wounded prince, Allen became the royal family's favorite physician and began giving a wide range of advice to the king and queen. After representing Korean interests in the United States, Allen served as secretary to the American legation and then as minister to Seoul from 1897 until 1905. Often evading State Department instructions against meddling in Korean affairs, he secured mining and lumbering concessions for American investors as well as contracts to install trolley, electric, and telephone lines. And while warning missionaries against offending Koreans' sensibilities, Allen used his influence at court to protect them.

Allen's career underscores a major development in late-nineteenth-century foreign policy: an intensified interest in Asia by merchants and missionaries alike. Indeed, religious leaders now frequently stressed the confluence of conversion and capitalism. Lecturing on the "Christian Conquest of Asia" at Union Theological Seminary in 1898, the Reverend J. H. Barrows, president of Oberlin College, envisioned the Pacific Ocean as the "chief highway of the world's commerce." By the 1890s missionaries in the Far East outnumbered those sent to the Middle East for the first time.

The convergence of evangelism, commerce, and politics should be no surprise. Much as merchants sought foreign markets to relieve economic stagnation, and as political leaders thought expansionism an antidote to real class conflict or alleged cultural decline, Protestants looked overseas to solve their particular domestic problems. Indeed, well-publicized missionary campaigns did reinvigorate the churches at home.

Symbolic of an era marked by strong religious hopes, fears, and tensions, the two major political parties in 1896 nominated the most devout pair of presidential candidates in American history: Methodist Republican William McKinley and Presbyterian Democrat William Jennings Bryan. Two years later, McKinley, the winning nominee, ushered in a new phase of "manifest destiny" (a term then still in common use) when he reluctantly led the United States to war against Spain.

As the United States moved toward war, religious leaders followed the general trajectory of opinion with two notable variations. They worried less than businessmen about the domestic side effects and kept a watchful eye on the interests of their respective creeds. Even after the USS *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor, most urged caution, though some Protestant editors could not resist openly coveting Spanish colonies as mission fields. Catholics felt special misgivings because Pope Leo XIII was actively seeking a peaceful settlement. The church hierarchy and press found Protestants altogether too bloodthirsty. Despite his devout Methodism and opportunistic flirtation with the American Protective Association, McKinley was no more eager than Polk had been to start an anti-Catholic crusade. He made at least a show of pursuing papal mediation. Archbishop Ireland, McKinley's emissary to the Vatican, believed that patient diplomacy could have preserved the peace. Pressed by Republican hawks, however, the president decided on war in April 1898 and told Con-

gress that intervention in Cuba was the duty of a "Christian, peace loving people."

Clergy and laymen outside of the peace churches joined in the patriotic surge. As had been the case with Mexico five decades earlier, Protestants frequently framed the war as a symbolic battle against the Spanish Inquisition and a few warned of treacherous Catholic soldiers. Catholics once again rallied to the flag, urged on by bishops who kept doubts to themselves. In the end, many citizens joined McKinley in viewing the quick victory with few casualties as a gift from God.

Nationalists in the Catholic hierarchy thought they saw a silver lining in the war clouds: now that the United States had clearly emerged as a world power, the American church would have to be respected by the Vatican and allowed to adapt to its special situation. The reaction in Rome was just the opposite. The U.S. military victory provided an additional reason, if any were necessary, for the Vatican to curb these bishops before their tolerance of democracy and religious pluralism spread to Europe. In 1899 Pope Leo XIII condemned an incipient "Americanist" heresy that challenged Vatican authority. Although the Pope did not explicitly accuse any churchmen of "Americanism," his encyclical signaled a turn toward tighter control over Catholic institutions and intellectual life in the United States.

With varying degrees of enthusiasm, the major Protestant denominations supported the wartime annexation of Hawaii and acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines via the peace treaty. Except among white southerners, qualms about ruling nonwhites deemed unfit for citizenship were generally overshadowed by a sense of missionary duty. Congregationalists and Presbyterians expressed the fewest reservations; Methodists tended to trust their coreligionist in the White House on this issue.

Religious adversaries quickly exported their conflicts to the Philippines, the most Christian land in Asia. While Protestants viewed the overwhelmingly Catholic population as potential converts, Catholic editors asked with sarcasm if they planned to replicate the Hawaiian pattern of bringing disease and disruption. Catholics credited priests with protecting the indigenous population; Protestants portrayed "greedy friars" clinging to their estates. This controversy subsided after the McKinley administration negotiated with the Vatican to purchase the land. Another followed when the superintendent of the new public school system hesitated to hire Catholics. On other fronts, Protestants assailed the army for distributing liquor, sanctioning prostitution, and acquiescing in polygamy among the Muslim minority.

These struggles for religious influence paled beside the squalid little war to defeat the Filipinos seeking independence. Yet only a handful of prominent clergy joined the antiwar movement. The Reverend Leighton Parks, a noted Episcopalian, repeatedly denounced atrocities committed by the American military. Although the Catholic hierarchy sought primarily to evade this controversy lest its church appear unpatriotic, Bishop John Spalding broke ranks to address an antiwar meeting. Protestant expansionists considered suppression of the insurrection a necessary evil on the way to spreading Christian civilization to Asia. The Philippines looked like an ideal base for capturing the great China market in souls.

During the late nineteenth century Christian missionaries, including the substantial American contingent, became the largest group of foreigners in China. Increasingly, too, they were subject to attack as flesh-and-blood symbols of Western intrusion. In 1900 the secret society of Boxers rose up to kill hundreds of missionaries and thousands of Chinese converts. An attack on the legation compound in Peking followed. A combined Western and Japanese military expedition marched to the rescue, engaging in murder, rape, and looting en route. A few missionaries joined in the looting; most at a minimum justified the brutality with the familiar contention that the Chinese only understood force.

The use or threat of force became commonplace during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. Indeed, both presidents illustrate that the American pursuit of world power required no evangelical Protestant motivation. Roosevelt was a pro forma member of the Dutch Reformed Church who may have doubted the existence of God and an afterlife. Yet no president sounded more fervent calls to enforce "righteousness." His endorsement of overseas missionaries was grounded in what he considered practicality. For example, he believed, mistakenly, that missionaries brought stability to China. Taft's Unitarian rejection of the Trinity elicited criticism from grassroots theological conservatives, but he felt none of his denomination's doubts about forcing American ways on others.

Taft's administration was marked by one of the most successful instances of religious activism in the history of American foreign relations: the

campaign by Jews and their gentile allies to abrogate a Russian-American trade agreement that had been on the books since 1832. The State Department often investigated and sometimes politely complained about the anti-Semitic acts that increased abroad in the late nineteenth century. The motives behind these diplomatic initiatives were mixed: humanitarian concern; protection of American citizens; responsiveness to Jewish voters; and fears that victims of persecution would immigrate to the United States. The results were mixed, too. Benjamin Peixotto, a Jewish consul appointed to Bucharest in the 1870s, negotiated a temporary remission in Romanian anti-Semitism. The Russian situation grew steadily worse. In 1903 a pogrom in Kishinev left dozens of Jews dead while police stood aside. Similar outbreaks followed elsewhere. Still, the Russian government blandly rebuffed Roosevelt administration inquiries and refused to receive a petition of protest forwarded by Secretary of State John Hay. Nor would Russia guarantee the safety of visiting American Jews.

After discrete lobbying failed to secure action by Taft to revise or abrogate the commercial treaty, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) led an effective public mobilization. As had been the case with the Damascus blood libel persecution in 1840, anti-Semitism abroad inspired cooperation among American Jews, who were now more diverse in national background than ever before. The AJC stressed the "sacred American principle of freedom of religion." Amid widespread hostility to czarist autocracy, thousands of gentiles in civic organizations, state legislatures, and Congress joined the call for abrogation. In December 1912 the Taft administration informed the Russians that the treaty would be allowed to expire the next year.

During the two decades before World War I, religious leaders helped to build a new peace movement—a peace movement adapted to an era in which the United States assumed the right to enforce righteousness. Almost all participants in the proliferating peace groups shunned pacifism, a term just coming into general use, often as a slur; many celebrated American and Christian expansion as the best ways to assure global amity in the long run. They typically emphasized prevention of war between "civilized" countries through arbitration and international law. Although a handful of noted Catholics and Jews joined secular peace societies, the religious wing of the movement was overwhelmingly Protestant and disproportionately modernist. For instance, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America (FCCCA), formed in 1908 by thirty-three liberal-leaning denominations, sponsored both the Commission on Peace and Arbitration and the Church Peace Union.

The notion that religion influenced the actions of President Woodrow Wilson and his first secretary of state, fellow Presbyterian William Jennings Bryan, is familiar to students of American diplomacy—too familiar. Standard accounts stress their respective religious styles, often in caricature, at the expense of substance. In fact, their lives illustrate the divergent responses to the Protestant intellectual crisis of their time. Equally important, their disagreement about World War I underscores the peril of tracing an unambiguous American conception of mission from John Winthrop's "city upon a hill" to the early twentieth century and beyond.

Both Wilson and Bryan felt some religious skepticism during their college years. Wilson's father, a modernist Presbyterian minister, urged him to cease worrying about doctrine and simply love Jesus. Thereafter, Wilson lived comfortably as a religious liberal, sometimes poking fun at orthodox assaults on Darwinism and at visions of hellfire. Along with other liberal Protestants, he saw the world improving under the amorphous guidance of "Divine Providence." With few exceptions—notably, his own election as president—he rarely credited God with direct intervention. As the "people's book of revelation," the Bible inspired human action to achieve high personal and social standards but contained little practical advice. Among the actors Wilson lauded were "my missionaries." Unlike Roosevelt, he sensed their role as agents of change rather than stability. China, a republic after the revolution of 1911, had been "cried awake by the voice of Christ," Wilson said.

Although Bryan followed the theologically conservative path, he was initially undogmatic on many doctrinal issues. For example, he corresponded with Leo Tolstoy, whose heterodox Christianity he thought compatible with his own conception of Jesus as the Prince of Peace. Like many of his fellow citizens, Bryan was torn between peace and world power. As secretary of state he both negotiated "cooling-off" treaties with two dozen countries and supported military intervention in the Mexican Revolution. Bryan resigned in 1915 because he considered Wilson's strictures on German submarine warfare a lapse

from neutrality. Yet Bryan went beyond the secular crisis at hand to affirm a restrained sense of American mission at least as old as the president's internationalist activism. Rather than descending into European-style power politics, the United States should "implant hope in the breast of humanity and substitute higher ideals for the ideals which have led nations into armed conflict."

After Congress declared war in 1917, religious leaders supported the cause at least as strongly as did other elites. With customary flamboyance, conservative evangelist Billy Sunday declared that Christian pacifists should be left to the lynch mob and the coroner. Although usually less blunt, liberal Protestants maintained that German militarism must be destroyed as a prerequisite for international peace. With customary prudence the Catholic hierarchy stepped carefully from neutrality to "preparedness" to patriotic cooperation. Cardinal Gibbons dutifully forwarded Pope Benedict XV's peace proposals to the White House, fended off plausible allegations of a papal tilt toward the Central Powers, and headed an interfaith League for National Unity. All of the major denominations mobilized to offer religious and social services to their men in uniform. Churches and synagogues conducted war bond drives and disseminated propaganda for the Committee on Public Information. Few discouraged the zealous rhetoric that sometimes did lead to the lynch mob and the coroner.

Grassroots skepticism was greater than might be inferred from the behavior of mainstream clergy and congregations. Pentecostals, still on the fringe of theologically conservative Protestantism, were especially unenthusiastic. Roughly 65,000 draftees claimed conscientious objector status; overwhelmingly, these men came from the peace churches. In the Selective Service System and in the courts, Jehovah's Witnesses fared worse than the less strident and more familiar Quakers and Mennonites.

FROM VERSAILLES TO PEARL HARBOR

Missionaries, representatives of the Federal Council of Churches, and delegates from the newly formed American Jewish Congress converged on the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Like their secular counterparts, religious interest groups discovered that a humane international order was more easily promised than attained. The fate of Armenians in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire provided a brutal case in point. Protestant missionaries had tried unsuccessfully in 1894 and 1895 to secure Western military action to halt Turkish pogroms. They pressed their case again after the Ottoman government orchestrated the killing of hundreds of thousands of Armenians during World War I. Wilson rejected armed intervention but would accept Armenia as a U.S. mandate under the League of Nations mandate. Congress quickly dismissed this proposal.

No event associated with religion during World War I proved more consequential for U.S. foreign policy than the British promise in the Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in

"THE PRINCE OF PEACE"

"Christ deserves to be called the Prince of Peace because He has given us a measure of greatness which promotes peace. . . .

"Christ has also led the way to peace by giving us a formula for the propagation of good. Not all of those who have really desired to do good have employed the Christian method—not all Christians even. In all the history of the human race but two methods have been employed. The first is the forcible method. . . .

"The other is the Bible plan—be not overcome of evil but overcome evil with good. And there is no other way to overcome evil. . . .

"In order that there might be no mistake about His plan of propagating good, Christ went into detail and laid emphasis on the value of example—'so live that others seeing your good works may be constrained to glorify your Father which is in Heaven.' . . .

"It may be a slow process—this conversion of the world by the silent influence of a noble example, but it is the only sure one, and the doctrine applies to nations as well as to individuals. The Gospel of the Prince of Peace gives us the only hope that the world has—and it is an increasing hope—of the substitution of reason for the arbitrament of force in the settling of international disputes."

— William Jennings Bryan, "The Prince of Peace" (1908) —

Palestine. The question divided Zionists and non-Zionists within Judaism. Reform Jews in particular thought a full-fledged state might prejudice their status as U.S. citizens. Protestant missionaries were adamantly opposed because they expected a hostile Arab reaction that would, in turn, disrupt their own efforts. According to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Christians would resent control of the Holy Land by the "race credited with the death of Christ." Nonetheless, Wilson gave early and repeated support to the Zionist cause.

Ultimately, World War I changed American religion much more than religious beliefs or activities affected the conduct of the war or the shape of the peace. There were noteworthy organizational consequences. The Federal Council of Churches asserted itself as the premier voice of the de facto Protestant establishment. More convinced than ever of human sinfulness and Jesus's imminent return, theological conservatives founded the World's Christian Fundamentals Association (WCFA) in 1917. The National Catholic War Council, renamed the National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), remained in operation after the armistice. So did the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), which had been a haven for conscientious objectors and pacifist social gospelers.

Even more important, the emotional charge of the war and its offspring, the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920, fueled religious anxieties and animosities. The main clashes involved domestic issues, especially Prohibition, looser sexual mores, and the possibility of a Catholic president. Yet several domestic developments intersected with foreign policy. In 1924 the prevailing nativist zeitgeist eased passage of the Johnson-Reed Act, which sharply curtailed immigration. Amid a nationwide surge of anti-Semitism, the Foreign Service joined other elite institutions in rejecting Jewish applicants on the basis of their religion.

Except for strongly separatist sects, clergy and churchgoers still paid attention at least to some portion of the outside world. Although bitterly disappointed by the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, liberal Protestants persisted in urging American affiliation with the League of Nations. A handful of social gospelers expressed cautious interest in the "Soviet experiment." Catholic clergy used their pulpits to denounce Mexican anticlericalism as well as atheistic communism. Influenced by a form of Bible prophecy called premillennial dispensationalism, fundamentalists became avid if unconventional students of foreign affairs. They found in Zionism fulfillment of the prophecy that the Jews would regather in the Holy Land shortly before Jesus's return and speculated that the Antichrist might be on earth already in the person of Benito Mussolini.

The evident decline of the Protestant missionary movement during the 1920s looks in retrospect like a pause and an adaptation to domestic and international trends. Few now thought that the world could be converted within a generation and some doubted the right to convert anybody. A Chinese student movement directed specifically against Christianity left many missionaries disheartened; others responded to rising Chinese nationalism by urging renegotiation of the "unequal treaties" granting special privileges to westerners. The modernist philosopher William Ernest Hocking, head of a layman's inquiry into missions that was completed in 1932, recommended against attacking "non-Christian systems" of thought. Theological conservatives in the major Protestant denominations felt no such qualms. Nor did Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses, all of whom hoped to save at least some portion of humanity. Moreover, in 1912 the American Catholic Church finally authorized an overseas mission society, popularly known as the Maryknolls.

Thus, in religion as in commerce, the United States was not isolated from the rest of the world during the interwar era. What is usually misconstrued as isolationism is the pervasive belief that the United States must keep out of any future European war. This sentiment needed little encouragement to flourish, but no group encouraged it more actively than the Protestant clergy. Of 19,372 ministers polled by a pacifist magazine in 1931, 12,076 said they would never sanction a war. Few of these ministers were absolute pacifists themselves. Rather, most were making symbolic amends for their martial ardor in 1917 and 1918.

The coalition Franklin D. Roosevelt created during his presidency was as complex in its religious dimensions as in its explicitly political aspects—and foreign policy was central to the complications. Roosevelt himself was an Episcopalian with an uncomplicated faith in God and a genuine commitment to religious tolerance. His supporters included a large majority of Catholics and Jews, southern theological conservatives still loyal to the Democrats as the party of segregation, and a small but vocal minority of Protestant modernists attracted to the Soviet Union and the Pop-

ular Front. Opponents included a distinctive religious right. These Protestant and Catholic theological conservatives viewed the Roosevelt administration as a subversive conspiracy and some of them considered it the American arm of an international Jewish plot.

Roosevelt's strongly anticommunist Catholic constituency required constant attention. The hierarchy and press in particular opposed the president's recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. The Good Neighbor Policy appealed as an entrée for the American church in Latin America, but complications soon arose. The administration seemed too neighborly to the Mexican revolutionary government, whose anticlericalism sometimes turned into outright persecution. Moved by ten thousand letters, a probable congressional investigation, and the approaching 1936 election, Roosevelt quietly urged Mexico to curb its anti-Catholicism.

When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Americans overwhelmingly favored neutrality and legislation banning arms sales to either side. The Catholic clergy pointedly preferred a victory by the insurgent general, Francisco Franco, despite his alliance with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Lay opinion was less monolithic. According to a Gallup poll in 1938, 42 percent of Catholics sided with the Spanish republic. Nonetheless, wariness of Catholic political power reinforced Roosevelt's decision in 1938 not to seek an end to the arms embargo, an action that would have benefited the loyalists. Meanwhile, liberal Protestants criticized Catholic priests for tilting toward Franco and far right fundamentalists discerned hitherto unobserved merit in the Roman church. Similarly, religious appeals, loyalties, and animosities affected the tone of the debate about American participation in World War II. In urging aid to the Allies in the 1939–1941 period, Roosevelt said—and perhaps half believed—that Germany planned to abolish all religions and create an international Nazi church. Even clergy, however, typically framed the argument in terms of geopolitics and general morality rather than religious ideas or interests. Protestant ministers who had recently vowed to stay aloof from any European war now endorsed administration policies that undermined neutrality. Nor was there a clear correlation between theology and foreign policy positions. For instance, the anti-Semitic radio priest Charles Coughlin, numerous far right fundamentalists, and the social gospelers at *Christian Century* magazine all chastised Roosevelt as he moved from efforts to repeal neutrality legislation in 1939 to undeclared naval warfare against German submarines in late 1941. After Pearl Harbor, the major denominations rallied to the flag. They did so with fewer rhetorical excesses than during 1917 and 1918, however, and some prominent mainstream Protestants remained pacifists.

As had been the case with the Spanish-American War and World War I, Catholics trod a distinctive path to the same patriotic destination. They feared from the outset that the European war would promote communist expansion; most also initially rejected aid to the Soviets after Germany invaded in June 1941. Here, too, clergy were less flexible than their parishioners. Responding with varying degrees of finesse, Roosevelt urged Joseph Stalin to ease restrictions on religion, professed to see signs of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, and tried to convince Pope Pius XII to soften his strictures against communism. Some bishops came around to the position that the Soviet people, as opposed to the regime, deserved help in their resistance to nazism. In striking contrast to the prudence of the World War I years, the hierarchy displayed its divisions in public. One bishop spoke under the auspices of the noninterventionist America First Committee, another joined the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and several sniped incessantly at the president.

In December 1939, Roosevelt named Myron Taylor, an Episcopalian, as his personal representative to the Vatican. Roosevelt hoped simultaneously to court Catholic voters, establish a listening post in Rome, and influence papal pronouncements on the war. Taylor's mission had no significant impact on the pope but did reveal—and probably exacerbated—domestic religious tensions. Only a few Protestant leaders managed to express grudging acquiescence. On the whole, Roosevelt was accused of religious favoritism and chided for violating the First Amendment; theological conservatives discerned a capitulation to satanic popery.

No foreign policy question associated with religion has elicited greater controversy than whether or not more European Jews could have been saved from the Holocaust. American Jews denounced Adolf Hitler's regime from 1933 onward. Once again they found gentile allies—but not enough of them. The level of American anti-Semitism reached a peak during the interwar years. Limits on immigration were strictly

enforced, often at the behest of anti-Semites in the State Department and the foreign service. Reports that the Nazis had begun to exterminate European Jewry were readily available by late 1942. The president was urged to bomb the death camps, announce plans to punish genocide, and extricate Jews from such inconstant Axis satellites as Romania and Bulgaria. The latter two tactics showed the most promise. Nonetheless, Roosevelt took no effective action until he created the War Refugee Board in January 1944. In short, even after the United States entered the war, greater effort could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

THE COLD WAR AND THE FIFTH GREAT AWAKENING

World War II catalyzed the revival evangelical Christians had been praying for since the 1920s. Like its four predecessors, this fifth Great Awakening reshaped religious life in unanticipated ways and influenced the relationship between faith and foreign affairs. Three aspects of the revival stand out. First, while modernist churches stagnated, theologically conservative Protestantism flourished, with Billy Graham leading one branch of the movement from fundamentalism toward a less separatist and less strident "evangelicalism." Second, Catholics grew more assertive and (especially after the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965) more cosmopolitan. Third, the bulk of the awakening coincided with the Cold War, which officials from the White House on down described as a spiritual battle against "godless communism."

The relationship between Cold War faith and foreign policy is often misconstrued in ways comparable to clichés about the Wilson era. Once again, standard accounts render the religious beliefs of policymakers in caricature and postulate an unambiguous sense of mission from John Winthrop to John Foster Dulles. Despite his image as a Puritan avenger, Dulles himself was a theologically liberal Presbyterian who began in the 1930s to use the Federal Council of Churches as a convenient forum for publicizing his foreign policy prescriptions. Insofar as he became a dogmatic cold warrior by the time he was named secretary of state in 1953, Dulles was moved by Republican partisanship rather than religious doctrine.

Unlike Dulles, Reinhold Niebuhr applied serious religious ideas to foreign policy. Yet Niebuhr's image as the premier theologian of the Cold War needs refinement. In Niebuhr's view, because human beings are fallible and sinful (at least in a metaphorical sense), even their best actions fall short of altruism and yield ironic results. This "neo-orthodox" worldview is consistent with any number of conflicting positions on foreign policy. Indeed, without changing his theology, Niebuhr had moved from the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation to the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. In *The Irony of American History* (1952), he sounded more reflective than the typical Cold War ideologist. Applying neo-orthodox premises, he warned the United States against international arrogance and described communism and American capitalism as arising from the same "ethos" of egotism. Niebuhr was less dispassionate in day-to-day polemics against those whose skepticism about the Cold War exceeded his own. Moreover, valued for his intellectual reputation rather than his ideas, Niebuhr had no discernible impact while serving as a State Department consultant.

Religious interest groups, rather than serious religious ideas, did affect foreign policy. Yet here, too, we must beware of exaggerating their influence or their uniformity. For instance, while many in the missionary movement lobbied on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese civil war, others initially hoped to arrange a modus vivendi with the communists. Although a remarkable mobilization by American Jews nudged President Harry S. Truman toward quick recognition of Israel in 1948, prominent Reform Jews organized the American Council for Judaism to lobby against a full-fledged Jewish state.

The Catholic role in the Cold War especially needs to be extricated from folklore. Certainly priests, nuns, and lay leaders mobilized against international communism, particularly after Soviet satellites suppressed Catholicism in Eastern Europe. Yet, following a long tradition, non-Catholics overstated the church's power and understated the autonomy of its adherents. When Catholics joined in urging Italians to vote against communism in 1948, they were advancing Truman administration policy rather than vice versa. And contrary to legend, Cardinal Francis Spellman was not responsible for Ngo Dinh Diem's appointment as prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam.

On balance, international events between Pearl Harbor and the mid-1960s fostered increased tolerance as well as surface religious consensus. Partly as a reaction against Nazi geno-

cide, anti-Semitism began a steady decline in the late 1940s. Ubiquitous invocations of the "Judeo-Christian tradition" not only legitimated Judaism, but also minimized differences within Christianity. Nonetheless, division and animosity persisted beneath the rhetorical conventions. The National Council of Churches, which superseded the Federal Council in 1950, appeared to be the authoritative voice of Protestantism, yet its leaders barely noticed the extraordinary revival among theological conservatives.

The tension between Catholics and Protestants was harder to ignore. Most clashes concerned such domestic questions as birth control and federal aid to education, but foreign policy was involved too. Yielding to Protestant complaints, Truman in 1951 abandoned his attempt to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Senator Joseph McCarthy, the country's best-known Catholic politician during the early 1950s, provoked even greater controversy. Although their attitudes ranged from pride to disgust, Catholics disproportionately considered McCarthy an admirable anticommunist. His zeal furthered the rapprochement between the Catholic and Protestant political right begun during the 1930s. Conversely, prominent liberal Protestants considered McCarthy the latest personification of Catholic authoritarianism; some chided the church for failing to condemn him. Ironically, such attacks reinforced defensiveness among Catholics struggling to break out of their insularity. In 1960, John F. Kennedy proved that a cosmopolitan Catholic could be elected president. Equally important to his victory, however, Kennedy combined secular urbanity with wartime heroism and public commitment to winning the Cold War.

The next two decades revealed both the fragility of Cold War orthodoxy and the superficiality of the domestic religious consensus. Indeed, the collapse of the former during the Vietnam War hastened the deterioration of the latter. American escalation in 1965 not only reinvigorated the pacifist remnant that had survived World War II; in addition, between 1965 and 1970 roughly 170,000 draft registrants applied for conscientious objector status. In contrast to the Korean "police action," mainstream religious figures opposed the war. In 1966 prominent liberal Protestants and Jews took the lead in founding Clergy and Layman Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV), a nondenominational coalition whose arguments against escalation usually echoed those of secular doves. Members ranged from chastened cold warrior Reinhold Niebuhr to African-American social gospeler Martin Luther King, Jr. Ultimately, the Vietnam conflict widened the split between Protestant theological liberals and conservatives. Most evangelicals and fundamentalists either stood aloof from this worldly issue or supported American policy.

For the first time, numerous Catholics remained part of a peace movement after the United States entered a war. Indeed, the radical priests Daniel and Philip Berrigan became vivid symbols of nonviolent resistance for doves and hawks of all faiths. In 1968, when Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy sought the Democratic presidential nomination as antiwar candidates, only strict fundamentalists worried about their Catholicism. In 1971 the bishops reversed their earlier endorsement of the war to advocate a "speedy" peace.

The Catholic left remained active following the war. By 1970 roughly half of all American Catholic missionaries served in Latin America, where many joined local clergy in opposing brutal dictatorships. Some of these priests and nuns—along with a few bishops—became proponents of "liberation theology," whose advocates adapted Marxist analysis and urged the church to champion the Third World poor.

Clearly, many Catholic liberals now felt sufficiently secure to risk accusations of disloyalty. Yet ironies abounded. These allegations often came from within their own church. Reversing the historical pattern, working-class Catholics pushed rightward by the turmoil of the 1960s often thought their priests too liberal. Liberals themselves came face to face with questions that had perplexed Protestants earlier in the century—for example, whether anyone should be converted from an ancestral religion. Finally, Catholics looked increasingly American to the rest of the country because they, too, were obviously divided among themselves.

In 1976 the two major political parties nominated the most devout pair of presidential candidates since McKinley and Bryan. Both Episcopalian Gerald Ford and Baptist Jimmy Carter considered themselves "born again" Christians. A competent lay theologian, Carter stands out as the only modern president whose foreign policy was affected by serious religious ideas. Simply put, he took to heart Niebuhr's warning against national egotism. Thus, within limits set by prevailing Cold War assumptions, Carter was distinctive in his calls for national humility, wariness of military intervention, and

respect for poor and nonwhite countries. For a growing number of his constituents, stunned by the lost Vietnam War and wary of Soviet exploitation of détente, humility seemed a source of the country's diplomatic problems.

Many of Carter's harshest critics were moved by religious concerns. After helping him defeat Ford, evangelical voters discovered that Carter was theologically, culturally, and politically more liberal than they had thought. By 1979 clergy were organizing a militant minority of theological conservatives into a "new Christian right." Interested primarily in domestic issues, they routinely adopted the foreign policy prescriptions of staunch Republican cold warriors, with one important twist: the strong belief that Israel deserved special protection because it fulfilled the Biblical prophecy that Jews would regather in the Holy Land on the eve of Jesus's return. This philo-Semitic interpretation of Scripture was one aspect of the new Christian right that actually was new.

A Jewish political right began to form at roughly the same time, with deep concerns about foreign policy. As early as 1967, some Jews had begun to reconsider their political alliances when Protestant and Catholic liberals sharply criticized Israel's attack on Egypt. Then, Soviet limits on the emigration of Jews seemed to illustrate the failure of détente. Despite initial misgivings, Jewish groups rallied behind the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which in 1974 denied most-favored-nation trade status to communist countries restricting emigration. Carter not only continued détente, but also pushed Israel harder than Egypt during the peace negotiations of 1978 and 1979. By that point, prominent Jewish intellectuals were helping to formulate an influential "neoconservative" critique of détente in general and Carter's diplomacy in particular. Losing to Ronald Reagan in 1980, Carter received only 45 percent of the Jewish vote.

Reagan never wavered in his conviction that God blessed America. Nor did he doubt the nation's mission—or his own—to end the Cold War by bringing down the Soviet "evil empire." A Protestant with a Catholic father and eclectic religious interests, he was well suited to manage a religious coalition as complex as Franklin Roosevelt's. In addition to moderate Protestants, the Republican base since the 1850s, his backers included Jewish neoconservatives as well as evangelicals and fundamentalists on the right. Furthermore, Reagan was the first Republican to win the Catholic vote twice.

Despite Reagan's frequent denunciations of communist evil before evangelical audiences, Catholics played a larger role in his Cold War diplomacy. No Catholic was more important in this respect than Pope John Paul II. The pope and the president coordinated efforts to weaken communism in Eastern Europe; their tactics ranged from public denunciations to covert Central Intelligence Agency funding of the anticommunist underground via the Vatican. When Reagan established full diplomatic relations with the papacy in 1984, Protestant theological conservatives in his coalition barely complained.

Cooperation across denominational lines also marked the opposition to Reagan's foreign policy. The grassroots movement to hold nuclear arsenals at their current levels—the "nuclear freeze"—became a powerful symbolic challenge to the administration's military buildup during the early 1980s. Advocates of the freeze included veteran pacifists in FOR and AFSC, theological liberals in Clergy and Laity Concerned (as CALCAV was renamed after the Vietnam War), and half of the Catholic bishops. Catholics were particularly active in providing humanitarian aid and opposing military intervention in Central America. Victims of rightist "death squads" in the El Salvador civil war included missionary nuns. While the U.S. Catholic Conference urged peace talks between the Salvadoran government and leftist rebels, numerous parishes assisted refugees who reached the United States. These actions were particularly impressive because Pope John Paul II gave de facto support to Reagan's anticommunist intervention in Central America.

By the 1990s the Cold War had ended but the effects of the fifth Great Awakening continued to be felt. In numbers, evangelicals, fundamentalists, and charismatics (as Pentecostals increasingly called themselves) constituted the religious mainstream. To an unprecedented degree, theological liberalism and conservatism correlated respectively with political liberalism and conservatism. Conservatives especially sponsored a resurgence of overseas missions; fifty thousand Americans lived abroad as missionaries or representatives of faith-based humanitarian organizations, often working closely with strong indigenous churches. To some extent the dream of the earliest missionaries had come true. At the end of the 1990s, there were 258 million Christians in Africa and 317 million in Asia.

Although references to the Judeo-Christian tradition lingered, use of this phrase to describe

American religious life was even more problematic than during the 1950s. Significant numbers of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists came to the United States after immigration law was liberalized in 1965. Astute political leaders took notice. President Carter denied any animosity toward Islam during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979 and 1980; President George H. W. Bush stressed the same point during the war against Iraq in 1991. Moreover, the appearance of yet another "new immigration" reinforced the American identity of those Catholics and Jews descended from earlier immigrants.

As Israel became both more secure and less central to their own identity, American Jews no longer felt obliged to defend all Israeli foreign policy. From the time President Carter negotiated the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, the United States served as primary mediator in what was called (with undue optimism) the Middle East "peace process." The Oslo Accords signed at the White House in 1993 established a quasi-independent Palestinian National Authority in territory contested by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. As with Protestants and Catholics, Jewish approaches to foreign policy increasingly correlated with their religious beliefs. While Conservative and Reform Jews overwhelmingly endorsed negotiations in general and the Oslo agreements in particular, Orthodox Jews were skeptical or hostile. In 1998, President William Jefferson Clinton prodded the Israelis at the Wye River negotiations to surrender more disputed territory to the Palestine Authority. Once again, Conservative and Reform Jews responded favorably while Orthodox Jews joined Israeli hawks in opposition. Like Protestants and Catholics, Jews were now openly divided on a foreign policy issue.

The expansion of missionary activity overseas may have stirred increased persecution of Christian minorities around the world. Religious conservatives had no doubts about it and sought legislation mandating a diplomatic response. Humanitarian motives aside, these activists hoped to keep evangelicals and fundamentalists politically involved in the post–Cold War era. Furthermore, recalling the impact of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, they thought religious freedom could be used to undermine Chinese communism. Still wary of imposing Christianity on non-Christian cultures, liberals hesitated to join the campaign. Even so, in 1997 and 1998, 100,000 Protestant and Catholic congregations sponsored annual days of prayer to "shatter the silence" about persecution. Ultimately, a broad coalition extending beyond the ranks of Christians and Jews supported the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which passed Congress unanimously in 1998. The IRFA established an Office of International Religious Freedom in the State Department, a comparable position in the National Security Council, and an independent commission to monitor persecution.

Both the breadth of the coalition and the constitutional ban on preferential treatment of any religion required officials to concern themselves with small sects as well as large denominations, and with minor harassment as well as with serious violations of human rights. For instance, the commission's reports criticized European democracies for treating Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Scientologists (products respectively of the second, fourth, and fifth Great Awakenings) as second-class faiths. The chief concern, however, was the arrest, torture, or killing of believers, usually Christians but sometimes Muslims, too, in communist states and Islamic republics. American government responses ranged from public denunciations to behind-the-scenes diplomacy. No country attracted greater attention than the People's Republic of China, which persecuted both the Falun Gong, an indigenous mystical religion, and Christian churches unwilling to register with the government. Religious activists, including some Protestant liberals and the Catholic bishops, joined the unsuccessful campaign to deny China permanent normal trade relations status. Indeed, despite the passage of the IRFA, American policy toward religious persecution abroad in the early twenty-first century resembled that of the early nineteenth century: a mixture of popular protest and diplomatic inquiries without direct economic or military intervention.

CONCLUSION

Five generalizations can be made about the history of religion and foreign policy. First, notwithstanding the frequent, formulaic references to John Winthrop's "city upon a hill," the impact of Reformation era Protestantism is typically oversimplified and exaggerated. Appeals to an amorphous Providence and Enlightenment republicanism rather than invocations of a Puri-

tan mission were the main motifs of nineteenth-century manifest destiny. Similarly, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt needed no Christian doctrine to bless their efforts to extend American power. Even those devout Protestants who tried to apply religious beliefs to foreign affairs not only disagreed about specifics, but also disputed the overall nature of the national mission. Although less often acknowledged than international Wilsonian activism, a visceral Bryanism—the sense that the United States should lead the world by separatist moral example—has been and remains a powerful force.

Second, religious beliefs and interests did not change the outcome of any first-rank foreign policy decision—for example, whether or not to declare independence, expand westward, develop an "informal empire" abroad, or fight a war. These factors, however, have affected the ways in which Americans framed and debated such major questions.

Third, religious concerns have influenced the outcome of some second-level foreign policy decisions. Abrogation of the Russian-American commercial treaty in 1912 and passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1974 serve as cases in point. Awakenings and immigration have rendered "people of faith" increasingly diverse. In this pluralist context, religious interest groups have been most effective when they found allies outside of their own communities and invoked widely held American values.

Fourth, the role of missionaries merits special attention. As has been the case with businessmen and soldiers, a relatively small number of Americans were able to exert great influence—for good or ill—in a few distant lands. Missionaries not only facilitated political and economic expansion, either deliberately or inadvertently, but also inspired, educated, and infuriated foreign elites.

Fifth, major foreign policy decisions have affected domestic religious life more than the other way around. Often the effects were unanticipated. For instance, the revolutionary war with France undermined fears of "popery"; World War I exacerbated the multisided conflict among Catholics, Jews, Protestant modernists, and theological conservatives; and World War II sparked a religious revival that defied cosmopolitan predictions of secularization. These five general trends will probably persist for the foreseeable future, though with no diminution of ironic results.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrams, Elliott, ed. *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U. S. Foreign Policy.* Lanham, Md., 2001. Essays on the contemporary situation by authors from diverse ideological perspectives.

Ahlstrom, Sydney E. *A Religious History of the American People.* New Haven, Conn., 1972. Still the best one-volume survey.

Chatfield, Charles. *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism.* New York, 1992. Historical survey from a sociological perspective.

Ehrman, John. *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994.* New Haven, Conn., 1995. The best study of the neoconservatives and foreign policy.

Fairbank, John K., ed. *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America.* Cambridge, Mass., 1974. Excellent collection of essays with implications beyond China.

Feingold, Henry L. *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938–1945.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1970. Still the most insightful study of Roosevelt's policy.

Field, James A., Jr. *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882.* Princeton, N.J., 1969. Much material on missionaries.

Flynn, George Q. *Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937–1945.* Westport, Conn., 1976. The standard work on the subject.

Fogarty, Gerald P. *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965.* Stuttgart, Germany, 1982. Good coverage of the hierarchy's role in American politics and foreign policy.

Gribbin, William. *The Churches Militant: The War of 1812 and American Religion.* New Haven, Conn., 1973. The standard work on the subject.

Hall, Mitchell K. *Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War.* New York, 1990. Standard account of the main religious group opposing the war.

Harrington, Fred Harvey. *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean American Relations, 1884–1908.* Madison, Wis., 1994. Biography of an important missionary and diplomat.

Hennesey, James. *American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States.* New York, 1981. Still the best one-volume synthesis.

Hero, Alfred O., Jr. *American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937–1969.* Durham, N.C., 1973. Good use of survey data.

Hunter, Jane. *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn of the Century China.* New Haven, Conn., 1984. Fine social history with implications beyond China.

Jacobs, Sylvia M., ed. *Black Americans and the Missionary Movement in Africa.* Westport, Conn., 1982. An anthology that approaches the subject from varied angles.

Johannsen, Robert W. *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination.* New York, 1985. Places the religious response in broad cultural context.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *The Great Century in the United States of America A.D. 1800–A.D. 1914.* Volume 4 of *The Expansion of Christianity.* New York, 1941. Insightful pioneering work.

Marchand, C. Roland. *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918.* Princeton, N.J., 1972. The best treatment of the Progressive-era religious peace movement is in chapter 9.

May, Ernest R. *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America As a Great Power.* New York, 1961. New edition, Chicago, 1991. Good on religious aspects of 1898 diplomacy.

Merk, Frederick. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation.*New York, 1963. An astute essay on the varied conceptions of American mission in the nineteenth century.

Pierard, Richard V., and Robert D. Linder. *Civil Religion and the Presidency.* Grand Rapids, Mich., 1988. The best single account of the subject.

Piper, John F., Jr. *The American Churches and World War I* . Athens, Ohio, 1985. The standard work on the subject.

Pratt, Julius W. *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands.* Baltimore, 1936. Chapter 8 is still a valuable analysis of religious opinion.

Ribuffo, Leo P. "God and Jimmy Carter." In his *Right Center Left: Essays in American History.* New Brunswick, N.J., 1992. The connection between Carter's Niebuhrian beliefs and his foreign policy.

Rosenthal, Steven T. *Irreconcilable Differences: The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel.* Hanover, N.H., 2001. Thorough treatment of American Jewish attitudes toward Israel.

Sachar, Howard M. *A History of the Jews in America.* New York, 1992. Comprehensive survey.

Sarna, Jonathan. *Jacksonian Jew: The Two Worlds of Mordecai Noah.* New York, 1981. Biography of an important early diplomat and politician.

Silk, Mark. *Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World War II.* New York, 1988. Insightful essay on religion and politics.

Toulouse, Mark G. *The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Prophet of Nationalism.* Macon, Ga., 1985. The fullest examination of Dulles and religion.

Welch, Richard E., Jr. *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979. Good account of religious opinion and conflicts in chapter 6.

Wyman, David S. *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945.* New York, 1984. A broad look at American attitudes.

See also COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; CONTINENTAL EXPANSION; CULTURAL IMPERIALISM; DISSENT IN WARS; IMMIGRATION; NATIVISM; PACIFISM; RACE AND ETHNICITY; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

REPARATIONS

Carl P. Parrini and James I. Matray

If popular wisdom holds that prostitution is the oldest profession, and spying only a slightly younger occupation, then surely reparations—a country demanding payment or indemnity from another in land, goods, or money for damage inflicted as a result of war—also dates from a very early point in human history. Modern practice on indemnities or reparations has its origins in the late nineteenth century, when statesmen at Hague conferences in the Netherlands began to rewrite the rules for warfare, to limit armaments, to encourage peaceful settlement of international disputes, and, by such indirect means, to fashion a definition of what constituted "a just cause" for war. Indemnities or reparations as a concept developed from the idea that there were clear "laws of war" arising from treaties, conventions, and other international agreements. When in the course of warfare a nation, including all institutions legally subordinate to it, violated these legal norms and brought about "wrongful injury to life, body, health, liberty, property, and rights," that nation must make pecuniary indemnification to the injured persons. It is important to emphasize that in its origins, reparations was conceived of as indemnification for violations of existing international law, rather than for actions contrary to the current "moral" precepts of society.

Germany's Second Reich under Otto von Bismarck established a modern benchmark for indemnities when it collected nearly $1 billion from France in 1871, at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War. That same year, the Treaty of Washington provided for arbitration to settle U.S. claims against Britain for the destruction that Confederate privateers built in British shipyards had inflicted on Union merchant ships during the American Civil War. The United States at first requested not only indemnification for direct damages but also $8 million in "war prolongation claims" for all Union costs after the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. The settlement provided for British payment of $15.5 million in *Alabama* claims, while the United States would pay $1.9 million for illegal wartime acts against Britain, such as property seizures and imprisonments. In 1885, France wanted an indemnity from the Qing dynasty to end its war against China, but later dropped the demand. Japan was not so lenient after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, extracting 200 million taels of silver from China in the peace treaty.

During 1900, the Boxer Uprising resulted in Chinese rebels killing the German minister and trapping the diplomatic legations of Japan and other Western nations, including the United States; foreign business people; and thousands of their Chinese servants and Christian converts in prolonged sieges at Tianjin and Beijing. After a multinational military force liberated the captives, China signed the Boxer Protocol, which required payment of an indemnity of $333 million to eleven nations. The American share was $25 million, but in 1908 Washington remitted all but $7 million to cover private damages. The U.S. government used the remainder to fund a program that sent Chinese students to schools in the United States. Meanwhile, Japan had won the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and wanted Russia to pay an indemnity. However, bowing to pressure from President Theodore Roosevelt, Japan dropped its monetary demand and accepted the southern half of Sakhalin Island. In 1907, when another conference convened at The Hague, the statesmen had not contemplated a long war that would result in the partial crippling of the economic life of nations. They had envisaged wars of short duration, in which the civilian economies of the belligerents would hardly be touched. But World War I would cause enormous destruction, shaking the foundations on which the "legal" conception of reparations was based.

THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT

The Great War was a total conflict of nation against nation, resulting in differential destruction of national social systems. It therefore changed the reparations question into an issue of apportioning the relative gains or losses from participation in the war. Because of the unexpectedly long duration of World War I, none of the belligerents could impose sufficiently large taxes to pay for their economic needs. Internal tax income proved too small to pay for necessary imports. Consequently, the Allies largely had financed the war in the United States through selling international investments and through first-year borrowing. Until April 1917, the British, and to a lesser extent the French, Russian, Italian, and Belgian governments, had borrowed by floating their bond issues through American bankers. The British loans were secured by the international investments of its citizens that the government had sequestered. As the war dragged on, it became clear to British leaders that the longer the conflict continued, the greater the probability that Britain would emerge from the war minus its international investment empire, the protection of which was one of the reasons it was fighting the war. In the view of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the burden of war costs had somehow to be shifted to the Central Powers, so that Britain would be able to keep its international investments.

U.S. entry into the war in April 1917 presented the possibility to Allied leaders that the United States somehow could be made to bear some of the burden of the war costs. They accordingly began to shape reparations plans that would redistribute Allied war costs not only to Germany but also to American taxpayers and investors. With this ultimate intention in mind, the Allied efforts to impose war costs on Germany began on 5 April 1919, when Lloyd George asserted that Germany should stipulate in the peace treaty "her obligation for all the costs of the war." The United States opposed, on legal grounds, the inclusion of war costs in the reparations total, although, paradoxically and illogically, President Woodrow Wilson did agree that pensions for Allied soldiers, despite not being part of existing international legal definitions of reparations, and thus in no way "civilian damages," ought to be part of the total. In order to limit the amount that Germany would be required to pay, the United States made two broad proposals concerning the parameters within which reparations totals ought to be determined. First, no matter what the amount, Germany would be required to make payments for no more than thirty-five years. Second, a reparations commission would be set up to fix the amount that Germany would be able to pay.

American leaders assumed that these parameters would limit reparations demands to the surplus the German economy could produce, over and above what was necessary for a restoration of a level approximating the nation's living standards in 1914. On the other hand, the provision that thirty-five years be the longest period of payment allowable would roughly fix the total of reparations to be paid. These limits were intended to encourage Allied interest in restoring German economic life. At the Paris Peace Conference early in 1919, the chief American experts, Norman H. Davis and Thomas W. Lamont, suggested a maximum figure of roughly $28.5 billion, half in gold and the remainder in German marks. But Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clemenceau pressed for a much higher amount. To prevent this disagreement from dividing the Allies, negotiators agreed to a compromise providing for creation of a reparations commission with responsibility to determine Germany's exact liability by May 1921. Veterans' pensions would be included, as Wilson had agreed, but in fact this would have an impact only on distribution, not on the final reparations amount. This decision to postpone determination of an exact amount and the terms of repayment resulted in the United States failing to gain either of its main objectives.

Superficially, the establishment of a reparations commission would seem to have been a victory for the American position. However, France insisted that the commission have no independent power to modify the length and amount of payment in accord with ability to pay. The French position, which prevailed, allowed the postwar commission simply to total up the claims and required at least fifty years of payment from Germany. Meeting its deadline, the commission in 1921 fixed Germany's total liability at about $33 billion. Of this total, approximately $11 billion was assessed to pay for all damaged Allied property. The rest represented war costs imposed by the victors as punishment for Germany's "war guilt" under article 231 of the Versailles Treaty. Under this provision, Germany accepted responsibility for "all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of

the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." By then, the U.S. Senate had rejected the League of Nations Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles to which it was attached. The United States therefore had withdrawn from the reparations commission and only had "observers" at its deliberations.

Close examination of the $33 billion in reparations reveals, however, that the amount was less than it appeared to be. The commission specified that about $11 billion of A and B bonds would be payable at 5 percent interest over thirty-seven years. The remainder, in C bonds, would bear no interest and would come due only when the commission determined that Germany's new Weimar Republic was able to pay. The Allies in fact planned not to collect on these C bonds if Washington canceled the war debts to the United States. The U.S. government resented this attempted coercion and refused to cancel all Allied war debts. Administration officials under Wilson and his successor, Warren G. Harding, also were appalled by both the totals fixed and the procedures designed to collect them. Starting with President Wilson, American leaders tried to use the war debts owed to the United States to coerce the European leaders into easing the German reparations burden, not least because the Allies presumably now would collect on the C bonds. Washington's scheme was essentially the same as the one Wilson proposed at Versailles. German reparations had to be based upon Germany's capacity to pay and the period of payment had to be shortened, so that eventually German economic health could be restored.

During negotiations at Versailles, Wilson, as an inducement to the Allies to change their position, offered to cancel that part of the war debts to the United States that the Allies actually had incurred in fighting the war, in exchange for a reduction in the amount of German payments and in the length of time Germany was expected to pay. From 1921 to 1924, Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge honored Wilson's offer. But the Allies refused. Instead, they demanded that Washington cancel all the war debts, including that portion of what they had borrowed from the United States after the fighting ceased ($3.3 billion of the total of $10.3 billion) that had been used for reconstruction and for civilian commercial trading. Wilson's Treasury secretaries, Carter Glass and David Houston, refused general cancellation on the ground that the Allies already had distributed among themselves spoils of war, including special concession trading advantages, greater than the postwar commercial debts they had contracted with the United States. At first, their successor, Republican secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon, followed the same policy.

With hindsight, it became fashionable among west European and U.S. intellectuals to accuse American leaders of ignorance and even selfishness in connection with their stubborn refusal to acknowledge any link between the reparations and the war debts. The majority seemed to accept the French argument that the war against Germany was a common effort, in which the United States had belatedly done its small part by contributing its money. "Some gave their ships, some munitions, some the lives of their sons, some money," a member of the French Chamber of Deputies told his colleagues, "and today those who gave money come saying to us: 'Give back what we loaned.'" If the United States indeed had been in "alliance" by treaty or moral commitment with the west European allies, this would have been a telling argument. But Wilson genuinely had tried to stay out of World War I—as long as he could do so—without facing some sort of settlement changing the balance of power against the Allies. To avoid a German military victory of this sort, he had joined the war, but he did not do so on behalf of Allied war aims. He opposed the division of spoils outlined in the "secret treaties" and rejected every Allied effort to induce the United States to share in the booty of war. Wilson in this specific sense sought a "peace without victory," which would allow the vanquished to reenter the community of industrial-capitalist states without disabling prohibitions.

From Wilson's standpoint, World War I was a civil war within the social system of industrial capitalism. Its basic causes were political and economic rivalries over issues such as access to raw materials, foreign markets, and investment outlets, with the allies attempting to defend the existing apportionment of world market opportunities and the Central Powers challenging it. But in Wilson's view neither side had gained as much as it had lost, because the war aroused forces that challenged the very legitimacy of industrial capitalism as a system. In general terms, the Arabian, Chinese, and Bolshevik revolutions were outgrowths of the war; specifically, they reflected the fact that the people in the Third World were dissatisfied with the pace at which they were achieving self-determination and industrial development under

the management of the advanced industrial nations. To Wilson, the political destabilization inherent in national revolution appeared to exacerbate the original problem of economic rivalries among industrial states by effectively withdrawing more resources and people from the world market. He believed that to protect, stabilize, and allow for the expansion of industrial capitalism as a social system in the future, leaders formulating the peace after World War I had to establish a peace that would avoid another world war and possible future national revolutions.

FROM DAWES TO DEFAULT

After World War I, the United States struggled to persuade European leaders to accept its definition of just amounts and terms for reparations payments. Presidents Harding and Coolidge, like their predecessor Wilson, applied a criterion in evaluating the different reparations payment proposals that reflected their view of its potential impact against war among industrial states and revolution in the Third World. They were certain that the high reparations required of Germany would militate against the rapid recovery of its economic and political life. Because they knew Germany was the industrial "power plant" of Europe, its slow recovery would retard that of eastern Europe. Narrowed world markets would reignite the kind of trade wars that had in great part caused World War I. At the same time, a failure to return Germany to equality among nations rather quickly would tend to inflame nationalist tendencies in that country. Far more frightening was the prospect of Bolshevik ideology gaining popularity among the German people, especially after the Soviet Union had established the Comintern in 1919 to promote a global communist revolution.

From the standpoint of the United States, the closed trade doors and special privileges arranged among the Allies would set in motion trends toward stagnation, if not contraction, of world markets. While it was true that closed doors and special-concession organization of world markets would tend to diminish both the share and the volume of world trade enjoyed by the United States, and so were against the immediate as well as the long-run interests of the United States, such policies were also against the long-run interests of industrial capitalism as a social system. It was true that Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium would achieve a larger share of world trade in a slowly growing global market under a regime of closed doors and special concessions, but the total volume of growth would be much smaller than under an open door regime—where each nation had equal opportunities to use its capital, technicians, and technology. However, it was also true that the total volume of goods and services available to satisfy the demands of competing domestic interests in the industrial states and of economic developers in the Third World would be greater in an open door world.

American leaders refused to cancel the war debts entirely in order to try to obtain an "expansionist" direction for the postwar world economy. This meant that the United States rejected a program for priority reconstruction of the victors, and instead pushed for priorities that would give the most economic growth for the whole system. It utilized war debts to press the victors to accept a "business-based" set of criteria providing for maximum efficiency of resource utilization. At any time that Britain and France were willing to accept such a businesslike "composition," the United States was willing to negotiate and make concessions in which it would give equivalent for equivalent. This was shown in 1922, when the U.S. Congress created the World War Foreign Debt Commission to set terms for the Allies to fund their borrowing, requiring an interest rate of at least 4.25 percent and repayment over twenty-five years with no reduction in principal. Britain, in the Balfour Note, stated that it would collect from its debtors only what was necessary to pay Washington. After prolonged haggling, the United States was forced to moderate its stand; the Coolidge administration canceled up to 80 percent of some nations' war debts. Thirteen countries agreed in 1926 to repay the lower amounts over sixty-two years at an average of 3.3 percent interest.

After 1926, U.S. and European leaders continued to disagree about the justice of these payments and the propriety of linking reparations to war debts. Meanwhile, the Allies expected the Weimar Republic to comply with the terms for payment of reparations, thereby financing reconstruction of their economies. But Germany refused to raise the taxes necessary to pay, allowing spiraling inflation to destroy the value of the mark. After a series of partial postponements, the Germans defaulted in January 1923. France and Belgium responded with joint occupation of the Ruhr Valley in an attempt to force Germany to devote its total surplus to reparations payments.

German workers organized passive resistance, and the Weimar Republic suspended all payments. These events provided an early indication of how in Germany political problems surrounding payment of reparations dominated economic ones. German refusal to comply with Allied demands, combined with the U.S. government's veto of projected reconstruction loans by the House of Morgan to France, on the ground that the French government had not yet settled its war debts to the United States, forced France and the other European powers to agree to convene a conference of business experts, with the Chicago banker Charles G. Dawes serving as chairman and with the task of settling the reparations according to U.S. standards.

Beginning in January 1924 and ending in September of that year, the conference worked out a system that U.S. delegates believed was based on Germany's ability to pay. In addition to measures for currency stabilization, the Dawes Plan provided for reductions in payments and, under very special circumstances, actual suspension of payments. Certain German revenues, to include taxes on alcohol and tobacco and railroad and budget revenues, were earmarked specifically for reparations payments. Furthermore, Weimar was not made responsible for obtaining the foreign exchange necessary to make the annual payments. Most significant, American and British bankers made a $200 million loan to enable German production to expand and reparations payments to begin. From 1924 to 1929, additional loans to Germany meant that net capital flow ran toward Germany. Foreign lending was responsible for a major transfer of wealth toward Germany that exceeded the amount of reparations and war debts. The total amount of reparations that the Dawes Plan imposed on Germany was not excessive, consuming between 5 and 6 percent of annual national income. Germany in fact maintained a higher standard of living than its production justified for the rest of the decade.

Subsequent to the Dawes agreements, German reparations payments to the Allies rose gradually. Germany's production also expanded. But what troubled the U.S. agent general for reparations payment, Seymour Parker Gilbert, was that most loans initially went for public works, unemployment relief, and investment in sectors with excess capacity, such as agriculture, textiles, and steel. Thus, the loans made no commensurate increase in Germany's ability to earn foreign exchange. While American officials objected to how Weimar was using the money, U.S. private bankers continued to extend loans to Germany, expecting profitable returns. German politicians hoped that increasing loans would work as a lever on the U.S. government, because, they believed, the more money Germany owed to U.S. banks, the more pressure Washington would place on the Allies to reduce reparations. This system could be sustained until German industry was essentially reconstructed, which came late in 1927. But then Germany's needs changed. Its heavy industry required new markets if it was to continue to expand. Germany's inability to find these markets revealed the major flaw in the Dawes Plan conception, which had envisioned a far more rapid development of world markets than actually occurred. Pointing to the necessity to deal with its inability to continue to balance foreign payments, the Weimar Republic requested a revision of the Dawes Plan. But Germany in fact resented paying even its already reduced reparations levy, viewing this as an act of national humiliation.

In recognition of the fact that the world market had not expanded as rapidly as the "Dawes planners" had expected, a new committee of experts on German reparations was formed to meet in Paris on 11 February 1929 to revise the Dawes Plan. General Electric Company executive Owen D. Young, one of the major architects of the Dawes Plan, was designated chair. Out of this meeting emerged the Young Plan, which scaled down the final amount of German payments again, reducing the amount by roughly 20 percent to $8,032,500,000 and making it payable over 58.5 years at an interest rate of 5.5 percent. An additional agreement placed limits on the length of German payments at 36.5 years, but this was dependent upon the organization of the Bank for International Settlements. In addition to functioning as a "trustee" for reparations payments, the new bank was supposed to provide financial facilities for making development loans, which planners thought would contribute to world market expansion. For the last twenty-two years of reparations payments, the profits of the new bank were used to make reparations payments. No nation was fully satisfied with the Young Plan. Reflecting the unhappiness in the United States, Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills complained that it "tied debts and reparations together," and thus ratified "the principles of the Balfour Note."

For various reasons, the Bank for International Settlements never functioned as a worldwide development bank. The new investment

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 28 JUNE 1919

Article 231 of the 400-article Treaty of Versailles placed responsibility for World War I on Germany. Articles 232 and 235 addressed the issue of German reparations.

Article 231 The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Article 232 The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account . . . other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each. . . .

Germany undertakes . . . as a consequence of the violation of Treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at a rate of five percent. . . . This amount shall be determined by the Reparation Commission. . . .

Article 233 The amount of the above damage for which compensations to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the *Reparation Commission.* . . .

This Commission shall consider the claims and give to the Germany Government a just opportunity to be heard.

The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the German Government on or before May 1, 1921, as representing the extent of that Government's obligations.

The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligations within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921. If, however, within the period mentioned Germany fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments . . . shall determine.

Article 234 The Reparation Commission shall after May 1, 1921, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany, and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments . . . in accordance with Article 233; but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

Article 235 In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once with the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claims, Germany shall pay in such instalments . . . as the Reparation Commission may fix . . . the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks. Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the Armistice of November 11, 1918, shall first be met. . . . The balance shall be reckoned towards liquidation of the amounts due for reparation.

markets it was to create did not appear. Markets for capital goods and the growing capital surpluses they represented never came into existence. The amount of capital investments going into default became too great for the system to sustain. As world trade contracted, the means of settling payments globally disintegrated. On 16 June 1931, President Herbert Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on payment of both reparations and war debts. He was still hopeful that some way could be found to reexpand the world economy in order to prevent the development of nationalist autarky. But after 1931, each industrial nation began to erect trade barriers to its domestic markets by means of tariffs and discriminatory administrative procedures, and combined these with export offensives based on government subsidies and currency depreciation. As a result, reparations

payments never resumed after Hoover's moratorium ended. At Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1932, the Allies canceled them altogether, subject to a final token payment that the Germans never made. Except for Finland, European nations also defaulted on their war debts to the United States.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who became president after defeating Hoover's bid for reelection, rejected an international solution to world economic problems then being considered at the London Economic Conference of June–July 1933. The movement toward nationalist autarky that he thereby accelerated prevented any reconsideration of a settlement on war debts or reparations. It later became fashionable to lay responsibility for the world depression, economic nationalism, the rise of Adolf Hitler, and World War II not only on high tariff rates in the United States, but also on the American refusal to equate war debts with reparations, and hence agree to the cancellation of war debts in exchange for a reduction of German reparations payments. These criticisms are without much merit. The key point that such critics make is that the burden of war debts caused the world economic crisis and the rise of "Hitlerism." Their argument ignores the reality that German financial policies and eventual defaults were mainly the product not of U.S. actions but of the political weakness that was a structural component of the political economy of the time. Weimar's fragmented polity, combined with the emotionally charged symbolic issues of war guilt, reparations, and nationalism, meant that following significantly different policies to prevent insolvency would have been highly unlikely, if not impossible.

Nor were Germany's reparations and loans solely responsible for creating the economic crisis that led to the international instability of the 1930s and the eventual outbreak of World War II. There were deeper causes. From 1924 to 1927, when the underlying condition for the economic crisis took shape, Germany had three possible avenues for stabilizing its foreign trade and payments. First, it could export directly to reparations receivers such as France and Belgium. Second, it could export its capital goods to the Third World for development purposes. And third, it could export to the Soviet Union. As a practical matter, all three of these alternatives were not open by 1927. Direct exports to reparations receivers would tend to interfere with employment in those countries, and so were not welcome. Export of capital goods to the Third World was not really possible—except for Latin America, where German industry could not compete very successfully with the United States, and China, where prolonged civil war by and large blocked economic development—because most of the Third World was under the control of the Allied victors, who discouraged the export of German capital goods to their colonies and semicolonies to preserve them as monopoly markets for their home industries. Extensive exports of German heavy industrial goods to the Soviet Union were blocked by the unofficial but effective U.S. government embargo on long-term American financing for developing Soviet socialized industry.

Since new outlets for German heavy industry did not appear in the world market, Germany began to invest American banking loans in an economically wasteful fashion. Bankers lent to German states and municipalities, which used these funds for projects designed to bring about more social consumption, such as municipal beautification, parks, sports stadia, hotels, public bathhouses, and roads of little or no productive utility. Investments of this sort did not provide goods or marketable services that could be used to defray the costs of the borrowed foreign capital. But the irony was that the United States, with the Dawes loans, spent an amount in excess of what the Germans paid in reparations. Germany transferred a total of 16.8 billion marks to the Allies while receiving 44.7 billion in speculative mark purchases and loans that it never repaid after the Great Depression brought down the international monetary system in 1931. President Hoover was not entirely wrong when he claimed that economic forces originating in Europe had shattered the U.S. economy, although his critics at that time ridiculed him for attempting to avoid blame for the economic collapse. While Hoover shares responsibility for the Great Depression, President Roosevelt failed to make any effort to protect the equity of American bondholders. His embrace of the anticreditor mood of the era meant that Germany was able to default on its war debts, resulting in U.S. investors paying "reverse reparations."

COMPLICATIONS OF COLD WAR COMPENSATION

When American, British, and Soviet leaders began to grapple with the problem of war debts and reparations resulting from World War II, they had the benefit of the World War I experience. Instead of granting simple war loans, the U.S. Congress

authorized the president in March 1941 to enable any country whose defense he defined as vital to the United States to receive arms, other equipment, and matériel "by sale, transfer, exchange or lease." Lend-lease aid to Britain, China, and the Soviet Union made possible a clear separation of wartime economic aid, reparations, and reconstruction credits. The Allies created a reparations commission at the Yalta Conference of 4–11 February 1945. Under Soviet pressure, the United States and Britain agreed that a figure of $20 billion would be the starting point for discussions about Germany's new reparations obligation. The Soviet Union would receive half of that amount. But at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, President Harry S. Truman opposed Soviet efforts to collect reparations from current output until Germany exported enough to pay for imports to feed its labor force and fuel its industry. He was following the advice of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who was acting in accordance with his understanding of the negative impact of the reparations dispute on European reconstruction and world economic and social stabilization in the 1920s, but was unaware that only U.S. loans had made possible German reparations payments.

By the time of the Potsdam Conference, Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945 had left the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union with separate zones of occupation in the defeated nation. Even before Potsdam, Soviet occupation forces had begun to dismantle and transport whole German industrial plants to Soviet territory. The Soviets also designated special factories to produce exclusively for them. Moreover, Moscow kept the services of four million German prisoners of war and demanded forced labor from those living in its occupation zone. In general terms, the Soviet Union acted after World War II much as France had after World War I. It wished to reconstruct its own economy and to retard the reconstruction of Germany, both to stabilize itself and to prevent the stabilization of Germany. A destabilized Germany would remain militarily weak and the Soviet Union would become militarily strong. Moscow saw that large reparations taken quickly would facilitate both these objectives. U.S. leaders already had decided that imposition of large-scale reparations on Germany would retard postwar European economic recovery. During 1946, they concluded that without surplus production, the western zones of Germany would become a vast relief camp dependent on U.S. aid.

Concerns about German postwar economic recovery had not stopped the United States from developing plans and organizations late in World War II for conducting industrial espionage and seizing useful patents in chemicals, machine tools, and other technologically advanced industries in Germany. Operation Petticoat and Operation Paperclip sought to acquire German equipment, scientific research, and technical information of both military and industrial value, not only in hopes of shortening the war against Japan, but also for postwar economic advantage. Britain and France conducted similar operations, no doubt justifying exploitation of German industry, science, and technology as legitimate reparations. Subsequently, in the Harmssen Report of 1947–1951, the city of Bremen's economic minister calculated the total value of the information that the Western Allies secured at $5 billion. Citing this report, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov set the final amount of German intellectual reparations, including the Soviet portion, at $10 billion. British, French, and U.S. officials disputed these numbers then and thereafter. Also, defenders of the seizures later would point out that Germany looted French companies, practiced slave labor, expropriated possessions of concentration camp victims, and extracted tribute from the countries it occupied.

Discord between the Allies over reparations contributed to starting the postwar Soviet-American Cold War. Devastated by World War II, the Soviet Union insisted upon major reparations payments from Germany to hasten economic recovery. Consequently, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin proposed that the Ruhr Valley industries be administered jointly by the Soviet Union and the three Western powers to secure reparations from the Western-controlled portions of Germany. The United States and Britain rejected this proposal, revealing the growing differences on matters of priorities to be observed in European reconstruction. Washington increasingly suspected that the Soviet Union's wish to strip Germany, and to slow European reconstruction, meant it wanted to dominate the balance of power in Europe. This negative view of Soviet intentions seemed to be confirmed by Moscow's refusal to accept the U.S. invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan, which was designed to solve the problem of European reconstruction on a joint Europe-wide basis. After considering the matter, Stalin decided to reject the offer, largely because this would have required the Soviet Union to reveal the secrets of

its economic capacity. Furthermore, the Marshall Plan would have meant priority for west European reconstruction over that of the Soviet Union, as well as that the east European countries would be linked economically to western Europe, functioning largely as raw material suppliers.

Once the Soviet Union rejected participation in the Marshall Plan, the logic of its situation was to organize East Germany and other areas of Eastern Europe along lines allowing it to seize resources for its own reconstruction. Between 1947 and 1956, Moscow took large reparations from East Germany and much of Eastern Europe, probably far more than the $10 billion it had demanded at Yalta. Based on its experience with France in the controversy over German reparations following World War I, the United States must have expected that the Soviet Union would fail in its effort to achieve unilateral reconstruction based on reparations forcibly taken. Since France had no choice but to withdraw from the Ruhr in 1923 and accept U.S. conditions for European reconstruction, American leaders believed the Soviet Union would ultimately have to give up its domination of Eastern Europe. But what had worked against France in 1922–1923 did not work against the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. The Soviet Union and France were two dissimilar political economies. Because it engaged in state trading and had long been denied supplies for its industry by the Western industrial states, the Soviet Union was in effect isolated from the major impact of the world market. Unlike France after World War I, it had made its unilateral system of reparations collection in East Germany and much of Eastern Europe a sufficient base for its own reconstruction and for its strategic, political, and economic control of Eastern Europe to the Elbe River.

Acting on the same assumptions that guided its policy toward Germany, the United States did not collect reparations from Japan. But the nations victimized by Japanese aggression in World War II demanded compensation immediately after the conflict ended. In Tokyo, the Far Eastern Commission began discussions on how to meet these demands in the fall of 1945. Early in 1946, President Truman named Edwin W. Pauley as special ambassador, with instructions to conduct a fact-finding mission for recommendations on Japanese payment of reparations. Made public in April 1946, Pauley's plan provided for transferring to the devastated nations of Asia all Japanese industrial equipment beyond that needed to maintain Japan's prewar living standard. Japanese leaders criticized the plan as both unduly harsh and impractical. General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of Allied powers and head of the U.S. occupation, agreed that the imposition of reparations would delay, if not prevent, Japan's economic recovery. Many American officials in Tokyo and Washington shared his concern. By the fall of 1946, as Soviet-American relations deteriorated in Europe, serious doubts about Pauley's plan arose in the War and State departments.

Early in 1947, the United States adopted the containment policy. This would lead to implementation of the "reverse course" in U.S. occupation policy toward Japan. Its objective was to create an economically powerful and friendly Japan that would be the cornerstone of a postwar U.S. policy in Asia to block Soviet-inspired communist expansion. While the United States abandoned Pauley's plan, the nations serving on the Far Eastern Commission were deadlocked over the complex question of how best to distribute the required reparations equipment. The War Department first commissioned several reevaluations of the reparations and economic policy that resulted in a two-thirds reduction of the demands. During May 1949, the United States broke the stalemate by unilaterally terminating all demands for reparations payments. The Philippines strenuously objected, compelling Washington to include in the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty an article providing that Japan negotiate and pay reparations in goods and services to any former victim of its aggression that demanded compensation. Japan's government and its business community would make a virtue of necessity after U.S. occupation ended in May 1952. They pursued a successful strategy for establishing friendly and productive relations with its former imperial conquests that utilized reparations payments to help reopen East Asian markets and regain access to raw material sources in Southeast Asia.

After regaining its sovereignty, Japan negotiated a series of agreements providing consumer goods and industrial equipment, often tied to economic assistance and loan programs, with the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and South Vietnam (after the division of Vietnam in 1954). Controversy in Japan surrounding alleged government-business collusion in awarding reparations contracts prolonged the talks, but separate agreements finally were reached with all four countries. In November 1954, Burma gained $200 million over a term of ten years, and in March

1963 supplementary payment of $140 million paid over twelve years. In May 1956, the Philippines accepted $550 million in reparations over a term of twenty years, and the agreement with Indonesia in January 1958 provided for payment of reparations of $223 million over twelve years. South Vietnam in May 1959 accepted $39 million over a term of five years. These four nations received an additional $707.5 million in the form of loans. Cambodia and Laos accepted "free technical aid" rather than formal reparations. Under these agreements, recipient nations agreed to provide Japan with necessary raw materials. In addition, receipt of economic aid often required purchase of Japanese manufactured goods, contributing significantly to Japan's economic recovery and later expansion, especially in its steel, shipbuilding, and electronics industries.

Japan did not pay reparations to China after World War II because of the outcome of the civil war in that country. Under pressure from the United States, the Japanese did not recognize the People's Republic of China. This precluded negotiations regarding reparations with the Chinese communist government, and the Republic of China, in exile on Taiwan, could not make claims because that island had been part of the Japanese empire. South Korea demanded that Japan pay $8 billion in reparations for gold and art objects taken from Korea, forced labor, and lost Korean investments during forty years of Japanese imperial rule and brutal colonial exploitation of the Korean peninsula after 1905. After protracted negotiations beginning in 1952, Tokyo and Seoul finally signed in June 1965 the Treaty of Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which provided for Japan's commitment to extend to South Korea's government $200 million in long-term, low interest loans, $300 million in goods and services over ten years, and $300 million in commercial loans to promote the development of South Korea's economy. Meanwhile, Japan had established and developed quasi-official contacts with North Korea, resulting in expanded trade that in 1964 reached $30 million. By that year, Japan had paid over $1 billion in reparations and $490 million in economic assistance to Burma, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

In August 1990, Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations then authorized the United States to organize military action to liberate Kuwait if Iraqi forces refused to withdraw. The Gulf War during January and February 1991 resulted in Iraq inflicting tremendous destruction on Kuwait, including its oil wells. After Saddam's surrender, the UN Security Council in April passed Resolution 687 to impose punishment on Iraq. One of its provisions stated that Iraq was liable under international law for all direct loss, damage (including environmental damage), and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals, and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. No concrete plan for collection emerged, because the resolution also called for measures to restrict Saddam's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, Iraq was prohibited from selling oil until it met the cease-fire conditions. But Saddam increasingly engaged in defiance and deceit to avoid full compliance with the resolution. The UN inspectors ultimately left Iraq in protest and new U.S. air strikes failed to alter Iraq's behavior, let alone revive any expectation of reparations payments. The Gulf War showed the supremacy of international power over international law.

REPARATIONS AND GROUP REMEDIATION

There were occasions in the twentieth century when the United States paid reparations or considered doing so. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt provided indirect assistance to a group of conspirators who staged a rebellion in Panama that resulted in the secession of this province from Colombia. His motivation was to help create an independent nation in Panama that would then sign a treaty authorizing the United States to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Roosevelt succeeded, but embarrassment over the incident and hopes for oil concessions caused Congress in 1921 to approve payment of a $25 million indemnity to Colombia, satisfying a demand it first had made in 1914. A similar situation existed in Hawaii, where many natives believed that the United States played an unethical role in conspiring with white American businessmen to stage a rebellion during 1893. Although the United States did not annex Hawaii at that time, its actions eventually led to the overthrow of Hawaii's last monarchy. In August 1988, the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on a proposal for payment of reparations to native Hawaiians. But in the end, native Hawaiians had to be satisfied with only an official apology that

Congress extended in November 1993 for U.S. actions in helping end Hawaiian home rule.

Much more controversial was the issue of whether the United States should pay reparations for the destruction that military operations inflicted on Vietnam during the Second Indochina War. In January 1973, as part of the Paris Peace Agreement, the Nixon administration agreed to provide North Vietnam with $4.75 billion in aid for economic reconstruction. This was intended as an inducement to respect the terms of the accord, but Hanoi was determined to reunite the country and achieved success in April 1975. Two years later, when President Jimmy Carter sought the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam made the payment of reparations at least equivalent to the amount of the promised reconstruction aid a condition for normalization. The House of Representatives, in a quick and angry response to perceived blackmail, voted to forbid aid, reparations, or payments of any kind to Vietnam. By contrast, a decade later, the United States paid compensation when it accidentally shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the Persian Gulf. These differing outcomes revealed how the principle of reparation for damages had not been firmly set in international law. In 2000, the United States chose not to pay reparations to the families of South Korean civilians that U.S. soldiers had killed at No Gun Ri during the first weeks of the Korean War.

During the years after World War II, specific groups of people have made claims to reparations for a variety of transgressions. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, voluntarily paid reparations to Israel for the policies and actions of the Nazi government that inflicted unspeakable suffering upon individual Jews. During the 1990s, U.S. World War II veterans who had been prisoners of war in Germany filed suit against Daimler-Benz and other firms to gain damages for German industry's ruthless exploitation of them as slave laborers. These demands gained legitimacy from a definition of reparations as an "act or process of making amends," usually by "giving compensation to satisfy one who has suffered injury, loss, or wrong at the hands of another." Consistent with this broader definition, in 1983 the U.S. Congress passed a remediation (remedy) law for Japanese Americans whom the U.S. government had put into internment camps during World War II. It provided for Congress first to pass a joint resolution, signed by the president, "which recognizes that a grave injustice was done and offers the apologies of the nation for the acts of exclusion, removal, and detention." Second, it granted official pardons to Japanese Americans convicted for violating orders to evacuate. Third, it created a foundation for educational and humanitarian purposes. Last, and most important, Congress established a $1.5 billion fund for the payment of reparations to survivors of the internment camps.

Remediation for Japanese Americans revived African-American demands to receive reparations for enslavement. Despite various legislative and legal attempts to redress the legacy of American slavery after 1865, large-scale payment of reparations never had gained widespread support in the United States as a viable option for indemnification. In 1989, Representative John Conyers, an African-American Democrat from Michigan, introduced in the House of Representatives legislation to allow African Americans to achieve remediation. It failed to pass then and again in 1991. But in February 1993, the first National Reparations Awareness Day program in Detroit presented strategies for accomplishing indemnification. Legal action, while not expected to succeed, was endorsed as a powerful symbol of white group responsibility for slavery that would set the stage for passage of remediation legislation once a favorable political context emerged. In 2001, at the National Reparations Conference in Chicago, activists argued that an honest reckoning of American history showed "the difficulty of transcending race without some attempt to repair the damage done by racial slavery and the structures of racism erected to justify it." That demands to indemnify the descendants of American slaves extended into the twenty-first century demonstrated that the principle of reparations for damages had not been firmly established either in U.S. domestic or international law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bower, Tom. *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists*. Boston, 1987. Discusses Operation Paperclip, which brought German scientists to the United States, despite the involvement of many in Nazi war crimes.

DeConde, Alexander. *A History of American Foreign Policy*. 3d ed. New York, 1978. Provides succinct summaries of the terms of U.S. agreements that involve reparations prior to the Versailles Peace Treaty.

Falkus, M. E. "The German Business Cycle in the 1920's." *Economic History Review* 27 (1975). Argues that net declines in foreign investment in Germany in 1928 and 1929 contributed to the onset of the Great Depression.

Finn, Richard B. *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan.* Berkeley, Calif., 1992. Provides a well-researched and reflective study of the occupation that covers the deliberations of the Far Eastern Commission and reparations.

Gimbel, John. *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany.* Stanford, Calif., 1990. Documents how after World War II the United States supervised a comprehensive and systematic intellectual reparations program to exploit German scientific and technical know-how.

Kent, Bruce. *The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918–1932.* Oxford and New York, 1989. Contends that the Allies were fully aware from the start that Germany could not pay the large reparations they demanded, but followed this policy as a way to silence calls for increased taxes to reduce government debt or finance expanded social programs.

Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.* New York and London, 1919. Contains an excellent analysis of why the reparations settlement worked out at Versailles was bound to fail.

Leffler, Melvin C. "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921–1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation." *Journal of American History* 59 (1972). Explains how domestic public opinion and administration, as well as congressional, views of American fiscal problems, complemented efforts of U.S. leaders to manipulate reparations to create an expansionist world market structure.

Link, Werner. *Die Amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland, 1921–1932.* Düsseldorf, 1970. Demonstrates that American, and to a lesser extent British, bankers insisted on reversal of French reparations policy as the major key to U.S. investment in Germany.

Magee, Rhonda V. "The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse." *Virginia Law Review* 79 (1993). Traces failed efforts after 1865 to gain compensation for African Americans, in land or money, for damages resulting from American slavery.

McNeil, William C. *American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression.* New York, 1986. Explains how attracting and allocating foreign loans following the approval of the Dawes Plan became the center of conflict between German political factions and between the Allies and Germany.

Moulton, Harold G., and Leo Pasvolsky. *War Debts and World Prosperity.* New York, 1932. Although covering events only up to 1932, this is still the most useful account of the complex interrelationships among reparations, war debts, tariff structures, and the requisites of an expanding world economy.

Parrini, Carl P. *Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923.* Pittsburgh, 1969. Shows that reparations were linked to war debts, and that the United States used war debts to force the European powers to modify the reparations settlement, and tried to find a place for Germany in an expanding world market without displacing other industrial states.

Rhodes, B. D. "Reassessing Uncle Shylock: The United States and the French War Debt, 1917–1929." *Journal of American History* 55 (1969). Asserts that the U.S. government maintained a moderate approach to war debts.

Rix, Alan. *Japan's Economic Aid: Policy-Making and Politics.* New York, 1980. Examines Japan's postwar foreign aid decision-making process.

Schaller, Michael. *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.* New York, 1985. Places the occupation within the context of overall postwar U.S. security strategy in East Asia from 1945 to 1950.

Schuker, Stephen A. *American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919–33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis.* Princeton, N.J., 1988. Asserts, in a revisionist argument reflecting the new international history of the 1920s, that, contrary to the view of John Maynard Keynes, the reparations bill assigned Germany in 1921 was not unreasonable, but in fact reflected a measure of rough political justice.

Temin, Peter. "The Beginning of the Depression in Germany." *Economic History Review* 24

(1971). Contends that the impact of the reparation payments on investment in Germany had no relationship to the onset of the Great Depression there.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923*. New York, 1980. Examines the reparations dispute after World War I from the French perspective.

U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. *Loans to Foreign Governments*. Senate Document no. 86. Washington, D.C., 1921. A collection of correspondence on war loans, war debts, and reparations.

U.S. World War Foreign Debts Commission. *Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission with Additional Information Regarding Foreign Debts Due the United States*. Washington, D.C., 1927. Contains much of the correspondence between the U.S. Treasury Department and the British and French governments.

See also ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES; COLD WAR ORIGINS; FOREIGN AID; INTERNATIONAL LAW; LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION; SUMMIT CONFERENCES.

REVISIONISM

Athan G. Theoharis

The term "revise" is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "to re-examine or reconsider and amend faults in." This definition describes the process by which historians have consistently reconsidered and improved upon what had once been standard, often unquestioned interpretations of past events, movements, and personalities. A number of factors ensure this process: new information acquired through research into recently accessioned documents; the posing of new questions; the utilization of new and at times more sophisticated methods derived from disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, or sociology; the exploitation of new research tools such as the computer; the relative detachment provided by chronological distance from the particular event under study; or new insights gained from the impact of seminal thinkers.

Interpretations of American foreign relations have not escaped this process of revision. Virtually every major American diplomatic problem—for example, Jay's Treaty, the War of 1812, the Monroe Doctrine, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, isolationism, World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War—has been subject to such reconsideration and reexamination. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the study of American foreign relations underwent a far-reaching change in focus with the emergence of the "realist" school. Robert Osgood, in *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations,* interprets Wilsonian diplomacy from a perspective based on considerations of national self-interest and international power relations; Paul Schroeder, in *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations,* applies "realist" principles to the study of the Roosevelt administration's diplomacy on the eve of World War II; and John Gaddis, in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,* similarly assesses the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' conduct of foreign relations during the 1940s. More recently, some historians of American foreign relations have applied the insights of multiculturalism and postmodernism to argue for a distinctly different approach to the study of war and diplomacy. The cumulative impact of these differing approaches has compelled students of American foreign relations to examine policy decisions from these perspectives. Since the 1950s, consequently, diplomatic historians have no longer been interested solely in questions involving state-to-state relations and international law, and have emphasized as well questions of power, rationalism, gender, race and ethnicity, bureaucracy, and the role of organized interest groups. The term "revise" clearly describes this historiography.

Yet, to adopt so literal a definition of revisionism does not clarify. As Warren Cohen points out in *The American Revisionist,* historians of American foreign relations have employed this term to describe "a number of men who, after one or both world wars, took upon themselves the task of persuading the American people to change their view of the origins of those wars and of the reasons for American intervention in them." Cohen's study, published in 1967, failed to account for three other groups of historians, the vast majority of whom began to publish after 1967 and who wrote instead about the origins of the Cold War, the reasons for the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, and the growth of the "national security state." Broadened to include these groups, Cohen's definition classifies a diverse group of writers, all of whom have discussed the processes leading to, and the consequences of, U.S. involvement in international conflict but who nonetheless differ in their emphases and conclusions.

Cohen's definition, however, while distinguishing these writers from others who have revised other historiographical issues (the coming of the Civil War, the Progressive Era), does not identify the particularity of "revisionist" his-

toriography. Using Cohen's definition, historians like Osgood, Schroeder, and Gaddis could be classified as "revisionists." They challenged what were once standard interpretations of U.S. involvement in wars and were no less interested in "persuading the American people to change their views." Osgood, Schroeder, and Gaddis, however, have not been classified as "revisionists," not because their conclusions were widely accepted but because they share perspectives with the majority of those writing about the American diplomatic past.

Revisionist historiography can be distinguished from other works of revision because its practitioners go beyond a reexamination of specific events and decisions. Instead, the revisionists challenge the assumptions held by more conventional historians about how policy is formulated and justified, about whether the executive branch is responsive to public opinion, and about the ideas and sources of official foreign policy. The common themes of revisionist historiography are those of executive independence, the mendaciousness or secretiveness by which policymakers develop public support for particular decisions, the betrayal of the nation's democratic ideals, and an implicit (in certain cases, explicit) criticism of the principal ideas and priorities that determine official policy. The revisionists do not accept the rhetoric of policymakers at face value, and tend to perceive proclaimed idealism as masking less noble, if not sinister, purposes. More basically, the revisionists share a set of assumptions that the foreign policy decisions that led to both world wars and the Cold War or opposition to the Vietnam War were not the result of public demand, and were shaped by the priorities and (for some) the disloyalty of policymakers. To accept the assumptions of the revisionists is to locate American involvement in international conflict not in the narrowing of available options by international developments but in internal factors and in conscious (or, for some, unthinking) choice.

In portraying policymakers as manipulators of public opinion and U.S. involvement in international conflict as the consequence of presidential decisions or of the insidious influence of special interest groups, the revisionists have challenged the conclusions of traditional historians (for example, Gaddis and Schroeder) who view public opinion as unduly constraining the development of a realistic foreign policy. These conclusions, however, are assumptions more than descriptions of reality. We know little about how or whether public opinion has shaped foreign policy. When referring to public opinion, most historians have frequently focused on elite opinion. From his interviews with State Department personnel during the 1960s, the political scientist Bernard Cohen, for example, established that when it was formulating policy, the foreign policy bureaucracy was not motivated to ascertain public opinion and viewed the public as an object to be manipulated or cajoled. There remains a need to ascertain even what constitutes evidence of public opinion. Recent studies suggest the need for greater caution when commenting on the public's influence on foreign policy.

The revisionist focus on elites and questioning whether official policy responds to the public's interests does not mean that the revisionists constitute a monolithic school. A further qualification is required. The revisionists' basic critique of the nature and sources of U.S. diplomacy and the methods by which government officials have conducted policy constitutes their principal commonality. Revisionists otherwise differ in their emphases and conclusions.

The revisionists can be classified into five broad schools: World War I, Right revisionism, Left revisionism, Vietnam revisionism, and national security revisionism, divisions reflecting both philosophical differences and the events commanding their attention. The subject matter of the World War I revisionists is obvious; the Right revisionists focus on the origins and consequences of World War II; the Left, Vietnam, and national security revisionists focus on different aspects of the Cold War. In an important sense, however, World War I revisionism created the intellectual climate and perspectives from which Right revisionism emerged. Some of the themes of World War I revisionism also appear in Left and national security revisionism. Right revisionists, moreover, can be classified as World War II revisionists, and their main themes underlie Vietnam revisionism. In contrast, although Left and national security revisionists focus on the Cold War, they differ in emphases and focus—the former on the origins and the latter on the consequences of the Cold War. In addition, the Right revisionists' conclusions about U.S. involvement in World War II indirectly shaped their analyses of the Cold War, while Vietnam revisionists endorse orthodox interpretations of the Cold War and the Right revisionist conspiratorial perspective on the reasons for harmful foreign and military decisions.

Revisionist historiography has also been influenced by three seminal thinkers writing about U.S. foreign policy—Harry Elmer Barnes on World War I and Right revisionists, William Appleman Williams on Left revisionists, and Charles Austin Beard on both Left and Right revisionists. These writers have not influenced either Vietnam or national security revisionists. The time of their writing and the degree to which their work was shaped by contemporary politics or research into recently accessible primary sources are factors underpinning the differences among the revisionists. The Right revisionists' conclusions about the origins of World War II derived in part from archival research documenting U.S. involvement in World War I and in part from their reaction to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of domestic and foreign policy during the 1930s and 1940s. For the Left revisionists, U.S. policy during the 1960s, particularly the Vietnam War, combined with research into recently accessible primary sources, shaped their conclusions about the origins of the Cold War. In contrast, Vietnam revisionists responded to the anticommunist analyses underpinning the debate over the Vietnam War and to Left revisionist interpretations of the Cold War, while national security revisionist interpretations were shaped by the unprecedented release of formerly classified Soviet and U.S. records and new public concerns about the consequences of secrecy and centralization on privacy rights and constitutional safeguards.

WORLD WAR I REVISIONISM

Harry Elmer Barnes To a generation accustomed to a globalist foreign policy, large defense budgets, and foreign military-assistance pacts and involvement, the postwar reaction to World War I might seem perplexing. Almost immediately after the end of that conflict, after having accepted this as a "war to end all wars" and "to make the world safe for democracy," and the portrayal of the Germans as "barbarous Huns," many Americans became disillusioned with the war's consequences and began to reappraise what had been unquestioned beliefs about the nation's proper international role. Harry Elmer Barnes was one such American. He had written propaganda tracts for the American Defense Society and the National Security League during the war that extolled the morality and necessity of U.S. participation to defeat Germany.

Influenced by Sidney Fay's article "New Light on the Origins of the World War, I. Berlin and Vienna, to July 29," published in the *American Historical Review* (1920), which demonstrated the inequity of the Versailles Treaty's war guilt clause, Barnes reassessed those judgments he had helped to popularize during the war years. In a series of book reviews and articles published during the 1920s, he questioned whether Germany was solely responsible for the war and called for a multicausal conception of responsibility. These themes were summarized in his important study *Genesis of the World War* (1926), a book that the publisher Alfred Knopf solicited on the basis of a series of articles Barnes had published in *Christian Century*.

In *Genesis of the World War,* Barnes argues that the revisionist interpretation was the "correct one" and that his book demonstrates the "dishonesty and unreliability of diplomats and statesmen." Conceding Germany's partial responsibility for the outbreak of World War I, Barnes also chronicles French, Russian, and Serbian culpability. The errors of men, the irrational consequences of nationalism, the influence of propaganda, and the economic interests of munitions makers combined to provide the catalyst for war. Barnes reiterated these themes in the foreword he wrote for H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen's influential *Merchants of Death* (1934), contending that the authors had not singled out the armaments industry but the "broader forces, such as patriotism, imperialism, nationalistic education, and capitalist competition, [which] play a larger part than the armament industry in keeping alive the war system."

Focusing on the outbreak of the war in Europe, Barnes discusses only peripherally the factors leading to U.S. involvement in 1917. Just as he challenged the conventional view of German war guilt, representing the German invasion of Belgium as the precipitating event, but not the real cause, of a general European war, so Barnes debunks the then conventional wisdom that German submarine warfare was the basis for U.S. involvement. He argues instead that "unneutrality, lack of courage, or maladroitness of the Washington authorities in regard to English violations of international law . . . produced German submarine warfare that actually led us into war."

Mistakes in judgment, emotionalism, and unthinking patriotism, and not any threat to the national interest (whether defined in economic or strategic terms), were the bases for war. Believing

that war was the consequence of myopia, and thus was avoidable, Barnes particularly emphasizes World War I's harmful legacy. It had not extended democracy or ensured against future wars, but had undermined world order and stability. Detailing but one of these revolutionary consequences, Barnes describes the war's "most unfortunate reaction upon the British Empire by stimulating nationalistic and independence movements everywhere."

Barnes's writings impelled other historians to consider these conclusions. His polemical tone, based on a conviction that this was no mere academic exercise, but involved the vital issue of war and peace, shaped his general approach to the study of war and his optimism that this research and writing could prevent the recurrence of war.

By the end of the 1930s, the dominant interpretation of World War I was that of the revisionists. In part, their writings provided a rationale for congressional enactment of the Neutrality Acts of 1935–1937. Yet despite this success, the United States would once again become involved in a major world war. This factor, as much as his conclusions about the causes and consequences of World War I, shaped Barnes's response to the debate precipitated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's successful efforts of 1937–1941 to alter the nation's foreign policy course, first from one of neutrality to one of aid to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and then to involvement as a cobelligerent.

World War II had a searing effect on Barnes. He was far less confident that he was speaking from a majority position, and the tone of his works after 1944 was more defensive and alienated. During the post–World War II period, Barnes also abandoned the multicausal approach characteristic of his writings on World War I. Instead, he attributed U.S. involvement in that later conflict to President Roosevelt's duplicitous conduct of the nation's foreign relations.

Central to Barnes's analysis was the conviction that the national interest did not require that the United States go to war. Quite the opposite; involvement in war would undermine national security and create continuous tensions that would inevitably ensure a militarized society. Minimizing German responsibility for World War II, as he had for World War I, in the introduction he wrote for *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace,* Barnes bluntly claimed: "Sane internationalism is one thing; it is something quite different to support our entry into a war likely to ruin civilization merely to promote the prospects of a domestic leader, however colorful or popular, to satisfy the neurotic compulsions of special interests and pressure groups, and to pull the chestnuts of foreign nations out of the fire." Presidential duplicity had been only one of the themes (and not a central one) in his earlier writing—witness his critical comment on the dishonesty and unreliability of statesmen and diplomats. Minimized in, if not totally absent from, Barnes's post–World War II writing, were his earlier emphases on competitive nationalism, emotionalism, and economic interest.

Resurrecting the correctness of the revisionist interpretation of World War I, Barnes attributed U.S. involvement in World War II partly to the decisions leading to that earlier conflict. World War I and U.S. involvement in that conflict, he argued, constituted "an ominous turning point" in American and world history. Barnes then returned to the principal theme of his writings about World War I: the war's disastrous consequences. He emphasized that both wars had inevitably resulted in "the rise and influence of Communism, military state capitalism, the police state, and the impending doom of civilization."

Barnes continued these themes in a later, more detailed study of how the nation became involved in World War II: "Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century," published in 1968 in the right-wing libertarian journal *Left and Right.* He then emphasized still another theme: the truth about U.S. involvement in World War II was not more widely known owing to the "blackout" and "blurring" resorted to by "court historians," publishers, and book reviewers.

By the 1950s, Barnes had abandoned the qualifications underpinning his dogmatic analyses of the 1920s for the posture of an aggrieved proponent and seeker of the truth. In his earlier writing, he was convinced that research, thoughtful analysis by experts, and publication could avert war's recurrence. This confidence and these themes were virtually absent from Barnes's more conspiratorial and defensive analysis of World War II. There was a simpler explanation: the power and principles of President Roosevelt. This shift in tone coincided with and contributed to the emergence of a more restrictive revisionism that could properly be labeled Right revisionism.

Charles Austin Beard Unlike Barnes, Charles Beard had not been greatly concerned during the 1920s about German war guilt or the process by

which the United States became involved in World War I. He first focused on foreign policy matters during the 1930s and 1940s and concentrated thereafter on U.S. involvement in World War II. Beard's published works on American foreign policy of the 1930s, however, differed markedly in tone and emphasis from his writings of the 1940s.

Although sharing Barnes's critical views on the uses of propaganda and the role of special interest groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy, Beard's analyses of the 1930s were broader and less conspiratorial. What particularly distinguished Beard from Barnes were his interests in the evolution of a more interventionist foreign policy and in the conceptions of national interest held by important political leaders. Unlike Barnes's more narrowly political and personalist approach, Beard's was more broadly cultural and economic. In this sense, Beard did not view certain men as culprits, war as irrational, and education as sufficient to avert undesirable developments. The principal themes of his writing on American internationalism were that an interventionist foreign policy was an outgrowth of domestic affairs more than of foreign developments, and that foreign policy decisions were the product of particular values that reflected the interests of powerful special economic interest groups. This was not, however, simply an economic interpretation of foreign policy decisions. Beard was interested in understanding the relationship between social and economic change and politics, and he denied that particular responses were foreordained. There were alternative policy options, but the specific direction that a nation pursued was based on its established national priorities.

In addition, Beard emphasized that "official foreign policy is always conducted by a few persons. . . . In this respect, democracies may differ little from dictatorships." Not representing policymakers as manipulators or as acting contrary to the national interest in his writings of the 1930s, Beard explored how the national interest (and hence foreign policy) was conceived and formulated. Foreign policy, moreover, could not be understood as a separate process; international involvement had far-reaching consequences both for republican principles and for reform. In *Open Door at Home,* Beard stressed the "control" that governments could exercise over domestic policies and national priorities. From these findings he offered a specific recommendation: "The argument thus far advanced is directed to the proposition that an efficiently operated commonwealth offers the best escape from the crisis in economy and thought in which the American nation now flounders."

In a different sense than Barnes, Beard advocated a restrictionist foreign policy. His recommendations, like those of Barnes, were rejected. Between 1937 and 1941, the Roosevelt administration successfully altered the noninterventionist stance of the American public and Congress. Beard became an active participant in the resultant debate over the wisdom of a course that risked involvement in an ongoing foreign war. After 1939 his writings became increasingly polemical. No longer directly assessing the intellectual framework within which the national interest came to be formulated, whether in *Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels* or *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War,* Beard moved closer to Barnes's focus on the actions of particular individuals and to the duplicity of policymakers. His discussion increasingly centered on the rhetoric and policy decisions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Beard's post–World War II books contrasted the disparity between President Roosevelt's rhetoric and reality. In a highly moralistic tone, Beard argues in *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War:* "President Roosevelt entered the year 1941 carrying moral responsibility for his covenants with the American people to keep this nation out of war—so to conduct foreign affairs as to avoid war." Roosevelt had not followed that course while, at the same time, publicly minimizing the risks of his policies. In conclusion, Beard pointedly questions the consequences of this abuse of power: "Was it within the legal and moral competence of President Roosevelt in 1941 so to conduct foreign affairs as to maneuver a foreign country into firing a shot that brought on war—indeed to make war on his own authority?"

In his later years Beard no longer emphasized the domestic sources of foreign policy decisions, whether economic interest or value choices. By then he had become concerned principally with process issues: how the conduct of foreign policy affected a system of checks and balances and constitutional liberties. This, and not simply moral fervor or partisanship, shaped his historical writing. In combination, Beard's later writings and those of Barnes gave rise to the decidedly more intemperate Right revisionism of the post–World War II period. Yet, while the essays in *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (1953) were dedicated to Beard, their intellectual debt

was to the Beard of the 1940s. His earlier, more sophisticated emphases on intellectual attitudes and economic influence, through the writings of William Appleman Williams, during the 1960s gave rise to Left revisionism, which focused less on U.S. involvement in World War II than on the origins of the Cold War.

1930s Revisionism Articulating themes suggested or emphasized by Barnes and Beard, other independent scholars during the 1930s examined the process leading to U.S. involvement in World War I. In contrast to the revisionist accounts published during the 1920s, the revisionism of the 1930s focused on the question of how the United States abandoned a neutrality policy to become involved in war in 1917. Revisionist writers of the 1930s concurred that U.S. involvement was neither necessary nor realistic, and thus that war could have been avoided. They also believed that those who had made policy (except former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and, with certain qualifications, President Woodrow Wilson) were shortsighted. Most policymakers (U.S. ambassador to London Walter Hines Page; President Wilson's influential adviser Edward House; Bryan's successor as secretary of state, Robert Lansing), they concluded, were Anglophiles and acted in ways contrary to the national interest. A further theme, popularized in C. Hartley Grattan's study *Why We Fought* (1929), was the important influence of propaganda (a thesis that derived from the pioneering work of Harold Laswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*).

The combination of traditional anti-German attitudes, pro-British sympathies, and the impact of the preparedness campaign of 1915–1916 had led to U.S. involvement in war. Yet, Grattan believed that the determining factor was domestic (and not Allied) propaganda, and principally President Wilson's unilateral and irresponsible conduct of foreign policy. By 1936, Grattan had considerably refined this emphasis on propaganda and presidential irresponsibility. In *Preface to Chaos,* he represented the system and needs of capitalism as creating the conditions leading to World War I.

These themes of propaganda and economic influences were either extended or refined by a larger group of revisionists. Thus, in *Merchants of Death,* H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen argue that arms merchants, in their efforts to sell military weapons, had contributed to international crises and influenced press reporting. Further archival research was needed to uncover the full story, they conceded, while stressing the influence of arms merchants on governmental policy and the close relationship between the military and the armaments industry. They further conclude that "American commitments with the Allies were so enormous that only our entry into the war saved the country from a major economic collapse."

This conviction that U.S. involvement in the war was not inevitable and that the public was influenced by the insidious machinations of special interests was further developed, although without Grattan's and Engelbrecht and Hanighen's narrow economic focus, in the propaganda studies of H. C. Peterson, Walter Millis, and Edwin Borchard and William Lage. In *Propaganda for War,* Peterson explores how American opinion was influenced by British propaganda during the period 1914–1917, concluding that many American politicians "were actively engaged in fighting Britain's battles on the American political front." The combination of British propaganda efforts, the sympathies of policymakers, and the degree to which important economic interests profited from trade with the Entente powers and undermined American neutrality—and not the national interest—had ensured U.S. involvement in war with the Central Powers.

An implicit theme in Peterson's analysis is that un-American sympathies determined official Washington's actions during the crucial period 1914–1917; the only exception was former Secretary of State Bryan, who "thought primarily of his own country." The policymakers' defective vision, their "utterly fallacious conclusion, as to what could be achieved" (there was no suggestion here of disloyalty but simply of misguided sympathies), and their failure to act in terms of the national interest had led the nation into an unnecessary and harmful war. Sharing Barnes's sense of the lessons of history, in an almost preacherlike tone Peterson concludes that American leaders had "failed to see that the war was merely one in a long series of wars which the European set-up makes inevitable—that it was the natural concomitant of the political transition caused by Germany's rise to power." U.S. involvement in the war was both tragic and contrary to the public will, for "To Americans a vote for Wilson [in 1916] had meant a vote for peace. Through the only medium available to them they had expressed their unmistakable desire to keep out of the European conflict."

Peterson's definition of realism was shared by Borchard and Lage in *Neutrality for the United States*. The national interest required not intervention in "the wars of other peoples" but respect for international law and constitutional government. This was "rational" and had traditionally provided "the path of progress." Emphasizing the limits to American power and influence, Borchard and Lage condemned the unneutrality of the Wilson administration's policies and denied that these policies advanced the interests of the United States so much as those of other states. The authors, however, do not represent this as sinister or mendacious: "The surrender was not made through malevolence but through short-sighted emotionalism, a confusion of ideas as to where America's interest lay."

Another underlying theme in their (and Peterson's) analysis was the undesirability of exclusive presidential conduct of foreign policy. Borchard and Lage stress how the Congress had attempted to remain neutral, an effort that was frustrated by the Wilson administration. Emphasizing President Wilson's role in undermining U.S. neutrality, they attribute this to a messianic conception of the nation's responsibilities, a conception they find unrealistic and counterproductive. In *Road to War,* Millis develops this theme: "It was only natural that the New Freedom which appealed to nationalism to enforce peace, justice and liberty in the domestic sphere, should have thought of the American nation as an active force for peace and justice in the international world as well."

In combination, these writers characterized U.S. policy during World War I as based on a defective vision of reality, and their writings reflect a strong suspicion of globalism and of the exercise of power by the executive branch. Not impressed by the wisdom of high-level governmental personnel, they also feared that centralizing decision making within the executive branch invited abuses of this power. In their use of the term "propaganda," they distinguished between how policy was publicly justified and how it actually was and should be made. Convinced of the limits to American power, they deplored the war's adverse consequences for the postwar world.

In *America Goes to War,* Charles Tansill expands upon these themes: a multiplicity of factors had resulted in U.S. involvement in World War I. The more important were pro-British sympathy, anti-German suspicions, and the interests of bankers and exporters. Tansill's thesis was multicausal and ambivalent. There was no conscious purpose behind a policy that sacrificed U.S. neutrality to aid the Entente powers, he argued:

> The real reason why America went to war cannot be found in any single set of circumstances. There was no clear-cut road to war that the President followed with certain steps that knew no hesitation. There were many dim trails of doubtful promise, and one along which he traveled with early misgivings and reluctant tread was that which led to American economic solidarity with the Allies.

Tansill condemned the incompetence of House, Page, and Lansing and their failure to recognize and act upon American interests. Developing more sharply what had been only an implicit theme of other World War I revisionists, Tansill stressed how the ineptness and pro-Entente (hence un-American) loyalties of these policymakers had led to the nation's unfortunate involvement in a European war. And, unlike other World War I revisionists, except Barnes, Tansill did not attribute this failure to the limits to American power and influence.

RIGHT REVISIONISM

Having contended that U.S. involvement in World War I had been the consequence of a series of blundering decisions, Tansill concluded that war could have been avoided if statesmen had been more realistic and nationalistic. This emphasis on error and this multicausal analysis did not, however, constitute Tansill's interpretation of U.S. involvement in World War II. A far more doctrinaire, self-righteous, and conspiratorial tone pervaded his analysis of that subject and that of other Right revisionists.

Right revisionism emerged only in the 1940s. This assessment did not repudiate the themes of World War I revisionism so much as it put forth a sharpened, narrower focus on the role and power of the executive branch. Right revisionism sharply questioned the wisdom of the policies of the Roosevelt administration during 1937–1941 and when seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union during the war. The Soviet Union, the Right revisionists affirmed, was the main beneficiary of World War II. This was not happenstance, but the result of a policy that, by seeking the total defeat of Germany and Japan, had removed these powerful counterweights to the spread of communism. The Right revisionists

also adapted an implicit theme of World War I revisionism: the un-Americanism of policymakers. Making this theme more explicit, they added the charge of subversive influence. Right revisionists might have had little impact on the scholarly community: their writings reflected the conclusions advanced by many conservatives about the Truman administration's policy during the early Cold War years, and provided legitimacy and justification for what became known as McCarthyism.

Whether Tansill's *Back Door to War,* the various contributors to the collection of essays that Barnes edited, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (with the exception of William Neumann), Frederick Sanborn's *Design for War,* George Crocker's *Roosevelt's Road to Russia,* George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor,* John Flynn's *While You Slept,* James Martin's *Revisionist Viewpoints,* Freda Utley's *The China Story,* or Anthony Kubek's *How the Far East Was Lost,* the Right revisionists denied that war with Germany or Japan had been necessary. Emphasizing the flexibility and restraint of Japanese and German diplomats, these authors questioned whether U.S. interests had been compromised by German or Japanese expansion in Europe or the Far East. The Right revisionists further emphasized, and drew sinister conclusions about, how President Roosevelt brought the nation into war. Kubek and Utley extended this indictment to the Truman administration, stressing the McCarthyite themes of "communist influence" and "softness toward communism."

Unlike World War I revisionism, however, Right revisionism reflected no sense of ambiguity or multiple causality. There was one major culprit: Franklin Delano Roosevelt (for some, Harry Truman as well). And when not accusing Roosevelt of opportunism or affinity for leftist views, most Right revisionists emphasized the excessive influence of communist supporters within the Roosevelt administration in formulating policies that led tragically to war and then inevitably to Soviet expansion.

This sharpened criticism runs throughout Right revisionism. The contrast with World War I revisionism is pointedly demonstrated in Tansill's writings. In his description of romantic pro-British sympathies, in *Back Door to War,* Tansill affirms that "The main objective of American foreign policy since 1900 has been the preservation of the British Empire." This theme, however, was dropped from Tansill's later analysis. Condemning U.S. involvement in war with the Axis powers, Tansill extolled the correctness of Japanese and German fears of communism. This realism, Tansill lamented, was not shared by President Roosevelt and his advisers: "It was apparent to Japan that Russia had long-range plans to communize China and thus eventually to control a large portion of eastern Asia. The very nature of international communism made it impossible to have stable relations with Russia, so Japan again turned to the United States in May 1934 in the hope of erecting a common front against the foes of capitalism." Opposed to the concentration of power in the executive branch and to the social reform policies of the Roosevelt New Deal, Tansill saw in the foreign policy of that administration the logical extension of its domestic principles to the international arena.

Tansill's analysis centered on two themes. First, he emphasized the sinister character of the president's deceitful conduct of diplomacy, whether during the prewar period of 1939–1941 or during the war years. No longer content to characterize presidential diplomacy as duplicitous, the Right revisionists denied that policies were based on popular support and emphasized the intentionally secret and unilateral process by which decisions were made.

The second theme of Right revisionism was that U.S. involvement in World War II and the secretive, unilateral conduct of foreign policy were so inimical to the national interest (having made possible Soviet expansion and the Cold War) that this could not have been the result either of mistaken judgment or of emotionalism. Rather, the Right revisionists maintained, this policy could best be understood as the result of subversion and treason. Anthony Kubek extended this theme to an extreme form: "The utter consistency of our policy in serving Soviet ends leaves no conclusion other than that pro-Communist elements in our government and press 'planned it that way.' But top American officials who sought to buy Soviet cooperation at any price must bear the final responsibility." Condemning the continued respectability of this "internationalist" and "accommodationist" thinking, Kubek concludes in *How the Far East Was Lost*: "We face . . . a criminal conspiracy and it must be dealt with as such. . . . The Communist conspiracy has been succeeding largely on the basis of our mistakes and of the ability of their agents to procure such mistakes on our part. . . . It should be clearly evident that the Communists cannot gain the world unless our government helps them to do it."

LEFT REVISIONISM

Convinced of the correctness of their interpretation of the two world wars and their lessons for current policy, the Right revisionists' analysis was based on a belief in American omnipotence. This led them to question why particular men pursued policies that undermined the national interest. Right revisionism, then, questioned why American power and interests did not dominate the postwar world. Left revisionists rejected this perspective. To them the central failings of U.S. diplomacy derived from the attempt to impose American interests and values on the world, and the inability to recognize that this quest was impossible and counterproductive. In striking contrast to the focus of Right revisionism on policymakers and criticism of their policies, eventually moving from emphasizing error to emphasizing treason, Left revisionists adopted a less personalist perspective.

William Appleman Williams Influenced by the pre-1940s writings of Charles Beard, William Appleman Williams concentrated on the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy. For him an understanding of policymaking required research not solely into diplomatic correspondence and international crises but also into the perceptions and priorities of policymakers. Far more sophisticated than Beard, Williams located the answer to why policymakers led the nation to war not in a conflict between Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism, and surely not in the emotionalism and duplicity of policymakers or their divided loyalties. Rather, he explained U.S. foreign policy in terms of the worldview of policymakers. For Williams the central question was not why the United States became involved in foreign wars but why it pursued a policy of overseas expansionism.

There are two central themes to Williams's analysis. Assuming an elite model of American decision making, Williams stressed how elites (based on the structure of the economy and the political system) made policy independent of popular support or involvement. Thus, in *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* he writes:

> One of the most unnerving features was the extensive elitism that had become ingrained in the policy-making process. The assault on Cuba was conceived, planned, and implemented by a small group of men in the executive department [who] opened no general dialogue with members of Congress (even in private conversation), and expended great effort and exerted great pressure to avoid any public disclosure or debate.

In describing the process of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, Williams emphasizes "the elite's self-isolation . . . arrogance and self-righteousness, and . . . messianic distortion of a sincere humanitarian desire to help other peoples. Even the American public came more and more to be considered as simply another factor to be manipulated and controlled in the effort to establish and maintain the American Way as the global status quo."

More central to Williams's analysis than this description of elite manipulation and determination of policy are his conclusions about the ideological basis for U.S. policy. Williams depicted policymakers as at times naive and at times misguided, questioned whether the United States need have entered the two world wars and the Cold War, and stressed elite manipulation of public opinion. His basic premise, however, was not that different men or more open procedures could have averted war. The sources of policymaking instead were established values and priorities, and not, as Barnes and the Right revisionists argued, the insidious influence of propaganda and manipulative leaders. Williams did not portray Wilson, Page, House, Roosevelt, or Alger Hiss as evil and shortsighted, traitors to the public in whose interests they acted. Williams conceded that the decisions of policy elites commanded popular acceptance or acquiescence. While critical of the consequences of their decisions, he offered not moralistic condemnation but reasoned analysis in explaining the "tragedy of American diplomacy." The exploitative results of U.S. foreign policy were not, Williams argued, the "result of malice, indifference, or ruthless and predatory exploitation. American leaders were not evil men. . . . Nor were they treacherous hypocrites. They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed."

Williams also denied that abstract idealism determined specific policy responses so much as did the changing character of the American economy and the beliefs thus engendered. Since the 1820s, he wrote, "Americans steadily deepened their commitment to the idea that democracy was inextricably connected with individualism, private property, and a capitalist marketplace economy. Even the great majority of critics sought to reform existing society precisely in order to realize that conception of the good system." This particular view of the national interest, and the

rejection of alternative models for organizing society, constituted the tragedy of American diplomacy. For Williams, there were no identifiable devils or correctable errors. History was too complex for such explanations. The dilemma was deeper, and stemmed partially from the American rejection of Marxism.

Commenting in *The Great Evasion,* Williams writes:

> We have never confronted his [Marx's] central thesis about the assumptions, the costs, and the nature of capitalist society. We have never confronted his central insight that capitalism is predicated upon an over emphasis and exaltation of the individualistic, egoistic half of man functioning in a marketplace system that overrides and crushes the social, humanitarian half of man. . . . And we have never confronted his argument that capitalism cannot create a community in which how men produce and own is less important than their relationships as they produce and distribute those products, less important than what they are as men, and less important than how they treat each other.

American foreign policy was the product of the definition of the national interest and the unquestioned beliefs held by policymakers, and not the actions of particular men. The combination of economic interest and the conviction of American omnipotence and omniscience led inevitably, and tragically, to a policy of overseas expansionism. Williams defined this policy as the Open Door. By the twentieth century, Williams argues in *Tragedy of American Diplomacy,* American foreign policy had come to be based on the "firm conviction, even dogmatic belief, that America's *domestic* well-being depends upon such sustained, ever-increasing overseas economic expansion. Here is a convergence of economic practice with intellectual analysis and emotional involvement that creates a very powerful and dangerous propensity to define the essentials of American welfare in terms of activities outside the United States."

Williams's radical analyses profoundly influenced a number of young historians, some of whom studied under him at the University of Wisconsin and others who were stimulated by his books, articles, and essays—notably *Tragedy of American Diplomacy, The Great Evasion,* and *Contours of American History.* Independent scholars, these Left revisionists have at times adopted part of Williams's complex analysis, at times have refined it, and at times have extended it to the point of fundamental departure from his conclusions. And, whereas Williams was synthetic, his scope broad, and the form of his writing essayist, these young scholars have written heavily documented monographs on narrowly defined subjects.

The principal focus of Left revisionism has been the Cold War, although Williams's influence is reflected in the studies of Walter LaFeber on U.S. expansionism during the 1890s, *The New Empire*; of Thomas McCormick on U.S. China policy, *China Market*; of David Green on U.S. policy toward Latin America, *The Containment of Latin America*; and of N. Gordon Levin on Wilson's wartime diplomacy, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics.* (Since the basic analysis of these volumes does not differ from that of Cold War revisionism, this essay will concentrate exclusively on these studies.)

Not all Cold War revisionists have written within Williams's framework or were influenced by him; those who did so differed widely in their emphases and conclusions. While all dissented from the orthodox interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, some Left revisionists emphasized only the elitist nature of U.S. policy formation; others, the ideology of policymakers; others, the economic basis of particular policy decisions; and still others combined these themes. These differences are fundamental and range from rather limited critiques of particular men to a more radical characterization of U.S. policy as imperialistic and counterrevolutionary.

The most important Left revisionist writings include Lloyd Gardner's *Architects of Illusion,* Barton Bernstein's "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," Walter LaFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War,* Gabriel Kolko's *Politics of War,* Richard Barnet's *Roots of War,* Thomas Paterson's *Soviet-American Confrontation,* David Horowitz's *Empire and Revolution,* Bruce Kuklick's *American Policy and the Division of Germany,* Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy,* Harry Magdoff's *Age of Imperialism,* Ronald Steel's *Pax Americana,* Stephen Ambrose's *Rise to Globalism,* Richard Freeland's *Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism,* Athan Theoharis's *Seeds of Repression,* Diane Shaver Clemens's *Yalta,* Lawrence Wittner's *Cold War America,* and D. F. Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins.*

Left revisionists have extended this analysis beyond the issue of the origins of the U.S.–Soviet conflict in Europe and have begun to examine the international dimensions of the Cold War. These

historians—most notably Thomas Paterson in *On Every Front,* Thomas McCormick in *America's Half Century,* and Robert McMahon in *Colonialism and Cold War*—have shifted from exploring the origins of the containment policy in Europe and have instead placed the U.S.–Soviet conflict in the context of the international economic system and the rise of anticolonial movements in the post–World War II era.

In their dissent from orthodox historiography, the Left revisionists deny that the Cold War resulted simply from Soviet territorial expansionism or the objectives of international communism to which the United States responded defensively in order to preserve freedom and democracy. Stressing the caution and conservatism of Soviet policy, the Left revisionists locate the origins of the Cold War in U.S. foreign policies. As Barton Bernstein writes in "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*:

> American policy was neither so innocent nor so nonideological. . . . American leaders sought to promote their conceptions of national interest and their values even at the conscious risk of provoking Russia's fears about her security. . . . By overextending policy and power and refusing to accept Soviet interests, American policy-makers contributed to the Cold War. . . . There is evidence that Russian policies were reasonably cautious and conservative, and that there was at least a basis for accommodation.

Left revisionist conceptions of the origins of the Cold War, however, mask important fundamental differences. The Left revisionists can be divided into two groups: radicals and Left liberals, the principal dividing line being that the radicals analyze American policy within a framework of imperialism and elite or class domination, while the Left liberals minimize power and ideology, and emphasize domestic politics, personality, and bureaucracy. According to this division, Fleming, Clemens, Steel, Theoharis, and Ambrose can be classified as Left liberals, and Kolko, Gardner, Bernstein, Paterson, Horowitz, LaFeber, Magdoff, Alperovitz, Freeland, Barnet, Wittner, and Kuklick as radicals. As with all definitions, this one sharpens differences, particularly in the distinction between elite domination and bureaucracy.

In addition to these broad divisions, the Left revisionists differ in their conclusions about two important questions. First, was the Cold War inevitable because the requirements of capitalism forced American leaders to pursue a consciously imperialistic foreign policy? This theme is developed by Gabriel Kolko in *Roots of American Foreign Policy*:

> The dominant interest of the United States is in world economic stability, and anything that undermines that condition presents a danger to its present hegemony. . . . From a purely economic viewpoint, the United States cannot maintain its existing vital dominating relationship to much of the Third World unless it can keep the poor nations from moving too far toward the Left. . . . A widespread leftward movement would critically affect its supply of raw materials and have profound long-term repercussions.

Only Kolko, Magdoff, and Horowitz among the radical revisionists hold to such a mechanistic view of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, other radicals emphasize tactics and perception (the quote from Bernstein cited above portrays this view).

Left revisionists also differ over whether U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union shifted fundamentally with Harry S. Truman's accession to the presidency in April 1945, a thesis advanced by Alperovitz, Clemens, Fleming, Wittner, Theoharis, and Ambrose, and accepted with major qualifications by Bernstein, Paterson, Kuklick, and Gardner (the latter group stressing that the change was more one of tactics than of objectives or priorities).

In addition, radical and Left liberal revisionists (LaFeber, Gardner, Bernstein, Paterson, Wittner, Kuklick, Steel, Theoharis, and Ambrose) concur that American policymakers brought on the Cold War, not because they were innocent or seeking to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union but because they believed in American omnipotence and omniscience. In *Soviet-American Confrontation,* Paterson concludes: "Convinced that their interpretations of international agreements were alone the correct ones, . . . United States officials attempted to fulfill their goals through the unilateral application of the power they knew they possessed." Gardner and Bernstein slightly modify this thesis of omnipotence, averring that policymakers fell victim to mythical and illusory views of U.S. power and principle in the pursuit of what was a counterrevolutionary foreign policy. In *Architects of Illusion,* Gardner develops this theme: "Only the United States had the power [at the conclusion of World War II] to enforce its decisions world-wide, . . . American policy-makers [subsequently] developed a series of rationales, expedients, and explanations which grew into the myths and illusions

of the Cold War. And men were later beguiled by their own creations."

Like Williams, the Left revisionists question whether public opinion constrained policymakers. To the contrary, they contend, officials of the Truman administration consciously sought to alter public opinion in order to ensure popular support for costly and controversial policy initiatives. Moving beyond Williams, they argue that this effort to alter public opinion created the climate that resulted in McCarthyism. This theme is developed by Theoharis and Freeland, though these historians' conclusions differ. Freeland contends that the Truman administration consciously pursued McCarthyite politics in an effort to develop support for a multilateral foreign policy, while Theoharis depicts the administration as reacting to partisan pressures and exigencies, as lacking a conscious and coherent strategy, and as sincerely if obsessively anticommunist.

Left revisionists have raised important questions about the nature of the decision-making process, the relationship between wealth and policy, the class and interest backgrounds of policymakers, and the process by which values and official policy are formed. Unlike Right revisionists, who simply chronicled executive branch manipulation of the public and suggested that certain policy decisions were harmful in their consequences, Left revisionists have moved beyond mere description of error and propaganda. Left and Right revisionism are distinctive, then, not simply because of differences in political philosophy and conclusions. The basic difference stems from the character of Left revisionism as intellectual and radical history (in the literal sense of seeking root causes).

VIETNAM AND NATIONAL SECURITY REVISIONISM

The emergence of Left revisionism during the 1960s coincided with a contentious public debate over U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The Left revisionist challenge to the core assumptions of the containment policy raised the question of whether the United States should continue a policy of supporting any and all anticommunist governments. As dissent over the Johnson and Nixon administrations' policies expanded beyond radical activists to the mainstream media and the halls of Congress, both administrations found it difficult to sustain support for the war. A further by-product of the resultant unraveling of the Cold War consensus was a heightened skepticism about the role of the presidency and the secretive conduct of national security policy. Tapping into this skepticism, Daniel Ellsberg, a former Defense Department and National Security Council aide, in 1971 leaked the classified Defense Department history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the so-called Pentagon Papers. Then, in 1973–1975, congressional investigations first of the Watergate scandal and then of the covert practices of federal intelligence agencies breached the wall of secrecy that had previously shrouded how national security policy was conducted, with the attendant result of the release of highly classified records of the White House and the intelligence agencies. One legacy of these companion developments was Vietnam and national security revisionism.

Vietnam Revisionism Historians would have researched the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam—the nation's longest war and only military defeat—if the earlier availability of relevant primary sources had expedited such research. A consensus quickly emerged, captured first in Stephen Ambroses's synthetic history of the Cold War era, *Rise to Globalism,* and later in the more thorough syntheses of George Herring, *America's Longest War,* James Olson and Randy Roberts, *Where the Domino Fell,* and George Moss, *Vietnam: An American Ordeal.*

The Herring, Olson and Roberts, and Moss surveys convey the consensus interpretations of the Vietnam War, placing that conflict in a broader context of anticolonial guerrilla movements and emphasizing the limits to American power and the containment policy. This critical assessment of the U.S. military role precipitated a Vietnam revisionism that reaffirmed the major tenets of Cold War orthodoxy while incorporating some of the core assumptions of Right revisionism (of mendacity, irresolution, erroneous judgment, and conspiratorial influence).

Two such revisionists, Harry Summers and Philip van Slyck, dissent from the consensus on the Vietnam War. Both deny that U.S. involvement was unwise and unnecessary, or the misapplication of military power to a guerrilla war. The U.S. defeat, they argue, was the product of a failure of will by the nation's presidents and the general public. Eschewing a conspiratorial analysis, they attribute this failure to achieve an attainable victory to skewed national priorities (a focus on domestic issues to the neglect of national security

interests), to a failure to respond rationally to an underlying Soviet threat, and to profound changes in the popular culture (the so-called counterculture) and the rise in influence of narrow special interest groups. Summers wrote in *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, the Vietnam defeat was the by-product of President Lyndon Johnson's "conscious decisions" not "to mobilize the American people—to invoke the National will"—and to the "social upheaval in America where the old rules and regulations were dismissed as irrelevant and history no longer had anything to offer . . . the 'Age of Aquarius.'"

Van Slyck echoes this analysis, condemning the "errors of judgment" of five presidents (from Dwight Eisenhower to Jimmy Carter) to lobby for needed increases in military spending and the commitments essential to checking the Soviet threat and averting the "ill-starred, mismanaged, and ultimately humiliating national ordeal in Vietnam." Lamenting the rise of "single-issue political causes" (the civil rights and youth movements of the 1960s), which he claims "displayed uncertainties of purpose and conflicting social and economic priorities," he concludes that "in this increasingly antiwar climate, the preoccupation with domestic affairs insured that expenditures for national security would be assigned a declining priority through the decade of the 1970s" (*Strategies for the 1980s: Lessons of Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan*). Michael Lind extends this analysis of the wisdom of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in *Vietnam, the Necessary War* (1999). In contrast, Martin Herz in *The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, 1972* criticizes the reporting and commentary of the "prestige press" (mainstream newspapers such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*) as contributing to the "weakening and demoralization of the United States and South Vietnam" that led ultimately to the North Vietnamese victory in 1975.

Norman Podhoretz and Guenter Lewy expand upon this indictment, in language more vituperative and condescending. In *Why We Were in Vietnam*, Podhoretz defends the purpose and morality of U.S. efforts to ensure a noncommunist government in South Vietnam. Like Summers, Lind, and Van Slyck, he attributes the ultimate military defeat to a failure of will, to the limited uses of U.S. military power by presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and to misguided military tactics and strategies. Adopting the conspiratorial framework of Right revisionism, Podhoretz condemns the insidious role of antiwar activists within the academic, journalist, and liberal communities whom he derides as "apologists for the Communist side in the Vietnam War." Because Susan Sontag, Mary McCarthy, and Frances Fitzgerald were "very good writers," Podhoretz laments, "they were able to state the Communist case in a style acceptable to an audience that would normally be put off . . . by the crude propagandistic rhetoric of the hard-core inveterate pro-Communist elements." In his concluding assessment of the consequences of the North Vietnamese victory of 1975, Podhoretz argues:

> The truth is that the antiwar movement bears a certain measure of responsibility for the horrors that have overtaken the people of Vietnam; and so long as those who participated in that movement are unwilling to acknowledge this, they will go on trying to discredit the idea that there is not distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. For to recognize the distinction is to recognize that in making a contribution to the conquest of South Vietnam by the Communists of the North they were siding with an evil system against something better from every political and moral point of view.

Guenter Lewy echoes Podhoretz. Writing with Harry Barnes's dogmatism, in the preface to his *America in Vietnam* (1978), Lewy describes his purpose as to "clear away the cobwebs of mythology that inhibit the correct understanding of what went on—and what went wrong in Vietnam" and to critique the "ideological fervor which has characterized much writing on the Vietnam War." Like Podhoretz, Lewy defends the purpose and morality of U.S. involvement, emphasizes the wisdom and necessity of a policy to contain the spread of communism, and condemns the bias of the media and the "growing permissiveness in American society . . . and widespread attitudes of disrespect toward authority and law enforcement." Lewy extends this indictment in *The Cause That Failed: Communism in American Political Life*, impugning the loyalty of anti–Vietnam War critics in the peace movement, the civil liberties community, and in the universities, and the "Leftward drift of the American political spectrum." He charges that

> Today a host of organizations, not formally linked to the Communist Party and in many cases defying the categories of Old and New Left, carry on an energetic agitation for a radical transformation of American society, push for drastic cuts in the American defense budget, if not for unilateral disarmament, and lobby for Communist guerrillas and regimes. The political outlook

> of these groups provides Communists with a perfect cover and allows them to ply their trade with little need to seize actual control. . . . Such alliances provide the Communist Party with valuable political legitimacy and respectability.

National Security Revisionism The public debate over the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair (and the resultant opening of formerly classified records of the federal intelligence agencies) also spawned a more critical assessment of the role of the presidency and federal intelligence agencies, and how bureaucracy and secrecy adversely influenced national security policy. This new historiography was previewed in Arthur Schlesinger's quasi-critical history of the U.S. presidency, *The Imperial Presidency.* Reassessing his own earlier endorsement of the "presidential mystique," Schlesinger chronicled how "Especially in the twentieth century, the circumstances of an increasingly perilous world as well as of an increasingly dependent economy and society served to compel a larger concentration of authority in the Presidency." Surveying how presidential power expanded (including by relying on secrecy and bypassing the Congress), Schlesinger nonetheless concludes that the abuses of power of the "imperial presidency" were peculiar to the Nixon presidency.

Published in 1973, at the time of the special Senate investigation of the Watergate scandal, Schlesinger's history of the Nixon administration's uses of the federal intelligence agencies (Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation) for political purposes was soon challenged as the result of subsequent revelations that presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt had similarly exploited these agencies—publicized in the hearings and reports of the Church and Pike Committees of 1975–1976 and in federal intelligence agency records released in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. These revelations confirmed how "national security" priorities and secrecy claims had altered executive-legislative relations, and how presidents and intelligence agency officials had exploited secrecy to violate the law, privacy rights, and First Amendment rights. These themes were developed in a number of studies, notably Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance;* Morton Halperin et al., *The Lawless State;* Edward Pessen, *Losing Our Souls;* Jessica Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety;* John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars;* and Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans.*

Although differing in their interpretations, these authors share a common framework—emphasizing that the more centralized and secretive decision-making process by which national security policy was conducted, undermined civil liberties and democratic principles. In *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan,* Theoharis summarizes these themes in his conclusion:

> [The] Cold War encouraged a strong elite-dominated government with authority to make decisions and the gradual acceptance of the need for secrecy and uncritical deference to so-called national security claims. . . . The steady rise in influence of the FBI, NSC, the CIA and the White House staff to dominant policy-making roles and the displacement of the State and Justice departments and the Cabinet—served to reduce the congressional oversight role. By the 1970s, therefore, the intelligence bureaucrats . . . had become independent powers, effectively establishing national policy, even at times independent of the occupant of the Oval Office.

These themes of the undermining of congressional oversight and of privacy and First Amendment rights were central to the new historiography that focused on the impact of the Cold War on American institutions and decision making. Reflecting the differing assessments of presidential power that distinguished Schlesinger from these other historians, in *Secrecy: The American Experience,* Daniel Patrick Moynihan surveys the history of the "institutions of the administrative state that developed during the great conflicts of the twentieth century." Moynihan criticizes overclassification as undermining democracy and immunizing decisions from needed scrutiny, and calls for the replacement of this new "culture of secrecy" by a "culture of openness," but at the same time recognizes that secrecy "is at times legitimate and necessary." In contrast, the various contributors to Athan Theoharis's *A Culture of Secrecy* deny that the legacy of international conflict was simply unnecessary overclassification and emphasize the purposefulness of secrecy in ensuring controversial, at times illegal, programs and procedures.

These differences over the purpose and consequences of secrecy are replicated in the writings of other historians on the evolution of the "national security state." In a study that transcends the debate among revisionist and orthodox historians on the origins of the Cold War, Melvyn Leffler in *A Preponderance of Power* emphasizes

how the "Cold War shaped our political culture, our institutions, and our national priorities; and how American officials, commanding a "preponderance of power," were emboldened to "refashion the world in America's image and create the American century." Leffler nonetheless concludes that the resultant exclusively executive decisions were neither aggressive nor mistaken, but "quite prescient," were reflective of a "sophisticated strategy," and "manifested sagacity, security, and wisdom" of "prudent officials" willing to take "calculated risks." Leffler had, however, introduced a distinctive theme—that executive decisions reflected the increased influence of bureaucrats whose expertise in formulating policy in secret ushered in the "national security state."

Michael Hogan in *A Cross of Iron* and Benjamin Fordham in *Building the Cold War Consensus* explicitly develop this theme of the "national security state." Surveying the congressional debate over Cold War policies, Hogan focuses on how during this era a "new class of national security managers" eventually triumphed over progressives and conservatives who feared that "bad policies could put the United States on the slippery slope to a garrison state dominated by military leaders and devoted to military purposes"—a debate between those who cast Cold War containment policies "in a new ideology of national security and those who adhered to values rooted in an older political culture." The national security ideology, Hogan argues, was shaped by the experiences of national security managers during World War II and the Cold War who came to see "the world and America's place within it. It laid the groundwork for a more international foreign policy and for a supportive program of state making, both of which challenged such traditions as isolationism and antistatism." Hogan concludes by emphasizing the "role of war and Cold War as agents of state formation" that in the process enabled bureaucrats "toward independent action and autonomy."

In contrast, Benjamin Fordham in *Building the Cold War Consensus* focuses on the intersection of domestic policy (and politics) and national security policy. Exploring the debate between "internationalists" and "nationalists" over the nature and costs of the nation's foreign policy role, Fordham locates national security decisions not as based on abstract conceptions of the national interest nor as responses to international crises, but as shaped by the "structure of the domestic political economy" and the ability of bureaucrats to "influence policy to the extent they can draw political support from interested groups in society."

CONCLUSION

The revisionists have had varying impacts on how historians understand the conduct of American foreign relations in the twentieth century and on the contemporary debate over the nation's role in the world. The World War I revisionists, for example, helped create a climate that moved many in Congress and the public to support the Neutrality Acts of 1935–1937 and that impelled President Roosevelt to move cautiously during the period 1939–1941 when seeking to reorient U.S. foreign policy. The Right revisionists provided the intellectual foundation for the McCarthyite charges of the early 1950s: the need to purge subversives from the federal bureaucracy, to repudiate the Yalta Conference agreements, and to restrict presidential foreign policy authority. Sharing this framework, Vietnam revisionists provided the intellectual rationale for the Committee on the Present Danger and the Reagan administration's military and foreign policy decisions of the 1980s—whether missile defense or aid to the contras in Nicaragua. In contrast, Left revisionists influenced the debate over the Vietnam War and the containment policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the national security revisionists have both tapped into and influenced the post-1975 debate over presidential power, the role of the intelligence agencies, and secrecy policy.

The long-term impact of revisionism on the public's understanding of American foreign relations, nonetheless, has been transitory, determined by the public's changing mood and priorities. The impact of revisionists on the scholarly community has been equally transitory, depending more on the quality of their scholarship than on the questions they have posed and the insights they have offered. Their most significant contribution has been to introduce new research issues and to lend support for the release of classified reports.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnes, Harry Elmer. *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt*. New York, 1926. The most influential

revisionist book written during the 1920s; most of the themes of later revisionism are suggested here.

Barnes, Harry Elmer, ed. *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath.* Caldwell, Idaho, 1953. A collection of essays reflecting the various themes of Right revisionists, this is based on minimal research into primary sources; most of the essays were written by nonhistorians.

Beard, Charles A. *The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest.* New York, 1934. An extremely heavy review of American diplomacy since the founding of the Republic and an important influence on Left revisionism, notably William A. Williams.

———. *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities.* Hamden, Conn., 1948. Beard's controversial study of the background to Pearl Harbor, based principally on the hearings and reports of the congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor in 1945.

Bernstein, Barton J. "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War." In Barton J. Bernstein, ed. *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration.* Chicago, 1970. An important, subtle, and sophisticated radical Left revisionist analysis of the origins of the Cold War.

Borchard, Edwin, and William Potter Lage. *Neutrality for the United States.* New Haven, Conn., 1937. The most sophisticated and balanced of the revisionist studies published during the 1930s.

Brune, Lester, and Richard Dean Burns. *America and the Indochina Wars, 1945–1990.* Claremont, Calif., 1992.

Cohen, Warren I. *The American Revisionist: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I.* Chicago, 1967. A thoughtful, often insightful study of the more important revisionist writing about U.S. involvement in both world wars.

Doenecke, Justus D. *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930–1972.* Colorado Springs, 1972. A useful annotated bibliography of the various articles, essays, books, and dissertations on the general theme of revisionism.

Engelbrecht, H. C., and F. C. Hanighen. *Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry.* New York, 1934. A popular book that provides impetus and a rationale for the so-called Nye Committee investigation of the munitions industry.

Fordham, Benjamin. *Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949–1951.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1998.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949.* Chicago, 1970. A series of portraits of the important foreign policymakers of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, written from a radical Left revisionist perspective.

Herz, Martin. *The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, 1972.* Washington, D.C., 1980.

Hogan, Michael. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954.* Cambridge and New York, 1998.

Hogan, Michael, ed. *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941.* Cambridge and New York, 1995.

Kirkendall, Richard S., ed. *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972.* Columbia, Mo., 1974. A balanced study of the literature on the Truman period that contains counterbalancing essays on domestic and foreign policy written by revisionists and nonrevisionists; an excellent source on the more important studies and on research collections.

Kolko, Gabriel. *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy.* New York, 1968.

Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko. *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954.* New York, 1972. An ambitious, heavily written and researched radical Left revisionist study of the diplomacy of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations that depicts American policy as counterrevolutionary and imperialistic.

Kubek, Anthony. *How the Far East Was Lost.* Chicago, 1963.

Leffler, Melvyn. *A Preponderance of Power.* Stanford, Calif., 1992.

Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam.* New York, 1978.

———. *The Cause That Failed: Communism in American Political Life.* New York, 1990.

Lind, Michael. *Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict.* New York, 1999.

Millis, Walter. *Road to War: America, 1914–1917.* Boston, 1935.

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. *Secrecy: The American Experience.* New Haven, Conn., 1998.

Olson, James S., ed. *The Vietnam War: Handbook of the Literature and Research.* Westport, Conn., 1993.

Paterson, Thomas G. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* Baltimore, 1973. An important Left revisionist study of the Cold War that reflects the evolution of Cold War revisionism away from the earlier, more exclusively economic analyses of Kolko and Williams.

Paterson, Thomas G., and Robert J. McMahon, eds. *The Origins of the Cold War.* 4th ed. Boston, 1999. Reprints excerpts and offers insightful commentary on the historiographical debate over the origins of the Cold War and the changes in Left revisionism; there is, however, no critical assessment to date on national security revisionism.

Peterson, H. C. *Propaganda for War.* Norman, Okla., 1939.

Podhoretz, Norman. *Why We Were in Vietnam.* New York, 1978.

Schlesinger, Arthur. *The Imperial Presidency.* Boston, 1973.

Siracusa, Joseph. *The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam.* New York, 1999.

Sorley, Lewis. *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam.* New York, 1999.

Summers, Harry. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.* Novato, Calif., 1982.

Tansill, Charles Callan. *America Goes to War.* Boston, 1938.

———. *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941.* Chicago, 1952. Relatively distinctive studies of the origins of the world wars, valuable principally because they reflect the changed focus and themes of Right revisionism.

Theoharis, Athan. *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan.* Philadelphia, 1978.

Theoharis, Athan, ed. *A Culture of Secrecy.* Lawrence, Kans., 1998.

Tucker, Robert W. *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* Baltimore, 1971. A thoughtful critique of Left revisionist writings on the Cold War, principally focusing on the theories, not the research, of the revisionists.

Van Slyck, Philip. *Strategies for the 1980s: Lessons of Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.* Westport, Conn., 1981.

Wang, Jessica. *American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Great Evasion.* Chicago, 1964.

———. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Rev. ed. New York, 1972. One of the most important books written about American diplomacy, this covers the period since the founding of the Republic and has shaped the thinking and research of the Left revisionist historians.

See also COLD WAR ORIGINS; ELITISM; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PUBLIC OPINION; REALISM AND IDEALISM; THE VIETNAM WAR.

REVOLUTION

Jeremi Suri

Many observers have noted the surprising resilience of certain ideas in American history. "Liberty," the belief that individuals should live free from most external restraints, is one particularly powerful American touchstone. "Enterprise," the virtue of hard work, business acumen, and wealth accumulation, is another. The belief that all people should share these ideas has prohibited Americans from ever accepting the world as it is. The assumption that individuals will, when capable, choose these "self-evident" propositions has made the nation a force for revolution. America's foreign policy has consistently sought to remake the external landscape in its own image.

As early as the eighteenth century, New World influences helped inspire revolutionary upheavals throughout the old empires of Europe. This pattern continued in the nineteenth century as thinkers from diverse cultures studied the American Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution to guide modern state building. During the first half of the twentieth century, American soldiers fought to undermine authoritarian regimes and revolutionize the workings of the international system. By the end of the twentieth century, American cinema, music, and fashion challenged traditional values in all corners of the globe.

Self-confidence and ignorance of the wider world fed the nation's revolutionary aspirations. These qualities also made Americans intolerant of the diversity of revolutionary experience. The imagery of the thirteen colonies' fight for independence from British rule in the late eighteenth century provided a template for acceptable foreign revolutions that became more rigid over time. The whole world had to follow the American revolutionary path. Heretical movements required repression because they offered destructive deviations from the highway of historical change.

Enthusiasm for revolution, in this sense, produced many counterrevolutionary policies. These were directed against alternative models, especially communism, that violated American definitions of "liberty" and "enterprise." In the second half of the twentieth century this paradox became most evident as the United States employed revolutionary concepts like "development" and "democratization" to restrain radical change in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. "Globalization" came to reflect the dominance of the American revolutionary model, and the repression of different approaches. Paraphrasing French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, America has forced much of the world to be free, but only on American terms.

A DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION BEFORE THE BREAK WITH BRITAIN

Decades before Americans contemplated a break with the British Empire, influential figures planned to promote a revolution beyond the boundaries of the original thirteen colonies. French, Spanish, Russian, British, and Indian groups uneasily interacted with one another in what eighteenth-century observers called the "western territories," then comprising more than two-thirds of what would later be the U.S. mainland. French and Indian encroachments on British settlements, in particular, threatened to encircle the residents of the colonies, imperiling their security and economy. Assembling in Albany, New York, between 19 June and 10 July 1754, representatives from seven of the colonies (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York) responded to these circumstances. They outlined an agenda for the future political unity and diplomatic expansion of American society. Although never officially implemented, the so-called Albany Plan created the foundation for a future revolution on the North American continent and abroad.

Benjamin Franklin, the charismatic Pennsylvania entrepreneur and politician, drafted much of the Albany Plan. He began with a call for unity among the colonies, under the leadership of a president general. This figure would work with a grand council of colonial representatives to "make peace or declare war with the Indian Nations." Beyond issues of territorial defense, the president general would also purchase lands for new settlements outside of the original colonies. On the expanding American frontier, the president general would "make laws" regulating commerce and society. Franklin and the other contributors to the Albany Plan devoted little attention to the interests of the Indians or the French. This was a scheme designed to make the residents of the "western territories" live by American (and British) laws. Trade would be organized according to American customs of contract. Settled farming and industry would replace the migratory livelihoods of many indigenous communities. Most significantly, land would be apportioned as personal property, demarcated, and defended with government force.

The historian Richard White has shown that before the second half of the eighteenth century, the various groups encountering one another in the western territories engaged in a series of careful compromises. European traders negotiated with Indian communities as mutual dependents. They exchanged gifts, accommodated their different interests, and intermixed culturally. White has called this the "middle ground" that naturally existed where diverse peoples, each with expansionist aims, came together.

The Albany Plan was one of the first instances when Americans acted self-consciously to convert the middle ground into clearly American ground. Benjamin Franklin and his successors would not tolerate the uncertainty that came through constant compromise with diverse interests. They rejected a strategy of balance among various groups. The Albany Plan sought to remake the frontier in America's image. It marked a revolutionary application of liberty and enterprise beyond America's then-limited boundaries.

Franklin's 1754 proposals set a precedent for the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and subsequent policies that unified the territories later comprising the United States as a single economic market, under a single set of "civilized" laws. Liberty and enterprise became the touchstones for legitimate authority in lands previously occupied by peoples with different traditions of political organization. Americans had clear economic and security interests in the West, but they also felt a sense of racial and cultural superiority that was exemplified in Franklin's references to "savages" on the frontier. In the next century these assumptions would find expression in an asserted American manifest destiny to revolutionize the "backward" hinterlands.

American policy after 1754 emphasized westward expansion and the export of revolution. This translated into explicit territorial occupation, forced population removals, and the extension of a single nation. Before independence these ideas were recognizable. They became most evident, in North America and across the Atlantic Ocean, at the dawn of the nineteenth century. American support for revolutionary activities would soon extend far beyond the nation's western frontier.

INDEPENDENCE AND REVOLUTION ABROAD

In the months following the first clashes between American and British forces at Lexington and Concord, the nascent United States made two surprising efforts to convert its struggle into a broader international movement. On 28 July 1775 the Continental Congress, representing the colonies in rebellion, addressed "the people of Ireland," similarly subjects of British imperial rule. According to the Americans, King George III's ministers had converted the citizens of colonial lands "from freemen into slaves, from subjects into vassals, and from friends into enemies." Members of the Continental Congress asserted that they shared a "common enemy" with the Irish population. They expected a "friendly disposition" between the two peoples, and a similar struggle for freedom: "God grant that the iniquitous schemes of extirpating liberty from the British Empire may soon be defeated."

This call for international revolution was much more than idle rhetoric. As they struggled to raise the forces necessary to challenge the British military on the eastern seaboard, American soldiers attempted to carry their revolution beyond their borders. On 4 September 1775 an army of two thousand men invaded British-controlled Canada. In the middle of November, they occupied Montreal. The Americans did not rape and pillage the Canadian population but instead created a "virtuous" government that would allow the people to elect their leaders ("liberty") and

protect their commerce ("enterprise"). Many residents of Montreal and other surrounding areas welcomed this imposed revolution.

American expansionism in 1775 reflected naive but serious enthusiasm for radical international change. Despite their relative weakness in relation to the British Empire, the former colonists felt that their revolution marked a turning point in world history. They believed that their cause would inspire men and women in Canada, Ireland, and other areas. Encouraging radical change abroad was not altruistic, but necessary for what the Continental Congress called the "golden period, when liberty, with all the gentle arts of peace and humanity, shall establish her mild dominion in this western world." The historian Joyce Appleby has demonstrated that even skeptics of political idealism like John Adams were "profoundly influenced by their belief in the unity of human experience and the general application of universal truths."

REVOLUTIONARY REALISM

The failure of the Irish population to rise in response to foreign overtures, and the rapid British success in recapturing the invaded areas of Canada, forced American leaders to rethink their tactics for securing independence. Men like Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson continued to believe that their cause was international in scope. They also understood that revolutionary ends called for pragmatic means. This required revolutionary realism: a willingness to make compromises and exhibit patience without corrupting ideals.

In February 1778, American leaders concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with the kingdom of France. This alliance brought the revolutionary colonists together with the conservative ancien régime of Louis XVI for the purpose of defeating British power. The French monarchy surely had no interest in seeing the cause of revolution spread beyond the British dominions. Nonetheless, most historians agree that without French aid the American Revolution might not have reached a successful conclusion. Paris supported American independence to promote its self-interest in the larger European balance of power.

Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson recognized the necessity of maintaining friendly but distant relations with unsavory regimes like that of France. Americans traded and procured aid from monarchical states. They generally avoided close political collaboration with these governments for fear of corrupting America's revolutionary principles. This explains, in part, the tradition of U.S. diplomatic aloofness, often termed "neutrality," that carried from the late eighteenth century up to World War II. While Americans sought to conduct profitable commerce with societies of all varieties—including France and Britain in the late eighteenth century—they attempted to remain separate from the politics of the conservative Old World.

President George Washington articulated this point of view in his Farewell Address, published on 19 September 1796. He called upon citizens to spread the virtues of commerce while avoiding "permanent alliances" that might threaten the new nation's security. American leaders like Washington were realistic enough to understand that they could never afford to isolate themselves from the international system. Through commerce and calculated political detachment from the powerful European monarchies, they hoped to protect their revolution, patiently spreading their principles abroad as opportunities opened.

The outbreak of revolution in France during the summer of 1789 offered Americans one of their first and most extraordinary opportunities. Louis XVI's attempt to increase his international power by supporting the American revolutionaries had the paradoxical effect of bankrupting his monarchy and opening the door to upheaval in his society. Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson came to symbolize for many French thinkers the enlightened possibilities of liberty and enterprise, unfettered from the chains of despotism. As violence spread and the monarchy crumbled, revolutionary leaders and propagandists in France looked to the American government for support.

Jefferson, then serving as America's minister to France, encouraged the initial spread of unrest against the ancien régime. Thomas Paine, whose pamphlet *Common Sense* (1776) had inspired many Americans to join their independence struggle, also traveled (in an unofficial capacity) to Paris to support the cause of revolution. Jefferson and Paine were the most eloquent American exponents of the ideals embodied in popular French attacks on monarchy, aristocracy, and political tradition. The two advocates of revolution were not, however, unique in their sympathies. French revolutionary figures— particularly Edmond Charles Genêt, a diplomat from the new regime—received the adulation of American

crowds throughout the United States. Even early skeptics of the events in France, notably John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, sympathized with those who wished to throw off the repression of the Bourbon regime and replace it with a society of liberty and enterprise.

Adams, Hamilton, and other members of the Federalist Party in America differed from Jefferson and Paine in their fear that the French Revolution would careen out of control. They perceived the violence in Paris and other cities as a threat to the very ideals the revolution wished to serve. They also understood that revolutionary chaos during the Jacobin period after the execution of the king would open the door for dictatorship, which is what occurred, first in the hands of the Directory and later under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Jefferson, Paine, and the early Republicans were slower than their Federalist counterparts to see these dangers. When they did, in the mid-1790s, they also separated themselves from the extremism of the French Revolution. Both the Federalists and the Republicans supported a revolution against the ancien régime, but the two parties came to despair the violence, anarchy, and seeming irrationality of events in comparison to America's less disruptive experience.

Federalists and Republicans exaggerated their differences over the French Revolution to gain support from different domestic groups. Northern merchants generally felt threatened by French revolutionary attacks on their commerce. Southern planters, in contrast, expected new opportunities for export to France under a revolutionary regime that denounced mercantilism. These sectional differences contributed to partisan acrimony in the late eighteenth century.

The breakdown in the American political consensus during this period reflected little change in attitudes toward revolution. Americans supported the overthrow of monarchy in France. They applauded appeals to liberty. They exhibited suspicion of excessive violence and social disruption. Most importantly, they denounced revolutions that appeared more radical than their own.

LAND ACQUISITION AND HEGEMONY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the United States established itself as a dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. This was no small accomplishment for a young nation with fragile unity and a minuscule military. Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe exploited Europe's preoccupation with the Napoleonic wars and the relative weakness of potential rivals in North America. They constructed what Jefferson called an "empire of liberty" that combined force and commerce with a sincere commitment to enlightened government in "savage" lands.

America's self-confidence in the righteousness of its revolutionary model motivated many of the bloodiest massacres and dispossessions of native communities during this period. For Jefferson in particular, those who resisted democratic government and economic penetration threatened the American cause. Resistance justified temporary repression and, when necessary, brutalization. Nonwhite races received the most violent treatment. They appeared "immature" and "unprepared" for the blessings of liberty. Americans defined themselves as paternalists, caring for blacks and Indians until these groups were ready (if ever) for democratic self-governance. In this curious way, American sincerity about revolutionary change inspired more complete domination over nonwhite communities than that frequently practiced by other, less ideologically imbued imperial powers.

The American acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803 doubled the size of the country. It allowed Jefferson to make his "empire of liberty" a reality. With full control of the Mississippi River, the United States could conduct commerce along the north-south axis of the continent free from European interference. Exploring, apportioning, and eventually settling the vast western territories, the United States would now "civilize" its surroundings, as envisioned in Franklin's Albany Plan of 1754. Foreign powers and Indian communities had, in American eyes, prohibited the spread of liberty and enterprise. By sponsoring a famous cross-continental "journey of discovery" directed from 1804 to 1806 by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, Jefferson provided a foundation for altering the West with the creation of national markets, state governments, and, very soon, railroads. The transformation of the territories acquired with the Louisiana Purchase involved the rapid and forceful extension of America's Revolution.

During this same period, residents of French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies in the Western Hemisphere revolted against European

authority. While Americans remained wary of revolutions directed by nonwhite peoples, the U.S. government supported independence in Haiti, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and other former imperial possessions. Nonwhite revolutionaries, like Toussaint Louverture in Haiti, received aid, goodwill, and, most importantly, inspiration from Americans.

Fearful that the European powers, including Russia, would attempt to repress the Latin American revolutions, President James Monroe and his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, worked to exclude this possibility. On 2 December 1823 the president announced what later became known as the Monroe Doctrine in his annual message to Congress. It explicitly prohibited "future colonization by any European powers" in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine asserted the predominance of U.S. interests. The president and his secretary of state believed that the security of American borders, trading lanes, and revolutionary principles required freedom from Old World intervention.

Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, the British navy enforced the Monroe Doctrine in order to weaken London's European rivals; American words and British seapower sheltered revolutionaries from their previous imperial oppressors. At the same time, the United States stepped into the place of the colonial empires, assuring that political and economic change followed its model. Americans intervened south of their border to support revolutions that promised democratic governance and free trade. They repressed revolutions that entailed extreme violence, limitations on commerce, and challenges to U.S. regional domination. As in their policies toward France during the late eighteenth century, Americans welcomed rapid change throughout the Western Hemisphere, but only on their own terms.

1848 AND "YOUNG AMERICA"

The year 1848 witnessed a string of upheavals throughout most of the major cities in Europe, including Paris, Naples, Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna. In a matter of weeks, urban revolutionaries forced the French king Louis-Philippe and Austrian prince Klemens von Metternich to flee from power. Inspired in part by the example of the American Revolution, many citizens of Europe were poised for a bright new democratic future.

Americans rejoiced at this prospect, as illustrated by the frequent parades and proclamations on behalf of popular liberty in Europe. Foreign revolutionaries, particularly the Hungarian nationalist Lajos Kossuth, emerged as national celebrities. Their names replaced the previous names for many towns throughout Indiana, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Ohio, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania, areas with large recent immigrant populations from the European continent. Small groups of Americans organized themselves for possible military action overseas on behalf of their revolutionary heroes. While most of this private militia activity came to very little, a small contingent of U.S. citizens joined the failed rebellion in Ireland. As in 1775, Americans believed that the long-term success of their Revolution was connected with events in Europe, and Ireland in particular.

At the highest levels of government, the United States supported the European uprisings with diplomatic means short of force. In May 1848, John C. Calhoun, the former secretary of state and prominent U.S. senator from South Carolina, used his connections with the Prussian minister-resident in America to encourage the formulation of "constitutional governments" upon the "true principles" embodied in the American federal system. The construction of new political institutions on this model, according to Calhoun, was necessary for "the successful consummation of what the recent revolutions aimed at in Germany" and "the rest of Europe." The White House also indulged in revolutionary enthusiasm. On 18 June 1849, President Zachary Taylor sent a special envoy, Dudley Mann, to support and advise Kossuth. When the ruling Habsburg government learned of the Mann mission, it protested to Washington. Secretary of State Daniel Webster publicly defended American action on behalf of the European revolutionaries. In response, Vienna severed its connections with the United States. Americans accepted this temporary break in their foreign relations for the purpose of articulating their sympathies with the brave men and women who hoped to overturn the old European political order.

These revolutionary hopes, however, failed to reach fruition. By the end of 1849 the established monarchies of Europe had reasserted their control over the continent. When necessary, they used military force to crush the reformers who had taken to the streets. Dismayed by this course of events, but conscious of its inability to affect a different outcome, the U.S. government reaf-

firmed its commercial relations with the conservative regimes. Americans condemned the brutality in Europe, but they took advantage of postrevolutionary stability to increase cotton and other exports across the Atlantic. This was another case of America's revolutionary realism: sympathy and support for political change overseas, but a recognition that compromise and patience were necessary. The United States took advantage of opportunities to push its ideals, and it also exploited existing markets to sell its products. This was an unavoidable balance.

After 1848 many Americans worried about the implications of their nation's failure to support the cause of revolution more concretely. A faction of dissatisfied Democrats came together at this time to form a group identified as Young America. In using this name they meant to differentiate their interventionist program from the caution of their party's so-called Old Fogies. Young America argued that the nation could only secure its ideals through more forceful "expansion and progress." Stephen A. Douglas, the U.S. senator from Illinois who would run against Abraham Lincoln in the 1860 presidential election, became the leading political figure for citizens who wished to make America a more effective beacon of revolution overseas. Douglas, however, failed to win the Democratic Party nomination for the presidency in 1852. Another Democrat, Franklin Pierce, was elected to the White House that year after making numerous appeals to Young America sentiment. Pierce advocated U.S. expansion for the purpose of opening markets and spreading American principles. The Democratic Party platform explained that "in view of the condition of popular institutions in the Old World, a high and sacred duty is devolved with increased responsibility upon the Democracy in this country." Americans believed that the vitality of their ideals required more effective support for political and economic change overseas. The spread of liberty and enterprise across the globe became more important as the United States suffered a profound crisis of identity in the years before the Civil War.

For American advocates of what the historian Eric Foner has identified as the ideology of "free soil, free labor, and free men," the post-1848 repressions in Europe threatened to reinforce unenlightened policies at home. This appeared most evident in the case of southern slavery. Transforming monarchies into democracies and liberating human beings from bondage became part of a single project. At home and abroad, free labor promised increased productivity, higher wages for workers of all races, and more democratic politics. Support for monarchy overseas and slavery in the American South constrained markets, depressed wages, and empowered conservative families.

Agitation around Young America in the 1850s, and broader attempts to foster the spread of liberty and enterprise, contributed to the American Civil War. The bloodshed between 1861 and 1865 resulted, at least in part, from a Northern attempt to enforce radical socioeconomic change in the South. Slavery and the South's "peculiar" precapitalist structure, according to Eugene Genovese, hindered the development of industry and democracy. The period of Reconstruction after the defeat of the Confederacy is, not surprisingly, called by many historians America's second revolution, when southern institutions—including slavery, voting restrictions, and property concentration in a landed aristocracy—were all radically dislocated by an interventionist Union government.

This second revolution went hand in hand with a more assertive U.S. foreign policy in Europe and Asia. Like Reconstruction at home, American activities abroad sought to eradicate "peculiar" obstacles to liberty and enterprise. "Free soil, free labor, and free men" was a global worldview that required U.S.-supported revolutions in the most tradition-bound empires, especially in Asia.

Between 1840 and 1870, American envoys forced China and Japan to open official contacts with Washington. In 1844, Caleb Cushing, U.S. representative from Massachusetts and longtime advocate of U.S. expansion, negotiated the Treaty of Wanghia with the Chinese emperor. This agreement guaranteed American trade access to key ports in Asia. Equally important, the treaty protected the legal rights of missionaries proselytizing on the mainland. For Cushing and his contemporaries, relations with China promised both wealth and the spread of America's "Christian" ideas of liberty. Commodore Matthew Perry's mission to the then-closed kingdom of Japan in 1853 served similar purposes. In 1858, Perry's successor, Townsend Harris, negotiated a treaty to open Japan for U.S. trade and ideas.

The upheavals in China and Japan during the second half of the nineteenth century were influenced significantly by these inroads. In both societies, Americans sought to undermine tradi-

tional political and economic institutions. Missionaries argued for new restrictions on monarchical authority. Merchants emphasized personal profit and private property. Intellectuals extolled the virtues of a learned and participatory citizenry. In all of these ways, the expansionist ideology of Young America encouraged U.S.-style liberty and enterprise to take root in some of the world's oldest civilizations. American ideas undermined conservative worldviews.

THE "NEW EMPIRE"

The historian Walter LaFeber wrote that the decades after the Civil War marked the beginning of modern American diplomacy. The dominance of northern and western economic interests, America's expansionist ideology, and the nation's growing industrial might made the United States a truly global power during this period. In the Philippines, Midway Islands, Hawaii, and Alaska the nation formed in a struggle for independence became, despite significant domestic opposition, a colonial overseer. The United States built an imperium that soon rivaled the empires of old.

The American empire was not only "new" in its chronology, according to LaFeber. It was also "new" in its structure and governing ideology. This was an empire predicated on the assumption that all of the world could become like the United States. William Henry Seward, secretary of state from 1861 to 1869, envisioned an almost unlimited expanse of liberty and enterprise. Railroads, ships, and other government-sponsored projects would allow for the free movement of people and products. Education and the rule of law would protect the freedom of the individual and the property of the merchant. Most importantly, Seward believed that America's model of a democratic society would improve the lives of citizens across the globe, even if it required violence and repression in the short run. This was a revolutionary vision that, like others, required sacrifice (usually most burdensome for non-Americans) on behalf of a higher cause. Democracy and markets were the perceived wave of the future, uprooting traditional hierarchies in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and other continents.

Seward's revolutionary vision served America's material and strategic interests, but it also had sincere racial and religious roots. Belief in an Anglo-Saxon mission to "Christianize" the world came through in one of the most widely read books of the post–Civil War years: the Reverend Josiah Strong's *Our Country*. Published in 1886 on behalf of the American Home Missionary Society, the first edition sold more than 130,000 copies (an astronomical figure for the time) and was serialized in countless newspapers. Like Seward, Strong affirmed the importance of expanded American influence throughout the world. Industrialization had brought the world closer together, Strong argued. Nations had to prepare for more intense international competition. Strong affirmed Seward's vision of a democratic and market-driven empire. He also elaborated on the importance of this imperial turn for America's "Anglo-Saxon Christian mission." In language that appealed to the prejudices of many readers, Strong asserted: "There is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon is to exercise the commanding influence in the world's future."

Struggling as he saw it against "heathen" influences in Asia and other parts of the globe, Strong assured readers that "I cannot think our civilization will perish. . . . I believe it is fully in the hands of the Christians of the United States, during the next ten or fifteen years, to hasten or retard the coming of Christ's kingdom in the world by hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of years." For Strong and his many thousands of followers, the Anglo-Saxon "race" was uniquely suited to bring civilization to the rest of the world. *Our Country* contained extended "scientific" discussion about the superiority of Anglo-Saxon physiques, the adaptability of settlers from this stock, and, most importantly, the positive influence of Protestantism. Free from the oppression of a Roman Catholic Church, an emperor, or any superstitious deities, Anglo-Saxons developed unique qualities of liberty and enterprise. They were self-governing and capable of creative production, according to Strong. *Our Country* tapped into popular anxieties that the growth of competing empires, the migration of "inferior races," and the spread of industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth century threatened Anglo-Saxon virtues. In this context Strong wrote that "the destinies of mankind, for centuries to come, can be seriously affected, much less determined, by the men of this generation in the United States." A global American empire would protect the essential qualities of Anglo-Saxon civilization by remaking the rest of the world in the U.S. image. Racial characteristics were inherited, according to Strong, but they could be overcome by the socializing qualities of Christian doctrine.

Converted believers in far-off lands could receive grace from God. American expansion and colonization in places like Hawaii and the Philippines promised, in Strong's words, to "mold the destinies of unborn millions."

This was God's revolution on an international scale. Strong's words reflected a popular American disposition to dislodge "heathen" elites overseas. Businessmen claimed they were doing God's work when they seized local resources and established trading posts in formerly closed societies. Missionaries asserted divine sanction when they disregarded local traditions and proselytized their beliefs to native citizens. Most significantly, U.S. military forces in Asia, Latin America, and other areas argued that violence was a necessary means of building God's kingdom. Citing Charles Darwin on the "survival of the fittest," Strong claimed that resisting populations would be routed in a contest "of vitality and of civilization." As on the western frontier in earlier years, after the Civil War Americans built an extensive new empire, employing brutality for the sake of revolutionary ends.

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was, according to Walter LaFeber, a natural outgrowth of America's revolutionary expansion in prior decades. When Cuban residents revolted in early 1895 against Spanish rule, the government of President Grover Cleveland offered support for the aspirations of the island's citizens. Cleveland did not advocate immediate Cuban independence—he condescendingly believed that the dark-skinned inhabitants of the island were unprepared for self-rule. However, the president pushed the Spanish government to initiate political and economic reforms that would make Cuba more like America. Cuban exiles residing in the United States and labor union leaders—especially Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor—went beyond Cleveland's caution, advocating an immediate revolution against Spanish authority. By 1897 newspaper publishers picked up on these sentiments. They demanded a U.S. war aimed at destroying the Spanish empire.

Simultaneously, an uprising against Madrid's rule in the Philippines attracted American attention. In this case, American interest did not derive from geographical proximity to the United States but instead from the Philippines' location near China. As Britain, France, Germany, and Japan divided up the economic markets of China, businessmen and policymakers in the United States worried that they would be excluded. The United States lacked the imperial springboard that Hong Kong, for example, provided to the British. A revolution in the Philippines promised, in many American eyes, to create a regime both friendly and compatible with the nation's economic interests in China. Secretary of State John Hay expected that a Philippine revolution against Spanish rule would ensure the continued spread of liberty and enterprise in Asia. This was the basic assumption of Hay's famous Open Door Notes (1899–1900), which connected American interests with assured access to the people and markets of foreign societies.

Drawn into the Cuban and Philippine uprisings, the United States went to war with Spain in April 1898 to expand its "new empire" and assure that revolutions overseas followed the American model. This meant the destruction of monarchy and other inherited authorities. U.S. occupation armies replaced traditional institutions with free markets, personal property protections, and promises of democratic self-rule. Racist American fears that nonwhite populations would not properly govern themselves if left to their own devices meant that, in practice, democratic reforms were virtually nonexistent in Cuba and the Philippines after 1898. While the Caribbean island attained nominal independence, the Platt Amendment of 1901 (named for Connecticut senator Orville Platt) guaranteed American military and economic dominance. In the Philippines, the United States did not rely upon informal mechanisms of control. The archipelago became an American colony, where U.S. soldiers fought a bloody four-year war against Filipino rebels. America supported revolution in Cuba and the Philippines, but it also suppressed revolution when it challenged core assumptions about liberty and enterprise.

Washington would not tolerate radicalism that jeopardized markets and assumptions about just government. Americans remained revolutionary thinkers, as they had been since before 1776. Their nation continued to inspire unprecedented social transformations across the globe. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Americans encountered numerous competing revolutionary models. These included the nationalism of many independence fighters (especially the Chinese Boxer rebels of 1900), the anti-industrialism of peasant activists, and the socialism of international-minded thinkers.

None of these forces was new. All three, particularly socialism, gained momentum from the disruption that accompanied heightened rivalries among the European imperial powers and the emergence of the United States as an important international player. Americans could begin to build a truly global empire of liberty and enterprise after 1898, but they quickly became aware of contrary, more radical tendencies throughout the world. For the United States the twentieth century was a struggle to spread the American Revolution and repress alternatives. Cuba and the Philippines were preludes to what lay ahead.

WILSONIANISM

On 15 March 1917, Czar Nicholas II, fearing the spread of domestic revolution, abdicated from the throne of imperial Russia. A provisional government, led by a recently formed party known as the Constitutional Democrats, asserted authority over the country. Inspired by British and other European liberals, the Constitutional Democrats promised to replace centuries of near absolute monarchy in Russia with a democratic society. They hoped to copy the social-market economies of western Europe that mixed industrial enterprise and private property with guarantees of basic public welfare.

The United States was far removed from events in Russia, but the nation and its leaders immediately expressed sympathy with the liberal revolution against the czar. Many immigrants in cities like New York, Pittsburgh, and Chicago had come to America as a refuge from czarist tyranny and the frequent ethnic violence encouraged by the old regime. In earlier years these groups had pressured President Theodore Roosevelt to protest against Russian pogroms. In 1917 they applauded the overthrow of the czar and supported friendly American gestures toward the revolutionaries now in power.

President Woodrow Wilson and his closest advisers shared much of this sentiment. On 22 March 1917, only seven days after the czar had abdicated, the United States officially recognized the legitimacy of the new government. Wilson was one of the first leaders to make this move because he hoped to encourage the spread of American-style liberty and enterprise in Russia and other areas emerging from long histories of autocratic rule. He followed the counsel of his confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, who explained that by supporting "the advancement of democracy in Russia," Wilson would accelerate "democracy throughout the world." Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels recorded in his diary that the president spoke of the Russian Revolution as a "glorious act."

Wilson's vision of American-supported "democracy throughout the world" permeated his declaration of war against Germany on 2 April 1917, less than a month after the "glorious" Russian Revolution. After more than two years of bloody conflict on the European continent, accompanied by increasing attacks on American shipping, the president announced to Congress that "autocratic government," like that in Germany, was more than just distasteful to U.S. sensibilities. Autocratic militarism, repression, and economic nationalism had become profound threats to the life of democracy. Without the spread of American-style liberty and enterprise, the historian Frank A. Ninkovich has explained, Wilson feared the degradation and destruction of his society. World revolution on the American model was necessary for U.S. survival. This is what Wilson meant when he proclaimed that the "world must be made safe for democracy." The future of "civilization" had reached an apparent turning point. The president's Fourteen Points, announced on 8 January 1918 in a speech to Congress, outlined a program that sought to revolutionize the basic structure of international relations for the purpose of spreading democracy. Emphasizing the liberated "voice of the Russian people," Wilson called for political openness, free trade, disarmament, "independent determination" for oppressed peoples, and a "general association" of peace-loving nations. Liberty and enterprise, not balance of power or divine right, would govern the international system. Affairs between nations would evolve to look more like the relations among citizens in the United States.

In late 1917, just as the first American soldiers began to arrive on the European continent, a small group of communist, or Bolshevik, revolutionaries overthrew the new government in Russia. Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, the Bolsheviks pledged to destroy capitalism and American-style democracy. Liberty and enterprise, according to Lenin, allowed for the strong and the wealthy to repress the weak and the poor. A global proletarian revolution, starting in Russia, would create a new international structure guaranteeing equality and individual welfare, not

AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND REVOLUTION IN 1917

In early 1917 Russia's revolution against centuries of despotism excited Americans. President Woodrow Wilson hoped that the abdication of the czar on 15 March would elicit a period of worldwide democracy. He became one of the first foreign leaders to recognize the new regime, which was led by a party of Constitutional Democrats. Wilson imbibed the same faith in liberal revolution that had animated American thinkers like Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and William Seward.

The appearance of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky in Russia defied Wilson's hopes. In late 1917 these men took control of the Russian government. They pledged to pursue an international revolution that would undermine the liberal individualism and free market capitalism at the core of American foreign policy. Communism in Russia was a revolutionary challenge to America's own ideas of revolution.

Like his predecessors in the White House, Wilson had little tolerance for dissent. He believed that both communist ideas on the political Left and conservative traditions on the Right undermined his hopes for global democracy. To save the American revolutionary model overseas from its detractors, Wilson dispatched a small expeditionary force to assist anti-Bolshevik groups fighting in Russia's Siberian region during 1918 and 1919.

Thus began a long century of American hostilities with the communist regime in Russia. Sincere revolutionary enthusiasm in the United States often produced counterrevolutionary policies. Events in 1917 followed an American pattern set in the eighteenth century.

the empty promises of bourgeois democracy. In order to establish their regime, the Bolsheviks made many short-term compromises, particularly the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany on 3 March 1918, but they were as serious as Wilson in their aspiration to revolutionize the international system.

This second, Soviet phase of the Russian Revolution elicited reactions similar to those inspired by the Jacobin period of the French Revolution more than a century earlier. Americans sympathized with Russian citizens who sought to overthrow the czar, but they recoiled from the sight of violence, property confiscation, and civil war. Wilson believed that his program for a democratic peace after World War I was the only one worth pursuing. Lenin's contrary vision challenged basic assumptions about liberty and enterprise. The Bolsheviks promised to make the world profoundly unsafe for democracy on American terms. Russia's communist revolution endangered the American revolution.

On 6 July 1918, Wilson authorized a small American expeditionary force to join British, French, and Japanese soldiers supporting the anti-Bolshevik White armies in Russian Siberia. This intervention followed a model that the president had applied, more than any of his predecessors, throughout the Western Hemisphere during his two terms in office. Small groups of U.S. soldiers entered a foreign country to assist favored revolutionary elements against their opponents. In Siberia—as in Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Central American states—Wilson hoped to ensure the kind of political order that would allow liberty and enterprise to take shape. N. Gordon Levin, Jr., has explained that the president and his advisers convinced themselves that they were not threatening Russia's self-determination because the U.S. force was so small. Wilson viewed limited American intervention as the action required to nurture legitimate revolutionary impulses threatened by domestic competitors and foreign predators.

In this context historians have noted the conservative implications of the president's revolutionary rhetoric, especially at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The Versailles settlement negotiated by the victors in World War I broke apart the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, as well as the German imperium outside of Europe. It established self-determination for the Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, and other long-repressed peoples. It also created a League of Nations that the United States, despite Wilson's efforts, refused to join. These constituted significant changes in the international system, but they paled in comparison to what the Versailles settle-

ment left intact. Fearful that Bolshevism and other nonliberal revolutionary movements in places like Germany, Hungary, and China would create anarchy, Wilson and his counterparts allowed the major world empires—Britain, France, and Japan—to grow. American influence—formal and informal—also expanded, especially in Asia. Local elites in China, Korea, and Indochina found their expectations for national independence under the terms of Wilson's Fourteen Points disappointed. Through military and economic means, the great powers worked to constrain political change that challenged basic liberal-capitalist assumptions.

Wilson carried the paradox of Jeffersonian politics into the twentieth century. American leaders and citizens naturally applauded the overthrow of old regimes, particularly those of King Louis XVI and Czar Nicholas II. They expected that governments ensuring liberty and enterprise on the American model would replace centuries of despotism and autocracy. Because of his young nation's relative weakness, Jefferson had to rely largely on rhetoric to support overseas revolution. Wilson, in contrast, matched emotional words with extended military commitments.

When the revolutionary visions of Jefferson and Wilson encountered more radical ideas, especially Jacobinism and Bolshevism—these two men proved intolerant of diversity. They worked to repress rivals and eliminate the conditions that produced uncertainty instead of orderly change. Away from the American continent, this involved mostly rhetoric for Jefferson. Wilson, however, took advantage of his influence at the Paris Peace Conference to bolster efforts aimed at repressing challengers to American-style liberty and enterprise. In the early twentieth century, the United States had the power to enforce its worldview throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in parts of Europe and Asia. Wilsonianism revolutionized these areas by making them more like America and less like other revolutionary alternatives. U.S. policy followed this Wilsonian pattern in succeeding decades, albeit with important variations.

LIBERAL DEVELOPMENTALISM

The 1920s are traditionally identified with alleged American "isolationism." Recent scholarship has shown that this picture is far too simple. Wilson's successors in the White House avoided foreign military commitments, but they pursued a consistent policy that the historian Emily S. Rosenberg has called "liberal developmentalism." This ideology, shared by U.S. leaders and citizens, assumed that "other nations could and should replicate America's own developmental experience." Businesses, philanthropic groups, labor unions, and government figures worked together after World War I to spread the "American dream" in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. This included encouraging the development of free markets, democratic institutions, and popular culture on the American model.

The last element of this triad proved most revolutionary. Manufacturers and advertisers—often working with government subsidies—contributed to a global diffusion of American-style automobiles, radios, and movie technologies, among other products. Rising criticisms of Americanization during this period attested to the ways in which U.S. cultural influence revolutionized foreign societies. The new popular culture made the nation of Jefferson and Wilson a focus of global attention. It disrupted social hierarchies by appealing to the desires of the average individual. Most significantly, it undermined traditional values by glorifying liberty and enterprise.

Contrary to the "isolationism" often associated with the White House during this period, American presidents shared public enthusiasm for the cultural spread of the American revolution abroad. As secretary of commerce and later as president, Herbert Hoover encouraged investment overseas, creating the foreign infrastructure and dependence that would guarantee access for American products and ideas. Instead of assuring fair competition among a variety of firms, the U.S. government supported the foreign expansion of near monopolies like J. P. Morgan, Standard Oil, and General Electric. These companies exerted strong influence over Republican presidential administrations. They also acted as "chosen instruments" for America's policy of supporting overseas revolution through economic and cultural means. Spreading the American dream in the 1920s promised massive profits and radical changes in the ways foreign societies functioned. Historians have generally avoided the temptation to glorify Americanization, but they have recognized that the nation's liberal developmentalism revolutionized international society.

FASCISM AND THE "AMERICAN WAY OF WAR"

During the Great Depression of the 1930s American culture lost some of its glow. In addition to Soviet communism, fascism emerged as a powerful challenger to America's revolutionary model. Scholars have long debated whether fascism constituted an alternative revolutionary paradigm or an antimodern regressive influence. Regardless of their position on this issue, historians agree that it sought to smother the influence of American-style liberty and enterprise in countries like Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan. In all of these nations, fascists condemned the decadence of imported cars, radio programs, and movies. Fascist leaders sought to create more nationalist—and often racial—cultural forms.

Unlike the citizens of many European and Asian countries, Americans never showed much sympathy for fascism. As early as 1933, prominent figures, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, expressed strong distaste for the "uncivilized" behavior of the Nazis in Germany. Mired in an economic depression, the United States offered little material support to antifascist fighters, but the leaders of the nation consistently criticized the violent infringements on individual liberty and free enterprise that accompanied the policies of dictators like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Americans hoped for a string of antifascist revolutions.

When these upheavals failed to materialize and the regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan began to undermine neighboring democracies, President Roosevelt initiated a policy of antifascist intervention overseas. He used a mix of foreign assistance, trade embargoes, and military expansion to bolster American influence. This included close cooperation with Britain, and after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the USSR. Like the revolutionary realists of the eighteenth century, Roosevelt recognized that alliance with unsavory regimes—in this case a communist state—was necessary to defeat a more pressing danger to American ideals.

On 14 August 1941 the president issued a public statement announcing what became known as the Atlantic Charter to guide the great powers during World War II and the postwar settlement. Negotiated during a three-and-one-half day meeting with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland, this document pledged Washington and London (as well as Moscow, they hoped) to the Wilsonian principles of self-determination, free trade, disarmament, and a "permanent system of general security." In addition, the Atlantic Charter included promises of "improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security" inspired by Roosevelt's domestic New Deal policies. The president sought to assure "that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." This was an extraordinary moment in the history of great power diplomacy. Roosevelt had pledged to support Britain against Nazi Germany, but in return he had extracted concessions that would revolutionize what was then the world's largest empire. Self-determination, as outlined in the Atlantic Charter, justified independence movements in Britain's Indian, Southeast Asian, and East African colonies. Free trade undermined the imperial preference system that had formerly allowed London to dominate the economies of its empire. A "permanent system of general security," soon to be named the United Nations, diminished the global predominance of the European capitals. Most significantly, New Deal guarantees of economic security and social welfare included in the Atlantic Charter helped to legitimize human rights, only a nascent concept before 1941.

Like Wilson, Roosevelt brought the United States into World War II with the purpose of making the world safe for democracy. This involved bloody battlefields on two fronts, in Europe and Asia, with frequent compromises concerning strategy and principle. The war was "total" for Americans because they saw no alternative but to eliminate their fascist enemies completely. All alliances and compromises served this purpose. Under American tutelage, political life in Europe and Asia had to start anew, infused with the principles of liberty and enterprise that foreign elites had resisted for too long.

Total annihilation of enemies and a revolutionary reconstruction of society on American terms was, according to historian Russell F. Weigley, "the American way of war." Acting to destroy threats to their way of life, U.S. leaders conquered much of Europe and Asia. They followed the same pattern pursued when men like Jefferson and Lincoln annexed the western territories during the nineteenth century and defeated the South during the Civil War. Operating under the guidance of the Atlantic Charter, U.S. soldiers forced foreign societies to accept American ideas of liberty and enterprise. They followed the vision of

figures like Josiah Strong, who had proclaimed a global mission to make the Old World new. World War II was, in this sense, a conflict fought by the United States for worldwide revolution on American terms.

RECONSTRUCTION AND CONTAINMENT

If the Civil War was America's second revolution, the years after World War II marked a third revolution. Having created a new form of government and expanded it across much of North America, the United States now rebuilt western Europe, Japan, and South Korea from the ground up. Historians have devoted extensive attention to the vital role that local citizens and leaders played in charting new directions for these societies. This is undeniable, but the revolutionary impact of American policy deserves serious consideration as well. Men like George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Lucius Clay, and Douglas MacArthur forced the defeated societies to reconstruct themselves on America's model. In West Germany and Japan this meant the formulation of new constitutions that enshrined free speech, democratic elections, and capitalist markets. In western Europe as a whole, Washington pushed for regional integration along lines that resembled American federalism. Most importantly, through the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, the United States provided societies devastated by war with the material resources to finance private enterprise and citizen welfare. Life for those vanquished by war in western Europe and Japan changed radically after 1945, largely along lines compatible with American sensibilities.

Americanization of this kind was revolutionary, but it also had conservative consequences. Washington chose to work with local elites that had strong anticommunist credentials. In many cases, this resulted in the repression of radical ideas. The Communist Party in Italy, for example, suffered electoral defeat in April 1948 after the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic Church with a large infusion of covert campaign funding. Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were ripe for revolution after World War II, and the United States worked to make certain that these areas followed America's model. Democratic liberties and capitalist enterprise provided the foundation for U.S.-directed reconstruction.

Soviet efforts to consolidate revolutionary change along communist lines in Eastern Europe, North Korea, and China inspired fears—some legitimate, some exaggerated—that Moscow would subvert the states in America's sphere of influence. The clash between American and Soviet revolutionary models gave rise to what contemporaries called the Cold War. In this prolonged ideological struggle, the lands devastated during World War II became the battlegrounds where the superpowers competed to influence the course of future developments. Both Washington and Moscow believed that they could only make the world safe for their respective ideals if key strategic areas in Europe and Asia followed their particular model of political organization. Americans expected that a Europe of liberal democracies would ensure long-term peace and prosperity. Soviet leaders hoped that a Europe of communist states would provide the resources needed to build something approximating Karl Marx's vision of a workers' paradise.

The incompatibility of these visions made the Cold War a prolonged period of Soviet-American hostility. Following the often-quoted advice of George Kennan—the chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff between 1947 and 1949—Americans sought to protect their revolutionary ideals by containing the spread of communist influence. This meant increasing support for allies who appeared to share American sensibilities, while limiting the influence of dissidents. From a geopolitical point of view, it also required a permanent mobilization of force to deter Soviet incursions. The policy of containment, in this sense, militarized America's revolutionary influence overseas, adding to the nation's already evident distrust of diversity. It also created a short-term bias to the status quo. Social experimentation and cooperation with a devious enemy appeared too risky.

By the 1950s the Cold War had spread to what contemporaries called the Third World. These were former colonial possessions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that began to attain their independence in the aftermath of World War II. In general, the superpowers had limited strategic and economic interests in these areas. They drew extensive American and Soviet intervention, however, because they served as natural showcases for each government's revolutionary model.

The economist and policy adviser Walt Rostow was only one of many to argue for extensive U.S. sponsorship of Third World development in America's image. Prosperous markets and free

societies, he explained, would increase the worldwide attraction of American-style liberty and enterprise. Otherwise, Rostow warned, newly independent states would fall prey to the "disease" of communist influence. On a strategic level, Rostow and others warned that Soviet advances in peripheral areas like Indochina would eventually jeopardize the survival of American-inspired values in critical strategic areas like Japan. This was the alleged threat of "falling dominoes."

Both Washington and Moscow used violence to reconstruct the Third World. In the American case, the Vietnam War was the clearest example of this phenomenon. Throughout the 1960s policymakers generally believed that they were bringing a positive revolution to the impoverished villagers of Indochina. Containment of communism and industrial development promised to create peace and prosperity, according to American assumptions. In pursuit of this vision, Washington deployed extensive military force to bludgeon local resistance.

Installing the American version of revolution in Vietnam involved the repression of all other varieties of revolution, nationalist and communist. The United States found itself destroying traditional villages and killing innocent civilians as it attempted, in vain, to build a new society in its own image. This was the perversity of American-sponsored revolution in the Third World. Many of the earliest and most consistent opponents of these policies were people who, like George Kennan, criticized the revolutionary and idealistic strains in U.S. foreign policy.

Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America the United States frequently hindered the process of decolonization because nationalists—like Ho Chi Minh—refused to accept the American model of liberal capitalism. Ideological dogmatism, economic interest, and cultural condescension combined when Washington lent its support to imperial powers and local "strong men." There were the counterrevolutionary consequences of America's inherited revolutionary narrow-mindedness, magnified by Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. conceptions of liberty and enterprise tragically set the most democratic nation against the cause of national independence.

DÉTENTE AND ITS CRITICS

The difficulties of supporting overseas revolution during the Cold War contributed to a crisis of American confidence in the late 1960s. Citizens and leaders doubted whether they could make a world with nuclear weapons, ubiquitous protest movements, and profound economic inequalities safe for democracy. Many individuals—including President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser (and later secretary of state), Henry Kissinger—believed that inherited American sensibilities were out of touch with international realities. Radical critics condemned the nation's long-standing ideals for producing destruction and devastation instead of helping those most in need.

Nixon and Kissinger sought to curtail America's revolutionary ambitions. They emphasized an international balance of power rather than promises for positive change. Through a series of agreements with former adversaries—especially the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—they created a framework for great power cooperation that limited conflict between different revolutionary models. At home they discredited critics who called for a more idealistic foreign policy. This period, called the era of détente by contemporaries, was one of unprecedented American pessimism and retrenchment. Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy cut against the grain of basic American assumptions regarding the virtues of liberty and enterprise. After the turmoil of the 1960s, citizens grew skeptical about the application of these values overseas. Americans, however, were also uncomfortable with the empty realpolitik of détente. A foreign policy guided by balance of power considerations, rather than principles, promised only permanent struggle. Americans could not escape their inherited belief in progress. The stability promised by Nixon and Kissinger was not enough. The period of détente ended in the late 1970s as the nation began, yet again, to pursue revolutionary aspirations abroad.

Despite their significant differences, Presidents James Earl Carter and Ronald Reagan embodied this return to revolution in the wake of détente. They promised a more open and democratic foreign policy, one that embraced human rights and condemned communist infringements on liberty and enterprise. They pledged to fight when necessary to make the world safe for democracy. Most importantly, these two presidents spoke of remaking foreign societies in America's image. This is what Reagan meant when he repeatedly claimed that it was "morning in America."

Reagan's popularity at home and abroad speaks to the power of this idealistic message. When the Soviet government began to loosen its grip on Eastern Europe and its own society after 1985, his affirmations of American-style liberty and enterprise contributed to a new period of international optimism. In contrast to the 1960s, the United States now appeared poised to bring democracy and wealth to long-repressed and impoverished lands. The world had reached, in the frequently repeated words of Francis Fukuyama, the "end of history." According to this argument, America's liberal capitalism embodied a system of values that would finally revolutionize the entire world.

Most observers understood that they had not reached anything like the end of history. American ideals remained highly contested. Their applicability in various environments awaited demonstration. Nonetheless, American citizens found themselves drawn to Reagan's rhetoric because it promised international revolution on U.S. terms. It affirmed the messianic quality of America's political model. All of Reagan's successors in the late twentieth century, especially President William Jefferson Clinton, repeated his rhetoric.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ENTERS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The twenty-first century offered a host of new opportunities and challenges for American foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made the United States an unmatched international power. Its technology, economy, and culture exerted influence in virtually all corners of the globe. American dynamism produced a startling trend toward the Americanization of food, fashion, music, law, and even language. American notions of liberty and enterprise revolutionized education, work, and entertainment in many societies, replacing traditional assumptions about hierarchy and status. U.S. influence provided many people with new hopes of freedom and wealth, but also new difficulties in protecting cultural particularity.

The latter consequence of America's revolutionary impact overseas—international homogenization—has inspired determined and sometimes violent resistance among groups who find their values under siege. The long list of Americanization's opponents includes farmers, environmentalists, labor union activists, religious believers, nationalists, and social democrats—as well as terrorists like Osama bin Laden. For these groups, American-inspired liberty and enterprise have the effect of repressing contrary ways of life. American movies and other forms of popular culture, for example, undermine assumptions about religious piety and social roles in countries as diverse as Italy and Iran. The same can be said for many of Washington's claims about human rights. America's revolutionary presumptions may seem self-evident and universally beneficial to some, but they also appear self-serving and shallow to others.

Throughout their history, Americans have consistently emphasized the global virtues of their ideals. They have generally ignored the shortcomings and narrow-mindedness embedded in their political values. This duality has made the United States a far-reaching revolutionary force. Time and again, the nation has rejected ideological diversity. Instead, it has used persuasion, coercion, and force to impose its vision on others. Traditional points of view have appeared to Americans as fodder for radical change. Alternative revolutionary programs, especially communism, have suffered from extreme repression at the hands of freedom's advocates. Americans are revolutionaries because they wish to change the world in their own image, with very little compromise or variation. They are frequently dogmatic and self-righteous. There is little reason to expect these qualities to change in the twenty-first century.

Rousseau anticipated the paradox of America as a revolutionary power. Forcing freedom on the world, the United States has supported radical change while also repressing diversity. This paradox became more evident during the course of the twentieth century, but it surely dates back as far as Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan of 1754. Even before they attained independence, Americans conceived of their revolution as an ongoing, global process of democratization. On the continent of North America, in the Western Hemisphere, and across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, this has meant the spread of individual freedoms and free markets. Americans have scoffed at foreign traditions and assumed that all human beings will attain happiness and wealth when their societies are governed by politically aware citizens and energetic business owners.

The steady growth of U.S. diplomatic power since the end of British rule allowed Americans remarkable success in remaking the world. The

international system at the dawn of the twenty-first century was disproportionately an American system. It produced many benefits for citizens of the United States and other nations, but it also undermined the diversity upon which liberty, enterprise, and most other values must ultimately depend. Global American influence seriously limited the range of human experience. Like other revolutionaries in the past, Americans confronted the possibility that their achievements had become self-defeating.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appleby, Joyce Oldham. *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination.* Cambridge, Mass., 1992. A provocative discussion of how Americans have thought about revolution.

Brinkley, Douglas, and David R. Facey-Crowther, eds. *The Atlantic Charter.* New York, 1994. A series of thoughtful analyses of the Atlantic Charter and its legacy.

Cooper, John Milton, Jr. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt.* Cambridge, Mass., 1983. A superb comparative study that analyzes the politics of early twentieth-century America.

Curti, Merle E. "Young America." *American Historical Review* 32 (1926): 34–55. Still a penetrating account of American thought regarding overseas revolution in the mid-nineteenth century.

———. "John C. Calhoun and the Unification of Germany." *American Historical Review* 40 (1935): 476–478. An insightful document on Calhoun's views of European revolution.

Davis, David Brion. *Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations.* Cambridge, Mass., 1900. A probing series of lectures on American views of revolution.

DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana.* New York, 1976. A thoughtful account of the politics surrounding the Louisiana Purchase and American imperialism.

Dull, Jonathan R. *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution.* New Haven, Conn., 1985. A concise account of the American Revolution in a broad international context.

Engerman, David C. "Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development." *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 383–416. An excellent study of how ideas about economic development influenced American views of the Soviet Union.

Foner, Eric. *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War.* New York, 1970. A penetrating account of American political ideology around the time of the Civil War.

Ford, Worthington Chauncey, et al., eds. *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789.* 34 vols. Washington D.C., 1904–1937. An indispensable source on early American revolutionary aspirations and foreign policy.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989). An extremely influential and controversial argument about the triumph of America's revolutionary vision around the world.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York and Oxford, 1982. The best analysis of the sources and implications of America's containment policy during the Cold War.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Safe for Democracy: Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923.* New York, 1984. A broad account of Wilson's opposition to radical revolution.

———. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam.* Chicago, 1995. A provocative analysis of how American liberal ideas contributed to the Vietnam War.

Genovese, Eugene D. *The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an American Conservatism.* Cambridge, Mass., 1994. A provocative account of southern society before the Civil War, and its implications for American politics.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1961. An eloquent and thoughtful essay on the meaning of Washington's address for American foreign policy.

Hahn, Peter L., and Mary Ann Heiss, eds. *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945.* Columbus, Ohio, 2001. A useful survey of American foreign policy in the Third World during the Cold War.

Hartz, Louis. *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution.* 2d ed. San Diego, Calif., 1991. A classic account of how ideas about liberty and enterprise have dominated American politics.

Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952.* New York and Cambridge, 1987. A penetrating account of how the Marshall Plan reconstructed Western Europe on America's model.

Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven, Conn., 1987. A stimulating account of how American ideas about liberty, race, and revolution have affected foreign policy.

Iriye, Akira. *The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945.* New York, 1993. A compelling discussion of Americanization in the first half of the twentieth century.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *Jefferson and France: An Essay on Politics and Political Ideas.* New Haven, Conn., 1967. A classic account of how America's preeminent revolutionary theorist grappled with the French Revolution.

Knock, Thomas J. *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order.* New York, 1992. The best late-twentieth-century account of Wilson's revolutionary foreign policy.

Labaree, Leonard W., et al., eds. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin.* 35 vols. New Haven, Conn., 1959–2001. An indispensable source on early American revolutionary aspirations and foreign policy.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1963. A classic account of American ideas and expansion in the late nineteenth century.

———. *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750.* New York, 1989. The best survey for the history of American expansionism.

Latham, Michael E. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000. A stimulating discussion of how American ideas about development influenced foreign policy.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. A rich account of how American values and fears of Soviet power drove foreign policy in the early Cold War.

Levin, Norman Gordon, Jr. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution.* New York, 1968. A classic criticism of Wilson's opposition to radical revolution.

Link, Arthur S., ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.* 69 vols. Princeton, N.J., 1966–1994. An indispensable source on Wilsonian ideas and foreign policy.

Maier, Pauline. *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776.* New York, 1972. An excellent discussion of the international context for the American Revolution.

McCormick, Thomas J. *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901.* Chicago, 1967. A provocative account of America's expanding influence in Asia at the end of the nineteenth century.

Ninkovich, Frank A. *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900.* Chicago, 1999. A compelling account of Wilson's revolutionary influence on American foreign policy in the twentieth century.

Roberts, Timothy M., and Daniel W. Howe. "The United States and the Revolutions of 1848." In R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds. *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction.* Oxford, 2000. An excellent survey of how Americans perceived the European revolutions of 1848.

Rosenberg, Emily S. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945.* New York, 1982. A thoughtful account of America's cultural and economic expansion between the two world wars.

Rostow, Walt W. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* 3d ed. New York, 1990. One of the most influential books on the role of liberal capitalist ideas in Third World development.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1994. A provocative analysis of America's support for democratic revolution abroad.

Strong, Josiah. *Our Country.* 1886. Reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1963. One of the most influential polemics about America's revolutionary "mission" overseas.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* New York, 1973. A compelling analysis of America's revolutionary approach to war.

White, Richard. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*. Cambridge and New York, 1991. The best account of relations between Americans, Europeans, and Indians in the eighteenth century.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. 2d and enlarged ed. New York, 1972. One of the most important works on the history of American foreign relations, a penetrating discussion of economics, ideas, and expansion.

See also CULTURAL IMPERIALISM; IMPERIALISM; ISOLATIONISM; REALISM AND IDEALISM; WILSONIANISM.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Ronald E. Doel and Zuoyue Wang

Science did not become a major concern of U.S. foreign policy until the twentieth century. This is not to say that science was unimportant to the young republic. U.S. leaders recognized that, in the Age of Reason, the prestige of science was part of the rivalry between nations. Yet through the nineteenth century science was primarily linked to foreign policy as an adjunct of trade relations or military exploration. By contrast, mechanical ability was central to the identity of Americans, and debates about the proper role of technology in American relations to Britain and Europe raged through the late nineteenth century, as the United States gained worldwide recognition for creating the modern technological nation.

Technology—and enthusiasm for technical solutions to social problems—remained important in American foreign relations through the twentieth century. But its position relative to science changed markedly after 1900. By the start of World War II, science became a new and urgent topic for policymakers, inspiring an uneasy relationship that profoundly challenged both diplomats and scientists. As the Cold War began, the U.S. government funded new institutions and programs that linked science with diplomatic efforts and national security aims. Some were cloaked in secrecy; others were incorporated into major foreign aid efforts such as the Marshall Plan. By the late twentieth century, policymakers viewed science and technology as synergistic twins, significant yet often unpredictable agents of economic, political, and social change on both national and global scales.

THE EARLY REPUBLIC

In the earliest years of the American Republic, the ideas of natural philosophy informed the worldview of the framers of the American Constitution. The most educated of them, including Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin, were familiar with the ordered clockwork universe that the greatest of Enlightenment scientists, Isaac Newton, had created, and metaphors and analogies drawn from the sciences permeated their political discourse. But the pursuit and practice of science was seen as part of a transnational "Republic of Letters," above the petty politics of nations. When a group of Harvard scientists sought to observe an eclipse in Maine's Penobscot Bay at the height of the revolutionary war in 1780, British forces not only tolerated them but provided safe passage. Similarly, while Franklin was a singularly well-known scientist, widely revered in France as the founder of the science of electricity, he served as the new nation's emissary to Paris on account of his similarly impressive skills in diplomacy and familiarity with French centers of power. While a number of institutions responsible for scientific research emerged within several decades after the nation's founding, including the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Naval Observatory, none dealt directly with areas of national policy. Alexis de Tocqueville overlooked significant pockets of learning when he declared in *Democracy in America* (1835) that "hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract portion of human knowledge," but he was astute in observing that the "purely practical part of science"—applied technology—was what stirred the American imagination.

Still, adroit statesmen recognized that the apolitical "republic of science" could be a helpful tool in aiding foreign policy ambitions, a value connected with scientific research that would grow dramatically in later years. Exploration and geographic knowledge were important elements in contests for empire, and the nascent United States did support several successful exploring expeditions prior to the mid-nineteenth century. When President Thomas Jefferson sought to send

Meriwether Lewis and William Clark on an expedition to the Pacific northwest, but lacked funds to provide military escort, he asked whether the Spanish minister would object to travelers exploring the Missouri River with "no other view than the advancement of geography." But in his secret message to Congress in January 1803, Jefferson emphasized the value the Lewis and Clark expedition would have in aiding United States control over this vast territory. By insisting that Lewis and Clark make careful astronomical and meteorological observations, study natural history, and record Indian contacts, Jefferson underscored an important relationship between science and imperialism. A similar set of concerns motivated the U.S. Exploring Expedition (Wilkes Expedition), which between 1838 and 1842 visited Brazil, Tierra del Fuego, Chile, Australia, and the East Indies and skirted 1,500 miles of the Antarctic ice pack (providing the first sighting of the Antarctic continent). Pressure to fund the expedition had come from concerned commercial and military groups, including whalers, who saw the Pacific as important for American interests. They did not sail empty waters, for this U.S. expedition overlapped with the voyages of the *Beagle*, the Antarctic expedition of Sir James Clark Ross of England, and the southern survey by Dumont d'Urville of France, and thus owed to nationalistic as well as scientific rivalries. Yet government-sponsored expeditions in this era remained infrequent.

By contrast, technological concerns were very much on the minds of American leaders. The industrial revolution was well underway in Britain at the time of the American Revolution. Stimulated by the depletion of forests by the early eighteenth century as wood was consumed for fuel, Britain had developed coal as an alternative energy source, accelerating technological development through the steam engine (the crucial invention of the first industrial revolution) and the construction of water- and steam-powered mills. By the time of the American Revolution, British industries were supplying the American colonies with manufactured goods, spun cloth, textiles, and iron implements employed in farming. The former colonists' victory created a dilemma for the newly independent states, as Britain sought to forbid the export of machines or even descriptions of them to maintain its trading advantage. While the war in fact only temporarily cut off the United States from the output of the burgeoning industrial mills in Birmingham, Manchester, and London, and resumed migration after the war allowed mechanics to transfer technical knowledge across the Atlantic, government leaders still faced the question of what kind of material society the United States would attempt to create.

Americans at the turn of the nineteenth century agreed on one matter: they did not wish the United States to acquire the "dark satanic mills" that had made Manchester and Birmingham grimy, filthy cities, with overflowing sewers, wretched working conditions, widespread disease, and choking smoke. But American leaders also realized that a rejection of mill technology raised fundamental questions about what standards of material comfort the United States would aspire to reach, and the means, domestic and foreign, it would need to adopt to achieve those ends. Since sources of power were needed to increase living standards, how and what ways the former colonies would develop means of production or acquire finished products would help to shape the future economic, political, and social structure of the nation.

The question of whether to import the factory system to America or to encourage the growth of the United States as an agrarian nation emerged as the initial critical struggle over the role of technology in American foreign policy. It fanned intense political passions in the nascent nation, and helped shape its first political parties. Thomas Jefferson favored limiting the import of technological systems and manufactured goods. Jefferson wanted a republic primarily composed of small farmers, who as independent landowners would enhance "genuine and substantial virtue." The growth of large cities, he feared, would lead to a privileged, capitalistic aristocracy and a deprived proletariat. Jefferson's vision of an agrarian republic represented an ideal in early American political thought, popularized by such works as Hector St. John de Crevecouer's *Letters from an American Farmer* in 1782. While Jefferson was not adverse to all forms of manufacturing and would later soften his opposition to it even more, he initially envisioned a republic in which American families produced needed textiles at home and traded America's natural resources and agricultural output to secure plows and other essential artifacts. His foreign policy thus sought autonomy at the cost of more limited energy production and a lower standard of living.

Opposition to Jefferson's vision came from Alexander Hamilton, the New York lawyer and protégé of President George Washington who served as the young nation's first secretary of the treasury. Hamilton favored a diversified capitalis-

tic economy, backed by a strong central government and import tariffs designed to nurture fledgling American industries. In his influential *Report on Manufactures* in 1791, Hamilton argued that "The Employment of Machinery forms an item of great importance in the general mass of national industry." Fearing a lack of social order from overreliance on an agricultural economy, Hamilton declared that the development of industry would encourage immigration, make better use of the diverse talents of individuals, promote more entrepreneurial activity, and create more robust markets for agricultural products. Hamilton's prescription for nationalism and his support for technology gained favor from Franklin, Washington, and John Adams, although fears of Jeffersonian Republicans that virtue followed the plow still held sway among many Americans.

By the 1830s and 1840s, Hamilton's ideas had gained the upper hand, and the federal government became a firm supporter of technological development as a promising means to promote national prosperity. Jefferson's embargo of 1807 and the War of 1812, which illuminated the vulnerability of relying on Britain for manufactured goods, helped spur this development, but another critical factor was American success in developing technologies that increased agricultural output, including the invention of the cotton gin and the mechanical harvester. The abundance of powerful rivers in New England allowed manufacturers to develop textile mills that relied on water power, initially allowing new manufacturing centers like Lowell, Massachusetts, to avoid the industrial grime of Manchester. No less important, the rapid advance of canals, river boat transportation, and especially railroads provided a model for the integration of hinter regions and seat of the nation, a means for insuring economic development and the sale of manufactured goods and products to foreign markets. For many, like the influential legislator William Seward, technology was the key to securing American domination over the continent and advancing trade. After Seward helped reinterpret patent law to insure that U.S. inventors would profit from their creations, patent numbers swelled. Patents granted rose from an average of 646 per year in the 1840s to 2,525 in the 1850s. Dreams of a global commercial empire were similarly behind American efforts to open Japan to U.S. trading after 1852, as Japan possessed the coal needed by steamships bound to ports in China. These arguments became an enduring component of American perceptions about its global role, finding expression in Alfred T. Mahan's influential late nineteenth-century work on the influence of sea power on history.

Events in the middle decades of the nineteenth century reinforced American acceptance of technology as central to national progress. U.S. manufacturing advantages became even more evident after the invention of the sewing machine and Charles Goodyear's patenting of a process to vulcanize rubber in 1844. The invention of the telegraph encouraged additional trade and opened new markets, and citizens heralded the completion of the first transcontinental telegraph cables in 1861 as a new chapter in establishing an American identity. Already ten years earlier, Americans had delighted at the positive reception British and European observers gave to U.S.-built technological artifacts exhibited at the Crystal Palace exhibition in London. The Civil War forcefully focused national attention on the production of guns and steel, but even before the war American citizens had become convinced of the value of embracing new technological systems. National desires to develop a transcontinental railroad were sufficient to overcome nativist American attitudes toward foreign labor and open the doors to the over 12,000 Chinese laborers who completed laying Central Pacific track to create the first transcontinental railroad. By the time the Centennial International Exhibit opened in Philadelphia in 1876, visitors flocking to Machinery Hall were already convinced, as Seward had argued in 1844, that technology aided nationalism, centralization, and dreams of imperialistic expansion.

THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

Three closely related factors—industrialism, nationalism, and imperialism—soon combined to reinforce American enthusiasm for technology as a key element of national policy. By the end of the nineteenth century, the first industrial revolution (begun in England and concerned with adding steam power to manufacturing) yielded to a larger, globally oriented second industrial revolution, linked to broader systems of technological production and to imperialistic practice. In contrast to the first industrial revolution, which was regional and primarily affected manufacturers and urban dwellers, the second industrial revolution

ON THE NEED TO SUSTAIN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

"In the world of science America has come of age in the decade immediately preceding the second world war. Before this time, basic science was largely a European monopoly and Americans trained either in this country or abroad had large stores of accumulated ideas and facts on which to draw when building new industries or promoting new processes. The automobile, for example, was engineered from basic ideas many of which went back to Newton and the radio industry has developed from the late nineteenth century theories and experiments of Maxwell and Hertz. Unfortunately the technological advancements of the last war, extended as they were by every means possible, appear to have largely exhausted developments latent in the present store of basic knowledge. This means that, unless steps are taken, the technological development of really new industries will gradually become more difficult and that in time a general leveling off in progress will take place. The implication of this for America and particularly for American foreign policy could be quite serious for, if such a plateau is reached, other countries, such as Russia, could presumably catch up with or even surpass us in production and hence in military potential. The consequences of such an altered balance are not difficult to foresee. Competent American scientists have recognized this dilemma for some time and have consequently come to believe that efforts must be made to stimulate basic science throughout the world in order that subsequent development either in America or elsewhere will have something on which to feed."

— R. Gordon Arneson,
U.S. Department of State,
Secret Memorandum, 2 February 1950
(declassified 22 July 1998) —

introduced mass-produced goods into an increasingly technologically dependent and international market. The rise of mass-produced sewing machines, automobiles, electrical lighting systems, and communications marked a profound transformation of methods of production and economics, becoming a major contributor to national economies in America and its European competitors. Manufacturing in the United States steadily climbed while the percentage of Americans working in agriculture declined from 84 percent in 1800 to less than 40 percent in 1900.

The second industrial revolution caused three important changes in the way Americans thought about the world and the best ways they could achieve national goals. First, the process of rapid industrialism brought about a heightened standard of living for many Americans, creating for the first time a distinct middle class. By the turn of the twentieth century, the architects of the interlocked technological systems that had made the United States an economic powerhouse—from the steel magnate Andrew Carnegie to the oil baron John D. Rockefeller and the inventor and electrical systems creator Thomas Alva Edison—were increasingly represented in Washington, and their concerns helped shape foreign policy discussions. Second, and closely related, industrialization heightened an emerging sense of national identity and professionalization among citizens in the leading industrialized nations. The rise of nationalism was fueled not only by the technologies that these system builders created, but by other technologies and systems that rose with them, including low-cost mass-circulation newspapers, recordings of popular songs and national anthems, and public schools designed to instill in pupils the work ethic and social structure of the modern factory. The late nineteenth century was also the time that national and international scientific societies were created. American science was growing through the increasing numbers of young scientists who flocked to European universities to earn their Ph.D.s, carrying home a wealth of international contacts and commitments to higher standards. It was no coincidence that the rise of professional scientific communities paralleled the expanding middle class, as both groups found common support in the expansion of land-grant and private universities and in the industrial opportunities that awaited graduates of those universities. These

new networks crystallized swiftly: they included the American Chemical Society (1876), the International Congress of Physiological Sciences (1889), the American Astronomical Society (1899), and the International Association of Academies (1899). The American Physical Society (1899) was founded two years before the federal government created the National Bureau of Standards, reflecting growing concerns from industrialists about creating international standards for manufacture.

Finally, the rise of advanced capitalist economies came to split the globe into "advanced" and "backward" regions, creating a distinct group of industrial nations linked to myriad colonial dependencies. Between 1880 and 1914 most of the Earth's surface was partitioned into territories ruled by the imperial powers, an arrangement precipitated by strategic, economic, and trade needs of these modern states, including the securing of raw materials such as rubber, timber, and petroleum. By the early 1900s, Africa was split entirely between Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, while Britain acquired significant parts of the East Asian subcontinent, including India. The demands of modern technological systems both promoted and reinforced these changes. The British navy launched the HMS *Dreadnought* in 1906, a super-battleship with greater speed and firing range than any other vessel, to help maintain its national edge and competitive standing among its trade routes and partners, while imperialistic relations were maintained by technological disparities in small-bore weapons. One was a rapid-fire machine gun invented by Sir Hiram Maxim, adapted by British and European armies after the late 1880s. Its role in the emerging arms race of the late nineteenth century was summed in an oft-repeated line of doggerel: "Whatever happens we have got / The Maxim gun and they have not."

The American experience in imperialism was less extensive than that of the leading European industrial nations, but nonetheless marked a striking shift from its earlier foreign policy. Until the early 1890s American diplomatic policy favored keeping the nation out of entangling alliances, and the United States had no overseas possessions. But by 1894 the United States came to administer the islands of Hawaii, and after the Spanish-American War of 1898 gained possession of (and later annexed) the Philippines. The story of America's beginnings as an imperial power has often been told, but the significance of technology and technological systems as a central factor in this development is not well appreciated. It is perhaps easier to see in the U.S. acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903. President Theodore Roosevelt and other American leaders recognized how an American-controlled canal would enhance its trade and strategic standing within the Pacific; they also had little doubt that U.S. industrialists and systems builders could construct it. A widely published photograph from that time reveals Roosevelt seated behind the controls of a massive earthmover in the Canal Zone. This single technological artifact served as an apt metaphor for the far larger technological system that turn-of-the-century Americans took great pride in creating.

World War I—a global conflict sparked by the clashing nationalistic aims of leading imperialist nations—pulled scientists and engineers further into the realm of diplomacy. While scientists continued to insist on the apolitical character of science, publication of a highly nationalistic defense of the German invasion of Serbia by leading German scientists in 1914 had left that ideal in tatters. More important, perhaps, was how the war educated Americans about its emerging role as a premier technological nation, and the importance of maintaining adequate sources of petroleum. After 1918, U.S. firms gained Germany's treasured chemical patents as war reparations, expanding American domination of textiles and the petrochemical industries. Americans also found that the leaders of the Russian revolution of 1917, Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, coveted American machinery and the American system of production to build the Soviet republic. By 1929 the Ford Motor Company had signed agreements with Moscow to build thousands of Ford autos and trucks, and Soviet authorities sought to adapt the management principles of Frederick Winslow Taylor in a Russian version of Taylorism.

The widening intersection between science, technology, and foreign relations was not limited entirely to contests between the United States and other imperialist powers. In the Progressive Era, biologists began to urge diplomats to aid efforts to preserve threatened species whose migrations took them across international boundaries. While efforts to ameliorate overfishing in the boundary waters separating the United States and Canada and seal hunting in the Bering Sea in the early 1890s amounted to little, a strong campaign to aid songbird populations resulted in the Migratory Bird Act of 1918 between the United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada), one of the

most important early instances of a bilateral science-based treaty negotiated by the federal government. The significance of this treaty was not just what it accomplished (even though it served as an exemplar for other environmental treaties between the United States and its neighbors, including the Colorado River water treaty signed with Mexico in 1944). It also underscored the growing appeal of conservation values among middle- and upper-class American citizens, who joined with scientists to create nature preserves in unspoiled wilderness areas outside the United States, particularly in Africa. In such places, "nature appreciation" emerged as a commodity for tourism, its value determined by declining opportunities to experience wilderness in the North American continent. Private investments of this kind became a potent area of U.S. influence in the world's less developed areas, and took place alongside more traditional interactions including trade relations and missionary work.

WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR

Science and technology entered a new phase in American foreign relations at the end of the 1930s. Gathering war clouds in western Europe convinced scientists and military leaders that greater attention had to be paid to scientific and technological developments that might aid the United States and its allies. World War II and the ensuing Cold War marked a fundamental watershed in the role that science and scientists would play in American diplomatic efforts. By the late 1940s, new institutions for international science arose within an unprecedented variety of settings (including the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency). Secrecy concerns influenced the practice of science and international communications, and new career opportunities arose as science and technology became significant in U.S. foreign policy as never before.

The integration of science into U.S. foreign policy during World War II initially came from the urging of scientists. In August 1939, just months after the German chemist Otto Hahn and Austrian physicist Lise Meitner, working with others, discovered that heavy atomic nuclei could be split to release energy, three scientists including Albert Einstein urged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to fund a crash program to see if an atomic bomb could be constructed. The Manhattan Project that ultimately resulted became the largest research project in the United States to date, one that involved intense and active cooperation with scientists from Great Britain and Canada. Advanced research in the United States also benefited from the emigration of outstanding Jewish scientists from Germany and Italy after the rise of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. But the atomic bomb project was only one area of international scientific cooperation: in 1940 the eminent British scientific leader Sir Henry Tizard flew to Washington on a secret mission to persuade the U.S. government to cooperate in building a system of radar and radar countermeasures. The Tizard mission laid the groundwork for effective Allied cooperation in building a wide range of science-based technological systems, including radar, the proximity fuze, and the atomic bomb. Scientists who served within the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, with access to greater manufacturing capacity than Britain, also put into production the new drug penicillin.

Concern with devising new wartime weapon systems was equaled by strenuous Allied efforts to discover what science-based weapon systems Germany and Japan had constructed. Through such bilateral efforts, World War II thus nurtured two critical developments that would shape science and technology in the postwar world: the imposition of secrecy systems to protect national security concerns, and the creation of scientific intelligence programs to discover foreign progress in science and technology (particularly but not limited to advances in weaponry). Like penicillin, scientific intelligence was largely a British invention: British scientific intelligence was more advanced than U.S. efforts at the start of the war, owing to its need to buttress its island defenses. But by 1944 U.S. leaders joined Allied efforts to send scientific intelligence teams behind the front lines of advancing Allied troops in western Europe, known as the ALSOS intelligence mission. While the most famous and best-remembered goal of the ALSOS teams was to discover whether Germany had built its own atomic bomb, this was only part of its larger mission to determine German advances in biological and chemical weapons, aeronautical and guided-missile research, and related scientific and technological systems. Broad fields of science were now for the first time relevant to foreign policy concerns.

Allied scientific intelligence missions also served another function: to catalog and inventory German and Japanese research and technological

facilities as assets in determining wartime reparations and postwar science policy in these defeated nations. Both Soviet and Allied occupational armies sent back scientific instruments and research results as war booty. In Germany, where the U.S. and Soviet armies converged in April 1945, U.S. science advisers sought to locate and capture German rocket experts who had built the V-2 guided missiles, including Wernher von Braun. Von Braun's team was soon brought to the United States under Project Paperclip, an army program that processed hundreds of Axis researchers without standard immigration screening for evidence of Nazi war crimes. Operation Paperclip was the most visible symbol of a concerted campaign to secure astronomers, mathematicians, biologists, chemists, and other highly trained individuals to aid American research critical for national security. In Japan, U.S. scientists focused primarily on wartime Japanese advances in biological warfare. While members of the Japanese Scientific Intelligence Mission that accompanied General Douglas MacArthur's occupation forces were unable to stop the senseless destruction of a research reactor by U.S. soldiers, science advisers successfully insisted that applied science and technology were critical components of Japan's economic recovery.

Above all it was the use of atomic weapons against Japan in the closing days of World War II that brought science and technology into the realm of U.S. foreign policy as never before. The roughly 140,000 who died immediately at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, combined with the awesome destructive power of a device that relied on the fundamental forces of nature, made the atomic bomb the enduring symbol of the marriage of science and the state. In subsequent decades the U.S. decision to employ atomic weapons has become one of the most fiercely debated events in American foreign policy. Even before the bomb decision was made, a number of American atomic scientists protested plans to use nuclear weapons against Japan since it, unlike Nazi Germany, lacked the capacity to construct atomic weapons of its own. How the decision to use the bomb was made has split historians. Some have argued that U.S. leaders sought to end the war before the Soviet Union could officially declare war on Japan and thus participate in its postwar government, but many have concluded that other motivations were at least as important, including fears that Japanese leaders might have fought far longer without a show of overwhelming force and domestic expectations that all available weapons be used to conclude the war. Others have pointed out that U.S. policymakers had long seemed especially attracted to the use of technology in its dealings with Asian countries.

The largest conflict over nuclear weapons in the immediate postwar period involved the American monopoly over them, and how the United States could best safeguard the postwar peace. Bernard Baruch, the financier and statesman, proposed that atomic power be placed under international control through the newly established United Nations. The Soviet Union vetoed the Baruch Plan, believing that the proposal was designed to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, conservatives promoted a congressional bill that placed atomic energy under military control. Liberal scientists opposed the bill and advocated civilian control instead. In 1946, with the support of President Harry S. Truman, a Senate committee under Brien McMahon drafted a new bill that eventually resulted in a civilian-led (but militarily responsive) Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), one of the first postwar agencies designed to address science in foreign policy.

As the Cold War began, debate over science and technology in American foreign policy split along familiar lines. The most well-known of these involved efforts to maintain the deeply eroded traditions of scientific internationalism. Atomic scientists who supported international control of atomic energy created new national organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists. Participating scientists, including Albert Einstein, argued that physicists could aid the development of world government that would avoid the political perils of atomic warfare. In July 1957 nuclear scientists convened the first Pugwash meeting, drawing nuclear scientists from Western and communist nations to discuss approaches to nuclear disarmament. But promoters of scientific internationalism were not solely interested in atomic issues. The liberal internationalist and Harvard astronomer Harlow Shapley backed prominent British scientists Julian Huxley and Joseph Needham in their efforts to highlight science within the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation launched major new science initiatives in Latin America, while the National Academy of Sciences urged policymakers not to restrict American access to the world community of science. While public

support for these positions remained high during the early years of the Cold War, they faded after Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin resumed a well-publicized crackdown on "bourgeois" research in genetics in favor of Trofin Lysenko's promotion of Lamarckian inheritance. This repression convinced many Americans that objective Soviet science had succumbed to state control. By the McCarthy era unrepentant internationalists were targets of a growing conservative backlash. The biochemist and Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling—who won a second Nobel Prize in 1962 for his campaign to end nuclear testing—was one of several outspoken American scientists whose passport was temporarily revoked in the 1950s.

At the same time, other scientists began working with government officials in Washington, sometimes clandestinely, to investigate ways that scientists could aid U.S. national security by addressing major issues in American foreign policy. These activities took many forms. One of the more visible steps came in 1949, when President Truman announced, as the fourth point of his inaugural speech, that the United States was willing to "embark on a bold new program for making the benefit of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas." After Congress approved the so-called Point Four program a year later, tens of millions of dollars supported bilateral projects in science education, public health, agriculture, and civil engineering, adding to mainstream Marshall Plan funds used to restore technological and scientific capacity in the war-ravaged nations of western Europe. At the same time, U.S. scientists and technical experts worked to thwart Soviet efforts to obtain advanced Western computers, electronic devices, and other technologies and resources critical to weapons development. These included efforts to limit export of weapons-grade uranium to the Soviet Union and to deny Soviet access to Scandinavian heavy water as well as prominent Swedish scientists in the event of a Soviet invasion.

For U.S. policymakers, a principal challenge was to secure reliable overt and covert information on the scientific and technological capacity of other nations, since such intelligence was necessary to match enemy advances in weaponry—particularly in biological, chemical, and radiological warfare. A major point of intersection between physicists and U.S. policymakers came in efforts to discern Soviet advances in atomic bomb work and in developing methods to detect and analyze Soviet atomic tests, a task that gained greater urgency after the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device in August 1949. Hindered by a paltry flow of overt information from communist countries, U.S. scientists sought alternative means to secure such data. In 1947 several scientists who had managed the wartime U.S. science effort, including Vannevar Bush, James Conant, and Lloyd V. Berkner, helped create a set of new institutions devoted to the role of international science in national security. The first was the Office of Scientific Intelligence within the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency. Three years later, scientists working with the Department of State created a scientific attaché program, patterned on the U.K. Science Mission. A 1950 Berkner report to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, justifying this effort, declared that the program would strengthen Western science while providing American scientists and businesses helpful information; a secret supplement optimistically spelled out ways that attachés could covertly secure needed intelligence. Yet by 1952, national security experts concluded that foreign science and technology intelligence-gathering from the CIA and the Department of State remained woefully inadequate. The United States then created the top-secret National Security Agency to foster signals intelligence, employing the clandestine code-breaking strategies that had aided Allied victory during World War II.

Scientists and policymakers both found the abrupt integration of science into U.S. foreign policy unnerving. Many American scientists recognized that post-1945 national security concerns required pragmatic compromise of the unfettered exchange of information that had long been the ideal of science. The close relations that developed between scientists and the government during World War II also helped certain scientists undertake clandestine research programs. But most American scientists resented increasingly tight security restrictions, demands for secrecy, loyalty oaths, and mandatory debriefings by federal agents following overseas professional trips. Scientists who accepted posts in the State Department felt the snubs of colleagues who regarded such service less prestigious than lab-bench research. For their part, traditional foreign relations experts, trained in economics or history, were largely unfamiliar with the concepts or practices of science, disdained the capacity of scientists in war-ravaged western Europe and the Soviet Union to produce quality science, and perceived the inherent inter-

nationalism of scientists suspicious if not unpatriotic. Such views were widespread within the national security bureaucracy. Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover, familiar with top-secret Venona intercepts of encrypted Soviet communications used to discover atomic spies in the United States, regarded the internationalism of scientists as a threat to democracy and the proper aims of U.S. foreign policy.

Despite these mutual tensions, American leaders in the 1950s nonetheless sought to use science to influence foreign policy debates. Officials used scientific intelligence to refute highly publicized (and still unresolved) Chinese claims that American forces in Korea had violated international accords by employing bacteriological weapons in the winter of 1952. Even greater use of science as an ideological weapon was made by President Dwight Eisenhower, who in a major speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953 offered his "Atoms for Peace" proposal calling for the peaceful uses of atomic power. Regarded at the time as a Marshall Plan for atomic energy, Atoms for Peace promoted the development of nuclear cooperation, trade, and nonproliferation efforts in noncommunist nations; it also provided nuclear research reactors to countries in South America and Asia. Eisenhower's advisers felt certain that the Soviet Union could not match the Atoms for Peace offer, and hence would suffer a political setback as a result. They also believed it would reduce the threat of nuclear warfare, an anxiety shared by western European leaders after the United States explicitly made massive retaliation the cornerstone of its national security policy.

Historians have debated the significance and meaning of the Atoms for Peace proposal. On the one hand, some maintain that Eisenhower correctly perceived that the most effective means of halting nuclear proliferation would come from promoting and regulating nuclear power through the auspices of the United Nations, while ensuring that the European western democracies would gain direct access to what at the time seemed a safe and low-cost source of energy. The program helped the United States secure 90 percent of the reactor export market by the 1960s. On the other hand, critics charge that Atoms for Peace actually served to increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. Yet other historians regard Atoms for Peace as part of a grander strategy to mute criticism of the accelerated buildup of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiles and their secret dispersal to locations around the world, including West Germany, Greenland, Iceland, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is also clear that Eisenhower sought to exploit the apolitical reputation of science to wage psychological warfare and to gather strategic intelligence. In the mid-1950s the Eisenhower administration approved funds for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957–1958, an enormous effort to study the terrestrial environment involving tens of thousands of scientists from sixty-seven nations (a plan conceived, among others, by science adviser Lloyd Berkner). In one sense, Eisenhower's support for the IGY was overdetermined: policymakers saw an advantage in limiting rival nations'

ON SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

"Historically, the major responsibility for intelligence in the United States, both during war and peace, has rested upon the military agencies of the government. Since World War II, intelligence has assumed a far greater peacetime role than heretofore and has had an increasing influence upon foreign policy decisions.

"In the overall utilization of intelligence in the policy making areas of the Department [of State], there appears to be too little recognition of the enormous present and future importance of scientific intelligence. In the past, military and political factors, and more recently economic considerations, have been the controlling elements in estimating the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers. Now, however, an increasingly important consideration in any such assessment is the scientific progress of the country concerned. For example, the determining factor in a decision by the U.S.S.R. either to make war or to resort to international political blackmail may well be the state of its scientific and technological development in weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore imperative that, in the Department, the scientific potential and technical achievements of the Soviet Union and their implications be integrated with the other elements of a balanced intelligence estimate for foreign policy determination."

— Lloyd Berkner, Report of the International Science Policy Survey Group (Secret), 18 April 1950 (declassified 22 July 1998) —

territorial claims to Antarctica by making the frozen realm a "continent for science" under IGY auspices, and Eisenhower recognized that a planned "scientific" satellite launch would enhance international claims for overflight of other nations' airspace, a concern because of U.S. reliance on high-altitude U-2 aircraft fights to gain intelligence on the Soviet Union. It was a strategy that his predecessor, Thomas Jefferson, had also understood.

Despite their greater involvement in foreign policymaking, scientists largely remained outsiders from diplomatic circles. This was due to several factors. Throughout his first term, Eisenhower maintained his small staff of science advisers in the Office of Defense Management, a marginal agency remote from the machinery of the White House. More importantly, the White House failed to defend scientists against charges from Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee that cast dispersions against the loyalty of atomic scientists, particularly after the Soviet atomic bomb test of 1949. With the declassification of the Venona intercepts, historians now understand that American espionage did provide Soviet agents with details of the "Fat Man" plutonium implosion bomb used at Nagasaki, giving Soviet physicists perhaps a year's advantage in constructing their own initial atomic weapon. This level of spying was greater than many on the left then believed, but far less than what Republican critics of scientific internationalism charged. These highly publicized accusations, and the loyalty investigation of atomic bomb project leader J. Robert Oppenheimer, nevertheless aided ideological conservatives convinced that scientists represented a threat to national security and that international science needed to be controlled along with foreign cultural and intellectual exchange. After the conservative-leaning *U.S. News and World Report* in 1953 reported a claim that the State Department's science office was "a stink hole of out-and-out Communists," Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, ignoring the protests of scientists, allowed the science attaché program to wither away.

These clashes pointed to fundamental tensions in efforts to employ science in American foreign policy. Moderates in the executive branch sought to use scientific internationalism to embarrass Soviet bloc countries by advertising links between Western democracy and achievements in science and technology (a theme heavily promoted in the Brussels World Exposition of 1958). Many believed that scientists in communist nations were the most likely agents for democratization and thus potential allies. Opposing them were ideological conservatives determined to limit international science contacts to strengthen national security and to restore clarity to U.S. foreign policy. These tensions came to a head in the mid-1950s when State Department officials refused to pay U.S. dues to parent international scientific unions in part because unrecognized regimes, including Communist China, were also members. American dues were instead quietly paid by the Ford Foundation, whose directors understood that the CIA's scientific intelligence branch greatly benefited from informal information and insights passed on by traveling American scientists. While the CIA's clandestine support for scientific internationalism helped sustain U.S. participation in major international bodies in the nadir of the Cold War, this conflict would not be resolved before the *Sputnik* crisis interceded.

SPUTNIK, THE ANTICOLONIAL REVOLUTION, AND SCIENCE AS AN IDEOLOGICAL WEAPON

By the late 1950s a second fundamental shift occurred in the role of science and technology in U.S. foreign policy. The shift had several causes. One was the launch of *Sputnik*, which established the Soviets as a potent technological force in the eyes of observers throughout the world, including western Europe. Another was that the Soviet Union's space spectacular occurred in the midst of the independence movement among former colonies in Africa and Asia. This worried U.S. officials who believed that Soviet triumphs in applied science and technology would tempt these emerging nations to develop socialist governments and build alliances with the Eastern bloc. Yet another factor was the heightened role of science in new multilateral treaty negotiations, including the Antarctic Treaty and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which brought scientists and policymakers into ever tighter orbits. Finally, increasing concern from American citizens about an environment at risk from radioactive fallout—a view shared by leaders of western European governments—helped make a wide range of environmental concerns from declining fish populations to improving agricultural productivity and addressing air and water pollution a greater focus

of American foreign policy. Together, these led to a considerable transformation of U.S. foreign policy, increasing the influence of United Nations and nongovernmental organizations, and heightening diplomatic links between the northern and southern hemispheres. While efforts to coordinate U.S. science policy remained ineffective, and relations between scientists and policymakers were sometimes strained, this realignment would persist through the end of the twentieth century.

The launch of *Sputnik* was a major foreign relations setback to the United States, in no small part because of American faith in its technology and a widespread conviction in the West that scientific and technological development within a democracy would triumph over that within a totalitarian state. But on 4 October 1957, the 184-pound *Sputnik I,* emitting a pulsed electronic beep, became the Earth's first artificial satellite. The launch produced banner headlines around the world and convinced many Allies that Eastern bloc science and technology was equal to that of the United States. Secret U.S. Information Agency polling in Britain and in western Europe indicated that a quarter of their populations believed the Soviet Union was ahead in science and technology. In response, the United States accelerated programs designed to symbolize the nation's scientific and material progress, above all the space program. For the next quarter century science and technology would take on a new role in foreign policy—as a surrogate for national prosperity and stability.

Elevating science and technology as symbols of national potency, and hence as tools of foreign policy, took several forms. One was by investing in highly visible technological projects. The space program developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was a prime example. Technology as a symbol of national prestige was embodied in the bold (and ultimately successful) proposal to land humans on the moon by 1969, which President John F. Kennedy announced in a speech to Congress in May 1961 after his most embarrassing foreign policy failure, the Bay of Pigs disaster. But this was only one expression of many. The Kennedy administration also stepped up international programs in such fields as agriculture, medicine, and oceanography. As with the Wilkes Expedition a century before, the motivations behind such efforts were mixed. New research programs in oceanography were intended to help increase fish harvests by less developed countries, and American oceanographic vessels could show the flag at distant points of call. But oceanography was also a particularly strategic field because of growing concerns with antisubmarine warfare and efforts by less developed countries, working through United Nations bureaus, to extend their sovereignty to two hundred nautical miles beyond their coasts. Knowing the sizes of Soviet fish harvests was also of strategic value. Undertakings such as the multinational Indian Ocean Expedition of 1964–1965, which American scientists helped plan, seamlessly embodied all of these aims.

Science constituencies both within and outside the federal government responded to the Soviet achievement in various ways. Worried air force officials, anxious to demonstrate U.S. technological competence in the months following the launch of *Sputnik,* proposed detonating a Hiroshima-sized bomb on the moon in 1959 that would be instantaneously visible to watchers from Earth. Cooler heads at the Department of State and the White House did not consider this idea because of its militaristic connotations. The National Science Foundation advocated increasing the number of exchanges between U.S. and Soviet scientists, while White House staff members supported the AEC's Plowshare program to make peaceful uses of atomic bombs, among them creating new canals and harbors. Members of Congress echoed private science groups in arguing that the *Sputnik* crisis showed that the United States had fallen behind in training future scientists. The massive rise in federal spending for math and science education after 1958 was another direct consequence of this foreign relations crisis.

The *Sputnik* shock forced administration officials to recognize that existing mechanisms for coordinating science and technology within foreign policy were inadequate. In 1957, President Eisenhower announced the creation of the position of special assistant to the president for science and technology (commonly known as the presidential science adviser) and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to provide the White House with advice on scientific and technical matters domestic and foreign. While members of PSAC, which was always chaired by the science adviser, were initially drawn from the physical sciences, reflecting continued preoccupation with space, nuclear weapons, and guided-missile delivery systems, PSAC's mandate soon expanded to include a wide range of scientific disciplines. The State Department's Science Office and attaché program, nearly eviscerated before

Sputnik, was revived and handed new responsibilities for coordinating bilateral and multilateral programs. Not all government officials saw the increased focus on science and technology as positive. A Latin American ambassador complained that the U.S. embassy in Rio de Janeiro "needs a science attaché the way a cigar-store Indian needs a brassiere." Despite such criticisms, Washington exported these conceptions into its regional security alliances, creating a new science directorate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Democrats worried that this plan would militarize western European science and limit contacts with Soviet colleagues, NATO's science directorate steered new research contracts to its closest allies.

Another response to the *Sputnik* crisis was a dramatic expansion of foreign aid programs to support science and technology. In 1961 President Kennedy announced the creation of the Agency for International Development (AID), with an explicit mandate to fund research, education, and technology-based programs around the world. Advocates of old-style scientific internationalism supported AID programs as a way to extend UN programs that nurtured emerging research centers and sustainable development in less developed countries. In certain respects they were not disappointed: AID science programs provided significantly greater support to Latin-American countries in the 1960s and 1970s than their feeble counterparts in the early Cold War period. Grants funded desalination projects, teacher training, and scientific equipment; in cooperation with science attachés, officials also protested the mistreatment of academics in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. But as with the Marshall Plan, foreign aid programs in science and technology were adjuncts in the greater struggle to extend U.S. influence to Latin America, the Asian subcontinent, and sub-Saharan Africa, and to win the hearts and minds of leaders in less developed countries deciding between Western and Soviet models of economic development. In practice, however, it was often difficult to separate humanitarian motives from calculation of Realpolitik. U.S. support for costly rain experiments in India's Bihar-Uttar Pradesh area in the mid-1960s was justified by noting that these programs aided American policy aims by mitigating Indian embarrassment at lagging behind Chinese efforts to create an atomic bomb. But this secret research, however fanciful, did attempt to mitigate a life-threatening drought.

The best-known science and technology foreign-assistance program from this period was the Green Revolution. Based on hybrid forms of rice and wheat that had been developed in the United States in the 1930s, the Green Revolution promised to allow poorer nations to avoid the Malthusian dilemma by increasing the efficiency of planted fields to satisfy the demands of growing populations. In India, where severe drought crippled crops between 1965 and 1967, the planting of high-yield grains nearly doubled wheat and rice yields by the late 1970s. Stimulated and financed by the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations, the Green Revolution was one of the most well-known private foreign aid programs during the Cold War.

Historians have reached differing conclusions about the impact and effectiveness of U.S. scientific and technological aid programs to Latin America and to sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Some argue that American aid programs in science and technology represent long-nurtured humanitarian impulses similar to those that informed the Marshall Plan and in general no less successful. Few scholars doubt that the American scientists and policy officials who designed these programs genuinely believed their efforts would achieve positive social ends. However, other historians have pointed out that scientists who sought grandiose results such as weather modification and greatly enlarged fish catches were overconfident about their ability to master nature without harming natural processes, and recent assessments of the Green Revolution have made clear that production gains were less than earlier claimed. A more significant problem was that planners often failed to realize that technical systems developed in advanced capitalistic countries could not be transported wholesale into other regions without concurrent local innovations and adaptive technologies. American enthusiasm about exporting the fruits of U.S. technologies was often accompanied by hubris in assessing the environments of less developed countries.

Beginning in the 1960s, American policymakers also faced new demands to negotiate international agreements governing applications of science and technology. A convergence of factors brought this about. The economic costs of maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal, concerns about proliferation, and a desire to moderate the arms race led the Eisenhower administration to begin discussions with the Soviet Union about what became the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty. The close call narrowly avoided in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 inspired President Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev to sign it. But another reason was the growing realization among scientists and policymakers that even the testing of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons represented a genuine threat to the health of American citizens and populations worldwide, and that such tests could have unintended consequences for diplomatic relations and regional stability. From secret monitoring of man-made radioactivity levels in the 1950s, scientists understood that measurable amounts had already spread worldwide. Policymakers were also unnerved by the "Bravo" nuclear test on Bikini Island in March 1954, a fifteen-megaton blast more than a thousand times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. Radioactive ash from the test spread across a broader area of the Pacific than expected, contaminating the Japanese tuna ship *Lucky Dragon* and in turn causing a panic in the Japanese fishing market and outrage in Japan and elsewhere. National Security Council members worried that a disruption of Japan's primary food resource might destabilize government and allow Soviet encroachment. Amplifying these worries was growing popular concern with an environment at risk, accentuated by anxiety concerning nuclear and chemical fallout and the contaminants issue exemplified by Rachel Carson's 1962 *Silent Spring*. International treaties served policymakers' ends by reassuring citizens of limitations on uses of science-based weapon systems that many Americans found unsafe and threatening.

To be sure, policymakers often found it difficult to steer science to aid foreign policy goals, in part resulting from the elite nature of science, in part because the goals of scientists were often tangential to those of the state. But part of the problem was that by the 1960s policymakers could no longer count on a compliant media to keep covert activities involving international scientific activities secret. In 1962, the *New York Times* reported a highly secret test of a U.S. atomic bomb exploded in outer space eight hundred miles from Hawaii, code-named Starfish. The resulting controversy intensified suspicions of citizen groups on the left that science had become an extension of state power and morally suspect. Though U.S. officials successfully concealed many related projects from view, demands for greater openness led the 1975 Church Committee to examine unauthorized medical experiments within the CIA, and subsequent revelations about U.S. efforts to employ radiological warfare and to steer hurricanes toward enemy lands raised ethical dilemmas for many citizens. Yet at times the government successfully mobilized public support behind using science as a moral weapon. In 1982 the U.S. government canceled its bilateral science agreements with the Soviet Union to protest its treatment of atomic physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov and its persecution of Jewish scientists. But at least as often relations between policymakers and their scientific advisers fractured. President Richard Nixon abolished PSAC in 1973 for its opposition to his antiballistic missile, supersonic transport, and Vietnam policies. In 1983 President Ronald Reagan announced his decision to proceed with his "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative after consulting a small circle of scientists, bypassing standard review circles in an attempt to use science for strategic advantage.

By the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers also found that the critical defining relations for international science were no longer exclusively East-West but also North-South, between the developed and developing nations. U.S. scientists and diplomats were slower to react to this change than to the upheavals of anticolonialism in the late 1950s, misperceiving the significance of the change. When the Pakistani physicist and Nobel Laureate Abdus Salam created the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, in 1964, a center devoted to researchers from less developed nations, leading U.S. scientists and policymakers criticized Salam's plan as simply duplicating existing Western research facilities. But Salam's institute (backed by the United Nations and private foundations) was soon followed by parallel efforts in other fields, whose leaders sought to set research agendas reflecting the peculiar needs of these developing lands. Although often wary of these new centers (which reflected the growing influence of the UN, UNESCO, and other multilateral agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency remote from American influence), U.S. officials sought to remain appraised of their activities.

Even if science sometimes seemed an uncertain asset in American foreign policy, U.S. policymakers continued to regard technology as a key indicator of the superiority of American capitalism, illuminating the nation's core values of productivity and resourcefulness. Most Americans still believed that technological solutions existed for a large range of social and political problems. Early in the Cold War, many Americans suggested

that Soviet citizens would revolt if sent Sears catalogs showing a cornucopia of American products, and their faith in technological fixes persisted after the launch of *Sputnik*. Perhaps technology, as embodied in military power, could cut through cultural differences to get the American message across. There was a sense of technological superiority on the part of American policymakers with a penchant for technological solutions to complex social and political problems in U.S. interactions with Asian countries. This was especially the case during the Vietnam War, when American scientists, engineers, military, and civilian leaders worked together to create and implement carpet bombing, defoliants, and electronic battlefields.

American policymakers also sought to capitalize on Asian countries' desire to catch up with the West in science and technology. This interest was not new: the U.S. government, when returning part of the Boxer indemnities to China in the early 1900s, had stipulated that the Chinese government had to use the returned funds for sending students to the United States to study science and technology-related subjects. As a result, the Boxer fellowships helped train several generations of Chinese scientists and engineers. In the 1970s and 1980s, American policymakers again hoped that American science and technology would play a role in the reopening and the normalization of U.S.–China relations. The Shanghai Communique signed by Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai during Richard Nixon's famous trip to China in 1972 highlighted science and technology, along with culture, sports, and journalism, as areas for people-to-people contacts and exchanges. Indeed, the ensuing exchange of students and scholars, including large numbers of scientists and engineers, shaped U.S.–China relations in many ways during this period. In this connection, the disproportionately large number of Chinese Americans who work in science and technology-related fields often played an important role in facilitating such exchanges and in mitigating U.S.–China tensions.

Faith in technological solutions to problems of U.S. foreign policy remained evident in the waning days of the Cold War, even as significant manufacturing sectors were shifted from the United States to lower-cost labor markets throughout the globe. This same faith was applied to relations with the Soviet Union. As historian Walter LaFeber has noted, Secretary of State George P. Shultz learned about the rapid advances of information technology and communications in the early 1980s, at the start of the Reagan presidency. He decided that communications technology could be used to make the Soviet Union face a potentially undermining choice: to yield control over information, at the cost of weakening the system, or maintaining communist controls at the cost of dramatically weakening its science and technology (and hence its economy and military). Against the advice of intelligence and State Department officials who saw few inherent technological weaknesses to exploit within the Soviet system, and convinced that the information revolution would lead to decentralized rather than central controls, Shultz pressed to bring this hard choice to the fore of American Soviet policy. While the decline and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union resulted from a complex set of social, political, and technological factors, modern information technology had become an important tool in U.S. foreign policy.

THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, accelerated two significant and already evident trends. The first was the decreased ability of the federal government to regulate the involvement of Americans in international science and technological ventures. This decline owed to further advances in communications technology, the continued globalization of manufacture and research, and an unprecedented expansion of nonprofit organizations involved in myriad aspects of foreign science policy. The second was greater international support for global treaties designed to limit technologies that threatened the natural environment.

Reduced state control over the conduct and practice of science and technology as aspects of foreign policy had several causes. One was the general relaxation of state restrictions that followed the end of the Cold War, including a reduced level of concern about the threat of nuclear annihilation (though, as the abortive spy trial of the Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee in the late 1990s would attest, the federal government remained vigilant, or even overzealous, as critics charged, about prosecuting alleged violations of nuclear secrets trade). By 1990, international scientific exchanges had become so commonplace that the Department of State, which thirty years before had scrutinized each case, gave up trying to count them. Yet another was the rising

influence of the biological and environmental sciences, challenging the dominance of the physical sciences as the key determinant of foreign policy in the sciences and providing nongovernmental organizations greater influence on policy decisions. In 1995 some 110,000 biological and life scientists were employed by the federal government, double the number from twelve years before. Well-funded conservation groups such as the World Wildlife Federation continued to export wilderness values and sustainable development concerns around the globe, including that for the Amazon rainforests, while more militant organizations, including Greenpeace, succeeded in stimulating public pressure to address problems with international whaling practices and the regulation of drilling platforms in international waters. No less influential were private foundations—notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which announced a $100 million commitment to international AIDS research in 2001—their undertaking reminiscent of the early twentieth century foreign health campaigns of the Rockefeller Foundation. But commercial concerns from powerful business interests also shaped State Department policies toward international science and technology, particularly as the growing commercial value of products derived from molecular biology and genetics inspired Eli Lilly, Hoffman-LaRoche, Genentech, and other large multinational firms to organize research and production facilities on a global scale.

Another factor that undermined the ability of the state to regulate international science and technological projects was the increasingly transnational character of fundamental scientific research. While the institutional structure of science remained largely national in character—since the state remained the dominant patron of scientific research—scientists found fewer barriers to participating in international collaborations than at any prior time in history. Transnational coauthorships in leading scientific nations reached 19 percent by the mid-1980s, and scientists found it easier to cross borders to conduct experiments at major foreign research facilities and to attend conferences in once off-limit cities such as Havana and Beijing. Financial exhaustion caused by the Cold War also inspired new transnational technological collaborations, including the U.S.–Russian space station, the Cassini Mission to Saturn, and the multinational Human Genome Project, the first big-science undertaking in the biological sciences. While Washington policymakers generally saw these developments as advantageous to U.S. interests, the reduction of centralized controls over technical systems occasionally disturbed security-conscious officials. During the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton, law enforcement agencies attempted to restrict the importation of foreign encryption programs, seeking to retain access to information transmitted via computers for criminal investigations and national security purposes, but technological firms successfully resisted this effort.

But the ending of the Cold War, which left the United States as the sole surviving superpower, also caused policymakers to scale back on efforts to convince other world leaders of the merits of capitalist-based science and technology. Despite calls for a new Marshall Plan to aid the democratic transformation of the former Soviet Union (which included providing ways to keep unemployed Russian nuclear technicians and bioweapons specialists from taking their skills to Iran, Libya, and other sponsors of international terrorism), the United States provided little support. Private efforts to provide such support did not succeed, despite a $100 million investment provided by the financier George Soros from 1992 to 1995. Soros argued (as American national security advisers had done throughout the Cold War) that Russian scientists were bulwarks of liberal democracy and antidotes to religious fundamentalism and mystical cults, but terminated his support when Western democracies failed to match his contributions. While citizens generally backed such measures, budget constraints did not permit policymakers to offer more than patchy responses to these problems.

The United States and other Western governments have proven more inclined to address the impact of scientific and technological developments on the global environment, seeing these threats as more immediate and more amenable to international negotiation. By the 1980s and 1990s, American leaders began playing active roles in negotiating treaties that sought to mitigate the effects of industrial and military byproducts in the environment, including efforts to maintain biodiversity, to reduce the destruction of ultraviolet-shielding stratospheric ozone, and to limit the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that heightened global warming. In certain respects these treaties resembled the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which limited the global spread of radioactive fallout. Like the much earlier Migratory Bird Treaty Act of

1918, these also sought to employ the best scientific knowledge available to address an evident problem, and they were controversial in their day. But these late twentieth-century treaties were profoundly different from their predecessors in several ways: they posed major economic and national security questions at the highest levels of government, they involved the full-time work of large numbers of scientists and policymakers, and they addressed issues intensely familiar to citizens (by 1989, 80 percent of Americans had heard of global warming). They were also multilateral treaties rather than bilateral—as most earlier international environmental treaties had been—thus reflecting the growing influence of the United Nations as a force in international science policy. In the mid-1990s the Clinton administration, aware that a majority of Americans backed these efforts (and believing, as historian Samuel P. Hays has argued, that they reflected deep-rooted American values about the environment), explicitly declared its support for environmental diplomacy. The Clinton administration also suggested that environmental degradation could lead to political and social stress, even major instability, and thus became the first to publicly argue that water rights disputes and overfishing were as significant in foreign policy as traditional issues of ideology, commerce, and immigration.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, U.S. willingness to take part in the post–Cold War framework of international science-based treaties appeared to wane. During his first six months in office, President George W. Bush signaled his intention to take a more unilateral stance, refusing to sign the Kyoto Accord on global warming while backing away from the 1996 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a pact designed to enforce an international ban on biological weapons (which powerful U.S. biotech groups had opposed, fearing the loss of trade secrets). In the early summer of 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld voiced willingness to "cast away" the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty, the bedrock of mutually assured destruction that had guided U.S. nuclear weapons policy throughout the Cold War era. These actions are a reminder that conservative concerns about limiting American power and the political unreliability of scientists have not faded. Yet these efforts ought not be taken as a sign of a major reorientation of the role of science and technology within U.S. foreign policy. The growth of an international framework for science and technology was largely determined by events beyond the control of the American people, who remain part of an international science and technological community more extensive than many realize. Constituencies for this system, within scientific community and within Congress and bureaucracy, are large. As with environmental values within the United States, global approaches to environmental regulation have gained favor with a significant portion of the U.S. population, and will remain a driving force in setting U.S. foreign policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Badash, Lawrence. *Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons: From Fission to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1939–1963*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995.

Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency: From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century*. New York, 2001.

Barth, Kai-Henrik. "Science and Politics in Early Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations." *Physics Today* 51 (1998): 34–39.

Cohen, I. Bernard. *Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and James Madison*. New York, 1995.

Cueto, Marcos, ed. *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America*. Bloomington, Ind., 1994.

DeGreiff, Alexis. "A History of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, 1960–1980. Ideology and Practice in a United Nations Institution for Scientific Co-operation for the Third World Development." Ph.D. dissertation. Imperial College London, 2001.

Divine, Robert A. *The Sputnik Challenge*. New York, 1993.

Doel, Ronald E., and Allan A. Needell. "Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National Needs, and Professional Opportunities." In Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew, eds. *Eternal Vigilance: Fifty Years of the CIA*. London, 1997.

Dorsey, Kurk. *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.–Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era*. Seattle, 1998.

Dupree, A. Hunter. *Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities*. Baltimore, 1986.

Graham, Loren R. *What Have We Learned About Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?* Stanford, Calif., 1998.

Hays, Samuel P. *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985.* Cambridge, Mass., 1987.

Hindle, Brooke, and Steven Lubar. *Engines of Change: The American Industrial Revolution, 1790–1860.* Washington, D.C., 1986.

Holloway, David. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956.* New Haven, Conn., 1994.

Hughes, Thomas P. *American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870–1970.* New York, 1989.

Kevles, Daniel J. "'Into Hostile Political Camps': The Reorganization of International Science in World War I." *Isis* 62 (1970): 47–60.

LaFeber, Walter. "Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations." *Diplomatic History* 24 (2000): 1–19.

Manzione, Joseph. "'Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military': The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945–1963." *Diplomatic History* 24 (2000): 21–56.

Needell, Allan A. *Science, the Cold War, and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the Balance of Professional Ideals.* London, 2000.

Rydell, Robert W., John E. Findling, and Kimberly D. Pelle. *Fair America: World's Fairs in the United States.* Washington, D.C., 2000.

Schröder-Gudehus, Brigitte. "Nationalism and Internationalism." In R. C. Olby et al., eds. *Companion to the History of Modern Science.* London, 1990.

Skolnikoff, Eugene B. *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics.* Princeton, N.J., 1993.

Wang, Jessica. *American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999.

Wang, Zuoyue. "U.S.–Chinese Scientific Exchange: A Case Study of State-Sponsored Scientific Internationalism During the Cold War and Beyond." *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences* 30, no. 1 (1999): 249–277.

Weiner, Charles. "A New Site for the Seminar: The Refugees and American Physics in the Thirties." *Perspectives in American History* 2 (1968): 190–234.

Wright, Susan. "Evolution of Biological Warfare Policy." In Susan Wright, ed. *Preventing a Biological Arms Race.* Cambridge, Mass., 1990.

See also ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; OUTER SPACE; PHILANTHROPY.

SELF-DETERMINATION

Betty Miller Unterberger

The principle of self-determination refers to the right of a people to determine its own political destiny. Beyond this broad definition, however, no legal criteria determine which groups may legitimately claim this right in particular cases. The right to self-determination has become one of the most complex issues facing policymakers in the United States and the international community at large. At the close of the twentieth century, it could mean the right of people to choose their form of government within existing borders or by achieving independence from a colonial power. It could mean the right of an ethnic, linguistic, or religious group to redefine existing national borders to achieve a separate national sovereignty or simply to achieve a greater degree of autonomy and linguistic or religious identity within a sovereign state. It could even mean the right of a political unit within a federal system such as Canada, Czechoslovakia, the former Soviet Union, or the former Yugoslavia to secede from the federation and become an independent sovereign state.

Self-determination is a concept that can be traced back to the beginning of government. The right has always been cherished by all peoples, although history has a long record of its denial to the weak by the strong. Both the Greek city-states and the earlier Mesopotamian ones were jealous of their right to self-determination. Yet to the Greeks, non-Greeks were barbarians, born to serve them and the object of conquest if they refused to submit. The development of modern states in Europe and the rise of popular national consciousness enhanced the status of self-determination as a political principle, but it was not until the period of World War I that the right of national independence came to be known as the principle of national self-determination. In general terms, it was simply the belief that each nation had a right to constitute an independent state and to determine its own government.

The historian Alfred Cobban has said that not every kind of national revolt can be included under the description of self-determination. The movement for national independence, or self-determination, falls into the same category as utilitarianism, communism, or Jeffersonian democracy. It is a theory, a principle, or an idea, and no simple, unconscious national movement can be identified with it. Struggles like the rising of the French under the inspiration of Joan of Arc or the Hussite Wars are fundamentally different from the national movements of the last two hundred years because of the absence of a theory of national self-determination, which could appear only in the presence of a democratic ideology.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

In this context, then, the revolt of the British colonies in North America has been defined as the first assertion of the right of national and democratic self-determination in the history of the world. Resenting domination from across the seas, and especially the imposition of taxes without representation, the American colonists invoked natural law and the natural rights of man, drawing inspiration from the writings of John Locke to support their view. Locke taught that political societies are based upon the consent of the people who compose them, each of whom agrees to submit to the majority. Man has a natural right to life, liberty, and property. Sovereignty belongs to the people and is therefore limited by the necessity to protect the individual members.

Thomas Jefferson emphasized Locke's theories as American ideals and epitomized the republican spirit of the century. In drafting the Declaration of Independence in June 1776, Jefferson stated his fundamental philosophy of government, upon which the modern concept of self-determination rests. He asserted that "all Men

are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and unalienable Rights ["certain unalienable Rights" in the Continental Congress's final draft], that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness"; that the "just Powers" of government are established "by the Consent of the governed" to protect these rights; and that when government does not, "it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government."

In considering the American Revolution as the seminal example of the modern principle of self-determination, it is important to focus attention on both elements of Jefferson's view. He was concerned not only with throwing off the foreign yoke but also with ensuring that the government was that of the people and that their will was supreme.

Since the formation of the United States, American statesmen have continually expressed sympathy for the basic principle of self-determination. In 1796, President George Washington stated that he was stirred "whenever, in any country, he saw an oppressed nation unfurl the banner of freedom." Three years earlier, Thomas Jefferson, then the American secretary of state, had said: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own is founded—that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change those forms at its own will."

Jefferson's view, supported by his fellow Virginians James Madison and James Monroe, was widely accepted by the American public during the ensuing years although never actually implemented as official policy. Nevertheless, regardless of its original intent, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Declaration of Independence provided a beacon of hope both to European peoples struggling for independence against autocratic governments and to colonial peoples seeking to advance toward independence. Frequently, American idealists threatened to drag the nation into European affairs by demanding that the government underwrite a policy of liberation abroad. For example, when the Greeks staged an abortive independence movement against the Turks in the 1820s, the Monroe administration was assailed by Daniel Webster in Congress and by many others for its apparent indifference to the cause of liberty in other parts of the world. Although realists like John Quincy Adams opposed the expression of sentiments unsupported by action, President James Monroe nonetheless placed on record his public support of the Greek struggle for self-determination in his famous message of December 1823.

NONINTERVENTION VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION

But it must be noted that while Adams recognized that American history fostered a sympathy for self-determination, that same tradition also had established as a cardinal priority the doctrine of nonintervention so forcefully enunciated by Washington in his Farewell Address. For Adams, concerned with the limits of American power in this period, the doctrine of nonintervention took precedence over the principle of self-determination.

Yet throughout the nineteenth century the American public frequently expressed sympathy for the struggles of oppressed peoples in Europe. This feeling was most vigorously demonstrated in relation to the Hungarians upon the failure of their revolution of 1848–1849. After the revolution had been crushed by Russian troops, Lajos Kossuth, the eloquent Hungarian leader, arrived in New York City in 1851 to the greatest ovation given anyone since the visit of the Marquis de Lafayette twenty-five years earlier.

When the Austrian chargé d'affaires protested to the State Department against the overt public sympathy expressed in favor of Hungary's liberation, Daniel Webster, then secretary of state, responded in a note explaining America's sympathy for Hungary as a natural expression of the national character, and assuring the Austrian government that such popular outbursts constituted no desertion of the established American doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Nevertheless, many persons in official positions demanded that the United States use its moral and physical power to support the freedom of Hungary. Furthermore, the government did not suppress the right of Congress to pass resolutions expressing the sympathy of the nation for struggling peoples, like the Hungarians, seeking freedom.

CIVIL WAR AND IMPERIALISM

The attitude of the federal government changed at the outset of the Civil War, when the United States found itself in the embarrassing position of using force to suppress the will of a minority of the nation seeking to establish its own independence.

Among the interested European observers of the American Civil War, there were perhaps as many partisans of the South as of the North. To some it seemed that the Southern states, by fighting for their self-determination as a nation, were striking a blow for political freedom and independence in the spirit of similar revolutionaries and national movements in the Old World. Southerners themselves contended that they were following the example of the American patriots of 1776, a view that appeared reasonable to many Englishmen. To the latter, Secretary of State William H. Seward made it clear that the United States could not regard as friends those who favored or gave aid to the insurrection under any pretext. In taking this position the United States pointed out that it was claiming only what it conceded to all other nations. Thus, the Civil War clearly determined the official policy of the United States toward self-determination. The United States in effect denied the right of communities within a constituted federal union to determine their allegiance, and that denial had been enforced by military power. Clearly, the doctrine of national sovereignty, supported by the principle of nonintervention, had officially and unequivocally taken precedence over the concept of self-determination.

This official view also influenced the policy of the United States in regard to the use of the plebiscite as a means of settling questions of sovereignty and self-determination. For example, Secretary Seward adamantly opposed a plebiscite on the abortive cession of the West Indian islands of St. Thomas and St. John in 1868. Again, in August 1897, in response to the Japanese minister's suggestion that a plebiscite be taken regarding the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, Secretary of State John Sherman drew upon the history of international relations to confirm the impropriety of "appealing from the action of the Government to 'the population.'" "In international comity and practice," said Sherman, "the will of a nation is ascertained through the established and recognized government," and "it is only through it that the nation can speak." The same principle in regard to annexed territories was asserted in the memorandum of the American Peace Commission at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Thus, by 1899 the United States had emphatically asserted its adherence to the principle and practice of annexation without the consent of the peoples annexed.

On the fall of the Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere in 1898, the United States gained colonial control of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and enjoyed quasi-suzerainty over Cuba, from which it withdrew its military presence in 1902 while reserving certain rights for itself. This put the United States in the anomalous position of having fought a war against Spain at least officially for Cuban self-determination, only to deny that principle to the colonies acquired in the peace settlement. Those who opposed annexation constituted a powerful anti-imperialist movement, headed by many political and intellectual leaders. Deeply concerned over the concept of self-determination, although they did not specifically mention it, they clearly opposed annexation on the ground that it involved the suppression of a conquered people. Although the anti-imperialists could not defeat the peace treaty, they were able to bring the issue of imperialism into the open and to raise considerable national doubt as to whether the treaty was in accord with the direct traditions of self-determination as revealed by the establishment of the nation.

The nation's ambivalence concerning the proper interpretation and appropriate application of the concept of self-determination was exposed again when the American people were called upon to decide the novel questions of whether the Constitution followed the flag across the Pacific and whether democracy could be preserved at home in its new imperial setting. Anti-imperialists argued against the abandonment of American principles for the ways of the Old World. Imperialists, also calling upon American traditions, maintained that democracy could be extended only to a people fit to receive it. Self-government depended upon a nation's capacity for political action, and if a people was not ready for independence, it must undergo a period of political tutelage and protection. Thus, the imperialists joined the American conception of manifest destiny with Rudyard Kipling's call for the Anglo-Saxon nations to take up the white man's burden. In the curious reasoning of an official U.S. commission to the Philippines, "American sovereignty is only another name for the liberty of the Filipinos." And yet it must be noted that every president after William McKinley extended the prospect of freedom and independence to the Philippines until it was actually granted in 1946.

By 1899, then, the American conflict of principle in regard to self-determination might clearly be seen by examining two great heroes in American history. The popular reputation of George Washington rested less on his great work

as the nation's first president than on his successful conduct of a struggle for self-determination, while Abraham Lincoln's rested on his success in suppressing such a struggle. Although pursuing diametrically opposite principles, both were judged right by posterity—even, in the main, by the descendants of the defeated sides. Later events have caused the Civil War to be regarded as waged on the issue of slavery, but at the outset Lincoln asserted that it was fought not to abolish slavery but to maintain the Union—that is, to resist the claim of the Southern states to independence. Such a claim or right has its limits, and—to state the matter from the cold standpoint of political philosophy—the national government believed that in this case the claim was not within the limits where the principle properly applied.

Considerations like these induce one to reflect upon the limited nature of principles commonly accepted as universal; upon the conflicts that arise when two inconsistent universal principles come into collision; and how far such conflict may be avoided by recognizing that there are limits, with a debatable region in which neither can be rigorously applied.

Wilsonianism World War I and the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson provided the nation an opportunity for a supreme effort to reconcile the principles of self-determination and national sovereignty in a way that might provide a lasting peace. In a May 1916 address before the League to Enforce Peace, he announced as a fundamental principle "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . . " During the following two years, Wilson continued to proclaim vigorously and with passionate conviction his version of the right of national self-determination. He stated that "No peace can last or ought to last which does not accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that "no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." The president's repeated affirmation of an abstract principle of justice that should be universally applied had a profound influence on the subsequent statements of both the Allies and the Central Powers. In a dramatic appearance before Congress in January 1918, Wilson crystallized his war aims in the famous Fourteen Points address. Although the phrase "self-determination" was not specifically used, at least six of the Fourteen Points dealt with some interpretation or application of the principle.

The Bolsheviks in Russia played a decisive role in the specific clarification and implementation of the American concept of self-determination. When the Bolshevik leaders Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky came to power in November 1917, they demanded an immediate, general, and democratic peace with the Central Powers, based on no "annexations and contributions [reparations] with the right of all nations to self-determination." On 3 December the Russians suspended hostilities with Germany and its allies, a state that lasted until 17 December. During this period the Bolsheviks used the concept of self-determination heavily on behalf of peace. After a powerful propaganda campaign, they were finally able to convince their opponents to allow more time for the negotiations, so as to permit the Allies to define their war aims and decide whether they wished to participate. During this period the Bolsheviks published the six points for world peace that they had laid down for the guidance of the peace conference. Five dealt with self-determination. Although the United States and the Allies failed to perceive it until Trotsky pointed it out to them, the points were directed at them as much as at the Central Powers. Indeed, the Russians had proposed five points that in essence were the same as five of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, published only a few weeks later.

On 29 December, with six days remaining during which the Entente Powers could exercise their option to participate in the negotiations, Trotsky sent them an appeal, pointing out that the Allies could no longer insist on fighting for the liberation of Belgium, northern France, Serbia, and other areas since Germany and its allies had indicated a willingness to evacuate those areas following a universal peace. Some response appeared to be necessary, for not only did Trotsky call for violent proletarian revolution against the Allied governments, but he had also shrewdly based his primary argument on Wilson's principle of self-determination. Although probably not realizing it, Wilson was in an ideological corner; either he must accept the Bolshevik conclusion that all peoples in all states, including all colonies, had the right to immediate self-determination, or he must reject it but in its place offer some standard of what constituted an acceptable unit for the application of that principle.

While Wilson had been sympathetic to the principle of self-determination as enunciated by Lenin, he had no illusions concerning the German response to it. By the end of December 1917

it appeared clear that self-determination, as understood by the Germans, justified the severance from Russia of the territories occupied by the German army: Russian Poland, most of the Baltic provinces, and parts of Belarus. Indeed, by the middle of December the State Department was aware that the Ukraine, Finland, and Transcaucasia were in the process of declaring themselves independent under the auspices of Lenin's program of self-determination. Finally, it was apparent that if Russia was to have peace according to the German interpretation of self-determination, it would entail heavy territorial sacrifices. Wilson was opposed to such an interpretation of self-determination, and on several occasions declared his opposition to the dismemberment of empires. But in that case, what did Wilson's concept of self-determination really mean? Trotsky had made it clear that to demand self-determination for the peoples of enemy states but not for the peoples within the Allied states or their own colonies would "mean the defense of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism."

Since Trotsky's invitation presented an ideological challenge, an analysis of the American response becomes crucial. Secretary of State Robert Lansing totally opposed it. His attack was based on his social conservatism, his animosity toward Bolshevik ideology, and, most important, his insight into the logical and political requirements for a meaningful application of the principle of self-determination in foreign policy. His advice to the president betrayed the contradictions that still existed in his thinking. On the one hand, he argued that the president should refuse to make any response whatsoever to their appeals. On the other, he admitted that Trotsky's logic demanded some answer and that a more detailed restatement of American war aims might well be expedient.

In his analysis of the Bolsheviks' reasoning, Lansing apparently also sought to convince the president of the undesirability of settling territorial problems by means of self-determination. He pointed out that the existing concept of the sovereignty of states in international relations would be destroyed if the "mere expression of popular will" were to become the governing principle in territorial settlements. He reminded Wilson of the nation's decision in regard to popular sovereignty in its own civil war and stated: "We as a nation, are therefore committed to the principle that a national state may by force if necessary prevent a portion of its territory from seceding without its consent especially if it has long exercised sovereignty over it or if its national safety or vital interests would be endangered." The Bolshevik proposal, Lansing warned, would be "utterly destructive of the political fabric of society and would result in constant turmoil and change."

One of the strongest points in Lansing's analysis was his discovery that the discussion regarding self-determination up to that point had a major ideological flaw. There was no definition of the "distinguishing characteristic" of the unit to which the principle was to be applied. Trotsky had discussed the right of nationalities without defining what a nationality was. Was it based on blood, habitation of a particular territory, language, or political affinity? Clearly, accurate definition of the word was necessary if the terms proposed were to be properly interpreted; otherwise, they were far too vague to be considered intelligently. Lansing added that if the Bolsheviks intended to suggest that every community could determine its own allegiance to a particular state, or to become independent, the political organization of the world would be shattered. The result, he said, would be international anarchy. Lansing did not provide a definition of "nationalities." He surely must have perceived that his criticism of the Bolsheviks applied equally to Wilson's position.

THE WILSONIAN RESPONSE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

President Wilson was now in possession of two totally divergent views on self-determination. Whereas Trotsky had pushed the principle to its limits, advocating that all peoples, not just a selected list, be liberated from foreign rule, Secretary Lansing had drawn his sword against Trotsky and negated the usefulness of self-determination in settling world issues. He insisted that if the present political and social order was to be preserved, then the principle of the legal sovereignty of constituted states must take precedence over any consideration of the popular will of minorities.

The president was at odds with both points of view. At the core of his belief, self-determination meant the moral necessity of government by consent of the governed. Self-determination was to Wilson almost another word for popular sovereignty; *vox populi* was *vox dei*. Rousseau's "general will" was for him not merely ideal will, but the actual will of the people, which had only to be freed from the ill will of autocratic governments

for its innate goodness to be manifested. The idealization of democracy was an essential part of Wilsonian ideology. Firmly convinced of the goodness of the people's will, he believed in the possibility of building a new and better international order on the basis of national sovereignty, in which he assumed the democratic will of the people to be embodied.

To put it in another way, Wilson's belief in the goodness and power of world opinion, which might be termed the general will of humanity, and its identity with the general will of every democratic nation, enabled him to hold the view that the self-determination of nations and national sovereignty was a possible basis—indeed, the only basis—of world peace. The president never conceived of these principles as divided or as being applied separately. He had concluded that the primary cause of aggression by one state against another was a desire for territorial and economic security in the absence of international political security. The hallmark of this lack of international security was the bipolar alliance system that operated in an atmosphere of struggle for the elusive balance of power. This being the case, the president reasoned, if national security could be restored to the various states, then the motive for political and economic aggression would be removed from international politics. Wilson believed that an international organization of states, through the common resources of a community of power, would provide the required security. Once states adjusted to operating for the common welfare of humankind, without resorting to the exploitation of one state by another, then the existing inequities regarding points of sovereignty could be resolved by an international organization based on the principle that government must be with the consent of the governed. This was Wilson's long-range view of the application of self-determination. Even before the United States entered the war, he had come to regard the League of Nations as central to his thought.

Nevertheless, the day after receiving Lansing's letter opposing the Bolsheviks, President Wilson revealed, in a conversation with the retiring British ambassador, that while he sympathized with the Bolshevik desire to settle the war on the basis of self-determination, he was also deeply influenced by the views of his secretary of state: "In point of logic, of pure logic, this principle which was good in itself would lead to the complete independence of various small nationalities now forming part of various empires. Pushed to its extreme, the principle would mean the disruption of existing governments, to an indefinable degree." Wilson's introduction to his Fourteen Points speech appeared to be a direct answer to the challenge presented by the German-Russian negotiations then being conducted at Brest-Litovsk. His deep concern with Russia's plight seems apparent from a reading of his eloquent passages concerning that nation. Apparently seeking to impress both the ruler and the ruled, he did not call for the overthrow of Bolshevik power as a condition for renewed cooperation. Moreover, fully resolved to continue the crusade regardless of all suggestions for a negotiated peace, Wilson refused to abandon Russia's borderland to the tortured interpretation of self-determination put forth by the Central Powers. Thus, the sixth of the Fourteen Points called for an evacuation of all Russian territory and the adoption of diplomacy by all other nations of the world, of actions that would permit an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for Russia's independent self-determination under institutions of its free choosing.

Even though the United States later, under tremendous pressure from the Allies, participated in expeditions to Siberia and northern Russia, Wilson justified these departures from his clearly enunciated principles on the ground that he was seeking to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia and the ultimate right of self-determination for its people, while at the same time "rescuing" the Czech legion presumably trapped in Russia and preserving the Open Door policy in the Russian Far East and northern Manchuria against suspected Japanese imperialism. But perhaps even more important, he was seeking to retain the goodwill of the Allies, whose support was vital to the success of a League of Nations, the capstone of his Fourteen Points. Thus, to block Japan and further the league, Wilson followed a policy that appeared to be totally at variance not only with the principle of self-determination, but also with the principles of his proposed league. Wilson, above all the man of principle, found himself caught, as had the nation itself many times since its inception, in a debatable situation where, despite deep convictions, none of his principles could be rigorously applied.

Wilson was in a somewhat similar quandary in relation to the tenth point, concerning Austria-Hungary. From the U.S. entry into the war, he had disapproved of the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy. In doing so he hoped to divide Vienna

and Berlin by strengthening those elements in Austria-Hungary that favored an early negotiated peace. Although sympathetic to the desires for self-determination of the oppressed nationalities within the empire, he could not accept "the extreme logic of this discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria Hungary." Thus, in the tenth point Wilson stopped short of a clear-cut endorsement of independence by placing his emphasis on providing the peoples of Austria-Hungary with the free opportunity for "autonomous development" within a Danubian Confederation of States.

In January 1918, Wilson had reason to believe that such a policy might still keep open the door to a negotiated peace with Austria-Hungary. However, subsequent events, especially Czech belligerency against the Germans in Russia and the failure of his efforts to negotiate a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, led Wilson to give up his dream for a Danubian Confederation and support an independent Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although Lansing and the State Department had presented strong arguments for the recognition of Czech independence on the basis of ethnicity, language, and shared historical experience, Wilson would accept none of these. It was only Czech belligerency in Russia against Germany that provided the rationale for his recognition of the de facto independence of Czechoslovakia.

Curiously, the first of Wilson's territorial points dealt with the colonial problem. Here the president very cautiously advocated "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims." Regardless of how broad or narrow the interpretation of "colonial claims," Wilson insisted that their settlement be based upon the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the governments whose title was to be determined. Lansing's caution surely had an effect. Once again, the president appeared, perhaps without realizing it, to be seeking some reconciliation of the historic conflict of principles.

An examination of the remainder of Wilson's points on self-determination reveals that only in the case of Poland did the president offer an outright and unqualified commitment to independence. The thirteenth point, then, contrasted sharply with Wilson's application of the self-determination principle in the preceding seven points. It must have been evident to Wilson that the national and language conflicts destined to emerge with the rebirth of Poland were likely to be intense. It is therefore noteworthy that Poland was given specific political and economic guarantees. First, Wilson publicly proclaimed Poland to be in need of a "free and secure access to the seas." Second, this economic and strategic safeguard was further supplemented by Wilson's proposal that Poland's "political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant." His thirteenth point, which gave an international guarantee for the independence of Poland, might be looked upon as the link to the fourteenth point, which called for the establishment of the League of Nations.

Although millions rallied to the idea of a League of Nations as the essential guarantee for a perpetual peace, Wilson—without even mentioning peace—chartered an association of nations in order to secure "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity." Peace was the ultimate objective, but the immediate function of the league was the preservation of the territorial arrangements that would emerge from the peace conference. The association of nations was meant to be a sort of midwife to nations about to be born; it would help them pass from the precarious stage of infancy through adolescence, to full maturity in a new "community of power."

Even the president himself possibly did not realize the full significance of the explosive principle that he had done so much to set in motion. Certainly a fundamental weakness of Wilson's ideas was his failure to realize how indeterminate a criterion nationality might be, and how little assistance it might sometimes give in deciding actual frontiers. Moreover, although he had spoken of self-determination as though it were an absolute principle of international right, from the very beginning he perforce allowed competing principles to influence his decisions and derogate from its claims. Yet by and large the peace conference of 1918 proceeded on the theory that, insofar as possible, boundaries should be readjusted by balancing the principle of national self-determination against other factors. The new boundaries would then be guaranteed against forcible change.

THE INTERWAR YEARS AND WORLD WAR II

Despite Wilson's efforts, the principle of self-determination was not explicitly written into the

League of Nations Covenant. Therefore, many predicted that it would soon be forgotten. Moreover, after the war U.S. officials tended to regard the Slavic states of Europe as politically corrupt, economically unstable, and strategically insignificant. During the interwar years, U.S. concern for the region was limited to occasional statements on behalf of religious freedom and self-determination of peoples. U.S. officials never formulated any specific policies to achieve such aims for the simple reason that Eastern Europe lay outside the region of historic American interest. It was obvious, therefore, that America would not oppose any serious German or Russian challenge to the newly created states. Thus, when Nazi power destroyed Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939 and overran all of Eastern Europe in 1940, the American people were reluctant to offer anything more than deep sympathy. Nevertheless, nationalists in Asia such as Mahatma Gandhi in India and Ho Chi Minh in Indochina continued to seek national liberation, inspired in part by Wilson's ideal of self-determination.

However, as events were to demonstrate, the view that self-determination was merely an anomaly of World War I proved to be false. Amid the confusion of World War II, the outline of the future world settlement began to appear and take shape. Franklin D. Roosevelt was as challenged and as baffled by the idea of self-determination as Wilson had been. Just as Wilson believed that an international organization was needed to transform the doctrine of self-determination into political reality, so Roosevelt saw the United Nations, Wilson's grandchild, as hopefully playing the role in which Wilson had cast it. The United Nations was to accept "the fact of nationalism and the need for internationalism." Just as Wilson had experienced difficulties in interpreting and applying the doctrine of self-determination in the face of Allied objections, the secret treaties, and Bolshevik competition, Franklin Roosevelt had similar problems. In the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, he and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain joined to make known certain common principles and national policies on which they based their hopes for a better future. Once again the principle of self-determination of peoples was affirmed and the desire expressed "to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Respect was also reaffirmed for "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" and "to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

As in World War I, both the meaning and the scope of these abstract principles were open to conflicting interpretations. For example, the Atlantic Charter ignored the burgeoning interests of the Soviet Union in European politics. For Joseph Stalin the charter's repudiation of any alteration in the prewar political and territorial status of Eastern Europe—the only region that offered the Soviets any tangible and lasting fruits of victory—rendered it totally unacceptable as a basis of action. That the Soviet Union, unlike both the United States and Britain, suffered incalculable physical destruction and twenty million deaths at the hands of the invading Nazis made inevitable vast disagreements over the applicability of the Atlantic Charter to the territories of Germany and Eastern Europe. While both Britain and the United States recognized that without the continued and unlimited military efforts of the Soviet Union the West could hardly hope to defeat Germany, the Atlantic Charter assumed that the two Western democracies, even before the United States had formally entered the war, could dominate the postwar settlements in a region that comprised not only the historic territorial objectives of the Russian nation but also the area the Soviet armies might actually occupy.

Fighting for their existence, the Russians were in no position to antagonize their Western allies. At the meeting of the Allies in London in September 1941, they accepted the principle of self-determination; clearly, though, the Soviet Union would follow the precepts of the Atlantic Charter only to the extent that they served its security interests. That the immediate military requirements far outweighed ultimate political intention was illustrated in January 1942, when the Soviet Union and twenty-five other nations signed the United Nations Declaration, the opening paragraph of which accepted the purpose and principles of the Atlantic Charter.

In 1944, as the Allies began to free vast areas of Europe from Nazi control, their political differences could no longer be submerged. As the Russian armies rolled across Eastern Europe, what the United States had denied Stalin by refusing to accede to a spheres-of-influence agreement, now fell to the Soviet Union through rapid military advancement. But as late as April 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, committed to the Wilsonian vision of self-determination, not only opposed any negotiation of spheres of influence with the

Soviet Union but also promised the American people a postwar world based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Whatever security Stalin required along his western boundaries, said Hull, he could obtain through a strong postwar peace organization. When it became clear to Stalin that free governments in such nations as Poland and Romania would not do his bidding, he employed his military advantage to impose governments friendly to the Soviet Union through the agency of communist puppet regimes. This eliminated the possibility of any serious negotiation on the postwar Soviet frontiers of Eastern Europe. By 1945 the Western powers could no longer assure even limited self-determination for the Slavic peoples of Europe. What remained for the United States was the cruel choice of compromising the principles of the Atlantic Charter or sacrificing the alliance itself.

DECOLONIZATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The principle of self-determination fared considerably better in other areas of the world. In effect, what World War I did for Eastern Europe, World War II accomplished in Asia and Africa. Between 1946 and 1960, thirty-seven new nations emerged from colonial status in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Roosevelt's efforts to implement the concept of self-determination were augmented enormously—indeed, decisively—by the rising tide of nationalism on these continents. Nevertheless, the United States was again beset with the problem of balancing its conflicting interests and its conflicting principles. As Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, the prime difficulty generally with regard to Asian colonial possessions was to induce the colonial powers—principally Britain, France, and the Netherlands—to adopt American ideas with regard to dependent peoples. Yet they could not be pressed too far without jeopardizing the very close cooperation the United States sought with them in Europe. Fortunately for Roosevelt's objectives, the movement for national self-determination in Asia and Africa was greatly accelerated by the quick, total collapse of French resistance to German aggression and the Japanese conquest and "liberation" of European colonial possessions in the Far East.

These events profoundly changed the attitudes of the Asian and African masses. Moreover, Roosevelt himself sought to exert a beneficial influence on his allies. For instance, despite suggestions that the date for granting full independence in the Philippines be postponed as a consequence of the ravages of war and the cooperation of prominent Filipinos with the Japanese, the United States kept its promise and the islands became independent on 4 July 1946. Nor did Britain, in its old liberality and realistic wisdom, attempt to restore its Asian empire. From 1947 it brought to fulfillment the work of true liberation that had started throughout the empire even before World War I. France, resenting its humiliation in World War II and seeking to restore old imperial glory, deeply resented Anglo-American accommodation to changing reality. Britain was held responsible for France's loss of Syria and Lebanon, and American greed or innocence—or perhaps a combination of both—was suspected of being behind the national liberation movements in Indochina and North Africa. Yet the American conflict of principles was revealed by the fact that France fought wars in Indochina and Algeria with the help of American arms and money.

On the other hand, the United Nations Charter reflected both the triumph of Wilson's concept of self-determination and the change in international relations that had occurred during the intervening years. Whereas the Covenant of the League of Nations ultimately had no references to the concept of national self-determination, the charter of the United Nations mentioned it three times. However, the charter did not insist on independence, but spoke only of self-government. The principle of federation was more promising than that of national independence. What was essential in the democratic tradition—and here the charter drew largely from Wilsonian thought—was not national independence but self-government, government based upon the consent of the governed, and respect for the equality of the peoples involved. After 1960 the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence was reaffirmed almost annually by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

THE COLD WAR

Yet throughout these years the United States continued to face the dilemma of which it became aware during and immediately following World War II. On the one hand, it hesitated to antagonize western European countries whose cooperation was needed in the postwar world. On the other

PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DETERMINATION

"Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."

— John Quincy Adams, 4 July 1821 —

"We are glad . . . to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of the people . . . for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. . . . We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and freedom of the nations can make them."

— Woodrow Wilson, 2 April 1917 —

"This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations."

— Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1945 —

"A despotism of the present Soviet type cannot indefinitely perpetuate its rule over hundreds of millions of people who love God, who love their country, and who have a sense of personal dignity. The Soviet system, which seeks to expunge the distinctive characteristics of nations, creed, and individuality must itself change or be doomed ultimately to collapse."

— John Foster Dulles, 1952 —

"The United States doesn't now and never has advocated open rebellion by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail."

— Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956 —

"We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. . . . This is not cultural imperialism, it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity. . . . It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy."

— Ronald Reagan, 8 June 1982 —

"No society, no continent should be disqualified from sharing the ideals of human liberty. . . . Abandonment of the worldwide democratic revolution could be disastrous for American security."

— George H. W. Bush, 15 December 1992 —

"Our dream is that of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace."

— Bill Clinton, 27 September 1993 —

hand, American idealists continued to express their deep-rooted sympathy with any people aspiring to freedom. The problem, however, was exacerbated by the onset of the Cold War and the American adoption of a policy of containment. Actually, the rationale for the policy developed in the Truman Doctrine drew heavily upon American ideological support of the principle of self-determination. However, the new interpretation changed America's early historic role of merely expressing sympathy to one of active and official economic and military support of the self-determination of "free peoples" who were "resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres-

sures." For the first time, President Harry S. Truman officially endorsed the necessity of actually assisting "free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." From this point on, official American policy held that international communism violated the principle of self-determination and was irreconcilable with the right of each state to develop its own political, economic, and cultural life. Nevertheless, Washington supported the efforts of Marshal Josip Broz Tito to hold together a unified federal Yugoslavia as an effective counterweight to the influence of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, while the United States paid homage to independence for the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union and provided token support for Tibetan nationalism in its claims against the People's Republic of China, because of the need to minimize the possibility of war or political crisis with the Soviet Union or the Sino-Soviet bloc, the United States did nothing to buttress these causes. The United States also sought to preserve existing states. It feared that the breakup of a state into its ethnic components would increase the risk of armed conflict and destabilize other multi-ethnic states. The United States not only favored the preservation of existing states, it also favored the integration of a number of states into multilateral groupings, such as the European community. Thus, the United States encouraged states of some ethnic diversity to join together and support one another in larger integrated communities.

The official pursuit of anticommunism raised pertinent questions concerning the nature and use of America's commitment to self-determination. For example, in the Western Hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine had been used by the United States to bar undesirable outside influence while securing the dominance of its own influence. Within ten years after World War II, the Monroe Doctrine—extended, supplemented, and reinterpreted by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the Declaration of Caracas in 1954—gave the United States a claim to keep communism, now clearly accepted as incompatible with the concept of self-determination, out of the American states. In furtherance of this policy the United States intervened in Guatemala in 1954 to unseat the incumbent government. The invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 was an abortive attempt to unseat the socialist and populist government of Fidel Castro. When disturbances broke out in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the United States occupied the capital, Santo Domingo. President Lyndon Johnson justified this action in May 1965 by asserting that what had begun as a popular revolution committed to democracy and social justice had fallen into "the hands of a band of communist conspirators."

In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the United States adopted a somewhat similar stance. The triumph of communism in China, the Korean War, McCarthyism at home, and the moral principles enunciated by John Foster Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of state, enormously enhanced this position. Thus, the recognition that communism itself was a basic threat to the self-determination of virtually any nation, as well as a threat to the American way of life, led the United States to support almost any anticommunist regime or to associate itself with traditional authoritarian regimes whose days were numbered because they had alienated mass support: Bao Dai and Ngo Dinh Diem in Indochina and King Faisal II in Iraq were only three such examples. The fact that their governments were pro-American and anticommunist qualified them in American eyes as democratic, or at least potentially so; by the same token, the United States opposed internal movements to overthrow them and condemned these as communist or procommunist. Moreover, such policies were implemented and elaborated by the formation of pacts like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and proposals like the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. Such a response was typical of the apparent inability of the United States to understand the unique social and political nature of the struggles for self-determination of Asia and the Middle East. In the attempt to contain communism and thus maintain its new concept of self-determination, the United States became committed to the domestic, social, and political status quo throughout the world.

VIETNAM

Nowhere did such a policy ultimately come to be regarded by the American public as more bankrupt than in Vietnam. When France was driven from Indochina by the communist forces of Ho Chi Minh in 1954, the United States established a noncommunist regime in South Vietnam in the hope of confining communism to the northern half of Vietnam. The objective was not only to help "free people" maintain their independence but also, the rationale went, to save neighboring Southeast Asian regimes that, it was believed,

would fall like dominoes should South Vietnam fall. Then, communism would be in a position to threaten the Indian subcontinent. By 1968 the weakness of the Saigon government and the military success of the Vietcong had led the U.S. government to commit a military force of 550,000 soldiers and a budget of roughly $24 billion. But as President Johnson escalated the war and the costs and casualties mounted, public criticism reached a level that made the Vietnam conflict the most unpopular war in American history.

Such criticisms ultimately led to President Johnson's decision to announce a halt in bombing north of the seventeenth parallel and to stay out of the 1968 presidential election. Among the arguments used to oppose the war was the charge that not only had the United States betrayed its own revolutionary traditions by becoming the aggressor in a civil war between peoples of the same linguistic background who resented foreign interference, but that it was also violating the Wilsonian principle of self-determination by conniving at the flouting of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which had stipulated that general elections to unify the country be held in Vietnam in 1956. In the early 1970s, as criticism of the war continued to mount, and particularly after President Richard Nixon authorized ill-starred incursions into Cambodia and Laos, serious peace negotiations were begun by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But the Paris accords, which Kissinger negotiated in early 1973 with North Vietnam and South Vietnam, never worked. The pact promised discussions leading to reunification "without coercion or annexation by either party." By late 1973, however, full-scale war had emerged. In 1974 an economically troubled United States cut aid by 30 percent. By early 1975, South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu, forced to surrender two-thirds of the country, prepared to defend Saigon and called for President Gerald Ford to provide the American "full force" promised by President Nixon in 1973. In late 1973, however, Congress had prohibited the reintroduction of any U.S. forces in Vietnam. Furthermore, Nixon's 1973 promise was of no effect, for he and Kissinger did not make the promise public, while Congress never acted to make it a national commitment. In April 1975, South Vietnam fell into communist hands. After the failure of the United States to impose self-determination by military means in Southeast Asia, foreign liberation movements and separatist groups rarely attracted any sizable American constituency.

The military collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, combined with the serious pursuit of détente with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China beginning in the late 1960s, appeared to offer the possibility not only of a redefinition of the American concept of self-determination but also of a modified implementation of the doctrine of intervention as a means of supporting it. The Nixon Doctrine offered to provide money, arms, and training, but no American troops. Nations seeking self-determination must now provide their own armies.

Yet it must be noted that throughout this period, Washington continued to oppose self-determination movements that appeared to favor any communist cause. This could be clearly seen even in the most cursory review of American policies in South Asia, Chile, and southern Africa.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTH ASIA AND CHILE

On 9 August 1971, some three weeks after President Nixon had announced his visit to Peking in an effort to normalize relations, the Soviets signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship (and quasi-alliance) with India. The Indians feared another crushing onslaught from the bordering Chinese (as in 1962), while the Soviets were evidently eager to clasp hands with India against an increasingly menacing China. Although India and Pakistan had been enemies since the partition of British India in 1947, the United States had been supplying arms to Pakistan, an American ally. This unpromising Asiatic pot came to a furious boil in March 1971, when populous East Pakistan, separated by more than a thousand miles from West Pakistan, formally rebelled against alleged mistreatment by its West Pakistan overlords. The secessionists officially proclaimed the independent state of Bangladesh. The West Pakistan army, with alleged genocidal intent, undertook to crush the uprising with full-scale butchery, rape, and pillage. An estimated nine million destitute refugees began to pour across borders into already overpopulated and underfed India. In November 1971, responding to protests from India, Washington cancelled further shipments of arms to Pakistan. Then, early in December, India, after declaring war on Pakistan, proceeded to invade and free Bangladesh in a mercifully short clash of fifteen days. The United States, supporting the losing side, emerged from

the episode looking rather foolish. Evidently seeking to counter a reported Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and to display sympathy for its Pakistani ally, Washington hastily dispatched a powerful naval task force to the Indian Ocean. The transparent explanation given at the time was the necessity of evacuating a handful of U.S. citizens, most of whom had already left Bangladesh. This futile exhibition of old-fashioned "show the flag" gunboat diplomacy, with its "tilt toward Pakistan," probably gratified China, which was pro-Pakistan, but pleased neither the Soviets, the Indians, nor even the Pakistanis. Relations with India became frigid, especially after Washington cut developmental loans, charging that India was the "main aggressor" in the conflict. Nearly a year later, in November 1972, Pakistan withdrew from the SEATO alliance and in other ways indicated alienation from the United States. Thus, Bangladesh was born: a satellite of India, famine-ridden and impoverished.

In the meantime, leftist trends in Chile, once an outstanding democracy, had become especially worrisome to Washington. A left-wing coalition, which accused American copper mining and other interests of "milking" the country, won the 1970 election and elevated to the presidency Salvador Allende Gossens, a home-grown Marxist. As the first avowed Marxist to win a free election in the hemisphere, Allende posed an unusual problem for the United States. The dilemma intensified when he nationalized nearly $1 billion of American investment, opened diplomatic relations with the government of Fidel Castro, and signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. The United States retaliated by refusing to help Chile with trade or developmental programs. American banks and the Export-Import Bank cut credit. President Nixon secretly ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to follow a "get rougher" policy that encouraged anti-Allende demonstrations by middle-class Chileans. Kissinger wholeheartedly approved, in part because he was afraid that a successful radical left coalition might have contagious effects not only in Latin America but also in France and Italy. It was his own version of the domino theory.

Allende's inability to stop a rapid economic deterioration brought attacks from both conservatives and ultraleftists. In September 1973 a coup by army officers resulted in Allende's death and a right-wing military dictatorship. The United States quickly reopened its aid program; some property taken from American corporations was returned or paid for; and when the American ambassador protested the army's repression, which included torturing and imprisoning thousands of political opponents, Kissinger angrily told the ambassador "to cut out the political science lectures." By 1975 there was no longer any doubt that the United States had played a role in overthrowing the Allende government in Chile and replacing it with the ferociously right-wing General Augusto Pinochet.

U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA

American policy in Africa, although not so heavily involved, followed the same pattern. The dominant element after 1946 was opposition to communism and to the communist powers. As far as Africa was concerned, responsibility for pursuing these objectives was delegated to America's trusted allies—Britain, France, Belgium, and even Portugal—whose policies in the area were therefore broadly supported, despite minor disagreements that arose as American business became interested in Africa's potential. Inevitably, this placed the United States in opposition to an Africa seeking to win its independence from those same powers. However, when political freedom could be achieved peacefully, the United States was able to appear to Africa like a neutral bystander. In these cases the United States was able to adjust its policies and accept the new status of African sovereign states without any difficulty, although it continued to look at African affairs largely through anticommunist spectacles.

In southern Africa, practical support for the status quo continued unabated until after the Portuguese revolution in April 1974. Thus, despite America's verbal criticism of Portuguese colonialism, U.S. arms and equipment were used by Portugal in its military operations in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Despite verbal opposition to apartheid, American trade and investment in South Africa were expanded, and the United States opposed any effective United Nations demonstration of hostility toward the apartheid state. The United States also fought a hard and largely successful rearguard action against the demands for international intervention against South Africa's occupation of Namibia (South-West Africa). Regarding the British colony of Rhodesia, the United States trailed behind British opposition to the white-minority regime of Ian Smith, watered down the sanctions policies it

had endorsed at the United Nations, and criticized black African regimes for the vehemence of their opposition to the Smith regime.

In Africa the superpowers nearly confronted each other in a crisis that typified the new Cold War that was developing in the 1970s. Throughout the anticolonial war in Angola (1960–1974), the United States supported Portugal, not any of the nationalist forces. Supplying the Portuguese-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) with money and military and other equipment while decolonization finally took place was thus a rather blatant attempt to place "friends" in political power in the new state. But the more effective Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) did not collapse. Instead, it asked for and received more arms from its supporters, including the Soviet Union, to meet a South African invasion of Angola in 1975. The MPLA also welcomed Cuban troops. When the FNLA demanded more help than the American administration could give without congressional approval, Congress—with the lessons of Vietnam still fresh in its mind—refused its support.

The Angolan debacle and other factors led toward a reassessment of traditional U.S. policies in southern Africa. Some Americans had long been urging support for the anticolonial struggle, and African Americans were beginning to take a greater interest in these matters. Also, trade with independent Africa had been growing and now included oil from Nigeria. The possibility that this trade might be jeopardized by pro–South African activities was no longer of merely academic interest to the United States. Moreover, guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia intensified after mid-1975, arousing fears of a repetition of the Angolan experience.

Black Africa welcomed Kissinger's Lusaka statement of 27 April 1976, which stipulated that majority rule must precede independence in Rhodesia and ruled out American material or diplomatic support to the Ian Smith regime. With some hesitation, Africa also cooperated with the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy later in the year. Africa hoped that "even at that late stage, the use of American power in support of majority rule could enable this to be attained in Rhodesia without further bloodshed." This Kissinger initiative forced Smith to shift his ground, but it did not succeed in its declared objective. Nor did it remove African uncertainty about the depth and the geographical limitations of the new American commitment to change in southern Africa.

HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CRITERION FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

With the election of President James E. Carter in 1976, the need to respect human rights became a focus of public attention and debate in the United States. This development reflected rising popular expectations around the world as individuals and groups expressed aspirations that included demands that government be more responsive to them. This trend appeared in many forms, from movements of national independence to devolution and demands for worker codetermination. In the United States, many saw the growing interest in the "human dimension" of world politics as a natural and healthy reaction to an overemphasis on great power diplomacy, elitist cynicism, and excessive secretiveness during the recent past.

The articulate and sympathetic stand adopted by the new administration on the question of human rights implied a distinct departure from the position of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The Carter administration's advocacy of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the widest sense had an important implication for America's policy regarding national self-determination. First and foremost, it implied an insistence on effective guarantees to safeguard the position of individual citizens in the societies to which they belonged, and particularly to protect them against infringement of basic civil rights and liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and movement—liberties inscribed in practically all modern constitutions, including those of the Soviet bloc. Second, to champion human rights involved supporting a long-established principle of international relations, reconfirmed in 1975 in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); this so-called Helsinki Agreement recognized the collective rights of peoples to self-determination and equal status in the international community.

In the ensuing months, the Carter administration demonstrated its commitment to human rights and self-determination by seeking to reestablish normal relations with both Cuba and Vietnam, and withdrawing its opposition to Vietnamese membership in the United Nations. In his inaugural address President Carter said, "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."

In the African nations of Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa, Carter and his eloquent United Nations ambassador, Andrew Young,

championed the oppressed black majorities. However, the president's most spectacular foreign policy achievement came in September 1978, when he invited President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to the presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, in an attempt to promote peace in the Middle East. Serving as a go-between, Carter persuaded them to sign an accord that month in which Israel agreed in principle to withdraw from Egyptian territory conquered in 1967, Egypt in return promised to respect Israeli borders, and both pledged to sign a formal peace treaty within three months. Carter also concluded two treaties designed to turn over complete ownership and control of the Panama Canal to Panamanians by the year 2000.

These dramatic accomplishments were overshadowed by the ominous reheating of the Cold War with the USSR. Détente fell into disrepute as thousands of Cuban troops, assisted by Soviet advisers, appeared in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa to support revolutionary factions. The worst fears of the West, however, were not aroused until the Soviet army in December 1979 invaded Afghanistan, next door to Iran, and appeared to be poised for a thrust at the oil jugular of the Persian Gulf. Only a month before, a howling mob of rabidly anti-American Muslim militants stormed the United States embassy in Tehran, Iran, and took all of its occupants hostage. World opinion hotly condemned the diplomatic felony in Iran while Americans agonized over both the fate of the hostages and the stability of the entire Persian Gulf region. President Carter slapped an embargo on the export of grain and high-technology machinery to the USSR, called for a boycott of the upcoming Olympic Games in Moscow, and requested that young people be required to register for a possible military draft. Meanwhile, the Soviet army met unexpectedly stiff resistance in Afghanistan and became bogged down in a nasty guerrilla war that came to be called "Russia's Vietnam."

RONALD REAGAN: A COLD WARRIOR PURSUES DÉTENTE

Ronald Reagan, Carter's successor, took a hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union, characterizing the USSR as "the focus of evil in the modern world." He believed in negotiating with the Soviets, but only from a position of overwhelming strength. Reagan's view that self-determination was being constantly threatened by what he saw as the revolutionary hand of the Soviet Union seemed to be clearly demonstrated in Poland. Challenged by a popular trade union movement called Solidarity, the government of Poland imposed martial law. Relations with the Soviet Union nosedived, with Reagan imposing economic sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union alike.

In the backyard of the United States, Central America rumbled menacingly. A leftist revolution deposed the longtime dictator of Nicaragua in 1979. President Carter tried to ignore the anti-American rhetoric of the revolutionaries, known as the Sandinistas, and to establish good diplomatic relations with them, but Reagan took their words at face value and hurled back at them some hot language of his own. He accused the Sandinistas of turning their country into a forward base for Soviet and Cuban penetration of all of Central America, and more specifically of shipping weapons to revolutionary forces in tiny El Salvador. Reagan sent military "advisers" to prop up El Salvador's pro-American government. He also provided covert aid to the contra rebels opposing the Sandinista government. In the Caribbean, Reagan—convinced that a military coup in Grenada had brought Marxists to power—dispatched a heavy invasion force to that tiny island in October 1983.

In his second term, Reagan found himself contending for the world's attention with the charismatic new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, installed in March 1985. Gorbachev was committed to allowing greater political liberty and the "restructuring" of the moribund Soviet economy by adopting many of the free-market practices of the capitalist West. Both these policies required great reductions in the size of the Soviet military that, in turn, necessitated an end to the Cold War. Gorbachev accordingly made warm overtures to the West. He sought without success the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe when he met Reagan at summit meetings in Geneva in November 1985 and Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. However, it was at a third summit, in Washington, D.C., in December 1987, that they agreed on such a ban. Reagan, the consummate cold warrior, had been flexible and savvy enough to seize a historic opportunity to join with the Soviet chief to bring the Cold War to a kind of conclusion. History would give both leaders high marks for this.

The two most difficult foreign policy problems for Reagan were the continued captivity of a

number of American hostages seized by Muslim extremist groups in civil war–torn Lebanon, and the continuing grip on power of the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua. When Congress repeatedly rejected the president's request for aid to the contras, the administration grew increasingly frustrated, even obsessed, in its search for a way to help them. In 1985 American diplomats secretly arranged arms sales to the embattled Iranians in return for Iranian aid in obtaining the release of American hostages held by Middle Eastern terrorists. At least one hostage was eventually set free. Meanwhile, money from the payment for the arms was diverted to the contras. These actions brazenly violated a congressional ban on military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, not to mention Reagan's repeated vow that he would never negotiate with terrorists.

In November 1986 news of these secret dealings broke and ignited a firestorm of controversy. President Reagan claimed that he was innocent of wrongdoing and ignorant about the activities of his subordinates, but a congressional committee condemned the "secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law" displayed by administration officials and concluded that if the president did not know what his national security advisers were doing he should have. The Iran-Contra affair cast a dark shadow over Reagan's record in foreign policy.

GEORGE BUSH AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

George Herbert Walker Bush was inaugurated as president of the United States in January 1989 at a watershed moment in twentieth-century history. As with 1918 and 1945, 1989 was a year when the old great-power order collapsed and the United States stood as preeminent in world affairs. In the first months of the Bush administration, the world was astounded as democracy arose everywhere in the communist bloc. Long oppressed by puppet regimes propped up by Soviet guns, Eastern Europe was revolutionized in just a few startling months in 1989. The Solidarity movement in Poland led the way when it toppled Poland's communist government in August. In rapid succession, communist regimes collapsed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and even hyper-repressive Romania. In December 1989 jubilant Germans danced atop the hated Berlin Wall, symbol of the division of Germany and all of Europe into two armed and hostile camps. The two Germanys, divided since 1945, were at last reunited in October 1990, with the approval of the victorious allied powers of World War II.

But the changes that swept the heartland of world communism were the most startling of all. Mikhail Gorbachev's policies had set in motion a groundswell that surged out of his control. Waves of nationalistic fervor and long-suppressed ethnic and racial hatred rolled across the Soviet Union's constituent republics, overwhelming communist ideology. Old-guard hard-liners, in a last-gasp effort to preserve the tottering communist system, attempted to dislodge Gorbachev with a military coup in August 1991. With the support of Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, Gorbachev foiled the plotters. But in December 1991, Gorbachev resigned as president and the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen sovereign republics with Russia the most powerful state and Yeltsin the dominant leader. To varying degrees, all the new governments in the former Soviet republics repudiated communism and embraced democratic reforms and free-market economies.

By the time the Cold War came to an end, the international legal right of self-determination had been accepted in the context of decolonization. But it was not clear whether that right extended to noncolonial situations. Most scholars of government believed that the principle of political unity prevailed over any expression of self-determination within a state. However, events in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the close of the Cold War forced the international community to cope with the demands of groups seeking to break off from existing states. International law, with its traditional rejection of such claims, provided little guidance. The United States and the international community scrambled to respond, with decidedly mixed results.

More then twenty months passed from the time the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union took their initial steps in March 1990 toward independence to the dissolution of the USSR. U.S. policy toward the Baltics set a pattern that would be followed until shortly before the Soviet Union's dissolution. The United States did not support steps toward sovereignty for the Soviet republics in general, or even on a case-by-case basis. Rather, it adopted a wait-and-see approach as a means to a larger object: the survival of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in a mostly unified Soviet Union. The United States had diplomatic relations with Lithuania in the 1920s and 1930s and never recognized Stalin's annexation in 1940. Further-

more, it had permitted a Lithuanian diplomatic presence in Washington throughout the Cold War. Nonetheless, when Lithuania moved toward independence in 1990, the United States tilted toward Moscow.

American reluctance to move toward recognition of an independent Lithuania continued for nearly a year and a half. On 1 August 1991, weeks before the failed coup by communist hard-liners in Moscow, President Bush warned against "suicidal nationalism" in the republics and stated that the United States "would maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet government." Even after the unsuccessful Soviet coup was launched and the three Baltic republics reasserted their independence, the United States stood back while European governments took the lead in responding to their claims.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union appearing more likely during the fall of 1991, the United States shifted its policy. Following Soviet president Gorbachev's resignation and the formal dissolution of the Soviet government on 25 December, the United States announced recognition of the twelve remaining Soviet republics as independent states. However, the United States proposed establishing full diplomatic relations with only six of the new states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine, states that the administration claimed had made specific commitments to responsible security policy and democratic principles. However, Secretary of State James A. Baker's articulation of principles guiding the pace of U.S. recognition seemed governed more by political expedience than principle. Each of the four successor states that possessed strategic nuclear weapons—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine—were among the first states to win U.S. recognition. This risked sending a dangerous message: that retaining nuclear weapons would offer the new states leverage with the West. Furthermore, the recognition of Armenia but not Azerbaijan may have exacerbated tension in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh—populated by Armenians but located in and administered by Azerbaijan—by undermining the U.S. neutral position regarding the conflict. Concern, however inflated, that a policy of selective recognition could prompt the Islamic republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus to turn toward Iran prompted the United States to quickly accept perfunctory promises of support for democratic principles and to establish diplomatic ties. By the end of February 1992 the United States had granted formal diplomatic recognition to eleven of the twelve non-Baltic republics. It granted recognition to the final republic, Georgia, in March 1992, after its civil wars subsided and Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, offered appropriate commitments.

POST–COLD WAR CONFLICTS

The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of all wars. In the middle of the apparent flood tide of democratization in Eastern Europe came Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Clearly, democracy was not the issue; neither in Iraq nor Kuwait could there be much hope of fostering self-determination. Nevertheless, by acting decisively Bush might give more shape to what he now called the New World Order that was to be crafted by American leadership. Most Americans cheered the rapid and enormously successful conclusion of the war against Iraq early in 1991. The war had nevertheless failed to dislodge Saddam Hussein from power. Moreover, the United States, for better or worse, found itself more deeply ensnared in the region's web of mortal hatred and intractable conflicts, from which no possibilities of self-determination seemed to emerge.

Caution, inconsistencies, and political expedience also characterized the American and, to a lesser degree, the European Community's initial response to Yugoslavia's self-determination crisis. Until hostilities broke out in mid-1991, the United States and the European governments asserted unconditional support for Yugoslav unity. That policy reflected, at least in part, concern that any splintering of Yugoslavia would be violent. When Serbia's strongly nationalist president, Slobodan Milosevic, began campaigning for a stronger Yugoslav federal center, calls among Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnians for a looser confederation or for outright secession multiplied. Slovenia, the most homogenous of the republics, had already taken its first steps toward independence in September 1989. In the fall of 1990 the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly predicted a breakup of Yugoslavia, probably involving civil war. Nevertheless, days after the May 1991 referendum in which Croatia's population voted overwhelmingly to secede, the United States remained firmly committed to the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia. Fighting erupted in June 1991 after Croatia and Slovenia formally declared their independence. As

the war in Croatia escalated throughout the summer and fall of 1991, the issue of international recognition for the Yugoslav republics became more controversial. It was Germany that led the European Community to an agreement on a process for recognizing the republics of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In January 1992 the twelve EC countries, as well as several other European states and Canada, recognized both Slovenia and Croatia. The EC granted recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, despite the fact that its referendum on independence had been largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serb minority.

U.S. policy evolved more slowly. In July 1991 Secretary Baker signaled a shift in policy when he indicated that the United States was prepared to accept any new political configuration negotiated by the republics. However, the United States was unwilling to grant separate recognition to any of the republics as long as the fighting continued.

UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, along with the United States, opposed the European Community's moves toward recognition, fearing that such action would fatally undermine UN and EC peace initiatives. U.S. deputy secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger warned EC members in December 1991 that early, separate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would not only damage the prospect for peace but would "almost inevitably lead to greater bloodshed."

The issue was how best to prevent Serbian aggression while protecting the rights of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the EC announced its recognition guidelines, the United States reiterated four principles guiding its policies toward the republics of Yugoslavia, none of which acknowledged the prospect of secession, even though by December 1991 it could be fairly predicted as a strong possibility.

In April 1992 the United States recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states. Despite its recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the pleas of that government for help against the onslaught of the Serb minority, the United States and the European Community were pitifully slow to initiate or support regional or international intervention to respond to aggression; "ethnic cleansing"; and other serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law.

The war in Bosnia promoted a reappraisal of American foreign policy. Although President Bush had enunciated his support of a New World Order, in which weak countries would be free from fear of predation by the strong, American support for action against Saddam and his invasion of Kuwait rested on readily identifiable material interest, namely oil. Bosnia's misfortune was that it possessed nothing of vital interest or importance to Americans or other influential foreigners. Nevertheless, some who took the New World Order seriously believed that the United States would assist Bosnian Muslims despite Bosnia's lack of commercial commodities. Many of these likened the Serbs' ethnic cleansing to the Nazis' genocidal policies toward the Jews, and the failure of the United States and the other democracies to assist Bosnia to the failure to halt Hitler in the 1930s. Some Bosnia advocates called for direct American military intervention, even the introduction of ground troops. Others would have been content with the lifting of the international embargo of arms to the warring parties, claiming that it helped the better-equipped Serbs.

Opponents of American involvement in the Bosnia war pointed to the complexity of the Bosnian terrain and contended that military intervention would be costly and difficult—far more difficult, for instance, than intervention in the open desert of Iraq. They also insisted that only a political settlement could guarantee lasting peace between Serbs and Muslims (and Bosnian Croats), given the obvious determination of the Serbs; military intervention would be futile in the absence of a settlement. In addition, they even suggested that military intervention might be counterproductive, causing the war to spread beyond Bosnia.

Also, while the Gulf crisis had found the United States and the Soviet Union in agreement, the situation in Bosnia promised to be more divisive. Given Russia's long-standing role as the protector of the Slavic and Orthodox Serbs, it was difficult to predict how the Russian government would react to strong U.S. action. In any case, neither the Bush administration nor, beginning in January 1993, that of Bill Clinton could count on Moscow's cooperation. Finally, many Americans argued that the problems in the Balkans were Europe's problems. Throughout the Cold War, the United States had looked after Europe. It was now time, they said, for the Europeans to start looking after themselves. In fact, there was a resounding lack of popular enthusiasm for intervention. While both administrations supported UN initiatives to ease the plight of the Bosnians and pressure the Serbs politically

to curtail their offensives, neither took the step of committing American combat troops directly to the battle.

The Cold War had provided the United States with the basic principles on which it had conducted foreign policy for nearly half a century; with the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration groped for a diplomatic formula to replace anticommunism as the guiding mechanism in America's foreign affairs. The international environment was no longer one of great power confrontation, but of numerous global hot spots that periodically threatened to boil over into major regional conflagrations. The Clinton administration generally tried to persuade international agencies, especially the United Nations and NATO, to support multilateral peacekeeping efforts, but often the United States was left alone to try to keep the lid on these flare-ups.

The Middle East remained a major source of trouble. With Norway's help in 1993, Israel and the PLO negotiated the Oslo Accords, which involved mutual recognition and Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and parts of the West Bank. In 1994 Jordan joined the peace process. In 1998 Clinton brokered a new set of agreements between the two sides in marathon meetings at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. This was followed by the Barak-Arafat summit of 2000. However, by the turn of the century, all of these agreements, which promised some measure of self-determination for the Palestinians, had proved ineffective.

Despite the failure of various attempts to change Serb behavior, Congress in the autumn of 1994 forced the Clinton administration to end its efforts to prevent Bosnia from receiving weapons. This move strained U.S. relations with the rest of NATO, but did little to halt the Balkan war. Neither did NATO air attacks, starting in February 1994, against Serbian planes and artillery. Despite these actions and the formation of a Croat-Muslim federation, Bosnian Serbs continued to displace Muslims from much of Bosnia. When Bosnian Serbs in July 1995 seized the safe havens of Srebrenica and Zepa and massacred thousands of Muslims within sight of UN peacekeepers, Washington flashed a green light whereupon the Croatian army overran Serb-held territory in northwestern Bosnia and NATO intensified its air attacks. As new refugees fled into Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic asserted his authority over the Bosnian Serbs and agreed to a cease-fire in October 1995.

At a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke "cajoled, harassed, and pressured" the presidents of Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia into an agreement. The Dayton Accords of December 1995 retained a Croat-Muslim federation and a Serb Republic within a single Bosnian state, with Sarajevo to remain a multi-ethnic capital. The United States agreed to contribute 20,000 personnel as part of a 60,000-member NATO implementation force that would separate the parties and assist in reconstruction. Four years later, some 8,000 U.S. troops remained in Bosnia, having sustained a fragile peace at a cost of more than $7 billion. Deadlines for removing U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia were abandoned as it became clear that they alone could prevent new hostilities.

In 1999, Kosovo, a Serbian province whose population was overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian, became the next Balkan crisis to spark international consequences. There, President Milosevic ordered a brutal ethnic cleansing. After he rejected NATO demands to halt the persecutions and preserve Kosovo's autonomy, NATO in March began to bomb military and communication sites in Serbia. The bombing unleashed even more cruelties in Kosovo as the Serbs systematically moved against ethnic Albanians, massacring and raping them, burning their homes, and forcing 800,000 of them to flee as refugees to neighboring Albania and Macedonia. However, Milosevic—bombed, encircled, and embargoed—relented in early June under an agreement to withdraw his forces from Kosovo, permit the return of refugees, accept a NATO security presence, and grant greater autonomy to Kosovo. The International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague indicted Milosevic and his top aides for atrocities against the people of Kosovo. The planned expansion of NATO in 1999 to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic increased incentives to prevent more fighting and to keep refugees from spreading into Eastern Europe.

ON THE VERGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States and the United Nations faced the fundamental question of how to manage demands for self-determination in a turbulent new world. The collapse of communism and the growing worldwide pressure for democracy had unleashed movements with broad public sup-

port. The number and variety of self-determination movements was growing, and bewildered governments and multilateral institutions tried to understand them and decide how to respond. Internal ethnic conflicts were proliferating, compelling national and international responses before considered policies could be developed. The United States and the world community faced the challenge of how to respond to the breakup of some nations and the restoration of others in ways that minimized violence and human suffering and maximized the chances for establishing democratic governments. The old assumption that the boundaries set after World War II were permanent had been shaken by events in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Although bold conditions for U.S. recognition were imposed upon the successor states of the Soviet Union, they were hurriedly signed off in an attempt to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and to contain Islamic expansionism in Central Asia. Regarding Yugoslavia, U.S. policy remained focused on preserving it as a state while the European Community took the lead in recognizing the new states of Slovenia and Croatia.

The United States was slow to accept collective military intervention as a response in some situations such as preventing armed conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance, defending a new state, advancing the cause of self-determination in certain limited circumstances, occasionally guaranteeing compliance with the recognition criteria, and in some cases defending an existing government from limited insurgency. The American people were reluctant to take on new international responsibilities and resisted new commitments that might drain resources from domestic needs and that could involve the United States in a new quagmire.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bailey, Thomas A. *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*. New York, 1944. Contains a scholarly analysis of the implementation of Wilson's concept of self-determination.

Balzer, Harley D., ed. *Five Years that Shook the World: Gorbachev's Unfinished Revolution*. Boulder, Colo., 1991.

Barbour, Walworth. "The Concept of Self-Determination in American Thought." *Department of State Bulletin* 31 (1954). Presents an official view.

Barker, Sir Ernest. *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation*. London, 1948. A classic work originally published in 1927.

Birdsall, Paul. *Versailles Twenty Years After*. New York, 1941. Presents a "realistic" view of Wilson's efforts to implement the concept of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference.

Carley, Patricia. *U.S. Responses to Self-Determination Movements*. Washington, D.C., 1997. A report of a roundtable by the United States Institute of Peace and the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State on strategies for nonviolent outcomes and alternatives to secession.

Cassese, Antonio. *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal*. Cambridge and New York, 1995. A comprehensive legal account of the concept of self-determination.

Cobban, Alfred. *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*. New York, 1969. Presents the most nearly definitive history and political analysis of the general concept of national self-determination by means of a pragmatic approach.

Diesing, Paul. "National Self-Determination and U.S. Foreign Policy." *Ethics* 77 (1967). A provocative ethical analysis.

Eagleton, Clyde. "The Excesses of Self-Determination." *Foreign Affairs* 31 (1953). An excellent analysis of problems presented by the attempt to apply the concept of self-determination in the post–World War II period.

Emerson, Rupert. *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*. Cambridge, Mass., 1964. A good synthesis, containing a fresh examination in a new nation-forming setting.

Gerson, Louis L. *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy*. Lawrence, Kans., 1964. Especially helpful on the role of East European hyphenates in promoting self-determination during the Wilson and Roosevelt administrations.

Halperin, Morton H., and David J. Scheffer. *Self-Determination in the New World Order*. Washington, D.C., 1992. Reviews U.S. and international claims during and after the Cold War.

Jessup, Philip C. "Self-Determination Today in Principle and in Practice." *Virginia Quarterly Review* 33 (1957). An evaluation by a first-rate scholar of international law.

Johnson, Harold S. *Self-Determination within the Community of Nations*. Leiden, Netherlands,

1967. Presents a careful analysis of conflicting interpretations of the great powers.

Lansing, Robert. *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative*. Boston and New York, 1921. Important for an understanding of Lansing's criticisms of national self-determination.

Link, Arthur S. *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace*. Arlington Heights, Ill., 1979. Necessary for an appreciation of how Wilson's principles influenced his foreign policy.

May, Arthur James. *Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe*. Philadelphia, 1927. Essential for the mid-nineteenth-century outlook.

Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919*. New York, 1967. Provides vital background for the Wilsonian position.

Musgrave, Thomas D. *Self Determination and National Minorities*. New York, 1997. Examines the historic and current status of self-determination in international law.

Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*. Rev. ed. New York, 1950. Presents a glimpse of Roosevelt's efforts to secure support for self-determination from both Churchill and Stalin.

Shukri, Muhammad Aziz. *The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations*. Damascus, Syria, 1965. A scholarly study analyzing the attitudes of major powers.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, N.J., 1994. Emphasizes the role of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination in the twentieth century.

Unterberger, Betty Miller. "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26 (fall 1996): 926–942.

———. *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia*. College Station, Tex., 2000. Traces President Wilson's efforts to implement his concept of self-determination toward Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Wambaugh, Sarah. *A Monograph on Plebiscites, with a Collection of Official Documents*. New York, 1920. A classic work with an excellent introductory chapter on self-determination.

———. *Plebiscites Since the World War, with a Collection of Official Documents*. Washington, D.C., 1933. Presents a historical summary on matters of self-determination covering the years from 1914 to 1933.

See also ANTI-IMPERIALISM; HUMAN RIGHTS; IMPERIALISM; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; REALISM AND IDEALISM; REVOLUTION; WILSONIANISM.

Special-Interest Lobbies

William Slany

Lobbies are generally recognized as those individuals or groups who seek to present the point of view of interest groups to members of Congress, generally with respect to specific legislation. But in the increasingly complicated American democracy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, lobbying must be seen as a wider and more dynamic phenomenon. Interest groups also lobby the executive branch, which has gained expanded discretionary authority from Congress; government officials lobby interest groups in the hope of generating grassroots support for policies and actions; and foreign governments lobby Congress to supplement traditional diplomacy. How and why these newer forms of lobbying arose and function is an important strand in the history of modern American foreign affairs.

The occasional lobbying on foreign affairs issues in the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century was largely by business and agricultural interests and was generally confined to trade and tariff issues. Until World War II, Congress generally met for short legislative sessions before members returned home; a handful of party oligarchs controlled the flow of legislation. They organized coalitions to adopt legislation and most of the deliberations of congressional committees took place in private. Foreign affairs very rarely rose above the level of inconsequential trade and tariff problems and Congress seldom faced the great pressure of international events that later became customary in World War II and the Cold War. For the greater part of the nation's history, members of Congress—whose constituents were very unlikely to come to Washington—had small staffs whose main task was answering mail, which was not very voluminous. There were few lobbyists and few interest groups in the capital.

By the middle of the nineteenth century Congress had begun in a rudimentary manner to regulate the influencing of legislation by outsiders, but attempts to control lobbyists systematically did not begin until the eve of World War I as a result of a congressional investigation of tariff lobbying by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Nothing came of this initial probe, and a "control of lobbying" bill failed to win congressional approval in 1928. But Depression-era investigations of lobbying abuses by the utilities and Wall Street banks resulted in New Deal legislation that regulated public utilities, the merchant marine, and foreign agents and required registration and reporting for the first time in history.

After World War II, and particularly starting in the 1970s, lobbying in Washington expanded to a degree unimagined in previous generations. As the nation grew larger it also became more pluralistic. Interest groups multiplied and often were in conflict. Traditional isolationism or general indifference to foreign affairs was replaced by heightened awareness of the global involvement and reach of the United States. The dissident political movements of the 1960s demonstrated the possibilities of group political activities and prompted the rise of new groups that felt government was not being responsive to their needs and interests. The rapid evolution of efficient and cheap mass communication promoted grassroots advocacy far beyond previous levels.

Perhaps the most important change was the quiet revolution in the fundamental nature and rules of the legislative process in Washington: the fragmentation of the power of the political parties and party leaderships; the promotion of individual candidates with special agendas at odds with party preferences and priorities; and the restructuring of election campaign spending in ways that allowed groups to support particular candidates. Changes in Congress in the early 1970s, which some have described as a revolt of a new generation of younger politicians against old-guard traditional leaders, resulted in a reorganization of power within Congress, including a reduction in the power of party leaders and committee heads

and an increase in the role of subcommittee heads and individual members. Instead of several dozen committees guided by the party leaderships, there were more than 200 subcommittees, often run by individual congressmen free of leadership control. Congressional staffs grew from 2,500 in 1947 to 18,000 in 2000.

These changes opened the door for interest groups, lobbyists, public relations experts, and political consultants of all kinds. The number of interest groups expanded steadily, growing by one measure from 10,300 in 1968 to 20,600 in 1988. The number of registered lobbyists in Washington grew from around 500 during World War II to more than 25,000 by the early 1990s. The number of political action committees (PACs) that financed many of the more powerful interest groups increased from a handful in 1970 to more than 4,000 in less than twenty years.

Changes in the 1970s in the regulations governing interest groups further facilitated the expansion of the legion of lobbyists. Congress adopted the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in 1946, the first comprehensive law controlling lobbying. It defined a lobbyist as one who has solicited or collected contributions, whose main purpose or the purpose of the contributions was to influence legislation, and whose method of influencing Congress was through direct communications with members of Congress. Lobbyists were required to register with the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives and file quarterly financial statements listing receipts and expenditures and including detailed accounts of contributions over $500.

The Lobbying Act did not provide for enforcement, and there have been few investigations. Moreover, the law had major loopholes: it did not cover lobbies or industries that did not solicit funds but instead spent their own funds, and it did not apply to lobbying activities that sought to influence Congress indirectly by influencing public opinion. Nor did its provisions apply to the lobbying of the executive branch. Congress sought to close some loopholes with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (amended in 1974 and 1979), which compelled disclosure of contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates standing for election. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the law did not apply to "issue groups," whose main purpose was not to elect candidates but to discuss public issues or influence public opinion. The legislation limited the amount of money, known as hard money, that individuals or groups could contribute directly to any candidate in a federal election but not the amounts that could be spent indirectly on behalf of candidates and their electoral campaigns, the so-called soft money. The legislation of the 1970s and ensuing Supreme Court interpretations led to the growth of political action committees (PACs), which could spend unlimited amounts of money on behalf of candidates. They also allowed unlimited expenditures by political parties and interest groups in volunteer efforts to get out the vote and educate voters on election issues.

The congressional limitation on presidential war powers during the Nixon years gained for Congress an expanded share of the responsibility for foreign policy at the expense of the executive branch of government. This new codetermination of foreign policy, combined with the internal changes occurring within Congress, made Congress much more responsive to special interests and their lobbies, which on occasion became decisive players in shaping foreign policies. Lobbies operating outside the executive and legislative branches of government became the means for organizing information about foreign policy issues. They informed and galvanized public opinion regarding particular courses of action and coordinated the persuasion of lawmakers and policymakers to take the issues on board. At the same time, the political parties were less and less able to control and disseminate information about issues or give coordinated statements regarding urgent foreign policy goals and national interests. Moreover, the elaborate information security systems that were deployed within government in the last half of the twentieth century invested foreign policy with a secrecy shield that deprived the public of much in the way of meaningful information on diplomatic crises and commitments. Many Washington lobbyists found that members of Congress and their staffs were their best contacts for influencing foreign affairs or for obtaining unauthorized information. On the other hand, lobbyists and their PACs were—on issues that concerned them—great sources of information for members of Congress and for the public at large and frequently set the tone of the debate on current issues.

ECONOMIC LOBBIES IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

Trade and Tariff Lobbies During the first century and a half of American history, trade was one

of the few consistent issues in an essentially isolationist foreign policy. Most of the lobbying of Congress resulted from the clash between protectionists and supporters of moderate tariffs. However, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act adopted by Congress in 1934 signaled the end of Congress's attempts, in response to the pressure of economic lobbying groups, to determine the tariff on individual commodities. The act gave the president the authority to negotiate reciprocal agreements and set tariffs. It ended the period in which tariff making was essentially a domestic affair and changed it into a foreign policy matter in which Congress was only periodically involved when major enabling legislation came before it.

In the decades after World War II, the lobbies in Washington for industry, business, and farm groups focused on specific national, regional, or economic sector protectionist measures in response to the rising sentiment in support for or acquiescence to international trade liberalization. The United States took the lead in 1946 in convening a conference on multilateral trade negotiations that resulted in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dedicated to reducing tariffs and import quotas and achieving free trade. The GATT laid out a code of trade practices and schedules of tariff reductions for many of the commodities in international trade. By 1975 tariffs had been reduced worldwide from an average of about 40 percent to an average of 10 percent, and international trade had tripled. The periodic negotiations among nations under GATT during the rest of the century attracted protectionist lobbies, and industries and farmers were likely to lobby Congress and the executive branch regarding the "escape clause" exceptions to tariff levels that were managed by the executive branch and periodically reauthorized by Congress.

The United States also entered into multilateral trade agreements in the immediate postwar period for such major commodities as wheat and sugar. International arrangements for other commodities such as tea, wool, cotton, tin, and rubber arose, but resistance to joining such cartels was strong in the United States. Lobbyists for farmers and other agricultural interests worked tirelessly to influence executive branch agencies involved in the negotiations, and Congress had its own continuing role to play. The lobbying on specific commodities also came from foreign governments. Caribbean governments mounted lobbying campaigns aimed at Congress regarding the allocation of the annual quota of imported sugar. Success could mean the difference between prosperity and depression in those island nations.

The growth of foreign economic competition with American industries and farms over the decades caused lobbies for particular interest groups—oil producers, southern textile companies, and automobile makers, for example—to lobby insistently for tariff protection. The rising trend of trade liberalization of the postwar period reached a peak in the 1960s with the so-called Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations (1962–1967) and the Trade Expansion Act adopted by Congress in October 1962. The 1962 legislation was strongly supported by the liberal trade lobby. It was led by the Committee for a National Trade Policy, representing large corporations with export interests, but which also included the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. On the losing side in 1962 were such protectionist interest groups as the American Trade Council, representing big businesses, trade associations, and farm groups, and the Liberty Lobby, an ultraconservative group that opposed trade legislation as an unconstitutional delegation of tariff-making power to the president.

Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the authority to negotiate trade agreements had been in the State Department, but many farm and industry groups came to believe that State was unsympathetic with and unresponsive to domestic interests. The establishment under the terms of the Trade Act of 1962 of an independent Office of the Special Trade Representative located in the Executive Office of the president was largely attributable to the efforts of the lobbyists for those groups. The appointment of the trade representative was made by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Military-Industrial Complex Another economic lobby resulted from the maintenance by the United States, from World War II onward, of a powerful and modern armed force based on the defense industries. This created a unique and troubling set of relationships between those industries and the government, particularly the Department of Defense (DOD). Also, the vast amount of U.S. military assistance to foreign countries became a major factor in American foreign affairs as well as in the domestic economy. The defense industries became the most consistently powerful of all interest groups. They developed and maintained vital relationships with the

Defense Department, which let contracts for the acquisition of arms, equipment, and services, as well as with members of Congress, particularly those whose districts were home to the corporations producing the arms. In his farewell address in 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of the "grave implications" of the growing influence of the "military-industrial complex" in every city, statehouse, and federal agency. Eisenhower said that he had sought, without consistent success, to curtail military spending and the economic and political power of the complex.

One consequence of the recognition of the danger of the Congress-DOD-industry triumvirate was the rise in power, beginning with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, of the national security adviser at the White House. This official could, better than the often unsatisfactory interagency resolutions within and outside the National Security Council system in the Eisenhower era, coordinate national security policy and insulate foreign policy decision making from the military-industrial interest groups.

IDEOLOGICAL LOBBIES IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

Interventionism on the Eve of World War II

After World War I, most Americans remained isolationists well into the 1930s. By 1940, however, when Britain stood alone against the aggression of Germany and its Axis partners, a clear majority of Americans approved of providing assistance to those who resisted fascism, and many even favored armed intervention. But a large number of Americans still clung to their isolationist views, fearing the nation's involvement in war. A national debate during 1940 and 1941, punctuated by congressional legislation, gradually moved the United States from strict neutrality to near belligerency in the war against the fascist dictatorships.

Lobbies for and against neutrality were mobilized for the congressional votes on the Revised Neutrality Act in November 1939, the Selective Service Act in September 1940, the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, the failed anticonvoy Senate resolution of April 1941, the renewal of Selective Service in August 1941, and the revision of the Neutrality Act in November 1941. President Roosevelt and some of his principal advisers maintained very close relationships with the pro-interventionist national interest groups in the lobbying of Congress for the legislation needed to spur American rearmament and the more urgent task of aiding Britain (and the Soviet Union after it was invaded by Germany in June 1941).

The Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through the Revision of the Neutrality Law marshaled the support of prominent internationalists in 1939. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, often called the White Committee after its chairman, William Allen White, became the leading interventionist mass pressure group until the outbreak of war in December 1941. Interventionists gained secret but significant support from the British government, which established the so-called British Security Coordination in New York City. This organization, which also headquartered British intelligence operations for the Western Hemisphere, had the approval of President Roosevelt and some assistance from FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover in discrediting leaders of the isolationist America First Committee such as Charles Lindbergh. On the other side, the America First Committee was formed in September 1940 by pacifists and leading isolationist political and social leaders from all parts of the political spectrum. Some of them were anti-Semites. It had more than 800,000 members organized in more than 450 local chapters at its high point in mid-1941.

American isolationism largely disappeared after World War II, and President Harry S. Truman was successful in persuading Congress to support the Marshall Plan, aid to Greece and Turkey, and the establishment of NATO, all in the late 1940s. Nonetheless, in 1951 a great debate broke out as the remaining isolationist congressmen and senators sought legislation to restrict U.S. engagement in Europe and limit the president's authority to station troops abroad. A private, nonpartisan lobbying group, the Committee on the Present Danger, which included leaders from the Council on Foreign Relations, college and corporate presidents, and former government officials, successfully rallied support for an activist role for America abroad. The committee used radio extensively to help shape public opinion and influence Congress not to limit President Truman's authority to act abroad. By 1954 the perception among some that presidential direction of an ever more boldly internationalist foreign policy was totally escaping congressional control precipitated one last serious effort to invoke the Constitution to restrain the White House. Major efforts by coalitions of lobbying groups on both sides preceded a close vote in

the Senate that repulsed Senator John Bricker's proposed legislation limiting the president's treaty-making authority.

Anticommunism and the China Lobby In place of prewar isolationism, Americans in the postwar period accepted the nation's superpower status and generally embraced an assertive anticommunist ideology in foreign affairs. The struggle with the Soviet Union was the central theme of the Cold War, but the rise to power in China of a communist regime in 1949 gave rise to a noisy if small domestic claque demanding U.S. intervention into Asian affairs. The so-called China Lobby was a loose association of supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese regime both before and after it was overthrown by the communists. This pressure group counted among its active participants public relations and business leaders, newspaper editors, ultraconservative writers, wartime members of the Nationalist government, a number of American military figures who had served in China during World War II, and some prominent Republican members of Congress.

China Lobby activities included sponsoring articles in magazines and newspapers and providing research support for sympathetic politicians on such critical congressional committees as the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate committees used by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy to investigate communism in government and elsewhere. Many Republicans aligned themselves with the China Lobby in political attacks against the Truman administration and the Democratic Party. It aimed its sharpest criticisms at the president himself and at the State Department's policymakers—the so-called China hands—for their failure to save Chiang's government on the mainland and for allegedly favoring the communists. During the Eisenhower administration, Senator William Knowland of California, a leading proponent of strong ties with the Chinese Nationalists who had fled to Taiwan in 1949, was criticized for his acceptance of support and information from the China Lobby and was characterized as the "Senator from Formosa."

Nuclear Disarmament Another postwar lobby emerged from the growth of antibomb and pro–nuclear disarmament sentiment. The development of this lobby, however, was slow and difficult in the face of the public's readiness to support military solutions to international problems, which were nearly always seen in Cold War terms. The antibomb movement in the United States drew upon the decades-old experience of traditional pacifists and antiwar groups in lobbying Congress. Nuclear disarmament issues, however, were not subjects for congressional legislation. Modern antiwar groups developed a unique mass movement and invented a new model of lobbying in the age of the "imperial presidency."

American scientists took the lead in warning of the dangers to humankind posed by nuclear weapons. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), formed in late 1945, spearheaded the dissemination of information about the dangers of nuclear weapons and developed a program for seeking effective political controls over such weapons. However, antibomb activists, including the FAS, had only one early success: the lobbying effort in Congress in 1946 in support of creating the Atomic Energy Commission and legislation that removed the manufacture of weapons and further research in nuclear energy.

U.S. and Soviet development of hydrogen bombs in the 1950s, the proliferation of bomb-making technology to Britain and France, and nuclear weapons testing spurred another round of antibomb activities in the United States and elsewhere. However, the secrecy with which the government protected all aspects of nuclear weapons development placed a constraint on antibomb lobbying.

The dangers of radioactive fallout from the U.S. and Soviet bomb tests of the 1950s became an immediate, recognizable danger to people around the globe. Beginning in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in July 1957, nuclear scientists from many nations met in a series of conferences over the next several decades that searched for a scientific basis for arms control, if not disarmament. The Pugwash movement laid the basis for later disarmament and arms control plans. The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) gave leadership to an emerging public consensus for an end to the testing of weapons and lobbied the government for action. SANE, founded in 1957, never numbered more than 25,000 members, but allied with such other groups as Women Strike for Peace, it soon convinced a majority of the population that nuclear fallout was a real public danger.

In the face of the secrecy and intensive security surrounding nuclear bomb development and testing and the absence of an effective dialogue with the government, antibomb activists resorted

to civil disobedience. SANE and Women Strike for Peace were joined in these actions by the American Friends Service Committee, the Non-Violent Action Against Nuclear Weapons, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. These groups conducted noisy demonstrations; protests at nuclear test sites, including intrusions by ship into Pacific test areas; prayer vigils outside the White House; and petition campaigns against testing.

The government, particularly during the Eisenhower presidency, denounced antiwar demonstrations as subversive and, wittingly or not, a boon to communism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested and on occasion sought to prosecute demonstrators or movement leaders. The FBI's anticommunist infiltration program targeted antibomb and pacifist groups, while the Central Intelligence Agency intercepted and reviewed their mail. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the House Un-American Activities Committee investigated antibomb organizations and accused many of them of being infected by communist sentiment to varying degrees.

The growing public awareness and anxiety regarding nuclear weapons testing that was stirred by the antibomb movement, combined with behind-the-scenes efforts of scientists to influence the government from within, finally moved the government toward arms control in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviet Union adopted a unilateral testing moratorium in March 1958, and the United States followed suit later that year with its own moratorium, which lasted until 1961. President John F. Kennedy and his liberal advisers adopted a friendly attitude toward the disarmament and antibomb activists. SANE representatives lobbied sympathetic members of Congress to introduce legislation calling for an international test ban. President Kennedy used Norman Cousins, the president of SANE, as an intermediary with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on partial test ban negotiations. After U.S., British, and Soviet representatives agreed to an atmospheric test ban treaty in July 1963, the Kennedy administration enlisted the antibomb movement in a lobbying effort with the Senate, and leaders of SANE and the United World Federalists worked with labor leaders to convince the Senate to confirm the test ban treaty by a large majority.

IDEOLOGICAL LOBBIES OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Vietnam Antiwar Movement The anti– nuclear bomb campaign, along with the civil rights movement, signaled the emergence of new and powerful ideological tendencies in the United States. The war in Vietnam in the 1960s and into the 1970s resulted in a steadily intensifying national debate and an antiwar movement of unprecedented scope and intensity. If the antiwar movement failed to conform to some of the more recognizable criteria of a lobby, its ultimate impact on American politics, on the organization of Congress, and on Americans' attitudes toward their government nevertheless precipitated an unprecedented engagement of the people with their government on foreign affairs issues that permanently changed the geography of foreign policy decision making.

The antiwar movement began on college campuses in the spring of 1965 with "teach-ins" and spread spontaneously later that year. Well-established peace groups like the SANE and traditional religious pacifist groups took up the movement. The November 1965 March on Washington brought together the largest antiwar protest seen in Washington in the postwar years and led to hearings on Vietnam before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1966. In 1967 the movement spread beyond the traditional arms control and pacifist groups to new specialized coalitions of activists from recently radicalized portions of the population. The new groups included Another Mother for Peace, Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, and the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War.

As the war continued, its domestic consequences included the shattering of the American consensus on foreign policy, skepticism about the veracity of the government, and a conviction of the need to petition the government directly and confrontationally. Antiwar demonstrations, although largely made up of middle-class and better-educated Americans, became increasingly strident and radical. In April 1967, 50,000 people in San Francisco gathered to protest the war and 200,000 demonstrated in New York. The October 1967 March on Washington drew 100,000 demonstrators to the Lincoln Memorial and 50,000 in a march on the embattled Pentagon.

President Richard M. Nixon's efforts to "Vietnamize" the war in Southeast Asia were frus-

tratingly slow in bringing an end to the fighting. Continued bombing and new incursions outside Vietnam into Laos and Cambodia regenerated the antiwar movement. There were nationwide demonstrations in October 1969, along with mail campaigns aimed at Congress. Massive demonstrations in Washington in November 1969 included candle-carrying demonstrators circling the White House, which was protected behind a barricade of buses, and the massing of 325,000 marchers on the Mall. The demonstrations persisted into 1971 and 1972 as the war continued. The conflict ended formally in January 1973 after protracted negotiations in Paris, with the last U.S. personnel leaving Vietnam in 1975.

Frustrated at its inability to end American military involvement in Southeast Asia, Congress from 1973 to 1975 undertook a series of legislative actions focused on the president's war powers. These measures were aimed at limiting the initiative of the president in foreign affairs by insisting on congressional involvement in decisions concerning not only U.S. military engagement in other countries but in the rendering of military and economic assistance. The efforts of the anti–Vietnam War movement to halt American involvement in Vietnam thus served as the catalyst for a revolution in foreign policymaking. Moreover, the horrendous excesses of the Vietnam War aroused the sensibilities of the American people and confirmed their new attentiveness to humanitarian, social, and even environmental issues. This gave rise to the emergence of new and powerful foreign affairs lobbies based on previously unheard interest groups and constituencies.

Environmental Lobby For Americans concerned about foreign policy, the anti–Vietnam War movement provided the model of how to influence and lobby policymakers. The environmental movement was one of the earliest outgrowths of the Vietnam experience. Millions were estimated to have participated in local activities during the first Earth Day, held in April 1970. Beginning that year the movement's more radical adherents employed the anticorporate rhetoric and civil-disobedience tactics developed by the Vietnam-era demonstrators. The mass action and confrontational model adopted by environmental advocates intersected with controversial foreign affairs issues in the 1990s to draw attention to the anti-environmental consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the decisions in support of economic globalization made at meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999 and the World Bank in Washington, D.C., in 2000.

Human Rights Lobby In the first decades after the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the issue of human rights was overshadowed by the Cold War. The Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker group founded in 1943, developed a reputation for lobbying activity on behalf of domestic civil rights and a humane foreign policy. It took a leading role in marshaling liberal political lobbies regarding the protection of human rights in the regional conflicts in Latin America. But the human rights lobby did not become important until the early 1970s. It was sparked in part by the civil rights movement of the 1960s but also by the fact that a major change occurred during the 1970s in the way American foreign policy was pursued. In that decade Congress acquired much more influence in the formulation of foreign policy. That was made possible particularly by the War Powers Act in 1973 but also by new measures for oversight of CIA operations, including creation of the permanent Joint Committee on Intelligence in 1976 and passage of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which regulated arms sales abroad.

Of signal importance was the revision in 1975 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include a provision for congressional supervision of the application of human rights standards in decisions about economic assistance. The revision, called the Harkin Amendment, forbade for the first time the provision of assistance to "any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations on internationally recognized human rights" unless the president determined that such aid would "directly benefit needy people" in the country.

Soon after the revision of the Foreign Assistance Act, human rights lobbies—much to the dismay of both the Ford and Carter administrations—began to intensify their efforts to halt or curb assistance to countries such as Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Ethiopia, whose governments were consistent human rights violators. The liberal human rights lobbying groups were soon matched by conservative human rights lobbies seeking to halt assistance to left-wing regimes in such countries as Angola and Mozambique. The Nixon and Ford

administrations, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the State Department sought to dissuade Congress with warnings of the negative impact that the withdrawal of aid would have on important relationships. The lobbyists could not persuade Congress to end or significantly scale back assistance to such strategically important nations as South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Philippines, even though their human rights records were poor. Human rights organizations did, however, become a primary source of legislative initiatives concerning U.S. policy on human rights issues in matters before the multilateral development banks, the International Monetary Fund, and the Export-Import Bank.

Nowhere were the post-1970 efforts of American human rights lobbies more vigorous than in the area of U.S. relations with Latin America. The human rights groups filled an information vacuum, providing sympathetic policymakers with information not accessible from government agencies. More importantly, in the 1970s ideologically liberal human rights groups developed more sophisticated, broadly based, and effective lobbying techniques. The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) made U.S. support for repressive regimes in Latin America a major foreign policy issue. The ADA took the lead in opposing the oppressive regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in the mid-1970s by persuading Congress to limit assistance to that nation. The human rights lobby incited congressional action that ended military training for Argentina by exposing the brutality of the Argentine regime. In the 1980s the human rights lobby and its concerns about regimes with bad human rights records mobilized public opinion and contributed significantly to congressional action restraining President Ronald Reagan's policies for military and covert operations in Central America. To hamper opponents of military intervention, the Internal Revenue Service went so far as to challenge the tax-exempt status of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), one of the main opponents of Central American policy.

While American business lobbies avoided taking a public stance against human rights lobbies, especially in the case of Latin America, they cultivated U.S. government support for regimes accused of repressive conduct and human rights violations. International Telephone and Telegraph was remarkably successful in promoting U.S. hostility to the Marxist government of Chile in the early 1970s. The successor right-wing government of Pinochet, in contrast, was supported by the business lobby.

Such key organizations as the Business Roundtable ensured that their members had personal meetings on foreign affairs issues with members of Congress and high-ranking executive branch officials, including the president. U.S. business interests in Latin America worked through organizations such as the Council of the Americas, a nonprofit association supported by more than two hundred corporations doing business in Latin America, and the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America. Neither organization opposed U.S. expressions of concern about human rights violations but sought to encourage the U.S. government to avoid actions that would disrupt normal lending policies of international financial institutions.

Amnesty International, which opened an office in Washington in 1976, and the International Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva, Switzerland, did not lobby Congress or the executive branch on human rights, but the authoritative information on human rights violations that these organizations provided made human rights lobbies more effective in Congress. In addition, the persistent lobbying by American groups of State Department officials responsible for human rights policy made the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Human Rights Commission the stalwart defender of human rights in nations around the world through the remainder of the twentieth century.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, Congress and the Clinton administration responded to a rising tide of lobbying on behalf of the victims, mostly Jewish, of fascist regimes in Europe, particularly Nazi Germany. The collapse of communism allowed for the revisiting of the unfinished history of the Holocaust era and a search for some final restitution to victims of Nazi aggression and genocide. In the United States, as in some European nations, Jewish organizations mobilized government support for a campaign against Switzerland, whose banks were alleged to hold the accounts of thousands of heirless victims of Nazi concentration camps. The U.S. and British governments took the lead in organizing an international effort to identify and recover what remained of monetary assets and gold looted by the Nazi regime. The lobbying effort expanded to other kinds of properties stolen from European Jews, such as art, insurance, and communal properties. By the end of the century it had extended its reach to the search for compensation for slave labor in Nazi Germany.

Anti-Apartheid Lobby The founding of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1969 and TransAfrica in 1978 provided a focus for a remarkably effective lobby for African issues, particularly initiatives aimed at thwarting and overturning the apartheid policies of the white-minority government in South Africa. A coalition of anti-apartheid groups gathered under the umbrella of the Free South Africa Movement stirred public awareness of the consequences of South Africa's racist policies. These organizations provided information, not forthcoming from the executive branch of the U.S. government, for the debate over American policy toward Africa and the white-minority governments in Africa, particularly South Africa. They rallied around the so-called Sullivan Principles, formulated in the late 1970s by the Reverend Leon Sullivan and expressing basic requirements for the equal treatment of black workers in South Africa and for improving living conditions outside the workplace. These organizations lobbied members of Congress and, more effectively, the major corporations doing business in South Africa, which were persuaded to adopt the principles.

This remarkable effort to refashion American foreign policy by an alliance of black activists, corporations, and some members of Congress went forward in the absence of direction from the president and the State Department. The alliance decisively influenced the 1985 passage in Congress, over President Reagan's veto, of legislation imposing economic sanctions on South Africa and a ban on major investments in and exports to that country. This was the first time since 1973—when Congress overrode President Nixon's veto of the War Powers Act—that Congress overrode a presidential veto on a foreign affairs issue. Secretary of State George Shultz, who preferred a more restrained and studied effort to change South Africa's policies, deplored the action by Congress as a true erosion of the president's ability to conduct foreign policy.

Women's Issues and Lobbies The vigorous involvement by women in the antibomb and anti–Vietnam War campaigns in the 1960s launched a new and powerful assertiveness by women in foreign affairs issues. This involvement coincided with the rapid evolution of the feminist movement. Observers have noted that no new domestic interest group rose more rapidly during the 1970s than organized feminism. One persistent demand of women's organizations from that time forward was the appointment of more women to government positions. The Coalition for Women's Appointments, representing more than fifty women's organizations, made the first-ever independent effort by women's groups to lobby for the appointment of women to major posts.

The number of appointments of women to policymaking positions in the foreign affairs community slowly grew during the rest of the century but scarcely kept up with the rapidly strengthening international movement for women's rights. World conferences on women were convened at Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, and Nairobi in 1985, and women's rights were high on the agendas of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, and the UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994. Thousands of American women, most often organized in hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), supported the advancement of women's issues in these and other international meetings and organizations. These women vigorously lobbied the U.S. government, particularly the State Department and the White House, beginning with the Carter presidency. The foreign affairs bureaucracy responded by appointing women to represent the United States on women's issues before the UN and other international organizations and to provide American leadership to international movements for women's rights.

ECONOMIC LOBBIES OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Panama Canal Treaty Lobbies The enormous growth of lobbies beginning in the 1970s, the tendency of presidential administrations to emphasize the national security aspects of most crucial issues, and increasing American public awareness of environmental issues worldwide all made the public debate over major foreign economic policy issues increasingly complex. Ideological issues became deeply intertwined with economic issues and often brought ideological lobbies to the side of economic issues in major policy controversies. The run-up to the ratification by Congress of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978 was marked by a national debate, the outlines of which were largely defined by two opposing groups of lobbies. Opponents of the treaties joined under an umbrella lobby called the Emer-

gency Coalition to Save the Panama Canal. Included were the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Conservative Union, American Security Council, Young Americans for Freedom, Conservative Caucus, Citizens for the Republic, and National Conservative Political Action Committee. Richard Viguerie, at the time the leading direct mailer of lobbying literature, called the campaign surrounding the Panama Canal Treaties the largest grassroots lobbying effort ever mounted, estimating that up to ten million letters had been directed to Congress. Some liberal Senate supporters of the treaties attributed the failure of their 1978 reelection bids directly to the conservative lobbying campaign. President Jimmy Carter's White House mounted a vigorous educational and lobbying campaign in support of the treaties. A Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties enlisted such prominent dignitaries as W. Averell Harriman, former CIA director William Colby, and AFL-CIO head George Meany. Leaders of the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Institute of Merchant Shipping testified on the benefits of the treaties for the United States. The AFL-CIO carried out a program for grassroots support of the treaties, and the White House urged Panamanian president Omar Torrijos to use professional lobbyists in approaching the Senate.

Business, Industrial, Aerospace, and Trade Lobbies Congressional action to limit political contributions to individual members of Congress was a major factor behind the decision by corporations to increase lobbying expenditures in the 1970s as a substitute for the previous practice of creating "slush funds" for politicians. The Chamber of Commerce, with its 2,500 local chapters, 1,300 professional and trade associations, and nearly 70,000 corporate members, was the most important business lobbyist. The chamber did not engage extensively in foreign relations matters; it did, though, have a noteworthy record of rescuing foreign aid programs during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Ad hoc business organizations carried the burden of the business community in developing wide national support for various trade agreements such as the GATT, the International Trade Organization (ITO), and NAFTA.

No commodity in American trade is more heavily lobbied than sugar. Domestic growers of cane and beets persuaded New Deal officials that the trade liberalization then being strenuously advanced by secretaries of state should not apply to sugar, which, they argued, should instead be protected from the uncertainties of international trade. The federal government, lobbied by highly effective organizations such as the American Sugar Alliance, continued until the end of the century legislative protections greatly limiting the import of sugar, despite the free-trade tide. By 2000, lobbyists for the American manufacturers of foods requiring large quantities of sugar were competing with the sugar-growing lobby to influence Congress regarding the future of programs limiting sugar imports and subsidizing domestic growers.

The oil and aerospace industries fielded the most important business lobbies. The American Petroleum Institute represented more than three hundred corporations, and major oil companies lobbied directly and retained costly legal and public relations firms. The oil industry lobbies were principally concerned with energy legislation and the administration of national energy policies, but they also acted to counter the efforts of the Israeli lobby to block arms sales to Israel's Arab neighbors.

The military-industrial complex continued through the end of the century to employ hundreds of former Defense Department officials as well as many former members of Congress. It appears, however, that the lobbyists in this area seldom united on foreign policy legislation; instead they simply competed with one another in securing contracts to supply the various branches of service.

Law of the Sea Agreement and Business, Fishing, and Environmental Lobbies The negotiation of the UN Law of the Sea Treaty—a treaty aimed at ensuring broad fishing rights for maritime nations and assigning control of deep sea mineral rights to an international authority—greatly concerned American business interests and prompted vigorous lobbying on their behalf. A lobby representing the bulk of the U.S. fisheries industry, including the National Coalition for Marine Conservation, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, the Maine Sardine Packers Association, and Yakima Tribal Council, persuaded Congress in 1975 to adopt a two-hundred-mile territorial zone from which foreign fishing was prohibited.

Joining in the lobbying effort were some of the newer public interest lobbies such as those mounted by the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, and Friends of the Earth. Normally confined to domestic environmental issues, these

organizations urged on Congress the need for strong national control of U.S. coastal zones in order to ensure high environmental and antipollution standards. American firms such as Kennecott Copper, Standard Oil of Indiana, Lockheed Missiles and Space, and Deepsea Ventures lobbied Congress for legislation to circumvent the international movement for the Law of the Sea Treaty and to allow American firms to exploit for profit seabed mineral resources. The proposals for the treaty, strongly supported by the many developing nations that had no means to reap the benefits of deep-sea mining, would establish an international authority with exclusive rights over the seabed. Nine years of intense international negotiations ended in 1982 with the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The convention, which included definitions of international navigational rights, territorial sea limits, the legal status of the resources in the seabed, and the conservation of marine resources, came into force in 1994 with the ratification by sixty signatories including the United States.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) In the lobbying over NAFTA and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) during the 1990s, the older issues of tariff and investment policy intersected with the more recent issues of human rights and environmental protection. The precursor agreement, the bilateral U.S.–Canadian agreement of 1989, was the culmination of a century of intermittent discussion between the two countries. The extension of free trade to Mexico under NAFTA, signed by President George H. W. Bush in December 1992, required three years of intense diplomatic negotiation and almost frantic lobbying.

NAFTA was as much about the regulation and protection of transnational investments as it was about lowering tariffs and facilitating commerce; in addition, it sought to clarify immigration policies, consumer safety regulations, and environmental standards and practices. Most of the businesses that had lobbied for much of the century for lower tariffs embraced NAFTA, but some economic leaders felt the agreement posed grave dangers. Influential business leaders such as Ross Perot led the effort to persuade Congress to reject the agreement. Trade union lobbies joined those of environmental groups and human rights organizations in opposition. They feared that NAFTA would not protect Mexican workers from exploitation, would lead to the degradation of the environment in Mexico, and would cause job losses in the United States when businesses moved south of the border.

This collision of lobbies resulted in a fracture of party loyalties and the usual coalitions in Congress. President Bill Clinton became the principal and eventually the successful lobbyist for NAFTA. He bargained with various individual members of Congress with promises of amending the agreement to provide protection for various regional products in exchange for favorable votes. The Senate approved the treaty in November 1993 by 61 to 38. In April 2001, when leaders from nearly all of the Western Hemisphere nations met in Quebec to agree on the outlines for the FTAA, more than 20,000 human rights, labor rights, and environmentalist demonstrators took to the streets with a spirit reminiscent of the antiwar rallies to protest the globalization of the economy.

ETHNIC LOBBIES

Ethnic politics and lobbies began with the large waves of nineteenth-century immigration. Irish Americans were one of the more effective ethnic lobbies. But ethnic lobbying became much stronger in the last quarter of the twentieth century. With Congress gaining a larger role in making foreign policy during the 1970s, ethnic groups became more involved in the deliberations over foreign affairs matters in Washington.

Ethnic groups and their lobbies proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s. Greek, Armenian, Turkish, Irish, Hungarian, Romanian, Serbian, and Croatian issues were among the many that often roiled the political scene. Violent rhetoric, confrontations, and even physical clashes led to fractious controversy and bitter recrimination. Congressional leaders regretted the fractiousness of ethnic controversies and the danger they could pose to national interests, but could see no way around such primordial tendencies.

While the executive branch of government proved better able than Congress to insulate itself from ethnic lobbies, some members of Congress began to worry in the late 1970s about the "overall ethnicization of foreign policy." The frequently successful targeting of Congress by ethnic lobbies created fears among some in the executive branch that congressional involvement in the daily conduct of foreign affairs policy, combined with Congress's vulnerability to ethnic interest groups, was imparting an ethnic hue to American diplomacy.

Arab-Israeli Conflict Among the ethnic lobbies, none were more vigorous—or more often successful—than those advocating American support for the state of Israel. The groups concerned with the fate of Israel were referred to at various times as the Zionist lobby, the Jewish lobby, or the Israeli lobby, a terminology that appears to have come into use in the 1970s, when lobbying both for and against support for Israel was most fierce. During World War II, Jewish groups united to advocate the establishment of a Palestinian state for the Jews at a time when outspoken appeals for the rescue of Jewish victims of nazism appeared politically unsound in the United States. They had, however, the support of Christian and labor groups and various public leaders. The American Zionist Council's Emergency Committee on Zionist Affairs, which evolved into the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1956, provided critical lobbying on behalf of U.S. recognition of Israel in 1948. President Truman acknowledged the importance of the lobbying, which, he observed, counterbalanced the pro-Arab sentiments prevailing in the State Department and the preferences of the oil companies. Pro-Israeli lobbying prevented congressional action mandating unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory following the 1956 Egyptian-Israeli war and also was successful in persuading Congress to suspend aid to Egypt until cargoes bound for Israel were allowed to pass through the Suez Canal.

AIPAC was among the most successful of the ethnic lobbies. By 1990 it represented the views of thirty-eight pro-Israeli organizations, had an annual budget of $12 million, a small but efficient staff supported by more than 10,000 dues-paying members, and an executive committee that included the heads of major American Jewish organizations. AIPAC, which confined its activities to advocating U.S. government policies in support of Israel (the Israeli government appears to have left to AIPAC the lobbying of Congress on important issues), gained the reputation for having outstanding intelligence about executive branch planning relative to Israel; often it was able to generate support for the Israeli government position by providing members of Congress with vital information sooner or more fully than could the State Department. AIPAC also generated grassroots lobbying by the many Jewish communities that deluged the State Department with telephone calls and other messages for or against American policies or actions.

AIPAC had some significant successes in lobbying for legislation that provided military and economic assistance to Israel and denied critical arms to its Arab neighbors. The tenacity of AIPAC was on occasion resented by both Republican and Democratic administrations, which wanted to measure American national interests in the Middle East by their own standards, and AIPAC occasionally failed to prevent actions opposed by the Israeli government. In 1978 the Carter administration pushed through Congress the sale of sixty F-15 planes to Saudi Arabia over the opposition of AIPAC. In 1981, Congress passed Reagan administration legislation for the sale of AWACS surveillance aircraft and other equipment to Saudi Arabia despite the strenuous lobbying of AIPAC, and during the senior Bush's presidency AIPAC unsuccessfully challenged White House opposition to a $10 million loan guarantee to Israel. The very vigor of AIPAC lobbying and its contribution to the electoral defeat of prominent congressional opponents of important pro-Israeli legislation stirred fear of renewed anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic sentiment in the United States.

In the absence of a substantial domestic constituency in the United States, Arab states countered the Israeli-AIPAC efforts with a combination of hired professional lobbyists and new advocacy groups. The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), formed in 1972, was never as successful as AIPAC, but it did attract attention in the media and in Congress among those who felt that the United States was not evenhanded in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. NAAA became increasingly effective in influencing U.S. institutions as Americans grew more concerned about the plight of the Palestinians. Other groups included the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, the American Palestine Committee, and the American Near East Refugee Committee. The rival lobbies tended to offset one another. They also intensified the debate around Middle East issues and often informed the outcome.

Jackson-Vanik Amendment In 1973 ethnic and human rights concerns coalesced when Congress adopted legislation requiring that the Soviet government permit wider emigration to Israel in order to obtain most-favored-nation trade status. In working for the legislation—the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act—Senator Henry Jackson gained critical support from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, an umbrella organization representing major

national and local Jewish organizations. The National Conference's grassroots campaign developed an expansive constituent appeal to Congress that generated more than 250 cosponsors for the amendment when Representative Charles Vanik introduced it in the House. The AFL-CIO, which lobbied Congress for special tariff protections for domestic industries impacted by cheap foreign imports, joined Jewish organizations in persuading Congress to adopt the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as well as to withdraw the United States from the International Labor Organization (ILO) because of that organization's recognition of "captive" labor unions in the USSR and the communist bloc generally. Despite an angry visit to Congress by Soviet politburo member Boris Ponomarev, efforts by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger to negotiate a diplomatic compromise with the Soviet Union were thwarted by the lobbying campaign. Leaders in Congress afterward complained that the kind of lobbying evidenced by Jackson-Vanik made it impossible to conduct normal or effective foreign policy.

Greek-American Lobby In 1964 Greek-American organizations sought to persuade President Lyndon B. Johnson to deny Turkey the use of U.S. military aid to thwart the movement for independence by Greek Cypriots. The impact of the Greek-American lobby on U.S. foreign policy reached its peak in 1974, when it helped to foster congressional legislation that favored an independent Greek Cyprus and opposed Turkish intervention there. Although most observers blamed the Greeks for the fighting that broke out in 1974 in Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after the Turkish invasion of the island, the Greek-American community and lobby persuaded Congress to deny U.S. arms to Turkey, a NATO ally. The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) and the American Hellenic Institute were instrumental in securing a law that amended foreign aid legislation to cut off assistance to nations using it for purposes other than national defense. In response to the congressional embargo of arms, an action strongly opposed not only by the Nixon administration but by the leadership of Congress itself, Turkey ordered the closing of American military installations on its soil.

A new, more professional lobbying organization, the American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee (AHIPAC), arose in the 1970s; it pressed friendly members of Congress to repel efforts to end the arms embargo against Turkey. AHIPAC—patterned after the successful, pro-Israeli AIPAC—and AHEPA carried on grassroots campaigns that generated large quantities of letters, telegrams, and telephone messages to Congress and the State Department whenever the administration initiated an effort to lift the embargo. The Greek-American community in the United States was not very large, and the effectiveness of its lobbies stemmed not from the number of senators and representatives they could influence but from their success in influencing those few members able to affect the work of Congress. Of course, the reorganization of power in Congress during the 1970s contributed to the potential effectiveness of lobbies like those pressing Greek concerns.

The Greek lobbies also increased their influence by cooperating with other ethnic lobbies, such as those advocating Armenian and Israeli issues. At the end of the 1970s, AIPAC supported the Greek lobby's effort to maintain the embargo against Turkey, while AHIPAC supported the lobbying effort to prevent the sale of aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government then retaliated by breaking off relations with Israel, an example of the unintended and unexpected consequences for American foreign policy that these ethnic alliances could have. An alliance of groups—particularly American veterans' organizations—concerned about U.S. military security and strength, rallied in support of the government's eventually successful effort to lift the embargo against Turkey.

During the 1970s the Cyprus dispute not only ignited grassroots ethnic lobbying but also precipitated one of the early examples of direct lobbying by foreign governments with Congress. When in 1978 Congress had before it legislation aimed at removing the embargo on arms sales to Turkey, the leaders of all of the concerned governments—Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit, Greek prime minister Constantine Karamanlis, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, and Cypriot president Spyros Kyprianou—met with members of the House. Also, the Greek minister to the United States consulted frequently with the House staff preparing the legislation and apparently was able to mitigate the language removing the embargo.

Armenian-American Lobby In the last several decades of the twentieth century, a small but passionate Armenian-American lobby made the public aware of alleged Turkish genocide in the

massacre of Armenians—in estimated numbers ranging from hundreds of thousands to more than 1.5 million—between 1915 and 1923. The Armenian lobby in America and other major Western nations was able to obtain a resolution in 2000 from the House International Affairs Committee acknowledging the killing of Armenians as genocide. Only an urgent appeal by President Clinton to the House leaders, reminding them of the danger that Turkey would evict the United States from its Turkish bases if such a resolution were adopted, brought about a last-minute withdrawal of the resolution from consideration.

By the end of the twentieth century Armenian lobbyists, responding to the growing tendency of state governments to adopt positions on foreign policy issues important to their citizens, had pushed their campaigns to the individual states and obtained resolutions in fifteen state legislatures condemning the Turkish massacre of Armenians as genocide. By 2001 the increasingly powerful Armenian Assembly of America, the central Armenian lobby, had purchased a headquarters building two blocks from the White House. The Turkish side of the dispute had no natural constituency in the United States, but representatives of the Turkish embassy engaged in their own lobbying in Washington and in state capitols. An articulate Turkish lobby consistently succeeded in frustrating Armenian demands for resolutions regarding the massacres by reminding members of Congress of the importance of the U.S.–Turkish alliance.

Cuban-American Lobby The waves of Cuban refugees to the United States in the last half of the twentieth century significantly impacted domestic politics in Florida and generated a foreign affairs lobby that was a virtual determinant in U.S. policy toward Cuba. The largest Cuban advocacy group, the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), led by Jose Mas Canosa until his death in 1997, was highly successful in pushing Congress and the executive branch into initiatives like the establishment of powerful U.S. broadcasting to Cuba by the Voice of America's Radio Martí (in 1985) and TV Martí (1990) and ensuring that the U.S. delegation to the annual meetings of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva took the lead in condemning and isolating the Castro regime. The U.S. sanctions regime against Cuba became a fixture of Washington's policy despite the general trend among America's friends and allies toward the end of the century—and especially after the collapse of the Soviet bloc—to seek to normalize diplomatic and economic relations. U.S. leadership in the UN on anti-Castro resolutions, whatever the cost to the overall American role in multilateral diplomacy, was a requirement of State Department policy in all administrations. None wished to arouse the anti-Castro lobby, which had no viable counter-lobby.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT LOBBIES

Only in the last decades of the twentieth century did foreign governments find it necessary to go beyond traditional diplomatic practices to compete effectively in the often frenzied lobbying efforts surrounding important foreign affairs legislation in Washington. While retaining the usual contingent of consular and diplomatic personnel, foreign embassies increasingly turned to American firms and consultants to represent them with members of Congress, officials of the executive branch, and foreign affairs interest groups. By the early 1990s Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, and Mexico were the biggest spenders on these kinds of activities in the United States. The Canadian government spent an estimated $40 million in seeking support for the U.S.–Canadian Free Trade Agreement and Mexico spent $40 million in promoting NAFTA. Nor did foreign governments rely exclusively upon paid lobbies; starting in the 1970s, foreign leaders began dealing directly with Congress. Visits of heads of state to Congress were initially ceremonial, but soon they became working sessions for negotiating with members of Congress and their staffs.

The first laws regulating lobbyists for foreign government were put in place on the eve of World War II, when Congress adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. The legislation was originally spurred by Nazi propaganda in the United States, but after the war its main target became the threat of communism. In 1966 the law was amended to deal more particularly with the lobbyists retained by friendly governments rather than with secret enemy agents. The revised law required every foreign agent engaged in political activity for a foreign government to register with the Justice Department and to make detailed reports of income, expenditures, and contributions. Although the law had enforcement and investigative provisions, it was not vigorously enforced, and compliance appears to have been

only nominal. The Foreign Agents Registration Act was again amended later in the 1960s and in the 1970s to provide for the criminal prosecution of foreign agents and lobbyists making election campaign contributions.

By the late 1970s the number of registered foreign agents lobbying or otherwise working on behalf of foreign governments had grown to more than 600, compared to 160 in 1944, and observers noted that this was just the tip of the iceberg. Former high-ranking executive branch officials and members of Congress, including former secretaries of state and chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, registered as agents for foreign governments. They generally worked for nations of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East that would be affected by trade and military assistance legislation but whose governments knew little about the details of legislation or the workings of Congress. Many foreign governments maintained advocacy offices in Washington that were independent of their embassies. These generally sought to foster commerce by lobbying Congress directly or through sympathetic American business groups. Foreign governments funded fellowships and scholarly centers, which indirectly ensured that the governments' interests and concerns reached Congress through the advice and testimony of American scholars.

The emergence of vigorous human rights lobbies in the 1970s aimed at notoriously repressive governments in Central and South America and Asia caused some governments of the region to enlist Washington lobbyists to mitigate the loss or reduction of American economic or military assistance and counteract bad publicity resulting from human rights violations. In the 1970s the Argentine and Chilean lobbies spent hundreds of thousands of dollars but had little success in dissuading Congress from greatly reducing annual aid allotments. During the same decade, the Nicaraguan lobby was successful in gaining the confidence of some strategically placed members of Congress, who helped delay the withdrawal of American military assistance to General Anastasio Somoza's regime.

Lobbying on behalf of the South Korean government, which annually received about $200 million in military aid and $100 million in Food for Peace agricultural products, precipitated a major scandal in 1976 and 1977. Congress and various executive branch agencies launched investigations into Koreagate, in which the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was accused of bribery, espionage, influence peddling, and other illegal practices aimed at a number of members of Congress. The investigations concluded that as much as $750,000 may have been distributed to more than thirty members by KCIA agents. The KCIA-managed lobbying program apparently succeeded in warding off restrictions on South Korean aid because of human rights violations by the South Korean regime, but the investigations led to legal action against several former members of Congress and disciplinary action against some sitting members.

U.S. Government Response to Foreign Affairs Lobbying The heightened sensitivity and vulnerability of members of Congress to vocal and determined interest groups contributed to the structural changes in Congress in the 1970s and evolved over time further methods of interaction between legislators and lobbying groups. Where the multiplication of subcommittees failed to meet the needs of interest groups or ensure an effective hearing to their issues, so called "issue caucuses" outside the formal congressional committee structure were set up, allowing interested legislators to work together in responding in a far more focused way to interest groups and their lobbyists. The issue caucuses allowed complicated issues to be more fully delineated and provided venues for individual legislators to develop their positions. The issue caucuses worked so well in bringing together information about contentious matters that the executive branch often tended to favor them rather than dealing with the interest groups themselves, thereby providing an unintended but useful synergy in moving the government forward more quickly to respond to the expectations of interest groups.

As the lobbying of executive branch officials came to be recognized as legitimate, federal officials and lobbyists developed new ways to accomplish common goals. The White House and the State Department more frequently turned not to political parties but to particular interest groups and their lobbies when it was necessary to develop public support for treaties, agreements, and difficult foreign affairs initiatives. In 1978 the Carter White House established a public liaison office that, along with selected senior presidential advisers, had the task of gathering support from interest groups for administration policies and to ensure that the political needs and expectations of those groups

were met as much as possible. This approach continued in following administrations. President Clinton drew criticism from political opponents for his extensive entertainment of business interests at the White House, but the practice resulted in important support for such foreign policy initiatives as NAFTA.

The Reagan administration developed a "public diplomacy" program aimed at lobbying public interest groups to counter the tide of public opinion and congressional action against counterinsurgency actions in Central America and the Caribbean. Public diplomacy was defined as government actions to generate support, through information and persuasion, for national security objectives. The State Department became the locus for this public diplomacy program, which over time consisted of numerous ad hoc working groups and task forces of officials drawn from various agencies. The program dealt with the public affairs aspects of each new crisis arising from the administration's Central American and, later, Middle East policies. Public diplomacy programs were carefully designed to allow the administration to skirt the legal constraints on executive branch lobbying of a Congress that sought to thwart the use of covert counterinsurgency actions. The State Department also sought to lobby the fragmented Congress, where individual members had acquired increased power to influence legislation. The liaison relationship between the State Department and Congress, previously funneled exclusively through a Congressional Relations Bureau, was decentralized, and State Department desk officers consulted with congressional staffs on a regular basis, something scarcely imaginable twenty years earlier. These mid-level policy officials also began to meet with interest group lobbyists as they developed policy proposals for the State Department leadership. Informing, persuading, or lobbying—everyone was doing it.

CONCLUSION

Foreign affairs experts have criticized the role and influence of domestic politics on the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Former secretaries of state took no pleasure in the difficult task of conducting foreign affairs with other nations while simultaneously negotiating policies with Congress or, worse still, with powerful interest groups. Dean Acheson ruefully observed that the limitation imposed by democratic political practices made it difficult to conduct foreign affairs in what he saw to be the national interest, and Henry Kissinger and others complained of the near impossibility of effectively conducting foreign policy in an open society. George Shultz lamented when Congress, persuaded in large measure by public advocates, proscribed executive-branch diplomatic initiatives. It may be inevitable that practitioners of diplomacy, faced with the difficult task of reconciling U.S. national interests, as articulated by the president, with the demands and expectations of other nations, will view with distress and even horror the public airing by interest groups and their lobbies of facts or issues that can embarrass and constrain diplomatic relations. American negotiators, comparing their situation with the virtual autonomy often enjoyed by foreign diplomats, must often feel handicapped by the uninvited and unwelcome intrusions of interest groups and their lobbies.

Not only are lobbies recurrent obstacles to policymakers and negotiators, but they have gathered around them more than an aura of operating outside of traditional rules and roles. Gifts and favors from lobbies and interest groups to members of Congress and officials of the executive branch heighten the fear of corruption in the lobbying process. "Single-issue" groups convey a sense of narrow selfishness pursued at the expense of the larger good. On the other hand, the activities of lobbies regarding various aspects of foreign policy in the last quarter of the twentieth century made the policy process far more transparent than ever before. The need to protect the national security information that lay at the heart of foreign policy generated an elaborate security mechanism, but it also gave rise to its antithesis—growing public pressure for freedom of information and "government in the sunshine."

Lobbies, including those representing single-issue groups, are after all only giving necessary expression to an articulate and committed engagement with the democratic process. They have become another kind of check and balance to the branches of government beyond those provided by the Constitution. Lobbies and the government have been exploring various ways by which the rulers and ruled can get along. The public, for better or worse, has become interested and engaged in thinking and speaking about foreign policy. Many Americans, defining themselves in terms of economic, ideological, and ethnic loyalties and interests rather than the more tradi-

tional party preferences and geographic residences, have gravitated to those advocacy groups that allow them more effectively to inform elected and appointed officials about their particular views on foreign policy.

On the positive side, lobbies have contributed to the emergence of more durable foreign policies based on the interests and involvement of a broad range of people rather than those of a handful of top leaders. It can be argued that American foreign affairs officials blundered more often when they operated secretly than when they engaged interest groups and developed broader consensual policies that were more likely to have sustained understanding and support. At the least, lobbies present information and articulate issues in a manner that the executive branch cannot provide because of traditional political logrolling or concealment behind the shield of national security. They also reflect the interests of an increasingly well-informed American public more concerned with the moral and humanitarian concerns of foreign policy than with strategic considerations of traditional diplomacy, most of which faded with the end of the Cold War. Moreover, foreign powers have learned to live with the vagaries of American foreign policy as influenced and conditioned by frequent elections, ethnic group sensitivities, and an independent legislature.

Perhaps the balance of lobbies and government, however messy it can sometimes be, is the best sign of a vital democracy dealing with circumstances hardly envisaged by the Founders of our nation. The danger exists, of course, that one side or the other will gain an excessive advantage. The government, both the executive branch and Congress, is learning to cope with, and perhaps even exploit, the proliferating lobbies and interest groups. Surely the greater danger would be the stifling of full public debate of foreign policies in the name of narrowly or secretly defined national interests and national security. The challenge is for government to use the information and resources so willingly provided by the myriad lobbies operating in the foreign affairs field to make informed and wise decisions for the nation and the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. "Interest Group Politics." *Congressional Quarterly.* Washington, D.C., 1995. The basic collection of essays by experts on the workings of interest groups and their lobbies.

Cohen, Bernard C. *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy.* Boston, 1973. The classic description of how the activities of interest groups were seen by mid-level diplomats.

DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and Foreign Policy: A History.* Boston, 1992. The best survey on the role of ethnicity in American foreign affairs.

Deese, David A. *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1994. The impact of special interest groups and their lobbies appear in all of the aspects of the "new politics" that are closely examined by a group of experts.

Fisher, Louis. *Presidential War Powers.* Lawrence, Kans., 1995. The basic study of the origins and development of the congressional assertion of control of presidential war powers, a key element in the emergence of foreign affairs lobbies.

Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. *Foreign Policy by Congress.* New York, 1979. A close examination of how Congress came to share foreign policymaking with the executive branch and how human rights and other lobbies took advantage of this fact.

Holsti, Ole R. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.* Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996.

Pastor, Robert A. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929–1976.* Berkeley, Calif., 1980. Provides valuable insights and examples of the role of interest groups in the evolution of American tariff and foreign economic policies.

Patterson, Mark. "The Presidency and Organized Interest Group Liaison." *American Political Science Review* 86 (September 1992): 612–625. An authoritative study of how presidents use interest groups.

Schoultz, Lars. *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America.* Princeton, N.J., 1981. Includes an extensive review and analysis of major human rights interest groups and their lobbies.

Small, Melvin. *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994.* Baltimore, 1996. An outstanding historical summary and analysis of the domestic influences on foreign policy, including the role of interest groups.

Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy.* Cambridge, Mass., 2000.

Stalcup, Brenda, ed. *The Women's Rights Movement: Opposing Viewpoints.* San Diego, Calif., 1996.

Wittner, Lawrence S. *The Struggle against the Bomb.* 2 vols. Stanford, Calif., 1994, 1997. The indispensable guide to the rise and activities of a major interest group that changed everything.

See also AFRICAN AMERICANS; THE CHINA LOBBY; CONGRESSIONAL POWER; CONSORTIA; ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; HUMAN RIGHTS; MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS; ORGANIZED LABOR; POWER POLITICS; THE PRESS; RACE AND ETHNICITY.

Summit Conferences

Theodore A. Wilson

The practice of tribal heads, kings, emperors, and princes of the church meeting together has been the normal way of conducting diplomacy for most of recorded history. Identification of the interests of the state with the ruler's personal concerns dictated that rulers eschew the usual device of emissaries, and meet with their peers to deal with grievances, arrange dynastic marriages, proclaim wars, and enforce peace settlements. Chronicles are replete with examples, whether real or mythical, of personal diplomacy. The council of the Aegean leaders before the Trojan War, the confrontation of Moses and the pharaoh, Richard I's legendary encounter with Saladin in the Holy Land, and certainly the dramatic meeting of Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV with Pope Gregory VII at Canossa in 1077 might all be termed "summit conferences."

The meeting of Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France on the Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) near Calais, France, however, was almost anachronistic. By the seventeenth century a system of diplomatic representatives was supplanting the personal diplomacy of secular and religious rulers. Thereafter, as permanent missions assumed responsibility for negotiations, the direct involvement of national leaders in diplomacy became quite unusual. For example, of the forty-two major international conferences that took place between 1776 and 1914 listed in Ernest Satow's *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1957), only one, the Congress of Vienna, featured the presence of heads of state.

Before World War I, the American diplomatic style called for the president to delegate responsibility for negotiations to others: secretaries of state, ambassadors, and special agents. Of course, some chief executives, such as President James K. Polk during the Mexican War (1846–1848), did intervene decisively in foreign affairs, but their initiatives were implemented by special emissaries. Very early, a tradition was established that a president not travel beyond the borders of the United States during his tenure in office. Theodore Roosevelt threw over this custom by visiting Panama in 1906. Another tradition appears to have discouraged official visits to the United States by foreign heads of state and heads of government, for just thirty such visits occurred prior to 1918. Thus, historical precedent alone made the exercise of personal diplomacy by the president unlikely.

All this changed when President Woodrow Wilson decided to attend the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Since World War I every president except Warren G. Harding has traveled abroad, taking part either in formal conferences or in consultations with the leaders of other nations. The incidence of such conferences in the diplomacy of all nations has increased markedly. Certainly, since the beginning of World War II, the United States has led the way to the top-level conference table. Since 1940 American presidents have taken part in more than 200 international meetings, ranging from bilateral and informal conversations to highly organized multinational conclaves. One analysis claims that from 1953 to 2000, presidential visits abroad, ranging from a few hours to several days, total 314. President William Jefferson Clinton leads in personal diplomacy by a staggering margin, having spent 229 days abroad and visited seventy-four different countries (or entities) during his eight years in office.

In and of itself, the break with tradition, from minimal involvement by U.S. chief executives in the negotiation process to direct, repeated participation through personal diplomacy, was not unexpected. It paralleled the mushrooming American interest in world affairs and the increasing influence exerted by the United States in the international arena. What may be deemed surprising is the emergence of high-level personal diplomacy and its principal manifestation, the summit conference, as a major technique for the conduct of

the nation's business abroad. "The summit conference," one observer wrote, "has become a vital part of the contemporary foreign relations system of the United States." Not only have post–World War II presidents relied extensively on this diplomatic technique; they have made it a test of the success or failure of ambitious initiatives in foreign affairs. Why have American leaders found the summit conference so appealing? What purposes have they believed summitry can accomplish that cannot be achieved by means of conventional diplomatic channels? Is the summit conference an inevitable result of the technological revolution in communication and transportation? A critical question is whether summit conferences are intended to deal with matters of substance or of style. Phrased bluntly, is the object of summit diplomacy the foreign leaders with whom a president confers or the American people? Last, what have been the significant effects, if any, of summitry on the course of U.S. foreign policy? Have these latter-day "religio-political circuses" benefited or harmed the United States?

CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

In order to treat at least some of these questions, it is necessary to identify the special characteristics of summit conferences and to ascertain which of the numerous international meetings American leaders have attended since 1950 were "summits" rather than "ordinary" high-level conferences. An impressive body of writing exists on this subject; but no precise, wholly satisfactory definition of "summit conferences" has been provided. *The Oxford Companion to American History*'s definition, which may be taken as typical, states: "Summit conferences, as the term has been used since World War II, applies to the meeting of heads of government of the leading powers in an effort to reach broad measures of agreement. The first such meeting took place (July 1955) at Geneva. . . . Although similar meetings have been proposed since then, none has taken place, since a fixed agenda prepared by lower-level conferences seems to be a necessary prerequisite." Not only is this definition self-contradictory (referring to the existence of the practice since World War II and then asserting that a summit conference first took place in 1955), it is also unduly restrictive and outdated. The stipulation that a summit conference be preceded by lower-level meetings to fix an agenda (which presumes that a summit must have an agenda) is unwarranted. From historical example and widespread usage, one may argue that any meeting sufficiently well organized to be termed a "conference" may also be called a summit conference. Indeed, the concept has become so widespread that just about any international convocation that includes one or more heads of government is labeled a "summit" conference.

The Oxford explication does, however, include certain other criteria that are essential to the construction of a working definition: for an international conference to be a summit meeting, heads of government must take part, "leading powers" must be involved, and it should represent "an effort to reach broad measures of agreement" rather than be merely a ceremonial visit. While admittedly unsophisticated, such a definition accurately reflects the present state of understanding. Elmer Plischke, whose *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States* (1958) was the first comprehensive study of the subject, simply refers to "the practice of chiefs of state and heads of government meeting in bipartite or multipartite gatherings." Clearly of most significance is the element of personal presidential involvement.

Application of the above criteria reveals that U.S. presidents have taken part in some eighty summit conferences since 1919. Among them would rank Versailles (1919); Franklin D. Roosevelt's nine wartime meetings with Allied leaders; Potsdam (1945); Geneva (1955); Camp David (1959); Paris (1959, 1960); Vienna (1961); Glassboro (1967); President Richard M. Nixon's visits to the Soviet Union and China; the participation of President Gerald R. Ford in the Helsinki summit and his trips elsewhere; the Group of Seven (G-7, but effectively G-8 since 1991) economic summits held annually since 1975; President James E. Carter's 1977 visit to London, the Sadat-Carter and Begin-Carter discussions in Washington, the Camp David Summit (1978), Carter's March 1978 trip to Egypt and Israel, and his Vienna meeting with Leonid Brezhnev to sign the SALT II Agreement; the participation of President Ronald Reagan in the Cancun Summit on International Cooperation and Development (1981), his visits to Europe (1982) and China (1984), the Reagan-Gorbachev summits at Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington (1987), and Moscow (1988), and the New York "mini-summit" with Gorbachev in December 1988; President George H. W. Bush's numerous

consultations in Washington and abroad with world leaders, including six meetings with Gorbachev; and the seemingly nonstop recourse of President Bill Clinton to personal diplomacy.

It may be argued that all of these meetings followed the script written by Henry VIII and Francis I in 1520. That meeting certainly featured personal diplomacy. It was arranged for the purpose of reaching "a meeting of minds" between the principals rather than for the resolution of specific differences. It transpired in an atmosphere of opulence, informality, and artificial camaraderie. Last, its achievements typically were minimal. For the most part, any benefits were psychological, lying in the clearer understanding of one another's motives and motivations gained by the participants. The prototypical summit conference emphasized the "images" of progress rather than the realities of problems left unresolved.

WILSON AT VERSAILLES

The decision of President Woodrow Wilson to participate personally in the Paris Peace Conference ushered in the modern era of summit conferences. For the first time an American president was asserting the right to be present at negotiations affecting his nation's and the world's future security and to deal directly with his foreign counterparts, the heads of the Allied Powers. That the meeting to settle peace terms would be conducted by the principal political leaders of the allied nations was a logical continuation of wartime diplomatic experience. In almost every nation, the Allied Powers and Central Powers alike, elected leaders had assumed personal control of foreign policy. The British prime minister, David Lloyd George, had established a private diplomatic operation, bypassing even his foreign secretary, Lord Balfour. Similarly ignoring established channels and his secretary of state, President Wilson chose to use his friend and adviser, Colonel Edward House, as a personal representative, often communicating with other governments through him alone.

For the Allies, suspicion and dislike of the professional diplomats largely explained the direct intervention of heads of government. As Keith Eubank wrote: "Leaders of the Allied nations blamed secret diplomacy for World War I. Professional diplomats had secretly constructed entangling alliances which many thought had caused the war. Allied politicians were convinced that in the future they must control diplomacy to ensure peace. The professionals could not be trusted." In 1916 and 1917, meetings of allied premiers, with their chief assistants, had taken place. This practice was continued under the Supreme War Council, which brought together elected officials (or their representatives) and military spokesmen. During the final months of the war, the Supreme War Council assumed direct control over allied operations and also set in motion arrangements for the meeting of victorious governments to decide the terms of peace. All the major allied leaders planned as a matter of course to attend at least some planning sessions for the peace conference. For example, when President Wilson arrived in Paris, he immediately replaced Colonel House as U.S. representative to the Supreme War Council. By the time this body convened on 12 January 1919, to hear a report from Marshal Ferdinand Foch, allied commander in chief, on Germany's implementation of the armistice, the heads of the principal allied nations were in attendance. Thus, there existed precedents and procedures to make Versailles a true summit conference. Only the "spirit" of summit diplomacy was lacking, and Wilson soon provided a surfeit of that commodity.

President Wilson had not journeyed to Europe to exchange chitchat with obscure diplomats. From the beginning, the Supreme War Council (renamed the Council of Ten), which included the heads of government or foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, dominated the proceedings. The great powers decided to meet separately "to find out their own minds before they entered into the process of the peace conference," thereby relegating the other delegates to a passive role. Conscious of his special status as a head of state and supremely confident about his powers of persuasion, Wilson willingly acceded to these arrangements. It appears that he was relying upon the enormous popular acclaim accorded him in Europe and the self-evident wisdom of the policies he advocated. He hoped to achieve an easy consensus within the "Big Five" and then to obtain quick ratification of his peace program by the full conference. It could then be offered to a jubilant world. President Wilson was counting on the powerful impact on American opinion should he return from Paris a modern Moses, carrying down from the summit the tablets of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant that he and Europe's wise men had inscribed.

It did not work out as planned. The Versailles Conference lasted too long and grappled with too many specific, complicated issues for the tone of lofty detachment to be maintained. Although Wilson dealt personally with almost every problem brought before the conference, many proved too esoteric even for him, and he was forced to call upon the "experts" for advice. Even more important, Wilson simply did not possess the power to dictate terms to the other participants. His status as folk hero and senior statesman meant little to the shrewd, experienced leaders with whom he had to negotiate. These men had specific goals, and they forced President Wilson to compromise on such matters as reparations and the mandate system. Convinced that the League of Nations, if inaugurated, would soon correct the imperfections of the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson chose to sacrifice other points to ensure that the League Covenant got through intact.

His was to prove a meaningless victory, for the United States eventually rejected membership in the League of Nations. There were to be various causes of the rejection of Wilson's dream. Certainly, though, President Wilson's presentation of the Versailles Conference as heralding the approach of the millennium was pivotal. Having exaggerated the benefits to be gained from this convocation of global leaders, whom he described as the forces of righteousness, Wilson was vulnerable to attack from all sides. The Versailles Conference must be termed the first modern summit conference. It demonstrated many characteristics that later practitioners were to emulate and improve. But Wilson's plunge into personal diplomacy also served as a warning, for he had failed to orchestrate the episode so as to ensure favorable public reaction. One explanation for this failure was his foolish attempt to use a summit conference to deal with substantive issues. His successors would not repeat that particular error.

THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

Perhaps because of the contradictory results of Versailles, national leaders resisted the temptation to participate directly in the important diplomatic conferences of the interwar years. When they did attend, their role was formal and ceremonial. It required the emergence of personalities who recognized the propaganda benefits to be derived from dramatic confrontations with their political opposite numbers to revivify the practice. Adolf Hitler was one such personality. It is now the accepted wisdom to characterize Munich, the infamous summit meeting of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain with the posturing, saber-rattling Hitler in April 1938, as a great blunder, the more tragic because Western diplomats should have recognized such efforts were futile and thus unnecessary. This ignores the climate that prevailed and the conviction (which Hitler, a dedicated advocate of personal diplomacy, cleverly fostered) that only direct discussions between political leaders could break through the paper barriers erected by professional diplomats. Hitler perceived that the summit conference preeminently offered an opportunity for publicity, the reiteration in dramatic circumstances of one's position, rather than serious negotiation. He was undoubtedly a master of the technique termed "spin doctoring" by a later generation.

ROOSEVELT'S SUMMITS

It is not surprising that Franklin D. Roosevelt, another political chief who was prone to personally engineered diplomatic fireworks, would find the summit conference a congenial tool. During his first term, Roosevelt concentrated on domestic problems. On the rare occasions he did involve himself in foreign affairs, his penchant for personal diplomacy, the dispatch of presidential agents, direct appeals to other heads of government, and proposals for top-level conferences offered a clear indication of his future course of action. After 1937, when Roosevelt assumed a more active role in foreign affairs, he based U.S. diplomacy largely on these techniques. Thoroughly distrusting the "striped-pants boys" in the Department of State and always on the lookout for opportunities to present issues to the American people in simple, dramatic terms, President Roosevelt loosed a torrent of midnight messages to European leaders and calls for general peace conferences. The purposes he assigned to these activities were less clearly formed, and in some ways more ambitious, than the cold assessment of potential results that underlay Hitler's fondness for summit conferences. While highly valuing the propaganda benefits, Roosevelt apparently also believed that leader-to-leader exchanges could bring about a personal rapport not possible via the ritualistic communications that typified traditional diplomacy. He also appears to have believed that mutual sympathy

could lead to important breakthroughs. In retrospect, the emergence of the summit conference as a dominant instrument in the diplomacy of World War II appears to have been inevitable, given the leading role of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Certainly, as compared with past eras, World War II witnessed a marked increase in meetings between national leaders. The assembling of presidents, premiers, and generalissimos became normal, even expected, events. On the American side, ten such summit conferences took place: the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August 1941; the first Washington Conference (Roosevelt and Churchill) in December 1941–January 1942; Casablanca (Roosevelt and Churchill) in January 1943; the second Washington Conference (Roosevelt and Churchill) in May 1943; the first Quebec Conference (Roosevelt and Churchill) in August 1943; Cairo (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) in November 1943; Tehran (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin) in November–December 1943; the second Quebec Conference (Roosevelt and Churchill) in September 1944; Yalta (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) in February 1945; and Potsdam (President Harry S. Truman, Churchill [replaced by Clement Attlee], and Stalin) in July 1945. Although called for various reasons, these meetings shared common characteristics and together they made the concept of summit conferences, if not the term itself, familiar to anyone with the remotest awareness of foreign affairs.

The first of these conferences, the dramatic sea meeting off Argentia, Newfoundland, of Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, coming as it did before formal U.S. entry into World War II, was in many ways the most novel. The Atlantic Conference established the style and much of the agenda for subsequent wartime meetings. It was secret, occurred in unique circumstances, and—reflecting the purposes of summits to come—dealt more with personal relationships than substantive issues. The conference confirmed the program of U.S. military aid to Great Britain; produced a short-lived agreement on policy toward Japan; sanctioned a statement of high purpose, the Atlantic Charter; and, most important, brought together two members of the triumvirate that was to lead the Allies.

Roosevelt and Churchill had been corresponding on a regular basis since September 1939, when the president congratulated the British politician on his reappointment as first lord of the Admiralty and had invited him to "keep in touch personally with anything you want to know about." Churchill responded with alacrity, and thus began a momentous correspondence. Soon, however, the two men were expressing eager interest in a personal meeting, moved largely by curiosity and anxiety. Both leaders possessed tremendous confidence in their charm and persuasive powers, and wished to test them against a worthy opponent. This first confrontation, though "devoutly wished and gladly consummated," produced great concern on both sides. Roosevelt's confidant, Harry Hopkins, once predicted: "Bringing together President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister . . . would cause the biggest explosion ever seen." He was mistaken. Roosevelt and Churchill reached an amicable understanding at the conference. Deeply satisfied, Churchill informed the British war cabinet, "I am sure I have established warm and deep personal relations with our great friend." Roosevelt later told his wife that this personal encounter "had broken the ice," and he had been shown that Churchill was a man with whom he could work. Despite Churchill's boasts, however, political cooperation did not lead to true friendship.

Precisely what the Atlantic Conference achieved, other than the calming of anxious egos and the satisfaction of curiosity, is difficult to say. Roosevelt let pass the opportunity afforded by the postconference publicity to take bold action regarding American entry into the war. Looking back at this first summit, it appears that Roosevelt perceived the meeting as a way to avoid decisions. There was only the most rudimentary agenda, the president intentionally excluded Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other diplomatic officials, and the experts who did accompany him (mostly military figures) were given almost no time to prepare. As usual, the British were thoroughly briefed, and they took the lead in organizing the discussions. However, the environment in which the meeting occurred and Roosevelt's casual, often flighty approach to the weighty issues they raised proved a source of constant frustration to the British and to his own subordinates. The fact that there exists no official text of the Atlantic Charter, the conference's one clear achievement, is testimony to its chaotic and cursory nature.

The hopes and assumptions that Roosevelt assigned to this type of diplomatic initiative greatly influenced the summit conferences that followed at intervals during the war. The "conference" volumes in the Department of State's docu-

mentary series Foreign Relations of the United States reveal that subsequent meetings were vastly better organized than Roosevelt's meetings with Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland. But these documents also demonstrate that the procedures changed very little. Claiming that his meetings with Churchill (and the tripartite meeting at Tehran) dealt solely with military matters, President Roosevelt continued to exclude the professional diplomats. On several occasions he specifically forbade any member of his staff to take minutes of the talks with other political leaders. Only when the question of the final conference communiqué, the public announcement of the questions discussed and decisions taken, arose did the president participate fully in the discussion and ask for his advisers' recommendations.

It was not until Tehran, when issues affecting postwar problems were dealt with, that Roosevelt permitted thoroughgoing preparation, a more formal agenda, and the participation by subordinates in carefully organized discussions with their opposite numbers. Tehran perhaps was the only true "conference" out of all the wartime summit meetings. Much more than the meeting at Yalta—at which Roosevelt's participation, betraying ill health and mental exhaustion—was sporadic and confused, the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference at Tehran produced important decisions affecting the conduct of the war and the shape of the postwar world.

It is important to emphasize that the summit conferences of World War II treated vital issues: problems of grand strategy and logistics (the second front question being most important), policy regarding the vanquished enemies, creation of a viable international organization, and the political and economic conditions of the peace. Whether these issues could have been more successfully handled by means of traditional diplomacy is moot. Despite the baneful influences to which the participants in these meetings were subjected—interminable dinners and toasts, late night tête-à-têtes, the pressure to render crucial decisions on the basis of comradely pleadings and unsubstantiated information—one may argue that Roosevelt never reversed established policies of the United States while caught up in the "unreal atmosphere" of a summit conference. The decisions regarding the second front, German occupation zones, and the supposed "sellout" to Stalin at Yalta may have had little to do with summitry; and the most famous indictment of Roosevelt's participation in summit conferences, the offhand announcement of the "unconditional surrender" policy at Casablanca, can be presented, as Warren Kimball and others have argued, as a logical, carefully prepared extension of accepted policy. In addition, the practice of traditional diplomacy continued and, indeed, greatly increased during the war. Summit diplomacy did not replace, but rather superimposed itself on, the normal diplomatic process, and the difficulties experienced by American diplomats in settling relatively minor disputes do not suggest that old-style laborious negotiation would have resolved the major issues dividing the wartime allies.

To the related question—whether the reliance on summit conferences best served the interests of the American people—a more definite answer is possible. Here the practice was clearly harmful. It gave rise to erroneous assumptions on the part of American leaders and public about the nature of wartime diplomacy and about the likelihood of harmonious adjustment of all international conflicts. A summit conference seems always to generate "an aura of unreality," because it brings together persons who perhaps hold diametrically opposed viewpoints, and compels them to smile and genuflect to each other and to the ideal of mutual understanding and goodwill. An individual such as Franklin Roosevelt, predisposed toward personal initiatives and the belief that, for example, "Uncle Joe" Stalin was basically a tough ward politician who happened to speak Russian, risked losing his sense of perspective. Roosevelt confused the appearance of progress fostered by the congeniality present at these meetings with the reality of the conflict between American, Soviet, and British goals. A rosy assessment of colleagues' good intentions manifestly colored Roosevelt's evaluation of their subsequent actions as set forth in the cables and memoranda that flooded into the White House map room. Further, the optimistic readings about the summit conferences offered by President Roosevelt stimulated popular euphoria about the era of universal peace that surely would ensue because of these highly publicized communions of world leaders.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 marked the beginning of a ten-year hiatus in American involvement with summit conferences. Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, did take part in the Potsdam Conference with his Russian

and British counterparts; he hosted Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in November 1945 for talks about sharing nuclear secrets; and he reluctantly welcomed Attlee again in December 1950, when the British prime minister insisted on personal discussions regarding a rumored American decision to use atomic weapons in Korea. But it was clear that Truman did not share his flamboyant predecessor's fondness for dramatic initiatives (such as summit conferences) in foreign affairs. Much more a team player, Truman preferred to find men whom he respected and trusted, then authorize them to carry on the business of diplomacy. President Truman's one major summit conference, Potsdam (which had been scheduled prior to his accession), was enlightening. He enjoyed meeting Stalin and Churchill on equal terms, and he gained a measure of confidence from the experience; but the methodical, straightforward Missourian was repelled by the frequent deviations from the agenda and the lapses of his fellow leaders into propaganda speeches. Truman's distaste for personal diplomacy and the deepening rift in Soviet-American relations temporarily banished the summit conference from the American diplomatic repertoire. By 1947 even the regular meetings of diplomatic chiefs, the Council of Foreign Ministers, had degenerated into self-serving rhetorical exercises. Thereafter, the Cold War inhibited communication of any kind between East and West. Only once, during the 1948 presidential election, did Truman seriously entertain the possibility of a personal meeting with Stalin.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

It remained for a new president, one possessing a gregarious personality and enormous self-confidence, to break open the frozen channels of East-West communication and to restore the summit conference to preeminence. The epoch that began with the meeting of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leaders at Geneva in July 1955 (the first "summit conference" so labeled) witnessed an astonishing return of popularity of the summit conference. It also produced significant changes in the functions of this diplomatic instrument. As Adam Ulam observed: "Negotiations as such were perhaps less important than the ability to assess your protagonists needs, fears, and goals." Thus, the dimension of personal understanding remained central. But in contrast with the wartime meetings, Geneva and a long list of successor conferences openly disavowed matters of substance in favor of the goodwill and rapport to be gained (or proclaimed). For example, the meeting in Panama in July 1956 of leaders from nineteen nations under the auspices of the Organization of American States was portrayed as a "hemispheric summit" to inaugurate a new era of cooperation. President Eisenhower attended but, aside from posed photographs, little was accomplished. From the American perspective, the effects of summitry on public opinion at home became more important than the chance for diplomatic breakthroughs. As noted, publicity always had been important. Now, however, the determination of American leaders to avoid any impression of weakness in dealings with the communists and, as well, to defuse popular anxieties produced modifications not just of emphasis but also of basic purpose. As Joan Hoff notes, when U.S. and Soviet leaders met in person, "it gave people a sense of reassurance that, even though there was the possibility of a terrible nuclear confrontation, . . . they were meeting and war was not going to happen."

The agreement to convene a summit conference in 1955 was especially noteworthy because of the previously intransigent attitude of President Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, toward the possibility of improved relations with the Soviet Union. It was forced upon them mainly by sentiment in Europe (where the Austrian peace treaty had finally been negotiated and the Warsaw Pact had been signed) and at home that, in Stephen Ambrose's cogent phrase, "some ground rules for the Cold War, of spirit if not of substance, were obviously needed." Worrying crises, such as the flare-up over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the China coast, demonstrated that the public would not support a long-term policy based on brinkmanship. Eisenhower himself was dedicated to peace, and he had been impressed by Churchill's argument for a summit. "It was only elementary prudence," the British statesman had written in the hopes of reviving the wartime habit of meetings between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, "for the West to learn at firsthand what sort of men were now in charge in the Kremlin, and to let these new men gauge the quality and temper of Western leadership." Secretary of State Dulles at first opposed such a meeting. He argued that the Russians were eager for a conference to dramatize the Soviet Union's moral and social equality with the West and to enhance the legitimacy of Stalin's

successors. Finally, Dulles bowed to the president's wishes, muttering that if the summit served "as an object lesson for deluded optimists," it would be worthwhile.

The meeting of Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and the new leaders of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, opened in Geneva on 18 July 1955. Each side brought a huge staff and a staggering amount of background data (the American delegation had prepared 20 "basic documents" and 150 "secondary papers"), and an elaborate agenda was agreed upon. The volume of documentation ensured that the conference would bog down in details, and this soon happened. The meeting's significance derived from the reopening of communication it symbolized. Perhaps, given the rigid stance of Soviet and American policy and the comparable frigidity of public attitudes, some such dramatic gesture was necessary. At any rate, it worked. Smiling genially, President Eisenhower posed for photographs with the beaming Bulganin and Khrushchev. Such incidents and the ingenuous statements by both sides about a possible future reduction of tensions sparked a wave of popular exhilaration. The conference had transpired in a blaze of publicity (some 1,500 reporters and such public figures as the evangelist Billy Graham were present), and almost everyone acclaimed the "spirit of Geneva" as inaugurating a new era. The "spirit of Geneva" did not end the Cold War and did not resolve any of the grave problems faced by the Soviet Union and the West. It did, however, provide a clear impression that neither side wanted a thermonuclear holocaust and recognition that a military stalemate existed.

As the Atlantic Conference had for the wartime summits, so the Geneva meeting of 1955 served as a model for the following period of conferences between national leaders. Indeed, the obvious psychological and political benefits of such affairs (Eisenhower's popularity index reached 79 percent shortly after Geneva) proved irresistible. Even the aborted Paris summit of 1960, at which Premier Khrushchev forced Eisenhower to admit publicly that he had authorized U-2 spy flights over Soviet territory, did not greatly diminish the luster of summitry.

KENNEDY AND JOHNSON

Anxious to prove his maturity to Khrushchev and the American people, President John F. Kennedy met the Russian leader at Vienna in 1961. Kennedy's apparent conviction that private discussions, avoiding bombastic public rhetoric, with someone such as Khrushchev would result in rational discourse foundered on the Soviet leader's desire to intimidate the young American president. Although Vienna proved a most unhappy experience, Kennedy's personal approach to diplomacy undoubtedly would have led to other such adventures had he lived. It is unlikely, however, that any repetition of the Vienna debacle would have occurred. With one notable exception, summit conferences from 1961 to the present have been carefully scripted.

President Lyndon Johnson was inclined toward face-to-face decision making. However, after a proposal in early 1965 for a U.S.–Soviet summit became enmeshed in Moscow's criticism of the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, Johnson, wary of possible political repercussions and unwilling to permit the Soviets a forum for attacking U.S. involvement in Vietnam, contented himself with one perfunctory meeting with the Russians, the so-called Glassboro Summit in New Jersey (1967). Even so, it appeared that some form of personal contact between national leaders had become an essential duty of office. If that was so, Richard Nixon elevated this ritual to something approaching high art.

RICHARD NIXON

All the elements of the modern-day summit conference were present in Nixon's personal diplomacy: the secret preparations; the dramatic announcement of the intended journey to Peking, Moscow, and Guam; the elaborate ceremonies and effusions of mutual regard; and the vague final communiqué. Whether Nixon's assorted trips abroad were "true" summit conferences or merely formal state visits, one leader journeying to another country to exclaim over scenic wonders, consume regional delicacies, acquire souvenirs, and proclaim admiration for the host nation's achievements, is open to question. The significant initiatives pursued by Nixon and his national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger to readjust U.S. foreign policy to the political and economic implications of a multipolar world owed little to Nixon's engagement with summitry. It may be that Nixon desired to use these affairs to achieve real breakthroughs. He certainly prepared for "conferences" rather than for ceremonial visits to

the Great Wall of China and the Bolshoi Ballet. If that was the case, Nixon was disappointed, for his interventions in diplomacy followed the pattern established two decades earlier, and their effects were decidedly greater at home than abroad. Nixon, of course, emphasized the domestic political effects of a summit conference. Talking with Kissinger about his 1972 summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon urged that no "final agreements be entered into" prior to his arrival in Moscow, for otherwise his critics "will try to make it appear that all of this could have been achieved without any summitry whatever."

Perhaps these frantic efforts proved unsuccessful because the usefulness of summit conferences now had been exhausted. Keith Eubank wrote: "Summit conferences ought not to be used as an antibiotic, believing that frequent doses will cure the patient. The summit conference can never be a quick cheap cure for international ills whose treatment requires time, labor, and thought." At some point, publicity stunts and presidential globe-trotting must give way to deliberate, serious analysis and negotiation. But diverting the public's attention may have been the point. Was it accidental that President Nixon visited ten countries and spent twenty-two days abroad during the eight months prior to his resignation on 9 August 1974?

THE BROKERED AND ECONOMIC SUMMITS

The summit conference as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy is marvelously exemplified by the Helsinki Conference in July 1975. There, President Gerald Ford and the leaders of some thirty other nations conferred in dignified surroundings and then signed a document that confirmed the political and territorial division of Europe that had occurred thirty years before. Convocation of a summit conference for such a blatantly propagandistic and shallow purpose appears to suggest, as Henry Kissinger wrote after the collapse of the Paris summit in 1960, that this technique, long put forward "as the magic solvent of all tensions," stood revealed as a "parody" of diplomacy. Nevertheless, summit conferences continued in favor, for they do offer political and propaganda benefits to participants. In November 1974, President Ford met with Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok to affirm their commitment to arms control, but SALT II was never implemented fully as a treaty. Ford's visit to China in the fall of 1975 was billed a summit conference in order to improve his "image" as a statesman, thus enhancing his chances of reelection. Even though nothing of substance resulted from the trip, the president and his advisers considered the China summit a great success. President Jimmy Carter's triumphal tour of England in the spring of 1977, capped by a friendly but diplomatically insignificant meeting with European leaders in London, was clearly in the same tradition.

The Ford and Carter presidencies did witness the emergence of two new variants of the summit conference: the "economic summit" and the "brokered summit." The economic summit is perhaps best exemplified by the inauguration of an annual meeting of the heads of the seven most powerful economic states (the G-7). These meetings have many of the hallmarks and various defects of bilateral summits, though they have proved useful in highlighting such global problems as drugs, the information society, and energy. Such regional summits as the annual meeting of European Union heads and the so-called "Summit of the Americas" mirror this approach.

The brokered summit may appropriately be considered as a manifestation since the mid-1970s of the uniquely powerful role of the United States in international affairs. Seeking a way out of the quagmire in which Israel and its Middle East neighbors had been trapped for thirty years, a bog that threatened to drag in major powers and cause a global conflict, President Jimmy Carter decided to offer his good offices as a broker-mediator-matchmaker. Following the remarkable visit of the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, to Jerusalem in November 1977, Carter invited Sadat and the Israeli prime minister, Menachim Begin, to Washington for separate discussions about finding a way out of the quagmire. Next, the president arranged a joint meeting with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders at the presidential retreat, Camp David, Maryland. Originally planned as a three-day "meet-and-greet," this brokered summit went on for thirteen days (5–17 September 1978). By shuttling between cabins, soothing wounded feelings, and pushing the two adversaries to keep talking, Carter brokered the Camp David Accords, a framework for peace that, while never completely implemented, remains the basic document in the ongoing process to find a fair and equitable peace in the Middle East.

RONALD REAGAN AND GEORGE H. W. BUSH

President Ronald Reagan brokered no peace settlements, and his first term saw a historic hiatus in the modern-day parade of summit conferences. Determined to rebuild America's power and prestige, Reagan and his advisers initially were hostile toward any dealings with that "evil empire," the Soviet Union. During his second term, however, there occurred a notable reversal of policies and attitudes. After Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power in March 1985, Reagan met more frequently with his Russian counterpart than had any of his predecessors. Reagan and Gorbachev arranged a "meet-and-greet" in Geneva in November 1985; took part in a summit at Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986; were reunited in Washington in December 1987 to sign the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; embraced in front of Lenin's Tomb at the Moscow Summit in June 1988; and met a final time in New York in December 1988.

The Reykjavik Summit was notable for its departures from the scripted agenda. President Reagan, eager for an attention-getting foreign policy feat prior to midterm congressional elections, agreed to a summit meeting without the usual lengthy preparations. The American delegation was stunned when Gorbachev proposed a 50 percent cut in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their eventual elimination in return for U.S. abandonment of its missile shield, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Apparently convinced he was in a high-stakes poker game, Reagan offered to eliminate all American (and British and French) ICBMs within ten years if the Russians accepted deployment of SDI. This proposal confused Gorbachev, Reagan's aides, and, quite likely, the president himself. The Reykjavik summit broke up in disarray. Thereafter, summits have hewed closely to prearranged scripts.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought neither the end of history nor the abolition of the summit conference as a favored tool in the American diplomatic and political arsenal. President George Bush met on six occasions with Gorbachev prior to the latter's transfer of power to Boris Yeltsin in December 1991, and he made numerous trips abroad.

BILL CLINTON AND GEORGE W. BUSH

President Bill Clinton proved to be the most enthusiastic exponent of personal diplomacy of the modern era. He engaged in brokered summitry and also took part in conferences with Yeltsin (with whom he established warm relations), with the leaders of the European Union, and with Premier Zhu Rongji of the People's Republic of China. As well, between the spring of 1993 and the fall of 2000, Clinton made 133 visits to other nations, more than his predecessors Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon combined. Many of these trips were for political and psychological purposes, though Clinton also conducted presidential business. The itineraries and agendas of these visits were as carefully planned as were the summits Clinton attended. Both required enormous entourages. It has been estimated that more than 1,300 federal officials accompanied Clinton on his six-nation trip to Africa in 1998.

The technique of using the power and prestige of the president to bring adversaries to the bargaining table was used again by Clinton. Following a lengthy period of shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Clinton brought Israel's prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, to proclaim in a remarkable ceremony on the south lawn of the White House their commitment to mutual recognition, Palestinian self-rule, and a comprehensive peace settlement. Although Clinton did not personally oversee the tortuous negotiations that led to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, the commitment of his prestige and the awesome power of the United States made Dayton yet another brokered summit. It may be that Clinton's greatly ballyhooed trips to Ireland—both Northern Ireland and the Republic—in December 1995 and September 1998, respectively, were intended to produce yet another brokered summit and public relations triumph. Unfortunately, Ireland's troubles were not so easily banished.

Although George W. Bush came into office as the least-traveled and perhaps least internationally minded of recent presidents, and waited some six months before taking part in his first summit (with the European Union leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2001), Bush appeared to be prepared to conduct personal diplomacy much as did his predecessors.

CONCLUSION

While the principal aims of the summit conference has changed little from the seventeenth to the

twenty-first century, the environment in which summitry occurs has changed since the end of the Cold War. At present and for the foreseeable future, the "typical" summit conference, a bilateral meeting of national leaders, has been replaced by multilateral summits, reflecting the diverse circumstances and problems of an increasingly multipolar and interdependent world system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambrose, Stephen. *The Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938.* 8th rev. ed. New York, 1997.

Ambrosius, Lloyd. *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I.* Wilmington, Del., 1991.

Bailey, Thomas A. *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace.* New York, 1944.

———. *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal.* New York, 1945.

Bischof, Gunter, and Saki Dockrill, eds. *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955.* Baton Rouge, La., 2000.

Brandon, Henry. *The Retreat of American Power.* Garden City, N.Y., 1973.

Burns, James MacGregor. *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom.* New York, 1970.

Clemens, Diane S. *Yalta.* New York, 1970.

Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy.* New York, 1983.

Eubank, Keith. *The Summit Conference, 1919–1960.* Norman, Okla., 1966.

Feis, Herbert. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin.* Princeton, N.J., 1957.

Hankey, Maurice. *Diplomacy by Conference.* London, 1946.

Hoopes, Townsend. *The Devil and John Foster Dulles.* Boston, 1973.

Kemp, Arthur. "Summit Conferences During World War II as Instruments of American Diplomacy." In *Issues and Conflict: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy.* Edited by George L. Anderson. Lawrence, Kans., 1959.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson.* 5 vols. Princeton, N.J., 1947–1965.

Mayer, Arno. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking.* New York, 1967.

Mee, Charles L., Jr. *Meeting at Potsdam.* New York and London, 1975.

Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power.* New York, 1990.

Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking, 1919.* New York, 1965.

O'Connor, Raymond. *Surrender.* New York, 1973.

Parmet, Herbert S. *Eisenhower and the American Crusades.* New York, 1972.

Plischke, Elmer. "Recent State Visits to the United States—A Technique of Summit Diplomacy." *World Affairs Quarterly* 29 (1958).

———. *Summit Diplomacy: The Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States.* College Park, Md., 1958.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency.* Boston, 1973.

U.S. Department of State. Supplement to *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference.* 13 vols. Washington, D.C., 1946–1952.

Walton, Richard J. *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy.* New York, 1972.

Walworth, Arthur. *Wilson and His Peacemakers.* New York, 1986.

Wilson, Theodore A. *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay 1941.* Rev. ed. Lawrence, Kans., 1991.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; THE MUNICH ANALOGY; PEACEMAKING; PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; PUBLIC OPINION; TREATIES.

SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY

Vojtech Mastny

The concept of a superpower was a product of the Cold War and the nuclear age. Although the word appeared, according to Webster's dictionary, as early as 1922, its common usage only dates from the time when the adversarial relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union became defined by their possession of nuclear arsenals so formidable that the two nations were set apart from any others in the world. It came to be widely, though by no means universally, accepted that the very possession of these weapons, regardless of their actual use, made the two nations immensely more powerful than any other.

Superpower diplomacy is thus closely related to nuclear weapons. They gave the U.S.–Soviet diplomatic intercourse its distinct character. During the years when the United States and the Soviet Union were in superpower positions in relation to their allies and clients in different parts of the world, their respective relations with those countries were of a different order and are therefore usually not considered under the rubric of superpower diplomacy. These relationships nevertheless influenced the manner in which Washington and Moscow dealt with one another.

Superpower diplomacy was a product of particular historical circumstances, characterized by bipolarism—the domination of the international system by two exceptionally powerful states locked in an adversarial relationship. Historically, such circumstances were highly unusual. The age of the superpowers began in 1945 with the appearance of nuclear weapons and ended in 1991 with the disappearance of one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union. The subsequent survival of the United States as "the world's only superpower" evolved in a radically different international environment, where bilateralism had ceased to exist and the concept of superpower diplomacy therefore lost its original meaning.

Despite its uniqueness and limited life span, superpower diplomacy was important because it altered and distorted previously established diplomatic practices by making the conduct of diplomacy dependent, to an unaccustomed degree, upon a new kind of weaponry that carried with it the threat of universal annihilation. The dependence tended to impose oversimplification upon a profession traditionally known for its subtlety, sometimes raising questions about whether diplomacy may not have outlived its usefulness because of the limitations placed on it by the crudeness and excess of the new power it wielded. Although such predictions proved wrong, the overriding concern with the management of that power left indelible marks on diplomacy, making it difficult to adjust to an era in which nuclear weapons continued to exist but bipolarism no longer applied.

While the superpower status of the United States and the Soviet Union derived from what the two countries had in common, the understanding of their diplomatic interaction requires constant attention to the differences that distinguished them from each other. One was a pluralistic democracy with a government accountable to the people. The other was a one-party dictatorship ruled by a self-perpetuating oligarchy accountable only to itself. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union defined themselves in different ways as outsiders to the traditional European system of power politics, which they regarded as alien to their respective values as well as detrimental to international order.

Twice in the twentieth century the United States attempted to reform the international system in accordance with its own, specifically American, model of a democratic federalism. It sought to ensure its primacy because of its superior economic power and presumably higher morality in an international system where the interests of all nations would be secured by generally accepted international institutions and procedures designed to mitigate and manage conflict.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet state in its early years sought to overthrow rather than reform what it regarded as an inherently destructive and ultimately doomed capitalist world order. Soviet leaders originally believed in a world revolution that would result in a community of states living in harmony because of their common dedication to Marxist principles, with the Soviet state as the first among equals. They hoped to conduct revolutionary diplomacy in conjunction with the management of congenial communist parties directed from Moscow.

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union had to adapt their utopian tenets to real life, the idealistic and ideological streaks never entirely disappeared from their foreign policies, making their diplomacy different from that of other countries, irrespective of their later superpower status. The United States, sobered by the rejection by its own Senate of the League of Nations designed during World War I by President Woodrow Wilson and the subsequent descent of Europe into another world war, subsequently attempted to build the United Nations on more realistic grounds, including a directorate of the main great powers. Once the concept of a directorate based on collaboration with the Soviet Union proved not realistic enough, American policymakers became more—though never entirely—receptive to European notions of balance of power based on the pursuit of national interest, as propagated by influential scholars of European origin such as Hans Morgenthau.

Under the dictatorship of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union likewise abandoned in practice its earlier revolutionary utopia in favor of a foreign policy that instead embraced many of the traditional goals of Russian imperialism. Under Stalin the Soviet Union became an opportunistic player in the international system, expanding its territory and sphere of influence first in collaboration with Nazi Germany, and, after Germany attacked it in World War II, in collaboration with the Western powers. To what extent Soviet foreign policy became traditional foreign policy despite the communist ideology of its practitioners became a tantalizing question for the United States once the Soviet Union emerged as its main rival and remains a contentious issue among historians and political scientists. The opening of former Soviet archives after the end of the Cold War has made more of them conclude that Marxist-Leninist ideological preconceptions continued to shape Soviet foreign policy in important ways until its very end—not so much by determining its goals as by providing the conceptual framework through which policymakers viewed the outside world and interpreted the intentions and capabilities of their adversaries.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union was long reluctant to accept the notion that there were two superpowers, which implied commonality with its capitalist adversary as well as permanence of the hostile system presided over by the United States, with its superior resources. The notion is of Western origin and was always more popular with critics of the superpowers than with either of them. In any case, their superpower relationship had come into being before it was recognized and labeled as such, and neither of the two rivals was able to anticipate correctly what their future relationship would be like.

THE UNEXPECTED NEW WORLD, 1945–1947

The February 1945 Yalta conference between Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to be regarded as the birthplace of superpower diplomacy. According to the Yalta myth, Stalin and Roosevelt, reluctantly assisted by Churchill, agreed to divide Europe into spheres of influence along the lines it would in fact be divided into three years later. In reality, no such agreement was concluded at the conference, whose main defect was instead the lack of any clear agreement about the potentially divisive effects of the respective visions of the postwar world. In its inattention to detail, its inability to distinguish the primary from the secondary issues, and its indulgence in wishful thinking, Yalta was characteristic of the excessively casual and highly personalized World War II coalition diplomacy—features that linked it with the later superpower diplomacy in style, if not in substance.

At issue in both the Soviet and the American visions of the postwar world was the choice between hegemony—domination by a single power—and condominium—predominance by several, not necessarily two, cooperating powers. Stalin's vision, now possible to reconstruct from Soviet archival documents, was that of a Europe in which the Soviet Union would have emerged, because of its overwhelming military victory, as the sole great power on the continent. He expected to achieve this hegemonic position by

working with, rather than against, his American and British allies. But suspicious as he was of the motives of anyone he could not control, he sought to secure a particularly strong hold on the neighboring peoples of Eastern Europe, most of whom were traditionally hostile to Russia. Seeking absolute security, as dictators are predisposed to do, he could only achieve it at the cost of the absolute insecurity of those around him.

There has been a long-standing controversy about whether Stalin originally aimed at establishing communist regimes in Europe, as they were in fact later established under his auspices in its eastern part. No evidence of such a premeditated design has been found, although Stalin, as a communist, took it for granted that communism would eventually prevail in the world. In practical terms, at issue was the kind of control he considered necessary to satisfy his sweeping notion of security. In Eastern Europe it soon became evident that nothing short of the monopoly of power by the communist parties beholden to Moscow could ensure the attainment of Soviet security as Stalin understood it. This entailed the extension of the Stalinist system, whose record of arbitrary rule, disregard for human rights, and genocide justified apprehension about what Soviet hegemony meant.

The American vision of international order blended U.S. security interests more successfully with those of other nations. It was more innovative than Stalin's vision in that it did not rely on crude power: in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States reduced its formidable military machine much more drastically than the Soviet Union did. Americans were sufficiently confident in their economic power, democratic political system, and the international arrangements they had been instrumental in bringing about within the framework of the United Nations. U.S. hegemony, while liable to be resented as any hegemony would be, was incomparably more benign than the Soviet variety.

A school of American revisionist historians has challenged the traditional view, according to which Stalin's policies were primarily responsible for prompting the U.S.–Soviet rivalry that became known as the Cold War. Inspired by the writings of William Appleman Williams, the revisionists have regarded especially America's hegemonic economic diplomacy—the quest for an "open door" through which the United States would inevitably walk the tallest—as a prescription for conflict. Yet the Soviet Union, taking a Marxist view, considered America's economic power to be resting on shaky foundations. Expecting the wartime boom to be followed by a crisis of overproduction, much on the order of the Great Depression, the Soviet Union expected to benefit from the capitalists' distress by being able to obtain U.S. economic assistance on its own terms.

Immediate post–World War II diplomacy had more in common with the traditional variety than with later superpower diplomacy. The July–August 1945 Potsdam conference of the Big Three—their first gathering after the victory in Europe and the last for another ten years—was about practical issues concerning treatment of the defeated Germany in anticipation of a later peace treaty. The London conference in September of that year inaugurated the Council of Foreign Ministers as what the three powers still believed would be their supreme coordinating body supervising the building of a new international order compatible with their respective interests. Although the incompatibility of those interests was becoming progressively evident, nothing yet pointed unequivocally to the emergence of a bipolar system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. For one thing, Great Britain still played an important role, often taking the lead over the United States in challenging the Soviet Union, and was for that reason regarded by Stalin as more dangerous a rival than the United States.

Despite their international ascendancy as a result of World War II, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were superpowers in 1945. Later that year the United States exploded the first nuclear bomb, but it did not effectively link its atomic monopoly to diplomacy. According to Gar Alperovitz and other historians of U.S. foreign policy, the very possession of the superweapon gave Washington a powerful policy tool that could not fail to have a constraining effect on the policies of other countries, particularly the Soviet Union. Yet the United States showed an unwillingness to use the tool by proposing in June 1946 the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy.

Nor did Stalin link nuclear weapons to diplomacy. Although he was prompted to accelerate the construction of the Soviet Union's own atomic bomb—the reason why the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan—he notably failed to be constrained by the U.S. nuclear monopoly. As late as 1946 he was confident that he could secure Soviet primacy in Europe and pursue Soviet interests elsewhere in the world by besting the West-

ern powers in the diplomatic game. The revealing secret exchanges between him and his foreign minister, Viacheslav M. Molotov, when the latter was attending the July–September 1946 Paris conference on peace treaties with Germany's former allies, show Stalin as being contemptuous of the Western statesmen's diplomatic skills as well as guts. The resulting peace treaties with Germany's former allies amounted to the reluctant recognition by the West of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe.

THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR AND DECLINE OF DIPLOMACY, 1947–1953

Diplomacy failed to resolve disagreements among the occupation powers about the administration and future status of Germany. The disagreements reflected the conflict between the Soviet concept of a weak though undivided and not necessarily communist Germany, which would ensure its dependence on Moscow, and the U.S. concept of a Germany integrated in a unifying Europe, even at the cost of detaching the western-occupied part of the country from the Soviet occupation zone as a separate state. At the March 1947 Moscow conference of foreign ministers, Secretary of State George C. Marshall became convinced about the incompatibility of these respective approaches to the solution of the German question and the necessity of reviewing the overall U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

The result of the review was the adoption of the concept of containment, which remained, with different variations, the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy until the Soviet Union's collapse ended the confrontation forty-four years later. Conceptualized by George F. Kennan, a historian, diplomat, and Russian expert who had served at the U.S. embassy in Moscow during the critical preceding years, containment was the most original, subtle, and successful foreign policy concept ever embraced by the United States. Anticipating long-term rivalry between the two future superpowers, Kennan grasped the fundamental systemic differences and conflicting interests that precluded their mutual accommodation, but concluded that America's superior political, economic, and moral assets could allow it to prevail without war until internal strains in the Soviet system brought about "either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." This is precisely what eventually happened.

Kennan believed that the Soviet Union posed a political rather than a military threat and was therefore critical of the later expansion of the U.S. military establishment as well as the application of containment to other nations on the questionable assumption that they were being manipulated from Moscow. In its original version, the containment doctrine assigned the primary role to diplomacy—including public diplomacy but not excluding covert action—while wielding enough military power to retain credibility. There had been successful U.S. attempts at using traditional diplomacy backed by force to prevent the expansion of Soviet power as an influence in peripheral areas, such as Iran and Turkey, as early as 1946. But the first example of containment in action motivated by Kennan's analysis was the Marshall Plan, announced by the secretary of state on 5 June 1947.

While the immediate goal of the plan was to provide extensive U.S. economic assistance to the European nations ravaged by the recent war, its larger purpose was to force a decision about the terms of the U.S.–Soviet rivalry. By offering assistance to any European state, including the Soviet Union, on conditions requiring openness, accountability, and cooperation among the recipients in pooling their resources—conditions incompatible with the system of imperial control Stalin was imposing on Eastern Europe—the United States shifted the decision onto him. He could either give up control by allowing the East Europeans to participate in the plan under American conditions or else reject it and let the Americans organize Western Europe under their auspices while he proceeded to organize Eastern Europe his own way. In either case the United States stood to win.

As the United States expected, the Soviet Union chose the partition of Europe, although the choice had not been predetermined in Stalin's mind. Scholars have discovered Soviet sources showing that he had hoped his negotiators could compel the Americans to give up their conditions and allow the Soviet Union to benefit from the Marshall Plan while preventing the consolidation of Western Europe—an illusion stemming from the dogmatic Soviet belief that U.S. capitalism was acting from a position of weakness because of its impending crisis. Once the illusion was exposed, the Soviet Union proceeded to tighten its hold on Eastern Europe by imposing full-fledged communist regimes—a policy that increased the West Europeans' willingness to rally behind U.S. leadership. The competition

between the two nascent superpowers was henceforth determined by the contrast between what the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad dubbed the American "empire by invitation" and the Soviet empire based on coercion.

The Soviet Union never developed a foreign policy concept comparable in intellectual subtlety and pragmatic utility to the U.S. concept of containment. Once the lines were drawn, its policy relied instead on what it considered an inevitable "general crisis of capitalism"—something beyond Soviet control that never came. The policy sought to precipitate the crisis by trying to foment instability in Western Europe and split it away from the United States, misjudging the extent to which West Europeans were ready to submit to American leadership as well as to overcome their differences in building new supranational structures. Although reputed for alleged realism and diplomatic skills, Stalin failed to achieve what mattered to him most. Having striven to ensure Soviet security as he understood it, he found himself in confrontation with the most powerful nation of the world, a situation he had neither wanted nor anticipated.

In 1949 two further developments prefigured the later superpower confrontation. The first was the militarization of the Cold War following the Berlin Blockade, in which Stalin vainly tried to dissuade the United States from proceeding with the proclamation of a separate West German state. By cutting overland supply lines to the western-controlled part of the city, Stalin ran the risk of a military clash should an attempt be made to force the blockade. Although the clash was avoided thanks to the West's ability to supply the city by air, the growing perception that the Soviet Union was not only a political but also a military threat persuaded the United States to support the establishment in April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its first peacetime military alliance. Created to reassure West Europeans about American support, the alliance was to become for the United States an essential military ingredient of superpower diplomacy.

The other crucial development was the successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, which ensured that the ingredient would be nuclear on both sides. Much as the end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly influenced perceptions of the balance of power, however, nuclear weapons did not yet critically influence the respective policies. They were particularly absent in the decision that brought U.S.–Soviet relations to a new level of hostility—the launching in June 1950 of the Korean War, initiated by the North Korean communists with Stalin's backing though without direct Soviet participation.

The Korean War further accelerated the decline of diplomacy as a casualty of the Cold War. After the negotiated end of the Berlin Blockade in May 1949, no important East-West negotiations took place; those that did occur, mainly within the framework of the United Nations, were notable for their futility. Once stalemated, the Korean War led in May 1951 to a conference of deputy foreign ministers at the Paris Palais Rose but it yielded no results. By 1952, Soviet-American diplomatic relations all but ceased to exist, as the relationship between the two countries deteriorated to little more than a mutual exchange of insults. The dawn of superpower diplomacy had to await Stalin's death, which came in March 1953.

THE ADVENT OF SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY, 1953–1958

The aftermath of Stalin's death showed how difficult it was to establish a productive diplomatic relationship after years of intense hostility. There was a general feeling that the departure of the dictator, which coincided with the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, made negotiations both feasible and desirable. But neither side was ready for the kind of give and take that is the substance of diplomacy.

Soviet foreign policy, masterminded by Stalin's former aide Molotov, did not substantially depart from its previous strategy of driving wedges between the United States and Europe even though the strategy had been ineffective if not counterproductive. Churchill's efforts to reconvene another summit meeting foundered on both American and Soviet reluctance to address the many seemingly intractable issues that divided the two countries. The conference of foreign ministers that met in Berlin in January 1954 to address the German question failed to advance toward its resolution; significantly, their subsequent Geneva conference on Indochina, where U.S. and Soviet interests were less involved, proved more successful in achieving a political settlement there.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was readier than Molotov to draw new conclusions from the changing situation. But the conclusions he drew did not make him any more willing to

engage the Soviet adversary in substantive negotiations. Dulles was particularly concerned about the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and only wanted to negotiate after the United States had achieved a position of strength, by which he understood mainly military strength. He attached particular importance to equipping NATO with tactical nuclear weapons and ratifying the European Defense Community as NATO's subsidiary, through which West Germany could be rearmed.

A hallmark of U.S. superpower diplomacy was the critical importance it attached to the nuclear balance. Imputing to the Soviet Union a willingness to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons worked to its advantage by diverting attention from its weaknesses in other areas than military. Taking a narrowly military view in the assessment of the adversary limited U.S. options and made relations with America's allies more difficult. The European allies, while craving U.S. protection, no longer saw the Soviet threat in such stark terms as the Americans because of their position as the ultimate guarantors of Western security.

The different assessments of the Soviet threat led to the failure of the European Defense Community, regarded by Washington as the acid test of European willingness to stand up to the Soviet Union under U.S. leadership. During the debate that preceded the final rejection of the project in August 1954, Dulles in December 1953 threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. foreign policy, implying a separate U.S.–Soviet arrangement over the heads of the Europeans and possibly at their expense. Yet a superpower deal did not materialize. An alternative way was found for making West Germany contribute to Western defense by admitting it into NATO.

The October 1954 Paris agreements, which reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and provided for West Germany's subsequent admission into NATO, were a setback for the Soviet Union, to which its new leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, responded by taking initiatives toward détente. According to the U.S. historian Marc Trachtenberg, the Soviet Union was ready for a European settlement whereby continued U.S. military presence on the continent would provide constraints on rising German power. But most other historians agree that the Soviet Union instead sought to weaken the American position in Europe. Rather than seeking a superpower deal, Khrushchev persistently if unsuccessfully pursued a plan for a European collective security system from which the United States would be excluded, thus leaving the Soviet Union as dominant power on the continent.

The Geneva summit of July 1955 was the first since the onset of the Cold War and the last in which Great Britain and France participated as ostensibly equal partners together with the United States and the Soviet Union. But although Britain possessed nuclear weapons and France would soon acquire them, too, the two countries' potential was so far behind that of the superpowers that it did not translate into diplomatic clout at a time when the U.S.–Soviet nuclear standoff was becoming the key item on the international agenda. This was the result of technological rather than political developments, particularly the introduction into the superpower arsenals of hydrogen bombs, the destructive power of which was theoretically unlimited, and of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting with increasing precision any target on earth.

The unresolved question was whether what came to be known as the "balance of terror" enhanced stability by deterring each side from contemplating the use of the deadly weapons, or whether the incalculable balance made the U.S.–Soviet relationship more precarious by making it dependent on unpredictable changes in military technology, the effects of which could not be estimated with any certainty. Superpower relations remained tense as Khrushchev took advantage of the American preoccupation with military balance by pursuing a successful diplomatic offensive toward other Western nations as well as nonaligned countries of the Third World. The perception that the Soviet Union was gaining political ground thus kept delaying U.S. attainment of the position of strength that Dulles had made a precondition of negotiations with Moscow. And the Soviet Union awaited further weakening of the U.S. adversary before wanting to negotiate seriously.

Disarmament negotiations, conducted on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis within the framework of the United Nations, had made little progress as each of the superpowers made proposals known to be unacceptable to the other. The Soviet Union pleaded for "general and complete disarmament" at a time when the United States regarded the West's rearmament as being the priority. For its part, the United States insisted on controls of arms reductions so pervasive that, if implemented, they would have undermined the pillar of secrecy on which the closed Soviet society was resting.

A landmark in superpower relations was the launching in October 1957 of *Sputnik*, the first artificial Earth satellite, which showed that the Soviet Union was more advanced in the technology necessary for the delivery of nuclear weapons than had been generally believed. This demonstration of technological prowess encouraged Khrushchev to use his country's perceived nuclear might as an instrument of diplomacy. The calculation that the United States would be sufficiently impressed to consent to the settlement of the German question on Soviet terms underlay the demands he made that in November 1958 initiated the Berlin crisis—the first of the two major Cold War crises that tested the efficacy of the superpower diplomacy.

THE SUPERPOWER CRISES AND THEIR RESOLUTIONS, 1958–1963

Although the crisis over the status of West Berlin as an enclave within Soviet-controlled East Germany nominally involved all four powers responsible for Germany, it was in effect a crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. The failed mission of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to Moscow in February–March 1959 to mediate between the superpowers was indicative of Britain's inability to be accepted by them as interlocutor. Only after the end of the Cold War did archival evidence come to light showing that the Berlin crisis was more dangerous than previously believed, and that its management by both superpowers left much to be desired.

In presenting the Western powers with demands for concessions amounting to the surrender of their positions in Berlin, Khrushchev acted on the assumption that the United States would not risk a military conflict that might escalate into nuclear war, but he did not entirely rule out that possibility either. When he met with President Dwight Eisenhower at Camp David in September 1959, he was given the wrong impression that the United States was willing to yield. This encouraged Khrushchev to subsequently moderate his demands, and when they were not met, resume pressure, staking his prestige on another meeting with the president. Yet just as the summit was about to take place in Paris in May 1960, following the shooting down over Soviet territory of the American U-2 spy plane that Eisenhower had been trying to cover up, the Soviet leader chose to humiliate the president and break up the talks that he had himself badly wanted.

The debut of superpower diplomacy was thus personal diplomacy at its worst—not because of the particular personalities involved, but because of the extent of discretion and improvisation it allowed the top leaders without adequate professional preparation. As a result, critical decisions were made that were excessively dependent on their personal beliefs and assessments of each other. The pattern continued during the disastrous June 1961 Vienna meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, who, unlike Eisenhower, was ready to make substantive concessions to the Soviets in Berlin. Aware of this, Khrushchev again miscalculated by pressing too hard and leaving the new president with the impression that war might be inevitable. This in turn put Khrushchev into the position of having to decide whether he should make good on his threat to nullify the Western rights in Berlin by concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany—as he led its leaders to believe he would do—or else back down. It is still not clear when and why he decided not to go ahead with the treaty. In any case, the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, which insulated the western part of the city from the surrounding communist territory, eventually defused the confrontation and provided a semblance of stability, without diplomacy having been substantially involved.

This did not prevent a far worse superpower crisis from developing in October 1962 over Cuba, after Khrushchev had surreptitiously tried to install nuclear-armed missiles on the island to protect its revolutionary regime from the perceived threat of an American invasion. At least the subsequent handling of the crisis, from which the allies and clients of both superpowers were notably excluded, showed that the superpowers were beginning to learn how to live with each other. On the one hand, the concentration of the decision-making power in Khrushchev and his docile Politburo and, on the other hand, the establishment of a special executive committee from which Kennedy prudently took and applied the advice, proved to be ways to avert a military showdown. Time and communication were of the essence, as were clarity of purpose and willingness to compromise while allowing the adversary to save face.

Even so, superpower diplomacy can only be credited for resolving a crisis that it had been responsible for creating in the first place. The management of the crisis bypassed established

diplomatic channels, giving critical importance to persons whose primary responsibilities and expertise were elsewhere, such as the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Georgi N. Bolshakov, a Soviet intelligence operative in Washington, who happened to have previously established a rapport. Diplomacy was thus made excessively dependent on chance.

Although the Cuban missile crisis has often been credited with establishing the "rules of the game" that allowed the superpowers to respect each other's interests while keeping their nuclear arsenals under control, the accomplishment was more apparent than real because of the absence of adequate institutional and procedural safeguards against capricious and arbitrary politics, particularly obvious on the Soviet side. The brush with disaster over Cuba prompted Washington and Moscow to establish in June 1963 the "hot line" connection—a technological communications gadget that was hailed at the time as a safeguard against another such emergency but which never played an important role in communication between the superpowers. More importantly, in the following month the two superpowers concluded the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—the first negotiated agreement between them that placed restrictions on the development of their nuclear arsenals.

Although the treaty has been rightly hailed in past years as a harbinger of détente, from a longer perspective it is more notable for its shortcomings. It banned nuclear tests above ground but not those under the ground, which both superpowers found it in their interest to continue to keep expanding their arsenals. Indeed, as late as 2000, the U.S. Senate voted down a treaty to ban all nuclear testing that had meanwhile been accepted by most other nations in the world. The 1963 agreement gave an air of permanence to the arms race by substituting the concept of disarmament with that of arms control. There were no more agreements for several years after the supreme practitioner of superpower diplomacy, Khrushchev, was forced out of office in October 1964.

ALLIANCES AND SUPERPOWER DOMINANCE, 1964–1968

The second half of the 1960s was a time of parallel crises for the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in both of which superpower dominance was at issue. For the first time since the onset of the Cold War, the loosening of the Kremlin leadership in the aftermath of Khrushchev's ouster gave Soviet allies an opportunity to challenge the predominance of the Soviet superpower—as U.S. allies had always been able to do in regard to the U.S. superpower but had been more reluctant to do as long as the Soviet Union appeared threatening. Now the belief in the Soviet intention to attack Western Europe had all but disappeared, though not—after the Berlin and Cuban experiences—the fear that Europeans might still find themselves exposed to a devastating confrontation on their territories as a result of miscalculation or mismanagement of a crisis over which they would have no control.

The fear was all the more legitimate since the war plans of both alliances, elaborated under the impact of the Berlin crisis, envisaged extensive nuclear exchanges on European territory. In October 1963 the Romanian government secretly gave the United States assurances that in case of a military conflict between the superpowers, Romania would remain neutral—an act of flagrant disloyalty to the Soviet alliance. Poland had been preparing proposals for military disengagement between the two blocs, notably the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, which, if implemented, would have restricted both U.S. and Soviet freedom of action in the area. Czechoslovakia, too, opposed the deployment of Soviet nuclear launchers on its territory.

U.S. leadership of NATO was challenged by French President Charles de Gaulle, who argued that the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" was no longer credible. In his opinion, shared by many Europeans, the United States would not risk the destruction of its cities by using its nuclear weapons to defend Europe against Soviet attack—an assessment retrospectively confirmed by the secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Robert S. McNamara. De Gaulle at first sought to replace superpower dominance by that of a larger consortium of powers, including France, which together would take the main responsibility for international security. When he did not succeed, in March 1966 he took France out of NATO's integrated command structure, though not out of the alliance itself, and proceeded to develop France's own small nuclear deterrent, which he believed sufficient to keep the Soviet Union and any other enemy at bay.

In 1962 the Kennedy administration proclaimed a "grand design" for interdependence that would heed the concerns of the European

allies. But at the same time the administration pressed them to accept the new U.S. strategy of "flexible response," regarded by many of them as destabilizing and resolutely opposed by France. The strategy entailed widening military options in the event of war, including nuclear options, thus making the actual exercise of those options appear more likely. American ability to assert its superpower position in Europe was hampered by the deepening U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, waged on the dubious and widely rejected assumption that fighting the Vietnamese communists was necessary to check the expansion of Soviet power.

The Johnson administration, though mired in the Vietnam War, managed the NATO crisis more deftly than the Kennedy administration had, helping the alliance overcome it once France's self-exclusion opened the door to its resolution. A compromise was found in the December 1967 Harmel Report, named after the Belgian foreign minister who prepared it, which set NATO the goals of both defense and détente—improvement of its military capabilities along with an effort to reduce the need to use them by improving relations with the Soviet enemy by diplomatic means. This was a new task for U.S. superpower diplomacy, invigorated by the reconfirmation of America's leading role in the alliance.

In 1966 the Soviet Union responded to Western overtures for détente and to the unrest within its own alliance by proposing to its members its reorganization for greater effectiveness. The difficult negotiations that followed were further slowed down by the communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia, which in August 1968 prompted a Soviet-led invasion of the country. The invasion reaffirmed the Soviet superpower prerogative to intervene militarily at will in any of the Warsaw Pact countries—the tenet of the "Brezhnev doctrine," named after the Soviet leader who succeeded Khrushchev. The suppression of the Czechoslovak heresy allowed the Soviet Union in 1969 to implement the reform of the alliance by introducing limited consultation with its members.

The reaffirmation of each superpower's primacy within its respective alliance facilitated their diplomatic rapprochement. Already, before the Czechoslovak intervention, the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1968 had succeeded in negotiating the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty. This important agreement aimed at preventing further spread of nuclear weapons by committing countries that did not possess them to refrain from their acquisition in return for the promise by the existing nuclear powers to gradually reduce their nuclear potential and take measures for preventing its use. Precipitated by the recent development of China's nuclear capability, which both the United States and the Soviet Union found threatening, the treaty enshrined their own special status as superpowers—a fact that drew criticism but did not prevent most of the world's nations from signing the agreement. The treaty curbed the spread of nuclear weapons during the Cold War despite the superpowers' failure to live up to their promises to substantially reduce their arsenals, and in later years remained a substantial impediment to proliferation.

The restrained U.S. reaction to the advance of the Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, reputedly characterized by President Lyndon B. Johnson as an "accident on the road to détente," showed how far the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union had already advanced by the late 1960s. That rapprochement rested not on settlement of their differences but rather on the incipient perception of their military parity, defined primarily in terms of their nuclear capabilities and the notion that the military balance overshadowed the political imbalance. Accordingly, their common diplomatic goal consisted of perpetuating their superpower position while limiting the dangers posed by the continued growth of the nuclear arsenals upon which that position was based.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY, 1969–1975

For the United States, arms control dominated the superpower agenda. Washington regarded as its foremost priority an agreement that would limit the growth of strategic nuclear weapons, the destructive potential of which had reached a level that made them capable of wiping out human life on Earth. The Soviet Union, while agreeing in 1969 to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), was more prepared than the United States to assume that the doomsday weapons would never be used and therefore made an understanding on political issues a higher priority.

The Soviet campaign for a political settlement in Europe, initiated in 1969, took the form of the proposal for a security conference, including the United States and Canada, which would

THE HIGH POINT OF SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY

On 29 May 1972, during President Richard M. Nixon's visit to Soviet party general secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in Moscow, a U.S.–Soviet declaration of "basic principles" of mutual relations was adopted. Drafted by the Soviet Union and accepted by the United States without significant changes, the grandiloquent declaration papered over any of the conflicting interests that were at the heart of the superpower competition. Substituting appearance for substance, it was bound to bring disappointment. The following is a brief excerpt from the declaration.

> The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.
>
> Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

confirm the territorial, and by extension also political, status quo on the continent, thus certifying the position the Soviet Union had established there as a result of its victory in World War II. The proposal, addressed to the governments of all the countries concerned, gave impetus to multilateral diplomacy as a supplement to superpower diplomacy, though not a substitute for it. Europeans in both West and East welcomed it as an opportunity to increase their international weight, while the Soviet Union saw it as a way to gradually attain the supremacy in Europe that had eluded it at the end of World War II. This was to be achieved after the conclusion of a vaguely worded treaty on security and cooperation. Its fulfillment was to be reviewed and interpreted at periodic follow-up conferences that the Soviet Union could expect to dominate, eventually acting as the arbiter of European security.

The United States, showing its greater concern with military matters, insisted on complementing the conference with negotiations that would address the asymmetry of the conventional forces in Europe favoring the Soviet Union. The United States was developing its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union with the goal of not only putting the arms race under control but also achieving a political understanding between the superpowers in terms of Realpolitik—a policy based on considerations of power and material interests rather than ethical considerations and ideals. The new trend was personified by Henry Kissinger, first the national security adviser and later secretary of state in the administration of President Richard M. Nixon.

Kissinger was the most influential of the foreign-born trio of America's most outspoken proponents of superpower diplomacy—the other two being President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and President Bill Clinton's secretary of state Madeleine Albright. An admirer of the nineteenth-century European diplomacy that maintained peace and stability by reconciling conservative powers with post-revolutionary France, Kissinger developed a secretive and manipulative approach to foreign policy that enabled him to attain a degree of independence in its conduct that was rare in the American political system. He preferred to deal with the Soviet Union through the "back channel" he had established through the long-serving and congenial Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin.

Kissinger's Soviet counterpart was the experienced and hard-driving foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who was dedicated to the maintenance and further advancement of Soviet superpower status. He cogently described this status as meaning that there was no important issue in the world that could be decided without the Soviet Union anymore. Unlike his Stalinist predecessor, Molotov, Gromyko believed in the possibility of advancing Soviet power and influence amid low rather than high international tension, thus facilitating the growth of East-West détente.

Kissinger's greatest achievement concerned China rather than the Soviet Union. His secretive diplomacy was well suited to preparing the normalization of U.S. relations with China, which Washington had previously misjudged as being a greater threat to American interests than the

Soviet Union. By simultaneously improving relations with both the Soviet Union and China, a communist power hostile to the Soviet Union, the United States expanded the bilateral relationship with Moscow into a triangular relationship, which it was able to manipulate to its advantage. It did so better with China than with the Soviet Union, however.

Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972 resulted in a series of treaties that together represented the peak of achievement of superpower diplomacy. The United States and the Soviet Union initialed their first agreement limiting the growth of their strategic nuclear armaments (SALT I), agreed on precautions to prevent accidents arising from the movements of their naval and air forces, and concluded the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which banned for all time the deployment of missiles against nuclear attack.

Reflecting the concept of "mutual assured destruction," believed by U.S. theorists of deterrence as necessary for preventing the superpowers from attacking each other, the treaty incorporated the notion that the lack of defense against nuclear attack was the best protection against it. As such, it was an authentic product of the Cold War that tellingly reflected a bipolar international system dominated by superpowers unable to resolve their fundamental political differences. Once the Cold War ended and the bipolar system disappeared, the relevance of the treaty became doubtful, although it was still invoked at the beginning of the twenty-first century by both the opponents and the advocates of the U.S. plan for national missile defense (NMD).

The technical precision of the arms control measures adopted at the May 1972 summit contrasted with the ambiguity of the "basic principles" agreement, mistakenly hailed at the time as the framework that would allow the two superpowers to manage their relationship without generating unacceptable tension. The United States acknowledged the Soviet right to "equal security"—as if the reasons for the insecurity of the authoritarian Soviet system could possibly be the same as the reasons for the insecurity of a pluralistic Western democracy. Further, the two superpowers vowed not to seek advantage at the expense of each other—as if doing so were the cause rather than the effect of their competitive relationship. While Kissinger hoped to "enmesh" the Soviet Union in a growing web of relationships that would allow the United States to exercise a mitigating influence on its growing power, the Soviet leaders regarded détente as an opportunity to enhance that power and influence without American interference.

The October 1973 Yom Kippur War—in which Moscow, in an attempt to deal a blow to the U.S. position in the Middle East, did not discourage its Arab clients from attacking Israel—revealed the different notions of détente while testing the efficacy of superpower diplomacy. The United States put in strategic nuclear forces at a high level of alert while the Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the war with its own forces. Yet since neither side wanted to go over the brink, preferring instead to curb its respective clients, the crisis passed, seemingly vindicating the efficacy of superpower diplomacy but shaking America's faith in détente.

Détente peaked in the conclusion of the August 1975 Helsinki agreement as a result of a new-style multilateral diplomacy defying the expectations of both superpowers. The Soviet Union, the architect of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in the end acquiesced in a treaty very different from the original Soviet concept in that the agreement embodied specific and detailed provisions for the protection of human rights as a matter of legitimate international concern. The Soviet Union signed the landmark treaty on the mistaken assumption that its paper provisions could not possibly gain political substance—an opinion shared by Kissinger, who, also mistakenly, regarded as more important Soviet consent to start negotiations on the "mutual and balanced" reductions of conventional forces (MBFR). The CSCE also encouraged the formation of nongovernmental organizations that challenged superpower diplomacy by the public advocacy of issues recently made relevant to foreign policy, such as human rights.

As a result of the unpopular Vietnam War and the scandals of the Nixon era, pressure increased for U.S. diplomacy to become more responsive to the public. While inevitable and potentially beneficial in a modern democracy, the pressure had the negative effect of increasing public and congressional expectations from the frequent superpower summits. Congenial to the authoritarian Soviet leaders, the summits were conducive to superficiality and improvisation. Rather than to finalize agreements previously negotiated and agreed upon, they often met without adequate preparation and yielded disappointing results.

By the mid-1970s, superpower diplomacy was thus challenged not only by the different notions of détente but also by alternative multilateral diplomacy as well as the pressure for more openness. At the same time, development of the nuclear arsenals, from which the superpowers derived their status, outpaced the political developments, making it more difficult for both the United States and the Soviet Union to apply their excessive stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction to any conceivable political purpose. Superpower diplomacy became increasingly divorced from political reality.

"COMPETITIVE DECADENCE," 1975–1980

The deterioration of superpower relations in the second half of the 1970s showed that nuclear balance was a precarious foundation for stable relations. There was a fundamental divergence of views about how the balance related to politics.

The United States tried to impress upon the Soviet Union the critical importance of strategic stability, with its corollary of political restraint by both superpowers. The Soviet Union, however, attached greater importance to what it called "military détente," understood as reductions of the strategic arsenals that would not alter the Soviet advantage in conventional forces, thus restricting political competition. Accordingly, only SALT negotiations were moving ahead while MBFR became stalled and CSCE proceeded in fits and starts.

The conduct of the superpowers was affected less by the development of military technologies, which evolved more and more independently of political developments than by their internal issues and their perceptions of those problems. By the end of the decade the terminal decline of the Soviet system had already begun, rooted in the inability of its command economy to ensure growth and the inability of its political system to accommodate the diversity of interests. On the American side the dispiriting legacy of the lost Vietnam War was magnified by the effects of its economic mismanagement amid spreading doubts about the merits of the American political system, leading to social unrest in the country and tensions with its allies.

The French political scientist Pierre Hassner characterized the resulting relationship between the superpowers as that of "competitive decadence," in which the issue for each was managing its mounting internal problems better than the other. The Soviet Union sought to use its military potential to offset its growing deficiencies in most other attributes of power. Its "arms diplomacy" consisted of both arms provision and outright military intervention by proxies in several countries of the Third World, where it managed to establish footholds, including Angola, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Such actions inevitably cast doubt on Soviet commitment to the principles of the 1972 agreement, causing alarm about Soviet intentions and harm to détente.

The initial U.S. response was equivocal. On the one hand, President Gerald Ford vowed publicly to erase the word "détente" from his vocabulary, implying that the United States no longer considered the Soviet Union a partner acting in good faith. On the other hand, the Ford administration proceeded with the strategic arms control negotiations to follow up SALT I with SALT II. Since Brezhnev, on the Soviet side, was personally committed to further reducing the growth of nuclear armaments as well, despite resistance by the Soviet military, the interim agreement signed in Vladivostok in November 1974 attested to the continued ability of superpower diplomacy to deliver results, at least in the limited area of arms control.

U.S.–Soviet relations took a turn for the worse after President Jimmy Carter took office. The new president sought to distance himself from what he regarded as an immoral and ineffective Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, whose penchant for Realpolitik had not helped to prevent relations with the Soviet Union from deteriorating nor the specter of nuclear holocaust from persisting. Carter correctly anticipated the future in trying to deemphasize the importance of the Soviet Union within the larger global context and instead to emphasize the growing importance of the nonmilitary aspects of security, such as the safeguarding of human rights. But in trying to build what he wanted to be a satisfactory lasting relationship with the Soviet Union, his administration's diplomacy faltered.

In an attempt to improve on the Vladivostok agreement, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance surprised the Soviet Union by proposing arms reductions so radical that they amounted in Soviet eyes to repudiation by the United States of the more modest Vladivostok agreement on which Brezhnev had staked his prestige. Gromyko's peremptory rejection of the Vance proposals put the eventual approval of the SALT II Treaty by the U.S Senate in doubt. Moscow was further alarmed by

the anti-Soviet reputation and rhetoric of the national security adviser, Brzezinski, whose influence in Washington increased after Vance's resignation. In September 1979, Washington raised an outcry about the presence of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba, although the unit had been there for several years without arousing U.S. concern, thus adding to the impression of both hostility and incompetence.

The image of a U.S. administration that was talking loudly but carrying a small stick did little to discourage the Soviet Union from making the fateful decision to send troops to Afghanistan to intervene in the internal struggle there and put its protégés in power. This was the first instance of direct Soviet military intervention in a country outside its recognized sphere of influence, and adjacent to the Persian Gulf region that was vital to the West's security as its major supplier of oil. Thus, in U.S. eyes, the Soviet move amounted to a gratuitous challenge to mutual respect for each other's vital interests, a respect that had made superpower diplomacy possible.

The Afghanistan invasion sealed the fate of SALT II for the duration of the Cold War by destroying the chances of its approval by the U.S. Congress. The Carter administration increased U.S. defense spending and military preparedness. It pressed U.S. allies to reduce the many contacts with the Soviet bloc that had been the fruit of a decade of détente, adding tension to American-European relations that were already strained by Washington's insistence, abruptly reversed, on equipping NATO forces with controversial neutron radiation weapons, followed by abrupt reversal. The Carter administration ended its term in office in disgrace and humiliation as it proved helpless in trying to obtain the release of U.S. diplomats held hostage by the revolutionary regime in Iran.

Although the Soviet Union appeared to be better off in the superpower competition, the appearance was deceptive. It was being drawn deeper into the Afghanistan war, with diminishing prospects of victory. In 1980–1981 the rise of the opposition in Poland, spearheaded by the Solidarity labor movement, paralyzed the communist regime there, threatening the Soviet hold on the strategically crucial country. Attesting to the Kremlin's growing doubts about the political utility of its vast military power in dealing with its political problems, the Soviet leaders abstained from intervening in Poland by force, making the restoration of communist rule dependent on Polish generals. The imposition of martial law in the country outraged the United States, bringing superpower diplomacy to a standstill.

THE "SECOND COLD WAR," 1980–1985

President Ronald Reagan broke with the cardinal principle of superpower diplomacy by refusing to acknowledge the Soviet Union as a legitimate equal. He publicly referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and predicted that it would not last. Although these were fair estimates of the reality, they were hardly conducive to resuming businesslike relations between the two countries. Coupled with a massive U.S. armament program believed widely, if unjustly, to have been calculated to bankrupt the Soviet Union by forcing it into a ruinous arms race, the administration's posture evoked the specter of a "second Cold War," if not a real war.

In June 1982 the Soviet Union conducted an exercise simulating a several-hour, all-out nuclear strike against the United States. The president's "Star Wars" speech of March 1983, which announced the plan to abandon the strategy of deterrence based on mutual vulnerability in favor of defense behind an invulnerable missile shield, could be interpreted as being designed to make the United States capable of launching such an attack. Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, came to suspect the Reagan administration was preparing such an attack. In November 1983, the NATO exercise "Able Archer" practiced procedures for the release of nuclear missiles by using codes that made it indistinguishable from the real thing, prompting panic in Moscow, though no action to preempt the possible surprise.

The prudent Soviet behavior showed that fears of war precipitated by design or miscalculation were exaggerated but also that the susceptibility to uncontrollable accidents of the increasingly complex nuclear weaponry gave warranted concern. Yet by 1983 the only forum where the superpowers were negotiating with each other was the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The talks followed NATO's 1987 "dual track" decision, which provided for preparations, in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union, for the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe to offset similar Soviet missiles that had already been deployed against it, unless an agreement had been

reached to rectify the imbalance. So technical had the talks become that only experts understood the issues involved. The chief U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Iurii Kvitsinskii, nevertheless came to a tentative agreement during a "walk in the woods" outside Geneva. Yet the agreement was not approved by their superiors.

As long as the deployment of the "Euromissiles" intended to counter the Soviet intermediate-range missiles targeted on Western Europe remained uncertain because of the widespread opposition it faced there, neither superpower had the necessary incentive to compromise. As the crucial vote in the West German parliament was approaching, the Soviet Union increased pressure by threatening to walk out of the negotiations if the deployment were approved. And when it was approved in November 1983, the Soviet leaders had no choice but to make good on their word or else lose credibility.

The breakdown of the Geneva talks, which brought superpower diplomacy to the lowest point since Stalin's days, nevertheless heralded their more constructive later resumption. Rather than an aggressive design, the walkout reflected paralysis within the Kremlin leadership dating back to the last years of Brezhnev and continuing during the terms in office of his two infirm successors, Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Despite the presence and growing influence of the veteran diplomat Gromyko, the aging leadership was no longer willing and able to tackle the Soviet Union's mounting internal and external problems. Superpower diplomacy required strong leaders. In a tacit recognition of its own failure, the old guard in the Politburo in March 1985 selected as Chernenko's successor the Politburo's youngest member, Mikhail S. Gorbachev. With the Reagan line reconfirmed by his reelection to the presidency the year before, the stage was set for the last act of superpower diplomacy.

THE END OF THE SOVIET SUPERPOWER, 1985–1991

Gorbachev demonstrated his strength as well as courage by resuming the Geneva talks despite American failure to fulfill any of the conditions the Soviet Union had set for its returning to the negotiating table. By then he had gone farther than the U.S. administration in drawing conclusions from the futility of the arms race while remaining convinced of his ability to preserve the Soviet Union as a superpower by ensuring its ascendancy through radical reforms of its political and economic system. Gorbachev understood that the West had reasons to fear the offensive Soviet military posture and acted to reassure it in order to break the spiral of the arms buildup.

As the Soviet Union began to set the pace of the Geneva negotiations by making unilateral concessions, the first meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan took place in Geneva in November 1985. The course of American policy at this critical juncture was in the hands of a president less attuned to the complexities of international politics, more beholden to an ideological view of the Soviet adversary, and less capable of sustained attention to the business of government than any U.S. president of the superpower era. Defying his own notion that the Soviet adversary was inherently untrustworthy, he intuitively decided that Gorbachev could be trusted—a decision that opened the door to the solution of problems previously regarded as insoluble and to the eventual termination of the Cold War.

The personal rapport established between the two leaders disrupted the pattern of superpower diplomacy. They both believed in the abolition of nuclear weapons—a convergence of views that foreshadowed the transformation of nuclear-based superpower diplomacy into a more normal kind. At the Reykjavik summit of October 1986, Reagan, not grasping the subtleties of deterrence, created confusion about whether he was willing to abolish all nuclear weapons or only some of them, thus putting in doubt the critical deterrent on which NATO had traditionally depended. Although the summit appeared to have failed, Gorbachev's readiness to give Reagan the benefit of the doubt allowed the Geneva talks to continue and bear fruit in the signing of the landmark treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in December 1987.

The treaty differed from previous arms agreements by providing for the complete elimination of a whole class of armaments, by reversing the arms race rather than merely slowing it down, and by introducing the kind of intrusive inspections that the Soviet Union had been consistently resisting to protect its secretive political system. By that time Gorbachev had already imposed upon the reluctant Soviet military a change of the country's strategic posture from offensive to defensive, precipitating the loosening and eventual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. His unilateral reductions of Soviet conventional

forces facilitated the negotiation of an agreement on deep reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE), previously regarded as all but impossible.

The CFE, which changed drastically the military landscape of Europe, had been negotiated between the two alliances rather than between the United States and the Soviet Union alone, thus signaling the demise of their superpower domination. In the last decisive stages of the Cold War, the nuclear balance that underlay that domination played a secondary role to the effects of the internal upheaval within the Soviet bloc, which led by the end of 1989 to the collapse of Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and, two years later, of the Soviet Union itself. Adaptation to these unexpected developments, which vindicated George F. Kennan's original design for containment, was a challenge comparable to that which the adoption of the policy of containment posed forty years earlier. This time the United States could at least rely on the expertise of a generation of academic specialists and career diplomats well versed in the workings of the Soviet system, such as ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., in the sensitive Moscow post. In responding to the challenge, the administration of President George H. W. Bush, which inherited from its predecessor a dramatically improved U.S.–Soviet relationship, had a mixed record.

Even as the Soviet power was disintegrating, the Bush administration acted on the assumption that a reformed Soviet Union would remain America's superpower partner for the foreseeable future—an assumption confirmed at the December 1989 Bush-Gorbachev summit off Malta. The misjudgment led Washington to occasionally try to oppose the inevitable. When Romania threatened to descend into chaos amid the downfall of its dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, Washington sent signals that it would not mind Soviet intervention to restore order there, only to be rebuffed by Moscow. And when Ukraine showed a readiness to break away from the Soviet Union, Bush, on a visit to Kiev, publicly expressed U.S. displeasure.

Otherwise, however, in responding to the self-liberation of Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet domination, U.S. superpower diplomacy was at its best. It extended unqualified support to the postcommunist governments without trying to seek added advantage at Soviet expense—an attitude that facilitated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region and the emergence of Europe's new and safer security environment. The Bush administration wisely proceeded to unilaterally remove the tactical nuclear weapons that had been most prone to make Europe a nuclear battlefield, dismantle the intermediate-range missiles in accordance with the INF treaty, and begin to destroy, in collaboration with Moscow, the stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons as well. This was the most important legacy of superpower diplomacy for the post–Cold War era.

The United States was the first of the powers responsible for Germany to recognize the inevitability of its reunification and worked consistently toward that end together with the Soviet Union, once Gorbachev, too, had come to the same conclusion. Great Britain and France only reluctantly followed. The "two-and-four" agreement between the German states and the powers set the terms of the unification without antagonizing Moscow and ensured the integration of the potentially overwhelming German power into the European Community and NATO.

However, once the Soviet Union collapsed and a critically weakened Russia became its most important successor state, possessing the bulk of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the United States continued to deal with the government of President Boris N. Yeltsin as if Russia still were a superpower. The likelihood of its irreversible descent to the ranks of secondary powers distorted America's priorities and its self-perception as the world's last remaining superpower.

THE UNITED STATES AS THE ONLY SUPERPOWER?

The self-image of the post–Cold War United States rested on the misconception that the disappearance of the Soviet Union left it the same kind of power it had wielded during the Cold War, when the possession of a vast nuclear arsenal was the measure of its special status in a bipolar international system. With the bipolar system gone, however, the U.S. nuclear potential became all but meaningless as a determinant of its status in the world. Instead, America's power in the new international system derived from its huge economic potential and unmatched cultural influence in addition to its military establishment, supported by defense spending that was greater than that of all other nations combined. America's new predominance thus was different from the superpower variety, as conveyed in the French-invented term "hyperpower," implying excess without clear purpose.

The legacy of the superpower era made it difficult for the United States to redefine its global role in the post–Cold War era and relate it to diplomacy. Americans also found it difficult to choose the proper ways of using their military power. On the one hand, they deployed it in some countries where their interests were not clearly involved. On the other hand, they placed self-imposed restrictions on its use by becoming beholden to the crippling concept of minimizing losses of their manpower and matériel and by insisting on the termination of their military involvements at a time of their choice.

Such restrictions made the involvements both controversial and less effective than suggested by America's military power. In the Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq—a conventional war against a regional aggressor—the United States showed a new sensitivity for multilateral diplomacy by being able to form a broad coalition in support of its intervention, but then abstained from trying to press for final victory, much as it had learned not to press the Soviet Union to the wall during their superpower competition. Similarly, it missed opportunities to prevent the descent of Yugoslavia into war by timely use of force sufficient to frustrate Serbian aggression. The Clinton administration, less attentive to foreign policy than most of its predecessors, suffered even more from belated and piecemeal deployment of military power, thus reducing America's ability to influence events. Its reluctance to commit itself militarily in the former Yugoslavia made the eventual American intervention in the Balkan wars more costly than it need have been. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, misled by notions of deterrence dating from the superpower era, underrated Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic's aggressive intent, leading the United States and NATO to a war for which they were unprepared and only won at high political cost.

Looking back at the long rivalry with the Soviet Union, American officials tended to see rising security threats comparable to the old Soviet one. Some regarded Russia as one such potential threat despite the low probability of its recovery as a great power. Others viewed China as a future superpower because of its size and nuclear capability, regardless of its lack of an expansionist political culture and despite an extensive number of complementary interests between Americans and Chinese. Washington also came to regard otherwise minor "rogue states"—Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq—as potential threats on the order of the Soviet Union solely because of the conceivable acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by their dictatorial regimes.

In dealing with these real or imaginary threats, the United States showed the same predilection for regarding them as military rather than political problems that it had shown during its competition with the Soviet Union. In particular, the national missile defense (NMD) project, embraced tentatively by the Clinton administration and unconditionally by the George W. Bush administration, harked back to the Cold War days when the other superpower's inclination to attack unless deterred was taken for granted. The concept of NMD, which assumed that such an intent may develop in the future, was conducive to bringing about the very threat the project was intended to avert. Insufficient confidence in the susceptibility of such threats to diplomatic solutions divided the United States from its allies, thus undermining its leadership position among them.

Unilateralist tendencies threatened important accomplishments of American diplomacy after the end of the superpower rivalry. The United States took the lead in such achievements of multilateral diplomacy as the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the provision of energy assistance to North Korea in return for the abandonment of its nuclear weapons program, and other international agreements recognizing the growing importance of dimensions of security other than military. As evidenced by the repudiation by the United States of the Kyoto Protocol to reverse global warming, of the International Criminal Court designed to deter crimes of genocide, and of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, those achievements proved liable to relapse to the obsolete superpower mentality. The United States had to recognize that, because of the increased relevance of economic and environmental as well as political constraints, the nation was in important ways less powerful than it had been as one of the two superpowers. America's transition from a superpower to the leading "normal" power marked the final demise of superpower diplomacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alperovitz, Gar. *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power.* New York, 1965. A passionate statement of what American diplomacy was not.

Bell, Coral. *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power.* London, 1962. Enduring critique of the fallacies of power politics.

Beschloss, Michael R. *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair.* Boston, 1986. A lively account of a major failure of superpower diplomacy by an able journalist-historian lent support by subsequently declassified documents.

Bischof, Günter, and Saki Dockrill, eds. *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955.* Baton Rouge, La., 2000. The first of the ambivalent Cold War summits thoughtfully analyzed by leading international historians.

Bozo, Frédéric. *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance.* Lanham, Md., 2001. A perceptive French scholar does justice to the challenge to the U.S. superpower by the larger-than-life French president.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981.* Rev. ed. New York, 1985. The account by a respected academic specialist on the Soviet Union turned a controversial statesman in the Carter administration.

Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986).* New York, 1995. Self-promoting and conceited but well-informed memoir of the Soviet bureaucrat who served in Washington through the rise and fall of détente.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.* New York, 1981. The classic sober and sobering account by Britain's leading expert.

———. *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.* New York, 2000. On balance, Kennedy's accomplishments outweigh his deficiencies in this subtle assessment using up-to-date evidence.

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964.* New York, 1997. The first study based on extensive, if selective, Soviet documentation shows the web of misperceptions that made the Cuban missile crisis such a narrow escape from catastrophe.

Gaddis, John L. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.* New York, 1982. An indispensable examination of the crucial relationship between strategy and diplomacy.

———. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History.* New York, 1997. Despite its title, a provisional, yet so far the most convincing assessment by the leading U.S. "postrevisionist" historian, benefiting from the wealth of new sources that surfaced after the end of the Cold War.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.* Washington, D.C., 1994. An experienced Washington analyst and staunch advocate of détente explores its course in painstaking detail.

Holloway, David. *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race.* New Haven, Conn., 1984. The standard account by a prominent U.S. academic expert.

Hutchings, Robert L. *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992.* Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, 1997. A knowledgeable staff member of the National Security Council pays tribute to the management of the Soviet collapse by the Bush administration.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years.* Westport, Conn., 1999. A spirited collection of essays by the dean of American NATO historians on the alliance that repeatedly complicated U.S. superpower diplomacy.

Kennan, George F. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25 (1947): 566–582. The intellectual foundation of the policy of containment by its main architect.

Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years.* Boston, 1979. Self-serving but indispensable for understanding the achievements and limitations of America's foremost practitioner of superpower diplomacy.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.* Stanford, Calif., 1992. The most extensively documented critique of the U.S. policy, inclined to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt.

Lundestad, Geir. *The American "Empire" and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective.* Oxford, 1990. The concept of "empire by invitation," persuasively argued by a Norwegian historian.

Mastny, Vojtech. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years.* New York, 1996. New Soviet evidence on how Stalin's exaggerated notions of security challenged the United States without giving the Soviet Union the security he wanted.

Matlock, Jack F. *Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union.* New York, 1995. Memoir by the scholarly U.S. ambassador shows how U.S. policy facilitated the peaceful demise of the Soviet superpower.

May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow, eds. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Cambridge, Mass., 1997. Admirably interpreted record of the historic decision making that allowed the president to avert the Soviet threat he had inadvertently helped to precipitate.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* New York, 1990. Harvard political scientist and former government official argues that, despite the changing nature of its power, the United States remains a superpower.

Pechatnov, Vladimir O. "'The Allies Are Pressing on You to Break Your Will': Foreign Policy Correspondence Between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946." *Cold War International History Project.* Working paper no. 25. Washington, D.C., 1999. Unique documentary material on highest-level Soviet decision making, interpreted by an able Russian historian.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. An ambitious and subtle, yet often ambiguous, history of the superpower relations, giving due account to America's European allies though not its Soviet adversary.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* 2d rev. and enlarged ed. New York, 1972. The bible of the revisionist critics holding the United States responsible for provoking the Cold War.

See also ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BALANCE OF POWER; COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; CONTAINMENT; DETERRENCE; INTERNATIONALISM; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; POST–COLD WAR POLICY; POWER POLITICS.

TARIFF POLICY

Thomas W. Zeiler

The tariff has been a central issue throughout American history. Its importance evolved over the decades, involving politics, economics, diplomacy, and ideology. Long a source of national revenue, the tariff (or duty or customs)—a tax levied on goods imported into the United States—was critical to the domestic economy and at the center of debates over government intervention in the marketplace. Tariff policy was also embedded in the diplomacy of the United States from its birth. From independence to globalization, tariff policy indicated the direction of U.S. foreign policy toward a particular nation or bloc of countries. It could be used as a defensive tool, a coercive weapon, or as a facilitator of cooperation and unity.

Because one of the top concerns of the United States has been the preservation and expansion of commerce, debates over the nature and uses of tariff policy were considerations in economic diplomacy, which itself undergirded political, military, and ideological aspects of American foreign affairs. Yet a constant theme underlay tariff policy, whatever its target. The United States always pushed for trade liberalization, a tariff policy designed to lower duty rates moderately while protecting certain producers (as opposed to free trade, which aimed to remove all barriers to trade). This was carried out on behalf of the country's economic and political self-interests, but increasingly, through the decades, as a means to instill in the world America's capitalist, open-door ideology as well as to enhance global stability. Tariff policy served diplomacy.

It is evident that the use of tariff policy changed during the course of American history. Until the Civil War, tariffs defended the United States from European imperialism and protected infant industries. After 1865 until World War I, a transition occurred in which policymakers tied the tariff closer to expansionist, big-power diplomacy, although a protectionist Congress restrained these efforts. During the interwar period, the more assertive brand of protectionism had its last gasp, as the Great Depression brought attempts at freer trade to a halt. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States became the global leader of trade liberalization. Although protectionism did not disappear, a freer trade policy united the Western alliance against communism. Successive administrations promoted low tariffs to boost the prosperity, and hence political stability and loyalty, of allies. By the 1970s, tariff policy had dwindled in importance as duties themselves fell to negligible levels and nontariff barriers became more significant. Over the course of U.S. history, therefore, the role of tariff policy in the diplomatic arena progressively changed from being a tool of national survival to one of international integration.

TRADE INDEPENDENCE

Economic survival lay at the heart of America's earliest diplomatic initiatives, and thus the tariff, as an element of commercial policy, played a major role in the efforts of the Founders to build the nation and protect it from external aggressors. The country's founding coincided with the era of mercantilism, in which trade was subject to oftentimes irrational discrimination from abroad that threatened to choke off America's lifeblood. The new nation depended on exports and imports, so the Founders pushed for fair and equal access to markets overseas out of economic desperation as well as the desire for political independence. They were, in essence, trade liberalizers out of necessity (although they also promulgated a vision of a world of open and equitable commerce). Tariff policy was placed in the hands of Congress, not only to ensure an equitable system of taxation but as a means of uniting the disparate regions of the former thirteen colonies into a large and viable free-trade area with power to promote American

foreign policy aims. The Constitution established a uniform, enforceable system of import duties (along with shipping rules and foreign treaties) that regulated the economies of the states into a national whole. This combination of a common external tariff with free trade among the states prevented each state from engaging in separate economic diplomacy with Europe. The country spoke with one voice in negotiations. Access to this tariff-free area was a card to be played in negotiations with the Europeans and, in particular, Great Britain.

Tariff policy, therefore, helped to build the economic infrastructure of the new nation while America engaged in great power diplomacy. The United States designed its customs policy with protection in mind; thus tariffs and protectionism became synonymous from the opening of the first Congress in 1789. Officials imposed duties mainly for revenue purposes but also to coax foreign nations to ease restrictions on U.S. shipping and trade. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other foes of Britain had earlier proposed a schedule of additional duties on goods imported from those nations, namely England, that had no commercial treaty with the United States. Fearing retaliation, President George Washington sought a diplomatic solution with Britain, which made concessions and thereby confirmed to Jefferson that tariff policy could ensure America would not be pushed around by the Europeans.

The Tariff of 1789 represented America's first tariff legislation, designed by Alexander Hamilton primarily to raise revenue by setting up the bureaucratic machinery for administering duties. But it also attempted to undercut European commercial monopolies and expand overseas markets by insisting on equal treatment for nations that accorded U.S. goods the same nondiscriminatory access. As matters stood, nations without commercial treaties with the United States (Britain) stood on an equal footing with treaty powers (France). Federalists sought to stave off Jeffersonian trade retaliation policies that might jeopardize American security.

The effort at gaining reciprocal lowering of foreign restrictions in return for decreased U.S. protectionism did not work well during the succeeding wartime period in Europe; the United States found the threat of higher tariffs useless in protecting its neutral shipping from seizure on the seas. The nation was just too reliant on tariff revenue. To be sure, as the War of 1812 loomed, the Jefferson administration cut off trade with the British and French but, recognizing U.S. dependence on customs duties, left commerce open with the rest of the world.

DEVELOPMENT AND DISCRIMINATION

At home, tariffs paid for the servicing of the public debt and the costs of defense and stimulated prosperity for farmers, merchants, and shipowners. Customs receipts multiplied five times during the 1790s. Imports for domestic consumption more than doubled, while the home market, protected by duties, experienced sizable gains from domestic exports. Some of the funds helped build a merchant marine independent from British shipping that boosted trade. Tariff policy of the late eighteenth century thus fueled economic prosperity, which, in turn, stimulated new settlements by a burgeoning population. Jefferson went to war to protect the rights of neutral shipping but also to retaliate against the embargo policies of Britain against U.S. merchants. The failed attempt convinced American diplomats that insulation from foreign conflict required building a domestic base of manufacturing through high-tariff protectionism. Tariff policy, in short, had evolved into an essential tool in American development and national security.

After the War of 1812 and the end of the Napoleonic wars, the protectionist approach to tariff policy dominated U.S. diplomacy; American leaders, on a nonpartisan basis, were convinced that without international peace and general commercial reciprocity, free trade was impossible. Thus, the Tariff of 1816 increased duties in order to pay for the wartime debt but also to promote the nascent production of textiles and iron. Protectionism of infant industries became standard practice. This was the thinking behind Henry Clay's American System. The United States would become Americanized, and less subject to the policy of the British Crown, by a tariff that developed the U.S. economy while it deemphasized diplomatic cooperation. This did not mean that overseas expansion into old and new markets would halt, but it did institutionalize a policy of higher tariffs.

The remarkable expansion of the United States before the Civil War was an outgrowth of this internally oriented approach, but it also necessitated an insistence on commercial reciprocity, or a mutual lowering of national tariff barriers. That is, America would lower its tariff on certain

imports in return for a reduced rate abroad. The stimulation given to the U.S. economy by exports to industrializing Britain of cotton, grain, and other raw materials, and the simultaneous massive inflow of British manufactures, maintained the policy of seeking trade liberalization abroad in return for lower American duties. Although the United States was determined to be politically isolationist in regard to international affairs, its leaders also pressed onward with the mission to break down empires, liberalize the global system, and civilize underdeveloped areas of the world. Between 1820 and 1860, moreover, dependence on British trade (and investment) made American trade liberalization an imperative. Tariff policy served this multifaceted mission.

U.S. merchants wished to end the cycle of American-European retaliation that had emerged from 1789 to 1815. Mutual discrimination had led to a system of countervailing duties by each side. The Americans suffered most because their cargoes were bulky, while European ships entered U.S. ports and reexported to their colonies with compact cargoes of finished goods. Faced with additional maritime restrictions by the 1820s, and a European policy of easing mercantilist regulations in intercolonial commerce through reciprocal accords, American officials wielded tariff policy once again in self-defense. The United States had no colonies and thus could not make similar deals. Left only with a policy of insisting on completely unrestricted free trade, the Americans linked a diplomatic stance of anticolonialism to a reciprocal tariff policy.

They failed in their objectives. While Europeans gradually abolished countervailing duties in return for the termination of U.S. discriminatory tariffs, American merchants still faced commercial monopolies in the European colonies. In the British West Indies, for instance, the United States's tariff reciprocity policy capitulated to the British principle of imperial preference. The other European powers, including Russia, extended such discriminatory tariff networks into their colonies. Meanwhile, American imperialists who sought similar preferential arrangements in U.S.-dominated territories in the Pacific and Latin America were rebuffed by anticolonial and latent trade liberalization sentiment at home. America sought open doors abroad but tariff policy, once again, accomplished little in this regard.

Commercial liberalization, always a hallmark of American diplomacy, drove U.S. tariff policy before the Civil War, but not for the entire country. Therein lay the linkage of tariff policy to sectionalism and the Civil War. At home, manufacturers struggled with British competition, while on the seas and in foreign ports merchants experienced French and British mercantilism and colonial restrictions. Western farmers found themselves excluded by tariffs in Europe; southern planters faced higher taxes abroad on their cotton. They blamed foreign producers and their governments for the 1819 panic and subsequent depression. Britain closed off the West Indies to U.S. vessels, and France imposed protective tariffs. American merchants demanded that the government negotiate reciprocity treaties to open foreign markets, or seek retaliation. Secretary of State and then President John Quincy Adams took up this cause, but he faced determined resistance both inside the country and out.

LIBERALIZATION OR PROTECTIONISM?

American manufacturers and westerners, convinced of Britain's intention to destroy the growing (though suffering) U.S. economy, pursued the nationalistic American System, designed to provide Americans with independent control over their economy. High-tariff protectionism, the antithesis of Adams's reciprocal tariff policy, would build the American System. Economic defense drove this conception of tariff policy, but advocates also argued that it would achieve the same goal as that pursued by the trade liberalizers. Protectionism would catalyze the production of raw materials at home while promoting increased surplus of manufactured goods for export. U.S. producers and labor would be the beneficiaries. European powers, prevented from further monopolizing the U.S. and Latin American markets, would be the losers. A high-tariff policy would result in economic independence for the United States, whose diplomats could then use the leverage of their closed market to pry open European colonies and markets. Clay believed tariff mercantilism would benefit the American economy, and thus serve as a weapon in diplomacy that could bring greater national security and even lead to U.S. imperial expansion. Of course, such a tariff policy was anathema to merchants, southerners, and others concerned about American diplomacy. The former noted that expansion into Latin America could never compensate for Britain's likely retaliation against U.S. exports. In addition, the revolutions then erupt-

ing across Latin America meant that the region would not be a reliable buyer of American products. And angering Spain by supporting the rebels might hurt U.S. trade with Cuba, to the benefit of other European powers. Southerners argued that protectionism would prompt Britain to turn to Latin America and away from the United States, thereby depleting the latter of manufactures that were traded for cotton. Latin America would become Britain's economic colony. Beyond the favoritism that high tariffs gave to northern manufacturers over western and southern farmers, low-tariff advocates warned that U.S. prosperity and expansion were at stake.

This debate led to considerations of tariff policy and diplomacy. President James Monroe supported revolutionaries in Latin America, but he also worried that Europeans would intervene to rescue their regional compatriot, Spain, against the forces of republicanism. He sought caution. Meanwhile, though siding with the northern merchants in their quest for profits, John Quincy Adams pushed for trade liberalization mostly on the principles of the open door and competition in global markets. He was determined to destroy European colonialism and impose an ideology of American-led trade liberalization that would boost U.S. commerce. He feared that without this course, not only would the United States continue to suffer deprivation from foreign mercantilism but that Latin American rebels would sign agreements for special trade privileges with the Europeans. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, based on commercial diplomacy and drawing support from both liberal traders and protectionists, warned Europe not to extend its "system" to the Western Hemisphere.

Another significant consensus was reached when John Quincy Adams became president in 1825, for by then he and Clay had accepted the basic foundations of each other's approaches. Adams committed to the American System and lived with Clay's protective tariff of 1824, which raised rates from the 1816 levels. Even liberal traders supported the notion of incidental protection for industry. For his part, Clay, the new secretary of state, attended to commercial reciprocity, even though he was skeptical that pleasing foreigners would lessen their protectionism. He negotiated a trade treaty with new Central American republics that served as a model of tariff liberalization. The tariff policy consensus was also served by the political alignments over the tariff of 1824, in which Westerners joined with divided northerners to back protectionism, but this result turned out to be temporary.

The culmination of the protectionist campaign was the so-called Tariff of Abominations of 1828, which enacted the highest tariffs in U.S. history. This law emerged after the celebrated debates between Clay and New England Representative Daniel Webster, who called the American System destructive to international commerce. Webster noted, for instance, the striking development of England's gradual phasing out of trade restrictions. He lost the day in 1828, yet the revision of 1833 reduced protectionism. A depression three years later led to the return to power of the Whigs and to a higher tariff in 1842. The West had turned to local needs, however, and flipped to the liberal trade side. Indeed, until the Civil War, tariffs slowly fell, although they remained high relative to the pre-Napoleonic period.

Regardless of the tariff, or tariff policy, scholars generally accept that neither tariffs nor the effort to forge commercial treaties with Latin America had much effect on U.S. growth, overseas expansion, or trade with the Europeans from 1820 to the Civil War. This conclusion satisfies scholars who support freer trade. They conclude that the high-tariff era came at an opportune time when American diplomacy focused more on continental rather than overseas expansion, and thus protectionism did not excite foreign concerns. But backers of the protectionist cause also are satisfied, for they argue that a protective tariff did not impede the nation's growth. Rather, it might have aided that growth.

The way of thinking that forged the American System faded away, with low-tariff Democrats asserting that the tariff should be for revenue only, and not for protection of industries. By the mid-1850s, the Democrats declared themselves in favor of "progressive" liberal trade the world over. They cut duties in 1857 and continued to negotiate reciprocity treaties with other nations. In 1854, the United States and Canada agreed to free trade in certain goods (although Congress abrogated the pact because it was not reciprocal). Canada gained from cuts in raw materials but raised its tariffs on U.S. manufactured goods. The expansionists also forged accords with China (1844) and Japan (1854), although these were one-sided arrangements that privileged American exports in those markets. These treaties represented the continued interest in reciprocity in tariff policy. But it was growing sectionalism, not the impact of tariff policies, that had the greatest

bearing on American diplomacy. Thus, trade liberalism—a pursuit of freer trade tempered by protectionism—remained the general approach in tariff policy.

GOLDEN AGE OF TRADE

Foreign trade in manufactures yoked U.S. diplomacy and economics together after the Civil War. This was a period of tremendous economic growth in the country, and in U.S. and European expansion overseas. American production of industrial goods gradually replaced raw materials in significance as exports, and imports of manufactures slowly declined. This pattern, as the United States moved into markets controlled by Britain and other commercial powers by the 1890s, lent tariff policy a new and important dimension. The country's dynamic domestic economy, combined with its emerging rapprochement with Great Britain and increasing reach abroad, transformed tariff policy into a diplomatic tool geared toward enhancing American competition. Before this time, the aim of tariff policy was to defend U.S. interests through reciprocity treaties. After the sectional conflict, tariff policy was an indicator of American economic and political muscle that projected the nation's power abroad, although it still remained enmeshed in domestic politics.

From the 1870s onward, more farmers and manufacturers had a stake in overseas trade than ever before, and more producers were devastated by recurrent bank panics and depressions. These caused gluts on domestic markets and thus dropped prices repeatedly throughout the Gilded Age. Producers pushed the government to expand U.S. foreign trade with appropriate trade policies. Historians, led by Marxist scholars, have emphasized the "glut theory" as the driving force behind tariff diplomacy of this time. They argue that policymakers sought to unload surpluses at home on world markets by creating an informal empire of commerce and investment throughout Latin America and into the Pacific and Asia. In this view, tariffs were part of a foreign economic policy that served the purposes of American business, which sought to dominate economies at home and abroad. Opponents of such economic determinism point out that U.S. business support for a lower tariff was not consistent or uniform. Some manufacturers sought exports as their salvation to overproduction but most focused on the home market. It is more evident that the executive branch managers of diplomacy saw great advantages to a tariff policy based on trade liberalization, and so acted accordingly to make this policy amenable to America's emerging foreign interests.

The debate over the tariff did not cease, by any means. Tariffs began to rise as early as 1861, as the southern coalition exited Congress, leaving the Republican Party, long a supporter of protectionism, in control of the presidency and at least one house of Congress for most of the period until 1913. In addition, powerful northern manufacturers demanded protection from imports. Farmers in particular campaigned against high duties, which forced them to buy in a pricey domestic market but sell in an unprotected one. By the 1890s, the Populists had taken up the cause of trade liberalization, focusing their wrath on the tariff as a punitive instrument to farmers and labor. But protectionist views were politically appealing. In addition, the tariff was a highly complex issue, buffeted by many interest groups, each seeking a slight revision in rates or valuation methods to gain an edge in cutthroat competition in the various fields over their equivalents abroad.

The low-tariff advocates in the business and diplomatic community tried to bypass the entrenched interests in Congress by taking up the cause of a tariff policy fashioned to bolster America's international power. Liberal traders lobbied for tariff reform (lower customs rates) as part of a package of foreign policy initiatives, although they just as strongly appealed on economic grounds by denouncing protectionist monopolies that operated behind a wall of tariffs while workers and farmers were exposed to free-trade winds. These liberal traders included in their calculations for lower customs duties the expansion of overseas commerce, the construction of U.S.-dominated transportation systems (with priority given to building a trans-isthmian canal through Central America), and a bigger, updated, and stronger navy. Liberal trade advocates, including southern legislators, diplomats, and presidents, welcomed British commercial prowess as confirmation that freer trade brought riches and diplomatic leverage. A rising power like the United States, they argued, should follow the British lead in liberalizing tariff restrictions. Richard Cobden, Britain's chief opponent of the protectionist Corn Laws, had successfully crusaded for a free-trade strategy on the notion that increased commerce would boost prosperity and peace. American liberal traders agreed. Besides, a protectionist tariff

policy would merely provoke retaliation from Europe. Such a response would not only lead to political and even military conflict abroad, but it would hurt American producers.

In what became the traditional State Department approach, bureaucrats in the diplomatic branch of the government, such as Worthington C. Ford of the Bureau of Statistics, promoted the idea that a liberal tariff policy would help Americans export production surpluses by encouraging Europeans to treat U.S. commerce on a reciprocal basis. The State Department no doubt suffered from the passivity of presidents of this time; Congress was the dominant branch, with the result that tariff policy remained pointed in a protectionist direction. Still, trade expansion—and thus tariff liberalization—held sway over the State Department, the agency responsible for negotiating international tariff treaties. Thus, duties, although of secondary interest to Secretary of State William Seward, nonetheless played a role in his ambition for territorial annexation across the Pacific, for he stressed that political expansion succeeded trade expansion. Tariff reciprocity accords promoted the latter. James G. Blaine attempted in 1881 to combat Britain's dominant position in major trade items in the hemisphere by creating a hemispheric customs union on the model of the German Zollverein, but the Latin Americans rejected him in 1889 during his service as secretary of state. He turned instead to reciprocity treaties to promote commerce. Later secretaries of state advocated trade growth abroad; most adopted reciprocity as the best means to accomplish this end.

TARIFF RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity treaties became the cause célèbre for the liberal traders. Between 1860 and 1898, nearly a dozen reciprocity treaties or other types of executive agreements were in effect. These bilateral accords, negotiated between the United States and another nation, usually took the form of modest agreements to reduce or eliminate duties on certain goods. The goal was to promote more trade. The reciprocity treaties of this era covered more than one-third of U.S. imports. But, unlike the agreements reached with Europeans in the early national period, these reciprocity treaties were forged with the Western Hemisphere and Pacific regions. Canada was the first target. The Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Treaty, which lasted until 1865, made the Canadians dependent on U.S. markets. Ottawa thus pressed for tariff reciprocity thereafter, which itself gave way to advocacy by the 1870s of a commercial union that would eliminate border customhouses. The planned free-trade area gained much backing but died in 1890, as American protectionists jacked duties under the McKinley Tariff and nationalists on both sides belittled the idea as a danger to sovereignty. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) realized the dream one hundred years later.

Wary of European tariff wars, the United States turned elsewhere for reciprocal trade accords. The second reciprocity treaty was forged with Hawaii, beginning in 1878. Domestic sugar producers protested, but they could not overcome the much more powerful support for the treaty from industrial sugar refiners, which gained immeasurably from the sudden increase in sugar production, American land-ownership, and island trade with the United States. Once renewed in 1887, the treaty's effect of tying Hawaii to the United States led to discussion of a coaling station for American warships near Honolulu, a port created in 1898 and named Pearl Harbor. Annexation attempts also resulted from the reciprocity treaty, which so stimulated the American-run Hawaiian economy that emboldened U.S. businessmen and landowners entered the imperial game by overthrowing the queen of the islands in 1893. This caused a diplomatic stir and such disgust at home that the Cleveland administration withdrew an annexation treaty from Congress. (Territorial annexation of Hawaii was finally achieved in 1898, marking the end of the reciprocity treaty.)

In Latin America, tariff agreements did not endure, or failed to be ratified by Congress, because of lobbying from U.S. protectionists. The influence of the U.S. domestic wool lobby hindered deals with South American countries, for which wool was a chief export. Mexico and a few nations in the Caribbean did enjoy reciprocity treaties, because their goods did not compete with American-made products. But Congress rejected most of the treaties reached by Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen in the early 1880s as threats to the American domestic economy.

Reciprocity was a compromise between free trade and protectionism. This weakened its cause because both sides could attack it. Diplomats were wary of foreign—namely British and German—commercial influence in the Western Hemisphere and also were mindful that growth and power overseas depended on negotiation of

treaties. Thus, diplomats sought the middle way of trade liberalization. The State Department insisted that the treaties confer only conditional most-favored-nation status (MFN) on another nation. Most other countries granted MFN on an unconditional basis, which meant that any tariff concessions the United States earned from the nation with which it had negotiated a treaty could be given by that nation to other countries, including America's competitors. Conditional treatment compelled the third nation to grant an equivalent concession in return or not receive the benefits of the reciprocity treaty to which the United States was a party. Europeans ignored this State Department proclamation (which the Supreme Court supported), eventually compelling America, in 1923, to adopt the unconditional form of MFN status.

Conditional MFN treatment indicated the intensifying interrelationship of tariff policy with diplomacy after the Civil War, as the United States became a player in the big-power scene. During the early 1880s, France and Germany banned American pork and pork products. This was a protective maneuver designed to help their farmers, cloaked in the excuse that U.S. meat was tainted by trichinae that the Germans claimed was the result of inadequate inspection at American meatpacking plants. American meatpackers protested, as did U.S. diplomats, to little effect until the McKinley Tariff Act passed Congress in 1890. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck refused to accede to American demands against the embargo. He did so for reasons of domestic politics but also because he wished to limit U.S. overseas influence, especially in the Pacific, where the division of the Samoan Islands remained a sore point until a German-American accord in 1899. The McKinley law contained a provision giving the president the authority to levy a retaliatory duty on German beet sugar imported into the United States. Congress, meanwhile, also passed meat inspection legislation. Recognizing that the two countries needed to ease tensions, for they had nearly come to blows over Samoa, American and German diplomats quickly agreed that U.S. pork would be admitted (after paying a duty) while German sugar would be kept on the American duty-free list. The United States and France also reached an agreement. The episode revealed how tariff policy wielded considerable clout in international political relations.

Reciprocity accords with Latin American nations also had diplomatic implications. Essentially, the State Department negotiated these accords to bind smaller nations to the American economy and keep them out of the hands of the Europeans. But the refusal by the House of Representatives to implement the reciprocity treaty of 1883 with Mexico (after Senate passage) was an affront to America's neighbor. The arrangement would have placed Mexican sugar, tobacco, and some other goods on the tariff-free list in return for Mexico cutting some of its duties. Later tariff hikes against silver-lead ores further strained relations, and, overall, U.S. protectionism was one cause among many that prompted Mexican revolutionaries to seek economic independence from the United States. The McKinley tariff, moreover, scuttled further attempts at reciprocity treaties, although a short-lived one with Brazil proved successful. Still, it was the United States's rather heavy-handed treatment of Latin Americans—in the *Baltimore* affair, Venezuelan boundary dispute, seizure of the Canal Zone, and Cuban revolutions—that combined with the very limited tariff reciprocity policies to shape American responses in the region.

PRESIDENTIAL REFORM

The tepid approach to trade liberalization, or a low-tariff policy, continued into the new century, but change was afoot. Congress still blocked major downward revisions of the tariff because politics dictated that reducing duties also reduced votes. Yet as the national Progressive movement took hold in the early 1900s, market-seeking trade associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce lobbied vigorously for a tariff policy conducive to export expansion. Their case was strong, as imports of manufactured goods continued their steady decline—from 14 percent of consumption of industrial products in 1869 to just under 6 percent by 1914, and the case of the protectionists became weak. They failed to persuade Congress to grant large-scale tariff cuts but sowed the ground for economic liberalization and expansion in foreign policy. Consular branches became active promoters of U.S. goods, the Department of Commerce provided necessary information on foreign markets, and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 authorized foreign branch banking. Furthermore, export expansion had made its mark abroad, as American goods carved such inroads into European markets that the British, by the turn of the

century, began to protest U.S. competition. The presidents of the times thought systematically about foreign affairs, of which tariff policy was increasingly deemed a part.

President William McKinley, noted for the high tariff in his name, actually pursued moderate customs policies. Like his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, he had denounced free trade as a threat to prosperity and even morality. Indeed, the champion of the Republican Party's high-tariff policy, Representative and Senator Justin Morrill of Vermont, had equated protectionism with patriotism. McKinley preached Republican-style tariff nationalism, as GOP leaders did until 1932, by arguing that duties were simply fees to be paid by foreigners to have the privilege of competing in the U.S. market. Tariffs protected wages, guarding the country from invasion and plunder from abroad. Yet McKinley also became a believer in reciprocity.

Backing trade liberalization, McKinley vowed to boost exports without surrendering domestic markets. Thus, the president welcomed a provision of the Dingley Tariff of 1897 that included European nations, along with Latin Americans, in reciprocity treaties. Including Europe indicated America's new confidence abroad and willingness to negotiate as an equal with the great powers and, in particular, lay aside more than a century of bitterness toward England. Consistent with the temper of the post–Civil War period, McKinley appointed a former congressman, now an elderly diplomat, John Kasson, to negotiate treaties with the European powers. Kasson's treaties were controversial, as many industries protested that production at home was sacrificed to the interests of exporters who would benefit from lower duty rates in Europe. Neither McKinley nor Roosevelt actively promoted the treaties in a protectionist-run Congress, and the agreements died in the Senate. There was more success with the commercial treaty that bound Cuba to the United States after the Spanish-American War. In return for a guaranteed sugar and tobacco market in the United States, American business, as well as the military, persuaded Congress to liberalize trade. The result, unfortunately for Cuba, was American domination of the island for a half century afterward.

Regardless of the imperial nature of the Cuban arrangement, tariff policy turned toward internationalism. The Republicans considered tariff revision, realizing that protectionism undercut American power abroad and led to conflict with the Europeans. Just before his assassination in September 1901, McKinley proclaimed that nations could no longer be indifferent toward each other. He urged reciprocity treaties and cuts in unnecessary tariffs. The new president, Theodore Roosevelt, who viewed reciprocal arrangements as "the handmaiden of protection," let the Kasson treaties die in the Senate but pursued preferential agreements with Cuba and the Philippines. Such a tariff policy would not only bind them economically to the United States but also promote political stability. Roosevelt advocated reciprocity as a form of aid to Cuba, a nation strategically located close to America and within the approaches to the Panama Canal, then under construction. Reciprocity, he believed, would encourage its independence from Europe. In regard to the Philippines, Roosevelt pushed tariff reciprocity to ensure that this territory, so essential to American trade and security interests along the route to the China market, remained hinged to the United States. He stood pat at first in 1905 when Germany threatened a tariff war over America's unwillingness to grant unconditional MFN status to the nation's exports. Recognizing Germany's importance in the European balance of power, the president backed the eventual accord in 1907 that rejected protectionism and allowed for reductions in tariffs of concern to Germany.

The Taft administration showed even less concern than Roosevelt for the tariff's effect on domestic politics and more sensitivity to foreign concerns. Such neglect of protectionism helped William Howard Taft lose his reelection bid in 1912. This former governor of the Philippines had backed tariff-free treatment for that territory's sugar and tobacco. The Republican Congress aided him by enacting the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, which facilitated reciprocal tariff bargaining with other nations by giving Taft discretionary authority to impose a minimum duty rate if he found no evidence of discrimination. The State Department discovered that the new authority was no inducement to France and Germany to relax restrictions against the United States. But Taft did forge a reciprocity treaty with Canada in 1911, only to be rebuffed by his own party, despite his argument that Canada would become a neocolonial "adjunct" of the United States, dependent on U.S. manufactures and banking while assuming the role of mere commodity supplier. The GOP rejected this argument of self-interest, retreating to traditional protectionism. Canadians did, however, buy the view, and as a result, they turned the Liberal Party from power

out of a fear that U.S. continental expansion, fueled by freer trade, would overtake the British Empire in Canada.

Protectionism was on the defensive, however. As an antimonopolist and internationalist, Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson won election in 1912 on a low-tariff policy. He counseled that Americans could compete effectively abroad but that a high-tariff policy hamstrung the State Department in its ability to conclude reciprocity treaties. The Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 sharply reduced duties and added a provision that gave the president authority to forge reciprocity treaties. The act did not lead to equal treatment for American exports, but it did confirm Wilson's intention of using trade liberalization as a panacea to economic distress and a means to maintain peace. World War I delayed Wilson's tariff internationalism.

FITS OF LIBERALISM

Throughout World War I, Wilson strove to have the United States play a lead role in planning the peace, which, in an economic sense, he based on an open world economy of free-flowing trade and investment. Such a structure would boost American power and profits (exports of manufactures skyrocketed from 1913 to 1920), yet Wilson looked beyond realism to the ideological elements of a new world order of democracy and liberal capitalism. A major element of his Fourteen Points involved accessible and expanded commercial relations. In this plan, tariffs would be reduced. Without cuts in duties, claimed businessmen, bankers, and the administration, U.S. imports of European products would flag, preventing European recovery from the war. Without economic revival, the Europeans would never stabilize their exchange rates or pay off their debts. The downward economic spiral not only would make them feeble trade partners but also render them susceptible to vicious cycles of political instability caused by economic uncertainties. That would jeopardize the peace and Wilson's grand scheme of internationalism. Lower duties became a general foreign policy objective for international stability, a watershed in thinking about tariff policy.

That was not the view of Congress, in which protectionists, farmers, and small business demanded a higher tariff wall. Once Congress rejected the Versailles Treaty, turning aside Wilson's internationalism, legislators then responded to the postwar recession in 1920 by trying to boost commodity prices for farmers. Wilson vetoed emergency tariff legislation to jack duties on agricultural products as a violation of his ideological crusade for trade liberalization, but in May 1921, his successor, President Warren Harding, signed a similar law into effect, placing the prosperity of American producers before that of foreigners. This pleased farmers and small manufacturers who feared an influx of cheap European chemical goods, and particularly stiff competition from German producers. The emergency tariff set the tone for the rest of the decade: reluctance to overhaul tariff (and loan) policies in the direction of liberalism. Tariff policy remained a part of more general strategic and economic interests, but not the impetus to a shift to internationalism in foreign policy. Higher tariffs, like the rejection of the League of Nations, indicated that domestic priorities still won out over foreign policy objectives.

During the 1920s and into the Great Depression, the United States searched for export markets while Congress maintained high tariffs. This posed a paradox in that the nation sought freer trade overseas but frowned on more imports at home. Foreign trade expansion became a cardinal aim of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who viewed commerce as "the lifeblood of modern civilization." Thus, while the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 raised duty rates back to their prewar levels, Hoover recognized that peace and prosperity were interlocked. Administration leaders viewed the world economy as an interdependent network of American, European, small-power, and colonial needs and interests. It was no surprise, then, that the Republican leaders who ran the country did not shy away from the rise in imports. The inflow only enhanced American exports abroad and made it easier to solve thorny issues like reparations and debt repayments that poisoned international political affairs. Yet the paradox remained: the aspiration to spread capitalist liberal principles worldwide did not match policy, as protectionism remained strong. Small industry and farmers still clashed with international bankers and diplomats over the tactics of protecting American markets but expanding in global markets. Until 1934, this deadlock prevented the trade liberalization necessary for world economic recovery. America's actions did not live up to its potential of global leadership.

On the internationalist side of the ledger, several positive steps pleased U.S. officials but fell

short of their goals. First, the acceptance of unconditional most-favored-nation status for America's trade partners ensured foreigners that their goods would be treated equally in every nation that had an agreement with the United States. Washington abandoned its preferential treatment in Brazil, for example, for equality of treatment in all other markets. Frank W. Taussig, the first chairman of the new Tariff Commission, had urged Wilson to push this approach as one way to open up foreign markets. Although the commission did not rule on revising conditional MFN status at the end of the war, it set the stage for further pressure toward this end. Using Fordney-McCumber's provision for retaliating against foreign discrimination, the State Department switched to unconditional MFN in 1923 in order to dampen antagonism in trade relations. Fairness, rather than special concessions, would avoid diplomatic misunderstandings and help assure American exports of equal treatment.

But this revolution in tariff policy coincided with growing discriminatory policies in Europe. By 1930, the State Department had inserted unconditional MFN status provisions into nearly half of its commercial treaties with forty-three nations. Fifteen additional executive agreements with trade partners included the equality-of-treatment principle. Yet countries in Europe and Central America maintained their unfair protectionism. In addition, the British Empire continued to advance its imperial preferential system of tariffs, showing Europe's embrace of restrictive trade principles and practices. In America's most important markets—Canada, Britain, and France—discrimination remained, preventing market openings for U.S. exports. These nations insisted on holding to protectionism until they received reciprocal concessions in the huge American market. Thus, the late-nineteenth-century vogue for reciprocity treaties returned a quarter century later.

A second liberal policy involved successfully lobbying in Congress to strengthen the Tariff Commission, the nonpartisan body of experts created in the Wilson years that advised the president on the height of tariffs. Under the urging of Hoover and Tariff Commissioner William Culbertson, Congress also accepted a flexible tariff policy and "scientific" protectionism, giving the president authority to adjust customs according to production costs in America and overseas. These measures, embodied in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, attempted to take tariff-setting out of the hands of the logrolling Congress and place it with the unbiased Tariff Commission, which would act according to national and international economic needs. But the commission did not avail itself of the flexible tariff policy, and duties increased. The Republican presidents of the 1920s refused to confront Congress on protectionism. Their pursuit of international stability and trade expansion through the efficacy of private market forces came up lame.

PROTECTIONIST BACKSLIDING

Fordney-McCumber coincided with a general rise in tariffs worldwide, as new nations formed out of the Austro-Hungarian empire sought to protect their industries. America, Britain, and other big powers called several international conferences—in Brussels in 1920 and Genoa two years later—to stop the increase in protectionism. But when these nations looked to the United States for leadership, they found—with passage of the Fordney-McCumber duty hikes—that America still elevated its domestic economy over foreign considerations in tariff policy. When the law passed, America was the world's creditor but, ironically, possessed the world's highest tariffs. Unable to negotiate down U.S. customs rates, European and Latin American nations revised their tariffs upward between 1926 and 1929. Three of the major British dominions—Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—responded likewise.

This tariff war alarmed the League of Nations, which called a world economic conference in Geneva in 1927. The representatives, including an American, resolved to terminate all prohibitions on imports. This was too bold for many nations, which attached reservations and loopholes. The U.S. delegate railed against high tariffs but focused on those in Europe, not in America. The Geneva meeting failed to stop the climb in tariff levels. Germany and Italy immediately raised tariffs against imported wheat, thereby escalating the world tariff war. In this context, the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (proposed in 1929) culminated the cycle of protectionism that liberal traders had feared for decades. The fallout was positive, however, for it transformed tariff policy into an internationalist instrument.

The initial trade-policy response to the Great Depression pointed in a protectionist direction under the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Historians continue to debate whether or not Smoot-Hawley represented the highest tariff in American history,

worsened the Depression, or sent chills into the stock market. The large majority of twentieth-century economists, politicians, diplomats, and students of international affairs believed the worst, but there is reason to believe this perspective exaggerates the case. Research reveals that earlier tariff levels on dutiable goods regularly exceeded those of Smoot-Hawley. The Tariff of Abominations raised the average ad valorem rate (set on a percentage of value) on dutiable imports to a higher level than the 1930 legislation. Scholars should be skeptical of weighing the effect of tariff levels too heavily when trying to show their impact on the Great Depression; demand and supply conditions and currency rates had much more influence. And a close reading of stock market fluctuations and the battle over Smoot-Hawley in Congress shows no correlation between the law and the bear market. Thus, a "myth" of Smoot-Hawley arose, perpetuated by free-trading economists and Democrats seeking to wrest control of the White House by blaming the Depression—and the rise of militarism in Europe and Asia—on selfish, shortsighted, and provocative Republican tariff policy.

Still, such conclusions were beyond commentators and policymakers at the time. In reality, perception was critical, and the tariff act indicated to foreign observers that America had chosen the path of economic nationalism. In short, Smoot-Hawley's timing was atrocious. World trade, both exports and imports, plummeted in value by 40 percent and by a quarter in volume from 1929 to 1933. That spooked U.S. investments, which, along with any hopes of loans to Europe, dried up. In a vicious economic cycle, the resulting defaults by foreigners holding U.S. loans led to further instability and slumps in Europe, which were echoed in America.

Journalists exaggerated the intensity and number of protests abroad regarding Smoot-Hawley, but governments did rally against the legislation. France, Argentina, Japan, and others assailed the law as it wended its way through Congress. Thirty-eight nations urged the Senate to reject it, while American liberals warned that the high tariff was a threat to peace. Switzerland, which exported almost all of its watch and clock production, suffered a 48 percent decline in sales to the United States as a result of Smoot-Hawley rates. The Swiss called for a consumer boycott of U.S. cars and typewriters as a response. Mussolini's Italy criticized the high tariffs on agricultural imports and, in retaliation, mounted a campaign against American autos that fizzled when the Italians realized that reprisals would jeopardize their olive oil and tomato exports to the United States. Spain imposed higher duties on bicycles and wine from France, in reaction to the unconditional MFN treatment given to third countries. In effect, although there was less foreign retaliation following passage of Smoot-Hawley than claimed at the time, the impact of American protectionism came in the form of uncooperative commercial relations in the international arena.

For example, the British Commonwealth did not directly retaliate against Smoot-Hawley when it forged the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, but the discriminatory duties and quotas against non-empire sources, especially the United States, were deemed a natural outgrowth of the measure for nations seeking a quid pro quo. Under the agreement, free trade flowed between Britain and its dominions but high tariffs faced America. In 1930, nearly three-quarters of U.S. exports entered Britain free of duties, but two years later, about one-fifth enjoyed such status. Smoot-Hawley prompted the British nations to circle their wagons around imperial preferences that the United States then spent the next three decades trying to eliminate in extensive tariff negotiations. Also, Canadians erupted over American tariff hikes on farm goods during their national election. Running for reelection, Prime Minister Mackenzie King issued countervailing duties in May 1930 to bolster his image as a protector of Canadian economic interests. The international trade situation was begging for a peaceful resolution.

HULL'S REVOLUTION

At this low ebb in the world economy, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt entered office. The president's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, determined to lower tariff and trade barriers. From his first speech in Congress in 1908, this Tennesseean crusaded against the protective tariff. Hull became a near-fanatical champion of liberal trade, arguing that American prosperity depended on trade expansion encouraged by a reciprocal lowering of tariffs. The Democrats forged an export-based coalition of producers, workers, business, and bankers to support Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal agenda and numerous reelection bids. Yet materialism and politics were only one part of Hull's agenda. A low-tariff policy, or freer trade, promoted lasting peace. Tariff wars were part of

economic rivalries that led to political tensions, he argued. Expanded and mutually prosperous trade brought economic well-being and, therefore, political stability and cooperation. Furthermore, reduced duties freed the economy from governmental intrusion. Regimentation and control of markets, as seen in Stalin's communist Soviet Union and Hitler's fascist Germany, threatened liberty and democracy.

The secretary of state pushed for mutual tariff concessions under reciprocal trade treaties and close adherence to the unconditional most-favored-nation policy. He attacked Smoot-Hawley as detrimental to U.S. interests and security. Liberal trade dovetailed with peace, he declared, and high tariffs with war. Hull labored to remove tariff-making policy from the clutches of self-interested congressmen and place it in the executive branch, namely with the freer-trade State Department and president. Using the lure of the large American market, he pursued reciprocity agreements with the revolutionary trade legislation that accomplished his agenda: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934.

Although Roosevelt was at first a lukewarm liberal trader, preferring instead nationalistic and unilateral solutions to the Great Depression, the president endorsed the RTAA. This began a new relationship of the tariff to diplomacy. The legislation, renewable every three years or so, amended the Smoot-Hawley Act, giving the president authority to negotiate bilateral agreements that raised or lowered tariff rates up to 50 percent on the condition that the other nation grant U.S. products reciprocal access to its markets. Each agreement included the unconditional MFN clause so that the concessions would apply to third parties. Congress would renew the RTAA but would not vote on any agreement, thus eliminating lobbying in the tariff process.

Protectionists were not routed, however. The president would seek advice from the Tariff Commission, as well as the departments of state, commerce, and agriculture, before engaging in commercial negotiations. The public would be given opportunities to be heard. The president could not transfer goods between the free and dutiable lists. And the preferential relationship of exclusive trade arrangements with Cuba would stand. Hull would not depart from previous tariff policies that granted cautious concessions and pushed nationalism to the fore. For instance, he ignored Australian requests to enter negotiations for months, and then protested when Canberra adopted certain restrictive measures. To many Latin American nations, the Hull program seemed bent more on U.S. export expansion than mutual, reciprocal benefits. An RTAA pact signed with Cuba just after dictator Fulgencio Batista came to power in 1934 did not stimulate the island's economy but instead tied the nation closer to the United States in a dependent relationship.

But Hull's philosophy represented a major shift in tariff policy. Protectionists railed that the RTAA meant unilateral economic disarmament on the part of the United States. The RTAA accord with Cuba, for instance, pursued political stability through economic dependence with the United States. In 1935, Hull signed an agreement with Belgium, offering the maximum 50 percent reduction in tariffs on many competitive products, including steel and cotton textiles. The goal was to open up Belgium's market for American automotive products, apples, and wheat flour. In fact, the accord gave one-sided benefits to Belgium, even allowing the nation to rescind some of its concessions. This pattern of sacrificing domestic industry for the imperatives of export expansion and, overall, for foreign policy goals, became a basic pattern that remained in RTAA negotiations well into the 1970s. Even though government experts found substantial discrimination abroad against U.S. goods, Hull decided to negotiate reciprocal trade pacts with as many nations as possible, except for aggressors like Germany and Japan. The State Department took a conciliatory position toward RTAA countries, oftentimes allowing imports into the United States to surge past, and even damage, home interests. The reason for such sacrifices lay in foreign policy objectives.

By the end of the twentieth century, many commentators lamented Hullian liberal trade logic as self-destructive, naive, or unwise. They accused tariff liberals of economic appeasement and of trading away American interests for illusive foreign policy goals. Yet the RTAA did not dismantle trade barriers, nor did they produce anything more than modest export expansion for U.S. farmers and manufacturers. Imperial preferences remained in force. But Hull was satisfied, for he had world politics, not economics, in mind as he negotiated agreements. He agreed that international affairs, and specifically matters of democracy, security, and peace, lay at the heart of the RTAA and American tariff policy. By 1937, in a policy enduring into the next millennium, officials elevated internationalism above domestic economic well-being. By doing so, they trans-

formed tariff policy from its protective guise to one of expansion and liberalism. As the world headed for another war, the Roosevelt administration used tariff policy to group together a coalition of democracies to confront militarist aggressors in Europe and Asia.

TARIFF DIPLOMACY

Under an RTAA bilateral accord with Britain in 1938, the Americans initially sought to curb the imperial preference system to outsiders but acquiesced to the maintenance of this discriminatory network. For example, the United States allowed the British to reduce American apple exports deemed competitive with dominion produce. The payoff, however, lay in the political arena. The British, Canadians, and Americans lauded the accord as representing Anglo-American solidarity in the face of fascism. With the tensions brought on by the Munich Pact a few months after the trade agreement, the State Department stressed that a conciliatory tariff policy was significant for it diplomatic impact.

Tariff reduction agreements appeared in rapid succession as war loomed. The Roosevelt administration successfully renewed the RTAA in 1937 and used the law to forge an agreement with Turkey in 1939, the first with a nation in the Middle East and the twenty-first since the RTAA had become law five years before. This accord, in which the United States granted an inordinate number of concessions relative to Turkey's offers, helped keep the nation out of Nazi Germany's grasp. The State Department signed bilateral pacts with several Latin American nations to turn them from German influence, and agreements with Iceland in 1943 kept that country in the Allied fold. No RTAA agreements were signed with Russia and China, two of America's closest allies during the war, providing evidence that Hull was selective in his wielding of the RTAA and that political partnership was not always conditioned upon economic cooperation. Yet it was just as evident that signatories stayed friendly to the United States during the war. Of the twenty-seven RTAA nations, only Finland fought an Allied power. (And for good reason: It had been invaded by the Soviet Union.) Sixteen countries sided with the United States, six had broken relations with the Axis, and four remained neutral. Placing the tariff in the service of wartime diplomacy helped deter aggressors.

Doing so also deterred the communist threat during the Cold War. Just as important as wartime liberalization was the postwar planning agenda dealing with duties. The war prevented major concessions, slowing down trade negotiations to a trickle. And protectionism did not disappear, either during or in the decades after the war. But State Department planners took Cordell Hull's vision of freer trade to the conference table and fashioned multilateral agreements (with several nations signing on under the unconditional MFN principle) designed to reduce tariffs and other commercial barriers as a basis for peace and stability. These more general ideological hopes changed once the Cold War began and the policy of containment was instituted in the late 1940s, first by economic means and then by military responses.

GATT AND THE COLD WAR

Early in World War II, Anglo-American planners addressed tariffs, especially the British imperial system of discrimination and America's high duty rates. They agreed to negotiate down such protection and include as many nations as possible in the exercise of tariff liberalization. The planners thus launched bargaining talks in the first round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 between twenty-three nations, and simultaneously formulated a blueprint for a trade organization, replete with rules and principles to guide future commercial policies on tariffs as well as related issues such as cartels, employment, and development. The organization itself never came into existence because of a lack of political will power in the United States (it would finally be born under the guise of the World Trade Organization, or WTO, in 1995), but tariff negotiating rounds of GATT continued into the 1990s, until the WTO absorbed GATT.

The first Geneva Round of GATT bogged down over imperial preferences, but the State Department placed greater importance on British economic problems than British intransigence in the negotiations. Maintaining free world unity took precedence over reducing foreign tariffs, which might undermine foreign recovery efforts and thus play into Soviet hands. This was an era in which aid proved more effective than trade in addressing the economic crises facing western Europe. Once the Marshall Plan period ended in the early 1950s, however, GATT rounds gradually lowered tariffs to the point that, by the early

LEMONS AND DIPLOMACY

The idea of placing tariffs in the service of diplomacy during the Cold War was so prevalent that it can be applied in the most esoteric of cases, such as lemons. At the second round of GATT in 1949, America and Italy disputed U.S. tariffs on lemons, a key Italian export. But timing was everything. Moscow had initiated a blockade of Berlin to chase out the Western powers. Czechoslovakia had fallen to the Soviets, while the Marshall Plan had been rushed to Western Europeans struggling to recover from the war and against popular socialist parties tied to Stalin. Communists were poised for triumph in China as the Russians exploded an atomic device, shocking the United States. In these dire circumstances, the State Department sided with Italy, warning that without a cut in the U.S. import duty on lemons, the result would be a failing economy, a peasant revolt in Sicily, and Italy's defection from NATO, which would have devastating effects on America's containment policy. California and Arizona lemon growers, however, lobbied the Truman administration against a concession. They noted, and even the State Department agreed, that Italian lemons competed effectively in the U.S. market, and so a tariff decrease was unnecessary. Furthermore, domestic producers accused the diplomats of trying to bribe Italy with a U.S. tariff decrease to remain at the GATT discussions as a show of Western unity against communism. President Harry Truman weighed their complaints alongside foreign policy objectives, and decided the matter on the latter's merits. America could absorb Italian lemons; growers would survive. Even if they were hurt, however, their sacrifice did not match the potential for Italy's economic and political instability, which would only cause diplomatic strife at a time of great tension in the Cold War. Subsuming tariffs under the containment doctrine ruled trade policy for decades thereafter.

1970s, industrial tariffs fell to minimal levels. Tariffs dropped about 80 percent under the RTAA, providing a boon to foreigners and many U.S. exporters, although the American merchandise trade surplus dwindled away by the early 1970s. By that time, nontariff forms of protection emerged as issues, and so it was difficult to separate tariffs from other barriers.

Postwar U.S. tariff policy also succeeded in molding an anticommunist alliance of solvent nations, bound together by integrated economies. Although protectionism reared up periodically during the half century after World War II, the battle over tariffs shifted to arguments over how much tariff slashing would boost America's Cold War allies. The State Department encouraged U.S. imports oftentimes more strenuously than exports. This was particularly the case during the early Cold War, in light of Japanese and western European recovery needs, but that approach persisted for decades. Repeatedly, the Eisenhower administration turned back protests from domestic producers for import restrictions on items ranging from clothespins to lemons. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations preferred side agreements, or special tariff hikes designed to help certain politically powerful interest groups in Congress, as they maintained an overall strategy of liberal trade for the accomplishment of foreign policy goals. Richard Nixon and Congress, however, restored the old emphasis on reciprocity abroad by adding retaliatory authority into trade legislation, although under subsequent presidents this amounted mostly to muscle flexing with lax enforcement against foreign discrimination. And by this time, tariffs were little involved; when protectionism against automobile imports became a cause célèbre in the 1980s, for example, the backlash from Congress and administrations came in the form of quotas and other nontariff restraints.

Trade liberalization succeeded in its diplomatic objectives: strengthening the alliance, integrating western Europe into a dynamic bloc of nations, attaching Japan to the U.S. side, and luring Third World countries into the free world fold. So successful was the RTAA that it had a large part in fueling growth in the West to the point that the Soviet Union and its satellites tried to compete but bankrupted themselves in the process, thereby ending the Cold War.

At home, by the 1970s and into the next decade there were renewed calls for tariff barriers. The ascendance of Japan in particular sparked protectionism. The advent of the WTO, with its supranational powers over global commerce, and the revolution of globalization spurred a loose coalition of protective-minded groups, among them labor, environmentalists, and populist politicians, to crusade at the turn of the new century for barriers, including tariffs, that would enhance national livelihoods. For example, labor sought restrictions on the ability of corporations

File not found (FNF)

TELEVISION

Chester Pach

Under the cover of darkness on 9 December 1992, U.S. forces went ashore at Mogadishu, Somalia, and got an unexpected reception. The night suddenly turned bright, as television lights illuminated the landing area and temporarily blinded marines and navy SEALs equipped with night vision goggles. At the water's edge were hundreds of journalists who had been waiting to film the beginning of Operation Restore Hope, a humanitarian mission to distribute food and other vital supplies to starving Somalis. The news media had turned the beach into a kind of outdoor television studio, much to the distress of the troops.

The advance guard of Operation Restore Hope did not know that television journalists would complicate their landing. Yet the reporters were there because Pentagon officials had alerted them. Military officials hoped for favorable publicity from news stories about the beginning of a mission that they thought would win widespread approbation. But while they notified reporters, Pentagon authorities forgot to tell marine and navy commanders to expect a reception of lights and cameras.

This incident illustrates the complex relationship between the news media—and particularly television journalists—and those who plan and implement U.S. foreign policy. Journalists depend on government officials for information and access—to conferences, briefings, crisis areas, and war zones. Yet they often chafe under the restrictions that policymakers or military commanders impose. Those who formulate or carry out foreign policy depend on TV news to provide them with favorable publicity as well as information about international affairs or channels for building public support. Yet these officials also worry about the power of cameras and reporters to transform events as well as to frame issues, expose secrets, or challenge official policies. Cooperation and mutual dependence is the flip side of tension and conflicting interests.

Since the middle of the twentieth century, television has been closely connected to U.S. foreign policy. What makes TV important is that it is a visual medium that commands large audiences. Continuing technological improvements, including live broadcasting of international events as they take place, have made television a powerful instrument for conveying information, molding public attitudes, and influencing government policies. Yet it is easy to exaggerate or misunderstand the power of television to shape foreign policy. Beginning in the late twentieth century, the U.S. government had to deal with twenty-four-hour news cycles, "real-time" reporting of "breaking" news, and extensive coverage of international events with large significance, such as the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001, or with dramatic appeal, such as whether Elián Gonzalez, the six-year-old refugee, should remain with relatives in Miami or return to his father in Cuba. Television has affected the ways that the U.S. government has made foreign policy and built public support for it. Yet presidents and other high officials with clear objectives and sophisticated strategies for dealing with the news media—for example, George H. W. Bush's administration during the Persian Gulf War and the international crisis that preceded it—have maintained control of foreign policy and commanded public backing for their international agenda.

Yet even before it had such immediacy or reach, television played a significant—and sometimes controversial—role in shaping government actions and popular understanding of international affairs. The Vietnam War was a critical event. It began, at least, as an American war, just when television had become the principal source of news for a majority of the U.S. public. It offered lessons—controversial, to be sure—about the role of TV in shaping public attitudes toward international affairs. And it occurred at a time of signifi-

cant changes in journalism. Despite their devotion to objectivity, balance, and fairness, TV reporters would no longer insist, as Edward R. Murrow had in 1947, on a contract provision that limited his right to express opinion in his stories. Vietnam, in short, marked a major transition in the relationship between television and foreign policy.

TV NEWS AND THE EARLY COLD WAR

Although it was a novelty in the United States at the end of World War II, television became an important part of American life during the first postwar decade. Fewer than one out of ten American homes had television in 1950. Five years later the proportion had grown to two-thirds. New stations quickly took to the air and usually affiliated with one of the networks: the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), or the short-lived DuMont Television Network.

Even when the networks consisted of a handful of stations, government officials showed keen interest in using television to build public support for U.S. foreign and military policies. Public affairs officers in the State Department said they favored television because it did "a better job than any other medium at depicting foreign policy in action." The department worked with both networks and independent producers to create shows about foreign policy and world affairs or make available for telecast films that it produced itself. Among the most popular series was *The Marshall Plan in Action,* which premiered on ABC in June 1950 and continued under the title *Strength for a Free World* until February 1953. Other shows were the interview program *Diplomatic Pouch* (CBS) and, during the Korean War, *The Facts We Face* (CBS) and *Battle Report—Washington* (NBC). In these early days of broadcasting, the networks were eager for programming to fill up their time slots. They also took advantage of opportunities to demonstrate support for American Cold War policies, especially during the McCarthy era.

Evening newscasts became regular features during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Each network aired fifteen-minute programs. CBS and NBC expanded their shows to thirty minutes in September 1963; ABC did not do the same until January 1967. John Daly anchored the ABC broadcast during most of the 1950s. Douglas Edwards held the same position at CBS until Walter Cronkite replaced him in April 1962. The most popular news program in the early 1950s was NBC's *Camel News Caravan,* with host John Cameron Swayze. With a carnation in his lapel and zest in his voice, Swayze invited viewers to "go hopscotching the world for headlines." After this brisk international tour, there might be stops at a beauty pageant or a stadium for the afternoon's scores. Chet Huntley and David Brinkley succeeded Swayze in October 1956. Anchors and journalists rather than hosts, as Swayze had been, they brought greater depth to the NBC newscasts without making them solemn. They also attracted viewers because of the novelty of their pairing, the contrast in their personalities, and the familiarity of their closing—"Good night, Chet;" "Good night, David." They led the ratings until the late 1960s.

International news was important on each of these programs, yet there were difficulties in covering distant stories, especially on film. Fifteen minutes (less time for commercials, lead-in, and closing) allowed coverage of only a few stories and little time for analysis. Cumbersome and complicated cameras and sound equipment made film reports difficult. Before the beginning of satellite communication in the 1960s, it might take a day or two for film from international locations to get on the air. Despite these limitations, the audience for these newscasts grew steadily. By 1961 surveys showed that the public considered television the "most believable" source of news. Two years later, for the first time, more people said that they relied on television rather than newspapers for most of their news.

Many viewers watched in utter astonishment on 22 October 1962, when President John F. Kennedy informed them about Soviet missiles in Cuba and the possibility of nuclear war. Soviet diplomats got a copy of the speech only an hour before Kennedy went before the cameras. The president's decision to make his demand for the removal of the missiles on television made compromise on this fundamental issue all but impossible. Kennedy spoke directly to Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, calling on him to step back from the nuclear brink. It was an extremely skillful use of television as a medium of diplomatic communication. The crisis dominated TV news coverage until its end six days later. The reporting surely influenced public attitudes, but it probably had little direct effect on Kennedy's advisers. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara later

revealed that he did not watch television even once during the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet during the growing difficulties in Vietnam, Kennedy, his advisers, and those who succeeded them in the White House paid close attention to television news.

THE FIRST TELEVISION WAR

Vietnam did not become a big story on American television until 1965, but it was a controversial one from the time that U.S. military personnel began to play a significant role in combat in the early 1960s. Officials of both the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments were extremely concerned about coverage of the war. Their criticism at first centered on reporting in newspapers and magazines and on wire services, as these news media began sending full-time correspondents to Vietnam several years before NBC's Garrick Utley became the first television journalist based in Saigon, beginning in mid-1964. Yet even though their assignments were brief and their numbers few, TV journalists still found that South Vietnamese authorities scrutinized their reporting and sometimes objected to it, as Utley's colleague, Jim Robinson, learned during one of his occasional trips to Saigon while stationed in NBC's Hong Kong bureau. Offended by one of Robinson's stories, President Ngo Dinh Diem expelled the correspondent from the country in November 1962, despite protests from both the U.S. embassy and journalists in Saigon.

The Kennedy administration used less heavy-handed methods to manage the news from Vietnam. Administration officials tried to play down U.S. involvement in what it described as a Vietnamese war, even as the president sharply increased U.S. military personnel from several hundred to more than sixteen thousand. Yet Kennedy and his advisers rejected the military censorship of news reporting that had prevailed in previous twentieth-century wars, lest such restrictions call attention to a story whose significance they wished to diminish. Instead, U.S. officials in Saigon mixed patriotic appeals "to get on the team" with upbeat statements about South Vietnamese military success and misleading information about what were ostensibly U.S. military advisers who in reality participated in combat operations.

The administration's efforts at news management collapsed during the Buddhist crisis of 1963, as horrifying images of the fiery suicides of monks protesting government restrictions on religious expression appeared in American television news reports and on the front pages of newspapers. What the U.S. embassy called the "press problem" worsened, as reporters not only mistrusted official sources because of their manipulation of information, but contributed to a public debate about whether the Diem government's liabilities were so great that it might not be able to prevail in the war against the National Liberation Front. In important televised interviews in September with Cronkite of CBS and Huntley and Brinkley of NBC on the day that each of those newscasts expanded to thirty minutes, Kennedy reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam while publicly delivering the message that diplomatic emissaries privately conveyed: that the Diem government should make changes to reclaim popular support so it could more effectively prosecute the war. Kennedy also quietly tried to dampen public criticism of Diem, even as his advisers debated how to step up the pressure on the South Vietnamese leader and whether to encourage a coup, by suggesting that the *New York Times* remove correspondent David Halberstam, whose critical reports had questioned the administration's backing of Diem. The publisher of the *Times* refused to buckle to presidential pressure; Halberstam remained in Saigon to cover the coup that ousted Diem on 1 November.

The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson in many ways followed its predecessor's pattern of news management as it expanded U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Johnson and his principal advisers believed that domestic support was critical to the U.S. war effort, but worried "that our public posture is fragile." Like its predecessor, the Johnson administration ruled out censorship of the news in favor of a system of voluntary cooperation in withholding certain kinds of military information. "Because we are fools" was the explanation that the president gave one group of journalists for this choice. Yet administration policymakers repeatedly considered censorship and rejected it for fear of damage to official credibility. They also hoped that an ambitious program of public relations would ensure favorable coverage of the U.S. war effort.

Yet the "information problem" continued, even after U.S. policy became "maximum candor and disclosure consistent with the requirements of security." Many reporters distrusted the daily official briefings in Saigon, which they derisively

FRIENDLY PERSUASION: LBJ, TV NEWS, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

On 28 April 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic to protect U.S. citizens during political violence and to prevent communists from seizing power. Johnson was extremely concerned about news coverage of the intervention. He tried unsuccessfully to get CBS to remove television correspondent Bert Quint, whose reports from Santo Domingo cast doubt on whether there was a significant communist threat. But Johnson found other ways to affect television reporting. In an oral history interview, NBC correspondent John Chancellor revealed the following about events of 2 May 1965: "We had a program, a television program on a Sunday afternoon. . . . I had gone down . . . to stand in front of the White House and speak a little essay into the camera on what the President's reaction was. . . . As I stood out there waiting for the program to begin, what I didn't know was that the President was upstairs. . . . He was alone and looking at me out the window, and he got very curious about what I was doing. . . . And the guard in the West Wing came out and got me, and I went inside. He said, 'There's a telephone call for you,' and it was the President."

According to the tape of the telephone conversation, Johnson said:

> John, . . . I don't want to be quarrelsome, but I want you to know the facts. . . . If we don't watch out, the bellyachers are going to run the country and we'll lose our democracy. . . . Our mission down there [in the Dominican Republic], evacuation, is not half-way through.. . . . [U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin] says that the Latin American . . . ambassadors, generally, are very favorable to us because we've saved their hide. . . . While they can't come out and say we're against mother or we support marines in Latin America, . . . they're very happy. . . . And . . . he's [Martin] going to point out [at a press conference] some of . . . them that have been imported and are known Castro leaders. . . . Fifty are identified as of last night. . . . I have to be very careful because I don't want to say a guy [who] disagrees with me is a Communist, or I'm a McCarthy. . . . The point, though, that I want to get over with you is those on the ground . . . are very happy that their lives have been spared and we're there. . . . Number two—the mission is not completed or about to be completed.

Chancellor replied, "All right, I have that clearly in mind," and Johnson said, "Okay, partner."

Chancellor recollected: "And I went out and stood out there—it didn't sound right, what he had told me, but nonetheless . . . I put it into the piece I'd written. . . . Then I went back and the following day I was able to determine pretty accurately that what he'd told me was an absolute fabrication, a big lie! I've rarely been as angry. I really was just furious! Presidents use all kinds of tools on reporters to do their work. . . . . I've never really told this to anybody before except a few close friends because you don't go around calling the president a liar. In this case, he was."

called "The Five O'clock Follies." While some journalists considered these briefings a mixture of spin, exaggeration, and half-truths, others concluded that the information officers told "outright lies." Evidence for this darker interpretation came from Arthur Sylvester, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, who turned an innocuous social occasion in Saigon in July 1965 into a nasty confrontation when he sneered at reporters, "Look, if you think that any American official is going to tell you the truth, you're stupid."

Some White House officials worried about "fragmentary" reports lacking "perspective" on TV newscasts as the networks rapidly increased their news operations in South Vietnam in 1965. Their fears about what TV cameras might reveal became acute when the *CBS Evening News* showed correspondent Morley Safer's sensational film report about U.S. marines using cigarette lighters to burn civilian huts in a search-and-destroy operation in the village of Cam Ne in August. Pentagon officials charged Safer with staging the incident and tried unsuccessfully to get him removed from his assignment because his Canadian nationality supposedly made it impossible for him to report fairly on what they now called an "American" war.

Safer's story was exceptional. Few reports on TV newscasts in 1965 and 1966 directly questioned U.S. objectives or methods of warfare. Most concentrated on combat that involved what anchors commonly called "our" troops or pilots. Many of these "bang-bang" stories lauded the sophisticated military technology that gave U.S.

forces advantages in firepower and mobility or the scale of the U.S. war effort, as troops and supplies poured into South Vietnam. Television news often entertained as it informed by providing many appealing human interest stories about American war heroes or ordinary GIs. Reporters and anchors usually accorded commanders in the field and high policymakers in Washington deferential treatment. Critics of the war—especially those in the more radical organizations—often got skeptical or patronizing coverage, if they got any at all.

Yet TV news also showed the difficulties, dilemmas, and horrors of Vietnam, if only occasionally, from the time that the Johnson administration committed large numbers of U.S. combat troops to the war in 1965. Some reporters quickly recognized fundamental strategic problems, as when ABC's Lou Cioffi asserted in October 1965 that "the United States has brought in a fantastic amount of military power here in Vietnam. But so far we've not been able to figure just exactly how to use it effectively in order to destroy the Vietcong." There were stories about the persistent troubles with pacification programs and the many ways that the war was distorting—and destroying—the lives of Vietnamese civilians. The difficulties and dangers of filming heavy fighting, along with the "queasy quotient" of network production staffs that edited reports for broadcast at the dinner hour, ensured that TV news programs would not show daily, graphic scenes of human suffering. But the newscasts did provide glimpses of severely wounded soldiers, as in Charles Kuralt's report for CBS about an artillery sergeant who clenched a cigar and grimaced as medics dressed the wounds in a leg that surgeons later amputated. A few stories also concerned atrocities, as when CBS's Don Webster described how U.S. troops severed ears from enemy corpses. And some stories could be unsettling, even if they contained no graphic images, as when the *CBS Evening News* showed a soldier's widow, baby in arms, reading one of her husband's last letters from Vietnam. Such stories were infrequent, yet their power came from what NBC News executive Reuven Frank said television journalism did best, which was the transmission of experience.

Johnson was concerned about the impact of dramatic images and the simplification inherent in half-hour newscasts. He also knew that television audiences were increasing; more than half the American people said they got most of their news from TV. The president's thinking was an example of what sociologist W. Phillips Davison has called "the third-person effect," a belief that mass communications have their greatest influence "not on 'me' or 'you,' but on 'them'" and a tendency to exaggerate the impact "on the attitudes and behavior of others." Johnson, who frequently watched the newscasts on banks of monitors tuned simultaneously to all three major networks, worried about the effects of even a single critical story and sometimes expressed his dismay directly to network news executives, anchors, or reporters. He also repeatedly found what he considered evidence of one-sidedness, unfairness, and bias.

As the war became more controversial and public support for his Vietnam policies declined, Johnson made more extreme charges. He told the president of NBC News in February 1967 that "all the networks, with the possible exception of ABC, were slanted against him," that they were "infiltrated," and that he was "ready to move on them if they move on us." The following month, he alleged that CBS and NBC were "controlled by the Vietcong," and later that year he insisted, "I can prove that Ho [Chi Minh] is a son-of-a-bitch, if you let me put it on the screen—but they [the networks] want me to be the son-of-a-bitch."

When many reporters began to describe the war as a stalemate in mid-1967, the Johnson administration launched a new public relations campaign aimed at persuading the American people that the United States was indeed making progress in achieving its goals in Vietnam. Believing that the "main front" of the war was "here in the United States," Johnson urged his advisers "to sell our product," since he insisted that "the Administration's greatest weakness was its inability to get over the complete story" on Vietnam. The Progress Campaign produced increased public support for Johnson's Vietnam policies. The improvement in the polls reflected the hopeful statements of high officials, including General William C. Westmoreland's famous declaration in a speech at the National Press Club in November 1967 that "we have reached the point when the end begins to come into view."

Such assertions of progress contributed to public disbelief and confusion and to further decline in the president's credibility when the Tet Offensive began in January 1968. TV showed startling scenes of South Vietnam under "hard, desperate, Communist attack," in the words of NBC's Brinkley, as fighting occurred in Saigon as well as in more than one hundred other loca-

tions. Some of the film was the most spectacular of the war, including footage on NBC and ABC of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the chief of the South Vietnamese police, executing a captured NLF officer after a street battle. Several disturbing reports showed TV journalists suffering wounds on camera.

Some observers have been highly critical of the news coverage of Tet. "The dominant themes of the words and film from Vietnam," wrote Peter Braestrup, "added up to a portrait of defeat for the allies. Historians, on the contrary, have concluded that the Tet offensive resulted in a severe military-political setback for Hanoi in the South." Yet historians continue to debate the results of the Tet fighting; there is no scholarly consensus, despite Braestrup's assertion. Moreover, TV journalists who assessed the battles did not find allied defeat. The most famous evaluation came from Walter Cronkite, who declared in a special, prime-time program on 27 February that "the Vietcong did not win by a knockout, but neither did we." "We are mired in stalemate," he concluded, and the time had come for negotiations to end U.S. involvement in the war.

"If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost the country," Johnson said gloomily. Cronkite's call for disengagement did influence the president, but only in combination with many other indications of deep divisions within the public, the Congress, the Democratic Party, and even his own administration over the war. Fearing that he could not govern effectively for another term, Johnson made his dramatic announcement to millions of stunned television viewers on the evening of 31 March 1968 that he sought negotiations to end the war and would not run again for president.

President Richard M. Nixon believed that he faced even greater opposition than Johnson from the news media in general and television journalists in particular, especially over his handling of the Vietnam War. Nixon usually read daily news summaries rather than watching the newscasts themselves. His marginal comments frequently indicated his displeasure and instructed assistants to "hit" or "kick" a particular correspondent or network for a story that he considered inaccurate or unfair. Presidential aides also maintained lists of journalists—mainly network anchors, White House correspondents, and syndicated columnists or commentators—ranked according to their friendliness toward the administration and that could be used for inflicting retaliation or providing "a special stroke."

Nixon followed a two-pronged strategy to deal with the alleged hostility of television news and to build public support for his Vietnam policies. One part involved direct, often hard-hitting, attacks on the networks. Beginning with his famous speech in Des Moines on 13 November 1969, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew tried to channel popular frustration with the war toward the networks by charging that the executives who ran them were "a tiny and closed fraternity" who "do not represent the views of America." The second part of the strategy was to use television as a medium of direct communication with the American people in order to bypass as much as possible critical reporters, editors, and commentators. As he withdrew U.S. forces from South Vietnam, Nixon urged his aides to use public relations initiatives—increasingly centered on television—to create an image of him "as a strong leader of boldness, courage, decisiveness, and independence" who would settle for nothing less than "peace with honor."

Television coverage of the war diminished as U.S. troops came home and U.S. casualties declined. Those stories that did air gave more attention to the social, political, and economic dimensions of a war that was again becoming mainly a Vietnamese conflict, one that to many Americans lacked the significance of earlier years, one that had simply gone on too long. In a report on the *CBS Evening News* about fighting in Quang Tri province in April 1972, the camera showed the crumpled bodies of children, refugees who died when their truck hit a land mine. There would be more fighting, correspondent Bob Simon declared, and more that generals, journalists, and politicians would say about those battles. "But it's difficult to imagine what those words can be," Simon concluded. "There's nothing left to say about this war. There's just nothing left to say."

Some critics blamed the extensive, uncensored television coverage for U.S. failure in Vietnam. Robert Elegant, who reported about Vietnam for the *Los Angeles Times*, insisted that partisanship prevailed over objectivity as journalists "instinctively" opposed the U.S. government and "reflexively" supported "Saigon's enemies." The television screen rather than the battlefield, according to Elegant, determined the outcome of the war by creating a "Vietnam syndrome" that "paralyzed American will" during Saigon's final crisis and that may have led to further troubles in Angola, Afghanistan, and Iran. Elegant offered little evidence to support these inflammatory charges, and Daniel C. Hallin, who carefully stud-

ied news media coverage of Vietnam, found many compelling reasons to conclude that television did not somehow lose the war. Hallin argued in *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (1986) that public opinion had turned against Johnson's handling of the war by early 1967, during a time that TV news coverage was most favorable to administration policies. Moreover, public support for the Korean War diminished even more quickly, yet "television was in its infancy, censorship was tight, and the World War II ethic of the journalist serving the war effort remained strong."

Hallin had the stronger argument, but Elegant's point of view had a greater effect on U.S. policy. Military officials resented the portrayal, as time went on, of the Vietnam War as part of what Hallin called the "sphere of legitimate controversy." Their belief that TV coverage undermined popular support for the war led to new restrictions on reporting when U.S. troops invaded Grenada in October 1983. Military commanders refused to transport reporters to the combat zone and barred them from the island for several days. Most journalists simply did not believe the official explanation that their exclusion was mainly to ensure their safety. ABC correspondent Steve Shepard was one of several reporters who chartered a boat, only to be turned away by the U.S. Navy as he approached Grenada. The Pentagon provided TV news programs with the only available video of the military operations in Grenada, but it did not include any scenes of combat. Walter Cronkite, who had retired in March 1981 as CBS anchor, deplored the abridgment of the public's right to know. Yet these protests did little to detract from the main story, which closely followed the Reagan administration's position—that U.S. forces had conducted a successful military operation against a potential Cuban-Soviet satellite. The restrictions on the reporting of the Grenada operation were an indication that in government-media relations, there would be no more Vietnams.

THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS

No international story other than war dominated television news for as long as the Iranian hostage crisis. The seizure of the staff of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 marked the beginning of fourteen months of concentrated, dramatic, and controversial news coverage that affected both public understanding of the hostage crisis and government efforts to resolve it.

TV's treatment of the Iranian hostage crisis invites comparison with its reporting about a similar event—the seizure of the USS *Pueblo* on 23 January 1968 and the imprisonment of its crew of eighty-two (another crew member died of wounds incurred during the ship's capture). The North Korean capture of this intelligence ship got extensive coverage for several days on all three networks. Yet even when it led the news, the *Pueblo* seizure seemed to be related to the biggest continuing story at the time—the Vietnam War. Some reporters, such as ABC's diplomatic correspondent John Scali, told viewers that senior U.S. officials believed that the North Koreans had coordinated their action with the North Vietnamese, who were massing troops around the U.S. marine base at Khe Sanh. The beginning of the Tet Offensive a week later eclipsed the *Pueblo* story, although newscasts occasionally reported about the negotiations to free the crew. No one, at least on TV, counted the days (335) that the sailors remained in captivity. No Western journalist could go to Pyongyang to interview government officials or gauge popular attitudes toward the United States. Without such film reports, the *Pueblo* story simply could not hold a prominent, continuing position on TV newscasts. Film of some crew members did occasionally appear on the evening news programs. But the North Korean government approved its release; it contained confessions of wrongdoing and apologies, and the network journalists who narrated it made clear that the film was highly suspect. A few interviews with family members dwelled less on their distress or outrage than on whether the face or voice in the film was really their relative's and whether he appeared any different since being imprisoned. The *Pueblo* was an important story, but in 1968—a year of "horrors and failures," according to CBS's Harry Reasoner—it was not nearly as sensational or shocking or troubling as the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, the violence at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the war in Vietnam.

The Iranian hostage crisis, by contrast, became a dominant story quickly and remained so throughout its duration, even during the 1980 presidential election campaign. Some journalists did not imagine that it would become a news event of such magnitude. Ted Koppel, who covered the State Department for ABC, thought that this incident, like the detention of U.S. diplomats during an earlier invasion of the embassy in

Tehran on 14 February 1979, would be over in hours. Yet the Sunday evening edition of ABC's *World News Tonight* on the first day of the crisis showed some of the images that did much to stoke public outrage: glimpses of hostages in handcuffs and blindfolds, the burning of an American flag, and a photograph of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who reportedly approved the takeover of the embassy.

Network competition had a notable effect on ABC's coverage of the crisis. In 1977 ABC News, traditionally third in ratings and reputation, got a new president, Roone Arledge, who also headed the network's highly successful sports division. Arledge considered expanding *World News Tonight* to a full hour as a way of giving it more prominence, but local affiliates were unwilling to cede to the network an additional—and highly profitable—half hour. Arledge then experimented with late night news programming by airing half-hour specials with increasing frequency at 11:30 P.M. (EST). The hostage crisis gave Arledge the opportunity to secure permanent hold of that time slot. ABC, however, did not show its first late-night special until 8 November 1979 nor make it a nightly offering until six days later. The title of the show was both revealing and influential: *America Held Hostage*.

On 24 March 1980 the program got a new, permanent host, Koppel, and a new name, *Nightline*. It continued to provide daily coverage, even if the hostage crisis sometimes was not the lead story. Koppel hoped to use the growing capabilities of satellite technology and his skills as an interviewer to create "intercontinental salons" on live TV. Yet the discussion on the debut program was hardly genteel, as Dorothea Morefield, wife of a hostage, asked Ali Agah, the Iranian chargé in Washington, how his government could "continue to hold these innocent people." Some critics found such verbal confrontations contrived and mawkish, with news taking a back seat to show business. Yet television newscasts have long been a mixture of entertainment and information; *Nightline* expanded the limits of an established genre. And like ABC, the other networks covered the hostage crisis as a human drama as well as an international event, devoting considerable time both to interviews with family members and to the diplomatic efforts to secure the hostages' release. While ABC may have provided the hostage crisis with a melodramatic title, CBS's Walter Cronkite, television's most respected journalist, popularized what became the standard for measuring its duration. He added to his famous sign-off—"and that's the way it is"—a count of the days, eventually 444, that the fifty-two hostages endured captivity.

The Carter administration at first welcomed the heavy news coverage. Administration officials had many chances to explain to viewers that they were taking strong, but measured action—diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions—to try to resolve the crisis without resorting to military force. Jimmy Carter could concentrate on his role as president, rather than as candidate facing a vigorous challenge for his party's presidential nomination from Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Indeed, Carter conspicuously refrained from campaign travel in favor of a Rose Garden strategy that played up his responsibilities as national leader. Carter's approval rating surged from 30 to 61 percent during the first month of the hostage crisis. Never before had the Gallup Poll recorded such a sharp improvement.

Yet administration officials soon deplored the extensive television coverage. Hodding Carter, the State Department spokesperson, complained that news reports were complicating negotiations. White House officials found considerable evidence that Iranian demonstrators were playing to the cameras. Yet their efforts to shift public attention away from the hostage crisis simply would not work because of what presidential counsel Lloyd Cutler called "the constant drumbeat of TV news." Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed that television intensified public anger and frustration as it reported about the failed rescue effort in April 1980, described diplomatic initiatives that seemed ineffective, and relentlessly counted the days. Press secretary Jody Powell expressed his frustration at the end of one long day when there had been demonstrations across from the White House by two antagonistic groups that had shouted and scuffled. He crossed Pennsylvania Avenue late at night, walked into Lafayette Park, and unexpectedly encountered CBS reporter Jed Duvall. The reason for these prolonged difficulties, Powell blurted out, was "the networks with their nose up the Ayatollah's ass."

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE LEGACIES OF VIETNAM

"No more Vietnams" was a popular slogan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but there were strong

disagreements about the meaning of that simple phrase. Some people wanted to avoid another long, costly, and—most important—unsuccessful war. Like Ronald Reagan's first secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, they believed that the United States should use its military forces only to achieve clear objectives that commanded public support and that would lead to victory. Others wanted to refrain from intervention in Third World revolutions or civil wars where no outside power could hope to impose a lasting settlement. Some counseled against a major effort, even to stop the spread of communism, in a peripheral area. Still others were wary of situations in which limited measures—military aid, the dispatch of advisers, covert action—might create pressures for progressively deeper involvement culminating in the commitment of combat troops.

Television viewers often learned about these perspectives as their advocates addressed a major, recurring question: Would Central America become "another Vietnam"? On the evening newscasts, the range of views on this issue—and, more generally, on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua or El Salvador—was much greater than in the early 1960s when television covered the expanding U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Changes in broadcast journalism did not account for this difference. Reporters still relied heavily on official sources of information. Quantitative studies of television newscasts show that officials of the Carter or Reagan administrations and members of Congress most frequently appeared in stories about Central America. What was different was that the sphere of legitimate controversy was broader, in large measure because of the legacy of Vietnam.

Television reporting did occasionally have a notable effect on public attitudes or U.S. policy concerning Central America. One shocking example involved ABC correspondent Bill Stewart, who was reporting about the civil war in Nicaragua. Carrying a white flag and media credentials, Stewart approached a National Guard roadblock in Managua on 20 June 1979. A guard officer ordered him to lie on the ground and then shot him and his interpreter. Stewart's crew filmed the killings from its van; the tape ran not just on ABC but on CBS and NBC as well. The footage was uniquely horrifying; the only comparable incidents that TV had shown were Jack Ruby's shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald and General Loan's execution of the NLF prisoner during the Tet Offensive. Speaking the next day to the Organization of American States, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance deplored "the mounting human tragedy" in Nicaragua. "This terror was brought home vividly to the American people yesterday with the cold-blooded murder . . . of an American newsman." Vance then issued the Carter administration's first public call for the resignation of Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza and his replacement with a "government of national reconciliation."

Eight years later in very different circumstances, television focused on another individual who affected public views about U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Colonel Oliver North, fired from his position with the National Security Council, testified for several days in July 1987 during televised congressional hearings into the Iran-contra scandal. Dressed in marine uniform, North was poised and passionate. He admitted that he had misled Congress, but was unrepentant. He presented himself as a patriot who had served his country and his president by maintaining the contras, "body and soul." Polls revealed a significant shift in public attitudes toward continued U.S. military aid to the contras, with opponents outnumbering supporters by a margin of more than two to one before North's testimony but opinion almost equally divided after his appearance. Television, however, helped focus attention more on North's personality than on public issues. Polls showed that many Americans agreed with Ronald Reagan, who called North "a national hero." "Olliemania," as some journalists called the phenomenon of his sudden celebrity, helped launch North on a new career as radio talk show host after appeals overturned three felony convictions.

THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR ON THE WORLD STAGE

President Ronald Reagan became known as the Great Communicator, a distinction that earned him both plaudits and derogation. Reagan's speeches moved, inspired, and reassured millions of people. Critics, however, insisted that Reagan was an acting president, a performer who brought to the White House the theatrical skills that he had learned in Hollywood and who followed scripts that he had done little, if anything, to create. Reagan, like most contemporary presidents, usually read texts that speechwriters had prepared. Yet sometimes the words and often the ideas were his own. Opponents deplored the troubling oversimplifications in his folksy anecdotes and uplifting

stories. Yet many viewers found an authenticity that came from the president's sincerity and conviction. Reagan was extraordinarily successful at using the White House and, indeed, the world, as a stage—or perhaps, more accurately, a studio—as he exploited the medium of television to build public support for his presidency.

White House aides planned Reagan's public appearances with meticulous care as television events. They chose the best camera angles, chalked in toe marks so the president would know exactly where to stand, and positioned reporters to minimize opportunities for unwanted questions. The preparations reflected what the president's assistants called the "line of the day," the story that they wanted to lead the news in order to advance their legislative or international agenda. What viewers saw, Reagan's communications experts thought, was more important than what they heard. When the *CBS Evening News* ran a critical story in October 1984 about Reagan's use of soothing images to obscure unpopular policies, reporter Lesley Stahl was astounded when White House aide Richard Darman telephoned to congratulate her. "You guys in Televisionland haven't figured it out, have you?" Darman said. "When the pictures are powerful and emotional, they override if not completely drown out the sound. Lesley, I mean it, nobody heard you."

Televised images mattered so much to the Reagan White House partly because of changes in TV news. By the early 1980s about two-thirds of the American public said that television was their primary source of news. Viewers could watch a growing number of news programs, including morning and midday shows as well as the traditional evening broadcasts. During prime time there were popular magazine programs, such as *60 Minutes* (CBS) and *20/20* (ABC), as well as brief updates called "newsbreaks." And at the end of the day, there was *Nightline*. Cable TV, which reached 20 percent of television households in 1981 and more than twice that proportion in 1985, offered more choices. On 1 June 1980 the Cable News Network became the first 24-hour news channel. Greater competition and corporate pressures made network news executives more concerned with ratings and willing to try to increase them by altering the balance between information and entertainment. At CBS, for example, when ratings plunged after Cronkite's retirement, the news director urged the new anchor, Dan Rather, to dress in a sweater to appear friendly and informal and insisted on more "feel-good" features. CBS producers dropped a report about State Department reaction to Israeli bombing in Lebanon to open a slot on the evening news of 30 November 1982 for a story about singing sheep. On all the networks, lighter features, striking visuals, and ten-second sound bites increasingly became ways to attract and hold viewers who had more choices, remote controls, and seemingly shorter attention spans. The communications experts in the White House exploited these trends, packaging presidential appearances to fit the changes in TV news.

Reagan's international trips produced many dramatic and memorable television scenes. The advance planners created public occasions, often in striking surroundings, where the president would be in the spotlight. For example, on the rocky coast of Normandy, Reagan gave a magnificent speech in which he commemorated the fortieth anniversary of D-Day on 6 June 1984 by saluting "the boys of Pointe du Hoc . . . the champions who helped free a continent . . . the heroes who helped end a war." White House aide Michael Deaver made sure that the French scheduled Reagan's address so it would air live during the network morning news programs. In another stirring scene, Reagan expressed his fervent anticommunism and his commitment to freedom when he stood before the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin on 12 June 1987 and cried, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall." Other trips produced less exalted, but nonetheless effective events. During a trip to South Korea in November 1983, Reagan attended an outdoor service at a chapel within sight of the North Korean border. One military police officer explained that a nearby armored personnel carrier was there for "backdrop." In one notorious case, advance planning failed. Presidential assistants did not learn that SS troops were buried at Bitburg cemetery in West Germany before the White House announced Reagan's visit. The president refused to change his plans, but he also went to Bergen-Belsen, the site of a Nazi concentration camp, where he gave one of his most moving addresses.

Reagan's summits with Mikhail Gorbachev were international media events with considerable symbolic significance. At their first meeting in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan said that he recognized from Gorbachev's smile that he was dealing with a different kind of Soviet leader. Televised images of their close and friendly relations symbolized the international changes that were occurring as the Cold War began to wane.

At their summit in Washington, D.C., in December 1987, the most important substantive achievement was the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. But what mattered as well was what the news media called "Gorby fever," which the Soviet leader stoked by stopping his limousine and plunging into welcoming crowds in downtown Washington. When Reagan reciprocated by traveling to Moscow in May 1988, he followed a schedule that was the result of elaborate planning, including the use of polling and focus groups to test the themes of his speeches. Cameras followed Reagan and Gorbachev as they strolled through Red Square answering questions that appeared to be spontaneous, but some of which had been planted. When a reporter asked about the "evil empire," as Reagan had described the Soviet Union in a famous speech in March 1983, the president replied, that was "another time, another era." The televised scenes beginning in late 1989 of revolutions in Eastern Europe and the opening of the Berlin Wall confirmed Reagan's pronouncement.

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

On 16–17 January 1991, viewers around the world watched the beginning of a war for the first time ever on live television. As allied bombs and cruise missiles hit targets in Iraq, CNN reporters described what they saw from their hotel in Baghdad during the first hours of the Persian Gulf War. The explosions had severed communications with other U.S. network reporters in the Iraqi capital. Using the telephone, CNN correspondents Peter Arnett, John Holliman, and Bernard Shaw acted much like radio reporters, since they were unable to transmit pictures of what they saw. "Now there's a huge fire that we've just seen," Holliman exclaimed. "And we just heard—whoa. Holy cow. That was a large air burst that we saw. It was filling the sky." "Go for it, guys," a CNN producer told the reporters. "The whole world's watching." One of those viewers was President George H. W. Bush, who said with relief that the war had begun, "just the way it was scheduled."

The reporting on that first night from Baghdad was exceptional, in part because government restrictions did not impede it. But Iraqi authorities established censorship within twenty-four hours after the start of the bombing and U.S. military officials imposed a system of restraints on the news media that had been years in the making.

Its outlines emerged in 1984, when the Pentagon responded to complaints about the exclusion of reporters from Grenada by creating a committee chaired by General Winant Sidle, who had served as a military information officer during the Vietnam War. The Sidle panel recognized that technological innovations—portable satellite antennas that made possible live broadcasting from the battlefield—might jeopardize the security of U.S. military operations or the safety of U.S. troops. It called on journalists to refrain from reporting sensitive information as a condition of their accreditation. If commanders decided that military considerations required limited access to combat areas, the Sidle panel recommended that small groups of journalists be allowed into battle zones and then share their reporting with their colleagues.

This pool system got its first test when U.S. troops invaded Panama in December 1989. Military transports carried reporters to base areas, but kept them sequestered during the first days of Operation Just Cause. Complaints about a system that seemed to keep reporters away from military action rather than to facilitate their access to it led to extended discussions between news organizations and military authorities during the buildup of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia during late 1990. On the eve of Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon announced new guidelines, which required journalists to participate in pools, exclude restricted information from their articles and broadcasts, and submit their reports to military officials for security review.

The legacies of Vietnam exerted a powerful influence on the Bush administration as it prepared for war. General Colin Powell, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that Vietnam had shown that the American public simply would not tolerate a prolonged, televised war with heavy casualties. Bush thought that Vietnam had also proven other lessons. He insisted that the United States and its coalition partners must use overwhelming military force that would produce decisive results. The president did a masterly job of building public support for his demand that Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait and his determination to use force, if necessary, to achieve that goal. He portrayed Saddam Hussein as a kind of Middle Eastern Hitler—a dictator who brutalized Iraqis, an outlaw who defied fundamental principles of international order, and an aggressor who wanted weapons of mass destruction to threaten other nations. TV news provided other view-

points, other voices, including Hussein's, as the Iraqi president granted interviews to several Western journalists, including news anchors Peter Jennings of ABC and Rather of CBS. The newscasts also covered the debate over the use of force, which Congress authorized on 12 January 1991. Polls showed that substantial majorities favored military action and endorsed Bush's handling of the crisis. Once the war began, the president enjoyed overwhelming public support for his policies.

TV's war coverage in some ways resembled a miniseries. The networks had distinctive titles—"War in the Gulf," " Showdown in the Gulf"—and accompanying music. A good deal of the coverage emphasized the drama of war—the danger of a sudden attack of Iraqi Scud missiles, the risks of flying into hostile fire, the heroism of U.S. troops and the sacrifices of their relatives at home.

Yet in all this reporting about war, TV provided an extremely limited view of the fighting. The Defense Department supplied most of the video of the air war. Recorded with night vision equipment, it seemed fantastic and futuristic, something that reminded many viewers of a video game. The pool system ensured that reporters would have few unregulated opportunities to cover combat. A handful of correspondents, like CBS's Bob Simon, went out into the Saudi desert without escorts. Simon's first such excursion produced a report from Khafji, near the border with Kuwait, where U.S. marines were under attack. On his next unescorted trip, Iraqi troops captured him; Simon and his crew remained prisoners until the end of the war. Although network newscasts ran several reports about what they bluntly called censorship, there was little public dissatisfaction with the Pentagon's restrictions. Viewers were far more interested in seeing the briefings of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commanding and apparently authoritative performances that made the general the greatest hero of the Gulf War.

The television journalist who got the most attention—much of it unwelcome—was CNN's Peter Arnett. When most reporters decided to put personal safety ahead of the story, Arnett decided to stay in Baghdad. When Iraqi authorities decided to expel the remaining Western TV correspondents during the first week of fighting, they excepted CNN, mainly because producer Robert Wiener had spent months building cooperative relations with government officials in Baghdad. Arnett had no competition, but he did have "minders," information officials who limited his movements and censored his reporting. Repeatedly Arnett pushed against those limits, for example, by arguing that his reports would have greater credibility if he could respond more freely to questions from CNN anchors during live broadcasts. His stories about civilian casualties during allied bombing raids—at a baby milk formula factory and an air raid shelter—stirred enormous controversy in the United States. The most extreme of many attacks on the alleged impropriety of reporting from behind enemy lines came from Republican representative Lawrence Coughlin of Pennsylvania, who denounced Arnett as "the Joseph Goebbels of Saddam Hussein's Hitler-like regime." Arnett disliked becoming part of the story, yet he stayed in Baghdad until the end of the ground war.

Arnett's reporting notwithstanding, Bush administration officials were pleased with television coverage of the Gulf War. Pete Williams, the Pentagon's chief public affairs officer, concluded that the news media had provided "the best war coverage we've ever had." Secretary of State James A. Baker spoke more candidly when he described "that poor demoralized rabble—outwitted, outflanked, outmaneuvered by the U.S. military. But I think, given time, the press will bounce back."

THE CNN EFFECT

By the early 1990s many people had concluded that television news possessed formidable powers to influence the U.S. government's foreign policy. The "CNN effect," as it is usually called, actually has several dimensions. The first is providing a new channel of diplomatic communication, one that allows governments to transmit proposals or engage in dialogue, sometimes with extraordinary speed. Officials in the Bush administration, for example, sometimes used TV to send messages to Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait, hoping that a public channel might increase the pressure on the Iraqi leader to accede to U.S. demands. Government leaders, however, have long used the news media as channels of diplomacy. Radio, for example, carried Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Point Address of 8 January 1918 to an international audience.

The second dimension of the "CNN effect" is setting the foreign policy agenda—giving certain issues urgency or importance through news reports that capture the interest of millions of viewers and elicit a strong response. The ability to provide live

reports from almost anywhere in the world, to transmit dramatic, emotional images, and to show them repeatedly seems to provide television with powers that exceed the other news media to alter the priorities that the government gives to international issues. The third dimension is accelerating official action. Even before the advent of CNN and other twenty-four-hour news channels, Lloyd Cutler, a counsel to President Carter, found that TV news had led to "foreign policy on deadline," as White House officials hurried to take action—to make a statement, to announce a new initiative—before the next newscast.

The final—and most controversial—dimension of the "CNN effect" is forcing government action. George F. Kennan, the foreign service officer who was an architect of containment during the early Cold War, summarized this perspective in a diary entry about U.S. intervention in Somalia in December 1992. Kennan maintained that television pictures of starving Somali children had produced "an emotional reaction, not a thoughtful or deliberate one," but one strong enough to take control of foreign policy decisions from "the responsible deliberative organs of our government."

A closer look at U.S. involvement in Somalia, however, suggests different conclusions than Kennan's about the effects of televised images on government policy decisions. Quantitative studies show that extensive coverage of the famine and fighting in Somalia followed the policy initiatives of the Bush administration in 1992 rather than preceded them. Television coverage surely affected the views of administration officials and gave them confidence that what they thought would be a limited, low-risk humanitarian intervention would have considerable public support. But television pictures of suffering Somalis did not determine the president's decision to dispatch troops. Television had a more decisive effect on President William Jefferson Clinton's decision to terminate Operation Restore Hope when newscasts showed shocking tape in early October 1993 of a crowd in Mogadishu desecrating the corpse of a U.S. soldier who had been killed in a firefight. The U.S. casualties took the president by surprise, and he was not prepared to appeal to angry members of Congress for the continuation of a mission that had suddenly grown dangerous. Instead, Clinton announced that U.S. forces would come home by 31 March 1994.

Television showed the horrors of ethnic cleansing and civil war in Bosnia, and those reports were influential but not decisive in shaping U.S. government action. Scenes of Serb camps with emaciated Muslim and Croat prisoners in August 1992 produced condemnations from the Bush administration. Yet the president and his principal advisers were unwilling to take military action, as they believed that there was no clear exit strategy. Clinton, too, reacted intensely to graphic TV reports of atrocities, such as the casualties that occurred when a mortar shell exploded in a Sarajevo marketplace on 5 February 1994. But he followed no consistent policy. Not until mid-1995 did the Clinton administration approve strong measures, including continuing NATO air strikes, to bring the Bosnian war to an end. Available evidence suggests that the president acted to eliminate a major problem that burdened U.S. foreign policy and that threatened his political prospects. Almost four years later, in March 1999, the United States and its NATO allies again used military force in an air war against Yugoslavia to persuade President Slobodan Milosevic to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. News reports, including many on TV, of brutality against Kosovars contributed to public support for this war. But concern about popular reaction to potential U.S. casualties led Clinton to rule out the use of ground troops, except for peacekeeping.

The "CNN effect" influenced U.S. interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. TV reports helped set the agenda; at times, officials of the Bush and Clinton administrations had to react—sometimes quickly—to events that dominated the newscasts. But the "CNN effect" was variable, and it was only one of many factors in the process of formulating foreign policy.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The new millennium began with televised celebrations on every continent, hopeful events that suggested that modern communications were bringing closer the creation of Marshall McLuhan's global village. Yet the twenty-first century also brought almost unimaginable scenes of horror and suffering when terrorists flew hijacked airplanes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Enormous audiences in the United States and around the world relied on television for news about these disasters. Even government officials watched television because it provided more information more quickly than other available sources. Round-the-clock coverage on the broad-

cast as well as the cable news channels quickly spread the disbelief, outrage, grief, and uncertainty about the future that were immediate products of these startling events.

Technological changes—especially greater Internet access and the increasing convergence of the computer and the television—may alter viewing habits and change sources of news and information. But for the immediate future, at least, during conflicts, crises, and other important international developments, both public officials and citizens will turn to television news.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arlen, Michael J. *Living-Room War.* New York, 1982.

Arnett, Peter. *Live from the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World's War Zones.* New York, 1994. A superb memoir by a reporter who covered the Vietnam War for the Associated Press and the Persian Gulf War for CNN.

Barnouw, Erik. *Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Culture.* 2d rev. ed. New York, 1990.

Baughman, James L. *The Republic of Mass Culture: Journalism, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in America Since 1941.* 2d ed. Baltimore, 1997.

Bernhard, Nancy E. *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947–1960.* New York, 1999.

Braestrup, Peter. *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington.* 2 vols. Boulder, Colo., 1977.

Cannon, Lou. *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime.* New York, 2000.

Cutler, Lloyd N. "Foreign Policy on Deadline." *Foreign Policy* no. 56 (fall 1984): 113–128.

Davison, W. Phillips. "The Third-Person Effect in Communication." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47 (spring 1983): 1–15.

Dennis, Everette E., et al. *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict.* New York, 1991.

Elegant, Robert. "How to Lose a War." *Encounter* 57 (August 1981): 73–90. A harsh and often polemical critique of reporting of the Vietnam War.

Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals.* New York, 2001.

Hallin, Daniel C. *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam.* New York, 1986. The best analysis of news media reporting of Vietnam.

———. *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere.* New York, 1994. A collection of excellent essays.

Hammond, William M. *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968.* Washington, D.C., 1988.

———. *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973.* Washington, D.C., 1996.

Isaacs, Arnold R. "The Five O'Clock Follies Revisited: Vietnam's 'Instant Historians' and the Legacy of Controversy." *The Long Term View* 5 (summer 2000): 92–101. Explains how Vietnam created lasting distrust of the news media among military officers.

Kimball, Jeffrey P. *Nixon's Vietnam War.* Lawrence, Kans., 1998.

Koppel, Ted, and Kyle Gibson. *Nightline: History in the Making and the Making of Television.* New York, 1996. Contains an insider account of the birth of the ABC news show *Nightline* during the Iranian hostage crisis.

MacArthur, John R. *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War.* New York, 1992. A scathing critique of the pool system and the news media's cooperation with it.

Maltese, John Anthony. *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News.* 2d ed. Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994.

Mermin, Jonathan. "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (autumn 1997): 385–403.

Neuman, Johanna. *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?* New York, 1996.

O'Neill, Michael J. *The Roar of the Crowd: How Television and People Power Are Changing the World.* New York, 1993.

Pach, Chester J., Jr. "And That's the Way It Was: The Vietnam War on the Network Nightly News." In David Farber, ed. *The Sixties: From Memory to History.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994.

———. "Tet on TV: U.S. Nightly News Reporting and Presidential Policymaking." In Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds. *1968: The World Transformed.* New York, 1998.

———. "The War on Television: TV News, the Johnson Administration, and Vietnam." In Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco, eds. *Blackwell Companion to the Vietnam War.* Malden, Mass., 2002.

Small, Melvin. *Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement*. New Brunswick, N. J., 1994.

Stahl, Lesley. *Reporting Live*. New York, 1999.

Strobel, Warren P. *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C., 1997. Includes excellent analysis of TV coverage of military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

Tallman, Gary C., and Joseph P. McKerns. "'Press Mess:' David Halberstam, the Buddhist Crisis, and U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1963." *Journalism and Communication Monographs* 2 (fall 2000): 109–153.

Utley, Garrick. *You Should Have Been There Yesterday: A Life in Television News*. New York, 2000. A highly informative memoir by one of television's most important international affairs correspondents.

Woodward, Bob. *The Commanders*. New York, 1991.

Wyatt, Clarence. *Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War*. New York, 1993.

See also DISSENT IN WARS; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; THE PRESS; PUBLIC OPINION.

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Brian Michael Jenkins

Terrorism was a matter of growing international concern during the last three decades of the twentieth century, but following the 11 September 2001, attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., it became the paramount issue of U.S. foreign policy. On that day Middle Eastern terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners. They seized the controls and crashed two of the planes into the World Trade Center and one plane into the Pentagon. Passengers fought to regain control of the fourth plane, which then crashed in Pennsylvania, missing any symbolic targets but killing all those on board. These attacks, unprecedented in the annals of terrorism and unparalleled in American history in the magnitude and concentration of casualties, provoked an equally unprecedented declaration of war against terrorism.

Terrorist tactics themselves are nothing new. Political intrigues and wars throughout history have involved murder, hostage taking, and sabotage. Deliberately savage and cruel, even by eighth-century standards, Viking berserkers spread terror throughout the British Isles. Muslim assassins provoked terror among Christian crusaders and Arab leaders in the twelfth century. Julius Caesar, King Richard the Lionhearted, and Miguel de Cervantes were all held for ransom.

The word "terror" entered the political lexicon during the French Revolution's "reign of terror" and in the twentieth century was associated with oppression by totalitarian governments. The term "terrorism" emerged in the nineteenth century when bomb-throwing revolutionaries who wanted to obliterate property and terrorize the ruling classes acknowledged themselves to be terrorists. Revolutionary terrorism continued into the early twentieth century and reemerged following World War I. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, terrorism often accompanied armed struggles for independence, especially in Algeria and Palestine.

THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorists continued to use the tactics of their historical predecessors: setting off bombs in public places, assassinating officials, kidnapping individuals to demand political concessions or ransom payments. But a new phenomenon, international terrorism, began with a series of spectacular attacks in the late 1960s. In 1968, Palestinians hijacked an El Al jetliner and flew it to Algeria, where they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners. This began a wave of hijackings to obtain political concessions. In 1969 urban guerrillas in Brazil kidnapped the U.S. ambassador, later releasing him in return for the release of fifteen comrades imprisoned in Brazil. The tactic quickly spread throughout the world. In the following twelve months, diplomats were kidnapped in Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Jordan.

In February 1970 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) sabotaged a Swissair flight to Tel Aviv, killing all forty-seven persons on board. In September 1970 the same group hijacked three airliners bound for Europe and diverted them to Jordan. In May 1972 three members of the Japanese Red Army, a group allied with the PFLP, attacked passengers at Israel's Lod Airport, killing twenty-five and wounding seventy-six. And in September of that year, members of Black September, another Middle Eastern group, seized nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Five of the terrorists and all nine of the hostages were killed in a disastrous rescue attempt by German police. The three surviving terrorists were traded for hostages aboard a Lufthansa flight hijacked the next month.

International terrorism emerged from a confluence of political circumstances and technological process. In the Middle East, Israel's defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of

1967 and the inability of Palestinians to mount an effective resistance movement in the territories newly occupied by Israel pushed them toward the use of terrorist tactics. Their mentors were the Algerian revolutionaries who in the fight for independence had carried their own terrorist campaign to France itself. For the Palestinians, anyone anywhere in the world who supported Israel's continued existence became a potential target, greatly broadening the theater of operations.

Inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution but unable to replicate its success, Latin America's guerrillas moved their struggle from the countryside into the cities. They replaced traditional guerrilla warfare with bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings, which guaranteed them national and international attention. Spectacular action took the place of patient political mobilization. At the same time, the Vietnam War sparked a new wave of revolutionary fervor that spread through the universities of Europe, Japan, and the United States. Mass protest movements spawned small groups on their extremist fringes that were determined to pursue a more violent struggle. These extremist groups emulated the tactics of their ideological counterparts in Latin America and the Middle East.

Changes in the technological environment during the 1970s also facilitated international terrorism. Jet air travel offered terrorists worldwide mobility and, with it, opportunities to strike targets anywhere. Television and the deployment of communications satellites offered terrorists almost instantaneous access to a global audience. By choreographing dramatic incidents of violence and hostage situations in which human life hung in the balance, terrorists could guarantee worldwide press coverage for their acts and their causes. The diffusion of small arms around the world and of increasingly powerful explosives and sophisticated detonating devices took terrorists far beyond the capacity of the early bomb throwers. Modern technology-dependent societies offered numerous vulnerabilities, from power grids to jumbo jets.

The relationship of all these incidents to one another was not self-evident at the time. Beyond the similarity in tactics, there was no obvious connection between a kidnapping in Uruguay, a bombing in Germany, and a hijacking in Africa. Why should actions carried out by persons who called themselves Tupamaros, Montoneros, the Red Brigades, or the Japanese Red Army be addressed within the same analytical and policy framework? International terrorism was an artificial construct useful for policy purposes. While recognizing the diversity of the terrorists and their causes, it identified their actions in the international domain as a mutual problem for all nations.

THE TARGETING OF AMERICA

Concern about international terrorism on the part of the U.S. foreign policy community was driven by two overlapping issues: the use of tactics that fell outside the accepted norms of diplomacy and armed conflict and the spillover of terrorist violence into the international domain. The latter was particularly important, since the prominence of the United States in world affairs and its involvement in many contentious areas made Americans and American interests frequent targets. Hundreds of terrorist attacks have been directed against the United States, its diplomats, and its diplomatic facilities.

Major incidents have included the kidnappings of U.S. diplomats in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the multiple hijacking to Jordan's Dawson Field in 1970; the attack on arriving American passengers at Israel's Lod Airport in 1972; the terrorist seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and the subsequent murder of two American diplomats in 1973; the terrorist takeover of the U.S. consulate in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1975; the 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Tehran; the suicide bombings of the American embassy and U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the bombing in 1983 of the American embassy in Kuwait; the kidnappings of Americans and the protracted hostage crisis in Lebanon, which lasted from 1984 to 1991; the hijackings of TWA flight 847 and of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in 1985; the Libyan terrorist campaign in 1986; the sabotage and crash of PanAm flight 103 in 1988; the assassination plot against former President George H. W. Bush in 1993; the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; the suicide bombing of the American military residential facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the suicide bombing of the destroyer USS *Cole* in 2000; and the attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The attacks in the 1980s increasingly involved truck bombs, huge amounts of explosives on wheels, often driven by suicide drivers. These attacks manifested a fundamental change in terrorism. Traditionally, terrorists wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Wanton violence was seen as counterproductive. But with the replacement of ideological causes by ethnic hatreds and religious fanaticism, large-scale, indiscriminate violence became the reality. Terrorists wanted a lot of people dead. But while truck bombs increased death tolls, they could not easily push the number of victims above several hundred. The terrorist solution was multiple attacks. In 1994 terrorists plotted to sabotage twelve U.S. airliners in the Pacific, and the 1998 attacks on the American embassies in Africa as well as the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon involved multiple targets. These large-scale operations have also led to fears that terrorists will incorporate chemical, biological, or possibly even nuclear weapons in future attacks.

DEFINING TERRORISM

It is clear that efforts to combat terrorism depend on international cooperation, but international politics has complicated attempts even to define international terrorism. Discussions in international forums have inevitably bogged down in futile debate. Some see terrorism as an alternative mode of warfare used by nations or groups that lack the conventional means of waging war, not as something to be outlawed. Some, believing that the ends justify the means, seek to exclude from the definition anything done by those engaged in wars of liberation. Others have wanted to broaden the definition to include acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist, and alien regimes against peoples struggling for liberation.

The United States has tried to define terrorism objectively on the basis of the quality of the act, not the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their political cause. The rationale is that all terrorist acts are crimes, and many would also be war crimes or "grave breaches" of the rules of war even if one accepted the terrorists' assertion that they wage war. Terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands and always directed against noncombatants. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group whose purposes are political. And the hallmark of terrorism—actions that are carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity and cause major alarm—introduces a distinction between the victims of the violence and the target audience. Indeed, the identity of the victims may be secondary or even irrelevant to the terrorist cause. "Pure terrorism" is entirely indiscriminate violence.

The U.S. position never won universal endorsement, but ultimately, the international community has come to achieve a rough consensus on terrorism. Although the community of nations could not reach an agreement on a precise definition, it did denounce terrorism as a form of political expression or mode of armed conflict and managed to construct a corpus of conventions that identified and outlawed specific tactics: airline hijacking, the sabotage of commercial aircraft, attacks on airports, attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities, the taking of hostages, bomb attacks on civilian targets, and so on. This tactic-by-tactic approach gradually extended to cover virtually all the manifestations of international terrorism.

CRIME OR WARFARE?

A continuing U.S. policy issue has been whether terrorism should be considered as a crime or a mode of war. The question is not merely one of a choice of words. The two are different concepts with entirely different operational implications. If terrorism is considered a criminal matter, the appropriate response is to gather evidence, correctly determine the culpability of the individual or individuals responsible for the incident, and then apprehend and bring the perpetrators to trial. This has been the primary approach taken by the United States, and it has received wide international acceptance. To enhance this approach, the United States extended the jurisdiction of American courts to cover all terrorist acts against U.S. citizens and facilities anywhere in the world, thereby giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation legislative authority to investigate terrorist crimes and apprehend terrorists anywhere. Although not all nations accept this assertion, a number of terrorists have been turned over to U.S. authorities for prosecution in the United States.

Public trials of terrorists keep terrorism firmly in the realm of crime, strip terrorists of

their political pretensions, and allow the United States to make a public case against those terrorists still at large. Dealing with terrorism strictly as a criminal matter, however, presents a number of problems. Evidence is extremely difficult to gather in an international investigation where some countries might not cooperate, and apprehending individual terrorists is extremely difficult. Moreover, the criminal approach does not provide an entirely satisfactory answer to a continuing campaign of terrorism waged by a distant group, and it does not work against a state sponsor of terrorism.

If, on the other hand, terrorism is viewed as war, there is less concern with individual culpability; only proximate responsibility—for example, the correct identification of the terrorist group—need be established. Evidence does not have to be of courtroom quality; intelligence reporting will suffice. The focus is not on the accused individual but on the correct identification of the enemy.

The United States has at different times taken both approaches, and recently began to orchestrate the criminal and military approaches, combining conventional evidence gathering and intelligence reporting to indict and prosecute terrorists, then combining that with information gained at trial to support further indictments, which were then utilized to justify military action.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY

U.S. policy on terrorism has been largely driven by events. Indeed, policy is rarely created in the abstract. It responds to events that create a requirement to do something. Policy is reactive, an accumulation of statements and actions that then become precedents. And it is constantly evolving. Ask some official to explain the reasoning behind a certain policy and, if he knows his history well enough, he will cite the exact incident that prompted the reaction. This is especially true of a diverse, multifaceted phenomenon such as terrorism.

Much of the early U.S. counterterrorist policy focused on dealing with hostage incidents—hijackings and kidnappings. In addition to increasing security at airports, the United States sought to improve international cooperation in returning passengers and aircraft and prosecuting or extraditing the hijackers. Gradually, use of this tactic became less frequent, but it never disappeared. In the cases of kidnappings of American diplomats by urban guerrilla organizations in Latin America, the United States initially took the position that the host country must do whatever is necessary, including yielding to the kidnappers' demands. As kidnappings continued, however, resistance grew and the policy moved toward one of no concessions. That policy was sealed in blood in March 1973 with the murder of two American diplomats by members of Black September who demanded, among other things, the release of the convicted assassin of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The no-concessions policy has remained one of the pillars of the U.S. response to terrorism, although at times creative ways to bend it have been sought.

The same hard-line policy was applied to embassy takeovers. Improved security made such takeovers more difficult and governments were increasingly willing to use force. Faced with declining prospects of achieving their demands and growing risks of capture or death, terrorists gradually abandoned the tactic in the 1980s.

American presidents have learned that hostage situations can be politically perilous. Frustration over the inability of the United States to rescue or negotiate the release of American hostages held for more than a year in Iran probably contributed to President James Earl Carter's defeat in the 1980 presidential elections. Six years later, the revelation that the United States, in contradiction to its own no-concessions policy, had secretly sold weapons to Iran in return for the release of American hostages in Lebanon deeply embarrassed the Reagan administration.

Since the late 1970s, the question of how to deal with state sponsors of terrorism has been a major policy issue. Under pressure from Congress, the U.S. Department of State identified Iran, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba as state sponsors of terrorism, a list that has changed little in the past quarter century. In 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism recommended that Afghanistan be added to the list and that both Pakistan and Greece be identified as countries that were not fully cooperating with the United States, a suggestion that provoked howls of protest.

Middle East conflicts have motivated most of the major terrorist crises, and most of the states identified by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism are in that part of the world. The region's secular extremists and, increasingly, its religious fanatics have seen themselves as being at

KIDNAPPED

On 9 September 1969 a small team comprised of members of two leftist urban guerrilla organizations—the October 8 Revolutionary Movement and Action for National Liberation—kidnapped Charles Burke Elbrick, the recently arrived U.S. ambassador to Brazil, the first of many kidnappings of diplomats. They selected him as their target because, in their words, "If we had selected the Turkish ambassador, nobody would have paid any attention." The kidnappers' communiqué gave more details. "Mr. Elbrick represents in our country the interests of imperialism, which . . . maintain the regime of oppression and exploitation." Elbrick's kidnappers never told him that in return for his safe release they had demanded the release of fifteen prisoners, mostly student and labor leaders, one old Communist Party leader, and several of those allegedly involved in the earlier assassination of American diplomat. It was a deliberately mixed group chosen to inspire unity among Brazil's revolutionaries.

The United States urged the government of Brazil to do everything necessary to ensure the ambassador's release. In fact, the triumvirate of military officers ruling Brazil during the president's illness had already decided to meet the kidnappers' demands, not because of U.S. pressure, but because they saw it as an opportunity to make a humanitarian gesture and give Brazil the chance to disprove accusations of widespread torture. This line of reasoning did not win unanimous approval through the Brazilian armed forces, and one local commander briefly ordered his forces to surround the airport where the prisoners had been assembled to be flown to political exile in Mexico, but higher-ranking officers intervened and the exchange plan proceeded.

Once the prisoners arrived in Mexico, Elbrick was released in good condition. His captors had washed and pressed his bloodstained shirt and tie (he had been hit on the head with a pistol during the abduction), and they gave him a copy of a book on revolution by Ho Chi Minh, in which they had inscribed, "To our first political prisoner, with the expression of our respect for his calm behavior in action."

In the following months the guerrillas kidnapped the Japanese consul general in Sao Paulo and the ambassadors of Germany and Switzerland. In each case the government freed prisoners in exchange for release of the diplomats but subsequently cracked down hard and brutally, ultimately destroying the urban guerrilla groups. But the tactic of kidnapping diplomats spread to other countries. Local governments and the governments of the diplomatic representatives became increasingly resistant to meeting the demands of those holding hostages. The term "terrorist" increasingly replaced the more neutral term "urban guerrilla."

war with America. America's steadfast support for the State of Israel has angered many, but even U.S. attempts to broker agreements between Israel and the Palestinians have provoked reactions by hardliners who oppose any accord. America's close relationship with the shah of Iran, overthrown by Islamic revolutionaries in 1979, was a further source of antagonism. Some Muslim fanatics have come to see the American commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy, and equality and what they regard as a subversive and libertine American popular culture as a dangerous influence to be eradicated. The fanatic terrorists' beliefs require them to strike violently at the American presence and influence, and no reconciliation is in sight. One continuing foreign policy challenge for the United States has been to keep efforts to combat terrorism from appearing to be a war on the Arab world or Islam. The United States opposes the violent tactics of terrorism, not any system of beliefs.

Countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism are subject to economic sanctions that deny U.S. assistance and prohibit trade with the United States, but sanctions are only effective if they are universally enforced. International compliance has been patchy at best, although Syria's blatant involvement in a 1986 plot to plant a bomb aboard an airliner departing London led to further European sanctions against that country. Largely to appease an angry United States, Europe went along with some sanctions against Libya in 1986, and suspected Libyan involvement in the sabotage of PanAm 103 in 1988 and a French airliner in Africa in 1989 resulted in more stringent sanctions being imposed until Libya agreed to

turn over two Libyans suspected of involvement in the PanAm incident to a tribunal in The Hague. U.S. sanctions on Libya remained in effect for other reasons. To ensure more universal compliance, the United States has sought to have the United Nations impose sanctions. In 2000 Afghanistan became subject to UN sanctions for its refusal to turn over known terrorists.

Additional sanctions were imposed on Iraq as a consequence of that country's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War. However, the issue transcends Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism and involves that country's suspected secret efforts to manufacture chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Sudan entered into productive discussions with the United States in mid-2000 and became a possible candidate for removal of American sanctions.

Sanctions, however, have been criticized as blunt, ineffective instruments—the modern economic equivalent of medieval siege warfare. They inflict more suffering on ordinary people than on the governments in which the people have no say, and efforts have been initiated to develop more precisely targeted sanctions that hurt rulers, not the general populace. Nonetheless, economic sanctions have stunted economic development in these countries and probably have moderated, if not reversed, the behavior of their governments, although that would be hard to prove.

MILITARY FORCE AND ITS LIMITS

The United States has used military force in response to terrorism on a number of occasions. U.S. forces bombed Libya in 1986 in response to a Libyan-sponsored terrorist attack in Germany and indications of further attacks being planned; an Iraqi intelligence facility was bombed in 1993 in response to Iraqi involvement in the thwarted assassination attempt on former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait; and, in response to terrorist attacks on American embassies in Africa in 1998, U.S. forces bombed terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons.

While terrorists themselves offer few lucrative targets for conventional attack, military action may still be useful. It can disrupt the terrorists' operations, forcing them to move their camps, tend to their own security, and worry about the possibility of further strikes. It can also be used to reinforce diplomacy. Military force serves as a warning to states that sponsoring terrorism is not without serious risks. It demonstrates resolve and it clearly signals that the country initiating it regards terrorism as a very serious issue. It also carries with it an invitation to states to cooperate.

Military force may also be viewed in some cases as necessary for domestic political purposes, not as a cynical ploy to garner political support or distract the public from other issues, but as a way to demonstrate to an alarmed public that something is being done. The British suffered terribly during the Battle of Britain, and their ability to take the punishment without a complete collapse of morale depended in part on the fact their British forces were fighting to destroy the enemy. The absence of military action could reinforce feelings of national impotence that could, in turn, lead to popular support for draconian measures to ensure security that might imperil civil liberties.

The opportunities for military action against terrorism, however, are limited. It is necessary to focus and carefully calibrate the response; otherwise, the use of force becomes capricious. A military response, moreover, must be delivered soon after the terrorist incident that provokes it. It has been difficult to sustain military operations beyond the first strike. The United States may have wanted the terrorists to fear that it might attack them again, but in fact it never did. That may change in light of the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.

QUESTIONABLE ALTERNATIVES

There were possible alternatives to the policies that have been chosen. The United States might have tried to pay less attention to the issue of terrorism, putting it lower on the foreign policy agenda, deliberately adopting a more phlegmatic posture and using less bellicose rhetoric. But given the spectacular nature of terrorist attacks and the public outrage they provoke, it would have been extremely difficult to sustain a deliberately phlegmatic policy.

The United States could have followed a more flexible policy in dealing with hostage situations, as did some European nations. However, the private sector's practice of routinely paying ransom for company executives kidnapped abroad suggests that compliance only encourages

further kidnappings. And research suggests that it is the ability of the local government to apprehend, convict, and punish kidnappers and destroy their gangs, whether they are politically motivated or common criminals, that determines the frequency of kidnappings. Politically motivated kidnappings have declined. The United States could have adopted a policy of assassinating foreign terrorist leaders, as Israel did in 1972. While this policy may have led to the removal of some effective terrorist leaders, it has had little discernible effect on the level of terrorism aimed against Israel.

The United States did not have to officially designate state sponsors of terrorism and automatically impose sanctions, thus depriving itself of more flexible forms of diplomacy. As noted earlier, the record of sanctions is at best a mixed one. The United States could have rejected the use of military force altogether, relying instead exclusively on a criminal justice approach. However, few other nations extend the jurisdiction of their courts and send law enforcement officials abroad to investigate terrorist crimes against their citizens.

Persuading other nations to support sanctions, America's use of military force, and the rendition of foreign terrorists to the United States for trial have all required vigorous American diplomacy. The willingness to impose sanctions and use military force, as well as offer assistance in other areas, has in turn reinforced that diplomacy.

THE FRUITS OF AMERICAN POLICY

American policy has historically been pragmatic. Efforts to combat terrorism were just that. American diplomats paid little attention to root causes and conflict resolution, lest counterterrorism efforts become mixed up with judgments of causes. At the same time, the United States has devoted considerable effort to resolving the Middle East conflict, helping to bring about an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, and intervening to prevent ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in the Balkans that, if left to fester or produce vast new semi-permanent populations of refugees, could have become new sources of terrorist violence.

Progress has been made. Intelligence has improved through unilateral efforts and improved liaison with other intelligence services. An international legal framework has been created and international cooperation has increased. Countries would rather not be identified as state sponsors of terrorism. The volume of international terrorism, as it is defined by the United States, has declined, and certain tactics have declined significantly. All this could have been seen as a measure of success on 10 September 2001. However, the terrorist attacks on the following day—attacks on American soil that caused far more casualties than all of the previous terrorist incidents put together—overshadowed any sense of achievement.

11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The 11 September 2001 attacks have provoked a more formal expression of belligerency—a presidential declaration of war on those responsible for the attacks. The declaration clearly indicates the intention of the United States to use military force again and again at times and places and with means it deems appropriate. More terrorist attacks against Americans, abroad and in the United States, are possible. Exactly how the continuing campaign will be conducted, whether allies of the United States will participate, and what effect it will have are unknown at this time. Whether the counterattack will divide the nation politically remains to be seen.

Within the shadow of this tragedy, however, lie opportunities for even greater international determination and cooperation, if not to end terrorism once and for all—an unrealistic objective—at least to significantly reduce its practice. Whether such determination and cooperation materialize will depend on whether the rest of the world sees this event as an attack on the United States or as a threat to the international system as it exists.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bass, Gail, et al. *Options for U.S. Policy on Terrorism.* Santa Monica, Calif., 1981.

Evans, Ernest. *Calling a Truce to Terror: The American Response to International Terrorism.* Westport, Conn., 1979.

Heymann, Philip B. *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society.* Cambridge, Mass., 1998.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism.* New York, 1998.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict.* Los Angeles, 1975.

———. *International Terrorism: The Other World War.* Santa Monica, Calif., 1985.

———. *Terrorism: Policy Issues for the Bush Administration.* Santa Monica, Calif., 1989.

Lesser, Ian O., et al. *Countering the New Terrorism.* Santa Monica, Calif., 1999.

Long, David E. *The Anatomy of Terrorism.* New York, 1990.

Pillar, Paul R. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Washington, D.C., 2001.

Simon, Jeffrey D. *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism.* Bloomington, Ind., 1994.

U.S. Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism.* Washington, D.C. Published annually.

See also COVERT OPERATIONS; EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS; INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

TREATIES

J. B. Duroselle and Ian J. Bickerton

Tracing the history of treaties entered into by the United States provides an illuminating insight into the changing nature, concerns, and direction of United States foreign relations. Given that the Constitution provides that the Senate must be advised and give consent before their ratification, treaties also provide a revealing insight into the ever-changing relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, as well as domestic politics and foreign relations.

Thus we see the Republic in its early years enter a series of treaties of amity and trade with European powers, followed in the nineteenth century by further commercial treaties (with their corollaries, freedom of the seas in time of war, provision for the safety of shipwrecked sailors, access to major communication routes), and treaties delineating the nation's expanding boundaries as well as defining its legal relations with indigenous Americans. Despite its own successful interventionist policy of military and economic expansion—especially in Central America and the Pacific—in the first half of the twentieth century the United States was reluctant to enter the most destructive conflict Europe had yet seen, and the Senate succeeded in limiting American involvement in international legal arrangements designed to prevent its recurrence. Following a second round of world war, in the latter half of the twentieth century, and reflecting a widespread American fear created by a ideologically polarized and increasingly militarized world, the United States entered a series of collective security alliances and arms—especially nuclear arms—limitation treaties. Reflecting renewed American efforts to establish global hegemony, the United States also embarked upon a number of economic agreements in the latter part of the twentieth century to break down what Washington regarded as restrictive trade barriers.

With the transformation of numerous former European colonies in Africa and Asia into independent states and a tremendous increase in the world's population in the second half of the twentieth century, the changed nature of international relations and the role of the United States in world affairs can be traced in the appearance of new kinds of treaties dealing with such matters as human rights, ecology and the environment, and the utilization of outer space. As the twenty-first century began much of U.S. foreign relations and domestic politics was taken up with determining how to respond to these new challenges.

DEFINITIONS

In the broad sense, a treaty is an accord concluded between members of the international community. These are generally states, although sometimes they are political entities seeking to become states (for example, Britain's American colonies in 1776). In the latter case, signing a treaty with the entity gives it the character of a state. According to this broad definition, a treaty is neither a law, which is internal as opposed to international, nor a contract, which is private (or is concluded between a state and a person or an organization). This was the case in the Lake Success Accord of 26 June 1947 between the United Nations and the United States, regarding the location of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations.

In the strict sense, a treaty is an international accord in which the parties involved abide by the constitutional or legal rules that, in a given state, establish treaty-making power. This is clearer in the United States than in Europe, where terminology tends to be ambiguous (the terms in use include "treaty," "convention," "pact," "charter," "statute," "act," "declaration," "protocol," "arrangement," "accord," and "modus vivendi").

In the United States the word "treaty" refers to a procedure defined in the Constitution. The president, the Constitution states, "shall have

power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Accordingly, regardless of how they are described in ordinary language (the "Covenant" of the League of Nations, the "Charter" of the United Nations, or the Atlantic "Pact"), all international accords concluded according to this procedure are "treaties," and all others are "agreements." For the first half century after independence, all treaties, once ratified by Congress, were regarded as, in the words of the Constitution, the (supreme) Law of the Land, super-added to the laws of the land and creating individual rights and duties in all states and upheld by federal courts. Today not all treaties are so highly regarded.

The distinction between treaties and agreements is clearer in the United States than elsewhere. In the latter category it is necessary to distinguish several types. An executive agreement is an accord not approved by Congress, either before or after its signing. An example is the Korean War armistice. A congressional executive agreement is an international accord concluded by the president in accordance with a law (and, as a law, enacted by a simple majority vote of the Congress), or approved after the fact by a simple majority. Examples are the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts of 1934 and 1962, along with the lend-lease agreements and the European Recovery Program agreements. A joint congressional-executive action is an accord passed by joint resolution of Congress requiring only a simple majority of both houses of Congress. Examples are the annexation of Texas in 1845 and American guarantees concerning Taiwan in 1955.

The president can avoid the constitutional requirement of submitting an international accord to the Senate for approval through the use of an executive agreement. While such an agreement may concern important matters, it can take as simple a form as an exchange of letters. Sometimes it derives from the president's powers as commander in chief of the armed forces. Or it may result from a law voted by Congress giving the president the power to conclude certain accords (for example, those pertaining to the Lend-Lease Act and to the European Recovery Program, as well as postal accords and certain tariff agreements since 1934). The scope of an agreement also can extend to the recognition of states and of governments, and to the provisional or preliminary accords drawn up prior to the signing of definitive treaties.

Executive agreements were unknown in the days of George Washington, only being recognized as constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1936 and 1937. It was not until January 1972 with the Case Act (Public Law 92-403, 1 USC 112b) that Congress accepted executive agreements as constitutional, a journey begun by Senators William Knowland of California and Homer Ferguson of Michigan in 1954. The distinction between treaties and executive agreements has only domestic significance, as both are regarded as binding in international law. But there has been a vast increase in executive agreements since World War II, in part at least because of the difficulty of obtaining two-thirds Senate approval.

The increase in executive agreements also reflects the increased volume of American business with other countries, a constant and accelerated growth of governmental responsibilities imposed on all nations by technological progress, an enormous increase in the amount of power exerted throughout the world by the United States, and congressional legislation authorizing the executive branch to conclude agreements in such areas as agriculture, trade, and foreign aid. The combined necessities of skill and speed in increasingly diversified international politics have made the president of the United States, more so than was formerly true, the most important person in the world. The following statistics speak for themselves. Between 1789 and 1840, there were 60 treaties and 27 executive agreements (a ratio of 2 to 1). Between 1789 and 1940, there were 841 treaties and 1,200 executive agreements (a ratio of 2 to 3). Between 1940 and 1955, there were 139 treaties and 1,950 executive agreements (a ratio of 1 to 14). Between 1960 and 1963, there were 30 treaties and 1,132 executive agreements (a ratio of 1 to 37). A 1984 Senate study revealed that approximately 88 percent of international agreements reached between 1946 and 1972 were based on statuary authority, 6 percent were treaties, and 6 percent solely executive agreements. By the end of the twentieth century the United States was a party to more than 5,000 executive agreements and more than 950 treaties.

Treaties include all types of international agreements among sovereign states. Those agreements may be referred to as "conventions" (usually multilateral agreements), "protocols" (which expand an agreement), "charters," or even "letters." Treaties may be bilateral or multilateral, binding or nonbinding, self-executing or requiring implementing legislation. A treaty enters into

force when it is deposited with an international organization or exchanges ratification with another country.

Treaties have existed for centuries, but an internationally acceptable law of treaties was not codified until the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which came into force in 1980. The United States, although not a party to the convention (it has been signed but not ratified), accepts it as setting out international law on the subject. Historically, treaties were used as instruments by states to transfer territory, settle disputes and execute other foreign policy matters (for example, to make peace). In recent history treaties have been concluded to regulate economic activities such as trade, commercial relations and intellectual property, and, increasingly, to protect international human rights, regulate pollution and protect the environment, and facilitate transnational litigation.

In the United States, the Founders gave the Senate a share of the treaty power to check presidential power. They also saw Senate involvement as a means of safeguarding the sovereignty of the states by giving each state an equal vote in the treaty-making process. The relationship between the executive branch and the Senate in the making of treaties has remained a controversial issue in U.S. foreign relations. While many presidents have sought the advice of the Senate before entering treaties or conventions, some have not. During the nineteenth century the Senate considerably extended its influence over the treaty-making process by exercising its power to amend treaties—a process begun with an amendment to Jay's Treaty in 1803—and, by the mid to late nineteenth century, requiring a simple majority vote.

Senate amendment may include reservations, understandings, interpretations, declarations, and other statements as conditions for the Senate recommendation of approval. Forty-three treaties never entered force because Senate reservations made them unacceptable to the executive or the other party(s) to the treaty, and eighty-five were withdrawn because of Senate failure to take final action on them. President William McKinley, hoping to avoid Senate rejection, which had become increasingly frequent, named three senators to negotiate the peace treaty with Spain in 1898, thereby facilitating Senate approval. Woodrow Wilson's failure to include any senators in negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I and establishing the League of Nations was widely believed to have contributed to the Senate defeat of that treaty. Warren G Harding included senators in negotiations leading to the 1922 Washington Arms Limitation Treaty. Senators assisted in drawing up the United Nations Charter following World War II, and there were only two Senate votes against ratification.

The Senate has rejected relatively few of the treaties it has considered. It sought, with not much success, to have its deliberations kept secret. The Senate approved more than 1,500 treaties—around 90 percent of those submitted to it—in its first two hundred years. The first treaty rejected was with the Wabash and Illinois Indians in 1794, and in 1825 the Senate rejected by a vote of 40 to 0 a convention with Colombia for the suppression of the slave trade.

The flexibility of the system derives from the wide range of options it provides. In a few major instances the treaty method is required constitutionally. In the vast majority, however, the president has the principal prerogative of deciding which method will be used or attempted. Over the vast network of events, times, ideas, attitudes, and strength relationships of the political parties, a decision on the preferred method in all given types of instances rests upon calculations virtually approaching infinity.

CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING TREATIES

During and immediately following the war of independence, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, John Adams, and the other American negotiators found their dealings with the French, Spanish, Dutch and other European powers extremely harrowing. Accordingly, they sought to avoid becoming involved in the intricacies of European politics. American leaders were determined to follow an independent foreign policy and to avoid all treaties other than those promoting (free) commerce and manufactures. In 1776, John Adams drew up a "Model Treaty," and it became the basis for the Americans' first treaties, the U.S.–French treaties signed by Benjamin Franklin and French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, count of Vergennes, on 6 February 1778.

Negotiations between the American colonists and France began at Passy and resulted in two treaties. The first was a treaty of military alliance, the object of which was "to establish the liberty, sovereignty, and absolute and unlimited

independence of the United States, in affairs of government as well as in affairs of commerce." It was asserted that the treaty "is based on the most perfect equality and reciprocity." The second treaty was a treaty of amity and commerce, under which each nation granted most-favored-nation status to the other.

On 4 May 1778, Congress unanimously ratified the two treaties, with the exception of a few secondary clauses. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had responsibility for conducting foreign policy, and every treaty had to be approved by at least nine of the thirteen states. Thus, through these first two treaties in American history, the United States was "introduced among the nations." It should be noted that these treaties dealt simultaneously with alliance, commerce, and the creation of international law, or "treaty law"—reciprocity of treatment, freedom of the seas, and the rights of neutral powers.

Peace negotiations between Britain and the Americans, already under way, proceeded apace following the American military success at Yorktown on 19 October 1781. The American delegates, Jay and Adams in particular, demanded more than independence; they also wanted the Newfoundland fisheries, the area west of the Alleghenies as far as the Mississippi River, the cession of Canada, and a war indemnity. Jay opened secret negotiations with England that led to British acceptance of the Mississippi frontier, of the Great Lakes frontier, and of a northeast boundary line at the St. Croix River. Although it was customary in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the loser to pay the winner a cash indemnity for its costly victory, the British refused to consider paying an indemnity.

A treaty—considered as only preliminary, in conformity with European usage—was signed at Paris on 30 November 1782. France and Spain followed the American example and on 20 January 1783 also signed preliminary treaties with England. The definitive treaties were signed on 3 September 1783, at Paris, between the United States and England, and a few days later, at Versailles, between France and England.

The first article of the 1783 Treaty of Paris states: "His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the United States, viz. [here follows a list of the thirteen colonies], to be free, sovereign and Independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his Heirs and Successors, relinquishes all Claims to the Government Propriety and Territorial Rights." Thus, following France (1778) and the Netherlands (1782), England extended recognition to its former colony. At first, the new nation's dealings with other nations tended to lack direction. Each state wished to be consulted about international affairs. A consular convention signed with France in 1784 was not accepted by Congress until 1788, after the elimination of a clause treating each of the thirteen states as sovereign. And when commercial and territorial negotiations with Spain produced the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty in 1786, its ratification was blocked by the southern states, which felt that their interests had been neglected. However, commercial treaties were signed with Sweden in 1783 and Prussia in 1785, as well as a treaty of peace and friendship with Morocco in 1786.

The situation of drift persisted until the adoption of the Constitution. When the Constitution came into force in 1788, it brought with it a more precise definition of "treaty-making power." On the question of the role the Senate would play in the negotiation of treaties, the Founders did not wish to see the Senate play the dominant role in foreign affairs that had been the prerogative of the Roman Senate, whose exploits in this domain were known and appreciated by such cultivated leaders as Jefferson. From the beginning, George Washington established the tradition of presidential designation of negotiators. (In 1778 and 1782 negotiators had been chosen by Congress.) The president was required, however, to obtain the "advice and consent" of the Senate (with a two-thirds majority) in the appointment of the secretary of state and of ambassadors.

TO ENTER TREATIES OR NOT TO ENTER TREATIES?

Whether because of fear of entrapment, abandonment, or exploitation by European powers, for the next century and a half the United States was wary of signing treaties of military alliance as a means of guaranteeing its own security. Concern over being drawn into the war between revolutionary France and England undoubtedly influenced President George Washington to exhort Americans to avoid entangling alliances in his Farewell Address of 1796, a warning repeated by Jefferson as president four years later. In relation to Europe, treaties were seen by the United States as too "open," too "anarchic" in character. As each party to a treaty retains substantial decision-making capabilities, the risks were too great in a

region where the United States was not likely to be the dominant party in any treaty arrangement. The United States did not sign another treaty of alliance until 1947 (the Rio Treaty) and 1949 (the NATO alliance).

This does not mean that the United States was not engaged in or active on the world stage. It simply means that the nation regarded unilateral action as in its best interests. The costs of cooperation—either in economic or military terms—were regarded as too high or the returns insufficient to warrant the risks involved in cooperation. This was not the case in continental America, where the United States was dealing with indigenous Americans and Mexico and Canada—although both those countries were integrated into the European state system. In this instance the United States readily entered into—and broke—treaty arrangements. In the Western Hemisphere the United States also felt it could best protect its interests unaided. Successive administrations felt that the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine—establishing Latin America as a sphere of interest, if not a protectorate—rendered treaties unnecessary.

In the Pacific and East Asia, on the other hand, American attitudes to treaties varied, although the major motivation remained commercial expansion. Although the United States was too late to participate in the "great game of empire" played out there by the European powers, it participated with the Western powers in the unequal treaty system they forced upon China following the Opium Wars. Following British success in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the United States, in the Treaty of Wanghia (July 1844), extorted similar concessions from China—most-favored-nation status, the opening of five ports, the imposition of extraterritorial rights for Americans (legal trials for foreigners in special courts of their own nationality)—that lasted until 1942. Also, although no treaty of alliance had been entered into, a U.S. navy warship acted in concert with British, French, and Dutch ships during 1863–1864 to punish Japan for harassment of merchant shipping, and the United States shared an indemnity that Japan was forced to pay to the Western powers.

Throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the two poles of American treaty making were territorial acquisition and amity and commerce, with its various corollaries.

TREATIES ACQUIRING TERRITORY

After the critical phase of revolution and gaining independence, American policy began to focus on the possibilities of the vast North American continent. In the category of territorial politics alone, the United States made fourteen major attempts to annex territory between 1800 and 1869. Four were unsuccessful (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Virgin Islands); one (the annexation of Texas in 1845) was settled not by a treaty but by a joint resolution. Eight of the remaining nine resulted in major treaties: four purchase treaties (Louisiana, Florida, parts of Arizona and New Mexico, and Alaska); three partition treaties concerning Oregon (1846); and a single peace treaty (Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848). Another, earlier peace treaty, that of Ghent (1814) did not involve territorial annexation.

The drafters of the Treaty of Ghent (December 1814), which ended the divisive war with the British begun two years earlier, were satisfied simply to restore the territorial status quo. News of the treaty did not reach Washington until February 1815, a delay that permitted General Andrew Jackson to prevent the capture of New Orleans in the meantime (8 January 1815). The Senate immediately approved the treaty, one of the most popular ever negotiated by Americans.

Territorial questions played a dominant role in American politics both before and after the Civil War. The territories in question were generally located on the North American continent and contiguous to previously annexed territories. (Alaska in 1867 and the Midway Islands seized in the same year were exceptions to this general rule.) Thus, the attempts or plans to acquire island territories—Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, Santo Domingo, even Cuba—were considered by many as immoral and not in accord with American tradition. Once the territories were acquired, generally by treaty, it was still necessary to occupy them, which often meant fighting and then negotiating with the indigenous inhabitants.

TREATIES AND NATIVE AMERICANS

One purpose of the new Constitution was to organize an effective army to deal with issues surrounding the "western lands." The western lands, were, of course, occupied by Native Americans. The history of U.S. relations with Native Americans during the nineteenth century is long and

complicated because of the number of different Native American peoples involved, but fundamentally simple in terms of the process that was repeated hundreds of times across the continent. The U.S. government deployed military garrisons on the edge of Indian (Native American) territories, and when conflict arose, as it invariably did, the army reacted by invading the Indian nations and attacking the Native Americans.

At the time of the American Revolution, however, Americans viewed the Indians as distinct peoples, and they viewed their nations as distinct nations, even if other countries did not. Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States reflected this reality. One of the first acts of the Continental Congress was the creation in 1775 of three departments of Indian affairs: northern, central, and southern. Among the first departmental commissioners were Benjamin Franklin and Patrick Henry. Their job was to negotiate treaties with Indian nations and obtain their neutrality in the coming revolutionary war. Among the first treaties presented to the Senate by George Washington—in August 1789—dealt with U.S. relations with various Native American tribes.

While the many accords reached with the Native Americans were sometimes called treaties, in reality the treaties were fictions. On 9 July 1821, Congress gave the president authority to appoint a commissioner of Indian affairs to serve under the secretary of war and have "the direction and management of all Indian affairs, and all matters arising out of Indian relations." From 1824, Native Americans were subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, newly established as a division of the War Department. After 1849 they were subject to the Home Department (later the Department of the Interior), which, within a century, controlled virtually every aspect of Indian existence.

International law in the nineteenth century did not consider as true treaties accords concluded with indigenous tribes that were not constituted in the form of genuine states. In 1831 the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall in *Cherokee Nation* v. *Georgia* ruled that Indian nations were not foreign nations but "domestic dependent nations," although the following year in *Worcester* v. *Georgia,* in a ruling that was defied by President Andrew Jackson and ignored by Congress, he ruled that they were capable of making treaties that under the Constitution were the supreme law of the land.

Between 1789 and 1871 the president was empowered by the Senate to make treaties with the Native American tribes or nations in the United States. These treaties ostensibly recognized the sovereignty of Native Americans. Many of the very early Native American treaties were ones of peace and friendship, and a few included mutual assistance pacts, or pacts to prevent other tribes from making hostile attacks. The majority of Native American treaties, however, dealt with trade and commerce, and involved Indians ceding land. Native title was effectively extinguished by treaties of evacuation and removal of the Native American population. Most were signed under coercion. During the two terms of the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1828–1836), when removal of Native Americans from their lands reached almost a frenzy, ninety-four Indian treaties were concluded under coercion. Interestingly, one feature that all Native American treaties share with foreign treaties is that the courts will not inquire into the validity of the signatories. Just as a court will not inquire into whether a foreign dignitary was bribed or forced into signing a treaty, the courts will not inquire into whether a Native American tribe was properly represented during negotiation of a ratified treaty or whether such a treaty was acquired by fraud or under duress.

The president's authority to make treaties with Native Americans was terminated by the Indian Appropriations Act of 3 March 1871, which declared that no Indian tribe or nation would be recognized as an independent power with whom the United States could contract by treaty. However, this statute did not alter or abrogate the terms of treaties that had already been made. Native American treaties are still enforced today and continue to constitute a major federal source of Native American law.

In later years, Congress made provisions to permit Native Americans to recover monetary damages for treaty violations by the federal government. Prior to 1946 Congress enacted numerous special statutes permitting tribes to recover damages through the court of claims, and in 1946 Congress established the Native American Claims Commission to settle claims.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMMERCIAL TREATIES

In addition to the territorial treaties, the United States signed a number of trade treaties during its

first half century. In realizing these treaties, as was also the case with the treaties annexing overseas territories, the navy was the chief instrument utilized. Chief among these were the Commercial Convention of 1815 with England (extended in 1818) and treaties of commerce with Russia (1832), Siam (1833), China (1844, 1858, and 1867), the Hawaiian Islands (1849 and 1875), and England (the Marcy-Elgin Treaty of 1854). Of a rather different nature were the treaties concerning possible canals linking the Atlantic and the Pacific. In 1846 a treaty was concluded with New Granada (later Colombia) guaranteeing the United States transit across the Isthmus of Panama, as well as the neutrality of the canal zone. In 1850 England and the United States signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty regarding the isthmus. Each of the countries undertook not to establish exclusive control over and to guarantee the neutrality of any canal that might be built across Central America. In 1867 a treaty signed with Nicaragua gave the United States the right to build a canal across that country.

Another economic treaty, which subsequently proved to be of great importance, was the Treaty of Kanawaga (Yokohama) with Japan (31 March 1854). Commodore Matthew C. Perry, bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore requesting the opening of the archipelago to world trade and seeking provision for the safety of shipwrecked American sailors (mainly whalers), led an expedition that reached Japan in July 1853 and returned in February–March 1854 to receive Japan's answer. This treaty was supplemented by the Harris Treaties of 18 June 1857 and 29 July 1858, the latter of which established diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 1883 the Treaty of Chemulpo, negotiated the year before by Commodore Robert Shulfeldt, which provided for American diplomatic representation in Seoul and opened Korea to American trade, passed the Senate.

The Treaty of Washington of 8 May 1871 between Great Britain and the United States should also be mentioned. The Confederate privateer *Alabama,* one of several constructed in British shipyards, had been involved in destructive attacks on the merchant fleet of the North. The United States demanded that London reimburse the damages incurred, with compound interest, as well as the cost of the two additional years of war supposedly rendered possible by this naval activity. The Senate had rejected an earlier treaty proposal (the Johnson-Clarendon Convention) on 13 April 1869. After international arbitration at Geneva, the Alabama Claims were settled by payment of an indemnity of $15.5 million.

Few treaties were signed in the next quarter century. From the time of the Alabama Claims until around 1890, the United States, preoccupied with its internal expansion, pursued a reserved foreign policy, being satisfied to formulate or recall the basic principles unilaterally, without concluding any important treaties. And, although after 1890 the United States did embark upon an imperialist foreign policy, replete with overseas conquests or interventions, this development came relatively late and was not as extensive as the colonial activities of the European powers, being limited geographically to the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific.

In addition, American annexation methods (whether purchase and partition, or through treaty or joint resolution) had been brought to a high degree of refinement and had only to be applied to colonial or occupied insular territories. The occupation of a territory depended, moreover, not on treaty-making power but on the power of the president as commander in chief and did not, therefore, provide occasions for making treaties.

COLLECTIVE TREATIES AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

During the period 1880–1910, two new phenomena appeared that were to have great significance. The first was American participation in the vast collective treaties negotiated in Europe that dealt with such matters as the rules of warfare at sea and other issues important to American overseas commercial activities. Whereas the United States had been absent from the congresses of Vienna (1814–1815), of Paris (1856), and of Berlin (1878), as well as from the ambassadorial conferences of the Concert of Europe (an obvious consequence of the Monroe Doctrine), in 1880 it participated in the Madrid Conference on Morocco (treaty approved by the Senate on 5 May 1881) and in 1884 and 1885 in the Berlin Conference on equatorial Africa. In July 1890 the United States signed an international agreement on the suppression of the slave trade in Africa (approved by the Senate on 11 January 1892).

The United States also participated in the 1888–1889 Pan-American Conference in Washington, D.C., which created the Pan American Union; it had refused to take part in the attempt

to create such a union in 1826. Later it took a seat at the Pan-American conferences in Mexico City (1901–1902), Rio de Janeiro (1906), and Buenos Aires (1910), as well as at the First International Peace Conference at The Hague (1899), which created the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and at the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague (1907). The United States also was represented at the Algeciras Conference (1906) on Morocco. On this occasion the Senate accepted the resulting agreement (in December 1906), but with the reservation that its approval did not signify a break with the traditional policy of noninvolvement in Europe.

The second new development was that for the first time in its history, the United States assumed the role of mediator between two great powers, Russia and Japan, then at war. President Theodore Roosevelt had been anxious to maintain the balance of power in the Far East. He knew that the United States possessed an effective means of putting pressure on the victorious Japanese, that is, the possibility of helping them obtain funds to revive their bankrupt economy. Consequently, as early as April 1905, before the decisive Russian naval defeat at Tsushima, he secretly agreed to serve as a mediator. Japan accepted mediation on 31 May, after the battle of Tsushima, for it realized that it was better to limit its ambitions than to risk provoking a coalition against it. The resulting Treaty of Portsmouth, in part a product of American initiatives, dissatisfied Japanese ultranationalists. The United States also was mediator (without being a signatory) at the Central American Peace Conference held in November–December 1907 in Washington, D.C.

TREATIES ACQUIRING OVERSEAS TERRITORY

It is not surprising that the most important acts of American foreign policy during this period involved territorial acquisitions, the only difference being that, with the disappearance of the frontier, the object was overseas territory, and the instrument employed was the navy rather than the army. This change was influenced by the great colonial expansion undertaken by the Europeans since 1881, as well as by Alfred Thayer Mahan, the apostle of seapower. The major motivation for U.S. expansion was the search for markets in a world (Indochina, Africa, and China) being closed off by Europeans. Nevertheless, the American approach retained its versatility: treaties remained but one among several methods of annexation.

On 17 January 1878 the United States signed the Samoan Treaty with a number of tribal chiefs, thereby receiving the right to use the strategic port of Pago Pago on the island of Tutuila. The Senate gave its approval on 30 January. The Berlin Conference of 1889, involving the Americans, the British, and the Germans, resulted in an accord establishing a tripartite protectorate over the islands (14 June). On 2 December 1899 a new treaty reallocated the islands among the three powers. It was ratified by the Senate on 16 January 1900.

In the Hawaiian Islands, after numerous futile negotiations during the nineteenth century, Queen Liliuokalani was deposed in 1893 in favor of a provisional revolutionary government. The latter (composed mainly of Americans) proposed a treaty of annexation by the United States (14 February 1893), which was rejected by President Grover Cleveland. The Republic of Hawaii was proclaimed on 4 July 1894 and recognized by Cleveland on 7 August. Cleveland was hostile to the annexation of the archipelago, but his successor, William McKinley, signed a treaty of annexation on 16 June 1897. In the Senate, however, a coalition of Democrats and anti-imperialist Republicans delayed ratification. During the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War, in order to ensure uninterrupted reinforcements to Admiral Dewey in Manila, McKinley asked Congress for a joint resolution, which required only a simple majority in both houses. The resolution was passed on 7 July 1898.

The most important actions taken in this decade were linked to the war against Spain, declared on 25 April 1898. As in the war with Mexico half a century earlier, the Americans were assured of victory. French mediation paved the way for a provisional protocol, signed on 12 August. The peace conference opened on 1 October in Paris, and the peace treaty was signed on 10 December. The final treaty added the annexation of the Philippines to that of Puerto Rico, provided for in the earlier protocol. The proposed annexation of the Philippines, which had become the symbol of U.S. imperialism, provoked heated debate in the Senate. Democrats, Populists, and anti-imperialist Republicans (numerous in New England) opposed the treaty. The imperialists based their argument on national prestige and the strategic necessity of a base in the area. The Senate did not approve the Treaty of Paris until 6 Feb-

ruary 1899. The vote was 57 to 27; a change of two votes would have made it impossible to attain the necessary two-thirds majority. Guam was also acquired from Spain along with the Philippines and was important for logistical support of the army as a means of suppressing the Philippine Insurrection. Senate approval was not sought when Wake Island was similarly annexed as a war measure on 17 January 1899.

THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA

With the Spanish-American War ended, the United States manifested a striking disregard for British naval power (still the greatest in the world) in the strategically critical zone of the Caribbean and Central America. The only two feasible trans-isthmian routes went through Panama, which belonged to Colombia, and Nicaragua. The Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty of 1884 (not ratified), which gave the United States exclusive rights to build a canal across Nicaragua, was complemented and made official by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914. Panama was the scene of considerable upheaval. In the wake of the scandal-ridden bankruptcy of the Compagnie Française du Canal de Panama (1893), its liquidator, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, made a concerted effort to persuade the United States to purchase the concession that the French had obtained from Colombia.

President Theodore Roosevelt, who was very interested in the project, sought to revive an old idea by forcing the British (at a disadvantage, because of their involvement in the Boer War) to relinquish their share of the control of the canal through the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. As early as 1880, James G. Blaine had called for replacement of joint Anglo-American control of the canal, provided for in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, by exclusive American control. Blaine was supported by Congress, but the British had refused to agree. The first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (5 February 1900), approved by the Senate, gave the United States exclusive rights but forbade it to fortify the canal zone. A second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (signed on 18 November 1901 and approved by the Senate on 16 December) eliminated this restriction.

The United States thereupon entered into negotiations with Colombia to obtain the concession for the canal. This was the object of the Hay-Herran Treaty of 22 January 1903, which was approved by the Senate but rejected by Colombia. Rather than seize the zone by force, Roosevelt preferred to encourage Panama's secession from Colombia. Coordinated by Bunau-Varilla, this action was taken on 3 November 1903; and by 6 November the United States, which had sent warships to the area, recognized the new republic. Bunau-Varilla was sent as Panamanian minister to Washington; and on 18 November he signed the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, whereby the United States was accorded the concession in perpetuity of a zone ten miles wide, with complete sovereignty and fortification rights. The Senate accepted the treaty on 23 February 1904.

In order better to protect the Canal Zone (the canal itself was completed in 1914), the United States set out to maintain order in the Caribbean. With Cuba there was initially only a unilateral decision made in 1901 (in the form of an amendment by Senator Orville H. Platt to the Army Appropriations Bill) according itself the right to intervene there. The Cubans were obliged to incorporate the Platt Amendment into their constitution. A treaty of 22 May 1903 later confirmed the amendment. This interventionist policy in Latin America, which President Woodrow Wilson greatly extended, gave rise to unilateral actions by the United States (based on the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, on 6 December 1904). Referred to as the "big stick" policy, it ultimately resulted in the landing of U.S. marines in Nicaragua on 14 August 1912. However, the Senate refused to ratify a treaty giving the United States a naval base in Nicaragua.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Woodrow Wilson, elected president in 1912, introduced what would be known as the New Diplomacy. His conception of this policy evolved gradually as the Great War in Europe progressed. Convinced that the European balance of power, from which the United States was excluded by the Monroe Doctrine, was the main cause of the war, Wilson envisioned international relations based on "a world safe for democracy." For him this meant equality of rights between states both large and small, replacement of an equilibrium based on violence by maintenance of peace through the creation of a league of nations, and abolition of secret treaties in favor of "open covenants openly arrived at" (the first of the Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918). In his eyes, the mission of the American peo-

ple, which he considered morally superior to other peoples by its composition and its democratic tradition, was the establishment of a lasting peace.

When Germany resumed its unrestricted submarine war on 1 February 1917, thereby violating the rights of neutral parties, Wilson, on 2 April, proposed to Congress that the United States enter the war. From this moment it became clear that the greater their role in the war, the more Americans would be in a position to impose the New Diplomacy on their associates, with whom they were careful not to link themselves by alliance.

Subsequently, Wilson exerted considerable influence on the negotiation and conclusion of a number of treaties, most notably the Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919). Regarding the negotiation of that treaty, Wilson imposed several important breaks with tradition on the Europeans. He announced that he would lead the American delegation himself, a step that caused a delay in the opening of discussions until 18 January 1919. He demanded that the Allies, following Germany, adopt the Fourteen Points before the signing of the armistice of 11 November 1918. He stipulated that the Covenant of the League of Nations must be drawn up before territorial, military, and economic issues were dealt with. Finally, Wilson wanted the Allies and associate powers to reach an agreement among themselves before imposing the treaty on Germany (a step that gave the treaty the appearance of a diktat).

When it was time to conclude the treaty, Wilson, supported by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, obliged France to renounce permanent military occupation of the Rhineland in exchange for two treaties (one Franco-American and the other Anglo-French) guaranteeing France's national boundaries. Wilson also delayed indefinitely the satisfaction of Italy's claims to Austrian territory and colonies. On the other hand, he had to yield to Japanese demands to acquire Germany's rights in China. The Japanese had threatened, first, to insert an article on racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations and, then, not to join the organization. Finally, Wilson and French Premier Georges Clemenceau forced Lloyd George, who was sympathetic to German objections and would have wanted to soften the terms of the treaty draft, to agree to keep it much as it had been presented on 7 May 1919 to the German delegation.

But Wilson failed to obtain ratification in the U.S. Senate. He made the error of not inviting any senators to participate in the negotiations. Since November 1918 the Senate membership had included forty-nine Republicans and forty-seven Democrats. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge, was a personal enemy of Wilson's. The Senate was bitterly divided on the issue of support for the Treaty of Versailles and U.S. membership in the League of Nations. In a vote, which had to approve the treaty by a two-thirds majority, Wilson could count on a maximum of only fifty-eight votes, while a two-thirds majority required sixty-four. It was clear that the Senate would accept the treaty only with major amendments.

Wilson refused to seek a compromise. He overestimated the support of world public opinion for the league as well as his own influence in the Senate. From 3 September to 29 September, Wilson traveled across the United States in order to arouse public support. The exertion was too much for him, and he became seriously ill. Sheltered from contact with the world by his wife and his physician, who withheld bad news, he obstinately refused any compromise, even though he was advised to do so by the Allies themselves. The Foreign Relations Committee agreed to condense all its objections into fourteen reservations, known as the Lodge Reservations. These were mostly aimed at denying the league the right to impose any obligations or restrictions on the United States (such as military sanctions), at rejecting any intervention of the league in internal affairs, and at exempting the Western Hemisphere—the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine—from sanctions of any kind. The text finally submitted to the Senate on 19 December was not the treaty but the treaty plus the Lodge Reservations. On 18 March 1920, in a surprise move, a fifteenth reservation, calling for the independence of Ireland, was added. On 19 March a final vote was held on the treaty plus the Lodge Reservations plus the fifteenth reservation. With only forty-five in favor, the two-thirds majority was not reached and the treaty was definitively rejected. The new president elected in 1920, Warren G. Harding, was a nationalist hostile to the League of Nations.

UNILATERALISM OR MULTILATERALISM?

Following World War I, the United States reaffirmed unilateralism as its preferred modus operandi on the world stage. From 1921 to 1941

the debate between Harding-style nationalism and Wilsonian internationalism continued. Nationalism held sway for twenty years, transforming itself in the 1930s into the doctrine of isolationism. Foreign policy was nationalist in the sense that important matters were settled not by treaties but by the unilateral acts of the United States (either declarations by the executive branch or, more commonly, laws passed by Congress). In 1921 and 1924 laws settled the immigration question through the institution of quotas (a matter normally involving relations with the other countries concerned). Laws were passed to raise tariff rates (Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930). A law announcing U.S. adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice was voted on 27 January 1926, but it was accompanied by so many reservations that the World Court ultimately rejected America's candidacy.

The United States acted unilaterally in Asia in the case of the Stimson Doctrine. Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson issued identical notes to Japan and China on 7 January 1932, asserting that the United States would not recognize any impairment of American treaty rights in China and morally condemning Japanese aggression. The Stimson Doctrine was later (March 1932) endorsed by the League of Nations. Other unilateral decisions included the Neutrality Acts (1935–1937), which imposed embargoes on arms and munitions destined for all belligerents, whether aggressors or victims. A promise of independence for the Philippines took the form of a law (Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934). There were declarations broadening the application of the Monroe Doctrine. An exchange of letters sufficed for recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. Everything seemed to indicate that Americans, after having rejected the greatest treaty of the century, had become suspicious of treaties, especially of collective ones. Nonentanglement no longer extended to alliances only, but also to numerous other types of treaties.

However, despite rejection of the multilateral Versailles approach, the United States under certain conditions was very willing to sign collective agreements. The clearest cases emerged from the Washington Conference of 1921–1922: the Five-Power Naval Disarmament Treaty (6 February 1922), the Nine-Power Treaty on China (6 February 1922), the Four-Power Treaty on the Pacific (13 December 1921), and the London Naval Conference agreements (1930 and 1935). The United States also forced Japan to renounce its claims to German rights in the Shantung Peninsula and in Siberia.

Another illustration of American willingness to act in concert with other nations was the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 27 August 1928, signed by an unprecedented sixty-three nations. This pact had originated in the useless, romantic proposal by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand on the tenth anniversary of U.S. entry into the war (April 1927) that France and the United States undertake never to wage war on each other. At the urging of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Borah, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg proposed that the pact be expanded to include all nations. War "as an instrument of national policy" was to be renounced (thereby leaving open the possibility of military sanctions voted by the league). In this way it was possible to satisfy American pacifists like Salmon Levinson, who rejected the League of Nations but called for "the outlawry of war," as well as men like James Shotwell and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who sought an alternative to collective security. There was no provision for enforcement or sanctions, however, and the Japanese violated the pact in Manchuria as early as 16 September 1931, leaving Stimson with little to fall back on except the moral condemnation contained in his "doctrine."

This was also the period of Pan-Americanism. Whereas the United States made few treaties with Europe or the Far East during these years, it concluded a fairly large number with Latin American republics. Matters such as evacuation of occupied Caribbean nations were generally settled by executive agreements (Dominican Republic, 1922; Nicaragua, 1927); but many pacts were signed at the conferences of Havana (1928), Montevideo (1933), Buenos Aires (1936), and Lima (1938). The most important were those of Montevideo, stipulating that "No State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another," and Lima, providing for consultations between ministers of foreign affairs whenever there was danger of war.

WORLD WAR II AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS

World War II brought American isolationism to an end. The first steps moving the United States

ON TREATIES

"He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other pubic Ministers and Consuls."

— From Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution —

"Do Americans want, or are they ready for world government?. . .That is what government by treaty will do, sooner or later. . . . Government by treaty is a dangerous approach, and if we wish to retain our freedom, and maintain our American concept of government we have got to abandon that approach."

— Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Genocide Convention Hearings, 1950 —

"The Internationalists in this country and elsewhere really proposed to use the United Nations and the treaty process as a law-making process to change the domestic laws and even the Government of the United States and to establish a World Government along socialistic lines."

— Frank Holman, president of the American Bar Association, November 1955, on human rights treaties —

"Only one overriding factor can determine whether the U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is Americans' interests. We should act multilaterally when doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when that we serve our purpose. . . . What works best."

— Anthony Lake, assistant to President Bill Clinton for national security affairs, September 1993 —

away from neutrality took the form of executive agreements (such as the destroyers-for-bases accord of 3 September 1940) permitting increased aid to England. But it was the crucially important Lend-Lease Act (11 March 1941) that, even prior to Pearl Harbor, introduced the United States into the front stage of world diplomacy and at the same time gave the latter an entirely new form. Franklin Roosevelt's bold initiatives, combined with the enormous growth of American economic power, yielded a new and unprecedented diplomatic form, that of foreign aid. While traditional diplomacy had been conducted between great and small powers, and Wilsonian diplomacy had established the principle of equality, diplomacy after lend-lease assumed a dual nature. On the one hand, relations between nations deemed to be equals continued to be conducted by ambassadors. On the other hand, there emerged a new form of relationship between two countries, whereby one became the aid donor and the other the aid recipient. Assistance, which could be economic, military, or technical, was administered by government officials who were not ambassadors and generally were dependent on them only nominally. Aid accords tended to evolve in the following manner: first, voting of a general law by Congress; second, voting of appropriations; third, aid accords concluded with the beneficiaries.

Many programs, each involving a set of accords, were elaborated in this fashion: lend-lease (11 March 1941–21 August 1945); bilateral aid accords (1945–1948); the Marshall Plan (5 June 1947), leading to the European Recovery Program (April 1948); Point Four (aid to underdeveloped countries, 20 January 1949); and the Mutual Security Program (replacing the European Recovery Program). These programs led to the signing of hundreds of accords, some of which were treaties. Occasionally, an accord has been considered an agreement by the United States and a treaty by the other party. This was the case, for example, with the Franco-American Mutual Aid Accord of 27 January 1950.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt took considerable precautions so that the Senate would not refuse American participation in the new international organization whose principles he had out-

lined as early as 1941 in the Atlantic Charter. The conferences at Tehran (28 November–1 December 1943), Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944), and Yalta (4–11 February 1945) had elaborated the underlying principles of the United Nations. Roosevelt constantly consulted with the Senate, endeavoring to make his collective security policy a bipartisan affair. The founding conference of the United Nations was held in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. Forty-six nations signed the charter, which the United States was the first to adopt, the Senate approving it on 29 July 1945 with near unanimity.

It should be noted that the right of veto held by the five permanent members of the Security Council protected the United States, in the last resort, against any obligations imposed by the council. At the same time, the locating of the UN headquarters in the United States (Lake Success Accord of 26 June 1947, between the United Nations and the United States) contributed to the popularity of the organization in America. Thereafter, actively involved in the life of the international organization, the United States found that it had adopted Wilsonian "internationalism," which constituted a break with tradition.

The main preoccupation of American treaties following World War II was security cooperation in a postwar climate characterized by ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, bipolarization of the world between these two powers, destruction of the colonial empires and the emergence of nearly ninety new nations, economic inequality, and reliance on atomic weapons as a deterrent. The United States, therefore, could no longer pursue its traditional (moderate and reserved) policy of treaty making. Indeed, since 1945 it has concluded more treaties (not counting agreements) than any other nation, and almost all have been of a new type. They have included aid accords, participation in the United Nations, peace treaties, treaties of alliance, treaties linked to deterrence, and treaties dealing with a far wider range of issues than had traditionally been the case: human rights, ecology, the environment and resources, global warming, the outlawing of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, access to and the future use of outer space, copyright and the protection of intellectual property, and biotechnology and human cloning.

The existence of fundamental disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States prevented the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949 was facilitated by the fact that the three Western occupying powers had unified their zones economically and had made procedural provisions for the reconstitution of a German nation (the London convention regarding Germany, June 1948). Having also defined the respective areas of responsibility for the future state and the occupiers (the Washington accords regarding Germany, April 1949), they began transferring an increasingly important role to the former. Finally, a simple peace protocol, the Treaty of Paris (October 1954), ended the occupation, replacing it with the presence of "security forces." The treaty was approved by the Senate on 1 April 1955.

For similar reasons it proved impossible to sign a common peace treaty including both Japan and the Soviet Union, despite the efforts of John Foster Dulles in 1947. Although formal surrender ceremonies had been held aboard the USS *Missouri* on 2 September 1945, it was not until 8 September 1951 that the United States and forty-eight other countries concluded a peace settlement with Japan, the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union, although it attended the San Francisco meeting, abstained. The Senate gave its consent with reservations on 20 March 1952 by a vote of 66 to 10.

In the case of Austria, which the victors intended to keep permanently separate from Germany, it required ten years of negotiations before the Soviet Union decided, in exchange for a guarantee of the country's neutrality, to join the other occupying powers in signing the Austrian State Treaty. Following Senate approval, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ratified it on 24 June 1955.

All of the above was accomplished outside the procedural framework provided for by the Potsdam Conference of 1945. On that occasion, a council of foreign ministers (of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China) was created for the purpose of negotiating the various peace treaties, on the understanding that of the five countries, only those that had signed armistice agreements with the defeated nations would participate in treaty negotiations (France being considered as having signed an armistice with Italy). In principle, this should have excluded the United States from the peace treaty with Finland. In fact, however, all the treaties with the "Axis satellites" were discussed by the Big Four (China being absent). Many meetings of the council took place in 1945 and 1946. They produced five peace treaties, signed by the

American secretary of state in Washington and by the other countries (Italy, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) on 10 February 1947 in Paris. The Senate approved them on 4 June 1947.

Two further meetings of the council took place, in Moscow (10 March–24 April 1947) and London (25 November–December 1947). These negotiations were brought to a halt by U.S. adoption of containment policy (the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947 and the Marshall Plan of 5 June 1947), the creation of the Kominform by the Soviet Union, and the increasing tensions of the Cold War in 1948 (the Berlin Blockade). While such diplomacy did revive sporadically, beginning with the Paris conference of 23 May–20 June 1949, which ended the Berlin Blockade, and including several summit meetings, it did not bring about any peace treaties.

Nor were peace treaties enacted—only armistice agreements—after the Korean War (27 July 1953), after French withdrawal from Indochina (the Geneva Accords of 20 July 1954 were rejected by the United States), or after the war in Vietnam. In the latter case, after five years of negotiations involving the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front, an accord was finally reached on 28 January 1973. Although it had the breadth and scope of a peace treaty, it was simply an executive agreement that, on the American side, went into effect with its signing by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and not after approval by the Senate.

As soon as World War II ended, American officials sought to give new form to Pan-Americanism. They began with a provisional alliance, excluding Argentina, that was signed at Chapultepec, Mexico, in March 1945. The signatories undertook to consult with one another in the event of aggression or the threat of aggression. At the inter-American conference "for the maintenance of continental peace and security" at Rio de Janeiro (15 August–2 September 1947), the twenty-one republics (except Nicaragua, which was absent) signed a reciprocal inter-American assistance treaty, which contained essentially the same provisions as the Pact of Chapultepec. Sanctions could be voted collectively against aggressors. Finally, on 30 April 1948, the Charter of the Organization of American States was signed, making the Pan American Union a regional organization within the framework of the United Nations. The United States did not ratify the charter until June 1951. Despite their innovative elements, these alliances invariably fell within the traditional perspective of the Monroe Doctrine. The same was not the case with later alliances.

The Atlantic Pact of 4 April 1949, which created NATO, was a reaction to the Cold War. The five European signatories of the treaty of alliance of Brussels (17 March 1948) gave the premier of France (Georges Bidault) and the foreign minister of England (Ernest Bevin) the task of requesting the American secretary of state, George C. Marshall, to secure his country's participation. The necessity of defending western Europe seemed so critical that on 11 June 1948 the Senate adopted, by a vote of 64 to 4, the Vandenberg Resolution, authorizing the president to conclude peacetime alliances outside the Western Hemisphere. This represented a break with prior American foreign policy, which had avoided alliances since the end of the eighteenth century. Negotiations were prolonged, since it was necessary to await the outcome of the presidential elections, in which Harry S. Truman was the victor.

A preliminary draft of 28 December was followed on 15 March 1949 by the version ultimately signed by the five (France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the United States, and Canada. They then invited Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy to participate. The treaty, published on 18 March, before it had been signed, provided for consultation in the event of threatened or actual aggression and for military assistance, which was not to be absolutely automatic. (In the event of aggression in the North Atlantic region, each party would undertake "immediately, individually and in accord with the other parties, whatever action it shall judge necessary, including the use of armed force.") The signing by the twelve members took place in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949. The following day, the U.S. government granted a request for military aid, which was voted by the Congress on 14 October, a few days after the first Soviet atomic explosion.

The treaty was supplemented by the creation of the North Atlantic Council (18 May 1950) and of an integrated command in Europe known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE, 19 December 1950). Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in February 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955. On 13 September 2001, two days into the crisis created by the horrific suicide attacks by Islamic terrorists on the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., NATO Secretary General Lord

Robertson (of Scotland) announced in Brussels that NATO (numbering nineteen members by 2001) stood ready to back U.S. military retaliation to the terror attack described by President George W. Bush as "an act of war." For the first time in its fifty-two-year history, NATO was invoking Article 5 of the alliance's charter, which states that "an armed attack against one or more of the nations in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," and if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will take the necessary action to assist the party so attacked, "including the use of armed force.

At the same time as the Japanese peace treaty, the United States concluded three new alliances: the Pacific Security Pact with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) on 1 September 1951, an alliance with the Philippines on 30 August 1951, and a security treaty with Japan on 8 September 1951. Provisions of ANZUS were invoked for the first time in September 2001, by Australian Prime Minister John Howard, in response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Later, the United States joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created by the Treaty of Manila of 8 September 1954. The other signatories of this collective defense treaty for Southeast Asia were the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. Article 4 guaranteed the political independence and territorial integrity of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although there was no formal alliance with these three states.

The United States also concluded bilateral mutual defense treaties with South Korea (1 October 1953), Pakistan (19 May 1954), and the Republic of China, or Taiwan (2 December 1954). This last treaty gave rise to a curious situation. Anxious to dramatize the danger presented by the People's Republic of China to Taiwan and its dependencies, the administration, without waiting for Senate approval (ultimately obtained in February 1955), had the two houses of Congress vote a joint resolution on 25 and 28 January, respectively (the votes were 409 to 3 in the House of Representatives and 95 to 3 in the Senate), authorizing the president to protect Taiwan against attack.

Thus, the United States, hostile to all military alliances for a century and a half, had enmeshed itself in the most extensive system of alliances in the history of the world, incorporating, at its peak, forty-four allies: twenty American republics, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, thirteen European nations in NATO, Japan, and seven Asian nations (including Iraq).

NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES

Among the most important treaties signed in the postwar years by the United States, despite their inadequacies, were those seeking to ban nuclear testing and to limit the proliferation of nuclear arms. It also became apparent in the years following World War II that national security would extend to activities in outer space. At first, in the face of obvious Soviet satellite superiority, the United States was determined to act unilaterally to assure its security from attack. But NATO had created a situation whereby Europe was dependent upon U.S. nuclear protection, and these obligations placed restraints upon the U.S. capacity to act unilaterally in relation to nuclear defense. Public opposition at home and in Europe to the threat of nuclear destruction forced the United States and the Soviet Union to stabilize the balance of their nuclear strategic weapon systems through some form of treaty arrangement. The first such treaty, the Treaty of Moscow, known as the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom), banning nuclear tests in space, in the atmosphere, and underwater, was signed on 5 August 1963. It was approved on 24 September by the Senate, 80 to 19. As of 2001, more than 100 nations had signed it.

A treaty regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear arms was signed on 1 July 1968. It had been presented to the Geneva disarmament conference on 11 March by the United States and the Soviet Union. A resolution recommending the signing of the treaty was voted on 12 June 1968 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions. As with the Test Ban Treaty, France and China refused to endorse it.

In June 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union began disarmament negotiations aimed at restricting the construction of launching devices for nuclear and thermonuclear projectiles. Such was to be the objective of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). On the occasion of President Richard M. Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union (22–30 May 1972), many economic and technical accords were signed. Among the most important was an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limiting the number of missiles and launchers each

side could deploy. The Senate approved the ABM treaty by a vote of 88 to 2. A further major accord concerning the prevention of nuclear war was signed on 22 June during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Washington, D.C. (16–25 June 1973). A number of agreements curbing nuclear testing were signed (3 July 1974) during Nixon's Moscow visit to meet with Brezhnev for the third time.

SALT bogged own, but negotiations on European cooperation and security came to fruition. In July 1975, President Gerald Ford traveled to Helsinki to attend a summit meeting of thirty-five nations and signed an accord that recognized Europe's boundaries as inviolable and provided vaguely for improvement of human rights, such as emigration and access to information, even in communist bloc countries. President Jimmy Carter made clear subsequently that arms control and the issue of the human rights element in the Helsinki Accords was at the core of relations with the Soviet Union. When Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance visited Moscow late in March 1977 hoping to conclude a SALT II agreement, the Soviets flatly rejected his proposals, indicating that Washington's rhetoric on human rights displeased them as meddling in their internal affairs. However, a new SALT II agreement was reached in 1979 placing a ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although not ratified, the United States and the Soviet Union more or less honored its terms.

In 1983 Republican President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based defense system against nuclear attack. SDI would not only have destabilized the nuclear balance with the Soviet Union, it would certainly have violated the spirit if not the letter of the 1972 ABM treaty. In 1985 Reagan initiated the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, but no treaty resulted in the ensuing summit meetings because of Reagan's adherence to the highly controversial SDI. Of special concern were intermediate-range land-based cruise and ballistic missiles (range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers). Finally, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, which aimed to reduce and eliminate rather than, as in previous arms agreements, limit a class of weapons. The Senate ratified the treaty, with conditions, on 27 May 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. The treaty was to stay in effect until 2001. Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, signed a START agreement with Gorbachev in Moscow in 1991, and in 1993, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, he signed a START II treaty with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Following the adoption of a resolution calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1993, negotiations on a CTBT began in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in January 1994. On 10 September 1996 the UN General Assembly approved the CTBT by an overwhelming vote of 158 to 3, with five nations abstaining. On 24 September 1996, President Bill Clinton became the first national leader to sign the treaty, and the White House submitted it to the U.S. Senate for ratification in September 1997. Despite overwhelming public support, after a long delay the Senate rejected it on 13 October 1999 by a vote of 51 to 48.

More than 160 nations had signed the CTBT by 2001, but of the original five nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia, and United States), only Britain, France, and Russia had ratified it. The treaty required the ratification of forty-four specific countries, including the United States. These were nations that had nuclear power reactors or nuclear research facilities; all were members of the Conference on Disarmament. This group included India and Pakistan, both of which tested nuclear devices in May 1998. India and Pakistan (and China) were thought unlikely to ratify the treaty unless the United States did so first.

The Clinton administration supported a CTBT that would contain the usual clause permitting a state to withdraw from the treaty for reasons of "supreme national interest." (The maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile was considered to be a supreme national interest of the United States.) President Bush declared a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons in 1992, and, by 2001, the United States had not conducted a nuclear test since that time. The disappearance of Cold War bipolarity brought an end to the strategic world it created and sharply reduced the sense of mutual vulnerability experienced by the two superpowers. The basic philosophy behind the 1972 ABM treaty, which banned the deployment of nationwide defenses against missile attacks, was that no nation would risk launching a missile attack if it was left defenseless against a retaliatory strike. After the Gulf War of 1991, however, the United States argued that the spread of missile technology required advanced nations to erect defenses against at least the handful of missiles that could

one day be launched against them by terrorists or rogue states. This, of course, would mean that the ABM treaty would have to be adjusted to accommodate a new strategic reality.

President Clinton pushed for unilaterally constructing a partial missile defense system, which he claimed would protect the United States against the new threat. Russia objected, claiming that this would violate the ABM Treaty and start the major nuclear powers on a new, defensive dimension of the arms race. Yeltsin's successor, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, argued that mutual reduction was the path to stability. There were good political reasons to cooperate with Russia, and in May 2001, President George W. Bush offered Russia a package to broaden the scope of missile defense technology to enlist Russian support for the new system.

By the early twenty-first century there was a broad consensus emerging in the United States that it was in the American national security interest to develop a limited missile defense commensurate with the emergence of real threats and the technology available. The politics of missile defense internationally would require cooperation with allies and Russian involvement. In relation to China, the other major concern for American policymakers, missile defense would also have to be handled as a part of the overall U.S.–China relationship.

The move toward cautious cooperation with Russia at the end of the Cold War was also evident in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. For thirty years after World War II, the United States had primarily regarded space as an area of competition. Tentative steps toward cooperation had been taken in the 1970s, symbolized by the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz docking. In 1988 the Reagan administration signed an agreement with ten European nations, Canada, and Japan to undertake technological collaboration in space and human space flights, but little came of the collaboration until Russia joined in 1993.

HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

Although American attitudes to treaties entered a new phase following World War II, the unilateralist impulse so dominant before the war continued in certain areas. The Senate opposed the ratification of multilateral UN treaties, particularly in relation to human rights issues. In the 1950s human rights became a major political issue in the United States, focusing on domestic racial segregation and civil rights. The civil rights movement and the Cold War were the domestic and international elements in a broad debate over the future of America. Conservatives believed human rights treaties conflicted with important national domestic interests. To them, desegregation at home and American participation in human rights treaties abroad were tools of the communists. Conservatives also regarded human rights treaties as a mechanism whereby the federal government would expand its powers over the rights of states and individuals, thereby destroying the constitutional rights of states and citizens. They believed the federal government would use treaty-making authority to make domestic and local law for the people of the various states, dismantling segregation and the property, marriage, and education laws associated with segregation. UN human rights treaties were seen as threatening the American way of life and introducing communist or socialistic government. The Soviet explosion of a nuclear device, the Korean War, and the success of the communist regime in China confirmed American fears of the threat and spread of communism. A further element in Senate opposition to human rights treaties was a strong chauvinistic belief in the superiority of the United States.

The principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) drawn up by the UN Human Rights Commission, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, were formally codified in the treaty known as the Human Rights Covenant completed in 1954. The United States supported the adoption of the declaration in the United Nations. Although not binding in legal terms, it was regarded by many legal scholars as a statement of customary international law. The Genocide Convention, linked to the proposed declaration and drafted in response to the atrocities of the Third Reich, was the first postwar treaty on human rights. It grew out of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal signed in London on 8 August 1945 by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, its purpose was to make genocide an international crime. President Truman transmitted the convention to the Senate on 16 June 1949 with a recommendation of ratification, but because of Senate opposition led by the American Bar Association (ABA), it was not ratified for almost forty years. The ABA was the main body influencing the Senate. In the early 1950s as many as 60 percent of

senators were lawyers and had a professional relationship with the organization. Of the membership of 41,000, only thirteen were African Americans—the ethnic group that, aside from Native Americans, had been the primary object of an American variant of genocide. The Genocide Convention was unsuccessful because of legal arguments used against it by opponents in the Senate. It is clear that many senators feared that the southern system of discrimination and segregation of African Americans—especially incidents of lynching and race riots—fell within the definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention. They did not appear to have the same awareness in relation to indigenous Americans. The Senate repeatedly held hearings on the Genocide Convention between 1950 and 1985, and it was finally approved with numerous reservations, understandings, and declarations (after passage by the House as the Proxmire Act) on 14 October 1988. The act was signed by President Ronald Reagan on 4 November 1988 and lodged with the United Nations on 15 November.

The opposition to human rights treaties is odd in a way because there is a rich history of the use of human rights precepts in U.S. history—especially U.S. domestic history. In the late eighteenth century, such precepts came under the rubric of "the rights of man," and, as noted by Alexander Hamilton in 1775, they could "never be erased or obscured by a mortal power." By 1789 human rights precepts were an established part of U.S. courts, although the vast majority of Supreme Court decisions referring to human rights have occurred only since the 1950s. John Adams stated in 1781 that the United States stood for "reason, justice, truth, the rights of mankind and the interests of the nations of Europe." Thomas Jefferson used the phrase the "rights of man" in presidential addresses in 1805–1806 to acknowledge the rights of Native Americans and African American slaves. Presidents John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln were among many who reaffirmed these rights in the decades preceding the Civil War. Human rights was the plank many in the Senate used to argue for the abolition of slavery. They argued that slavery was a violation of the rights of man, and that "the Constitution of the United States confers no power on Congress to deprive men of their natural rights and inalienable liberty." Some senators went even further. Charles Sumner argued in 1863, for example, that intervention in foreign countries was permissible if "on the side of Human Rights." In a treaty with China signed in 1868 the United States affirmed the "inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance."

Despite the Supreme Court decisions supporting segregation in the late nineteenth century and the Senate rejection of the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the second decade of the twentieth century there was a clear movement to further human rights. Women were given the vote, the civil rights of Native Americans as citizens were recognized, and Americans began to contemplate incorporating a Declaration of Universal Human Rights into the law of the land. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms were perhaps the clearest expressions of America's commitment to human rights. Indeed the impulse to further human rights had reached such a point by midcentury that the career diplomat and leading architect of the American policy of containment of the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan, felt obliged to warn that the moral legalistic thread running through American foreign policy seriously threatened its vital national interests abroad. Nevertheless, nongovernmental organizations have been highly critical of the selective manner in which the United States has applied its foreign policy in relation to human rights.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, broadened the definition of human rights to include not only the traditional, classic, political, and civil rights such as the rights to property, the right to a fair trial, freedom of movement, freedom of expression and religion, and so on, but also formalized the prohibition of slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, and such social and economic rights as the right to work, right to an adequate standard of living, right to an education, right to seek asylum—rights formerly not included in the jurisdiction of international treaties. Cultural rights—the right to participate in the cultural life of one's community, the right to share in scientific advancement, and the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one's scientific, literary, or artistic production—were also recognized and codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights adopted as legally binding treaties by the UN General Assembly in 1966.

These broad definitions gave many senators pause. President Carter signed the two human

rights treaties in 1978 and recommended their adoption, but the Senate only ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights in 1992, and then with a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations. The most important of these was that the treaty could not be invoked before American courts, and that the provisions of the treaty relating to, for example, "cruel and unusual punishment" (like the death penalty) must be interpreted as it is under the U.S. Constitution. These reservations have been rejected by many parties to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

During the Nixon administration Congress added an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any government that consistently, grossly violated internationally recognized human rights, and in 1976 it extended the prohibition to security assistance and arms sales, except under "extraordinary circumstances." This loophole enabled Washington to continue to support such governments as that of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and President Suharto of Indonesia despite their gross human rights violations. President Carter, who regarded human rights as a major element of foreign policy, did terminate military assistance to a number of Latin American countries because of their human rights policies, although Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush did not pursue Carter's policies. By the late twentieth century the State Department was required to report to Congress annually on the human rights records of those countries receiving U.S. economic and military assistance, some 190 nations. China's violations of human rights were a particular target of the Bush administration, although President Clinton came under strong criticism for renewing China's most-favored-nation status in 1993 and 1994. Increasingly, U.S. support of Israel was being criticized by international nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International because of Israel's alleged human rights violations in its treatment of Palestinians.

ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES

The number and range of international agreements on environmental practices and policies have grown tremendously since the 1970s. Some estimates suggest that there were around 900 agreements in force in 1992, including regional and bilateral treaties. Major accords reached on issues related to global environmental change include the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), and the various agreements forged as part of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.

The United States, like many other countries, came to the realization that solutions to shared environmental problems would occur only through cooperation among states. Successful cooperation, in turn, would require effective international institutions to guide international behavior toward sustainable development. Treaties and agreements are among the more important of these institutions. Environmental scientists identified seven major international environmental problems: oil pollution from tankers, acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, pollution of the North and Baltic seas, mismanagement of fisheries, overpopulation, and misuse of agricultural chemicals.

Responding to concerns that human activities were increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide and methane) in the atmosphere, most nations of the world joined together in 1992 to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and was the world's most comprehensive organized response to international environmental degradation. UNCED delegates sought to adopt conventions on greenhouse gases and biodiversity; to enunciate in an Earth Charter the principles by which humans should conduct themselves in relation to the environment; to adopt a program of action, called Agenda 21, to implement the Earth Charter; and to develop a set of institutional and financial arrangements to support such measures.

The Framework Convention on Climate Change was one of two binding treaties opened for signature at UNCED in 1992. The treaty, also known as the Climate Convention, addressed potential human-induced global warming by pledging countries to seek "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."

Although stated only in general terms, the Climate Convention parties agreed to attempt to limit emissions of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide and methane.

Although signed at UNCED, the Climate Convention was negotiated through a separate process under the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Framework Convention on Climate Change. The text was adopted at New York on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro from 4 to 14 June 1992 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters from 20 June 1992 to 19 June 1993. By that date the convention had received 166 signatures.

The United States was one of the first nations to ratify this treaty. It included a legally nonbinding, voluntary pledge that the major industrialized, developed nations would reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, as it became apparent that major nations such as the United States and Japan would not meet the voluntary stabilization target by 2000, parties to the treaty decided in 1995 to enter into negotiations on a protocol to establish legally binding limitations or reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. These negotiations were completed at a meeting held in Kyoto, Japan, 1–10 December 1997. There was wide disparity among key players especially on three items: (1) the amounts of binding reductions in greenhouse gases to be required, and the gases to be included in these requirements; (2) whether developing countries should be part of the requirements for greenhouse gas limitations; and (3) whether to allow emissions trading and joint implementation, which allow credit to be given for emissions reductions to a country that provides funding or investments in other countries that bring about the actual reductions in those other countries or locations where they may be cheaper to attain.

The Kyoto Protocol committed the industrialized nations to specified, legally binding reductions in emissions of six greenhouse gases. The treaty was opened for signature on 16 March 1998 through 16 March 1999, and the United States signed the protocol on 12 November 1998. The treaty committed the United States to a target of reducing greenhouse gases by 7 percent below 1990 levels during a "commitment period" between 2008 and 2012. By February 2000, eighty-four countries had signed the treaty, including the European Union and most of its members, along with Canada, Japan, China, and a range of developing countries. Some twenty-two countries were reported by the UNFCCC Secretariat to have ratified the treaty. Following completion of the protocol in December of 1997, details of a number of the more difficult issues remained to be negotiated and resolved. At a fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4) held 2–13 November 1998 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, it became apparent that these issues could not be resolved as had been expected during this meeting. Instead, parties established a two-year "Buenos Aires action plan" to deal with these issues, with a deadline for completion by the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) held in The Hague, Netherlands, 13–24 November 2000.

More than 7,000 participants from 182 governments, 323 intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and 443 media outlets attended the COP-6 meeting. COP-6 sought to reduce differences among member countries over the following issues: the transfer of technology to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition; the adverse effects of climate change and the impact of implementation of response measures; best practices in domestic policies and measures to address greenhouse gas emissions; the mechanisms outlined under the Kyoto Protocol; a compliance system for the protocol; and issues relating to the land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector. Despite the best efforts of COP-6 president Jan Pronk (of the Netherlands), by 23 November negotiations had stalled. Two days later, Pronk announced that delegates had failed to reach agreement. Delegates agreed to suspend COP-6 and expressed a willingness to resume their work in 2001.

President Clinton voiced strong support for the Kyoto Protocol but criticized it for not including commitments for developing countries. The United States signature was criticized by several members of Congress who opposed the treaty on a number of grounds, including questions about the scientific justification for it and about the likely economic impacts that might occur if the United States were to attempt to meet its emission reduction commitments. In recognition of the opposition to the protocol expressed in the Senate by Resolution 98 (which passed 95–0), President Clinton indicated that he would not submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until meaningful developing-country participation had been achieved, thereby delaying indefinitely any possibility of ratification.

House and Senate delegations served as observers on the U.S. delegation to the Kyoto meeting, as well as to other COP meetings, including Buenos Aires. Supporters and opponents of the protocol were included in these delegations. A number of committees held hearings on the implications of the protocol for the United States—its economy, energy prices, impacts on climate change, and other related issues. While the Clinton administration stated that the treaty could be implemented without harm to the United States economy and without imposing additional taxes, a number of questions related to how its goals could be achieved, and at what cost, continued to be of interest to Congress.

In a major setback for the environmental movement, in April 2001, President George W. Bush, responding to pressure from domestic business interests, announced that the United States no longer regarded itself bound by the Kyoto Protocol. This decision represented the triumph of U.S. economic interests over the realistic preservation of the natural global environment, and reflected the force of economic motives in the United States regardless of any detrimental impact on the world.

POST–WORLD WAR II COLLECTIVE TRADE AGREEMENTS

The determination of the United States to spread "free" market capitalism can be seen in the multilateral economic agreements and treaties entered into by the United States in the last decade of the twentieth century. Following World War II, Washington sought cooperative ways to rebuild the world economy and create a more coherent institutional framework within which the United States might best utilize its economic strength. This restructuring was to be based on the law of comparative advantage and free trade.

The first steps were taken at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where forty-four nations met from 1 July to 22 July 1944 and created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee the world's monetary and exchange-rate systems. The Bretton Woods Conference also established the World Bank to rebuild western Europe utilizing Marshall Plan funds. Congress passed the Bretton Woods Agreement Act in July 1945 (House 345 to 18; Senate 61 to 16). In 1946 the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on Trade and Employment created the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), to which the United States became a party. The trade rules in the GATT were part of the International Trade Organization (ITO) agreed to in the Havana charter in 1948. Interestingly, because the rules governing world trade set out in the GATT were so ambiguous, flexible, and loosely framed, Congress refused to ratify U.S. membership in the International Trade Organization. So the United States joined through an executive agreement, using power given to the president under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Congress has never recognized the GATT, but in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, it extended the power given to the president in the 1934 act to negotiate tariff-cutting agreements.

The initial purpose of the GATT was to negotiate tariff concessions among members and to establish a code of conduct and procedures for the resolution of trade disputes by negotiation. The core assumption underlying American participation in these efforts to encourage multilateral trade arrangements was that international cooperation in trade and investment created harmonious political relations and reduced tensions between nations. The GATT was founded on the principles of nondiscrimination and multilateralism in international trade. Nondiscrimination was expressed through unconditional most-favored-nation status for all contracting parties. By this convention, if tariffs on imports from one country were lowered, the tariff on all imports of the same goods from other GATT members must also be reduced. Most-favored-nation treaties had been the preferred device for the United States in dealing with China in the nineteenth century, when the United States gained access to the China market on the back of British imperialism. Indeed, most-favored-nation treaties were favored throughout U.S. history, and the GATT was just the latest embodiment of this mechanism of extending commercial opportunities. Multilateralism in the 1950s and 1960s favored the expansion of U.S. corporations across the globe, but by the 1970s and 1980s free trade meant that the United States faced stiff competition from the revitalized economies of western Europe and Japan. At first Washington sought to maintain its advantage by promoting the expansion of the GATT rules into nontraditional areas. GATT sponsored a series of multinational trade negotiations (called rounds) to progressively lower tariffs and eliminate unfair trade practices. At the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), in which 117 countries participated, the GATT agreement was extended to include such areas as services, patents, trade-

marks, copyright, and, most importantly, agriculture. At its final meeting (held in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 7 April 1994), the Uruguay Round also created the World Trade Organization, which, from 1 January 1995, would take over the administrative functions formerly conducted by GATT. Congress legislated to implement the agreement on 7 December 1994.

Under President Reagan the United States adopted protectionist measures. It attempted to stem the hemorrhage of its traditional areas of comparative advantage through "managed" trade and ending European subsidies on agriculture. When members of GATT resisted, Washington reverted to a unilateral policy—falling back on Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allowed for more effective (punitive) measures on goods entering the United States. The United States also entered bilateral arrangements with Canada.

As the twentieth century came to an end the world economy was in turmoil. Macroeconomic failures across countries had created staggering levels of unemployment in rich and poor countries alike. American protectionist practices, along with the programs dictated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, helped increase the gap between rich and poor countries. Mexico, one of the countries whose economy was most at risk because of foreign-owed debt—primarily to American-owned banks—had signed the GATT in 1986, and in response to International Monetary Fund demands, began to restructure its economy along lines acceptable to U.S. economic and financial interests. These requirements included elimination of fetters on the free market, privatizing areas of the economy that were previously under public control, and eliminating restrictions on foreign investment. Mexico set in motion a series of tariff-reduction and other economic liberalization measures. It also indicated that it would be interested in securing a "Canadian" deal with the United States.

The United States, once the defender of multilateralism and free trade, sought regional solutions to its economic woes. One such initiative was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed with Canada and Mexico. Designed to create a free trade zone in the North American continent, it came into effect on 1 January 1994. NAFTA was an executive agreement reached on 12 August 1992. It was approved by the Congress after a vigorous national debate in late 1993.

In its own words, one of the main objectives of NAFTA was "the elimination of tariffs between Canada, Mexico, and the United States on 'qualifying' goods by the year 1998 for originating goods from Canada and for originating goods from Mexico by the year 2008." It also sought to promote fair competition, increase investment in the territories, protect and enforce intellectual property rights, and establish a framework for further cooperation between the countries.

Critics argued that NAFTA had only a limited relation to free trade. They pointed out that a primary U.S. objective was increased protection for "intellectual property," including software, patents for seeds and drugs, and so on. Such measures were designed to ensure that U.S.-based corporations controlled the technology of the future, including biotechnology, which, it was hoped, would allow protected private enterprise to control health, agriculture, and the means of life generally, locking the poor into dependence and hopelessness. Nevertheless, NAFTA provided Mexican exporters with additional market access and helped attract foreign direct investment into Mexico, in services as well as in the industrial export sector. At the end of 1999, Mexico was the eighth largest export economy in the world, with $280 billion in exports. By the end of 2000, Mexico ranked as the fifth largest export economy in the world (up from twenty-sixth at the beginning of the 1990s) with an estimated $300 billion in exports. Between 1993 and 1999, Mexico's exports to the United States rose a remarkable 160 percent. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that American companies stood to gain $61 billion a year from the Third World if U.S. protectionist demands were satisfied by NAFTA. Opponents further pointed out that NAFTA included intricate "rules of origin" requirements designed to keep foreign competitors out. Moreover, the agreements went far beyond trade. A prime U.S. objective was liberalization of services, which would allow supranational banks to displace domestic competitors and thus eliminate any threat of national economic planning and independent development .

The treaty was also thought likely to have harmful environmental effects, encouraging a shift of production to regions where enforcement was lax. Increasingly in the global economy, production could be shifted to high-repression, low-wage areas and directed to privileged sectors. In 1996, General Motors, for example, planned to close almost two dozen plants in the United States and Canada even as it became the largest private

employer in Mexico. Critics charged that the agreement overrode the rights of workers, consumers, and the future generations who cannot "vote" in the market on environmental issues, and that the goal was to provide a business environment unfettered by government interference. Package and labeling requirements and inspection procedures to protect consumers, for example, would not be required.

NAFTA did set up an institutional framework to address regional environmental issues. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) were two such steps to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law. Mexico attempted to enforce its environmental laws for new companies, thereby diminishing any incentive for firms to relocate to Mexico to avoid environmental enforcement. The Mexican government began to enforce more effectively its environmental laws by imposing sanctions against the more visible polluters and, more importantly, developed a program of voluntary environmental audits. One institution set up to help deal with the extensive environmental problems on the U.S.–Mexico border was the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BEEC). The BEEC was an autonomous, binational organization that supported local communities and other project sponsors in developing and implementing environmental infrastructure projects related to the treatment of water and wastewater and the management of municipal solid waste.

CONCLUSION

The meaning, nature, and purpose of treaties changed significantly over two centuries, reflecting the greater complexity of international relations. Several developments contributed to this phenomenon. Among the more obvious changes that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century were the unprecedented rise in the world's population, the emergence of ethnic awareness around the world, an increase in the number of independent states, and developments associated with inventions in weapons systems, communications, and science, especially biochemistry. Treaties came to address not only the needs met by the relatively simple military security alliances and trade arrangements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they became also instruments for organizing and structuring the tremendously complex demands of an interdependent global geopolitical economic system. Treaties now dictated the conduct of nations in matters of global importance such as human rights, resource use and allocation, pollution, protection of the environment and animal species, intellectual property rights, and a whole host of hitherto unthought-of areas of national behavior. Despite the objections of individual nations, these international arrangements were proving remarkably successful in shaping international and domestic performance, and whether they liked it or not, most nations were linked into a complex international treaty system.

In this interdependent, international environment, the United States found itself in an anomalous position. It could no longer continue to enter—or refuse to enter—into treaty arrangements based solely upon domestic political considerations or an entirely independent assessment of whether or not unilateral action is preferable to multilateral action. The United States, although by some measures the world's most powerful military and economic power and free of the crippling shackles of the Cold War, could not ignore the responsibilities and restraints imposed by such institutions as the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, acting through a global, multilateral, treaty system. Nor could it ignore world opinion while seeking to take advantage of its membership in that treaty system.

Treaties came to impinge upon almost all aspects of the lives of Americans as well as the lives of most of the world's population. Perhaps the most dramatic change in respect to treaties was that they came to reflect the interests of global institutions as much as individual nations or their populations. This was as true of the United States as it was of other nations. A little over two centuries later, the worst fears of the Founders appeared to have been realized: the United States was involved in a series of world entanglements they could not have imagined.

Despite these views, it was not clear at the turn of the twenty-first century that the United States would accept the new order. President George W. Bush and his administration appeared to want to return to the nonentanglement envisioned in the days of the early Republic, and in their desire to do so they struck a resonant chord in the American people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bemis, Samuel F. *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1949.

———. *Pinckney's Treaty: America's Advantage from Europe's Distress.* New Haven, Conn., 1960.

———. *Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy.* New Haven, Conn., 1962. All three Bemis books provide an excellent background to the early treaties.

Byrd, Elbert M. *Treaties and Executive Agreements in the United States, Their Separate Roles and Limitations.* The Hague, 1960. Good on the treaty-making process.

Caldwell, Lynton Keith. *International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions.* 2d ed. Durham, N.C. 1990.

DeConde, Alexander. *Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy Under George Washington.* Westport, Conn., 1958.

———. *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War With France, 1797–1801.* New York, 1966. Both DeConde works clearly set out the issues that shaped early attitudes toward treaties.

DeConde, Alexander, ed. *Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy.* Durham, N.C., 1957. Examines the domestic factors at work between the wars.

Duroselle, Jean Baptiste. *From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913–1945.* Cambridge, Mass., 1963. Helpful for World Wars I and II.

Ferrell, Robert H. *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.* New Haven, Conn., 1952. Careful and scholarly.

Fisher, Louis. *Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President.* 4th ed. Lawrence, Kans., 1997. A survey that contains useful material on treaty ratifications.

Jackson, John H. *The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations.* Cambridge, Mass., 1997. An introduction to trade law and policy by a supporter of GATT and the WTO.

Kaufman, Natalie Hevener. *Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1990. Forceful attack on Senate opposition to human rights treaties, including the Genocide Convention.

Kimball, Warren F. *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941.* Baltimore, 1969. Indispensable on the turning point toward cooperation.

Lake, David A. *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1999. A political scientist examines the tension that surrounded the question of whether the United States should act unilaterally or cooperatively through treaties in twentieth-century foreign relations.

Leopold, Richard. *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History.* New York, 1962. Although it does not go beyond the 1950s, this survey provides helpful structural details on the relationship between treaties and foreign relations.

Malloy, William M., comp. *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776–1909.* 2 vols. Holmes Beach, Fla., 1996. A comprehensive collection of nineteenth-century treaties.

Paterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan. *American Foreign Relations: A History.* 2 vols. Boston, 2000. A particularly useful survey of United States foreign relations for this topic.

Pletcher, David M. *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War.* Columbia, Mo., 1973. Remains the classic examination of these episodes.

Prucha, Francis Paul. *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians.* 2 vols. Lincoln, Neb., 1984. Traces the stages of government policy toward Native Americans.

Rosenne, Shabtai. *Developments in the Law of Treaties, 1945–1986.* Cambridge, 1989. Technical lectures on legal aspects of how treaties have developed since World War II.

United States Department of State. *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements.* Washington, D.C., annually since 1950. The most up-to-date list (by topic and country) of treaties to which the United States is a signatory.

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. "Implications of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change." Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Congress, 2d Session, 11 February 1998 (Washington D.C., 1998). One of a series of congressional publications on hearings before Congress on the Kyoto Protocol.

Van Cleave, William R., and S. T. Cohen. *Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue.* New York, 1987. Critical of test ban treaties.

Zupnick, Elliott. *Visions and Revisions: The U.S. in the Global Economy.* Boulder, Colo., 1999. A strong defense of the U.S. role in globalization.

See also AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES; ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; COLLECTIVE SECURITY; CONGRESSIONAL POWER; THE CONSTITUTION; ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY; HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL POWER; NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY; TARIFF POLICIES.

The Vietnam War and Its Impact

Larry Berman and Jason Newman

On 2 September 1945 at Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh issued the historic Vietnamese proclamation of independence with words borrowed from the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold the truth that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Ho Chi Minh—who four years earlier had founded the League for Revolution and Independence, or Vietminh—had been preparing his entire life for the opportunity to rid Vietnam of colonial rule, both Japanese and French. Crowds marched from one end of Saigon to the other chanting, "Do Dao de quoc, Do Dao thuc dan phap." (Down with the Imperialists, Down with the French Colonialists.) Throughout Vietnam banners proclaimed "Vietnam for the Vietnamese."

Ho Chi Minh requested support for his cause from nations that recognized the principles of self-determination and equality of nations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt seemed to favor an international trusteeship for Vietnam to be followed by independence, but new pressures would soon change the situation for Ho and the Vietnamese. As the Cold War developed, Washington became more sensitive to the colonial interests of its allies than to the decolonization of Indochina. Ho was defined as being pro-Moscow. U.S. Cold War policy was guided by the containment of a perceived Soviet aggression. Containment was composed of economic, political, and military initiatives that sought to maintain stability in the international arena. The bitter recriminations in the United States over "who lost China?" after 1949 led the Truman administration to do what it could to prevent a Vietminh victory in Vietnam or anywhere else in Indochina. Vietnam was valued not for its own merit, but was seen rather as a test of America's global position and credibility. In December 1950, the United States joined France and the French-controlled governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. The United States agreed to provide military supplies and equipment through a military advisory group. This small contingent of U.S. advisers provided limited logistical services; all supplies and equipment were dispensed through the French Expeditionary Corps. U.S. aid to the French military effort mounted from $130 million in 1950 to $800 million in 1953.

In May 1953 the French government appointed General Henri Navarre commander in Vietnam and charged him with mounting a major new offensive against the Vietminh. One of Navarre's first moves, late in 1953, was to dispatch French troops to Dien Bien Phu, the juncture of a number of roads in northwestern Indochina about 100 miles from the Chinese border. On 7 May 1954 the French forces were defeated there. Shortly thereafter the Geneva Conference was held, bringing together representatives of Vietminh-controlled territory and Bao Dai's French-controlled government—which would later evolve into North and South Vietnam, respectively—the other emerging Indochinese states of Laos and Cambodia, and the major powers of France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. The Geneva Accords, formally known as the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indochina, essentially settled military but not political issues.

The Vietminh controlled most of Vietnam and sought a political settlement at Geneva that would lead to the withdrawal of French forces and the establishment of an independent government led by Ho Chi Minh. But at the Geneva Conference, Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, Pierre Mendès-France of France, Vyacheslav Molotov of the Soviet Union, and Chou En-lai of China pressured the Vietminh, through its representative, Pham Van Dong, to accept much less than it had won in battle. Under great pressure in

particular from the Chinese and Soviets, who feared American military intervention under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Ho made two major concessions—a provisional demarcation line drawn at the seventeenth parallel and free nationwide elections for unifying the country supervised by an international commission scheduled for 1956. The election was intended to settle the question of political control over Vietnam. Externally, the accords provided for a neutral Vietnam, meaning that no military alliances were to be made by either side.

Three months after Dien Bien Phu, President Dwight D. Eisenhower convened the National Security Council (NSC) to review U.S. policy in Asia. The president was already on record as claiming that

> strategically South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam, would have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

Eisenhower had also articulated the line of reasoning that came to be known as the domino theory, that the fall of one state to communism would lead to the next and the next being knocked over. Not losing Southeast Asia thus became the goal of the United States.

In an October 1954 letter to the president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, President Eisenhower was exceedingly clear:

> I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. The purpose of this offer is to assist the government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

By 1961 Vietnam loomed as a test of President John F. Kennedy's inaugural commitment "to pay any price, to bear any burden, in the defense of freedom." But Diem's government had evolved into a family oligarchy that ruled through force and repression. Opposition grew from a wide range of political, social, and religious groups. Protests raged, including the quite dramatic self-immolations by Buddhist monks. On 1 November 1963, Diem was removed from office and murdered in the back of a U.S.-built personnel carrier. The coup was planned and implemented by South Vietnamese military officers; U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were involved. Kennedy, given the opportunity to instruct Lodge that the coup be stopped, issued no such order.

Diem's death was followed by a period of great political instability in Saigon, while three weeks after the coup Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. His successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, assumed office with the belief that the United

THE LESSONS OF 1954

There is an important historical caveat worth noting. Richard Nixon was vice president of the United States at the time of the Geneva Conference of 1954 and Pham Van Dong headed the DRV delegation. By 1970 both men would be the leaders of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, respectively. Both drew lessons from the Geneva experience that would influence how each approached the final phase of negotiations in Paris nearly two decades later. Dong always believed that the Vietminh had been betrayed by its friends and was wary of a repetition. Therefore, he was determined that the Soviet Union and China not use their interest in improved relations with the United States to leverage a quick settlement. For Nixon the lessons from Geneva were just as clear. He would again try to use Hanoi's friends, the Soviets and Chinese, to force concessions that would lead to a political settlement advantageous to the United States. Nixon would insist that President Thieu remain in office as part of any negotiated settlement. Once that goal was accomplished, there would be no need to hold elections until the North Vietnamese troops went home. After all, with American support, Diem had called off the elections of 1956. Such was Nixon's view of Geneva's lessons.

States had to ensure the stability and security of South Vietnam. Momentum was building in favor of action that might reverse the disintegrating political conditions in South Vietnam, which was under military pressure from the North Vietnamese–backed National Liberation Front (NLF), or Vietcong (VC). One form of new activity involved U.S. Navy patrols up the Gulf of Tonkin for intelligence-gathering purposes. On 2 August 1964 the destroyer *Maddox* was returning from one of these DeSoto electronic espionage missions when North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired on the ship. Rather than withdrawing U.S. ships from the danger zone, the president ordered another destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy,* to join the *Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin. On 4 August both the *Maddox* and the *C. Turner Joy* reportedly came under attack. The president later met with congressional leaders and sought assurance that his response would be supported.

On 10 August 1964, Congress passed the Southeast Asia Resolution, also known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which authorized Johnson "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The president later used the resolution to justify his escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. With the 1964 presidential election against Republican conservative Barry Goldwater less than three months away, however, he had no desire to be portrayed as planning for war. Instead, he left the rhetoric of war to Goldwater and the planning to his military advisers. "Peace candidate" Johnson won the election in a landslide.

AMERICANIZING THE WAR

Rolling Thunder, the commitment of marines in March 1965, and the deployment of other troops all before June 1965 provided ample evidence that the war was already on the road to being Americanized. Throughout June and July of 1965, the question of "Americanizing" the war was at the center of all foreign policy discussions. Undersecretary of State George Ball tried to warn Johnson of the dangers ahead. In an 18 June memo titled "Keeping the Power of Decision in the South Vietnam Crisis," Ball argued that the United States was on the threshold of a new war:

> In raising our commitment from 50,000 to 100,000 or more men and deploying most of the increment in combat roles we were beginning a new war—the United States directly against the VC. The president's most difficult continuing problem in South Vietnam is to prevent "things" from getting into the saddle—or, in other words, to keep control of policy and prevent the momentum of events from taking command.

The president needed to understand the effect of losing control:

> Perhaps the large-scale introduction of U.S. forces with their concentrated firepower will force Hanoi and the VC to the decision we are seeking. On the other hand, we may not be able to fight the war successfully enough—even with 500,000 Americans in South Vietnam we must have more evidence than we now have that our troops will not bog down in the jungles and rice paddies—while we slowly blow the country to pieces.

Ball tried to review the French experience for Johnson, reminding the president that

> the French fought a war in Vietnam, and were finally defeated—after seven years of bloody struggle and when they still had 250,000 combat-hardened veterans in the field, supported by an army of 205,000 South Vietnamese. To be sure, the French were fighting a colonial war while we are fighting to stop aggression. But when we have put enough Americans on the ground in South Vietnam to give the appearance of a white man's war, the distinction as to our ultimate purpose will have less and less practical effect.

Ball's arguments had little influence on policymakers. On 26 June, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara circulated his "Program of Expanded Military and Political Moves with Respect to Vietnam." McNamara argued that North Vietnam was clearly winning the war and "the tide almost certainly cannot begin to turn in less than a few months and may not for a year or more; the war is one of attrition and will be a long one." McNamara defined winning as "to create conditions for a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. Under present conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small—and the VC are winning now—largely because the ratio of guerrilla to antiguerrilla forces is unfavorable to the government." The secretary recommended that ground strength be increased to whatever force levels were necessary to show the VC that they "cannot win."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) urged Johnson to call up the Reserves and the National Guard and seek public support on national security grounds.

National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy proposed that the president go before a joint session of Congress or make a statement in the form of a fireside address. But Johnson decided that there would be no public announcement of a change in policy. Instead, he simply called a midday press conference for 9 July. The content as well as the forum of Johnson's presentation downplayed its significance. The expected call-up of the Reserves and request for new funds were absent. In announcing a troop increase, Johnson did not fully reveal the levels he had now authorized: 175,000 to 200,000. Instead, he noted only the immediate force increment of fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000. Nor did he tell the U.S. people that just a few days earlier, Clark Clifford had privately warned against any substantial buildup of U.S. ground troops. "This could be a quagmire," the president's trusted friend had warned. "It could turn into an open-ended commitment on our part that would take more and more ground troops, without a realistic hope of ultimate victory." Instead, Johnson chose to walk a thin line of credibility. "Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested," Johnson observed at his afternoon press conference. His seemingly passing remark correctly indicated that the U.S. commitment had become open-ended: "I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs."

Having made the fateful decision, Johnson traveled in February 1966 to Honolulu for a firsthand assessment of the war's progress and to secure additional commitments for political reform from South Vietnam. Johnson utilized his favorite exhortation, telling Westmoreland to "nail the coonskin to the wall" by reaching the crossover point in the war of attrition by December 1966. This so-called light at the end of the tunnel was to be achieved primarily by inflicting losses on enemy forces. Johnson and his advisers expected the enemy to seek negotiations when this ever-elusive crossover point was reached. A fixation on statistics led to use of such terms as "kill ratios," "body counts," "weapons-loss ratios," "died of wounds," and "population-control data" to show that progress was being made. The computers could always demonstrate at least the end of the tunnel; statistically, the United States was always winning the war. In the words of Senator J. William Fulbright, the Great Society had become the "sick society." Disenchantment with the war manifested itself in the growing antiwar movement that began organizing massive protests and moratoriums against U.S. policy.

THE TET OFFENSIVE

While the American people had been told repeatedly that there was a light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam, the deployment of some 525,000 troops had brought the United States no closer to achieving its limited political goals, and there would soon be a call for major new increases in troop deployments. In effect, the United States faced a stalemate in Vietnam because the enemy controlled the strategic initiative. During the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, the Vietnamese New Year, known as Tet, approximately 80,000 North Vietnamese regulars and NLF guerrillas attacked more than one hundred cities in South Vietnam. The military goal was to spark a popular uprising and, as captured documents revealed, "move forward to achieve final victory." This final victory was not achieved, but psychological and political gains were made. The front page of the 1 February *New York Times* showed a picture of the U.S. embassy in Saigon under assault. Guerrillas had blasted their way into the embassy and held part of the embassy grounds for nearly six hours. All nineteen guerrillas were killed, as were four MPs, a marine guard, and a South Vietnamese embassy employee.

The enemy sustained major losses at Tet, from which it would take years to recover. But Tet also demonstrated the enemy's great skill in planning, coordination, and courage. North Vietnamese regulars and NLF forces had successfully infiltrated previously secure population centers and discredited Saigon's claims of security from attack.

On 27 February, Johnson received JCS chairman Earle Wheeler's report on military requirements in South Vietnam. The document contained a request for 206,000 additional troops. To some, this was proof of the bankruptcy of the army's strategy in Vietnam. Despite the large enemy losses during Tet, the United States was no closer to achieving its goal in Vietnam than it had been in 1965. There appeared to be no breaking point in the enemy's will to continue the struggle indefinitely. The new reinforcements would bring the total American military commitment to three-quarters of a million troops. It was becoming increasingly evident that no amount of military

power would bring North Vietnam to the conference table for negotiations.

That same evening CBS news anchorman Walter Cronkite told the nation that the war was destined to remain deadlocked:

> We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. . . . For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.

BOMBING HALT

The president appointed a task force, under the direction of Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, to evaluate a request for 206,000 troops. The president's final instructions to Clifford were "give me the lesser of evils." For weeks Johnson wavered between a bombing halt and sending another 206,000 troops. Within the White House, Clifford led the cabal to convince their president that he ought to stop the bombing and thereby start negotiations that might end the war. "Is he with us?" a phrase from the French Revolution, became the code for those working toward a bombing halt.

Johnson's instincts told him that the North Vietnamese could not be trusted, and his fears made him worry that a bombing halt would be exploited by domestic political opponents. Still, in the end Johnson listened to those who urged that he stop the bombing. Addressing the nation on 31 March 1968, the president spoke of his willingness "to move immediately toward peace through negotiations." Johnson announced that "there is no need to delay talks that could bring an end to this long and this bloody war." He was "taking the first step to deescalate the level of hostilities" by unilaterally reducing attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area just north of the demilitarized zone, known as the DMZ. "The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population and most of its territory," said Johnson. "Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi."

Johnson called on North Vietnam's leader, Ho Chi Minh, to respond favorably and positively to these overtures and not to take advantage of this restraint. "We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations." The United States was "ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end." To prove his sincerity, Johnson named the distinguished American ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman as his "personal representative for such talks," asking Harriman to "search for peace."

Then, in a dramatic gesture toward national unity, the president announced that he would not seek reelection, declaring, "I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome partisan causes of this office—the presidency of your country. Accordingly, I shall not seek and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your president."

Three days later, Radio Hanoi broadcast the news that the DRV had accepted Johnson's offer and would agree to establish contact with representatives of the United States. This was the first time that Hanoi had said publicly that it was willing to open talks with the United States. Hanoi was careful to stipulate that these initial contacts would focus first on bringing about the unconditional end to American bombing and other acts of aggression against Vietnam.

On 3 May 1968 President Johnson announced that both sides had agreed to hold preliminary talks in Paris, but he cautioned that "this is only the first step. There are many, many hazards and difficulties ahead." The talks were scheduled to begin on 10 May. President Johnson knew that the government of South Vietnam (GVN), headed by President Nguyen Van Thieu, opposed any bilateral discussions with the North Vietnamese on issues that would effect the South. Thieu believed that North Vietnam would use these initial contacts to demand direct negotiations between the GVN and the NLF in the hope of creating the conditions for a coalition government. Thieu also feared the election of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, a Democratic president hopeful, who was slowly distancing himself from Johnson's position.

President Thieu believed that a Humphrey victory would bring a coalition government and a U.S. withdrawal. "A Humphrey victory would mean a coalition government in six months. With Nixon at least there was a chance," recalled Thieu. This view was shared by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, who remembered that "we had little desire to sit down with the communists at all, and no intention of sitting down with, and

thereby recognizing, the National Liberation Front." Thieu thus decided he would not go to Paris even if there were a bombing halt.

President Thieu had two contacts in Washington: Anna Chennault, the widow of Flying Tigers hero General Claire Chennault, and Bui Diem, the respected South Vietnamese ambassador. Chennault was a central figure in the China lobby, a vehement anticommunist, and chair of Republican Women for Nixon. During the 1968 campaign Nixon, the Republican candidate for president, asked her to be "the sole representative between the Vietnamese government and the Nixon campaign headquarters." With Nixon's encouragement, Chennault encouraged Thieu to defy Johnson. The latter knew all about it, but his information had been obtained from illegal wiretaps and surveillance, so he could not do much with it.

NIXON'S PEACE WITH HONOR

Prior to 5 May 1968, Nixon spoke of seeking a "victorious peace" in Vietnam. But on that day, speaking in New Hampshire, the nation's first primary state, he used the term "honorable peace" for the first time. Crucial to his plan was the concept of linkage—using the Soviet Union to get the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously.

In what Nixon believed was an off-the-record discussion with southern delegates at the 1968 Republican Convention, the nominee described another way to end the war:

> How do you bring a war to a conclusion? I'll tell you how Korea was ended. We got in there and had this messy war on our hands. Eisenhower let the word get out—let the word go out diplomatically to the Chinese and the North Koreans that we would not tolerate this continued round of attrition. And within a matter of months, they negotiated.

When Nixon took office in January 1969, the United States had been involved in combat operations in Vietnam for nearly four years. U.S. military forces totaled 536,040, the bulk of which were ground combat troops. More than 30,000 Americans had lost their lives to then and the war cost $30 billion in fiscal year 1969. In 1968 alone, more than 14,500 U.S. troops were killed.

Richard Nixon was determined that Vietnam would not ruin his presidency, as had been the case with Lyndon Johnson. The Nixon plan was to "de-Americanize" the war, an approach that became known as Vietnamization. It involved building up the South Vietnamese armed forces so that they could assume greater combat responsibility while simultaneously withdrawing U.S. combat troops. The U.S. military role would shift from fighting the DRV and VC to advising the South Vietnamese and sending in a massive influx of military equipment and weaponry. Perhaps most important, Nixon changed the political objective of U.S. intervention from guaranteeing a free and independent South Vietnam to creating the opportunity for South Vietnam to determine its own political future. Vietnamization along with negotiation were Nixon's twin pillars for achieving an honorable peace.

During the first weeks of his presidency, Nixon also began to consider options for dealing with Cambodia, including the feasibility and utility of a quarantine to block equipment and supplies coming from that nation into South Vietnam. Under code name MENU, B-52 strikes began on 18 March 1969 against enemy sanctuaries in that country. They were kept secret from the American public, in part because Cambodia was a neutral country, but even more important because Nixon had not been elected to expand the war after just three months in office.

Halfway through Nixon's first year in the White House, President Thieu requested that a meeting be held in Washington, D.C., but Nixon, fearful of demonstrations, selected Honolulu, which the Vietnamese rejected because they did not want to meet on a U.S. resort island. Nixon next suggested the remote island of Midway, where Nixon won Thieu's public acquiescence for Vietnamization. When Nixon proposed that secret or private contacts be started between Washington and Hanoi in an effort to secure a negotiated settlement, Thieu asked that he be kept fully informed on the details of these meetings and that he be consulted on any matters internal to South Vietnam. He received assurances that this would most certainly be the case. By January 1972 the United States had conceded on almost every major point, including, at least implicitly, that any cease-fire would be a cease-fire in place, which meant that North Vietnamese troops then in the South would stay there. What came next was predictable: The North Vietnamese could not get the United States to dispose of Thieu for them. They did not intend to stop fighting until they regained the South. Thus, they had one obvious strategy: stall the peace, pour forces into the South, and strike a deal only when a

cease-fire in place virtually amounted to a "victory in place." In an announcement made on national television on 25 January 1972, President Nixon revealed that Henry Kissinger had been holding private talks with the North Vietnamese starting in August 1969 and that every reasonable American proposal to end the war had been turned down. Nixon offered the details of a secret proposal made on 11 October 1971 that called for internationally supervised free elections in which the communists would participate and before which President Thieu would resign.

On 30 March 1972, Easter Sunday, the North Vietnamese began their biggest attack of the Vietnam War. It was a conventional military assault, designed to inflict a crippling blow against the army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and would last six months. On 8 May, President Nixon met with the NSC and told of plans for mining Haiphong harbor and resuming the bombardment of Hanoi and Haiphong. He also told the council that he would inform the public of his decision in a televised speech that evening.

After the NSC meeting Nixon brought his cabinet together and stated frankly, "We've crossed the Rubicon." As Nixon would put it to Kissinger the next day, he wanted to "go for broke" and "go to the brink" to "destroy the enemy's warmaking capacity." He wanted to avoid the previous mistakes of "letting up" on the bombing that he and Johnson had made in the past. "I have the will in spades," he declared. Nixon was determined not to repeat LBJ's mistakes. "Those bastards are going to be bombed like they've never been bombed before," gloated Nixon. What followed, starting in May, was the most successful use of airpower during the Vietnam War and one of the largest aerial bombardments in world history—Operation Linebacker. Targeting roads, bridges, rail lines, troops, bases, and supply depots, the attack was the first large-scale use of precision-guided laser bombs in modern aerial warfare.

In the short term, the offensive was clearly a military defeat for the North Vietnamese and would cost General Vo Nguyen Giap his job as chief strategist. On the other hand, although Hanoi never retained control over a provincial capital, the North Vietnamese did gain ground along the Cambodian and Laotian borders and the area just south of the DMZ. Hanoi remained in control of this territory for the rest of the war, and in 1975 would use it to launch a successful attack on Saigon.

A week before the 1972 presidential election, Kissinger stated that "peace is at hand," but again the talks stalled and Nixon turned to "jugular diplomacy." Nixon decided that no treaty would be signed until after the November 1972 election, when his position would be strengthened by what most observers expected to be an overwhelming election victory over Democratic challenger and antiwar leader George McGovern. Reelected by just such a landslide, Nixon moved swiftly against North Vietnam.

On 13 December the peace talks broke down, and on the following day Nixon ordered that the bombing be resumed. Now his only goal was to bring Hanoi back to the bargaining table. On 18 December, Linebacker II—widely known as the Christmas bombing—began with B-52 bomber sorties and fighter-bomber sorties on the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The day prior to the start of the Christmas bombing, Nixon told Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I don't want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn't hit this target or that one. This is your chance to use military power effectively to win this war, and if you don't, I'll consider you responsible." Admiral Moorer called for expanded air attacks with an objective of "maximum destruction of selected military targets in the vicinity of Hanoi/Haiphong." He ordered that B-52s carry maximum ordnance with preapproved restrikes of targets. Kissinger wrote later that "the North Vietnamese committed a cardinal error in dealing with Nixon, they cornered him." The B-52s were his last roll of the dice.

THE PEACE AGREEMENT

The basic elements of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam—signed at the International Conference Center in Paris on 27 January 1973—provided for the end of the fighting and the withdrawal of American forces. The United States committed itself to ending all air and naval actions against North Vietnam and to dismantling or deactivating all mines in the waters of North Vietnam. Within two months after the signing of the agreement, all forces of the United States and of U.S. allies would depart Vietnam. The United States was barred from sending new war materials or supplies to South Vietnam and was required to dismantle all military bases there. The armed forces of the GVN and the NLF were allowed to remain where they were, but the

cease-fire barred the introduction of new troops, military advisers, military personnel—including technical military personnel—armaments, munitions, and war material from North Vietnam or anywhere else. The disposition of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam would be determined by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of "national reconciliation and concord." In addition, the accord required the return of all captured military personnel and foreign civilians during the same two-month period. The two South Vietnamese parties would handle the return of Vietnamese civilians. The United States and North Vietnam promised to uphold the principles of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, which included free and democratic elections under international supervision.

Even more unusually, the treaty called for a Four-Party Joint Military Commission to be constituted by the four signatories for implementing and monitoring compliance with the provisions on withdrawal, cease-fire, dismantling of bases, return of war prisoners, and exchange of information on those missing in action. An International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), consisting of Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland, would oversee the agreement and report violations. In *No Peace, No Honor* (2001), Larry Berman utilized recently declassified records to show that Nixon had little faith in the Paris accord and expected that the accord would be violated, which would trigger a brutal military response. Permanent war (air war, not ground operations) at acceptable political cost was what Nixon expected from the signed agreement. President Thieu received repeated assurances that when the communists violated the accord, the B-52s would return to punish Hanoi, but the Watergate scandal prevented such a retaliation.

Not a moment of peace ever came to Vietnam. Following the return of the American POWs, there was little adherence to the Paris agreements from either North or South Vietnam. The U.S. troops departed Vietnam sixty days after the Paris agreement was signed, but the level of violence had not significantly declined. Watergate was about to destroy the Nixon presidency and a new antiwar Congress had little interest in continuing economic support to the South. Faced with funding a $722 million supplement to stave off a collapse of South Vietnam, Congress refused to act. For many Americans, the last image of Vietnam was that of ambassador Graham Martin carrying a folded American flag during the final evacuation. This bitter aftermath left Americans searching for explanations as to what had gone wrong and who was responsible for failure.

TAPES, BLACKMAIL, AND PEACE TALKS

The Watergate tapes revealed that in January 1973, when the Democratic-controlled Congress was investigating the Watergate break-in, Nixon devised a bizarre scheme of pressuring former President Lyndon Johnson to call his Democrat friends in Congress and request that they stop the Watergate investigation. Nixon threatened Johnson with a public disclosure that Johnson had bugged the Nixon and Agnew planes and campaign offices during the 1968 campaign, thus embarrassing Johnson and also proving that Nixon was not the first to illegally wiretap those suspected of leaking information. On a 9 January 1973 tape, Nixon says, "LBJ could turn off the whole Congressional investigation." But Johnson trumped Nixon by threatening to release the complete National Security Agency (NSA) Chennault files showing that the Nixon campaign had "illegally interfered with the Paris peace talks by convincing Saigon to stay away until after Nixon came to office."

LESSONS AND LEGACIES

There may be no phrase more overused in foreign policy discussions and analyses since the 1960s than "the lessons of Vietnam." Nonetheless, exactly what those lessons are have been hotly debated. The debate has also been played out in the larger field of American politics, splitting the Democratic Party for more than two decades and fueling the political appeal of Ronald Reagan in 1980. It has framed U.S. policy toward a number of other countries, most notably Central America in the late 1970s and the 1980s and later in the Persian Gulf, where the Vietnam analogy was invoked with regularity. And time and again the debate has come back to heated arguments about the Vietnam War itself, as scholars and former policymakers have continued to reflect, lecture, and write about it. Former Defense Secretary Robert S.

McNamara, in his *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (1995), broke his own long silence on the subject with the provocative admission that while "we acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation . . . we were wrong, terribly wrong."

In 1975 the Vietnamese economy lay in shambles and it would take decades to rebuild. Most of the population of fifty-five million was unemployed, impoverished, and suffering from the emotional and physical ramifications of the war. Over two million had been killed and 300,000 were reported missing and presumed dead. The number of Vietnamese who lost loved ones and family members was many times more. The loss of so many adults made Vietnam by the 1990s one of the youngest nations on earth.

Lacking an industrialized base and highly lucrative mineral or agricultural products, Vietnam found one immediate solution by exporting over $1 billion in abandoned American military equipment and scrap metal. The new regime also sold rice and other essential goods at below market prices for ten years. But a war against Cambodia beginning in December 1978 strained the economy. Large defense expenditures to fight the Khmer Rouge and conduct a war with the People's Republic of China in 1979, along with low consumer prices, combined to unleash widespread famine and hyperinflation that lasted into the 1980s.

Economic reforms improved conditions in Vietnam beginning in the mid-1980s. The benefits of peace with Cambodia after 1989 were balanced by the loss of economic aid from the declining Soviet Union. Impatient at the slow pace of economic change and heartened by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, over seventy-five thousand Vietnamese fled the nation in 1989 for Australia, the United States, and other nations willing to accept them. Vietnam continued privatization reforms, known as *dau man hade,* that transformed it into the third-largest rice producer in the world.

Another long-term impact of the Vietnam conflict entailed the presence of toxic chemicals in the soil and water. Between 1961 and 1970 the United States sprayed over nineteen million gallons of herbicides containing hazardous dioxins over the forests and farmlands of Vietnam, poisoning the people and contaminating the soil to the present day. A special U.S. Air Force program known as Operation Ranch Hand employed a fleet of C-123 airplanes to spread defoliants across the inland and coastal areas of South Vietnam in order to reduce tree cover and render crops unfit for consumption by North Vietnamese troops. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese suffered a range of illnesses from varying levels of chemical poisoning, in some cases leading to cancer and birth defects that have passed through three generations.

Many species of animals disappeared from heavily sprayed regions, while others adapted to a new environment and returned to their former habitats slowly over time. By the late 1980s the inland forests had recovered, but the more delicate mangrove coastal zone still had not returned to its former health. Today, the vestiges of chemical pollution are still apparent in altered vegetation patterns and cancer clusters in some areas of Vietnam. Although it became accepted scientific fact by the late 1960s that herbicides and dioxin were harmful to humans and the environment, the spraying of chemicals like Agent Orange continued until 1971, when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to stop using biological weapons.

A large number of returning veterans on both sides of the war developed cancer and unknown illnesses during the 1970s as a result of contact with dioxins in Vietnam. When the last herbicides were destroyed by the U.S. military in 1977, veterans were already mounting a vigorous campaign to make the government more aware of their plight; some even sued the chemical industry. In 1984 the Dow Chemical Company and other chemical companies that had manufactured Agent Orange made a $180 million out-of-court settlement with veterans and their families (for an average payment of $1,000 per veteran). The following year the federal government funded $1 billion to conduct research on the chemical poisoning of veterans. In 1992 the Department of Defense declared that Vietnam veterans exhibiting Hodgkin's disease, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, soft-tissue sarcoma, chloracne, and birth defects could claim contamination by herbicides in Vietnam.

The economy of Vietnam revived in the early 1990s when political relations with the United States began to thaw. In February 1994 the United States lifted a twenty-year embargo of Vietnam, enabling American companies to resume business with the communist nation. Incentives for companies to invest in Vietnam included cheap wages and abundant natural resources. The Vietnamese welcomed this development. By 1996 foreign investment, most of it from neighboring Asian "tiger" nations, had

topped $20 billion. American holdings in Vietnam also had increased from a few million into billions of dollars. But policies by the Vietnamese government slowed foreign investment by 1997, making some analysts cautious about Vietnam's economic turn toward the West. Foreign investment took a downward spiral from $2.8 billion in 1997 to a mere $500 million by 1999. Tourism, however, continued to increase, as did student and cultural exchange programs that funneled foreign influences and dollars into Vietnam.

Improved relations with Vietnam also enabled more Vietnamese Americans to reunite with family members. When college-educated Vietnamese granddaughters met their elderly Vietnamese grandmothers living in rural villages for the first time, emotional healing, cultural exchange, and an improved financial situation for some Vietnamese were the consequences. Reflecting the impact of the war on so many different groups of people, American and Vietnamese veterans and war widows from both nations traveled thousands of miles to Vietnam to participate in private and officially sponsored exchange groups. They often searched for missing remains, shared their pain, and tried to understand the loss of their loved ones in the devastating conflict.

The communist government memorialized the war primarily through several public museums, as at the hidden Vietcong southern base within the Cu Chi tunnels outside of Ho Chi Minh City, or at Dien Bien Phu, where the French were finally defeated in 1954. Both have become major tourist destinations for war-fixated foreigners and patriotic and proud Vietnamese. To some extent the government utilized the successful prosecution of the war as propaganda to keep Vietnam a socialist state. The hero worship of Ho Chi Minh reflects a conscious decision on the part of the government to create a cult of personality for the father of modern Vietnam at a time when the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese population was born after his death.

VIETNAMESE VETERANS

For Vietnamese veterans on both sides of the conflict, the violence of war remained firmly with them for the rest of their lives. For the victorious communist troops, the end of the war meant a return home to participate in village life and the rebuilding of a united nation. Compared to South Vietnamese veterans, many northern veterans suffered long isolation from their families whom they had not seen in some cases since the mid-1960s. The communist government forbade the returning veterans to fully take part in village politics due to fears that ex-soldiers would take on increased power through their enhanced status as war heroes. Over the next two decades the veterans fared poorly and received paltry rations of rice, meat, and cigarettes in compensation for their war service. Even more so than for American veterans, Vietnamese veterans were largely forgotten by the government, and the service of women was utterly ignored. Only near the end of the twentieth century did the Vietnamese government fully honor the women who fought as frontline troops during the war.

The five million ARVN veterans (including 500,000 disabled vets) faced difficult choices at the war's end. Of the 145,000 Vietnamese refugees who fled Vietnam in 1975, approximately 33 percent were South Vietnamese veterans who, with their families, chose to immigrate to the United States. Most South Vietnamese veterans who fought with the Vietcong were, along with their families, forced into land redevelopment projects, or New Economic Zones, established in the rural countryside to increase land productivity. They comprised nearly half of the one million Vietnamese detailed to the rural projects. Those who survived malaria and malnutrition drifted back to major southern cities when food supplies dissipated. There, many reentered Vietnamese urban society as cab drivers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of these veterans and their families swelled the tide of "boat people" seeking refuge in the United States. Approximately 100,000 South Vietnamese veterans entered the United States in this fashion, though an unknown number perished at sea.

Other South Vietnamese veterans deemed more dangerous were sent to reeducation camps located in rural areas. The estimate of the number sent to the camps was over 300,000 and included army officers, civil servants, teachers, Catholic clergy, journalists, doctors, engineers, and political activists. The system of reeducation involved regular confessions of "crimes" against Vietnam, coupled with readings on American imperialism and Vietnamese socialism. Higher officials and those who resisted were sometimes tortured. Terms of service ranged from a few months to several years. Those prisoners viewed as the most threatening were sent to camps in northern Vietnam, where slave labor was not uncommon. Some of these

prisoners were held until 1989, when the camps finally disbanded. The United States estimated that at least fifty camps existed in the 1970s and 1980s, with an average population of four thousand people each. An unknown number of the war veterans perished from disease, starvation, and overwork. Family members who attempted to smuggle food to the prisoners endured great suffering by having to support themselves while they made long trips to the camps. American and Vietnamese efforts led to the release of most of the sixty thousand veterans by 1990.

Vietnamese veterans who fought for South Vietnam and immigrated to the United States secured political asylum beginning in 1988 through the official Orderly Departure Program. By 1997 tens of thousands of veterans had used the program. Many remained bitter, however, over alleged abandonment by Vietnamese and American officials, who failed to provide adequate financial support once the veterans arrived in the United States. Many Vietnamese veterans suffered from substance abuse, joblessness, and underemployment.

REFUGEES AND "BOAT PEOPLE"

The immigration of thousands of people from Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s impacted American-Vietnamese relations and gave rise to new communities of Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Hmong Americans in the United States. Known as boat people for escaping Southeast Asia by sea, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians (predominantly Vietnamese) generated a political and humanitarian firestorm for the international community, the United States, and Vietnam.

The first wave in 1975 included 140,000 South Vietnamese, mostly political leaders, army officers, and skilled professionals escaping the communist takeover. Fewer than a thousand Vietnamese successfully fled the nation. Those who managed to escape pirates, typhoons, and starvation sought safety and a new life in refugee camps in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. For many, these countries became permanent homes, while for others they were only waystations to acquiring political asylum in other nations, including the United States.

During the administration of President James Earl Carter, Vietnamese immigration to the United States became a prominent political issue. The number of refugees fleeing Vietnam by sea increased to nearly six thousand in 1976 and twenty thousand the following year. Officials estimated that nearly one-third of this total perished at sea from starvation, drowning, and pirates, problems that increased when some Asian countries began turning away boat people.

The Vietnamese government began to institute socialist reforms by the late 1970s, including the confiscation of businesses and farmland. Many ethnic Chinese business owners who had lived in southern Vietnam for generations came under attack. The Chinese, or Hoa as the Vietnamese called them, were suspected of sympathizing with China, profiting from the poverty of the Vietnamese people, and betraying Vietnam during the conflict with the United States. As a result, they were officially encouraged to leave the country. Adults could pay a bribe and a departure fee to arrange their deportation. In at least one case, a Hoa man paid for the passage of himself and his large family with a bag of gold bars obtained from the liquidation of his estate. Other Vietnamese took advantage of the black market trade in selling passage outside of the country, which developed into a lucrative business in Vietnam between 1977 and 1979.

International attention to the plight of Vietnamese immigrants escalated in 1979, when the human tide of boat people increased to an unprecedented level of 100,000. Public alarm outside of Asia increased when Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines (known as ASEAN countries) declared that they could no longer accept immigrants into their overcrowded camps. But from ten thousand to fifteen thousand immigrants were still leaving Vietnam each month. United Nations secretary general Kurt Waldheim called a conference in response to the impending catastrophe. Sixty-five nations attended the meeting in Geneva, voting to increase funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Utilizing an executive order to raise immigration quotas, President Carter doubled the number of Southeast Asian refugees allowed into the United States each month. Agreements were also reached with Vietnam to establish an orderly departure program. These developments combined to slow the exodus of refugees in 1980 and 1981. By 2000, more than two million Vietnamese had left the nation of their birth to start new lives in foreign lands.

Ethnic minorities in Vietnam confronted difficult choices in the wake of the Vietnam conflict. Hundreds of thousands of Hmong and Montagnard people, who supported the United States and South Vietnam during the conflict, migrated to refugee camps in the late 1970s to evade the violence and instability left in the wake of American withdrawal. Many of the Hmong, natives of Laos, became political refugees and finally settled in communities in California and Minnesota, where they continued to practice their culture and adjust to new circumstances as hyphenated Americans. Until 1990 many Hmong funded attempts to retake Laos from communist control. Many Montagnards, who inhabited the Central Highlands of Vietnam, continued resisting the Vietnamese until the close of the Cold War in the early 1990s. By then, most of the one-half million Montagnards had either fled to refugee camps in Cambodia or resettled in the United States.

The political plight of Amerasian children embodies one of the most fundamental and lasting legacies of the Vietnam conflict. The offspring of American men and Vietnamese women, Amerasian children could not immigrate to the United States until the late 1980s. Following the end of the war in 1975, the Vietnamese government refused to meet with American officials to arrange for the immigration of these children. In turn, the United States refused to deal directly with the new communist regime. The children languished in uncertainty, held political hostage by two nations over a war long over.

Although the children were viewed as half-castes, they were not officially targeted for discrimination. But the Vietnamese government viewed their mothers as traitors and called the children *bui doi* (dust of life). Local officials often targeted Amerasian families for forced migration to New Economic Zones, where the surplus urban population resettled. Some Amerasian children suffered abandonment by families that did not want them for the shame and fear it brought upon their families. As a result, the children were sent to orphanages, and many became street urchins in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. For children of African-American soldiers and Vietnamese women, ethnic discrimination was even more intense.

The children allowed to leave between 1975 and 1982 included those who could prove U.S. citizenship. Vietnamese mothers and refugee organizations attempted to contact the fathers, who would be in a position to arrange for the immigration of the children through government agencies in their home nation. Yet citizenship itself did not guarantee safe passage. Bribes and exit fees were necessary to leave Vietnam legally during the era of massive emigration from 1977 to 1980.

Amerasian children received renewed hope in 1982 when Congress passed the Amerasian Immigration Act, which applied to children throughout Southeast Asia, not just Vietnam. The act had substantial limitations and only a small number of children successfully immigrated. The Vietnamese government announced in 1986 that over twenty-five thousand cases still awaited processing; it then stopped the processing of new cases, causing a steep decline of Amerasian immigration by 1987.

Abandoned and unwanted by the Vietnamese and American governments, the struggle of Amerasian children received widespread publicity, prompting renewed congressional action. The Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1988, sponsored by U.S. Representative Robert Mrazek, facilitated the immigration of Vietnamese Amerasians and certain members of their families. The act successfully broadened Amerasian immigration so that by 1994, refugee watch groups had declared that only a few thousand Amerasian children remained in Vietnam. The by-then grown children and their families had adapted to life there and had chosen to stay.

Despite setbacks and challenges, many Amerasian children became prosperous. Those who adjusted most successfully were usually children who accompanied their Vietnamese mothers to America. Some of these children received assistance through the Big Brother and Big Sister programs. By 1995, however, all Amerasian children had reached adulthood, and all federal programs to assist their assimilation and adjustment were terminated.

Another group of children from Vietnam also grew to adulthood in the United States. As communist forces closed on Saigon in early April 1975, President Gerald Ford began Operation Babylift, the evacuation of 2,600 Vietnamese orphans for adoption by American parents. Twenty years later, many of the children had adjusted successfully to living in the United States. Some became part of the tide of temporary migration back to Vietnam to find missing relatives.

By 1995 over 480,000 Vietnamese had chosen to immigrate to the United States. Another 210,000 lived in other countries around the world. But 46,000 still remained in the refugee camps in ASEAN nations. Many of these coun-

tries began to close the camps, forcing dislocated refugees to contemplate returning to Vietnam. By early 1996 more than 39,000 Vietnamese still remained in the camps. That year the United Nations began to withdraw funding of the refugee installations, and soon after closed the camps. Most of the Vietnamese refugees, including children who had never seen Vietnam, returned to an uncertain fate in their home country.

VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES

Foreign relations between the United States and Vietnam soured after 1975. They did not fully recover until the mid-1990s, when economic, political, and cultural ties revived, leading to a vibrant period of political reconciliation by the year 2000. Following North Vietnam's victory in 1975, the U.S. attitude toward Vietnam was antagonistic. In the Paris Peace Accords, the United States had agreed to provide $3.3 billion over five years to help rebuild the shattered infrastructure of Vietnam. Rather than meeting its obligations, the United States extended to all of Vietnam the trade embargo against communist North Vietnam that had been ratified under the Trading with the Enemy Act passed during the early years of the conflict. The United States further marginalized Vietnam by halting credits and loans from monetary institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. Seeking acceptance in the international arena, Vietnam attempted several times to join the United Nations, only to be halted by American vetoes.

Relations with the United States began to soften during the first year of the Carter administration, though war wounds still ran too deep to permit a relationship of cooperation and agreement between the two nations. President Carter and Congress indicated that relations could be normalized if the vexing issues surrounding prisoners of war (POWs) and soldiers missing in action (MIAs) were resolved. Approximately 2,500 U.S. service personnel continued to be reported as missing in the jungles of Vietnam, and Americans desperately wanted an accurate assessment of their numbers and of whether any of them were still alive in Vietnamese camps. Optimism grew in 1977 and 1978 as the two nations discussed preliminary issues.

President Carter sent Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in May 1977 to meet with Vietnamese officials. The talks broke down, however, when Vietnam demanded several billion dollars in payment for war damages, which the United States rejected because the Vietnamese had allegedly violated the 1975 Paris Accords by invading South Vietnam. President Carter indicated that the United States would provide aid, but that funding could not be linked to normalization or the POW-MIA issue.

When the Vietnamese finally relented on their demands for reparations, they failed to receive a corresponding overture from the United States. This stemmed from official and public alarm over Vietnamese immigration, a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and an increasingly powerful Soviet presence in the region (epitomized by the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay, the largest military installation of the USSR outside of its borders). After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the United States sent covert aid to noncommunist Cambodian guerrillas who were fighting Vietnam.

Meanwhile, as relations between China and Vietnam worsened, U.S.–Chinese relations improved, culminating in the establishment of full diplomatic ties between the two nations in 1978. This development, combined with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, its treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union the same year, and a border war with China in 1979 gave more impetus to American hostility toward Vietnam. During the final years of the Cold War, Vietnam found itself strongly aligned with anti-American forces that helped offset billions of dollars lost from the American trade embargo.

At the heart of the inability of American and Vietnamese leaders to reconcile national interests in the 1970s and 1980s lay the troublesome POW-MIA issue. Although the number of MIAs in World War II and the Korean War (80,000 and 8,000, respectively) was much greater than MIAs in the Vietnam War, the small number of missing American soldiers in the latter conflict (1,992 in all of Southeast Asia, 1,498 in Vietnam) captured the national psyche. They became the focus of a national crusade that retained its fervor into the twenty-first century. The plight of MIAs received much greater attention in the aftermath of the conflict as national leaders and the media fed public alarm over the fate of missing veterans. Although the Department of Defense declared the MIAs deceased, it could not stop the issue from growing to national importance. Unconfirmed public sightings of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam by refugees and others led to expeditions by Ameri-

can veterans to find their missing comrades. As of 2001 no sightings had been confirmed, although human remains were repatriated from Vietnam to the United States as part of an ongoing plan of cooperation between the two nations. More than $5 million were spent annually by the United States on attempts to find and return the remains of missing servicemen in Southeast Asia.

During the 1980s President Ronald Reagan kept the MIA issue at the forefront of American relations with Vietnam. Supported by the National League of POW/MIA Families, Reagan harnessed a national crusade to hinge the normalization of relations with Vietnam on the fate of the MIAs. In July 1985 Vietnam finally allowed an American inspection team to visit alleged MIA burial sites. The return of the remains of several dozen pilots that year eased tensions and led to further investigations. In 1987 and 1989 Vietnam allowed General John Vessey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to visit with Vietnamese leaders as an emissary of Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

Realizing that further concessions would help improve a stagnant economy, Vietnam assisted in returning the remains of more than two hundred American soldiers between 1985 and 1990 and also provided access to archives, war files, and cemetery records. They also allowed the United States to establish a Hanoi office to oversee MIA investigations. Between 1993 and 2001, joint ventures by the United States and Vietnam generated thirty-nine official searches that yielded 288 sets of remains and the identification of another 135 American servicemen previously unaccounted for in Vietnam. In a move to further pacify American political leaders, Vietnam announced in 1995 that its continuing cooperation regarding American MIAs and POWs did not depend on an accurate accounting by the United States and its allies of the whereabouts of the 330,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese MIAs.

Kindled by the MIA issue, relations between the United States and Vietnam grew closer during the 1990s. As the Cold War came to a close in 1989, Vietnam finally agreed to withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia, ending its long and costly period of isolation from the United States. The Cold War's termination also improved relations by ending the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership. To further ease foreign antagonism toward Vietnam and to increase foreign investment, the communist government removed from the Vietnamese constitution unflattering characterizations of Western countries.

Other agreements between Vietnam and the United States centered upon the issue of Vietnamese political refugees. To improve relations with many of its southern people, the Vietnamese government in September 1987 released more than six thousand military and political prisoners, many of them senior officials in the former government of South Vietnam. Under the Orderly Departure Program in 1990, Vietnam agreed to assist the United Nations in helping refugees utilize official channels rather than leaky boats to immigrate to America. Another agreement, signed in 1990, enabled former South Vietnamese officials and army officers to immigrate to America.

Under the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton during the 1990s, Vietnamese-American relations continued to improve. With the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo in 1994, economic relations opened and American companies increased their investments in Vietnam. Clinton fostered educational and cultural exchange, enabling veterans, students, and the expatriate sons and daughters from Vietnam to cement family ties. Humanitarian aid to Vietnam from the American government and private associations increased and tourism became a vibrant element of the national economy. In a sign of growing political ties, Vietnamese officials in January 1995 signed an agreement with the United States providing for an exchange of diplomats and other officials as a prelude to full normalization of relations. As expected, President Clinton overrode Republican conservative critics and MIA stalwarts to extend full recognition to Vietnam in July 1995.

One month later the American flag was raised over the new U.S. embassy in Hanoi while Secretary of State Warren Christopher looked on. Over the next two years, President Clinton established the diplomatic structures necessary to bring the two nations closer together. He nominated U.S. Representative Douglas "Pete" Peterson, a former POW, to represent the United States as the first envoy to a united Vietnam. Soon after Peterson took up his post in the summer of 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright visited Vietnamese officials in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The first U.S. secretary of state to visit Vietnam since the end of the war, Albright participated in ceremonies dedicating a new site for an American consulate.

Beginning in the late 1990s a number of steps further enhanced economic relations

between the United States and Vietnam. After Vietnam joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1998, the United States jettisoned the Jackson-Vanick Amendment that had capped U.S. investment programs in Vietnam. In 1999 the two nations finally agreed on the outlines of a trade agreement to help Vietnam open its markets to world investors. American investment support programs then poured in, reversing the decline of world economic interest in Vietnam that had begun to worry investors in 1997, when the Vietnamese government enacted political and economic policies of retrenchment that retarded the growth of capitalism and capital investment in Vietnam. President Clinton further thawed U.S.–Vietnamese relations during the waning days of his administration. In July 2000 the two countries signed an unprecedented bilateral trade agreement reached between the two nations. The agreement mandated that Vietnam halt quotas on all imported goods over the following seven years, cut tariffs, and handle American imports in the same manner as domestic products.

Four months later President Clinton traveled to Vietnam, the first president to do so since President Nixon touched down in South Vietnam in 1969. The visit closed a sad chapter of violence and strained political relations between the two nations, and ushered in a new era of economic boom in Vietnam that was unparalleled in its tragic history of successful resistance against foreign military intervention. Vietnamese analysts predicted that Vietnamese exports to the United States, hovering near the $800 million mark in 2001, could top $3 billion in 2005 and $11 billion by 2010. U.S. investment in Vietnam had already increased from $4 million in 1992 to $291 million in 1999, providing hope that this trend would continue well into the twenty-first century. In late July 2001, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who had been a soldier in Vietnam, returned there for the first time in thirty years in an historic attempt to put the past to rest.

During the first six months of his administration in 2001, President George W. Bush pledged to continue Clinton's policy of economic liberalization toward Vietnam, and took active steps to support the American diplomatic mission based in Hanoi. In one of his first actions as president, Bush reappointed as ambassador Pete Peterson, who in the Clinton years had been instrumental in helping to negotiate the bilateral trade agreement. Although Bush was associated with a conservative Republican bloc that in the past had voiced criticism of American reconciliation with Vietnam, the new administration recognized the potential economic windfall awaiting U.S. investors in Vietnam.

AMERICAN VETERANS

The Vietnam conflict impacted veterans in a variety of ways. Most combat soldiers witnessed violence and lost friends to the horrors of war. The dedication of eight new names to the Vietnam War Memorial on 28 May 2001 brought the American death toll to 58,226, a number that will continue to rise as the classified casualties of the covert war in Laos and Cambodia continue to surface. Some American veterans bore emotional and physical injuries that they would carry for the rest of their lives. Most remained proud of their service and of the role of the United States in the conflict. During the war approximately twenty-seven million American men dealt with the draft; 11 percent of them served in some fashion in Vietnam. As a consequence of college deferments, most U.S. soldiers in Vietnam came from minority and working-class backgrounds. The average age of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, nineteen, was three years lower than for American men during World War II and Korea.

In contrast to World War II, American soldiers in Vietnam served individualized tours of duty rather than remaining attached to their units throughout the war. This sometimes produced difficulties in adjusting to life back at home. A minority of soldiers in Vietnam also became drug addicts who continued their self-medication because of the difficulties of transitioning to a peacetime existence, the availability of drugs in the United States, and the lack of federal programs to help veterans cope with postwar life at home.

Whether or not they felt proud of their service or sustained war injuries, returning Vietnam veterans received a lukewarm welcome for their service. A vocal section of the public vented its frustration with racism, the federal government, and the war on the returning veterans. While most Americans viewed World War II as the "good war," a majority of the American public viewed the Vietnam conflict as a disaster. Only the POWs generated postwar sympathy for the suffering they endured.

Some veterans wrote about their war experiences to educate the nation as well as improve their own understanding of their participation in the conflict and the public reception they

received. Ron Kovic, a disabled veteran who served two tours of duty in Vietnam with the marines, wrote *Born on the Fourth of July* (1976), which explained his participation in the war and the difficulties of coming home in a wheelchair to an angry and hostile American public. Oliver Stone transformed the book into a successful film in 1989. Stone, who served in Vietnam, also produced the film *Platoon* (1986).

Despite the myth of the chronically impaired Vietnam veteran, most vets married, found jobs, and successfully reintegrated into American society. Many became successful businessmen and politicians whose experiences in the war shaped subsequent U.S. policy toward Vietnam. They became the point men leading the nation to a complex but more hopeful phase of Vietnamese-American relations. Yet veterans like Senator Bob Kerrey continued to face the fallout from their actions in Vietnam, revealing that the American people were still unable to unburden themselves from the political context of the conflict. Reminiscent of many veterans who have come under fire for their participation in the war, Kerrey rationalized his participation in a firefight that left twelve women and children dead as a response to orders followed in a chaotic and unconventional military engagement.

Although most veterans were not permanently damaged by the war, some 15 to 25 percent of Vietnam veterans (between 500,000 and 700,000) suffered from a stress-related impairment known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a psychological disease brought on by acute combat experience. Some of the 11,500 women who served in the war—90 percent of them as nurses—also returned exhibiting PTSD. This condition can occur in combat soldiers or other individuals suffering from violent trauma and can manifest itself years after the initial experience. Also known as shell shock or combat fatigue, the disorder is vaguely defined and was overused in diagnosing the psychological reactions to war of Vietnam veterans. Some of the 11,500 women who served in the war (90 percent as nurses) also returned exhibiting PTSD.

Reflecting the changing mood of the American public toward both the war and the veterans, memorials and other commemorations of the Vietnam conflict began to surface in the mid-1980s. They revealed a national desire to "welcome home" vets who had not received domestic support when they most needed it—immediately after the war.

THE POW AND MIA CRUSADE

A national obsession over the fate of the approximately two thousand American soldiers missing in Southeast Asia became one of the most unexpected and permanent legacies of the war. To many Americans, perpetuation of the search for the POWs and MIAs provided the opportunity to extend belated thanks and honor to all Vietnam veterans.

The return of POWs became a heated political and military issue during the Paris peace talks that culminated in 1973. Both sides attempted to use it to their advantage over the next two years. The Americans claimed that the freeing and returning of the veterans was taking too long, though most of the men were later returned. During the administration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977, more than one thousand of the two thousand listed as MIA were reclassified as killed in action, although no credible reports existed that any missing service personnel not declared prisoners of war were still alive.

In the late 1970s the POW-MIA issue resurfaced as a result of lobbying by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. In 1979 Congress reclassified the fate of the soldiers killed in action as POW-MIA. President Ronald Reagan kept the issue alive three years later by stating publicly that he felt some Americans were still being held in Vietnam. His belief was supported by international humanitarian workers and Vietnamese immigrants who reported seeing Americans still held under guard.

Public passion for the return of MIAs increased following a spate of films in the mid-1980s, such as *Rambo: First Blood Part II* (1985), starring Sylvester Stallone as a lone American freeing American POWs under intense enemy fire. MIA supporters soon began wearing bracelets and dog tags that listed a missing American veteran as a hero to be remembered and located. During his failed bid for the presidency in 1992, Ross Perot also fueled the MIA cause by declaring that he not only believed that Americans were still held, but that he had funded covert forays to locate and free the missing men. Because of contradictory and late-arriving information from the Vietnamese and U.S. governments, many Americans remained suspicious of the POW-MIA issue and came to believe it had declined as an issue of national importance.

Furthering national support for the controversial cause, President Reagan in 1988 ordered a

black and white POW-MIA flag designed by the National League to fly one day each year at the White House. It stands as the only other flag besides the Stars and Stripes that has ever been hoisted at the White House. A Massachusetts state law passed in 1990 mandated that the flag be flown above one or more public buildings in every Massachusetts town. In April 2001, the state of Virginia passed similar legislation. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts organized the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs in 1992. Congressional prodding soon led the Postal Service to issue a POW-MIA stamp. Eventually, all fifty states officially recognized National POW-MIA Recognition Day to commemorate the missing veterans.

COMMEMORATING THE WAR

The Vietnam Memorial, like the POW-MIA flag, stands as the physical embodiment of the desire of the American people to understand the meaning of the Vietnam conflict and remember the men and women who took part in it. During the late 1970s both public and private efforts began to congeal around the idea of establishing a monument to the 58,000 American dead in Vietnam. Influenced by the film *The Deer Hunter* (1978), Jan Scruggs, a Vietnam veteran, teamed up with two other servicemen in 1979 to create a nonprofit organization known as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund.

The location and design of the memorial generated intense political controversy over an issue still raw in the American national consciousness. Maya Lin, a young Chinese-American architectural student at Yale University, won the competition with a design based on a sunken 500-foot, V-shaped wall of polished black granite bearing inscriptions on fourteen panels of all the names of the American men and women who died in Vietnam between 1959 and 1975.

Controversy immediately erupted over the political message conveyed by the wall. Some detractors saw it as a thinly veiled criticism of American motives in the war. Lin, who was also attacked by American racists who saw her Chinese heritage as implicated in her interpretation of the war and design of the memorial, effectively kept critics at bay and successfully preserved the inclusion of a chronological listing of the names of the deceased. Conservative critics influenced Secretary of the Interior James Watt to delay construction, however, until agreement was reached adding three life-sized bronze casts of American soldiers in more heroic form near the wall. This new addition reflected the desires and needs of a more conservative segment of the American population, personified by Ross Perot, who felt that the memorial should also recognize the positive aspects of the war and American service in Southeast Asia.

The wall, once unveiled, induced some veterans to feel guilt about surviving a conflict that their friends had not. Others discovered friends had not perished, and reconnected with former friends in the armed services who were at the wall to do the same. Thousands of flowers, cards, and other mementos have been left at the wall, a tradition that serves as a constant reminder that the conflict remains firmly imbedded in the memories of most Americans. A sacred shrine to many, over 2.5 million people visit the wall each year; it is the most visited memorial in Washington, D.C. The Korean War Veterans Memorial, established in 1995, owes its existence in part to a heightened sense of sympathy toward veterans by the American people in the wake of the Vietnam conflict.

On Veterans Day 1993 the Vietnam Women's Memorial Project unveiled a monument to the participation of women in the Vietnam War. Diane Evans, a Vietnam veteran who served as a nurse in hospitals and transport planes along with thousands of other women, pushed the project forward with tireless effort. In ways similar to the inclusion of a black male soldier in a bronze statue installed near the Vietnam Memorial in

DIFFERENT SHAPES, DIFFERENT LANGUAGES

The Soviet ambassador to France made a recommendation for the Paris peace talks: use a round table and two opposite rectangular tables off the round table for secretaries with no flags or plates for names. That way, the parties could speak of either a two- or four-sided conference, depending on their view. The United States would call the talks two-party, the communists would call them four-party. The United States called them the Paris peace talks, Hanoi the Paris talks. For months, nobody spoke the same language.

1984, the women's memorial—built by sculptor Glenna Goodacre—reflected the inclusiveness of the war and the shared experiences of participants across race and ethnicity. The statue depicts two female nurses (one black and one white) assisting a fallen soldier. The Vietnam War elevated the visibility of military women within the armed services, leaving a lasting legacy that helped later women achieve even greater gains in rank, job participation, and benefits.

POLITICAL LESSONS

The meaning of the Vietnam War for American foreign policy remains a hotly contested and unresolved issue. Most aspects of the war remain open to dispute, ranging from the wisdom of U.S. involvement to the reasoning behind continued escalation and final withdrawal.

The political legacies of the war began to surface even before North Vietnam's victory in 1975. A powerful domestic antiwar movement that arose in the mid-1960s influenced a bipartisan group of U.S. congresspersons who by 1970 began to question openly the commitment of American troops to conflicts of uncertain national importance. Their doubts were enhanced by the fact that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon sent U.S. forces into Vietnam with little regard for congressional approval. Passage of the War Powers Resolution by both houses of Congress and over President Nixon's veto in 1973 signaled that American politicians and the public would no longer allow presidents to single-handedly dictate military policy as commander in chief of the armed forces.

The War Powers Resolution mandated that U.S. presidents inform Congress within forty-eight hours of a troop commitment in the absence of a declaration of war. If Congress does not declare war within sixty days of the commitment, the president must terminate the use of U.S. military forces, unless he has sought in writing a thirty-day extension of the deadline. Since its passage, however, the War Powers Resolution has made little impact on presidential warmaking because creative ways have been found to circumvent its limitations.

More important as a brake on presidential war policy is the Vietnam syndrome, a catchall phrase that describes the public's impatience for protracted American wars based on vague policy goals. Most pronounced from the American withdrawal in 1973 to the Gulf War in 1991, the Vietnam syndrome congealed after the war as the public mood slid toward isolation and the belief that troops should be committed only in cases of national invasion. This sentiment handcuffed President Jimmy Carter's ability to use military force to free American hostages in Iran in 1979 and 1980, and deterred President Ronald Reagan from seeking congressional approval to fund the Nicaraguan contras in the early 1980s.

During his first term in office, President Ronald Reagan assured the nation that there would be "no more Vietnams," a refrain also echoed by George H. W. Bush during his presidency. To conservatives, this meant that U.S. troops would never again fight a war without the necessary full political support to win it. To others, it meant that popular opinion would now limit any extensions of American military power across the globe. The public would not support a troop commitment to another war against communists, even in the Western Hemisphere. Mistrust spawned by the Vietnam conflict led Reagan's foreign policymakers to cover up arms deals during the Iran-Contra affair.

American invasions of Grenada and Panama in the 1980s were short-lived partly because of executive fears of escalating military involvement without strong public support. The deaths of more than two hundred marines at a base in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 threatened to rekindle the nightmare of Vietnam once again. But the victorious Gulf War of 1991 did much to remove the enormous burden of the Vietnam conflict from the back of American foreign policy.

In the invasion plan to oust the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, General Norman Schwarzkopf, a Vietnam veteran, remembered lessons of Southeast Asia. He helped to limit the information released about the conflict (to prevent another "living-room" television war) and patiently built up his forces to maximum strength before attacking Iraqi troops. The architects of the Gulf War also relied on precision bombing rather than ground troops in order to minimize casualties and preserve public support for the war. President Bush successfully mollified the public's post-Vietnam fears of wasteful wars fought by poor men by pledging to do away with college draft deferments, if the draft was reinstated, and by calling for unqualified patriotic support to honor the 500,000 servicemen sent to the Gulf.

Following the Persian Gulf War the American public showered returning troops with a level

of adulation not witnessed in the United States since 1945, and cracks became visible in the Vietnam syndrome. But hesitation in committing troops to Bosnia and the withdrawal from Somalia stemmed in part from Clinton administration fears that the conflicts there would escalate and damage American credibility, as with Vietnam. Strong domestic support for a precision bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999, however, demonstrated how far the American public had drifted from the antiwar fervor of the early 1970s.

As time healed the wounds of violence and bloodshed, the impact of the Vietnam conflict still lingered for the Vietnamese and American people. But a new phase began, characterized by hope, new friendships, and cultural and political exchange unprecedented in the history of two nations once at war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrade, Dale. *Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle.* New York, 1995. Using official records, interviews with participants, and captured North Vietnamese documents, this important book covers the entire scope of the Easter offensive.

Berman, Larry. *Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam.* New York, 1982. A detailed archival-based account of the crucial July 1965 decision that Americanized the war in Vietnam.

———. *Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam.* New York, 1989.

———. *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam.* New York, 2001. Drawing on new declassified documents, the case is presented that Nixon and Kissinger viewed the Paris accords as a vehicle for prolonging indefinitely American involvement in Southeast Asia.

Brigham, Robert K. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1999. The very best account of the NLF's activities during the war. The author utilizes many primary source documents from Hanoi archives and interviews with many Vietnamese leaders.

Bundy, William P. *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency.* New York, 1998.

Butler, David. *The Fall of Saigon.* New York, 1985.

Chanoff, David, and Doan Van Toai. *Vietnam: A Portrait of Its People at War.* New York, 1986.

Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam.* New York, 1989. The most comprehensive account on the subject of U.S. airpower and strategy during the war.

Diem, Bui, and David Chanoff. *In the Jaws of History.* Boston, 1987. Diem, the former Vietnam ambassador to the United States, offers a gripping personal and political account of his life and the struggle for democracy in Vietnam.

Dillard, Walter Scott. *Sixty Days to Peace: Implementing the Paris Peace Accords, Vietnam 1973.* Washington, D.C., 1982.

Don, Tran Van. *Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam.* San Rafael, Calif., 1978.

Engelmann, Larry. *Tears Before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam.* New York, 1990. A stunning series of more than seventy oral history interviews with those who were there for the fall of South Vietnam.

Gaiduk, I. V. *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War.* Chicago, 1996. A seminal contribution that draws on Soviet archives to advance understanding of Soviet ideology and policy during the war.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam.* Chicago, 1995.

Herring, George C. *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War.* Austin, Tex., 1994.

Hung, Nguyen Tien, and Jerrold L. Schecter. *The Palace File.* New York, 1986. Based on more than thirty previously unpublished letters between South Vietnam's President Thieu and U.S. Presidents Nixon and Ford, the book documents the broken promises that resulted in the fall of South Vietnam.

Isaacs, Arnold R. *Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia.* Baltimore, 1983.

Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History.* New York, 1991. This monumental narrative clarifies and analyzes the many facets of the Vietnam War.

Kimball, Jeffrey. *Nixon's Vietnam War.* Lawrence, Kans., 1998.

Kutler, Stanley I., ed. *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes.* New York, 1997.

Logevall, Fredrik. *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.* Berkeley, Calif., 1999. The first truly comprehensive examination of the making of the war in Vietnam from 1963 to 1965.

Develops an international context for the author's analysis and documents that at every step American decision makers chose war over disengagement.

Loi, Luu Van, and Nguyen Anh Vu. *Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris.* Hanoi, 1996. Vietnam diplomats who participated in the negotiations offer an invaluable Vietnamese perspective with documents and analysis.

McNamara, Robert S. *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.* New York, 1995.

———. *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy.* New York, 1999. Provides a new view of the Vietnam conflict by offering the assessments of what went on in the minds of decision makers in Hanoi and Washington as they confronted one another. The Vietnamese perspectives are especially valuable for the historical record.

Record, Jeffrey. *The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam.* Annapolis, Md., 1998.

Shawcross, William. *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia.* New York, 1979.

Sheehan, Neil. *After the War Was Over: Hanoi and Saigon.* New York, 1992.

Snepp, Frank. *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End.* New York, 1977.

Sorley, Lewis. *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam.* New York, 1999. Draws on many previously unavailable documents and provides a valuable interpretation for American strategy and policies during the war.

Tang, Truong Nhu. *A Viet Cong Memoir.* New York, 1985.

Tin, Bui. *Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel.* Honolulu, 1995.

Zhai, Qiang. *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000. In examining China's conduct toward Vietnam, Zhai provides important insights into Mao Zedong's foreign policy and the ideological and geopolitical motives behind it.

See also COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS; COLD WAR ORIGINS; COLD WAR TERMINATION; CONTAINMENT; DOMINO THEORY; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; POST–COLD WAR POLICY.

WILSONIANISM

Tony Smith

Defining a term like "Wilsonianism" presents the same sort of difficulties one finds in attempting to define virtually any "ism" in world affairs. On the one hand, aspects in U.S. foreign policy of what we currently call Wilsonianism handily predate Woodrow Wilson's tenure in office (1913–1921), while on the other, aspects of what came to define the term appeared later in fuller or different form than Wilson himself could ever have imagined. Given the multitude of connotations the term consequently bears, at times it may appear that everyone is to some extent Wilsonian, while at other moments it seems that Wilsonians may differ among themselves over how best to proceed in world affairs, as if their compass lacks the sure points of reference an "ism" should rightly give them.

These concessions made, no other American president has had his name used to define a foreign policy orientation. Given the importance of the set of ideas introduced by America's twenty-eighth president, it is widely agreed that using the term "Wilsonianism" is meaningful, even if just what the word means may be open to some disagreement. Surely the best way to proceed is to look at the sets of policies Woodrow Wilson advanced for world order, then to place them within earlier and later American foreign policy initiatives so as to see a family resemblance from which a group of concepts may be said to emerge that, taken together, is the substance of Wilsonianism.

The first (and for some the only) defining element of Wilsonianism is the conviction that a leading priority of U.S. foreign policy should be the promotion of democratic government the world around—"national self-determination," as Wilson put it. Original as this conviction was with Wilson, we should be careful to see it more as a development out of an American tradition rather than as a wholly new departure. For as Wilson himself said, what he was calling for was the "globalization of the Monroe Doctrine." Put differently, international order should be based on a politically plural world, a situation where national self-determination (a phrase Wilson used constantly after 1914) would be the rule of the day. As the evocation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) indicates, and as the Open Door Notes with respect to China confirmed at the turn of the century, Wilson understood that his call to dismember the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires in 1918–1919 was long-standing U.S. policy. This same reliance on globalizing the Monroe Doctrine would be reflected later, during and after World War II, when the administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman denounced great power spheres of influence and so supported the decolonization of European empires and criticized the expansion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe by use of the Red Army.

If Wilson's dedication to a politically plural world was in the established tradition of American foreign policy, his call for the democratization of this political plurality most certainly was not. Here was this president's single most important contribution to the American foreign policy tradition—the notion that in an era of nationalist passion, the blueprint for state construction should be of a liberal democratic sort.

At the time, most diplomats were astonished—or amused—at Wilson's ambition. Only today, nearly a century after Wilson's dramatic appeals, can we fully appreciate how momentous his suggestions actually were. For nationalism—the ideologically based demand of a "people," defined in terms of a collective history and purpose, for a state based on popular participation—came to be one of the politically most volatile forces of the twentieth century. The problem was that while nationalist passions excelled at destroying authoritarian and imperial regimes, they were less good at establishing new forms of the state, modern regimes based on radically different principles of legitimacy and different structures of state power and mass mobilization.

In sum, to be "for nationalism" and "against imperialism," as U.S. policy was prior to Wilson, turned out not to be enough. Once the old order was destroyed, what would go in its place? Into this hornets' nest Wilson stepped with his blueprint for liberal democracy, first for Latin America (his intervention in the Mexican Revolution in 1914 and the U.S. occupations of various countries, of which the most ambitious was the Dominican Republic in 1916), and later, and with far more consequences, for eastern Europe, in a design presented to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

With the notable exception of Czechoslovakia, Wilson's hopes came to naught. Many blame Wilson himself for the demise of his plans, pointing to his personal rigidity at home and abroad as the source of his undoing. But surely a better explanation was the tenor of the times. The Bolshevik Revolution (1917), Mussolini's seizure of power in Rome (1922), the Great Depression that started in 1929, and Hitler's assumption of power in Berlin in 1933 combined with the U.S. Senate's refusal to let the United States join the League of Nations so as to make Wilson's policies seem impractical in the interwar years. The United States had played a determining role in winning the Great War but Wilson could not win the peace that followed.

Still, seeds had been planted. When the United States confronted the task of winning the peace after it won the war against fascism in 1945, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations found themselves returning to Wilsonianism as the basis for at least a part of U.S. policy for world order. Thus, in occupation policy for Italy, Germany, and Japan, U.S. intentions were that these countries be democratized—purged of their militaristic elites and converted by institutional and ideological means into pacific, constitutional polities. In eastern Europe, the United States called on Joseph Stalin to respect national self-determination for the peoples liberated from Nazi control by the Red Army (an appeal Stalin agreed to in the Declaration on Liberated Europe at Yalta in 1945). In Latin America, too, there was for a brief moment hope that democracy would take root.

Nevertheless, even before the Cold War obliged Washington to work with authoritarian friends against local communist takeovers, the United States recognized that in many parts of the world in which it had an interest after 1945—Iran and China, for example—the prospects for democratic government were decidedly dim. Roosevelt had seen the failure of Wilson's efforts in the Caribbean as a warning signal as to how much change the United States could actually introduce into agrarian, authoritarian lands. As a result, Roosevelt might be called a "realistic liberal," ready to push for a Wilsonian world where the ground appeared promising, but careful not to engage American power in quagmires from which it could not easily extricate itself.

Still, the dream of promoting democracy elsewhere did not die with occupation policy. During the Eisenhower years, Washington continued to call for democratic national self-determination in Eastern Europe so as to undermine the rule of "puppet" governments in "captive nations" controlled by Moscow. So, too, the Kennedy administration saw American security in Latin America helped by that region's democratization and authored the Alliance for Progress. Jimmy Carter's important innovation in the Wilsonian tradition was to craft a "human rights" policy that called not so much for democratization as for the liberalization of authoritarian regimes (constitutional restraints on the government's power), a policy that might be seen as a prelude to eventual democratization.

Ronald Reagan's foreign policy continued in the Wilsonian tradition through innovations of its own. For example, "constructive engagement" was designed to ease authoritarian allies of the United States into the construction of liberal democratic regimes, an initiative that had impact in lands as different as the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa, Central America, and the Soviet Union. Also, the deregulation and privatization of the economy Reagan called for was seen as a socioeconomic facilitator of a democratic political order.

Promotion of democracy in Central America and Eastern Europe remained an appeal of the Bush administration, but George H. W. Bush famously commented that he did not "have the vision thing." Under President Bill Clinton, Wilsonianism became the centerpiece of administration policy early on, when it was announced that "the containment of communism" would be replaced by "the enlargement of democracy."

In sum, the best short definition of what it means to be Wilsonian is that American security interests are well served by promoting liberal democratic governments internationally. When most people casually refer to Wilsonianism, this is what they usually mean to summon up: the notion that promoting democracy for others should be "a," if not "the," leading goal of U.S. foreign policy.

EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF WILSONIANISM

It can well be argued, however, that Wilsonianism has critical elements besides fostering democracy in its framework for global order. For a politically plural world, one opposed to great power imperial spheres of influence, would rather obviously need mechanisms to stitch together regional and global consensus on any number of matters. One of Wilson's leading concerns, consequently, was to get international affairs past balance-of-power politics. His solution was "collective security," the notion that all peace-loving states (a category he at first reserved only for democratic countries) should pledge themselves to joint action to keep the peace. Wilson recognized early on that a world composed of a large number of independent states, an order explicitly committed to anti-imperialism in the name of national self-determination, would by its very nature be forced to create a set of multilateral institutions to maintain the peace. Hence, he proposed the Pan American League (today the Organization of American States) and, most important of all, the League of Nations (the prototype of what became the United Nations). In short, a second element of Wilsonianism is multilateralism: the conviction that a range of international institutions based on the rule of law could keep the peace among states pledged domestically to the same principles.

Wilson's hopes for multilateral institutions may be said to have come to fruition in the five years between 1944 and 1949, the period that saw the creation of the Bretton Woods system for the world economy, the establishment of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, and the setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Here were the instruments for Washington to pursue two goals—a two-track policy—at the same time: the containment of communism and the construction of a democratic fraternity with special emphasis on western Europe and Japan.

International economic openness was a third element of Wilsonianism. Following the British example, Wilson championed liberalism in world economics, the notion that states should not claim special privileges for themselves in economic matters (a position that often led to political imperialism) but instead let market forces operate, treating all comers equally through what are called "most-favored-nation treaties." The result would contribute not only to a more prosperous, but also to a more peaceful, international system. The concern to foster such a system stretches back in American history to the American Revolution itself, with its hatred of British mercantilist practices.

Nevertheless, Wilson's ideas on this score were not highly developed. By comparison, the efforts at Bretton Woods in 1944 to set up an open postwar international economic system were far more ambitious than anything he had ever conceived. Yet whatever these earlier and later considerations, Wilson certainly embraced international economic openness and saw it as an ingredient in his liberal internationalist package, one that tied in rather neatly with his call for strong multilateral institutions to regulate world affairs.

The fourth element of Wilsonianism was the conviction that the United States had to be deeply involved in international affairs if "the world was to be safe for democracy." Whatever the fear of "entangling alliances" warned against by George Washington, the United States simply could no longer stand aloof. By Wilson's lights, the United States had stepped onto the world stage in the War with Spain (1898), which had made it a Pacific power and the dominant presence in the Caribbean. By entering the European war in 1917 and presiding at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the United States had committed itself to being a European power as well. Henceforth, matters of political moment in most parts of the globe necessarily had to be the concern of Washington.

As with other elements of Wilsonianism, the notion that the United States was necessarily committed to internationalism became more widespread with World War II and the Cold War that followed. To be sure, in the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet communism, both public and elite opinion in the United States began to become relatively more concerned with domestic issues than had been the case before. Nevertheless, the Republican commitment to "unilateralism" rather than multilateralism, vexing as it may be to Wilsonians who fear that neo-isolationism might follow if the Republican penchant should be confirmed, does not necessarily mean that U.S. involvement in world affairs will noticeably diminish in the twenty-first century.

Thus, while Wilsonianism is most commonly identified as human rights and fostering democracy for others, in fact, it is necessarily a commitment as well to multilateralism, open

markets, and U.S. leadership in world affairs. An interest in an open international economic system and a politically plural world may predate Wilson's tenure as president, and all aspects of what we call Wilsonianism may have evolved with time, without putting in doubt the utility of keeping the term.

Perhaps the most significant change since Woodrow Wilson's time in liberal democratic internationalism is the conviction that for democracy to occur, changes in other domains of a people's life must be involved. For example, while Wilson himself did not envision socioeconomic change as a constituent part of the democratizing process, his successors who oversaw the democratization of Germany and Japan were New Dealers, who most certainly did. So, too, the Alliance for Progress linked the democratization of Latin America to socioeconomic change, and especially to land reform. And again, Ronald Reagan had an economic dimension to his call for democratization when he stressed the importance of deregulation and privatization along with economic openness as essential for political change. Neither Jimmy Carter nor George H. W. Bush gave much attention to the socioeconomic character of political change, yet each could nonetheless be called Wilsonian, given their commitment to human rights and promotion of democracy abroad.

With respect to later innovations, Jimmy Carter's call for the respect worldwide of human rights emerges as especially important. The character of virtually all these "rights" dealt with restraints on governments in their relationship with society. Such rights were thus part of the liberal heritage of the West and were basic to the emergence of constitutionally limited government there. But as Carter himself understood, human rights were not synonymous with democracy. Nonetheless, a government that respected human rights as defined by the Western tradition almost necessarily was setting into motion forces that could lead to democratic government.

As this example of Carter's human rights appeal indicates, Wilsonianism is a multifaceted concept, constantly in evolution. Differences may well appear among Wilsonians as to the proper cast of U.S. foreign policy, and changes are sure to be introduced that today we can see only dimly. But such is the lot of any general approach to world events and not a reason to conclude that Wilsonianism is too vague, too internally contradictory, or too subject to change to be worthy of being considered a distinctive approach to answering the question of how the United States should orient itself, at least in part, with respect to the challenges posed by international affairs.

Perhaps most important of all, Wilsonianism should be seen as a U.S. bid to structure a world order on American terms. It is an essential part of the framework for American hegemony, designed to win the peace after winning three wars: the two world wars and the Cold War. Foreign critics of the United States have generally grasped this truth about Wilsonianism more clearly than many Americans, including those who think of themselves as Wilsonians. Wilson would make the world safe for democracy. But critics of Wilsonianism sometimes have understandably been concerned that in these circumstances democracy might not be safe for the world, that it might become the rallying call for an international crusade, waging war in the name of peace and bringing American domination in the guise of national self-determination. What is certainly the case is that Wilsonianism is part of an American bid for international hegemony, and it should be more widely recognized as such by those who might otherwise treat the doctrine as more altruistic and less self-interested than it actually is.

WHY WILSONIANISM?

Wilsonianism came into being not because of American "innocence" and "religiosity," as its critics often like to claim, so much as because the program was based on deep-seated American interests, values, and institutions, and, equally important, because the doctrine found a response in social and political forces the world around that sensed its global relevance. The source of the doctrine's strength thus lies in powerful material forces, some domestic, others foreign, which must be appreciated if we are to free ourselves from the notion that Wilsonianism is simply ideology without substance, a form of "social work" best performed by Mother Teresa, as one critic called it, devoid of an ability to express and serve the national interest. Let us then focus on each of the doctrine's analytically distinct material bases in turn, first the domestic and then the international.

The origins of an American belief that democracy, open markets, and multilateralism might serve as a framework for the construction of the country's foreign policy grew from the interests, values, and institutions of this country

itself. Thus, the American Revolution stemmed from many sources, but one was the colonists' objection to British mercantilism, the feeling that the colonies would be better off if they were able to buy and sell on the world market without London's interference. What was true for London was equally true for Madrid; hence, U.S. sympathy with the independence of Latin America in the early nineteenth century. As the United States grew into an industrial power in the second half of the nineteenth century, its commitment to open markets was confirmed. Thus, the Open Door Notes for China, predicated on the assumption that an independent China was good for American commerce, expressed essentially the same interests at the end of the nineteenth century that the Monroe Doctrine had expressed at its opening.

Antimercantilism meant anti-imperialism. From the Monroe Doctrine to the Open Door Notes, the United States favored a politically plural world for economic reasons. With the coming of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency, the American preference for open markets for the first time became an appeal for free (or freer) trade, an ambition institutionalized in the Bretton Woods system created in 1944, which has evolved and expanded significantly since. As the world's dominant economic power, the United States could only gain, on balance, from open economic arrangements, and it could easily be maintained, as it had been by the British in the nineteenth century, that the political dividends of international accord on open markets would be the dampening of competition, and hence the likelihood of war, among the great powers. In short, Wilsonianism's call for a plural political world of countries engaged in an open international economic network corresponded with the interests of powerful social and political domestic forces.

But there were critical security considerations as well. Protected by mighty oceans and weak neighbors, the United States was able to indulge the belief of its founders that standing armies were a menace to the health of republican institutions and values. Anti-imperialism thus meant that the United States need maintain only a small armed force—at the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, there were fewer than 50,000 men in the army and navy combined, an astonishingly small number by comparative measures. The fear, however, was that other great powers might somehow endanger the United States by their imperial expansions, developments Washington was determined to keep at bay in the Western Hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine) and was concerned to see limited in northeast Asia (the Open Door Notes and later support for China) and in Europe as well after 1914.

In addition to economic and military reasons to oppose great power imperialism, the United States put forth arguments that were political as well. As a democracy, the country was not interested in annexing foreign peoples to participate in its government—especially when these people were numerous, poor, dark-skinned, and Roman Catholic, as was the case in the Caribbean, Mexico, and the Philippines, where American power bulked large after the victories over Mexico in 1848 and over Spain in 1898. Nor did controlling these people through military proconsuls seem appealing, for there was concern that such practices might endanger republican institutions at home. The character of the country's values and institutions thus melded with security and economic considerations to allow the United States to respect the nationalist ambitions of other peoples and to applaud the destruction of foreign empires when they occurred.

Now that some account has been made of why Wilsonianism originated in the United States for reasons apart from Woodrow Wilson's personal genius, we turn to the international reception of liberal democratic internationalism. Too often, U.S. foreign policy is explained "from the inside out," as if the context in which Washington's ambitions are operationalized is of second-order importance (if even that) in understanding a policy's logic. Yet, if we set U.S. policy within a global framework, our perspective changes, because we can see the correspondence, the synchronization, the "fit" between American hopes and global realities and better appreciate how U.S. policy often succeeded (so that the Wilsonian ambition was confirmed) by working in tandem with global forces of modernization in ways that secured a range of U.S. interests. Simply put, there were powerful reasons why large parts of the globe might respond to Wilsonianism—just as there were reasons why parts might respond instead to the contemporary doctrines of Marxism-Leninism or fascism or national socialism.

From a historical perspective, the ideologies of communism, fascism, and liberal democracy that dominated politics in the twentieth century were relatively recent responses to economic, social, and political changes whose most immediate origins lie in the eighteenth century but whose

pedigree can be traced farther back by the careful historian. A competitive European state system gave rise as early as the late sixteenth century to forms of nationalism and mass mobilization that would be accentuated as time progressed. The coming of the Industrial Revolution meant the empowerment or despoliation (the middle class on the one hand, the peasantry on the other, for example) of social forces new and old. The Renaissance and the Reformation engendered forms of thought that implicitly questioned a host of practices, from the basis of social order to the character of state legitimacy. Ultimately, the Enlightenment allowed the articulation of radically novel concepts of the nature of citizenship, the state, and the basis of international peace that were as troubling to domestic, regional, and global order as the challenges produced by a competitive state system and economic change.

In the process of what might be termed "the crisis of modernity," authoritarian and imperial states came one by one to their day of reckoning. It was not so much that these states were corrupt, immoral, decadent, and the like (although, of course, they typically were, from our current perspective) as that they were weak relative to states based on mass mobilization. In short order, a law of international life obliged other peoples in contact with the states where modern nationalism and economic development began either to imitate these new political forms or to perish. The result was a host of efforts at defensive modernization—undertakings by the Young Turks from central and eastern Europe to East Asia whose nationalist passion to modernize by reforming the state and society called forth tremendous domestic upheavals that quickly found their parallels in international life.

How were states and the international order to be restructured in an era of unprecedented economic and social change and modern nationalism? The American and French revolutions (as well as the evolution of Great Britain) initially suggested a natural affinity between liberal democracy and modernization. But the problems France later had in consolidating constitutional government, the failure of the "springtime of nations" in 1848, the deliberate attempts of conservative governments such as those in Japan, Russia, and Turkey to modernize without liberalizing or democratizing (although the former sometimes made headway without the latter), and the authoritarian aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917) all indicated the difficulties in many lands of founding constitutional government with a liberal democratic base. Ultimately, World War I revealed that the progressive optimism of the fin de siècle was altogether mistaken in its confident assurances that nationalism and liberal democracy necessarily had much in common.

Both communism and fascism were born of the conflagration of 1914–1918, the most momentous period of that terrible century. Each of these ideologies answered the crisis of modernity by setting forth ways of organizing society, the state, and state-society relations, and each came to be championed by great powers and to appear to be a viable alternative to liberal democratic government, which was despised by both of these forms of totalitarianism.

For the communists, the state would be structured as "the dictatorship of the proletariat," dominated by a "vanguard party" working through the Third International (the Comintern) to liberate the wretched of the earth—oppressed peasantries and working classes especially. Fascism would counter communist mass mobilization by mass parties of its own, parties devoted to defending the traditional order (as they mythologized it), including property, royalty, and established religion (where these institutions existed), while raising popular support with brands of nationalism that were racist and militarist. Different as communism and fascism were from each other and from liberal democracy, what all three had in common was their modernity, their ability to deal with new ideas of citizenship, state power, and world order in ways that were decisively different from any ideologies or organization of power that had preceded them and that promised new forms of state power to those who embraced their blueprints. As a consequence, each of these ideologies came to be championed by class, ethnic, and political interests not only in their lands of origin but virtually everywhere in the world. As the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) revealed, a three-way contest thus was joined from which few could stand apart.

This overly brief review of twentieth-century politics indicates that the stark elegance of realist theory about international relations, which holds that there is a universal dynamic to states' behavior, based on their calculation of their relative power position with respect to other states, needs to be augmented by historical and domestic analysis of the great changes of our times. While there may well be eternal verities about the

human condition that we should honor whatever the differences of time and place (let us read and reread Thucydides and Machiavelli, by all means), these arguments should not give a license to overlook those verities that are specific to time and place, especially when they are of the fundamentally transformative kind we witnessed in the century just past. For what was occurring in the twentieth century was the birth pangs, on an international level, of the modern state, where more power was accumulated than ever before but where political actors often had opposing ideas as to the proper structuring of domestic and international life. In these circumstances, Wilsonianism, or liberal democratic internationalism, represented interests and values in fundamental opposition to those of communist and fascist regimes. The epochal struggle of World War II was over purpose as well as power, as Stalin's remark to the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas in April 1945 reveals: "This war is not as in the past. Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."

To be sure, ideologies were also camouflages in the age-old struggle for power that concerned personalities as well as states. Still, the reason to take ideological contests seriously is that these idea sets represented large groupings of interests that gave them a material base in the struggle for supremacy in the twentieth century. In the event, it is not at all simplistic to maintain that it was not so much the United States and its European allies that triumphed in the struggles against fascism and communism as that what triumphed (at least by the end of the century) was liberal democratic internationalism, a set of ideas on the proper organization of the state, state-society relations, social structures from the family to the relative place of ethnic and religious minorities, and the structure of economic production.

Here, then, is a second persuasive reason why Wilsonianism should be taken seriously: it is not simply an American project for world order favorable to U.S. interests; it is also a formula (incomplete, vague, contradictory, and in constant evolution though it may be) that corresponds to the interests, values, and institutions of many other peoples around the globe. As Wilsonians realize, regime type matters. That is, it may well be a matter of concern for Washington whether powerful foreign governments are liberal democracies, for the historical evidence is clear that when they are, then the likelihood of stable, cooperative relations is significantly increased.

The evidence of the uniquely complicated agenda of social and political reorganization in the modern era is apparent in the early twenty-first century, when liberal democratic capitalism is the only game in town. This monopoly of design should not disguise the fear and hatred that many around the world feel for it. Still, no other general form of political and social life has yet been devised that is as effective at the local and international level as the one enjoyed by the international liberal democratic community today—a system kept in place, it might be underscored, largely by the terms set out by a hegemonic America.

Of course, the set of ideas that we call liberal democratic has never been either fully coherent or static. It has shown itself to possess numerous internal contradictions and to evolve dramatically according to time and place. American hegemony is complicated, therefore, not simply by its external rivals but also by its internal organization, which ceaselessly works to bedevil the problems of leadership.

As we have seen, by the early twentieth century—the time Wilson was elected president—it was becoming increasingly apparent that nationalism itself was no guarantee that a stable political order would be born either locally or regionally. In these circumstances, liberal democratic government could be proposed for others as a tried and proven formula perhaps of universal applicability. Perhaps Wilson was ahead of his time for most of Latin America and eastern Europe. But it is noteworthy at the beginning of the twenty-first century that whatever the troubles these regions experienced in the twentieth century, the promise of liberal democratic government remains as relevant today as ever. Fascism and communism have not worked as models of government in these areas. Hence, the continuing promise of Wilsonianism as the form of organization most likely to provide peace and well-being.

Nevertheless, many parts of the world rejected the Wilsonian premise in the twentieth century. In the early twenty-first century, the anarchy of much of Africa, the hostility of much of the Muslim world, and the cultural pride of China suggest clear limits to the appeal of liberal democratic government. Such countries and regions must nonetheless be worked with by Washington in a search for mutual interest that a well-nigh religious fervor for human rights and

democratic government may fail to perceive at all adequately.

The record of the Clinton administration (1993–2001) suggests the limits of the Wilsonian argument. Initially, the administration believed that "the containment of communism would be replaced by the enlargement of democracy," that a "muscular multilateralism" would prevail, and that the intensified globalization of the world economy not only would lead to general prosperity but also would help to integrate the world politically while fostering democratic governments in areas like China, where the future of regime types seemed up for debate.

In short order, the Clinton administration was chastened to learn how limited a Wilsonian policy could be. China successfully rebuffed efforts to link trade negotiations to its human rights conduct. The U.S. intervention in Somalia for human rights purposes backfired, stymieing efforts to duplicate such action in Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Later, Clinton oversaw a U.S. occupation of Haiti and an attack on Serbia so as to end its human rights abuses in Kosovo, but as the prospects for democratic government appeared stark in both regions, a certain soberness set in as to the centrality of Wilsonian thinking in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

In sum, Wilsonianism is a tried and proven formula for advancing U.S. interests in the world because of its correspondence both to the character of America as a country and to the needs of peoples around the world. But it is far from a complete or foolproof guide to what American foreign policy should be. The task for the future, as it was for the past, is to know when and how to make use of its recommendations, but also when and why to be skeptical of its relevance.

WHITHER WILSONIANISM?

Arguing the strength and the success of Wilsonianism in American foreign policy does not necessarily predict its role in the framework for American policy in the new century. The so-called realist critics of Wilsonianism have been cogent in the analysis of the shortcomings they see in liberal democratic internationalism. To realists such as George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann, and Henry Kissinger, Wilsonianism is "idealistic," "utopian," and "moralistic" for two essential reasons.

First, not all the world is ready for liberal democratic government. The social, economic, cultural, and political preconditions for such a regime type are in many instances so lacking that for the United States to pursue global democratization is to engage upon a quixotic crusade sure to damage the national interest. From this point of view, Wilsonians may fail to cooperate with authoritarian governments when this is necessary for security reasons; indeed, they may raise tensions with such regimes by their hectoring, superior, self-righteous posturing. Or Wilsonians may intervene, trying to bend local conditions to their recipes, in the process overextending American power and confusing national priorities.

Realists are thus correct to suggest that Wilsonians may suffer from a failure to recognize the objective limits to American power, to set clear priorities regarding American goals, to see the United States with the modesty that a reading of the country's history should reveal, and to sup with the devil when expediency demands it. Liberal democratic internationalists should learn from these counsels when they consider how to promote their agenda abroad.

In many parts of the world (China, many Muslim countries), cultures hostile to the West or proud of ancient traditions equate democratization with Westernization, and any such process with cultural decadence and national disintegration. Like Slavophiles, Germanophiles, or groups of Japanese, Turkish, or Chinese reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the hopes of many in these lands are to duplicate the power of the West but in terms of local ways. Elsewhere, as in much of Africa, hostility toward the West may be less marked, but anarchy undermines every effort toward democratic consolidation.

The second criticism offered by realists is that even were the world to be dominated by liberal democratic states, the anarchy of international relations would soon pit them against one another. Consider, for example, that in world affairs both India and France rather consistently distance themselves from American policy. In other words, from the point of view of war and peace, whether governments are democratic or not is not of great moment.

Here, however, realists are on far weaker ground than in their first objection to Wilsonianism, or so liberal internationalists believe. Since the early 1990s, a compelling amount of data have been produced demonstrating that liberal democratic regimes are in fact more cooperative and

less conflictual in their relations with one another than other regime types would be. This literature argues the existence of a "democratic peace," maintaining that there is strong historical evidence that liberal democratic states do not go to war with one another, are likely to make superior economic partners, and are remarkably successful at making common institutions work. The Princeton political scientist Michael Doyle was the first to present empirical findings in this direction in the early 1980s, but with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union two years later, Doyle's articles became subject to closer attention. The result was a string of empirical confirmations of the existence of the democratic peace and a variety of efforts to explain why it held true.

Seen from this perspective, the emergence of liberal democratic government in Russia, Turkey, and Mexico—to cite three examples of nations where such transitions seem possible in the early twenty-first century—could be argued to be of genuine importance to the national interests of the United States and its co-democracies in the European Union. Indeed, the character of the European Union is the most dramatic evidence of the kind of positive effects democratization may bring. Thanks to the democratization of Germany, European integration became a possibility. As the European Union grew in power, it drew into its institutions the countries of southern Europe, where the prospects for liberal democratic government had been relatively weak. The result was the consolidation of democratic regimes throughout this region, a development that would have been inconceivable without the European Union's insistence on democracy as a prerequisite for membership. The same process seems evident in central Europe, from Poland to Slovenia especially, where the prospect of joining the European Union offers a fillip for democratic forces and institutions there. And behind the integration of Europe on these terms stands the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, who was the first to maintain that this epochal event could occur only if Germany were democratized and Germany and France were to join together, creating what today is called the "engine of European unity."

Much the same positive outcome, so far as promotion of democracy and U.S. interests are concerned, can be said to have occurred with the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO's basic security mission should not conceal the fact that it has also been associated with the liberalization of those countries that are members. To take but one example, civilian control of the military is obligatory on all member countries, and the reforms that this rule has entailed have contributed directly to the stability of democratic life in southern and central Europe. In these circumstances, it is worth noting that the most outspoken Wilsonian on European affairs at the turn of the century was Czech President Václav Havel.

To what extent have the lessons of history, as they are taught by Wilsonians, captured the mind of the American political elite? The vagaries of American political life are such that some individuals and parties stress the importance of liberal democratic internationalism more than others. Traditionally, the Democratic Party has been more Wilsonian than the Republican Party, but one should be careful not to overstate the differences. Republican Ronald Reagan was especially strong in his efforts to promote democratic government worldwide, while the dominant wing of the Republican Party has long favored open international markets and an active role for the United States in world affairs. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Democratic Party is far more likely to call for promotion of human rights and democracy abroad and to be concerned about U.S. participation in multinational institutions of a variety of sorts. The Republicans, by contrast, tend to be suspicious that promotion of democracy and excessive commitments to international organizations could muddle the priorities for the national interest while imprudently overextending the United States in situations where it has little at stake.

One problem for Wilsonians in the early twenty-first century is that public opinion polls show little interest in fostering human rights and democracy for others among the public at large. Meanwhile, powerful voices representing the working class warn of possible income decline among poorer Americans should economic globalization proceed apace. And a neo-isolationist sentiment, a concern about entanglements abroad where the United States has no evident stake, makes leadership in a host of multinational institutions difficult to assert.

In these circumstances, some liberal internationalists began to call themselves "national security liberals," meaning they argued that the promotion of Wilsonianism constituted what Arthur Link called a "higher realism," a way of defending vital U.S. interests around the world.

These modern Wilsonians stress that it is not only the degree of its power that allowed the United States to emerge as the world's leader at the beginning of the twenty-first century; there was a style to this power as well, a character that allowed it to create a security alliance and a world economic order unprecedented in history. They worry that lack of understanding of the purpose behind American power may cause this power to lack direction and confidence. But they comfort themselves with the notion that the package of programs liberal democratic internationalism calls for corresponds both to deep-set U.S. interests and to the needs of many foreign people. The result is that Wilsonian features of American foreign policy should remain an inescapable part of its character into the foreseeable future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auchincloss, Louis. *Woodrow Wilson.* New York, 2000.

Brown, Michael, ed. *Debating the Democratic Peace.* Cambridge, Mass., 1996.

Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad.* Washington, D.C., 1999.

Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (summer 1983) and (fall 1983).

———. *Ways of War and Peace.* New York, 1997.

Gowa, Joanne. *Ballots and Bullets.* Princeton, N.J., 1999.

Human Rights Watch. *Human Rights Watch World Report.* New York, annual publication.

Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars.* Princeton, N.J., 2000.

Kennan, George. *American Diplomacy.* Enlarged ed. Chicago, 1984.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy.* New York, 1994.

Knock, Thomas. *To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order.* New York, 1995.

Link, Arthur S. *Woodrow Wilson and the World of Today.* Edited by Arthur P. Dudden. Philadelphia, 1957.

Maoz, Zeev. "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace." *International Security* 22 (summer 1997).

Morgenthau, Hans. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy.* New York, 1951.

Owen, John M., IV. *Liberal Peace, Liberal War.* Ithaca, N.Y., 1997.

Pearlmutter, Amos. *Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy.* Princeton, N.J., 1999.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.* New York, 1999.

Ruggie, John Gerard, ed. *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an International Form.* New York, 1993.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century.* Princeton, N.J., 1994.

———. "Making the World Safe for Democracy." In Michael Hogan, ed. *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century."* New York, 1999.

Steigerwald, David. "The Reclamation of Woodrow Wilson." *Diplomatic History* 23 (1999).

See also ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY; HUMAN RIGHTS; MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE; THE NATIONAL INTEREST; REALISM AND IDEALISM; SELF-DETERMINATION; WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY.

WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY

Roger R. Trask

"Missionary diplomacy" is a descriptive label often applied to the policies and practices of the United States in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921). According to Arthur S. Link in *Wilson: The New Freedom* (p. 278), "[Secretary of State William Jennings] Bryan and Wilson were both fundamentally missionaries of democracy, driven by inner compulsions to give other peoples the blessings of democracy and inspired by the confidence that they knew better how to promote the peace and well-being of other countries than did the leaders of those countries themselves." Wilson related both missionary diplomacy and the New Freedom, his domestic program, to his concepts of morality and democratic government. Despite Wilson's admirable ideas and objectives, missionary diplomacy was a disaster. Perhaps some of the historians who have placed Wilson high in the presidential pantheon have not given enough consideration to the failure of missionary diplomacy.

FOUNDATIONS OF WILSONIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Woodrow Wilson came to the presidency with little knowledge of or interest in foreign affairs. His well-known remark to a Princeton friend, "It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs," seemed to emphasize his concentration on domestic questions. But from the start of his term, Wilson saw close relationships between domestic and foreign policies. The New Freedom envisaged a return to free competition in the United States. The monopolistic interests had to be destroyed at home and their influence in foreign policy dispelled, and thus Wilson's initial rejection of "dollar diplomacy." Although he was not unqualifiedly hostile to business interests, he believed that their activities ought to serve, rather than dominate, the public interest.

Wilson's ethical and religious beliefs also profoundly influenced his foreign policy. Nations, like individuals, should adhere to high ethical and moral standards. Democracy, Wilson thought, was the most Christian of governmental systems, suitable for all peoples. The democratic United States thus had a moral mandate for world leadership. At the end of World War I, the president saw the League of Nations as an instrument for the application of Wilsonian democracy on an international scale.

WILSON'S INITIAL POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA

When Wilson took office in March 1913, the immediate problems he faced in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean gave him opportunities to apply these concepts to Latin American policy. He promptly presented a draft Latin American policy statement to his cabinet. Most of the cabinet thought Wilson's proposal hasty and radical; it had not been discussed with Bryan or other advisers, or with Latin American diplomats in Washington. D.C. Wilson held firm, arguing that the change in administration in Washington could not be the occasion for a wave of irresponsible revolutions in Latin America. His statement appeared in the press on 12 March 1913.

Wilson said that his administration desired the "most cordial understanding and cooperation" with Latin America. "As friends . . . we shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights, and respect the restraints of constitutional provision." Wilson concluded by extending "the hand of genuine disinterested friendship." The statement was a curious mixture of Wilson's commitment to democracy and constitutionalism, a profession of

neighborly friendship, and a threat against revolutionists. He put forward a significant change in United States recognition policy: de facto governments would have to be constitutionally legitimate in order to gain recognition. Otherwise, Wilson's statement did not really change Latin American policy.

Wilson's address to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, on 27 October 1913 presumably did. He predicted improved and closer relations between the United States and its southern neighbors. The United States would seek a "spiritual union" with Latin America and the freeing of those nations from the exploitative nature of foreign concessions. Referring to the Panama Canal, then under construction, he noted, "While we physically cut two continents asunder, we spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union which we seek." The canal would "open the world to a commerce . . . of intelligence, of thought and sympathy between north and south." Wilson deplored the exploitative nature of foreign concessions in Latin American nations. "I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting that emancipation." In conclusion, Wilson emphasized his commitment to "constitutional liberty."

As Wilson's first term progressed, the promise of the Mobile address disintegrated. United States intervention in Latin America escalated to heights perhaps beyond the comprehension of earlier practitioners of "big stick" and dollar diplomacy. Missionary diplomacy created seemingly permanent hostility between the United States and Latin America. This was especially true in Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, which experienced Wilsonian interventionism in its most virulent forms.

INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

Wilson first tested his Latin American policy in Mexico. In February 1913, Mexico entered a new stage in the epic revolution that had begun in 1910 against the dictator Porfirio Díaz. Francisco Madero, the leader of the rebels, was a moderate revolutionist who eventually aroused the ire of radicals like Emiliano Zapata, who demanded redistribution of land to peasants, as well as Francisco (Pancho) Villa, Pascual Orozco, and Felix Díaz, nephew of the deposed dictator.

President William Howard Taft, although unenthusiastic, had recognized Madero as president of Mexico in November 1911. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, concerned about threats to U.S. business interests in Mexico, maintained cool relations with the Madero government. In the "Pact of the Embassy" (19 February 1913), Ambassador Wilson joined with Victoriano Huerta, Madero's top general, and Felix Díaz in a plan to replace Madero: Huerta as provisional president, and Díaz as a candidate in a later presidential election. Huerta assumed the presidency after pressuring Madero and Vice President José Maria Pino Suárez to resign. Apparently some of Huerta's men assassinated Madero and Pino Suárez, although they had been assured of safe conduct on 22 February. Taft left the problem of recognizing Huerta to the incoming Wilson administration. Wilson believed that Huerta had gained power by undemocratic and unconstitutional means, and the Madero–Pino Suárez murders shocked him. Furthermore, the president had deep suspicions about Ambassador Wilson, who flooded Washington with dispatches lauding Huerta and asserting that the new Mexican leader would cooperate with United States interests. President Wilson, however, applied the tough tests of constitutional legitimacy to the Mexican regime.

The president sent a friend, the journalist William Bayard Hale, to Mexico in June 1913 to get firsthand information. Hale was unenthusiastic about Huerta, describing him as "an ape-like old man" who "may almost be said to subsist on alcohol." With Hale's views in mind, President Wilson continued to shun the new Mexican government, even though Ambassador Wilson virtually insisted that Huerta be recognized. Acting on the president's orders, Bryan recalled Wilson and accepted his resignation.

In August 1913, Wilson sent another personal representative, John Lind, to Mexico. Previously both a representative and governor of Minnesota, Lind had no diplomatic experience. His instructions put forth terms for a Mexican settlement: an immediate cease-fire, an early and free election, a promise from Huerta not to be a candidate, and pledges that all Mexican factions would respect the election results. Huerta flatly rejected these proposals, as well as a subsequent offer of a large private loan if he would agree to an election in which he was not a candidate. On 27 August, Wilson told a joint session of Congress that the United States would wait patiently until the Mex-

ican civil strife had run its course, meanwhile embargoing arms sales to all sides. Unfortunately, Wilson did not consistently adhere to this policy of "watchful waiting."

In the fall of 1913, Venustiano Carranza, Huerta's main opponent, announced that his Constitutionalist Party would boycott the presidential election scheduled for 26 October. When Huerta arrested more than 100 opposition deputies in the Mexican congress, Wilson announced that the United States would ignore the election results. After an inconclusive election, Mexico's congress reappointed Huerta provisional president until balloting scheduled for July 1914. Wilson now abandoned "watchful waiting." As Secretary Bryan wrote to United States diplomats in Latin America, President Wilson considered that "it is his immediate duty to require Huerta's retirement," and that the United States would "proceed to employ such means as may be necessary to secure this result." At this point, Wilson sympathized with the Carranza group. The president's struggle with Huerta had become personal as well as national.

Wilson, feeling that Great Britain's role was crucial, put special pressure on London to repudiate Huerta. Although the British fleet depended somewhat on Mexican oil, Britain's problems in Europe dictated rapprochement with the United States. Britain withdrew recognition of Huerta in mid-1914, after negotiations with the United States that included a satisfactory settlement of the controversy over a U.S. law providing discriminatory tolls on the Panama Canal.

In February 1914, in a further attempt to strengthen Carranza and the Constitutionalists, Wilson lifted the embargo on arms to Mexico, but Huerta continued to hold out. A new crisis developed on 9 April 1914, when Mexican authorities mistakenly arrested eight U.S. sailors at Tampico. Within an hour, Huerta's commanding general in the port released the men and apologized to Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, the commander of the U.S. squadron at Tampico. Mayo gave Huerta twenty-four hours to make a more formal apology, punish the arresting officer, and fire a twenty-one-gun salute. Wilson backed Mayo and ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Mexican waters. Congress gave him permission to take punitive action against Mexico. These acts presumably were on behalf of constitutionality and democracy.

Before these plans could be implemented, the United States consul at Veracruz reported the imminent arrival of the German steamer *Ypiranga* with a cargo of guns and ammunition for Huerta's forces. Wilson decided to seize the customhouse at Veracruz and impound the cargo. When this occurred on 21 April, the Mexicans resisted, precipitating a battle in which 126 Mexicans were killed and 200 were wounded. Huerta

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS AT MOBILE, ALABAMA, 27 OCTOBER 1913

"The future . . . is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. These States lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by innumerable ties, and, I hope, chief of all, by the tie of a common understanding of each other. Interest does not tie nations together; it sometimes separates them. But sympathy and understanding does [*sic*] unite them, and I believe that by the new route that is just about to be opened, while we physically cut two continents asunder, we spiritually unite them. It is a spiritual union which we seek. . . .

"What these States are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the courage, the self-possession, the self-respect of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these adverse circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. . . .

"We must prove ourselves their friends, and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality. You cannot be friends at all except upon the terms of honor. We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. . . .

"I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity."

severed diplomatic relations after U.S. forces occupied the city.

The bloodshed appalled President Wilson, who had not expected Mexican resistance. Thus, he welcomed the offer of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to mediate; and Huerta also accepted. Wilson intended to use the mediation conference, which began in Niagara Falls, Canada, on 20 May 1914, to get rid of Huerta and bring the Constitutionalists to power. But Carranza, who had denounced the U.S. aggression at Veracruz, instructed his delegation, which never really participated in the conference, to refuse a cease-fire and to deny the right of the mediators to discuss the Mexican situation. The conference adjourned on 2 July without positive results. But the United States intervention and heightened conflict with his enemies forced Huerta to resign on 15 July. Venustiano Carranza soon entered Mexico City. Although earlier an advocate of Carranza, Wilson now rejected him and initiated negotiations with his chief rival in northern Mexico, Pancho Villa, who then had a favorable image in the United States. Carranza, who retained the support of Alvaro Obregón and other leading generals, refused to give in to Villa. As the months passed, Wilson's policy became more threatening; but Carranza insisted that he would fight until victory over his opponents.

At this juncture, Wilson proposed a meeting of the United States and six Latin American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala), anticipating joint intervention to remove Carranza; but by the time the conference convened at Washington in August 1915, Wilson had changed his mind. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, worried about German activity in the hemisphere, thought it necessary to improve relations with Mexico in the face of this external threat. Although the conferees offered to act as mediators in Mexico, Wilson ignored them and extended de facto recognition to Carranza on 19 October 1915.

Even if Wilson wished to concentrate on problems other than Mexico, Pancho Villa was unwilling to let him. Unable to defeat Carranza with his army, Villa apparently decided to provoke U.S. intervention as an alternative way to achieve his goal. On 10 January 1916, Villa forces murdered sixteen U.S. mining engineers and technicians in Chihuahua. On 7 March, the U.S. Congress responded with a resolution advocating armed intervention. Two days later, Villa raided the border town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing seventeen Americans. Wilson immediately ordered troops into Mexico. General John J. Pershing's force never caught Villa but clashed with Carranza's army. Unsuccessful in his efforts to extort concessions from Carranza, and embroiled in a serious crisis with Germany, Wilson withdrew the troops from Mexico in February 1917.

Mexican-American relations followed a less spectacular course for the rest of Wilson's presidency. The Mexican constitution of 1917 contained several provisions threatening to foreign concessionaires, but Wilson extended de jure recognition to Carranza in August 1917, after assurances that such interests would be respected. A potentially serious dispute developed in 1918, after Mexico decreed taxes on oil property, rents, royalties, and production based on contracts effective before 1 May 1917. United States oil companies refused to register their land titles, arguing that to do so would be recognition of Mexican claims to subsurface deposits. Carranza ignored State Department protests, but he did not enforce the decrees until June 1919, when Mexican troops moved into the oil fields to halt unapproved drilling operations. Secretary of State Lansing, backed by the Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico, urged Wilson to be more aggressive. But in January 1920, Wilson wisely rejected Lansing's recommendations, and the oil producers arranged a satisfactory modus vivendi with Carranza. After Obregón ousted Carranza in May 1920, a Senate subcommittee recommended that the United States delay recognition until U.S. citizens gained exemption from certain articles of the Mexican constitution. Wilson and Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby favored this approach, but negotiations failed and the United States did not recognize Obregón until 1923.

INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA

When Wilson used missionary diplomacy elsewhere, it led to the same legacy of failure and ill will as in Mexico. In Nicaragua, Wilson inherited from the Taft administration a military intervention and an extensive effort at dollar diplomacy. Taft broke relations in 1909 with Nicaraguan President José Zelaya and encouraged the latter's enemies to revolt when he menaced the nearby Central American nations, threatened the ouster of United States financial interests, and mortgaged his country to European interests. When his successor, Adolfo Díaz, faced a revolt in 1912, Taft

sent in U.S. marines, who were still there when Wilson became president. In 1911 the two countries signed the Knox-Castrillo Convention, providing for a large loan from United States bankers to re-fund the Nicaraguan debt and U.S. administration of the customs services. The U.S. Senate rejected this plan, but a new treaty signed early in 1913 gave the United States an option on a canal route, naval base rights on the Gulf of Fonseca, and leases on the Corn Islands in the Caribbean, in return for a payment of $3 million. Bryan favored this glaring example of dollar diplomacy and persuaded President Wilson to accept it.

The Senate demurred, partly because of an amendment (patterned after the 1901 Platt Amendment for Cuba) allowing the United States to intervene to maintain internal order. Bryan then suggested to Wilson that the United States should be a "modern example of the Good Samaritan"—the government should make direct loans to Latin American nations by issuing bonds at 3 percent and lending the proceeds at 4.5 percent, with the profit used for debt retirement. Wilson rejected the proposal, leaving private loans as the only alternative. In October 1913, the U.S. firms of Brown Brothers and J. and W. Seligman, by buying stock in the Pacific Railroad and the National Bank of Nicaragua, purchasing Treasury bills, and lending money to the railroad, provided Nicaragua with more than $2.5 million. Bryan consulted Wilson before approving this formal act of dollar diplomacy.

In August 1914, the United States and Nicaragua signed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, a restatement of the 1913 proposals without Platt Amendment provisions. Because of questions about the role of U.S. business interests in Nicaragua, charges that the United States was dealing with a puppet regime, and protests from several Central American countries, the Senate delayed approval of the treaty until February 1916. El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, by raising critical questions about U.S. motives, exposed the bankruptcy of missionary diplomacy. Costa Rica argued that the canal concession violated its rights in the area; El Salvador and Honduras claimed that establishment of a naval base would violate their equal rights in the Gulf of Fonseca. In 1916, Costa Rica and El Salvador brought charges against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice. Both the United States and Nicaragua argued that the court had no jurisdiction and refused to accept its decisions in favor of Costa Rica and El Salvador. This reaction made it clear that the court, which the United States had helped to establish in 1907, was useful only when it did not tread on the toes of the United States. Impotent to enforce its decisions, the court soon ceased to exist.

After ratification of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, the United States moved to control Nicaraguan politics and finance. Political and economic pressures and a naval demonstration helped to ensure the election of the conservative Emiliano Chamorro as president in 1916. The United States also dictated the disbursement of the $3 million Bryan-Chamorro fund, handed over after adoption of the Financial Plan of 1917. The plan limited the monthly budget of Nicaragua, provided for a high commission dominated by U.S. citizens to monitor government spending, and established a schedule for payment of the Nicaraguan debt to British bondholders and U.S. bankers. Another financial plan in 1920 increased the government's monthly allowance, but the presence of U.S. marines and continued financial and political control tainted this progress.

INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

As in Nicaragua, the Wilson administration inherited a difficult situation in the Dominican Republic. Political instability and nonpayment of debts threatened U.S. business interests and invited European intervention in the country as early as 1904. These problems influenced President Theodore Roosevelt to announce a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that assumed a unilateral right for the United States to intervene in Latin America. After the Taft administration intervened in a civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1912, Archbishop Adolfo A. Nouel became president; he resigned in late March 1913, however, giving up the almost impossible task of pacifying the various political factions.

The Dominican situation demanded astute action by the Wilson administration; but Secretary of State Bryan replaced a competent minister, William W. Russell, with James M. Sullivan. Sullivan was associated with New York financiers who controlled the National Bank of Santo Domingo, an institution hoping to become the depository of funds collected by the receiver general of Dominican customs. Sullivan later resigned after a State Department investigation disclosed his deficiencies. Another bad appointment was that of Walter

C. Vick as receiver general. Bryan's choices inevitably led to inaccurate, biased reports from the Dominican Republic.

In September 1913, when a new revolt broke out against the provisional government in Santo Domingo, Bryan announced that the United States would not recognize any revolutionary regime, thus invoking Wilsonian constitutional legitimacy. After an armistice, the United States supervised elections in December 1913 for a constituent assembly, even though the Dominican government resented the outside pressure. With less than gentle prodding by Minister Sullivan, President José Bordas Valdés agreed to the appointment, in June 1914, of Charles W. Johnston as financial expert, with power to control Dominican expenditures. Following a U.S. electoral plan, the Dominicans held a presidential election in late 1914. The candidates, Juan Isidro Jiménez and Horacio Vásquez, represented the two strongest political factions in the country. Jiménez won and took office on 5 December 1914; the United States immediately pressed for more financial control and intervention privileges. Jiménez resisted these demands, but he could not overcome the continued opposition of his rivals, including Desiderio Arias, whom he dismissed as minister of war in May 1916. After Arias's forces took the city of Santo Domingo and Jiménez resigned, the United States intervened. Admiral William B. Caperton demanded that Arias withdraw and occupied the city. Fearing that Arias would come to power, President Wilson proclaimed full military occupation of the Dominican Republic on 26 November 1916. He cited political and fiscal disorder and the Dominican government's refusal to reform as reasons for the intervention. Undoubtedly, another factor was State Department concern about possible war with Germany and the influence of pro-German elements in the Dominican Republic.

Until 1924 a U.S. military government ruled the Dominican Republic. Although there were noticeable improvements—highway construction, establishment of the constabulary, expansion of the schools, and a better internal revenue collection system—the opposition to U.S. domination steadily increased. When the troops finally left late in 1924, a new treaty continued U.S. financial control.

INTERVENTION IN HAITI

Events in Haiti followed a familiar path. When Wilson became president, political and economic instability and threats of foreign intervention existed there. United States citizens owned perhaps 40 percent of the stock in the National Bank of Haiti, half the stock in the national railroad, and a smaller portion of the German-dominated Central Railroad. Loans from foreign sources contributed to the financial crisis and increased the threat of intervention. By 1915, Haiti's public debt stood at $32 million.

In January 1914 a revolution brought Oreste Zamor to power. The United States recognized him as president on 1 March 1914, even though he declined to accept a customs receivership and to pledge that no foreign power other than the United States would secure a naval station at Môle St. Nicholas. President Zamor later rejected a similar proposal, strengthened perhaps by German and French demands to share in the customs receivership; President Wilson objected, in effect invoking the Monroe Doctrine.

In October 1914, when Davilmar Theodore ousted Zamor, Secretary of State Bryan notified him that recognition would be extended only after agreement on a customs convention, settlement of disputes between the government and the railroads and the national bank, and guarantees against leases of coaling or naval stations to any European country. Theodore rejected these demands. Domestically, he became involved in a serious controversy with the national bank. His government printed a large quantity of paper currency and seized $65,000 of the bank's gold supply. To prevent further raids, the bank transferred $500,000 in gold to New York aboard the USS *Machias*. Although Bryan denied Haitian claims that armed intervention on behalf of U.S. business interests had taken place, U.S. investment in the national bank was extensive.

Theodore resigned in February 1915, and General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam assumed the presidency. Wilson sent a special agent to Haiti to press a treaty upon Sam's government as a condition for recognition. Failing to achieve his mission, the agent suggested that U.S. marines be used to impose a settlement. Although the State Department did not overtly accept this recommendation, the revolutionary situation in Haiti made its implementation possible. President Sam apparently ordered the murder of 167 political opponents at the prison in Port-au-Prince on 27 July. Although he took asylum in the French legation, he was dragged out by a mob that dismembered him in the streets. As these events occurred, the USS *Washington*, under Admiral Caperton,

landed forces in Port-au-Prince. Caperton occupied the major coastal towns and took charge of customs collections.

After some confusion, the Haitian congress designated Caperton's choice, Sudre Dartiguenave, as the new president. The State Department soon presented Dartiguenave with a draft treaty providing for United States control of Haiti's finances, creation of a U.S.-officered constabulary, appointment of U.S. engineers to supervise sanitation and public improvement, a pledge not to transfer territory to any power other than the United States, and an article giving the United States the right to intervene to enforce the treaty and preserve Haitian independence. Dartiguenave's government signed the treaty after the United States refused to discuss substantive changes and threatened to establish a full military government. To implement the pact, the signatories set up five treaty services—a customs receivership, the financial adviser, the public works service, the public health service, and the constabulary. Although each except customs was subordinate to the Haitian government, the president of the United States nominated the top officials, who at first were all naval officers.

Late in 1917, the State Department proposed a draft constitution for Haiti (this was the document that Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt later claimed he had written). The Haitian congress resisted, but President Dartiguenave proclaimed it after a plebiscite (with a low vote and opponents abstaining) endorsed it. The constitution incorporated the 1915 treaty and validated acts of the military government. As in the Dominican Republic, there were improvements in Haiti under U.S. occupation. The constabulary, a well-trained force, maintained peace in the country; prisons improved; and the road-building program greatly extended the internal transportation and communications system. The courts and public schools did not receive the attention they needed, however, and Haiti's financial problems remained unsolved. When President Wilson left office, resentment against continued military occupation and the financial adviser's complete control of government expenditures was high.

MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY: NEGATIVES AND POSITIVES

This account of missionary diplomacy suggests that there was no significant change from earlier (1898–1913) United States policy in Latin America. If anything, missionary diplomacy meant "missionaries" (U.S. diplomats, military and naval officers, and businessmen) sometimes working in distasteful and ill-conceived ways, certainly not destined to ensure the voluntary "conversion" of the flock. Woodrow Wilson's objectives for Latin America, emphasizing democracy and constitutionalism, were admirable in the abstract; but they did not accord with reality in the nations affected. Furthermore, Wilson's methods were paradoxical: he did not use democratic and constitutional means to achieve his objectives. As on other occasions during his service in higher education and government, personal combat consumed Wilson; his struggles with Huerta, Carranza, and Villa ultimately became tests of personal strength and honor. On such occasions he lost his sense of perspective and the ability to see varieties of opinion and alternative approaches.

Missionary diplomacy was not devoid of positive effects. The negotiation of a treaty with Colombia in 1914 to resolve the deep resentment over that nation's loss of Panama in 1903 is an example. In the treaty, the United States expressed "sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations" and proposed to pay Colombia $25 million. Partly because of opposition from Theodore Roosevelt, the Senate ignored the treaty while Wilson was president but approved it in 1921 after removing the expression of regret. Wilson's support for the settlement appears to have been based on a conviction that U.S. actions in 1903 were wrong, that the whole affair had contributed substantially to Yankeephobia, and that an apology and reparations were long overdue. But Wilson could take this stand because the Colombian treaty did not interfere with his basic objectives for Latin America.

Some historians, especially Mark T. Gilderhus, have pointed to Wilson's support for a "Pan American pact" beginning in 1914 as another effort to put United States–Latin American relations on the basis of "equality and honor," as promised in the Mobile address. The draft pact was a multilateral agreement to guarantee territorial integrity, political independence, republican government, arbitration of disputes, and arms control. Presumably, the United States would forgo the unilateral right of intervention in Latin America. Edward M. House, who did much of the planning for the proposal, saw it as a way to pro-

mote hemispheric peace, just as Wilson later envisaged the world role of the League of Nations. Efforts to secure agreement on the pact failed. Some of the larger countries, such as Chile, rejected the idea of guaranteeing territorial integrity before the settlement of existing boundary disputes; and, given the contemporary United States interventions, it was difficult to see the pact as anything other than a cloak for established policy. In fact, neither Wilson nor his advisers were willing to renounce the practice of intervention.

SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY

Recent works by scholars demonstrate the varying views they hold about Wilsonian missionary diplomacy in Latin America. Many of these scholars are more critical of Wilson's diplomacy in their books and articles than earlier historians. Walter LaFeber in *The American Age* (p. 261) observes that Wilson, "Determined to help other peoples become democratic and orderly, . . . himself became the greatest military interventionist in U.S. history." The works of Frederick S. Calhoun strongly back this point of view. "More than any other president," Calhoun writes in *Power and Principle* (p. ix), "Woodrow Wilson defined the various ways armed interventions could support foreign policy." In another work, *Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy* (p. 9), Calhoun defines five categories for the use of force, all of which he argues Wilson used in Latin America: "force for protection," to defend specific national interests; "force for retribution," military action against a government that has violated international law; "force for solution," to oppose a nation's policies in a third nation; "force for introduction," military intimidation to persuade a government to enter negotiations to settle a dispute; and "force for association," military action in accordance with alliance regulations.

Lester D. Langley writes in *America in the Americas* (p. 111) that "the record of Woodrow Wilson, who condemned the interventionism of his predecessor [Taft] and chastised the economic imperialists," was "among the ironies of the Latin American policy of the United States." He added, "Three-quarters of a century later, the United States has yet to shake off the cultural paternalism he grafted onto the Pan-American tissue."

In an astute analysis, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (pp. 17–18), Michael H. Hunt identifies three enduring components of the U.S. worldview in place early in the twentieth century:

> The capstone idea defined the American future in terms of an active quest for national greatness closely coupled to the promotion of liberty. . . . A second element . . . defined attitudes toward other peoples in terms of a racial hierarchy. . . . The third element defined the limits of acceptable political and social change overseas in keeping with the settled conviction that revolutions, though they might be a force for good, could as easily develop in a dangerous direction.

Hunt applies these elements in his account of Wilson's policy in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, as well as elsewhere in the world.

Walter A. McDougall in *Promised Land, Crusader State* (p. 129) contends that Wilson intensified the so-called progressive imperialism that had become prominent in U.S. foreign policy by the turn of the twentieth century. Wilson made clear, according to McDougall, that the United States (the "Crusader State") would cooperate with its Latin American neighbors, but only "when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based on law." When order collapsed, the United States would use "influence of every kind" to reestablish it. He discusses "Wilsonianism, or liberal internationalism (so called)" in reference to U.S. policy in Mexico, Haiti, and Nicaragua.

Jules R. Benjamin's revisionist interpretation of Wilson's policy in the article "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century" (p. 99) emphasizes his uses of military intervention as well as the promotion of U.S. economic interests. As Benjamin puts it, "Although Wilson protested that neither Mars nor Mammon would be a part of his liberal hemisphere, he found no way to improve Latin America that did not include entrepreneurs and policemen. . . . [H]is principal legacy was to add to the older punishment of sins against order the punishment of sins against progress."

In the article "'An Irony of Fate': Woodrow Wilson's Pre–World War I Diplomacy," based mainly on *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* volumes 27–30, John Milton Cooper Jr. takes a more favorable view of Wilson's diplomacy in Latin America, especially in Mexico. He rejects the argument that Wilson aimed to promote U.S. economic interests in Mexico, and argues that "Mexico provides the clearest application of Wilson's political ideals to a diplomatic solution and offers . . . the best test of the effects of his ideals on his diplomacy" (p. 434).

Wilson's use of military force in Veracruz was a "blunder," according to Cooper, the result of his "interventionist impulses" temporarily determining his course of action. Cooper also argues that the "irony of fate" viewpoint associated with Wilsonian diplomacy has little relevance. Wilson, he says, "embarked on leadership in foreign affairs willingly and confidently" (p. 429) and clearly led his administration in foreign policy.

Kendrick A. Clements's article "Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy, 1913–15" reaches similar conclusions. After Veracruz, "Wilson's policy . . .was to support the [Mexican] revolution, avoid intervention, and attempt to influence the rebel leaders into the path of justice and moderation by means of diplomatic influence" (p. 135). Neither Cooper nor Clements mentions Pershing's 1916 punitive expedition into Mexico; this event needs to be considered in evaluating their views on Wilson's policy.

MISSIONARY MOTIVES: DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONALISM, SECURITY, ECONOMICS

How, in the final analysis, can missionary diplomacy be explained? What were Wilson's motives and objectives? No single explanation will suffice, although there were unquestionably occasions when one consideration carried more weight than others. First, Wilson's concern about democracy and constitutionalism was genuine, and this was probably the main component of his Latin American policy when his administration began. What makes acceptance of this point difficult is that from the beginning, Wilson apparently assumed that the United States might have to use a heavy hand, to act undemocratically to install democracy. It was hard to see his commitment to constitutionalism in the midst of the bombardment of Veracruz or the U.S. marines' occupation of Santo Domingo, but it was there. Revolutions were unconstitutional and had to be prevented; illegitimate governments could not be recognized.

There is a second explanation for Wilson's policy that became clearer as World War I progressed—concern about the security of the hemisphere. Potential enemies, such as Germany, became of increasing concern. State Department documents illustrate the point clearly. What more startling example than the 1917 Zimmerman telegram, in which the German foreign minister invited Mexico to ally with Germany against the United States in the event of a German-American war? Security considerations were not always the primary explanation for missionary diplomacy, but they were constant concerns for Wilson, the State Department, and diplomats in the field. With a world war being fought during most of the Wilson presidency, and with the United States a belligerent by 1917, the situation was understandable.

There are also economic explanations for missionary diplomacy. As had long been the case, American entrepreneurs hoped to increase trade, find new markets and raw materials, and expand investment fields. Clearly these goals were applicable to Latin America during the Wilson administration. The available evidence does not prove conclusively that Wilson's central objective, as some scholars insist, was to advance U.S. economic interests. But facilitating the work of these interests, and giving them diplomatic protection, was important to Wilson and the State Department. Some diplomats, such as Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico and James Sullivan in the Dominican Republic, were dominated by their personal economic interests.

Missionary diplomacy contributed enormously to the Yankeephobia that had been building steadily in Latin America since the late nineteenth century. The task of the interwar presidents and the State Department was to dispel this aura of hostility. Considerable progress came with what came to be known as the Good Neighbor Policy, which reached its peak in the late 1930s. Whether the Good Neighbor Policy represented substantive change or merely a shift in rhetoric and tactics is debatable. Whatever the case, Woodrow Wilson, the practitioner of missionary diplomacy, made the Good Neighbor Policy, or something similar, a necessity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benjamin, Jules R. "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay." *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987): 91–112.

Calder, Bruce J. *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924*. Austin, Tex., 1984.

Calhoun, Frederick S. *Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy*. Kent, Ohio, 1986.

———. *Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy*. Kent, Ohio, 1993.

Calvert, Peter. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict*. London and New York, 1968. Emphasizes England's role in the U.S.–Mexican conflict.

Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy, 1913–15." *Diplomatic History* 4 (1980): 113–136.

Cooper, John Milton, Jr. "An Irony of Fate: Woodrow Wilson's Pre–World War I Diplomacy." *Diplomatic History* 3 (1979): 425–437.

Gilderhus, Mark T. *Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913–1921*. Tucson, Ariz., 1986.

———. "Wilson, Carranza, and the Monroe Doctrine: A Question in Regional Organization." *Diplomatic History* 7 (1983): 103–115.

Healy, David. *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898–1917*. Madison, Wis., 1988. Covers Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama.

Hunt, Michael Hy. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New Haven, Conn., 1987. A valuable study that applies three elements helping shape the U.S. vision of the world to Wilson's policies and actions in Latin America and elsewhere.

Katz, Friedrich. *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution*. Chicago, 1981. A detailed volume suggesting that Wilson's policy was designed to promote U.S. capital interests.

LaFeber, Walter. *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750*. New York and London, 1989.

Langley, Lester D. *America in the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere*. Athens, Ga., 1989. An interpretive survey of the history of U.S.–Latin American relations.

Levin, N. Gordon, Jr. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution*. New York, 1968. Emphasizes economic motives in Wilson's foreign policy.

Link, Arthur S. *Wilson: The New Freedom; Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914–1915; Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915–1916; Wilson: Campaign for Progressivism and Peace, 1916–1917*. Princeton, N.J., 1956–1965. Volumes 2–5 in Link's monumental biography. Traces in detail the story of missionary diplomacy, of which Link is critical.

Link, Arthur S., et al., eds. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. 69 vols. Princeton, N.J., 1966–1993. Vols. 27–30 present documents on Wilson's diplomacy in Latin America.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*. Boston and New York, 1997. A thoughtful survey and interpretive history of U.S. foreign policy.

Schmidt, Hans. *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. New Brunswick, N.J., 1971. Argues that Wilson's policy was ill conceived and economically motivated.

Trask, David F., Michael C. Meyer, and Roger R. Trask, eds. *A Bibliography of United States–Latin American Relations Since 1810: A Selected List of Eleven Thousand Published References*. Lincoln, Neb., 1968. Meyer, Michael C., ed. *Supplement to A Bibliography of United States–Latin American Relations Since 1810*. Lincoln, Neb., 1979. These two volumes present an exhaustive list of books, articles, and documents.

Ulloa, Berta. *La revolución intervenida: Relaciones diplomáticas entre México y los Estados Unidos (1910–1914)*. Mexico City, 1971.

See also DOLLAR DIPLOMACY; INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION; OIL; WILSONIANISM.

EDITORS AND ADVISERS

Richard Dean Burns Professor emeritus and former chair of the Department of History at California State University, Los Angeles. Burns has designed and edited a number of award-winning projects, including *A Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1970;* the three-volume *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament;* and, as general editor, the War/Peace Bibliography Series and the Twentieth Century Presidential Bibliographical Series. He has authored, coauthored, or edited more than a dozen books and two dozen articles covering arms control, diplomatic history, international law, and American foreign policy. He is the founder and publisher of Regina Books.

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman Dwight Stanford professor of U.S. foreign relations at San Diego State University. Her first book, *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil* (1992), received the Allan Nevins Prize of the Society of American Historians and the Stuart Bernath Award of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. She is also the author of *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* and *Major Problems in American History, 1865 to the Present.* Cobbs Hoffman has received fellowships from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Organization of American States, is a member of the Historical Advisory Committee to the U.S. Department of State, and has served on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History.*

Nick Cullather Associate professor of history at Indiana University. He is the author of *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States–Philippine Relations, 1942–1960* and *Secret History: The Classified Account of the CIA's Operations in Guatemala.* He is also the coauthor of *Making a Nation: The United States and Its People.*

Alexander DeConde Professor emeritus of American history at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has also taught at Stanford University, Whittier College, Duke University, and the University of Michigan. He has also lectured and taught in Europe and Asia and written essays and books on American foreign relations, covering topics from the colonial era to the present. He was editor in chief of the first edition of the *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy.* His books include the two-volume *History of American Foreign Policy; Entangling Alliance; The Quasi-War; Half-Bitter, Half Sweet; This Affair of Louisiana; Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy; Presidential Machismo;* and *Gun Violence in America.*

Louise B. Ketz President of Louise B. Ketz Book Producing and Literary Agency in New York City. She was a senior editor at Charles Scribner's Sons (1970–1983) and publisher of Prentice Hall Press (1985). She was editor of the *Dictionary of American History, Revised Edition,* and executive editor of the *Concise Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 2d Edition.* She was also coeditor of the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the American Military* and has contributed essays to various encyclopedias, including the *Scribner Encyclopedia of American Lives* and *Violence in America.*

Fredrik Logevall Associate professor of history and codirector of the Cold War History Group at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Logevall is the author of *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (1999), which won the Warren F. Kuehl Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. In 1998 he received the University of California at Santa Barbara Academic Senate Distinguished Teaching Award.

Chester Pach Faculty associate of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University. He is author of *Arming the Free World: The Ori-*

gins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Revised Edition, and *The First Television War: TV News, the White House, and Vietnam.* He has received grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Fulbright Program. He has been a member of the board of editors of *Diplomatic History* and a member of the council of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

William O. Walker III Professor of history and international relations at Florida International University, where he is also chair of the History Department. He is the author or editor of six books on U.S. drug control policy, including *Drug Control in Americas, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954,* and *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Culture in Conflict.* He is a recipient of an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in Peace and Security.

CONTRIBUTORS

Michael R. Adamson. MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE

David Gray Adler, Idaho State University. THE CONSTITUTION

David L. Anderson, University of Indianapolis. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thom M. Armstrong, Citrus College. NEUTRALITY

Burton F. Beers, North Carolina State University. PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD

Edward M. Bennett, Washington State University. COLONIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM; MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIPS

Larry Berman, University of California Washington Center. THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT

Barton J. Bernstein, Stanford University. CONTAINMENT

Ian J. Bickerton, University of New South Wales. TREATIES

Albert Bowman,† University of Tennessee, Chattanooga. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS

William R. Braisted, University of Texas at Austin. NAVAL DIPLOMACY

H. W. Brands, Texas A&M University. THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Kinley Brauer, University of Minnesota. CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY

Richard Dean Burns, California State University, Los Angeles. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT; BALANCE OF POWER; CHRONOLOGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Robert Buzzanco, University of Houston. ANTI-IMPERIALISM

A. E. Campbell, University of Alabama at Birmingham. BALANCE OF POWER

Berenice A. Carroll, Purdue University. PEACEMAKING

Charles Chatfield, Wittenberg University. PACIFISM

Inis L. Claude, Jr., University of Virginia. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Warren I. Cohen, University of Maryland Baltimore County. THE CHINA LOBBY; CONSORTIA

David Coleman, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. DETERRENCE

Paolo E. Coletta, U.S. Naval Academy. RECOGNITION

Jerald A. Combs, San Francisco State University. EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS

Nick Cullather, Indiana University. DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE AND MODERNIZATION THEORY

Roger Daniels, University of Cincinnati. IMMIGRATION

Jules Davids,† Georgetown University. EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Calvin D. Davis, Duke University. ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND CONCILIATION

Alexander DeConde, University of California, Santa Barbara. PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Robert A. Divine, University of Texas at Austin. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS

Ronald E. Doel, Oregon State University. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Justus D. Doenecke, University of South Florida. MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE

Kurk Dorsey, Horton Social Science Center, University of New Hampshire. ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY

Michael Dunne, University of Sussex. ASYLUM

J. B. Duroselle, University of Paris. TREATIES

Raymond A. Esthus, Tulane University. PROTECTORATES AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Thomas H. Etzold,† Naval War College. POWER POLITICS

Robert H. Ferrell, Indiana University. BLOCKADES; PEACE MOVEMENTS

James A. Field, Jr., Swarthmore College. PHILANTHROPY

Francis J. Gavin, University of Texas at Austin. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK

Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Harvard University. CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Doris A. Graber, University of Illinois at Chicago. INTERVENTION AND NONINTERVENTION

Norman A. Graebner, University of Virginia. REALISM AND IDEALISM

Kenneth J. Grieb, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. AMBASSADORS, EXECUTIVE AGENTS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

Terrence R. Guay, Syracuse University. JUDICIARY POWER AND PRACTICE

Kenneth J. Hagan, Naval War College at Monterey. NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY

David Healy, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. IMPERIALISM

Alan K. Henrikson, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. ELITISM

Walter L. Hixson, Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences. COLD WAR EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS

Valerie M. Hudson, Brigham Young University. DECISION MAKING

James A. Huston. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Akira Iriye, Harvard University. CULTURAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES

Jerry Israel, University of Indianapolis. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND Corporation. TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

T. Christopher Jespersen, North George College and State University. HUMAN RIGHTS

Robert David Johnson, Brooklyn College. CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Manfred Jonas, Union College, Schenectady, New York. ISOLATIONISM

Christopher C. Joyner, Georgetown University. INTERNATIONAL LAW

William Kamman, University of North Texas. MILITARISM

Lawrence S. Kaplan, Georgetown University. NATIONALISM

Thomas L. Karnes, Arizona State University. PAN-AMERICANISM

Burton I. Kaufman, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Louise B. Ketz, Louise B. Ketz Book Producing and Literary Agency, New York. CHRONOLOGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University, Newark. ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ENTENTES

Michael T. Klare, Hampshire College. ARMS TRANSFERS AND TRADE

Warren F. Kuehl,† University of Akron. INTERNATIONALISM

Klaus Larres, Queens University Belfast. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Roger Launius, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. OUTER SPACE

Mark Atwood Lawrence, University of Texas at Austin. OPEN DOOR POLICY

Thomas M. Leonard, University of North Florida. PAN-AMERICANISM

Ralph B. Levering, Davidson College. THE PRESS

Louis W. Liebovich, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. THE PRESS

Fredrik Logevall, University of California, Santa Barbara. PARTY POLITICS

Thomas R. Maddux, California State University, Northridge. COLD WAR TERMINATION

Vojtech Mastny, Woodrow Wilson Center and National Security Archive. SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY

James I. Matray, New Mexico State University. REPARATIONS

Tim Matthewson, The Patent Company of Arlington, Virginia. PHILANTHROPY

Trevor B. McCrisken, Cartmel College, Lancaster University. EXCEPTIONALISM

Laura McEnaney, Whittier College. GENDER

Elizabeth McKillen, University of Maine. ORGANIZED LABOR

Richard A. Melanson, National War College. POST–COLD WAR POLICY

Frank J. Merli,† Queens College. BLOCKADES

Robert L. Messer, University of Illinois at Chicago. POWER POLITICS

Edwin Moïse, Clemson University. DOMINO THEORY

Ian Mugridge, The Open University. ARMED NEUTRALITIES

Anna Kasten Nelson, American University. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jason Newman. THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPACT

Jonathan C. Nielson, Columbia College. EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Kenneth A. Osgood, Florida Atlantic University. PROPAGANDA

Gary B. Ostrower, Alfred University. INTERNATIONALISM

Chester Pach, Ohio University. TELEVISION

David S. Painter, Georgetown University. OIL

Carl P. Parrini, Northern Illinois University. REPARATIONS

David S. Patterson, Office of the Historian, Department of State. DISSENT IN WARS

David M. Pletcher, Indiana University. CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

Brenda Gayle Plummer, University of Wisconsin–Madison. AFRICAN AMERICANS

John Prados, National Security Archives. COVERT OPERATIONS; INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Armin Rappaport,† University of California, San Diego. FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Steven L. Rearden, Joint History Office, Department of Defense. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

David M. Reimers, New York University. REFUGEE POLICIES

Leo P. Ribuffo, George Washington University. RELIGION

Darlene Rivas, Pepperdine University. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RELIEF

Andrew J. Rotter, Colgate University. COLD WARRIORS

T. Michael Ruddy, St. Louis University. NEUTRALISM

David F. Schmitz, Whitman College. DICTATORSHIPS

Jennifer W. See, University of California, Santa Barbara. IDEOLOGY

Marc Jay Selverstone, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. DOCTRINES

David Shreve, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEORY

Katherine A. S. Sibley, St. Joseph's University. FOREIGN AID

J. David Singer, University of Michigan. THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Joseph M. Siracusa, University of Queensland. LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION; THE MUNICH ANALOGY

Elizabeth Skinner, Naval Postgraduate School. NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY

William Slany, Department of State. SPECIAL-INTEREST LOBBIES

Melvin Small, Wayne State University. PUBLIC OPINION

Geoffrey S. Smith, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario. NATIVISM

Robert Freeman Smith, University of Toledo. RECIPROCITY

Tony Smith, Tufts University. WILSONIANISM

John Snetsinger, California Polytechnic State University. RACE AND ETHNICITY

Anders Stephanson, Columbia University. COLD WAR ORIGINS

Roland N. Stromberg, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Jeremi Suri, University of Wisconsin. REVOLUTION

Athan G. Theoharis, Marquette University. REVISIONISM

Eugene P. Trani, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Roger R. Trask, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. WILSONIAN MISSIONARY DIPLOMACY

Betty Miller Unterberger, Texas A&M University. SELF-DETERMINATION

Richard W. Van Alstyne,† Callison College, University of the Pacific. LOANS AND DEBT RESOLUTION

William O. Walker III, Florida International University. NARCOTICS POLICY

Zuoyue Wang, California Polytechnic State University. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

William Earl Weeks, Frostburg State University, Maryland. FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Russell F. Weigley, Temple University. DISSENT IN WARS

William Appleman Williams,† Oregon State University. OPEN DOOR INTERPRETATION

Theodore A. Wilson, University of Kansas. SUMMIT CONFERENCES

Randall Woods, J. William Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences, University of Arkansas. BIPARTISANSHIP

Marvin R. Zahniser, The Ohio State University. THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Thomas W. Zeiler, University of Colorado at Boulder. GLOBALIZATION; TARIFF POLICY